Not everything that can be counted, counts. And not everything that counts can be counted.
Albert Einstein

Brief Summary of Accounting Theory

Bob Jensen at Trinity University

Accounting History in a Nutshell

Islamic Accounting

XBRL:  The Next Big Thing

Key Differences Between International (IFRS) and U.S. GAAP (SFAS)

Accounting Research Versus the Accountancy Profession

Learning at Research Schools Versus "Teaching Schools" Versus "Happiness"
With a Side Track into Substance Abuse

Why must all accounting doctoral programs be social
science (particularly econometrics) doctoral programs?

Why accountancy doctoral programs are drying up and
why accountancy is no longer required for admission or
graduation in an accountancy doctoral program

GMAT: Paying for Points

Accounting Journal Lack of Interest in Publishing Replications

Controversies in Setting Accounting Standards

Why Let the I.R.S. See What the S.E.C. Doesn't?

Radical Changes in Financial Reporting

Underlying Bases of Balance Sheet Valuation

Accrual Accounting and Estimation 

Controversy Over  the SEC's Rule 144a

FIN 48 Liability if Transaction Is Later Disallowed by the IRS

Controversy Over FAS 2 on Research and Development (R&D)

Earnings Management, Agency Theory, and Accounting Manipulations 

Goodwill Impairment Issues 

Purchase Versus Pooling: The Never Ending Debate

Off-Balance Sheet Financing (OBSF)

Insurance:  A Scheme for Hiding Debt That Won't Go Away

CDOs: A Scheme for Hiding Debt That Won't Go Away

Pensions and Post-retirement benefits:  Schemes for Hiding Deb

Leases:  A  Scheme for Hiding Debt That Won't Go Away 

Accounting for Executory Contracts Such as
Purchase/Sale Commitments and Loan Commitments

Debt Versus Equity (including shareholder earn-out contracts)

Intangibles and Contingencies:   Theory Disputes Focus Mainly on the Tip of the Iceberg

Intangibles:  An Accounting Paradox

Intangibles:  Selected References On Accounting for Intangibles

EBR:  Enhanced Business Reporting (including non-financial information)

The Controversy Over Revenue Reporting and HFV 

The Controversy Over Employee Stock Options as Compenation  

Accounting for Options to Buy Real Estate

The Controversy over Accounting for Securitizations and Loan Guarantees  

The Controversy Over Pro Forma Reporting

Triple-Bottom (Social, Environmental) Reporting  

Which is More Value-Relevant: Earnings or Cash Flows?

The Controversy Over Fair Value (Mark-to-Market) Financial Reporting

Online Resources for Business Valuations
See http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

Understanding the Issues 

Issues of Auditor Independence 

Quality of Earnings, Restatements, and Core Earnings

Economic Theory of Accounting

Socionomics Theory of Finance and Fraud

Facts Based on Assumptions:  The Power of Postpositive Thinking

Mike Kearl's great social theory site

Bob Jensen's threads on GAAP comparisons (with particular stress upon derivative financial
instruments accounting rules) are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/canada.htm
The above site also links to more general GAAP comparison guides between nations.

Implications of Bad Auditing on Capital Markets
and Client's Cost of Captial
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm#IncompetentAudits

Bob Jensen's threads on corporate governance are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#Governance

Great Minds in Management:  The Process of Theory Development --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/GreatMinds.htm

"Cornell Theory Center Aids Social Science Researchers," PR Web, June 19, 2006 --- http://www.prweb.com/releases/2006/6/prweb400160.htm

 

You can order back issues or relevant links management and accounting books and journals from MAAW --- http://maaw.info/

Free Access to Back Issues of The Accounting Review --- http://maaw.info/TheAccountingReview.htm 

Bob Jensen's threads on special purpose (variable interest) entities are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm

"Visualization of Multidimensional Data" --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/352wpVisual/000DataVisualization.htm 

Bob Jensen's threads on XBRL are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm#XBRLextended 

Accounting for Electronic Commerce, Including Controversies on Business Valuation, ROI, and Revenue Reporting --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce.htm 

Comparisons of International IAS Versus FASB Standards --- http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/pocketiasus.pdf 

Bob Jensen's Enron Quiz (with answers) --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnronQuiz.htm

"Corporate Reports Now Searchable Via EDGAR," SmartPros, June 16, 2006 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x53502.xml

Investors and analysts can now search the full text of every SEC document filed by companies within the last two years. They'll also be able to retrieve mutual fund filings by fund or share class.

The company filing search engine enables real-time, full-text searches of filings on the entirety of the SEC's EDGAR (Electronic Document, Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval) database of company filings for the last two years. The tool can be found at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm.

SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, a strong proponent of using the Internet to post dynamic financial reports and to serve as a tool for investors and analysts made the announcement in his opening remarks at the SEC's Interactive Data Roundtable in Washington, D.C.

"This new full-text search capability will give investors and analysts instant access to the specific information they want," said Cox.

The new mutual fund search capability was made possible when the SEC recently required that filings contain a unique numerical identifier for each fund and share class. Investors will be able to find relevant filings by searching for the name of their own fund. In the past, searching for information on particular funds and particular share classes within funds was very difficult, because a single prospectus might contain information about many mutual funds and share classes.

The SEC is asking users of this Web site feature to supply feedback, including suggestions for additional functions, so that further improvements to the site can be considered and implemented.

 

Paul Pacter has been working hard to both maintain his international accounting site and to produce a comparison guide between international and Chinese GAAP.  He states the following on May 26, 2005 at http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm 

May 26, 2005:  Deloitte (China) has published a comparison of accounting standards in the People's Republic of China and International Financial Reporting Standards as of March 2005. The comparison is available in both English and Chinese. China has different levels of accounting standards that apply to different classes of entities. The comparison relates to the standards applicable to the largest companies (including all non-financial listed and foreign-invested enterprises) and identifies major accounting recognition and measurement differences. Click to download:

 
 

 


The chronology of events leading up to European adoption if common international accounting standards --- http://www.iasplus.com/restruct/resteuro.htm

Large International Accounting Firm History --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Four_auditors

This is a Good Summary of Various Forms of Business Risk  --- http://www.erisk.com/portal/Resources/resources_archive.asp 

  1. Enterprise Risk Management

  2. Credit Risk

  3. Market Risk

  4. Operational Risk

  5. Business Risk

  6. Other Types of Risk?

Accounting History in a Nutshell

Confucius is described, by Sima Qian and other sources, as having endured a poverty-stricken and humiliating youth and been forced, upon reaching manhood, to undertake such petty jobs as accounting and caring for livestock.

Early accounting was a knotty issue
South American Indian culture apparently used layers of knotted strings as a complicated ledger.

Two Harvard University researchers believe they have uncovered the meaning of a group of Incan khipus, cryptic assemblages of string and knots that were used by the South American civilization for record-keeping and perhaps even as a written language. Researchers have long known that some knot patterns represented a specific number. Archeologist Gary Urton and mathematician Carrie Brezine report today in the journal Science that computer analysis of 21 khipus showed how individual strings were combined into multilayered collections that were used as a kind of ledger.
Thomas H. Maugh, "Researchers Think They've Got the Incas' Numbers," Los Angeles Times, August 12, 2005 ---
http://www.latimes.com/news/science/la-sci-khipu12aug12,1,6589325.story?coll=la-news-science&ctrack=1&cset=true
 

Jensen Comment:  I'm told that accounting tallies in Africa and other parts of the world preceded written language.  However, tallies alone did not permit aggregations such as accounting for such things as three goats plus sixty apples.   Modern accounting awaited a combination of the Arabic numbering ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arabic_numbers ) and a common valuation scheme for valuing heterogeneous items (e.g., gold equivalents or currency units) such that the values of goats and apples could be aggregated.  It is intriguing that Inca knot patterns were something more than simple tallies since patterns could depict different numbers and aggregations could possibly be achieved with "multilayered collections."


Accounting History (across hundreds of years)
 
A Change Fifty-Years in the Making, by Jennie Mitchell, Project Accounting WED Interconnect --- http://accounting.smwc.edu/historyacc.htm


Serious Accounting Historians May Find Some Things of Use Here
Advanced Papyrological Information System from Columbia University --- http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/projects/digital/apis/

APIS is a collections-based repository hosting information about and images of papyrological materials (e.g. papyri, ostraca, wood tablets, etc) located in collections around the world. It contains physical descriptions and bibliographic information about the papyri and other written materials, as well as digital images and English translations of many of these texts. When possible, links are also provided to the original language texts (e.g. through the Duke Data Bank of Documentary Papyri). The user can move back and forth among text, translation, bibliography, description, and image. With the specially-developed APIS Search System many different types of complex searches can be carried out.

APIS includes both published and unpublished material. Generally, much more detailed information is available about the published texts. Unpublished papyri have often not yet been fully transcribed, and the information available is sometimes very basic. If you need more information about a papyrus, you should contact the appropriate person at the owning institution. (See the list of contacts under Rights & Permissions.)

APIS is still very much a work in progress; current statistics are shown in the sidebar at right. Other statistics are available on the statistics page in the project documentation. Curators of collections interested in becoming part of APIS are invited to communicate with the project director, Traianos Gagos.


More Than a Numbers Game: A Brief History of Accounting
Author: Thomas A. King
ISBN: 0-470-00873-3
Hardcover 242 pages
September 2006

Inspired by a 1998 speech by former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, this book addresses the why of accounting instead of the how, providing practitioners and students with a highly readable history of U.S. corporate accounting. Each chapter explores a controversial accounting topic. Author Thomas King is treasurer of Progressive Insurance.
SmartPros Newsletter, September 25, 2006


More Than a Numbers Game: A Brief History of Accounting
Author: Thomas A. King
ISBN: 0-470-00873-3
Hardcover 242 pages
September 2006

Inspired by a 1998 speech by former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, this book addresses the why of accounting instead of the how, providing practitioners and students with a highly readable history of U.S. corporate accounting. Each chapter explores a controversial accounting topic. Author Thomas King is treasurer of Progressive Insurance.
SmartPros Newsletter, September 25, 2006

Jensen Comment
The Chief Accountant of the SEC under Arthur Levitt was one of my heroes named Lynn Turner.

Let me close by citing Harry S. Truman who said, "I never give them hell; I just tell them the truth and they think its hell!"
Great Speeches About the State of Accountancy

"20th Century Myths," by Lynn Turner when he was still Chief Accountant at the SEC in 1999 --- http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch323.htm

It is interesting to listen to people ask for simple, less complex standards like in "the good old days." But I never hear them ask for business to be like "the good old days," with smokestacks rather than high technology, Glass-Steagall rather than Gramm-Leach, and plain vanilla interest rate deals rather than swaps, collars, and Tigers!! The bottom line is—things have changed. And so have people.

Today, we have enormous pressure on CEO’s and CFO’s. It used to be that CEO’s would be in their positions for an average of more than ten years. Today, the average is 3 to 4 years. And Financial Executive Institute surveys show that the CEO and CFO changes are often linked.

In such an environment, we in the auditing and preparer community have created what I consider to be a two-headed monster. The first head of this monster is what I call the "show me" face. First, it is not uncommon to hear one say, "show me where it says in an accounting book that I can’t do this?" This approach to financial reporting unfortunately necessitates the level of detail currently being developed by the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB"), the Emerging Issues Task Force, and the AICPA’s Accounting Standards Executive Committee. Maybe this isn’t a recent phenomenon. In 1961, Leonard Spacek, then managing partner at Arthur Andersen, explained the motivation for less specificity in accounting standards when he stated that "most industry representatives and public accountants want what they call ‘flexibility’ in accounting principles. That term is never clearly defined; but what is wanted is ‘flexibility’ that permits greater latitude to both industry and accountants to do as they please." But Mr. Spacek was not a defender of those who wanted to "do as they please." He went on to say, "Public accountants are constantly required to make a choice between obtaining or retaining a client and standing firm for accounting principles. Where the choice requires accepting a practice which will produce results that are erroneous by a relatively material amount, we must decline the engagement even though there is precedent for the practice desired by the client."

We create the second head of our monster when we ask for standards that absolutely do not reflect the underlying economics of transactions. I offer two prime examples. Leasing is first. We have accounting literature put out by the FASB with follow-on interpretative guidance by the accounting firms—hundreds of pages of lease accounting guidance that, I will be the first to admit, is complex and difficult to decipher. But it is due principally to people not being willing to call a horse a horse, and a lease what it really is—a financing. The second example is Statement 133 on derivatives. Some people absolutely howl about its complexity. And yet we know that: (1) people were not complying with the intent of the simpler Statements 52 and 80, and (2) despite the fact that we manage risk in business by managing values rather than notional amounts, people want to account only for notional amounts. As a result, we ended up with a compromise position in Statement 133. To its credit, Statement 133 does advance the quality of financial reporting. For that, I commend the FASB. But I believe that we could have possibly achieved more, in a less complex fashion, if people would have agreed to a standard that truly reflects the underlying economics of the transactions in an unbiased and representationally faithful fashion.

I certainly hope that we can find a way to do just that with standards we develop in the future, both in the U.S. and internationally. It will require a change in how we approach standard setting and in how we apply those standards. It will require a mantra based on the fact that transparent, high quality financial reporting is what makes our capital markets the most efficient, liquid, and deep in the world.


In her notes compiled in 1979, Professor Linda Plunkett of the College of Charleston S.C., calls accounting the "oldest profession"; in fact, since prehistoric times families had to account for food and clothing to face the cold seasons. Later, as man began to trade, we established the concept of value and developed a monetary system. Evidence of accounting records can be found in the Babylonian Empire (4500 B.C.), in pharaohs' Egypt and in the Code of Hammurabi (2250 B.C.). Eventually, with the advent of taxation, record keeping became a necessity for governments to sustain social orders.
James deSantis, A BRIEF HISTORY OF ACCOUNTING: FROM PREHISTORY TO THE INFORMATION AGE --- http://www.ftlcomm.com/ensign/historyAcc/ResearchPaperFin.htm 

 


Origins of Double Entry Accounting are Unknown

Recall that double entry bookkeeping supposedly evolved in Italy long before it was put into algebraic form in the book Summa by Luca Pacioli .  As a result the English term "Debit" really has a Latin origin.  

You can read the following at http://www.wikiverse.org/debit

**************
Debit is an accounting and bookkeeping term that comes from the Latin word debere which means "to owe." The opposite of a debit is a credit. Debit is abbreviated Dr while credit is abbreviated Cr.
**************

December 13, 2005 message from Robert Bowers [M.Robert.Bowers@WHARTON.UPENN.EDU]

In the 14th Century, the Phoenicians sent trading ships to Cathay (China) to trade for silk. Problem was, if a ship sank, the merchant prob sank (bankrupt) with it. So the merchants pooled their resources so if a ship sank no one merchant lost everything. Along with this, an Italian Count named Paole (seriously) set up a system of recordkeeping to keep track of the ventures. In this system, he created two registers, a Debit Register (DR), and a Credit Register (CR)

I'll bet 95% of all CPA's don't know that which makes me .... a trivia freak?

December 16, 2005  message from Robert B Walker [walkerrb@ACTRIX.CO.NZ]

Luca Pacioli did not invent double entry book-keeping. The rudiments of double entry book-keeping (DEBK) can be found in Muslim government administration in the 10th Century. (See Book-keeping and Accounting Systems in a tenth Century Muslim Administrative Office by Hamid, Craig & Clark in Accounting, Business & Financial History Vol 3 No 5 1995).

As I understand it Pacioli saw the technique being used by Arab traders and adapted and codified the technique allowing it to spread to Northern Europe where it became a* key component in Western economic dominance in the last 500 years.

This is logical if you think about it. DEBK is the greatest expression of applied algebra – that Arab word betraying the origin of the particular mathematical technique in which the world’s duality is reflected.

RW

* but not the key component as Werner Sombart would have it. But then his reason for wanting that to be was his extreme anti-semitism … but that is another story.

December 13, 2005 reply from Earl Hall [earl@PERSPLAN.COM]

From thefreedictionary.com

DR = Debit [Middle English debite, from Latin dbitum, debt; see debt.]

CR=Credit [French, from Old French, from Old Italian credito, from Latin crditum, loan, from neuter past participle of crdere, to entrust; see kerd- in Indo-European roots.]

Who am I to argue with a free dictionary? The answer is worth what I paid.


Accountancy and the da Vinci Code

April 12, 2007 message from Barry Rice [brice@LOYOLA.EDU

From the April 11 Brisbane Times:

Forgotten magic manual contains original da Vinci code
AFTER lying almost untouched in the vaults of an Italian university for 500 years, a book on the magic arts written by Leonardo da Vinci's best friend and teacher has been translated into English for the first time.

The world's oldest magic text, De viribus quantitatis (On the Powers of Numbers), was penned by Luca Pacioli, a Franciscan monk who shared lodgings with da Vinci.

Continued at http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/articles/2007/04/10/1175971101054.html  .

E. Barry Rice, MBA, CPA
Director, Instructional Services
Emeritus Accounting Professor
Loyola College in Maryland
BRice@Loyola.edu
410-617-2478

www.barryrice.com 

Facebook me! http://www.facebook.com/p/Barry_Rice/20102311


The following is a controversial quotation from http://www.cbs.dk/staff/hkacc/BOOK-ART.doc 

"The power of double-entry bookkeeping has been praised by many notable authors throughout history. In Wilhelm Meister, Goethe states, "What advantage does he derive from the system of bookkeeping by double-entry! It is among the finest inventions of the human mind"... Werner Sombart, a German economic historian, says, "... double-entry bookkeeping is borne of the same spirit as the system of Galileo and Newton" and "Capitalism without double-entry bookkeeping is simply inconceivable. They hold together as form and matter. And one may indeed doubt whether capitalism has procured in double-entry bookkeeping a tool which activates its forces, or whether double-entry bookkeeping has first given rise to capitalism out of its own (rational and systematic) spirit".

If, for a moment, one considers the credibility crisis of practical accounting, it would be quite impossible to dismiss the following paradox: the conflict between the enthusiastic praise of the system's strength on the one hand, and on the other, the many financial failures in the real world. How can such a powerful system, even when applied meticulously, still result in disasters? Although it is hardly necessary to argue more in favour of double-entry book-keeping, I still want to underline the two qualities of the system which I find are valid explanations of the system's very important and world-wide role in financial development for five centuries.

The Logic of Double-Entry Bookkeeping, by Henning Kirkegaard
Department of Financial & Management Accounting 
Copenhagen Business School 
Howitzvej 60

 

Along this same double-entry thread I might mention my mentor at Stanford.
Nobody I know holds the mathematical wonderment of double-entry and historical cost accounting more in awe than Yuji Ijiri.  For example, see Theory of Accounting Measurement, by Yuji Ijiri (Sarasota:  American Accounting Association Studies in Accounting Research No. 10, 1975).  

Dr. Ijirii also extended the concept to triple-entry bookkeeping in (Sarasota:  Triple-Entry Bookkeeping and Income Momentum
American Accounting Association Studies in Accounting Research No. 18, 1982).
http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aaa/market/studar.htm
tm 

Also see the following:

Brush up your Shakespeare:  Medieval manuscripts to hit Internet
Stanford University Libraries, the University of Cambridge and Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, will make hundreds of medieval manuscripts, dating from the sixth through the 16th centuries, accessible on the Internet.
"Medieval manuscripts to hit Internet," Stanford Report, July 13, 2005 ---
http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2005/july13/parker-071305.html

A summary of the medieval times and literature is available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medieval


Brush up your Shakespeare:  Medieval manuscripts to hit Internet
Stanford University Libraries, the University of Cambridge and Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, will make hundreds of medieval manuscripts, dating from the sixth through the 16th centuries, accessible on the Internet.
"Medieval manuscripts to hit Internet," Stanford Report, July 13, 2005 ---
http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2005/july13/parker-071305.html

A summary of the medieval times and literature is available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medieval

May 28, 2005  reply from Barbara Scofield [scofield@GSM.UDALLAS.EDU]

Thank you for the notice about the availability of the medieval manuscripts on the Internet through the project Parker on the Web at Stanford University. Two manuscripts are currently available, and on page 11 of the English translation of Matthew Paris's "English History From 1235 to 1273" I have already found references to accounting (see below).

Accountants are still using the principle "under whatever name it may be called" and entities are still making up new names for inconvenient economic events in the hopes of avoiding full disclosure.

At this Catholic liberal arts university Shakespeare is modern, and the medieval world is revered, so I'm interested in gaining some insight into the medieval worldview.

Barbara W. Scofield, PhD, CPA
Associate Professor of Accounting
University of Dallas
1845 E. Northgate Irving, TX 75062
Braniff 262
scofield@gsm.udallas.edu 

 


Ancient Finance from Harvard Business School

From Jim Mahar's blog on May 17, 2006 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

 
The HBS Working Knowledge site has an interesting article by William Goetzmann on financial instruments back in the time of the Romans and Greeks. For instance on checks:

...bankers' checks written in Greek on papyri appeared in ancient Egypt as far back as 250 B.C. Papyri preserved well in Egypt thanks to its arid climate, but Goetzmann thinks it's safe to say such checks changed hands throughout the Mediterranean world . . . So the whole tradition of bank checks predates the current era and has its roots at least in Hellenistic Greek times," he says.


Going Concern and Accrual Accounting Evolved in the 1500s

Limited liability Corporations (divorced professional management from ownership shares)

Speculation Fever
Fraud and corruption festered and grew with the trading of joint stock, especially after 1600 A.D.  The South Seas Company scandal (reporting stock sales as income and paying dividends out of capital) led to England's Bubble Act in 1720 A.D. that focused on misleading accounting practices that helped managers rip off investors, especially by crediting stock sales to income.

Laissez-Faire Accounting survived endless debates and scandals until the Great Depression in 1933

After 1933, the AICPA and the SEC seriously attempted to generate accounting standards, enforce accounting standards, and provide academic justification for promulgated standards.

Wow Online Accounting History Book (Free)
Thank you David A.R. Forrester for providing a great, full-length, and online book:
An Invitation to Accounting History --- http://accfinweb.account.strath.ac.uk/df/contents.html 
Note especially Section B2 --- "
Rational Administration, Finance And Control Accounting:  the Experience of Cameralism" --- http://accfinweb.account.strath.ac.uk/df/b2.html 

Accounting history lecture worth noting --- http://newman.baruch.cuny.edu/digital/saxe/saxe_1978/baxter_79.htm

The for-free IASC comparison study of IAS 39 versus FAS 133 (by Paul Pacter) at http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm

The non-free FASB comparison study of all standards entitled The IASC-U.S. Comparison Project: A Report on the Similarities and Differences between IASC Standards and U.S. GAAP
SECOND EDITION, (October 1999) at http://stores.yahoo.com/fasbpubs/publications.html 

In 1999 the Joint Working Group of the Banking Associations sharply rebuffed the IAS 39 fair value accounting in two white papers that can be downloaded from http://www.iasc.org.uk/frame/cen3_112.htm.

Also see the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Federation of Accountants Committee (IFAC).

Side by Side: IAS 39 Compared with FASB Standards (FAS 133), by Paul Pacter, as published in Accountancy International Magazine, June 1999 --- http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm 
Also note "Comparisons of International IAS Versus FASB Standards" --- http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/pocketiasus.pdf

October 21, 2005 message from Scott Bonacker [lister@BONACKERS.COM]

I remember a thread or two asking for information on historical figures or accounting heros or something like that. I couldn't come up with the right key words to find it by searching the archives unfortunately.

When I saw this article, I thought this was someone that should be included:


"Mary T. Washington of Chicago stepped bravely beyond race and gender boundaries in 1943, becoming the first black female certified public accountant in the United States. Washington, 99 years old when she died in late July, first opened an accounting practice for African-American clients in her basement while working on her college degree.

Washington lived and led in a world not yet here, creating what her business partner later called an "underground railroad" for aspiring black CPAs.
...."

Read the rest at: 

http://www.sojo.net/index.cfm?action=magazine.article&issue=soj0511&article=051149
 

October 21, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Scott,

Although there are probably various interesting sites such as those you mentioned, there are several sites that are of particular interest with respect to famous accounting practitioners and academics.

The OSU Accounting Hall of Fame
It should be noted that members elected to this Hall of Fame include famous accountants from around the world --- http://fisher.osu.edu/acctmis/hall/ 

U.K. Accounting Hall of Fame
Professors David Otley and Ken Peasnell of the Department of Accounting and Finance are two of the fourteen founding members of the British Accounting Association’s Hall of Fame. The ceremony took place at the British Accounting Association 2004 Annual conference at York in April 2004 --- http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/news/3806/ 

Michigan State Video Archive
I've not yet seen anything about other accounting Hall of Fame sites. Michigan State University has a video archive of famous accountants. These accountants were invited to campus and then taped live. I don't think any of this footage is available online, but it would be a nice thing to do now that digitization hardware is so inexpensive. Don Edwards (U. of Georgia) probably knows more about these videos than anybody else.

A few accountants who became famous in fields other than accounting are listed at http://www.educationwithattitude.com/catch/accounting.asp 

The above site missed my favorite accounting celebrity John Cleese
The Unofficial Monty Python Website --- http://www.educationwithattitude.com/catch/accounting.asp

Note especially The Accountancy Shanty (audio) at http://www.educationwithattitude.com/catch/accounting.asp 

Bob Jensen

October 23, 2005 reply from Tom Sentman [TSentman@MSN.COM]

Here is a historical figure for consideration. While not a CPA, Luca Pacioli is considered to be the father of accounting. Although he did not invent dual-entry accounting, he described the system as we know it today. I always use this question on my tests.

Visit http://acct.tamu.edu/smith/ethics/pacioli.htm  for more.

Cheers,

Tom Sentman


See Accounting History Publications list 1998 --- http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3933/is_199905/ai_n8843886

A substantial listing of history papers is available from the Institute of Chartered Accountants --- http://www.icaew.co.uk/library/index.cfm?AUB=TB2I_27022

Accounting Historians Journal --- http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aah/

The University of Sydney's Accounting Foundation provides some accounting history publications --- http://www.econ.usyd.edu.au/af /

History of Information Technology in Auditing (EDP Auditing) --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_information_technology_auditing

For additional information on the history of accountancy and the accountancy profession see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accounting


Islamic Accounting

Islamic Accounting --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_accounting

The Differences of Conventional and Islamic Accounting --- Click Here

"Islamic Accounting: Challenges, Opportunities and Terror," AccountingWeb, October 5, 2006 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102651

Recent events, from the start of Ramadan, to the Pope’s controversial remarks about Islam, to the discovery of a new tape by two of the September 11 attackers, to the release of Bob Woodward’s latest book, have once more made Islam a topic of conversation. Beyond the headlines, however, exists a complex religious and social system that affects far more people than just Muslims. Islamic finance, particularly Islamic banking, insurance and accounting, is playing a growing role around the globe, especially in the business world.

Islamic accounting is generally defined as an alternative accounting system which aims to provide users with information enabling them to operate businesses and organizations according to Shariah, or Islamic law. With little doubt, the greatest challenges to Islamic accounting and finance in the United States stem from a lack of knowledge and understanding of Islam and the intricacies of its financial laws and concerns regarding terrorism, combined with the U.S. regulatory framework and guiding principles of American business. The Muslim and Islamic financial markets within the U.S. and around the world, currently represent an enormous opportunity for those willing to overcome these challenges.

Islam & Islamic Financial Laws

“To professional accountants who have been brought-up on the idea of accounting as an ‘objective’, technical and value-free discipline, the idea of attaching a religious adjective to accounting may seem embarrassing, unprofessional and even dangerous,” Dr. Shahul Hameed bin Mohamed Ibrahim says in Islamic Accounting – A Primer.

Both conventional and Islamic accounting provide information and define how that information is measured, valued, recorded and communicated. Conventional accounting provides information about economic events and transactions, measuring resources in terms of assets and liabilities, and communicating that information through financial statements users, typically investors, rely on to make decisions regarding their investments. Islamic accounting, however, identifies socio-economic events and transactions measured in both financial and non-financial terms and the information is used to ensure Islamic organizations of all types adhere to Shariah and achieve the socio-economic objectives promoted by Islam. This is not to say, or imply, Islamic accounting is not concerned with money, rather it is not concerned only with money.

Islamic accounting, in many ways, is more holistic. Shariah prohibits interest-based income or usury and also gambling, so part of what Islamic accounting does is help ensure companies do not harm others while making money and achieve an equitable allocation and distribution of wealth, not just among shareholders of a specific corporation but also among society in general. Of course, as with conventional accounting, this is not always achieved in practice, as an examination of the wide variances in wealth among the populations of Arab nations, particularly those with majority Muslim populations shows.

In addition, because a significant part of operating within Shariah means delivering on Islam’s socio-economic objectives, Islamic organizations have far wider interests and engage in more diverse activities than their non-Islamic counterparts.

Concerns About Terrorism

The diverse activities and interests organizations pursue under Shariah is a cause for concern when applying conventional accounting to Islamic organizations. After all, conventional accounting can be used to disguise unethical and even illegal activities within the very organizations they were intended to provide information about. Imagine how easy it is to overlook or just not identify such information when employing an accounting system not designed for use with the type of organization it is being applied to.

In the past, the issues raised by this mismatch focused on the ability of users beyond the Muslim world to make appropriate decisions regarding investments. Since September 11, 2001, however, the concern has changed from the potential loss of investment to the possibility of supporting terrorism.

This concern is particularly significant for non-profit organizations involved in providing humanitarian relief outside the U.S.. Fortunately, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (DoT) has issued updated Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-based Charities (Guidelines).

“The abuse of charities by terrorist organizations is a serious and urgent matter, and the Guidelines reinforce the need for the U.S. Government and the charitable sector alike, to keep this challenge at the forefront of our complementary efforts,” Pat O’Brien, Assistant Secretary for the Treasury’s Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crime, said in a statement announcing the updated guidelines. The Treasury Department is committed to protecting and enabling legitimate and vital charity worldwide, and will continue to work with the sector to advance our mutual goals.”

The Guidelines urge charities to take a proactive, risk-based approach to protecting against illicit abuse and are intended to be applied by those charities vulnerable to such abuse, in a manner commensurate with the risks they face and the resources with which they work. At the request of the charitable sector, the Guidelines contain extensive anti-terrorist financing guidance, as well as guidance on sound governance and financial practices that helps prevent the exploitation of charities.

Regulatory Issues

The regulatory environment Islamic individuals and organizations are most concerned with, considering the current political climate, are those relating to anti-terrorism and anti-money laundering. Yet the tensions arising from regulatory requirements within the U.S. related to American business practices often prove more difficult to resolve.

It is in trying to balance the expectations of distinct business cultures that the differences between conventional and Islamic accounting are most notable. For instance, depending upon the type of transactions the organizations are engaged in, the roles, responsibilities and rights assigned to each party can be contradictory and even in direct conflict. In some situations, such as transactions involving private equity, venture capital, profit sharing and liquidations, organizations and individuals employing conventional accounting may actually find they prefer Islamic accounting. Other issues, such as those related to taxation, require significant effort to resolve. The inherent flexibility of Shariah is a benefit under these circumstances, since the complexity of the American tax code is highly inflexible.

The number of Muslim consumers, investors and business owners has grown along with the Muslim American population which is currently estimated to be between six and seven million. Although demand for Islamic financial products and services has increased, both the supply and the number of providers remain insufficient. It should also be noted that Islamic orthodoxy, expressed as the desire to implement Shariah as the sole legal foundation of a nation, is actually associated with progressive economic principles, including increasing government for the poor, reducing income inequality and increasing government ownership of industries and industries, especially in the poorer nations of the Muslim world.

“While it is common to associate traditional religious beliefs with conservative political stances on a wide range of issues, this is only partly true,” said Robert V. Robinson, Chancellor’s Professor and chair of Indiana University’s Department of Sociology. “The Islamic orthodox are more conservative on issues having to do with gender, sexuality and the family, but more liberal or left on economic issues.

Islamic Accounting Web --- http://www.iiu.edu.my/iaw/

The Islamic Accounting Website is a project of the Department of Accounting, Kulliyah of Economics and Management Sciences, International Islamic University Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur. This project is under the direction of Dr. Shahul Hameed bin Mohamed Ibrahim, Assistant Professor and the current Head of the Department. The philosophy of the University is to Islamize knowledge to solve the crisis in Muslim thinking brought about by the secularization of knowledge and furthermore contributing as a centre of educational excellence to revive the dynamism of the Muslim Ummah in knowledge, learning and the professions. The Department of Accounting is fully committed to this vision and strives to Islamicise Accounting.

"ISLAMIC ACCOUNTING STANDARDS," by Shadia Rahman --- http://islamic-finance.net/islamic-accounting/acctg5.html

Sharing site of Dr Shahul Hameed Bin Hj Mohamed Ibrahim --- http://islamic-finance.net/islamic-accounting/

articles by the author

 

articles by other scholars

 Forthcoming Articles on Islamic Accounting


XBRL:  The Next Big Thing

December 6, 2005 message from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@terry.uga.edu]

National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments. His talk is available at: http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch120505cc.htm 

He had three main messages:

1. Accounting rules need to be simplified. "The accounting scandals that our nation and the world have now mostly weathered were made possible in part by the sheer complexity of the rules." "The sheer accretion of detail has, in time, led to one of the system's weaknesses - its extreme complexity. Convolution is now reducing its usefulness."

2. The concentration of auditing services in the Big 4 "quadropoly" is bad for the securities markets. The SEC will try to do more to encourage the use of medium size and smaller firms that receive good inspection reports from the PCAOB.

3. The SEC will continue to push XBRL. "The interactive data that this initiative will create will lead to vast improvements in the quality, timeliness, and usefulness of information that investors get about the companies they're investing in."

A very interesting talk - one that seems to promise a high level of cooperation with the accounting profession.

Denny

Bob Jensen's threads on XBRL are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm


Two XBRL Videos

XBRL is no longer something we only play with in academe.  It is now available to investors around the world, although it may take a while for some companies to add the XBRL tags to their financial statements.  Some things that are now being done in XBRL such as time graphs and ratio graphs can be done with things other than XBRL.  What XBRL does, however, is make it possible to:

(1) Compare different companies in a Web browser

(2) Perform customized analyses if the XBRL statements are downloaded into Excel

(3) Conduct easy searches that do not yield thousands of unwanted and extraneous hits

Bob Jensen's New Video Tutorial on XBRL (about 30 minutes)
It's the XBRLdemos2005.wmv file at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/video/Tutorials/ 
But first read the following and watch the KOSDAQ video before watching the above video.

Question
What are the two most significant events in the history of accounting, financial reporting, and financial statement analysis? 

Answers
Double Entry Bookkeeping and XBRL

The origins of double entry bookkeeping are unknown.  It goes back over 100 years before Luca Pacioli  made it famous by algebraically describing it in the world's first algebra book called Summa written in 1494.  Pacioli's basic equation A=L+E simply shows how recorded asset values in total equal the double-entry sum of creditor liabilities plus owner equities in those assets.  For over 500 years accounting disputes mainly lie in defining the A, L, and E concepts and measuring them in financial statements.  Pacioli gave us the algebra without the crucial and operational definitions of terms.  Bob Jensen's brief summary of the history of accounting is at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm

XBRL stands for eXtensible Business Reporting Language in XML that can now be interpreted by every Web browser such as Microsoft's Internet Explorer.  In the future, virtually every all academic disciplines such as Chemistry, Physics, and History will probably develop their own taxonomies for XML reporting on the Web.  Hence, we one day may have XCHEM, XPHYS, and XHIST eXtensible reporting languages

Whereas the famous HTML tags on data are not extensible and are more or less fixed in scope and time, XML extensible meta-tags will become the world's most popular way of creating customized "meta-tags" that attach to virtually every piece of Web data and describe attributes of each piece of data.  The history of data tags and meta-tags is briefly outlined at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm
I also highly recommend the XBRL history and news site at XBRL headquarters at http://www.xbrl.org/Home/

XBRL is a taxonomy for XML meta-tags to be placed on virtually every number in a set of financial statements.  For over a decade, efforts have been made by huge companies and accounting firms to develop standardized XBRL tags for key taxonomies in accounting.  These taxonomies may vary as to a particular set of accounting generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) such as International GAAP or US GAAP.  Once a company or user selects which GAAP taxonomy to use, it's financial statements can be "marked up" with XBRL meta-tags that facilitate comparative financial statement analysis.  Users may also take any set of financial statements and add tags for a chosen set of GAAP tags.  For example, see Drag and Tag from Rivet Corporation --- http://www.rivetsoftware.com/
Also see http://www.xbrl.org/eu/CEBS-3/Rivet_Industry Day_Brussels_14 Sept 2005.pdf

Because adding XBRL meta-tags to a given set of financial statements is time consuming, most large companies are in the process of adding these tags to their own financial data so that investors will not have to do their own tagging.  The major stock exchanges of the world are now urging companies to send in their financial reports marked up in XBRL.  Soon they will require all listed companies to submit XBRL-tagged financial statements.

Bob Jensen's Old XBRL Video Tutorial called XBRLdemos.wmf
About four years ago (I can't remember exactly when) I prepared a XBRL tutorial on how to use XBRL in financial statement analysis.  The tutorial itself was actually developed by NASDAQ, Microsoft, and PwC in a NMP partnership.  NASDAQ selected 20 companies and marked up their financial statements in XBRL.  Microsoft wrote a fancy Excel program to analyze those financial statements in Excel.  PwC served up the data on the Web.  This NMP tutorial was intended to have a short life since the plan was eventually to use XBRL directly in Web browsers without having to use Excel.  Indeed, PwC no longer serves up this tutorial.  Bob Jensen probably has the only recorded history of this NMP tutorial on video in the file XBRLdemos.wfm at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/video/Tutorials/

Bob Jensen's New 2005 XBRL Video Tutorial called XBRLdemos2005.wmf
XBRL is now marked up on many financial statements on the Web and can be used for financial statement analysis in Web browsers.  I found a set of such statements for various (Star) companies on the Korean KOSDAQ stock exchange homepage. 

Before looking at my new video, I want you to first view the KOSDAQ Camtasia video at http://www.ubmatrix.com/solutions/WebHelp/KOSDAQDemo.html

After viewing this video, you can then go to my new Camtasia 2005 video XBRLdemos2005.wmv file at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/video/Tutorials/ 

My new video is mainly a tutorial about how I learned to use the XBRL financial statements made available by KOSDAQ for actual use by investors in companies listed on the KOSDAQ stock exchange.

In particular, my new video shows how to perform the following steps at the KOSDAQ site.

First
Watch the http://www.ubmatrix.com/solutions/WebHelp/KOSDAQDemo.html

Second
Watch my XBRLdemos2005.wmv file at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/video/Tutorials/ 

The KOSDAQ homepage is at http://www.ubmatrix.com/home/default.asp
           
Go to http://km.krx.co.kr/
     You do not have to install the Korean language pack
     Note that it may take some time for the upper menu to appear
     Click on the English button in the upper right corner after the menu appears

Third
Go directly to http://english.kosdaq.com/
     Click on the "XBRL Service" on the right side of the screen
     Click on a company's logo (ignore any pop ups to install a language pack)
     If you do not see a graph on the left side of a company's report,
             click on the button/instruction below the graph's border
     After you see a graph,
             click on the various financial statement line items to the right of the graph
            (Your mouse pointer will now be a small bar graph)

Go to the bottom of the page and click on "Ratios"
     If your pointer is still a small graph,
             click on the ratios that you want to see in the graph
    

Go to the bottom of the page and click on "Comparison"
     Options for comparisons are given (they are also demonstrated in my video)
    

Go to the bottom of the page and read about the Excel Analyzer
      See what you can download if you really get interested in the analysis options

 

October 30, 2005 reply from Deborah Johnson [Finance@WeFightFraud.com]

I followed the instructions you plan to give your students for Monday and found a few bugs you might want to know about.

The Demos link at XBRL.org  is not on the home page. They need to know that this site requires them to navigate to "Showcase" to find the Demo.

http://km.krx.co.kr/   selected English and then XBRL Services, then chose the company. The graph is only available if you agree to download and install additional software on your PC. If they do not have administrator rights, this is not going to be an option for your students. (say on college lab and classroom computers).

The company I selected, LG Micron, had an obvious defect in the financial data being presented for this demonstration. XBRL is clearly not going to minimize any human mistakes, and the printed financials will still have to be carefully scrutinized by management and the auditors. Do the math on the Trade Receivables at Net. Demerits for any student who doesn't find the error. If you go to the bottom of the table and select "Get these financials in XBRL" you may get an XML Parsing Error. This is probably a higher version of XMl required, and again the student would need administrator rights to upgrade the software or install patches and plug ins.

Regards,

Deborah Johnson

October 30, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Deborah,

I agree with all your points and thank you for providing some clarifications.  With respect to needing administrative rights to view the graphs (say on college lab computers and on classroom computers), it behooves faculty to ask administrators to install the software that can be downloaded free by clicking below the graph frame for any company in the demo.

If students do not have administrative rights on a college lab or classroom computer, I guess this makes my video tutorial even more valuable since students can see what will happen if they try this on their own computers where they automatically have administrative rights.

Thanks,

Bob

 

 


Bob Jensen's threads on GAAP comparisons (with particular stress upon derivative financial instruments accounting rules) are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/canada.htm
The above site also links to more general GAAP comparison guides between nations.

International Standards from the IASB --- Click Here
IASB homepage--- http://www.iasb.org/Home.htm 

U.S. Standards from the FASB (Free Downloads) --- http://www.fasb.org/public/ 
FASB homepage --- http://www.fasb.org/

Management Accounting Standards from the IMA (Free Downloads) --- http://www.imanet.org/publications_statements.asp#C
IMA homepage --- http://www.imanet.org/

Bob Jensen's summary of accounting theory and controversies --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm

Comparison of IFRSs and US GAAP (Educators can provide free copies to students) --- http://www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/0703ifrsusgaap.pdf
Comparisons for other nations --- http://www.iasplus.com/country/compare.htm

From IAS Plus on March 14, 2007 --- http://www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/0703ifrsusgaap.pdf

Deloitte's IFRS Global Office has published a new Comparison of International Financial Reporting Standards and United States GAAP (PDF 208k, 36 pages) as of 28 February 2007. While this comparison is comprehensive, it does not attempt to capture all of the differences that exist or that may be material to a particular entity's financial statements. Our focus is on differences that are commonly found in practice. The significance of the differences enumerated in this pubilcation – and others not included – will vary with respect to individual entities depending on such factors as the nature of the entity's operations, the industry in which it operates, and the accounting policy choices it has made. We are pleased to grant permission for accounting educators and students to make copies for educational purposes.

 

Main News Site for International Accounting Happenings --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm 

KEY GROUPS
EFRAG
Europe
IFAC
IOSCO
US FASB
US SEC
US PCAOB
RESOURCES
Past News by Month
Reference Materials
Statistics Database
IFRS in Europe by 2005
UK Web-based IFRS Updates
Country/Region Use of IFRSs
IAASB Auditing Standards
Public Sector Standards
TOOLS
11-Year Calendar
Currency Converter
Loan Amortisation
News Headlines
Stock Market Indexes
Telephone Codes
Unit Conversions
World Electric Guide
World Phone Guide
World Time Clock
Worldwide Weather
DELOITTE'S IASPLUS WEBSITE
About IASPlus
Terms for Use
Privacy Policy
Abbreviations
IAS Plus Spanish
IAS Plus German
Paul Pacter and Deloitte provide a statistical database (with data about international accounting) at http://www.iasplus.com/stats/stats.htm

 

International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Summary --- http://www.iasplus.com/standard/standard.htm

Use of IFRS varies by nation --- http://www.iasplus.com/country/useias.htm 

If you click on the Search tab and enter something like (IFRS AND China) to compare IFRS with the domestic standards of a given nation --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm


Standard Setting and Securities Markets:  U.S. Versus Europe

November 29, 2007 message from Pacter, Paul (CN - Hong Kong) [paupacter@DELOITTE.COM.HK]

Some similarities to Chair of SEC, but some important differences. SEC has direct regulatory powers over securities markets, entities that offer securities in those markets, broker/dealers in securities, auditors, and others. SEC can impose penalties on those it regulates.

In Europe there is no pan-European securities regulator equivalent to the SEC with direct regulatory powers similar to the SEC's. Rather, there are 27 securities regulators (one from each member state) who have that power. Here's a link to the list:

http://www.cesr-eu.org/index.php?page=members_directory&mac=0&id=

There is a coordinating body of European securities regulators called CESR (the Committee of European Securities Regulators (http://www.cesr-eu.org/) but CESR's role is advisory, not regulatory.

When the European Parliament adopts legislation (such as securitieslegislation) the legislation first has to be transposed (legally adopted) into the national laws of the Member States. Commissioner McCreevy's role is to propose policies and propose legislation to adopt those policies in Europe, oversee implementation of the legislation in the 27 Member States (plus 3 EEA countries), and (through both persuasion and some legal authority) try to ensure consistent and coordinated implementation. The Commissioner also has outreach and liaison responsibilities outside the European Union. Because there is no pan-European counterpart to the SEC Chairman, Commissioner McCreevy generally handles top level policy liaison between the SEC and Europe.

Like the Chair of the SEC, EU Commissioners are political appointees.

Paul Pacter

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting standard setting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting


Question
Will the U.S. adopt all IFRS international standards while the European Union cherry picks which standards it will adopt?

From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on April 27, 2007

"SEC to Mull Letting U.S. Companies Use International Accounting Rules," by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, Page: C3 --- http://snipurl.com/WSJ0425

TOPICS: Accounting, Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Securities and Exchange Commission

SUMMARY: The article describes the SEC's willingness to consider allowing U.S. companies to use USGAAP or International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in their filings. This development stems from the initiative to allow international firms traded on U.S. exchanges to file using IFRS without reconciling to USGAAP-based net income and stockholders' equity as is now required on Form 20F. "SEC Chairman Christopher Cox said the agency remains committed to removing the reconciliation requirement by 2009. Such a move was the subject of an SEC roundtable and is being closely watched by European Union officials." The SEC will accept comments this summer on its proposal to eliminate the reconciliation requirements. If the agency does implement this change, then it will consider allowing U.S. companies the same alternative.

QUESTIONS:
1.) What is a "foreign private issuer" (FPI)? Summarize the SEC's current filing requirements for these entities.

2.) Why is the SEC considering allowing U.S. companies to submit filings under IFRS rather than U.S. GAAP?

3.) Why might the SEC's decision in this matter "spell the demise of USGAAP"?

4.) Define "principles-based standards" and contrast with "rules-based standards." Give an example in either USGAAP or IFRS requirements for each of these items.

5.) "Some experts don't think a move away from U.S. GAAP would necessarily be bad." Who do you think would hold this opinion? Who would disagree? Explain.

6.) Define the term convergence in relation to global standards. Who is working towards this goal?

Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

Jensen Comment
Canada has already decided to adopt the IFRS in place of domestic Canadian standards.

Also see ""Strengthening the Transatlantic Economy," by José Manuel Barroso (European Commission President), April 27, 2007 --- http://www.iasplus.com/europe/0704barroso.pdf

Also don't assume that the European Union automatically adopts each IASB international standard. For example, the EU may not adopt IFRS 8 --- http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ifrs08.htm

 


iGAAP (International GAAP) 2007 Financial Instruments: IAS 32, IAS 39 and IFRS 7 Explained (Third Edition)
Deloitte & Touche LLP (United Kingdom) has developed iGAAP 2007 Financial Instruments: IAS 32, IAS 39 and IFRS 7 Explained (Third Edition), which has been published by CCH. This publication is the authoritative guide for financial instruments accounting under IFRSs. The 2007 edition expands last year's edition with further interpretations, examples, discussions from the IASB and the IFRIC, updates on comparisons of IFRSs with US GAAP for financial instruments, as well as a new chapter on IFRS 7 Financial Instruments Disclosures including illustrative disclosures. iGAAP 2007 Financial Instruments: IAS 32, IAS 39 and IFRS 7 Explained (628 pages, March 2007) can be purchased through CCH Online or by phone at +44 (0) 870 777 2906 or by email: customer.services@cch.co.uk .
IAS Plus, March 24, 2007 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

Bob Jensen's tutorials on IAS 39 (Derivative Financial Instruments) are linked at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm


CPA Examination candidates and accounting faculty should check out the free database at
http://www.cpa-exam.org/cpa/literature.htm

The Trinity University library has a single-user license (with an academic discount) for PwC’s Comperio --- http://www.pwcglobal.com/comperio
The single-user limitation really has not been problematic for us. Our Library guru wrote some front end code that lets any Trinity faculty member or student go directly into Comperio without having to remember a password

Comperio evolved out of a CD-Rom database that Price Waterhouse  sold under the name “Price Waterhouse Researcher.” Updated CDs were sent to us each quarter in the old days before things were as networked on the Web. Now it’s all Comperio on the Web.

Andersen had a competing CD database called Research Manager. That was bought out after Andersen fell, but I think it is now defunct (I could be wrong about this).

Now Comperio is the main commercial database available other than FARs --- http://www.fasb.org/fars/
I think each student can buy this from Wiley, but there have been numerous complaints about it.

PwC's Comperio Accounting Research Manager

Comperio is the most comprehensive on-line library of financial reporting and assurance literature in the world. Over 1,500 financial executives from around the world use Comperio on a daily basis. Comperio content includes AICPA, DIG, EITF, FASB, IAS, ISB and the SEC as well as pronouncements and standards from Australia, Belgium, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

With Comperio, the answers you need are always available - right now, right at your fingertips. There is no software to install - just go to the Comperio website and start researching!

The entire online library can be immediately accessed by browsing a pronouncement or topic directly, or by searching the entire database for key words, topics or terms.

Visit the Comperio product information site at http://www.pwcglobal.com/comperio . You will find the necessary forms to order Comperio today or to request a 30-day free trial.

Andersen's old Accounting Research Manager is now updated and maintained by CCH. The AICPA has accounting research literature in the FARs database.

For national and international accounting rulings and online research, it is best to subscribe for a fee to one of the leading services shown below:

PwC Comperio --- http://www.pwcglobal.com/comperio

CCH Accounting Research Manager --- http://www.accountingresearchmanager.com/ARMMenu.nsf/vwHTML/ARMSplash?OpenDocument

AICPA FARs (marketed by Wiley) --- http://www.fasb.org/fars/

For looking up filings with the SEC, there are two major sources:

EDGAR --- http://www.sec.gov/edgar/quickedgar.htm

PwC EdgarScan --- http://edgarscan.pwcglobal.com/servlets/edgarscan 

It is possible to do comparative company financial analyses using the core earnings databases --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#CoreEarnings

Many IFRS and multiple nation standards and reviews are available from Deloitte's IAS Plus --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

Free International Auditing Standards
All documents issued by IFAC and the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) are now available for immediate download at no charge. Visitors must simply fill out a one-time registration to gain access to the documents. http://www.accountingweb.com/item/96952 


PwC has a new helper comparing U.S. GAAP with international (IFRS) GAAP --- http://www.pwc.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/74d6c09e0a4ee610802569a1003354c8

Download: Similarities and Differences - A comparison of IFRS and US GAAP (2005 update) [PDF file, 469k]

Download: Similarities and Differences - A comparison of IFRS and US GAAP (2004) [PDF file, 314k]

Download: publication order form [PDF file, 212k]

Other publications in the Similarities and Differences series are also available.


Updated in 2005:  Some Key Differences Between IFRs and U.S. GAAP --- http://www.iasplus.com/usa/ifrsus.htm
By way of example, consider FAS 133 versus IAS 39:

IAS 39 Option to designate any financial asset or financial liability to be measured at fair value through profit or loss ('fair value option')
  • IFRS: Option is allowed.
  • US: No such option.
  • Status: This option was added in the December 2003 revisions to IAS 39.

IAS 39 Option to designate loans and receivables as available for sale to be measured at fair value through equity ('available-for-sale option')

  • IFRS: Option is allowed.
  • US: No such option.
  • Status: This option was added in the December 2003 revisions to IAS 39.

IAS 39 Investments in unlisted equity instruments

  • IFRS: Measured at fair value if reliably measurable; otherwise at cost.
  • US: Measured at cost.
  • Status: Not currently being addressed.

IAS 39 Measurement of derivatives

  • IFRS: All derivatives are measured at fair value except that a derivative that is linked to and must be settled by delivery of an unquoted equity instrument whose fair value cannot be reliably measured is measured at cost.
  • US: All derivatives are measured at fair value (though the definition of a derivative is not identical to that of IAS 39).
  • Status: Not currently being addressed.

IAS 39 Multiple embedded derivatives in a single hybrid instrument

  • IFRS: Sometimes accounted for separately.
  • US: Always treated as a single compound embedded derivative.
  • Status: Not currently being addressed.

IAS 39 Reclassification of financial instruments into or out of the trading category

  • IFRS: Prohibited.
  • US: Permitted, but generally transfers into or from the trading category should be rare.
  • Status: Not currently being addressed.

IAS 39 Effect of selling investments classified as held-to-maturity

  • IFRS: Prohibited from using held-to-maturity classification for the next two years.
  • US: Prohibited from using held-to-maturity classification. SEC indicates that prohibition is generally for two years.
  • Status: Not currently being addressed.

IAS 39 Subsequent reversal of an impairment loss

  • IFRS: Required for loans and receivables, held-to-maturity, and available-for-sale debt instruments if certain criteria are met.
  • US: Prohibited for held-to-maturity and available-for-sale securities. Reversal of valuation allowances on loans is recognised in the income statement.
  • Status: Not currently being addressed.

IAS 39 Derecognition of financial assets

  • IFRS: Combination of risks and rewards and control approach. Can derecognise part of an asset. No "isolation in bankruptcy" test. Partial derecognition allowed only if specific criteria are complied with.
  • US: Derecognise assets when transferor has surrendered control over the assets. One of the conditions is legal isolation in bankruptcy. No partial derecognition.
  • Status: This is a subject that both Boards are likely to address in the future.

IAS 39 Use of "Qualifying SPEs"

  • IFRS: No such category of SPEs.
  • US: Necessary for derecognition of financial assets if transferee is not free to sell or pledge transferred assets.
  • Status: This is a subject that both Boards are likely to address in the future.

IAS 39 Offsetting amounts due from and owed to two different parties

  • IFRS: Required if legal right of set-off and intent to settle net.
  • US: Prohibited.
  • Status: Not currently being addressed.

IAS 39 Use of "partial-term hedges" (hedge of a fair value exposure for only a part of the term of a hedged item)

  • IFRS: Allowed.
  • US: Prohibited.
  • Status: Not currently being addressed.

IAS 39 Hedging foreign currency risk in a held-to-maturity investment

  • IFRS: Can qualify for hedge accounting.
  • US: Cannot qualify for hedge accounting.
  • Status: Not currently being addressed.

IAS 39 Hedging foreign currency risk in a firm commitment to acquire a business in a business combination

  • IFRS: Can qualify for hedge accounting.
  • US: Cannot qualify for hedge accounting.
  • Status: Not currently being addressed.

IAS 39 Assuming perfect effectiveness of a hedge if critical terms match

  • IFRS: Prohibited. Must always measure effectiveness.
  • US: Allowed for hedge of interest rate risk in a debt instrument if certain conditions are met – "Shortcut Method".
  • Status: Not currently being addressed.

IAS 39 Use of "basis adjustment"

  • IFRS:
    Fair value hedge: Required.
    Cash flow hedge of a transaction resulting in a financial asset or liability: Same as US GAAP.
    Cash flow hedge of a transaction resulting in a non-financial asset or liability: Choice of US GAAP or basis adjustment.
  • US:
    Fair value hedge: Required.
    Cash flow hedge of a transaction resulting in an asset or liability: Gain/loss on hedging instrument that had been reported in equity remains in equity and is reclassified into earnings in the same period the acquired asset or incurred liability affects earnings.
  • Status: Not currently being addressed.

IAS 39 Hedging gain or loss on net investment in a foreign entity

  • IFRS: The portion determined to be an effective hedge is recognised in equity.
  • US: Gains and losses relating to hedge ineffectiveness is recognised in profit or loss immediately.
  • Status: Not currently being addressed.

IAS 39 Macro hedging

  • IFRS: Fair value hedge accounting treatment for a portfolio hedge of interest rate risk is allowed if certain specified conditions are met.
  • US: Hedge accounting treatment is prohibited, though similar results may be achieved by designating specific assets or liabilities as hedged items.
  • Status: FASB does not have a project to address macro hedging.
Fair value accounting politics in the revised IAS 39

From Paul Pacter's IAS Plus on July 13, 2005 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

 
The European Commission has published Frequently Asked Questions – IAS 39 Fair Value Option (FVO) (PDF 94k), providing the Commission's views on the following questions:
  • Why did the Commission carve out the full fair value option in the original IAS 39 standard?
  • Do prudential supervisors support IAS 39 FVO as published by the IASB?
  • When will the Commission to adopt the amended standard for the IAS 39 FVO?
  • Will companies be able to apply the amended standard for their 2005 financial statements?
  • Does the amended standard for IAS 39 FVO meet the EU endorsement criteria?
  • What about the relationship between the fair valuation of own liabilities under the amended IAS 39 FVO standard and under Article 42(a) of the Fourth Company Law Directive?
  • Will the Commission now propose amending Article 42(a) of the Fourth Company Directive?
  • What about the remaining IAS 39 carve-out relating to certain hedge accounting provisions?

Bob Jensen's threads and tutorials on FAS 133 and IAS 39 are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

IAS 39 Implementation Guidance

IAS 39 Amendments in 2005 --- http://snipurl.com/IAS39amendments


Convergence of foreign and domestic accounting rules could catch some U.S. companies by surprise
Although many differences remain between U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and international financial reporting standards (IFRS), they are being eliminated faster than anyone, even Herz or Tweedie, could have imagined. In April, FASB and the IASB agreed that all major projects going forward would be conducted jointly. That same month, the Securities and Exchange Commission said that, as soon as 2007, it might allow foreign companies to use IFRS to raise capital in the United States, eliminating the current requirement that they reconcile their statements to U.S. GAAP. The change is all the more remarkable given that the IASB was formed only four years ago, and has rushed to complete 25 new or revamped standards in time for all 25 countries in the European Union to adopt IFRS by this year. By next year, some 100 countries will be using IFRS. "We reckon it will be 150 in five years," marvels Tweedie. "That leaves only 50 out."
Tim Reason, "The Narrowing GAAP:  The convergence of foreign and domestic accounting rules could catch some U.S. companies by surprise," CFO Magazine December 01, 2005 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/5193385/c_5243641?f=magazine_coverstory


Monumental Scholarship (The following book is not online.)
The Early History of Financial Economics 1478-1776
by Geoffrey Poitras (Simon Fraser University) --- http://www.sfu.ca/~poitras/photo_pa.htm 
(Edward Elgar,  Cheltenham, UK, 2000) --- http://www.e-elgar.co.uk/ 

Jack Anderson sent the following message:

A good book on accounting history in the U.S. is

A History of Accountancy in the United States by Gary John Previts and  Barbara Dubis Merino

 

It's available through The Ohio State University Press (see web site

http://www.ohiostatepress.org/cat97/previts.htm )

 

I'm unaware of a good history of international accounting but would like to hear of one.

 

Jack Anderson

 

The FASB's website is at http://www.iasb.org/ 

The future of the FASB and all national standard setters is cloudy due to the globalization of business and increasing needs for international standards.  The primary body for setting international standards was the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) that evolved into the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) having a homepage at http://www.iasc.org.uk/  For a brief review of its history and the history of its standards, I recommend going to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/pacter.htm#003.04.

In 2001, the IASC was restructured into the new and smaller International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).  The majority of the IASB members will be full-time, whereas the members of the IASC were only part-time and did not have daily face-to-face encounters with other Board members or the IASC staff.  The IASB will operate more like the FASB in the U.S.  

In the early years of its existence, the IASC tended to avoid controversial issues and there was nothing to back up its standards (except in the U.S. where lawyers will use almost anything to support litigation brought by investors against corporations).  

Times are changing at the IASC.  It has been restructured and is getting a much greater budget for accounting research.  Most importantly, IASC standards are becoming the standards required by large international stock exchanges (IOSCO).

The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) was established in late 1997 with the mission of developing globally applicable guidelines for reporting on the economic, environmental, and social performance, initially for corporations and eventually for any business, governmental, or non-governmental organisation (NGO). Convened by the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) in partnership with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the GRI incorporates the active participation of corporations, NGOs, accountancy organisations, business associations, and other stakeholders from around the world business plan --- http://www.globalreporting.org/ 

Jagdish Gangolly recommends the following book:
Dollars & scholars, scribes & bribes: The story of accounting by Gary Giroux # Dame Publications, Inc (1996) # ASIN: B0006R6WQS --- http://snipurl.com/Giroux  

Jim McKinney recommends the following book;
It is not a lot more recent but I would consider the US centric text: A History of Accountancy in the United States: The Cultural Significance of Accounting by Previtz & Merino published in 1998. It is available in paperback.

SHARPEN YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE (2005) YEAR'S FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS AND DEVELOPMENTS --- http://accountingeducation.com/index.cfm?page=newsdetails&id=141776

Accounting Research Versus the Accountancy Profession


Perhaps I'm old and tired, but I always think that the chances of finding out what really is going on are so absurdly remote that the only thing to do is to say hang the sense of it and just keep yourself occupied.

Douglas Adams

There are two explanations one can give for this state of affairs here. The first is due to the great English economist Maurice Dobb according to whom the theory of value was replaced in the United States by theory of price. May be, the consequence for us today is that we know the price of everything but perhaps the value of nothing. Economics divorced from politics and philosophy is vacuous. In accounting, we have inherited the vacuousness by ignoring those two enduring areas of inquiry.
Professor Jagdish Gangolly, SUNY Albany

The second is the comment that Joan Robinson made about American Keynsians: that their theories were so flimsy that they had to put math into them. In accounting academia, the shortest path to respectability seems to be to use math (and statistics), whether meaningful or not.
Professor Jagdish Gangolly, SUNY Albany


Question
Given the dire shortages of doctoral students in accountancy, should the requirement for doctoral degrees be eliminated in higher education?

Perhaps I'm old and tired, but I always think that the chances of finding out what really is going on are so absurdly remote that the only thing to do is to say hang the sense of it and just keep yourself occupied.
Douglas Adams

There are two explanations one can give for this state of affairs here. The first is due to the great English economist Maurice Dobb according to whom the theory of value was replaced in the United States by theory of price. May be, the consequence for us today is that we know the price of everything but perhaps the value of nothing. Economics divorced from politics and philosophy is vacuous. In accounting, we have inherited the vacuousness by ignoring those two enduring areas of inquiry.
Professor Jagdish Gangolly, SUNY Albany

The second is the comment that Joan Robinson made about American Keynsians: that their theories were so flimsy that they had to put math into them. In accounting academia, the shortest path to respectability seems to be to use math (and statistics), whether meaningful or not.
Professor Jagdish Gangolly, SUNY Albany

There are two sides to nearly every profession (as opposed to a narrow trade). The first one is the clinical side, and the second one is the research side. But this is not to say that the twain do not meet.

I advocate requiring that most (maybe not all) clinical instructors be grounded solidly in research. Requiring a PhD is a traditional way to get groundings in research. Probably more importantly is that doctoral studies are ways to motivate clinically-minded students to attempt to do research on clinical issues and make important contributions to the practicing profession.

I define “research” as a contribution to new knowledge. Among other things a good doctoral program should make scholars more appreciative of good research and critical of bad/superficial research that does not contribute to much of anything that is relevant, including research that should get Senator William Proxmire's  Golden Fleece Awards. Like urban cowboys, our academic accounting researchers are all hat (mathematical/statistical models) with no cows.

The problem with accountancy doctoral programs is that they’ve become narrowly bounded by accountics (especially econometrics and psychometrics) that in the past three decades have made little progress toward helping the clinical side of our profession of accountancy. This makes our doctoral programs very much unlike those in economics, finance, medicine, science, and engineering where many clinical advances in their disciplines have emerged from studies in doctoral programs.

The problem with higher education in accountancy is not that we require doctoral degrees in our major colleges and universities. The problem is that our doctoral programs shut out research methodologies that are perhaps better suited for making research discoveries that really help the clinical side of our profession. Accountics models just do not deal well with missing variables and nonstationarities that must be allowed for on the clinical side of accountancy. Humanities researchers face many of these same issues and have evolved a much broader arsenal of research methodologies that are verboten in accounting doctoral programs --- (See below).

The related problem is that our leading scholars running those doctoral programs have taken a supercilious view of the clinical side of our profession. Or maybe it’s just that these leaders do not want to take the time and trouble to learn the clinical side of the profession. Once again I repeat the oft-quoted referee of an Accounting Horizons rejection of Denny Beresford’s 2005 submission

I quote from http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession

*************
1. The paper provides specific recommendations for things that accounting academics should be doing to make the accounting profession better. However (unless the author believes that academics' time is a free good) this would presumably take academics' time away from what they are currently doing. While following the author's advice might make the accounting profession better, what is being made worse? In other words, suppose I stop reading current academic research and start reading news about current developments in accounting standards. Who is made better off and who is made worse off by this reallocation of my time? Presumably my students are marginally better off, because I can tell them some new stuff in class about current accounting standards, and this might possibly have some limited benefit on their careers. But haven't I made my colleagues in my department worse off if they depend on me for research advice, and haven't I made my university worse off if its academic reputation suffers because I'm no longer considered a leading scholar? Why does making the accounting profession better take precedence over everything else an academic does with their time?
**************

Joel Demski steers us away from the clinical side of the accountancy profession by saying we should avoid that pesky “vocational virus.” (See below).

The (Random House) dictionary defines "academic" as "pertaining to areas of study that are not primarily vocational or applied , as the humanities or pure mathematics." Clearly, the short answer to the question is no, accounting is not an academic discipline.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline?" Accounting Horizons, June 2007, pp. 153-157

 

Statistically there are a few youngsters who came to academia for the joy of learning, who are yet relatively untainted by the vocational virus. I urge you to nurture your taste for learning, to follow your joy. That is the path of scholarship, and it is the only one with any possibility of turning us back toward the academy.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline? American Accounting Association Plenary Session" August 9, 2006 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm

Too many accountancy doctoral programs have immunized themselves against the “vocational virus.” The problem lies not in requiring doctoral degrees in our leading colleges and universities. The problem is that we’ve been neglecting the clinical needs of our profession. Perhaps the real underlying reason is that our clinical problems are so immense that academic accountants quake in fear of having to make contributions to the clinical side of accountancy as opposed to the clinical side of finance, economics, and psychology.

Our problems with doctoral programs in accountancy are shared with other disciplines, notably education and nursing schools.
Bob Jensen's threads on controversies in higher education are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm


Question
Is accounting an "academic" discipline?

The (Random House) dictionary defines "academic" as "pertaining to areas of study that are not primarily vocational or applied , as the humanities or pure mathematics." Clearly, the short answer to the question is no, accounting is not an academic discipline.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline?" Accounting Horizons, June 2007, pp. 153-157

Statistically there are a few youngsters who came to academia for the joy of learning, who are yet relatively untainted by the vocational virus. I urge you to nurture your taste for learning, to follow your joy. That is the path of scholarship, and it is the only one with any possibility of turning us back toward the academy.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline? American Accounting Association Plenary Session" August 9, 2006 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm

Jensen Comment
Joel's lament is a bit confusing since for the past four decades, virtually all doctoral programs have replaced accounting professional content with mathematics, statistics, econometrics, psychometrics, and sociometrics content to a fault and to a point where very few accountants are interested in applying for accountancy doctoral programs --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

The decline in doctoral program graduates (to less than 100 per year in the United States) combined with the scientific requirements for publication in leading academic accounting research journals resulted in the academy serving the accountancy profession less and less over the past few decades:

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/03MainDocumentMar2007.htm

It would help if Joel would be more explicit about what types of basic "academic" research studies qualify as "accounting research" and why there is virtually none of it being produced according to his paper and his address to the AAA membership in August 2006. In particular, I would like to know what types of academic "accounting" publications set academic accounting apart from mathematical economics and mathematics disciplines such that these basic research contributions can still be called "accounting" research that is not applied (in the sense of his definition of "academic" research as not being applied).

Following Joel's paper is a paper by the same title "is Accounting an Academic Discipline?" by John C. Fellingham, Accounting Horizons, June 2007, pp. 159-163. John features the following quotation from Henry Rand Hatfield in 1924:

I am sure that all of us who teach accounting in the university suffer from the implied contempt of our colleagues, who look upon accounting as an intruder, a Saul among the prophets, a paria whose very presence detracts somewhat from the sanctity of the academic halls.
Henry Rand Hatfield, "An Historical Defense of Bookkeeping," Journal of Accountancy, 1924.

I consider this quotation to be inappropriate in 2007. Professor Hatfield was referring to the teaching of bookkeeping which is no longer the mundane vocational subject matter of college accounting in the past fifty or more years. I consider most of what we now teach in college accountancy to be very appropriate in service to the accountancy profession. You can read more about accounting education in Hatfield's time in the following historic papers:

Allen, C. E. (1927), "The growth of accounting instruction since 1900," The Accounting Review (June): 150-166 ---
http://maaw.info/TheAccountingReview.htm Click on the "Non USF User Link"

Atkins, P. M. (1928), "University instruction in industrial cost accounting," The Accounting Review,"  (December): 345-363 --- http://maaw.info/TheAccountingReview.htm  Click on the "Non USF User Link"

Atkins, P. M. (1929), "University instruction in industrial cost accounting,"  The Accounting Review (March): 23-32 ---
http://maaw.info/TheAccountingReview.htm  Click on the "Non USF User Link"

I guess what I'm really trying to say is that accountancy is a profession like law is a profession, medicine is a profession, architecture is a profession, engineering is a profession, pharmacy is a profession, etc. Why does the academy need to apologize for teaching to the profession of accountancy when in fact the academy is very proud to serve those other highly esteemed professions. I do not see schools of law and schools of medicine apologizing to the world for nobly serving those professions.

Both Demski and Fellingham made emotional appeals for academic accounting researchers to make noteworthy contributions to the "true academic disciplines" as quoted by Fellingham on Page 163. Not only should this be a goal, but in a sense they are arguing that this should be a primary goal far above the goal of serving the accountancy profession. I fail to note similar appeals being made by professors of law and medicine and engineering. These professions do distinguish between clinical versus research publications and teaching, but in general they do not further glorify their research if it cannot conceivably have some relevance to their professions. Indeed, even the most basic chemical and physiological research in medicine still takes place with an eye toward eventual relevance to human health.

I might also note that both law and medicine also publish some academic research that is not based upon esoteric mathematics and statistics. For example, historical and philosophical research methodologies are still allowed in their most prestigious academic law and science journals, which currently is not the case for leading academic accounting research journals.

By way of example, since Joel Demski took charge of the accounting doctoral program at the University of Florida, every applicant to that doctoral program cannot even matriculate into the program before pre-requisites of advanced mathematics are satisfied.

Students are required to demonstrate math competency prior to matriculating the doctoral program. Each student's background will be evaluated individually, and guidance provided on ways a student can ready themselves prior to beginning the doctoral course work. There are opportunities to complete preparatory course work at the University of Florida prior to matriculating our doctoral program. 
University of Florida Accounting Concentration  --- http://www.cba.ufl.edu/fsoa/docs/phd_AccConcentration.pdf

Why does every candidate have to qualify in advanced mathematics rather than allowing substitutes such as advanced philosophy or advanced legal studies?

I might also add that science and medicine academic journals also still place monumental priorities on replications of research findings. Leading academic accounting research journals will not even publish replications and mostly as a result it is very difficult to find replications of most of the top academic accounting research papers published by so-called leading accounting researchers --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Replication

More of my rants on this can be found in the following links:

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/03MainDocumentMar2007.htm


Question
Are college students good surrogates for real life studies?
The majority of behavioral experiments in accounting have used students as experimental subjects.

"Too Many Studies Use College Students As Their Guinea Pigs," by Carl Bialik, The Wall Street Journal, August 10, 2007; Page B1--- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118670089203393577.html?mod=todays_us_marketplace

Many of the numbers that make news about how we feel, think and behave are derived from studying a narrow population: college students. It's cheap for social scientists to tap into the on-campus research pool -- everyone from psychology majors who must participate in studies for course credit to students who respond to posters promising a few bucks if they sign up.

Consider just three studies that have received press in the past month. In one, muscular men were twice as likely as their less well-built brethren to have had more than three sex partners -- at least according to 99 UCLA undergraduates. Another, an examination of six separate studies that tape-recorded college students' conversations, found that women, despite being stereotyped as relatively chatty, spoke just 3% more words each day than men. And in the third, 40 undergraduates at Washington University in St. Louis were 6% more likely to complete verbal jokes and 14% more likely to complete visual jests than 41 older study participants.

College students are "essentially free," says Brian Nosek, a psychology professor at the University of Virginia. "We walk out of our office, and there they are." The epitome of a convenience sample, they have become the basis for what some critics call the "science of the sophomore."

But psychologists may be getting what they pay for. College students aren't representative by age, wealth, income, educational level or geographic location. "What if you studied 7-year-old kids and made inferences about geriatrics?" asks Robert Peterson, a marketing professor at the University of Texas, Austin. "Everyone would say you can't do that. But you can use these college students."

Prof. Peterson scoured the literature for examples of studies that examined the same psychological relationships in students and nonstudents. In almost half of the 63 relationships he examined, there were major discrepancies between students and nonstudents: The two groups either produced contradictory results, or one showed an effect at least twice as great as the other.

In a follow-up study, not yet published, Prof. Peterson demonstrated that even college students are far from homogeneous. With help from faculty at 58 schools in 31 states, he surveyed undergraduate business students across the country and found that they vary widely from school to school. That means a professor studying the relationship between students' attitudes toward capitalism and business ethics at one school could reach a sharply different conclusion than a professor at another school.

"People have always been aware of this issue," Prof. Peterson says, but many have chosen to ignore it. A 1986 paper by David Sears, a UCLA psychology professor, documented the increased use of college students for research in the prior quarter century and explored the potential biases that might introduce. In the meantime, the use of college students has, if anything, risen, researchers say.

Authors of the recent studies on sex, chattiness and humor acknowledge the limitations of their research pool. But they argue that college students do just fine for purposes of studying basic cognitive processes. Others agree. "If you think all people have the same attitudes as introductory psychology students, that's really problematic," says Tony Bogaert, a psychology professor at Brock University in St. Catharines, Ontario. "But if you're looking at cognitive processes, intro psych students probably work OK."

After all, every study is hampered by possible differences between those who volunteer to participate and those who don't, whether they're college students or a broader group.

In any case, the fault often lies not with the researchers, who are careful not to overstate the impact of their findings, but with the news articles suggesting the numbers apply to all humanity. "Even if you only focus on college students, the results are still generalizable to millions of Americans," says David Frederick, a UCLA psychology graduate student and lead author of the study on muscularity and sex partners.

Prof. Nosek, a critic of the science of the sophomore, responds that college students are still developing their personalities and behavior. "There is no other time outside my life as an undergraduate where I thought it would be a good idea to wear all my clothes inside out," he says, or to "stay up for as many hours in a row as I could just to see what happens."

To widen the pool of people answering questions about, say, all-nighters, Prof. Nosek has submitted a proposal to the National Institutes of Health to fund the creation of an international, online research panel. That would build on studies his laboratory has already administered online at ProjectImplicit.net.

Online research has its own problems, but at least it taps into the hundreds of millions of people who are online globally, rather than just the hundreds of people enrolled in Psych 101.

"The scientific reward structure does not benefit someone who puts in the enormous effort" to create a representative research sample, Prof. Nosek says. "The way to change researchers' data habits is to make it easier to collect data in a more generalizable way."


Question
When should professors add practitioners to their courses?

"Mixing Theory and Practice on Defense Policy," by Andy Guess, Inside Higher Ed, August 8, 2007 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/08/08/defense

In a class about United Nations regulations on the laws of war, the discussion turned inevitably to Star Trek.

When the U.N. authorizes sanctions against a particular nation, said Ilan Berman, the professor, the institution acts much like the Borg — in the show’s universe, a mechanized force of cyborg mercenaries bent on assimilating all of mankind. The analogy was lost on most of the class, but Berman drove the point home for those who didn’t regularly tune in to syndicated science fiction programs in the early 1990s: Each member nation must act as part of the collective.

The lecture, peppered as it was with the occasional pop culture reference, covered a lot of ground, from the U.S. national security strategy to the justifications for nations’ use of force. The students in the class — five were present on a Monday night in July for the elective — come from a range of backgrounds, several of them working full-time, but all in the program with an eye toward defense policy, whether in the government, consulting or think tanks.

In Washington, those are hardly unorthodox goals. Programs in defense or security studies churn out students every year in the nation’s capital, from well-known and respected institutions such as Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, and also outside the Beltway at places like Harvard (Kennedy) and Princeton (Wilson). The students in Berman’s class, tucked in a conference room on the seventh floor of a corporate office building in Fairfax, Va., are part of a relatively new experiment: What if a state school in Springfield, Mo., operated a satellite campus alongside the established players in defense studies?

So far, enrollments have been growing each year since the unit opened shop in 2005 within commuting distance from the city, sandwiched between a rapidly developing apartment complex and an office park. The Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, a part of Missouri State University, caters to students who want to break into Beltway defense circles with a public university price tag and the advantages of a more practical approach. In doing so, it offers a two-year M.S. degree that requires both coursework and internships.

Having access to actual practitioners in the classroom means, in this case, connections to defense and foreign policy officials in the government. As with others like it, the program has had a long revolving-doors tradition, starting from its original incarnation in the early 1970s at the University of Southern California, where it was founded by a former defense official who served on the SALT I delegation, William R. Van Cleave, and partially funded by the free-market Earhart Foundation. But unlike at similar departments elsewhere, Missouri State’s full-time faculty of three and its nine affiliated lecturers tend to come mainly from positions in Republican administrations and conservative-leaning institutions.

Continued in article

Jensen Comment
Some years back Professor Sharon Lightner (UC at San Diego) put together a really interesting online course for students, practitioners, and accounting standard setters in six different countries where the classes met synchronously.
"An Innovative Online International Accounting Course on Six Campuses Around the World" --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/255light.htm


Question
Does faculty research improve student learning in the classrooms where researchers teach?
Put another way, is research more important than scholarship that does not contribute to new knowledge?

Major Issue
If the answer leans toward scholarship over research, it could monumentally change criteria for tenure in many colleges and universities.

AACSB International: the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business, has released for comment a report calling for the accreditation process for business schools to evaluate whether faculty research improves the learning process. The report expresses the concern that accreditors have noted the volume of research, but not whether it is making business schools better from an educational standpoint.
Inside Higher Ed, August 6, 2007 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/08/06/qt

"Controversial Report on Business School Research Released for Comments," AACSB News Release, August 3, 2007 --- http://www.aacsb.edu/Resource_Centers/Research/media_release-8-3-07.pdf

FL (August 3, 2007) ― A report released today evaluates the nature and purposes of business school research and recommends steps to increase its value to students, practicing managers and society. The report, issued by the Impact of Research task force of AACSB International, is released as a draft to solicit comments and feedback from business schools, their faculties and others. The report includes recommendations that could profoundly change the way business schools organize, measure, and communicate about research.

AACSB International, the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business, estimates that each year accredited business schools spend more than $320 million to support faculty research and another half a billion dollars supports research-based doctoral education.

“Research is now reflected in nearly everything business schools do, so we must find better ways to demonstrate the impact of our contributions to advancing management theory, practice and education” says task force chair Joseph A. Alutto, of The Ohio State University. “But quality business schools are not and should not be the same; that’s why the report also proposes accreditation changes to strengthen the alignment of research expectations to individual school missions.”

The task force argues that a business school cannot separate itself from management practice and still serve its function, but it cannot be so focused on practice that it fails to develop rigorous, independent insights that increase our understanding of organizations and management. Accordingly, the task force recommends building stronger interactions between academic researchers and practicing managers on questions of relevance and developing new channels that make quality academic research more accessible to practice.

According to AACSB President and CEO John J. Fernandes, recommendations in this report have the potential to foster a new generation of academic research. “In the end,” he says, “it is a commitment to scholarship that enables business schools to best serve the future needs of business and society through quality management education.”

The Impact of Research task force report draft for comments is available for download on the AACSB website: www.aacsb.edu/research. The website also provides additional resources related to the issue and the opportunity to submit comments on the draft report. The AACSB Committee on Issues in Management Education and Board of Directors will use the feedback to determine the next steps for implementation.

The AACSB International Impact of Research Task Force
Chairs:
Joseph A. Alutto, interim president, and
John W. Berry, Senior Chair in Business, Max M. FisherCollege of Business, The Ohio State University

K. C. Chan, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Richard A. Cosier, Purdue University
Thomas G. Cummings, University of Southern California
Ken Fenoglio, AT&T
Gabriel Hawawini, INSEAD and the University of Pennsylvania
Cynthia H. Milligan, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Myron Roomkin, Case Western Reserve University
Anthony J. Rucci, The Ohio State University

Teaching Excellence Secondary to Research for Promotion, Tenure, and Pay ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm#TeachingVsResearch

Bob Jensen's threads on higher education controversies are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm


My letter to Kate

Now that the 2007 Annual Meetings are ended and it is public information that finance professor Erik Lie (University of Iowa) won the AICPA/AAA Notable Contributions to Accounting Literature Award, I feel compelled to make my letter to Kate written on May 17 public. This year I served on the Part 2 selection committee that chose Erik Lie from the list of candidates submitted to us by the Part 1 Screening Committee. Professor Lie's contribution was truly notable and deserving of this award for 2007.

But I have serious reservations about the Part 1 Screening Committee's choices over the past two decades. I think it's been a rigged game in which the Part 2 Selection Committee has no choice but to choose an esoteric "accountics" article published in an academic research journal.

My letter to Kate is entirely consistent with the long tidbit below received from Paul Williams on August 10, 2007 after the AAA 2007 Annual Meetings in Chicago. Kate was chair of our 2007 Selection Committee but not the 2007 Screening Committee.

You can read my letter to Kate http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2007NotableLiteratureAward.htm

An Analysis of the Contributions of The Accounting Review Across 80 Years: 1926-2005 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
Co-authored with Jean Heck and forthcoming in the December 2007 edition of the Accounting Historians Journal.

Bob Jensen's threads on the sad state of academic accounting research --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession


David Dennis organized a discussion panel to address the state of academic research in accounting. I could not be at the AAA meetings this year. But Paul Williams was on the panel and sent out the following message to panel members.

Paul Williams (North Carolina State University) Weighs in Once Again on the Sad State of Accounting Research in the Academy. Paul gave me permission to post his email message to the panel members.

August 10, 2007 message from Paul Williams [Paul_Williams@ncsu.edu]

It is a source of constant frustration that there exists reams of "empirical evidence" that the US academy is as we trouble makers say it is.  For folks who claim to worship empirical evidence there is a great reluctance to consider it.  Jacci Rodgers and I have another paper that you didn't include that was published in The Accounting Historians Journal that dealt with authors during the same period of time as our editors' paper. 

We did a comparison of elite school graduates appearances as authors in TAR (The Accounting Review) with their proportion in the population of North American PhDs (a procedure that was biased in that it overstates the proportion of elite graduates who were in the effective population of people of publishing age).  In Table 3 of that paper we report the proportion of appearance by elite grads and their proportion of the total North American PhD population at the beginnning of each TAR editor's term starting with

Trumball, the first editor to have a published editorial board, the first number is proportion of appearances and the second is proportion of PhDs:

Editor
Trumball:         63.6/63.5

Griffin:             71.3/59.6

Hendrickson:    75/53.7

Keller:              61.1/50.3

Decoster:         63/45.2

Zeff:                 51.9/43.1

Sundem:            47.1/38

Kinney:             50.6/34.7

Abdel-khalik:     56.6/33

 

Through Zeff and Sundems' editorships we start to see the effects of the emergence of the many new doctoral programs that were created during the 1970s.  The dilution of elite school dominance proceeded apace through time as the elite became a smaller proportion of the total population.  I had a paper accepted in TAR by both Zeff and Sundem: both experiences were good.  Both Zeff and Sundem were open-minded and quite helpful during the process; the reviews were constructive. 

But this expected demographically induced trend dramatically reversed itself after Sundem's editorship.  Since that time the elite appearances among authors has hovered, Avogadro's number-like around the mid-60 percent mark -- the proportion that prevailed when Trumball was editor.  All of a sudden the virtues of scholarship that Zeff and Sundem were able to recognize in the work of people not trained at elite schools as conventional economists disappeared.  The ideologues took over by default because of TAR's fear of losing so much reputational ground to JAR and JAE.  TAR became a JAR and JAE clone.  It hasn't changed since. 

So why doesn't Bill McCarthy get enough good systems papers? Perhaps it's because we haven't been terribly interested, for nearly 25 years, in training in U.S. PhD programs people who could do quality systems, or sociological, or historical, or legal, or anthropological work in accounting.  As Jagdish Gangolly noted on the AECM, finance types reproduce like mosquitoes, but it is a struggle for anyone interested in some "causal delta" other than neoclassical economics to find a place to study. 

Today, with the exception of a couple of places, you have to go outside the United States.  Why submit a paper to TAR when the editorial process is not one to be trusted?  Those of us who have been in the AAA a long time have heard these promises of "inclusiveness" before.  They were hot air then, they're hot air now unless the TAR editorial process is willing to take a laxative and publish some papers that may not be the best (there are an awful lot of "main-stream" papers published that aren't very good, either). 

TAR has to signal it isn't telling us another fib and that involves more than just passively sitting around waiting for papers to come.  Trust has been lost and you won't get it back by chastising the mistrustful.  Wouldn't it be refreshing to see someone from the editorial board show up at conferences like IPA, APIRA, CPA, . . . etc. to press the flesh and find out what the rest of the world thinks?

It is perhaps not a coincidence that the only two papers ever published in TAR informed by critical literature (papers by Chua and Hines) were ushered through the review process by Sundem.  Nothing of that kind has ever appeared in TAR since. 

Even JAR published a paper by Peter Miller!

David: kudos on your item 8.  As the U.S. has become the O.E.C.D. country with the most skewed distribution of income and wealth and as our great experiment in democracy appears more and more each day to be less and less robust (see Prem Sikka's work on the extensiveness of accounting corruption), we get a scholarly community primarily fixated on individual career enhancement through the engineering of a linear model with an R-squared of seldom double digits explaining yet some other absurdity about why Nozickian justice is the sine qua non of human  existence.  

I have seen literally  thousands of those models over the years and no two have ever born any resemblance to each other. 

What kind of "models" are really only unique representations of themselves?  Thank you for organizing the panel and allowing me to participate. 

Paul

 Paul Williams

paul_williams@ncsu.edu

(919)515-4436


The Financial Accounting Standards Board recently approached Bloomfield about studying how to create financial accounting standards that will assist investors as much as possible, he quickly turned to the virtual world for answers.

"Theory Meets Practice Online: Researchers and academics are looking to online worlds such as Second Life to shed new light on old economic questions," by Francesca Di Meglio, Business Week, July 24, 2007 --- Click Here 

In fact, many economics researchers, including Bloomfield, professor of accounting at Cornell's Johnson Graduate School of Management, are using the virtual environment to test ideas involving staples of economics such as game theory, the effects of regulation, and issues involving money. Since 1989, Bloomfield has been running experiments in the lab in which he creates small game economies to study narrow issues. But when the Financial Accounting Standards Board recently approached Bloomfield about studying how to create financial accounting standards that will assist investors as much as possible, he quickly turned to the virtual world for answers.

"It would be very difficult to look at the complex issues that FASB is trying to address with eight people in a laboratory playing a very simple economic game," he says. "I started looking for how I could create a more realistic economy with more players dealing with a high degree of complexity. It didn't take me long to realize that people in virtual worlds are already doing just that."

. . .

At Indiana University, researcher Edward Castronova has posed the idea of creating multiple virtual economies to study the effects of different regulatory policies. At Indiana, Castronova is director of the Synthethic Worlds Initiative, a research center to study virtual worlds. "The opportunity is to conduct controlled research experiments at the level of all society, something social scientists have never been able to do before," the center's Web site notes (see BusinessWeek.com, 5/1/06, "Virtual World, Virtual Economies").

A virtual stock market is certainly not the only online entity that opens itself up to research. Marketers are already using the virtual world to test campaigns, packaging, and consumer satisfaction. Pepsi (PEP) famously tracks use of its products in There.com. Architects seek reaction to design. Starwood Hotels (HOT) test-marketed its new loft designs in Second Life (see BusinessWeek.com, 8/23/06, "Starwood Hotels Explore Second Life First").

Continued in article

Bob Jensen's threads on tools and tricks of the trade are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/000aaa/thetools.htm


Summarizing Academic Accounting Research for Practitioners

April 14, 2007 message from Ron Huefner [rhuefner@acsu.buffalo.edu]

The Journal of Accountancy (AICPA) has begun a new series of articles to review accounting research papers and explain them to practitioners. The April issue has an article on "Mining Auditing Research."

It summarizes about a dozen research articles, mostly from The Accounting Review, but also including articles from JAR, CAR, AOS, and the European Accounting Review.

The link for this article is: <http://aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/apr2007/boltlee.htm

This may be useful in bringing research findings into classes

Ron


March 2007 Updates on the Sad State of Accounting Research in Academe --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession

Nearly two years ago I sent out an "Appeal" for accounting educators, researchers, and practitioners to actively support what I call The Accounting Review (TAR) Diversity Initiative as initiated by last year's American Accounting Association President Judy Rayburn --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR.htm

In it I noted that a bright ray of hope for changing narrow focus of The Accounting Review (TAR) was the appointment of Bill McCarthy as Associate Editor for purposes of introducing Accounting Information Systems research into TAR.

I now have an expanded paper written in partnership with Jean Heck --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR\03MainDocumentMar2007.htm
The MS Word version is at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR\395wp.doc
This paper is forthcoming in the December 2007 edition of the Accounting Historians Journal

March 27, 2007 message from McCarthy, William [mccarthy@BUS.MSU.EDU]

This thread and other AECM posts regarding information technology research in accounting casts a grim picture for people who wish to do computer science related work aimed at the major accounting academic journals. This has been an "us vs. them" problem for most of my 30 years in AIS research.

While it is indeed true that JAR, JAE, and the other private accounting journals remain in the Stone Age as far as accounting technology issues are concerned, there have been significant steps taken by TAR to open up the main AAA journal to this kind of work. Dan Dhaliwal appointed me as an editor with the express purpose of having a person knowledgeable in information systems and computer science research methods available to the AIS research community for manuscript review and decision-making.

Surprisingly, as I have outlined at both the sectional and national AAA meetings, the problem has not been as much with "them" as it has been with "us," at least in the last 15 months or so. Quite simply, the number of AIS submissions to TAR has been alarmingly low. In Washington last August, I set a target of 12-18 for the AIS community for this academic year, a number I thought was modest and achievable. However, it does not look like we will come close to that at our present rate.

*

As I mentioned in Washington, the submission procedure is this:

*

Do the work and make sure it is rigorous according to accounting, IS, and/or computer science standards,

*

Submit the paper and note or show that it deals with an important accounting issue issue by using AIS, MIS or CS methods, and

*

Ask that the paper be assigned to me as the editor most familiar with IS and CS methods.

If you make a convincing case on these points and if the senior editor thinks it is high quality, then I get it, I assign the referees, and I get to make the consolidated judgment.

Paraphrasing the famous Canadian hockey player Wayne Gretzky, the AIS research and the accounting practice communities will miss on 100% of the good ideas that never get submitted to TAR. If we want change the face of accounting research, the time for action is now. Do the work and submit "that" paper. Additionally, send your name off to me as a possible referee, outlining your particular expertise in either methods or specific technologies.

Bill McCarthy,
Michigan State University

mccarthy@bus.msu.edu 
http://www.msu.edu/user/mccarth4 <https://mercury.bus.msu.edu/exchweb/bin/redir.asp?URL=http://www.msu.edu/user/mccarth4>

March 27, 2007 reply from Paul Williams [Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]

Bill,

What we may be paying as the price for dragging doctoral education in accounting back to the Stone Age about 40 years ago, is the phenomenon you describe. People have become so disenchanted with TAR that they have found other more comfortable venues for pursuing their work. In spite of public declarations about the new openness, we have heard this before only to have it turn out to be disengenuous PR. I think your appeal here might encourage people to trust you once and submit a paper, BUT it better produce some postitive experiences.

Another issue is "rigor." Everything must be RIGOROUS, but most GOOD IDEAS aren't "rigorous". They are typically fraught with error, but they open new vistas and ways of thinking about things. The history of science is filled with tales of earth changing ideas that were not offered in a RIGOROUS way (we know Mendel fudged his data on sweet peas, so did Milliken and Keynes General Theory... was notoriously cobbled together). We have become so fixated on method and our public appearance as rigorous scientists that all accounting scholarship in the U.S. at least follows the same template. Our idea of rigor is, frankly, naïve, based more on appearance than substance. Robert Heilbroner once remarked that "Mathematics brought great rigor to economics.

Unfortunately it also brought mortis." Bill, you now have some power (?). Take some chances. What is the point of an academic discourse confined only to statistical model building where, simultaneously, replication is emphatically discouraged? Empirical rigor means doing it over and over by independent investigators with rigorous controls. We may not even be doing what we currently do "rigorously."

March 27, 2007 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

Methodological hangups, fetish about quantitative rigour, phobia about normative research, all have afflicted most disciplines at one time or the other. We in accounting seem to have them all at the same time.

I remembering sitting on a doctoral committee with folks from psychology, and was frightened to discover my own prejudices after hearing a well known (Skinnerian) psychologist fellow committee member asked me to be a bit more understanding of methodologies used by others.

I have found the accounting crowd reward conformity with received wisdom from the self-anointed sages.

Much of my work has been normative, and therefore considered "unsuitable" for publications in better known accounting journals (statement made by editor of one of the top rated accounting journal). I feel driven out of the field years ago into Operations Research, Information Systems, Computing & Information Sciences.

In none of those fields have the journal editors/ referees used any litmus tests. On the other hand, the referees at an AAA section journal, (about 20 years ago) was bold enough to state that my paper was an insult to the excellent work done by others in the field (the paper was later published in a respected journal in IS with few changes; it was the last paper I submitted to any establishment accounting journals).

Bill's message gives me hope in a way I never imagined. As a test balloon, I will submit TAR one of our papers that I had targeted for a CSI journal.

We need a balance between rigour, relevance, and methodological purity. Above all, we need tolerance for work that differs from our own perspective on each of these. We also need a diversity of approaches to the issues in the papers.

Jagdish

Academics Versus the Profession

The real world is only a special case, and not a very interesting one at that.
--Attributed to C. E. Ferguson and forwarded by Ed Scribner

Imagination is not to be divorced from facts: it is a way of illuminating the facts. It works by eliciting the general principles which apply to the facts, as they exist, and then by an intellectual survey of alternative possibilities which are consistent with these principles. It enables men (sic) to construct an intellectual vision of a new world, and it preserves the zest of life by the suggestion of satisfying purposes.
Alfred North Whitehead in an address to the AACSB in 1927 and quoted in the paper by Bennis and O'Toole cited below.

During the past several decades, many leading B schools have quietly adopted an inappropriate --- and ultimately self-defeating --- model of academic excellence.  Instead of measuring themselves in terms of the competence of their graduates, or by how well their faculties understand important drivers of business performance, they measure themselves almost solely by the rigor of their scientific research. They have adopted a model of science that uses abstract financial and economic analysis, statistical regressions, and laboratory psychology.  Some of the research produced is excellent, but because so little of it is grounded in actual business practices. the focus of graduate business education has become increasingly circumscribed --- and less and less relevant to practitioners ...We are not advocating a return to the days when business schools were glorified trade schools.  In every business, decision making requires amassing and analyzing objective facts, so B schools must continue to teach quantitative skills.  The challenge is to restore balance to the curriculum and the faculty:  We need rigor and relevance.  The dirty little secret at most of today's best business schools is that they chiefly serve the faculty's research interests and career goals, with too little regard for the needs of other stakehollders.
Warren G. Bennis and James O'Toole, "How Business Schools Lost Their Way," Harvard Business Review, May 2005.
The article be downloaded for a fee of $6.00 ($3.70 to educators) --- http://harvardbusinessonline.hbsp.harvard.edu/b02/en/hbr/hbr_home.jhtml


Bob Jensen's threads on higher education controversies are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm


The original Accounting Hall of Fame is maintained by Ohio State University --- http://fisher.osu.edu/departments/accounting-and-mis/hall-of-fame/

The distinguished set of members selected to date are listed at
http://fisher.osu.edu/departments/accounting-and-mis/hall-of-fame/membership-in-hall/  

At the forthcoming American Accounting Association (AAA) annual meetings in Washington DC this year on August 7, two new distinguished scholars will be inducted into the Accounting Hall of Fame.

June 22, 2006 message from Hall of Famer Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@terry.uga.edu]

Bob,

I don't know if you've seen the news yet, but Bob Kaplan and Bob Sterling will be this year's inductees to the Accounting Hall of Fame.

Denny

June 23, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Denny,

Thanks for the update. Both Bob and Bob are more than worthy of this honor. Both accountancy professors have very distinguished teaching and research accomplishments. Although I do not want to detract from those most noteworthy accomplishments, I cannot resist this opportunity to point out that both Bob Sterling and Bob Kaplan are failed critics of the hijacking of the leading academic accounting research journals by the Accountics/Positivist Establishment. However, both of these scholars took vastly different approaches in their efforts to maintain diversity of research methods and topics in the leading research journals.

The Accountics/Positivist Establishment virtually ignored both Sterling and Kaplan!

The following quotations appear in the following two documents:

An "Appeal" for accounting educators, researchers, and practitioners to actively support what I call The Accounting Review (TAR) Diversity Initiative as initiated by American Accounting Association President Judy Rayburn --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR.htm

An Analysis of the Contributions of The Accounting Review Across 80 Years: 1926-2005 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm

 

Accountics is the mathematical science of (accounting) values.
Charles Sprague (1887) as quoted by McMillan (2003, 1)
 

As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality.
Albert Einstein
 

PG. #390 NONAKA
The chapter argues that building the theory of knowledge creation needs to an epistemological and ontological discussion, instead of just relying on a positivist approach, which has been the implicit paradigm of social science. The positivist rationality has become identified with analytical thinking that focuses on generating and testing hypotheses through formal logic. While providing a clear guideline for theory building and empirical examinations, it poses problems for the investigation of complex and dynamic social phenomena, such as knowledge creation. In positivist-based research, knowledge is still often treated as an exogenous variable or distraction against linear economic rationale. The relative lack of alternative conceptualization has meant that management science has slowly been detached from the surrounding societal reality. The understanding of social systems cannot be based entirely on natural scientific facts.
Ikujiro Nonaka as quoted at Great Minds in Management: The Process of Theory Development --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/GreatMinds.htm 



 

Bob Sterling is rooted in economics and philosophy. He, like Tony Tinker, Barbara Marino, and Paul Williams, relied upon his roots in philosophy to attack the positivists from the standpoint of misinterpretation of the writings of Karl Popper --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Popper

 

Sterling wrote the following in "Positive Accounting: An Assessment," Abacus,Volume 26, Issue 2, September 1990:

*********Begin Quote
Positive accounting theory, using the book of the same name by Watts and Zimmerman (1986) as the primary source of information about that theory, is subjected to scrutiny. The two pillars — (a) value-free study of (b) accounting practices — upon which the legitimacy of that theory are said to rest (and the absence of which is said to make other theories illegitimate) are found to be insubstantial. The claim that authorities — economic and scientific — support the type of theory espoused is found to be mistaken. The accomplishments — actual and potential — of positive theory are found to have been nil, and are projected to continue to be nil. Based on these findings, the recommendation is to classify positive accounting theory as a 'cottage industry' at the periphery of accounting thought and reject its attempt to take centre stage by radically redefining the fundamental question of accounting.
*********End Quote

 

I might add that the above critique would've had zero chance of being published in The Accounting Review (TAR) or other leading U.S. accounting research journals. Professor Sterling always wrote with interesting and simple analogies. He stated that if anthropology research was limited to positivism, then the only research would be the study of anthropologists rather than anthropology.

In some ways, Bob Kaplan is the more interesting critic of the hijacking of academic accounting research by the Accountics/Positivist Establishment. This is because Professor Kaplan built his early reputation, while full time at Carnegie-Mellon University, as an accountics expert in mathematical model building. Later, after he took on joint appointments at Carnegie and the Harvard Business School, he became more involved in case method research. Now he's best noted as a case method researcher since moving full time to Harvard.

In 1986 Steve Zeff was President of the AAA. I had the honor of being appointed by Steve as Program Director for the 1986 AAA annual meetings in Times Square in NYC. I persuaded Bob Kaplan and Joel Demski to share a plenary session in debate of the hijacking of the leading academic accounting research journals by the Accountics/Positivist Establishment (although since the early 1900s the term "accountics" was no longer used in accounting in favor of the term "analytics").

Bob Kaplan's 1986 presentation lamented the fact that researchers using the case method could no longer get their research published in TAR or other leading accounting research journals. He also lamented that innovations generally had their seminal roots in discoveries of practitioners rather than researchers publishing in the leading academic accounting research journals. Whereas practitioners once took a keen interest in academic accounting research, this interest waned to almost nothing.

Joel Demski's presentation defended mathematical model building and analysis as the cornerstone of accounting as a a pure "academic discipline." I would not describe Joel as an evangelist of positivism relative to the extremes of Watts and Zimmerman. Joel typically has had less to say about positivism than he has about mathematical model building and economic information theory applied to accountancy. In this regard I would describe Joel as an ardent defender of accountics. Joel admitted in 1986 that it was very difficult to pinpoint discoveries in academe that were noteworthy in the practicing profession. However, he claimed that this was not a leading purpose of academic accounting research.

In some ways the 2006 AAA annual meetings this year in Washington DC may be a replay of the 1986 meetings in NYC. Taking Bob Kaplan's place at the August 8, 2006 plenary session will be ardent positivism critic Anthony Hopwood from the United Kingdom. His message is somewhat predictable and he will deliver it forcefully.

Joel Demski's (with John Fellingham) presentation at the August 9, 2006 plenary session is less predictable, but the title "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline?" provides some clues that Joel will remain an ardent defender of mathematical and statistical modeling as the core of academic accounting research. It will be interesting to compare what Joel had to say in 1986 versus what he says after 20 years after continued accountics/positivism hijacking of leading U.S. academic accounting research journals and, I might add, U.S. doctoral programs.

Ohio State University became one of the leading accountics/positivsim research centers. Under the noteworthy leadership of Tom Burns, OSU became one of the first major universities to drop traditional accounting courses from its doctoral programs in favor of sending students outside the College of Business to take graduate courses in mathematics, statistics, econometrics, psychometrics, and sociometrics. In this context, it is a pleasure that leaders at OSU, in conjunction with the outside Accounting Hall of Fame nominating committee members, sees fit this year to honor two ardent critics of the Accountics/Positivist Establishment.

 Hopefully some of you will heed my current "Appeal" for accounting educators, researchers, and practitioners to actively support what I call The Accounting Review (TAR) Diversity Initiative as initiated by American Accounting Association President Judy Rayburn --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR.htm


I examined the Vision being promoted, since November 8, 2006, by CEOs of the largest accounting firms --- http://www.globalpublicpolicysymposium.com/CEO_Vision.pdf
It struck me as yet another example of how small the role of academe is in shaping the future of the profession of accountancy. I wonder if the professions of medicine and law would chart the future of their own professions with so little regard for schools of medicine and law. Large firms in accounting actively seek to hire our students and have great public relations with professors. However, when it comes to something as substantive as this it's very difficult to find where leaders of the profession charted this change in course by building upon academic accounting research. There are probably indirect links, but it would be surprising if the writers of this proposed huge change in policy were influenced heavily by published academic research. An exception might be the thrust toward XBRL, but the so-called leading academic accounting journals have paid scant attention to XBRL,

On one hand we could blame the leaders of the profession for avoiding academe in the generation of new vision for the future. On the other hand we could blame the accounting researchers and their top journals for addressing what they can study with scientific models rather than what the profession wants to be studied. My threads on this issue are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession

"Largest Accounting Firms See Coming Revolution in Business Reporting," AccountingWeb, November 27, 2006 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102827

As part of the Global Public Policy Symposium in Paris, held on November 8 and attended by key players concerned with ensuring the quality and reliability of financial reporting worldwide, the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) International, Grant Thornton International, Deloitte, KPMG International and Ernst & Young, published a joint statement of their vision of what the future might hold for financial reporting and the accounting profession.

Entitled “Global Capital Markets and the Global Economy: A Vision from the CEOs of the International Audit Networks,” the document envisions investors having access to real time company financial information through XBRL, financial statements that go beyond reporting past performance to projecting future performance based on information about business intangibles that are not currently measured, and a recommendation that companies choose to supplement regular audits with periodic forensic audits. The report may be viewed at www.globalpublicpolicysymposium.com/

“This essay is about one type of information and its importance to all actors in the global economy; information about the performance of management and companies that make and deliver goods and services, and compete for capital,” the symposium paper says.

In a letter to the Wall Street Journal published on November 8, the day their paper was released, the CEOs wrote that when the basics of current accounting procedures were written, the world’s investors were more a “private club than a global network. Auditors used fountain pens, capital stayed pooled in a few financial centers, and information moved by runner.” The world has changed since then.

In the short term, the letter says, it will be necessary to proceed as rapidly as possible with convergence in international accounting standards, and with overcoming national differences in oversight of auditors and in enforcement.

In the longer term, auditors themselves must evaluate the usefulness to investors of information provided in the current financial statement and footnote format and consider the inclusion of more nonfinancial information.

But, the CEOs say in the Journal letter, “All of these steps should include an emphasis on allowing auditors greater room to exercise judgment. Accountants and auditors are trained professionals who have the ability to apply the spirit of broad principles in deciding how to account for and report financial and other information. . . . Such [future] measures should also include an honest assessment of the “expectations gap,” relating to material fraud and the ability of auditors to uncover it at a reasonable cost.”

The paper looks forward to a world “where users increasingly will want to customize the information they receive” in which “the process for recording and classifying business information will be as important, if not more important, than the static formats in which today’s financial information is reported. Our jobs as auditors, must therefore change to increasing focus on those business processes.”

An “important enabler” of future reporting will be the Global XBRL Initiative, the paper says. XBRL users will be able to view company data in any language, any currency and under different accounting systems and get immediate answers to queries. “In fact the new world is already here for the approximately 40,000 companies that already use XBRL to input their data. . . . China, Spain, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have required companies to use XBRL.”

The paper acknowledges that investors, analysts and others will still want standardized reports to be issued by public companies on a regular basis. But the CEOs say that investors have told them they want more relevant information to be included. “The large discrepancies between the “book” and “market” values of many, if not most, public companies similarly provide strong evidence of the limited usefulness of statements of assets and liabilities that are based on historical costs. A range of intangibles, such as employee creativity and loyalty and relationships with suppliers and customers, can drive a company’s performance, yet the value of these intangibles is not consistently reported."

In short, the CEO’s vision states “the same forces that are reshaping economies at all levels are driving the need to transform what kind of information various stakeholders want from companies, in what form, and at what frequency. In a world of “mass customization,” standard financial statements have less and less meaning and relevance. The future of auditing in such an environment lies in the need to verify that the process by which company-specific information is collected, sorted and reported is reliable and the information presented is relevant for decision making.”

Investors and regulatory bodies may expect auditors to go further than is reasonable to detect fraud and the paper recommends that all companies be subjected to a regular forensic audit, or be subjected to forensic audits on a random basis.

Another option would be introducing more choice regarding the intensity of audits for fraud. For example, since forensic audits are conducted primarily for the benefit of investors, one possibility would be to let shareholders decide on the intensity of the fraud detection effort
they want auditors to perform. Shareholders could be assisted in making this decision by disclosure in the proxy materials of the costs of the different levels of audits, as well as the historical experience of the company with fraud.

The CEO paper calls for both liability reform and scope of service reform.

Considering the “Brave New World” of auditing envisioned in the document and the scope of the questions it raises, “Global Capital Markets and the Global Economy” has received little attention in the financial press, Motley Fool reports. But, while approving the idea of more timely information flows for the investor, Fool says, “enough companies have trouble meeting their reporting obligations as it is. I would prefer to both maintain those reports and supplement them with additional data.”

That financial reporting will evolve and change is inevitable, the International Herald Tribune says, but whether large accounting firms will lead the dialogue is another matter that may be influenced by their “life-threatening litigation risks.”

"Accounting Firms Seek Overhaul," by Tad Kopinski, Institutional Shareholder Services ISS, November 20, 2006 ---
http://blog.issproxy.com/2006/11/accounting_firms_seek_overhaul.html  

Bob Jensen's threads on proposed reforms --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudProposedReforms.htm


Redesigning an MBA Curriculum Toward the Action:  Why Aren't Accountants Headed on the Same Paths?

"Wall Street Warms To Finance Degree With Focus on Math," by Ronald Alsop, The Wall Street Journal,  November 14, 2006; Page B7 --- Click Here

Just a few years ago, the University of California, Berkeley, found its master's degree in financial engineering a hard sell. Wall Street had cut back sharply on hiring, and many recruiters were still fixated on M.B.A. graduates.

"The doors were shut on us at the human-resource level on Wall Street," recalls Linda Kreitzman, executive director of the financial engineering program at Berkeley's Haas School of Business. "I had to go directly to managing directors to get our students placed after we started the program in 2001."

Now, in a turnabout, it's often the banks and hedge funds that are calling on Dr. Kreitzman and offering her graduates six-figure compensation packages. "They have come to realize they really need students with strong skills in financial economics, math and computer modeling for more complex products like mortgage- and asset-backed securities and credit and equity derivatives," she says. This fall, all 58 financial engineering students seeking internships found spots at such companies as Citigroup, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch. Their projects will include credit portfolio valuation, artificial-intelligence trading models and structured fixed-income products.

While the master's in business administration certainly remains in high demand, companies are increasingly interested in other graduate-level credentials, including Ph.D.s and master's degrees in specific business fields. Deutsche Bank, for example, has hired Ph.D. and master-of-finance graduates in Europe for some time and is now recruiting more in the U.S. as well.

"We are continually looking for strong quantitative skills," says Kristina Peters, global head of graduate recruiting. With a master's degree in finance, "there tends to be more applied finance knowledge such as derivatives pricing."

Continued in article

Jensen Comment
The big question is where will auditing firms find accountants that can handle the exotic contracts written by the financial engineers?


The Sad State of English Literature Research

"Student Pressure and Your Average English Department," by Sanford Pinsker, The Irascible Professor, January 2, 2006 --- http://irascibleprofessor.com/comments-01-02-06.htm .

English professors reflect their graduate school training long after they "graduate" as newly minted Ph.D.s. The rub comes in if you happen to have been more deeply trained in literary theory than you were in literature, and you were taught to believe that theoreticians were much more interesting than novelists or poets.

The result is that many English professors of a certain age find it easier to get excited about multiculturalism than about great writers because they have read very few primary works of consequence. Asking these folk about literature reminds me of the Israeli army recruit who was asked if he could swim, "No," he replied, then quickly added "But I know the theory of it." English departments are likely to suffer through this joke for at least the next twenty more years, as professors who got tenure because they were savvy about Derrida and Foucault hang around to shape an English department curriculum that is longer on deserts than it is on meat-and-potatoes.

That's why advanced seminars in multiculturalism, Madonna, or "The Sopranos" are just a heart beat away from making it into the college catalogue. Those who remember an Irish poet named Yeats might remember what he said about things falling apart and the center not holding. That is what is occurring across the land as English department have a hard time resisting whatever fashionable bandwagon squeaks its way down the road.


The Sad State of Academic Accounting Research

February 3, 2006 message from Jagdish S. Gangolly [gangolly@INFOTOC.COM]

The well known mathematician GH Hardy once observed that he would be disappointed if any one found mathematics useful (I think he was referring to "Pure" mathematics), and that mathematics is to be enjoyed to appreciate its intrinsic beauty. Nevertheless, even "Pure" Mathematics Mathgematics is found useful by many. One pertinent example I can give is of non-Euclidean Geometry which has had a profound impact on data visualisation (See, for example, http://iv.slis.indiana.edu/sw/hyptree.html ).

While mathematical propositions are tautological and hence not "verifiable" in a positivist sense, the underlying axiom system can be examined to see if it corresponds to reality. That is how, for example, things work in Physics where replication is an essential and valued activity. In accounting research (especially of the financial accounting kind), replication is not well regarded, and unlike in Physics there is no "competition" to reach the top of the greasy pole or to prove each other wrong. The result is the mutual admiration society that we have reduced ourselves to, with a few citing each other and the rest of the world ignoring us all.

In human science such as ours is, research should be relevant and useful. We have an obligation to be evaluated by the society (all the stakeholders including the professional practice) at large about this. In this, in my opinion, we in academics have failed miserably.

Jagdish

February 4, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Jagdish,

You have pointed to the heart of the mess in modern day academic accounting research. The pure mathematics term "mathgematics" reminds me of the historic term "accountics." After an intense turn-of-the-century debate over whether academic accounting research should become the "mathematical science of values," leading accounting researchers rejected this "accountics" idea. Both the term and the movement died out for the next 60 years.

In the 1960s the concept was born again without the revival of the word "accountics." You aptly and concisely described how accountics has taken over our top-tier journals that, in turn, have turned our doctoral programs into virtually a singular very narrow research skills curriculum.

I was greatly encouraged by Judy Rayburn's Presidential Address on August 10, 2005 and the publishing of her remarks in Accounting Education News, Fall 2005, pp. 1-4.

Accounting research is different from other business disciplines in the area of citations:  Top-tier accounting journals in total have fewer citations than top-tier journals in finance, management, and marketing.  Our journals are not widely cited outside our discipline.  Our top-tier journals as a group project too narrow a view of the breadth and diversity of (what should count as) accounting research.
Rayburn (2005b, Page 4)
 

I might add that Judy's points are mostly echoing Andy Bailey's 1994 Presidential Address in which he claimed the AAA journals were at a "crisis point." The AAA Publications Committees, TAR editors, and TAR referees ignored Andy's appeals to broaden the scope of topics and research methods that allowed in TAR. And after a long conversation with the current editor of TAR on February 2, 2006, I fear that Judy's appeals are also falling on deaf ears. TAR is not going to change in the near future with the exception of adding some AIS papers that Bill McCarthy, as the new AIS Associate Editor, allows to pass through the gates. TAR will expand to five issues per hear in 2006 and six issues per year after that. But accountics constraints will still dominate TAR in years to come.

February 4, 2006 reply from Jagdish S. Gangolly [gangolly@INFOTOC.COM]

Bob,

Mathgematics was an innocent typo on my part. Your response worried me that there might really be such a term, and so I googled it and went through each of those pages. And on each of those pages the problem was a similar typo. While I would love to put my stamp on lexicography, I need to improve my keyboarding skills first. (My Mac keyboard is driving me up the wall.)

Hardy used the term pure mathematics (he wrote a book with the same title that we used as text) in the same sense that Immanuel Kant used it in the "Critique of Pure Reason" -- uncontaminated by facts.

People were always uncomfortable with Euclid's fifth postulate which says that given a straight line and a point not on the line, it is possible to construct a straight line through the point that is parallel to the given line (there are other equivalent ways to state the postulate). For example, if you stand in the middle of railroad tracks in Kansas and look into the horizon along the tracks, it would appear to you that the two parallel tracks meet there, which would "invalidate" the postulate.

Mathematicians before Lobachevsky were trying to prove that the fifth postulate could be proved as a theorem from the first four (which we all know from grade school). Lobachevsky thought out of the box and showed that Euclidean Geometry was a special case of general non-Euclidean Geometries. Lobachevsky was not alone in this discovery. Gauss (German) and Bolyai (Hungarian) mathematicians independently developed the area.

By the way, the tracks seem to meet at the horizon in Kanbsas because earth is spherical. The non-Euclidean Geometry I referred to in the earlier message was spherical Geometry which is the staple of data visualisation in diverse fields as taxonomy, genetics, forestry,...; We can even use it in Accounting, for example, in visualising XBRL taxonomies.

Jagdish


So what is the history of accountics?

TAR Between 1926 and 1955: Ignoring Accountics

Accountics is the mathematical science of values.
Charles Sprague (1887) as quoted by McMillan (2003, 1)


 

Accounting professor Charles Sprague coined the word "accountics" in 1887. The word is not used today in accounting and has some alternative meanings outside our discipline. However, in the early 19th Century, accountics was the centerpiece of some forward thrusting unpublished lectures by Charles Sprague at Columbia University.  McMillan (2003, 11) stated the following:

These claims were not a pragmatic strategy to legitimize the development of sophisticated bookkeeping theories.  Rather, this development of a science was seen as revealing long-hidden realities within the economic environment and the double-entry bookkeeping system itself.  The science of accounts, through systematic mathematical analysis, could discover hidden thrust of the reality of economic value.  The term, “accountics,” captured the imagination of the members of the IA, connoting advances in bookkeeping that all these men were experiencing.

 

By 1900 there was a journal called Accountics according to Forrester (2003).  Both the journal and the term accountics had short lives, but belief that mathematical analysis and empirical research can “discover hidden thrust in the reality of economic value” underlies much of what has been published in TAR over the past three decades. Hence we propose reviving the term “accountics” in the context of research methods and quantitative analysis tools that have become popular in TAR and other leading accounting research journals.

The American Association of University Instructors of Accounting, which in December 1935 became the American Accounting Association, commenced unofficially in 1915, (Zeff 1966, 5).  It was proposed in October 1919 that the Association publish a Quarterly Journal of AccounticsBut this proposed accountics journal never got off the ground while leaders in the Association argued heatedly and fruitlessly about whether accountancy was a science. A quarterly journal called The Accounting Review was subsequently born in 1925 with its first issue being published in March of 1926.  Its accountics-like attributes did not commence in earnest until the 1960s.

Practitioner involvement, in a large measure, was the reason for changing the name of the Association by removing the words “University Instructors.” Practitioners interested in accounting education participated actively in AAA meetings. TAR articles in the first several decades were devoted heavily to education issues and accounting issues in particular industries and trade groups. Research methodologies were mainly normative (without mathematics), case, and archival (history) methods.  Anecdotal evidence and hypothetical illustrations ruled the day. The longest serving editor of TAR was a practitioner who determined what was published in TAR between 1929 and 1943.  In those years the AAA leadership actually mandated that TAR focus on development of accounting principles and to orient the papers to both practitioners and educators, Chatfield (1975, Page 4).

Following World War II, practitioners outnumbered educators in the AAA, (Chatfield 1975, 4). Leading partners from accounting firms took pride in publishing papers and books intended to inspire scholarship among professors and students. Some practitioners, particularly those with scholarly publications, were admitted over the years into the Accounting Hall of Fame formed by The Ohio State University. Accounting educators were generally long on practical experience and short on academic credentials such as doctoral degrees prior to the 1960s.

A major catalyst for change was the Ford Foundation that poured millions of dollars into first the study of collegiate business schools and second the funding of doctoral programs and students in business studies. Gordon and Howell (1959) reported that business faculty in colleges lacked research skills and academic esteem among their humanities and science colleagues. The Ford Foundation thereafter funded doctoral programs and top quality graduate students to pursue doctoral degrees in business and accountancy. This Foundation even funded publication of selected doctoral dissertations to give business discipline doctoral studies more visibility. Great pressures were also brought to bear on academic associations like the AAA to increase the academic standards for publications in journals like TAR.

Competitors to TAR were launched in the early 1960s, including the Journal of Accounting Research (1963), Abacus (1965) and The International Journal of Accounting Education and Research (1965). Clinging to its traditional normative roots and trade-article style would have made TAR appear to be a journal for academic luddites. Actually, many of the new mathematical approaches to theory development were fundamentally normative, but they were couched in the formidable language and rigors of mathematics. Publication of papers in traditional normative theory, history, and systems slowly ground to almost zero in the new age of accountics.

These new spearheads in accountics were not without problems.  It’s humorous and sad to go back and discover how naïve and misleading some of TAR’s bold and high risk thrusts were into quantitative methods.  Statistical models were employed without regard to underlying assumptions of independence, temporal stationarity, multicollinearity, homoscedasticity, missing variables, and departures from the normal distribution.  Mathematical applications were proposed for real-world systems that failed to meet continuity and non-convexity assumptions inherent in such models as linear programming and calculus optimizations.  Proposed applications of finite mathematics and discrete (integer) programming failed because the fastest computers in the world then, and now, could not solve most realistic integer programming problems in less than 100 years.

After financial databases provided a BETA covariance of each security in a portfolio with the market portfolio, a flood of capital market events studies were published by TAR and other leading accounting journals.  In the early years, accounting researchers did not challenge CAPM’s assumptions and limitations, limitations that, in retrospect cast doubt upon many of the findings based upon any single index of market risk, (Fama and French 1992).

Leading accounting professors have lamented as TAR’s preference for rigor over relevancy, (Zeff 1978; Lee 1997; and Williams 1999). Sundem (1987) provides revealing information about the changed perceptions of authors, almost entirely from academe, who submitted manuscripts for review between June 1982 and May 1986. Among the 1,148 submissions, only 39 used archival (history) methods and 34 of those submissions were rejected.  Also 34 used survey methods and 33 of those were rejected.  And 100 used traditional normative (deductive) methods with 85 of those being rejected.  Except for a small set of 28 manuscripts classified as using  “other” methods (mainly descriptive empirical according to Sundem), the remaining larger subset submitted manuscripts used methods that Sundem classified as follows for leading 1982-1986 submissions:

292 General Empirical

119 Capital Market

172 Behavioral

135 Analytical modeling

  97 Economic modeling

  40 Statistical modeling

  29 Simulation

What’s clear is that by 1982 accounting researchers got the message that having mathematical or statistical analysis in TAR publications made accountics virtually a necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition for acceptance for publication. It became increasingly difficult for a single editor to have expertise in all the above methods. In the late 1960s editorial decisions on publication shifted from the TAR editor alone to the TAR editor in conjunction with specialized referees and eventually associate editors, (Flesher 1991, 167). Fleming et al. (2000) wrote the following:

The big change was in research methods.  Modeling and empirical methods became prominent during 1966-1985, with analytical modeling and general empirical methods leading the way.  Although used to a surprising extent, deductive-type methods declined in popularity, especially in the second half of the 1966-1985 period.

Fleming et al. (2000, Page 48) report that education articles in TAR declined from 21% in 1966 to 8% before Issues in Accounting Education began to publish education articles. Garcha, Harwood, and Hermanson (1983) reported on the readership of TAR before any new specialty journals commenced in the AAA. They reported that among their AAA membership respondents, only 41.7% would subscribe if TAR was unbundled in terms of dollar savings from AAA membership dues. TAR apparently was not meeting the membership’s market test. Based heavily upon the written comments of respondents, the authors’ conclusions were, in part, as follows:

The findings of the survey reveal that opinions vary regarding TAR and that emotions run high.  At one extreme some respondents seem to believe that TAR is performing its intended function very well.  Those sharing this view may believe that its mission is to provide a high-quality outlet for those at the cutting-edge of accounting research.  The pay-off for this approach may be recognition by peers, achieving tenure and promotion, and gaining mobility should one care to move.  This group may also believe that trying to affect current practice is futile anyway, so why even try?

 

At the other extreme are those who believe that TAR is not serving its intended purpose.  This group may believe TAR should serve the readership interests of the audiences identified by the Moonitz Committee.  Many in the intended audience cannot write for, cannot read, or are not interested in reading the Main Articles which have been published during approximately the last decade.  As a result there is the suggestion that this group believes that a change in editorial policy is needed.

 

After a study by Abdel-khalik(1976) that revealed complaints about difficulties of following the increased quantitative methods jargon in TAR, editors did introduce abstracts in front of the articles to summarize major findings with less jargon, (Flesher 1991, 169). But the problem was simultaneously exacerbated when TAR stopped publishing commentaries and rebuttals that sometimes aid understanding of complicated research. Science journals are much better about encouraging commentaries and rebuttals.

The saddest and most revealing state of accountics research is the lack of interest of replicating the many findings of TAR's econometric and psychometric methodologies --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Relication

Bob Jensen


Scientific Method in Accounting Has Not Been a Method for Generating New Theories

The following is a quote from the 1993 President’s Message of Gary Sundem, President’s Message. Accounting Education News 21 (3). 3.
 

Although empirical scientific method has made many positive contributions to accounting research, it is not the method that is likely to generate new theories, though it will be useful in testing them. For example, Einstein’s theories were not developed empirically, but they relied on understanding the empirical evidence and they were tested empirically. Both the development and testing of theories should be recognized as acceptable accounting research.

 

Question
What is the trend in the number of doctoral degrees awarded in accountancy in the United States?

Answer
It all depends on who you ask and whether or not the alma maters are AACSB accredited universities
(note that the AACSB accredits bachelors and masters degree programs but not doctoral programs per se).
The data suggest that there are a lot of ABD doctoral students who never complete the final hurdle of writing a dissertation, although this is only my speculation based upon the higher number of graduates that I would expect from the size of the enrollments.

On January 27, 2006, Jean Heck at Villanova sent me the following message:

This data is only for AACSB accredited schools, so the numbers you had for Accounting in the slide are a little bigger. I got these numbers straight from the AACSB data director.
   
     
  Accounting & Finance Historical Data 2000 - 2004
     
Accounting Full Time Enrollment Part Time Enrollment Degrees Conferred
2000 552 36 122
     
2001 585 80 102
     
2002 578 13 97
     
2003 694 12 103
     
2004 631 16 86
     
     
     
Finance      
2000 738 59 159
     
2001 771 109 129
     
2002 807 49 125
     
2003 939 40 136
     
2004 859 48 109

********************
Jensen Comment
Hasselback, J.R. (2006), Accounting Faculty Directory 2006-2007 (Prentice-Hall, Just Prior to Page 1) reports the following doctoral graduates in accounting:

1998–99 122 - 18%
1999–00 095 - 22%
2000–01 108 +14%
2001–02 099 - 08%
2002–03 069 - 30%

 

In Slide 23 of her Presidential Address at the American Accounting Association Annual Meetings in San Francisco on August 10, Judy Rayburn presented the following data regarding doctoral graduates in accounting --- http://aaahq.org/AM2005/menu.htm

145 Accounting Ph.D.s were awarded in 2002-2003, an increase over 2001-2002 estimates.
TABLE 3B
Accounting Ph.D’s Awarded 1998–99 Through 2002–03
Number of Graduates Rate of Growth
1998–99 185 – 3%
1999–00 195 + 5%
2000–01 115 – 41%
2001–02 110 – 4%
2002–03 145 + 32%

Data from the U.S. Department of Education
You can download an Excel spreadsheet of Doctor's degrees conferred by degree-granting institutions, by discipline division: Selected years, 1970-71 to 2002-03 --- http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d04/tables/dt04_252.asp

Part of that spreadsheet is shown below:

Table 252.  Doctor's degrees conferred by degree-granting institutions, by discipline division: 
Selected years, 1970-71 to 2002-03
_ _ _ _ _ _
Discipline division 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03
_ _ _ _ _
Agriculture and natural resources ................. 1,231 1,168 1,127 1,148 1,229
Architecture and related services ....................... 123 129 153 183 152
Area, ethnic, cultural, and gender studies ................................... 187 205 216 212 186
Biological and biomedical sciences ....................................... 5,024 5,180 4,953 4,823 5,003
Business ........................................................... 1,201 1,194 1,180 1,156 1,251
         
Communication, journalism, and related programs .............................................. 347 347 368 374 394
Communications technologies .......................... 5 10 2 9 4
Computer and information sciences ........................... 801 779 768 752 816
Education ............................................... 6,394 6,409 6,284 6,549 6,835
Engineering ........................................... 5,432 5,390 5,542 5,187 5,276
         
Engineering technologies ................................ 29 31 62 58 57
English language and literature/letters ....................... 1,407 1,470 1,330 1,291 1,246
Family and consumer sciences/human sciences ........... 323 327 354 311 372
Foreign languages, literatures, and linguistics ......................... 1,049 1,086 1,078 1,003 1,042
Health professions and related clinical sciences ............................ 1,920 2,053 2,242 2,913 3,328
         
Legal professions and studies ................................... 58 74 286 79 105
Liberal arts and sciences,           
  general studies, and humanities ................................. 78 83 102 113 78
Library science .......................................... 55 68 58 45 62
Mathematics and statistics ........................................ 1,090 1,075 997 923 1,007
Multi/interdisciplinary studies ................................ 754 792 784 765 899
         
Parks, recreation, leisure and fitness studies ................... 137 134 177 151 199
Philosophy and religious studies .................................. 584 598 600 610 662
Physical sciences and science technologies ............................. 4,142 3,963 3,911 3,760 3,858
Psychology ......................................... 4,695 4,731 5,091 4,759 4,831
Public administration and social services ........................ 532 537 574 571 596
         
Security and protective services .................................... 48 52 44 49 72
Social sciences and history ........................................ 3,855 4,095 3,930 3,902 3,850
Theology and religious vocations .................... 1,440 1,630 1,461 1,350 1,321
Transportation and materials moving ..................... 0 0 0 0 0
Visual and performing arts ............................... 1,130 1,127 1,167 1,114 1,293
Not classified by field of study ................... 6 71 63 0 0

 

 


Question
Why is supply of doctoral faculty, and possibly all business faculty, not a sustainable process?

Jensen Answer
See Below


Question
Why do accounting doctoral students have to be more like science students than medical students and law students?

Jensen Answer
With the explosion of demand for accounting faculty, production of only about 100 doctoral graduates from AACSB schools is no longer a sustainable process. Perhaps the time has come to have a Scholarship Track and a Research Track in accounting doctoral studies. One of the real barriers to entry has been the narrow quantitative method and science method curriculum now required in virtually all doctoral programs in accountancy. Many accounting professionals who contemplate returning to college for doctoral degrees are not interested and/or not talented in our present narrow Ph.D. curriculum.

In my opinion this will work only if our most prestigious universities take the lead in lending prestige to Scholarship Track doctoral students in accounting. Case Western is one university that has already taken a small step in this direction. Now lets open this alternative to younger students who have perhaps only had a few years experience in accounting practice,

In the January 30, 2006 edition of New Bookmarks I presented tables of the numbers of doctoral graduates in all disciplines with particular stress on those in accounting, finance, and business in general. As baby boomers from the World War II era commence to retire, the AACSB International predicts a crisis shortage of new faculty to take their place and to meet the growth in popularity of business programs in universities. In August 2002, the AACSB International Management Education Task Force (METF) issued a landmark report, “Management Education at Risk.” The  2002 report on this is available at http://www.aacsb.edu/publications/dfc/default.asp
 

In particular, note the section on Rethinking Doctoral Education quoted below.

Rethinking Doctoral Education

Several issues in doctoral education are in need of rethinking in light of doctoral faculty shortages.  They include vertical orientation, strategies for sourcing doctoral faculty, the relevance of curricula, rewards and promotion, accreditation standards, and leveraging technology.

Vertical Orientation

Doctoral education is built on vertical orientation to disciplines, requiring prospective applicants to choose their field at the point of entry.  Many doctoral programs train students in narrowly defined research agendas, giving them little, if any, exposure to research problems and methodologies outside their discipline.  In parallel, most hiring adheres to traditional departmental tracks, with few instances of cross-departmental appointments because they are inherently challenging to the structure of most business schools.  Among the schools that are exceptions is IMD, in Switzerland, which eliminated departmental and rank distinctions.

Meanwhile, advancement in business knowledge and thinking requires research frameworks that can span functional and industry boundaries.  And businesses continue to call for more cross-functional education in undergraduate and MBA programs.  There is inevitable and healthy tension between training and theory in vertical disciplines, on the one hand, and the evolving issues of the marketplace that tend to defy such neat categorization, on the other.

There is little question that schools need to add to their doctoral curricula research training that encompasses questions and methodologies across vertical boundaries.  Unless some shifts are instituted, the training ground for researchers in business will become less relevant to the knowledge advances the marketplace needs and demands, and to the teaching and learning needs within business schools.

Strategies for Sourcing Doctoral Faculty

To preserve the inimitable scholarship role of business academics, faculty resources need to be better leveraged.  Business schools must address pervasive doctoral shortages creatively by reaching beyond traditional sources for doctoral faculty.  Though not without challenges, the following are among possible alternative sources of doctoral faculty:

Along with tapping new sources for doctoral faculty, such strategies may have the added benefit of increasing the "practice" flavor of curricula.

A concurrent approach to support continued, vibrant scholarship of business research faculty is a productivity-enhancement strategy, rather than a focus on faculty supply.  The reason for suggesting that approaches to enhance productivity are needed is that reduced teaching loads alone do not ensure increased faculty research contributions.  Possible such approaches include faculty development in best research practices; greater flexibility in faculty employment relationships, to facilitate researcher collaboration and mobility across institutions; a multilevel faculty model that fine-tunes faculty assignments to fit their competencies; and differentiated performance accountability and rewards around these assignments.

The quest for sustained research productivity also hinges on our definition of research.  EQUIS, the business school accreditation program offered by the European Foundation for Management Development, has proposed an expanded definition of research to include research, development, and innovation (RDI).  RDI includes activities related to the origination, dissemination, and application of knowledge to practical management.

I have always been one to distinguish scholarship from research. One can be a scholar by mastering some important subset of what is already known. A researcher must attempt to contribute new knowledge to this subset. Every academic discipline has an obligation to conduct research in an effort to keep the knowledge base dynamic and alive. However, this does not necessarily mean that every tenured professor must have been a researcher at some point along the way as long as the criteria for tenure include highly significant scholarship. This tends not to be the model we work with in colleges and universities in modern times. But given the extreme shortages in accounting doctoral students, perhaps the time has come to attract more scholars into our discipline. It will require a huge rethinking of curriculum and thesis requirements, and I do think there should be a thesis requirement that demonstrates advanced scholarship. I also think that the curriculum should cover a variety of disciplines without aspirations to produce Super CPAs to teach accounting. Possibly universities will even generate some doctoral theses other than the present ones that everybody hopes, including the authors, that nobody will read.

Medical schools have used these two tracks for years. Some medical professors are highly skilled clinically and teach medicine without necessarily devoting 80% of their time in research labs. Other medical professors spend more than 80% of their time in research labs. In law, the distinction is less obvious, but I think when push comes to shove there are many law professors who have mastered case law without contributing significantly to what the legal profession would call new knowledge. Other law professors are noted for their contributions to new theory.

Along these lines follows an obligation to teach “professionalization” in an effort to attract doctoral students
Donald E. Hall finishes his series with proposals to change the dissertation process and a call to teach “professionalization.”
"Collegiality and Graduate School Training," by Donald E. Hall, Inside Higher Ed, January 24, 2006 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/workplace/2006/01/24/hall

This emphasis on conversational skills and commitments allows us then to fine tune also our definition of what “professionalization” actually means. Certainly in the venues above — the classroom and in research mentorship — we work to make our students more aware of the norms and best practices of academic professional life. But the graduate programs that are most concerned with meeting their students’ needs attend also to that professionalization process by offering seminars, roundtables, workshops, and other activities to students intent on or just thinking about pursuing an academic career. In all of these it is important to note that aspiring academics are not only entering the conversation represented by their research fields, but also the conversation of a dynamic and multi-faceted profession.

This does mean encouraging literal conversations among graduate students and recent graduates who have taken a wide variety of positions — from high profile academic, to teaching centered, to those in the publishing industry and a wide variety of non-academic fields. I started this essay by noting that when I was a graduate student I had never heard from or about individuals who had taken jobs like the one I eventually took. Certainly I could have sought out those individuals on my own (though I didn’t know them personally, since they were not part of my cohort group), but it is also true that those individuals were not generally recognized as ones to emulate.

One hopes, given the terrible prospects that most new Ph.D.’s face today as they enter the academic job market, that such snobbishness has waned. However, I still would not go so far as to say that we should tell students that “any job” is better than “no job” or that they should simply “take what they can get.” Some individuals would be terribly mismatched with certain positions — weak teachers who live for research should not take positions at teaching universities unless they are willing to re-prioritize and devote their energies to improving their pedagogies. Similarly, I have known superb teachers with poor research habits and skills who have taken wholly inappropriate positions at prestigious universities and then lost those jobs for low research productivity during third year or tenure reviews (unfortunately, they sometimes got their jobs in the first place because they were able to — and were counseled to — market themselves within certain highly sought-after identity political fields but with no recognition of their own individual needs or abilities). A discussion of who will be happy and will succeed where must be part of any broad conversation on the academic profession, whether that conversation takes place in seminars, workshops, or with groups of students about to “go on the market.”

Indeed, it is vital to invite students into conversation on these matters as often and as early as possible. At the beginning of every meeting of every graduate class I teach, I ask if there are any questions on the minds of the students regarding their program, general professional issues or processes, or the often unexplained norms of academic life. Even if students are sometimes too shy to ask what they really want to know in class, their recognition of my willingness to address such issues means they often show up during office hours to ask what they consider an embarrassing question (“how much do assistant professors typically make?” or “what do you say in a cover letter when you send out an article for consideration?”). We have to let students know that we are willing to share information with them in an honest and practical manner. We should be “open texts” for them to read and learn from in their own processes of professional interpretation and skill-building.

I believe it would be useful to build some of the expectations above into the desired outcomes of our graduate programs. In fact, I haven’t heard of any programs that articulate specific goals for professionalization processes, but I think we should be asking what specifically we wish the end product to be of those seminars, workshops, and other conversations about academic life. I would offer that an overarching goal might be to help our students become more supple and skilled participants in the wide variety of conversations that comprise an academic career. By necessity, acquiring this conversational skill means learning the value of being both multi-voiced and open to the perspectives of others.

This bears some explanation. By multi-voiced I am not implying that students should learn to be Machiavellian or duplicitous. Rather, I mean that all of us who are thriving in our careers have learned to speak within a wide variety of contexts and to choose our language carefully depending upon the venue. I would never speak in class as I do in some of my more theoretically dense writings. I would never speak to administrators from other departments as I do to those in my home department who use the same terms and points of reference. And finally I would never speak to the public exactly as I would to a scholarly audience at a conference. Being multi-voiced in this way means being aware of your conversation partners’ needs and placing their need to understand above your own desire to express yourself in intellectually self-serving ways.

And this is, in fact, an important component of being open to the perspectives of others. Yet that openness also means allowing one’s own beliefs, values, and opinions to be challenged and transformed by contact with those of conversation partners. This does not mean being unwilling to defend one’s beliefs (whether on matters of social justice or minute points of interpretation), but it does mean being able to position oneself at least partially outside of oneself in the process of conversational exchange. It certainly means working to understand how the general public perceives the academy (and the debate over tenure, for example). It means trying to see the world through the eyes of a different generation of professors who may not use the same methodologies or theoretical touchstones in their work. It means seeing one’s own sacredly held positions as ones that exist in a landscape of positions, many of which are also sacredly held.

Continued in article


December 11, 2005 message from David Albrecht [albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]

At Bowling Green, much institutional emphasis is being placed on having undergraduates conduct or participate in research. Of course, I'm pretty sure the program is slanted toward the hard sciences. An economics professor here is active in this area. She suggests that I get involved.

I'd love to get involved, there are significant rewards being tossed about.

On what would my undergraduates do research?

Please help me.

David Albrecht

December 12, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi David,

At the college of business level, you might suggest that your college become involved in the highly popular National Conferences on Undergraduate Research (NCUR). This affords students the opportunity to travel a bit and make presentations with other students at the excellent NCUR conferences. It also is an opportunity to promote your college and its faculty. Your social and physical science colleges may already be involved with NCUR --- http://www.ncur.org/ 

As far as research goes, I think it would be great to have students write responses to FASB, GASB, and IASB exposure drafts and other invitations to comment. Undergraduate research is not as esoteric as PhD research and leaves some room for normative methodology.

Along these lines I had an opportunity to view two absolutely absurd referee reports sent to a professor, not me, with respect to a submission. His submission suggested, among other things, that some accounting faculty should spend more time responding to standard setters' invitations to comment on matters that need more applied research. For lack of a better term, I will call this applied research in accounting.

The reports of both referees were highly critical of professors trying to publish applied research in any AAA journals (including Accounting Horizons which they assert is read mostly by academics rather than practitioners). Perhaps they might make an allowance for Issues in Accounting Education, but no mention is made for IAE in these referee reports.

I think the following quotation (listed as the Number 1 criticism) from one of the referee reports pretty much sums up the sad state of academic accounting research today.

I quote:

*************
1. The paper provides specific recommendations for things that accounting academics should be doing to make the accounting profession better. However (unless the author believes that academics' time is a free good) this would presumably take academics' time away from what they are currently doing. While following the author's advice might make the accounting profession better, what is being made worse? In other words, suppose I stop reading current academic research and start reading news about current developments in accounting standards. Who is made better off and who is made worse off by this reallocation of my time? Presumably my students are marginally better off, because I can tell them some new stuff in class about current accounting standards, and this might possibly have some limited benefit on their careers. But haven't I made my colleagues in my department worse off if they depend on me for research advice, and haven't I made my university worse off if its academic reputation suffers because I'm no longer considered a leading scholar? Why does making the accounting profession better take precedence over everything else an academic does with their time?
**************

Both referees imply that studying accounting standards will take our researchers away from what's really important in accounting academe, namely publishing empirical and analytical research on problems that lend themselves to esoteric statistics and mathematics. The irony is that most of the esoteric research published research along those lines is more or less focused on trivial hypotheses of little interest in and of themselves. Certainly our academic friends in economics and finance are not subscribing to our accounting research journals. We, of course, subscribe to their esoteric journals.

Once again I make my case that that academic research hypotheses published in top accounting research journals cannot be of much interest since all top accounting research journals in academe have a policy against publication of replication studies. What value can the findings have of the replication studies are of no interest? See http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Replication

The bottom line is that real scientists, economists, medical researchers, and legal researchers would laugh the above two arrogant AAA journal referees off the face of the planet. I'm certainly glad that medical researchers focus on professional practice problems and insist on replication. I'm certainly glad that biology researchers focus on microbes that are helping or hindering life on earth. I'm certainly glad that legal research is almost entirely focused on real world case law. No respectable academic discipline, other than accounting, divorces itself from the practice of its own profession. I think this is the main reason academic accounting research is held is such low esteem both by practitioners and by other academic disciplines. We've become a sick joke.

What the two idiots, who are typical arrogant referees for AAA journals, are doing, David, is leaving a whole lot of room for Bowling Green's undergraduates to conduct research on the important problems of the academic profession while they themselves go off and play in the sandbox of research that their own top journals conclude is not worth replicating. I suggest to you David that there is ample room for your undergraduates do applied research that may benefit the profession. Just do not expect the arrogant "philosophers" who guard the gates of our academic accounting research journals to allow any of this research pass into the gates of heaven.

I think the two referee reports mentioned above are exactly what the current AAA President (Judy Rayburn) and the Past President (Jane Mutchler) are trying in vain to overcome by changing the refereeing policy of the AAA's leading journals. I'm certain the prejudices of our arrogant ivory tower academics are so ingrained that these two women are fighting losing battles.

I suggest that you, David, conduct a lab experiment in your undergraduate classes. Bring a scale to each class and have the students weigh the last four issues of The Accounting Review. Then have students weigh the last four issues of Accounting Horizons. You must first tear out only the research articles themselves since both journals do publish some items that are not research submissions to the journals. Please publish this comparative study on the AECM. I think the results will speak for themselves about the sad state of applied research in accounting academe.

Imagine the how academe might be shaken up if an AAA Doctoral Consortium were entirely devoted one year to taking up current issues facing the FASB, GASB, and IASB. The very foundations of academe might crumble if we let outsiders into the tightly controlled esoteric program of the Doctoral Consortium and corrupt the research biases of our new doctoral graduates in accountancy.

Send your undergraduate researchers marching forward David. The accounting world will be a better place. The profession is getting very little help from unreplicated research articles that pass through the gates diligently guarded by arrogant and narcisstic AAA journal referees.

Bob Jensen

December 12, 2005 reply from McCarthy, William [mccarthy@BUS.MSU.EDU]

On Monday 12 December 2005, David Fordham wrote on AECM:

...

No matter how good it is, no matter what its form, systems research will not be published in accounting journals given the current editorship and review staff

...

David and other AECM system researchers:

This has been generally true in the past and there are certainly still a host of accounting journals that underestimate the importance of accounting information systems (AIS) research. Additionally, it is still true that almost all accounting academics remain clueless about the different kinds of methodologies that AIS, MIS, and computer science researchers generally use. Thus, accounting systems people (like Dave and I plus many AECM members) are forced to live in an academic world that understands neither “the what” nor “the how” of AIS research and teaching.

However, the American Accounting Association (in general) and The Accounting Review (in particular) are taking steps to narrow this gap in understanding. Dan Dhaliwal, the senior editor of The Accounting Review (TAR) has appointed me – a known maverick in accounting circles and a long-time champion of AIS research and teaching -- as an editor for TAR.

That was the good news; now the bad (sort of) news. Since the announcement in August of a systems champion at the Review, we have seen no changes because systems people are not submitting manuscripts. I know that gearing up takes a while, but in the interim, I think we need to speak less of our underprivileged past status and concentrate more on how we are going to attack the myriad of problems that accounting faces today with systems-informed thinking and systems-informed methods. If you fervently believe that the practice of accounting benefits little from what TAR, JAR, JAE, et al. produce, and you also believe that accounting practice could benefit tremendously from improvements researched and suggested by good AIS people and computer scientists, you need to get busy.

I am going to give a speech on this at the AAA Information Systems Section mid-year meeting on January 7th, 2006, but in the interim, I hope people can use their inter-term break time to get the flow to TAR increased. Let’s get going!!

Bill McCarthy
Michigan State

Dennis Beresford, former Chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board and current Ernst & Young Professor of Accounting at the University of Georgia, had much to recommend on how academic accountants could improve.  His luncheon speech on August 10, 2005 at the AAA Annual Meetings in San Francisco is provided at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/BeresfordAAAspeech2005.htm
I snipped the above URL to
http://snipurl.com/Beresford2005

My apologies for some formatting that was lost when I converted Denny's DOC file into a HTM file.

December 12, 2005 reply from David Albrecht

What is applied research?

I've never been able to figure this one out.

David Albrecht

December 13, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi David,

First let me point out that for over three decades, Denny Beresford has been appealing for more applied research among accounting educators.  Two days ago I requested and received his permission to post his luncheon speech at the annual 2005 AAA meetings in San Francisco.  His somewhat emotional appeal is at  http://snipurl.com/Beresford2005

You can obtain various definitions of applied research by going to
http://www.google.com/advanced_search?hl=en
Type in the following in one of the search boxes:

        Define "Applied Research"

Among the many definitions the one I like is that basic research is "the  systematic, intensive study directed toward the practical application of knowledge and problem solving."
www.unlv.edu/depts/cas/glossary.htm

 The key word in this definition is "practical application."  In the context of the accountancy profession I think of this is as discovery of practical applications that can be put into place by practicing accountants and their firms.  Included here are practical applications for standard setters such as the FASB, GASB, and IASB.

By way of example, I would include virtually all of the applied research papers published by Ira Kawaller on the practical applications of derivative financial instruments and accounting for derivative financial instruments --- http://www.kawaller.com/articles.shtml  

By way of a particular example, I like Ira's applied research on when to use dollar-offset versus regression tests of hedge effectiveness.  Hedge effectiveness testing is required for hedge accounting per Paragraph 62 in FAS 133.  The FASB does not prescribe how such testing should be done in practice.  It only says such testing is required.  Ira makes some practical  suggestions at http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/AFP_Regression.pdf

I contend that most ABC costing research is of an applied nature since most published papers and the seminal discoveries of ABC by the John Deere Company back in the 1940s are intended for practical application.

Lines between basic research and applied research in accounting are really  confusing because it is common to associate quantitative methods and/or historical methodology with basic research.  Basic research should not be confused with tools and methods of research.  Basic research quite simply is a research discovery, new knowledge, that has no perceived application in practice or at best has some hope for possible discovery of practical applications in future applied research.

I suspect that the discovery of the structure of DNA by Watson and Crick is conceived as basic research.  Applied researchers later on found ways to put this to use in practice such as the practice of using DNA evidence in criminal cases. 

I suspect that portfolio theory in the 1959 doctoral dissertation of Harry Markowitz at Princeton would be considered basic research that later led to the CAPM model and Options Pricing Model applied in practice.  The discovery by Markowitz was totally impractical until simplified index models were later discovered when trying to apply Markowitz theory to actual portfolio choices.

The best examples of basic versus applied research discoveries probably come from the discipline of mathematics.  Theoretical mathematicians like to prove things with no thought as to possible relevance to anything in the real world.

 It is much more difficult to find truly basic research discoveries in accountancy.  We should be grateful that we do not have to select Nobel Prize Winners in accountancy.  The Ball and Brown study got the first Seminal Contribution Award from the AAA.  But this is an application of capital market research discovered previously by researchers in finance and economics.  Capital markets studies have mostly applied models developed in finance, econometrics, and statistics.   

What I am saying is that it is possible to apply theory and test hypotheses without intending to have the discoveries be put directly into practice in a profession.  For example an events study such as the discovery by George Foster that the publication of a Barrons' paper by Abe Briloff was highly correlated with a plunge in share prices of McDonalds Corporation tells us something about an association between Briloff's accounting publication and capital market events.  But correlation is not causation.  Foster's study could not really tell us if the accounting issue (dirty pooling) or the mere fact that Briloff said something negative about McDonalds in Barrons actually caused the plunge in share prices.

The bottom line here is that the basic versus applied research distinction in mathematics and science does not carry over well into accounting.  I prefer to make the distinction more along the lines of research not having versus having a direct impact on practicing accountants.  For example, Ira's paper on hedge effectiveness techniques had immediate and direct impact on having firms use dollar-offset testing for retrospective data and regression for prospective data.  Companies actually follow Ira's recommendations when implementing FAS 133 rules. 

So what makes Ira's study different from those of Ball and Brown, Beaver, and Foster?  I guess the distinction lies in the "take home" for practicing accountants and standard setters.  Most capital markets research discoveries do not provide the CPA on the street with something to immediately place into practice or take out of practice.  The Ira Kawaller studies linked above provide CFOs with strategies for hedging and CAOs/CPAs with strategies for implementing FAS 133.

Now the question is:  What is Denny Beresford asking us to provide to the standard setters?  I think what he's asking for is more along the lines of Ira Kawaller's practical-application contributions.  If Ira's studies had been done before FAS 133 was issued, the standard itself in Paragraph 62 might have suggested or even required specific types of hedge effectiveness testing.  Instead Paragraph 62 of FAS 133 offered no suggestions for how to test for effectiveness.  This has led to thousands of variations, often inconsistent, of hedge effectiveness testing in practice.

Both while he was Chairman of the FASB and after he became a professor of accounting at Georgia, Denny Beresford has consistently been appealing for the academy to conduct research that will have more direct benefit in the writing of accounting standards.  This of course entails a considerable effort in learning the issues faced by standard setters on particular complicated issues like the thousands of different types of derivative financial instruments actually used in practice.  Most academic accountants shun learning about such contracts and instead turn to tried and true regression models of data found in existing databases like those provided by Compustat and Audit Analytics.  My conclusion is that this so-called basic research is actually easier than making creative contributions to practicing accountants, i.e. providing them with discoveries that they did not make themselves in practice.  This is so tough that it is why the academy tends to avoid Denny's appeal.

I repeat and lament the sad state of the accountancy academy as reflected in the following quotation from a referee that closed the gate on publishing a paper of a very close friend of mine:

I quote:

*************

1. The paper provides specific recommendations for things that accounting academics should be doing to make the accounting profession better. However (unless the author believes that academics' time is a free good) this would presumably take academics' time away from what they are currently doing. While following the author's advice might make the accounting profession better, what is being made worse? In other words, suppose I stop reading current academic research and start reading news about current developments in accounting standards. Who is made better off and who is made worse off by this reallocation of my time? Presumably my students are marginally better off, because I can tell them some new stuff in class about current accounting standards, and this might possibly have some limited benefit on their careers. But haven't I made my colleagues in my department worse off if they depend on me for research advice, and haven't I made my university worse off if its academic reputation suffers because I'm no longer considered a leading scholar? Why does making the accounting profession better take precedence over everything else an academic does with their time?

**************

My bottom line conclusion is that the referee acting superior above is really scared to death that he or she cannot be creative enough to make a practical suggestion to the FASB that the FASB itself has not already discovered. 

          Bob Jensen

January 19, 2006 reply from Paul Williams [williamsp@COMFS1.COM.NCSU.EDU]

This type of review is all too common and is symptomatic of what the accounting academy has become. I recall a panel discussion that was organized for an AAA annual meeting (I believe it was the last time we held it in Washington) to air an issue that Bill Cooper was animated about at that time -- data sharing and the bigger problem of research impropriety. One of the panelists was a scientist from John Hopkins who had just started a research ethics journal. As part of this program editors of many leading accounting journals were invited to give their perspectives on the problem of replication and potential research malfeasance. Of course none thought there was any problem.

One editor (still an editor of one of the most prominent journals)  responding to the scientist's contention that the scholarly enterprise is to ultimately seek knowledge, concurred, but added, (paraphrased, but pretty close) "An alternative hypothesis is that the academic enterprise is a game constructed to identify the cleverest people so we know who to give the money to."

His smirk revealed a great deal about what he believed to be the silly idea that scholarship was about knowledge. The reviewer's reply above is evidence that the hypothesis about an academic game is more believable than one in which the academic enterprise in accounting has understanding anything as its objective. And the profession is certainly culpable. It created professorships and awarded them to the winners of this game. It funded the JAR conferences. It dropped out of the AAA. This may be because the profession has never had any great respect for scholarship, at least not in my lifetime. Medical scholarship is not about creating profit opportunities for doctors; neither is legal scholarship about creating profit opportunities for lawyers. Perhaps this is why we now have, as Ray Chambers opined in his Abacus article in 1999 (just before he passed away) that we had created vast tomes of incoherent rules "...as if for a profession of morons."


The shift from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft.

"Notes from the Underground," by Scott McLemee, Inside Higher Ed, January 18, 2006 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2006/01/18/mclemee

“Knowledge and competence increasingly developed out of the internal dynamics of esoteric disciplines rather than within the context of shared perceptions of public needs,” writes Bender. “This is not to say that professionalized disciplines or the modern service professions that imitated them became socially irresponsible. But their contributions to society began to flow from their own self-definitions rather than from a reciprocal engagement with general public discourse.”

Now, there is a definite note of sadness in Bender’s narrative – as there always tends to be in accounts of the shift from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft. Yet it is also clear that the transformation from civic to disciplinary professionalism was necessary.

“The new disciplines offered relatively precise subject matter and procedures,” Bender concedes, “at a time when both were greatly confused. The new professionalism also promised guarantees of competence — certification — in an era when criteria of intellectual authority were vague and professional performance was unreliable.”

But in the epilogue to Intellect and Public Life, Bender suggests that the process eventually went too far. “The risk now is precisely the opposite,” he writes. “Academe is threatened by the twin dangers of fossilization and scholasticism (of three types: tedium, high tech, and radical chic). The agenda for the next decade, at least as I see it, ought to be the opening up of the disciplines, the ventilating of professional communities that have come to share too much and that have become too self-referential.”

The above quotation does not contain beginning and ending parts of the article


I loved the Marx Brothers Analogy in This One:  It shows what happens when government runs a business

"Is This Any Way to Run a Railroad? You think you've got problems? Amtrak's got an overpaid workforce. Its trains and tracks are falling apart. Worse, the carrier's balance sheet is a flat-out mess," by John Goff, CFO Magazine, November 2005 --- http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/5077873/c_5101083?f=magazine_featured

As Marx Brothers movies go, Go West isn't much. The aging comedy team was running out of ideas, and it shows: the plot is predictable and the gags are stale. Yet there is one memorable scene in the 1940 film. In it, the boys — desperate to keep a steam-powered locomotive chugging along — feed the entire train to itself, car by car, piece by piece, caboose to tender.

Management at the National Railroad Passenger Corp., better known as Amtrak, performed a similar sacrifice in 2001. Four years into an effort to wean itself from federal operating subsidies, the rail carrier was running on empty. Executives had already started diverting funds earmarked for capital projects to help plug operating holes. But even that wasn't enough, and soon, Amtrak's management began cannibalizing the railroad. Recalls Cliff Black, Amtrak's director of media relations: "We mortgaged everything."

Things got so bad that the railroad took out a loan on New York's Pennsylvania Station to cover three months of expenses. It was a move the U.S. Office of Management and Budget called "a financial absurdity equivalent to a family taking out a second mortgage on its home to pay its grocery bills." Eventually, Amtrak conceded it couldn't break even, and Congress continued pumping funds back into the rail operator.

The damage to the balance sheet had been done, however. During the five-year plan, the carrier's debt load nearly tripled, from $1.7 billion to $4.8 billion. Once dubbed the "Glide Path to Profitability," Amtrak's intended march to self-sufficiency is termed something else by current CFO David Smith. "I call it the slippery slope to hell," he says.

Since taking the reins last November, Smith has personally spent considerable time in purgatory — stuck awaiting vital federal funding for the carrier while politicians dither over the future of passenger rail service. "Amtrak's never had full support from any Administration. And it has no ongoing real capital budget," notes James Coston, chairman of Corridor Capital LLC, which specializes in finance and development for intercity and commuter rail systems. "So each year, they go up to Capitol Hill with a tin cup."

And that cup remains far from full. Last February, for example, the White House announced it intended to cut off Amtrak's billion-dollar-plus annual subsidy — which covers about half the railroad's total budget — unless the carrier agreed to a radical restructuring. Both the House and the Senate defied the Administration, calling for subsidies ranging from $1.17 billion to $1.45 billion for 2006 (the carrier generated $1.9 billion in revenues last year against $2.9 billion in costs). But the details have yet to be ironed out, and it's still unclear just how much money Amtrak will get.

Amid the revenue uncertainty, Smith must somehow pay down Amtrak's borrowings, upgrade its information technology and financial skills, and wring concessions from entrenched unions. He is also charged with mapping out long-term capital investments on the railroad's antiquated infrastructure — a tall order when you don't actually know what funds will be available to finance the repairs. And he must do all this under the scrutiny of an Administration whose purported goal, says Amtrak president and CEO David Gunn, is "to destroy Amtrak."

It is, in sum, a nearly impossible to-do list. But judging from his efforts so far, Smith has what it takes to defy long odds: steadiness, belief, and a certain imperviousness to the Coliseum crowd. Some observers say his first year on the job could be used as a case study for grace under fire. Says Coston: "I can't imagine a tougher job than being CFO at Amtrak."

December 5, 2005 reply from Paul Williams

Bob, Come on! This kind of argument is unfair. You sound like the folks at Rochester. Outcomes I like I attribute to market forces and the private sector; outcomes I don't like are the fault of government meddling. I defy anyone to draw a line that demarcates private from public outcomes. The intertwining of government and economics is today the same as it has always been. Abandoning the messy world of political economy for the mathematically elegant imaginary world of mere economics makes for a nice living for a lot of mathematicians. Since my paycheck is drawn on the account of the State of North Carolina I am legally a government employee. NC State's Centennial Campus is living testament to the impossibility, in a meaningful scientific sense (as opposed to a rhetorical sense), of the distinction between pubic and private. All that exists are organizations within a context of constraints and incentives mutually determined by economic, political, and social forces (if force is the right metaphor).

Paul Williams
paul_williams@ncsu.edu  (919)515-4436

December 6, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen

From the KPMG Audit Report on September 30, 2004 --- http://www.amtrak.com/pdf/04financial.pdf The Company (Amtrak) has a history of substantial operating losses and is highly dependent upon substantial Federal government subsidies to sustain its operations. There are currently no Federal government subsidies authorized or appropriated for any period subsequent to the fiscal year ending September 30, 2005 (“fiscal year 2005”). Without such subsidies, Amtrak will not be able to continue to operate in its current form and significant operating changes, restructuring or bankruptcy may occur. Such changes or restructuring would likely result in asset impairments.

************************

I guess I have to agree Paul that the difference between Amtrak and other businesses, like farmers, dependent upon government subsidies is largely semantic (rhetorical). In a sense, Amtrak is less like Fanny Mae since Amtrak's debt is not guaranteed by the Federal government. It is also less like the U.S. Post Office since Amtrak did sell equity (that has nearly been wiped out by huge deficits). Like the Post Office, Amtrak does negotiate directly with the government for appropriations to a particular business. But unlike the Post Office, I think Amtrak can set prices without an act of Congress.

The lines are indeed fuzzy between government enterprises, private enterprises directly subsidized, private enterprises indirectly subsidized, and the theoretical private firms that have no government subsidies. There may not be any such private firms in modern times since nearly every product or service is indirectly subsidized somewhere along the supply chain.

One possible distinction between public and private enterprises is whether the government is obligated to pay creditors off in full if the enterprise fails. I gather that this is the case for NC state universities, the U.S. Post Office, and Fannie Mae (even though Fanny Mae also sells equity shares). Debt guarantees are not assured in the case of Amtrak such that Amtrak is closer to being private in this context. In this context, classifying public versus private enterprises becomes a sliding scale as to what portion of the debt is guaranteed by the government. Pension guarantees cloud this issue since these are a form of insurance that enterprises must buy into to become partly covered.

I'm not certain where your argument bears much fruit if we don't have some distinction between public and private. If subsidies make every enterprise a government enterprise, wouldn't all businesses become government enterprises? It would not be helpful to have no definition of private enterprise since many equity owners and creditors can still fail and do every day in firms where the government does not guarantee repayment of all debt.

One problem of debt guarantees like we have in Fanny Mae and the Post Office is that managers of those companies can be tempted put their companies in extremely high levels of debt risk because creditors are always willing to loan to the hilt if the government guarantees repayment. Then cowboy managers might be tempted to borrow great amounts to pay for highly inefficient operating costs or make extremely high risk investments (as Fannie Mae did with billions invested in losing manufactured housing mortgages).

When I started this thread I mistakenly thought that Amtrak's debt was guaranteed by the government. What amazes me is how Amtrak is still able to borrow money to finance losing operations. Creditors (who are largely in Canada and France) must have faith that the U.S. government will not allow Amtrak to fail in spite of Amtrak's bleak future for ever earning a profit. Apparently the close association of Amtrak and government make it not like Penn Central in the eyes of lenders.


A huge corporate finance textbook
From Jim Mahar's Blog on October 17, 2005 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

Vernimmen.com --- http://vernimmen.com/

What a great site!

When I was gone I received a message from the authors of Corporate Finance by Vernimmen, Quiry, Le Fur, and Salvi.

The book, newsletter, and website are all very interesting and useful.

The book is 48 chapters (about 1000 pages) full of corporate finance. I have to agree with the authors "It is a book in which theory and practice are constantly set off against each other...."

I really like it. Especially the emphasis not so much on techniques ("which tend to shift and change over time."

VERY WELL DONE!

Moreover, the authors also put out a monthly newsletter and have a web site that could stand alone as one of the best in the business.

Vernimmen.com --- http://vernimmen.com/

Jensen Comment:
Perhaps intermediate accounting textbooks will one day follow this lead of contrasting theory and practice.


Accentuate the Obvious
Not every scientist can discover the double helix, or the cellular basis of memory, or the fundamental building blocks of matter. But fear not. For those who fall short of these lofty goals, another entry in the "publications" section of the ol' c.v. is within your reach. The proliferation of scientific journals and meetings makes it possible to publish or present papers whose conclusion inspires less "Wow! Who would have guessed?" and more "For this you got a Ph.D.?" In what follows (with thanks to colleagues who passed along their favorites), names have been withheld to protect the silly.
Sharon Begley, "Scientists Research Questions Few Others Would Bother to Ask," The Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2005; Page B1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB111715390781744684,00.html
Jensen Comment:  Although some of the studies Begley cites are well-intended, her article does remind me of some of the more extreme studies that won Senator Proxmire's Golden Fleece Awards --- http://www.taxpayer.net/awards/goldenfleece/about.htm
Also see http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/G/GoldenF1l.asp
Accounting research in top accounting journals seldom is not so much a fleecing as it is a disappointment in drawing "obvious" conclusions that practicing accountants "would not bother to ask."  Behavioral studies focus on what can be studied rather than what is interesting to study.  Studies based on analytical mathematics often start with assumptions that guarantee the outcomes.  And capital markets event studies either "discover" the obvious or are inconclusive.


A Populist Movement in Accounting Research

At the 2005 American Accounting Association meetings in San Francisco, the 2005-2006 President, Judy Rayburn from the University of Minnesota, gave a luncheon speech about the State of the AAA.  The AAA is not in the best of shape and comparisons are made with other academic associations in business studies such as finance and management.

What is especially interesting is the current populist movement going on in the AAA.  It is built upon the argument that the AAA journals and meeting programs became too detached from the accounting profession and problems within the profession.  There is a strong movement rising to change the editorial biases of the AAA’s top journals that have been tightly controlled by positivists demanding great rigor in empirical and analytical studies.  One problem is that such demands for rigor have limited researchers to rather uninteresting problems that derive outcomes of little surprise or interest.  In many respects there is a current populist movement with respect to the entire academic tenure and performance evaluation process.   You can read a bit more about this at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession  

 

August 23, 2005 message from Tracey Sutherland [tracey@AAAHQ.ORG]

Given the lively discussion about Judy Rayburn's luncheon talk in San Francisco, I thought some would be interested in her PowerPoint slides which are posted on the AAA website -- you'll find them at http://aaahq.org/AM2005/menu.htm  . It was great to see many of you at the Annual Meeting -- special thanks to folks for discussing ideas for some of the teaching/learning related sessions developed by the VP for Education -- a session on using games in teaching accounting was an outcome of conversations on AECM.

Best regards, Tracey

Jensen Comment:  Katherine Schipper's Presidential Lecture slides are also available"

Katherine Schipper's Presidential Lecture
(PowerPoint Slides)
Judy Rayburn's President's Talk
(PowerPoint Slides)

I suspect the AAA is holding off on Denny Beresford's speech until it is determined if Accounting Horizons is going to publish his paper.

Cynthia Cooper’s plenary speech on Wednesday is proprietary and will not be published by the AAA. You can, however, find some of her remarks in various places if you run a search on Google. There is a basketball star by that same name, so I suggest you run the search on “Cooper” AND “Worldcom”.

Cooper was one of Time Magazine's 2002 "Persons of the Year" --- http://www.time.com/time/personoftheyear/2002/

Also see http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m4153/is_6_60/ai_111737943

August 23 reply from Ken Crofts [kcrofts@CSU.EDU.AU]

Judy Rayburn’s slides . . . are also interesting, particularly drop in membership of AAA over the years.

Ken


The philosophy of science is a dying discipline
The philosophy of science is a dying discipline in part because it added philosophical terminology and discourse that did not have enough value added to scientists themselves as they got on with the work at hand, particularly social scientists.

Social scientists have moved on from debates over the scientific paradigm. I highly recommend examining how sociologists now proceed without getting all hung up on positivist or anti-positivist dogma --- http://www.trinity.edu/mkearl/methods.html#ms 

I particularly like the following quotation from the above document:

Methodology entails the procedures by which social research, whether  quantitative and qualitative, are conducted and ultimately evaluated--in other words, how one's hypotheses are tested. Getting more specific, researchers' methodologies guide them in defining, collecting, organizing, and interpreting their data. Often the major breakthroughs in our understanding of social processes occur because of the novelty of the data used, the techniques by which it is gathered, or by the model or question directing its acquisition and/or interpretation.  And let's hear it for the findings that don't support the hypotheses at the Journal of Articles in Support of the Null Hypothesis and in the Index of Null Effects and Replication Failures.

Defining one's data: Precisely how does one go about and measure such theoretical concepts as altruistic behavior, esprit de corps, or anomie?  Even such apparent "no brainers" as religiosity, happiness, or social class reveal how methodological adequacy and validity are a function of the clarity of one's theory and its part.  Further, theory tends to be built into our measurement tools.  When, for instance, one measures temperature with a thermometer it is not the temperature per se that one sees but rather a phenomenon (mercury rising within a column) theoretically related to it.

For strategies for data collection see Bill Trochim's Research Methods Tutorials, including material on:

Thinking about using the web for conducting a survey?  Available online is Matthias Schonlau, Ronald D. Fricker, Jr., and Marc N. Elliott's Conducting Research Surveys via E-mail and the Web.

August 22, 2005 reply from Paul Williams at North Carolina State University

To add a bit more to Michael, Ron, and Bob's comments: Even Popper, by the time he died wasn't a Popperian, but an evolutionary epistimologist. Even he had to recognize the implications of the linguistic turn and, particularly, Paul Feyerabend's (a student of Popper) destruction of the pretenses of method. Bob is right that philosophy of science is a dead horse replaced by a sociology and history of science. Even scientists don't follow the scientific method. Underlying every theory are propositions that don't enter into the specific experiment or hypothesis being tested. I am with Ron, and many others, that rigor is not obtained by running experiments within the context of a theory that has absolutely pernicious underlying presuppostions.
Capital market theory and principal/agent theory are such theories.


The pernicious underlying proposition that is both empirically false (as evolutionary biologists and anthropologists have provided ample evidence of the kind you would consider rigorous) and morally repugnant is that of humans' nature. What we in accounting seem never to consider is what ramifications such presuppositions have for the very culture in which we live. As Ed Arrington labeled it, Watts and Zimmerman are merely Hobbes in drag. Hobbesian human nature was constructed to argue for Leviathan -- self- government is beyond the ken of humans engaged in a war of all against all. Certainly a libertarian philosophy is untenable in a Hobbesian world. Solipsistic, vicious self-maximizers. The
project of the Scottish Enlightenment (of which Thomas Jefferson was a diligent student) was to produce a human being who was capable of being free of the rule of Kings or absolute sovereigns.
 

Jagdish provided us a reference to Sumantra Ghoshal's article "Bad Management Theories Are Destroying Good Management Practices." The bad management theories he speaks of are those of agency theory. Why accounting should have been preoccupied for the last 35 years in substance testing a theory of human nature is one of the great mysteries. Principal/agent theory is a bad theory based on its own empirical pretensions. What kind of Rsquares have we produced? Most of human behavior is left unexplained by the theory. And after this last stock market bubble, does anyone seriously believe in capital market efficiency?
 

How good a "scientific" theory do you have when after 40 years of testing you are still back at square one? And if capital markets aren't efficient, what does that do to the 30 years of "information content" studies predicated on the assumption that markets were at least semi-strong efficient? Let me ask this question, of you and everyone else: How much of what you believe do you believe on the basis of the "empirical evidence?" Very little. Indeed, believing you are a Popperian is a belief not based on empirical evidence. No one did an experiment and proved that Popper was
right.


But what makes capital market theory and principal agent theory bad is what it forces me to believe about myself and Michael and Ron and You, which I will not, nor do I have to, accept. To quote from Michael Shermer's The Science of Good and Evil: "Still, something profound happened in the last 100,000 years that made us -- and no other species -- moral animals to a degree unprecedented in nature (p. 31)." Accounting is a human practice.


It's objects are not atoms, or quarks, or stars, or planets. It's objects are also its subjects (the double hermeneutic that our physicists friends don't have to deal with). A human practice that investigates itself as if human capacities are as impoverished as neo-classicists would have us believe they are (both in terms of doing good and evil) might be missing something exceedingly important to it.

 


Kurt Kleiner, "Most scientific papers are probably wrong," New Scientist, August 30, 2005 --- http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7915&feedId=online-news_rss091

Most published scientific research papers are wrong, according to a new analysis. Assuming that the new paper is itself correct, problems with experimental and statistical methods mean that there is less than a 50% chance that the results of any randomly chosen scientific paper are true.

John Ioannidis, an epidemiologist at the University of Ioannina School of Medicine in Greece, says that small sample sizes, poor study design, researcher bias, and selective reporting and other problems combine to make most research findings false. But even large, well-designed studies are not always right, meaning that scientists and the public have to be wary of reported findings.

"We should accept that most research findings will be refuted. Some will be replicated and validated. The replication process is more important than the first discovery," Ioannidis says.

In the paper, Ioannidis does not show that any particular findings are false. Instead, he shows statistically how the many obstacles to getting research findings right combine to make most published research wrong.

Massaged conclusions Traditionally a study is said to be "statistically significant" if the odds are only 1 in 20 that the result could be pure chance. But in a complicated field where there are many potential hypotheses to sift through - such as whether a particular gene influences a particular disease - it is easy to reach false conclusions using this standard. If you test 20 false hypotheses, one of them is likely to show up as true, on average.

Odds get even worse for studies that are too small, studies that find small effects (for example, a drug that works for only 10% of patients), or studies where the protocol and endpoints are poorly defined, allowing researchers to massage their conclusions after the fact.

Surprisingly, Ioannidis says another predictor of false findings is if a field is "hot", with many teams feeling pressure to beat the others to statistically significant findings.

But Solomon Snyder, senior editor at the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, and a neuroscientist at Johns Hopkins Medical School in Baltimore, US, says most working scientists understand the limitations of published research.

"When I read the literature, I'm not reading it to find proof like a textbook. I'm reading to get ideas. So even if something is wrong with the paper, if they have the kernel of a novel idea, that's something to think about," he says.

Journal reference: Public Library of Science Medicine (DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124)

Jensen Comment:  By analogy, this is a black eye against top accounting research journals that refuse to publish replication studies.  It is a special problem for accounting behavior studies where sample sizes and validity are enormous problems.  It may be less of a problem in capital market studies where sample sizes are often huge.  But problems of poor study design and missing variables in models are an enormous in accounting research that tries to be scientific.

Always subject a research conclusion to the so-what test! Even without technical skills you often can question that which your common sense tells you is not correct, although you may have to endure slings and arrows of paranoids in doing so.  Sometimes a child's question is the best kind of question --- http://imagine.gsfc.nasa.gov/docs/ask_astro/answers/011021a.html

Never be overwhelmed by CAPM studies.  The CAPM is such a simplified model (reducing market risk to one index) that most studies based on CAPM are probably correct versus incorrect by sheer chance.  The problem with multiple-index models, in turn, is that there are all sorts of specification problems due missing variables and other things such as the following:

multicollinearity (http://seamonkey.ed.asu.edu/~alex/computer/sas/collinear.html ),

homoscedasticity ( http://davidmlane.com/hyperstat/A121947.html ),

nonstationarity (http://sepwww.stanford.edu/oldsep/matt/sdi/nstat/Fig/paper_html/node1.html)

And there are many other problems that editors often overlook among "members of the club." 

One common problem in our studies that have huge sample sizes is that statistical inference is nonsense.  For example, suppose that we sample 50,000 men and 50,000 women to see if there is a difference in IQ.  Infinitesmal differences may be deemed "statistically significant."  I once had to critique a paper by a renowned researcher in accounting who somehow just did not understand this problem with large samples.

 


Year 2005 American Accounting Association Annual Meeting in San Francisco August 5-10, 2005
The AAA meetings were very good this year except for the first plenary session. Bravo to Tracie, Dee, and their helpers for great logistics. The Hilton did a great job. Bravo to Jane and her helpers for a great program.

I think Katherine's plenary (Tuesday) session on disclosures will be posted by the AAA. Katherine made reference to quite a lot of academic research. She might also make her PowerPoint file available at the FASB.

I hope the AAA will also post Denny's terrific luncheon speech. If not, I think Denny will share it in some way with all of us on the AECM.

A highlight of the meetings for me was the XBRL workshop conducted by Glen, Roger, and Skip. Eric Cohen also participated with a great demo of Rivet Software's Dragon Tag software which finally makes it possible to teach XBRL hands on to students.

Another highlight was the great debate between Katherine Schipper (for fair value accounting) versus more negative positions taken by Ross Watts and Zoe-Vanna Palmrose. All three did a great (actually unforgettable) job on Monday afternoon.

This 2005 AAA meeting set a record with nearly 2,700 registrations plus over 500 registered guests. This topped the previous record which was also set in San Francisco some years ago. Such a registration number is very high considering that there are only about 8,000 worldwide members of the AAA --- http://aaahq.org/about/financials/KeyIndicators8_31_04.PDF

I returned to Trinity University from New Hampshire today. Trinity is still seeking somebody to fill my chair (the Jesse H. Jones Distinguished Professor of Business Chair) after I retire in May 2006. Anyone interested in applying should contact Dan Walz at 210-999-7289 or dwalz@trinity.edu I am very grateful to have had the privilege to fill it for 24 years.

Life is good!

August 13, 2005 reply from Glen Gray [glen.gray@CSUN.EDU]

Gee, thanks for your kind words regarding our XBRL workshop.

For those who want to know more about XBRL, you should:

See XBRL cover story in August 2005 Journal of Accountancy at http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/aug2005/tie.htm 

Visit http://www.xbrl.org  -- includes general and technical information about XBRL

Check out the 5-years of XBRL abstracts at http://bryant2.bryant.edu/~xbrl/index.html 

Review FAQs at http://xbrl.edgar-online.com/x/faqs/  , which cover a broad range of XBRL questions

Visit http://www.xbrlspy.org/  , a blog-like coverage of XBRL 

Check out the free XBRL teaching materials that will be available (Sept 1) at www.eycarat.ku.edu/XBRLClassMaterials

Bob Jensen's threads on XBRL are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm#TimelineXBRL

Bob Jensen's threads on fair value reporting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue

August 15, 2005 reply from McCarthy, William [mccarthy@BUS.MSU.EDU]

I agree that some of the annual meeting sessions mentioned already were quite good this year, but for me, the clear highlight of the convention was the policy speech given by new AAA president Judy Rayburn at the Wednesday luncheon.

Judy made a strong case for expanding the scope and volume of the AAA journal set by using comparisons to publication trends and citation trends in management, marketing, and finance. She also mentioned some specific AAA committee work that was going to assess these matters. Judy finished by coming down to the floor and answering all individual questions on rather difficult matters such as the acceptability of research paradigms from other countries and disciplines, and the effect of expansion on AAA section journals.

Many attendees did not have a ticket to the Wednesday luncheon, but I am sure Judy's slides will be made available to all.

Bill McCarthy
Michigan State

August 15, 2005 reply from Ali Mohammad J. Abdolmohammadi

I agree with Bill. While I found many presentations to be excellent this year, I was particularly impressed with Judy Rayburn's luncheon policy speech on Wednesday. I found the speech to be honest and gutsy. My nonscientific observation of the crowd was that the speech resonated well with the majority. It'll take a lot of hard work to make serious changes to the current publication culture of AAA journals, but it is well worth trying.

Ali Mohammad J. Abdolmohammadi, DBA, CPA
http://web.bentley.edu/empl/a/mabdolmohamm/ 
John E. Rhodes Professor of Accounting
Bentley College
175 Forest Street
Waltham, MA 02452


Fraudulent Conferences that Rip Off Colleges:  Do you really want to participate in these frauds?
I've written about this before, but I want to elaborate.  Academics either unwittingly or willingly sometimes allow themselves to get caught up in fraudulent "conferences."  Spam is on the rise for these frauds.  The degree of fraudulence varies.  At worst, there is no conference and organizers merely charge an exorbitant fee that allows the paper to be "refereed"  and published in a conference proceedings, thereby giving a professor a "publication."  See http://lists.village.virginia.edu/lists_archive/Humanist/v18/0633.html

Even when the conferences meet, they may be fraudulent.  Generally these conferences are held in places where professors like to travel in Europe, South America, Latin America, Las Vegas, Canada, the Virgin Islands, or other nice locations for vacations that accompany a trip to a conference paid for by a professor's employer.  The professor gets credit for a presentation and possibly a publication in the conference proceedings. 

But wait a minute!  Here are some warning signs for a fraudulent conference:

  1. Even though there is a high registration fee, there are no conference-hosted receptions, luncheons, or plenary sessions.  The conference organizer is never called to account for the high registration fee.  The organizer may allude to the cost of meeting rooms in a hotel, but often the meeting rooms are free as long as the organizer can guarantee a minimum number of guests who will pay for rooms in the hotel.
     

  2. All or nearly all submissions are accepted for presentation.
     

  3. The only participants in most presentation audiences are generally other presenters assigned to make a presentation in the same time slot.  There is virtually no non-participating audience.  Hence only a few people are in the room and each of them take turns making a presentation.  Most are looking at their watches and hoping to get out of the room as soon as possible.
     

  4. Presenters present their papers and then disappear for the rest of the conference.  There is virtually no interaction among all conference presenters.
     

  5. The papers presented are often journal rejects that are cycled conference after conference if the professor can find a conference that will accept anything submitted on paper.  Check the dates on the references listed for each paper.  Chances are the papers have few if any references from the current decade.
     

  6. These conferences are almost always held in popular tourist locations and are often scheduled between semesters for the convenience of adding vacation time to the trip.  They are especially popular in the summer.

Bob Jensen's threads on various types of fraud in academe are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm

August 17, 2005 reply from Jagdish Patha

Bob:

I was about to be fleeced by one such conference cheat claiming himself some Dr.----. generally organizes conferences at almost all the exotic locations of US, Cancun, Venice etc. This organizer double blind peer reviewed my submission (almost 35-40 pages) within 52 hours! Asked for per page charges if required to be placed in "proceedings" which happens to be a CD-ROM. This organizer has also got 4-5 journals which can ultimately accommodate any paper written from any angle of any sphere of business. You may get into any journal of your choice which will claim to be "double blind peer reviewed'!

I wish there should be some agency of regulators who can tame them. These people are bogus, there conferences are bogus and often I feel that what will be the face of a person who will come out and claim a paper presented and published in such bogus outlet to be considered suitable for tenure and promotion!

Jagdish Pathak, PhD
Guest Editor- Managerial Auditing Journal (Special Issue)
Associate Professor of Accounting & Systems Accounting & Finance Area
Odette School of Business
University of Windsor 401 Sunset Windsor, N9B 3P4, ON Canada

August 17, 2005 reply from David Albrecht

My answer is at the bottom of the paper, but please read my supporting argument.

Generally speaking I am not in favor of my department funding conference presentations for other faculty. I just don't think much is gained from it, and it is a very expensive CV line. I'd say that a lot of sponsored conferences haven't distinguished themselves from the rip-offs. However, the research-oriented faculty at my school are funded to attend conferences and conference presentations are the name of the game. So like it or not, I have to play the game.

But are quality conferences, such as AAA conferences, a rip-off? Is the phrase quality conference an oxymoron for the AAA? Here's my experience at the recent AAA in San Francisco. Tell me what you think.

I'm really upset with people making presentations, but then refusing by their actions to share their paper with members of the audience. I attended research presentations at eight of the nine time slots in SF, and tried to surf over to a simultaneous session a couple of times. In all of the sessions I attended, only 2 of 30 presenters had copies of the paper to distribute. The responsible presenters (both in education-related sessions) were Freddie Choo and the co-authoring team of Elizabeth Haywood, Dorothy McMullen and Donald Wygal. In the non-education related sessions I attended, there were no available copies of any paper. I then had to approach each presenter afterward and ask for a copy of the paper to be sent to me (seems reasonable that they would be available, as the papers had to be submitted 8-9 months in advance). Not one of the non-education presenters has sent anything to me. This is my usual experience. A few years ago I asked for a copy of a conference paper, and was assured that I would be sent one. Stereotypically, I received an e-mail two years later informing me that the paper was now available in some journal's most recent edition, and I was free to track it down. Of course, I was thanked for my interest in the paper.

Most of the time when someone says that I will sent a copy of the paper, it is an empty promise apparently designed to get rid of me. I hardly ever get one.

If one of the purposes of the AAA is to share research, then why are most of the presenters so proprietary and reluctant to share details? I don't think that much knowledge is shared when a presenter makes a very brief presentation using ineffective public speaking methods and then has no copy of the paper to share.

I've attended three conferences so far this year, two of which I had to pay for myself. In the Ohio AAA regional (BGSU paid for this one) there were no copies available, but Tim Fogarty was very good in sending me a copy of each of his papers presented. I learned so much from actually reading the papers. At a second conference, I think I was the only presenter at the conference to bring copies for attendees. I asked a few people for a copy his/her paper, but I have yet to be sent one. In the third conference, the SF AAA, I haven't received any requested papers from any concurrent session presenter* except for Tom Buttross, and his paper is education-related.

The teaching-related forums put on by the T&C section (the best section of the AAA, IMHO) were good, and it's my guess that about 20% had some write-up or paper to share at the forums. I picked up material there from Torben Thomson, the co-authoring team of Graeme Dean, Sandra Van Der Laan and Cameron Esslemont, the co-authoring team of Patsy Lee, Cheryl Prachyl and Carol Sullivan, the team of Gary Siegel & Gail Kucuiba, the team of Paul Mihalek, Milo Peck and Patricia Poli, the team of Elsie Ameen, Daryl Guffey and Cynthia Jackson, the team of Violet Rogers and Aileen Smith, the team of Michael Garner, Karen Papke-Shields, Ellen Pettingill and Denise Rotondo, and the sole author Christie Johnson. Well, maybe the rate is closer to 10%.

Following the conference, I've received materials from teaching forum participants George Schmelzle, Wendy Tietz, Gail Kucuiba, Yan Bao and Angela Lee. If I've misclassified anyone, I'm sorry.

My point is, the lid seems to be open for people eager to share their teaching ideas, but when it comes to the research-oriented presenters I'm SOL. Ironic, given that the major reason I attended AAA was to get caught up on financial reporting and auditing research ideas. Oh, I got my money's worth from the people mentioned above (as well as Thomas Calderon and Denny Beresford), but I really wish the conference would have been more research-oriented.

So, are AAA conferences rip-offs? Not entirely, but pretty much so. And since I spend my own money to attend them, I'm much less likely to attend one in the future.

David Albrecht

August 17, 2005 reply from Amy Dunbar [Amy.Dunbar@BUSINESS.UCONN.EDU]

David,

Although I agree that a paper should be available to you, I do not agree that the paper should be available in paper form. Rather, the links to the papers should be provided by the author. Requiring the author to haul papers to the conference is unreasonable, imo, but I think the authors should provide a handout with the title of the paper, the abstract, author information, and a link to the paper. As Bob Jensen mentioned in an earlier posting, an author can easily put a file on his/her web server. Personally, I would prefer to see links to the papers on an electronic version of the AAA program, but many argue that such availability could be construed to be a “publication” of the paper. I find this reasoning suspect because no one has a problem with SSRN postings.

I missed this AAA conference for the first time in years, and I really regret not being able to go. I find the meetings very useful, not only for the various sessions, but also from a networking perspective. This year, I heard there were also excellent CPE sessions. Far from being a “rip-off,” the AAA annual meeting is a valuable resource that takes incredible time on the part of the faculty volunteers who organize that meeting with the help of the AAA staff.

Amy Dunbar

UConn

August 18, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi David,

Although I disagree with the general negativism of your opinions about the AAA annual meetings, I will begin with one item of support.  Years ago when these meetings were held in San Diego, a CD recording company recorded every session (concurrent sessions to panel discussions to luncheons to plenary sessions).  The company had a booth were participants could buy the CD after each session at a rather modest cost  The sad part was that there was almost no demand to buy the CDs, especially the CDs from the research presentation sessions.  The reasons for this are unknown.  My own conclusion is that this is no fault of the AAA.  The problem is accounting research itself.  Most of it is just not very interesting whether or not it is presented at an AAA meeting.

The CD recording company lost a bundle on this venture and since then no effort is made to record AAA meeting sessions other than occasional plenary and luncheon sessions that are captured by the AAA itself on video as part of the projection system for large audiences.

There is a general lack of interest in accounting research.  Amy mentioned the SSRN working paper series --- http://www.ssrn.com/ . The big sellers in SSRN are economics and finance papers.  Demand for accounting research is dismal, especially when you factor out those papers billed as accounting papers that are economics research papers in accounting clothing.  I can't get the ranking system to work this morning, but the last time I looked there was not a single accounting paper in the SSRN listing of top downloads ---
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/topten/topTenResults.cfm?groupingtype=3&groupingId=1

I discuss problems with accounting research at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
The biggest problem is that our accounting journals themselves do not even judge it worthy to publish research  replications.  If our findings were really of interest our journals would be like science journals that actively seek out replications of findings in science.

Your comments focus on whether the benefit of sending a professor to the AAA meetings justifies the cost.  If we had interactive teleconferencing or Webcasting of sessions available, perhaps you would be correct in terms of the sessions themselves.  But this fails to weigh in the many other benefits of the AAA meetings, benefits that include the following:


I think you're asking too much in benefits from of the AAA meetings.  Such meetings serve many audiences from Glendale Community College to Ivy League research centers.  Such meetings serve many interests from teaching ideas to empirical/analytical research methods to issues of great concern in accountancy and business in the real world (that "other world").   Such meetings serve many audiences from the U.S. to Europe, to India, to Africa, to Russia to Japan to China to Kangaroo and Kiwi lands.

All we can expect from the AAA meetings are peep holes to opportunities, knowledge, and happenings in our corner on the world of teaching and research and professional practice.

Lastly David, I might add that the annual AAA meetings pass the market test.  Thousands of people would not take the time, trouble, and cost to come to these meetings from all over the world if they were not serving an important purpose.  You have every right to protest in an effort to make the meetings better.  However, I’m afraid that you must first demonstrate how to make accounting research itself better.

Bob Jensen

August 18, 2005 reply from Ruth Bender [r.bender@CRANFIELD.AC.UK]

The European Accounting Association has the papers available for download from its website before the conference and for a week after the conference has ended. My experience was that about 90% of what I wanted was available, and a couple of other authors who I emailed for papers were happy to oblige. Likewise, when I was emailed for a paper about a month after the conference, I sent it by return.

The great advantage of having downloads available before the conference was that it meant that the discussion at sessions could be a bit better informed.

Mind you, I do wish you'd stop putting down the 'Fraudulent Conferences'. One of my minor enjoyments on a wet English morning is looking at that conference email and working out which exotic locations I could possibly get Cranfield to pay for me to visit :-)

Regards Ruth

Dr Ruth Bender
Cranfield School of Management


Thursday, April 28, 2005
The Chronicle of Higher Education
Business Schools' Focus on Research Has Ensured Their Irrelevance, Says Scathing Article
By KATHERINE S. MANGAN

Business schools are "institutionalizing their own irrelevance" by focusing on scientific research rather than real-life business practices, according to a blistering critique of M.B.A. programs that will be published today in the May issue of the Harvard Business Review.

The article, "How Business Schools Lost Their Way," was written by Warren G. Bennis and James O'Toole, both prominent professors at the University of Southern California's Marshall School of Business. Mr. Bennis is also the founding chairman of the university's Leadership Institute, and Mr. O'Toole is a research professor at Southern Cal's Center for Effective Organizations.

Mr. Bennis and Mr. O'Toole conclude that business schools are too focused on theory and quantitative approaches, and that, as a result, they are graduating students who lack useful business skills and sound ethical judgment. The authors call on business schools to become more like medical and law schools, which treat their disciplines as professions rather than academic departments, and to expect faculty members to be practicing members of their professions.

"We cannot imagine a professor of surgery who has never seen a patient or a piano teacher who doesn't play the instrument, and yet today's business schools are packed with intelligent, highly skilled faculty with little or no managerial experience," the two professors write. "As a result, they can't identify the most important problems facing executives and don't know how to analyze the indirect and long-term implications of complex business decisions."

While business deans pay lip service to making their courses more relevant, particularly when they are trying to raise money, their institutions continue to promote and award tenure to faculty members with narrow, scientific specialties, the authors contend.

"By allowing the scientific-research model to drive out all others, business schools are institutionalizing their own irrelevance," the authors write.

Most business problems cannot be solved neatly by applying hypothetical models or formulas, they say. "When applied to business -- essentially a human activity in which judgments are made with messy, incomplete, and incoherent data -- statistical and methodological wizardry can blind rather than illuminate."

Not surprisingly, the head of the association that accredits business schools in the United States disagrees with the authors' assessment. John J. Fernandes, president and chief executive officer of AACSB International: the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business, said most business schools today are making an effort to teach broad skills that are directly applicable to real-world business practices.

He pointed out that in 2003, the association updated its accreditation standards to emphasize the teaching of "soft skills" like ethics and communication, and to require that business schools assess how well students are learning a broad range of managerial skills.

"I think the authors are looking at a very limited group of business schools that emphasize research," said Mr. Fernandes. "Most schools have done an excellent job of producing graduates with a broad range of skills who can hit the ground running when they're hired."

Mr. Bennis and Mr. O'Toole are not convinced. They say that business schools, which in the early 20th century had the reputation of being little more than glorified trade schools, have swung too far in the other direction by focusing too heavily on research. The shift began in 1959, they say, when the Ford and Carnegie Foundations issued scathing reports about the state of business-school research.

While the Southern Cal professors say they do not favor a return to the trade-school days, they think business schools, and business professors, have grown too comfortable with an approach that serves their own needs but hurts students.

"This model gives scientific respectability to the research they enjoy doing and eliminates the vocational stigma that business-school professors once bore," the article concludes. "In short, the model advances the careers and satisfies the egos of the professoriate."

The authors point out a few bright spots in their otherwise gloomy assessment of M.B.A. education. The business schools at the University of California at Berkeley and the University of Dallas are among those that emphasize softer, nonquantifiable skills like ethics and communication, they write. In addition, some business schools operate their own businesses, such as the student-run investment fund offered by Cornell University's S.C. Johnson Graduate School of Management.


Learning at Research Schools
Versus "Teaching Schools"
Versus "Happiness"
With a Side Track into Substance Abuse


If you connect students to the real world, will they be happier?
Somehow it's nice to know that accountancy schools are not alone in this dilemma!

"If You Teach Them, They Will Be Happy," by Jennifer Epstein, Inside Higher Ed, June 19, 2007 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/06/19/lawstudents

Law students — and the lawyers they become — are notoriously unhappy, but the interests of their professors could make all the difference in helping them through law school and in preparing them to be good lawyers.
A study published this month in the Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin compared recent classes at two law schools with almost identical average undergraduate grade-point averages and LSAT scores and found that students at the school that encouraged its professors to be good teachers rather than good scholars reported higher levels of well-being and competence, and scored higher on bar exams.

The study, “Understanding the Negative Effects of Legal Education on Law Students: A Longitudinal Test of Self-Determination Theory,” was conducted by Kennon M. Sheldon, a psychology professor at the University of Missouri at Columbia, and Lawrence S. Krieger, a law professor at Florida State University.

Students at both law schools entered with similar statistics: average undergraduate GPAs around 3.4 and LSAT averages near 156. The schools differed significantly, however, in overall ranking. Law School 1 (LS1), with a good reputation and an emphasis on faculty scholarship, ranked in the second tier (as defined by the study) while Law School 2 (LS2), with an emphasis on hiring and training faculty to be good teachers, ranked in the fourth tier.

Twenty-four percent of the Law School 2 graduates who took the bar exam in the summer of 2005 had “high” scores above 150, compared to 14 percent of Law School 1 graduates. Nearly half of Law School 1’s graduates, meanwhile, had “low” scores – below 130 – on the bar exam, compared with 22 percent of Law School 2’s graduates. Though the scoring statistics are representative of each law school overall, rather than just those students who participated in the study, they are “strongly suggestive that the teaching and learning at LS2 may be more effective,” the authors wrote.

Krieger, one of the authors, said in an interview that it was “almost shocking” to see “how significantly the fourth tier students outperformed the second tier law students on the bar.” But, he added, “it makes sense psychologically – the students at the fourth tier school were happier – and it makes sense that they would have learned more from better teachers.”

By the third year of law school, students at Law School 2 reported significantly higher levels of “subjective well-being,” autonomy and competence than students at Law School 1.

But Ann Althouse, a professor at the University of Wisconsin Law School in Madison said that though it is “intuitively right that the school that emphasizes teaching is the one with students who are happier and score better,” those students may not be better off in the long run.

She said that if all a law school expects of its faculty is to teach, then they can “put more time into teaching students to be lawyers, but not necessarily how to think like lawyers.”

In February, Althouse, a blogger on law and current events, was a month-long guest columnist for The New York Times. In one column, she wrote that while “law should connect to the real world … that doesn’t mean we ought to devote our classes to the personal expression of law students.” Rather, she said, law professors should “deny ourselves the comfort of trying to make [law students] happy and teach them what they came to learn: how to think like lawyers.”

Continued in article

June 23, 2007 reply from Dan Stone, Univ. of Kentucky [dstone@UKY.EDU]

Hi all,

Regarding Ken Sheldon & Lawrence Krieger's law school study (actually, they have published two studies on this topic: the one that Bob cites is their second published study.)

Professor Althouse's assertion that the students at the teaching school may not be learning "how to think like lawyers" suggests that she has not read this study carefully. The students at the teaching school were not only happier they also scored HIGHER on the bar exam. Therefore, unless Professor Althouse argues that the bar exam doesn't test critical thinking skills her argument doesn't accord to the data.

So, perhaps one need not be unhappy to be a competent professional? Perhaps at least some professor-induced suffering merely creates unhappiness and doesn't improve the quality of the "product"? Ok, now I am overstepping the data.....

FYI, I saw Ken present this paper a few weeks ago at the self-determination theory conference and was left wondering if similar results hold for professional accountancy programs. I chatted with Ken about this and he is also interested this topic.

Relatedly, there is some evidence that lawyers have higher alcohol and drug use rates than do some other professionals (though I can't recall the cites just now).

Best,

Dan Stone

Reply from Bob Jensen

Thank you Dan for that helpful and somewhat personalized reply. Here are a couple of citations of possible interest with respect to lawyer substance abuse:

Title:  Substance Abuse in Law Schools: A Tool Kit for Law School Administrators
Authors: Orgena Lewis Singleton JD, Alfred "Cal" Baker L.C.D.C., more...
Publication Date: December 2005, American Bar Association
ISBN: 1-59031-628-2
Topics: Law School, Law Students, Lawyer Assistance Programs, Legal Education & Admissions to the Bar
URL:  Click Here
Also see "Torts, Trials and ... Treatments," by Elia Powers, Issues in Higher Ed, January 4, 2007 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/01/04/lawschool

The ABA report argues that the quality of the legal profession is affected by lawyers who “are impaired as a result of abuse of alcohol and drugs.” One of the co-authors who spoke at Wednesday’s meeting in Washington, Cal Baker, is a recent law school graduate and director of a company that provides chemical dependency treatments.

Baker, a recovering alcoholic, said alcohol and drug abuse are the two top problems he sees among law students. (Other panelists said students often report depression and extreme anxiety, as well as substance abuse issues. ) He said he would have been unable to recover from his condition while in school, because nearly all the planned social activities were centered around bar nights.

One of the largest hurdles, Baker said, is convincing students that admitting their drinking problems won’t lead to disciplinary action. Many who have previous alcohol-related citations are concerned about their professional futures.

Continued in article

I do not know of comparable studies in the accounting profession. I do know that substance abuse is a problem on two levels for accountants, particularly auditors who are away from home a lot of the time. At level one is the professional away from home more than many other professionals. At level two is the family of a professional who is absent from home much of the time.

Some large CPA firms have hot lines where professionals and their family members can seek counseling with complete confidentiality and possible anonymity. These hot lines link directly with medical and family counseling professionals who are outside the firm itself but are paid by the firm. I'm told that an overwhelming proportion of the problems dealt with are substance abuse and troubled family members.

I suspect that these are problems that are not dealt with at all well in our schools of accountancy. One problem is that we want to attract students to this profession and do not like to dwell on the dark side of this profession's troubles. There are substance abuse problems in all professions. It would be interesting to study whether some professions tend to keep substance abuse problems in dark closets more than other professions. For example, perhaps there is more perceived sensitivity among clients/patients who are more afraid of substance abusers in accounting and medicine relative to law. That is only a personal observation and not something that I've studied. My guess is that substance abuse is highest among physicians and highest in terms of keeping their dependencies secret.

A more general site on substance abuse is provided at http://www.ndsn.org/links.html

June 25, 2007 reply from Bill Dent [billdent@tx.rr.com]

Bob—

I don’t know about other states, but the Texas State Board of Public Accountancy acknowledges the problem as evidenced by the following link on their website:

http://www.tsbpa.state.tx.us/pi8.htm 

Bill Dent

WILLIAM C. DENT, CPA (Retired)

Indirectly this relates to the current accounting doctoral program controversies described at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

It also relates to the issues of whether it is best to spoon feed students --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/265wp.htm

June 19, 2007 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

Bob,

In some ways, the situation in accounting is similar to that in law. In others, there is substantial difference.

In law there are essentially two tiers in law schools: those that are quite bar exam oriented, and those that emphasize legal theory and philosophy. The kinds of placements they have are also very different. The students at second sort of schools do clerkships with well known or almost-well known judges, while those at the first sort of schools do not. The students at the second sort of schools get hired by the large well known law firms (for example, on the Wall Street) doing structured finance and M&A work, whereas the first kind often may do work that could be considered menial (uncontested divorces, fixing speeding tickets/DUI, etc.). Of course there are crossovers.

Often, students at the second sort of schools do not practice at all, but have a profound impact on the profession, and there are some who practice only occasionally (Tribe, Dershowitz,...).

I agree with Ann Althouse that the second sort of schools teach students to think like lawyers whereas the first kind teach them to be lawyers.

In accounting, on the other hand, I think we have only one kind of schools (the equivalent of second sort have no professional accounting programs), and they teach students to BE accountants rather) than to think like accountants.

This situation is convenient for many. It is much easier to teach one to be like someone than to teach one to think like some one.

Jagdish

June 23, 2007 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

Dan,

I am not familiar with the Sheldon/Krieger studies, but will read them soon.

However, I interact with law school faculty often, and ask them questions just to find out how we in accounting can learn from them. I also have an abiding interest in the relationship between jurisprudence and accounting, and it is one of the few psychic benefits I have enjoyed being an accounting academic.

The law school market is pretty much a differentiated market. I think the missions of the top tier schools and others are very different, and both conform to their missions well; there are no pretensions as we have among the accounting schools where there is a race to reach the greasy pole no matter what one's comparative advantages are.

It is difficult to find students from non-top schools doing clerkships with supreme court justices, or the top law firms recruiting from such schools.

* The top tier schools emphasise law as an interdisciplinary field rather than a field confined to narrowly defined learning of existing laws.

* The top tier schools emphasise more critical analyses of certain aspects of law such as constitutional law, international law, jurisprudence... and de-emphasise other aspects such as administrative law, criminal procedure,... as the other schools do.

* Many students graduating from top schools do not enter law practice, and even when they do, they enter very different practices where critical thinking, interdisciplinary, and liberal arts type skills predominate. Many enter government and public service. Many also enter the academia. Over my career I have had dozens of friends and colleagues who went to top law schools (Harvard, Stanford, Cambridge, ...), and they have established their presence as scholars even outside their narrow domain. On the other hand, most law academics that I have known from non-top schools, on the other hand, have been in areas such as tax law, business law,..., generally not considerer the intellectual centers of gravity of law.

I do not mean to be an elitist when I make the above observations. In fact, one of my heroes in law, the late Don Berman, a Harvard educated lawyer at Northeastern, specialised in tax law. If I dig deep, I am sure I can find some law academics from non-top schools who were brilliant scholars in areas of law that are considered scholarly. The point I make is that the two types of schools are just different.

About a dozen years ago, I was trying to establish relationships with a local (non-top) law school to introduce our students in accounting to topics such as the relationship between constitutional law and accounting, and the role of jurisprudence in accounting. I got no where, and we were in fact on different wavelengths. On the other hand, more recently we did try to establish relationships for tax students and it has worked out very well. Our graduate tax students take some tax courses at the law school and it has helped them tremendously.

I attend law sort of conferences (usually at the intersection of law and computer science), and almost all participants are from the top tier law schools. Some from other law schools too attend, but usually to meet CPE requirements to keep their licenses current. I also am an avid reader of law literature (specially in constitutional law and jurisprudence) and there too just about every author is from a top tier law school.

There is nothing wrong in this dichotomy. Those from non-top law schools have performed brilliantly in the corporate world, and once in a while they do spectacular jobs for their clients (see OJ Simpson's dream team)Sometimes they also excel as legal scholars

Another difference I find between the alums at the two types of schools is that the contribution to legal literature from the top law schools is disproportionately large. Ronald Dworkin, Lawrence Tribe, and Richard Posner in the US, or Joseph Raz and HLA Hart in Britain,... one has to stretch one's imagination to come up with those from non-top tier law schools who come close.

And there is no cartel in law as we have in accounting. Good scholarship gets recognised no matter where it originates, and gatekeepers are generally powerless; quite unlike in accounting.

There is learning at both kinds of schools, they are just different. Trying to compare them is like comparing apples and oranges, or worse, like comparing apple to an ape.

I'll try to collect my thoughts on what we in accounting can learn from legal education at both levels and post them to AECM one of these days.

Regards,

Jagdish

 

 


Why accountancy doctoral programs are drying up and
why accountancy is no longer required for admission or
graduation in an accountancy doctoral program

 

 

Question
How long does it take to get an accounting doctorate?

 

Answer
The answer varies with respect to how long it takes to get both the undergraduate degree plus the requisite masters degree (or at least 150 credits required in most states). Assuming the student is full time and on track as an accounting major this makes it about 5.5 years before entering a doctoral program, although some masters programs only require one year for the masters degree for undergraduate accounting majors. To that we must add about four years of doctoral studies. This adds up to 9.5 years of full time study in college give or take a year. To this we must add the typical 1-5 years of experience most doctoral students spend in practice between attainment of a masters degree and eventual matriculation into a doctoral program.

The good news is that, unlike masters of accountancy and MBA programs, virtually all accountancy doctoral programs provide free tuition and rather generous living allowances from start to finish, although some of the time doctoral students must work as teaching and/or research assistants. Often fellowships in the fourth year allow students to devote full time to finishing their doctoral thesis.

Accountancy doctoral programs take at least four years in most cases for former accounting majors because entering students typically must take advanced mathematics, statistics, econometrics, and psychometrics prerequisites for doctoral seminars in accounting --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

Students who get doctorates in fields other than accounting can typically get a doctoral degree in less than 9.5 years of full-time college. For example, an economics PhD can realistically spend only 7.5 years in college. He or she can then enter a bridge program to become a business, finance, or even an accounting professor under the AACSB's new Bridge Program, but that program may take two or more years part time. There just does not appear to be a short track into accounting tenure track positions. But the added years may be worth it since accounting faculty salaries are extremely high relative to most other academic disciplines. The high salaries, in part, are do to the enormous shortage of accounting doctoral graduates relative to the number of tenure-track openings in major colleges and universities --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

 

 

"Exploring Ways to Shorten the Ascent to a Ph.D.," by Joseph Berger, The New York Times, October 3, 2007 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/03/education/03education.html

 

Many of us have known this scholar: The hair is well-streaked with gray, the chin has begun to sag, but still our tortured friend slaves away at a masterwork intended to change the course of civilization that everyone else just hopes will finally get a career under way.

We even have a name for this sometimes pitied species — the A.B.D. — All But Dissertation. But in academia these days, that person is less a subject of ridicule than of soul-searching about what can done to shorten the time, sometimes much of a lifetime, it takes for so many graduate students to, well, graduate. The Council of Graduate Schools, representing 480 universities in the United States and Canada, is halfway through a seven-year project to explore ways of speeding up the ordeal.

For those who attempt it, the doctoral dissertation can loom on the horizon like Everest, gleaming invitingly as a challenge but often turning into a masochistic exercise once the ascent is begun. The average student takes 8.2 years to get a Ph.D.; in education, that figure surpasses 13 years. Fifty percent of students drop out along the way, with dissertations the major stumbling block. At commencement, the typical doctoral holder is 33, an age when peers are well along in their professions, and 12 percent of graduates are saddled with more than $50,000 in debt.

These statistics, compiled by the National Science Foundation and other government agencies by studying the 43,354 doctoral recipients of 2005, were even worse a few years ago. Now, universities are setting stricter timelines and demanding that faculty advisers meet regularly with protégés. Most science programs allow students to submit three research papers rather than a single grand work. More universities find ways to ease financial burdens, providing better paid teaching assistantships as well as tuition waivers. And more universities are setting up writing groups so that students feel less alone cobbling together a thesis.

Fighting these trends, and stretching out the process, is the increased competition for jobs and research grants; in fields like English where faculty vacancies are scarce, students realize they must come up with original, significant topics. Nevertheless, education researchers like Barbara E. Lovitts, who has written a new book urging professors to clarify what they expect in dissertations; for example, to point out that professors “view the dissertation as a training exercise” and that students should stop trying for “a degree of perfection that’s unnecessary and unobtainable.”

There are probably few universities that nudge students out the door as rapidly as Princeton, where a humanities student now averages 6.4 years compared with 7.5 in 2003. That is largely because Princeton guarantees financial support for its 330 scholars for five years, including free tuition and stipends that range up to $30,000 a year. That means students need teach no more than two courses during their schooling and can focus on research.

“Princeton since the 1930s has felt that a Ph.D. should be an education, not a career, and has valued a tight program,” said William B. Russel, dean of the graduate school.

And students are grateful. “Every morning I wake up and remind myself the university is paying me to do nothing but write the dissertation,” said Kellam Conover, 26, a classicist who expects to complete his course of study in five years next May when he finishes his dissertation on bribery in Athens. “It’s a tremendous advantage compared to having to work during the day and complete the dissertation part time.”

But fewer than a dozen universities have endowments or sources of financing large enough to afford five-year packages. The rest require students to teach regularly. Compare Princetonians with Brian Gatten, 28, an English scholar at the University of Texas in Austin. He has either been teaching or assisting in two courses every semester for five years.

“Universities need us as cheap labor to teach their undergraduates, and frankly we need to be needed because there isn’t another way for us to fund our education,” he said.

That raises a question that state legislatures and trustees might ponder: Would it be more cost effective to provide financing to speed graduate students into careers rather than having them drag out their apprenticeships?

But money is not the only reason Princeton does well. It has developed a culture where professors keep after students. Students talk of frequent meetings with advisers, not a semiannual review. For example, Ning Wu, 30, a father of two, works in Dr. Russel’s chemical engineering lab and said Dr. Russel comes by every Friday to discuss Mr. Wu’s work on polymer films used in computer chips. He aims to get his Ph.D. next year, his fifth.

While Dr. Russel values “the critical thinking and independent digging students have to do, either in their mind for an original concept or in the archives,” others question the necessity of book-length works. Some universities have established what they call professional doctorates for students who plan careers more as practitioners than scholars. Since the 1970s, Yeshiva University has not only offered a Ph.D. in psychology but also a separate doctor of psychology degree, or Psy.D., for those more interested in clinical work than research; that program requires a more modest research paper.

OTHER institutions are reviving master’s degree programs for, say, aspiring scientists who plan careers in development of products rather than research.

Those who insist on dissertations are aware that they must reduce the loneliness that defeats so many scholars. Gregory Nicholson, completing his sixth and final year at Michigan State, was able to finish a 270-page dissertation on spatial environments in novels like Kerouac’s “On the Road” with relative efficiency because of a writing group where he thrashed out his work with other thesis writers.

Continued in article

 

Bob Jensen's threads on accountancy doctoral programs are at the following three links:

 


The Fall 2007 Edition of Accounting Education News (AEN from the American Accounting Association) --- 
http://aaahq.org/pubs/AEN/2007/Fall2007.pdf

Two important things to note:

In his first President's Message, Gary Previts mentions the Plumlee report on the dire shortage of accountancy doctoral students and provides a link to the AAA's new site providing resources for research and experimentation on "Future Accounting Faculty and Programs Projects" --- http://aaahq.org/temp/phd/index.cfm
Note especially the Accounting PhD Program Info link with a picture) and the PhD Project link (at the bottom):

Welcome to the preliminary posting of a new resource for the community participating in and supporting accounting programs, students, faculty, and by that connection practitioners of accounting. We plan to build this collection of resources for the broad community committed to a vital future for accounting education. This page is an initial step to creating a place where we can come together to gather resources and share data and ideas.
Making A Difference: Careers in Academia
Powerpoint slides created by Nancy Bagranoff and Stephanie Bryant for the 2007 Beta Alpha Psi Annual Meeting. Permission granted for use and adaptation with attribution.
GradSchools.com
Accounting PhD Program Info

New Research Projects by the AAA on the Trends and Characteristics of Accounting Faculty, Students, Curriculum, and Programs

Part I: Future of Accounting Faculty Project (Report December, 2007)
Part II: Future of Accounting Programs Project

Part I will describe today's accounting academic workforce, via demographics, work patterns, productivity, and career progression of accounting faculty, as well as of faculty in selected peer disciplines using data from the national survey of postsecondary faculty (NSOPF) to establish trends, and a set of measures will be combined to benchmark the overall status of accounting against (approximately) 150 fields. This project will provide context and data to identify factors affecting the pipeline and workplace.

Part II will focus on expanding understanding of the characteristics of accounting faculty, students, and accounting programs, and implications of their evolving environment. The need for the Part I project illustrates how essential it is for the discipline and profession of accounting that we establish a more standard and comprehensive process for collecting, analyzing, and reporting data about accounting students, doctoral students, faculty, curriculum, and programs.

More Resources on the Changing Environment for Faculty:

The Reshaping of America's Academic Workforce
David W. Leslie, TIAA-CREF Institute Fellow
The College of William and Mary
TIAA Institute Research Dialogue Series, 2007

Jim Hasselback's* 2007 Analysis of Accounting Faculty Birthdates
*Copyrighted – requests for use to J. R. Hasselback

  • Among U.S. Accounting Academics -- 53.4% are 55 or older

From the Integrated Postsecondary Education System (IPEDS)

  • 34.8% of all full-time faculty in the U.S. are non-tenure-track -- nearly 2 in 5 of all full-time appointments
  • Between 1993 and 2003 the proportion of all new full-time hires into "off-track" appointments increased each year from 50% to nearly 3 in 5 (58.6%)
  • Reported in J. Schuster & M. Finkelstein (Fall, 2006). "On the Brink: Assessing the Status of the American Faculty," Thought & Action 51-62.

Supply and Demand for Accounting PhDs

American Accounting Association PhD Supply/Demand Resource Page
A collection of resources, links, and reports related to the pipeline of future Accounting faculty. Highlights include:

  • Report of the AAA/APLG Committee to Assess the Supply and Demand of Accounting PhDs
  • Link to the Doctoral Education Resource Center of AACSB International (Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business)
  • AICPA's Journal of Accountancy's article "Teaching for the Love of It"

Deloitte Foundation Accounting Doctoral Student Survey

Survey Results (Summer, 2007)
Data collected by survey of attendees of the 2007 AAA/Deloitte J. Michael Cook Doctoral Consortium

The PhD Project and Accounting Doctoral Students Association

The PhD Project is an information clearinghouse created to increase the diversity of business school faculty by attracting African Americans, Hispanic Americans and Native Americans to business doctoral programs and by providing a network of peer support. In just 12 short years, the PhD Project has been the catalyst for a dramatic increase in the number of minority business school faculty—from 294 to 842, with approximately 380 more candidates currently immersed in doctoral studies.

The PhD Project Accounting Doctoral Students Association is a voluntary association offering moral support and encouragement to African-American, Hispanic-American, and Native American Accounting Doctoral Students as their pursue their degrees and take their places in the teaching and research profession, and serve as mentors to new doctoral students.

PhD Project Surveys of Students, Professors, and Deans
Results of a survey among students to understand the impact of minority professors on minority and non-minority students.

Accounting Firms Supporting the AAA and Accounting Programs, Faculty, and Students

Related Organizations Sharing Interest in Accounting Faculty and Programs

 

Professor Dan Deines at Kansas State University has a handful of Outstanding Educator Awards, including one from the AICPA. Beginning on Page 5 of the Fall 2007 edition of AEN, Dan discusses the Taylor Research and Consulting Group study of accounting education commissioned by the AICPA in 2002. The study identifies barriers to students that prevent many top students from majoring in accounting. Dan then describes a pilot program initiated by KSU in reaction to the Taylor Report. I think accounting educators outside KSU may attend some of the pilot program events.

Bob Jensen's threads on the shortage of doctoral students in accountancy are shown below.

 


Questions
Why must all accounting doctoral programs be social science (particularly econometrics) doctoral programs?
What's wrong with humanities research methodologies?
What's wrong about studying accounting in accounting doctoral programs?
Why are we graduating so many new assistant professors of accounting who do not know any accounting?
Hint: Similar problems exist in languages and education school PhD programs


Question
What drastic move is the AACSB International (accrediting body)  taking to deal with the shortage of graduating students from business doctoral programs (including accountancy doctoral programs)?
Hint:
It's called a “Postdoctoral Bridge to Business”

Answer

With many business schools reporting difficulty attracting Ph.D. faculty members, the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business has announced the first participating institutions in new “Postdoctoral Bridge to Business” programs — short-term programs that will train new Ph.D.’s in fields outside business for faculty jobs at business schools. The programs are starting at the Grenoble Ecole de Management, Tulane University, the University of Florida, the University of Toledo and Virginia Tech.
Inside Higher Ed, September 20, 2007 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/09/20/qt

Bob Jensen's threads on alleged reasons why there are such shortages in accountancy doctoral programs can be found at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

A cynic might conclude that this is a correctional option for naive students who earned an economics PhD in an Economics Department rather than lucky students who earned virtual economics PhDs in accountancy doctoral programs.

A realist might term this the "Bridge Over Troubled Waters" that leads to higher salaries for "90-Day Wonders" in business/accounting education --- http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=90+day+wonder

This reminds me of the Harvard math professor (I can't recall which one at the moment) who said:  "Accounting is a fascinating discipline. I think I might take a couple of hours to master it."


Question
The faculty shortage in nursing schools is even more severe than that of accounting schools. Why are there "bridges over troubled waters" in schools of nursing in the same context as the new bridges being built for non-accounting PhDs mentioned above?

Answer with a Question
Would you really want an economics PhD who took a crash course in nursing teaching the nurses who serve you?

Answer with an Answer --- http://nln.allenpress.com/pdfserv/i1536-5026-028-04-0223.pdf
The fact of the matter is that the law of supply and demand works better in schools of accounting than in schools of nursing. In general, accounting educators are among the highest paid faculty on campus. The number of unfilled tenure-track job openings in schools of accounting combined with starting salaries in excess of $130,000 per year are the main reasons that the AACSB International's "
Postdoctoral Bridge to Business" just might work, although I seriously doubt whether any of the bridged students will be able to teach upper division financial accounting, auditing, and tax courses.

The fact is that the law of supply and demand works lousy in nursing schools. In spite of shortages of qualified faculty, nursing educators remain among the lowest paid faculty on campus. A Nursing International's "Postdoctoral Bridge to Nursing" probably would not work, and given my cynacism about 90-0Day Wonders it is some comfort to me that there is no such bridge over troubled waters in nursing schools.

 


Question
What do accounting schools and nursing schools have in common?

"The Nursing Education Dilemma," by Elia Powers, Inside Higher Ed, June 22, 2007 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/06/22/nursing

The market for nursing graduates remains hot, and plenty of students are vying for those open positions. Enrollment in entry-level baccalaureate nursing programs increased by nearly 8 percent in 2006 from the previous year, which marked the sixth straight year of gains. Community College programs are also seeing increases in applications and enrollments.
It’s all positive news for the health care industry, which has suffered from a well-documented nursing shortage since the 1990s, when many hospitals cut their staffs and some colleges cut back their programs.

But for colleges of nursing, the increasing demand to accommodate more students presents a dilemma: Who will teach them?

When it comes to clinical nursing courses, college programs are bound to strict faculty-to-student ratios, set by individual states. One instructor to every 10 or 12 students is a fairly common ratio. So even as administrators and state lawmakers seek more slots for students, there’s a ceiling on expansion unless more faculty are recruited or produced.

That’s not happening quickly. A survey released last year by the American Association of Colleges of Nursing identified at least 637 faculty vacancies at more than 300 nursing schools with baccalaureate or graduate programs — or what amounts to a nearly 8 percent faculty vacancy rate. The majority of the openings are tenure-track positions that require applicants have a doctorate, the survey shows.

Meanwhile, there continues to be a backlog of students. In 2006, more than 38,000 nursing school candidates deemed “qualified” by the AACN were turned away from entry-level baccalaureate programs, while a total of 50,783 nursing school applicants enrolled and registered in courses. When the new students are added to the pool of all students enrolled, total enrollment rises to 133,578.

Nearly three quarters of the colleges that responded to the AACN survey pointed to faculty shortages as a reason for not accepting the applicants. Community colleges are turning away 3.3 “qualified” applicants for every one turned away by four-year institutions, said Roxanne Fulcher, director of health professions policy at the American Association of Community Colleges.

At many nursing schools, wait lists are shrinking after years of growth, officials say, not because slots are opening up, but because students are becoming frustrated that their chances of enrolling are dim.

Continued in article

Question
What do accounting schools and nursing schools have in common?

"The Nursing Education Dilemma," by Elia Powers, Inside Higher Ed, June 22, 2007 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/06/22/nursing

The market for nursing graduates remains hot, and plenty of students are vying for those open positions. Enrollment in entry-level baccalaureate nursing programs increased by nearly 8 percent in 2006 from the previous year, which marked the sixth straight year of gains. Community College programs are also seeing increases in applications and enrollments.
It’s all positive news for the health care industry, which has suffered from a well-documented nursing shortage since the 1990s, when many hospitals cut their staffs and some colleges cut back their programs.

But for colleges of nursing, the increasing demand to accommodate more students presents a dilemma: Who will teach them?

When it comes to clinical nursing courses, college programs are bound to strict faculty-to-student ratios, set by individual states. One instructor to every 10 or 12 students is a fairly common ratio. So even as administrators and state lawmakers seek more slots for students, there’s a ceiling on expansion unless more faculty are recruited or produced.

That’s not happening quickly. A survey released last year by the American Association of Colleges of Nursing identified at least 637 faculty vacancies at more than 300 nursing schools with baccalaureate or graduate programs — or what amounts to a nearly 8 percent faculty vacancy rate. The majority of the openings are tenure-track positions that require applicants have a doctorate, the survey shows.

Meanwhile, there continues to be a backlog of students. In 2006, more than 38,000 nursing school candidates deemed “qualified” by the AACN were turned away from entry-level baccalaureate programs, while a total of 50,783 nursing school applicants enrolled and registered in courses. When the new students are added to the pool of all students enrolled, total enrollment rises to 133,578.

Nearly three quarters of the colleges that responded to the AACN survey pointed to faculty shortages as a reason for not accepting the applicants. Community colleges are turning away 3.3 “qualified” applicants for every one turned away by four-year institutions, said Roxanne Fulcher, director of health professions policy at the American Association of Community Colleges.

At many nursing schools, wait lists are shrinking after years of growth, officials say, not because slots are opening up, but because students are becoming frustrated that their chances of enrolling are dim.

Continued in article

 


Rankings of Universities in Terms of Doctoral Student Placements
The journal PS: Political Science & Politics has just published
an analysis that suggests that there is not a direct relationship between the general reputation of a department and its success at placing new Ph.D.’s; some programs far exceed their reputation when it comes to placing new Ph.D.’s while others lag. The analysis may provide new evidence for the “halo effect” in which many experts worry that general (and sometimes outdated) institutional reputations cloud the judgment of those asked to fill out surveys on departmental quality. And while the analysis was prepared about political science, its authors believe the same approach could be used in other fields in the humanities and social sciences, with the method more problematic in other areas because fewer Ph.D. students aspire to academic careers.
Scott Jaschik, "A Ranking That Would Matter," Inside Higher Ed, August 21, 2007 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/08/21/ranking
 

Jensen Comment
The big problem here is defining what constitutes "a top job" or a "a good job." There are so many elements in job satisfaction, many of which are intangible and cannot be quantified, that I'm suspect of any study that purports to identify top jobs. Obviously prestigious universities have a bias for hiring prestigious university graduates. But this is often due to the reputations of the graduate student's teachers and thesis advisors. And the quality of the dissertation may have a great deal of impact on hiring even if the degree is from No-name University. Also prestigious universities tend to have the highest GMAT applicants, but this is not always the case. Often the highest GMAT applicants are really tremendous graduates.

In disciplines having great shortages of doctoral graduates, especially doctoral graduates in accounting and finance, findings from political science do not necessarily extrapolate.

Be that as it may, the findings of the above study come as no surprise to me. Particularly in accounting, some prestigious universities have taken a nose dive in terms of reputations of faculty supervising dissertations. And students may not have access to the most reputable faculty, especially faculty who are too busy with consulting and world travel. For example, a few years ago I encountered a doctoral student in accounting at the University of Chicago who claimed that it was very difficult to even find a faculty member who would supervise a dissertation. But if he ever graduates from Chicago, he will have the Chicago halo around his head. In fairness, I've not had recent information regarding what is happening with doctoral students in accounting at the University of Chicago. Certainly it is still a very reputable university in terms of its business studies and research programs.

Also there is a problem in accountancy that mathematics-educated accountancy doctoral graduates from prestigious universities may know very little about accountancy and additionally have troubles with the English language. On occasion prestige-university graduates do not get the "top jobs" where accountancy is spoken.

Beyond Research Rankings," by Luis M. Proenza, Inside Higher Ed, May 17, 2007 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2007/05/17/proenza

Controversies in media rankings of colleges are discussed at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/20/education/20colleges.html

Bob Jensen's threads on college rankings controversies are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm#BusinessSchoolRankings

 


All is Not Well in Modern Languages Education
Proposal to integrate languages with literature, history, culture, economics and linguistics
Proposal to use fewer adjuncts who now teach language courses
The MLA created a special committee in 2004 to study the future of language education and its report, being issued today
(May 24, 2007) is in many ways unprecedented for the association in that it is urging departments to reorganize how languages are taught and who does the teaching. In general, the critique of the committee is that the traditional model has started with basic language training (typically taught by those other than tenure-track faculty members) and proceeded to literary study (taught by tenure-track faculty members). The report calls for moving away from this “two tiered” system, integrating language study with literature, and placing much more emphasis on history, culture, economics and linguistics — among other topics — of the societies whose languages are being taught.
Scott Jaschik, Inside Higher Ed, May 24, 2007 --- http://insidehighered.com/news/2007/05/24/mla

Who Teaches First-Year Language Courses?
Rank Doctoral-Granting Departments B.A.-Granting Departments
Tenured or tenure-track professors 7.4% 41.8%
Full-time, non-tenure track 19.6% 21.1%
Part-time instructors 15.7% 34.7%
Graduate students 57.4% 2.4%

 


All is Not Well in Programs for Doctoral Students in Departments/Colleges of Education
The education doctorate, attempting to serve dual purposes—to prepare researchers and to prepare practitioners—is not serving either purpose well. To address what they have termed this "crippling" problem, Carnegie and the Council of Academic Deans in Research Education Institutions (CADREI) have launched the Carnegie Project on the Education Doctorate (CPED), a three-year effort to reclaim the education doctorate and to transform it into the degree of choice for the next generation of school and college leaders. The project is coordinated by David Imig, professor of practice at the University of Maryland. "Today, the Ed.D. is perceived as 'Ph.D.-lite,'" said Carnegie President Lee S. Shulman. "More important than the public relations problem, however, is the real risk that schools of education are becoming impotent in carrying out their primary missions to prepare leading practitioners as well as leading scholars."
"Institutions Enlisted to Reclaim Education Doctorate," The Carnegie Foundation for Advancement in Teaching --- http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/news/sub.asp?key=51&subkey=2266

The EED does not focus enough on research, and the PhD program has become a social science doctoral program without enough education content. Middle ground is being sought.


All is Not Well in Programs for Doctoral Students in Departments/Colleges of Business, Especially in Accounting
The problem is that not enough accounting is taught in what have become social science doctoral programs
See http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

Partly the problem is the same as with PhD programs in colleges of education.
The pool of accounting doctoral program applicants is drying up, especially accounting doctoral program pool that is increasingly trickle-filled with mathematically-educated foreign students who have virtually no background in accounting. Twenty years ago, over 200 accounting doctoral students were being graduated each year in the United States. Now it's less than one hundred graduates per year, many of whom know very little about accounting, especially U.S. accounting. This is particularly problematic for financial accounting, tax, and auditing education requiring knowledge of U.S. standards, regulations, and laws.

Accounting doctoral programs are social science research programs that do not appeal to accountants who are interested in becoming college educators but have no aptitude for or interest in the five or more years of quantitative methods study required for current accounting doctoral programs.

To meet the demand of thousands of colleges seeking accounting faculty, the supply situation is revealed by Plumlee et al (2006) as quoted at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm

There were only 29 doctoral students in auditing and 23 in tax out of the 2004 total of 391 accounting doctoral students enrolled in years 1-5 in the United States.

The answer here it seems to me is to open doctoral programs to wider humanities and legal studies research methodologies and to put accounting back into accounting doctoral programs.

Partly the problem is the same as with “two-tiered” departments of modern languages
The huge shortage of accounting doctoral graduates has bifurcated the teaching of accounting. Increasingly, accounting, tax, systems, and auditing courses are taught by adjunct part-time faculty or full-time adjunct faculty who are not on a tenure track and often are paid much less than tenure-track faculty who teach graduate research courses.

The short run answer here is difficult since there are so few doctoral graduates who know enough accounting to take over for the adjunct faculty. If doctoral programs open up more to accountants, perhaps more adjunct faculty will enter the pool of doctoral program prospects. This might help the long run problem. Meanwhile as former large doctoral programs (e.g., at Illinois, Texas, Florida, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Michigan) shrink more and more, we’re increasingly building two-tier accounting education programs due to increasing demand and shrinking supply of doctoral graduates in accountancy.

We’re becoming more and more like “two-tier” language departments in our large and small colleges.

Practitioners in  education schools generally are K-12 teachers and school administrators. In the case of accounting doctoral programs, our dual mission is to prepare college teachers of accountancy as well as leading scholars. Our accounting doctoral programs are drying up (less than 100 per year now graduating in the United States, many of whom know virtually no accounting) primarily because our doctoral programs have become five years of social science and mathematics concentrations that do not appeal to accountants who might otherwise enter the pool of doctoral program admission candidates.

Note that the above Carnegie study also claims that education doctoral programs are also failing to "prepare researchers." I think the same criticism applies to current accountancy doctoral programs in the United States. We're failing in our own dual purpose accountancy doctoral programs and need a concerted effort to become a "degree of choice" among the accounting professionals who would like to move into academe in a role other than that of a low-status and low-paid adjunct professor.

In the United States, following the Gordon/Howell and Pierson reports, our accounting doctoral programs and leading academic journals bet the farm on the social sciences without taking the due cautions of realizing why the social sciences are called "soft sciences." They're soft because "not everything that can be counted, counts. And not everything that counts can be counted."

Leading academic accounting research journals commenced accepting only esoteric papers with complicated mathematical models and trivial hypotheses of zero interest to accounting practitioners --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm

Accounting doctoral programs made a concerted effort to recruit students with mathematics, economics, and social science backgrounds even though these doctoral candidates knew virtually nothing about accountancy. To compound the felony, the doctoral programs dropped all accounting requirements except for some doctoral seminars on how to mine accounting data archives with econometric and psychometric models and advanced statistical inference testing.

I cannot find the exact quotation in my archives, but some years ago Linda Kidwell complained that her university had recently hired a newly-minted graduate from an accounting doctoral program who did not know any accounting. When assigned to teach accounting courses, this new "accounting" professor was a disaster since she knew nothing about the subjects she was assigned to teach.

In the year following his assignment as President of the American Accounting Association Joel Demski asserted that research focused on the accounting profession will become a "vocational virus" leading us away from the joys of mathematics and the social sciences and the pureness of the scientific academy:

Statistically there are a few youngsters who came to academia for the joy of learning, who are yet relatively untainted by the vocational virus. I urge you to nurture your taste for learning, to follow your joy. That is the path of scholarship, and it is the only one with any possibility of turning us back toward the academy.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline? American Accounting Association Plenary Session" August 9, 2006 --- http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/demski/Is_Accounting_an_Academic_Discipline.pdf

Accounting professors are no longer "leading scholars" if they focus on accounting rather than mathematics and the social sciences --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR.htm

When Professor Beresford attempted to publish his remarks, an Accounting Horizons referee’s report to him contained the following revealing reply about “leading scholars” in accounting research:

1. The paper provides specific recommendations for things that accounting academics should be doing to make the accounting profession better. However (unless the author believes that academics' time is a free good) this would presumably take academics' time away from what they are currently doing. While following the author's advice might make the accounting profession better, what is being made worse? In other words, suppose I stop reading current academic research and start reading news about current developments in accounting standards. Who is made better off and who is made worse off by this reallocation of my time? Presumably my students are marginally better off, because I can tell them some new stuff in class about current accounting standards, and this might possibly have some limited benefit on their careers. But haven't I made my colleagues in my department worse off if they depend on me for research advice, and haven't I made my university worse off if its academic reputation suffers because I'm no longer considered a leading scholar? Why does making the accounting profession better take precedence over everything else an academic does with their time?
As quoted in Jensen (2006a) ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession


Advice to students planning to take standardized tests such as the SAT, GRE, GMAT, LSAT, TOEFL, etc.
See Test Magic at http://www.testmagic.com/
There is a forum here where students interested in doctoral programs in business (e.g., accounting and finance) and economics discuss the ins and outs of doctoral programs.


Question
Does faculty research improve student learning in the classrooms where researchers teach?
Put another way, is research more important than scholarship that does not contribute to new knowledge?

Major Issue
If the answer leans toward scholarship over research, it could monumentally change criteria for tenure in many colleges and universities.

AACSB International: the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business, has released for comment a report calling for the accreditation process for business schools to evaluate whether faculty research improves the learning process. The report expresses the concern that accreditors have noted the volume of research, but not whether it is making business schools better from an educational standpoint.
Inside Higher Ed, August 6, 2007 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/08/06/qt

"Controversial Report on Business School Research Released for Comments," AACSB News Release, August 3, 2007 --- http://www.aacsb.edu/Resource_Centers/Research/media_release-8-3-07.pdf

FL (August 3, 2007) ― A report released today evaluates the nature and purposes of business school research and recommends steps to increase its value to students, practicing managers and society. The report, issued by the Impact of Research task force of AACSB International, is released as a draft to solicit comments and feedback from business schools, their faculties and others. The report includes recommendations that could profoundly change the way business schools organize, measure, and communicate about research.

AACSB International, the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business, estimates that each year accredited business schools spend more than $320 million to support faculty research and another half a billion dollars supports research-based doctoral education.

“Research is now reflected in nearly everything business schools do, so we must find better ways to demonstrate the impact of our contributions to advancing management theory, practice and education” says task force chair Joseph A. Alutto, of The Ohio State University. “But quality business schools are not and should not be the same; that’s why the report also proposes accreditation changes to strengthen the alignment of research expectations to individual school missions.”

The task force argues that a business school cannot separate itself from management practice and still serve its function, but it cannot be so focused on practice that it fails to develop rigorous, independent insights that increase our understanding of organizations and management. Accordingly, the task force recommends building stronger interactions between academic researchers and practicing managers on questions of relevance and developing new channels that make quality academic research more accessible to practice.

According to AACSB President and CEO John J. Fernandes, recommendations in this report have the potential to foster a new generation of academic research. “In the end,” he says, “it is a commitment to scholarship that enables business schools to best serve the future needs of business and society through quality management education.”

The Impact of Research task force report draft for comments is available for download on the AACSB website: www.aacsb.edu/research. The website also provides additional resources related to the issue and the opportunity to submit comments on the draft report. The AACSB Committee on Issues in Management Education and Board of Directors will use the feedback to determine the next steps for implementation.

The AACSB International Impact of Research Task Force
Chairs:
Joseph A. Alutto, interim president, and
John W. Berry, Senior Chair in Business, Max M. FisherCollege of Business, The Ohio State University

K. C. Chan, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Richard A. Cosier, Purdue University
Thomas G. Cummings, University of Southern California
Ken Fenoglio, AT&T
Gabriel Hawawini, INSEAD and the University of Pennsylvania
Cynthia H. Milligan, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Myron Roomkin, Case Western Reserve University
Anthony J. Rucci, The Ohio State University

Teaching Excellence Secondary to Research for Promotion, Tenure, and Pay ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm#TeachingVsResearch

Bob Jensen's threads on higher education controversies are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm


The Parable Of Being In The Wrong Paradigm
May 30, 2007 parable by David Albrecht [albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]

Sorry to revive this thread (need a favor) after it seemed to die 10 days ago. I present this parable with apologies to Ed Scribner, our resident parable teller.

I call this The Parable Of Being In The Wrong Paradigm.

A certain professor is the sad-sack of accounting higher education. It seems as if he's always been a member of an out-of-power paradigm. He started off college as a music major. He then switched to chemistry to Spanish to creative writing to history to political science. After graduation he discovered his degree qualified him to operate the french frier at a fast food joint. Friends, unhappy with his unhappiness, advised him to pursue an MBA degree. Our professor switched to an MA in accounting.

After this graduation he failed to secure an accounting or auditing job with the Big 8-7-6-5-4, probably due to a combination of not being young enough and wearing a colored shirt to his interviews. He wanted a true job, but it was not to be for him. Count him out of the Big 8-7-6-5-4 paradigm, his first experience with the wrong paradigm.

But lo and behold, a small school hired him to teach accounting. He enjoyed it so much that he decided to pursue an accounting doctorate for that academic union card. On the bright side, he learned new ways of thinking, new ways to approach a problem, and mental flexibility (this trait gets him in trouble, though). On the dark side he tried to pass himself off as a quantoid, but he wasn't. Nor was his degree from a powerful elite university. So count him out of the elite accounting school paradigm, and count him out of a top level salary. He is again a member of the wrong paradigm.

He's been a bust as a research/publishing hound, never hitting a top four journal. Some of his pubs were practitioner oriented and out of favor in his department. His last publication was too many years ago. He hit with the Journal of Excellence in College Teaching, but was told by his dean that it wouldn't count because his article wasn't about accounting (and the journal is too lowly ranked anyway). So, count him out of the dominant accounting research paradigm and from getting annual raises from his department. He is again a member of the wrong paradigm.

He was curious fellow, though, and always eager to contribute to making things better. Intrigued by how students learned, he researched it (but never got anything published, of course). He invested the results of the research back into his classrooms and became a popular teacher. As he continued to learn about how students learn, he became more popular. Eventually, students had to line up to get into one of his classes. The department chair responded by putting in a special registration process to keep excess students away from his classes and into other sections. The lucky students in his classes thrived in his learning-centered environment, it seems that they had been hungry to learn for a long time. The traditional paradigm ("tell them and then test them") is alive and well at at his school, though. He had to endure peer-to-peer evaluations of his teaching from professors who had difficulty in helping students learn. One accounting professor, notorious for his long lectures and lethal use of Power Point, came into our professor's classroom on one of his more non-traditional approach days. After a few minutes, the notorious accounting professor angrily steamed out of the classroom, giving our professor the the lowest score ever on a peer evaluation of teaching. It seems our professor didn't cover enough content. So count him out of another dominant accounting professor paradigm, and again a member of the wrong paradigm.

Despite being considered the worst accounting professor (0 for 4) by his department, he received his university's highest award for contributing to student learning.

One day he was asked how it felt not to be a part of the crowd or a dominant accounting paradigm. He replied that not being in a correct paradigm feels like not being invited to a party. He took solace, though from reading posts to AECM. Contributors seemed to be out of at least one power paradigm, just like him. They discussed it aud nauseum, year after year. Eventually he concluded that the more people lament the power of a dominant paradigm, the more things stay the same. It is like the weather--people can talk about it a lot but no one can do anything to change it. Leaving his computer, our professor went back to work, changing the world one student at a time.

David Albrecht


What's wrong about studying accounting in accounting doctoral programs?
May 2, 2007 message from Bob Jensen to the AECM Listserv

I have a former student and very good friend who’s interested in applying for an accounting doctoral program. He’s a good student who became a better student each year of his five year program. He’s somewhat experienced as a tax accountant.

But he’s not especially interested in a doctoral program that is heavy in quantitative methods (dare I say “accountics?”).

I have a couple of suggestions for him. But before I reply to him I would like some other suggestions from the AECM regarding full-time doctoral programs that are heavier on accounting and taxation skills and a bit lighter on the quantitative methods focus of most (all?) respected accounting doctoral programs at the moment.

You may send your suggestions privately to me or share them on the AECM if you choose to do so.

Please let me know if I can forward your suggestions under your name or if I should make your suggestions to him anonymous.

I do recommend this young man for a doctoral program. He’s become very passionate about becoming an accounting educator.

Thanks,

Bob Jensen

May 2, 2007 reply from Michael Haselkorn [MHASELKORN@bentley.edu]

Bob,

He should check out Bentley College’s new PhD program. Feel free to use my name.

Mike Haselkorn

May 2, 2007 reply from Randy Kuhn [jkuhn@bus.ucf.edu]

Bob,

I would definitely recommend your student speak to some of the professors at UCF (Central Florida in Orlando) like Robin Roberts and Steve Sutton. The general approach for the PhD program here is to provide as much exposure as possible to all areas of accounting scholarship and let the student decide what area best suits them. We take five accounting seminars that include a general overview of research (Kuhn, Burrell & Morgan, etc.), behavioral accounting, accounting information systems, financial archival, and sociological. A nice mix overall. Most of us take electives outside the College of Business in psychology, sociology, education, etc. for our minor as well as for the methods requirements. We can choose a more quantitative approach but no one in the last three classes went that route. Of the nine students in the last two classes, seven came from public accounting (six audit, one tax). The program has definitely enlightened all of us to other views of accounting, research, education, and the world in general. We only accept students every other year and I believe there are one or two spots left for the Fall 2007 class. If you think our program might fit your student, then I strongly recommend that he contact Robin ASAP.

Thanks,

Randy

May 2, 2007 reply from Steve Sutton [ssutton@bus.ucf.edu]

Bob,

I’ve watched this discussion with some interest. I’m always reluctant to speak of our own PhD program in this forum because it can be taken and interpreted the wrong way. Our PhD program has carved a niche out that is different from the ‘glamour’ programs. If we have a student who applies and wishes to do “accountics” type work, we generally steer them towards a more appropriate program.

Our program has basically focused on audit, tax and systems with a focus on behavioral and public policy research. We have what I believe to be some very accomplished and bright scholars working with our students, but our research is primarily behavioral from an individual (psychology-based), organizational (sociology), and societal (critical and radical humanist perspectives) perspective(s). We believe dialogue about the professions, accounting institutions, ethical implications and the philosophy underlying all of those is critical to the role of accounting academics.

That said, a PhD is still a research degree and not a technical degree. We assume that a student that has attained an undergraduate and masters level education in accounting has the technical accounting knowledge. The PhD is about how to look at accounting with a critical thinking mind and question the rules, processes and institutions—and to ask if there is a better way.

We educate our PhD students in the traditional areas as we believe this is critical to be good colleagues and appreciating each other’s research. But we do a lot in non-traditional areas also. You might find the structure of the programming interesting (or you may not): http://www.graduate.ucf.edu/CurrentGradCatalog/content/Degrees/ACAD_PROG_94.cfm#BUPHD-ACCOUNTING 

Hope you’re enjoying retirement in the mountains. This is the time of year I miss New England.

Steve G. Sutton
KPMG Professor
Dixon School of Accounting, UCF

www.bus.ucf.edu/ssutton/ 

May 2, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

Bob,

What are your friend's aspirations? If he could describe his ideal faculty position, including the sort of research (if any) he would like to pursue, what would that be? (He may be uncertain, which is fine.)

Recommending a set of inputs is easier if the desired output is clear.

Richard Sansing

May 2, Reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Richard,

I think (surmising at this point) that he might aspire to teach accounting/tax in a small liberal arts college where publishing in top research journals is not deemed more important than a dedication for teaching accounting and inspiring liberal arts students to pursue a career in accountancy.

In spite of what some of us more familiar with research universities think, there are many such liberal arts and even smaller state-supported colleges that still place the highest emphasis on teaching and youth inspiration.

What I've discovered is that all colleges want evidence of continued scholarship, but some are much more willing to accept publication in what we might call lower-tiered journals.

Then again, this young man showed such increased aptitude for accounting theory. It may be possible that in the course of his doctoral program he gets fired up for higher level research. His father is a good statistician and systems analyst in a top university. His mother is a teacher.

Bob Jensen

May 2, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

Bob,

I would encourage your friend to think about the real option aspect of this decision. He should be very confident of his decision to not pursue a Ph.D. at a research-oriented program before bypassing that option. If he studies at Chicago and makes an informed decision not to pursue "mainstream" academic research, then he will be over-trained for his dream job at the kind of liberal arts college you describe. But he also has the option of pursuing the research route. But if he studies at a place that puts less emphasis on research methods, he has limited his options at the outset.

Richard Sansing

May 2, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Richard,

I used to think that way. Then I had one student named XXXXX who had similar goals to YYYYY, although XXXXX was a much more brilliant math student according to the Mathematics Department at Trinity University. I made a special effort to have XXXXX admitted to an "accountics" doctoral program without having as much as one week of experience in accounting practice. XXXXX did not even intern and went straight from our Trinity University masters program to an accounting doctoral program.

To my utter disappointment XXXXX dropped out after the end of the first semester. He said he was just not interested in getting an econometrics PhD in an accounting doctoral program. He wanted an accounting PhD and discovered that he would have four or five years of econometrics, statistics, and psychometrics.

Honestly Richard, I'm not making this up. XXXXX enrolled in this accounting doctoral program about three years ago if my memory serves me correctly. With his exceptional math skills XXXXX was capable of getting his accounting (ergo econometrics PhD). He just wasn't interested in econometrics before he applied for the doctoral program, when he was in the doctoral program, or when he withdrew from the doctoral program.

I did not do XXXXX or that doctoral program any favors by pushing XXXXX in the way that you would probably have pushed XXXXX. Now when it comes to YYYYY, we have a similar situation except I don't think YYYYY has the exceptional math skills of XXXXX. YYYYY admits that he's more like his mother than his father in this regard.

YYYYY, like XXXXX, really wants to study accountancy rather than econometrics. If XXXXX wanted to be an econometrics PhD, however, he probably would have stuck it out in the accountancy doctoral program because economics PhDs are a dime a dozen relative to accounting econometricians masquerading as accountants.

My point, Richard, is that sometimes "keeping options open" is not the best advice for some types of students, especially accounting students who really do not want to become statisticians, econometricians, psychometricians, and management scientists. We've pretty much taken the study of accountancy out of doctoral programs. Those entering doctoral programs learn very little accounting beyond what they learned before entering the program.

What accountancy doctoral programs lack is imagination. Why can't there be a joint accounting/JD doctoral program in law and accountancy? Why can't there be an accounting/philosophy doctoral program? Why must virtually all accountancy doctoral programs be accounting/ECONOMICS doctoral programs for economists who want higher starting salaries?

That's my $.02.

Bob Jensen

May 2, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

1. Yes, sometimes options expire out of the money. A bad outcome ex post does not imply a bad decision ex ante.

2. Not everything you learn has to be learned in a classroom. I've learned a lot about non-profit organizations over the last ten years without ever taking a class on the subject.If it is (relatively) harder to learn about research methods on your own than it is to learn about institutional detail on your own, a program that focuses on economics and research methods is likely the most efficient way to learn. There is also an economy of scale issue. If I have five doctoral students interested in five different topics, a program that focuses on methods rather than subjects seems like the way to go; each student can learn about the institutional issues that interest them in another way.

Richard Sansing

May 2, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Richard

Plumlee et al. (2006) discovered that there were only 29 doctoral students in auditing and 23 in tax out of the 2004 total of 391 accounting doctoral students enrolled in years 1-5 in the United States.

With the excessive shortage of new PhDs in accounting (especially in auditing, tax, and systems), I think those who get a PhD with accounting skills will have pretty good "options" to become teachers and may even become the highest paid teachers in smaller colleges.

And you have difficulty separating yourself from the fundamental profit maximization economics assumption that plagues virtually all economics models. You assume that all accounting graduates who elect to go into academe want the highest salaries and probably the lowest teaching loads possible. In fact, there are students like XXXXX and YYYYY who truly want the psychic rewards of teaching rather than earn the highest dollar and the lowest teaching load.

What may be my most important point in this exchange with you is that there are many smaller colleges that would rather have dedicated teachers of accounting rather than failed econmetricians belatedly wanting to teach accounting because they were denied tenure in a top university's accounting/econometrics program.

And your latter assumption is that accounting can be self taught. Actually most anything can be self taught, including Egon Balas who became a well known Carnegie-Mellon mathematics professor after having taught himself mathematics during ten years of solitary confinement in a Hungarian prison. But why should an accounting doctoral student have to spend four or five years studying dreaded econometrics when their first love is learning accounting, tax, auditing, or systems?

And you might've been interested in learning accountancy after you earned an economics doctorate. But there are many econometrics professors in accounting departments who do not share your view. Let me once again dredge up the best example of the Accounting Horizon's referee who rejected a paper submitted by Denny Beresford.

When Professor Beresford attempted to publish his paper appealing for accounting researchers to have more interest in the accounting profession, an Accounting Horizons referee’s report to him contained the following revealing reply about “leading scholars” in accounting research:

Begin Quote
*****************

1. The paper provides specific recommendations for things that accounting academics should be doing to make the accounting profession better. However (unless the author believes that academics' time is a free good) this would presumably take academics' time away from what they are currently doing. While following the author's advice might make the accounting profession better, what is being made worse? In other words, suppose I stop reading current academic research and start reading news about current developments in accounting standards. Who is made better off and who is made worse off by this reallocation of my time? Presumably my students are marginally better off, because I can tell them some new stuff in class about current accounting standards, and this might possibly have some limited benefit on their careers. But haven't I made my colleagues in my department worse off if they depend on me for research advice, and haven't I made my university worse off if its academic reputation suffers because I'm no longer considered a leading scholar? Why does making the accounting profession better take precedence over everything else an academic does with their time?
As quoted at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession

*****************
End Quote

 

Particularly relevant in this regard is Dennis Beresford’s address to the AAA membership at the 2005 Annual AAA Meetings in San Francisco


Begin Quote
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In my eight years in teaching I’ve concluded that way too many of us don’t stay relatively up to date on professional issues. Most of us have some experience as an auditor, corporate accountant, or in some similar type of work. That’s great, but things change quickly these days.

Beresford (2005
)
*****************
End Quote

I'm glad that you like accounting and tax. Unfortunately, may of your econometrics friends in accounting academe hate having to teach such courses as intermediate accounting, advanced accounting, auditing, or introductory tax courses. And they interpret accounting theory as minimal accounting and maximal economic theory.

Bob Jensen

May 2, 2007 reply from Randy Kuhn [jkuhn@BUS.UCF.EDU]

When being recruited I recall my PhD coordinator showing me statistics about the number of accounting PhD students graduating each year and the general declining trend, down to around 70-75 per year. The AAA placement center at the national conference last year listed over 300 job postings. What a dilemma and not getting any better given that many of the baby boomers still have yet to retire.

The Plumlee et al. (2006) study paints an even bleaker picture. The general lack of students specializing in non-financial areas should raise a huge red flag. Will our non-financial accounting classes eventually be taught by professors outside their research area and interest? What kind of higher education will that provide? I have been fervently recruiting friends in public accounting. My approach to date has been to drop a bug in their ear during the worst of busy season then keep plugging away. So far, only one success. Many would love to enter academia but the thought of giving up four years of compensation is unpalatable and just not feasible for their families. The barriers to entry are great. Successful recruiting will take a concerted effort by us all.

May 2, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

---Bob Jensen wrote:

And you have difficulty separating yourself from the fundamental profit maximization economics assumption that plagues virtually all economics models. You assume that all accounting graduates who elect to go into academe want the highest salaries and probably the lowest teaching loads possible. In fact, there are students like XXXXX and YYYYY who truly want the psychic rewards of teaching rather than earn the highest dollar and the lowest teaching load.

---

Nonsense. From a purely financial perspective, an academic career for an accoutant is a big negative NPV. But I wouldn't trade careers with anyone.

Richard Sansing

May 3, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Richard,

Negative NPV makes no sense to me for new accounting PhDs. With universities paying over $180,000 (including summer stipends) as starting salaries plus generous amounts of free time for personal consulting fees and textbook writing, I have a difficult time calculating a negative NPV. And consulting opportunities are relatively easy to get in top universities because the elite names of those universities are a draw for faculty opportunities to consult and write books.

Most Harvard, Wharton, MIT, NYU, and Stanford professors that I know make more in consulting and royalties than their paltry salaries over $200,000 per year plus relatively generous travel allowances. The very top universities also provide incidental funding for research ranging from $10,000 to $30,000 each year (plus summer stipends in the range of $40,000 to $60,000).

When you make the NPV calculations you must also factor in the current fringe benefits averaging 30% of starting salaries. This includes health care and TIAA-CREF contributions. The 30% probably does not even count sabbatical leaves, discounts for child care, and entertainment opportunities such as concerts and theatre.

Sure an accounting or finance professor may have cut off chances of winning the CEO lottery, but this is a low-probability career track. Becoming a partner in a large CPA firm can be lucrative, but not necessarily on a present value basis considering the first ten years at relatively low salary (around $50,000-$60,000 per year) and the necessity to buy into (usually by borrowing) the partnership for those lucky few (less than 10% of the staff accountants) who are eventually invited to become partners.

If our recent undergraduates really took the trouble to compare the NPVs, I think newly-minted accounting professors have a comparable or even better outlook if the competing alternatives are weighted by the relatively low probabilities of becoming an executive partner in a large CPA firm. Smaller CPA firms are harder to compare, because they vary to such a huge extent. Some partners of small CPA firms net over a million dollars each year and many others barely scrape out a living in their home offices.

When you couple this with the wonderful lifestyle opportunities and sabbatical leaves, I always thought of myself as having lived in tall cotton for 40 years before I retired. Now I live in grass that's becoming too tall since I've put off mowing.

Bob Jensen

May 3, 2007 reply from Randy Kuhn [jkuhn@BUS.UCF.EDU]

CPA firm salary ranges obviously vary by location, but really not all that much honestly. Here in Orlando, staff auditors fresh out of school or even experienced hires from smaller firms into the new Big 6 are receiving offers of $50 with $2-3k signing bonuses this semester. This is consistent across the more popular disciplines (audit, tax, business advisory). Business advisory (business process & IT audit/consulting) starts to pull ahead at the manager stage and takes 1-2 years less per level for promotion. Whereas audit typically takes 12 years for partner, business advisory can be as quick as 9 years with a greater probability of making partner due to the demand/supply (not many hybrids out there that know financial, business process, and IT). As a 2nd year advisory manager (10 yrs exp) my base was $100k two years ago while the first-year audit senior manager with comparable experience received less than $90k which I think is on the low-end. The month I started the PhD program, one of my friends in a nearby office made audit partner at the age of 34 receiving a bump in salary from $150k to $225k with the promotion. Not sure about his loan though.

May 3, 2007 message from Bob Jensen

Hi Richard (Sansing),

I’m still trying to find a PhD program that extends beyond the blinders of the social science research paradigm. I need to look a little closer at Bentley’s new program. Also there are a few AIS tracks in existing programs, but my guess is that the AIS majors still have to take the econometrics qualifying courses and exams.

Your NPV sidetrack took us off the main issue regarding why our leading academic journals and virtually all of our accounting doctoral programs define accounting research as a social science that requires the requisite skills in advanced statistics, econometrics, psychometrics, sociometrics, etc.

The fact of the matter is that our current doctoral programs are critically unable to meet demand according to the AACSB and Plumlee et al --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/03MainDocumentMar2007.htm
The supply is steadily dwindling with less than 100 graduates per year (and less than 20 a year in auditing, tax, and systems). The demand is at least ten times the supply and probably higher. Accounting education programs will soon be to the point were virtually all of the instructors have no doctorates or have only doctorates in economics, law, education, etc.

The problem as I pointed out in earlier correspondence is a mismatch between accounting graduates who want to study and do research in accounting but have neither the aptitude nor an interest in becoming social scientists (and in particular econometricians studying capital markets). 

Accounting doctoral programs increasingly have ignored other research paradigms outside the social science paradigm. For example, I do not find humanities or legal research paradigm choices being offered in any accounting doctoral program. Philosophy departments, history departments, and law schools give doctorates to students who have few, if any, social science research skills.

Is there any university in the U.S. where a doctoral student can major in accounting history without having to become a social scientist? Is there a doctoral program in the U.S. where a student can major in accounting philosophy? Is there any doctoral program in the U.S. that uses a law school research paradigm?

And lastly, I would like to point out that our leading journals and award selection committees tend to ignore submissions based upon any research paradigm other than a social science research paradigm.

The AICPA and the AAA jointly award a "Notable Contributions to Accounting Literature Award" of $2,500 and a plaque at the AAA's annual meetings. For the past 20 years, these awards have virtually all gone to empirical research using positivist research methodologies.

This year I'm on the Selection Committee for the first time. The fact that the Screening Committee only gave us empirical studies to select from for the 2007 award to be granted in Chicago makes me wonder why only empirical studies are candidates for Selection Committee evaluation.

The criteria for the award are embedded in the following paragraphs at http://aaahq.org/awards/nominat3.htm

Begin Quote
**************
The Screening Committee for the Joint AICPA/AAA Notable Contributions to Accounting Literature Award invites nominations of outstanding articles, books, monographs, or other publications for consideration. Nominations from regular and irregular (e.g., AICPA-sponsored research studies or monographs) publications, as well as from nonaccounting publications, may be submitted as long as the nominated work is relevant to accounting. Both academic and practitioner nominations will be accepted.

Nominated items must have been published within the years 2002 to 2006. Each nomination must be accompanied by a brief supporting statement (no more than 150 words) summarizing reasons for the nomination that are consistent with the award selection criteria. These criteria include: uniqueness and potential magnitude of contribution to accounting education, practice and/or future accounting research; breadth of potential interest; originality and innovative content; clarity and organization of exposition; and soundness and appropriateness of methodology.

End Quote
**************

This important award can go to both research and other scholarly literature contributions in accountancy. The Award's research literature is not restricted to empirical research and positivist methods. What is curious to me is why only this subset of the literature is repeatedly the only winning subset.

What is even more curious this is why even the literature pieces forwarded this year are only esoteric empirical research studies of dubious value to "accounting education and practice." I say of "dubious value" in the sense of highly simplified modeling assumptions and no replication of the findings by other researchers.

Shouldn't the award winning literature item be at least independently replicated if it is an empirical research study? My previous lament over lack of replication in academic accounting research can be found at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Replication

The accountics bias seems to be rearing up repeatedly in this award process for the past two decades. Is it because of narrowness in the nomination process? Have members of the AAA given up nominating literature that is not of an esoteric accountics nature? Is it because only empirical research is deemed notable by the Screening Committees?

For more on the accountics bias in academe, go to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm

Also see the various commentaries at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession

May 3, 2007 reply from Paul Williams [Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]

I agree that the conversation has drifted a bit from the original question, but if Bob's friend has been following this discussion, he might be inclined to think ill of his prospects for doing what he wants. It is largely the case now that U.S. PhD programs are as Jagdish and Bob have characterized them.

There are a few places in the U.S. where Bob's friend might be able to pursue an interest in accounting. Central Florida and South Florida are PhD programs that offer some diversity of faculty talent that provide a doctoral student with flexibility for pursuing whatever interest excites them.

North Texas and Case Western Reserve are other places. There are probably others, but they are fewer and farther between than they were when I went through the experience. If Bob's friend is adventuresome, there are many excellent doctoral opportunities at schools outside the U.S. For example, the University of Alberta has a diverse faculty, which allows the pursuit of interests that would simply not be tolerated in most U.S. doctoral programs.

Then there are schools in the UK and Australia. Adelaide, Wollongong, Cardiff, Strathclyde, Essex, the list goes on. These places afford someone a different experience from many US programs and provide much greater freedom to follow one's intellectual bliss than the stultifying places that are the U.S. "elite."

Paul

May 11, 2007 reply from Sue P. Ravenscroft [ACCT] [sueraven@iastate.edu]
Sue gave me permission to forward a somewhat laundered version of her original message. It confirms what I've been arguing aud nauseum. The number of accounting student doctoral graduates in the U.S. plunged to less than 100 per year to meet an exploding demand for accounting professors. A major cause of the shortage of applicants to doctoral programs is that these econometrics programs do not interest most accountants in the pool of possible applicants to such doctoral programs.  Nearly all available accounting doctoral programs (not just Tier I programs) are no longer accounting programs and have no dedicated accounting courses. They’re literally social science methodology programs with most emphasis on econometrics and no choices for other research methodologies --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm

Dear Bob,

I was just contacted by a wonderful young woman, who graduated from Iowa State University last year. She is bright, personable, hard-working, and interested in going into a PhD program. She is NOT interested in doing a highly quantitative economics-based program, but can handle the math and statistics needed for behavioral research. I feel fortunate in the timing of her inquiry, because I observed the discussion about a young man you know who is looking into doctoral schools, and the subsequent advice from Sansing that he consider only a Tier One school because of the "alleged choices" such schools provide versus the counter-advice of actually getting training to do what one loves.

The young woman has already received the Tier One type advice and was totally taken aback and turned off by it. The assistant professor who gave her that advice told her she should take two years of college level advanced math courses and then apply, because she is definitely bright enough to go to a Tier One school and should not even consider going to a Tier Two type institution. Her goal was to enter a program in fall of 2008. After that set-back she wrote me, and I was far more encouraging.......I told her that I had just seen a rather long (albeit sometimes almost hostile) exchange about the types of programs available and the wisdom of going to the "Tier One" schools even if that wasn't where one's interest or heart lay.....This student is a wise young woman and doesn't want to be trained to do something she doesn't want to do.....

So, I am writing to ask if you have a final listing of schools that might be more open to a variety of research approaches.....If so, could you please write to me (address above or to her). I would be ever so grateful.

Thank you very much.

Best regards,

Sue Ravenscroft

May 15, 2007 reply from Dana Carpenter [dcarpenter@MATCMADISON.EDU]

I have followed the need a favor thread with great interest. I am in my mid 40'sand have taught at community colleges (with a few years at bachelor granting universities) for 20 years following 3 years with KPMG. I have always wanted to get my doctorate for personal actualization and would be interested in teaching at a regional university. I scored 99 percentile on the verbal portion of the GMAT but just average on the Mathematics. Two years ago I was told during an interview with a very prestigous school that with a few semesters of calculus I could probably gain admission to their Ph. D Program. I was also admitted to a Ph. D in management at a different college. I decided against both options. I would definitely be interested in a DBA or some of the teaching oriented or blended accounting Ph. D's that have been discussed. In my situation (with fewer years left in my career) I am really not interested in a professorship at a Top Tier University. For the same reasons I hesitate to give up a job I love and earn no income for 4 or 5 years at a minimum. I would be interested in your response to the Accounting DBA question as well as specific ideas as to programs or perhaps a different field with a concentration in accounting.

Dana Carpenter
(608) 246-6590

May 4, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen

Your experience, Dana, is very typical of the many students at all ages who are turned off by having to study five years of social science research to obtain a tenure track position to be an accounting professor.

To my knowledge, the distinction between a PhD and a DBA from a Tier 1 research university is about as marked as the distinction between ketchup vs. catsup. Both doctoral degrees are intended to instill research skills in students intent on careers in academia. The DBA used to entail a more rounded set of business courses (management, organization behavior, finance, marketing, etc.) but I think most accounting PhD and DBA programs have dropped required courses except for a few research seminars and possibly some social science (especially economics) and statistics courses.

The DBA used to focus more on the "application of theory" as opposed to the "development of new theory" in a PhD program --- http://dr-hy.com/Menu-Bar/mVita/DBA-vs-PHD.html
In my opinion, these distinctions between the two degrees have largely evaporated. The U.S. Department of Education and the National Science Foundation recognize numerous research-oriented doctoral degrees such as the D.B.A. as "equivalent" to the Ph.D. and do not discriminate between them --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doctor_of_Business_Administration
Certainly the distinction between DBA versus PhD in business schools  is not as great as the distinction between EED and PhD in schools of education.

Probably the best known business school that offers DBA and PhD degrees is the Harvard Business School. If you major in a traditional business area (e.g., accounting, marketing, management strategy, information technology) you get a DBA. If you major in business economics, health policy, or organization behavior you get a PhD. The actual distinction between the two designations is not at all clear to me. About the only thing I can tell is that some HBS doctoral students get ketchup on their hamburgers and others get catsup.

Most certainly, having a DBA will not change the criteria for obtaining tenure later in life. I do not know of any serious university that will put higher weightings on teaching performance for DBA faculty versus higher weightings on research for PhD faculty.

Amy Dunbar provided a link to a good listing of international doctoral programs --- http://aaahq.org/ata/_ATAMenu/phd-programs.htm 

Questions raised are how large each program is and what have been the trends in growth or shrinkage. As new doctoral programs came on line, the very large doctoral programs such as those in Illinois, Michigan, Texas, Indiana, and Michigan State greatly reduced doctoral program size in the 1986-2005 period. What used to be large programs shrank greatly in size. Some smaller programs like Rice have gone out of accounting doctoral programs entirely. Some like Minnesota seem to have disappeared without making any official announcements.

A listing of the history of U.S. accounting doctoral programs is provided in your free Prentice-Hall  Hasselback Accounting Faculty Directory (at least in the hard copy version). The Doctoral Program History table is on the page preceding the start of the alphabetized listing of accounting faculty by college. In don't think this table is available in Jim's Online Directory at http://rarc.rutgers.edu/raw/hasselback/

There are some errors in the Hasselback table that are due mainly to failures of some programs to accurately report their own data to Jim. But except for Penn State, I think the recent undercounting is relatively minor.

Jim also provides the totals by year. The last column is generally way off for the most recent year because of reporting time lags. However, the preceding columns are relatively accurate.

In the past twenty years, the most accounting doctoral graduates reported for the U.S. was 207 in 1988. The least was 69 in 2003. It has not been over 100 since 2001.

The depressing Plumlee et al (2006) study is probably more accurate for the year 2004. Further analysis is provided at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm 

Bob Jensen

May 11, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen

A summary listing of non-traditional programs was provided by Paul Williams in the listing of messages at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

The snipped version is http://snipurl.com/1jb1g

One of the subsequent messages that I sent to my Student YYYYY is shown below:

Message from Bob Jensen to YYYYY

I’m particularly happy that you’re now motivated to become an accounting educator. I loved this profession.

First and foremost is your GMAT score that determines almost everything regarding admission to any respectable doctoral program. Consider all your options for having as high a score as possible.

Second you need to honestly evaluate your aptitude for statistics and mathematics. Nearly all accounting doctoral programs are tantamount to econometrics programs these days with great stress on econometrics models of capital markets data.

I don’t know if you followed the recent AECM lively exchange on this topic or not. You can read some of the messages at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

A listing of doctoral programs is provided at
http://aaahq.org/ata/_ATAMenu/phd-programs.htm

I know you are somewhat interested in taxation. In nearly all instances, taxation doctoral students still have to master the econometrics requirements of capital markets research.

If you are looking for the handful of programs that allow you to customize your program and possibly cut back on the econometrics hurdles, I recommend that you look into the following programs, messages about which appear at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

Bentley College (Boston) This is a new program that I don’t yet know much about. Bentley is a very good accounting and finance college, although I would not expect it to be strong for a tax concentration.

Case Western University (Cleveland)
University of Central Florida (Orlando)
University of South Florida (Tampa)
University of North Texas (Denton)

Various programs outside the U.S. (Please scroll down to the informative message from Paul Williams in this regard) --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

If I can be of further help, please let me know.

Bob Jensen

 

May 12, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

--- Sue Ravenscroft wrote (to Bob Jensen, who then posted it here):

I feel fortunate in the timing of her inquiry, because I observed the discussion about a young man you know who is looking into doctoral schools, and the subsequent advice from Sansing that he consider only a Tier One school because of the "alleged choices" such schools provide versus the counter-advice of actually getting training to do what one loves.

---

For those interested in what I actually said, as opposed to how it is characterized above, I repeat it below.

"I would encourage your friend to think about the real option aspect of this decision. He should be very confident of his decision to not pursue a Ph.D. at a research-oriented program before bypassing that option. If he studies at Chicago and makes an informed decision not to pursue "mainstream" academic research, then he will be over-trained for his dream job at the kind of liberal arts college you describe. But he also has the option of pursuing the research route. But if he studies at a place that puts less emphasis on research methods, he has limited his options at the outset."

Later in the same thread, I also said:

"My point was that the decision Bob's friend makes regarding a Ph.D. program will significantly affect the opportunities that he or she faces upon graduation, which will in turn affect subsequent academic opportunties as well. Unless one is very sure about what what one's preferences will be in the future, the course of action that preserves options has a lot to recommend it. Whether one ultimately prefers a career that features both research and teaching, or wants to teach and do no research, it would be nice to have the skill set needed to make have a real choice."

Richard Sansing

May 12, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Richard,

Even better advice would be to avoid accounting altogether if you want to be a top researcher in a Tier 1 accounting research university. Consider the role model examples. Ron Dye (Northwestern Accounting Professor) has his doctorate and undergraduate degrees in mathematics and economics with almost no accounting. Some of our other top accounting researchers have management science, mathematics, econometrics, and psychometric doctorates with very little in the way of accountancy education and/or experience in accounting practice. What accounting they learned is when having to teach a little about it after they became professors.

I'm not trying to be facetious or cynical here. Those of us that majored in accounting for five years had to take a lot more time in college to earn a doctorate in an accounting doctoral program. It is actually quite costly in time and opportunity cost to first become an accountant and then enter one of our present accounting doctoral programs. It is far more efficient to major in economics and then earn an econometrics doctorate from a prestigious Economics Department. Equally great is to earn a doctorate in computer science.

The only risk of not having an accounting background as far as I can tell is the risk of not getting tenure in a Tier 1 accounting university. Without accounting, it is more difficult for tenure rejects to become accounting teachers in Tier 2 and Tier 3 colleges and universities. Those universities typically require more knowledge of accountancy.

Accounting majors realistically face 12 years of full-time undergraduate and graduate studies before graduating with a doctorate in an accounting program. On top of that, accounting doctoral programs prefer that doctoral candidates have 1-5 years of accounting practice experience. This adds up to 13-17 years to graduate from an accounting doctoral program.

An economics major can earn an economics doctorate in seven years of full-time studies before graduating with a doctorate from an Economics Department. If she or he bothers to earn a MBA degree along the way, it may take eight years to complete the doctorate. Under new AACSB rules, doctoral graduates in economics, statistics, mathematics, psychology, etc. are fully qualified to become accounting professors.

I must admit that I reasoned exactly like you, Richard, until I pushed Student XXXXX into a Tier 1 accounting doctoral program that he withdrew from after his first semester in spite of his being a brilliant math student (double major with accounting).This unfortunate outcome made me think more seriously about why the pool for accounting doctoral students is drying up.

Once again consider the Plumlee et al findings:  Plumlee et al. (2006) discovered that there were only 29 doctoral students in auditing and 23 in tax out of the 2004 total of 391 accounting doctoral students enrolled in years 1-5 in the United States. The number of graduates has shrunk to less than 100 per year.

If the Tier 1 accounting doctoral programs (and in fact virtually all accounting doctoral programs) require that all applicants have the advanced mathematics, statistics, and economics, we have in fact added possibly two more years to a five-year accounting program just to enter the accounting doctoral program applicant pool. Alternately, an applicant might be admitted provisionally into an accounting doctoral studies program and take the two years of econometrics preparatory courses in what becomes tantamount to a six or seven year doctoral full-time studies program in graduate school.

My conclusions are as follows.

1. To become an accounting professor in a Tier 1 accounting program it is far more efficient and possibly more effective (toward tenure) to earn social science, mathematics, or statistics doctorate outside accounting in a highly prestigious university. Accounting doctoral programs are actually inefficient alternatives to becoming an accounting professor in a Tier 1 accounting program unless you cannot get into a highly prestigious non-accounting doctoral program.

2. The pool of applicants for accounting doctoral programs is drying up. Accountants with 1-5 years of experience typically want to study accounting if they choose to enter a doctoral program. Since virtually all accounting doctoral programs in the United States are social science (particularly econometrics) programs with few if any accounting courses, these programs do not appeal to accountants. These doctoral programs might appeal to economists and statisticians, but it is far more efficient to earn economics and statistics doctorates from Departments of Economics and Statistics.

Thus I gave the wrong advice to my Student XXXXX who was a brilliant dual major in accounting and mathematics. Instead of recommending a doctoral program in accounting (where he really did not want a forced feeding of econometrics), I should've recommended that he go directly into a prestigious mathematics doctoral program. Then he could ultimately apply to become an accounting professor in a Tier 1 accounting research university after getting his mathematics doctorate.

Since the number of graduates from accounting doctoral programs is less than 100 students per year, Tier 1 research universities are often forced to seek top graduates from non-accounting doctoral programs such as econometrics and management science programs in prestigious universities.

Isn't it sad that for some accounting professors like me, majoring in accounting was wasted time.

Bob Jensen

May 13, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

Bob,

I suspect that Ron Dye would recommend studying under Ron Dye at Kellogg's accounting Ph.D. program! One way to find out-- I'll ask him and post his response.

Some of your analysis seems exaggerated. I came into the doctoral program with a very weak math background. In my three years of coursework, roughly 1/3 of my classes were accounting research seminars and 2/3 were math and economics classes. When you say:

"If the Tier 1 accounting doctoral programs (and in fact virtually all accounting doctoral programs) require that all applicants have the advanced mathematics, statistics, and economics, we have in fact added possibly two more years to a five-year accounting program just to enter the accounting doctoral program applicant pool."

you are double counting. You take those "tools" courses during the five-year accounting doctoral program, not in addition to it.

I think that trying to become an accounting researcher without taking the accounting research seminars and attending the weekly accounting research workshops would be very difficult.

I would ask someone considering an accounting academic career what sort of questions they would like to answer. Much of this thread has framed the questions in negative terms "How do I avoid course X during my doctoral program?" rather than in positive terms "How do I learn how to answer question Y?"

Richard Sansing

May 14, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Richard,

"Three years" is bad advice these days! Your college (Dartmouth) does not have a doctoral program. Let me use as a benchmark what I view as a typical accounting doctoral program in the 21st Century. The University of Florida writes that it takes 4-5 years to complete an accounting PhD for students entering with strong mathematics backgrounds. Students who must additionally take the "mathematics preparatory courses" must anticipate six or seven years of full-time effort.

Apparently your experience (advice?) differs from the advice given by the accounting professor who advised Sue's accounting graduate to take two more years "advanced mathematics" before applying to accounting doctoral programs.

It also differs from my experience trying to place some top accounting graduates in accounting doctoral programs in recent years. Nearly all who were admitted had significantly stronger mathematics credentials than those that were rejected.  Most programs now advise applicants that (even those with math credentials and masters degrees) the accounting doctoral program will take 4-5 years (See the University of Florida statement quoted below).

In fact most universities make a concerted effort to recruit accounting doctoral program candidates who do not have accounting degrees. Virtually every accounting doctoral program has a mathematics matriculation requirement that is now quite formidable (possibly more so for applicants today than for us applicants in the 20th Century). Consider the following statement at the Fisher School of Accounting Website at the University of Florida.

Note in particular the suggested admission alternatives of "economics, engineering, mathematics, operations research, psychology, and statistics." No mention is made of such undergraduate degrees as history, philosophy, or other humanities degrees, and I suspect that unless a humanities graduate is very strong in mathematics, the chances are zero of being admitted to most any U.S. accounting doctoral program even among humanities graduates that are actively recruited by top law schools. By the way, top law schools in particular recruit accounting graduates more aggressively than accounting doctoral programs in my opinion. One of the major reasons for the shrinking pool of applicants to accounting doctoral programs is the now preferred option to go to law school (including some who want to specialize in tax and eventually teach tax at the college level with a JD credential).

Begin Quote
*************

University of Florida Ph.D. in Business Administration - Accounting

Ph.D. Program - Accounting Concentration

This program is open to all applicants who have completed an undergraduate degree. Individuals with a degree in a non-business discipline (e.g., economics, engineering, mathematics, operations research, psychology, statistics) are encouraged to apply.

Program Details (pdf)

Students are required to demonstrate math competency prior to matriculating the doctoral program. Each student's background will be evaluated individually, and guidance provided on ways a student can ready themselves prior to beginning the doctoral course work. There are opportunities to complete preparatory course work at the University of Florida prior to matriculating our doctoral program.

The accounting concentration is designed to be completed in four to five years. The first year of the program is essentially lockstep with doctoral students in economics and finance. Starting in the second year, individual course work is designed by the student in consultation with his or her supervisory committee and the accounting graduate coordinator. Other than the Accounting Seminars (listed below) there are no specific required courses after the first year of the program.

Accounting Seminars:

ACG 7939 Theoretical Constructs in Accounting
ACG 7979 Accounting Readings and Replication
ACG 7885 Empirical Research Methods in Accounting
ACG 7979 Accounting Readings and Research Project
ACG 7887 Research Analysis in Accounting

Ph.D. Co-Major Program with the Department of Statistics

A program of study for a single degree in which a student satisfies co-major requirements in two separate academic disciplines that offer the Ph.D.

 

End Quote
*************

Is there any accounting doctoral program in the United States that encourages humanities graduates to apply? Is there an accounting doctoral program in the entire United States that has a co-major with the Department of Philosophy or the Department of History?

As of today, The University of Florida graduated four accounting PhDs since Year 2000. As far as I can tell, none of them were undergraduate accounting majors. Degrees in engineering, economics, and mathematics most likely hastened completion of their doctoral degrees in accounting at Florida in less than six or seven years. I mention Florida only because Florida is not a unique accounting doctoral program in this regard. I commend Florida for being more honest than some when stating the program requirements.

The bottom line is that I don't think that the doctoral program that you (Richard) entered "with a very weak math background" and completed in three years makes you a relevant role model for today's applicants to doctoral programs. My reading is that today you could not even be admitted to the University of Florida accounting doctoral program unless you completed the "preparatory course work at the University of Florida prior to matriculating our doctoral program." We (you and me) are no longer role models in that regard for applicants to accounting doctoral programs.

In my case I was admitted to the doctoral program but then had to take all those extra undergraduate math, operations research, economics, and statistics courses while in the program. My PhD graduation would've been hastened at Stanford if I had majored in mathematics or statistics instead of accounting as an undergraduate. I perhaps then could've graduated in three years instead of the five full (and delightful) years that I spent in Palo Alto. Now I think it requires six or seven years in Palo Alto for candidates who must take the preparatory undergraduate courses. In my day we did not have all those accounting research seminars at the graduate level.

Bob Jensen

May 13, 2007 reply from

Bob,

You are not confused. And I am not brainwashed. ;-)

My point, as you well know, is that when we do research using archival data we need math skills. Different types of research appear to be rewarded differently, as evidenced by the salary differentials across the schools at a university.

Amy

May 14, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Amy,

You wrote that "when we do research using archival data we need math skills."

To which I respectfully reply as follows:

Not everything that can be counted, counts. And not everything that counts can be counted.
Albert Einstein

I think that you're confining doctoral scholarship to archives that can be counted and overlooking the archives, possibly the most relevant archived information, that cannot be counted.

In the United States, following the Gordon/Howell and Pierson reports, our accounting doctoral programs and leading academic journals bet the farm on the social sciences without taking the due cautions of realizing why the social sciences are called "soft sciences." They're soft because "not everything that can be counted, counts. And not everything that counts can be counted."

It seems to me that history scholars have a much longer history of analyzing archival data than most any other type of scholars, I wonder what the discipline of history would’ve become if every history scholar over the past 1,000 years had to have two years of preparatory “advanced mathematics” before entering a doctoral program in history.

It seems to me that legal scholars have a very long and scholarly history of doing research on archival data, especially court records, I wonder what the discipline of law would’ve become if every legal scholar over the past 1,000 years had to have two years of preparatory “advanced mathematics” before entering a JD program.

Many of our serious professional problems needing research in accounting are closer to law than economics. Particularly vexing are the issues of how to account for complex contracts (e.g., those with derivatives, contingencies, and intangibles) in settings where the contracts are being written to deceive investors and creditors. Must years of advanced mathematics and econometrics necessary conditions for conducting academic research to help the profession with these contracts?

Where would we be in medicine, law, and most other professions if it was dictated on high that all their doctoral programs had to require advanced mathematics? Would they find themselves in the mess we have today in academic accounting in the United States where the pool of potential doctoral candidates is drying up?

Would we find ourselves in the mess of having to rely on adjuncts to teach more of the accounting courses than our tenure-track faculty who bargained for minimal teaching and maximal salaries and benefits so they could conduct econometric and psychometric research with models of dubious relevance to the practicing profession?

Why is it that virtually all of our doctoral programs in accounting are now being shunned by so many accounting professionals who would like to teach accounting, auditing, tax, or AIS but are turned off by having to first take preparatory courses in advanced mathematics and not have the opportunity for studying accounting in accounting doctoral programs?

In academic accounting we’ve almost all been seduced by frustrated economists in the U.S. who found a way to secure a monopoly by putting up barriers to entry that shrinks the supply of accounting doctoral graduates and lifts the salaries of accounting professors to the highest levels in every university. Most of us, especially me, have benefited from these barriers to entry. But in the process, we’ve widened the schism between professors of accounting and the accounting profession and students of accounting.

These barriers to entry to doctoral programs have frustrated practicing accountants to a point where doctoral programs like the one at the University of Florida are in many cases more appealing to non-accountants ("economics, engineering, mathematics, operations research, psychology, and statistics") who can matriculate into the program with their advanced mathematics skills and graduate from the program without every having studied the things we teach our undergraduates and masters students in accounting. In fairness, the current body of eight accounting doctoral students at the University of Florida has three candidates with undergraduate degrees in accounting. Others include a mathematics major, a statistics major, a finance major, a commerce major, and a student who majored in economics. The finance major also earned a masters of accounting degree.

It seems to me that in the United States after the Gordon/Howell and Pierson reports our accounting doctoral programs and leading academic journals bet the farm on the social sciences without heeding the due cautions of realizing why the social sciences are called "soft sciences." They're soft because "not everything that can be counted, counts. And not everything that counts can be counted."

Why is it that only outside the United States various accounting doctoral programs in prestigious universities have seen the light regarding diversity of research methodologies in academic accountancy?

Bob Jensen

May 13, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

--- Bob Jensen wrote:

Even better advice would be to avoid accounting altogether if you want to be a top researcher in a Tier 1 accounting research university. Consider the role model examples. Ron Dye (Northwestern Accounting Professor) has his doctorate and undergraduate degrees in mathematics and economics with almost no accounting. Some of our other top accounting researchers have management science, mathematics, econometrics, and psychometric doctorates with very little in the way of accountancy education and/or experience in accounting practice. What accounting they learned is when having to teach a little about it after they became professors.

--- end of quote ---

Here is Ron's response, along with the question that I posed to him.

About the question: by and large, I think it is a mistake for someone interested in pursuing an academic career in accounting not to get a phd in accounting. If you look at the "success" stories, there aren't many: most of the people who make a post-phd transition fail. I think that happens for a couple reasons. 1. I think some of the people that transfer late do it for the money, and aren't really all that interested in accounting. While the $ are nice, it is impossible to think about $ when you are trying to come up with an idea, and anyway, you're unlikely to come up with an idea unless you're really interested in the subject. 2. I think, almost independent of the field, unless you get involved in the field at an early age, for some reason it becomes very hard to develop good intuition for the area - which is a second reason good problems are often not generated by "crossovers."

The bigger thing - not related to the question you raise - but maybe you could add to the discussion is that there are, as far as I can tell, not a lot of new ideas being put forth by anyone in accounting nowadays (with the possible exception of John Dickhaut's neuro stuff). In most fields, the youngsters are supposed to come up with the new problems, techniques, etc., but I see a lot more mimicry than innovation among newly minted phds now.

Anyway, for what it's worth....

Ron

May 14, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Richard,

I thank you for obtaining a reply from Ron Dye. He's one among a number of leading researchers who became an accounting professor without having a background in accounting. He's also one of the finest mathematics researchers in academic accounting.

What is especially interesting to me is Ron's conclusion that essentially our highly touted and highly selective accounting doctoral programs (with the highest-paid graduates in academe) in the United States are pretty much failures if we define research as the creation of new and innovative knowledge. I love his choice of the word  "mimicry" in his following conclusion:

Begin Quote
**********************

The bigger thing - not related to the question you raise - but maybe you could add to the discussion is that there are, as far as I can tell, not a lot of new ideas being put forth by anyone in accounting nowadays (with the possible exception of John Dickhaut's neuro stuff). In most fields, the youngsters are supposed to come up with the new problems, techniques, etc., but I see a lot more mimicry than innovation among newly minted phds now.

**********************
End Quote

I might add that John Dickhaut is nowhere close to being a newly-minted doctoral student. He's an old guy who got his PhD at Ohio State in 1970 before Ohio State transitioned into its present highly mathematical accounting doctoral program. This illustrates how innovative research can come from graduates of accounting doctoral programs that do not (at least way back then) require advanced mathematics.

I suggested that Ron Dye's route to becoming an accounting academic was more efficient in the sense of taking less time (three  years in an economics doctoral program at Carnegie built upon his mathematics undergraduate degree) rather than the route of entering an accounting doctoral program where it now takes 4-5 years built upon a mathematics undergraduate degree or 6-7 years built upon a typical accounting undergraduate degree if the student has to take the two years of preparatory mathematics required by many of our top accounting doctoral programs.

In terms of accountics, I think our econometrics-based accounting doctoral programs are probably better for us than doctoral programs in the economics departments because accounting doctoral students are more likely to conduct research on archival databases that are more of interest in accounting than are the databases of interest to economics departments. The downside is that the econometrics studies published in leading accounting research journals by graduates of accounting doctoral programs have probably reflected mostly "mimicry" lamented by Professor Dye.

In his message Professor Dye does not recommend that his streamlined route to becoming an accounting professor (without an accounting education background) serve as a role model. I tend to agree, although I now have newer doubts. I'm currently evaluating publications submitted for the 2007 AICPA/AAA Notable Contributions to Literature Award. The Award's Screening Committee filtered out all submissions that were not accountics papers. Among those accountics papers submitted to our Selection Committee by the Screening Committee, many of the authors do not have accounting backgrounds and some of the submissions are from such journals as Management Science and the Journal of Financial Economics. My recommendation for the award will actually be a finance professor's paper that made it through the Screening Committee. Sadly we have to go to finance and management science graduates to find our most notable contributions to accounting literature.

This is consistent with Ron's claim that among graduates of accounting doctoral programs "I see a lot more mimicry than innovation among newly minted phds now." Even some of our so-called Seminal Contributions to Accounting Research Award-winning studies mimicked a lot from prior research of economics and finance professors

Thanks to Ron Dye's reply, I'm even more concerned about our doctoral programs in accounting and our leading academic accounting journals --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm

Thanks for the favor Richard!

Bob Jensen

 

May 3, 2007 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

1.
Students consider many factors before deciding to enter an accounting PhD program, some of them random and/or serendipitous (as in my case; my would-be advisor in Operations Research passed away within four months of my stay in the program). But we need to ask why there are no takers inspite of the astronomical salaries we offer, while outstanding candidates are begging to be admitted into Phd programs in disciplines where tenure-track positions are almost non-existent, or where a doctoral degree is only ticket to years of serfdom as Postdocs.

The simple answer is that our field, AS WE PORTRAY IT, is just not exciting to a young inquiring mind. In accounting there is no Fermat's last theorem to be proved (as in mathematics), nor Hilbert's entscheidungsproblem to be solved (as in Computing), nor the mind-body problem (as in philosophy), nor new chemicals to be synthesised (chemistry), grammar of lost languages to be discovered (anthropology), genes to be targeted (medicine)....

A long time ago, Yuji Ijiri tried to convince us that there were fundamental problems in accounting that are equally challenging. How many of us even remember them today, or even have heard of them?

Most of us have sought to use statistics the same way a drunk uses a lamp post -- more for support than for illumination (apologies to Mark Twain).

I personally think that often, these days, people get into a PhD for a wrong reason, and some times live to regret it.

We accounting academics, especially in the so-called research universities, are living a lie, thanks to AACSB. We portray ourselves as scholars and yet rarely interact with the scholarly community on our campuses. We claim to be academics in a professional discipline and yet hardly interact with the profession in a meaningful way. Aren't we like race horses with blinders on and no jockies?

2.
The shortage of PhD students in non-financial areas is also rigged. We make it clear to the students which side of the toast is buttered. We dump on journals in accounting other than those in the financial area which publish the so-called "mainstream" (I prefer the term stale) research. Then we make life difficult at tenure time for those who have not toed the party line. We tolerate third rate pedagogy as long as it releases time for prima donnas to indulge in stale irrelevant research. Then we squabble over what is "real" research, and why what every one else is doing is not that. Is this a recipe for recruiting young inquiring minds into our discipline?

I left the corporate world in the early seventies because I was fascinated with the problems I had to deal with there (mostly in operations) and the promise that Operations Research offered. Today, however, As someone at the front end of the baby boom generation, I sometimes wonder if, were I shopping today for a PhD program, I would leave the corporate world if my success depended on toeing the party line.

Jagdish

May 13, 2007 reply from Roger Debreceny [Roger@DEBRECENY.COM]

Just a plug for the Shidler PhD program. Given the strategic direction of the Shidler College in international management, our PhD program is somewhat different than the usual program. The program is in International Management, with specializations in accounting, marketing, MIS and so on. Details at http://shidler.hawaii.edu/Programs/Graduate/PhDinInternationalManagement/PhDOverview/tabid/382/Default.aspx . We're always looking for high quality candidates,

Roger Debreceny
Shidler College Distinguished Professor of Accounting
School of Accountancy
Shidler College of Business
University of Hawai`i at Mānoa
2404 Maile Way, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA

roger@debreceny.com     rogersd@hawaii.edu 
Office: +1 808 956 8545 Cell: +1 808 393 1352
www.debreceny.com 

May 13, 2007 reply from Dan Stone, Univ. of Kentucky [dstone@UKY.EDU]

Please add the Univ. of Kentucky to the list of doctoral programs that seek students interested in, and support, a variety of research methods and topics. For example, among the 12 doctoral students in residence currently, we have students pursuing research related to:

1. XBRL

2. Accounting issues related to environmental sustainability 3. Knowledge management in professional service firms 4. Applications of self-determination theory to motivating accounting professionals 5. Accounting methods to aid economic development in emerging economies 6. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting

Information about the Univ. of Kentucky doctoral program is available at:

http://gatton.uky.edu/Programs/ACC/DoctoralDegreeInformation.html

We typically admit 2-3 students per year to the program.

Happy Mother's Day!

Dan Stone (dstone@uky.edu)
Director of Graduate Studies
University of Kentucky

June 12, 2007 reply from doctoral student Randy Kuhn [jkuhn@BUS.UCF.EDU]

Later this week, I will be attending the AAA doctoral consortium held in Tahoe each year as a representative of the University of Central.

Later this week, I will be attending the AAA doctoral consortium held in Tahoe each year as a representative of the University of Central Florida. A few minutes ago I received the message below from one of the professors who will be presenting to the doctoral candidates. Apparently, some of the students attending do not feel his non-archival style of research is worth discussing at the consortium and complained to one of the organizers prompting a well-established professor from an elite private institution to essentially justify his place on the agenda BEFORE we even arrive. I find this behavior not only completely rude and disrespectful but just plain anti-academic from many angles. These folks are complaining about one article out of 21. Should I email the organizer complaining that two-thirds of the material on the agenda is from a neo-classical, efficient markets slant in which I have no interest? My head was spinning in circles for hours trying to grapple with the analytical models that ultimately told me what I already intuitively knew. I’m game for new experiences and will embrace the opportunity to learn about others’ research. Isn’t that what academia is supposed to be about? In the back of my mind I kind of hope one of the complainers is my roommate so I can bore him to tears each night discussing how accounting choices exist, are made by people, are quite often not rational, and have mega impacts to society. Ok enough of my diatribe, see the lengthy note to the consortium participants below.

-Randy

June 12, 2007 reply from doctoral student Randy Kuhn [jkuhn@BUS.UCF.EDU]

Boy, did I misconstrue the original email from the professor. I emailed the professor to express my interest in his subject matter and he responded by stating that he did not mean to imply students had complained negatively about his articles. Rather, several students complained about the overwhelming econometrics-based research on the agenda and lack of diversity in the consortium curriculum. Big oopsy on my part! That is a much brighter situation!

June 12, 2007 reply from Sue P. Ravenscroft [sueraven@IASTATE.EDU]

Randy,

Thanks for the update....I am delighted to hear that doctoral students are finally expressing some dissatisfaction at the constrained nature of what is considered "good" research! As we attempt to replace the retiring professoriate, we need to attract more people, which should mean that we become more catholic in our research approaches, rather than more restrictive.

Sue Ravenscroft

June 12, 2007 reply from Paul Williams [Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]

Randy, et al.,

This is encouraging. When I attended the doctoral consortium the only thing that was on the agenda was EMH. The consortium has historically been an avenue for the ideologues (just check out who the faculty at that thing have been over the years). At the one I attended, Sandy Burton was invited for what appeared to be the sole purpose of humiliating him because of his "naïve" beliefs about accounting and security markets (he was invited to be the "normative" that the "positives" aimed to purge from the academy).

The tide may be turning. Given your interests, there are some recent books you might find useful.

Bent Flyvbjerg, "Making Social Science Matter," Cambridge University Press, 2001. Relying on research mainly from cognitive psych and sociology he makes the case that, "Predictive theories and universals cannot be found in the study of human affairs. Concrete, context-dependent knowledge is therefore more valuable than the vain search for predictive theories and universals (p. 73)."

A much better book than The Black Swan is David Orrell's (Oxford U. PhD in mathematics), "The Future of Everything: The Science of Prediction," Thunder's Mouth Press, 2007. Using the phenomena of weather, securities markets, and genetic variablility as examples he argues that complexity makes such phenomena "uncomputable," thus predicting them with mathematical precision is impossible. Those wanting to understand Bob's animus to "accountics" might find this a useful read.

Related, but specific to environmental science is Orrin H. Pilkey and Linda Pilkey-Jarvis, "useless arithmetic: Why Environmental Scientists Can't Predict the Future," Columbia University Press, 2007.

Paul

 

June 13, 2007 reply from Mac Wright [mac.wright@VU.EDU.AU]

Dear Randy, et al.,

Another book which might lend an interesting direction to a discourse on the SEC is Clarke, F., Dean, G., Oliver, K. Corporate Collapse – Accounting, regulatory and ethical failure, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003.

While directed at the Australian regulatory framework, the argument could be applied with equal validity to the SEC.

Kind regards,
Mac Wright
Co-Ordinator Aviation Program
Victoria University
Melbourne Australia

Fabio's Grad School Rulez (not humor) --- http://orgtheory.wordpress.com/grad-skool-rulz/


GMAT: Paying for Points
Test-prep services can be a big help as applicants prepare for the B-school admissions exam. Here, a rundown of some well-known players
by Francesca Di Meglio
Business Week, May 22, 2007
http://www.businessweek.com/bschools/content/may2007/bs20070522_855049.htm

If you're thinking of applying to B-school, then you're likely also wondering how to conquer the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT)—and whether a commercial test-preparation service, which can cost upwards of $1,000, is right for you.

Although admissions committees, even at the best-ranked B-schools, will tell you that your GMAT score is only one of many criteria for getting accepted, you still should plan on earning between 600 and a perfect 800, especially if you're gunning for the A-list. (To find the average and median GMAT scores of accepted students in individual programs, scan the BusinessWeek.com B-school profiles.)

. . .

One popular option is consulting a test-prep company that provides everything from group instruction to online courses. Here's an overview of the most popular GMAT test-preparation services in alphabetical order. For more opinions on the various test-prep services from test takers themselves, visit the BusinessWeek.com B-School forums, where this subject comes up a lot. And you can also check out BusinessWeek.com's newly updated GMAT Prep page --- http://www.businessweek.com/bschools/gmat/

Continued in article

Jensen Comment
The above article then goes on to identify the main commercial players in GMAT coaching for a fee, including those with coaching books, coaching CDs, coaching Websites, coaching courses, and one-on-one coaching tutorials with a supposed expert near where you live. The Business Week capsule summaries are rather nice summaries about options, costs, pros and cons of each coaching option.

Kaplan --- http://www.kaptest.com/

Manhattan GMAT --- http://www.manhattangmat.com/gmat-prep-global-home.cfm

Princeton Review --- http://www.princetonreview.com/mba/default.asp

Veritas --- http://www.veritasprep.com/

Business Week fails to mention one of the better sites (Test Magic) , in my viewpoint, for GMAT, SAT, GRE, and other test coaching:

Advice to students planning to take standardized tests such as the SAT, GRE, GMAT, LSAT, TOEFL, etc.
See Test Magic at http://www.testmagic.com/
There is a forum here where students interested in doctoral programs in business (e.g., accounting and finance) and economics discuss the ins and outs of doctoral programs.

Bob Jensen's threads about higher education controversies are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm


 

A scientist in any serious scientific discipline, such as genetics, would be in serious trouble if his fellow scientists were unable to confirm or replicate his claim to have found the gene for fatness. He would gain a reputation as being 'unreliable' and universities would be reluctant to employ him. This self-imposed insistence on rigorous methodology is however missing from contemporary epidemiology; indeed the most striking feature is the insouciance with which epidemiologists announce their findings, as if they do not expect anybody to take them seriously. It would, after all, be a very serious matter if drinking alcohol really did cause breast cancer.
James Le Fanu --- http://www.open2.net/truthwillout/human_genome/article/genome_fanu.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on replication are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Replication

Natural blondes are going extinct. It's a published fact!
Suppose this study had actually been reported a leading accounting research journal such as The Accounting Review.
Keep in mind that leading accounting research journals do not publish replication studies.
As a result few accounting researchers conduct replication studies since they cannot be published.
The logical deduction becomes that accountants would forever think that natural blondes are going extinct.

From the WSJ Opinion Journal on March 6, 2006

"Media outlets around the world, from CBS, ABC and CNN to the British tabloids" all fell for a hoax--a fake study from the World Health Organization claiming blondes are going extinct.

The Washington Post reported http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30318-2002Oct1.html
(Actually I think the story was removed with some very red faces)

"The decline and fall of the blonde is most likely being caused by bottle blondes, who researchers believe are more attractive to men than true blondes," said CBS "Early Show" co-host Gretchen Carlson.

"There's a study from the World Health Organization--this is for real--that says that blondes are an endangered species," Charlie Gibson said on "Good Morning America," prompting Diane Sawyer to say she's "going the way of the snail darter." . . .

"We've certainly never conducted any research into the subject," WHO spokeswoman Rebecca Harding said yesterday from Geneva. "It's been impossible to find out where it came from. It just seems like it was a hoax."

The health group traced the story to an account Thursday on a German wire service, which in turn was based on a two-year-old article in the German women's magazine Allegra, which cited a WHO anthropologist. Harding could find no record of such a man working for the WHO.

Hey, if you're a journalist, we've got a great human-interest story for you: Did you hear about the blonde who invented the solar flashlight? --- http://www.zelo.com/blonde/no_brains.asp

Now you see how ridiculous the accounting journal policy of not publishing replications becomes. Hopefully this published story in a leading U.S. newspaper (I mean The Washington Post that broke the Watergate scandal) the next time you read the findings in a leading accounting research journal.


A Fraudulent Paper Published in Nature, a Prestigious Science Journal
Another Case for Better Replication in Research Reporting

"'Grape harvest dates are poor indicators of summer warmth', as well as about scientific publication generally," by Douglas J. Keenan, Informath, November 3, 2006 ---  http://www.informath.org/apprise/a3200.htm 

That is, the authors had developed a method that gave a falsely-high estimate of temperature in 2003 and falsely-low estimates of temperatures in other very warm years. They then used those false estimates to proclaim that 2003 was tremendously warmer than other years.

The above is easy enough to understand. It does not even require any specialist scientific training. So how could the peer reviewers of the paper not have seen it? (Peer reviewers are the scientists who check a paper prior to its publication.) I asked Dr. Chuine what data was sent to Nature, when the paper was submitted to the journal. Dr. Chuine replied, “We never sent data to Nature”.

I have since published a short note that details the above problem (reference below). There are several other problems with the paper of Chuine et al. as well. I have written a brief survey of those (for people with an undergraduate-level background in science). As described in that survey, problems would be obvious to anyone with an appropriate scientific background, even without the data. In other words, the peer reviewers could not have had appropriate background.

What is important here is not the truth or falsity of the assertion of Chuine et al. about Burgundy temperatures. Rather, what is important is that a paper on what is arguably the world's most important scientific topic (global warming) was published in the world's most prestigious scientific journal with essentially no checking of the work prior to publication.

Moreover—and crucially—this lack of checking is not the result of some fluke failures in the publication process. Rather, it is common for researchers to submit papers without supporting data, and it is frequent that peer reviewers do not have the requisite mathematical or statistical skills needed to check the work (medical sciences largely excepted). In other words, the publication of the work of Chuine et al. was due to systemic problems in the scientific publication process.

The systemic nature of the problems indicates that there might be many other scientific papers that, like the paper of Chuine et al., were inappropriately published. Indeed, that is true and I could list numerous examples. The only thing really unusual about the paper of Chuine et al. is that the main problem with it is understandable for people without specialist scientific training. Actually, that is why I decided to publish about it. In many cases of incorrect research the authors will try to hide behind an obfuscating smokescreen of complexity and sophistry. That is not very feasible for Chuine et al. (though the authors did try).

Finally, it is worth noting that Chuine et al. had the data; so they must have known that their conclusions were unfounded. In other words, there is prima facie evidence of scientific fraud. What will happen to the researchers as a result of this? Probably nothing. That is another systemic problem with the scientific publication process.


This is replication doing its job
Purdue University is investigating “extremely serious” concerns about the research of Rusi Taleyarkhan, a professor of nuclear engineering who has published articles saying that he had produced nuclear fusion in a tabletop experiment, The New York Times reported. While the research was published in Science in 2002, the findings have faced increasing skepticism because other scientists have been unable to replicate them. Taleyarkhan did not respond to inquiries from The Times about the investigation.
Inside Higher Ed, March 08, 2006 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/index.php/news/2006/03/08/qt
The New York Times March 9 report is at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/08/science/08fusion.html?_r=1&oref=slogin 
 

Question
What is an "out of sample" test?
Hint: It's related to the concept of "replication" that almost seems to be unheard of in academic accounting research?

From Jim Mahar's Blog on June 29, 2006 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

I am a big fan of so called "out of sample" tests. When researchers find some anomaly within a data set and then others test for the presence in the same data set, we really do not learn much if they find the same thing. But when a new data set is used for the test, we have a much better understanding of the possible anomaly.

In the current JFQA there is just such an article by Richard Grossman and Stephen Shore. Using a data set that goes from 1870 to 1913 for British stocks, the authors find no small firm effect, and only a limited value effect.

In their own words:

 
"Unlike modern CRSP data, stocks that do not pay dividends do not outperform stocks that pay small dividends during this period. But like modern CRSP data, there is a weak relationship between dividend yield and performance for stocks that pay dividends. In sum, the size and reversal anomalies present in modern data are not present in our historical data, while there is some evidence for a value anomaly."
Which makes me wonder how many other things we think we "know" we really don't.

The current version of the paper is not listed on SSRN, but a past version of the paper is available (at least right now) here.

The evidence lies in lack of interest in replication
I wrote the following on December 1, 2004 at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession

Faculty interest in a professor’s “academic” research may be greater for a number of reasons. Academic research fits into a methodology that other professors like to hear about and critique. Since academic accounting and finance journals are methodology driven, there is potential benefit from being inspired to conduct a follow up study using the same or similar methods. In contrast, practitioners are more apt to look at relevant (big) problems for which there are no research methods accepted by the top journals.

Accounting Research Farmers Are More Interested in Their Tractors Than in Their Harvests

For a long time I’ve argued that top accounting research journals are just not interested in the relevance of their findings (except in the areas of tax and AIS). If the journals were primarily interested in the findings themselves, they would abandon their policies about not publishing replications of published research findings. If accounting researchers were more interested in relevance, they would conduct more replication studies. In countless instances in our top accounting research journals, the findings themselves just aren’t interesting enough to replicate. This is something that I attacked at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/book02q4.htm#Replication

At one point back in the 1980s there was a chance for accounting programs that were becoming “Schools of Accountancy” to become more like law schools and to have their elite professors become more closely aligned with the legal profession. Law schools and top law journals are less concerned about science than they are about case methodology driven by the practice of law. But the elite professors of accounting who already had vested interest in scientific methodology (e.g., positivism) and analytical modeling beat down case methodology. I once heard Bob Kaplan say to an audience that no elite accounting research journal would publish his case research. Science methodologies work great in the natural sciences. They are problematic in the psychology and sociology. They are even more problematic in the professions of accounting, law, journalism/communications, and political “science.”

We often criticize practitioners for ignoring academic research Maybe they are just being smart. I chuckle when I see our heroes in the mathematical theories of economics and finance winning prizes for knocking down theories that were granted earlier prizes (including Nobel prices). The Beta model was the basis for thousands of academic studies, and now the Beta model is a fallen icon. Fama got prizes for showing that capital markets were efficient and then more prizes for showing they were not so “efficient.” In the meantime, investment bankers, stock traders, and mutual funds were just ripping off investors. For a long time, elite accounting researchers could find no “empirical evidence” of widespread earnings management. All they had to do was look up from the computers where their heads were buried.

Few, if any, of the elite “academic” researchers were investigating the dire corruption of the markets themselves that rendered many of the published empirical findings useless.

Academic researchers worship at the feet of Penman and do not even recognize the name of Frank Partnoy or Jim Copeland.

Bob Jensen


Question
In science it is somewhat common for published papers to subsequently be withdrawn because the outcomes could not be replicated. In the history of accounting research has any published paper ever been "withdrawn" or “retracted” because the results could not be replicated?

"Columbia researcher retracts more studies," The New York Times via PhysOrg, June 15, 2006 --- http://www.physorg.com/news69601046.html

A Columbia University researcher has reportedly retracted four more scientific papers because the findings could not be replicated.

Chemistry Professor Dalibor Sames earlier this year retracted two other papers and part of a third published in a scientific journal, The New York Times reported Thursday. All of the papers involved carbon-hydrogen bond activation research.

Although Sames is listed as senior author on all of the papers, one of his former graduate students -- Bengu Sezen -- performed most of the experiments, the Times said.

Sames said each experiment has been repeated by at least two independent scientists who have not been able to replicate the results.

Sezen, a doctoral student in another field at the University of Heidelberg in Germany, disputed the retractions, questioning whether other members of Sames's group had tried to exactly repeat her experiments, the newspaper said.

The retraction of one paper, published in the journal Organic Letters in 2003, appeared Thursday, while the three others published in The Journal of the American Chemical Society in 2002 and 2003 are to be formally retracted later this month, the Times said.

Jensen Comment
What's disappointing and inconsistent is that leading universities pushed accounting research into positivist scientific methods but did not require that findings be verified by independent replication. In fact leading academic accounting research journals discourage replication by their absurd policies of not publishing replications of published research outcomes. They also do not publish commentaries that challenge underlying assumptions of purely analytical research. Hence I like to say that academic accounting researchers became more interested in their tractors than their harvests.

My threads on the dearth of replication/debate and some of the reasons top accounting research journals will not publish replications and commentaries are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Relication 

June 17, 2006 reply from Jagdish S. Gangolly [gangolly@INFOTOC.COM]

Bob,

I have not heard of any one in accounting retracting his/her work. It does not surprise me because of what I see to be the philosophical suppositions of most empirical accounting researchers.

In my opinion, most of us in empirical accounting research are, in many ways, stuck with the philosophical suppositions of late 19th and early 20th century positivists of the Vienna school, the most vocal proponent of the ideas whose work I am familiar with is A.J. Ayer. In his view of the world, a synthetic (that is, not an analytical) sentence must be verifiABLE to be considered a scientific statement, and is added to the stock of science when verified.

The physical sciences have passed by this view, and in fact, in my opinion, regard the latter-day positivist Popperian ideas of falsificationism to be the ideal. Here, a sentence is scientific if it is FalsifIABLE. The stock of sentences that are not repeatedly falsified is science in some sense. Therefore, in most physical sciences, when a statement is falsified (by not being replicable) is treated as nonsense rather than science. For example, when the theory about cold fusion in the Utah experiments met failure in repeated attempts to replicate them, the theory was treated as nonsensical and not scientific.

The unfortunate thing is that verification (or falsification) is misinterpreted by most, since I don't think either Ayer or Popper intended their views to form a theory of meaning.

The above approach has had a whole host of severe critics. My shortlist would include C.S. Peirce, William James, Quine (though a verificationist he did not accept logical positivism), Feyerabend, Davidson, and a bunch of others.

We have twisted the meaning of Popperian as well as Logical positivist thought to consider "scientific propositions" as those "veriFIED" or "not falsiFIED". Philosopher of those schools, on the other hand used veriFIABILITY and falsiFIABILITY as criterion to answer the question whether a proposition is scientific or not. We mistake an epistemic community for a theory of meaning. While it might help reaffirm our belief in our epistemic community to do so, it certainly would not provide our community a resilient philosophical foundation. It also would make us more of a theological community.

Regards to all,

Jagdish

 


My 67th birthday April 30, 2005 commentary on how research in business schools has run full circle  since the 1950s.  We've now completed the circle of virtually no science (long on speculation without rigor) to virtually all science (strong on rigor with irrelevant findings) to criticisms that science is not going to solve our problems that are too complex for rigorous scientific methods.

The U.S. led the way in bringing accounting, finance, and other business education and research into respectability in separate schools or colleges the business (so called B-schools) within top universities of the country.  The movement began in the 1960s and followed later in Europe after leading universities like Harvard, Chicago, Columbia, Chicago, Pennsylvania, UC Berkeley and Stanford showed how such schools could become important sources of cash and respectability. 

A major catalyst for change was the Ford Foundation that put a large amount of money into first the study of business schools and second the funding of doctoral programs and students in business studies.  First came the Ford-Foundation's Gordon and Howell Report (Gordon, R.A., & Howell, J.E. (1959). Higher education for business. New York: Columbia University Press) that investigated the state of business higher education in general.  You can read the following at http://siop.org/tip/backissues/tipoct97/HIGHHO~1.HTM

The Gordon and Howell report, published in 1959, examined the state of business education in the United States. This influential report recommended that managerial and organizational issues be studied in business schools using more rigorous scientific methods. Applied psychologists, well equipped to undertake such an endeavor, were highly sought after by business schools. Today, new psychology Ph.D.s continue to land jobs in business schools. However, we believe that this source of academic employment will be less available in the future because psychologists in the business schools have become well established enough to have their own "off-spring," who hold business Ph.D.s. More business school job ads these days contain the requirement that applicants possess degrees in business administration.

Prior to 1960, business education either took place in economics departments of major universities or in business schools that were viewed as parochial training programs by the more "academic" departments in humanities and sciences where most professors held doctoral degrees.  Business schools in that era had professors rooted in practice who had no doctoral degrees and virtually no research skills.  As a result some universities avoided having business schools altogether and others were ashamed of the ones they had. 

The Gordon and Howell Report concluded that doctoral programs were both insufficient and inadequate for business studies.  Inspired by the Gordon and Howell Report, the Ford Foundation poured millions of dollars into universities that would upgrade doctoral programs for business studies.  I was one of the beneficiaries of this initiative.  Stanford University obtained a great deal of this Ford Foundation money and used a goodly share of that money to attract business doctoral students.  My relatively large fellowship to Stanford (which actually turned into a five-year fellowship for me) afforded me the opportunity to get a PhD in accounting.  The same opportunities were taking place for other business students at major universities around the country.

Another initiative of the Gordon and Howell Report was that doctoral studies in business would entail very little study in business.  Instead the focus would be on building research skills.  In most instances, the business doctoral programs generally sent their students to doctoral studies in other departments in the university.  In my own case, I can only recall having one accounting course at Stanford University.  Instead I was sent to the Mathematics, Statistics, Economics, Psychology, and Engineering (for Operations Research) graduate studies.  It was tough, because in most instances we were thrown into courses to compete head-to-head with doctoral students in those disciplines.  I was even sent to the Political Science Department to study (critically) the current research of Herb Simon and his colleagues at Carnegie Mellon.  That experience taught me that traditional social science researchers were highly skeptical of this new thrust in "business" research. 

Another example of the changing times was at Ohio State University when Tom Burns took command of doctoral students.  OSU took the Stanford approach to an extreme to where accounting doctoral students took virtually all courses outside the College of Business.  The entire thrust was one of building research skills that could then be applied to business problems.

The nature of our academic research journals also changed.  Older journals like The Accounting Review (TAR) became more and more biased and often printed articles that were better suited for journals in operations research, economics, and behavioral science.  Accounting research journal relevance to the profession was spiraling down and down.  I benefited from this bias in the 1960s and 1970s because I found it relatively easy to publish quantitative studies that assumed away the real world and allowed us to play in easier and simpler worlds that we could merely assume existed somewhere in the universe if not on earth.  In fairness, I think that our journal editors today demand more earthly grounding for even our most esoteric research studies.  But in the many papers I published in the 1960s and 1970s, I can only recall one that I think made any sort of practical contribution to the profession of accounting (and the world never noticed that paper published in TAR).

I even got a big head and commenced to think it was mundane to even teach accounting.  In my first university I taught mostly mathematical programming to doctoral students.  When I got a chair at a second university, I taught mathematical programming and computer programming (yes FORTRAN and COBOL) to graduate students.  But my roots were in accounting (as a CPA), my PhD was in accounting (well sort of), and I discovered that the real opportunities for an academic were really in accounting.  The reasons for these opportunities are rooted the various professional attractions of top students to major in accounting and the shortage of doctoral faculty across the world in the field of accountancy.  So I came home so to speak, but I've always been frustrated by the difficulty of making my research relevant to the profession.  If you look at my 75+ published research papers, you will find few contributions to the profession itself.  I'm one of the guilty parties that spend most of my life conducting research of interest to me that had little relevance to the accounting profession.

I was one of those accounting research farmers more interested in my tractors than in my harvests.  Most of my research during my entire career devoted to a study of methods and techniques than on professional problems faced by accounting standard setters, auditors, and business managers.  I didn't want to muck around the real world gathering data from real businesses and real accounting firms.  It was easier to live in assumed worlds or, on occasion, to study student behavior rather than have to go outside the campus. 

What has rooted me to the real world in the past two decades is my teaching.  As contracting became exceedingly complex (e.g., derivative financial instruments and complex financial structurings), I became interested in finding ways of teaching about this contracting and in having students contemplate unsolved problems of how to account for an increasingly complex world of contracts.

In accounting research since the 1950s we've now completed the circle of virtually no science (long on speculation without rigor) to virtually all science (strong on rigor with irrelevant findings) to criticisms that science is not going to solve our problems that are too complex for rigorous scientific methods.  We are also facing increasing hostility from students and the profession that our accounting, finance, and business faculties are really teaching in the wrong departments of our universities --- that our faculties prefer to stay out of touch with people in the business world and ignore the many problems faced in the real world of business and financial reporting.  For more on this I refer you to  http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession

Things won’t change as long as our "scientists" control our editorial boards, and they won’t give those up without a huge fight. I’m not sure that even Accounting Horizons (AH) is aimed at practice research at the moment. The rigor hurdles to get into AH are great as of late. Did you compare the thicknesses of the recent AH juxtaposed against the latest Accounting Review? Hold one in each of each in your hands.

What will make this year’s AAA plenary sessions interesting will be to have Katherine defending our economic theorists and Denny Beresford saying “we still don’t get it.” Katherine is now a most interesting case since, in later life, she’s bridging the gap back to practice somewhat. Denny’s an interesting case because he came out of practice into academe only to discover that, like Pogo, “the enemy is us.”

I think what is misleading about the recent HBR article is that focusing more on practice will help us solve our “big” problems. If you look at the contributions of the HBR toward solving these problems in the last 25 years, you will find their contributions are superficial and faddish (e.g., balanced score card). The real problem in accounting (and much of business as well), is that our big problems don’t have practical solutions. I summarize a few of those at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm#BadNews 
Note the analogy with “your favorite greens.”

Focusing on practice will help our teaching. We can never say “never” when it comes to research, but I pretty much stand by my claims at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm#BadNews 

So what can we conclude from having traveled the whole circle from virtually no scientific method to virtually all scientific method to new calls to back off of scientific method and grub around in the real world?  What do we conclude from facing up to the fact that research rigor and our most pressing problems don't mix?

My recommendation at the moment is to shift the focus from scientific rigor to cleverness and creativity in dealing with our most serious problems.  We should put less emphasis on scientific rigor applied to trivial problems.  We should put more emphasis on clever and creative approaches to our most serious problems.  For example, rather than seek optimal ways to classify complex financial instruments into traditional debt and equity sections on the balance sheet, perhaps we should look into clever ways to report those instruments in non-traditional ways in this new era of electronic communications and multimedia graphics.  Much of my earlier research was spent in applying what is called cluster analysis to classification and aggregation.  I can envision all sorts of possible ways of extending these rudimentary efforts into our new multimedia world.

Bob Jensen on my 67th birthday on April 30, 2005

 


A December 5, 2002 reply from David Stout about the replications thing --- an AAA journal editor’s inside perspective!  

Note that I think that a big policy weakness is that the policy of accounting research journals to not publish confirming replications (even in abstracted form) is that this policy discourages efforts to perform confirming replications.    

But the most serious problem is that the findings themselves may not be interesting enough for researchers to perform replications whether or not those replications will be published. Are the findings so uninteresting that researchers aren’t really interested in seeking truth?

Bob Jensen

-----Original Message-----
From: David E. Stout [mailto:david.stout@villanova.edu]
Sent:
Thursday, December 05, 2002
To: Jensen, Robert
Subject: Re: Are we really interested in truth?

I read through the material you sent (below)--one thing caught my eye: the issue of REPLICATIONS. This is a subject about which I am passionate. When I assumed the editorship of Issues, I had to appear before the AAA Publications Committee to present/defend a plan for the journal during my (then) forthcoming tenure. One of my plans was to institute a "Replications Section" in the journal. (The sad reality, beyond the excellent points you make, is that the lack of replications has a limiting effect on our ability to establish a knowledge base. In short, there are not many things where, on the basis of empirical research, we can draw firm conclusions.) After listening to my presentation, the chair of the Publications Committee posed the following question: "Why would we want to devote precious journal space to that which we already know?" To say the least, I was shocked--a rather stark reality check you might say. The lack of replications precludes us, in a very real sense, from "knowing." 

I applaud your frank comments regarding the whole issue of replications, and their (proper) place within the conduct of "scientific" investigations. You made my day!


------
David E. Stout
Villanova University

 


December 15, 2004 message from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU

In a recent issue of Golf World, a letter writer was commenting on the need for professional golfers to be more "entertaining."  He went on to say:

"Fans pay top dollar to attend tournaments and to subscribe to cable coverage.  Not many would pay to see an accountant work in his office or watch The Audit Channel."

That's probably a true comment.  On the other hand, wouldn't at least some of us have liked to watch The Audit Channel and see what was being done on Enron, WorldCom, HeathSouth, or some of the other recent interesting situations?

Denny Beresford

December 15, 2004 reply from Bob Jensen

You know better than the rest of us, Denny, that academic accounting researchers won't tune in to watch practitioners on the Audit Channel. They're locked into the SciFi Channel.

Bob Jensen


December 1, 2004 message from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU
Denny is now a professor of accounting at the University of Georgia.  For ten years he was Chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board and is a member of the Accounting Hall of Fame.

I've enjoyed the recent "debate" on AECM relating to the Economist article about the auditing profession.  I'm delighted to see this interest in such professional issues.  But I'm concerned that academic accountants, by and large, aren't nearly enough involved in actually trying to help solve professional issues.  Let me give an illustration, and I'd certainly be interested in reactions.

Last night our Beta Alpha Psi chapter was fortunate to have Jim Copeland as a guest speaker.  Jim retired as the managing partner of Deloitte a couple of years ago and he continues to be a leading voice in the profession through, among other things, his role in chairing a major study by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on the auditing profession.  Jim also serves as a director of three major corporations and on their audit committees.  In short, he is the kind of person that all students and faculty should be interested in meeting and hearing.

Students turned out in fairly large numbers, as did quite a few practitioners who always are there to further their recruiting efforts.  However, only four faculty members attended (out of a group of about 18) and this included our department head and the BAP advisor, both of whom were pretty much obligated to be there. No PhD students attended.  I'm sure that some faculty members had good excuses but most simply weren't sufficiently interested enough to attend.  Perhaps at some other schools more faculty would have been there but my own experience in speaking to about 100 schools over the years would indicate that this lack of interest is pretty common.

On the other hand, this coming Friday a very young professor from another university will present a research workshop and I expect that nearly all faculty members and PhD students will be there.  The paper being discussed is replete with formulas using dubious (in my humble view) proxies for real world economic matters that can't be observed directly.  The basic conclusion of the paper is that companies are more inclined to give stock options rather than cash compensation because options don't have to be charged to expense.  Somehow I thought that this was a conclusion that was pretty clear to most accountants and business people well before now.

I've heard some faculty members say that they feel obligated to attend such workshops even if they aren't particularly interested in the paper being discussed.  They want to show support for the person who is visiting as well as reinforce the importance of these events to the PhD students.  I certainly understand that thinking and tend to share it.  However, for the life of me I can't understand why faculty members don't feel a similar "obligation" to show respect for a person like Jim Copeland, one of the most important people in the accounting profession in recent years and someone who is making a personal sacrifice to visit our school.

My purpose in this brief note is not to belittle the research paper.  But I simply observe that it would be nice if there were a little more balance between interest in professional matters and such high level research among faculty members at research institutions.  As the Economist article noted, and as should be clear to all of us in the age of Sarbanes-Oxley, etc., there are tremendous issues facing the accounting profession.  Rather than simply complaining about things, it seems to me that academics could become more familiar with professionals and the issues they face and then try to work with them to help resolve those issues.

When is the last time that you called an auditor or corporate accountant and asked him or her to have lunch to just kick around some of the tremendously interesting issues of the day?

Denny Beresford

December 1, 2004 reply from Bob Jensen  (The evidence lies in lack of interest in replication)

Hi Denny,

Jim gave a plenary session at the AAA meetings in Orlando. You may have been in the audience. I thought Jim’s presentation was well received by the audience. He handled himself very well in the follow up Q&A session.

I think academics have some preconceived notions about the auditing “establishment.” They may be surprised at some of the positions taken by leaders of that establishment if they took the time to learn about those positions. I summarized some of Jim’s more controversial statements at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/book04q3.htm#090104  
Note that he proposed eliminating the corporate income tax (but he said he hoped none of his former partners were in the audience).

Faculty interest in a professor’s “academic” research may be greater for a number of reasons. Academic research fits into a methodology that other professors like to hear about and critique. Since academic accounting and finance journals are methodology driven, there is potential benefit from being inspired to conduct a follow up study using the same or similar methods. In contrast, practitioners are more apt to look at relevant (big) problems for which there are no research methods accepted by the top journals.

Accounting Research Farmers Are More Interested in Their Tractors Than in Their Harvests

For a long time I’ve argued that top accounting research journals are just not interested in the relevance of their findings (except in the areas of tax and AIS). If the journals were primarily interested in the findings themselves, they would abandon their policies about not publishing replications of published research findings. If accounting researchers were more interested in relevance, they would conduct more replication studies. In countless instances in our top accounting research journals, the findings themselves just aren’t interesting enough to replicate. This is something that I attacked at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/book02q4.htm#Replication

At one point back in the 1980s there was a chance for accounting programs that were becoming “Schools of Accountancy” to become more like law schools and to have their elite professors become more closely aligned with the legal profession. Law schools and top law journals are less concerned about science than they are about case methodology driven by the practice of law. But the elite professors of accounting who already had vested interest in scientific methodology (e.g., positivism) and analytical modeling beat down case methodology. I once heard Bob Kaplan say to an audience that no elite accounting research journal would publish his case research. Science methodologies work great in the natural sciences. They are problematic in the psychology and sociology. They are even more problematic in the professions of accounting, law, journalism/communications, and political “science.”

We often criticize practitioners for ignoring academic research Maybe they are just being smart. I chuckle when I see our heroes in the mathematical theories of economics and finance winning prizes for knocking down theories that were granted earlier prizes (including Nobel prices). The Beta model was the basis for thousands of academic studies, and now the Beta model is a fallen icon. Fama got prizes for showing that capital markets were efficient and then more prizes for showing they were not so “efficient.” In the meantime, investment bankers, stock traders, and mutual funds were just ripping off investors. For a long time, elite accounting researchers could find no “empirical evidence” of widespread earnings management. All they had to do was look up from the computers where their heads were buried.

Few, if any, of the elite “academic” researchers were investigating the dire corruption of the markets themselves that rendered many of the published empirical findings useless.

Academic researchers worship at the feet of Penman and do not even recognize the name of Frank Partnoy or Jim Copeland.

Bob Jensen

As you recall, this thread was initiated when Denny Beresford raised concern about the University of Georgia's accounting faculty lack of interest in listening to an on-campus presentation by the recently retired CEO of Deloitte & Touche (Jim Copeland).  A leading faculty member from another major research university raises much the same concern.  Jane F. Mutchler is the J. W. Holloway/Ernst & Young Professor of Accounting at Georgia State University.  She is also the current President of the American Accounting Association.


"President's Message," Accounting Education News, Fall 2004, Page 3.  This is available online to paid subscribers but cannot be copied due to a terrible policy established by the AAA Publications Committee.  Any typos in the following quotation are my own at 4:30 this morning.

I raise these questions because I worry that we are all too quick to blame all the problems on the practitioners.  But we must remember that we were the ones responsible for the education of the practitioners.  And unless we analyze the issues and the questions I raised, I fear that we won't make any changes ourselves.  So it is important that we examine our approaches to the classes we are teaching and ask ourselves if we are doing all we canto assure that our students are being made aware of the pressures they will face in practice and if we are helping them develop the skills they need to appropriately deal with those pressures.  In my mind these issues need to be dealt with in every class we teach.  It will do no good to simply mandate new stand alone ethics courses where issues are examined in isolation.  

Continued in  Jane’s Message to the Membership of the American Accounting Association

December 5, 2004 reply from Stone, Dan [Dan.Stone@UKY.EDU

I enjoyed Denny's commentary on the interplay between accounting research and practice, and, Jane's AAA President's statement on this issue.

A few thoughts:

1. Yes, accounting research is largely, though not entirely, divorced from accounting practice. This is no coincidence or anomaly. It is by design. Large sample, archival, financial accounting research -- which dominates mainstream academic accounting -- is about the role of accounting information in markets. It is not about understanding the institutions and individuals who produce and disseminate this information, or, the technologies that make its production possible. We could have an accounting scholarship takes seriously issues of accounting practice. The US institutional structures of accounting scholarship currently eliminate this possibility. Change these institutional structures and we change accounting scholarship.

2. There is a particular and peculiar hubris of financial accounting academics to assume that all accounting scholarship is, or should be, about financial accounting. Am I reading this into Denny's argument? Am I reading beyond the text here?

The unity model of accounting scholarship increasingly, which says that all accounting scholarship is or should be about financial accounting, is no coincidence or anomaly. It is by design. The top disseminators of accounting scholarship in the US increasingly publish, and the major producers of accounting scholars increasingly produce scholars who know about, only 1 small sub-area of accounting -- financial, archival accounting. Change the institutional structures of the disseminators and the producers and we change accounting scholarship.

Best,

Dan Stone 
Gatton Endowed Chair 
University of Kentucky 
Lexington, Kentucky

December 6, 2004 reply from Paul Williams [williamsp@COMFS1.COM.NCSU.EDU

To add to Dan's observations. He is correct that until we change the structure of the US academy nothing is going to change re practice. As Sara Reiter and I argued (with evidence) in our AOS piece, accounting in the academy has been transformed from an autonomous, professional discipline into a lab practice for a discipline for which lab practices are incidental to the main activity, i.e, accounting is an empirical sub discipline of a sub discipline of a sub discipline for which empirical work is irrelevant. The purpose of scholarship in accounting is now purely instrumental -- to create politically correct academic reputations. 

The powers that be are not interested in accounting research for its intrinsic value or for improving practice broadly understood, but only as a means to enhance their own careers (to get "hits" in the major journals). The profession is not powerless to assist in changing that structure. For example, KPMG funds (or at least used to) the JAR conferences. Stop doing that!! Why subsidize that which is doing you more harm than good? The profession has abandoned the AAA in droves -- in the mid-60s the AAA had nearly 15,000 members, 2/3 of which were practitioners. Now we are approximately 8,000 of which only about 1/7 are practitioners. If practitioners aren't happy about the academy they are not powerless to engage it. 

Bob sent us an excerpt from Jane Mutchler's presidential address suggesting things that should be done. They already have been. At the Critical Perspectives conference in New York in 2002 there were numerous sessions devoted to how academics have failed in their educational responsibilities (someone credentialed Andy Fastow). Do the firms help fund that conference? Of course not -- too left wing. Accounting Education: An International Journal dedicated an entire issue to accounting education after Enron, as has the European Accounting Review. Have any AAA journals done so? The insularity of the US academy is evident in that Jane doesn't seem aware that there already has been significant activity for at least the last three years, but none of it as visible as that which is promoted by AAA. Let's have genuine debates in Horizons where others besides those vetted for political correctness are permitted to speak to the issues. 

Let me remind you of the Briloff affair -- Abe wrote a piece for Horizons critical of the COSO report. Abe argued that the "problem" was not just small firms with small auditors. Was Abe right? Less than two years after he wrote that article we had Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Andersen's implosion, etc. See the special issue of Critical Perspectives on Accounting, "AAA, Inc." to see first hand how the structure of the academy handles candid discussion of the profession's problems. If people aren't happy with the way the AAA manages the academy, they are not powerless to change it. The structure stays the same because of the apathy of the membership. It only takes 100 signatures to challenge for an AAA office. Since less than 100 people bother to vote (out of 8,000) it wouldn't take much effort for someone with the resources to effect significant changes. Denny could get his colleagues' attention and get them interested in attending his guests' talks by running for president of AAA -- I will gladly sign his petition to be put on the ballot for 2005. That will shake them up! Change won't happen unless enough members of the academy recognize that we have some very real, serious problems that require candid, adult conversation and a willingness to accept responsibility. 

Realize that there are more of us than there are of them (that is the whole idea of the current structure - to keep the number of them very, very small). Change the executive committee, select editors of the AAA journals that aren't committed to the narrow notion of rigor that now predominates and, as Dan says, things will change. There are plenty of qualified, thoughtful people who could manage an academy more dedicated to the practice of accounting (in all its many manifestations besides financial reporting, likely the most insignificant of accounting's functions). It just takes people with the political and financial leverage to put their efforts into altering that intellectually oppressive structure. PFW

December 1, 2004 reply from Jagdish Gangolly [JGangolly@UAMAIL.ALBANY.EDU

I could not agree more. May be most "top" journals suffer a case of "analysis paralysis". In a practical field such as accounting, how do we know what relevant problems are if we have little contact with the real world (and I would not count sporadic consulting as contact).

There are ways in which the academia and industry mingle in a meaningful way. In the areas I am interested in (computationally oriented work in information systems and auditing), for example, I have found a very healthy relationship between the academia and industry, and in fact far more exciting research reported in computing journals during the past three years than in accounting/auditing journals during the past 30. (I can think of work in computational auditing done by folks at Eindhoven and Delloitte & Touche; work on role-based access control at George Mason and Singlesignonnet, work on formal models of accounting systems as discrete dynamical systems done also at Delloitte and Eindhoven, work on interface of formal models of accounting systems and back-end databases done at Promatis and Goethe-Universität Frankfurt & University of Karlsruhe, to name just a few). In fact it has got to a point where I attend AAA meetings only to meet old friends and have a good time, and not for intellectual stimulation. For that, I go to computing meetings.

The reason for the schism between academia and the profession in accounting, in my opinion, is the almost total lack of accountability in academic accounting research. Once the control of "academic" journals have been wrested, research is pursued not even for its own sake, but for the preservation of control and perpetuation of ones genes. We have not had a Kuhnian paradigm shift for close to 40 years in accounting, because we haven't found the need for anomalies. We use "academic" journals the same way that the proverbial Mark Twain's drunk uses a lamp post, more for support than for illumination.

Respectfully submitted,

Jagdish

December 1, 2004 reply from Paul Williams [williamsp@COMFS1.COM.NCSU.EDU

Bob is right that the accounting academy in the US (not so much the rest of the world) is driven mainly by the interests of methidoliters -- those that suffer from a terminal case of what McCloskey described as the poverty of economic modernism. Sara Reiter and I had a study published in AOS last summer that included an analysis of the rhetorical behavior of the JAR conferences through time to see if the discursive practices of the "leading" forum were conducive to progressive critique -- all sciences "advance" via destruction -- received wisdom is constantly under assault. When the JAR conferences started practiioners and scholars from other disciplines like law and sociology were invited to participate. These were the people that asked the most troublesome questions, the ones who provided the most enervating critique. How did the geniuses at JAR deal with the problem of heretics in the temple? They simply stopped inviting practitioners and scholars from other disciplines. The academy in the US is an exceedingly closed society of only true believers. Accounting academics are now more interested in trying to prove that an imaginary world is real, rather than confront a world too messy for the methods (and, it must be noted, moral and political commitments) to which they unshakeably devoted REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SAYS! (As Bob notes, who in their right mind can still say market efficiency without a smirk on their face. The stock exchange, after all, has members. Does anyone know of any group of "members" that writes the rules of the organization to benefit others equally to themselves? Invisible hands, my a..)

But it must be said the profession is not without guilt in all of this. I avoid listening to big shots from the Big 4 myself because they are as predictable as Jerry Falwell. Accountants have a license, which is a privilege granted to them by the public to serve the broad society of which they are citizens. But whenever you hear them speak, all they do is whine about the evils of government regulation, the onerous burden of taxes on the wealthy (I have never heard a partner of a Big 4 firm complain that taxes were too regressive); they simply parrot the shiboleths that underlay the methodologies of academics. No profession has failed as spectacularly as accounting has just done. If medicine performed as poorly as public accounting has just done in fulfilling its public responsibilities, there would be doctor swinging from every tree. Spectacular audit failures, tax evasion schemes for only the wealthiest people on the planet, liability caps, off-shore incorporation, fraud, etc., a profession up to its neck in the corruption that Bob mentioned. But have we heard one word of contrition from this profession? Has it dedicated itself to adopting the skeptical posture toward its "clients" required of anyone who wants to do a thorough audit? Don't think so. All we still hear is the problem ain't us, it all those corrupt politicians, etc. (Who corrupted them?). And PWC has the gall to run ads about a chief courage officer -- do these guys have no shame? If the profession wants to engage with the academy with an open mind and the courage to hear the truth about itself, the courage to really want to become a learned profession (which it isn't now), then maybe we could get somewhere. But for now, both sides are comfortable where they are -- the chasm serves both of their exceedingly narrow interests. 

There are now 7 volumes of Carl's essays. Thanks to Yuji Ijiri's efforts, the AAA published the first 5 volumes as Studies in Accounting Research #22, Essays in Accounting Theory. A sixth volume, edited by Harvey Hendrickson, Carl Thomas Devine Essays in Accounting Theory: A Capstone was published by Garland Publishing in 1999. A seventh volume was being edited by Harvey when he died. I was asked to finish Harvey's work and that volume, Accounting Theory: Essays by Carl Thomas Devine has been published by Routledge, 2004. Carl also had a collection of Readings in Accounting Theory he compiled mainly for his teaching during his stint in Indonesia (I think). Those were mimeographed as well, but, to my knowledge, have never been published. I have copies of those 4 volumes but their condition is not good -- paper is yellowed and brittle. Thoughtful, curious, imaginative, humble, and kind -- we don't see the likes of Carl much anymore. His daughter Beth told me that he even approach his death with the same vibrant intellectual curiousity he brought to everything. 

PFW

December 6, 2004 reply from Ed Scribner [escribne@NMSU.EDU

Seems to me that most folks on this list take a pretty harsh view of the accounting research "establishment" for being closed, methodology-driven, irrelevant to practice, self-serving, and just generally in the wrong paradigm. Yet I see things like the following in the JAR and the AR that appear relevant and "practice-oriented" to me.

--- Journal of Accounting Research, Volume 42: Issue 3 "Auditor Independence, Non-Audit Services, and Restatements: Was the U.S. Government Right?"

Abstract Do fees for non-audit services compromise auditor's independence and result in reduced quality of financial reporting? The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 presumes that some fees do and bans these services for audit clients. Also, some registrants voluntarily restrict their audit firms from providing legally permitted non-audit services. Assuming that restatements of previously issued financial statements reflect low-quality financial reporting, we investigate detailed fees for restating registrants for 1995 to 2000 and for similar nonrestating registrants. We do not find a statistically significant positive association between fees for either financial information systems design and implementation or internal audit services and restatements, but we do find some such association for unspecified non-audit services and restatements. We find a significant negative association between tax services fees and restatements, consistent with net benefits from acquiring tax services from a registrant's audit firm. The significant associations are driven primarily by larger registrants.

---

I also see articles on topics other than financial accounting. Are these just window-dressing?

Journal editors are always saying that they want work that has "policy implications." Yet it seems to me that important questions in accounting tend to be more complicated than, "Does this medication cause nausea in the control group?" Tough questions are tough to address rigorously.

What are some examples of specific questions (susceptible to rigorous research) that academia should be addressing but is not?

Ed "Paton's Advocate" (am I alone?)

P.S. Many years ago a senior faculty member told me the "top" journals were a closed society, and hitting them was a matter of whom you knew. I made some naïve reply to the effect that the top journals reflected the best work--"the cream rises to the top." Next morning I found in my mailbox photocopies of the tables of contents of then-recent JARs, along with the editorial board, with lines drawn connecting names on the board with names of authors, as if it were a "matching question" on an exam.

December 1, 2004 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Paul,

During one of the early JAR conferences that I attended had an assistant professor present a behavioral research study. A noted psychologist, also from the University of Chicago, Sel Becker, was assigned to critique the paper.

Sel got up and announced words to the affect that this garbage wasn't worth discussing.

I'm not condoning the undiplomatic way Sel treated a colleague. But this does support your argument as to why experts from other disciplines were no longer invited to future JAR conferences.

Bob Jensen

December 1, 2004 reply from Roger Collins [rcollins@CARIBOO.BC.CA

Paul makes some excellent points. Sociologists are interesting to listen to because they tend to get folks' backs up (and if they didn't want to do that they probably wouldn't be sociologists in the first place). That's especially the case in accounting where both the profession and the academics are (with notable exceptions) hidebound in their own way.  If you want a new perspective on things, get a sociologist to comment, throw away any half of what's been said and the remainder will still be an interesting pathway to further thought, whichever half you choose.

The scorn that certain academics in other areas show for accounting academics (and indeed, business academics in general) may be justified (sometimes? often?)- but no-one ever built bridges out of scorn. I think that if Sel Becker was really interested in advancing the cause of academic enquiry he would have figured out that whatever was going on was, from his point of view, an immature contribution and taken the time to give his views on the gap between the contribution and the issues he considered important, and identify some "road map" to move from one position to another.

But then, Sel is a "big, important" person. (From what I can gather), instead of taking a little time to build bridges he indulged in a spot of academic tribalism. Trashing a colleagues paper (isn't that something a noted member of the Rochester School was famous for?) is cheap in terms of effort and may generate some petty self-satisfaction; it may even be justified if the presenter is arrogant in turn -but again, arrogance is a destroyer rather than a builder.

On the other hand, the JAR reaction is just as bad if not worse.  Closing one's ears to criticism will only lead to the prettification of the academy; the dogmatists will have won.

Question - is there a way of enticing the various parties out of their bunkers ? If there is, what are the chances that the "generals" of the profession and academia won't use their power to squash the proposals of the "subalterns" ?

Some years ago a University of Alberta prof. had the temerity to suggest that the local oil companies' financial statements weren't all that they should have been. He was promptly jumped on from every direction. Why ? I suspect, because there is a general (not inevitably true) assumption that business schools are the "cash cows" of the university, and other academics tolerate them on that basis. (Nowadays, pharmaceutical research departments seem to be vying for that label). Maybe the only way out is poverty; poor accounting profs will have less to lose and more reason to explore..

Regards - tongue partly in cheek,

Roger Roger Collins 
UCC (soon to be TRU) School of Business.

December 2, 2004 reply from Paul Williams [williamsp@COMFS1.COM.NCSU.EDU

How do we bridge the chasm?

Good question. We won't be able to do that in the US until we change the structure of the AAA. I was on Council when the great debate over Accounting Horizons occurred. Jerry Searfoss, a person who served time on both sides of the chasm, was a vigorous proponent for creating a medium through which academe and practice could communicate. If you peruse the editorial board of the first issues of Horizons, it reflected this eclectic approach to scholarship. What happened to it? Look at Horizons now. Its editorial board looks just like the editorial board at The Accounting Review and its editor is a University of Chicago PhD! The AAA has a particular structure -- an organizational culture that reproduces itself generation after generation. Horizons, as originally conceived by people like Searfoss, Sack, Mautz, etc., posed a threat to the overwhelmingly anal retentive, ideological commitments (the shadow of William Paton still chills the intellectual climate of the US academy) of the organization. Anti-bodies were quickly mobilized and, voila, Horizons looks just like TAR (two years ago a plan to eliminate Horizons and Issues and roll them into one ill-defined journal was proposed). This body will protect itself at all costs (even declining membership, banal research, etc. will not dissuade them from jumping over the cliff). 

The only way to change that is to create a structure that fosters a place where Sel Beckers and Big 4 partners can say what they have to say IN PRINT and be forced to defend it as often as the Dopuchs, Demskis, Watts and Zimmermans, and Schippers of the world (who never have to defend themselves in print). That will only happen when the selection of executive committees, editors, etc. is democratic. As long as the Politburo structure of the AAA exists and the culture of fear and suspicion of ideas remains, nothing will change. Good models for what the journals should look like are the proceedings of conferences like Tinker's Critical Perspectives conference, Lee Parker's APIRA, and the IPA sponsored by Manchester. Those conferences are so much more exhilirating than the AAA meetings. I'm like Jagdish -- I go to AAA to see old friends and work for the Public Interest Section. The "technical" sessions are of little interest. When the AAA gives Seminal Contribution Awards to "contributions" lifted wholesale from the radical Lockean/monetarist wing of economics, how can you take such an organization seriously. This is particularly true when there are genuinely seminal contributions possessed by the discipline itself, e.g., Ijiri's work, Paton's Accounting Theory, Andy Stredry's budget work, Bill Cooper's QM applications, Sterling/Edwards and Bell/Chambers, etc. (the copyrights on these tell you how long it has been since accounting acted like an autonomous discipline!). 

PFW

December 2 reply from Paul Williams (after a request that he elaborate on Bill Paton)

While Carl Devine was still alive, I used to visit him whenever I could. When Jacci Rodgers and I did our work on editorial boards at The Accounting Review I consulted Carl about how the review process worked at TAR since the first time TAR published the members of an editorial board was 1967 (I beleive). According to Carl, Paton edited TAR for many years after its founding via a process that was, shall we say, less than transparent. According to Carl, Paton and Littleton between them virtually hand picked the AAA presidents for years. You can see a pattern of early presidencies -- one president not from one of the elite 15, then two from, then one, etc. This encouraged the illusion that the AAA was open to everyone, but in fact it was pretty tightly controlled. Now there is no attempt whatsoever to create the illusion of an open organization -- every president for the last 30 years (save one or two) is an elite school grad. It was never permitted to veer too far from the nucleus of schools that founded it. 

Everyone should be familiar with Paton's politics -- he was conservative in the extreme (he published a book that was a rather rabid screed on the evils of Fabian socialism). There were competing root metaphors for accounting during the era of Paton, e.g., the institutionalism of DR Scott (whose spin on the role of accounting seems prescient now that we have a few years separating us from him), there was the accounting as fulfilling social needs of Littleton etc. But what clearly has emerged triumphant was the radical free market ideology of Paton. So, even though accounting seems clearly part of the regulatory apparatus and part of the justice system in the US, the language we use to talk about what accountants are for is mainly that of efficent markets, rational economic actors, etc. No wonder Brian West is able to build such a persuasive case that accounting currently has no coherent cognitive foundation, thus, is not a "learned" profession. Accounting enables market functions in a world of economic competitors whose actions are harmoniously coordinated by the magic fingers of invisible hands (a metaphor that Adam Smith didn't set too much stock in -- it was merely an off-hand remark to which he never returned). Carl Devine has a very useful essay in Essays in Accounting theory, volume six, edited by Harvey Hendrickson (Garland) where he provides an insightful analysis of the contributions to theory of those persons of his generation and his generation of mentors (he particularly admired Mattesich.) 

Carl noted that Paton was a very effective rhetorician, so was perhaps more influential than his ideas really merited (like the relative influence of the contemporaries Malthus and Ricardo; Ricardo, the much better writer overshadowed Malthus in their day). Paton influenced a disproportionate number of the next generation of accounting academics; he was, after all, a classicaly trained economist. 

There is, in my view, absolutely no compelling reason why accountants should be the least bit concerned with new classical economic theory, but Paton, because of his influence, set the US academy on a path that brings us to where we are today. It is an interesting thought experiment (ala Trevor Gambling's buddhist accounting) to imagine what we would be doing and talking about if we had taken the institutionalists, or Ijiri's legal imagery more seriously. But, as they say here in NC, "It is what it is." 

PFW

December 2, 2004 reply from Bob Jensen

Bill Paton was all-powerful on the Michigan campus and was considered an economist as well as an accountant.  For a time under his power, a basic course in accounting was in the common core for all majors.  One of the most noted books advocating historical cost is called Introduction to Corporate Accounting Standards by William Paton and A.C. Littleton (Sarasota:  American Accounting Association, 1940).  Probably no single book has ever had so much influence or is more widely cited in accounting literature than this thin book by Paton and Littleton .  See http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases

Later on Paton changed horses and was apologetic about once being such a strong advocate of historical cost.  He subsequently favored fair value accounting, while his co-author clung to historical cost.  However, Paton never became widely known as a valuation theorist compared to the likes of Edwards, Bell , Canning, Chambers, and Sterling .  (In case you did not know this, former FASB Board Member and SEC Chief Accountant Walter Scheutz is also a long-time advocate of fair value accounting.)

You can read about the Hall of Fame’s Bill Paton at
 http://fisher.osu.edu/Departments/Accounting-and-MIS/Hall-of-Fame/Membership-in-Hall/William-A.-Paton 

Bob Jensen

December 2, 2004 reply from Jagdish Gangolly [JGangolly@UAMAIL.ALBANY.EDU

My earlier posts unfortunately may have implied that every onbe I mentioned continued to be a historical cost advocate -- that is not true. Paton changed his mind, as Bob mentioned.

The point I was trying to make there was the approach to theory building in accounting (something that crudely initates the axiomatic approach) that Paton essentially started. However, Paton had a "theory" in the sense of a set of axioms, but no theorems. In other words it was a sort of laundry list of axioms with out a detailed study of their collective implications (this is what struck me most while I was a student, but that might have been my problem since I came to accounting via applied mathematics/statistics). In fact most of the work of Paton & Littleton, Ijiri, Sprouse & Moonitz,... never really followed through their thoughts to their logical conclusions. One reason might have been that they did not really state their axioms in logic. Mattesich, as I understand, went a bit further, but he must have realised that a field like accounting where most sentences are deontic (normative, stated in English sentences in the imperative mood) rather than alethic (descriptive, stated in English sentences in the indicative mood). In normative systems, as even Hans Kelsen has admitted, there is no concept of truth and therefore logical deduction as we know it is not possible.

I think this becomes clear in one of the later books of Mattesich on Instrumental Reasoning (all but ignored by accountants because it is more philosophical, but in my opinion one of his most fascinating works).

I would not put Paul Grady, Carman Blough,... in the same group. For Paul Grady, for example, accounting "principles" were no more than a grab bag of mundane rules.

Leonard Spacek, one of my heroes, on the other hand, tried to emphasize accounting as communication of rights people had to resources UNDER LAW. He also emphasized fairness as an objective.

One reason for this chasm between practice and academia is that almost all practice is normatively based, whereas in the academia in accounting, for the past 40 years we have cared just about only for descriptive work of the naive positivist kind.

I hate peddling my work, but those interested might like to take a look at an old paper of mine (I consider it the best that I ever wrote) where some of these issues are discussed :

Generally Accepted Accounting Principles: Perspectives from Philosophy of Law, J. Gangolly & M. Hussein Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol. 7 (1996), pp. 383-407.

I think we need to realise that we are not the only discipline that has gone astray from the original lofty goals.

Consider economics in the United States. In Britain, at least till the 70s (I haven't kept in touch since then), it was considered important that Economics teaching devoid of political and philosophical discussions was some how deficient; probably the main reason popular Oxford undergraduate major is PPE (Politics, Philosophy, Economics, with Economics taking the third seat). Specially in the US, attempts to make Economics value-free (wertfrei) have, to an extent also succeeded in making it a bit sterile. In his critique of Ludwig von Mises, Murray Rothbard ("Praxeology, Value Judgments, and Public Policy") states:

"The trouble is that most economists burn to make ethical pronouncements and to advocate political policies - to say, in effect, that policy X is "good" and policy Y "bad." Properly, an economist may only make such pronouncements in one of two ways: either (1) to insert his own arbitrary, ad hoc personal value judgments and advocate policy on that basis; or (2) to develop and defend a coherent ethical system and make his pronouncement, not as an economist, but as an ethicist, who also uses the data of economic science."

Or, that Economics is the "value-free handmaiden of ethics".

In accounting too, the positivists have worked hard over the past forty years or so to make it pretentiously value-free (remember disparaging references to non-descriptive work, and Carl Nelson's virtual jihad to rid accounting of "fairness" as an objective?). The result has been that it is perhaps not unfair to speak of "fair" in the audit reports just cheap talk.

Renaissance in accounting will come only when we look as much at Politics and Law as at Economics to inspire research.

Jagdish

December 3, 2004 reply from Paul Williams

For many subscribers this thread may have started to fray; to them I apologize, but I have to chime in to add a contrarian view to Bob's contention that Paton, Edwards and Bell ,etc. were advocates of fair value accounting. Fair value accounting is (in my view) a classic case of eliding into a use of a concept as if it were what we traditionally understood it to be while radically redefining it (see Feyerabend's analysis of Galileo's use of this same ploy). None of the early theorists were proponents of fair value accounting. 

They may have been advocates of replacement cost or opportunity cost, but never of "fair value," which is a purely hypothetical number generated through heroic assumptions about an undivinable future. As Carl Devine famously said, "No one has ever learned anything from the future." All subscribed to the principle that accounting should report only what actually occurred during a period of time -- this was the essence of E&B's argument that accounting data are for evaluating decisions; its value lies in its value as feedback and accounting data, therefore, categorically should not be generated on assumptions about the outcomes resulting from decisions that have already been made. The significant accomplishment of these theorists was to provide a defense of accounting's avoidance of subjective values. i.e., the accounting was in its essence objective (anyone remember Five 

Monographs on Business Income, particularly Sidney Alexander's critique of accounting measures of profit?). Now we accept seemingly without question the radical transformation of accounting affected by FASB to a system of nearly exclusively subjective values, i.e., your guess is as good as mine. In spite of the optimism people seem to express, we have no technology (nor would a believer in rational expectations theory ever expect there to be) that can divine the economic future. Perhaps a renaissance of some of these old ideas is overdo. I believe it was Clarence Darrow who opined that "Contempt for law is brought about by law making itself ridiculous." As writers of LAW (kudos to Jagdish's paper) the FASB seems to make accounting more ridiculous by the day.

 PFW

December 3, 2004 reply from David Fordham

For those who don't know, Paul is an FSU alum, and Bob is a former Seminole, too, although they pre-dated me and may have had some professional interaction with Carl Devine. ...

David Fordham

December 3, 2004 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi David,

I arrived on the faculty at FSU in 1978. Carl was a recluse for all practical purposes. I don' think anybody had contact with him except a very devoted Ed McIntyre. Paul Williams was very close to Ed and may also have had some contact.  (Paul later reminded me that Carl grew interested in discussing newer directions with Ed Arrington.)

I think Carl was still actively writing and to the walls. His labor of love may have been lost if Ed and Paul didn't strive to share Carl's writings with the world. Carl was a classic scholar who'd lived most of his life in libraries.

Carl could've added a great deal to our intellectual growth and historical foundations if he participated in some of our seminars. He was a renaissance scholar.

It would've been interesting to know how Carl's behavior might've changed in the era of email. Scholars who asked him challenging questions might've gotten lengthy replies (Carl was not concise) that he would not provide face-to-face.

Bob Jensen

Decemeber 3, 2004 reply from Mclelland, Malcolm J [mjmclell@INDIANA.EDU

It almost seems there's a consensus on the AECM listserv on all this! Given the widespread interest and existng intellectual wherewithal among AECMs to do it, maybe it's time to start up the "Journal of Neo-Classical Accounting Theory"? Revisiting Edwards, Bell, Sterling, Chambers, Paton, et al. certainly seems worthwhile; especially if it can be fit into or reconciled with the more recent literature in accounting and finance.

Best regards,

Malcolm

Malcolm J. McLelland, Ph.D. 
mjmclell@indiana.edu
  
website: http://www.uic.edu/~mclellan  
research: http://ssrn.com/author=154711 

December 1, 2004 reply from Glen Gray [glen.gray@CSUN.EDU]

Your story does surprise me. A few years ago I convinced Barry Melancon (President) and Louis Matherne (at that time, Director of IT) from the AICPA to come to L.A. and speak at a dinner meeting of the L.A. chapter of the California Society of CPAs. The meeting was at UCLA, not my campus, however, the chapter offered to waive the $35 dinner charge for any CSUN faculty who want to attend. Other than myself, one (out of about 20) other faculty member attended the dinner. I asked some of the faculty members why they did not attend. The most common answer was something like “We know what he (Barry) is going to say—use more computers in your accounting courses.”

December 1, 2004 reply from Richard C. Sansing [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU

Two thoughts in response:

First, I agree with the gist of your sentiment. Hanging around real world accountants can inform both our teaching and research, and most of us underinvest in such activities.

Second, the effect of "citizenship" considerations looks like an easy cost-benefit tradeoff to me. Seminars are attended only by faculty and doctoral students, so one's presence in the room is more noticable for a research seminar than a presentation attended by lots of undergraduates. Furthermore, the personal cost of attending a daytime event is much less than a nightime event. So if one is driven by citizenship considerations, I expect many more faculty to attend the daytime research seminar than the nightime practitioner presentation.

Richard C. Sansing 
Associate Professor of Business Administration 
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth 
 
email: Richard.C.Sansing@dartmouth.edu

December 1, 2004 reply from Chuck Pier [texcap@HOTMAIL.COM]

Dennis,

I think that you have put your finger on, or maybe stumbled onto, one of the major splits in academic accounting today. You happen to be looking at this situation from one of the "research" universities. Most all of us (I use the term "us" to refer to academic accountants) have been associated with a research university. However, many of us have only been there as students during our doctoral studies. These universities place heavy premiums on both their faculties and students for what we call "basic research" that is quite replete with formulas and theories and the like. Faculty are tenured, promoted and financially rewarded to produce cutting edge research that is published in the top journals, and doctoral students are judged on their ability to analyze and conduct similar research.

On the other hand, many of "us" teach in "teaching universities" that place more emphasis on teaching and "professional" research. In other words, research that has a direct application to either the accounting profession or the teaching of accounting. There is usually not a penalty exerted on those who chose to do the more academic research, but there is also not any special rewartds for that research either.

I feel that many of "us" at teaching schools attend the lectures that you describe with a lot more regularity than your experience at your university. For example, at my school we have a weekly meeting during the fall of our Beta Alpha Psi chapter that inculeds a presentation on a topic by one of the firms in our area. These firms include all of the big four, as well as other national, regional, and local firms. The presentations run the gamut from interview techniques for the students to the latest updates on SOX or forensic accounting. As with any sample, some are better than others and many are appropriate to just the students. Despite the uneveness of the presentations I would estimate that at least 80% of our tenure track faculty are at each meeting, with the missing 20% having some other engagement and unable to attend. There is not a single member of our faculty that routinely does not attend. These meetings are not mandatory, but most of us feel that it supports both or students and the presenters, who hire our students to attend.

I am not trying to indite or point fingers at either side of the academic accounting community but it is obvious that we each have separate priorities. I for one chose the institution that I am at for the very reason that we do have a heavy emphasis on the practioneer and the undergraduate student. I know that many would abhor what I do and could not picture themselves here. They, like me have decided what they like and what they are best suited for. I do feel that at times we who are not at the big research schools feel that we are overlooked, but I wouldn't trade my place with anyone else. I think that I am providing a good service and enjoy the opportunities that it presents.

Chuck

December 3, 2004 reply from Robin A Alexander [alexande.robi@UWLAX.EDU

Interesting. I too came from a math background and finally realized there was no accounting theory in the scientific sense. I also came to suspect it was not a system of measurement either because to be so, there has to be something to measure independent of the measuring tool. Rather it seemed to me accounting defined, for instance, income rather than measured it.

Robin Alexander 

December 3, 2004 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Robin,

I think the distinction lies not so much on "independence" of the measuring tool as it does on behavior induced by the measurements themselves, although this may be what you had in mind in your message to us.

Scientists measure the distance to the moon without fear that behavior of either the earth or the moon will be affected by the measurement process. There may some indirect behavioral impacts such as when designing fuel tanks for a rocket to the moon. In natural science, except for quantum mechanics, the measurers cannot re-define the distance to the moon for purposes of being able to design smaller fuel tanks.

In economics, and social science in general, behavior resulting from measurements is often more impacted by the definition of measurement itself. Changed definitions of inflation or a consumer price index might result in wealth transfers between economic sectors. Plus there is the added problem that measurements in the social sciences are generally less precise and stable, e.g., when people change behavior just because they have been "measured" or diagnosed.

Similarly in accounting, changed definitions of what goes into things like revenue, eps, asset values, and debt values may lead to wealth transfers. The Silicon Valley executives certainly believe that lowering eps by booking stock options will affect share prices vis-a-vis merely disclosing the same information in a footnote rather than as a booked expense. Virtually all earnings management efforts on the part of managers hinges on the notion that accounting outcomes affect wealth transfers. In fact if they did not do so, there probably would not be much interest in accounting numbers See "Toting Up Stock Options," by Frederick Rose, Stanford Business, November 2004, pp. 21 --- http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/bmag/sbsm0411/feature_stockoptions.shtml

Early accounting theorists such as Paton, Littleton, Hatfield, Edwards, Bell, Chambers, etc. generally believed there was some kind of optimal set of definitions that could be deduced without scientifically linking possible wealth transfers to particular definitions. And it is doubtful that subsequent events studies in capital market empiricism will ever solve that problem because human behavior itself is too adaptive. Academic researchers are still seeking to link behavior with accounting numbers, but they're often viewed as chasing moving windmills with lances thrust forward.

Auditors are more concerned about being faithful to the definitions. If the definition says book all leases that meet the FAS 13 criteria for a capital lease, then leases that meet those tests should not have been accounted for as operating leases. The audit mission is to do or die, not to question why. The FASB and other standard setters are supposed to question why. But they are often more impacted by the behavior of the preparers than the users. The behavior of preparers trying to circumvent accounting standards seems to have more bearing than the resulting impacts on wealth transfers that defy being built into a conceptual framework. Where science fails accounting in this regard is that the wealth transfer process is just too complicated to model except in the case of blatant fraud that lines the pockets of a villain.

It is not surprising that accounting "theory" has plummeted in terms of books and curricula. Theory debates never seem to go anywhere beyond unsupportable conjectures. I teach a theory course, but it has degenerated to one of studying intangibles and how preparers design complex contracts such as hedging and SPE contracts that challenge students into thinking how these contracts should be accounted for given our existing standards like FAS 133 and FIN 46. One course that I would someday like to teach is to design a new standard (such as a new FAS 133) and then predict how preparers would change behavior and contracting. Unfortunately my students are not interested in wild blue yonder conjectures. The CPA exam is on their minds no matter where I try to fly. They tolerate "theory" only to the point where they are also learning about existing standards. In their minds, any financial accounting course beyond intermediate should simply be an extension of intermediate accounting.

Bob Jensen


"The Accounting Cycle:  The Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting Op/Ed,"  by J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, September 2006 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x54322.xml 

The Financial Accounting Standards Board and the International Accounting Standards Board have joined forces to flesh out a common conceptual framework. Recently they issued some preliminary views on the "objectives of financial reporting" and the "qualitative characteristics of decision-useful financial reporting information" and have asked for comment.

To obtain "coherent financial reporting," the boards feel that they need "a framework that is sound, comprehensive, and internally consistent" (paragraph P3). In P5, they also state their hope for convergence between U.S. and international accounting standards.

P6 indicates a need to fill in certain gaps, such as a "robust concept of a reporting entity." I presume that they will accomplish this task later, as the current document does not develop such a "robust concept."

Chapter 1 presents the objective for financial reporting, and the description differs little from what is in Concepts Statement No. 1. This objective is "to provide information that is useful to present and potential investors and creditors and others in making investment, credit, and similar resource allocation decisions." The emphasis lay with capital providers, as it should. If anything, I would place greater accent on this aspect, because in the last 10 years, so many managers have defined the "business world" as including managers and excluding investors and creditors. To our chagrin, we learned that managers actually believed this lie, as they pretended that the resources supplied by the investment community belonged to the management team.

FASB and IASB further explain that these users are interested in the cash flows of the entity so they can assess the potential returns and the potential variability of those returns (e.g., in paragraph OB.23). I wish they had drawn the logical conclusion that financial reporting ought to exclude income smoothing. Income smoothing leads the user to assess a smaller variance of earnings than warranted by the underlying economics; income smoothing biases downward the actual variability of the earnings and thus the returns.

Later, in the basis of conclusions, the document addresses the reporting of comprehensive income and its components (see BC1.28-31). Currently, FASB has four items that enter other comprehensive income: gains and losses on available-for-sale investments, losses when incurring additional amounts to recognize a minimum pension liability, exchange gains and losses from a foreign subsidiary under the all-current method, and gains and losses from derivatives that hedge cash flows.

The purported reason for this demarcation between earnings and other comprehensive income rests with the purported low reliability of measurements of these four items; however, the real reason for these other comprehensive items seems to be political. For example, FASB capitulated in Statement No. 115 when a number of managers objected to reporting gains and losses on available-for-sale securities because that would create volatility in earnings. (I find it curious how FASB caters to the whims of managers but claims that the primary rationale for financial reporting is to serve the investment community.) Because one has a hard time reconciling other comprehensive income with the needs of investors and creditors, it would serve the investment community better if the boards eliminate this notion of comprehensive income.

Two IASB members think that an objective for financial reporting should encompass the stewardship function (see AV1.1-7). Stewardship seems to be a subset of economic usefulness, so this objection is pointless. It behooves these two IASB members to explain the consequences of adopting a stewardship objective and how these consequences differ from the usefulness objective before we can entertain their protestation seriously.

Sections BC1.42 and 43 ask whether management intent should be a part of the financial reporting process. Given management intent during the last decade, I think decidedly not. Management intent is merely a license to massage accounting numbers as managers please. Fortunately, the Justice Department calls such tactics fraud.

Chapter 2 of this document concerns qualitative characteristics. For the most part, this presentation is similar to that in Concepts Statement No. 2, though arranged somewhat differently. Concepts 2 had as its overarching qualitative characteristics relevance and reliability. This Preliminary Views expounds relevance, faithful representation, comparability, and understandability as the qualitative characteristics.

The discussion on faithful representation is interesting (QC.16-19) inasmuch as they distinguish between accounts that depict real world phenomena and accounts that are constructs with no real world referents. They explain that deferred debits and credits do not possess faithful representation because they are merely the creation of accountants. I hope that analysis applies to deferred income tax debits and credits.

Verifiability implies similar measures by different measurers (QC.23-26). I wish FASB and IASB to include auditability as an aspect of verifiability; after all, if you cannot audit something, it is hardly verifiable. Yet, the soon to be released standard on fair value measurements includes a variety of items that will prove difficult if not impossible to audit.

Understandability is obvious, though the two boards feel that users with a "reasonable knowledge of business and economic activities" can understand financial statements. I no longer agree. Such a person might employ a profit analysis model or ratio analysis on a set of financial statements and mis-analyze a firm's condition because he or she did not make analytical adjustments for off-balance sheet items and other fanciful tricks by managers. This includes so many of Enron's investors and creditors. No, to understand financial reporting today, you must be an expert in accounting and finance.

Benefits-that-justify-costs acts as a constraint on financial reporting. While this criterion is acceptable, too often the boards view costs only from the perspective of the preparers. I wish the boards explicitly acknowledged the fact that not reporting on some things adds costs to users. When a business enterprise engages in aggressive accounting, the expert user needs to employ analytical adjustments to correct this overzealousness. These adjustments consume the investor's economic resources and thus involve costs to the investment community.

In the basis-for-conclusions section, FASB and IASB explain that the concept of substance over form is included in the concept of faithful representation (see paragraphs BC2.17 and 18). While I don't have a problem with that, I think they should at least emphasize this point in Chapter 2 rather than bury it in this section. Substance over form is a critically important doctrine, especially as it relates to business combinations and leases, so it deserves greater stress.

On balance, the document is well written and contains a good clarification of the objective of financial reporting and the qualitative characteristics of decision-useful financial reporting information. I offer the criticisms above as a hope to strengthen and improve the Preliminary Views.

My most important comment, however, does not address any particular aspects within the document itself. Instead, I worry about the usefulness of this objective and these qualitative characteristics to FASB and IASB. To enjoy coherent financial reporting, there not only is need for a sound, comprehensive, and internally consistent framework, we also must have a board with the political will to utilize the conceptual framework. FASB ignored its own conceptual framework in its issuance of standards on:

* Leases (Aren't the financial commitments of the lessee a liability?) * Pensions (How can the pension intangible asset really be an asset as it has no real world referent?) * Stock options (Why did the board not require the expensing of stock options in the 1990s when stock options clearly involve real costs to the firm?), and * Special purpose entities (Why did the board wait for the collapse of Enron before dealing with this issue?).

Clearly, the low power of FASB -- IASB likewise possesses little power -- explains some of these decisions, but it is frustrating nonetheless to see the board ignore its own conceptual framework. Why engage in this deliberation unless FASB is prepared to follow through?

J. EDWARD KETZ is accounting professor at The Pennsylvania State University. Dr. Ketz's teaching and research interests focus on financial accounting, accounting information systems, and accounting ethics. He is the author of Hidden Financial Risk, which explores the causes of recent accounting scandals. He also has edited Accounting Ethics, a four-volume set that explores ethical thought in accounting since the Great Depression and across several countries.


December 7, 2004 message from Carnegie President [carnegiepresident@carnegiefoundation.org

A different way to think about ... Professional Education This month's Carnegie Perspective is written by Carnegie Senior Scholar William Sullivan, whose extensively revised second edition of Work and Integrity was just released by Jossey-Bass. The Perspective is based on the book's argument that in today's environment of unrelenting economic and social pressures, in which professional models of good work come under increasing strain, the professions need their educational centers more than ever as resources and as rallying points for renewal.

Since our goal in Carnegie Perspectives is to contribute to the dialogue on issues and to provide a different way to think and talk about concerns, we have opened up the conversation by creating a forum—Carnegie Conversations—where you can engage publicly with the author and read and respond to what others have to say.

However, if you would prefer that your comments not be read by others, you may still respond to the author of the piece through CarnegiePresident@carnegiefoundation.org .

If you would like to unsubscribe to Carnegie Perspectives, use the same address and merely type unsubscribe in the subject line of your email to us.

We look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Lee S. Shulman President 
The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching

Preparing Professionals as Moral Agents By William Sullivan

Breakdowns in institutional reliability and professional self-policing, as revealed in waves of scandals in business, accounting, journalism, and the law, have spawned a cancerous cynicism on the part of the public that threatens the predictable social environment needed for a healthy society. For professionals to overcome this public distrust, they must embrace a new way of looking at their role to include civic responsibility for themselves and their profession, and a personal commitment to a deeper engagement with society.

The highly publicized unethical behavior that we see today by professionals is still often thought by many—physicians, lawyers, educators, scientists, engineers—as "marginal" matters in their fields, to be overcome in due course by the application of the value-neutral, learned techniques of their profession. But this conventional view fails to recognize that professionals' "problems" arise outside the sterile, neutral and technical and instead lie within human social contexts. These are not simply physical environments or information systems. They are networks of social engagement structured by shared meanings, purposes, and loyalties. Such networks form the distinctive ecology of human life.

For example, a doctor faced with today's lifestyle diseases—obesity, addictions, cancer, strokes—rather than with infectious biological agents, soon realizes that he or she must take into account how individuals, groups, or whole societies lead their lives. Or in education, it is often assumed that schools can improve student achievement by setting clear standards and then devising teaching techniques to reach them. But this approach has been confounded when it encounters students who do not see a relationship between academic performance and their own goals, or when the experience of students and parents has made trusting school authorities appear a dubious bargain.

In order to "solve" the apparently intractable problems of health care, education, public distrust, or developing a humane and sustainable technological order, the strategies of intervention employed by professionals must engage with, and if possible, strengthen, the social networks of meaning and connection in people's lives—or their efforts will continue to misfire or fail. And not only will they be less effective in meeting the needs of society and the individuals who entrust their lives to their care, but they will also find in their midst colleagues who do not uphold the moral tenets of the profession.

The idea of the professional as neutral problem solver, above the fray, which was launched with great expectations a century ago, is now obsolete. A new ideal of a more engaged, civic professionalism must take its place. Such an ideal understands, as a purely technical professionalism does not, that professionals are inescapably moral agents whose work depends upon public trust for its success.

Since professional schools are the portals to professional life, they bear much of the responsibility for the reliable formation in their students of integrity of professional purpose and identity. In addition to enabling students to become competent practitioners, professional schools always must provide ways to induct students into the distinctive habits of mind that define the domain of a lawyer, a physician, nurse, engineer, or teacher. However, the basic knowledge of a professional domain must be revised and recast as conditions change. Today, that means that the definition of basic knowledge must be expanded to include an understanding of the moral and social ecology within which students will practice.

Today's professional schools will not serve their students well unless they foster forms of practice that open possibilities of trust and partnership with those the professions serve. Such a reorientation of professional education means nothing less than a broadening and rebalancing of professional identity. It means an intentional abandonment of the image of the professional as superior and detached problem-solver. It also requires a positive engagement. Professional education must promote the opening of professional life to meet clients and patients as also fellow citizens, persons with whom teachers, physicians, lawyers, nurses, accountants, engineers, and indeed all professionals share a larger, common "practice"—that of citizen, working to contribute particular knowledge and specialized skills toward improving the quality of life, perhaps especially for those most in need.

Professional schools have too often held out to their students a notion of expert knowledge that remains abstracted from context. Since the displacement of apprenticeship on the job by academic training in a university setting, professional schools have tilted the definition of professional competence heavily toward cognitive capacity, while downplaying other crucial aspects of professional maturity. This elective affinity between the academy's penchant for theoretical abstraction and the distanced stance of problem solving has often obscured the key role played by the face-to-face transmission of professional understanding and judgment from teacher to student. This is the core of apprenticeship that must not be allowed to wither from lack of understanding and attention.

A new civic awareness within professional preparation could go a long way toward awakening awareness that the authentic spirit of each professional domain represents more than a body of knowledge or skills. It is a living culture, painfully developed over time, which represents at once the individual practitioner's most prized possession and an asset of great social value. Its future worth, however, will depend in large measure on how well professional culture gets reshaped to answer these new needs of our time

 


"The Practitioner-Professor Link," by Bonita K. Peterson, Christie W. Johnson, Gil W. Crain, and Scott J. Miller, Journal of Accountancy, June 2006 --- http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/jun2005/kramer.htm


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
PERIODIC FEEDBACK FROM PRACTITIONERS to faculty about the strengths and weaknesses of their graduates and their program can help to positively influence the accounting profession.

CPAs ALSO CAN INSPIRE STUDENTS’ education by providing internship opportunities for accounting students, or serving as a guest speaker in class.

MEMBERSHIP ON A UNIVERSITY’S ACCOUNTING advisory council permits a CPA to interact with faculty on a regular basis and directly affect the accounting curriculum.

SERVING AS A “PROFESSOR FOR A DAY” is another way a CPA can promote the profession to accounting students and answer any questions they have.

CPAs CAN SUPPORT STUDENTS’ PROFESSIONAL development by providing advice on proper business attire and tips for preparing resumes, and conducting mock interviews.

CPAs CAN SHARE EXPERIENCES with a professor to cowrite an instructional case study for a journal, which can reach countless students in classrooms across the world.

ORGANIZING OR CONTRIBUTING to an accounting education fund at the university can help fund a variety of educational purposes, such as student scholarships and travel expenses to professional meetings.

PARTICIPATION BY PRACTITIONERS in the education of today’s accounting students is a win-win-win situation for students, CPAs and faculty.

 


 

 

Controversies in Setting Accounting Standards

 


SEC Seeks Stronger GASB
Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher Cox wants the Governmental Accounting Standards Board to have more clout, he said Wednesday in a speech at a community town hall meeting in Los Angeles.
SmartPros, July 19, 2007 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x58440.xml


Neutrality Concept in Accounting Standard Setting

In Concepts Statement No. 2, the FASB asserts it should not issue a standard for the purpose of achieving some particular economic behavior. Among other things, this statement implies that the board should not set accounting standards in an attempt to bolster the economy or some industry sector. Ideally, scorekeeping should not affect how the game is played. But this is an impossible ideal since changes in rules for keeping score almost always change player behavior. Hence, accounting standards cannot be ideally neutral. The FASB, however, actively attempts not to not take political sides on changing behavior that favors certain political segments of society. In other words, the FASB still operates on the basis that fairness and transparency in the spirit of neutrality override politics. However, there is a huge gray zone that, in large measure, involves how companies, analysts, investors, creditors, and even the media react to new accounting rules. Sometimes they react in ways that are not anticipated by the FASB.

Questions
Is there a problem with how GAAP covers one's Fannie?
Would fair value accounting help in this situation?

"Fannie Execs Defend Accounting Change Friday," by Marcy Gordon, Yahoo News, November 16, 2007 --- http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/071116/fannie_mae_accounting.html 

Fannie Mae executives on Friday defended a change in the way the mortgage lender discloses losses on home loans amid concern from analysts that it could mask the true impact of the credit crisis on its bottom line.

The chief financial officer and other executives of the government-sponsored company, which reported a $1.4 billion third-quarter loss last week, held a conference call with Wall Street analysts to explain the recent change.

Analysts peppered the executives with questions in a skeptical tone. The way Fannie discloses its mortgage losses, addressed in an article published online by Fortune, raises extra concern among analysts given that Fannie Mae was racked by a $6.3 billion accounting scandal in 2004 that tarnished its reputation and brought government sanctions against it.

Moreover, the skepticism from Wall Street comes as Fannie seeks approval from the government to raise the cap of its investment portfolio.

The chief financial officer, Stephen Swad, said in the call that some of the $670 million in provisions for credit losses on soured home loans that Fannie Mae wrote off in the third quarter likely would be recovered.

"We book what we book under (generally accepted accounting principles) and we provide this disclosure to help you understand it," Swad said.

Shares of Fannie Mae fell $4.30, or 10 percent, to $38.74 on Friday, following a 10 percent drop the day before.

"Fannie Shares Continue Plunge," by Mike Barris,  The Wall Street Journal, November 16, 2007 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119522620923495790.html

Shares of Fannie Mae skidded further Friday, after falling 10% Thursday amid worries over the way the mortgage giant reports credit losses and a gloomy outlook for the housing market.

The latest decline in the company's share price came as Chief Financial Officer Stephen Swad on Friday attempted to alleviate investor concerns about the company's credit losses.

In morning trading, Fannie shares were at $41.30, down $1.75, or 4%. The shares had fallen as much as 14% early in the day before recovering somewhat. Shares of Fannie's counterpart, Freddie Mac, also fell, down $1.98, or 4.8%, to $39.91.

Thursday's drop came after Fortune magazine's Web site reported a change in the method Fannie uses to report credit losses.

Last week, the nation's biggest investor in home-mortgage loans reported that its credit losses in the year's first nine months equaled 0.04% of the company's $2.8 trillion of mortgages and related securities owned or guaranteed, up from 0.018% a year earlier. That was in line with the company's forecast.

But the company changed its method of presenting the figure, excluding unrealized losses on certain loans that were marked down to reflect current market conditions. Including those unrealized losses, the rate for this year's first nine months was 0.075%, up from 0.023% a year before.

Fannie officials said the change was made to separate realized losses from ones that haven't been realized and depend on fluctuating market values for loans. A report from J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. analyst George Sacco said the new method is similar to that used by Freddie Mac. Fannie officials noted that both the realized and unrealized losses were reflected in the earnings reported last week.

Fannie's stock had already been falling for a few weeks amid worries about how hard Fannie would be hurt by rising mortgage defaults. At an investment conference Thursday in New York, Wells Fargo & Co.'s chief executive, John Stumpf, predicted more pain for mortgage lenders in the year ahead as falling home prices cut the value of collateral, saying the nationwide decline in housing is the worst since the Great Depression.

Thursday, Fannie shares dropped $4.78, or 10%, to $43.04.

On Friday, Mr. Swad tried to explain further how the company was accounting for potential losses.

Last week, Fannie Mae reported roughly $670 million in credit losses in the third quarter related to certain charge-offs recorded when delinquent loans were purchased from mortgage-backed securities trusts. Mr. Swad explained Friday that portions of the credit losses would likely be recovered.

Though these third quarter losses were charged off, they are not considered realized losses, Mr. Swad said, because the loans backing these securities could still be "cured." Mr. Swad said the company was "required to take a charge when the market estimate is below our purchase price." The company's experience, he added, "has shown that the majority of these loans don't result in any realized losses." But he declined to be more specific about what percentage of the loans would eventually "cure."

Fannie last week released earnings for the first three quarters of the year. It reported an additional unrealized loss of $955 million in the value of private-label securities backed by subprime and Alt-A mortgages through the end of the third quarter. This was in addition to $376 million the company had previously accounted as a loss for these securities this year.

November 16, 2007 reply from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]

For the record, there was no "accounting change" as per this headline. A headline of "Fannie Mae follows GAAP" probably wouldn't be quite as sexy but it would be 100% accurate. The company's clear explanation of what it is required to do under GAAP is covered in the conference call that is available on Fannie Mae's web site for those accounting aficionados who want to learn more about AICPA Statement of Position 03-03 that requires companies repurchasing loans to record them at fair value. So the answer to your question is that fair value accounting apparently only complicated analysts' understanding in this case.

Denny Beresford

November 17, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Denny,

Your comment sheds a lot of light on this apparent gap between analyst expectations and GAAP rules in this case. The SEC, FASB, and the IASB are pushing hard and steady toward fair value accounting with FAS 155, 157, and 159 just being intermediary steps along the way. At least in this case, however, required fair value accounting is allegedly contributing to the plunge in Fannie Mae’s share values.

This is another example of the unpredictability of the Neutrality Concept in standard setting. You point out (see below) that FASB seriously considers neutrality for every new standard and interpretation with the goal of having scorekeeping not affect how the game is played, but in athletics and business it is virtually impossible to change how something is scored without affecting policies and strategies. For example, when long shots in basketball commenced to earn three points rather than two points it fundamentally changed the game of basketball.

Perhaps this is all an example of what you, in 1989, termed "relevant financial information may bring about damaging consequences." (see a quote from your article below). It would have been interesting if the media reporters in 2007 had cited your 1989 article in this beating Fannie Mae is now taking by adhering to GAAP.

Bob Jensen

"How well does the FASB consider the consequences of its work?" by Dennis Beresford, All Business, March 1, 1989 ---
http://www.allbusiness.com/accounting/methods-standards/105127-1.html

Neutrality is the quality that distinguishes technical decision-making from political decision-making. Neutrality is defined in FASB Concepts Statement 2 as the absence of bias that is intended to attain a predetermined result. Professor Paul B. W. Miller, who has held fellowships at both the FASB and the SEC, has written a paper titled: "Neutrality--The Forgotten Concept in Accounting Standards Setting." It is an excellent paper, but I take exception to his title. The FASB has not forgotten neutrality, even though some of its constituents may appear to have. Neutrality is written into our mission statement as a primary consideration. And the neutrality concept dominates every Board meeting discussion, every informal conversation, and every memorandum that is written at the FASB. As I have indicated, not even those who have a mandate to consider public policy matters have a firm grasp on the macroeconomic or the social consequences of their actions. The FASB has no mandate to consider public policy matters. It has said repeatedly that it is not qualified to adjudicate such matters and therefore does not seek such a mandate. Decisions on such matters properly reside in the United States Congress and with public agencies.

The only mandate the FASB has, or wants, is to formulate unbiased standards that advance the art of financial reporting for the benefit of investors, creditors, and all other users of financial information. This means standards that result in information on which economic decisions can be based with a reasonable degree of confidence.

A fear of information

Unfortunately, there is sometimes a fear that reliable, relevant financial information may bring about damaging consequences. But damaging to whom? Our democracy is based on free dissemination of reliable information. Yes, at times that kind of information has had temporarily damaging consequences for certain parties. But on balance, considering all interests, and the future as well as the present, society has concluded in favor of freedom of information. Why should we fear it in financial reporting?

Continued in article

 

Bob Jensen's threads on standard setting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on Accrual Accounting and Estimation are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AccrualAccounting

Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue

Bob Jensen's threads on Fannie Mae's enormous problem (the largest in history that led to the firing of KPMG from the audit and a multiple-year effort to restate financial statemetns) with applying FAS 133 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm#FannieMae


Standard Setting and Securities Markets:  U.S. Versus Europe

November 29, 2007 message from Pacter, Paul (CN - Hong Kong) [paupacter@DELOITTE.COM.HK]

Some similarities to Chair of SEC, but some important differences. SEC has direct regulatory powers over securities markets, entities that offer securities in those markets, broker/dealers in securities, auditors, and others. SEC can impose penalties on those it regulates.

In Europe there is no pan-European securities regulator equivalent to the SEC with direct regulatory powers similar to the SEC's. Rather, there are 27 securities regulators (one from each member state) who have that power. Here's a link to the list:

http://www.cesr-eu.org/index.php?page=members_directory&mac=0&id=

There is a coordinating body of European securities regulators called CESR (the Committee of European Securities Regulators (http://www.cesr-eu.org/) but CESR's role is advisory, not regulatory.

When the European Parliament adopts legislation (such as securitieslegislation) the legislation first has to be transposed (legally adopted) into the national laws of the Member States. Commissioner McCreevy's role is to propose policies and propose legislation to adopt those policies in Europe, oversee implementation of the legislation in the 27 Member States (plus 3 EEA countries), and (through both persuasion and some legal authority) try to ensure consistent and coordinated implementation. The Commissioner also has outreach and liaison responsibilities outside the European Union. Because there is no pan-European counterpart to the SEC Chairman, Commissioner McCreevy generally handles top level policy liaison between the SEC and Europe.

Like the Chair of the SEC, EU Commissioners are political appointees.

Paul Pacter

Key differences between U.S. and International Standards --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FASBvsIASB


Question
Is a major overhaul of accounting standards on the way?

Hint
There may no longer be the tried and untrusted earnings per share number to report!
Comment
It would be interesting to see a documentation of the academic research, if any, that the FASB relied upon to commence this blockbuster initiative. I recommend that some astute researcher commence to probe into the thinking behind this proposal.

"Profit as We Know It Could Be Lost With New Accounting Statements," by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, May 12, 2007; Page A1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117893520139500814.html?mod=DAT

Pretty soon the bottom line may not be, well, the bottom line.

In coming months, accounting-rule makers are planning to unveil a draft plan to rework financial statements, the bedrock data that millions of investors use every day when deciding whether to buy or sell stocks, bonds and other financial instruments. One possible result: the elimination of what today is known as net income or net profit, the bottom-line figure showing what is left after expenses have been met and taxes paid.

It is the item many investors look to as a key gauge of corporate performance and one measure used to determine executive compensation. In its place, investors might find a number of profit figures that correspond to different corporate activities such as business operations, financing and investing.

Another possible radical change in the works: assets and liabilities may no longer be separate categories on the balance sheet, or fall to the left and right side in the classic format taught in introductory accounting classes.

ACCOUNTING OVERHAUL

Get a glimpse of what new financial statements could look like, according to an early draft recently provided by the Financial Accounting Standards Board to one of its advisory groups.The overhaul could mark one of the most drastic changes to accounting and financial reporting since the start of the Industrial Revolution in the 19th century, when companies began publishing financial information as they sought outside capital. The move is being undertaken by accounting-rule makers in the U.S. and internationally, and ultimately could affect companies and investors around the world.

The project is aimed at providing investors with more telling information and has come about as rule makers work to one day come up with a common, global set of accounting standards. If adopted, the changes will likely force every accounting textbook to be rewritten and anyone who uses accounting -- from clerks to chief executives -- to relearn how to compile and analyze information that shows what is happening in a business.

This is likely to come as a shock, even if many investors and executives acknowledge that net income has flaws. "If there was no bottom line, I'd want to have a sense of what other indicators I ought to be looking at to get a sense of the comprehensive health of the company," says Katrina Presti, a part-time independent health-care contractor and stay-at-home mom who is part of a 12-woman investment club in Pueblo, Colo. "Net income might be a false indicator, but what would I look at if it goes away?"

The effort to redo financial statements reflects changes in who uses them and for what purposes. Financial statements were originally crafted with bankers and lenders in mind. Their biggest question: Is the business solvent and what's left if it fails? Stock investors care more about a business's current and future profits, so the net-income line takes on added significance for them.

Indeed, that single profit number, particularly when it is divided by the number of shares outstanding, provides the most popular measure of a company's valuation: the price-to-earnings ratio. A company that trades at $10 a share, and which has net profit of $1 a share, has a P/E of 10.

But giving that much power to one number has long been a recipe for fraud and stock-market excesses. Many major accounting scandals earlier this decade centered on manipulation of net income. The stock-market bubble of the 1990s was largely based on investors' assumption that net profit for stocks would grow rapidly for years to come. And the game of beating a quarterly earnings number became a distraction or worse for companies' managers and investors. Obviously it isn't known whether the new format would cut down on attempts to game the numbers, but companies would have to give a more detailed breakdown of what is going on.

The goal of the accounting-rule makers is to better reflect how businesses are actually run and divert attention from the one number. "I know the world likes single bottom-line numbers and all of that, but complicated businesses are hard to translate into just one number," says Robert Herz, chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the U.S. rule-making body that is one of several groups working on the changes.

At the same time, public companies today are more global than local, and as likely to be involved in services or lines of business that involve intellectual property such as software rather than the plants and equipment that defined the manufacturing age. "The income statement today looks a lot like it did when I started out in this profession," says William Parrett, the retiring CEO of accounting firm Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, who started as a junior accountant in 1967. "But the kind of information that goes into it is completely different."

Along the way, figures such as net income have become muddied. That is in part because more and more of the items used to calculate net profit are based on management estimates, such as the value of items that don't trade in active markets and the direction of interest rates. Also, over the years rule makers agreed to corporate demands to account for some things, such as day-to-day changes in the value of pension plans or financial instruments used to protect against changes in interest rates, in ways that keep them from causing swings in net income.

Rule makers hope reformatting financial statements will address some of these issues, while giving investors more information about what is happening in different parts of a business to better assess its value. The project is being managed jointly by the FASB in the U.S. and the London-based International Accounting Standards Board, and involves accounting bodies in Japan, other parts of Asia and individual European nations.

The entire process of adopting the revised approach could take a few years to play out, so much could yet change. Plus, once rule makers adopt the changes, they would have to be ratified by regulatory authorities, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission in the U.S. and the European Commission in Europe, before public companies would be required to follow them.

As a first step, rule makers expect later this year to publish a document outlining their preliminary views on what new form financial statements might take. But already they have given hints of what's in store. In March, the FASB provided draft, new financial statements at the end of a 32-page handout for members of an advisory group. (See an example.)

Although likely to change, this preview showed an income statement that has separate segments for the company's operating business, its financing activities, investing activities and tax payments. Each area has an income subtotal for that particular segment.

There is also a "total comprehensive income" category that is wider ranging than net profit as it is known today, and so wouldn't be directly comparable. That is because this total would likely include gains and losses now kept in other parts of the financial statements. These include some currency fluctuations and changes in the value of financial instruments used to hedge against other items.

Comprehensive income could also eventually include short-term changes in the value of corporate pension plans, which currently are smoothed out over a number of years. As a result, comprehensive income could be a lot more difficult to predict and could be volatile from quarter to quarter or year to year.

As for the balance sheet, the new version would group assets and liabilities together according to similar categories of operating, investing and financing activities, although it does provide a section for shareholders equity. Currently, a balance sheet is broken down between assets and liabilities, rather than by operating categories.

Such drastic change isn't likely to happen without a fight. Efforts to bring now-excluded figures into the income statement could prompt battles with companies that fear their profit will be subject to big swings. Companies may also balk at the expense involved.

"The cost of this change could be monumental," says Gary John Previts, an accounting professor at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland. "All the textbooks are going to have to change, every contract and every bank arrangement will have to change." Investors in Europe and Asia, meanwhile, have opposed the idea of dropping net profit as it appears today, David Tweedie, the IASB's chairman, said in an interview earlier this year.

Analysts in the London office of UBS AG recently published a report arguing this very point -- that even if net income is a "simplistic measure," that doesn't mean it isn't a valid "starting point in valuation" and that "its widespread use is justification enough for its retention."

Such opposition doesn't surprise many accounting experts. Net income is "the basis for bonuses and judgments about what a company's stock is worth," says Stephen A. Zeff, an accounting professor at Rice University. "I just don't know what the markets would do if companies stopped reporting a bottom line somewhere." In the U.S., professional investors and analysts have taken a more nuanced view, perhaps because the manipulation of numbers was more pronounced in U.S. markets.

That said, net profit has been around for some time. The income statement in use today, along with the balance sheet, generally dates to the 1940s when the SEC laid out regulations on financial disclosure. But many companies have included net profit in one form or another since the 1800s.

In its fourth annual report, General Electric Co. provided investors with a consolidated balance sheet and consolidated profit-and-loss account for the year ended Jan. 31, 1896. The company, whose board at the time included Thomas Edison, generated "profit of the year" -- what today would be called net income or net profit -- of $1,388,967.46.

For the moment, net profit will probably exist in some form, although its days are likely numbered. "We've decided in the interim to keep a net-income subtotal, but that's all up for discussion," the FASB's Mr. Herz says.


Accounting Rule Is Eased for Foreign Companies
Federal regulators tentatively agreed Wednesday to ease an accounting requirement for foreign companies that trade on United States exchanges. The action by the Securities and Exchange Commission paves the way for a related change that would allow public companies to choose between international and United States accounting standards when reporting financial results. The step taken by the S.E.C. on Wednesday would eliminate a requirement for foreign companies to reconcile their financial results with United States standards called generally accepted accounting principles, or GAAP. Foreign companies, which already adhere to what are called international financial reporting standards, say the S.E.C. mandate is burdensome and costly. The change, which awaits formal adoption after a 75-day public comment period, would apply to 2008 annual reports, which are submitted in early 2009.
Associated Press, "Accounting Rule Is Eased for Foreign Companies," The New York Times, June 21, 2007 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/21/business/worldbusiness/21sec.html


From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on March 30, 2007

Accounting Standard Setters--Independent and Tough
by Robert E. Denham
Mar 26, 2007
Page: A13
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117486496797748456.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
 

TOPICS: Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Governmental Accounting

SUMMARY: Robert E. Denham is Chairman of the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF), the oversight organization of trustees for the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB). In this editorial page discussion, he responds to concerns expressed in a March 9, 2007, editorial by former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr. Mr. Denham discusses the benefits of stable funding that has been achieved for the FASB through Sarbanes-Oxley requirements and wishes for such a resource for the GASB. He comments on the fact that the FASB and the GASB recently have taken "concrete steps to improve user input to the standard-setting process." He also describes how the Boards have faced enormous opposition at times from corporations and Congressional leaders to do things that have in hindsight turned out to be "the right thing to do. "As they demonstrated in standing up to corporate and governmental pressure on options expensing, the trustees act to protect the independence of the standards setters when they are attacked by special interest groups seeking to block or reverse the decisions of the boards. Students may answer questions by referring to the organizations' web sites at http://www.fasb.org/faf/ http://www.fasb.org/ http://www.gasb.org/

QUESTIONS: 
1.) What is the Financial Accounting Foundation? What is its role in relation to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB)?

2.) Why is it important that the FASB and GASB operate on an independent basis? How did implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley law improve that ability for the FASB?

3.) What challenges do the FASB and GASB face in setting standards that are controversial? How does independence help in facing those challenges? Glean all you can from the articles or from your own knowledge.
 

Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
 

RELATED ARTICLES: 
Standards Deviation
by Arthur Levitt, Jr.
Mar 09, 2007
Page: A15

 


"Accounting Firms Seek Overhaul," by Tad Kopinski, Institutional Shareholder Services ISS, November 20, 2006 ---
http://blog.issproxy.com/2006/11/accounting_firms_seek_overhaul.html

The six biggest international audit firms have called for a complete overhaul of corporate financial reporting as the U.S. and Europe move toward convergence of international audit standards.

In a Nov. 8 report, the accounting firms propose to replace static quarterly financial statements with real-time, Internet-based reporting that encompasses a wider range of performance measures, including non-financial ones. The report was signed by the chiefs of PricewaterhouseCoopers International, Grant Thornton International, Deloitte, KPMG International, BDO International, and Ernst & Young. The report can be downloaded here.

"We all believe the current model is broken," Mike D. Rake, KPMG's chairman, told the Financial Times. "There are significant shortcomings to U.S. GAAP [Generally Accepted Accounting Principles] and issues of concern with International Financial Reporting Standards. We're not in a very happy situation."

Rake noted that quarterly reporting and the short-term focus on companies' ability to meet Wall Street earnings expectations helped foster accounting scandals. The firms have been working on their proposals for more than a year.

The large discrepancy between the "book" and "market" values of many listed companies is clear evidence that the content of traditional financial statements is of limited use, the report said. The audit firms recommend using non-financial measures that would provide more valuable indications of a company's future prospects, such as customer satisfaction, product or service defects, employee turnover, and patent awards.

The report said the following developments need to occur to ensure capital market stability, efficiency, and growth:

--Investor needs for information are well defined and met;
--The roles of the various stakeholders in these markets--financial statement preparers, regulators, investors, standards setters, and auditors--are aligned and supported by effective forums for continuous dialogue;
--The auditing profession is vibrant, sustainable, and provides sufficient choice for all stakeholders in these markets;
--A new business-reporting model is developed to deliver relevant and reliable information in a timely way;
--Large, collusive frauds are more and more rare; and
--Information is reported and audited pursuant to globally consistent standards.
 

ICGN Expresses Concerns Over Convergence

Meanwhile, the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) has expressed concerns about a draft proposal on harmonizing international and U.S. accounting standards. The ICGN argues that the draft doesn't pay sufficient attention to shareholder rights and the stewardship role of boards and investors.

"Convergence must be there to raise standards," ICGN Executive Director Anne Simpson told the Financial Times. "Convergence for its own sake is not of value."

The ICGN letter was in response to a request for comment by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and its U.S. counterpart, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) on a discussion paper on harmonization objectives. The IASB and the FASB have been working on harmonizing the two accounting systems since October 2002 and have set 2008 as the goal for finalizing the process.

Unlike the current IASB auditing framework, the discussion paper endorses a model more similar to U.S. standards, dropping a key shareowner safeguard embedded in U.K.-style standards, the ICGN noted. Rather than focusing audits on past transactions, the discussion paper calls for audits to focus on "decision-usefulness" that can affect company cash flows, the letter said.

"We are concerned that this emphasis on the ability to forecast the future does not fully capture the requirements of stewardship, which is concerned with monitoring past transactions and events," Mark Anson, the CEO of Hermes Pensions Management who chairs the ICGN, wrote in the Nov. 2 letter. (A Hermes affiliate is a part owner of ISS.)

"In many jurisdictions, financial statements provide significant input into the decisions we make as shareholders, by providing an account of past transactions and events and the current financial position of the business," the ICGN letter noted. "In de-emphasizing things that are particularly [relevant to shareholders' risks and rights], the standards setters could achieve the perverse effect of actually increasing the cost of capital."

The ICGN includes more than 400 institutional and private investors, corporations, and advisers from 38 countries with capital under management in excess of $10 trillion, according to its Web site. The ICGN letter also was signed by Claude Lamoureux, CEO of the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan.

A copy of the IASB discussion paper, which was published in July, can be downloaded here.

Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue

Bob Jensen's threads on troubles in the big international accounting firms are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on proposed reforms are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudProposedReforms.htm


Question
Will the U.S. adopt all IFRS international standards while the European Union cherry picks which standards it will adopt?

From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on April 27, 2007

"SEC to Mull Letting U.S. Companies Use International Accounting Rules," by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, Page: C3 --- http://snipurl.com/WSJ0425

TOPICS: Accounting, Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Securities and Exchange Commission

SUMMARY: The article describes the SEC's willingness to consider allowing U.S. companies to use USGAAP or International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in their filings. This development stems from the initiative to allow international firms traded on U.S. exchanges to file using IFRS without reconciling to USGAAP-based net income and stockholders' equity as is now required on Form 20F. "SEC Chairman Christopher Cox said the agency remains committed to removing the reconciliation requirement by 2009. Such a move was the subject of an SEC roundtable and is being closely watched by European Union officials." The SEC will accept comments this summer on its proposal to eliminate the reconciliation requirements. If the agency does implement this change, then it will consider allowing U.S. companies the same alternative.

QUESTIONS:
1.) What is a "foreign private issuer" (FPI)? Summarize the SEC's current filing requirements for these entities.

2.) Why is the SEC considering allowing U.S. companies to submit filings under IFRS rather than U.S. GAAP?

3.) Why might the SEC's decision in this matter "spell the demise of USGAAP"?

4.) Define "principles-based standards" and contrast with "rules-based standards." Give an example in either USGAAP or IFRS requirements for each of these items.

5.) "Some experts don't think a move away from U.S. GAAP would necessarily be bad." Who do you think would hold this opinion? Who would disagree? Explain.

6.) Define the term convergence in relation to global standards. Who is working towards this goal?

Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

Jensen Comment
Canada has already decided to adopt the IFRS in place of domestic Canadian standards.

Also see ""Strengthening the Transatlantic Economy," by José Manuel Barroso (European Commission President), April 27, 2007 --- http://www.iasplus.com/europe/0704barroso.pdf

Also don't assume that the European Union automatically adopts each IASB international standard. For example, the EU may not adopt IFRS 8 --- http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ifrs08.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on differences between the international and U.S. standards are summarized at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FASBvsIASB


Complicated Accounting Rules and Employee Pressures

November 7, 2006 message from Amy Dunbar [Amy.Dunbar@BUSINESS.UCONN.EDU]

I am teaching a class, Research for Accounting Professionals, and I have been thinking about how to prepare my students for the "real world." I am looking for some insight re: the apparent increased pressure on accountants. For example, some say that the financial reporting environment is rivaling the tax world for the number of new rules that come out every year. I counted the number of statements issued since per year and found that the 1980s was the busiest period, with 1982 being the highest year with 18 statements. Does anyone know why that was? If the number of statements isn't increasing, is it the guidance from SEC that has increased, or is the pressure coming from the SOX environment with its emphasis on internal controls? Has the internal control guidance stepped up? Or is the pressure simply the same pressure that all business people are facing from increased global competition?

1 1973
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Amy Dunbar
University of Connecticut
School of Business
Department of Accounting
2100 Hillside Road, Unit 1041 Storrs, CT 06269

November 8, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Amy,

I don’t think you can compare numbers of FASB/SEC statements with any sort of confidence. How do you compare FAS 133 (incredibly complex) with FAS 157 (relatively simple)? The problem is not the number of new standards but the way new standards merely add to a growing mountain of previous standards that does not go away --- the mountain just grows higher and higher.

Our students must face an exceedingly complex world of technology. They must have skills in pivot tables, client databases, knowledge databases, ERP, and things that were just not crashing down on our graduates in the 1980s.

I personally think that a negative externality of technology has been increased risk of fraud that increases pressures on auditors. For example, technology has made it lucrative to steal IDs. Now we have huge conspiracies to steal those IDs, as witnessed by the recent reporting of a gang, including hotel owners, managers, and employees, that were stealing IDs at multiple hotels. Internal controls have just not kept pace with the level of theft risks and temptations, and our graduates are under pressures to invent newer  internal controls in complicated IT systems. Hacker/Cracker criminals themselves are extremely sophisticated and skilled. Our networked enemies can be anywhere on the globe.

Pressures are coming from a wide variety of interacting causes, not the least of which is SOX which is basically aimed at improving audit quality. What you had back in the 1980s was auditing sham! Firms like Andersen were removing much of the detail testing and trench work out of the audits, thereby taking much of the pressure off of auditors in the field --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm#RiskBasedAuditing
The world’s worst audit in history, WorldCom, brought this sham into the light.

The audit scandals (spread rather evenly among firms), litigation losses, the nose dive of reputation of the CPA profession, and SOX turned much of this around and now the audit firms are trying to restore the professionalism of their work with a dramatic increase in funding to do the job. But the pressures are bound to increase as well if auditors really try to do professional work.

You have audit firms being fired (the way KPMG was fired from Fannie Mae and E&Y was fired from TIAA/CREF). You have clients paying millions upon millions to restate financial statements because of bad auditing (e.g., Fannie is spending over $100 million to produce restatements). This is bound to pressure auditors assigned to do the job right. One of my former students brought in by PwC to help generate Fannie’s restatements said that he had to become an expert on valuing derivatives using a Bloomberg terminal (as part of the restatement effort). How many of our accounting education programs teach students how to value interest rate swaps on a Bloomberg terminal?

But mostly I think the pressure is on our graduates to deal with incredibly tough contracts that their professors and their supervisors themselves do not understand. Pressure is put on our green-as-grass new graduates to understand and explain contract complexity all the way up the food chain in their firms.

Below is a message that I received yesterday from a recent graduate who went to work immediately for AT&T rather than one of the big auditing firms. It helps explain how our young graduates encounter contracts that do not appear in our textbooks and how they must have skills and knowledge well beyond what we taught in the past Century.

 

Hey again Dr. Jensen,

I have another derivatives situation! Do you know anything about zero coupon bonds that are puttable? I guess they are a relatively new transaction type that banks are trying to push. I guess the theory is that you sacrifice some additional risk (by allowing the bondholder to put to you) in return for a lower interest rate than a typical zero coupon bond. It is my interpretation that written options don't count for hedge accounting status unless they offset another derivative instrument (FAS 133, P 396-401). It is also my interpretation that this is a situation which would create a difference in the bond value which would be reflected as an income statement (other income/expense) effect.

However, I think the financial components of the situation are over my head, and my boss is trying to tell me that he thinks that all of this transaction would either run through interest expense or there would be a huge increase in income in the first period represented (with no MTM throughout). I don't understand these arguments. Do you have any idea what he is getting at?

I am really grateful for any help you can provide, but I am starting to feel bad about emailing you. I have always assumed that you enjoyed these kind of discussions, but if you don't please don't feel obligated to answer. Just let me know - I don't want to disturb your retirement!

As always, hope things are well.

Thanks again so much.

Andrew

 My response to him is too long to repeat here, but you can read a bit more about puttable bond accounting at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm

Each new message from a frustrated former student makes me happier that I’m retired in the high hills.  I would not want to be one of these young men and women today.

Bob Jensen

November 8, 2006 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

Years ago, I suggested one of my doctoral students (now a colleague) to prepare a graph that shows how the various standards are related. The result was the graph attached.

Here, we represent each standard as a point, equidistant from each other, on the circumference of a circle. Then we draw an arrow from standard A to standard B if standard A amended Standard B. The result is the attached graph. It looks more like an oval because I had to compress the image to fit powerpoint slide.

The graph helps us understand the dynamics of standards, forces us to ask questions as to why standards may be frequently revised, why interpretation of "the GAAP" as opposed to standards becomes difficult, and behooves us to ask what needs to be done.

This sort of a graph is used in information retrieval as well as exploratory data analysis. I teach using this figure in my statistics course for accountants (and not Accounting "Theory" course).

Those interested in my first class of the semester, please go to the following link:

http://www.albany.edu/acc/courses/acc522.fall2006/classnotes/acc522sept142006.ppt 

Hope I am not too far off the mark.

Regards,

Jagdish

November 8, 2006 reply from Jim Formosa [Jim.Formosa@NSCC.EDU]

I believe that SOX and the PCOAB shocked the FASB for a while and I am not sure that the shock has worn off. I remember reading in several journals that, with the advent of the PCOAB, the FASB became tentative. Then I believe you have to consider the FASB process which requires drafting and approvals with the constant threat of legislative interference at the federal level. Many have questioned the long-term efficacy of the FASB process itself. I believe in full disclosure and feedback in the rule making process but it should not take years - expensing options as only one of several examples.

I have also read that many believe the FASB is fast becoming a dinosaur that has outlived its usefulness- it will certainly be interesting.

Jim Formosa, M.S., CPA
Certified Senior WebCT Trainer
Associate Professor of Accounting
Nashville Community College 615-353-3420 FAX 615-356-1213

November 8, 2006 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

1. Codification is a neanderthal concept and a vestige of the disastrous Napoleonic rule in Europe. It is expensive, does nothing to resolve whatever ambiguities that might be present (in fact it might exacerbate them), has high maintenance, and totally ignores all the developments in information technologies over the past century. In fact, in my humble opinion, codification is the accounting equivalent of Iraq (I am, of course, exaggerating here). What is needed is NOT radical reconstitutive surgery of the body of accounting standards (as in Iraq) by first disemboweling them, but a philosophical reflection of the way we draft standards (and how we use them) that is informed by the developments in information technology.

In my humble opinion, the emerging technologies surrounding the semantic web initiative of W3C is the way to go, but that involves considerable research investments.

Years ago I tried a dialogue with some firms (and also with FASB through some friends) about supporting research in the area, but my plea fell on deaf ears (except for Arthur Andersen - their Litigation Support people, who showed considerable interest before they tragically disbanded).

2. Your second question as to why people still refer to SASes rather than their codification, I think I can safely rest my case in 1. above. Codification adds little value at great cost. Codification is for the lazy people who want their thinking done for them.

If the standards are drafted well, codification is a trivial task. One can have an algorithm for codification in less than a semester of a competent doctoral student's time. Drafting the standards well is another matter, and is a profoundly intellectual activity. We can not do that without adequate theories of language competence, language use, reasoning, and theories of textual interpretation (similar to legal hermeneutics). And having examined the standards as well as EDGAR filings over the past few years, I can safely say that we in accounting are quite lacking in each of these.

Regards,

Jagdish

November 8, 2006 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

Bob,

1. That accounting standards standards have become complex over the years is true. It is also perhaps true that they are nowadays better drafted compared with the philosophical ramblings in very early "standards". However, I personally don't think they are anywhere close to the tax code in complexity (and of course length. For example, section 10 of SFAS 133, a relatively long paragraph for SFASes, is dwarfed by, for example section 351 of the Tax code, a relatively average paragraph).

I will not resort to midieval torture of the reader by reproducing the two sections side-by-side. But the elegance of the tax code and the lack thereof is there plainly to be seen.

One of the problems with drafting in accounting standards is in the way definitions are stated. In accounting, the definitions are often given by examples rather than definitions with exceptions to the definitions. That is not the only problem. There are a slew of problems that I wrote about in an article titled "Some thoughts on the Engineering of Financial Accounting Standards" that I wrote a long time ago (in the second volume on AI in Accounting edited by Miklos Vasarhelyi.

It would be an interesting exercise comparing the complexities between the two texts after developing appropriate metrics. I am not sure accounting standards would measure up to the tax code, but I am no expert in either field. Perhaps some one like Amy who is one in both can enlighten us.

Jagdish

November 9, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

Jagdish,

Codification with enforcement suppresses some types of atrocious behavior. For example, thousands of CEOs commenced to steal from investors by backdating stock options until disclosure rules were put in place.

Without codification and enforcement there's anarchy. With excess codification freedom and creativity is suppressed. It's just very, very difficult to set the bar optimally because Arrow's Impossibility Theorem proved it to be impossible --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impossibility_theorem 

We are thus doomed to forever debate codes of behavior ad infinitum.

As usual you make good points. However, financial contracting is so complex that I'm like Amy is with tax accounting. I cannot imagine trying to account on a subjective judgment basis without codification. Without codification comparability is virtually impossible with exotic financial structurings.

It's possible to reduce the problem with simplified rules/laws such as eliminating 90% of the personal tax code with a new flat tax, eliminating accrual accounting in favor of cash flow financial reporting, or reporting on a "fair value" basis for all assets and liabilities. But the social impacts of a flat tax are contentious. Cash flow reporting is a license for CEOs to mislead and manipulate investors with cash flow timing manipulations. Fair value reporting creates more fiction than fact (such as wild earnings fluctuations of perfect hedges that eliminate cash flow or FX risk).

Codification sets parameters on major types of behavior. What is "right" versus "wrong" becomes anarchy if those parameters become subjective variables. The never-ending debate becomes one of deciding what are the "major types of behavior" to be codified since it is impractical and undesirable to set a parameter for every element of behavior. In the case of financial structuring we keep inventing new "major types." For example, the interest rate swap was invented in 1984 and quickly became a major way to raise capital before it even had to be disclosed (FAS 119) and eventually booked (FAS 133) in Year 2000.

We are thus doomed to forever debate codes of behavior and accounting standards ad infinitum.

My threads containing earlier arguments on this issue (e.g., Beresford versus Ketz) are shown below.

Bob Jensen


March 28, 2006 message from Denny Beresford [DBeresfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]

A House of Representatives subcommittee is going to have a public hearing on Wednesday that has the objective of discussing "ways to promote more transparent financial reporting, including current initiatives by regulators and industry."

See the press release at:
http://financialservices.house.gov/news.asp?FormMode=release&id=777&NewsType=1  for further details.

Denny Beresford

House Committee on Financial Services --- http://snipurl.com/BakerSub

Baker Subcommittee to Advocate Transparency in Financial Reporting

The Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises, chaired by Rep. Richard H. Baker (LA), will convene for a hearing entitled Fostering Accuracy and Transparency in Financial Reporting. The hearing will take place on Wednesday, March 29 at 10 a.m. in room 2128 of the Rayburn building.

Members of the Subcommittee are expected to discuss ways to promote more transparent financial reporting, including current initiatives by regulators and industry.

For the capital markets to operate most efficiently, information about public companies must be understandable, accessible, and accurate. Corporate statements are mathematical summaries meant to convey a company’s condition. The four basic documents which must be filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are at the heart of investor disclosure: the income statement, the cash flow statement, the balance sheet, and the statement of changes in equity.

Among the current initiatives to improve the clarity and usefulness of public company information is a trend away from quarterly earnings forecasting, the use of technology to decrease complexity, and a review of the various accounting standards and how they interact.

Subcommittee Chairman Baker said, "If U.S. markets are to remain on top in an increasingly competitive global marketplace, we need to move away from the complex and cumbersome and explore technological and other methods of enhancing the clarity, accuracy, and efficiency of our accounting system. At the same time, we need to look at whether earnings forecasting and the beat-the-street mentality, which appears to have contributed to some of the executive malfeasance of the past several years, truly serves the best interest of investors or the goal of long-term economic growth."

The corporate scandals several years ago revealed weaknesses in the financial reporting system. While many companies were violating financial reporting requirements, regulatory complexity also may have contributed to some lapses in compliance.

Fraud, general manipulation of statements, and regulatory complexity all contribute to a reduction in the usefulness of financial statements and all may obfuscate the picture of companies’ financial health. A number of recent studies have argued against the practice of predicting future quarterly earnings, concluding that the drive to “make the numbers” can lead to poor business decisions and the manipulation of earnings.

Congress, regulators, and the industry subsequently have assessed financial reporting failures and have reacted with efforts aimed at strengthening the system, including many provisions of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

More recent initiatives by regulators to streamline financial reporting standards and accounting include:

Public Companies have been filing financial statements with the SEC since the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

March 28, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Denny,

 I know that we disagree on the principles based standards initiative. My negative position on this is outlined somewhat at
http://snipurl.com/JensenPBS

I just don't think the principles based Ten Commandments are sufficient to discard all statutes on felony law. I don't think we can discard all FDA rules on drug testing and replace them with principles based guidelines for pharmaceutical companies to follow. The same can be said for environmental protection regulations, child protective services, and whatever. Sometimes we need detailed rules so we have better guidance as to what is right and what is wrong in specific and complex circumstances.

You and I go back to the old days (and we passed the CPA exam). GAAP was much less complex and could virtually be memorized. We go back to the days when much was left to "auditor judgment."

But we also go back to the days when CEOs were not fanatics about hitting analyst forecasts. We go back to days when top-tier management compensation did not swing heavily an eps number. We go back to the days when debt was debt and equity was equity. More importantly we go back to the days when an auditor could actually understand contracts being written.

In the past CEOs respected auditor decisions and did not threaten auditors like in so many companies are doing today. Too many times in recent years we've seen where virtually all big auditing firms have caved in to pressures from large clients such as the way KPMG caved in on Fannie Mae and Andersen caved in on various big clients --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm#others

 I think that less complex principles based standards will only increase conflicts between clients and auditors. Neither will know that rules (albeit complex rules as in the case of derivatives, leases, VIEs, and pensions) are being broken if there are no detailed rules to be broken.

 I think the absence of detailed rules greatly increase inconsistencies in "auditor judgment." I think absence of detailed rules takes away auditor bargaining chips when dealing with clients.

I guess my bottom line conclusion is that the global world of contracting, risk management, and mezzanine debt is totally unlike the simpler world back in the old days when we were auditor whippersnappers.

 Bob Jensen


Principles-Based Versus Rules-Based Accounting Standards

"Standing on Principles In a world with more regulation than ever, can the accounting rulebook be thrown away?" byAlix Nyberg Stuart, CFO Magazine September 01, 2006 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7852613/c_7873404?f=magazine_featured

As Groucho Marx once said, "Those are my principles, and if you don't like them...well, I have others."

Groucho would enjoy the heated stalemate over principles-based accounting. Four years after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act required the Securities and Exchange Commission to explore the feasibility of developing principles-based accounting standards in lieu of detailed rules, the move to such standards has gone exactly nowhere. ad

Broadly speaking, principles-based standards would be consistent, concise, and general, requiring CFOs to apply common sense rather than bright-lines. Instead of having, say, numerical thresholds to define when leases must be capitalized, a CFO could use his or her own judgment as to whether a company's interest was substantial enough to put a lease on the balance sheet. If anything, though, accounting and auditing standards have reached new levels of nitpickiness. "In the current environment, CFOs are second-guessed by auditors, who are then third-guessed by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [PCAOB], and then fourth- and fifth-guessed by the SEC and the plaintiffs' bar," says Colleen Cunningham, president and CEO of Financial Executives International (FEI).

Indeed, the Financial Accounting Standards Board seems to have taken a principled stand in favor of rule-creation. The Board continues to issue detailed rules and staff positions. Auditors have amped up their level of scrutiny, in many cases leading to a tripling of audit fees since 2002. And there is still scant mercy for anyone who breaks the rules: the annual number of restatements doubled to more than 1,000 between 2003 and 2005, thanks to pressure from auditors and the SEC. The agency pursued a record number of enforcement actions in the past three years, while shareholder lawsuits, many involving accounting practices, continued apace, claiming a record $7.6 billion in settlements last year and probably more in 2006.

Yet the dream won't die. On the contrary, principles are at the heart of FASB's latest thinking about changes to its basic accounting framework, as reflected in the "preliminary views" the board issued in July with the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) as part of its plan to converge U.S. and international standards. Principles-based accounting has been championed by FASB chairman Robert Herz, SEC commissioner Paul Atkins, SEC deputy chief accountant Scott Taub, and PCAOB member Charlie Niemeier in various speeches over the past six months. And they're not just talking about editing a few lines in the rulebook.

"We need FASB, the SEC, the PCAOB, preparers, users, auditors, and the legal profession to get together and check their respective agendas at the door in order to collectively think through the obstacles," says Herz. "And if it turns out some of the obstacles are hardwired into our structure, then maybe we need some legal changes as well," such as safe harbors that would protect executives and auditors from having their judgments continually challenged. Even the SEC is talking about loosening up. Most at the agency favor the idea of principles instead of rules, says Taub, even knowing that "people will interpret them in different ways and we'll have to deal with it."

Standards Deviation Why lawmakers are so set on principles and what exactly those principles would look like is all a bit hazy right now. "Post-Enron, the perception was that people were engineering around the accounting rules. We looked around the world and saw that England had principles-based accounting and they didn't have scandals there, so we decided this was the way to go," recounts CVS Corp. CFO David Rickard, a Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Committee (FASAC) member.

But Rickard considers the approach "naive." His firsthand experience with principles-based accounting, as a group controller for London-based Grand Metropolitan from 1991 to 1997, left him unimpressed. "We had accounting rules we could drive trucks through," he says.

Would such a change be worth the trouble? A recent study that compared the accrual quality of Canadian companies reporting under a relatively principles-based GAAP to that of U.S. companies reporting by the rules suggests that there may be no effective difference between the two systems. The authors, Queen's University (Ontario) professors Daniel B. Thornton and Erin Webster, found some evidence that the Canadian approach yields better results, but conclude that "stronger U.S. oversight and greater litigation risk" compensate for any differences.

U.S. GAAP is built on principles; they just happen to be buried under hundreds of rules. The SEC, in its 2003 report on principles-based accounting, labeled some standards as being either "rules" or "principles." (No surprise to CFOs, FAS 133, stock-option accounting, and lease accounting fall in the former category, while FAS 141 and 142 were illustrative of the latter.) The difference: principles offer only "a modicum" of implementation guidance and few scope exceptions or bright-lines. ad

For FASB, the move to principles-based accounting is part of a larger effort to organize the existing body of accounting literature, and to eliminate internal inconsistencies. "Right now, we have a pretty good conceptual framework, but the standards have often deviated from the concepts," says Herz. He envisions "a common framework" with the IASB, where "you take the concepts," such as how assets and liabilities should be measured, and "from those you draw key principles" for specific areas of accounting, like pensions and business combinations. In fact, that framework as it now stands would change corporate accounting's most elemental principle, that income essentially reflects the difference between revenues and expenses. Instead, income would depend more on changes in the value of assets and liabilities (see "Will Fair Value Fly?").

For its part, the SEC has also made clear that it does not envisage an entirely free-form world. "Clearly, the standard setters should provide some implementation guidance as a part of a newly issued standard," its 2003 report states.

The catch is that drawing a line between rules and principles is easier said than done. Principles need to be coupled with implementation guidance, which is more of an art than a science, says Ben Neuhausen, national director of accounting for BDO Seidman. That ambiguity may explain why finance executives are so divided on support for this concept. Forty-seven percent of the executives surveyed by CFO say they are in favor of a shift to principles, another 25 percent are unsure of its merits, and 17 percent are unfamiliar with the whole idea. Only 10 percent oppose it outright, largely out of concern that it would be too difficult to determine which judgments would pass muster.

A Road to Hell? As it stands now, many CFOs fear that principles-based accounting would quickly lead to court. "The big concern is that we make a legitimate judgment based on the facts as we understand them, in the spirit of trying to comply, and that plaintiffs' attorneys come along later with an expert accountant who says, 'I wouldn't have done it that way,' and aha! — lawsuit! — several billion dollars, please," says Rickard.

Massive shareholder lawsuits were a concern for 36 percent of CFOs who oppose ditching rules, according to CFO's survey, and regulators are sympathetic. "There are institutional and behavioral issues, and they're much broader than FASB or even the SEC," says Herz, citing "the focus on short-term earnings, and the whole kabuki dance around quarterly guidance."

Continued in article


"The Accounting Cycle: Herz Encourages Simpler Accounting: Again, Bah, Humbug!" by: J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, December 2005 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x50933.xml

Robert Herz, chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, spoke at the AICPA National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments* on December 6. Similar to the speech by SEC Chairman Christopher Cox on the previous day, Mr. Herz directed his comments to the proposition "that we need to reduce the complexity of our reporting system." The proposition may be true, but Herz did little to advance the cause in his speech.

In particular, Robert Herz merely asserted his beliefs without adding any logic or any evidence that the reporting system is too complex. Worse, he touts principles-based accounting as the savior for the world of financial reporting, but again provides no argumentation to support his hypothesis. Maybe it’s because there is none. (Read the full speech.)

Given that we have two chairmen making some brash comments about the complexity of accounting, let’s investigate this further. Is complexity really bad? Is complexity really the major problem with financial reporting?

Is complexity bad?

Suppose a patient visits his or her general practitioner about some medical problem. After some initial testing, the general practitioner refers the patient to a specialist. The patient obtains a copy of the referral letter, but has difficulty reading it. Should a government agency intervene, complaining that the letter is "too complex" and require medical doctors to apply plain English?

I think the answer is obvious -- of course not. When one doctor writes to another physician, he or she may employ scientific jargon. They are both trained in biology, chemistry, and medicine. The complex vocabulary and the complex theories that they utilize actually improve the communication process. The additional complexity allows a doctor to make more precise statements about the patient's condition and about possible solutions to the medical problem. Requiring plain English statements would create greater ambiguity and distort the communication process.

Of course, when the doctor talks with the patient, he or she must use plain English. Because the patient does not have medical training, the patient will not understand the more precise language and therefore the communication process will suffer if the physician employs medical language. As the physician employs the less precise language of everyday English, the patient will learn more about the medical problem and possible future tests. Some communication with a less precise language is better than virtually no communication with a more powerful language designed for experts.

While the analogy isn't perfect, it fits the accounting scenario. When business enterprises report on their financial condition and on their results during the past year (or quarter), they can more precisely convey their message by applying a more precise accounting language. This text, however, is meant for those trained in finance and in accounting. Complexity can actually improve the communication process when the recipient is a sophisticated user.

Naïve financial statement readers may not understand the language of accounting, but they are not necessarily hurt by that situation. Just as general practitioners can revert from a medical language to everyday language when they speak with patients, financial analysts and brokers can employ plain English when they speak with clients. In this manner, the messages contained in an annual (or quarterly) report become disseminated to a wide audience.

More precise language and better economic theories will improve the communication between business enterprises and sophisticated users, even if the reports are complex. Sophisticated users can then translate the messages into plain English and convey these stories to naïve users.

Is complexity really the major problem?

When remonstrating the overly complex accounting rules and when touting principles-based accounting, Chairman Herz points to "bright lines" as an example of what's wrong with current-day standards. I agree with him that such bright lines constitute a problem, but the problem isn’t the complexity introduced by these bright lines. The problem is that these bright lines are arbitrary and capricious. Instead of relying upon economic theory, the FASB (and the SEC whenever it enters the skirmish) has invented these bright lines that have no meaning and no empirical referent.

Consider leases: the FASB created the 90 percent cutoff point for deciding whether a lessee had to capitalize a lease, but it never informed us why. If the present value of the future cash commitments equals 89.9 percent of the property's fair value, then the lease is an operating lease; but if it equals 90 percent, then the lease is a capital lease. What economic theory does the FASB rest its decision on? No theory at all. The board randomly and recklessly introduced this bright line into the literature.

If the board really wanted to improve financial reporting, then it would require lessees to capitalize all leases that had duration greater than one year. You introduce no fictitious bright lines and ironically, you simplify the accounting! More importantly, the rule would require corporations to tell it as it is rather than distort the economic reality of the lease.

Continued in article

Jensen Comment
Although there is a ground swell of support for both principles-based accounting standards and greatly simplified standards, I'm inclined to be against both movements.  Business contracting, especially risk diffusion and management contracting, is becoming so complex that I think principles-based standards and greatly simplified standards are moves in the wrong direction.  Powerful new financial analysis tools in networked communications, meta-tagging (e.g., XBRL), and database sharing (eventually object-oriented database elements) will be greatly harmed if complex standards do not accompany complex contracting.  I think Professor Ketz has taken a bold stand in the above article, and I personally take the same stance.  This, of course, puts me at odds with the current and many former directors of standard setting bodies (e.g., the FASB and the IASB), including my very good friend Dennis Beresford who sides with Bob Herz and probably influenced Bob Herz.  See http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm

I'm not necessarily arguing in favor of more bright lines.  We can perhaps avoid these bright lines with more details, albeit complex details, about contracts, hedging strategies, hedging effectiveness, mezzanine debt contracts, VIEs, etc.  Years ago Bill Beaver (in an innovative unpublished working paper) argued in favor of database reporting to get around some of the bright lines problems.  This is more complex reporting, but we can have develop the technologies needed to analyze database reporting.  What we cannot do is do away with complex standards to deal with how complex contracts are reported in the databases.  The standards are what makes comparisons between databases possible.

The analogy relating accounting to medicine is on target.  In this era of DNA advances in medicine, we do not want medical standards to become less complex in a more complex world of knowledge.  We hope the standards become more complex to match the increased complexity of our understanding.  Similarly, we hope the standards of accounting become more complex to match the increased complexity of contracts around the world.

 

"The Accounting Cycle: Herz Encourages Simpler Accounting: Again, Bah, Humbug!" by: J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, December 2005 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x50933.xml

Robert Herz, chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, spoke at the AICPA National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments* on December 6. Similar to the speech by SEC Chairman Christopher Cox on the previous day, Mr. Herz directed his comments to the proposition "that we need to reduce the complexity of our reporting system." The proposition may be true, but Herz did little to advance the cause in his speech.

In particular, Robert Herz merely asserted his beliefs without adding any logic or any evidence that the reporting system is too complex. Worse, he touts principles-based accounting as the savior for the world of financial reporting, but again provides no argumentation to support his hypothesis. Maybe it’s because there is none. (Read the full speech.)

Given that we have two chairmen making some brash comments about the complexity of accounting, let’s investigate this further. Is complexity really bad? Is complexity really the major problem with financial reporting?

Is complexity bad?

Suppose a patient visits his or her general practitioner about some medical problem. After some initial testing, the general practitioner refers the patient to a specialist. The patient obtains a copy of the referral letter, but has difficulty reading it. Should a government agency intervene, complaining that the letter is "too complex" and require medical doctors to apply plain English?

I think the answer is obvious -- of course not. When one doctor writes to another physician, he or she may employ scientific jargon. They are both trained in biology, chemistry, and medicine. The complex vocabulary and the complex theories that they utilize actually improve the communication process. The additional complexity allows a doctor to make more precise statements about the patient's condition and about possible solutions to the medical problem. Requiring plain English statements would create greater ambiguity and distort the communication process.

Of course, when the doctor talks with the patient, he or she must use plain English. Because the patient does not have medical training, the patient will not understand the more precise language and therefore the communication process will suffer if the physician employs medical language. As the physician employs the less precise language of everyday English, the patient will learn more about the medical problem and possible future tests. Some communication with a less precise language is better than virtually no communication with a more powerful language designed for experts.

While the analogy isn't perfect, it fits the accounting scenario. When business enterprises report on their financial condition and on their results during the past year (or quarter), they can more precisely convey their message by applying a more precise accounting language. This text, however, is meant for those trained in finance and in accounting. Complexity can actually improve the communication process when the recipient is a sophisticated user.

Naïve financial statement readers may not understand the language of accounting, but they are not necessarily hurt by that situation. Just as general practitioners can revert from a medical language to everyday language when they speak with patients, financial analysts and brokers can employ plain English when they speak with clients. In this manner, the messages contained in an annual (or quarterly) report become disseminated to a wide audience.

More precise language and better economic theories will improve the communication between business enterprises and sophisticated users, even if the reports are complex. Sophisticated users can then translate the messages into plain English and convey these stories to naïve users.

Is complexity really the major problem?

When remonstrating the overly complex accounting rules and when touting principles-based accounting, Chairman Herz points to "bright lines" as an example of what's wrong with current-day standards. I agree with him that such bright lines constitute a problem, but the problem isn’t the complexity introduced by these bright lines. The problem is that these bright lines are arbitrary and capricious. Instead of relying upon economic theory, the FASB (and the SEC whenever it enters the skirmish) has invented these bright lines that have no meaning and no empirical referent.

Consider leases: the FASB created the 90 percent cutoff point for deciding whether a lessee had to capitalize a lease, but it never informed us why. If the present value of the future cash commitments equals 89.9 percent of the property's fair value, then the lease is an operating lease; but if it equals 90 percent, then the lease is a capital lease. What economic theory does the FASB rest its decision on? No theory at all. The board randomly and recklessly introduced this bright line into the literature.

If the board really wanted to improve financial reporting, then it would require lessees to capitalize all leases that had duration greater than one year. You introduce no fictitious bright lines and ironically, you simplify the accounting! More importantly, the rule would require corporations to tell it as it is rather than distort the economic reality of the lease.

Continued in article

Jensen Comment
Although there is a ground swell of support for both principles-based accounting standards and greatly simplified standards, I'm inclined to be against both movements.  Business contracting, especially risk diffusion and management contracting, is becoming so complex that I think principles-based standards and greatly simplified standards are moves in the wrong direction.  Powerful new financial analysis tools in networked communications, meta-tagging (e.g., XBRL), and database sharing (eventually object-oriented database elements) will be greatly harmed if complex standards do not accompany complex contracting.  I think Professor Ketz has taken a bold stand in the above article, and I personally take the same stance.  This, of course, puts me at odds with the current and many former directors of standard setting bodies (e.g., the FASB and the IASB), including my very good friend Dennis Beresford who sides with Bob Herz and probably influenced Bob Herz.  See http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm

I'm not necessarily arguing in favor of more bright lines.  We can perhaps avoid these bright lines with more details, albeit complex details, about contracts, hedging strategies, hedging effectiveness, mezzanine debt contracts, VIEs, etc.  Years ago Bill Beaver (in an innovative unpublished working paper) argued in favor of database reporting to get around some of the bright lines problems.  This is more complex reporting, but we can have develop the technologies needed to analyze database reporting.  What we cannot do is do away with complex standards to deal with how complex contracts are reported in the databases.  The standards are what makes comparisons between databases possible.

The analogy relating accounting to medicine is on target.  In this era of DNA advances in medicine, we do not want medical standards to become less complex in a more complex world of knowledge.  We hope the standards become more complex to match the increased complexity of our understanding.  Similarly, we hope the standards of accounting become more complex to match the increased complexity of contracts around the world.


"The Accounting Cycle:  The Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting Op/Ed,"  by J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, September 2006 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x54322.xml 

The Financial Accounting Standards Board and the International Accounting Standards Board have joined forces to flesh out a common conceptual framework. Recently they issued some preliminary views on the "objectives of financial reporting" and the "qualitative characteristics of decision-useful financial reporting information" and have asked for comment.

To obtain "coherent financial reporting," the boards feel that they need "a framework that is sound, comprehensive, and internally consistent" (paragraph P3). In P5, they also state their hope for convergence between U.S. and international accounting standards.

P6 indicates a need to fill in certain gaps, such as a "robust concept of a reporting entity." I presume that they will accomplish this task later, as the current document does not develop such a "robust concept."

Chapter 1 presents the objective for financial reporting, and the description differs little from what is in Concepts Statement No. 1. This objective is "to provide information that is useful to present and potential investors and creditors and others in making investment, credit, and similar resource allocation decisions." The emphasis lay with capital providers, as it should. If anything, I would place greater accent on this aspect, because in the last 10 years, so many managers have defined the "business world" as including managers and excluding investors and creditors. To our chagrin, we learned that managers actually believed this lie, as they pretended that the resources supplied by the investment community belonged to the management team.

FASB and IASB further explain that these users are interested in the cash flows of the entity so they can assess the potential returns and the potential variability of those returns (e.g., in paragraph OB.23). I wish they had drawn the logical conclusion that financial reporting ought to exclude income smoothing. Income smoothing leads the user to assess a smaller variance of earnings than warranted by the underlying economics; income smoothing biases downward the actual variability of the earnings and thus the returns.

Later, in the basis of conclusions, the document addresses the reporting of comprehensive income and its components (see BC1.28-31). Currently, FASB has four items that enter other comprehensive income: gains and losses on available-for-sale investments, losses when incurring additional amounts to recognize a minimum pension liability, exchange gains and losses from a foreign subsidiary under the all-current method, and gains and losses from derivatives that hedge cash flows.

The purported reason for this demarcation between earnings and other comprehensive income rests with the purported low reliability of measurements of these four items; however, the real reason for these other comprehensive items seems to be political. For example, FASB capitulated in Statement No. 115 when a number of managers objected to reporting gains and losses on available-for-sale securities because that would create volatility in earnings. (I find it curious how FASB caters to the whims of managers but claims that the primary rationale for financial reporting is to serve the investment community.) Because one has a hard time reconciling other comprehensive income with the needs of investors and creditors, it would serve the investment community better if the boards eliminate this notion of comprehensive income.

Two IASB members think that an objective for financial reporting should encompass the stewardship function (see AV1.1-7). Stewardship seems to be a subset of economic usefulness, so this objection is pointless. It behooves these two IASB members to explain the consequences of adopting a stewardship objective and how these consequences differ from the usefulness objective before we can entertain their protestation seriously.

Sections BC1.42 and 43 ask whether management intent should be a part of the financial reporting process. Given management intent during the last decade, I think decidedly not. Management intent is merely a license to massage accounting numbers as managers please. Fortunately, the Justice Department calls such tactics fraud.

Chapter 2 of this document concerns qualitative characteristics. For the most part, this presentation is similar to that in Concepts Statement No. 2, though arranged somewhat differently. Concepts 2 had as its overarching qualitative characteristics relevance and reliability. This Preliminary Views expounds relevance, faithful representation, comparability, and understandability as the qualitative characteristics.

The discussion on faithful representation is interesting (QC.16-19) inasmuch as they distinguish between accounts that depict real world phenomena and accounts that are constructs with no real world referents. They explain that deferred debits and credits do not possess faithful representation because they are merely the creation of accountants. I hope that analysis applies to deferred income tax debits and credits.

Verifiability implies similar measures by different measurers (QC.23-26). I wish FASB and IASB to include auditability as an aspect of verifiability; after all, if you cannot audit something, it is hardly verifiable. Yet, the soon to be released standard on fair value measurements includes a variety of items that will prove difficult if not impossible to audit.

Understandability is obvious, though the two boards feel that users with a "reasonable knowledge of business and economic activities" can understand financial statements. I no longer agree. Such a person might employ a profit analysis model or ratio analysis on a set of financial statements and mis-analyze a firm's condition because he or she did not make analytical adjustments for off-balance sheet items and other fanciful tricks by managers. This includes so many of Enron's investors and creditors. No, to understand financial reporting today, you must be an expert in accounting and finance.

Benefits-that-justify-costs acts as a constraint on financial reporting. While this criterion is acceptable, too often the boards view costs only from the perspective of the preparers. I wish the boards explicitly acknowledged the fact that not reporting on some things adds costs to users. When a business enterprise engages in aggressive accounting, the expert user needs to employ analytical adjustments to correct this overzealousness. These adjustments consume the investor's economic resources and thus involve costs to the investment community.

In the basis-for-conclusions section, FASB and IASB explain that the concept of substance over form is included in the concept of faithful representation (see paragraphs BC2.17 and 18). While I don't have a problem with that, I think they should at least emphasize this point in Chapter 2 rather than bury it in this section. Substance over form is a critically important doctrine, especially as it relates to business combinations and leases, so it deserves greater stress.

On balance, the document is well written and contains a good clarification of the objective of financial reporting and the qualitative characteristics of decision-useful financial reporting information. I offer the criticisms above as a hope to strengthen and improve the Preliminary Views.

My most important comment, however, does not address any particular aspects within the document itself. Instead, I worry about the usefulness of this objective and these qualitative characteristics to FASB and IASB. To enjoy coherent financial reporting, there not only is need for a sound, comprehensive, and internally consistent framework, we also must have a board with the political will to utilize the conceptual framework. FASB ignored its own conceptual framework in its issuance of standards on:

* Leases (Aren't the financial commitments of the lessee a liability?) * Pensions (How can the pension intangible asset really be an asset as it has no real world referent?) * Stock options (Why did the board not require the expensing of stock options in the 1990s when stock options clearly involve real costs to the firm?), and * Special purpose entities (Why did the board wait for the collapse of Enron before dealing with this issue?).

Clearly, the low power of FASB -- IASB likewise possesses little power -- explains some of these decisions, but it is frustrating nonetheless to see the board ignore its own conceptual framework. Why engage in this deliberation unless FASB is prepared to follow through?

J. EDWARD KETZ is accounting professor at The Pennsylvania State University. Dr. Ketz's teaching and research interests focus on financial accounting, accounting information systems, and accounting ethics. He is the author of Hidden Financial Risk, which explores the causes of recent accounting scandals. He also has edited Accounting Ethics, a four-volume set that explores ethical thought in accounting since the Great Depression and across several countries.

 


Suggestions for accountancy from the Directors of the SEC and the FASB

From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on December 9, 2005

TITLE: SEC's Cox Wants Simpler Rules, More Competition for Accounting
REPORTER: Judith Burns
DATE: Dec 06, 2005
PAGE: C3
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113381176660114298.html
TOPICS: Accounting, Auditing, Auditing Services, Public Accounting, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Securities and Exchange Commission

SUMMARY: Questions relate to helping students understand the status various influences on the accounting profession from the AICPA, the SEC, the FASB, and the legislature via the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

QUESTIONS:
1.) Where did SEC Chairman Christopher Cox describe the ways in which he wants to see change in the accounting and auditing professions? What is the purpose of that organization? (Hint: you may find out about the organization's mission via its web site at www.aicpa.org 

2.) In accordance with law, how is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) responsible for accounting and reporting requirements in the United States? Hint: you may investigate the SEC's mission via its web site at www.sec.gov 

3.) What are the issues associated with complex accounting rules? Who establishes those rules? In what way are those rules influenced by the SEC?

4.) The SEC has named an interim chairman of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). How is this speech's topic related to the process of change in leadership at the PCAOB?

5.) Commissioner Cox indicated his concern over the fact that only 4 public accounting firms perform audit and accounting work for most of the publicly traded companies in the U.S. and that regulators may have contributed to that concentration. How is that the case? What might regulators do to change that situation?

"SEC's Cox Wants Simpler Rules, More Competition for Accounting," by Judith Burns, The Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2005; Page C3 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113381176660114298.html

U.S. securities regulators hope to make accounting rules less complicated while increasing competition in a field now dominated by just four firms, Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher Cox said.

Addressing a meeting of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Mr. Cox called for clearer, more straightforward accounting rules, saying that would benefit investors, public companies and accountants.

"Plain English is just as important in accountancy," he said.

Mr. Cox also raised concern about concentration in the U.S. accounting profession, with the Big Four firms -- Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers -- handling the vast majority of public-company audits. He said this "intense concentration" isn't desirable, adding that regulators need to consider whether their rules are inhibiting competition in the field.

SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins, who also addressed the meeting, acknowledged that regulators were surprised by the cost of internal-control rules that took effect for the largest U.S. companies last year, and he said he hopes such costs will be lower this year.

The rules stem from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed by Congress in 2002. They mandate that public companies make an annual examination of their internal controls related to financial reporting, subject to review by these companies' outside auditors.

The SEC is "at an early stage" in considering who should head the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board now that William McDonough, its former chairman, has stepped down, Mr. Atkins said.

Last week the SEC named oversight board member Bill Gradison, a member of Congress, as interim oversight board chairman. Mr. Atkins said Mr. Gradison, an Ohio Republican, could be in the running as a permanent chair "if he wants to be."

In repeated speeches, Dennis Beresford, former Chairman of the FASB, has called for simplification of accounting standards and guidelines.  For example see the following reference:
"Can We Go Back to the Good Old Days?" by Dennis R. Beresford, The CPA Journal --- http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/1204/perspectives/p6.htm 

 

December 6, 2005 message from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@terry.uga.edu]

National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments. His talk is available at: http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch120505cc.htm 

He had three main messages:

1. Accounting rules need to be simplified. "The accounting scandals that our nation and the world have now mostly weathered were made possible in part by the sheer complexity of the rules." "The sheer accretion of detail has, in time, led to one of the system's weaknesses - its extreme complexity. Convolution is now reducing its usefulness."

2. The concentration of auditing services in the Big 4 "quadropoly" is bad for the securities markets. The SEC will try to do more to encourage the use of medium size and smaller firms that receive good inspection reports from the PCAOB.

3. The SEC will continue to push XBRL. "The interactive data that this initiative will create will lead to vast improvements in the quality, timeliness, and usefulness of information that investors get about the companies they're investing in."

A very interesting talk - one that seems to promise a high level of cooperation with the accounting profession.

Denny

Bob Jensen's threads on XBRL are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm


Convergence of foreign and domestic accounting rules could catch some U.S. companies by surprise
Although many differences remain between U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and international financial reporting standards (IFRS), they are being eliminated faster than anyone, even Herz or Tweedie, could have imagined. In April, FASB and the IASB agreed that all major projects going forward would be conducted jointly. That same month, the Securities and Exchange Commission said that, as soon as 2007, it might allow foreign companies to use IFRS to raise capital in the United States, eliminating the current requirement that they reconcile their statements to U.S. GAAP. The change is all the more remarkable given that the IASB was formed only four years ago, and has rushed to complete 25 new or revamped standards in time for all 25 countries in the European Union to adopt IFRS by this year. By next year, some 100 countries will be using IFRS. "We reckon it will be 150 in five years," marvels Tweedie. "That leaves only 50 out."
Tim Reason, "The Narrowing GAAP:  The convergence of foreign and domestic accounting rules could catch some U.S. companies by surprise," CFO Magazine December 01, 2005 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/5193385/c_5243641?f=magazine_coverstory


David Fordham wrote the following after a very long and very interesting illustration of corporate accounting:

*****************
Seeing businesses in Europe, I'm learning that the European laws are to accountants what weight lifting is to the Mr. Atlas competition. The really good European accountants are without peer when it comes to working within the system to turn a profit under the rules. So this begs the question: should we more agressively teach accountants how to help their managers? Would we be more valuable as "trusted partners" to management if we could be more helpful in this way?
******************

Jensen Comment:

First I would note that in Europe most financing was and still is raised from banks who work in close partnership with companies. As in Japan, these banks are almost insiders that can get most any kind of information they want irrespective of accounting rules.

Until the IASB wanted to crack into the U.S. Stock exchanges, the IAS standards were pretty much milk toast. If the former IASC (it was IASC in those days) standards had replaced the FASB standards, U.S. Corporations would have been ecstatic with IASC off-balance sheet financing opportunities and opportunities to create hidden reserves and manage earnings. European companies are notorious for managing earnings with hidden reserves.

Whether the two Davids (Albrecht and Fordham) like it or not, the FASB has struggled to make management of earnings and the hiding of debt more difficult in the U.S. The standards are now almost incomprehensible (especially for derivatives, SPEs, mezzanine financing, re-insurance, etc.) because U.S. companies countered the FASB standards with ever-increasing exotic financial contracts.

Before complaining about the complexity of FASB standards, first take a serious look at the absolute nightmare of complexity of the financial and insurance contracting. Especially look at the absolutely ridiculous derivative financial instrument contracts that are intentionally designed to be too complex for accountants or trust investors to understand --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds 

Many exotic contracts are relatively new. We now have over $100 trillion in interest rate swaps that were not even invented until 1984.

One of my favorite quotations is a 1994 quotation from Denny Beresford while, as Chairman of the FASB, he was making a presentation in NYC at the annual AAA meetings. He was at the time being extremely pressured by the SEC to issue what became FAS 133 in 1998.

The quotation went something like this:

*******************
"The Director of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, tells me the three main problems for the SEC and FASB are derivatives, derivatives, and derivatives. I had to ask some experts to tell me what a derivative is, because until now I thought a derivative was something a person my age takes when prunes don't quite do the job. John Stewart of Arthur Andersen tells me that there are over 1,000 kinds of complex derivative contracts . . . "
********************

Once again, David, my main point to you is that accounting standards outside the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, did not have to be too complex since most financing was raised from insiders (mostly banks) who had inside information sources. The countries with the complex standards rely more on equity investors who only get the information provided to the public by companies. The FASB has declared that protection of the public investors is its number one priority (as is also the case with the SEC).

The real problem we are now facing is that corporations no longer take accounting seriously other than as something to get around. This has led to an ever-increasing game where the FASB discovers misleading accounting, writes a new standard or interpretation, and subsequently discovers how corporations are re-writing contracts to get around the new standard.

Will this vicious cycle ever cease? Not as long as corporate managers continue to view accounting as an opportunity to creatively paint rosy portraits.

David Albrecht asked:
"Has anyone a good definition of financial statement transparency?"

Jensen reply:
Here's one paper that discusses the problem of transparency ---http://www.accenture.com/xdoc/en/ideas/outlook/6_2005/pdf/share_value.pdf
The snipped version is
http://snipurl.com/ShareholderValue

October 18, 2005 reply from Bender, Ruth [r.bender@CRANFIELD.AC.UK]

I just want to point out that the UK, which is in Europe, doesn't meet Bob's description of mostly bank finance. Our financing is much like that of the US - mostly equity, and our lenders are kept at arm's length from the board.

And a lot of our accountants are howling at the way IFRS change the accounts. It's not that people are trying to hide things by using lax standards (although, from my experience as an auditor, I know that this does of course happen). It's the fact that we and others don't understand accounts any more! I'm doing some research at the moment that involves interviewing experienced CFOs of large listed companies. Almost all of them are complaining that the IFRS, being 'market' facing, are making a nonsense of the numbers, because in most cases there isn't a market, and so they are having to use poor proxies. It's taking us away from factually based accounts and into a world of estimates - which in some ways makes earnings management easier, not harder! That was the gist of the FT article that David cited.

Incidentally, there is a really interesting paper about the fundamental differences between US and UK approaches to financial regulation and standards, that sets out why convergence is going to be a problem - if it ever happens. The title is "Where economics meets the law: US reporting systems compared to other markets" and you can download it from the ICAEW's website at
http://www.icaew.co.uk/members/index.cfm?AUB=TB2I_79757|MNXI_79757

Outline is:

"In particular the paper examines: * the evolution of the US financial reporting model; * contrasting approaches to accounting and auditing: 'principles' versus 'prescription'; * shareholder rights and the governance function of annual financial statements; * investor behaviour and corporate governance; * accounting convergence with the US or recognition of the differences.

Divided by common language is the first in the Beyond the myth of Anglo-American corporate governance series which aims to:

Challenge commonly held assumptions regarding the perceived similarity of US and UK corporate governance systems; Identify possible areas for convergence and, where not practical, clarify why elements of one system may not be appropriate for incorporation into another; Anticipate developments and set out challenges for future thinking about the US and UK models and encourage transatlantic dialogue."

Regards

Dr Ruth Bender
Cranfield School of Management UK

 


Dr. Ijiri was one of my major professors in the doctoral program at Stanford.  I'm naturally drawn to things he writes.  He is one of the long-time advocates of historical cost based accounting.  He is in fact much more dedicated to it than Bill Paton (but not Ananias Littleton) where Paton and Littleton are best known advocates of historical cost accounting.  The following is the lead article in the Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, July/August 2005, pp. 255-279.

US accounting standards and their environment:
A dualistic study of their 75-years of transition

Yuji Ijiri
Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University

Abstract
This article examines the 75-year transition of the US accounting standards and their environment.  It consists of three parts, each having two themes: Part (1) Past changes: 1. The first market crash and the second market crash; 2. Facts-based accounting and forecasts-based accounting,  Part (II) Present issues: 3. The reform legislation (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) and the reform administration; 4. Procedural fairness and pure fairness, and Part (III) Future trends: 5. Forecast protection and forecast separation; 6. Principles-based systems and rules-based systems.  These themes are each examined from dualistic perspectives by contrasting two fundamental concepts or principles.  The article concludes with the strong need to focus on "procedural fairness" in establishing accounting standards as well as in implementing the reform legislation and administration, in contrast to "pure fairness" that is almost impossible to achieve by anyone.


Accounting Rules So Plentiful "It's Nuts"
There are perhaps 2,000 accounting rules and standards that, when written out, possibly exceed the U.S. tax code in length. Yet, there are only the Ten Commandments. So Bob Herz, chairman of the rule-setting Financial Accounting Standards Board, is asked this: How come there are 2,000 rules to prepare a financial statement but only 10 for eternal salvation? "It is nuts," Herz allows. "But you're not going to get it down to ten commandments because the transactions are so complicated. . . . And the people on the front lines, the companies and their auditors, are saying: 'Give me principles, but tell me exactly what to do; I don't want to be second-guessed.' " Nonetheless, the FASB (pronounced, by accounting insiders, as "FAZ-bee") is embarking on efforts to simplify and codify accounting rules while improving them and integrating them with international standards.
"Accounting Rules So Plentiful 'It's Nuts' ; Standards Board Takes on Tough Job to Simplify, Codify," SmartPros, June 8, 2005 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x48525.xml


Jensen Comment:  Shyam Sunder (Yale University) is the 2005 President-Elect of the American Accounting Association --- http://aaahq.org/about/Nominees2005.htm

From Jim Mahar's blog on July 18 2005 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

SSRN-Social Norms versus Standards of Accounting by Shyam Sunder --- http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=725821

A few highlights from the paper:

"Historically, norms of accounting played an important role in corporate financial reporting. Starting with the federal regulation of securities, accounting norms have been progressively replaced by written standards....[and]enforcement mechanisms, often supported by implicit or explicit power of the state to impose punishment. The spate of accounting and auditing failures of the recent years raise questions about the wisdom of this transition from norms to standards....It is possible that the pendulum of standardization in accounting may have swung too far, and it may be time to allow for a greater role for social norms in the practice of corporate financial reporting."

"The monopoly rights given to the FASB in the U.S. (and the International Accounting Standards Board or IASB in the EU) deprived the economies, and their rule makers, from the benefits of experimentation with alternative rules and structures so their consequences could be observed in the field before deciding on which rules, if any, might be more efficient. Rule makers have little idea, ex ante, of the important consequences (e.g., the corporate cost of capital) of the alternatives they consider."

"Given the deliberate and premeditated nature of financial fraud and misrepresentation (and other white color crimes), "clarifications of the rules invite and facilitate evasion"

And my favorite!

"Indeed the U.S. constitution, a document that covers the entire governance system for the republic, has less than 5,000 words. The United Kingdom has no written constitution. A great part of the governance of both countries depends on norms. Do accountants deal with greater stakes?"

BTW: I like the prescriptions called for as well, but will allow you to read those (pages 20 to 22 of paper)

Cite: Sunder, Shyam, "Social Norms versus Standards of Accounting" (May 2005). Yale ICF Working Paper No. 05-14. http://ssrn.com/abstract=725821


Let me close by citing Harry S. Truman who said, "I never give them hell; I just tell them the truth and they think its hell!"
Great Speeches About the State of Accountancy

"20th Century Myths," by Lynn Turner when he was still Chief Accountant at the SEC in 1999 --- http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch323.htm

It is interesting to listen to people ask for simple, less complex standards like in "the good old days." But I never hear them ask for business to be like "the good old days," with smokestacks rather than high technology, Glass-Steagall rather than Gramm-Leach, and plain vanilla interest rate deals rather than swaps, collars, and Tigers!! The bottom line is—things have changed. And so have people.

Today, we have enormous pressure on CEO’s and CFO’s. It used to be that CEO’s would be in their positions for an average of more than ten years. Today, the average is 3 to 4 years. And Financial Executive Institute surveys show that the CEO and CFO changes are often linked.

In such an environment, we in the auditing and preparer community have created what I consider to be a two-headed monster. The first head of this monster is what I call the "show me" face. First, it is not uncommon to hear one say, "show me where it says in an accounting book that I can’t do this?" This approach to financial reporting unfortunately necessitates the level of detail currently being developed by the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB"), the Emerging Issues Task Force, and the AICPA’s Accounting Standards Executive Committee. Maybe this isn’t a recent phenomenon. In 1961, Leonard Spacek, then managing partner at Arthur Andersen, explained the motivation for less specificity in accounting standards when he stated that "most industry representatives and public accountants want what they call ‘flexibility’ in accounting principles. That term is never clearly defined; but what is wanted is ‘flexibility’ that permits greater latitude to both industry and accountants to do as they please." But Mr. Spacek was not a defender of those who wanted to "do as they please." He went on to say, "Public accountants are constantly required to make a choice between obtaining or retaining a client and standing firm for accounting principles. Where the choice requires accepting a practice which will produce results that are erroneous by a relatively material amount, we must decline the engagement even though there is precedent for the practice desired by the client."

We create the second head of our monster when we ask for standards that absolutely do not reflect the underlying economics of transactions. I offer two prime examples. Leasing is first. We have accounting literature put out by the FASB with follow-on interpretative guidance by the accounting firms—hundreds of pages of lease accounting guidance that, I will be the first to admit, is complex and difficult to decipher. But it is due principally to people not being willing to call a horse a horse, and a lease what it really is—a financing. The second example is Statement 133 on derivatives. Some people absolutely howl about its complexity. And yet we know that: (1) people were not complying with the intent of the simpler Statements 52 and 80, and (2) despite the fact that we manage risk in business by managing values rather than notional amounts, people want to account only for notional amounts. As a result, we ended up with a compromise position in Statement 133. To its credit, Statement 133 does advance the quality of financial reporting. For that, I commend the FASB. But I believe that we could have possibly achieved more, in a less complex fashion, if people would have agreed to a standard that truly reflects the underlying economics of the transactions in an unbiased and representationally faithful fashion.

I certainly hope that we can find a way to do just that with standards we develop in the future, both in the U.S. and internationally. It will require a change in how we approach standard setting and in how we apply those standards. It will require a mantra based on the fact that transparent, high quality financial reporting is what makes our capital markets the most efficient, liquid, and deep in the world.


Landmark Exposure Draft containing joint proposals to improve and align accounting for business combinations

"IASB and FASB Publish First Major Exposure Draft Standard," AccountingWeb, July 11, 2005 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=101084

The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), based in London, and the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have announced publication of an Exposure Draft containing joint proposals to improve and align accounting for business combinations. The proposed standard would replace IASB’s International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 3, Business Combinations and the FASB’s Statement 141, Business Combinations.

Sir David Tweedie, IASB Chairman and Bob Herz, FASB Chairman, emphasized the value of a single standard to users and preparers of financial statements of companies around the world as it improves comparability of financial information. "Development of a single standard demonstrates the ability of the IASB and the FASB to work together,” Tweedie continued.

Continued in article


"Can We Go Back to the Good Old Days?" by Dennis R. Beresford, The CPA Journal --- http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/1204/perspectives/p6.htm 

Recently I visited my pharmacy to pick up eyedrops for my two golden retrievers. Before he would give me the prescription, the pharmacist insisted I sign a form on behalf of Murphy and Millie, representing that they had been apprised of their rights under the new medical privacy rules. This ludicrous situation is a good illustration of how complicated life has gotten.

I was still shaking my head later that same day when I was clicking mindlessly through the 150 or so channels that my local cable TV service makes available to me. I happened to land on The Andy Griffith Show, and the few minutes I spent with Andy, Barney, Opie, and Aunt Bea got me thinking about the Good Old Days. Wouldn’t it be nice, I thought, to go back to the Good Old Days of the profession in the early 1960s when I graduated from college?

Back then, accounting was really simple. The Accounting Principles Board hadn’t issued any standards yet, and FASB didn’t exist. So we didn’t have 880 pages listing all of the current rules and guidance on derivative financial instruments, for example. The totality of authoritative GAAP at that time fit in one softbound booklet about one-third the size of the new derivatives guidance.

In those Good Old Days, the SEC had been around for quite a while but it rarely got excited about accounting matters. Neither mandatory quarterly reporting nor management’s discussion and analysis (MD&A) had yet come into being, for example. And annual report footnotes could actually be read in an hour or so.

The country had eight major accounting firms, and becoming a partner in one was a truly big deal. Lawsuits against accounting firms were rare, and almost none of them resulted in substantial damages against the accountants.

In short, accounting seemed more like a true profession, with good judgment and experience key requirements for success.

Of course, however much we might like to return to simpler times, it’s easier said than done. And most of us would never give up the many benefits of progress, such as photocopiers, personal computers, e-mail, the Internet, and cellphones. But I think that accounting rules may have become more complicated than necessary.

Let me start with a mea culpa. You may remember the famous line from the comic strip Pogo: “We have met the enemy, and he is us!” Well, you may be tempted to rephrase that quote to “We have met the enemy, and he is … Beresford!”

I plead guilty to having led the development of 40 or so new accounting standards over my time at FASB. A number of them had pervasive effects on financial statements, and some have been costly to apply. I always tried to be as practical as possible, however, although probably few would say that I was 100% successful in meeting that objective.

In any event, more-recent accounting standards and proposals seem to be getting increasingly complicated and harder to apply. Even the best-intentioned accountants have difficulty keeping up with all of the changes from FASB, the AICPA, the SEC, the EITF, and the IASB. And some individual standards, such as those on derivatives and variable-interest entities, are almost impossible for professionals, let alone laypeople, to decipher.

Furthermore, these days, companies are subject to what I’ll call quadruple jeopardy. They have to apply GAAP as best they can, but they are then subject to as many as four levels of possible second-guessing of their judgments.

First, the external auditors must weigh in. Second, the SEC will now be reviewing all public companies’ reports at least once every three years. Third, the PCAOB will be looking at a sample of accounting firms’ audits, and that could include any given company’s reports. Finally, the plaintiff’s bar is always looking for opportunities to challenge accounting judgments and extort settlements. Broad Principles Versus Detailed Rules

I suspect that all this second-guessing is what leads many companies and auditors to ask for more-detailed accounting rules. But we may have reached the point of diminishing returns. In response to the complexity and sheer volume of many current standards, some have suggested that accounting standards should be broad principles rather than detailed rules. FASB and the SEC have expressed support for the general notion of a principles-based approach to accounting standards. (It’s kind of like apple pie and motherhood: Who can object to broad principles?) Of course, implementing such an approach is problematic.

In 2002, FASB issued a proposal on this matter. And last year the SEC reported to Congress on the same topic. Specific things that FASB suggested could happen include the following:

Standards should always state very clear objectives. Standards should have a clearly defined scope and there should be few, if any, exceptions (e.g., for certain industries). Standards should contain fewer alternative accounting treatments (e.g., unrealized gains and losses on marketable securities could all be run through income rather than the various approaches used at present). FASB also said that a principles-based approach probably would include less in the way of detailed interpretive and implementation guidance. Thus, companies and auditors would be expected to rely more on professional judgment in applying the standards.

The SEC prefers to call this approach “objectives-based” rather than “principles-based.” SEC Chief Accountant Donald Nicolaisen recently repeated the SEC’s support for such an approach, agreeing with the notion of clearly identifying and articulating the objective for each standard. Although he also suggested that objectives-based standards should avoid bright-line tests such as lease capitalization rules, he called for “sufficiently detailed” implementation guidance, including real-world examples.

Although FASB and the SEC may have reached a meeting of the minds on the overall notion of more general principles, they may disagree on the key point of how much implementation guidance to provide. FASB thinks that a principles-based approach should include less implementation guidance and rely more on judgment, while the SEC thinks that “sufficiently detailed” guidance is needed, and I suspect that would make it difficult to significantly reduce complexity in some cases.

In any event, FASB recently said that it may take “several years or more” for preparers and auditors to adjust to a change to less detail. Meantime, little has changed with respect to individual standards, which if anything are becoming even harder to understand and apply.

I’ve heard FASB board members say that FASB Interpretation (FIN) 46, on variable-interest entities (VIE), is an example of a principles-based standard. I assume they say this because FIN 46 states an objective of requiring consolidation when control over a VIE exists. But the definition of a VIE and the rules for determining when control exists are extremely difficult to understand.

FASB recently described what it meant by the operationality of an accounting standard. The first condition was that standards have to be comprehensible to readers with a reasonable level of knowledge and sophistication. This doesn’t seem to be the case for FIN 46. Many auditors and financial executives have told me that only a few individuals in the country truly know how to apply FIN 46. And those few individuals often disagree among themselves!

Such complications make it difficult to get decisions on many accounting matters from an audit engagement team. Decisions on VIEs, derivatives, and securitization transactions, to name a few, must routinely be cleared by an accounting firm’s national experts. And with section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) and new concerns about auditor independence, getting answers is now even harder. For example, in the past, companies would commonly consult with their auditors on difficult accounting matters. But now the PCAOB may view this as a control weakness, under the assumption that the company lacks adequate internal expertise. And if auditors get too involved in technical decisions before a complex transaction is completed, the SEC or the PCAOB might decide that the auditors aren’t independent, because they’re auditing their own decisions.

When things become this complicated, I wonder whether it’s time for a new approach. Maybe we do need to go back to the Good Old Days.

Internal Controls

Today, financial executives are probably more concerned about internal controls than new accounting requirements. For the first time, all public companies must report on the adequacy of their internal controls over financial reporting, and outside auditors must express their opinion on the company’s controls. Many people have questioned whether this incredibly expensive activity is worth the presumed benefit to investors. While one might argue that the section 404 rules are a regulatory overreaction, shareholders should expect good internal controls. And audit committees, as shareholders’ representatives, must demand those good controls. So this has been by far the most time-consuming topic at all audit committee meetings I’ve attended in the past couple of years.

Companies and auditors are spending huge sums this year to ensure that transactions are properly processed and controlled. Yet the most perfect system of internal controls and the best audit of them might not catch an incorrect interpretation of GAAP. A good example of this was contained in the PCAOB’s August 2004 report on its initial reviews of the Big Four’s audit practices. The report noted that all four firms had missed the fact that some clients had misapplied EITF Issue 95-22. As the New York Times (August 27, 2004) noted, “The fact that all of the top firms had been misapplying it raised issues of just how well they know the sometimes complicated rules.”

Responding to a different criticism in that same PCAOB report, KPMG noted, “Three knowledgeable informed bodies—the firm, the PCAOB, and the SEC—had reached three different conclusions on proper accounting, illustrating the complex accounting issues registrants, auditors and regulators all face.”

Fair Value Accounting

Even those who are very confident about their understanding of the current accounting rules shouldn’t get complacent: Fair value accounting is right around the corner, making things even harder. In fact, it is already required in several recent standards.

To be clear, I’m not opposed in general to fair value accounting. It makes sense for marketable securities, derivatives, and probably many other financial instruments. But expanding the fair value concept to many other assets and liabilities is a challenge.

Consider this sentence from FASB’s recent exposure draft on fair value measurements: “The Board agreed that, conceptually, the fair value measurement objective and the approach for applying that objective should be the same for all assets and liabilities.” In that same document, FASB said, “Users of financial statements generally have agreed that fair value information is relevant.”

So the overall objective of moving toward a fair value accounting model seems clear. Of course, that doesn’t necessarily mean that we will get there soon. In fact, in the same exposure draft the board said that it would continue to use a project-by-project approach to decide on fair value or some other measure. But in reality the board has been adopting a fair value approach in most recent decisions:

SFAS 142, on goodwill, requires that impairment losses for certain intangible assets be recognized based upon a decline in the fair value of the asset. SFAS 143, on asset retirement obligations, requires that these liabilities be recorded initially at fair value rather than what the company expects to incur. SFAS 146, on exit or disposal activities, calls for the fair value of exit liabilities to be recorded, not the amount actually expected to be paid. FIN 45, on guarantees, says that a fair value must be recorded even when the company doesn’t expect to have to make good on a guarantee. A fair value approach is also integral to other pending projects, including the conditional asset retirement obligation exposure draft. Under such a standard, a company might have to record a fair value liability even when it doesn’t expect to incur an obligation. Fair value is also key to projects on business combination purchase procedures; differentiating between liabilities and equity; share-based payments (stock options); and the tremendously important revenue recognition project.

I have three major concerns about such pervasive use of fair value accounting. First, in many cases determining fair value in any kind of objective way will be difficult if not impossible. Second, the resulting accounting will produce answers that won’t benefit users of financial statements. Third, those answers will be very difficult to explain to business managers, with the result that accounting will be further discredited in their minds.

The approach that FASB is using for what I would call operating liabilities is particularly troubling. Take, for example, a company that owns and operates a facility that has some asbestos contamination. The facility is safe and can be operated indefinitely, but if the company wanted to sell the property it would have to remediate that contamination. The company has no plans to sell the property. But FASB’s exposure draft on conditional asset retirement obligations calls for the company to estimate and record a fair value liability. This would be based on what someone else would charge now to assume the obligation to clean up the problem at some unspecified future date. The board admits that it might be difficult to determine what the fair value would be in this case, and companies could omit the liability if they simply couldn’t make a reasonable estimate.

Although FASB and the SEC expect most companies to be able to make a reasonable estimate, in reality I think that will be possible only rarely. Even more important, does it really make sense to record a liability when the company might believe that there is only a 5% chance that it will have to be paid? Consider how this line of reasoning might apply to litigation. Presently, liabilities are recorded only when it’s probable that a loss has been incurred and that a reasonable estimate of the loss can be made. So if a company were sued for $1 billion but there were only a 1% chance that it would lose, nothing would be recorded. The fair value approach would seem to call for a liability of $10 million in this case, based on 1% of $1 billion.

One might think this kind of accounting will apply only in the distant future, but FASB is due to release its proposal on purchase accounting procedures in the next few months, and I understand that the proposal will require exactly this kind of accounting.

In addition to the very questionable relevance of this, I don’t know how anyone would ever be able to reasonably determine the 1% likelihood I assumed. How would an auditor attest to the reliability of financial statements whose results depend significantly on such assumptions? And where would an auditor go to obtain objective audit evidence against which to evaluate such assumptions?

Fair value definitely makes sense in certain instances, but FASB seems intent on extending the notion beyond the boundaries of common sense. FASB also seems to have an exaggerated notion of what companies and auditors are actually capable of doing. Perhaps we should consider FASB’s faith in the profession to be a compliment. Rather than feeling complimented, however, I think that this just makes many of us long for the Good Old Days.

Fair Value Accounting and Revenue Recognition

Currently, asset retirement obligations and exit costs apply to only a few companies, and even guarantees are not an everyday issue. All companies, however, have revenues—or at least they hope to have them. And for the past year or so, FASB has been engaged in a complete rethinking of revenue recognition. This, of course, was precipitated by the numerous SEC enforcement cases on improper revenue recognition. Most cases, however, involved failure to follow existing standards, and most cases also resulted in premature recognition of revenue.

Now there’s no doubt that the current revenue accounting rules are overly complicated, with many specific rules depending on the type of product or service being sold. But FASB’s current thinking would replace these rules with an asset and liability–oriented approach based on fair value accounting. This may well make revenue accounting even more complicated than the detailed rules that we are at least used to working with.

For example, assume product A is being sold to a customer. It costs $50 to produce product A and the customer has agreed to pay a nonrefundable $100 in exchange for the company’s promise to deliver this hot product next month. What should the company record at month-end?

Most accountants would probably think first of the traditional approach and conclude that the earnings process had not been completed. Because product A hasn’t been completed and shipped to the customer, the $100 credit is unearned income. Some aggressive accountants would probably say that the company should record the sale now because the $100 is nonrefundable. In that case the company would probably also record a liability for the $50 cost that will be incurred next month.

FASB has a surprise for both. The board is presently thinking about whether revenue for what it calls the “selling activity”—the difference between the $100 received and the assumed fair value of the obligation to deliver the product—should be recorded now. This assumed fair value would be the estimated amount that other companies would charge to produce product A. In other words, it’s the hypothetical amount a company would have to pay someone else to assume the obligation to produce the product. The company would have to make this assumption even though it is 100% sure that it will make the product itself rather than have someone else make it.

If one could ever determine what other companies would charge, I suspect that the amount would be higher than the $50 expected cost, because another company probably would require a risk premium to produce a product that it isn’t familiar with. It would want to earn a profit as well. Let’s assume in this case that the fair value could be determined as $80. If so, the company would record now $20 of revenue and profit for what FASB calls the selling activity. Next month it would record the $80 remaining amount of revenue, along with the $50 cost actually incurred. It’s unclear when the company would record sales commissions, delivery costs, and similar expenses, but I assume these would have to be allocated somehow.

Given that this project was added to FASB’s agenda in large part because of premature recognition of revenue in some SEC cases—Enron recognized income based on the supposed fair value of energy contracts extending 30 years into the future—it is ironic that the project may well mandate recognition earlier than most accountants would consider appropriate. That kind of premature revenue recognition is now generally prohibited, but other examples could follow, depending on the outcome of this FASB project.

Although the revenue recognition project is still in an early stage and both my understanding and the board’s positions could change, FASB seems determined to use some sort of fair value approach to revenue recognition in many cases. If this happens, we will all be wishing for the Good Old Days to return.

Is All That EITF Guidance Really Necessary?

In early 2004, FASB’s board members began reviewing all EITF consensus positions. A majority of board members now have to “not disagree” with the EITF before those positions become final and binding on companies. This gives FASB more control over the EITF process, and it should prevent the task force from developing positions that the board sees as inconsistent with existing GAAP.

Although I think the task force has done a great deal of good over its 20-year existence (I was a charter member), I think it’s time to challenge whether everything that the EITF does is necessary or even consistent with its original purpose. Too many of the task force’s topics in recent years can’t really be called “emerging issues.” Rather, the task force often takes up long-standing issues where it thinks that some limitations need to be placed on professional judgment.

For example, a couple of years ago the SEC became concerned about the accounting for certain investments in other companies. For years we’ve had standards that call for recognition of losses when market value declines are “other than temporary.” The EITF discussed this matter at eight meetings over two years and also relied on a separate working group of accounting experts. Earlier this year, a final consensus position was issued. It includes a lengthy abstract that tells companies what factors to consider, including the following matters:

Evidence to support the ability and intent to continue to hold the investment; The severity of the decline in value; How long the decline has lasted; and The evidence supporting a market price recovery. So now we have a “detailed rule” on this matter. Will this result in more consistency in practice? Will investors and other users of financial statements receive better information as a result? Is the result worth the additional effort?

Moreover, after two years of effort on this project, FASB had to reconsider the whole thing because no one had considered the effect on debt securities held as available for sale by financial institutions. So now the board is developing even more specifics to deal with the unintended consequences of the rule.

Again, I support the EITF, and I believe it has generally done a great job. The members try to develop practical ways to deal with current problems. Nonetheless, both the task force and FASB may need to more carefully challenge whether all of the EITF’s projects are really needed. If FASB actually issued relatively broad standards, there probably would be a need for the EITF to provide supplemental guidance on some issues. But we now seem to have the worst of all worlds, with quite detailed accounting standards being accompanied by even more detailed EITF guidance.

A Multitude of Challenges

I don’t intend to seem overly critical of FASB and others who are working to improve financial reporting. It’s a tough job, and the brickbats always outnumber the bouquets. If I didn’t strongly support accounting standards setting I wouldn’t have spent 10 Qs years on the inside of the process. Still, those years at FASB, as well as my time before and after, have caused me to develop strong views on these issues. And I truly do believe that standards have gotten just too complicated.

The announced move to broader principles is one I fully support. That job won’t be easy, but it has to be tried or the sea of detail will become even deeper in the near future. FASB needs to actually start doing this and not allow its actions to speak otherwise. And companies, auditors, and regulators need to support such a move and resist the temptation to seek answers to every imaginable question. Furthermore, companies and auditors may have to become more principled before a principles-based approach will work.

Part of this process could be for the EITF to be more judicious in what it takes on. Also, I urge FASB to reevaluate its attitude toward fair value accounting. I believe FASB is moving much faster in this area than preparers, auditors, and users of financial statements can accommodate. Furthermore, the SEC and other regulators may not yet be on board with this new thinking.

In the final analysis, we won’t be able to return to my so-called Good Old Days. But we have to make sure that what accounting and accountants can do is meaningful and operational. We never want to look back and ask, “Remember the Good Old Days, when accounting was important?”

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CPA Journal Editorial Board member Dennis R. Beresford, CPA, was recently named the 2005 recipient of the Gold Medal for Distinguished Service from the AICPA. He received the award on October 26, during the fall meeting of the Institute’s governing council in Orlando. Beresford is the Ernst & Young Executive Professor of Accounting at the J.M. Tull School of Accounting at the University of Georgia, Terry College of Business. From 1987 to 1997, he was chairman of FASB. Prior to joining FASB, he was national director of accounting standards for Ernst & Young.ecently I visited my pharmacy to pick up eyedrops for my two golden retrievers. Before he would give me the prescription, the pharmacist insisted I sign a form on behalf of Murphy and Millie, representing that they had been apprised of their rights under the new medical privacy rules. This ludicrous situation is a good illustration of how complicated life has gotten.

 


From the FASB in July 2004 "FASB Response to SEC Study on the Adoption of a Principles-Based Accounting System" --- http://www.fasb.org/response_sec_study_july2004.pdf 

Introduction

In July 2003, the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) submitted to Congress its Study Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adoption by the United States Financial Reporting System of a Principles-Based Accounting System (the Study). The Study includes the following recommendations to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB or Board):

1. The FASB should issue objectives-oriented standards.

2. The FASB should address deficiencies in the conceptual framework.

3. The FASB should be the only organization setting authoritative accounting

guidance in the United States.

4. The FASB should continue its convergence efforts.

5. The FASB should work to redefine the GAAP hierarchy.

6. The FASB should increase access to authoritative literature.

7. The FASB should perform a comprehensive review of its literature to identify standards that are more rules-based and adopt a transition plan to change those standards.

The Board welcomes the SEC’s Study and agrees with the recommendations. Indeed, a number of those recommendations relate to initiatives the Board had under way at the time the Study was issued.1 The Board is committed to continuously improving its standard-setting process. The Board’s specific responses to the recommendations in the Study are described in the following sections of this paper.

Objectives-Oriented Standards

In the Study, the SEC staff recommends that "those involved in the standard-setting

process more consistently develop standards on a principles-based or objectives-oriented

basis" (page 4).2 According to the Study (page 4), an objectives-oriented standard would

have the following characteristics:

Be based on an improved and consistently applied conceptual framework;

Clearly state the accounting objective of the standard;

Provide sufficient detail and structure so that the standard can be operationalized and applied on a consistent basis;1

Minimize exceptions from the standard;

Avoid use of percentage tests ("bright-lines") that allow financial engineers to achieve technical compliance with the standard while evading the intent of the standard.

The “objectives-oriented” approach to setting standards described above (and expanded
upon in the Study) is similar to the principles-based approach described in the Board’s
Proposal. After discussing the comments received on its Proposal, the Board agreed that
its conceptual framework needs to be improved. This is because an internally consistent
and complete conceptual framework is critical to a standard-setting approach that places
more emphasis on the underlying principles that are based on that framework. Pages 8
and 9 of this paper further describe the Board’s activities related to the conceptual
framework; the following sections address the other characteristics of an objectivesoriented
approach addressed in the Study.


Format and Content of Standards

The Board agrees with the Study’s recommendation to improve the format and content of its standards. In particular, The Board agrees that the objective and underlying principles  of a standard should be clearly articulated and prominently placed in FASB standards. In response to comments received on its Proposal, the Board agreed that although its existing standards are based on concepts and principles, the understandability of its standards could be improved by writing its standards in ways that (a) clearly state the accounting objective(s), (b) clearly articulate the underlying principles, and (c) improve the explanation of the rationale behind those principles and how they relate to the conceptual framework.

The Board is working on developing a format for its standards that will encompass the attributes of an objectives-oriented standard described in the Study, for example, describing the underlying objective of the standard in the introductory paragraphs, using bold type to set off the principles,3 and providing a glossary for defined terms.

In addition, the Board is working with a consultant to identify changes in the organization and exposition of its standards that will increase the understandability of those standards.  Accounting standards by their nature will include many specific technical terms; however, the Board believes it can do a better job simplifying the language used in its standards to describe how to account for complex transactions. In addition, the Board will strive to apply other effective writing techniques to enhance constituents’ understanding of FASB standards.

When discussing proposed accounting standards or specific provisions of a standard, many of the Board’s constituents comment on whether a standard is "operational."  Because that term can mean different things to different people, the Board decided to define the term operational for its purposes. The Board uses the term operational to mean the following:

A provision/standard is comprehensible by a reader who has a reasonable level of knowledge and sophistication,

The information needed to apply the provision/standard is currently available or can be created, and 

The provision/standard can be applied in the manner in which it was intended. The Board believes that if its standards are more understandable, they also will be more operational.

Implementation Guidance

As noted in the Board’s Proposal, an approach to setting standards that places more emphasis on principles will not eliminate the need to provide interpretive and implementation guidance for applying those standards. Thus, the Board agrees that some amount of implementation guidance is needed in objectives-oriented standards in order for entities to apply those standards in a consistent manner. The Board uses the term implementation guidance to refer to all of the guidance necessary to explain and operationalize the principles (that is, the explanatory text in the standards section, the definitions in the glossary, and guidance and examples included in one or more appendices that help an entity apply the provisions in the standards section). The Board believes that the amount of necessary guidance will vary depending on the nature and complexity of the arrangements that are the subject of the standard. The Board believes that there should be enough guidance such that a principle is understandable, operational, and capable of being applied consistently in similar situations. Judgment is required to decide how much guidance is needed to achieve those objectives, without providing so much guidance that the overall standard combined with its implementation guidance becomes a collection of detailed rules. Therefore, the amount and nature of implementation guidance will vary from standard to standard. 

The Board believes that its primary focus should be providing broadly applicable implementation guidance, not providing guidance on relatively narrow and less pervasive issues, including, for example, issues that are specific to certain entities or industries. When developing that implementation guidance, the Board plans to apply the same guidelines that underpin objectives-oriented standards. For example, rather than consisting of a list of rules or bright lines, the implementation guidance would explain or expand on the principle(s) or objectives in the standard. 4.

Continued in the report

 


From the FASB in October 2002 --- http://www.fasb.org/fasac/results2002.pdf 

Results of the 2002 Annual FASAC Survey

FASAC's annual survey on the priorities of the FASB provides valuable perspectives and observations about the Board's process and direction. The 2002 survey asked Council members, Board members, and other interested constituents to provide their views about the FASB's priorities, the financial reporting issues of tomorrow, principles-based standards, and the FASB's international activities.

Key observations and conclusions from the responses to the 2002 survey are:

Twenty-two current Council members, 7 Board members, and 9 other constituents responded to the survey.

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm 

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting fraud are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm 

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting for electronic commerce are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce.htm 


There is a complete saga of attempts to establish a conceptual framework of accounting.  See 
http://www.wku.edu/~halljo/attempts.html
 

Methods for setting accounting standards all have advantages and disadvantages.  It is not possible to set optimal standards for all stakeholders.  Arrow's Impossibility Theorem applies, which means that what is optimal for one constituency must be sub-optimal for other constituencies.  Accounting standards are usually expensive to implement, and the benefits of any new standard must be weighed against its costs to preparers and users of financial statements.

Deductive Accounting Theory (Mathematical Methods)

Inductive Accounting Theory (Scientific Methods)

Normative Accounting Theory

Positive Accounting Theory


April 2002 Document on SPEs and Enron from the International Accounting Standards Board (This Document is Free)

WRITTEN EVIDENCE OF SIR DAVID TWEEDIE CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD TO THE TREASURY COMMITTEE  --- http://www.iasc.org.uk/docs/speeches/020405-dpt.pdf 

An excerpt is shown below:

Consolidations 

Of the 16 topics on our research agenda, one warrants special mention here. For several years, there has been an international debate on the topic of consolidation policy. The failure to consolidate some entities has been identified as a significant issue in the restatement of Enron’s financial statements. Accountants use the term consolidation policy as shorthand for the principles that govern the preparation of consolidated financial statements that include the assets and liabilities of a parent company and its subsidiaries. For an example of consolidation, consider the simple example known to every accounting student. Company A operates a branch office in Edinburgh. Company B also operates a branch office in Edinburgh, but organises the branch as a corporation owned by Company B. Every accounting student knows that the financial statements of each company should report all of the assets and liabilities of their respective Edinburgh operations, without regard to the legal form surrounding those operations. 

Of course, real life is seldom as straightforward as textbook examples. Companies often own less than 100 per cent of a company that might be included in the consolidated group. Some special purpose entities (SPEs) may not be organised in traditional corporate form. The challenge for accountants is to determine which entities should be included in consolidated financial statements. 

There is a broad consensus among accounting standard-setters that the decision to consolidate should be based on whether one entity controls another. However, there is much disagreement over how control should be defined and translated into accounting guidance. In some jurisdictions accounting standards and practice seem to have gravitated toward a legal or ownership notion of control, usually based on direct or indirect ownership of over 50 per cent of the outstanding voting shares. In contrast, both international standards and the standards in some national jurisdictions are based on a broader notion of control that includes ownership, but extends to control over financial and operating policies, power to appoint or remove a majority of the board of directors, and power to cast a majority of votes at meetings of the board of directors. 

A number of commentators, including many in the USA, have questioned whether the control principle is consistently applied. The IASB and its partner standard-setters are committed to an ongoing review of the effectiveness of our standards. If they do not work as well as they should, we want to find out why and fix the problem. Last summer we asked the UK ASB to help us by researching the various national standards on consolidation and identifying any inconsistencies or implementation problems. It has completed the first stage of that effort and is moving now to more difficult questions. 

The particular consolidation problems posed by SPEs were addressed by the IASB’s former Standing Interpretations Committee in SIC-12. There are some kinds of SPE that pose particular problems for both an ownership approach and a control-based approach to consolidations. It is not uncommon for SPEs to have minimal capital, held by a third party, that bears little if any of the risks and rewards usually associated with share ownership. The activities of some SPEs are

so precisely prescribed in the documents that establish them that no active exercise of day-to-day control is needed or allowed. These kinds of SPEs are commonly referred to as running on ‘auto-pilot’. In these cases, control is exercised in a passive way. To discover who has control it is necessary to look at which party receives the benefits and risks of the SPE. 

SIC-12 sets out four particular circumstances that may indicate that an SPE should be consolidated:

(a) in substance, the activities of the SPE are being conducted on behalf of the enterprise according to its specific business needs so that the enterprise obtains benefits from the SPE’s operation. 

(b) in substance, the enterprise has the decision-making powers to obtain the majority of the benefits of the activities of the SPE or, by setting up an ‘autopilot’ mechanism, the enterprise has delegated these decision-making powers. 

(c) in substance, the enterprise has rights to obtain the majority of the benefits of the SPE and therefore may be exposed to risks incidental to the activities of the SPE. 

(d) in substance, the enterprise retains the majority of the residual or ownership risks related to the SPE or its assets in order to obtain benefits from its activities.

The IASB recognises that we may be able to improve our approach to SPEs. With this in mind, we have already asked our interpretations committee if there are any ways in which the rules need to be strengthened or clarified.

Current criticisms and concerns about financial reporting 

There some common threads that pass through most of the topics on our active and research agendas. Each represents a broad topic that has occupied the best accounting minds for several years. It is time to bring many of these issues to a conclusion. 

Off balance sheet items 

When a manufacturer sells a car or a dishwasher, the inventory is removed from the balance sheet (a process that accountants refer to as derecognition) because the manufacturer no longerowns the item. Similarly, when a company repays a loan, it no longer reports that loan as a liability. However, the last 20 years have seen a number of attempts by companies to remove assets and liabilities from balance sheets through transactions that may obscure the economic substance of the company’s financial position. There are four areas that warrant mention here, each of which has the potential to obscure the extent of a company’s assets and liabilities. 

Leasing transactions

A company that owns an asset, say an aircraft, and finances that asset with debt reports an asset (the aircraft) and a liability (the debt). Under existing accounting standards in most jurisdictions (including ASB and IASB standards), a company that operates the same asset under a lease structured as an operating lease reports neither the asset nor the liability. It is possible to operate a company, say an airline, without reporting any of the company’s principal assets (aircraft) on the balance sheet. A balance sheet that presents an airline without any aircraft is clearly not a faithful representation of economic reality.

Our predecessor body, working in conjunction with our partners in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the USA, published a research paper that invited comments on accounting for leases. The UK ASB is continuing work on this topic and we are monitoring its work carefully. As noted above, we expect to move accounting for leases to our active agenda at some point in the future. There is a distinct possibility that such a project would lead us to propose that companies recognise assets and related lease obligations for all leases.

 Securitisation transactions

Under existing accounting standards in many jurisdictions, a company that transfers assets (like loans or credit-card balances) through a securitisation transaction recognises the transaction as a sale and removes the amounts from its balance sheet. Some securitisations are appropriately accounted for as sales, but many continue to expose the transferor to many of the significant risks and rewards inherent in the transferred assets. In our project on improvements to IAS 39 (page 5), we plan to propose an approach that will clarify international standards governing a company’s ability to derecognise assets in a securitisation. Our approach, which will not allow sale treatment when the ‘seller’ has a continuing involvement with the assets, will be significantly different from the one found in the existing standards of most jurisdictions.

Creation of unconsolidated entities 

Under existing accounting standards in many jurisdictions, a company that transfers assets and liabilities to a subsidiary company must consolidate that subsidiary in the parent company’s financial statements (see page 6). However, in some cases (often involving the use of an SPE), the transferor may be able (in some jurisdictions) to escape the requirement to consolidate. Standards governing the consolidation of SPEs are described on page 7. 

Pension obligations

Under existing standards in many jurisdictions (including existing international standards) a company’s obligation to a defined benefit pension plan is reported on the company’s balance sheet. However, the amount reported is not the current obligation, based on current information and assumptions, but instead represents the result of a series of devices designed to spread changes over several years. In contrast, the UK standard (FRS 17) has attracted significant recent attention because it does not include a smoothing mechanism. The IASB plans to examine the differences among the various national accounting standards for pensions (in particular, the smoothing mechanism), as part of our ongoing work on convergence.

Items not included in the profit and loss account 

Under existing accounting standards in some jurisdictions, a company that pays for goods and services through the use of its own shares, options on its shares, or instruments tied to the value of its shares may not record any cost for those goods and services. The most common form of this share-based transaction is the employee share option. In 1995, after what it called an “extraordinarily controversial” debate, the FASB issued a standard that, in most cases in the USA, requires disclosure of the effect of employee share options but does not require recognition in the financial statements. In its Basis for Conclusions, the FASB observed:

The Board chose a disclosure-based solution for stock-based employee compensation to bring closure to the divisive debate on this issue—not because it believes that solution is the best way to improve financial accounting and reporting.

Most jurisdictions, including the UK, do not have any standard on accounting for share-based payment, and the use of this technique is growing outside of the USA. There is a clear need for international accounting guidance. Last autumn, the IASB reopened the comment period on a discussion document Accounting for Share-based Payment. This document was initially published by our predecessor, in concert with standard-setters from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the USA. We have now considered the comments received and have begun active deliberation of this project. Accounting measurement

Under existing accounting standards in most jurisdictions, assets and liabilities are reported at amounts based on a mixture of accounting measurements. Some measurements are based on historical transaction prices, perhaps adjusted for depreciation, amortisation, or impairment. Others are based on fair values, using either amounts observed in the marketplace or estimates of fair value. Accountants refer to this as the mixed attribute model. It is increasingly clear that a mixed attribute system creates complexity and opportunities for accounting arbitrage, especially for derivatives and financial instruments. Some have suggested that financial reporting should move to a system that measures all financial instruments at fair value.

Our predecessor body participated in a group of ten accounting standard-setters (the Joint Working Group or JWG) to study the problem of accounting for financial instruments. The JWG proposal (which recommended a change to measuring all financial assets and liabilities at fair value) was published at the end of 2000. Earlier this year the Canadian Accounting Standards Board presented an analysis of comments on that proposal. The IASB has just begun to consider how this effort should move forward. 

Intangible assets

Under existing accounting standards in most jurisdictions, the cost of an intangible asset (a patent, copyright, or the like) purchased from a third party is capitalised as an asset. This is the same as the accounting for acquired tangible assets (buildings and machines) and financial assets (loans and accounts receivable). Existing accounting standards extend this approach to self-constructed tangible assets, so a company that builds its own building capitalises the costs incurred and reports that as the cost of its self-constructed asset. However, a company that develops its own patent for a new drug or process is prohibited from capitalising much (sometimes all) of the costs of creating that intangible asset. Many have criticised this inconsistency, especially at a time when many view intangible assets as significant drivers of company performance.

The accounting recognition and measurement of internally generated intangibles challenges many long-cherished accounting conventions. Applying the discipline of accounting concepts challenges many of the popular conceptions of intangible assets and ‘intellectual capital’. We have this topic on our research agenda. We also note the significant work that the FASB has done on this topic and its recent decision to add a project to develop proposed disclosures about internally generated intangible assets. We plan to monitor those efforts closely.

Bob Jensen's threads on the Enron/Andersen scandals are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm 

Bob Jensen's SPE threads are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm 

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm 


Why Let the I.R.S. See What the S.E.C. Doesn't?

"Why Let the I.R.S. See What the S.E.C. Doesn't?," by Anna Bernasek, The New York Times, February 5, 2006 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/05/business/yourmoney/05view.html

IMAGINE a company that makes a practice of keeping two sets of accounts. One version is revealed to the public through periodic Securities and Exchange Commission filings and public announcements. The other is never made public and conveys a markedly different picture.

Does it sound scandalous? Actually, it's common practice.

It isn't as if companies are breaking the law. Public companies are required by the S.E.C. to keep their books in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, or GAAP, and to announce their results each quarter. At the same time, companies keep a separate and confidential set of books according to rules established by the Internal Revenue Service. These accounts seldom match. After all, companies typically have an incentive to state the highest possible earnings under GAAP and the lowest possible under tax rules.

Economists have long understood that profits reported to the I.R.S. may be a more reliable guide than those reported to the S.E.C. and scrutinized on Wall Street. The public presentation of accounts involves the exercise of an accountant's judgment on such topics as the useful life of assets, the probability of uncertain events and the fair value of property. Each exercise of judgment, on which reasonable people may differ, offers a degree of flexibility in the final reporting of results.

In general, tax rules are less lenient. That is because allowing companies too much leeway in stating how much tax they owe would make collecting taxes difficult. So when economists analyze corporate profits, they tend to focus on a measure derived from corporate tax returns. Unfortunately, the government publishes only aggregate data, so it is impossible to know what any particular company made, or paid, under I.R.S. rules.

It doesn't have to be that way. Companies already have basic tax information at hand that could be released to the public without imposing significant costs. And some experts say they believe that the benefits to investors, regulators and the overall tax system could be substantial.

A study published in 2003 concluded that the benefits of disclosing additional tax information would outweigh any costs. It was conducted by David L. Lenter, a lawyer now on the staff of the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation; Joel B. Slemrod, an economist at the University of Michigan; and Douglas A. Shackelford, an accountant at the University of North Carolina.

In the study, published in the National Tax Journal, they quickly agreed that corporate tax returns, which can run into thousands of pages, should not be exposed in their entirety. That could reveal sensitive information that companies have a legitimate need to keep private, they said.

But a simple presentation of summary information — the bottom-line numbers, for example — would have many attractions. Even better, companies could release a simplified version of a schedule that they already prepare. The I.R.S. currently requires companies to reconcile the differences between the numbers on their financial reports and the corresponding amounts on their tax return, but so far those reconciliations have not been made public.

Greater disclosure of tax information would allow investors and analysts to better appreciate the true economic condition of a company. More transparent tax figures would also give analysts a tool to cut through the sometimes confusing tax disclosures currently provided under S.E.C. rules. Even more significantly, investors could track a company's performance under an accounting system believed to be less susceptible to manipulation than GAAP. Together, these effects would permit investors to value securities with greater confidence. Over all, the researchers say they believe that it would help financial markets function more efficiently.

Another significant benefit could be to improve the transparency of the tax system to the voting public. Despite all the information embedded in accounting footnotes, some basic questions go unanswered. Under current S.E.C. rules, a public company does not have to reveal precisely what it paid in taxes for a specific year. "Right now the tax numbers companies release can contain things like taxes on audits 20 years ago," Professor Shackelford said. "What they don't tell us is how much they paid the government in taxes in 2005, for instance. You can't find that anywhere."

The study argued that if companies revealed that figure, it would help clarify how much tax a company was paying relative to its income and relative to other companies. And that would yield positive benefits. For instance, the study says, it could put pressure on legislators to improve the tax system. And it could discourage corporations from aggressive tax-reduction strategies if they feared public criticism.

THERE is good cause for trying to understand what is really going on with corporate taxes, company by company. The aggregate figures suggest a disturbing trend. While companies have reported rising profits in recent years, corporate tax receipts have been dwindling. In the late 1990's, corporate tax receipts hovered between 2 percent and 2.2 percent of the country's overall gross domestic product. But from 2000 to 2004, the last year for which figures are available, the ratio of corporate tax receipts to G.D.P. has dropped, ranging between 1.2 and 2 percent.

Without reliable tax information, we can only guess at what companies are really up to. During the late 1990's, company profits based on tax return information — the profit figure most watched by economists — grew at a much slower rate than reported profits. The divergence between the two measures implied that either companies were finding new ways to minimize their tax bills or they were finding new ways to overstate their accounting earnings. We now know that at least some companies were indeed bolstering their earnings, through both legal and illegal maneuvers.

After a brief reconciliation in 2001 and 2002, reported earnings and taxed earnings are again diverging. While disclosing some basic tax information won't by itself prevent the kinds of abuses that multiplied in the 1990's, it is a step in the right direction. And that's what good public policy is all about.

 

 


Radical Changes on the Way in Financial Reporting

Five General Categories of Aggregation
"The Sums of All Parts: Redesigning Financials:  As part of radical changes to the income statement, balance sheet, and cash flow statement, FASB signs off on a series of new subtotals to be contained in each," byMarie Leone, CFO Magazine, November 14, 2007 --- http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/10131571?f=rsspage

In another large step towards the most dramatic overhaul of financial statements in decades, the Financial Accounting Standards Board Wednesday laid out a series of subtotal figures that companies would be required to include on their balance sheets, income statements and cash flow statements.

The new look for financials will break all three statements into five general categories: business, discontinued operations, financing, income taxes, and equity (if needed). Each of those groupings will carry its own total. In addition, the business, financing, and income tax categories will be segmented into even more narrow sections, each of which will include a subtotal. For example, the business category will be broken down into operating assets, operating liabilities and a subtotal; and investing assets, investing liabilities, and a second subtotal.

(Although FASB will not officially release its proposal until the second quarter of 2008, it has made public some initial peeks at the proposed format.)

The addition of totals and subtotals is an extension of FASB's broader principle on disaggregating financial statement line items. It is the board's belief that separating line items into their components gives investors, creditors, analysts and other financial statement users a better view of a company's financial health. For example, the new format should make it easier for an investor to see how much cash a company generates by selling its products versus how much it generates by selling-off a business unit or through financial investments made by the corporate treasurer.

FASB staffers say buy- and sell-side analysts typically scrutinize financial statements by breaking them down into categories similar to the ones the board is proposing.

In keeping with its promise to strip accounting standards of complexity, the board also agreed to issue two overarching principles in its draft document on financial statement presentation. One principle instructs preparers to keep the category order consistent in each of the three financial statements. For example, if income tax is the last category shown in on the balance sheet, then it should also be the final category on the cash flow and income statement. "We're not going to tell you what order [to use], just that you should use the same order in all three statements," noted FASB Chairman Robert Herz during the meeting.

In addition, the board wants companies to "clearly distinguish" between operating assets and operating liabilities, as well as short-term assets and liabilities and their long-term counterparts. But the board is not going to prescribe how that should be done. Regarding the issue of common sums, "the only requirement will be that totals and subtotals are segmented by activities," noted board member George Batavick, "the rest will be principles."

Updating the look and functionality of financial statements is one of the joint projects that FASB is working on with the International Accounting Standards Board as the two organizations work to converge U.S. and global accounting rules. On Thursday, IASB will discuss the common totals issue and is expected to release its recommendations.

FASB expects the draft proposal to spark a healthy debate among users and preparers, and staffers are planning for a four- to six-month comment period to follow its release. One issue that will have to be thrashed out, for example, is whether discontinued operations should be relegated to its own category, or run through the income statement or financing activities.

To avoid any last-minute confusion with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Herz asked the FASB accountants working on the project to "touch base with the SEC staff just to get their input." Herz noted that last time the two groups discussed disaggregation principles, Scott Taub, not James Kroeker, was the SEC's deputy chief accountant.

Jensen Comment
Now is especially the time for accounting researchers to look into leading edge alternatives for visualizing data. My threads on that topic are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/352wpVisual/000DataVisualization.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm


No Bottom Line

Question
Is a major overhaul of accounting standards on the way?

Hint
There may no longer be the tried and untrusted earnings per share number to report!
Comment
It would be interesting to see a documentation of the academic research, if any, that the FASB relied upon to commence this blockbuster initiative. I recommend that some astute researcher commence to probe into the thinking behind this proposal.

"Profit as We Know It Could Be Lost With New Accounting Statements," by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, May 12, 2007; Page A1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117893520139500814.html?mod=DAT

Pretty soon the bottom line may not be, well, the bottom line.

In coming months, accounting-rule makers are planning to unveil a draft plan to rework financial statements, the bedrock data that millions of investors use every day when deciding whether to buy or sell stocks, bonds and other financial instruments. One possible result: the elimination of what today is known as net income or net profit, the bottom-line figure showing what is left after expenses have been met and taxes paid.

It is the item many investors look to as a key gauge of corporate performance and one measure used to determine executive compensation. In its place, investors might find a number of profit figures that correspond to different corporate activities such as business operations, financing and investing.

Another possible radical change in the works: assets and liabilities may no longer be separate categories on the balance sheet, or fall to the left and right side in the classic format taught in introductory accounting classes.

ACCOUNTING OVERHAUL

Get a glimpse of what new financial statements could look like, according to an early draft recently provided by the Financial Accounting Standards Board to one of its advisory groups. The overhaul could mark one of the most drastic changes to accounting and financial reporting since the start of the Industrial Revolution in the 19th century, when companies began publishing financial information as they sought outside capital. The move is being undertaken by accounting-rule makers in the U.S. and internationally, and ultimately could affect companies and investors around the world.

The project is aimed at providing investors with more telling information and has come about as rule makers work to one day come up with a common, global set of accounting standards. If adopted, the changes will likely force every accounting textbook to be rewritten and anyone who uses accounting -- from clerks to chief executives -- to relearn how to compile and analyze information that shows what is happening in a business.

This is likely to come as a shock, even if many investors and executives acknowledge that net income has flaws. "If there was no bottom line, I'd want to have a sense of what other indicators I ought to be looking at to get a sense of the comprehensive health of the company," says Katrina Presti, a part-time independent health-care contractor and stay-at-home mom who is part of a 12-woman investment club in Pueblo, Colo. "Net income might be a false indicator, but what would I look at if it goes away?"

The effort to redo financial statements reflects changes in who uses them and for what purposes. Financial statements were originally crafted with bankers and lenders in mind. Their biggest question: Is the business solvent and what's left if it fails? Stock investors care more about a business's current and future profits, so the net-income line takes on added significance for them.

Indeed, that single profit number, particularly when it is divided by the number of shares outstanding, provides the most popular measure of a company's valuation: the price-to-earnings ratio. A company that trades at $10 a share, and which has net profit of $1 a share, has a P/E of 10.

But giving that much power to one number has long been a recipe for fraud and stock-market excesses. Many major accounting scandals earlier this decade centered on manipulation of net income. The stock-market bubble of the 1990s was largely based on investors' assumption that net profit for stocks would grow rapidly for years to come. And the game of beating a quarterly earnings number became a distraction or worse for companies' managers and investors. Obviously it isn't known whether the new format would cut down on attempts to game the numbers, but companies would have to give a more detailed breakdown of what is going on.

The goal of the accounting-rule makers is to better reflect how businesses are actually run and divert attention from the one number. "I know the world likes single bottom-line numbers and all of that, but complicated businesses are hard to translate into just one number," says Robert Herz, chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the U.S. rule-making body that is one of several groups working on the changes.

At the same time, public companies today are more global than local, and as likely to be involved in services or lines of business that involve intellectual property such as software rather than the plants and equipment that defined the manufacturing age. "The income statement today looks a lot like it did when I started out in this profession," says William Parrett, the retiring CEO of accounting firm Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, who started as a junior accountant in 1967. "But the kind of information that goes into it is completely different."

Along the way, figures such as net income have become muddied. That is in part because more and more of the items used to calculate net profit are based on management estimates, such as the value of items that don't trade in active markets and the direction of interest rates. Also, over the years rule makers agreed to corporate demands to account for some things, such as day-to-day changes in the value of pension plans or financial instruments used to protect against changes in interest rates, in ways that keep them from causing swings in net income.

Rule makers hope reformatting financial statements will address some of these issues, while giving investors more information about what is happening in different parts of a business to better assess its value. The project is being managed jointly by the FASB in the U.S. and the London-based International Accounting Standards Board, and involves accounting bodies in Japan, other parts of Asia and individual European nations.

The entire process of adopting the revised approach could take a few years to play out, so much could yet change. Plus, once rule makers adopt the changes, they would have to be ratified by regulatory authorities, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission in the U.S. and the European Commission in Europe, before public companies would be required to follow them.

As a first step, rule makers expect later this year to publish a document outlining their preliminary views on what new form financial statements might take. But already they have given hints of what's in store. In March, the FASB provided draft, new financial statements at the end of a 32-page handout for members of an advisory group. (See an example.)

Although likely to change, this preview showed an income statement that has separate segments for the company's operating business, its financing activities, investing activities and tax payments. Each area has an income subtotal for that particular segment.

There is also a "total comprehensive income" category that is wider ranging than net profit as it is known today, and so wouldn't be directly comparable. That is because this total would likely include gains and losses now kept in other parts of the financial statements. These include some currency fluctuations and changes in the value of financial instruments used to hedge against other items.

Comprehensive income could also eventually include short-term changes in the value of corporate pension plans, which currently are smoothed out over a number of years. As a result, comprehensive income could be a lot more difficult to predict and could be volatile from quarter to quarter or year to year.

As for the balance sheet, the new version would group assets and liabilities together according to similar categories of operating, investing and financing activities, although it does provide a section for shareholders equity. Currently, a balance sheet is broken down between assets and liabilities, rather than by operating categories.

Such drastic change isn't likely to happen without a fight. Efforts to bring now-excluded figures into the income statement could prompt battles with companies that fear their profit will be subject to big swings. Companies may also balk at the expense involved.

"The cost of this change could be monumental," says Gary John Previts, an accounting professor at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland. "All the textbooks are going to have to change, every contract and every bank arrangement will have to change." Investors in Europe and Asia, meanwhile, have opposed the idea of dropping net profit as it appears today, David Tweedie, the IASB's chairman, said in an interview earlier this year.

Analysts in the London office of UBS AG recently published a report arguing this very point -- that even if net income is a "simplistic measure," that doesn't mean it isn't a valid "starting point in valuation" and that "its widespread use is justification enough for its retention."

Such opposition doesn't surprise many accounting experts. Net income is "the basis for bonuses and judgments about what a company's stock is worth," says Stephen A. Zeff, an accounting professor at Rice University. "I just don't know what the markets would do if companies stopped reporting a bottom line somewhere." In the U.S., professional investors and analysts have taken a more nuanced view, perhaps because the manipulation of numbers was more pronounced in U.S. markets.

That said, net profit has been around for some time. The income statement in use today, along with the balance sheet, generally dates to the 1940s when the SEC laid out regulations on financial disclosure. But many companies have included net profit in one form or another since the 1800s.

In its fourth annual report, General Electric Co. provided investors with a consolidated balance sheet and consolidated profit-and-loss account for the year ended Jan. 31, 1896. The company, whose board at the time included Thomas Edison, generated "profit of the year" -- what today would be called net income or net profit -- of $1,388,967.46.

For the moment, net profit will probably exist in some form, although its days are likely numbered. "We've decided in the interim to keep a net-income subtotal, but that's all up for discussion," the FASB's Mr. Herz says.

Bob Jensen's summary of accounting theory is at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm

 


Underlying Bases of Balance Sheet Valuation

Levels of "Value" of an Entire Company
General Theory Days Inns of America
(As Reported September 30, 1987)
Market Value of the Entire Block of Common Shares at Today's Price Per Share
(Ignoring Blockage Factors)
Not Available 
Day Inns of America
Was Privately Owned
Exit Value of Firm if Sold As a Firm
(Includes synergy factors and unbooked intangibles)
Not Available for
Days Inns of America
Sum of Exit Values of Booked Assets Minus Liabilities & Pref. Stock
(includes unbooked and unrealized gains and losses)
$194,812,000 
as Reported by Days Inns
Book Value of the Firm as Reported in Financial Statements  $87,356,000 as Reported
Book Value of the Firm as Reported in the Financial Statements  After General Price Level Adjustments Not Available for Days Inns

 

Analysts often examine the market to book ratios which is the green value above divided by the book value.  Usually the book value is not adjusted for general price levels in calculating this ratio, but there is not reason why it could not be PLA book value.  But the green value often widely misses the mark in measuring the value of the firm as a whole (the blue value above).  The green value is based upon marginal trades of the day that do not adjust for blockage factors (large purchases that give total ownership or effective ownership control of the company).  Usually it is impossible to know whether the green value above is higher or lower than the blue value.  In addition to the blockage factor, there is the huge problem that the stock market prices have transitory movements up and down due to changing moods of speculators that create short-term bubbles and bursts.  Buyers and sellers of an entire firm are looking at the long term and generally ignore transitory price fluctuations of daily trades of relatively small numbers of shares.  For example, daily transaction prices on 100,000 shares in a bubble or burst market are hardly indicative of the long term value of 100 million shares of a corporation.

Beginning in 1979, FAS 33 required large corporations to provide a supplementary schedule of condensed balance sheets and income statements comparing annual outcomes under three valuation bases --- Unadjusted Historical Cost, Price Level Adjusted (PLA) Historical Cost, and Current Cost Entry Value (adjusted for depreciation and amortization).  Companies complained heavily that users did not obtain value that justified the cost of implementing FAS 33.  Analysts complained that the FASB allowed such crude estimates that the FAS 33 schedules were virtually useless, especially the Current Cost estimates.  The FASB rescinded FAS 33 when it issued FAS 89 in 1986.  

FAS 33 had a significant impact on some companies.  For example the the earnings reported by United States Steel in the 1981 Annual Report as required under FAS 33 were as follows:

1981 United States Steel Income Before Extraordinary items and Changes in Acctg. Principles
Historical Cost (Non-PLA Adjusted) Historical Cost (PLA Adjusted) Market Value (Current Cost)
$1,077,000,000 Income $475,300,000 Income 
Plus $164,500,000 PLA gain due to decline in purchasing power of debt
$446,400,000 Income
Plus $164,500,000 PLA Gain

Less $168,000,000 Current cost increase less effect of increase in the general price level

Companies are no longer required to generate FAS 33-type comparisons.  The primary basis of accounting in the U.S. is unadjusted historical cost with numerous exceptions in particular instances.  For example, price-level adjustments may be required for for operations in hyperinflation nations.  Exit value accounting is required for firms deemed highly likely to become non-going concerns.  Exit value accounting is required for personal financial statements (whether an individual or a personal partnership such as two married people).  Economic (discounted cash flow) valuations are required for certain types of assets and liabilities such as pension liabilities.  

Hence in the United States and virtually every other nation, accounting standards do not require or even allow one single basis of accounting.  Beginning in January 2005, all nations in the Eurpean Union adopted the IASB's international standards that have moved closer and closer each year to the FASB/SEC standards of the United States.

New Fair Value Accounting Standards

From IAS Plus on August 28, 2006 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

At its meeting on 16 August 2006, the US Financial Accounting Standards Board authorised its staff to prepare a final draft of a Statement on Fair Value Measurements for vote by written ballot. The FASB plans to issue the Statement in September 2006. That Statement will form the basis of the next step of the IASB's project to develop fair value measurement guidance. The IASB plans to issue a discussion paper in the fourth quarter of 2006 that would:
 

  • indicate the IASB's preliminary views of the provisions of the FASB's Statement on Fair Value Measurements; and
  • identify differences between the FASB Statement and fair value measurement guidance in existing IFRSs.
The IASB will invite respondents to comment on the provisions of the FASB's statement on fair value measurements and on the IASB's preliminary views about FASB's Statement. Those comments would be considered in conjunction with the development of an IASB exposure draft on fair value measurements.

Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at various other links:

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes 

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms

Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation, and Yield Curves for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm

I recently completed the first draft of a paper on fair value at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
Comments would be helpful.

 

One of the major problems of using financial statements to value firms is that sometimes the unbooked assets and liabilities are much larger than some or all of the booked items.

SEC Staff Report on Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements, Special Purpose Entities, and Related Issues

From IAS Plus, February 16, 2006 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

The US Financial Accounting Standards Board has submitted its response to the SEC Staff Report on Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements, Special Purpose Entities, and Related Issues released by the US Securities and Exchange Commission in June 2005. The SEC report was prepared pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and was submitted to the President and several Congressional committees. The SEC staff report includes an analysis of the filings of issuers as well as an analysis of pertinent US generally accepted accounting principles and Commission disclosure rules. The report contains several recommendations for potentially sweeping changes in current accounting and reporting requirements for pensions, leases, financial instruments, and consolidation:

  • Pensions: The staff recommends the accounting guidance for defined-benefit pension plans and other post-retirement benefit plans be reconsidered. The trusts that administer these plans are currently exempt from consolidation by the issuers that sponsor them, effectively resulting in the netting of assets and liabilities in the balance sheet. In addition, issuers have the option to delay recognition of certain gains and losses related to the retirement obligations and the assets used to fund these obligations.

     

  • Leases: The staff recommends that the accounting guidance for leases be reconsidered. The current accounting for leases takes an 'all or nothing' approach to recognizing leases on the balance sheet. This results in a clustering of lease arrangements such that their terms approach, but do not cross, the 'bright lines' in the accounting guidance that would require a liability to be recognized. As a consequence, arrangements with similar economic outcomes are accounted for very differently.

     

  • Financial instruments: The staff recommends the continued exploration of the feasibility of reporting all financial instruments at fair value.

     

  • Consolidation: The staff recommends that the Financial Accounting Standards Board continue its work on the accounting guidance that determines whether an issuer would consolidate other entities – including SPEs – in which the issuer has an ownership or other interest.

     

  • Disclosures: The staff believes that, in general, certain disclosures in the filings of issuers could be better organized and integrated.
FASB's response discusses a number of "fundamental structural, institutional, cultural, and behavioral forces" that it believes cause complexity and impede transparent financial reporting. FASB provides an update on its activities and projects intended to address and improve outdated, overly complex accounting standards. These areas include accounting for leases; accounting for pensions and other post employment benefits; consolidation policies; accounting for financial instruments; accounting for intangible assets; and conceptual and disclosure frameworks. The FASB also identifies several other initiatives aimed at improving the understandability, consistency, and overall usability of existing accounting literature, through codification, by attempting to stem the proliferation of new pronouncements emanating from multiple sources, and by developing new standards in a 'principles-based' or 'objectives-oriented' approach. Click to download:

"FASB Responds to SEC Study," AccountingWeb, February 21, 2006 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=101801

AccountingWEB.com - Feb-21-2006 - The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) last week responded to the Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) Off Balance Sheet Report by identifying forces causing complexity and impeding financial transparency, as well as providing an update on the FASB’s activities intended to address complex accounting standards. The FASB also reaffirmed its commitment to improving the transparency and usefulness of financial reporting.

“The FASB remains fiercely committed to protecting the interests of investors and the capital markets by developing accounting standards that, if faithfully followed, provided relevant, reliable and useful financial information,” FASB Chariman Robert Herz said in a prepared statement. “Along these lines, we remain concerned about the root causes and the effects that complexity continues to have on our financial reporting system and believe that concerted and coordinated action by the SEC, the FASB, and the PCAOB, together with other parties in the financial reporting system, is critical.”

The FASB has named several areas as key for overcoming the challenges facing the financial reporting system including: accounting for leases; accounting for pensions and other post-employment benefits; consolidation policies; accounting for financial instruments; accounting for intangible assets; and conceptual and disclosure frameworks. Several initiatives have been undertaken to help improve understandability, consistency, and overall usability of existing accounting literature, through codification and by attempting to limit the proliferation of pronouncements from multiple sources and by developing new standards using a principles-based or objectives-oriented approach.

The FASB Response to SEC Study on Arrangements with Off-Balance Sheet Implications, Special Purpose Entities, and Transparency of Filings by Issuers provides comments on issues and recommendations included in the Report and Recommendations Pursuant to Section 401(c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on Arrangements with Off-Balance Sheet Implications, Special Purpose Entities, and Transparency of Filings by Issuers submitted in June 2005 by the staff of the SEC to the President of the United States, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs and the Committee of Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives.

Bob Jensen's threads on special purpose (variable interest) entities are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm

How a firm reports an asset or liability in a balance sheet typically is rooted in one of the following valuation concepts. GAAP in the United States is historical cost by default, but there are countless instances where departures from historical cost are either allowed or required under certain standards in certain circumstances.

The Cost Approach for Financial Reporting
From IASPlus on November 21, 2006 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

The International Valuation Standards Committee has published Proposed Revisions to International Valuation Guidance Note 8 – The Cost Approach for Financial Reporting {PDF 193k). The proposed revisions are the result of requests for clarification and suggestions of minor improvements to the 2005 version of GN8. Comment deadline is 31 December 2006. The IVSC has also released an update of its work programme:

Historical Cost Accounting: Unadjusted for General Price-Level Changes

Advantages of Historical Cost

Nobody I know holds the mathematical wonderment of double entry and historical cost accounting more in awe than Yuji Ijiri. For example, see Theory of Accounting Measurement, by Yuji Ijiri (Sarasota: American Accounting Association Studies in Accounting Research No. 10, 1975) --- http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aaa/market/studar.htm 

Disadvantages of Historical Cost

Example 1:  Accounting for a Website

August 7, 2006 message from Ganesh M. Pandit, DBA, CPA, CMA [profgmp@hotmail.com]

Hi Bob,

How would you answer this question from a student: "I wonder if a company's Web site is considered a long-lived asset!"

Ganesh M. Pandit
Adelphi University

August 9, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Ganesh,

Accounting for Website investment is a classic example of the issue of "matching" versus "value" accounting. From an income statement perspective, matching requires the matching of current revenues with the expenses of generating that revenue, including the "using up" of fixed asset investments. But we don't depreciate investment in the site value of land because land site value, unlike a building, is not used up due to usage in generating revenue. Like land site value, a Website's "value" probably increases in value over time. One might argue that a Website should not be expensed since a successful Website, like land, is not used up when generating revenue. However, Websites do require maintenance fees and improvement outlays over time which makes it somewhat different than the site investment in land that requires no such added outlays other than property taxes that are expensed each year.

I don't think current accounting rules for Websites are appropriate in theory --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm#Issue08

It seems to me that you can partition your Website development and improvement outlays into various types of assets and expenses. For example, computers used in development and maintenance of the Website are accounted for like other computers. Software is accounted for under software amortization accounting rules. Purchased goodwill is accounted for like purchased goodwill under new impairment test rules. Labor costs for Website maintenance versus improvements are more problematic.

Leased Website items are treated like leases, although there are some complications if a Website is leased entirely. For example, such a leased Website is not "used up" like airplanes that are typically contracted as operating leases. Leased Website space may be appropriately accounted for as an operating lease. But leasing an entire Website is more like the capital lease of a land in that the asset does not get "used up." My hunch is that most firms ignore this controversy and treat Website leases as operating leases. It is pretty easy to bury custom development costs into the "rental fee" for leased Website server space, thereby burying the development costs and deferring them over the contracted server space rental period. It would seem to me that rental fees for Websites that are strictly used for advertising are written off as advertising expenses. Of course many Websites are used for much more than advertising.

Firms are taking rather rapid write-offs of purchased Websites such as write-offs over three years. I'm not certain I agree with this, but firms are "depreciating" these for tax purposes and you can see them in filed SEC financial statements such as the one at Briton International (under the Depreciation heading) ---
http://sec.edgar-online.com/2006/01/27/0001127855-06-000047/Section27.asp

It is more common in annual reports to see the term Website Amortization instead of Website Depreciation. A few sites amortize on the basis of Website traffic --- http://www.nexusenergy.com/presentation6.aspx
This makes no sense to me since traffic does not use up a Website over time.

Bob Jensen

  • October 5, 2006 reply from Scott Bonacker [cpas-l@BONACKER.US]

    I can't think of anyone that would be more knowledgeable than David Hardesty, at http://davidhardesty.com/ 

    His book, published by CCH, is excellent.

    Hope this helps ....

    Scott Bonacker, CPA
    Springfield, Missouri

  • Bob Jensen's threads on e-Commerce and e-Business revenue accounting controversies are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm

    Example 2 --- Proposition 87 VAT Tax

    An interesting accounting problem (or employment opportunity?) posed by Proposition 87 on the State of California November 7 ballot in 2006

    Proposition 87 would tax every barrel of oil pumped from an in-state well . . .But just to make sure, the proposition would fund investigations of oil companies that try to "pass on" the tax increase in the price. Severin Borenstein, director of University of California Energy Institute at UC Berkeley, points out that this would lead to "constant investigation that will yield no more than what past investigations (on why gasoline prices spike) have yielded, or even less." The oil tax revenues would go to fund "alternative energy." That approach didn't work for former President Carter, is not working for President Bush, and won't work in California. Government funding, by definition, is not subject to a market test. "Alternate energy" will make sense only when its cost is less than the cost of using oil. The market will handle this problem as it did over a century ago by replacing the depleting whale-oil supply with petroleum. Amazingly, over $40 million of the $45.6 million contributed to the campaign for the tax comes from one man, Hollywood big shot Stephen Bing.
    David Henderson, "'Sinful and Tyrannical'," The Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2006; Page A7 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116078251442292601.html?mod=todays_us_opinion

    Jensen Comment
    Proposition 87 is like (well not entirely) a VAT tax. Although I'm not against value added taxes (VAT), VAT taxes have been fought tooth and nail in U.S. politics (unlike in Europe). Apart from the VAT economic debates that are well known, Proposition 87 raises interesting accounting issues because it in effect introduces cost-plus pricing controls where fuel prices in California would now be in a sense regulated by California officials. Fuel companies in essence must justify prices with a full analysis of costs to verify that the $50 per barrel tax is not being passed on at the pump. In contrast, most VAT taxes are typically passed on to consumers in other nations (I think)

    Proposition 87 runs four square into the enormous and famous joint costing problem that has generally never been solved by accountants. Joint costs are always allocated arbitrarily unless laws govern (arbitrarily) such allocations. Given the complexity of oil refining joint costs, it would seem that unscrupulous oil refiners could devise ways of burying this new tax (in fuel prices) in such a manner that it is impossible for state auditors to detect. In practice, I think it is absurd to think that any type of corporate taxes cannot be factored into product and service prices unless prices themselves are to be regulated by the state. Price regulations themselves generally become either a joke (if industry controls the regulators) or a disaster (if regulators as central planners ignore the laws of supply and demand).

    Presumably California will not object to this Proposition 87 VAT tax being passed along to out-of-state customers of oil refiners. It would be difficult to pass along the tax if out-of-state customers had open access to world markets. However, some Nevada and Oregon fueling stations may not have any efficient source, at least in the short-run, of 92-octane gasoline other than from California refiners.

    Proposition 87 might then be viewed as a tax on surrounding states if 100% of the Proposition 87 VAT tax can be passed on to states surrounding California. Sounds like a good deal for California if those other states are willing to be taxed for California schools. Nevada may in fact punch a whole in the new immigration wall large enough for a gasoline pipe into Mexico.

    In any case, Proposition 87 might be better termed California's Cost Accountant Employment Relief Act.
    It would seem to be a whole lot easier to simply raise the corporate income tax, which of course is what California voters are being asked to do in another proposition, Proposition 89. It is totally naive to think that business taxes of any kind will not be passed along to customers in one way or another. You can fool some of the people some of the time, but not all the people all of the time (didn't someone else think of that line first?).

    As an aside, there is also Proposition 88 that will impose a $50 flat tax on every parcel of land, which of course is a tax that will be easily raised in future years. This in reality is a state-wide property tax that will grow and grow in spite of an older Proposition 13 assurance that property taxes cannot grow and grow for long-time home owners. What happens in California when new ballot propositions clash with older ballot propositions already voted in by the public?

     


    Historical Cost Accounting: Price-Level Adjusted (PLA) Historical Cost Accounting

    The primary basis of accounting in the U.S. is unadjusted historical cost with numerous exceptions in particular instances. For example, price-level adjustments may be required for operations in hyperinflation nations. The international IASB standards require PLA accounting in hyperinflation nations.

    The SEC issued ASR 190 requiring PLA supplemental reports. This was followed by the FASB's 1979 FAS 33 short-lived standard. Follow-up studies did not point to investor enthusiasm over such supplemental reports. Eventually, both ASR 190 and FAS 33 were rescinded, largely from lack of interest on the part of financial analysts and investors due to relatively low inflation rates in the United States. However, PLA adjustments are still required for operations in nations subject to high rates of inflation.

    Advantages of PLA Accounting

    Disadvantages of PLA Accounting

    Market Value Accounting: Entry Value (Current Cost, Replacement Cost) Accounting

    Beginning in 1979, FAS 33 required large corporations to provide a supplementary schedule of condensed balance sheets and income statements comparing annual outcomes under three valuation bases --- Unadjusted Historical Cost, Price Level Adjusted (PLA) Historical Cost, and Current Cost Entry Value (adjusted for depreciation and amortization). Companies complained heavily that users did not obtain value that justified the cost of implementing FAS 33. Analysts complained that the FASB allowed such crude estimates that the FAS 33 schedules were virtually useless, especially the Current Cost estimates. The FASB rescinded FAS 33 when it issued FAS 89 in 1986.

    Current cost accounting by whatever name (e.g., current or replacement cost) entails the historical cost of balance sheet items with current (replacement) costs. Depreciation rates can be re-set based upon current costs rather than historical costs. 

    Beginning in 1979, FAS 33 required large corporations to provide a supplementary schedule of condensed balance sheets and income statements comparing annual outcomes under three valuation bases --- Unadjusted Historical Cost, PLA-Adjusted historical cost, and Current Cost Entry Value (adjusted for depreciation and amortization). Companies are no longer required to generate FAS 33-type comparisons. The primary basis of accounting in the U.S. is unadjusted historical cost with numerous exceptions in particular instances. For example, price-level adjustments may be required for operations in hyperinflation nations. Exit value accounting is required for firms deemed highly likely to become non-going concerns. Exit value accounting is required for personal financial statements (whether an individual or a personal partnership such as two married people). Economic (discounted cash flow) valuations are required for certain types of assets and liabilities such as pension liabilities. Hence in the United States and virtually every other nation, accounting standards do not require or even allow one single basis of accounting. Beginning in January 2005, all nations in the Eurpean Union adopted the IASB's international standards that have moved closer and closer each year to the FASB/SEC standards of the United States.

    Advantages of Entry Value (Current Cost, Replacement Cost) Accounting

    Disadvantages of Entry Value (Current Cost, Replacement Cost) Accounting

    Market Value Accounting: Exit Value (Liquidation, Fair Value) Accounting

    Whereas entry value is what it will cost to replace an item, exit value is the value of disposing of the item. It can even be negative in some instances where costs of clean up and disposal make to exit price negative. Exit value accounting is required under GAAP for personal financial statements (individuals and married couples) and companies that are deemed likely to become non-going concerns. See "Personal Financial Statements," by Anthony Mancuso, The CPA Journal, September 1992 --- http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/old/13606731.htm 

    Some theorists advocate exit value accounting for going concerns as well as non-going concerns. Both nationally (particularly under FAS 115 and FAS 133) and internationally (under IAS 32 and 39 for), exit value accounting is presently required in some instances for financial instrument assets and liabilities. Both the FASB and the IASB have exposure drafts advocating fair value accounting for all financial instruments.

    FASB's Exposure Draft for Fair Value Adjustments to all Financial Instruments
    On December 14, 1999 the FASB issued Exposure Draft 204-B entitled Reporting Financial Instruments and Certain Related Assets and Liabilities at Fair Value.

    If an item is viewed as a financial instrument rather than inventory, the accounting becomes more complicated under FAS 115. Traders in financial instruments adjust such instruments to fair value with all changes in value passing through current earnings. Business firms who are not deemed to be traders must designate the instrument as either available-for-sale (AFS) or hold-to-maturity (HTM). A HTM instrument is maintained at original cost. An AFS financial instrument must be marked-to-market, but the changes in value pass through OCI rather than current earnings until the instrument is actually sold or otherwise expires.  Under international standards, the IASB requires fair value adjustments for most financial instruments. This has led to strong reaction from businesses around the world, especially banks. There are now two major working group debates. In 1999 the Joint Working Group of the Banking Associations sharply rebuffed the IAS 39 fair value accounting in two white papers that can be downloaded from http://www.iasc.org.uk/frame/cen3_112.htm.

    ·         Financial Instruments: Issues Relating to Banks (strongly argues for required fair value adjustments of financial instruments). The issue date is August 31, 1999.

    ·         Accounting for financial Instruments for Banks (concludes that a modified form of historical cost is optimal for bank accounting). The issue date is October 4, 1999.

    Advantages of Exit Value (Liquidation, Fair Value) Accounting

    Exit value reporting is not deemed desirable or practical for going concern businesses for a number of reasons that I will not go into in great depth here.

    Disadvantages of Exit Value (Liquidation, Fair Value) Accounting

    ·     Operating assets are bought to use rather than sell. For example, as long as no consideration is being given to selling or abandoning a manufacturing plant, recording the fluctuating values of the land and buildings creates a misleading fluctuation in earnings and balance sheet volatility. Who cares if the value of the land went up by $1 million in 1994 and down by $2 million in 1998 if the plant that sits on the land has been in operation for 60 years and no consideration is being given to leaving this plant?

    ·     Some assets like software, knowledge databases, and Web servers for e-Commerce cost millions of dollars to develop for the benefit of future revenue growth and future expense savings. These assets may have immense value if the entire firm is sold, but they may have no market as unbundled assets. In fact it may be impossible to unbundle such assets from the firm as a whole. Examples include the Enterprise Planning Model SAP system in firms such as Union Carbide. These systems costing millions of dollars have no exit value in the context of exit value accounting even though they are designed to benefit the companies for many years into the future.

    ·     Exit value accounting records anticipated profits well in advance of transactions. For example, a large home building company with 200 completed houses in inventory would record the profits of these homes long before the company even had any buyers for those homes. Even though exit value accounting is billed as a conservative approach, there are instances where it is far from conservative.

    ·     Value of a subsystem of items differs from the sum of the value of its parts. Investors may be lulled into thinking that the sum of all subsystem net assets valued at liquidation prices is the value of the system of these net assets. Values may differ depending upon how the subsystems are diced and sliced in a sale.

    ·     Appraisals of exit values are both to expensive to obtain for each accounting report date and are highly subjective and subject to enormous variations of opinion. The U.S. Savings and Loan scandals of the 1980s demonstrated how reliance upon appraisals is an invitation for massive frauds. Experiments by some, mostly real estate companies, to use exit value-based accounting died on the vine, including well-known attempts decades ago by TRC, Rouse, and Days Inn.

    ·     Exit values are affected by how something is sold. If quick cash is needed, the best price may only be half of what the price can be by waiting for the right time and the right buyer.

    ·     Financial contracts that for one reason or another are deemed as to be "held-to-maturity" items may cause misleading increases and decreases in reported values that will never be realized.  A good example is the market value of a fixed-rate bond that may go up and down with interest rates but will always pay its face value at maturity no matter what happens to interest rates.

    ·         Exit value markets are often thin and inefficient markets.

    Economic Value (Discounted Cash Flow, Present Value) Accounting

    There are over 100 instances where present GAAP requires that historical cost accounting be abandoned in favor of discounted cash flow accounting (e.g., when valuing pension liabilities and computing fair values of derivative financial instruments). These apply in situations where future cash inflows and outflows can be reliably estimated and are attributable to the particular asset or liability being valued on a discounted cash flow basis.

    Advantages of Economic Value (Discounted Cash Flow, Present Value) Accounting

    Disadvantages of Economic Value (Discounted Cash Flow, Present Value) Accounting

     




     

     

    Theory Disputes Focus Mainly on the Tip of the Iceberg
    (Intangibles and Other Assets and Liabilities Beneath the Surface)

    The big stuff lies below the surface where it is powerful and invisible.

    Pictures Source:  http://www.geocities.com/Yosemite/Rapids/4233/more.htm 

    What is important to ship navigators is the giant mass that lies below the icebergs.  If we make an analogy that the financial statements contain only what appears above the surface, over 99% of the accounting theory disputes have centered on the top of the icebergs.  We endlessly debate how to value what is seen above the surface and provide investors virtually nothing about the really big stuff beneath the surface.

    For example, what difference does it make how Microsoft Corporation values its tangible assets if 98% of its value lies in intangible assets such as intellectual property, human resources, market share, and other items of value that accountants do not know how to value?  One can argue that the difference between the capitalized value of Microsoft's outstanding shares and the reported value of Shareholders' Equity is mostly due to intangibles that accountants have no idea how to detect and value.  If the goal of accounting is to help investors value a company, it is backwards to value intangibles from market prices.  Our job is to help investors set those prices.


    Question
    Accountants talk a lot about "intangibles" and accountant inability to usefully measure intangibles of companies. Economists also talk about intangibles and economist inability build successful models incorporating intangibles and externalities that give rise to troublesome omitted variables and non-convexities in mathematical optimization.

    What is the World Bank's definition that gives rise to a claim that "the average American has access to over $418,000 in intangible wealth, while the stay-at-home Mexican's intangible wealth is just $34,000?"

    "The Secrets of Intangible Wealth:  For once the World Bank says something smart about the real causes of prosperity," by Ronald Bailey, Reason Magazine, October 5, 2007 --- http://www.reason.com/news/show/122854.html

    A Mexican migrant to the U.S. is five times more productive than one who stays home. Why is that?

    The answer is not the obvious one: This country has more machinery or tools or natural resources. Instead, according to some remarkable but largely ignored research—by the World Bank, of all places—it is because the average American has access to over $418,000 in intangible wealth, while the stay-at-home Mexican's intangible wealth is just $34,000.

    But what is intangible wealth, and how on earth is it measured? And what does it mean for the world's people—poor and rich? That's where the story gets even more interesting.

    Two years ago the World Bank's environmental economics department set out to assess the relative contributions of various kinds of capital to economic development. Its study, "Where is the Wealth of Nations?: Measuring Capital for the 21st Century," began by defining natural capital as the sum of nonrenewable resources (including oil, natural gas, coal and mineral resources), cropland, pasture land, forested areas and protected areas. Produced, or built, capital is what many of us think of when we think of capital: the sum of machinery, equipment, and structures (including infrastructure) and urban land.

    But once the value of all these are added up, the economists found something big was still missing: the vast majority of world's wealth! If one simply adds up the current value of a country's natural resources and produced, or built, capital, there's no way that can account for that country's level of income.

    The rest is the result of "intangible" factors—such as the trust among people in a society, an efficient judicial system, clear property rights and effective government. All this intangible capital also boosts the productivity of labor and results in higher total wealth. In fact, the World Bank finds, "Human capital and the value of institutions (as measured by rule of law) constitute the largest share of wealth in virtually all countries."

    Once one takes into account all of the world's natural resources and produced capital, 80% of the wealth of rich countries and 60% of the wealth of poor countries is of this intangible type. The bottom line: "Rich countries are largely rich because of the skills of their populations and the quality of the institutions supporting economic activity."

    What the World Bank economists have brilliantly done is quantify the intangible value of education and social institutions. According to their regression analyses, for example, the rule of law explains 57 percent of countries' intangible capital. Education accounts for 36 percent.

    The rule-of-law index was devised using several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 25 separate data sources constructed by 18 different organizations. The latter include civil society groups (Freedom House), political and business risk-rating agencies (Economist Intelligence Unit) and think tanks (International Budget Project Open Budget Index).

    Switzerland scores 99.5 out of 100 on the rule-of-law index and the U.S. hits 91.8. By contrast, Nigeria's score is a pitiful 5.8; Burundi's 4.3; and Ethiopia's 16.4. The members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development—30 wealthy developed countries—have an average score of 90, while sub-Saharan Africa's is a dismal 28.

    The natural wealth in rich countries like the U.S. is a tiny proportion of their overall wealth—typically 1 percent to 3 percent—yet they derive more value from what they have. Cropland, pastures and forests are more valuable in rich countries because they can be combined with other capital like machinery and strong property rights to produce more value. Machinery, buildings, roads and so forth account for 17% of the rich countries' total wealth.

    Overall, the average per capita wealth in the rich Organization for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD) countries is $440,000, consisting of $10,000 in natural capital, $76,000 in produced capital, and a whopping $354,000 in intangible capital. (Switzerland has the highest per capita wealth, at $648,000. The U.S. is fourth at $513,000.)

    By comparison, the World Bank study finds that total wealth for the low income countries averages $7,216 per person. That consists of $2,075 in natural capital, $1,150 in produced capital and $3,991 in intangible capital. The countries with the lowest per capita wealth are Ethiopia ($1,965), Nigeria ($2,748), and Burundi ($2,859).

    In fact, some countries are so badly run, that they actually have negative intangible capital. Through rampant corruption and failing school systems, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are destroying their intangible capital and ensuring that their people will be poorer in the future.

    In the U.S., according to the World Bank study, natural capital is $15,000 per person, produced capital is $80,000 and intangible capital is $418,000. And thus, considering common measure used to compare countries, its annual purchasing power parity GDP per capita is $43,800. By contrast, oil-rich Mexico's total natural capital per person is $8,500 ($6,000 due to oil), produced capital is $19,000 and intangible capita is $34,500—a total of $62,000 per person. Yet its GDP per capita is $10,700. When a Mexican, or for that matter, a South Asian or African, walks across our border, they gain immediate access to intangible capital worth $418,000 per person. Who wouldn't walk across the border in such circumstances?

    The World Bank study bolsters the deep insights of the late development economist Peter Bauer. In his brilliant 1972 book Dissent on Development, Bauer wrote: "If all conditions for development other than capital are present, capital will soon be generated locally or will be available . . . from abroad. . . . If, however, the conditions for development are not present, then aid . . . will be necessarily unproductive and therefore ineffective. Thus, if the mainsprings of development are present, material progress will occur even without foreign aid. If they are absent, it will not occur even with aid."

    The World Bank's pathbreaking "Where is the Wealth of Nations?" convincingly demonstrates that the "mainsprings of development" are the rule of law and a good school system. The big question that its researchers don't answer is: How can the people of the developing world rid themselves of the kleptocrats who loot their countries and keep them poor
    ?

    Ronald Bailey is Reason's science correspondent. His most recent book, Liberation Biology: The Scientific and Moral Case for the Biotech Revolution, is available from Prometheus Books.

    Bob Jensen's threads on intangibles from the standpoint of accounting theory and practice are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes

    Intangibles --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intangibles

    Externalities --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Externalities

    Trivia Question
    The fact that open source and free Office Software is getting closer and closer to quality of MS Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, etc.) software is still not really threatening Microsoft's worldwide monopoly for its relatively expensive MS Office software. What is the main intangible that gives MS Office products such value in world markets?

    Jensen's Opinion
    I think the main intangible here is the cost of retraining over 90% of the computer users of the world. Related to this is the difficulty students and "white-collar workers" will encounter if they do not know how to use MS Office software when seeking employment. Whereas most of drivers can drive rental cars of most any manufacturer,  computer users who cannot "drive" Excel, Word, PowerPoint, etc. face tremendous barriers that give rise to the main intangible asset of Microsoft Corporation. Organizations spent billions in training that gave rise to billions in intangible assets of Microsoft.

     


    A Sad Time for Corporate Reputations

    "Question for Corporate America: Does Your Reputation Fall into the Liabilities Column on Your Balance Sheet?" PR Web, June 19, 2006 --- http://www.prweb.com/releases/2006/6/prweb399939.htm

    In a survey conducted among 2,000 participants at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum, more CEOs said that corporate reputation, not profitability, was their most important measure of success. Fortune Magazine calculates that a one-point change on its scale used to rank its most admired companies translates to a difference of $107 million to a company’s market value.

    Lord Levene, Chairman of Lloyd’s of London, reported in a 2005 speech at the Philadelphia Club that loss of reputation is now viewed as the second most serious threat to an organization’s viability. (Business interruption is the first.)An Economist Intelligence Unit survey ranked reputational risk as the greatest potential threat to an organization's value. More than 30% of participating CEOs said that reputational risk represents the greatest potential threat to their company's market value. Of this same group of CEOs only 11% said that they had taken any action against the threat.

    If these data are not sufficient to jolt companies into action, there is enough compelling data linking corporate reputation to corporate performance that should. Fortune Magazine, which has been publishing the results of its "America’s Most Admired Companies" survey for 20 years, calculates that a change of 1 point on its scale, either positively or negatively, affects a company's market value by an average of $107 million. The results of another study published in 2003 in Management Today, Britain's leading monthly business magazine, demonstrate a clear correlation between corporate reputation and equity return. Using existing data from Fortune’s surveys to construct portfolios of the most and least admired companies, the authors found that for the five years following Fortune’s publication of the results, the portfolios of the most admired companies had cumulative returns of 126% while those of the least admired had cumulative returns of 80%.

    "While executives may choose to spend time analyzing these data and poking holes in research methodologies in order to dismiss reputation as a strategic priority," says Wallace, "the effort would simply provide another diversion from addressing the problem head-on. The fact that corporate America's sullied reputation has lead to such dramatic legislative change in the form of the Sarbannes-Oxley Act, and that it has become routine front-page news, is as telling as any data. No company wants bad press, but it may finally be what convinces American business that, left unmanaged, a company’s reputation can become a terminal liability."

    Continued in article

    Bob Jensen's threads on proposed reforms are at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudProposedReforms.htm
     


    Say what?
    Why bother entering into contracts that are not enforceable?
    Do unenforceable contracts create emerging problems in accounting theory and in practice?
    "The Best Way to Construct Unenforceable Contracts," by Erica Plambeck, Stanford Graduate School of Business Newsletter, April 2007 --- http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/mfg_plambeck_contracts.shtml

    Strong relationships are frequently more important than legally binding contracts when companies outsource key operational activities.

    Researchers say that as more firms form international relationships—particularly in innovation-intensive industries such as biopharmaceuticals or high tech—ironclad legal agreements can be impractical, if not impossible. Overburdened court systems around the world and the growing complexity of the types of collaborative deals being forged mean that increasingly firms rely on the threat of loss of future business rather than the court system to enforce those deals.

    “When an innovative product is under development and a supplier must invest in capacity up front, it can be difficult—if not impossible—to write a court-enforceable contract that specifies exactly what will be delivered,” says Erica Plambeck, associate professor of operations, information, and technology at the Stanford Graduate School of Business.

    For example, she says, electronics giant Toshiba is continually making design changes, frequently substantial ones, throughout the development process. If Toshiba’s suppliers delayed making capacity investment for manufacturing a new product until the design was finalized and a court-enforceable procurement contract could be negotiated, Toshiba would miss the small windows of opportunity that the consumer electronics market allows for releasing state-of-the-art products. Therefore, Toshiba needs suppliers to build capacity early, without a contract. In a one-off transaction, a supplier would be likely to build far too little capacity, anticipating that Toshiba would attempt to negotiate a low price for production once the capacity investment was made. But within the context of an ongoing, cooperative relationship, Toshiba could offer more generous compensation, and convince the supplier to expand its capacity—and both firms’ profits—even without a contract.

    Alternatively, she says, there are cases where assurances about the quality or quantity of output cannot be legally enforceable. “Frequently, producing a viable product depends on the collaborative efforts of both parties, and it’s difficult to determine fault if something goes wrong,” she says. A case in point: A biopharmaceutical firm could hand over genetically modified cells and the liquid medium in which to multiply them to a supplier, who then would be responsible for managing that fermentation process to produce a therapeutic protein. If the protein yield is unexpectedly low, a court would have difficulty determining whether the cells and medium were of poor quality or the supplier made mistakes in managing the fermentation process.

    “This kind of complicated business arrangement can be difficult to specify in a contract in a manner that a court could enforce,” says Plambeck. “Under such conditions, an ongoing relationship between partners is critical to cooperation.”

    Plambeck has written a series of papers on so-called relational contracts—agreements enforced by the value of the ongoing cooperative relationship—research she has conducted with Terry Taylor, an associate professor in the business school at Columbia University. Plambeck became interested in relational contracts after realizing that there was an almost universal assumption in the operations and supply chain management literature that all contracts were court-enforced.

    “By recognizing that the strength of incentives for investment in design, capacity, and inventory are limited by the value of the future business, one obtains qualitatively different managerial insights and policies for operations and supply chain management,” she says. There is a rich body of economics research in this area—indeed, it was a Stanford economics professor, Robert Gibbons (now at MIT) who coined the phrase “relational contracts.” Plambeck and Taylor build on this existing work by taking the abstract idea of relational contracts and applying it to dynamic problems of collaborative product development, capacity, production, and inventory management.

    Plambeck has some high-level recommendations for managers.

    Continued in article


    Accounting Theory:  The Vexing Problem of Contingent Liabilities and Environmental Risk

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on November 2, 2007

    BP Settles Charges, Submits to Watchdogs
    by Ann Davis, Amir Efrati, Matthew Dalton and Guy Chazan
    The Wall Street Journal

    Oct 26, 2007
    Page: A3
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119332810057671536.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
     

    TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Contingent Liabilities, Environmental Cleanup Costs

    SUMMARY: "[British Petroleum] BP PLC put a host of legal threats behind it with far-reaching federal settlements yesterday [10/24/2007] and $373 million in fines and restitution...The British energy firm agreed to plead guilty to environmental crimes and agreed to a three-year probation connected to a fatal accident in Texas and an oil spill in Alaska." The article describes the expected impact on BP PLC's operations; the questions in this review focus on the company's Form 20-F contingent liability disclosures, including environmental and other contingent liabilities.

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Environmental liabilities and other contingencies are discussed in this article.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) The article states that BP PLC (British Petroleum) "put a host of legal threats behind it" through a settlement with U.S. government authorities and fines. Summarize the legal issues facing the company and the settlement that was reached.

    2.) In general, where can you find information about the likely financial impact of legal and environmental issues facing any company? Describe the authoritative literature requiring disclosure of this information.

    3.) BP PLC uses the term "provisions" in their corporate balance sheet, rather than "contingent liabilities." What is the meaning of the term "provisions"?

    4.) Specifically investigate the extent of the legal and environmental issues facing BP PLC by examining their annual report filed on Form 20-F with the Securities and Exchange Commission, available at: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/313807/000115697307000346/b848881-20f.htm#p85 
    How extensive are the liabilities associated with these issues, as measured on December 31, 2006?

    5.) Examine footnote 40 to further investigate these liabilities. What are the 3 major categories of provisions for estimated liabilities recorded by BP PLC? How do they estimate the amounts recorded for these liabilities?

    6.) Which category of provisions do you think will be impacted by the settlement, based on the disclosures in the December 31, 2006, year end financial statements and the description of the settlement in the article?
     

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
     

     


    FINANCIAL REPORTING: MORE SCIENCE, LESS ART
    Governments and investors alike now demand more financial transparency from public companies. And, given the impressive evolution of technology and business practices, there is no excuse for reporting that is anything but spot-on. Intangible factors that are not taken into account when following U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (G.A.A.P.) -- such as brand value, intellectual capital, growth expectations and forecasts, and corporate citizenship -- are now being recognized as important drivers of shareholder value. A new white paper from Accenture explores "Enhanced Business Reporting" as a means for businesses to gain and communicate a clearer picture of company goals and performance.
    Frank D'Andrea, "FINANCIAL REPORTING: MORE SCIENCE, LESS ART," Double Entries, September 21, 2005 --- http://accountingeducation.com/news/news6481.html

    The Accenture report is at http://www.accenture.com/xdoc/en/ideas/outlook/6_2005/pdf/share_value.pdf


    Gore and Blood
    We see a lot of snide remarks and jokes about Al Gore the conservative media, and he (like his counterpart George W. Bush) has made some rather dumb remarks in highly boring speeches. But when teamed up with the former head of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, Gore and Blood (not the best of last name combinations) produced a rather good, albeit short, article about some severe accounting limitations.

    I commend The Wall Street Journal for carrying this piece which I would normally expect to appear in the more liberal media.

    "For People and Planet:  When will companies start accounting for environmental costs?" by Al gore and David Blood, The Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2006 --- http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110008151 

    Capitalism and sustainability are deeply and increasingly interrelated. After all, our economic activity is based on the use of natural and human resources. Not until we more broadly "price in" the external costs of investment decisions across all sectors will we have a sustainable economy and society.

    The industrial revolution brought enormous prosperity, but it also introduced unsustainable business practices. Our current system for accounting was principally established in the 1930s by Lord Keynes and the creation of "national accounts" (the backbone of today's gross domestic product). While this system was precise in its ability to account for capital goods, it was imprecise in its ability to account for natural and human resources because it assumed them to be limitless. This, in part, explains why our current model of economic development is hard-wired to externalize as many costs as possible.

    Externalities are costs created by industry but paid for by society. For example, pollution is an externality which is sometimes taxed by government in order to make the entity responsible "internalize" the full costs of production. Over the past century, companies have been rewarded financially for maximizing externalities in order to minimize costs.

    Today, the global context for business is clearly changing. "Capitalism is at a crossroads," says Stuart Hart, professor of management at Cornell University. We agree, and we think the financial markets have a significant opportunity to chart the way forward. In fact, we believe that sustainable development will be the primary driver of industrial and economic change over the next 50 years. The interests of shareholders, over time, will be best served by companies that maximize their financial performance by strategically managing their economic, social, environmental and ethical performance. This is increasingly true as we confront the limits of our ecological system to hold up under current patterns of use. "License to operate" can no longer be taken for granted by business as challenges such as climate change, HIV/AIDS, water scarcity and poverty have reached a point where civil society is demanding a response from business and government. The "polluter pays" principle is just one example of how companies can be held accountable for the full costs of doing business. Now, more than ever, factors beyond the scope of Keynes's national accounts are directly affecting a company's ability to generate revenues, manage risks, and sustain competitive advantage. There are many examples of the growing acceptance of this view.

    In the corporate sector, companies like General Electric are designing products to enable their clients to compete in a carbon-constrained world. Novo Nordisk is taking a holistic view of combating diabetes not only through treatment but also through prevention. And Whole Foods and others are addressing the demand for quality food by sourcing local and organic produce. Importantly, the business response is about making money for shareholders, not altruism.

    In the nongovernmental sector, organizations such as World Resources Institute, Transparency International, the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (Ceres) and AccountAbility are helping companies explore how best to align corporate responsibility with business strategy.

    Over the past five years we have seen markets begin to incorporate the external cost of carbon dioxide emissions. This is happening through pricing mechanisms (price per ton of carbon dioxide) and government-supported trading platforms such as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme in Europe. Even without a regulatory framework in the U.S., voluntary markets are emerging, such as the Chicago Climate Exchange and state-level initiatives such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. These market mechanisms increasingly enable companies to calculate project returns and capital expenditures decisions with the price of carbon dioxide fully integrated.

    The investment community has also started to respond. For example, the Enhanced Analytics Initiative, an international collaboration between asset owners and managers, encourages investment research that considers the impact of extrafinancial issues on long-term company performance. The Equator Principles, designed to help financial institutions manage environmental and social risk in project financing, have now been adopted by 40 banks, which arrange over 75% of the world's project loans. In addition, the rise in shareholder activism and the growing debate on fiduciary responsibility, governance legislation and reporting requirements (such as the Global Reporting Initiative and the EU Business Review) indicate the mainstream incorporation of sustainability concerns. While we are seeing evidence of leading public companies adopting sustainable business practices in developed markets, there is still a long way to go to make sustainability fully integrated and therefore truly mainstream. A short-term focus still pervades both corporate and investment communities, which hinders long-term value creation.

    As some have said, "We are operating the Earth like it's a business in liquidation." More mechanisms to incorporate environmental and social externalities will be needed to enable capital markets to achieve their intended purpose--to consistently allocate capital to its highest and best use for the good of the people and the planet.

    Mr. Gore, a former vice president of the United States, is chairman of Generation Investment Management. Mr. Blood, formerly head of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, is managing partner of Generation Investment Management, which he co-founded with Mr. Gore.

    "Kyoto? No Go. How to combat "global warming" without destroying the economy," by Pete Du Pont, The Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2006 --- http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/pdupont/?id=110008113 


    What we teach just won't float?

    Quite a few of you out there, like me, are trying to teach analysis of financial statements and business analysis and valuation from books like Penman or Palepu, Healy, and Bernard.   The current task of valuing MCI illustrates how frustrating this can be in the real world and how financial statement analysis that we teach, along with the revered Residual Income and Free Cash Flow Models, are often Titanic tasks in rearranging the deck chairs on sinking models.  If you've not attempted valuations with these models I suggest that you begin with my favorite case study:

    "Questrom vs. Federated Department Stores, Inc.:  A Question of Equity Value," May 2001 edition of Issues in Accounting Education, by University of Alabama faculty members Gary Taylor, William Sampson, and Benton Gup, pp. 223-256.

    In spite of all the sophistication in models, it is ever so common for intangibles and forecasting problems to sink the valuation models we teach.  
    My threads on valuation are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm 

    A question I always ask my students is:  What is the major thing that has to be factored in when valuing Microsoft Corporation?

    The answer I'm looking for is certainly not product innovation or something similar to that.  The answer is also not customer loyalty, although that probably is a huge factor.  The big factor is the massive cost of retraining the entire working world in something that replaces MS Office products (Excel, Word, PowerPoint, Outlook, etc.).  It simply costs too much to retrain workers in MS Office substitues even if we are so sick of security problems in Micosoft's systems.   How do you factor this "customer lock-in" into a Residual Income or FCF Model?  Our models are torpedoed by intangibles in the real world.

    MCI's customer base is another torpedo for valuation models.  Here the value seems to lie in a "web of corporate customers."  And nobody seems to be able to value that.

    "Valuing MCI in an Industry Awash in Questions," by Matt Richtel, The New York Times, February 9, 2005 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/09/business/09phone.html

    Industry bankers and accountants are trying to answer just that: What is the value of MCI, a company for which Qwest Communications has already made a tentative offer of about $6.3 billion, and on which Verizon Communications has been running the numbers. Conversations between MCI and Qwest have been suspended since late last week, and Verizon has yet to make a formal offer, people close to the negotiations say.

    Most analysts say MCI's extensive network assets in this country and Europe may have diminishing value because of the industry's continued capacity glut. Instead, they say, MCI's worth lies more in its web of corporate customers.

    But as MCI's revenue continues to tumble, the real trick for the accountants is trying to forecast the future. Can the company meet its stated goal of achieving profitable growth as a telecommunications company emphasizing Internet technology before the bottom falls out of its traditional voice and data business?

    Continued in article


    What we teach just won't float?

    Quite a few of you out there, like me, are trying to teach analysis of financial statements and business analysis and valuation from books like Penman or Palepu, Healy, and Bernard.   The current task of valuing Amazon illustrates how frustrating this can be in the real world and how financial statement analysis that we teach, along with the revered Residual Income and Free Cash Flow Models, are often Titanic tasks in rearranging the deck chairs on sinking models.  

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on February 11, 2005

    TITLE: Amazon's Net Is Curtailed by Costs 
    REPORTER: Mylene Mangalindan 
    DATE: Feb 03, 2005 
    PAGE: A3 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110735918865643669,00.html  
    TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Statement Analysis, Income Taxes, Managerial Accounting, Net Operating Losses

    SUMMARY: Amazon "...had forecast that profit margins would rise in the fourth quarter, while Wall Street analysts had expected margins to remain about the same." The company's operating profits fell in the fourth quarter from 7.9% of revenue to 7%. The company's stock price plunged "14% in after-hours trading."

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) "Amazon said net income rose nearly fivefold, to $346.7 million, or 82 cents a share, from $73.2 million, or 17 cents a share a year earlier." Why then did their stock price drop 14% after this announcement?

    2.) Refer to the related article. How were some analysts' projections borne out by the earnings Amazon announced?

    3.) One analyst discussed in the related article, Ken Smith, disagrees with the majority of analysts' views as discussed under #2 above. Do you think that his viewpoint is supported by these results? Explain.

    4.) Summarize the assessments made in answers to questions 2 and 3 with the way in which Amazon's operating profits as a percentage of sales turned out this quarter.

    5.) Amazon's results "included a $244 million gain from tax benefits, stemming from Amazon's heavy losses earlier in the decade." What does that statement say about the accounting treatment of the deferred tax benefit for operating loss carryforwards when those losses were experienced? Be specific in describing exactly how these tax benefits were accounted for.

    6.) Why does Amazon adjust out certain items, including the tax gain described above, in assessing their earnings? In your answer, specifically state which items are adjusted out of earnings and why that adjustment might be made. What is a general term for announcing earnings in this fashion?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    --- RELATED ARTICLES --- 
    TITLE: Web Sales' Boom Could Leave Amazon Behind 
    REPORTER: Mylene Mangalindan 
    ISSUE: Jan 21, 2005 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110627113243532202,00.html 

    Bob Jensen's  threads on valuation are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm 


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on March 10, 2006

    TITLE: Troll Call
    REPORTER: Bruce Sewell
    DATE: Mar 06, 2006
    PAGE: A14
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114161297437490081.html 
    TOPICS: Accounting, Intangible Assets

    SUMMARY: The author describes issues on both sides of patent disputes, based on his experience as general counsel for Intel Corp., and relates them to the patent infringement suit settlement by RIM.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) What have been the events leading up to RIM (the company behind BlackBerry hand held devices) paying $615 million to NTP? On what basis has that amount increased over time? You may refer to the related articles to get a sense of that issue.

    2.) What are the accounting issues related to intellectual property? List all that you can think of. How are these issues related to patent rights and disputes as described in the article?

    3.) How has RIM been accounting for the cost of defending against the patent infringement suit by NTP? Determine the answer to this question based on information in the second related article.

    4.) What are the author' s proposals for reforming patent infringement law?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    --- RELATED ARTICLES ---
    TITLE: BlackBerry maker Agrees to Settle Patent Dispute
    REPORTER: Mark Heinzl
    PAGE: B4
    ISSUE: Mar 17, 2005
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111098088750681042,00.html 

    TITLE: BlackBerry Case Could Spur Patent-Revision efforts
    REPORTER: Mark Heinzl
    PAGE: B4
    ISSUE: Mar 06, 2006
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114160263279289921.html

    "Troll Call," by Bruce Sewell, The Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2006; Page A14 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114161297437490081.html

    RIM, the company that brings BlackBerry service to four million subscribers, finally caved in to the threat of losing its business. It paid NTP, a small patent holding company reputedly comprised of just one inventor and one patent lawyer, $615 million to settle a four-year patent dispute. For NTP it was like winning the lottery, but for the rest of us, and for business in particular, it stinks. NTP used the patent system, and the threat of shutting down BlackBerry service, to play chicken with RIM and millions of BlackBerry users around the world. Unless the courts or Congress do something to stop this kind of gamesmanship, we're only going to see more cases like this.

    NTP doesn't have a competitive product. It isn't even in the business of making products. It's one of a large number of companies known as patent trolls. Trolls acquire and use patents just to sue companies that actually make products and generate revenue. A patent without a product isn't worth much, whereas a patent tied to a revenue stream, particularly someone else's, is a whole different matter. RIM was the best thing that ever happened to NTP, because by last Friday the only question left was how much of RIM's pie NTP could get.

    The distressing part of this picture is that RIM's contribution of complementary technologies, business acumen, product R&D and marketing is what "enabled" the NTP invention to achieve commercial relevance. The right question is: What would be a fair royalty for NTP, given its contribution of the patent and RIM's contribution of everything else? Unfortunately, that isn't where this case ended up. Because NTP had the presumptive right to obtain an injunction against RIM and stop it dead in its tracks, the issue on the table wasn't the value of NTP's patent in the context of RIM's business; instead, it was the total value of RIM's business. "Pay me a lot or lose everything" hardly leads to rational settlements. Is this really what we want from our patent system?

    At Intel, I see this problem every day and from both sides of the fence. Intel owns a considerable portfolio of patents and we believe strongly that inventors are entitled to fair compensation for their efforts. But Intel is also a target for patent trolls because we run a successful business. The fact that success creates leverage for trolls to extract value above and beyond the true contribution of the patented invention just doesn't seem quite . . . American.

    Things got so lopsided in the world of patent litigation not on account of the patent statute itself but from case law, which has become increasingly protective of patent owners and tolerant of excessive damages arguments by plaintiffs' lawyers. Our patent laws are supposed to be about proliferation of technology. If there is actual competition between patent owner and infringer, an injunction may be appropriate -- it protects the patent owner's right to exclusivity and does not deprive society of the benefits of the technology. On the other hand, if the patent owner has not commercialized the invention, blocking others from using it is a loss for all of us. The right to an injunction also needs to be tempered by a commonsense look at how much real value the patented technology adds to the whole commercial product. A fundamental invention deserves greater value than a relatively minor tweak to work that went before it. A broad application of the injunction remedy makes all patents "crucial," whether they are or not.

    What I'm suggesting here is not all that radical. These concepts are already embedded in our patent laws; but unfortunately they have been buried beneath the wrongheaded notion that all patents should be treated equally.

    There is a glimmer of hope. The Supreme Court will hear eBay v. MercExchange, in which eBay faces the threat of an injunction from MercExchange, a patent-holding company without a competitive product in the online auction space. The eBay case is an opportunity for the highest court to take the judiciary back to the language of the patent statute and remind judges that they don't have to grant injunctions in every patent case. Judges have the right to balance the interests of patent plaintiffs with those of the defendant, and society at large. It may be with just a touch of irony that we'll read about the eBay case on our now more costly BlackBerries.


    When do contingencies become liabilities and when should they be booked?

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on August 25, 2005

    TITLE: Merck Loss Jolts Drug Giant, Industry: In Landmark Vioxx Case, Jury Tuned Out Science, Explored Coverup Angle
    REPORTER: Heather Won Tesoriero, Ilan Brat, Gary McWilliams, and Barbara Martinez
    DATE: Aug 22, 2005
    PAGE: A1
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB112447069284018316,00.html
    TOPICS: Contingent Liabilities, Disclosure, Accounting, Disclosure Requirements

    SUMMARY: Merck lost its first case defending against a claim of death stemming from the drug Vioxx. The company faces thousands of lawsuits over Vioxx following the drug's removal from the market, but many observers had felt the company had an ironclad defense in this one because the patient's cause of death was not a risk identified in the drug's clinical trials. The primary article describes the process of the lawsuit while the related articles post two viewpoints on investment in the company's stock. (The first of those uses the term "Stock Dividend" in its title when the author actually is referring to a cash dividend.) Questions also ask students to examine Merck's most recent quarterly filing for disclosures about the litigation.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) Access Merck's most recent 10-Q filing with the SEC. You may do so through the on-line version of this article by clicking on Merck & Co. under Companies in the right hand side of the page, then clicking on SEC Filings under Web Resources on the left hand side of the page, then choosing the 10-Q filed on 8/8/2005. Find all disclosures related to the recall of Vioxx and summarize the various financial implications of this drug's withdrawal.

    2.) What costs were recorded when the company issued the Vioxx recall? Prepare summary journal entries based on the information in the financial statement disclosures.

    3.) What information is disclosed about the Ernst case on which the main article reports? What accounting standard promulgates required accounting for litigation cases such as these that Merck faces?

    4.) Based on their disclosure as of the 8/8/2005 filing date, what do you think was the company's assessment of the potential outcome of this case? Support your answer with reference to the accounting standard identified in answer to question 3 above.

    5.) Based on the discussion in the end of the first related article, how are analysts using the information in Merck's footnote disclosures? What do they estimate from that information?

    6.) Compare the arguments made in the two related articles about the desirability of holding Merck stock at this point. Which argument do you believe? Support your answer.

    7.) What is incorrect about the use of the term "stock dividend" in the title of the first related article?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    --- RELATED ARTICLES ---
    TITLE: Merck's Stock Dividend May Ease Vioxx Pain
    REPORTER: Barbara Martinez
    PAGE: C1
    ISSUE: Aug 24, 2005
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB112484944952621498,00.html 

    TITLE: First Vioxx Verdict Casts Doubt on Merck, But Not the Industry
    REPORTER: James B.Stewart
    PAGE: D2
    ISSUE: Aug 24, 2005
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB112483560740621188,00.html

     


    From Paul Pacter's IAS Plus on October 28, 2005 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

    We have posted the Deloitte Letter of Comment on Proposed Amendments to IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets (PDF 47k). On 30 June 2005, the IASB proposed to amend IAS 37 (and to retitle it Non-financial Liabilities) and complementary limited amendments to IAS 19 Employee Benefits. The amendments to IAS 37 would change the conceptual approach to recognising non-financial liabilities by requiring recognition of all obligations that meet the definition of a liability in the IASB’s Framework, unless they cannot be measured reliably. Uncertainty about the amount or timing of settlement would be reflected in measuring the liability instead of (as is currently required) affecting whether it is recognised.

    Our response states:

    With the exception of the proposals for restructuring provisions, we do not support the ED, which we see as largely unnecessary. In our view, the majority of the Board's proposals are premature and pre-judge matters that should be discussed in the context of the review of the IASB Framework rather than as an amendment of IAS 37. We think that IAS 37 is operating satisfactorily within the current operating model and environment. In addition, we do not think that the Board's choice of a single measurement attribute is appropriate. As such, we find the majority of the changes proposed in the ED fail to achieve an improvement in financial reporting.

     


    What lies below the surface of the financial reporting icebergs?  

    The knowledge capital estimates that Lev and Bothwell came up with during their run last fall of some 90 leading companies (see accompanying table) were absolutely huge. Microsoft, for example, boasted a number of $211 billion, while Intel, General Electric and Merck weighed in with $170 billion, $112 billion and $110 billion, respectively.

    Source: "The New Math," by Jonathan R. Laing, Barrons Online, November 20, 2000 --- http://equity.stern.nyu.edu/News/news/levbarrons1120.html
    Trinity students may go to J:\courses\acct5341\readings\levNov2000.htm

    .In October 1996, AMR Corp. sold 18% of its computer-reservations system, called SABRE, to the public. It held on to the remaining 82%. That one transaction provides a beautiful way of evaluating tangible and intangible assets. When I recently checked the market, SABRE constituted 50% of AMR's value. This is mind-boggling! You have one of the largest airlines in the world, with roughly 700 jets in its fleet, nearly 100,000 employees, and exclusive and valuable landing rights in the world's most heavily trafficked airports. On the other hand, you have a computer-reservation system. It's a good system that's used by a lot of people, but it's just a computer system nonetheless. And this system is valued as much as the entire airline. Now, what makes this asset -- the computer system -- so valuable?

    One big difference is that when you're dealing with tangible assets, your ability to leverage them -- to get additional business or value out of them -- is limited. You can't use the same airplane on five different routes at the same time. You can't put the same crew on five different routes at the same time. And the same goes for the financial investment that you've made in the airplane.

    But there's no limit to the number of people who can use AMR Corp.'s SABRE system at once: It works as well with 5 million people as it does with 1 million people. The only limit to your ability to leverage a knowledge asset is the size of the market.

    Economists call physical assets "rival assets" -- meaning that users act as rivals for the specific use of an asset. With an airplane, you've got to decide which route it's going to take. But knowledge assets aren't rivals. Choosing isn't necessary. You can apply them in more than one place at the same time. In fact, with many knowledge assets, the more places in which you apply them, the larger the return. With many knowledge assets, you get what economists call "increasing returns to scale." That's one key to intangible assets: The larger the network of users, the greater the benefit to everyone.

    Source: "New Math for the New Economy," by Alan M. Webber, Fast Company, January/February, 2000 --- http://pf.fastcompany.com/online/31/lev.html
    Trinity students may go to J:\courses\acct5341\readings\levJan2000.htm

    On August 28, 2002, the FASB met with representatives from the Financial Valuation Group and the Phillips-Hitchner firm to discuss valuation of intangible assets. See our news item for access to their presentation. More details in our full news item at http://accountingeducation.com/news/news3225.html 


    Companies will have to place intangible assets, such as customer lists and customer back orders, in their financial statements, under proposals released last week by the International Accounting Standards Board --- http://www.smartpros.com/x36285.xml 


    Question
    Do you really understand the SEC's Rule 144a?
    What is it and why do accountants hate it?

    And here's the real beauty of it: Companies that issue stock under Rule 144a can access America's deep pools of capital without submitting to public-company accounting rules or to the tender mercies of Sarbanes-Oxley. In exchange, however, they must strictly limit the number of qualified U.S. investors in their company -- to 500 total for U.S.-based firms and 300 for foreign-based. They are also barred from offering comparable securities for sale in the public market. The 144a market is also for the most part nontransparent, often illiquid and thus in some ways riskier. But increasingly, this is a trade that institutional investors and companies seeking capital are willing to make.
    "A Capital Idea," The Wall Street Journal,  April 26, 2007; Page A18 --- Click Here
  •  

    That America's public capital markets have lost some of their allure is no longer much disputed. Eminences as unlikely as Chuck Schumer and Eliot Spitzer have taken to bemoaning the fact and calling for some sort of fix, albeit without doing much.

    Tort reform -- to reduce jackpot justice in securities class-action suits -- would certainly help. So would easing the compliance costs and regulatory burden placed on publicly traded companies by Sarbanes-Oxley, Regulation FD and the like. (See Robert Grady nearby.) The good news is that, as usual, private-sector innovation is finding a way around these government obstacles through the rapid growth of something known as the Rule 144a market.

    First, a little capital-markets background: Most Americans are familiar with the "public markets," which consist of the New York Stock Exchange, the Nasdaq and other stock markets. These are open to investors of every stripe and are where the stocks of most of the world's best-known companies are traded. Nearly anyone can invest, and these exchanges are comprehensively regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

    Less well understood is another, more restricted market known after SEC Rule 144a that governs participation in it. As on stock exchanges, this market allows for the buying and selling of the stock of companies that offer their shares for sale. But participation is strictly limited. To be what is called a "qualified buyer" in this market, you must be a financial institution with at least $100 million in investable assets. If you meet these criteria, you are free to buy stocks of both U.S. and foreign companies that have never offered their shares to the investing public.

    And here's the real beauty of it: Companies that issue stock under Rule 144a can access America's deep pools of capital without submitting to public-company accounting rules or to the tender mercies of Sarbanes-Oxley. In exchange, however, they must strictly limit the number of qualified U.S. investors in their company -- to 500 total for U.S.-based firms and 300 for foreign-based. They are also barred from offering comparable securities for sale in the public market. The 144a market is also for the most part nontransparent, often illiquid and thus in some ways riskier. But increasingly, this is a trade that institutional investors and companies seeking capital are willing to make.

    There are estimated to be about 1,000 companies whose stocks trade in the 144a market. And last year, for perhaps the first time, more capital was raised in the U.S. by issuing these so-called unregistered securities than through IPOs on all the major stock exchanges combined. Even more telling is that the large institutional investors eligible to buy these unregistered securities are more than happy to oblige. There is no selling without buying, and for the 144a market to overtake the giant stock exchanges, institutional investors who control trillions of dollars in capital must see better opportunities outside the regulations built by Congress and the SEC.

    In a sign of these times, none other than Nasdaq is now stepping in to bring some greater order, liquidity and transparency to the Rule 144a market. Any day now, the SEC is expected to propose giving the green light to a Nasdaq project called Portal. Portal aims to be a central clearing house for buyers and sellers of Section 144a securities. You will still need to be a "qualified institutional buyer" to purchase 144a securities. And the companies whose stocks change hands on Portal will still need to meet the limitations on numbers of investors to offer their stock there.

    So Portal will not bring unregistered securities to the masses -- at least not directly. It is forbidden to do so because the entire U.S. regulatory system is designed to protect individual investors from such things. What Portal will do, if it operates as intended, is make the trading of Rule 144a securities easier and less costly. And this could, in turn, further increase their attractiveness to issuers and investors alike. Average investors will at least be able to participate indirectly via mutual and pension funds, most of which meet the standards for "qualified institutional buyers."

    Given the limitations on eligibility for Rule 144a assets, they will never replace our public markets. But their growth is one more sign that investors, far from valuing current regulation, are seeking ways to avoid its costs and complications. Nasdaq's participation is especially notable given its stake as an established public exchange. Nasdaq seems to have concluded that there is a new market opportunity created by overregulation, so it is following the money.

    This leaves our politicians with two choices. They can move to meddle with and diminish this second securities market -- which will only drive more business away from U.S. shores. Or they can address the overregulation that is hurting public markets and prompting both investors and companies to seek alternatives.


  • New Accounting Rule Lays Bare A Firm's Liability if Transaction Is Later Disallowed by the IRS

    CPA auditors have always considered their primary role as attesting to full and fair corporate disclosures to investors and creditors under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Now it turns out that this extends, perhaps unexpectedly, to the government as well.

    "How Accounting Rule (FIN 48) Led to Probe Disclosure of Tax Savings Firms Regard as Vulnerable Leaves Senate Panel a Trail," by Jesse Drucker, The Wall Street Journal, September 11, 2007; Page A5 ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118947026768923240.html?mod=todays_us_page_one

    The probe, by the Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, appears to have been sparked by an accounting rule known as FIN 48, which took effect in January. The rule for the first time requires companies to disclose how much they have set aside to pay tax authorities if certain tax-cutting transactions are successfully challenged by the government. The disclosures require companies to attach a dollar figure to tax-savings arrangements they think could be vulnerable.

    Although intended to inform investors, the disclosures also serve as a kind of road map for government authorities, guiding them to companies that may have taken an aggressive stance on tax-related arrangements.

    The probe, by the Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, appears to have been sparked by an accounting rule known as FIN 48, which took effect in January. The rule for the first time requires companies to disclose how much they have set aside to pay tax authorities if certain tax-cutting transactions are successfully challenged by the government. The disclosures require companies to attach a dollar figure to tax-savings arrangements they think could be vulnerable.

    Although intended to inform investors, the disclosures also serve as a kind of road map for government authorities, guiding them to companies that may have taken an aggressive stance on tax-related arrangements.

    The FIN 48 disclosures generally reveal how much a company has set aside in an accounting reserve called "unrecognized tax benefits." The reserve represents the portion of the tax benefits realized on a company's tax return that also hasn't been recognized in its financial reporting.

    In the letters, sent Aug. 23, Senate investigators seek to obtain more details about the underlying transactions in the FIN 48 disclosures. One letter viewed by The Wall Street Journal asks the companies to "describe any United States tax position or group of similar tax positions that represents five percent or more of your total [unrecognized tax benefit] for the period, including in the description of each whether the tax position involved foreign entities or jurisdictions."

    The subcommittee, led by Sen. Carl Levin (D., Mich.), has held numerous hearings on tax shelters, tax avoidance, and the law firms and accounting firms that set up such structures.

    The Senate's inquiry also includes questions about other tax-cutting arrangements. For tax-cutting transactions on which companies spent at least $1 million for legal fees or other costs, Senate investigators are asking companies to identify the amount of the tax benefit, as well as "the tax professional(s) who planned or designed the transaction or structure and the law firm(s) that authored the tax opinion or advice."

    Continued in article


    "Accounting for Uncertainty (FIN 48)," by Damon M. Fleming and Gerald E. Whittenburg, Journal of Accountancy, October 2007 --- --- http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/oct2007/uncertainty.htm

    FASB Interpretation no. 48 (FIN 48), Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, sets the threshold for recognizing the benefits of tax return positions in financial statements as “more likely than not” (greater than 50%) to be sustained by a taxing authority. The effect is most pronounced where the uncertainty arises in the timing, amount or validity of a deduction.

    Thresholds applicable to tax practitioners have been revised from a “realistic possibility” to “more likely than not” that a tax position will be sustained, as set forth in the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007 that was signed into law in May.

    A third threshold, that a tax position possesses a “reasonable basis” in tax law, has been regarded as reflecting 25% certainty. In addition, taxpayers are subject to penalties if an understatement of liability is caused by a position that lacks “substantial authority,” a threshold for which no percentage of certainty has been established but has been regarded as between the reasonable-basis and more-likely-than-not standards.

    Being familiar with the different thresholds for the reporting of uncertain tax positions can help CPAs effectively advocate for their clients’ tax positions and be impartial in financial reporting.


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on June 1, 2007

    Lifting the Veil on Tax Risk
    by Jesse Drucker
    The Wall Street Journal
    May 25, 2007
    Page: C1
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
    ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118005869184314270.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
     

    TOPICS: Accounting, Accounting Theory, Advanced Financial Accounting, Disclosure Requirements, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Financial Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis, Income Taxes

    SUMMARY: FIN 48, entitled Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes--An Interpretation of FASB Statement No. 109, was issued in June 2006 with an effective date of fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2006. As stated on the FASB's web site, "This Interpretation prescribes a recognition threshold and measurement attribute for the financial statement recognition and measurement of a tax position taken or expected to be taken in a tax return. This Interpretation also provides guidance on derecognition, classification, interest and penalties, accounting in interim periods, disclosure, and transition." See the summary of this interpretation at http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/finsum48.shtml  As noted in this article, "in the past, companies had to reveal little information about transactions that could face some risk in an audit by the IRS or other government entities." Further, some concern about use of deferred tax liability accounts to create so-called "cookie jar reserves" useful in smoothing income contributed to development of this interpretation's recognition, timing and disclosure requirements. The article highlights an analysis of 361 companies by Credit Suisse Group to identify those with the largest recorded liabilities as an indicator of risk of future settlement with the IRS over disputed amounts. One example given in this article is Merck's $2.3 billion settlement with the IRS in February 2007 over a Bermuda tax shelter; another is the same company's current dispute with Canadian taxing authorities over transfer pricing. Financial statement analysis procedures to compare the size of the uncertain tax liability to other financial statement components and follow up discussions with the companies showing the highest uncertain tax positions also is described.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) Summarize the requirements of Financial Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes--An Interpretation of FASB Statement No. 109 (FIN 48).

    2.) In describing the FIN 48 requirements, the author of this article states that "until now, there was generally no way to know about" the accounting for reserves for uncertain tax positions. Why is that the case?

    3.) Some firms may develop "FIN 48 opinions" every time a tax position is taken that could be questioned by the IRS or other tax governing authority. Why might companies naturally want to avoid having to document these positions very clearly in their own records?

    4.) Credit Suisse analysts note that the new FIN 48 disclosures about unrecognized tax benefits provide investors with information about risks companies are undertaking. Explain how this information can be used for this purpose.

    5.) How are the absolute amounts of unrecognized tax benefits compared to other financial statement categories to provide a better frame of reference for analysis? In your answer, propose a financial statement ratio you feel is useful in assessing the risk described in answer to question 4, and support your reasons for calculating this amount.

    6.) The amount of reserves recorded by Merck for unrecognized tax benefits, tops the list from the analysis done by Credit Suisse and the one done by Professors Blouin, Gleason, Mills and Sikes. Based only on the descriptions given in the article, how did the two analyses differ in their measurements? What do you infer from the fact that Merck is at the top of both lists?

    7.) Why are transfer prices among international operations likely to develop into uncertain tax positions?
     

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
     

     

    Tutorial:  FIN 48 from different perspectives
    Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48), Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, is intended to substantially reduce uncertainty in accounting for income taxes. Its implementation and infrastructure requirements, however, generate a great deal of uncertainty. This feature provides an overview of FIN 48, addresses some of its federal and international tax issues, as well as issues arising at the state and local level.
    AccountingWeb, June 2007 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=103625


    "GM Will Book $39 Billion Charge Write-Down of Tax Credits Indicates That Profits Won't Come in Near Term," by John D. Stoll, The Wall Street Journal, November 7, 2007; Page A3 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119438884709884385.html?mod=todays_us_page_one

    General Motors Corp. will take a $39 billion, noncash charge to write down deferred-tax credits, a signal that it expects to continue to struggle financially despite significant restructuring and cost cutting in the past two years.

    The deferred-tax assets stem from losses and could be used to offset taxes on current or future profits for a certain number of years.

    In after-hours trading, GM fell 2.9% to $35.14. Before the disclosure, its shares finished at $36.16, up 16 cents, or less than 1%, in New York Stock Exchange composite trading.

    GM, the world's largest auto maker in vehicle sales, was to report third-quarter financial results today. The company, which was stung by big losses in 2005 and 2006, said the write-down was triggered by three main issues: a string of adjusted losses in core North American operations and Germany over the past three years, weakness at its GMAC Financial Services unit, and the long duration of tax-deferred assets.

    GM had appeared to be making progress in stemming its losses. Its global automotive operations were profitable in the first half of the year. It recently signed a labor deal with the United Auto Workers that allows it to establish an independent trust to absorb its approximately $50 billion in hourly retiree health-care liabilities. The move promises to significantly reduce GM's cash health-care expenses and combine with other labor-cost cuts in creating a more profitable North American arm.

    If it returns to steady profits, GM could remove the valuation allowance and reclaim some or all of the $39 billion in deferred credits.

    For now, the massive charge promises to devastate GM's headline financial results for the third quarter, and for the year, likely leading to the worst annual loss in its 99-year history. Although the charge is an accounting loss that doesn't involve cash, it is still a staggering sum. By comparison, the company reported a total of $34 billion in net income from 1996 to 2004.

    GM will partially offset the charge with a gain of more than $5 billion related to the sale of its Allison Transmission unit.

    The charge follows more than $12 billion in losses since the beginning of 2005. GM has been scrambling to cut the size of its U.S. operation amid shrinking market share, rising costs and a rapidly globalizing auto industry. Its restructuring has been complicated by a slowdown in U.S. demand for automobiles and losses at GMAC.

    The lending giant lost $1.6 billion in the third quarter, the biggest quarterly setback since at least the 1960s. It made money on auto lending and insurance but was dragged down by a $1.8 billion setback at ResCap, its residential-mortgage business and a big player in subprime loans. GM's exposure is limited because it sold 51% of GMAC to Cerberus Capital Management LP last year. In the past, GMAC delivered dividends to GM, including more than $9 billion in the decade before the GMAC sale.

    The write-down isn't expected to affect GM's liquidity position, which stood at $27.2 billion as of June 30. GM has been selling noncore assets in recent years to pad its bank account. In addition, GM Chief Financial Officer Frederick "Fritz" Henderson said the write-down won't preclude it from using loss carry-forwards or other deferred-tax assets in the future. It is unclear whether GM's plunge deeper into negative shareholder-equity status will affect it's borrowing capabilities or credit rating.

    The latest disclosure underscores the challenge Chief Executive Officer Richard Wagoner faces in seeking a full-scale turnaround as GM hangs on to its No. 1 global-sales ranking over Toyota Motor Corp. by a thread. Delphi Corp., GM's top supplier, has failed in attempts to emerge from bankruptcy protection, so GM must wait indefinitely on cost savings it hopes to gain from a reorganized Delphi. Also, U.S. automobile demand has withered to the lowest point in a decade, and, as oil futures continue to escalate, pressure on high-profit trucks and SUVs remains firm.

     

    Denny Beresford provided a link to another reference --- Click Here

    November 7, 2008 reply from Amy Dunbar [Amy.Dunbar@BUSINESS.UCONN.EDU]

    >So they think it is more likely than not that they will receive zero tax benefit from their tax loss carryforwards! 

    Hmmmmm, I doubt that is what GM thinks. As the news release stated, "In making such judgments, significant weight is given to evidence that can be objectively verified. A company's current or previous losses are given more weight than its future outlook, and a recent three-year historical cumulative loss is considered a significant factor that is difficult to overcome." FAS 109, P 23 states, "Forming a conclusion that a valuation allowance is not needed is difficult when there is negative evidence such as cumulative losses in recent years."

    As an aside, the more-likely-than-not standard in FAS 109 existed before FIN 48 adopted the standard. FIN 48 doesn't talk about objective evidence wrt the MLTN standard.

    FIN 48, 6, states, "An enterprise shall initially recognize the financial statement effects of a tax position when it is more likely than not, based on the technical merits, that the position will be sustained upon examination. As used in this Interpretation, the term more likely than not means a likelihood of more than 50 percent; the terms examined and upon examination also include resolution of the related appeals or litigation processes, if any. The more-likely than- not recognition threshold is a positive assertion that an enterprise believes it is entitled to the economic benefits associated with a tax position. The determination of whether or not a tax position has met the more-likely-than-not recognition threshold shall consider the facts, circumstances, and information available at the reporting date.

    FIN 48, 7, states, "In assessing the more-likely-than-not criterion as required by paragraph 6 of this Interpretation: a. It shall be presumed that the tax position will be examined by the relevant taxing authority that has full knowledge of all relevant information. b. Technical merits of a tax position derive from sources of authorities in the tax law (legislation and statutes, legislative intent, regulations, rulings, and case law) and their applicability to the facts and circumstances of the tax position. When the past administrative practices and precedents of the taxing authority in its dealings with the enterprise or similar enterprises are widely understood, those practices and precedents shall be taken into account. c. Each tax position must be evaluated without consideration of the possibility of offset or aggregation with other positions."

    In an appendix, FIN 48, B46, states, "In considering the subsequent recognition of tax positions that do not initially meet the more-likely-than-not recognition threshold and the subsequent measurement of tax positions, the Board initially considered whether specific external events should be required to effect a change in judgment about the recognition of a tax position or the measurement of a recognized tax position. The Board concluded in the Exposure Draft that a change in estimate is a judgment that requires evaluation of all available facts and circumstances, not a specific triggering event. Some respondents to the Exposure Draft stated that the evidence supporting a change in judgment should be objectively verifiable and that a triggering event is normally required to subsequently recognize a tax benefit."

    Since this language wasn't put in the standard, I wonder if one could argue that the two MLTN standards are different. It would be interesting to be a fly on the wall as some of the debate goes on about uncertain tax positions.

    Amy Dunbar

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on November 9, 2007

    GM Will Book $39 Billion Charge
    by John D. Stoll
    Nov 07, 2007
    Page: A3
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119438884709884385.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac

     

    TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Income Taxes

    SUMMARY: "General Motors Corp. will take a $39 billion, noncash charge to write down deferred tax assets, "...a signal that it expects to continue to struggle financially despite significant restructuring and cost cutting in the past two years."

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Use to cover accounting for deferred tax assets and a related valuation account.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) Define the terms deferred tax assets, deferred tax liabilities, net operating loss carryforwards, and deferred tax credits.

    2.) Which of the above three items has General Motors recorded for a total of $39 billion? In your answer, comment on the opening statement in the article that GM will write-down its "deferred tax credits."

    3.) What is a valuation allowance against deferred tax assets? When must such an allowance be recorded under generally accepted accounting standards? Use GM's situation as an example in your answer.

    4.) GM states that its $39 billion write down was impacted by three factors. Explain how each of these factors bears on the determination of a valuation allowance against deferred tax assets. Be specific.

    5.) The author writes, "If it returns to steady profits, GM could remove the valuation allowance and reclaim some or all of the $39 billion in deferred credits," and that the write-down does not preclude GM from future use of its net operating loss carryforwards and deferred tax assets. Explain these statements, including the entries that will be recorded if the deferred tax assets are used in the future.
     

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
     

    RELATED ARTICLES: 
    GM Statement on Noncash Charge
    by General Motors, via PRNewswire
    Nov 06, 2007
    Online Exclusive
     

     


    Controversy Over FAS 2 on Research and Development (R&D)

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on April 23, 2004

    TITLE: Brothers of Invention
    REPORTER: Timothy Aeppel
    DATE: Apr 19, 2004
    PAGE: B1,3
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108233054158486127,00.html 
    TOPICS: Research & Development, Intangible Assets

    SUMMARY: Lahart reports on the growing instances of designing variations of new
    patent-protected products in an attempt to skirt the patent laws and offer
    virtual clones of those products at lower prices.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) What is a patent? How does one appropriately account for a patent that has
    been granted to a firm? How does a patent differ from other intangible assets?
    How is it similar? How does a patent give a firm a competitive advantage? In
    the Aeppel article, what happens to this advantage when a design-around is
    introduced?

    2.) Explain impairment of an intangible asset. How do the "design arounds"
    described in the Aeppel article impair the value of the patent? How do you
    account for such an impairment?

    3.) What effect is this issue having on research & development (R&D)
    expenditures for firms developing new patented products? Are R&D costs expensed
    or capitalized? What about R&D costs that result in the granting of a patent?

    4.) Why are valid patent-holders designing around their own products?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

    "Brothers of Invention:  'Design-Arounds' Surge As More Companies Imitate Rivals' Patented Products," by Timothy Aeppel, The Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2004, Page B1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108233054158486127,00.html 

    Nebraska rancher Gerald Gohl had a bright idea: Create a remote-controlled spotlight, so he wouldn't have to roll down the window of his pickup truck and stick out a hand-held beacon to look for his cattle on cold nights.

    By 1997, Mr. Gohl held a patent on the RadioRay, a wireless version of his spotlight that could rotate 360 degrees and was mounted using suction cups or brackets. Retail price: more than $200. RadioRay started to catch on with ranchers, boaters, hunters and even police.

    Wal-Mart Stores Inc. liked it, too. Mr. Gohl says a buyer for Wal-Mart's Sam's Club stores called to discuss carrying the RadioRay as a "wow" item, an unusual product that might attract lots of attention and sales. Mr. Gohl said no, worrying that selling to Sam's Club could drive the spotlight's price lower and poison his relationships with distributors.

    Before long, though, Sam's Club was selling its own wireless, remote-controlled searchlight -- for about $60. It looked nearly identical to the RadioRay, except for a small, plastic part restricting the light's rotation to slightly less than 360 degrees. Golight Inc., Mr. Gohl's McCook, Neb., company, sued Wal-Mart in 2000, alleging patent infringement. The retailer countered that Mr. Gohl's invention was obvious and that its light wasn't an exact copy of the RadioRay's design.

    The legal battle between Mr. Gohl and the world's largest retailer -- which Wal-Mart lost in a federal district court and on appeal and is now considering taking to the Supreme Court -- reflects a growing trend in the high-stakes, persnickety world of patents and product design. Patent attorneys say that companies increasingly are imitating rivals' inventions, while trying to make their own versions just different enough to avoid infringing on a patent. The near-copycat procedure, which among other things helps companies avoid paying royalties to patent holders, is called a "design-around."

    "The thinking in engineering offices more and more boils down to, 'Let's see what the patent says and see if we can get around it and get something as good -- or almost as good -- without violating the patent,' " says Ken Kuffner, a patent attorney in Houston who represents a U.S. maker of retail-display stands that designed around the patent on plastic displays it used to buy from another company. He declines to identify his client.

    Design-arounds are nearly as old as the patent system itself, underscoring the pressure that companies feel to keep pace with the innovations of competitors. And U.S. courts have repeatedly concluded that designing around -- and even copying products left unprotected -- can be good for consumers by lowering prices and encouraging innovation.

    The practice appears to be surging as companies shift more manufacturing outside the U.S. in an effort to drive costs lower. No one tracks overall design-around numbers, but "there's really been a spike in this sort of activity in the last few years," says Jack Barufka, a patent-attorney specializing in design-arounds at Pillsbury Winthrop LLP in McLean, Va.

    Mr. Barufka, a former physicist, has handled design-arounds on exercise equipment, industrial parts, and factory machinery. A client recently brought him a household appliance, which he won't identify, to be dissected part-by-part so that his client can try to make a similar product at a cheaper price, probably by using foreign suppliers.

    "We design around competitor patents on a regular basis," says James O'Shaughnessy, vice president and chief intellectual property counsel at Rockwell Automation Inc. in Milwaukee, a maker of industrial automation equipment. "Anybody who is really paying attention to the patent system, who respects it, will still nevertheless try to find ways -- either offshore production or a design-around -- to produce an equivalent product that doesn't infringe."

    Design-arounds are particularly common in auto parts, semiconductors and other industries with enormous markets that are attractive to newcomers looking for a way to break in. The practice also happens in mature industries, where there are few big breakthroughs and competitors rely on relatively small changes to gain a competitive advantage. Patented products are attractive targets for an attempted end run because they command premium prices, making them irresistible amid razor-thin profit margins and expanding global competition.

    Few companies will talk about their design-around efforts, since the results often look like little more than clones of someone else's idea. Even companies with patented products that are designed-around usually keep quiet, sometimes because their own engineers are looking for ways to make an end run on rivals.

    The surge in design-arounds is pushing research-and-development costs higher, since some companies feel forced to protect their inventions from being copied by coming up with as many alternative ways to achieve the same result -- and patenting those, too.

    "A patent is basically worthless if someone else can design around it easily and make a high-performing component for less," says Morgan Chu, a patent attorney at Irell & Manella LLP in Los Angeles.

    Because successful design-arounds also force prices lower, they make it harder for companies to recover their investment in new products. Danfoss AS, a Danish maker of air conditioning, heating and other industrial equipment, discovered in the late 1990s that a customer in England had switched to buying a designed-around part for a Danfoss agricultural machine at a lower price from an English supplier. Danfoss eventually won back the customer, but only after agreeing to a price concession, says Georg Nissen, the Danish company's intellectual property manager, who notes they lowered their price about 5%.

    The main way for companies to fight design-arounds is in court -- or the threat of it. Dutton-Lainson Co., a Hastings, Neb., maker of marine, agricultural, and industrial products, recently discovered that a rival was selling a tool used by ranchers to tighten the barbed wire on fences that was identical to its own patented tool, with an ergonomic handle shaped to fit the palm of a hand.

    Continued in the article

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on October 14, 2005

    TITLE: In R&D, Brains Beat Spending in Boosting Profit
    REPORTER: Gary McWilliams
    DATE: Oct 11, 2005
    PAGE: A2
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB112898917962665021.html 
    TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis, Research & Development

    SUMMARY: The article reports on a study by management consultants Booz Allen Hamilton on firms� levels of R&D spending and related performance metrics.

    QUESTIONS:

    1.) How must U.S. firms account for Research and Development expenditures? What is the major reasoning behind the FASB's requirement to treat these costs in this way? In your answer, reference the authoritative accounting literature promulgating this treatment and the FASB's supporting reasoning.

    2.) How does the U.S. treatment differ from the treatment of R&D costs under accounting standards in effect in most countries of the world?

    3.) Describe the study undertake by Booz Allen Hamilton as reported in the article. In your answer, define each of the terms for variables used in the analysis. Why would a management consulting firm undertake such a study?

    4.) What were the major findings of the study? How does this finding support the FASB�s reasoning as described in answer to question 1 above?

    5.) As far as you can glean from the description in the article, what are the potential weaknesses to the study? Do these weaknesses have any bearing on your opinion about the support that the results give to the current R&D accounting requirements in the U.S.? Explain.

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    "In R&D, Brains Beat Spending in Boosting Profit," by Gary McWilliams, The Wall Street Journal, October 11, 2005, Page A2 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB112898917962665021.html 

    Booz Allen concluded that once a minimum level of research and development spending is achieved, better oversight and culture were more significant factors in determining financial results. The study calculated the percentage of a company's revenue spent on R&D and compared it with sales growth, gross profit, operating profit, market capitalization and total shareholder result.

    It found "no statistically significant difference" when comparing the financial results of middle-of-the-pack companies with those in the top 10% of their industry, said Barry Jaruzelski, Booz Allen's vice president of Global Technology Practice. The result was the same when viewed within 10 industry groups or across all industries evaluated.

    "It is the culture, the skills and the process more than the absolute amount of money available," he said. "It says tremendous results can be achieved with relatively modest amounts" of spending.

    He points to Toyota Motor Corp., which spent 4.1% of revenue on R&D last year, but consistently has outperformed rivals such as Ford Motor Co., which spent 4.3% of sales on research and development. Toyota's success with hybrid, gasoline-electric cars resulted from better spending, not more spending, Mr. Jaruzelski says.

    The study rankles some. Allan C. Eberhart, a professor of finance at Georgetown University, says the time period examined is too short to catch companies whose results might have benefited from past R&D spending. He co-authored a paper that found "economically significant" increases in R&D spending did benefit operating profits. The paper, which examined R&D spending at 8,000 companies over a 50-year period, found 1% to 2% increased operating profit at companies that increased R&D spending by 5% or more in a single year.

    Mr. Jaruzelski said less isn't always better. The study found that companies that ranked among the bottom 10% of R&D spenders performed worse than average or top spenders. The result suggests there is a base level of research and development needed to remain healthy but that spending above a certain level doesn't confer additional benefits.

    R&D spending was positively associated with one performance measure: gross margins. Median gross margins of the top half of companies measured by R&D to sales spending were 40% higher than those in the bottom half.

     

     


    This is a good slide show!
    "The Truth Behind the Earnings Illusion:  The profit picture has never been so distorted. The surprise? Things aren't as ugly as they look" by Justin Fox, Fortune, July 22, 2002 --- http://www.fortune.com/indexw.jhtml?channel=artcol.jhtml&doc_id=208677 

    Question:  
    Where are the major differences between book income and taxable income that favor booked income reported to the investing public?

    Answer according to Justin Fox:

    What the heck happened? The most obvious explanations for the disconnect are disparities in accounting for stock options and pension funds. When a company's employees exercise stock options, the gains are treated for tax purposes as an expense to the company but are completely ignored in reported earnings. And while investment gains made by a company's employee pension fund are counted in reported earnings, they don't show up in tax profits.

    Analysts at Standard & Poor's are working to remove those two distortions by calculating a new "core earnings" measure for S&P 500 companies that includes options costs and excludes pension fund gains. When that exercise is completed in the coming weeks, most of the profit disconnect may disappear. Then again, maybe not. In struggling to deliver the outsized profits to which they and their investors had become accustomed in the mid-1990s, a lot more CEOs and CFOs may have bent the rules than we know about. "There was some cheating around the edges," says S&P chief economist David Wyss. "It's just not clear how big the edges are."

    While conservative accounting is now back in vogue, it's impossible to say with certainty that reported earnings have returned to reality: Comparing the earnings per share of the S&P 500 with the tax profits of all American corporations, both public and private (which is what the Commerce Department reports), is too much of an apples and oranges exercise. But over the long run reported earnings and tax earnings do grow at about the same rate--just over 7% a year since 1960, according to Prudential Securities chief economist Richard Rippe, Wall Street's most devoted student of the Commerce Department profit numbers. So the fact that Commerce says after-tax profits came in at an annualized rate of $615 billion in the first quarter--a record-setting pace if it holds up for the full year--ought to be at least a little reassuring to investors. "I do believe the hints of recovery that we're seeing in tax profits will continue," Rippe says.

    That does not mean we're due for another profit boom. Declining interest rates were the biggest reason profits rose so fast in the 1990s, says S&P's Wyss. Rates simply don't have that far to fall now. So even when investors start believing again what companies say about their earnings, they may still be shocked at how slowly those earnings are growing.

    Continued at http://www.fortune.com/indexw.jhtml?channel=artcol.jhtml&doc_id=208677 

    Reply by Bob Jensen:

    For a technical explanation of the stock option accounting alluded to in the above quotation, go to one of my student examinations at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Exams/5341sp02/exam02/Exam02VersionATeachingNotes.htm 

    The exam02.xls Excel workbook answers can be downloaded from http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Exams/5341sp02/exam02/ 

    The S&P revised GAAP core earnings model alluded to in the above quotation can be examined in greater detail at http://www.standardandpoors.com/Forum/MarketAnalysis/coreEarnings/index.html 

    The pause that refreshes just got a bit more refreshing - Coca-Cola Co. announced Sunday it will lead the corporate pack by treating future stock option grants as employee compensation. http://www.accountingweb.com/item/86333

    Question:
    Where are the major differences between book income and economic income that understate book income reported to the investing public?

    Answer:
    This question is too complex to even scratch the surface in a short paragraph.  One of the main bones of contention between the FASB and technology companies is FAS 2 that requires the expensing of both research and development (R&D)  even though it is virtually certain that a great deal of the outlays for these items will have economic benefit in future years.  The FASB contends that the identification of which projects, what future periods, and the amount of the estimated benefits per period are too uncertain and subject to a high degree of accounting manipulation (book cooking) if such current expenditures are allowed to be capitalized rather than expensed.  Other bones of contention concern expenditures for building up the goodwill, reputation, and training "assets" of companies.  The FASB requires that these be expensed rather than capitalized except in the case of an acquisition of an entire company at a price that exceeds the value of tangible assets less current market value of debt.  In summary, many firms have argued for "pro forma" earnings reporting such that companies can make a case that huge expense reporting required by the FASB and GAAP can be adjusted for better matching of future revenues with past expenditures.

    You can read more about these problems in the following two documents:

    Accounting Theory --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm 

    State of the Profession of Accountancy --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm 

    Hard Assets Versus Intangible Assets

    Intangible assets are difficult to define because there are so many types and circumstances.  For example some have contractual or statutory lives (e.g., copyrights, patents and human resources) whereas others have indefinite lives (e.g., goodwill and intellectual capital).  Baruch Lev classifies intangibles as follows in "Accounting for Intangibles:  The New Frontier" --- http://www.nyssa.org/abstract/acct_intangibles.html :

    He does not flesh in these groupings.  I flesh in some examples below of unbooked (unrecorded) intangible assets that may have value far in excess of all the booked assets of a company.

    Baruch Lev's Value Chain Scorecard
     

    Discovery/Learning

    • Internal Renewal

    · Research and Development
    · IT Development
    · Employee Training
    · Communities of Practice
    · Customer Acquisition Costs

    • Acquired Knowledge

    · Technology Purchase
    · Reverse Engineering
    -Spillovers
    · IT Acquisition

    • Networking

    · R&D Alliances/Joint Ventures
    · Supplier/Customer Integration

    Implementation

    • Intellectual Property

      · Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights
      · Cross-licensing
      · Patent/Know-how Royalties

    • Technological Feasibility

    · Clinical Tests, FDA Approvals
    · Beta Tests
    · Unique Visitors

    • Customers

    · Marketing Alliances
    · Brand Support
    · Stickiness and Loyalty Traffic Measures

    • Employees

    · Work Practices
    · Retention
    · Hot Skills (Knowledge Workers

    Commercialization

    • Top Line

    · Innovation Revenues
    · Market Share/Growth
    · Online Revenues
    · Revenues from Alliances
    · Revenue Growth by Segments

    • Bottom Line

    · Productivity Gains
    · Online Supply Channels
    · Earnings/Cash Flows
    · Value Added
    · Cash Burn Rate

    • Growth Options

    · Product Pipeline
    · Expected Restructuring Impact
    · Market Potential/Growth
    · Expected Capital Spending

     

    The knowledge capital estimates that Lev and Bothwell came up with during their run last fall of some 90 leading companies (see accompanying table) were absolutely huge. Microsoft, for example, boasted a number of $211 billion, while Intel, General Electric and Merck weighed in with $170 billion, $112 billion and $110 billion, respectively.

    Source: "The New Math," by Jonathan R. Laing, Barrons Online, November 20, 2000 --- http://equity.stern.nyu.edu/News/news/levbarrons1120.html
    Trinity students may go to J:\courses\acct5341\readings\levNov2000.htm

    • It is seldom, if ever mentioned, but Microsoft's overwhelming huge asset is its customer lock-in to the Windows Operating System combined with the enormous dominance of MS Office (Word, Excel, Outlook, etc) and MS Access.  The cost of shifting most any organization over to some other operating system and suite software comparable to MS Office is virtually prohibitive.  This is the main asset of Microsoft, but measuring its value and variability is virtually impossible.
      • Intellectual property
      • Trademarks, patents, copyrights
      • In-process R&D
      • Unrecorded goodwill
      • Ways of doing business and adapting to technology changes and shifts in consumer tastes
    For example, my (Baruch Lev's) recent computations show that Microsoft has knowledge assets worth $211 billion -- by far the most of any company. Intel has knowledge assets worth $170 billion, and Merck has knowledge assets worth $110 billion. Now, compare those figures with DuPont's assets. DuPont has more employees than all of those companies combined. And yet, DuPont's knowledge assets total only $41 billion -- there isn't much extra profitability there.

    Source: "The New Math," by Jonathan R. Laing, Barrons Online, November 20, 2000 --- http://equity.stern.nyu.edu/News/news/levbarrons1120.html
    Trinity students may go to J:\courses\acct5341\readings\levNov2000.htm

     

    University logos of prestigious universities (Stanford, Columbia, Carnegie-Mellon, Duke, etc.) are worth billions when discounting their value in distance education of the future--- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/000aaa/0000start.htm 

     

     


    Purchase Versus Pooling:  The Never Ending Debate

    FAS 141 and the Question of Value By PricewaterhouseCoopers CFOdirect Network Newsdesk, January 16, 2003 --- http://www.cfodirect.com/cfopublic.nsf/vContentPrint/CA13B226B214A04085256CB000512D34?OpenDocument 

    Just as early reactions to FAS 142 seemed to have overlooked the complexities in reviewing and testing goodwill for impairment, so too have reactions to complying with the Financial Accounting Standards Board's Statement No. 141 – Business Combinations.

    Adopted and issued at the same time as Statement No. 142 in the summer of 2001, the headline news about FAS 141 was the elimination of the Pooling-of-Interest accounting method in mergers and acquisitions. Going forward from June 30, 2001, all acquisitions are to be accounted for using one method only – Purchase Accounting.

    This change is significant and one particular aspect of it – the identification and measurement of intangible assets outside of goodwill – seems to be somewhat under-appreciated.

    Stephen C. Gerard, Managing Director at Standard & Poor's Corporate Value Consulting, says that there is "general conceptual understanding of Statement 141 by corporate management and finance teams. But the real impact will not be felt until the next deal is done." And that deal in FAS 141 parlance will be a "purchase" since "poolings" are no longer recognized.

    Consistent M&A Accounting

    The FASB, in issuing Statement No. 141, concluded that "virtually all business combinations are acquisitions and, thus, all business combinations should be accounted for in the same way that other asset acquisitions are accounted for – based on the values exchanged."

    In defining how business combinations are to be accounted for, FAS 141 supersedes parts of APB Opinion No. 16. That Opinion allowed companies involved in a merger or acquisition to use either pooling-of-interest or purchase accounting. The choice hinged on whether the deal met 12 specified criteria. If so, pooling-of-interest was required.

    Over time, "pooling" became the accounting method of choice, especially in "mega-deal" transactions. That, in the words of the FASB, resulted in "…similar business combinations being accounted for using different methods that produced dramatically different financial statement results."

    FAS 141 seeks to level that playing field and improve M&A financial reporting by:
      • Better reflecting the investment made in an acquired entity based on the values exchanged.
      • Improving the comparability of reported financial information on an apples-to-apples basis.
      • Providing more complete financial information about the assets acquired and liabilities assumed in business combinations.
      • Requiring disclosure of information on the business strategy and reasons for the acquisition.

    When announcing FAS 141, the FASB wrote: "This Statement requires those (intangible assets) be recognized as assets apart from goodwill if they meet one of two criteria – the contractual-legal criterion or the separability criterion."

    Unchanged by the new rule are the fundamentals of purchase accounting and the purchase price allocation methodology for measuring goodwill: that is, goodwill represents the amount remaining after allocating the purchase price to the fair market values of the acquired assets, including recognized intangibles, and assumed liabilities at the date of the acquisition.

    "What has changed," says Steve Gerard, "is the rigor companies must apply in determining what assets to break out of goodwill and separately recognize and amortize."

    Thus, in an unheralded way, FAS 141 introduces a process of identifying and placing value on intangible assets that could prove to be a new experience for many in corporate finance, as well as a costly and time-consuming exercise. Nonetheless, an exercise critical to compliance with the new rule.

    Continued at  http://www.cfodirect.com/cfopublic.nsf/vContentPrint/CA13B226B214A04085256CB000512D34?OpenDocument  

     


    A Little Like Dirty Pooling Accounting
    Tyco Undervalues Acquired Assets and Overvalues Acquired Liabilities: 

    Tyco International Ltd. said Monday it has agreed to pay the Securities and Exchange Commission $50 million to settle charges related to allegations of accounting fraud by the high-tech conglomerate's prior management. The regulatory agency had accused Tyco of inflating operating earnings, undervaluing acquired assets, overvaluing acquired liabilities and using improper accounting rules, company spokeswoman Sheri Woodruff said. 'The accounting practices violated federal securities laws,'' she said.
    "Tyco to Pay S.E.C. $50 Million on Accounting Charges," The New York Times, April 17, 2006 --- http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/business/AP-Tyco-SEC-Fine.html?_r=1&oref=slogin

    April 17, 2006 reply from Saeed Roohani

    Bob,

    Assuming improper accounting practices by Tyco negatively impacted investors and creditors in the capital markets, why SEC gets the $50 M? Shouldn't SEC give at least some of it back to the people potentially hurt by such practices? Or damage to investors should only come from auditors' pocket?

    Saeed Roohani

    April 18, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Saeed,

    In a case like this it is difficult to identify particular victims and the extent of the damage of this one small set of accounting misdeeds in the complex and interactive multivariate world of information.

    The damage is also highly dispersed even if you confine the scope to just existing shareholders in Tyco at the particular time of the financial reports.

    One has to look at motives. I'm guessing that one motive was to provide overstated future ROIs from acquisitions in order to justify the huge compensation packages that the CEO (Kozlowski) and the CFO (Schwarz) were requesting from Tyco's Board of Directors for superior acquisition performance. Suppose that they got $125 million extra in compensation. The amount of damage for to each shareholder for each share of stock is rather minor since there were so many shares outstanding.

    Also, in spite of the illegal accounting, Kozlowski's acquisitions were and still are darn profitable for Tyco. I have a close friend (and neighbor) in New Hampshire, a former NH State Trooper, who became Koslowski's personal body guard. To this day my friend, Jack, swears that Kozlowski did a great job for Tyco in spite of possibly "stealing" some of Tyco's money. Many shareholders wish Kozlowski was still in command even if he did steal a small portion of the huge amount he made for Tyco. He had a skill at negotiating some great acquisition deals in spite of trying to take a bit more credit for the future ROIs than was justified under purchase accounting instead of virtual pooling accounting.

    I actually think Dennis Kozlowski was simply trying to get a bit larger commission (than authorized by the Board) for some of his good acquisition deals.

    Would you rather have a smart crook or an unimaginative bean counter managing your company? (Just kidding)

    Bob Jensen

    Bob Jensen's threads on the Tyco scandals are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm#PwC

    April 18, 2006 message reply Gregg Wilson

    Hi Bob Jensen

    From Forbes:

    <<But Briloff says what's particularly egregious is the fact that Tyco did not file with the SEC disclosure forms (known as 8K filings), which would have carried the exhibits setting forth the balance sheets and income statements of the acquired companies.

    "This is an even worse situation than under the old pooling accounting, " Briloff says, "because under that now vestigial method, investors and analysts could dig out the historical balance sheet and income statement for the acquired companies." >>

    Ah yes, the good old days, when accountants understood what mattered.

    Gregg

    April 18, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Interesting but still does not mean Abe wanted to pool those statements. Abe fought poolings like a tiger. He never said that accounting information before an acquisition is totally useless. He did say it could be misleading when pooled, especially in relation to terms of the acquisition.

    Bob Jensen


    Purchase Versus Pooling:  The Never Ending Debate

    March 29, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hope you don't mind another question.

    I worked on Wall Street during the other tech mania (late 60's) which included the conglomerate craze. I know pooling-of-interest accounting was kind of tarred and feathered in the ensuing meltdown, but I was never too clear why that was so. I am still wondering why bogus goodwill is preferable to retaining the financial track record of the combined companies. Are you aware of what the actual objections to p-o-i are?

    Gregg Wilson

    March 29, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Some investors are impressed by high ROI or ROE numbers. Keeping the denominator low with old historical cost numbers and the numerator high with future earnings numbers "inflated" ROI and ROE and made the mergers appear more successful than was actually the case.

    There are other problems with "dirty pooling."

    One of the best-known articles (from Barrons) was written by Professor Abe Briloff about "Dirty Pooling at McDonalds." McDonald's shares plummeted significantly the day that Briloff exposed dirty pooling by McDonald's  --- http://www.jstor.org/view/00014826/ap010167/01a00060/0 

    Actually, one of the arguments in favor of purchase accounting rather than pooling of interests is that in an arm's length transaction goodwill can actually be measured, unlike the pie-in-the sky valuations in a hypothetical world.

    Bob Jensen

    March 29, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Bob Jensen

    Well I wasn't able to find a site where I could access Abe's article.

    The "old numbers" are worth a lot to this user of financial statements, and I would much rather have the combined track record of the two companies than its obliteration. I am not sure why accountants feel that there is a problem revealing what the past and current combined ROE has been. The pooling-of-interest doesn't create that number, it only preserves it for those who want to use it.

    If you mean that the value of the exchanged stock is an actual measurement of goodwill then I would take very serious issue. There is no economic meaning to that number. Companies negotiate an exchange ratio. The relative value of the two stocks may matter, but the value of the exchanged stock has no relevance to the negotiation, so how could it be a measure of anything economic? All you have to do is look at the real cases of stock acquisitions that were made during the market boom to see how true that is and how spurious the numbers became. I always assumed that the amortization rules were changed because of the charade of company after company being forced to report pro forma earnings due to the ludicrous mountains of mythical goodwill.

    But even if the goodwill number were determinable why would you want to use it. The point isn't to have accurate values on the balance sheet. The point is retaining the historical relationships of the earnings model. Deferred costs are not assets that you want to value but the merely costs that are going to be expensed and the historical relationship of those costs to the resulting earnings is what tells you what the capital efficiency of the company is. I want that information. Why obliterate it?

    Gregg Wilson

    March 29, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Generally there are market values of the stocks at the date of the acquisition. These give some evidence of value at the time of the merger, although there are blockage factor considerations.

    In any case there is a long history of abuses of pooling to mislead investors. In some cases that was the main purpose such that without being able to use pooling accounting, acquisitions did not take place. In other words the main purpose was to deceive.

    A summary of FAS 141 is given at http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/stsum141.shtml 

    The standard itself discusses a lot of both theory and abuses. In general, academics fought against pooling. About the only parties in favor of pooling were the corporations themselves.

    Read the standard itself and you will learn a lot.

    Bob Jensen

    March 30, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Bob Jensen

    Well I would call that entire FAS 141 a lot of sophistries. Apples and oranges indeed. This is a case of trying to make an apple into an orange and getting a rotten banana.

    In the above example, if a company bought another company for more than its net worth, the excess price paid was attributable to goodwill and would have to be written off over a period of years. The problem is that the writing off goodwill creates an expense that lowers earnings. To get around this, companies use an accounting technique called pooling of interest. This practice allows the acquiring company to buy other companies at inflated prices and keep the goodwill charges off the company's books. This strategy has resulted in merger mania. It enables a corporation to buy another company at an inflated price using its own highly priced stock as currency. In honest times, this process would create huge amounts of goodwill that normally would have to be written off against future earnings. Today, companies avoid this detriment to their bottom line by pooling. The Merger Wave

    These accounting abuses can be credited to what is behind the current merger wave on Wall Street. Companies are using their inflated stock prices to buy other companies. The result of buying more companies brings in more sales and more profits, which Wall Street loves. Using the pooling method of accounting, companies can acquire other companies at high prices without the consequences of depressing future earnings through the amortization of goodwill.

    I was trying to find example of the abuses you were talking about. I thought this was a terrific one. What fantastic misinformation!

    The thing that's so laughable about these arguments is that they take investors for fools. In a stock acquisition not a nickel of cash has been expended, so everyone understands that the purchase goodwill is just a little paper farce that the accountants make us go through. The amortization thing doesn't effect the price of the stock because it has no e ffect whatsoever on the company's actual profitability or cash flow. Have you read about the efficient market? I was really struck in this last go around at the willingness of companies to take on billions of dollars in goodwill that literally dwarfed everything else on their balance sheets and caused their GAP earnings to be huge losses. They reported their pro forma earnings and everyone understood that they hadn't really paid 10 billion dollars for a company that was worth 100 million. I looked at a couple of the deals and the share exchange ratios were really very fair relative to the fundamentals (not the share prices). They were good solid deals, between smallish tech companies that were very profitable in the capex bubble and so were richly priced as one would expect. So the accountants caved and changed the rule, and this little pint sized company took some astounding goodwill writeoff the next year and the stock did nothing. Did the guy who wrote 141 really think that phony made up good will is the same thing as actual paid for with cash good will? I always get the feeling that the companies relented on this one so they could fight their battles on the ones that really matter. An orange is an orange, and an apple is an apple.

    I think accountants have really misunderstood the whole abuse issue. I worked on Wall Street during the conglomerate fad and spent hours analyzing stock acquisitions. There were some accounting abuses but they were really not about pooling-of-interest. The people that really got hurt were not the investors so much as the entrepreneurs who sold their companies. Textron started the whole conglomerate thing and the business schools wet their pants over the idea and pretty soon you could call yourself a congolmerate and get a high stock price. I can't tell you how tired I got of hearing the word "synergy". What was basically happening was that the companies were making really good deals and getting a lot of value for the stock they were giving up, partly because of the whole aura of the thing. When you get a really good share exchange it makes your earnings higher than they would be otherwise. Of course there is nothing abusive about this. It's just the reality of doing a good deal. The real earnings and cash flow are indeed and in fact actually higher per share for the acquiring company. But of course that meant it took on the qualities of a self-fullfilling prophecy. Investors were not fools then and they're not fools now. They understood perfectly what was going on and hopped on for the ride. It was the entrepreneurs that were selling their companies that were duped. They were the ones that ended up with most of the stock when the bubble burst.

    I remember going out to talk to Henry Singleton at Teledyne. What a brilliant man. He was telling me a story about a guy who was peddling his company and wanted a certain price which he was evaluating purely in terms of the value of the stock he was going to receive in the exchange. Henry said that he sent him off to one of the schlock companies that he knew would "pay" him what he wanted. We had our little moment of bemusement, because even though it was early in the melt down stage, the guy was obviously going to come up short. He just wasn't willing to look at what he was getting a whole bunch of shares in, and he wasn't going to be able to sell it for a while. So what do you think? Is it the accountants job to protect that guy from his own greed?

    By the way, Henry was playing his own games, and they weren't really about pooling of interest. He was making literally hundreds of stock acquisitions most of which were not really growth companies but good solid little cash cows, and then he would slip in a nice medium sized cash acquisitions once a quarter to make his "internal growth" target. He would say that he was doing 15% external growth (the deal value factor) and 15% internal growth. The thing about pooling was that you could really see what the year-to-year growth of the combined companies was, so Henry had to do his fix. Then after the stock tanked with the other congomerates he was in great shape with all his cash flow so he started doing debt swaps for the depressed stock. I was really sad when I heard he had died prematurely. It would have been fun to see what his next move would have been. The company languished without him.

    Anyway I think the whole thing got interpreted as a pooling-of-interest abuse, but as far as I'm concerned it really didn't have anything to do with the accounting treatment. It's not the accountants business to police the markets. In a stock deal the goodwill is all funny money anyways, so the way I see it we are mucking up the balance sheet for no good reason. You can amortize til you're blue in the face but it's not really going to have any affect on anything real. It's not cash and it never was. But you can pretend.

    Gregg Wilson

    March 30, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    FASB rules now require writing off goodwill only to the extent it is deemed impaired.

    If you want to publish on such issues you have to provide something other than off the top-of-your-head evidence. Do you have any evidence that companies tend to buy other companies at inflated prices above what companies are actually worth in terms of synergy and possibly oligopoly benefits (such as when AT&T bought Bell South). You need to define "inflated prices." About the only good examples I found of this on a large scale was during the S&L bubble of the 1980s and the technology bubble of the 1990s when almost everything was inflated in value. But at the time, who could've predicted if and when the bubble would burst? It's always easier to assess value in hindsight.

    In general, it's very hard to define "inflated value" since the worth of Company B to Company A may be far different than the worth of Company B to Company C. You can always make an assumption that CEOs acquiring companies are all stupid and/or crooks, but this assumption is just plain idiotic. Many acquisitions pay off very nicely such as when Tyco bought most of its acquisitions. Even crooks like Dennis Koswalski often make good acquisitions for their companies. Koswalski simply thought he should get a bigger piece of the action from his good deals.

    Of course there are obvious isolated cases such as when Time Warner bought AOL, but in this case AOL used fraudulent accounting that was not detected.

    I'm a little curious about what you would recommend for a balance sheet of the merged AB Company when Company A buys Company B having the following balance sheets:

    Company A
    Cash    $200
    Land    $100 having a current exit value of $200
    Equity ($300)

    Company B
    Land     $10 having a current exit value of $100
    Equity  ($10)

    Company A buys all Company B shares for $120 million in cash and merges the accounts. Company A and B business operations are all merged such that maintaining Company B as a subsidiary makes no sense. Employees of Company B are highly skilled real estate investors who now work for Company AB. The extra $20 million paid above the land current values of Company B was paid mainly to acquire the highly skilled employees of Company B.

    Company AB
    Cash     $ 80
    Land          ?
    Equity   ($ ?)

    Why would a pooling be better than purchase accounting in the above instance? I think not.

    Bob Jensen

    March 30, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    I certainly didn't mean to imply that cash acquisitions should be treated as pooling-of-interest. On the contrary I was trying to make the point that they are totally different situations, and can't be treated effectively by the same accounting rule. The cash is the whole point.

    Gregg Wilson

    March 30, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    I guess I still don't see a convincing argument why pooling is better for non-cash deals since you still have the same problem as with cash deals. That problem is badly out of date historical cost accounts on the books that are totally meaningless in the acquisition negotiations. If they are totally meaningless in negotiations, why should historical costs be pooled into the acquiring firm's book instead of more relevant numbers reflecting the fair values of the tangible assets at the time of the acquisition?

    Of course there are many issues that your raise below, but I don't think they argue for pooling.

    Bob Jensen

    March 30, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Bob Jensen

    Because historical costs are the historical record of the company's capital efficiency. As my old accounting teacher pointed out, the earnings model is a gross approximation at best, but if persued with consistency and conservativeness it can be a good indicator of the capital efficiency of the firm and it's ability to generate a stream of future cash returns. For me the killer argument in that regard is this. The reality of a company is the stream of cash returns itself, dividends if you will, and that's what the stock is worth. It makes no difference whether the company has liberal accounting policies or conservative accounting policies. If applied consistently then that rate of return on equity will define the stream of future cash returns. It can be liberal accounting with a low ROE and high E and a high reinvestment rate, or conservative accounting with a high ROE and low E and a low reinvestment rate, but the resulting stream of dividends is the same. The historical deferred costs and historical ROE are the evidence of value, but they depend on consistent application of some kind of accounting standards and rules whether they be liberal or conservative (conservative has its advantages). I would rather have that evidence than know what the current "fair value" of the assets is. Those values don't help me determine the value of the stock. Pooling of interest is terrific, because it recreates that earnings model history for the combined companies. The historical costs are not meaningless to the negotiations but rather are the basis for the negotiations, for they are the evidence that the companies are using to determine the share exchange ratio that they will accept. A low ROE company will have less to bargain with than a high ROE company, all else being equal. There are potentials for abuse in the differing accounting standards of the two entities, but if major changes in the accounting standards of one of the companies occur, then the accountants should disclose that material fact.

    Gregg Wilson

    March 30, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hardly a measure of capital efficiency. I have the 1981 U.S. Steel Annual Report back when FAS 33 was still in force. U.S. Steel had to report under both historical cost and current cost bases.

    Under historical cost, U.S. Steel reported over $1 billion in net earnings. On a current cost basis, all earnings disappeared and a net loss of over $300 million was reported.

    I consider the $1 billion net income reported under historical cost to be a misleading figure of capital efficiency.

    I think you should first read the FASB's standard on pooling versus purchase accounting in detail. Then see if you still prefer pooling. Also study http://www.jstor.org/view/00014826/ap010167/01a00060/0 

    You might want to compare your analysis below with what Fama states at http://library.dfaus.com/reprints/interview_fama_tanous/ 

    Bob Jensen

    March 31, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Gregg,

    The law views this in reverse. Equity is a residual claim on assets under securities laws. But the claim itself has no bearing on the historical (deferred) cost amount since, in liquidation, the historical cost is irrelevant. And in negotiating acquisition deals historical cost is irrelevant. I have trouble imagining acquisitions where it would be relevant since asset appraisals are essential in acquisitions.

    Deferred cost such as book value of buildings and equipment is also rendered meaningless by entirely arbitrary accumulated depreciation contra accounts. Your argument does not convince me that pooling is better than purchase accounting in acquisitions.

    Since you feel so strongly about this, I suggest that you expose your theories to the academic accounting world. Consider subscribing (free) to the AECM at http://pacioli.loyola.edu/aecm/  (Don't be mislead by the technology description of this listserv. It has become the discussion forum for all matters of accounting theory.)

    Then carefully summarize your argument for pooling and see how accounting professors respond to your arguments.

    See if you can convince some accounting professors. You've not yet convinced me that pooling is better.

    Bob Jensen

    April 5, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    I have been having an e-mail discussion with Bob Jensen about accounting of stock acquisitions, and he kindly suggested that I post my thoughts on the matter in this forum. I am not an academic and I am here only because, as a user of financial statements, I find purchase accounting of stock acquisitions puzzling.

    (1) To me, the value of the exchanged shares is not an economically relevant amount and is certainly not a purchase price. The price of a stock acquisition is the share exchange ratio and what is negotiated is the equity participation of the two groups of stockholders in the combined companies. In the latest boom period purchase accounting often produced extreme purchase prices many times what any cash buyer would have paid and, when amortization was employed, large losses for the acquiror which prompted pro forma reporting. If there was any economic reality to the accounting treatment, why did those managements not lose their jobs? They didn't "pay" the value of the exchanged shares. On the contrary, the share exchange ratio that they negotiated was perfectly reasonable and beneficial.

    (2) The exchanged stock value as purchase price is a non-cash paper value which, regardless of the amortization or impairment treatment, is ignored by this investor and, from what I have seen, investors in general. It has no relevance to determining the discounted value of the future cash returns, simply because the acquisition was in fact a combination of equity interests and not a cash purchase and there was never an economically relevant cash cost.

    (3) Pooling-of-interest is good because it preserves the historical profitability history of the combined companies and accurately reflects the merger of equity interests which has in fact taken place.

    (4) There is nothing deceptive or abusive about pooling accounting. If the ROE is higher it's because that's the right ROE. It will result in a more accurate, and not a less accurate, projection of future cash returns.

    If company A and company B are very similar fundamentally and both stocks are selling at 20 and they are negotiating a share for share exchange and interest rates drop suddenly and both stocks go to 25, then A isn't going to think oh-my-gosh we are "paying" 25% more for B and drop out of the negotiations. On the contrary they will take the market action as validation of the negotiated exchange ratio which is the price. The stocks could go to 90 and it still wouldn't change anything except the size of the goodwill on the balance sheet of the combined companies that I have to back out of my analysis.

    Gregg Wilson

    April 5, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

    --- Gregg Wilson wrote: I have been having an e-mail discussion with Bob Jensen about accounting of stock acquisitions, and he kindly suggested that I post my thoughts on the matter in this forum.

    (snip) --- end of quote ---

    Consider the following two sets of transactions:

    1. P Corporation (P is for purchaser) raises $100 by issuing ten new shares to the capital market. It uses the $100 cash to purchase 100% of the outstanding stock of T (as in Target) Corporation.

    2. P issues ten new shares to the stockholders of T in exchange for 100% of the outstanding stock of T.

    Questions:

    1. Should the accounting for the assets of T in the consolidated financial statements of P differ between these two transactions?

    2. The crux of your critique of purchase accounting seems to your assertion: "To me, the value of the exchanged shares is not an economically relevant amount and is certainly not a purchase price."

    a. Is the $100 cash raised by P in transaction #1 above an economically relevant amount?

    b. Is the $100 cash transferred by P to the shareholders of T in transaction #1 above a purchase price?

    Richard C. Sansing
    Associate Professor of Business Administration
    Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
    100 Tuck Hall Hanover, NH 03755

    April 5, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Richard Sansing

    I would say the two transactions are not equivalent.

    In 1. the stockholders of T end out with $100. In 2. the stockholders of T end out with shares of stock in P.

    1. is still a cash purchase and
    2. is still an exchange of shares.

    Say that P has 100 shares outstanding. In 2. what P and T have negotiated is that in combining the two companies the shareholders of T will end up with 10 shares in the combined companies and P will end up with 100. That is obviously based on an assessment that the value of P is 10 times the value of T based on their relative fundamentals and ability to produce future cash returns. The price at which P can sell it's stock to some third party is not relevant.

    Gregg Wilson

    April 6, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

    --- Gregg Wilson wrote:

    I would say the two transactions are not equivalent.

    In 1. the stockholders of T end out with $100. In 2. the stockholders of T end out with shares of stock in P.

    1. is still a cash purchase and 2. is still an exchange of shares.

    --- end of quote ---

    That the former shareholders of T wind up with different assets in the two settings is not in dispute. Let's try this once more.

    In response to your original post, I posed three questions. They were:

    1. Should the accounting for the assets of T in the consolidated financial statements of P differ between these two transactions?

    2. a. Is the $100 cash raised by P in transaction #1 above an economically relevant amount?

    b. Is the $100 cash transferred by P to the shareholders of T in transaction #1 above a purchase price?

    You answered none of them. You did remark:

    "The price at which P can sell it's stock to some third party is not relevant."

    but I did not pose a question to which that is a plausible answer. I have stipulated a transaction, that P sells--not could sell, did sell--ten new shares of P stock in exchange for $100 cash as part of transaction #1. Question 2a is a simple one. Is the $100 cash that P received for its stock in the stipulated transaction an economically relevant amount? If later in the discussion you want to dispute a premise in an argument I advance, you are of course free to do so. But I have not yet advanced an argument. I have simply posed some questions.

    You have chosen to enter a community in which abstract reasoning involving hypothetical examples the norm. You can participate in this community, or not. If you answer the three questions, we can proceed, because then I think I can understand what it is about the purchase method of accounting that you find objectionable. But right now I am unsure how you are thinking about the problem.

    Richard C. Sansing
    Associate Professor of Business Administration
    Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
    100 Tuck Hall Hanover, NH 03755

    April 6, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Richard Sansing

    Maybe I should qualify my "Yes" answer. Answers 2 and 3 are yes to the extent they are economically relevant within transaction set 1. They are not economically relevant to transaction set 2.

    Gregg Wilson

    April 6, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

    ---Gregg Wilson wrote:

    Answer to all questions is yes.

    Maybe I should qualify that. Answers 2 and 3 are yes to the extent they are economically relevant within transaction set 1. They are not economically relevant to transaction set 2.

    --- end of quote ---

    Okay, that helps. Given your answers, I think I can put forward the case for purchase accounting. Transaction set #1 is recorded in the following manner.

    Sale of new equity for cash:

    Cash 100
         Stockholder equity 100

    Purchase of T's assets for cash:

    Assets 100
         Cash 100

    When the smoke clears, P has recorded assets with a book value of 100 and stockholder equity of 100.

    Purchase accounting takes the view that P's acquisition of T's assets for stock essentially collapses these two transactions into one, recording the value of the T assets at the market price of the P stock. In contrast, if T's assets had a book value of 60, pooling of interest would record assets of 60 and equity of 60.

    The issue is whether this "collapsing" is appropriate. P and T certainly wind up in the same position under both transactions. Whether the shareholders of P and T are in the same position depends on their portfolio choices.

    Suppose first that I behave in accordance with the principles of Capital Markets 101, in which I hold the market portfolio plus the risk-free asset. Before either transaction #1 or #2, I hold (say) 10 P shares (out of 100 outstanding) and 1 T share (out of 10 outstanding).

    After either transaction, I own 11 P shares (out of 110

    outstanding.) If all shareholders behave as I do, then every party associated with the transaction is in the same position under both sets of transactions. The burden seems to be on those advocating the pooling method to explain why the accounting should differ when the results to every party are the same.

    Now suppose instead that shareholders, for whatever reason, do not behave in this manner, and the two transactions lead to substantive differences at the shareholder level (but not at the corporate level). Should differences between the two transactions at the shareholder level dictate different accounting treatments at the corporate level? Why?

    Finally, let's consider the assertions you made in your original post.

    "To me, the value of the exchanged shares is not an economically relevant amount and is certainly not a purchase price. (snip) In the latest boom period purchase accounting often produced extreme purchase prices many times what any cash buyer would have paid..."

    When the stock was issued for cash, you considered the cash price paid economically relevant (my question 2a); and when the assets were sold for cash, you considered it a purchase price (my question

    2b.) Yet when the transaction is collapsed, you consider the market value of shares an not economically relevant amount and not a purchase price. So if transaction were arranged as a stock deal, are you arguing that P would issue more than ten shares to the shareholders of T in exchange for their T stock? Why?

    Richard Sansing

    April 7, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Richard Sansing

    I was going to followup this morning, and noticed that you had already responded.

    On the details of your case... What I didn't understand was the equivalence of the subscribers to the P stock, and the T shareholders. Why would we presume that they are one in the same? The hypothetical subscribers to the P stock obviously would view the price of P as economically relevant. But the T shareholders are only interested in the shares of P that they end up with. From their point of view the collapsible transaction could be executed at any price and it would still bear the same result for them. It's a wash with regard to price. That is why I qualified my response to question 2 by indicating that it was not economically relevant to transaction 2. The price of P is an economic reality, but not one which consititutes a purchase price of T.

    I wouldn't say that pooling looks to the book value as a value of the combined companies, any more than book value is the value of any other company. What pooling does is reflect the merging of the two historical earnings and financial records of the two companies to reflect that the nature of the transaction as a merging of equity interests with an indeterminate "purchase price".

    I had never thought about the compensation issue. I'll get back to you if I can figure something out.

    Gregg

    April 7, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

    ---Gregg Wilson wrote:
    P and T have negotiated that P should issue ten shares in exchange for T stock. That is the economic reality. (snip) And there is no economic reason that we should pick the one that happens to coincide with the actual current price of P's stock, because that was not an input of determining the exchange ratio. The problem is that there is no determinant value for a share exchange acquisition. Using the current P stock price is merely an arbitrary convention (snip)
    --- end of quote ---

    The current market price of P is part of the economic reality, as is the current book value of T. Purchase accounting looks to the former to record the assets of T on the books of P; pooling looks to the latter.

    Okay, time for a new thought experiment. The CEO of P corporation receives a salary of $400K plus 1,000 shares of P stock on July 1. These are shares, not options, and they are not restricted. On July 1, when the shares were delivered to the CEO, the stock had a market value of $60 per share, a book value of $40 per share, and a par value of $1 per share. Note that the amount of shares delivered is not a function of the stock price.

    Record the entry for compensation expense for the year. The accounts are provided below.

    Compensation expense
         Cash Stockholder's equity

    Richard C. Sansing
    Associate Professor of Business Administration
    Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
    100 Tuck Hall Hanover, NH 03755

    April 6, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Richard Sansing

    I was going to follow up this morning, and noticed that you had already responded.

    On the details of your case... What I didn't understand was the equivalence of the subscribers to the P stock, and the T shareholders. Why would we presume that they are one in the same? The hypothetical subscribers to the P stock obviously would view the price of P as economically relevant. But the T shareholders are only interested in the shares of P that they end up with. From their point of view the collapsible transaction could be executed at any price and it would still bear the same result for them. It's a wash with regard to price. That is why I qualified my response to question 2 by indicating that it was not economically relevant to transaction 2. The price of P is an economic reality, but not one which consititutes a purchase price of T.

    I wouldn't say that pooling looks to the book value as a value of the combined companies, any more than book value is the value of any other company. What pooling does is reflect the merging of the two historical earnings and financial records of the two companies to reflect that the nature of the transaction as a merging of equity interests with an indeterminate "purchase price".

    I had never thought about the compensation issue. I'll get back to you if I can figure something out.

    Gregg

    April 7, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

    --- Gregg Wilson wrote:

    On the details of your case... What I didn't understand was the equivalence of the subscribers to the P stock, and the T shareholders. Why would we presume that they are one in the same? The hypothetical subscribers to the P stock obviously would view the price of P as economically relevant. But the T shareholders are only interested in the shares of P that they end up with. From their point of view the collapsible transaction could be executed at any price and it would still bear the same result for them. (snip)

    I had never thought about the compensation issue. I'll get back to you if I can figure something out.

    --- end of quote ---

    The setting in which P and T shareholders are the same is an interesting special case in which the distinction you regard as crucial--the difference in what the T shareholders hold after transaction #1 and transaction #2--vanishes. And it is not a unreasonable case to consider, as it is consistent with finance portfolio theory in which all investors hold the market portfolio.

    Let me restate what I hear you saying to see if I understand. Investors that receive P stock for cash care about the price of P stock. Investors that receive P stock in a merger care only about the number of shares they receive, but do not care about the price of those shares. Do I have that right?

    Your answer to the compensation question will, I think, help me understand how you are framing these issues.

    Richard Sansing

    April 7, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Richard Sansing

    I am afraid I am not well-versed in the compensation/option issues though I probably should do better. So without the benefit of prior knowledge...

    I guess if there is a compensation expense, it is not necessarily one that is determinable. If there were 100,000 shares outstanding, then from the owners point of view they expect that the incremental net cash returns produced by the extra efforts of the CEO motivated by the stock grant can be valued at a minimum of 1/100 of the value of the company's future cash returns without the CEO's extra effort. But relative values aren't costs and it's unclear to me whether the owners care what the current price of the stock is. Maybe not since the grant is not a function of the stock price. That's as far as I've gotten. I need to get some other things done. I'll keep thinking on it, but I seem to be stumped for now.

    Gregg Wilson

    April 7, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

    Hi Gregg Wilson,

    I think I am starting to understand your perspective, but I need a little more input from you. First, here are some excerpts from your recent contributions to this thread.

    ---Gregg Wilson wrote: I guess if there is a compensation expense, it is not necessarily one that is determinable. (Note: The compensation consisted of $400K cash and 1,000 shares of stock with a market price of $60 per share--RS)

    ...it's unclear to me whether the owners care what the current price of the stock is.

    And there is no economic reason that we should pick the one that happens to coincide with the actual current price of P's stock.

    Using the current P stock price is merely an arbitrary convention.

    The price at which P can sell it's stock to some third party is not relevant.

    The price of P is relevant not as an absolute number, but only in terms of its ratio to the real or imputed price of T.

    ---end of quotations

    In the compensation issue that I posed, I stipulated that the market value of the stock was $60 per share. Tell me what that number means to you. At the most fundamental level, why do you think the price might be $60 instead of $6 or $600? I'm not looking for a "because that's where the market cleared that day" answer, but something that gets at the most primitive, fundamental reasons stock prices are what they are. And when they change, why do they change?

    Richard Sansing

    April 8, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Richard Sansing

    That's easy. I subcribe to the dividend-discount-model view of stock prices. Stock prices are basically a function of interest rates and expected sustainable future profitability (ROE; the best estimator we have (with reinvestment rate) for those future cash returns).

    In fact I use my own DDM to convert stock prices to expectational ROEs. Such a DDM is a complete model of stock valuation, and can fully explain stock price levels from the 10-12% ROE low reinvestment low interest rate period of the late 30s, to the 12-15% ROE high interest rate period of the 70s, to the 25% cap-weighted ROE and low interest rates of the capex peak in 2000. Stock prices are extremely volatile because they are a point-in-time market consensus of the future sustainable profitability of the company. A decline in profitabliity expectations will typically produce a price change of two or three times the magnitude, while a change in discount rate will have a more subdued impact.

    Gregg Wilson

    April 8, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

    --- Gregg Wilson wrote: I subscribe to the dividend-discount-model view of stock prices. (snip) --- end of quote ---

    Understood. The theme that has emerged in this thread is that you are uncomfortable in situations in which GAAP would use the current market price of the firm's stock as an input when determining an accounting entry.

    Let's put aside the purchase/pooling dispute to look at the compensation question. Under the set of facts that I stipulated, I don't think there is any controversy regarding the appropriate accounting treatment. It would be:

    Compensation expense $460K Cash $400K Equity $60K

    A rationale for this treatment is to decompose the equity transfer into two components. First, suppose the firm sells 1,000 shares of new equity to the CEO at the market price of $60 per share (debit cash, credit equity); second, suppose the firm pays the CEO a cash salary of $460K (credit cash, debit compensation expense.) Collapsing these two transactions into one (transfer of $400K cash plus equity worth $60K in exchange for services) doesn't change the accounting treatment.

    Now change some of the numbers and labels around and let the firm issue new P equity to T in exchange for all of its equity. The purchase method uses the value of the P stock issued to record the assets and liabilities of T.

    Which brings us full circle to your original post. You wrote:

    "To me, the value of the exchanged shares is not an economically relevant amount and is certainly not a purchase price."

    I argue that the value of P stock is relevant and is a purchase price, in both the compensation case and P's acquisition of T.

    Richard Sansing

    April 9, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Richard Sansing

    I trust you are having a pleasant weekend. Before tackling the compensation case etc, can you tell me how we account for open market share repurchases.

    Gregg Wilson

    April 10, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

    --- You wrote: Before tackling the compensation case etc, can you tell me how we account for open market share repurchases. --- end of quote ---

    Credit cash, debit equity; details can vary depending on whether the repurchase is a major retirement or acquiring the shares to distribute as part of compensation. If the latter, the debit is to Treasury Stock.

    Richard Sansing

    April 11, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Richard Sansing

    Well I'm still in the same place. It seems to me that when a company pays an employee $60,000 in cash they are compensating them for services rendered in that value. When a company grants stock to an employee they are diluting the interests of the current equity participants in the expectation that the employee will be motivated to more than compensate them by an improved stream of cash returns in the future; the point of making the employee an equity participant in the first place, rather than an immediately richer individual. So I don't see the relevance of the price of the shares to the trans 2 again. Except in this case the use of the market share price seems even more suspect in the collapsible transaction, since the company and the CEO could execute the wash transactions between themselves at any price. Also the dilution is the cost, so adding an additional phantom non-cash cost seems to me to be a double counting. It also has the same characteristics as the pooling transaction where very bizarre results could be possible. If a company had a 50 PE then a 2% dilution would erase the company's entire earnings for the period while if the company had a 10 PE a 2% dilution would erase 20% of the earnings. It's the same 2% dilution.

    So is that it Richard? Am I a hopeless dolt? I'm sorry but I can't get there on the collapsible transaction. Nor do I understand why the lack of rational result doesn't matter to anyone. I don't want to go look up the data again, but I know when JDS Uniphase bought E-tek the share exchange was quite reasonable but the value of the exchanged stock was in the multi billions and was probably like 500 times the eanrings of E-tek. So when this pipsqueek company goes to raise billions of dollars at their current market price, it's not just whether they could sell that much stock, but rather how they would justify it to the buyers. "Use of Proceeds: we are going to go out and make a cash acquisition of a company called E-tek and we are going to pay billions of dollars and 500 times E-teks's earnings and many many multiples of book value and sales." So what would their real chances be of getting away with that, and why doesn't that seem like a phoney number to anyone? Why doesn't it seem funny that the "prices" of stock purchase acquisitions are basically randomly distributed from the reasonable to the ludicrous to the sublime? Isn't that evidence that the price is uneconomic? Is this really the basic justification for the economic relevance of the purchase number, or is there something more?

    Gregg Wilson

    April 11, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

    --- Gregg Wilson wrote:

    It seems to me that when a company pays an employee $60,000 in cash they are compensating them for services rendered in that value. When a company grants stock to an employee they are diluting the interests of the current equity participants in the expectation that the employee will be motivated to more than compensate them by an improved stream of cash returns in the future; the point of making the employee an equity participant in the first place, rather than an immediately richer individual. (snip) Why doesn't it seem funny that the "prices" of stock purchase acquisitions are basically randomly distributed from the reasonable to the ludicrous to the sublime? Isn't that evidence that the price is uneconomic?

    --- end of quote ---

    I did not stipulate an assumption that the employee had to hold the 1,000 shares granted.

    The interests of the current stockholders are not diluted in the specified transaction ($400K cash plus stock worth $60K) relative to an alternative cash compensation arrangement of equal value ($460K cash.)

    You had earlier indicated a belief that stock prices are best explain by a dividend discount model. Now you suggest that they are random. If you think they are random, of course, I quite understand your discomfort using stock price as an input to the accounting system; but GAAP can use stock price as an input in many transactions, and it is that, not the purchase method per se, that appears to trouble you.

    Anecdotes regarding one firm "over-paying" for another in a stock deal don't add much to our understanding, and in any case the issues involving merger premiums and acquisition method may be unrelated to the financial accounting treatment of the acquisition. There is a large and growing literature on this topic; see for example:

    Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. 2003. Stock market driven acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics 70 (December): 295-311.

    Richard Sansing

    April 11, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

    --- Gregg Wilson wrote:

    <<> The interests of the current stockholders are not diluted in the specified > transaction ($400K cash plus stock worth $60K) relative to an > alternative cash compensation arrangement of equal value ($460K > cash.)>>

    I'm confused. Aren't there 1,000 more shares outstanding?

    --- end of quote ---

    Yes. Suppose before any compensation is paid, 100K shares are outstanding and the firm is worth $6,460,000. After we pay $460K compensation, the firm is worth $6,000,000, or $60 per share.

    If instead we compensate the CEO with $400K and 1,000 shares, after compensating the CEO the firm is worth $6,460,000 - $400,000 =$6,060,000 and 101K shares are outstanding, still with a value of $60 per share (because $6,060,000/101,000 = $60).

    With regard to the rest of the thread, I think we are going around in circles. Purchase accounting uses the price of P shares to record the assets of T on P's financial statements. If that price is meaningful, goodwill is meaningful; if the price is random, goodwill is too.

    Richard Sansing

    April 11, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Richard Sansing

    If I spend $460,000 I certainly hope that my company isn't worth $460,000 less or I certainly wouldn't spend the money. Hopefully the present value of the impact of the $460,000 on future net cash returns will at least exceed the cash expenditure. The same could be said for the 1,000 shares, although they are not a book cost but merely a redistribution of equity participation.

    But by your logic I should point out that the company was worth $60.60 per share after the $400,000 total loss expenditure. Now by issuing 1,000 shares the company is only worth $60.00 per share. Dilution?

    Well it has certainly been an interesting conversation, and I do thank you for your time and interest. I have learned a great deal. I would agree that we are at an impasse. All my best to you and yours.

    Gregg Wilson

    April 11, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Richard Sansing

    Sorry for the confusion. I was referring to the value of the exchanged shares of stock in the purchase acquisitions, the "price" that purchase accounting puts on the deal which becomes in fact random because it bears no relationship to the economic basis of the negotiation.

    <<> The interests of the current stockholders are not diluted in the specified > transaction ($400K cash plus stock worth $60K) relative to an > alternative cash compensation arrangement of equal value ($460K > cash.)>>

    I'm confused. Aren't there 1,000 more shares outstanding?

    > Anecdotes regarding one firm "over-paying" for another in a stock > deal don't add much to our understanding,>>

    Apparently not, but it should. We should be asking why any of those managements still have a job. The point is they didn't overpay. The share exchange ratio in the JDS/E-tek deal was quite reasonable and resulting in a fair allocation of equity ownership between the two groups of shareholders. It just had nothing to do with the market value of the JDS stock that was exchanged. The monstrocity of the goodwill is a tip off that something is wrong about the treatment, not that the buyer overpaid.

    <<> merger premiums and acquisition method may be unrelated to the financial > accounting treatment of the acquisition.>>

    I think that's right. Management has caught on that the market doesn't care about the phony goodwill and they just do what's right for the company. There's always pro forma reporting if the GAAP reporting gets too messed up.

    Gregg Wilson

    April 12, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Gregg,

    You wrote: "There's always pro forma reporting if the GAAP reporting gets too messed up." End Quote

    I hardly think pro forma does a whole lot for investors when "GAAP gets messed up." The problem is that you can't compare pro forma, anything-goes, reports with any benchmarks at all --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#ProForma

    Appealing to pro forma reporting only weakens your case for an already defenseless case for pooling.

    Bob Jensen

    April 11, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Bob Jensen

    I think you misunderstand my point. I am surely not defending pro forma reporting. I would assume that one reason goodwill amortization was suspended was that it left companies with no other option. Management rightly assumes that investors want to know what the company is actually earning. If goodwill amortization was suspended for some other reason, what might it have been?

    Gregg Wilson

    April 13, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Richard Sansing and anyone who would care to reply.

    We have come to an impasse on purchase accounting, but I did have a question on pooling that I wanted to ask you about.

    I am old enough to have been hanging around Wall Street research departments in my misspent youth, and was there for the conglomerate craze in the late sixties, and these are the things I remember. After the Harvard B School did there endorsement of Textron, all you had to do was call yourself a conglomerate and talk about synergy and you'd have an immediate following for your stock. Not only that, but you seemed to be able to make share exchange acquisitions on favorable terms which were accretive to your earnings, and pretty soon you had a kind of self-fullfilling prophecy going on. I did some work on Teledyne and even went out to California and met Henry Singleton. He used to talk about 15% internal growth, and 15% external growth. The external part was the accretion to earnings from stock acquisitions. Well we know that the whole thing ended badly, although Henry was nobody's fool and had been buying little cash-cow companies all along despite the sales pitch, so he was in far better shape than some.

    Now for years afterwards you keep hearing this idea that pooling is abusive because companies can use their "high priced" stock to make acquisitions, especially in periods of market enthusiasm like the late sixties. I guess what is really being said is that companies stand a better chance of making accretive acquisitions when times are good and the stock is selling at a high price, and the whole thing is in danger of becoming another ponzi scheme like the conglomerate fad all over again, because the accretion to earnings will then reinforce the high price of the stock. There is a perception that the price of the stock matters and because it matters we have to somehow account for that mattering in the accounting treatment of the acquisition.

    My biggest concern with this conclusion is that the problem is not the accounting treatment. If a company makes a favorable share exchange acquisition which is accretive to earnings, then that is what has happened. That is an accurate portrayal of economic reality. There is no denying that the company made a GOOD DEAL. They ended up with a share of the combined companies that is quite favorable to their interests. The second problem is that in many circumstances the value of the exchanged shares is much less of a factor than we fear. If the acquired company has publically traded shares, then the price of those shares will be reflecting the current market expectations as well. There is little motivation on the part of the seller to consider the deal in terms of the putative purchase value of the exchanged shares, because they can already cash in at a "high price". It is the relative values of the two share prices that will be the consideration. JDS Uniphase negotiates a share exchange acquisition with E-tek. The share exchange ratio is pretty fair to both companies, and is not really particularly accretive or advantageous to JDS, despite the fact that the value of the exchanged shares is in the multi billions of dollars and many many times what any reasonable cash buyer would pay. E-tek has a "high price" stock already. They don't need JDS to cash in on the market's current enthusiasm for net stocks. Would there be anything abusive or deceptive about accounting for this deal as a pooling-of-interest?

    Now I won't deny the fact that the price of the acquirors stock can influence the deal. Henry himself told me a story about a seller that came to him and was looking for a certain "price" expressed in terms of the value of the exchanged shares that he expected to get. The seller was a private company owned by a single entrepreneur, not untypical of the sellers at that time. Henry couldn't give him that many shares for his company because it wouldn't have met his accretion requirments, but he sent him to another conglomerator who he knew would, because that company's stock was flying high relative to it's underlying profitability which didn't compare to Teledyne's. The seller got his deal, but by the time the sellers shares came out of lockup that company was almost bankrupt. Though we think of the crash in conglomerate stocks in terms of the poor investors, it was really the sellers who were the biggest victims of the conglomerate fad, because they were left holding a much bigger proportion of the bag. And the investors weren't really investors. They were speculators and knew perfetly well they were playing a musical chairs game. There are two points (1) the sellers may consider the deal in terms of the value of the exchanged shares, particularly if they are non-publically-traded sellers, but they would probably be well advised to also consider that the shares they receive represent an equity interest in the combined companies, and (2) whatever the seller's motivation, the buyer will always be looking at the deal in terms of their equity share of the combined companies and whether the deal will be accretive or dilutive to their interests.

    When we say that pooling is abusive and deceptive what are we really talking about? Is it pooling itself, or is it the fear that rollup companies can make those self-fullfilling accretive acquisitions because of the desire of sellers to cash in on the market value of that stock, and that is somehow an evil thing? Is it really our responsibility as accountants to police the market and try to keep that from happening? Is an accretive acquistion really deceptive? Didn't the company actually make a good deal? Whom are we really protecting from whom?

    Gregg Wilson

    April 13, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU] -- end of quote ---

    --- Gregg Wilson wrote:

    Hi Richard Sansing and anyone who would care to reply.

    When we say that pooling is abusive and deceptive what are we really talking about?

    --- end of quote ---

    I will pass on continuing this thread, except to reiterate that your unhappiness with GAAP extends well beyond the purchase method. If we can't agree that the transfer of $60K of a publicly traded company's own stock, unrestricted, to an employee in exchanges for services should be accounted for as an expense of $60K, I doubt we can come to agreement on accounting for more complicated transactions that involve the transfer of a company's stock for anything other than cash.

    Richard Sansing

    April 13, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Richard Sansing

    Interesting argument. Sort of a combination of all or none and falling back on good authority. Well you did better than Bob Jensen's suggested reading approach, and for that I am grateful. My wife once opined that we should be happy to have heretics for they help us test the veracity of our faith. Still I better leave before I get burned at the stake.

    Regards,
    Gregg Wilson

    April 14, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    GAAP espouses the economic entity assumption. In what way does transferring stock to an employee represent a cost to the company? Is there any tangible evidence that the company is worse off? Does it have less cash, dimmer prospects, damaged intangible assets? It is a cost to the shareholders. According to GAAP they are distinct from the company.

    Regards,
    Gregg Wilson

    April 15, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Gregg,

    Following your logic to its conclusion, firms need not pay employees in anything other than paper. Why bother giving them assets? Just print stock certificates and have them toil for 60 years for 100 shares of stock per week.

    This is tantamount to what the Germans did after World War I. Rather than have the banks create marks, the German government just printed millions of marks that soon became worth less than the paper they were printed on. It eventually took a wheel barrow full of marks to buy a slice of bread (literally).

    Suppose a firm pays $120 in cash to an employee and the employee pays $20 in income taxes and invests $40 in the open market for 40 shares of his employer's common shares. What is different about this if the company pays him $80 in cash and issues him 40 shares of treasury stock? The employee ends up in the same situation under either alternative. And he or she owes $20 in taxes in either case. Stock must often be issued from the treasury of shares purchased by the company on the open market since new shares have pre-emptive rights that make it difficult to pay employees in new shares.

    If employees instead are given stock options or restricted stock, the situation is more complicated but the principle is the same. The stock or the options must be valued and taxes must eventually be paid on the value received for his or her services.

    As far as what is wrong with pooling, I told you before your exchanges with Professor Sansing that the main problem with pooling is the reason firms want pooling. They like to keep acquired net assets on the books at very old and outdated historical costs so that future revenues divided by outdated book values show high rates of return (ROIs) and make managers who acquired the old assets look brilliant.

    Other abuses are described in the paper by Abe Briloff on "Dirty Pooling" that I sent to you --- Briloff, AJ 1967. Dirty pooling. The Accounting Review (July): 489-496 --- http://www.jstor.org/view/00014826/ap010167/01a00060/0 

    I hope you will read Abe's paper carefully before continuing this thread.

    Bob Jensen

    April 15, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU] -- end of quote ---

    These issues are covered Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123, which you can find on the FASB website, http://www.fasb.org .

    The excerpt that follows states the general rule.

    This Statement requires a public entity to measure the cost of employee services received in exchange for an award of equity instruments based on the grant-date fair value of the award.

    Richard Sansing

    April 15, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Bob Jensen,
    Hope all is well with you.

    I am not arguing from the employee's point of view. What I am arguing is that the company can pay the employee cash, but if the employee is being paid stock it is not the company but the shareholders who are doing the paying, so it cannot be a cost to the company. The employee is being paid something that belongs to the shareholders, and does not belong to the company. The ownership interest is distinct from the company according to the economic entity assumption.

    <<As far as what is wrong with pooling, I told you before your exchanges with Professor Sansing that the main problem with pooling is the reason firms want pooling. They like to keep acquired net assets on the books at very old and outdated historical costs so that future revenues divided by outdated book values show high rates of return (ROIs) and make managers who acquired the old assets look brilliant.>>

    I would argue that the costs of the acquired firm are no more old and outdated than any other company that follows GAAP accounting procedures. There is no such thing as an "outdated" book value. The earnings model matches costs and revenues consistently and conservatively over time and that is what makes the return on equity number meaningful. Adjusting those costs to some other random value at a random point in time makes the return on equity number NOT meaningful. The return on equity of the combined companies under pooling is not an inflated return on equity that is meant to make the management look brilliant. It is merely the correct return on equity, and the correct measure of the capital efficiency of the combined companies. It is the return on equity that should be used to project future cash returns in order to determine the value of the company as an ongoing enterprise.

    Suppose there are two companies that are both highly profitable and both have 30% ROEs. Is there something misleading about a pooling acquisition where the combined ROE of the two companies is pro forma'ed at a 30% ROE? Is it more meaningul to write up the assets of the acquired company by some phoney goodwill amount so that the combined number will now be 15% ROE? Which number is going to produce a more accurate assessment of the value of the combined companies going forward? For a cash acquisition there has been an additional economic cash cost and the ROE is rightfully lower. But there is no such cost, cash or otherwise, when the equity interests are combined through a share exchange.

    Gregg Wilson

    April 15, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Sorry Greg,

    You show no evidence of countering Abe Briloff’s real contention that pooling is likely to be “dirty.” It has little to do with stock valuation since the same “cost” has been incurred for an acquisition irrespective of whether the bean counters book it as a purchase or a pooling. The pooling alternative has everything to do with manipulation of accounting numbers to make managers look like they increased the ROI because of their clever acquisition even if the acquisition is a bad deal in terms of underlying economics.
    Briloff, AJ 1967. Dirty pooling. The Accounting Review (July): 489-496 --- http://www.jstor.org/view/00014826/ap010167/01a00060/0 

    I doubt that you’ve convinced a single professor around the world that pooling provides better information to investors. Pooling was banned years ago because of widespread opinion that pooling has a greater potential of misleading investors than purchase accounting. If the historical cost net book value of the acquired firm is only half of the current value relevant to the acquisition price, there is no way that future ROIs under pooling and purchasing can be the same. You’ve set up a straw man.

    Please don’t bring stock dividends into this debate. Stock dividends and stock splits only confuse the issue. Stock dividends must be distributed to all shareholders and are merely a means, like stock splits, of lowering share prices without changing the value of any shareholder’s investment. Certainly stock dividends cannot be issued selectively to employees and not outside investors. The main argument for large stock dividends/splits is to lower share prices to attract smaller investors into buying blocks of shares without having to pay odd-lot commissions in the market. The only argument for small stock dividends is to mislead shareholders into thinking they are getting something when they are not getting anything at all. Studies show the market is very efficient in adjusting prices to stock dividends and splits.

    Certainly not a single professor around the world has come to your defense. It’s time to come up with a new argument Gregg. You must counter Abe’s arguments to convince us otherwise. The only valid argument for pooling is that markets are perfectly efficient irrespective of bean counter reporting. That argument holds some water but it is a leaky bucket according to many studies in recent years. If that argument was really true, management and shareholders would not care what bean counters do. Managers are in reality very concerned about bean counting rules. Corporations actually fought tooth and nail for pooling, but their arguments were not convincing from the standpoint for shareholder interests.

    If ABC Company is contemplating buying anything for $40 cash (wheat, corn, Microsoft Shares, or ABC treasury shares) and making this part of a future compensation payment in kind, it’s irrelevant how that $40 is paid to an employee because the net cost to ABC Company is $40 in cash. As the proportionate share of ABC Company has not been changed for remaining shareholders whether the payment is salary cash or in treasury shares (which need not be purchased if the salary is to be $40 in cash), the cash cost is the same for the employment services as far as shareholders and the ABC Company are concerned.

    ABC Company might feel that payment in ABC’s treasury shares increases the employee’s motivation level. The employee, however, may not view the two alternatives as equivalent since he or she must incur an added transactions cost to convert most any in-kind item into cash.

    Your argument would make a little more sense if ABC Company could issue new shares instead of paying $40 in cash. But in most states this is not allowed without shareholder approval due to preemptive anti-dilution protections for existing shareholders that prevent companies from acting like the German government in the wake of World War I (when Germany started printing Deutsch marks that weren’t worth the cost of the paper they were printed on).

    It’s very risky to buy shares of corporations that do not have preemptive rights. I think you’ve ignored preemptive rights from get go on this thread.

    Bob Jensen

    April 17, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Bob Jensen

    Maybe you could produce an example of how pooling is "dirty in practice", OTHER THAN the fact that it produces a higher ROI.

    Gregg Wilson

    April 18, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Gregg,

    High ROIs are the main reason pooling becomes dirty. It is “dirty” because it is intended to deceive the public and distort future performance measures relative to the underlying economics of the acquisition.

     As to other examples, I think Abe gives you ample illustrations of how management tries to take credit (“feathers in their cap” on Page 494) for “something shareholders are paying dearly for.” Also note his Case II where “A Piddle Makes a Pool.” Briloff, AJ 1967. "Dirty pooling." The Accounting Review (July): 489-496 --- http://www.jstor.org/view/00014826/ap010167/01a00060/0 

    Additional examples have been provided over the years by Abe. The following is Table 1 from a paper entitled "Briloff and the Capital Markets" by George Foster, Journal of Accounting Research, Volume 17, Spring 1979 --- http://www.jstor.org/view/00218456/di008014/00p0266h/0
     

    As George Foster points out, what makes Briloff unique in academe are the detailed real-world examples he provides. Briloff became so important that stock prices reacted instantly to his publications, particularly those in Barron's. George formally studied market reactions to Briloff articles.

    Companies Professor Briloff criticized for misleading accounting reports experienced an average drop in share prices of 8%.

    TABLE 1
    Articles of Briloff Examined
      Article Journal/Publication Date Companies Cited That Are Examined in This Note
    1.  "Dirty Pooling" Barron's (July 15, 1968) Gulf and Wesern: Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV)
    2.  "All a Fandangle?" Barron's (December 2, 1968) Leasco Data Processing: Levin-Townsend
    3.  "Much-Abused Goodwill" Barron's (April 28, 1969) Levin-Townsend; National General Corp.
    4.  "Out of Focus" Barron's (July 28, 1969) Perfect Film & Chemical Corp.
    5. "Castles of Sand?"


     
    Barron's (February 2, 1970)


     
    Amrep Corp.; Canaveral International; Deltona Corp.; General Development Corp.; Great Southwest Corp.; Great Western United, Major Realty; Penn Central
    6. "Tomorrow's Profits?" Barron's (May 11, 1970) Telex
    7. "Six Flags at Half-Mast?" Barron's (January 11, 1971) Great Southwest Corp.; Penn Central
    8. "Gimme Shelter"
     
    Barron's (October 25, 1971)
     
    Kaufman & Broad Inc.; U.S. Home Corp.; U.S. Financial Inc.
    9. "SEC Questions Accounting"
     
    Commercial and Financial Chronicle (November 2, 1972) Penn Central
     
    10. "$200 Million Question" Barron's (December 18, 1972) Leasco Corp.
    11. "Sunrise, Sunset" Barron's (May 14, 1973) Kaufman & Broad
    12. "Kaufman & Broad--More Questions? Commercial and Financial Chronicle (July 12, 1973) Kaufman & Broad
     
    13. "You Deserve a Break..." Barron's (July 8, 1974) McDonald's
    14. "The Bottom Line: What's Going on at I.T.T." (Interview with Briloff) New York Magazine (August 12, 1974)

     
    I.T.T.

     
    15. "Whose Deep Pocket?" Barron's (July 19, 1976) Reliance Group Inc.

     Not all of the above illustrations are focused on pooling accounting, but some of them provide real-world examples that you are looking for, particularly dirty pooling at McDonalds Corporation.

     It would would help your case if you followed Briloff’s example by getting out of hypothetical (nonexistent?) examples and give us some real world examples from your consulting. I don’t buy into any illustrations that merely criticize goodwill accounting. What you need to demonstrate how accounting for goodwill under purchase accounting was more misleading than pooling accounting for at least one real-world acquisition. I realize, however, that this may be difficult since the SEC will sue companies who use pooling accounting illegally these days. Did you ever wonder why the SEC made pooling illegal?

    Perhaps for your clients you have prepared statements contrasting purchase versus pooling in acquisitions. It would be nice if you could share those (with names disguised).

    Bob Jensen

    April 17, 2006 reply from Paul Polinski [pwp3@CASE.EDU]

    Gregg:
    Please let me use a slightly different example to look at your views in the purchase/pooling debate, and invite anyone else to contribute or to improve the example.

    Let's say you own and run several bed-and-breakfast inns. About 20 years ago, you received as a gift an authentic Normal Rockwell painting, which you put behind a false wall in your house to protect your investment. You recently brought it back out, and several reputable appraisers have put its value at $255,000.

    You want to invest in an inn, and its lot, that the current owner is selling. The current owner bought the inn and lot many years ago for $100,000; the inn's $60,000 gross book value is fully depreciated, while the lot (as land) is still recorded on current owner's books at $40,000. You and another party agree to jointly purchase the inn from the current owner; you exchange your Normal Rockwell painting for 51% ownership in the inn/lot, and the other party pays $245,000 in cash for his or her 49% ownership. You and the other party have rights and responsibilities proportional to your ownership percentages in all aspects under the joint ownership agreement.

    To simplify matters, at my own risk, I'll say "ignore tax treatments for now."

    My questions to you are:

    (1) For performance evaluation purposes, when you and the other party are computing the returns on your respective investments in this inn, what are your relevant investment amounts?

    (2) (I'm wandering out on a limb here, so I'll invite anyone who wants to improve or correct this to do so...)

    Now let's say that all the other facts are the same, except that:

    - The other party pays $122,500 for 49% ownership of the inn/lot;

    - You get 51% ownership in the inn/lot in exchange for giving the current owner a 50% transferable ownership interest in your Norman Rockwell.

    What are your relevant investment amounts in this case?

    Paul

    April 18, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Paul Polinski

    So what's the point? Your example is clearly a cash acquisition. Pooling is appropriate only in the case of a share exchange acquisition, and I would say pooling should only be used in the case of two ongoing enterprise. The point is that a share exchange acquisition is a combining of equity interests and there is no purchase price beyond the exchange ratio. Say you had two inns and both are ongoing businesses so they not only have real estate assets but furniture and equipment and supplies and payables and receivables etc. Lets say they each have book assets of $40,000 and they decide to combine their two enterprises on a share for share basis. The owner of each inn ends up with half the equity in the combined enterprise. Has a new value been placed on the assets by the share exchange? Would the owners want to restate the assets to some different value just because they have merged? Or would they prefer to retain the combined financial statements as they are? Doesn't the meaningfulness of the earnings model depend on following consistent rules of matching costs and revenues over a period of time, and wouldn't revaluing those costs merely represent an obliteration of the earnings model and the information it imparts? Is not a share exchange acquisition a totally different animal from a cash purchase, and shouldn't it be recorded in the financial statements in a way that reflects that economic reality?

    Gregg Wilson

    April 19, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Sorry Gregg,

    You’re too hung up on cash basis accounting. You only think transactions can be valued if and when they are paid in cash. This is clearly absurd since there are many purchase transactions that are not cash deals and require value estimation on the part of both the buyer and the seller. We use value estimates in countless transactions, and accounting would really revert to the dark ages if we were forced to trace value of each item back to some ancient surrogate cash transaction value years ago. Cash accounting can badly mislead investors about risk, such as when interest rate swaps were not even disclosed on financial statements until cash flowed. Our estimates of current values and obligations may be imperfect, but they beat non-estimation.

    With respect to business combinations/acquisitions, GAAP requires that the accounting come as close as possible to the value estimations upon which the deal was actually transacted. I don’t know how many times we have to tell you that the valuation estimation process is not perfect, but trying to come as close to economic reality at the time of the current transaction is our goal, not pulling values from transactions from olden times and ancient history circumstances.

    Be careful what you declare on this forum, because some students are also in the forum and they may believe such declaratives as “Pooling is appropriate only in the case of a share exchange acquisition.” Pooling is not only a violation of FASB standards, it is against SEC law. Please do not encourage students to break the law.

    And there are good reasons for bans on pooling. You’ve not been able to convince a single professor in this forum that pooling is better accounting for stock trades. You’ve ranted against estimates of value and how these estimates may become impaired shortly after deals go down, but GAAP says to do the best job possible in booking the values that were in effect at the time the deals actually went down. If values become impaired later on, GAAP says to adjust the values.

    You’ve not convinced a single one of us who watched pooling accounting become dirty time and time again when it was legal. We don’t want to revert to those days of allowing managers to repeatedly report inflated ROIs on acquired companies.

    I think Richard Sansing is right. You’re beating a dead horse. Future communications that only repeat prior rants are becoming time wasters in this forum.

    Forum members interested in our long and tedious exchange on this topic can go to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Pooling 

    Bob Jensen

    April 18, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Again Bob Jensen

    Let's put it this way. If we want to value the acquisition at a non-cost current value, then we should use a fair appraisal like something akin to what a cash buyer would be willing to pay, and not the phoney share exchange value. Then we could actually have goodwill numbers that made some sense and would avoid all those embarassing impairment writedowns a year after the acquisition. I prefer pooling, but if you insist on revaluing, then use an economic value. The value of the exchanged shares is not, I repeat, not an economic value.

    Gregg

    April 20, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Sorry Gregg,

    GAAP states that all tangible assets should be valued at what cash purchasers would pay for them, so we have no argument.

    Intangibles such as knowledge capital are more difficult to value, but the ideal is to value them for what cash purchasers would pay for such things as a skilled work force, customers, name recognition, etc.

    The problem with using a cash price surrogate lies in situations where there is really valuable synergy that is unique to the acquiring company. For example, there is probably considerable synergy value (actually monopoly) value when SBC acquired AT&T that probably made it much more valuable to SBC than to any other buyer whether the deal would be done in cash or stock.

    Auditors are supposed to attest to the value at the time the acquisition deal goes down. Not long afterwards it may be found that the best estimate at the time the deal went down was either in error or it was reasonable at the time but the value changed afterwards, possible because of the market impact of the “new” company operating after the acquisition. For example, when Time Warner acquired AOL it appears that Time Warner and its auditors gave up way to much value to AOL in the deal, in part due to accounting fraud in AOL.

    Problems of valuation in purchase accounting should not, and cannot under current law, be used as an excuse to use historical cost values that typically have far greater deviation from accurate values at the time the acquisition deal is consummated.

    I think you made your points Gregg. Please stop repeating arguments that you have hammered repeatedly at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Pooling 

    Bob Jensen

    April 20, 2006 message reply Gregg Wilson

    Hi Bob Jensen

    You have masterfully skirted the issue as usual. Do you believe that the value of the exchanged shares is either a "fair value" and/or an "economic value"? If we are attesting to the value at the time of the deal as the share exchange value then I would say we are attesting badly. Use whatever fair value you want. The value of the exchanged shares isn't one.

    By the way. AOL purchased Time Warner, not the other way around. From the 10K:

    April 20, 2006 Reply from Bob Jensen

    Sorry Gregg

    I think you're wasting our time and embarrassing yourself until you can back your wild claims with convincing research. Your wild speculations appear to run counter to serious research.

    If you are really convinced of evidence to the contrary, please go out and conduct some rigorous research testing your hypotheses. Please don't continue making wild claims in an academic forum until you've got some convincing evidence.

    Or as Richard Sansing would say, we seldom accept anecdotal evidence that can be selectively cherry picked to show most any wild speculation.

    If you bothered to do research rather than wildly speculate, you would find that serious academic research points to the conclusions opposite to your wild speculations about revaluations and goodwill write-offs.


    First consider the Steven L. Henning, Wayne H. Shaw, and Toby Stock (2004) study:

    This paper investigates criticisms that U.S. GAAP had given firms too much discretion in determining the amount and timing of goodwill write-offs. Using 1,576 U.S. and 563 U.K. acquisitions, we find little evidence that U.S. firms managed the amount of goodwill write-off or that U.K. firms managed the amount of revaluations (write-ups of intangible assets). However, our results are consistent with U.S. firms delaying goodwill write-offs and U.K. firms timing revaluations strategically to avoid shareholder approval linked to certain financial ratios.
    Steven L. Henning, Wayne H. Shaw, and Toby Stock, "The Amount and Timing of Goodwill Write-Offs and Revaluations: Evidence from U.S. and U.K. Firms," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Volume 23, Number 2, September 2004 Pages: 99 - 121


    Also consider the Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2002a) conclusions below:

    We investigate two related questions. What factors influence firms' use of acquisition accounting method, and are firms willing to pay higher acquisition premiums to use the pooling-of-interests accounting method? We analyze a comprehensive sample of nontaxable corporate stock-for-stock acquisitions from 1990 through 1996. We use a two-stage, instrumental variables estimation method that explicitly allows for simultaneity in the choice of accounting method and acquisition premiums. After controlling for economic differences across pooling and purchase transactions, our evidence indicates that financial reporting incentives influence how acquiring firms structure stock-for-stock acquisitions. In addition, our two-stage analysis indicates that higher acquisition premiums are associated with the pooling method. In sum, our evidence suggests that acquiring firms structure acquisitions and expend significant resources to secure preferential accounting treatment in stock-for-stock acquisitions.
    Benjamin C. Ayers , Craig E. Lefanowicz and John R. Robinson, "Do Firms Purchase the Pooling Method?" Review of Accounting Studies Volume 7, Number 1, March 2002 Pages: 5 - 32.

    You apparently have evidence to contradict the Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2002a) study. Would you please enlighten us with some convincing evidence.


    Consider the Patrick E. Hopkins, Richard W. Houston, and Michael F. Peters (2000) research:

    We provide evidence that analysts' stock-price judgments depend on (1) the method of accounting for a business combination and (2) the number of years that have elapsed since the business combination. Consistent with business-press reports of managers' concerns, analysts' stock-price judgments are lowest when a company applies the purchase method of accounting and ratably amortizes the acquisition premium. The number of years since the business combination affects analysts' price estimates only when the company applies the purchase method and ratably amortizes goodwill—analysts' price estimates are lower when the business-combination transaction is further in the past. However, this joint effect of accounting method and timing is mitigated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board's proposed income-statement format requiring companies to report separate line items for after-tax income before goodwill charges and net-of-tax goodwill charges. When a company uses the purchase method of accounting and writes off the acquisition premium as in-process research and development, analysts' stock price judgments are not statistically different from their judgments when a company applies pooling-of-interest accounting.
    Patrick E. Hopkins, Richard W. Houston, and Michael F. Peters, "Purchase, Pooling, and Equity Analysts' Valuation Judgments," The Accounting Review, Vol. 75, 2000, 257-281.


    You seem to think that acquisition goodwill is based upon wild speculation. Research studies discover rather sophisticated valuation approaches that distinguish core from synergy goodwill components. See Henning, Lewis, and Shaw, "Valuation of Components of Purchased Goodwill," The Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 38, Autumn 2000.


    Also consider the Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2002b) study: 

    Accounting standard setters have become increasingly concerned with the perceived manipulation of financial statements afforded by the pooling-of-interests (pooling) method of accounting for corporate acquisitions. While different restrictions have been discussed, in September 1999 the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued an Exposure Draft to eliminate the pooling method. This study provides a basis for evaluating restrictions on the pooling method by analyzing the financial statement effects on pooling acquisitions made by public corporations over the period 1992 through 1997. Using these acquisitions we (1) quantify the scope of the pooling problem, (2) estimate the financial statement repercussions of eliminating the pooling method, and (3) examine the effects of restricting pooling accounting to business combinations meeting various merger of equals restrictions.

    While our analysis does not address whether restrictions on the pooling method will influence the nature or level of acquisition activity, the results indicate that the pooling method generates enormous amounts of unrecognized assets, across individual acquisitions, and in aggregate. In addition, our results suggest that recording and amortizing these assets generate significant balance sheet and income statement effects that vary with industry. Regarding restrictions on the pooling method, our analysis indicates that size restrictions would significantly reduce the number and value of pooling acquisitions and unrecognized assets generated by these acquisitions.

    . . .

    Accounting standard setters have become increasingly concerned with the perceived manipulation of financial statements and the lack of comparability across firms financial statements that have resulted from having two acquisition accounting methods. Consistent with these concerns, the FASB issued an Exposure Draft in September 1999 to eliminate the pooling-of-interests method. Using a comprehensive set of pooling acquisitions by public corporations over the period 1992 through 1997, this study analyzes the financial statement effects of eliminating or severely restricting the pooling method of accounting for business combinations. Although we make no assumptions regarding the effects of pooling restrictions on either acquisition activity or acquisition price, this study provides a useful starting point for assessing the effects of different pooling restrictions. Our evidence suggests that firms avoid recognition of significant amounts of target firms purchase prices, both in aggregate and per acquisition, via the pooling method. Further, we document that these unrecognized assets are significant relative to the bidders book value and that the quantity and dollar magnitude of pooling acquisitions have increased dramatically in recent years. With respect to industry-specific analyses, we find that the financial services industry accounts for approximately one-third of all pooling acquisitions in number and value.

    The effects on bidder financial-reporting ratios of precluding use of the pooling method for a typical acquisition are substantial, though varying widely across industries. Decreases in return on equity, assuming a ten-year amortization period for unrecognized assets, range from a 65 percent decline for the hotel and services industry to a13 percent decline for the financial services industry.15For earnings per share, the effects are more moderate than are those on return on equity. Decreases, assuming a ten-year amortization period, range from a 42 percent decrease for the food, textile, and chemicals industry to an 8 percent decrease for the financial services industry. For market-to-book ratios, four industries (the metal and mining industry; the food, textile, and chemicals industry; the hotel and other services industry; and the health and engineering industry) have decreases in bidder market-to-book ratio in excess of 30 percent, whereas the financial services industry has only a 6 percent decrease. The relatively small effects for the financial services industry suggests that the industry�s opposition to eliminating the pooling method may be more driven by the quantity and aggregate magnitude of pooling acquisitions than per-acquisition effects. Overall, we find that eliminating the pooling method affects firm profitability and capitalization ratios in all industries, but there is a wide dispersion of the magnitude of these effects across industry.

    Finally, we document that restricting pooling treatment via a relative size criterion significantly decreases the number and value of pooling acquisitions as well as the unrecognized assets generated by these acquisitions. Nevertheless, we find that a size restriction, depending on its exact implementation, can simultaneously allow a number of acquisitions to be accounted for under the pooling method. Regardless of the type of restriction, the magnitude of past pooling transactions, both in total dollars and relative to the individual bidder's financial condition, lends credibility to the contention that the imposition of pooling restrictions has the potential to seriously impact firm financial statements and related financial-reporting ratios. These effects, of course, decrease with a longer amortization period for unrecognized assets.
    Benjamin C. Ayers , Craig E. Lefanowicz and John R. Robinson, "The Financial Statement Effects of Eliminating the Pooling-of-Interests Method of Acquisition," Accounting Horizons, Vol 14, March 2000.


    There are many, many more such studies. If you are really convinced of evidence to the contrary, please go out and conduct some rigorous research testing your hypotheses. Please don't continue this until you've got some convincing evidence.

    Or as Richard Sansing would say, we seldom accept anecdotal evidence that can be selectively cherry picked to show most any wild conclusion.

    Nobody argues that the present system of accounting for acquisitions and goodwill is perfect. Various alternatives have been proposed in the research literature. But none to my knowledge support your advocacy of a return to pooling-of-interests accounting.

    Bob Jensen

    PS
    You are correct about the AOL purchase of Time Warner. I forgot this since Time Warner runs the household. Later on it was Time Warner that tried to sell AOL (to Google). It's a little like husband buys wife and later on wife puts husband for sale.

    April 18, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Bob Jensen

    I was really trying to go one step at a time, and establish that the value of the exchanged shares is not an economic value or a "fair appraisal" of the value of the acquired company. I am certainly not a researcher, and as you know I do not have access to the fine studies that you have referenced. I am not even sure what would qualify as evidence of the point.

    I was thinking one could send the following questionnaire to companies that had made share exchange acquistions....

    """"""""""" You recently made a share exchange for XYZ company. After you determined the value of the target company to you, [Target value], which of the following do you feel best describes the decision process by which you arrived at the number of shares to offer the target company:

    (1) [Target value] / [Price of your stock]

    (2) [Your shares outstanding] * ([Target value] / [Your value]) where [Your value] is the value of your own company arrived at by a similar valuation standard as [Target value].

    (3) Some combination of the above, or other decision process. Please explain________________________________.

    """"""""""""""""

    If the response came back overwhelmingly (2), then would that be conclusive evidence that the value of the exchanged shares is not an economic value or the price paid? I really wouldn't want to go to the trouble, if the result wouldn't demonstrate what I am trying to demonstrate.

    Gregg Wilson

    April 23, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Sorry Gregg,

    If you want to communicate with the academy you must play by the academy’s rules. The number one rule is that a hypothesis must be supported by irrefutable (normative) arguments or convincing empirical evidence. We do accept idle speculation but only for purposes of forming interesting hypotheses to be tested later on.

    In my communications with you regarding pooling-of-interests accounting, I've always focused on what I will term your Pooling-Preferred Hypothesis or PP Hypothesis for short. Your hypothesis may be implied from a collection of your earlier quotations from http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Pooling

    Well I would call that entire FAS 141 a lot of sophistries. This is a case of trying to make an apple into an orange and getting a rotten banana.
    Gregg Wilson, March 30, 2006

    I certainly didn't mean to imply that cash acquisitions should be treated as pooling-of-interest. On the contrary I was trying to make the point that they are totally different situations, and can't be treated effectively by the same accounting rule. The cash is the whole point.
    Gregg Wilson, March 30, 2006

    Pooling of interest is terrific, because it recreates that earnings model history for the combined companies. The historical costs are not meaningless to the negotiations but rather are the basis for the negotiations, for they are the evidence that the companies are using to determine the share exchange ratio that they will accept.
    Gregg Wilson, March 30, 2006

    Pooling is appropriate only in the case of a share exchange acquisition, and I would say pooling should only be used in the case of two ongoing enterprise(s).
    Gregg Wilson, March 30, 2006

    There's a bit of inconsistency in your quotations, because in one case you say pooling is "terrific" for combined companies and in the other quotation you claim pooling should only when the acquired company carries on by itself. I will state your Pooling-Preferred (PP) Hypothesis as follows:

    Pooling-Preferred (PP) Hypothesis
    FAS 141 is based upon sophistry. Pooling-of--interest accounting is the best accounting approach when a company is acquired in a stock-for-stock (non-cash) acquisition. Purchase accounting required under FAS 141 is a "case of trying to make an apple into an orange and getting a rotten banana. "

    What I've tried to point out all along is that FAS 141 is not based upon sophistry. It rests on the foundation of countless normative and empirical studies that refute your PP Hypothesis.

    Your only support of the PP Hypothesis is another hypothesis that is stated by you over and over ad nausea for two months as follows:

    Exchanged Shares Non-Value (ESNV) Hypothesis
    T
    he value of the exchanged shares is not an economic value or a "fair appraisal" of the value of the acquired company. 
    Gregg Wilson, April 22, 2006

    In the academy we cannot accept an untested hypothesis as a legitimate test of another hypothesis. Even if we speculate that the ESNV Hypothesis is true, it does not support your PP Hypothesis because it is totally disconnected to the real reason that standard setters and the academic academy no longer want pooling accounting. The "real reason" is that corporations are motivated to want pooling accounting so they can inflate future ROIs and make most all acquisitions look like great deals even though some of them are bad deals from an economic perspective (to say nothing about wanting inflated ROIs to support larger bonuses and sweetened future compensation plans for executives).

    The preponderance of academic research refutes the PP Hypothesis. One of the highlight studies in fact shows that managers may enter into worse deals (in the past when it was legal) just to get pooling accounting.

    Some of the Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2002a) conclusions are as follows:

    We investigate two related questions. What factors influence firms' use of acquisition accounting method, and are firms willing to pay higher acquisition premiums to use the pooling-of-interests accounting method? We analyze a comprehensive sample of nontaxable corporate stock-for-stock acquisitions from 1990 through 1996. We use a two-stage, instrumental variables estimation method that explicitly allows for simultaneity in the choice of accounting method and acquisition premiums. After controlling for economic differences across pooling and purchase transactions, our evidence indicates that financial reporting incentives influence how acquiring firms structure stock-for-stock acquisitions. In addition, our two-stage analysis indicates that higher acquisition premiums are associated with the pooling method. In sum, our evidence suggests that acquiring firms structure acquisitions and expend significant resources to secure preferential accounting treatment in stock-for-stock acquisitions.
    Benjamin C. Ayers , Craig E. Lefanowicz and John R. Robinson, "Do Firms Purchase the Pooling Method?" Review of Accounting Studies Volume 7, Number 1, March 2002 Pages: 5 - 32.

    In fact the above study suggests that pooling accounting creates a worse situation that you speculate in your ESNV Hypothesis. My conclusion is that if we accept your ESNV hypothesis we most certainly would not want pooling accounting due to the above findings of Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson.

    Your alleged support of the PP Hypothesis is your untested ESNV Hypothesis. As mentioned above, you cannot support a hypothesis with an untested hypothesis. Certainly the academy to date has not accepted your ESNV Hypothesis. And even if it did, this hypothesis alone is disconnected to the academic research pointing to why pooling accounting deceives investors.

    Your only support of the ESNV Hypothesis lies in conclusions drawn based upon your own anecdotal experiences. Anecdotal experience is not an acceptable means of hypothesis testing in the academy. Anecdotal evidence can be cherry picked to support most any wild speculation.

    As a result, I recommend the following"

    1. Admit that you do not have sufficient evidence to support your PP Hypothesis. You must otherwise refute a mountain of prior academic evidence that runs counter to the PP Hypothesis.

       

    2. Admit that you do not have sufficient evidence in the academic world to support your ESNV hypothesis. Certainly you've not convinced, to my knowledge, any members of this academic (AECM) forum that virtually all managers are so ignorant of values when putting together stock-for-stock acquisitions.

       

    3. Stop hawking and repeating your anecdotal speculations that are already documented on the Web at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Pooling
      Come back to us only when you have sufficient academic evidence to support your hypotheses.


    April 22, 2006 reply from Henry Collier [henrycollier@aapt.net.au]

    You have been very gentle with Gregg Wilson … I would suggest that we send him to Singapore and subject him to the cane that is so liberally used there to the recalcitrant. He has ‘convinced’ not one it seems. Many of us ‘old timers’ agree with you … perhaps Wilson just doesn’t get it … or perhaps it’s his Warhol’s 15 minutes of fame (or infamy in this case).

    One comment that has always struck me as relevant in business combinations … well perhaps 2 … (1) why would we revalue only the acquired company’s assets to FMV in the combination and (2) why would we bother to recognize ‘goodwill’ at all? In the recognition it seems as though we’ve just ‘paid’ too much for the FMV of the assets … why wouldn’t we just reduce the ‘retained earnings’ of the combination?

    Just my old management accountant’s rant I suppose. Over the years with my approach to the share markets, I’ve found ‘income statements’ and ‘balance sheets’ somewhat less than useful … seems to me that particularly in high risk companies, like pink sheet things being offered / touted on certain websites and through phishing mails, one can obtain both historical and pro-forma I/S and B/S, but seldom any real or projected cash flow information.

    With regards from the land down under …

    Enjoy retirement, I’ve found it very rewarding … thanks for all you’ve done for the profession …

    Henry Collier

    April 23, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU] --

    Bob,

    ---Bob Jensen wrote:

    In my communications with you (Gregg Wilson) regarding pooling-of-interests accounting, I've always focused on what I will term your Pooling-Preferred Hypothesis or PP Hypothesis for short.

    ---

    My exchanges with Gregg Wilson suggests that his discomfort with GAAP goes well beyond the pooling vs. purchase debate. He does not care for the GAAP treatment of simple transactions such as the transfer of shares to employees in lieu of cash compensation. Why argue about (relatively) complicated transactions with someone who does not understand simple ones?

    Richard Sansing

     


    Strange as it may seem a losing company may have more value to someone else than itself

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on April 27, 2006

    TITLE: Alcatel Stands to Reap Tax Benefit on Merger
    REPORTER: Jesse Drucker and Sara Silver
    DATE: Apr 26, 2006
    PAGE: C3
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114601908332236130.html 
    TOPICS: Accounting, International Accounting, Net Operating Losses, Taxation

    SUMMARY: "Lucent's operating losses in [the] wake of [the] tech bubble may allow big deductions" for the merged firm's U.S. operations.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) What is the purpose of allowing net operating losses (NOLs) to be deducted against other years' income amounts?

    2.) Summarize the U.S. tax law provisions regarding NOLs. Why has Lucent been unable to use up all of its NOL carryforwards since the tech bubble burst in 2000-2001?

    3.) Define the term deferred tax assets. Describe how NOLs fit the definition you provide. What other types of deferred tax assets do you think that Lucent has available and wants to take advantage of?

    4.) How is it possible that the "federal, state and local deductions" from the deferred tax assets described in answer to question #3 "will nearly double the U.S. net income that the combined company [of Alcatel and Lucent Technologies] will be able to report"?

    5.) How does the availability of NOL carryforwards, and the expected timing of their deductions based on an acquirer's earnings or the recent tax law change referred to in the article, impact the price an acquirer is willing to pay in a merger or acquisition transaction?

    6.) How did the availability of deferred tax asset deductions drive Alcatel's choice of its location for its headquarters? What other factors do you think drive such a choice?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

     


    From The Wall Street Journal Weekly Accounting Review on April 7, 2006

    TITLE: Takeover of VNU to Begin with Explanation of Price
    REPORTER: Jason Singer
    DATE: Apr 03, 2006
    PAGE: A2
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114405567166415142.html 
    TOPICS: Accounting, Mergers and Acquisitions

    SUMMARY: The article offers an excellent description of the process undertaken by VNU's Board of Directors in deciding to put the company "on the auction block", consider alternative strategies, and finally accept an offer price.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) Describe the transaction agreed to by the Board of VNU NV and its acquirer, AlpInvest Partners.

    2.) What does the current stock price of VNU imply about the takeover transaction? Why do you think that VNU is distributing the 210 page document explaining the transaction and the Board's decision process?

    3.) Connect to the press release dated March 8 through the on-line version of the article. Scroll down to the section covering the "background of the offer." Draw a timeline of the events, using abbreviations that are succinct but understandable.

    4.) What other alternatives did the VNU Board consider rather than selling the company? Why did they decide against each of these alternatives?

    5.) Based on the information in the article and the press releases, do you think the acquirers will obtain value from the investment they are making? Support your answer, including refuting possible arguments against your position.

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    "Takeover of VNU to Begin With Explanation of Price," by Jason Singer, The Wall Street Journal, April 3, 2006 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114405567166415142.html 

    A group of private-equity funds is beginning a $9 billion takeover of Dutch media giant VNU NV with the release of documents that explain for the first time how VNU's board determined the purchase price was high enough.

    In the four weeks since VNU announced it would recommend the private-equity group's offer, many shareholders have accused the company of rushing to sell itself after being forced by investors to abandon a big acquisition last year.

    These critics said that the sale process was halfhearted and that the agreed-upon price too low. Some have said they preferred VNU to break itself up and separately sell the pieces.

    At least two VNU shareholders, including mutual-fund giant Fidelity Investments, have said publicly they are unlikely to support the takeover; many others have said so privately.

    VNU shares have traded far below the agreed per-share offer price of €28.75 ($34.85) since the deal was announced, suggesting the market expects the takeover bid to fail.

    VNU – based in Haarlem, Netherlands, and the world's largest market-research firm by sales – addresses these concerns in the 210-page offer document to be sent to shareholders and outlines in detail the steps it took to ensure the highest value.

    Materials include two fairness opinions written by VNU's financial advisers, one by Credit Suisse Group and the other by NM Rothschild & Sons, evaluating the offer and concluding the price is attractive for shareholders.

    "This was a fully open auction," said Roger Altman, chairman of Evercore Partners, another VNU financial adviser. The company's board fully vetted all options, including a breakup of the business, restructuring opportunities or proceeding with the status quo, he said. "None provided a value as high as €28.75 [a share]. None of them."

    Mr. Altman said that after being contacted by private-equity funds interested in buying VNU after its failed attempt last year to acquire IMS Health Inc., of Fairfield, Conn., VNU auctioned itself, including seeking other strategic or private-equity bidders.

    A second group of private-equity funds explored a possible bid but dropped out when it concluded it couldn't pay as much as the first group said it was prepared to offer. Another potential bidder, a company, withdrew after refusing to sign a confidentiality agreement, VNU's offer document says.

    The initial group, which submitted the only firm bid, consists of AlpInvest Partners of the Netherlands, and Blackstone Group, Carlyle Group, Hellman & Friedman, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. and Thomas H. Lee Partners, all of the U.S. The group formed Valcon Acquisition BV to make the bid.

    Some of the calculations provided in the offer document suggest the company might be valued higher than the Valcon bid price in certain circumstances. The Credit Suisse letter indicates the company could be valued at as much as €29.60 a share based on prices paid for businesses similar to VNU's in the past. It says a "sum of the parts breakup analysis" indicates a range of €25.90 to €29.35.

    The Rothschild letter also shows certain methods of valuing the company reaching as high as €35.80 a share. But both advisers said that when weighed against the many risks in VNU's future, the cash payment being offered now by the Valcon group is the most attractive option for shareholders.

    COMPANIES
    Dow Jon
    VNU N.V. (38987.AE)
      PRICE
    CHANGE
     
    27.49
    0.06
    8:25a.m.

     
     
    Cadbury Schweppes PLC ADS (CSG)
      PRICE
    CHANGE
     
    40.10
    0.07
    4/6

     
     
    IMS Health Inc. (RX)
      PRICE
    CHANGE
     
    25.99
    0.02
    4/6

     

    From The Wall Street Journal Weekly Accounting Review on April 7, 2006

    TITLE: Sign of the Times: A Deal for GMAC by Investor Group
    REPORTER: Dennis K. Berman and Monica Langley
    DATE: Apr 04, 2006
    PAGE: A1 LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114406446238015171.html 
    TOPICS: Accounting, Advanced Financial Accounting, Banking, Bankruptcy, Board of Directors, Financial Accounting, Investments, Mergers and Acquisitions, Spinoffs

    SUMMARY: Cerberus Capital Management LP has led the group who will acquire control of General Motors Acceptance Corp. (GMAC) from GM for $7.4 billion (plus an additional payment from GMAC to GM of $2.7 billion). GM had expected to receive offers for GMAC from big banks. Instead, they received offers from private-equity and hedge funds, like the one from Cerberus. This article follows up on last week's coverage of this topic; the related article identifies how CEO Rick Wagoner is working with his Board to extend time for evaluating his own performance there.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) Describe the transaction GM is undertaking to sell control in GMAC. Specifically, who owns the 51% ownership of GMAC that is being sold? What will happen to the 49% ownership in GMAC following this transaction? To answer the question, you may also refer to the GM statement available through the on-line article link at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114406559238215183.html 

    2.) Again refer to the GM statement on the GMAC deal. In addition to the purchase price, what other cash flows will accrue to GM from this transaction? How do you think these items relate to the fact that GM is selling a 51% interest in GMAC?

    3.) What is the nature of GMAC's business? Specifically describe its "portfolio of loans and lease receivables."

    4.) Why do you think GM expected "...be courted by big banks..." to negotiate a purchase of GMAC? Why do you think that expectation proved wrong, that other entities ended up bidding for GMAC? To answer, consider the point made in the article that even Citigroup, GM's primary bank and a significant player in the ultimate deal, had decided that it couldn't structure a deal that GM wanted from big banks.

    5.) What are the risks associated with the acquisition of GMAC? In particular, comment on the risk associated with GM's possible bankruptcy and its relation to GMAC's business operations.

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    --- RELATED ARTICLES ---
    TITLE: GM's Wagoner Gains Some Time for Turnaround
    REPORTER: Lee Hawkins, Jr., Monica Langley, and Joseph B. White
    PAGE: A1
    ISSUE: Apr 04, 2006
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114411090537615994.html




    OBSF:  Off Balance Sheet Financing

     

    Off-Balance-Sheet Financing --- http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/obsf.asp

    A form of financing in which large capital expenditures are kept off of a company's balance sheet through various classification methods. Companies will often use off-balance-sheet financing to keep their debt to equity (D/E) and leverage ratios low, especially if the inclusion of a large expenditure would break negative debt covenants.

    Contrast to loans, debt and equity, which do appear on the balance sheet. Examples of off-balance-sheet financing include joint ventures, research and development partnerships, and operating leases (rather than purchases of capital equipment).

    Operating leases are one of the most common forms of off-balance-sheet financing. In these cases, the asset itself is kept on the lessor's balance sheet, and the lessee reports only the required rental expense for use of the asset. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in the U.S. have set numerous rules for companies to follow in determining whether a lease should be capitalized (included on the balance sheet) or expensed.

    This term came into popular use during the Enron bankruptcy. Many of the energy traders' problems stemmed from setting up inappropriate off-balance-sheet entities.


    The history of financial reporting is replete with ploys to keep debt from being disclosed in financial statements. If standard setters require disclosures, the history of financial reporting is replete with ploys to keep the disclosed obligations from being booked under the liabilities section of the balance sheet.

    Examples of OBSF ploys in the past and some that still remain as viable means of keeping debt off the balance sheets.


    Shocking Impact of GASB 45

    Underfunded Pensions, Post-Retirement Obligations, and Other Debt
    Probably the largest form of OBSF is booked debt that is badly understated. Particularly problematic is variable debt that is badly underestimated. For example, a company or a government unit (e.g., city or county) may be obligated to pay medical bills or insurance premiums for retired employees and their families. Until FAS 106 companies did not report these obligations at all. Governmental agencies (not the Federal government) are just not becoming obligated to report such obligations under GASB 45. Accounting rules have been so lax that many of these obligations were never disclosed or disclosed at absurdly low amounts relative to the explosion in the costs of medical care and medical insurance. Pensions had to be booked, but the rules allowed companies to greatly understate the amount of the unfunded debt.

    "A $2-Trillion Fiscal Hole," by Chris Edwards and Jagadeesh Gokhale, The Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2006; Page A18 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116062308693690263.html?mod=opinion&ojcontent=otep

    State and local governments are amassing huge obligations in the form of unfunded retirement benefits for their workers. Aside from underfunded pension plans, governments have also run up large obligations from their retiree health plans. While a new Governmental Accounting Standards Board rule will kick in next year and reveal exactly how large this problem is, we estimate that retiree health benefits are a $1.4 trillion fiscal time bomb.

    The new GASB regulations will require accrual accounting of state and local retiree health benefits, thus revealing to taxpayers the true costs of the large bureaucracies that they fund. We reviewed unfunded health costs across 16 states and 11 local governments that have made actuarial estimates, and found an average accrued liability per covered worker of $135,000. Multiplying that by the number of covered state and local employees in the country yields a total unfunded obligation of $1.4 trillion -- twice the reported underfunding in state and local pension plans at $700 billion.

    To put these costs in context, consider the explicit net debt of state and local governments. According to the Federal Reserve Board, state and local credit market debt has risen rapidly in recent years, from $313 billion in 2001 to $568 billion in 2005. But unfunded obligations from state and local pension and retiree health plans -- about $2 trillion -- are still more than three times this net debt amount.

    The key problem is that the great majority of state and local governments finance their retiree health benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis. In coming years that will create pressure to raise taxes as Baby Boomers age and government employees retire in droves. New Jersey's accrued unfunded obligations in its retiree health plan now stand at $20 billion, and the overall costs of its employee health plan are expected to grow at 18% annually for the next four years.

    To compound the problem, defined-benefit pension and retirement health plans are much more common and generous in the public sector than the private sector. Out of 15.9 million state and local workers, about 65% are covered under retirement health plans, compared to just 24% of workers in large firms in the private sector.

    The prospect of funding $2 trillion of obligations with higher taxes is frightening, especially when you consider that state politicians would be imposing them on the same income base as federal politicians trying to finance massive shortfalls in Social Security and Medicare. Hopefully, most state policy makers appreciate that hiking taxes in today's highly competitive global economy is a losing proposition.

    The only good options are to cut benefits and move state and local retirement plans to a pre-funded basis with personal savings plans. Two states, Alaska and Michigan, have moved to savings-based (defined-contribution) pension plans for their new employees. Alaska has also implemented a health-care plan for new state employees, which includes high-deductible insurance and a Health Savings Account. Expect to see more states following Alaska's lead.

    State and local governments also need to cut retirement benefits, which were greatly expanded during the 1990s boom. From a fairness perspective, cutting benefits especially of younger workers is reasonable given the generosity of state and local plans. Federal data shows that state and local governments spend an average of $3.91 per hour worked on employee health benefits, compared to $1.72 in the private sector.

    Underfunded -- or more accurately, over-promised -- retirement plans for state and local workers have created a $2 trillion fiscal hole. Every year that policy makers put off the tough decisions, the hole gets bigger. Hopefully, the new GASB rules will prompt them to enact the reforms needed to avert job-destroying tax increases on the next generation.

    Mr. Edwards is tax policy director at the Cato Institute. Mr. Gokhale is a senior fellow at Cato and a former senior economic adviser to the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.


    Question
    What is the new European accounting ploy (termed the 2007 Accounting Miracle) to hide debt until the instant it becomes due?

     

     

    "Italy's Accounting Miracle," by Tito Boeri and Guido Tabellini, The Wall Street Journal, November 28, 2006 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116466953696233804.html?mod=opinion&ojcontent=otep

     

    The latest murky accounting ploy has received the European Union's stamp of approval. As of 2007, Italy will be able to reduce its official budget deficit with the cash proceeds of new liabilities. The new debt will remain hidden until it comes due. If this is how the EU's revised Stability and Growth Pact will work, it would be wiser to scrap the budget rules altogether. At least then national capitals would not be so tempted to artificially reduce their budget deficits, and citizens would be better informed about the true state of public finances.

    Here's how the new gimmick works. Under current Italian law, employees must set aside a tax-exempt fraction of their gross wages, nearly 7%, into a severance scheme called TFR. Instead of creating personal accounts for their employees, each company collects the money in one large fund. When an employee leaves the firm, he receives the money he paid into the fund plus interest, currently about 3%. The TFR is thus debt that companies owe to their employees. That's why firms list it as liabilities in their financial statements.

    Under the new Italian budget law, though, part of the contributions to this severance scheme will be collected and held by Italy's social security administration to finance public expenditures. When the employee leaves his job or has health problems, the government, rather than the employer, will disburse his severance payments. The bottom line is that, by receiving the contributions for this new, implicit debt, the Italian government expects to reduce its yearly budget deficit by almost 0.5% of GDP. A debt instrument has miraculously become a surplus.

    This bookkeeping equivalent of turning water into wine is possible because EU accounting rules for government finances are much looser than the rules that the same governments apply to private firms. The bloc's statistics service, Eurostat, does not consider the future obligations implicit in public pensions as part of government liabilities. Hence, the transfer of the TFR to the Italian social security system is treated like the creation of a new pay-as-you go system.

    The Stability Pact's 2005 reform, though, specifically encourages Brussels to pay special attention to fiscal sustainability in the long run, and in particular to the future liabilities implicit in the pension systems. The Commission, however, has paid lip service to the principle of long-run sustainability, while in practice is giving its blessing to the Italian accounting miracle. In so doing, it has shown that the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact will not be enforced.

    This creates a dangerous precedent that other member states might be tempted to follow. Germany, for instance, has a "book reserve" system similar to the Italian TFR that automatically applies to a significant portion of its work force. The contributions to the German system are even more attractive as a potential source of government finance since, unlike the TFR, they can only be claimed by the workers upon retirement. Many other Europeans countries have sizable occupational pension plans. The EU is implicitly saying that the proceeds from nationalizing these plans can be used to meet its budget deficit targets. Firms in financial difficulties with occupational pension plans are always tempted to transfer to the state their pension liabilities, together with the annual contributions to the fund. Now myopic governments will have an additional incentive to meet these requests for "state aid." Public revenues increase immediately, while the debt disappears once it is transferred to the public sector.

    Europe's public finances can ill afford these kinds of miracles.

    Messrs. Boeri and Tabellini are economics professors at Bocconi University in Milan.


    This could make a good case study for an accounting theory course

     

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on December 8, 2006

     

    TITLE: Making Use of Frequent-Flier Miles Gets Harder
    REPORTER: Scott McCartney
    DATE: Dec 05, 2006
    PAGE: D5
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116528094651740654.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac 
    TOPICS: Accounting, Auditing

    SUMMARY: The Department of Transportation (DOT) has undertaken audit procedures on airlines to review how they are "living up to their 1999 'Customer Service Commitment.'" This document was written when "airlines were under pressure from Congress and consumers for lousy service and long delays" in order to "stave off new legislation regulating their business." The airlines also report little about the frequent flier mile plans they offer, and particularly focus only on the financial aspects of these plans in their annual reports and SEC filings, rather than, say, information about ease of redeeming miles in which customers may be particularly interested.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) What information do airlines provide about frequent flier mileage offerings and redemptions in their annual reports and SEC filings?

    2.) Why is this information important for financial statement users? In your answer, describe your understanding of the business model and accounting for frequent flier miles, based on the description in the article.

    3.) Why did the Department of Transportation (DOT) undertake a review of airline practices? What type of audit would you say that the DOT performed?

    4.) What audit procedures did the airlines abandon due to financial exigencies? What was the result of abandoning these audit procedures? In your answer, describe the incentives provided by the act of undertaking audit procedures on operational efficiencies and effectiveness.

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    "Making Use of Frequent-Flier Miles Gets Harder Falling Redemption Rate Is One of Many Service Issues, Government Report Find," by Scott McCartney, The Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2006; Page D5 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116528094651740654.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac

     

     

  • Which airline is the most accommodating when it comes to letting consumers cash in frequent-flier mileage awards? It's hard to know, a new government report says, because airlines disclose so little information.

    One thing is clear: Over the past four years, the percentage of travelers cashing in frequent-flier award tickets has declined at four of the five biggest airlines, even though miles accumulated by consumers have increased.

    The Department of Transportation's inspector general went back and checked how airlines were living up to their 1999 "Customer Service Commitment." Back then, airlines were under pressure from Congress and consumers for lousy service and long delays, and they promised reform to stave off new legislation regulating their business.

    Seven years later, Inspector General Calvin L. Scovel III found that under financial pressure, many airlines quit auditing or quality control checks on their own customer service, leading to service deterioration. Airlines don't provide enough training for employees who assist passengers with disabilities, the investigation found, and don't always follow rules when handling passengers who get bumped from flights.

    And as travelers have long complained, government auditors studying 15 carriers at 17 airports found airline employees often don't provide timely and accurate information on flight delays and their causes, and don't give consumers straightforward information about frequent-flier award redemptions.

    "They can do better and must do better, and if they don't do better, Congress has authority to wield a big stick," said U.S. Rep John Mica, the outgoing chairman of the House Aviation Subcommittee who requested the inspector general's customer-service investigation. He said he's eager to hear the airline industry's response before making final judgments, but the report card gives airlines only "average to poor grades in a range of areas that need improvement."

    Since airlines are returning to profitability and aggressively raising fares, there's more attention being paid to customer-service issues. Delays have increased; baggage handling worsened. As traffic has rebounded, airlines still under financial pressure because of high oil prices may not have adequate staff to live up to the promises they made on customer service.

    The report called on the DOT to "strengthen its oversight and enforcement of air-traveler consumer-protection rules" and urged airlines to get back on the stick for customer service. The inspector general also reminded consumers that since airlines incorporated the customer-service commitment into their "contract of carriage" -- the legal rules governing tickets -- carriers can be sued for not living up to their customer-service commitment.

    The industry says it is paying attention. The inspector general's Nov. 21 report "is a good report card for reminding us where we need to improve," said David Castelveter, a spokesman for the Air Transport Association, the industry's lobbying group, which coordinated the "Customer Service Commitment." Airlines will "react accordingly," he said.

    One of the stickiest areas is frequent-flier redemptions because airlines are loath to release detailed information about their programs, considering it crucial competitive information. Frequent-flier programs have become big money-makers for airlines since they sell so many miles in advance to credit-card companies, merchants, charities and others. That allows them to pocket cash years in advance of a ticket, then incur very little expense when consumers eventually redeem the miles, if they ever do.

    In 1999, airlines pledged to publish "annual reports" on frequent-flier redemptions. But at most carriers, the disclosure didn't change at all. Today, as then, carriers typically bury numbers deep in filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission and report only the number of awards issued, the estimated liability they have for the cost of awards earned but not yet redeemed and the number of awards as a percentage either of passengers or passenger miles traveled.

    The inspector general said the hard-to-find information has only "marginal value to the consumer for purposes of determining which frequent-flier program best meets their need."

    What you'd really want to know is which airline makes it easiest to get an award, particularly the cheapest domestic coach ticket, typically 25,000 miles, which is the most popular award. But airlines don't disclose how many awards are at the lowest level, and how many consumers have to pay double miles or so for a premium award of an "unrestricted" coach ticket.

    The award market follows ticket prices and availability, so recent years have seen an increase in the price people have to pay to get the awards they want, and less availability of award seats, particularly at the cheapest level, because some airlines have cut capacity and demand for travel has been strong. Add in the flood of miles airlines are issuing, and the value of a frequent-flier mile has declined sharply.

    The inspector general's report compares award-redemption rates at big airlines over the past four years and found a relatively steady drop at four carriers: UAL Corp.'s United Airlines, Continental Airlines Inc., AMR Corp.'s American Airlines and Northwest Airlines Corp. US Airways Group Inc. actually saw higher rates of redemption in 2005 than in 2002, and Delta Air Lines Inc. was unchanged. Both Delta and US Airways had higher redemption rates than competitors.

    to claim short-trip tickets, adding more seats to award inventory this fall and offering a new credit card with easier redemption features. Northwest said its numbers have remained relatively consistent -- roughly one in every 12 seats is a reward seat.

    Other airlines said declining redemption rates result from factors including an increase in paying customers, fuller planes and shifts in airline capacity. American says the number of awards it has issued has remained fairly constant, and while the number of passengers it carries has climbed, its seat capacity hasn't. In addition, several airlines said customer preferences like using miles for first-class upgrades or hoarding miles longer to land big international trips can affect the redemption rate. "Reward traffic does not spool up and absorb capacity increases as fast as revenue traffic does," said a Continental spokesman.

    Those numbers don't include awards that their customers redeem on partner airlines, so some of the decline could be attributable to an increase in consumers' opting to grab award seats on foreign airlines or other partners, says frequent-flier expert Randy Petersen. American, for example, does disclose more redemption data on its Web site and showed that last year, it issued more than 955,000 awards for travel on its partners, compared with the 2.6 million used on American and American Eagle flights.

    "The data can be misleading," said Mr. Petersen, founder of InsideFlyer.com. He'd like to see more data, including numbers on how many customers made requests but couldn't find seats.

    But further disclosure is unlikely to happen unless the government forces it. "Left to their own devices," said Tim Winship, publisher of FrequentFlier.com, "I see no reason to expect airlines to step up and disclose more."


  •  

    Insurance:  A Scheme for Hiding Debt That Won't Go Away

    The SEC and Eliot Spitzer have launched probes into sales by insurance firms of products that help customers burnish results.  Industry executives say companies can reap distinct accounting benefits by obtaining loans dressed up as insurance products. Under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, companies are allowed to use insurance recoveries to offset losses on their income statements -- often without disclosing them. To qualify as insurance under the accounting rules, financial contracts must involve a significant transfer of risk from one party to another.

    "Fresh Probes Target Insurers' Earnings Role," by Theo Francis and Jonathan Weil, The Wall Street Journal, November 8, 2004, Page C1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB109988032427267296,00.html?mod=home_whats_news_us 

    The Securities and Exchange Commission and New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer each have launched investigations into sales by insurance companies of questionable financial products that help customers burnish their financial statements, according to people familiar with the matter.

    The SEC's enforcement division is conducting an industrywide investigation into whether a variety of insurance companies may have helped customers improperly smooth their earnings by selling them financial-engineering products that were designed to look like insurance but in some cases were little more than loans in disguise, people familiar with the matter say. The agency is focusing on a universe of products that are intended to achieve desired accounting results for customers' financial statements, as opposed to traditional insurance, whose primary goal is transferring risk of losses from a policyholder to the insurer selling the coverage.

    Meanwhile, New York state investigators are preparing to issue subpoenas as soon as this week to several large insurance companies. After months of combing through industry documents in its continuing probe of insurance-broker compensation, Mr. Spitzer's office has grown increasingly concerned about insurance-industry products, detailed in The Wall Street Journal last month, that customers can use to manipulate their income statements and balance sheets.

    Although Mr. Spitzer's office and the SEC began looking into the issue separately, they have discussed sharing information and resources, according to a person familiar with the probes.

    Normally, an insurer is paid a specific amount of premiums to take on a risk of uncertain size and timing. In the "insurance" at issue, the risk of loss to the insurer selling the policy is limited and sometimes even eliminated -- partly because, in these policies' simplest form, the premiums are so high; other times, the loss already has occurred.

    Industry executives say companies can reap distinct accounting benefits by obtaining loans dressed up as insurance products. Under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, companies are allowed to use insurance recoveries to offset losses on their income statements -- often without disclosing them. To qualify as insurance under the accounting rules, financial contracts must involve a significant transfer of risk from one party to another.

    Continued in the article

    Insurance companies historically have been rancid with white collar crime and consumer rip offs.  Bob Jensen's threads on insurance company scandals are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudRotten.htm#Insurance



    Off-Balance-Sheet Entities: The Good, The Bad And The Ugly - This article defines some typical off-balance-sheet items and discusses when they are justified and when they are misleading.

    The Good
    Off-balance-sheet companies were created to help finance new ventures. Theoretically, these separate companies were used to transfer the risk of the new venture from the parent to the separate company. This way, the parent could finance the new venture without diluting existing shareholders or adding to the parent's debt burden. These separate legal entities could be privately held partnerships or publicly traded spin-offs.

    Sometimes the separate companies were created to pursue a business project that was a part of the parent's main line of business. For example, oil-drilling companies established off-balance-sheet subsidiaries as a way to finance oil exploration projects. These subsidiaries were jointly funded by the parent and outside investors who were willing to take the exploration risk. The parent company could have sold shares or borrowed the money directly, but the accounting and tax laws were designed to allow the project funding come from investors who were interested in investing in specific explorations rather than investing in the parent company.

    Other times these separate companies were created to house businesses that were decidedly different from the parent's line of work (in order to unlock "value"). For example, Williams Co's, created Williams Communications to pursue the communications business. Williams Companies spun off Williams Communications, but the bankers required the parent to guarantee the debt of Williams Communications. Because Williams Communications was a new company, this is not an unusual request.

    This use of off-balance-sheet entities is good in that it transfers risk from the parent's shareholders to others that were willing to take the business risk. Investors in Williams Companies (an energy resource company) may not have wanted to invest in a communications company, so management created a separate entity to house that business. Likewise, oil companies used off-balance-sheet entities to remove the exploration risk from their business to share it with others that wanted a bigger piece of the potential return from exploration.

    The Bad
    While GAAP and tax laws allow off-balance-sheet entities for valid reasons noted above, bad things happen when economic reality differs significantly from the assumptions that were used to justify the off-balance-sheet entity. Problems also occur when egos get too big.

    In Williams's case, the decision to spin off the communications business was reasonable at the time. The parent had the infrastructure on which to build a communications network, but it was an energy company. By spinning off the subsidiary, it was not forcing its investors to take on the risk of a communications company, and it was able to take advantage of the market's demand for communication stocks. At the same time, the need to guarantee the debt of a new subsidiary is a reasonable request that bankers make in this type of transaction.

    What went "wrong" was that economic reality differed from the assumptions that were used to justify the spin off. Dotcom mania resulted in over-capacity, causing problems for all telecommunications companies. The loan guarantee, which is never expected to be triggered, is now an issue for the company because of the recession and the slump in the telecommunications sector.

    Enron exemplifies how ego can be the basis for the misuse of off-balance-sheet items. Here, off-balance-sheet vehicles appear to have been used to pump up financial results rather than for legitimate business purposes. What started as a plan to legitimately use off-balance-sheet vehicles morphed into ways to manufacture earnings as trades went bad. While one could argue that this is also a case of economic reality differing from expectations, the way management reacted to the situation allows us to classify it as an ego thing.

    This financial engineering is usually fueled by the need to reach certain operating targets established by Wall Street or compensation plans. Once management succumbs to this "Dark Side", more time is spent on trying to game the system than trying to manage the core business. It is then only a matter of time before the house of cards falls.

    The Ugly
    It gets ugly when the markets start to punish a stock just because it has an off-balance-sheet item. Granted, it is not always easy to read a company's SEC filings, let alone dig into the footnotes and figure out how the off-balance-sheet items might impact results. But the companies that provide full disclosure will probably be the better investments.

    Conclusion The loss of faith in accounting's ability to provide full disclosure could have a bigger impact on the stock market than the events of September 11th. The attacks were an exogenous factor and we bounced back nicely. The loss of confidence in financial statements is an attack on one of the core elements of investment decision making. To quote Johnny Cochran, "If the statements aren't true, what will we do?"

    However, the focus on off-balance-sheet accounting will have two major benefits. First, it will result in new regulations that will hopefully prevent future Enrons. Some of these changes will likely be the following:

    Prevention of officers of the parent from being officers of the off-balance-sheet subsidiary

    Increasing the percentage ownership by outside and non-affiliated companies

    Enforcing disclosure rules so that investors can clearly understand the risk (if any) posed by off-balance-sheet companies Second, market over-reaction creates a buying opportunity. Markets always overreact, causing panic in the Street. Uncertainty created by the loss of faith in financial disclosures could even cause more damage to the market than extreme events like September 11th.

    Bob Jensen's threads on VIE's (SPEs) are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm



    Uncovering Hidden Debt - Understand how financing through operating leases, synthetic leases, and securitizations affects companies' image of performance.

    Is the company whose stock you own carrying more debt than the balance sheet is showing? Most of the information about debt can be found on the balance sheet--but many debt obligations are not disclosed there. Here is a review of some off-balance-sheet transactions and what they mean for investors.

    The term "off-balance-sheet" debt has recently come under the spotlight. The reason, of course, is Enron, which used underhanded techniques to shift debt off its balance sheet, making the company's fundamentals look far stronger than they were. That said, not all off–balance-sheet finance is shady. In fact, it can be a useful tool that all sorts of companies can use for a variety of legitimate purposes--such as tapping into extra sources of financing and reducing liability risk that could hurt earnings.

    As an investor, it's your job to understand the differences between various off-balance-sheet transactions. Has the company really reduced its risk by shifting the burden of debt to another company, or has it simply come up with a devious way of eliminating a liability from its balance sheet?

    Operating Leases
    A lot of investors don't know that there are two kinds of leases: capital leases, which show up on the balance sheet, and operating leases, which do not.

    Under accounting rules, a capital lease is treated like a purchase. Let's say an airline company buying an airplane sets up a long-term payment lease plan and pays for the airplane over time. Since the airline will ultimately own the plane, it shows up on its books as an asset, and the lease obligations show up as liabilities.

    If the airline sets up an operating lease, the leasing group retains ownership of the plane; therefore, the transaction does not appear on the airline's balance sheet. The lease payments appear as operating expenses instead. Operating leases, which are popular in industries that use expensive equipment, are disclosed in the footnotes of the company's published financial statements.

    Consider Federal Express Corp. In its 2004 annual report, the balance sheet shows liabilities totaling $11.1 billion. But dig deeper, and you will notice in the footnotes that Federal Express discloses $XX worth of non-cancelable operating leases. So, the company's total debt is clearly much higher than what's listed on the balance sheet. Since operating leases keep substantial liabilities away from plain sight, they have the added benefit of boosting--artificially, critics say--key performance measures such as return-on-assets and debt-to-capital ratios.

    The accounting differences between capital and operating leases impact the cash flow statement as well as the balance sheet. Payments for operating leases show up as cash outflows from operations. Capital lease payments, by contrast, are divided between operating activities and financing activities. Therefore, firms that use capital leases will typically report higher cash flows from operations than those that rely on operating leases.

    Synthetic Leases
    Building or buying an office building can load up a company's debt on the balance sheet. A lot of businesses therefore avoid the liability by using synthetic leases to finance their property: a bank or other third party purchases the property and rents it to the company. For accounting purposes, the company is treated like a tenant in a traditional operating lease. So, neither the building asset nor the lease liability appears on the firm's balance sheet. However, a synthetic lease, unlike a traditional lease, gives the company some benefits of ownership, including the right to deduct interest payments and the depreciation of the property from its tax bill.

    Details about synthetic leases normally appear in the footnotes of financial statements, where investors can determine their impact on debt. Synthetic leases can become a big worry for investors when the footnotes reveal that the company is responsible for not only making lease payments but also guaranteeing property values. If property prices fall, those guarantees represent a big source of liability risk.

    Securitizations
    Banks and other financial organizations often hold assets--like credit card receivables--that third parties might be willing to buy. To distinguish the assets it sells from the ones it keeps, the company creates a special purpose entity (SPE). The SPE purchases the credit card receivables from the company with the proceeds from a bond offering backed by the receivables themselves. The SPE then uses the money received from cardholders to repay the bond investors. Since much of the credit risk gets offloaded along with the assets, these liabilities are taken off the company's balance sheet.

    Capital One is just one of many credit card issuers that securitize loans. In its 2004 first quarter report, the bank highlights results of its credit card operations on a so-called managed basis, which includes $38.4 billion worth of off-balance-sheet securitized loans. The performance of Capital One's entire portfolio, including the securitized loans, is an important indicator of how well or poorly the overall business is being run.

    Conclusion
    Companies argue that off-balance-sheet techniques benefit investors because they allow management to tap extra sources of financing and reduce liability risk that could hurt earnings. That's true, but off-balance-sheet finance also has the power to make companies and their management teams look better than they are. Although most examples of off-balance sheet debt are far removed from the shadowy world of Enron's books, there are nonetheless billions of dollars worth of real financial liabilities that are not immediately apparent in companies' financial reports. It's important for investors to get the full story on company liabilities.



    Show and Tell: The Importance of Transparency  - Clear and honest financial statements not only reflect value, they also help ensure it.

    Ask investors what kind of financial information they want companies to publish and you'll probably hear two words: more and better. Quality financial reports allow for effective, informative fundamental analysis.

    But let's face it, the financial statements of some firms are designed to hide rather than reveal information. Investors should steer clear of companies that lack transparency in their business operations, financial statements or strategies. Companies with inscrutable financials and complex business structures are riskier and less valuable investments.

    Transparency Is Assurance The word "transparent" can be used to describe high-quality financial statements. The term has quickly become a part of business vocabulary. Dictionaries offer many definitions for the word, but those synonyms relevant to financial reporting are "easily understood", "very clear", "frank", and "candid".

    Consider two companies with the same market capitalization, same overall market-risk exposure, and the same financial leverage. Assume that both also have the same earnings, earnings growth rate and similar returns on capital. The difference is that Company A is a single-business company with easy-to-understand financial statements. Company B, by contrast, has numerous businesses and subsidiaries with complex financials.

    Which one will have more value? Odds are good the market will value Company A more highly. Because of its complex and opaque financial statements, Company B's value will be discounted.

    The reason is simple: less information means less certainty for investors. When financial statements are not transparent, investors can never be sure about a company's real fundamentals and true risk. For instance, a firm's growth prospects are related to how it invests. It's difficult if not impossible to evaluate a company's investment performance if its investments are funneled through holding companies, making them hidden from view. Lack of transparency may also obscure the company's level of debt. If a company hides its debt, investors can't estimate their exposure to bankruptcy risk.

    High-profile cases of financial shenanigans, such as those at Enron and Tyco, showed everyone that managers employ fuzzy financials and complex business structures to hide unpleasant news. Lack of transparency can mean nasty surprises to come.

    Blurry Vision The reasons for inaccurate financial reporting are varied: a small but dangerous minority of companies actively intends to defraud investors; other companies may release information that is misleading but technically conforms to legal standards.

    The rise of stock option compensation has increased the incentives for companies to misreport key information. Companies have increased their reliance on pro forma earnings and similar techniques, which can include hypothetical transactions. Then again, many companies just find it difficult to present financial information that complies with fuzzy and evolving accounting standards.

    Furthermore, some firms are simply more complex than others. Many operate in multiple businesses that often have little in common. For example, analyzing General Electric - an enormous conglomerate with dozens of businesses, from GE Plastics to NBC - is more challenging than examining the financials of a firm like Amazon.com, a pure play online retailer.

    When firms enter new markets or businesses, the way they structure these new businesses can result in greater complexity and less transparency. For instance, a firm that keeps each business separate will be easier to value than one that squeezes all the businesses into a single entity. Meanwhile, the increasing use of derivatives, forward sales, off-balance-sheet financing, complex contractual arrangements and new tax vehicles can befuddle investors.

    The cause of poor transparency, however, is less important than its effect on a company's ability to give investors the critical information they need to value their investments. If investors neither believe nor understand financial statements, the performance and fundamental value of that company remains either irrelevant or distorted.

    Transparency Pays
    Mounting evidence suggests that the market gives a higher value to firms that are upfront with investors and analysts. Transparency pays, according to Robert Eccles, author of "Building Public Trust – The Value Reporting Revolution". Eccles shows that companies with fuller disclosure win more trust from investors. Relevant and reliable information means less risk to investors and thus a lower cost of capital, which naturally translates into higher valuations. The key finding is that companies that share the key metrics and performance indicators that investors consider important are more valuable than those companies that keep information to themselves.

    Of course, there are two ways to interpret this evidence. One is that the market rewards more transparent companies with higher valuations because the risk of unpleasant surprises is believed to be lower. The other interpretation is that companies with good results usually release their earnings earlier. Companies that are doing well have nothing to hide and are eager to publicize their good performance as widely as possible. It is in their interest to be transparent and forthcoming with information, so that the market can upgrade their fair value.

    Further evidence suggests that the tendency among investors to mark down complexity explains the conglomerate discount. Relative to single-market or pure play firms, conglomerates are discounted by as much as 20%. The positive reaction associated with spin-offs and divestment can be viewed as evidence that the market rewards transparency.

    Naturally, there could be other reasons for the conglomerate discount. It could be the lack of focus of these companies and the inefficiencies that follow. Or it could be that the absence of market prices for the separate businesses makes it harder for investors to assess value.

    It's worth noting that, even if a company's financial statements are totally transparent, investors may still not understand them. If biotech specialist Amgen and semiconductor maker Intel were totally forthcoming about their R&D spending, investors might still lack the knowledge to properly value these companies.

    Conclusion
    Investors should seek disclosure and simplicity. The more companies say about where they are making money and how they are spending their resources, the more confident investors can be about the companies' fundamentals.

    It's even better when financial reports provide a line-of-sight view into the company's growth drivers. Transparency makes analysis easier and thus lowers an investor's risk when investing in stocks. That way you, the investor, are less likely to face unpleasant surprises.

     




    Question
    What are CDOs?
    Should they be booked?
    Why were they particularly troublesome in the Year 2007?

    CDO --- Click Here

    Accounting for CDOs (including journal entries) under U.S. and Foreign GAAP --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/TheoryOnFirmCommitments.htm

    Why were CDOs particularly troublesome in the Year 2007?
    The accounting standards are not resolved on whether or not CDOs should be booked.
    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on November 30, 2007

    Citi's $41 Billion Issue: Should It Put CDOs On the Balance Sheet?
    by David Reilly
    The Wall Street Journal
    Nov 26, 2007
    Page: C1
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
    ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119604238679603556.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac

     

    TOPICS: Accounting, CDO, Collateralized Debt Obligations, Consolidated Financial Statements, Consolidations, Financial Accounting, Reconsideration Events

    SUMMARY: Does Citigroup need to bring $41 billion in potentially shaky securities onto its balance sheet? Opinions are divided, reflecting a wider debate over how to interpret accounting rules on off-balance-sheet treatment for some financing vehicles.

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: This article offers a good basis for discussion of CDOs, possible consolidation of CDOs, and the balance sheet presentation of CDOs based on the rules related to "reconsideration events."

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) What are CDOs? What are the recent problems connected with CDOs? What is the cause of these problems? In general, why are they especially a concern for Citigroup?

    2.) What is the specific issue facing Citigroup, as detailed in the article?

    3.) What are the accounting rules regarding consolidation of CDOs? How do banks avoid having to consolidate?

    4.) Why is there controversy over the how the losses should be booked by the bank? What is the potentially vague part of the rules?

    5.) What position does Citigroup take? What position are some accounting experts taking? Is either side getting support from other parties? If so, from whom?

    6.) With what position do you agree? How did you reach this conclusion? Please offer support from your answer.
     

    Reviewed By: Linda Christiansen, Indiana University Southeast
     

    RELATED ARTICLES: 
    Why Citi Struggles to Tally Losses
    by Carrick Mollenkamp and David Reilly
    Nov 05, 2007
    Page: C1

    The Nine Lives of CDOs
    by
    Nov 26, 2007
    Page: C10

    Goldman Says Citigroup Faces $15 Billion CDO Write-Downs
    by Kimberly A. Vlach
    Nov 20, 2007
    Online Exclusive
     

    "Citi's $41 Billion Issue: Should It Put CDOs On the Balance Sheet?" by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, November 26, 2007; Page C1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119604238679603556.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac

    A $41 billion question mark is hanging over Citigroup Inc.

    That is the amount, in a worst-case scenario, of potentially shaky securities the bank would need to bring onto its balance sheet. Citi has already taken billions of dollars of such securities onto its balance sheet and expects to take big write-downs on those holdings.

    The fate of the $41 billion rests on the outcome of a debate going on in accounting circles over what constitutes a "reconsideration event." Those who say Citi needs to put these securities, known as collateralized debt obligations, onto its balance sheet argue that because Citi acted over the summer to backstop some of them, its relationship with them changed, prompting a reconsideration event.

    At the moment, it seems unlikely Citigroup will be forced to bring the assets onto its books. The bank doesn't believe such a reconsideration event is in order. A spokeswoman says Citigroup is confident its "financial statements fully comply with all applicable rules and regulations."

    But the division of opinion reflects debate within accounting circles over just how to interpret rules that govern off-balance-sheet treatment for some financing vehicles. That, in turn, underscores what many consider to be a failure of these rules to ensure that investors in the companies that create these vehicles are adequately informed of the risks posed by them.

    In recent months, investors have been shocked to learn that many banks were exposed to big losses because of their involvement with vehicles that issued commercial paper and purchased risky assets such as mortgage securities. The troubles facing one kind of off-balance-sheet entity, known as structured investment vehicles, have even prompted Citigroup and other major banks to organize a rescue fund.

    But CDO vehicles created by Citigroup have proved to be a more immediate threat. The bank's announcement this month that it expects to take $8 billion to $11 billion in write-downs in the fourth quarter largely stems from its exposure to CDO assets. Citigroup was one of the biggest arrangers of CDOs -- products that pool debt, often mortgage securities, and then sell slices with varying degrees of risk.

    If Citigroup had to include an additional $41 billion in CDO assets on its books, that could potentially spur a further $8 billion in write-downs, above and beyond those already signaled, according to a report earlier this month by Howard Mason, an analyst at Sanford C. Bernstein. Such losses could further weaken Citigroup's capital position, threatening its dividend or forcing the bank to raise money.

    The issue for Citigroup is when, and if, it has to reconsider consolidation of the CDO vehicles it sponsors.

    Like other banks, Citigroup structured these vehicles so they wouldn't be included on its books. The vehicles are created as corporate zombies that ostensibly aren't owned or controlled by anyone. In that case, accounting rules say consolidation of such vehicles is determined by who holds the majority of risks and rewards connected to them.

    To deal with that, banks sell off the riskiest pieces of the vehicles. This ensures they don't shoulder a majority of the risk and so don't have to consolidate the vehicles. The assessment of who absorbs the majority of losses is made when the vehicles are created.

    Over time, though, rising losses within a vehicle can lead a sponsor to shoulder more risk, or even a majority of it. That can also happen if a sponsor takes on additional interests in the vehicle by buying up the short-term IOUs it issues.

    That is what happened to Citigroup. Over the summer, the bank was forced to buy $25 billion in commercial paper issued by its CDO vehicles because investors were no longer interested in the paper. Citigroup already had an $18 billion exposure to these vehicles through other funding it had provided.

    This combined $43 billion exposure means that if CDO losses climb high enough, the bank could be exposed to more than half the losses, according to Bernstein's Mr. Mason. That would seem to argue for Citigroup's consolidating all $84 billion of its CDO assets originally held in off-balance-sheet vehicles.

    But the accounting rules don't say that sponsors of these vehicles have to reassess on any regular basis the question of who bears the majority of risk of loss. Such "reconsideration events" occur when there is a change in the "governing documents or contractual arrangements" related to these vehicles, the rules say.

    Citigroup believes that because it hasn't changed the documents or contracts related to the vehicles, it shouldn't have to reconsider its relationship to them, according to people familiar with the bank's thinking.

    But some accounting experts point out that the rule also says a reconsideration event occurs when an institution acquires additional interests in the vehicle. "If a bank is being forced to step in and be a bigger holder of the commercial paper, to me that's pretty black and white that it's a reconsideration event," says Ed Trott, a retired member of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the body that wrote the accounting rule.

    An influential accounting-industry group, the Center for Audit Quality, also seems to lean toward this view. In a paper issued last month, the center said the purchase of commercial paper is an example of a change in the contractual arrangements governing these vehicles. This "may also result in a reconsideration event," the paper said.

    But Citigroup believes its purchase of the CDO vehicles' commercial paper is different, because it had taken on the obligation to provide such assistance when the vehicles were created. This means the bank was acting within the contractual arrangements governing the vehicles, not changing them, according to the people familiar with Citigroup's thinking.

    Some accounting experts agree. "If all that's happening is one set of [paper holders] is going out and another is coming in, that's not a reconsideration event," says Stephen Ryan, an accounting professor at New York University. "I don't think you reconsider moment by moment; an event is not just bad luck happening."


    "The Accounting Cycle:  Poor Performance of Credit Rating Agencies," by J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, December 2007 --- http://lyris.smartpros.com/t/204743/5562870/4383/0/

    Soon after Merrill Lynch disclosed its $8.4 billion write-down because of problems with collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and other financial instruments relating to subprime mortgages, the credit rating agencies started downgrading the securities. But, this is like the proverbial soldier who watches a raging battle from afar; when the war is over, he proceeds to bayonet the wounded. 

    Merrill Lynch and other banks got into the CDO business several years ago. The CDOs received an imprimatur from agencies such as Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch. Some CDOs were even evaluated as investment grade securities. The analysts at Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch apparently ignored the risks involved in the subprime mortgage market as well as the risks in real estate prices.

    This segment generated lots of money for Merrill Lynch and the other banks. The CDO business brought in millions and millions of revenues. This line of business was at least as profitable for the bond rating agencies, too, as their ratings produced massive amounts of money.

    Not surprisingly, problems developed because the financial institutions were lending funds to marginal borrowers, those with less-than-stellar credentials for loan applicants. When some of these riskier borrowers defaulted on their mortgages, the CDOs started losing value. The credit rating agencies did nothing; presumably, they felt that the CDOs still had investment grade status.

    With the losses by Merrill Lynch out in the open, everybody knows not only that the CDOs have less fair value, but also that the credit raters aren't earning their keep. Unfortunately, members of Congress believe that they should hold investigations on the matter. I say unfortunate because such a move would be a waste of time, energy, and money.

    Recall the downfall of Enron and the high credit ratings that Enron received from the credit rating agencies. These agencies did not downgrade Enron's debt until after the 2001 third quarter results became public and Enron's stock price started its nosedive. When Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, section 702(b) required the SEC to conduct a study of credit rating agencies to determine why these credit rating agencies did not act as useful watchdogs and warn the public about Enron's true situation. It accomplished little at the time; if Congress holds hearings now, nothing new will be learned. Until policy makers focus on the institution of credit ratings and follow the cash, they waste their time with investigations.

    Moody's and the other agencies make money by charging the business entities who are issuing debt. It doesn't take a genius to see the conflict of interest. The credit agencies lean on the issuer for more money or risk receiving a poor rating. Payment not only entitles one to a good rating, but also it gives one the privilege of not receiving a downgrade unless bad news becomes public.

    The SEC barely mentions this institutional feature in its "Report on the Roles and Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the Operation of the Securities Markets."

    This essay, written in January, 2003, practically ignores the problem. On page 41, the SEC report states, "The practice of issuers paying for their own ratings creates the potential for a conflict of interest." The SEC goes on to review comments by the large rating agencies themselves on how they manage this potential conflict of interest.

    The comments are pathetic. First, the SEC and the managers at credit rating agencies mangle the English language when they refuse to identify conflicts of interest for what they are. My dictionary defines conflict of interest as "the circumstance of a public officeholder, corporate officer, etc., whose personal interests might benefit from his or her official actions or influence." The term does not mean that they actually do benefit, but calls attention to the possibility. Calling such circumstances "potential conflicts of interests" merely attempts to push ethics aside. I can understand this behavior by the managers, but I don't comprehend the words of the SEC staff.

    Second, the comments rely heavily on the assertions of the credit rating agencies themselves. Managers of these agencies claim there is no problem, and of course the SEC should listen to them and accept every word as truth. Yeah, right!

    Third, on page 42 of the report, the SEC promises to explore whether these credit rating agencies "should implement procedures to manage potential conflicts of interest that arise when issuers [pay] for ratings." Either the SEC did not keep its promise or such actions are inadequate. Clearly, the credit rating agencies have not responded any differently to the CDO problem than they did with Enron's circumstances.

    Policy makers can reduce the problems by reducing the very real conflict of interests that perniciously raises its ugly head from time to time. The solution is to prohibit credit rating agencies to receive any funds from the issuers. If the ratings have any merit, then investors will be willing to pay for them.

    This essay reflects the opinion of the author and not necessarily the opinion of The Pennsylvania State University.

    Bob Jensen's threads on credit rating industry frauds are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#CreditRatingAgencies  

    Accounting for CDOs (including journal entries) under U.S. and Foreign GAAP --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/TheoryOnFirmCommitments.htm


    Pensions and Post-retirement Benefits: 
    Schemes for Hiding Debt

    Horrible (shell game) accounting rules for pension accounting
    Over the past three decades, we have allowed a system of pension accounting to develop that is a shell game, misleading taxpayers and investors about the true fiscal health of their cities and companies -- and allowing management to make promises to workers that saddle future generations with huge costs. The result: According to a recent estimate by Credit Suisse First Boston, unfunded pension liabilities of companies in the S&P 500 could hit $218 billion by the end of this year. Others estimate that public pensions -- the benefits promised by state and local governments -- could be in the red upwards of $700 billion.
    Arthur Levitt, Jr., "Pensions Unplugged," The Wall Street Journal, November 10, 2005; Page A16 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113159015994793200.html?mod=opinion&ojcontent=otep
     


    Question
    What do American Airlines pensions have to do with funding of the Iraq war?

    Answer
    Plenty, but who knows why?

    A pension measure tucked into last month’s Iraq war spending bill is causing some leading members of Congress to complain that American Airlines got a break worth almost $2 billion without proper scrutiny. The measure will allow American to greatly reduce its payments into its pension fund over the next 10 years. At the end of 2006, the fund had assets of $8.5 billion and needed an additional $2.5 billion to cover all its obligations. The new provision will allow American to recalculate those numbers, so that the shortfall disappears and the plan looks fully funded. Continental, along with a small number of regional airlines and a caterer, will also be able to take advantage of the provision. But American, the nation’s largest airline, is by far the biggest beneficiary, according to government calculations. Some lawmakers who would normally be involved in tax and pension measures say they were shut out of the process.
    Mary Williams Walsh, "Pension Relief for Airlines Faulted by Some Legislators," The New York Times, June 21, 2007 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/21/business/21pension.html?ref=business 

    Jensen Question
    How should accountants factor in politics in disclosing and reporting pension obligations, especially for airlines that do not declare bankruptcy?


    Changed pension accounting rules are in the wind
    This week, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, which writes the accounting rules for American business, will decide whether to go ahead with plans to change the way pension accounting is done. The board's current rule is 20 years old and has drawn fire from retirees and investors for many of the same reasons that disturb Mr. Zydney, who has made his concerns about his Lucent pension into something of a crusade. "Right now, the stuff isn't transparent," Mr. Zydney said. "There's no accuracy. No consistency. And everybody's trying to play some financial game to make things look better."
    Mary Williams Walsh, "A Pension Rule, Sometimes Murky, Is Under Pressure," The New York Times, November 8, 2005 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/08/business/08pension.html?pagewanted=1

    Off the government balance sheets - out of sight and out of mind


    This may be a helpful video to use when teaching the new FAS 132(R) and the new FAS 158

    "Can You Afford to Retire?" PBS --- http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/retirement/need/
    Click the Tab "Watch Online" to view the video (not free)!

    "PBS Frontline: Can You Afford to Retire," Financial Page, November 8, 2006 --- Click Here

    PBS Frontline has rebroadcast a critical examination of the nation's retirement system. You can access the interviews and written material for the program at PBS Frontline: Can You Afford to Retire. One can also view the program on-line, from the referenced link.

    The program highlights problems with both the Defined Benefit pension system (rapidly becoming obsolete) and the rising Contributory Benefit system, which brings with it a number of problems. The program considers:
    The program does not address the problem of high intermediation costs in the Contributory Pension system, or the preponderence of substandard investment vehicles (high cost annuities, load funds, and high cost active funds) in many employer provided plans.

    While the program explores the underfunding and closing of Corporate Defined Benefit plans, it does not touch on underfunding in the government pension system, nor does it address the fatal flaw of Defined Benefit plans: the total lack of portability of these plans for the employee.

    FAS 158 improves financial reporting by requiring an employer to recognize the overfunded or underfunded status of a defined benefit postretirement plan (other than a multiemployer plan) as an asset or liability in its statement of financial position and to recognize changes in that funded status in the year in which the changes occur through comprehensive income of a business entity or changes in unrestricted net assets of a not-for-profit organization. This Statement also improves financial reporting by requiring an employer to measure the funded status of a plan as of the date of its year-end statement of financial position, with limited exceptions.
    FASB --- http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/stsum158.shtml


    "FASB Proposal Puts Pension Plans on Balance Sheet," SmartPros, April 3, 2006 ---
    http://accounting.smartpros.com/x52449.xml

    The Financial Accounting Standards Board issued a proposal on Friday that would require employers to recognize the overfunded or underfunded positions of defined benefit postretirement plans, including pension plans, in their balance sheets. The proposal would also require that employers measure plan assets and obligations as of the date of their financial statements.

    According to the standards board, the proposed changes would increase the transparency and completeness of financial statements for shareholders, creditors, employees, retirees, donors, and other users.

    The exposure draft applies to plan sponsors that are public and private companies and nongovernmental not-for-profit organizations. It results from the first phase of a comprehensive project to reconsider guidance in Statement No. 87, Employers' Accounting for Pensions, and Statement No. 106, Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions. A second, broader phase will address remaining issues. FASB expects to collaborate with the International Accounting Standards Board on that phase.

    In a statement released on Friday, FASB said the current accounting standards do not provide complete information about postretirement benefit obligations. For example, those standards allow an employer to recognize an asset or liability in its balance sheet that almost always differs from its overfunded or underfunded positions. Instead, they require that information about the current funded status of such plans be reported in the notes to financial statements. That incomplete reporting results because existing standards allow delayed recognition of certain changes in plan assets and obligations that affect the costs of providing such benefits.

    "Many constituents, including our advisory councils, investors, creditors, and the SEC staff believe that the current incomplete accounting makes it difficult to assess an employer's financial position and its ability to carry out the obligations of its plans," said George Batavick, FASB member. "We agree. Today's proposal, by requiring sponsoring employers to reflect the current overfunded or underfunded positions of postretirement benefit plans in the balance sheet, makes the basic financial statements more complete, useful, and transparent. "

    The proposed changes, other than the requirement to measure plan assets and obligations as of the balance sheet date, would be effective for fiscal years ending after December 15, 2006. Public companies would be required to apply the proposed changes to the measurement date for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2006 and nonpublic entities, including not-for-profit organizations, would become subject to that requirement in fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2007.

    FASB is seeking written comments on the proposal by May 31, 2006. After the comment period, the board will hold a public roundtable meeting on the proposal on June 27, 2006, in Norwalk, Connecticut.


    So Long Footnoted Liabilities
    Pensions and other retiree benefits are graduating to the balance sheet; how far should a company go to protect its compensation information?; choosing your auditor wisely may help protect your stock price; and more.

    "So Long Footnoted Liabilities," by Rob Garver, CFO Magazine, February 2006, pp. 16-17 --- http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/5435560/c_5461573?f=magazine_alsoinside

    Verizon, Ford, and ExxonMobil, pay attention. It looks as though pensions and other retiree benefits are about to graduate from the footnotes to the balance sheet. And companies that have previously been able to hide underfunded retirement programs may have to count them as liabilities — often multi-billion-dollar liabilities.

    In November, the Financial Accounting Standards Board voted to move toward a proposal that would require companies to report the difference between the net present value of their pension- and other retirement-benefit obligations and the amount the company has set aside to meet those obligations. And although a final decision is a year or more away, the numbers won't be pretty. (See "Will Washington Really Act?")

    Standard & Poor's, in fact, estimates a retirement-obligations shortfall of some $442 billion in the S&P 500 alone. Indeed, it is difficult to understate the potential impact of the FASB plan, which is expected to be only the first phase in a larger effort to overhaul the accounting treatment of pensions and benefits. "We believe this FASB project will have a significant impact on stock evaluations, income statements, and balance sheets, and will become the major issue in financial accounting over the next five years," S&P wrote in its December report.

    The news was welcome to many in the accounting business who have been concerned that current rules allow companies to hide retiree obligations in the footnotes. John Hepp, a senior manager with Grant Thornton LLP, praised the board's decision to move toward a "simplified approach. We think this will be a big step forward."

    But it won't be without pain for many companies faced with adding a large negative number to their balance sheets, such as telecom giant Verizon Communications Inc. Standard & Poor's reported in December that Verizon has underfunded the nonpension portion of its postretirement benefits by an estimated $22.5 billion. The company is clearly trying to get a handle on retirement benefits and health-care costs, announcing that same month that it will freeze the pension benefits of all managers who currently receive them.

    While the company refused to comment, Verizon is far from alone. Ford and General Motors have underfunded their retirement obligations by $44.7 billion and $69.0 billion, respectively, and other big names facing a shortfall include ExxonMobil ($16.4 billion) and AT&T ($14.8 billion).

    If any of these companies think the markets will treat these obligations as a one-time problem, they had better think again, says S&P equity market analyst Howard Silverblatt. "Moving this onto the balance sheet is going to wake people up," he says. "The bottom line is that shareholder equity [in the S&P 500] is going to be decreased by about 9 percent." And as companies begin to explore their legal options for limiting the financial damage — including paring back benefits even further — Silverblatt predicts that the issue will become more politicized and remain in the public eye for years to come.


    Pension Fund Accounting Fraud in San Diego

    "San Diego Charges," by Nicole Gelinas, The Wall Street Journal, November 27, 2006; Page A12 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116459315111633209.html?mod=todays_us_opinion

    The SEC has announced that it has resolved its pension-fund fraud case against San Diego, with the city agreeing not to commit illegal shenanigans in the future and to hire an "independent monitor" to help it avoid doing so. Although the SEC went easy on the residents and taxpayers of San Diego in its settlement, it still has an opportunity to make an example of the former officials who the SEC determined committed the fraud. The feds should seize that chance to show they're serious about policing a sector of the investment world that remains vulnerable to similar fraud.

    San Diego ran into legal trouble with its pension fund because elected officials wanted to keep its municipal workers happy by awarding them more generous pension and health-care benefits, but also wanted to keep taxpayers happy by sticking to a lean budget. The two goals were mathematically irreconcilable. So San Diego officials, with the cooperation of the board members of the city employees' retirement system (the majority of whom were also city officials), intentionally underfunded the pension plan for years. They used the "savings" to award workers and retirees more benefits, some retroactive. Because taxpayers couldn't see how much retirement benefits for public employees eventually would cost them, they couldn't protest against those high future costs. The fund also violated sound investment principles by using "surplus" earnings in boom years to pay extra benefits to retirees, including a "13th check" in some years. Trustees should have put such "surpluses" aside for years in which the market was down.

    But the alleged escalated in 2002 and 2003, when city officials brushed aside warnings from outside groups, as well as from an analyst it had itself commissioned, about the fund's parlous financial straits. Although figures clearly showed that the pension fund would face a seven-fold increase in its deficit, to more than $2 billion, over less than a decade, San Diego didn't disclose what, according to the SEC, it "knew or was reckless in not knowing" was an inevitability, instead maintaining its charade. City officials disclosed not a word of the fund's financial troubles to potential investors or bond analysts as it raised nearly $300 million in new municipal securities during those two years.

    The SEC elected to go easy on the city. The feds won't levy a fine against it, reasoning that it would end up being the taxpayers who would pay. This argument has merit, since these taxpayers are already on the hook for the $1.5 billion deficit -- roughly equal to the city's operating budget -- the pension-fund fraud had concealed. Taxpayers could face fallout if wronged investors sue the city. But while SEC won't punish taxpayers, it can't afford to go so easy on the officials it's still investigating. (The SEC doesn't name the current and former officials under its scrutiny, but former Mayor Dick Murphy, former city manager Michael Uberuaga and former auditor Ed Ryan, as well as members of the City Council, all had degrees of responsibility for and knowledge of the pension fund's operations.) The SEC must demonstrate that it considers the fraud officials committed against the city's bondholders to be just as grave as similar frauds in the private sector.

    People who invest in municipal bonds do so because they feel that such investments are safer than investing in the common stocks of corporations. That's why cities and states enjoy access to capital at affordable interest rates. And, for tax reasons, municipal-bond investors often invest in the bonds of the city in which they reside, so they face double jeopardy. In the first place, if city officials are committing fraud, their bonds will turn out not to be as sound (and thus not as valuable) as they thought they were. The second risk is that they will have to pay higher taxes, or suffer lower government services, to cover pension-funding shortfalls in their city's budget if that is the case.

    Continued in article


    "FASB Improves Employer Pension & Postretirement Plan Accounting," AccountingWeb, October 4, 2006 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102640

    The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 158, Employers Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans last week, making it easier for users of financial information to understand and assess an employer’s financial position and its ability to fulfill benefit plan obligations. The new standard requires that employers fully recognize those obligations associated with single-employer defined benefit pension, retiree healthcare and other postretirement plans in their financial statements. It amends Statements No. 87, 88, 106 and 132R.

    “Previous standards covering these benefits went a long way toward improving financial reporting. However, the Board at that time acknowledged that future changes would be needed, and now our constituents share this view,” said George Batavick, FASB member, in the statement announcing the new standard. “Accordingly, today’s standard represents a significant improvement in financial reporting as it provides employees, retirees, investors and other financial statement users with access to more complete information. This information will help users make more informed assessments about a company’s financial position and its ability to carry out the benefit promises made through these plans.”

    The new standard requires an employer to:

    Statement No. 158 applies to plan sponsors that are public and private companies and nongovernmental not-for-profit organizations. The requirements recognize the funded status of a benefit plan and disclosure requirements are effective as of the end of the fiscal year ending after December 15, 2006, for employers with publicly traded equity securities and the end of the fiscal year ending after June 15, 2007, for all other entities. The requirement to measure plan assets and benefit obligations as of the date of the employer’s fiscal year-end statement of financial position is effective for fiscal years ending after December 15, 2008.

    http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas158.pdf Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 158, Employers Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans was developed in direct response to concerns expressed by many FASB constituents that past standards of accounting for postretirement benefit plans needed to be revisited to improve the transparency and usefulness of the information reported about them. Among the Board’s constituents calling for change were many members of the investment community, the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council, the User Advisory Council, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and others.

    The issuing of Statement No. 158 completes the first phase of the Board’s comprehensive project to improve the accounting and reporting for defined benefit pension and other postretirement plans. A second, broader phase of this project will comprehensively address remaining issues. The Board expects to collaborate with the International Accounting Standards Board on that phase.


    Like Texas (which has a bill pending to hide pension and health care liabilities for retired government workers and families)
    Connecticut has picked a fight with the independent board that tells state and local governments how to report their financial affairs.
    Mary Williams Walsh, "Connecticut Takes Up Fight Over Accounting Rules," The New York Times, June 2, 2007 ---
    Click Here
    Jensen Comment
    Funny thing is Andy Fastow said the same thing about accounting standards and auditors. If you're going to sell your bonds in the public capital markets, it seems that hiding debt from bond purchasers is not an especially good idea.

    At issue is the immense amount of such debt even when discounted back to a present value amount.
    Bob Jensen's threads on this controversial topic are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Pensions


    "Shocks Seen in New Math for Pensions," by Mary Williams Walsh, The New York Times, March 31, 2006 ---
    Click Here

    The board that writes accounting rules for American business is proposing a new method of reporting pension obligations that is likely to show that many companies have a lot more debt than was obvious before.

    In some cases, particularly at old industrial companies like automakers, the newly disclosed obligations are likely to be so large that they will wipe out the net worth of the company.

    The panel, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, said the new method, which it plans to issue today for public comment, would address a widespread complaint about the current pension accounting method: that it exposes shareholders and employees to billions of dollars in risks that they cannot easily see or evaluate. The new accounting rule would also apply to retirees' health plans and other benefits.

    A member of the accounting board, George Batavick, said, "We took on this project because the current accounting standards just don't provide complete information about these obligations."

    The board is moving ahead with the proposed pension changes even as Congress remains bogged down on much broader revisions of the law that governs company pension plans. In fact, Representative John A. Boehner, Republican of Ohio and the new House majority leader, who has been a driving force behind pension changes in Congress, said yesterday that he saw little chance of a finished bill before a deadline for corporate pension contributions in mid-April.

    Congress is trying to tighten the rules that govern how much money companies are to set aside in advance to pay for benefits. The accounting board is working with a different set of rules that govern what companies tell investors about their retirement plans.

    The new method proposed by the accounting board would require companies to take certain pension values they now report deep in the footnotes of their financial statements and move the information onto their balance sheets — where all their assets and liabilities are reflected. The pension values that now appear on corporate balance sheets are almost universally derided as of little use in understanding the status of a company's retirement plan.

    Mr. Batavick of the accounting board said the new rule would also require companies to measure their pension funds' values on the same date they measure all their other corporate obligations. Companies now have delays as long as three months between the time they calculate their pension values and when they measure everything else. That can yield misleading results as market fluctuations change the values.

    "Old industrial, old economy companies with heavily unionized work forces" would be affected most sharply by the new rule, said Janet Pegg, an accounting analyst with Bear, Stearns. A recent report by Ms. Pegg and other Bear, Stearns analysts found that the companies with the biggest balance-sheet changes were likely to include General Motors, Ford, Verizon, BellSouth and General Electric.

    Using information in the footnotes of Ford's 2005 financial statements, Ms. Pegg said that if the new rule were already in effect, Ford's balance sheet would reflect about $20 billion more in obligations than it now does. The full recognition of health care promised to Ford's retirees accounts for most of the difference. Ford now reports a net worth of $14 billion. That would be wiped out under the new rule. Ford officials said they had not evaluated the effect of the new accounting rule and therefore could not comment.

    Applying the same method to General Motors' balance sheet suggests that if the accounting rule had been in effect at the end of 2005, there would be a swing of about $37 billion. At the end of 2005, the company reported a net worth of $14.6 billion. A G.M. spokesman declined to comment, noting that the new accounting rule had not yet been issued.

    Many complaints about the way obligations are now reported revolve around the practice of spreading pension figures over many years. Calculating pensions involves making many assumptions about the future, and at the end of every year there are differences between the assumptions and what actually happened. Actuaries keep track of these differences in a running balance, and incorporate them into pension calculations slowly.

    That practice means that many companies' pension disclosures do not yet show the full impact of the bear market of 2000-3, because they are easing the losses onto their books a little at a time. The new accounting rule will force them to bring the pension values up to date immediately, and use the adjusted numbers on their balance sheets.

    Not all companies would be adversely affected by the new rule. A small number might even see improvement in their balance sheets. One appears to be Berkshire Hathaway. Even though its pension fund has a shortfall of $501 million, adjusting the numbers on its balance sheet means reducing an even larger shortfall of $528 million that the company recognized at the end of 2005.

    Berkshire Hathaway's pension plan differs from that of many other companies because it is invested in assets that tend to be less volatile. Its assumptions about investment returns are also lower, and it will not have to make a big adjustment for earlier-year losses when the accounting rule takes effect. Berkshire also looks less indebted than other companies because it does not have retiree medical plans.

    Mr. Batavick said he did not know what kind of public comments to expect, but hoped to have a final standard completed by the third quarter of the year. Companies would then be expected to use it for their 2006 annual reports. The rule will also apply to nonprofit institutions like universities and museums, as well as privately held companies.

    The rule would not have any effect on corporate profits, only on the balance sheets. The accounting board plans to make additional pension accounting changes after this one takes effect. Those are expected to affect the bottom line and could easily be more contentious.


    First They Do
    "Bill Requires Reporting Unfunded Federal Liabilities," AccountingWeb, April 12, 2006 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102016

    With state and local governments scrambling to meet the Government Accounting Standards Board’s (GASB) amended rules for reporting on postretirement benefits, and private and public companies getting ready for compliance with the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) proposed statement on recording pension liabilities, a congressman from Indiana has introduced legislation that would require the federal government to meet a similar standard. The Truth in Accounting Act, sponsored by Rep. Chris Chocola (R-Ind) and co-sponsored by Reps. Jim Cooper (D-Tenn) and Mark Kirk (R – Ill), would require the federal government to accurately report the nation’s unfunded long-term liabilities, including Social Security and Medicare, a debt that amounts to $43 trillion dollars, during the next 75 years, Chocola says, according to wndu.com.

    The U.S. Treasury Department is not currently required to file an annual report of these debts to Congress, wndu.com says.

    “When I was in business, the federal government required our company to account for long-term liabilities using generally accepted accounting principles,” Chocola told the South Bend Tribune. “This bill would require the federal government to follow the same laws they require every public business in America to follow. If any company accounted for its business the way the government accounts, the business would be bankrupt and the executives would be thrown into jail.”

    The legislation doesn’t propose solutions for the burgeoning liabilities, but it takes a crucial first step, according to Chocola, “by requiring the Treasury Department to begin reporting and tracking those liabilities according to net present value calculations and accrual accounting principles,” the Tribune reports.

    “In order to solve our problems and prevent an impending fiscal crisis,” Chocola said, “we have to first identify where and how large the problem is.”

    Chocola clearly sees a looming fiscal crisis. “Congress is the Levee Commission and the flood is coming,” he told the Tribune. “This [bill] is intended to sound the warning bell.”

    To support his position, according to the Tribune, Chocola referred to an article written by David Walker, a Clinton appointee who serves as Comptroller General of the United States and head of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Walker wrote that the government was on an “unsustainable path”.

    Speaking to a British audience last month, Walker said that the U.S. is headed for a financial crisis unless it changes its course of racking up huge deficits, Reuters reported. Walker said some combination of reforming Social Security and Medicare spending, discretionary spending and possibly changes in tax policy would be required to get the deficits under control.

    “I think it’s going to take 20-plus years before we are ultimately on a prudent and sustainable path,” Walker said, according to Reuters, partly because so many American consumers follow the government’s example. “Too many Americans are spending more than they take in and are running up debt at record rates.”

    Now They Don't
    "Bill Requires Reporting Unfunded Federal Liabilities," AccountingWeb, April 12, 2006 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102016

    With state and local governments scrambling to meet the Government Accounting Standards Board’s (GASB) amended rules for reporting on postretirement benefits, and private and public companies getting ready for compliance with the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) proposed statement on recording pension liabilities, a congressman from Indiana has introduced legislation that would require the federal government to meet a similar standard. The Truth in Accounting Act, sponsored by Rep. Chris Chocola (R-Ind) and co-sponsored by Reps. Jim Cooper (D-Tenn) and Mark Kirk (R – Ill), would require the federal government to accurately report the nation’s unfunded long-term liabilities, including Social Security and Medicare, a debt that amounts to $43 trillion dollars, during the next 75 years, Chocola says, according to wndu.com.

    The U.S. Treasury Department is not currently required to file an annual report of these debts to Congress, wndu.com says.

    “When I was in business, the federal government required our company to account for long-term liabilities using generally accepted accounting principles,” Chocola told the South Bend Tribune. “This bill would require the federal government to follow the same laws they require every public business in America to follow. If any company accounted for its business the way the government accounts, the business would be bankrupt and the executives would be thrown into jail.”

    The legislation doesn’t propose solutions for the burgeoning liabilities, but it takes a crucial first step, according to Chocola, “by requiring the Treasury Department to begin reporting and tracking those liabilities according to net present value calculations and accrual accounting principles,” the Tribune reports.

    “In order to solve our problems and prevent an impending fiscal crisis,” Chocola said, “we have to first identify where and how large the problem is.”

    Chocola clearly sees a looming fiscal crisis. “Congress is the Levee Commission and the flood is coming,” he told the Tribune. “This [bill] is intended to sound the warning bell.”

    To support his position, according to the Tribune, Chocola referred to an article written by David Walker, a Clinton appointee who serves as Comptroller General of the United States and head of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Walker wrote that the government was on an “unsustainable path”.

    Speaking to a British audience last month, Walker said that the U.S. is headed for a financial crisis unless it changes its course of racking up huge deficits, Reuters reported. Walker said some combination of reforming Social Security and Medicare spending, discretionary spending and possibly changes in tax policy would be required to get the deficits under control.

    “I think it’s going to take 20-plus years before we are ultimately on a prudent and sustainable path,” Walker said, according to Reuters, partly because so many American consumers follow the government’s example. “Too many Americans are spending more than they take in and are running up debt at record rates.”


    "The Next Retirement Time Bomb," by Milt Freudenheim and Mary Williams, The New York Times, December 11, 2005 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/11/business/yourmoney/11retire.html 

    SINCE 1983, the city of Duluth, Minn., has been promising free lifetime health care to all of its retired workers, their spouses and their children up to age 26. No one really knew how much it would cost. Three years ago, the city decided to find out.

    It took an actuary about three months to identify all the past and current city workers who qualified for the benefits. She tallied their data by age, sex, previous insurance claims and other factors. Then she estimated how much it would cost to provide free lifetime care to such a group.

    The total came to about $178 million, or more than double the city's operating budget. And the bill was growing.

    "Then we knew we were looking down the barrel of a pretty high-caliber weapon," said Gary Meier, Duluth's human resources manager, who attended the meeting where the actuary presented her findings.

    Mayor Herb Bergson was more direct. "We can't pay for it," he said in a recent interview. "The city isn't going to function because it's just going to be in the health care business."

    Duluth's doleful discovery is about to be repeated across the country. Thousands of government bodies, including states, cities, towns, school districts and water authorities, are in for the same kind of shock in the next year or so. For years, governments have been promising generous medical benefits to millions of schoolteachers, firefighters and other employees when they retire, yet experts say that virtually none of these governments have kept track of the mounting price tag. The usual practice is to budget for health care a year at a time, and to leave the rest for the future.

    Off the government balance sheets - out of sight and out of mind - those obligations have been ballooning as health care costs have spiraled and as the baby-boom generation has approached retirement. And now the accounting rulemaker for the public sector, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board, says it is time for every government to do what Duluth has done: to come to grips with the total value of its promises, and to report it to their taxpayers and bondholders.

    Continued in article


    NEWS RELEASE 11/10/05 FASB Adds Comprehensive Project to Reconsider Accounting for Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits

    Board Seeks to Improve Transparency and Usefulness for Investors, Creditors, Employees, Retirees and Other Users of Financial Information

    Norwalk, CT, November 10, 2005—The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) voted today to add a project to its agenda to reconsider guidance in Statement No. 87, Employers’ Accounting for Pensions, and Statement No. 106, Employers’ Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions.

    The Board’s objective in undertaking the project is to improve the reporting of pensions and other postretirement benefit plans in the financial statements by making information more useful and transparent for investors, creditors, employees, retirees, and other users. The agenda addition reflects the Board’s commitment to ensure that its standards address current accounting issues and changing business practices.

    In making its decision, the Board considered requests by various constituents, including members of the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council (FASAC), the FASB’s User Advisory Council (UAC), and the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

    Complex and Comprehensive

    “We have heard many different views from our constituents about how the current accounting model should be reconsidered to improve transparency and usefulness. The breadth and complexity of the issues involved and the views on how to address them are deeply held. While the accounting and reporting issues do not appear to lend themselves to a simple fix, the Board believes that immediate improvements are necessary and will look for areas that can be improved quickly,” said Robert Herz, Chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board.

    The accounting and reporting issues involved touch on many fundamental areas of accounting, including measurement of assets and liabilities, consolidation, and reporting of financial performance. They are also impacted by complex funding and tax rules that, while not directly associated with accounting standards, affect the economics the accounting seeks to depict.

    Comprehensive Approach with Initial Improvements in 2006

    Given these complexities, the Board believes that a comprehensive project conducted in two phases is the most effective way to address these issues. The first phase is expected to be finalized by the end of 2006.

    The first phase seeks to address the fact that under current accounting standards, important information about the financial status of a company’s plan is reported in the footnotes, but not in the basic financial statements. Accordingly, this phase seeks to improve financial reporting by requiring that the funded or unfunded status of postretirement benefit plans, measured as the difference between the fair value of plan assets and the benefit obligation - i.e., the projected benefit obligation (PBO) for pensions and the accumulated postretirement benefit obligation (APBO) for other postretirement benefits - be recognized on the balance sheet.

    The second broader phase would comprehensively address remaining issues, including:

    How to best recognize and display in earnings and other comprehensive income the various elements that affect the cost of providing postretirement benefits

    How to best measure the obligation, in particular the obligations under plans with lump-sum settlement options

    Whether more or different guidance should be provided regarding measurement assumptions

    Whether postretirement benefit trusts should be consolidated by the plan sponsor

    In conducting the project, the FASB will seek the views of parties currently involved in other, independent reviews of the pension system including the Department of Labor and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. Furthermore, consistent with its effort toward international convergence of accounting standards, the FASB expects to work with the International Accounting Standards Board and other standards setters.

    An Ongoing Improvement Effort

    The agenda addition represents the latest step in the FASB’s effort to ensure that standards for pensions and other postretirement benefits provide credible, comparable, conceptually sound and usable information to the public.

    In 1987, the Board issued Statement 87, which made significant improvements in the way the costs of defined benefit plans were measured and disclosed. It is important to note that at that time, the Board acknowledged that pension accounting was still in a transitional stage and that future changes might be warranted.

    Accordingly, additional enhancements since that time have included:

    Statement No. 106 (1990)—which made similar significant improvements to those made in Statement No. 87 but for postretirement benefits other than pensions

    Statement No. 132, Employers’ Disclosures about Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits, (1998)—which revised employers’ disclosures about pension and other postretirement benefits to enhance the information disclosed about changes in the benefit obligation and fair value of plan assets

    Statement No. 132R, Employers’ Disclosures about Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits (Revised 2003)—which provided expanded disclosures in several areas, including plan assets, benefit obligations, and cash flows.


    "Huge Rise Looms for Health Care in City's Budget," by Mary Williams Walsh and Milt Freudenheim, The New York
    Times,
    December 26, 2005 --- http://snipurl.com/NYT122605

    But the cost of pensions may look paltry next to that of another benefit soon to hit New York and most other states and cities: the health care promised to retired teachers, judges, firefighters, bus drivers and other former employees, which must be figured under a new accounting formula.

    The city currently provides free health insurance to its retirees, their spouses and dependent children. The state is almost as generous, promising to pay, depending on the date of hire, 90 to 100 percent of the cost for individual retirees, and 82 to 86 percent for retiree families.

    Those bills - $911 million this year for city retirees and $859 million for state retirees out of a total city and state budget of $156.6 billion - may seem affordable now. But the New York governments, like most other public agencies across the country, have been calculating the costs in a way that sharply understates their price tag over time.

    Although governments will not have to come up with the cash immediately, failure to find a way to finance the yearly total will eventually hurt their ability to borrow money affordably.

    When the numbers are added up under new accounting rules scheduled to go into effect at the end of 2006, New York City's annual expense for retiree health care is expected to at least quintuple, experts say, approaching and maybe surpassing $5 billion, for exactly the same benefits the retirees get today. The number will grow because the city must start including the value of all the benefits earned in a given year, even those that will not be paid until future years.

    Some actuaries say the new yearly amount could be as high as $10 billion. The increases for the state could be equally startling. Most other states and cities also offer health benefits to retirees, and will also be affected by the accounting change.

    Continued in article

    Jensen Comment
    FAS 106 (effective December 15, 1992) prohibits keeping post-retirement benefits such as medical benefits off private sector  balance sheets of corporations --- http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas106.pdf .  The equivalent for the public sector is GASB 45, but the new rules do not go into effect until for cities as large as Duluth and NYC until December 15, 2006 --- http://www.gasb.org/pub/index.html

    Effective Date:

      The requirements of this Statement are effective in three phases based on a government's total annual revenues in the first fiscal year ending after June 15, 1999:

      • Governments that were phase 1 governments for the purpose of implementation of Statement 34—those with annual revenues of $100 million or more—are required to implement this Statement in financial statements for periods beginning after December 15, 2006.
      • Governments that were phase 2 governments for the purpose of implementation of Statement 34—those with total annual revenues of $10 million or more but less than $100 million—are required to implement this Statement in financial statements for periods beginning after December 15, 2007.
      • Governments that were phase 3 governments for the purpose of implementation of Statement 34—those with total annual revenues of less than $10 million—are required to implement this Statement in financial statements for periods beginning after December 15, 2008.

    The new GASB 25 implementation dates may trigger defaults and "The Next Retirement Time Bomb."

    January 2, 2006 reply from Mac Wright in Australia

    Dear Bob,

    In considering the problems faced by these bodies, one has to remember that the promise of these benefits was held out to the then potential employees as an inducement to work in the system. Thus attempts at cutbacks are a form of theft. It is no different that finding that commercial paer accepted some time back is worthless because the acceptor has disappeared with his ill gotten gains (Ponzi)!

    Perhaps the message to government workers is "demand cash up front and do not trust any promise of future benefits!"

    Kind regards,

    Mac Wright

    January 2, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Mac,

    I think theft is too strong a word. In a sense, all bankruptcies are a form of theft, but theft is hardly an appropriate word since the victims (e.g., creditors) often favor declaration of bankruptcy and restructuring in an attempt to salvage some of the amounts owing them. Also, employees, creditors, and investors are aware that they are taking on some risks of default.

    The United Auto Workers Union and its membership have overwhelmingly elected to reduce GM's post-retirement benefits for retirees since over $1,500 per vehicle sold today for such purposes will end GM and reduce those benefits to zero. Is this theft? No! Is this bad management? Most certainly! In my viewpoint all organizations should fully fund post-retirement benefits of employees on a pay-as-you-go basis?

    The problem is more complex for national social security and national medical plans for citizens (not just government employees). Fully funding these in advance is probably infeasible for the nation as a whole and/or will stifle economic growth needed to sustain any types of benefits.

    What will happen to Duluth and NYC if the retired employee benefits are not reduced? Due to exploding medical costs, we can easily imagine taxes becoming so oppressive that there is a mass exodus from those cities, especially among yuppies and senior citizens having greater discretion on where to live. One can easily imagine industry migrations out of high-tax cities. Texas, Delaware, Florida, and New Hampshire cities look inviting for a Wall Street move since there would no longer be oppressive NY state income taxes added to all the extra NYC taxes. It is not too far fetched to imagine that post-retirement benefits will collapse to almost zero if retirees themselves do not accept some concessions to save the post-retirement udder from going completely dry.

    What is interesting to me is how an accounting rule change suddenly awakens city managers (e.g., the Duluth managers) to the fact that they should actually try to find out how much they owe former city employees and the dependents of those employees. This is just another example of where an accounting rule change instigates better financial management. We might call city management in Duluth and other cities abnormally stupid if it were not for the history of so many companies that were oblivious to their post-retirement obligations until FAS 106 was about to be required. A whole lot of executives and directors had no idea they were in such deep trouble until being faced with FAS 106 requirements to report these huge obligations arising from past promises of bad managers (many of whom are now trying to collect on what they promised themselves and their kids in the way of medical care).

    In fact, it leads us to question conflicts of interest when managers vote themselves generous post-retirement benefits. When you use the term "theft," Mac, you might question who is stealing from whom. Perhaps some of the retirees slipped these generous benefits in because they thought they could get away with something that would not be noticed until it became too late. Dumb managers may have been "dumb like foxes."

    Bob Jensen

    January 3, 2006 reply from Bill Herrmann [billherr@ROCKETMAIL.COM]

    An alternative to this discussion is the realization is that the employee who accepts future "guarantee" of benefits is in fact loaning the value of the expected benefits to the employer so has a credit risk much the same as if they were sending in cash for bonds or stock. There is a risk of bankruptcy or insolvency with any asset held by another party. Anyone with a "guaranteed future benefit" is susceptible to this risk.

    Bill Herrmann
    Spoon River College.

     


    Leases:  A Scheme for Hiding Debt

    Accounting rules still allow companies to classify lease obligations differently than debt, leaving billions of dollars off corporate balance sheets and relegating a big slice of corporate financing to the shadows.
    Jonathan Weil, "How Leases Play A Shadowy Role In Accounting" (See below)


    At the FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board), Bob Herz says he thinks "lease accounting is probably an area where people had good intentions way back when, but it evolved into a set of rules that can result in form-over substance accounting."  He cautions that an overhaul wouldn't be easy:  "Any attempts to change the current accounting in an area where people have built their business models around it become extremely controversial --- just like you see with stock options."
    Jonathan Weil, "How Leases Play A Shadowy Role In Accounting" (See below)  
    By the phrase form over substance, Bob Herz is referring to the four bright line tests of requiring leases to be booked on the balance sheet.  Over the past two decades corporations have been using these tests to skate on the edge with leasing contracts that result in hundreds of billions of dollars of debt being off balance sheets.  The leasing industry has built an enormously profitable business around financing contracts that just fall under the wire of each bright line test, particularly the 90% rule that was far too lenient in the first place.  One might read Bob's statement that after the political fight in the U.S. legislature over expensing of stock options, the FASB is a bit weary and reluctant to take on the leasing industry.  I hope he did not mean this.


    FASB Okays Project to Overhaul Lease Accounting
    The Financial Accounting Standards Board voted unanimously to formally add a project to its agenda to "comprehensively reconsider" the current rules on lease accounting. Critics say those rules, which haven't gotten a thorough revision in 30 years, make it too easy for companies to keep their leases of real estate, equipment and other items off their balance sheets. As such, FASB members said, they're concerned that financial statements don't fully and clearly portray the impact of leasing transactions under the current rules. "I think we have received a clear signal from the investing community that current accounting standards are not providing them with all the information they want," FASB member Leslie Seidman said before the vote.
    "FASB Okays Project to Overhaul Lease Accounting," SmartPros, July 20, 2006 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x53931.xml


    Question
    What's a "cookie-cutter" lease and why does it illustrate why accounting standards are not neutral?

    "FASB Launches Review of Accounting for Leases," AccountingWeb, June 12, 2006 ---
    http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102240

    The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has begun reviewing its guidance on one of the most complex areas of off-balance sheet reporting, accounting for leases, Chairman Robert Herz told Forbes. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had requested that FASB review off-balance sheet arrangements, special purpose entities and related issues in a staff report issued in June 2005. The most prominent topics for review were pension disclosure and accounting for leases.

    Having issued its Exposure Draft to Improve Accounting of Pensions and other Postretirement Benefits, FASB is now considering moving lease obligations from the current footnote disclosure to the balance sheet. But the sheer number of rules and regulations that relate to leases – hundreds, according to Business Week – offers experts plenty of opportunities to keep disclosure off the books and presents FASB with an enormous challenge.

    Companies are currently required to record future lease obligations in a footnote, but actual rent payments are deducted in quarterly income statements. Approximately 10 percent of leases are already disclosed on the balance sheet as liabilities because the company can purchase the equipment at the end of the lease, and therefore the lease is treated as a loan, or because lease payments add up to 90 percent of the value of the leased property.

    Robert Herz says, according to Business Week, that “cookie-cutter templates” have been created to design leases so that they don’t add up to more than 89 percent of the value of the property. And to add to the complexity, the AP says, if the contract describes a more temporary rental-type arrangement, it can be treated as an operating lease and recorded in the footnote.

    Leasing footnotes do not reveal the interest portion of future payments and require the analyst or investor to make assumptions about the number of years over which the debt needs to be paid, the AP says, as well as the interest rate the company will be paying. David Zion, an analyst from Credit Suisse told the AP that many professionals interpret the footnotes by multiplying a company’s annual rental costs by eight.

    Thomas J. Linsmeier, recently named a member of the FASB, said that the current rule for accounting for leases needed to be changed because it sets such specific criteria. “It is a poster child for bright-line tests,” he said, according to the New York Times.

    The SEC requested the review it said in a press release because “the current accounting for leases takes an “all or nothing” approach to recognizing leases on the balance sheet. This results in a clustering of lease arrangements such that their terms approach, but do not cross, “the bright lines” in the accounting guidance that would require a liability to be recognized. As a consequence, arrangements with similar economic outcomes are accounted for very differently.”

    Finding a way to define a lease for accounting purposes presents additional problems. Some accountants argue that since the lessor does not own the property and cannot sell it, the property should not be viewed as an asset, Business Week says. Others say that the promise to pay a rent is equal to any other liability.

    Of 200 companies reviewed by SEC staffers in 2005, 77 percent had off-balance-sheet operating leases, totaling about $1.25 trillion, the Wall Street Journal reported.

    Among the companies with the biggest lease obligations are Walgreen Co. with $15.2 billion, CVS Corp with $11.1 billion and Fedex Corp. with $10.5 billion, the AP reports. Walgreens owns less that one-fifth of its store locations and leases the rest. Fedex leases airplanes, land and facilities.

    Robert Herz, in an editorial response in Forbes to Harvey Pitt, former SEC chairman, acknowledged that FASB’s current projects, including the review of lease accounting, could generate controversy. But he says that the complexity and volume of standards impedes transparency, and that the FASB is working jointly with the IASB to develop more principles based standards.

    “Complexity has impeded the overall usefulness of financial statements and added to the costs of preparing and auditing financial statements – particularly for small and private enterprises – and it is also viewed as a contributory factor to the unacceptably high number of restatements,” Herz writes in Forbes.

    Herz does not expect the new rules to be completed before 2008 or 2009, Business Week says.


    Let me close by citing Harry S. Truman who said, "I never give them hell; I just tell them the truth and they think its hell!"
    Great Speeches About the State of Accountancy

    "20th Century Myths," by Lynn Turner when he was still Chief Accountant at the SEC in 1999 --- http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch323.htm

    It is interesting to listen to people ask for simple, less complex standards like in "the good old days." But I never hear them ask for business to be like "the good old days," with smokestacks rather than high technology, Glass-Steagall rather than Gramm-Leach, and plain vanilla interest rate deals rather than swaps, collars, and Tigers!! The bottom line is—things have changed. And so have people.

    Today, we have enormous pressure on CEO’s and CFO’s. It used to be that CEO’s would be in their positions for an average of more than ten years. Today, the average is 3 to 4 years. And Financial Executive Institute surveys show that the CEO and CFO changes are often linked.

    In such an environment, we in the auditing and preparer community have created what I consider to be a two-headed monster. The first head of this monster is what I call the "show me" face. First, it is not uncommon to hear one say, "show me where it says in an accounting book that I can’t do this?" This approach to financial reporting unfortunately necessitates the level of detail currently being developed by the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB"), the Emerging Issues Task Force, and the AICPA’s Accounting Standards Executive Committee. Maybe this isn’t a recent phenomenon. In 1961, Leonard Spacek, then managing partner at Arthur Andersen, explained the motivation for less specificity in accounting standards when he stated that "most industry representatives and public accountants want what they call ‘flexibility’ in accounting principles. That term is never clearly defined; but what is wanted is ‘flexibility’ that permits greater latitude to both industry and accountants to do as they please." But Mr. Spacek was not a defender of those who wanted to "do as they please." He went on to say, "Public accountants are constantly required to make a choice between obtaining or retaining a client and standing firm for accounting principles. Where the choice requires accepting a practice which will produce results that are erroneous by a relatively material amount, we must decline the engagement even though there is precedent for the practice desired by the client."

    We create the second head of our monster when we ask for standards that absolutely do not reflect the underlying economics of transactions. I offer two prime examples. Leasing is first. We have accounting literature put out by the FASB with follow-on interpretative guidance by the accounting firms—hundreds of pages of lease accounting guidance that, I will be the first to admit, is complex and difficult to decipher. But it is due principally to people not being willing to call a horse a horse, and a lease what it really is—a financing. The second example is Statement 133 on derivatives. Some people absolutely howl about its complexity. And yet we know that: (1) people were not complying with the intent of the simpler Statements 52 and 80, and (2) despite the fact that we manage risk in business by managing values rather than notional amounts, people want to account only for notional amounts. As a result, we ended up with a compromise position in Statement 133. To its credit, Statement 133 does advance the quality of financial reporting. For that, I commend the FASB. But I believe that we could have possibly achieved more, in a less complex fashion, if people would have agreed to a standard that truly reflects the underlying economics of the transactions in an unbiased and representationally faithful fashion.

    I certainly hope that we can find a way to do just that with standards we develop in the future, both in the U.S. and internationally. It will require a change in how we approach standard setting and in how we apply those standards. It will require a mantra based on the fact that transparent, high quality financial reporting is what makes our capital markets the most efficient, liquid, and deep in the world.

    Bob Jensen's threads on lease accounting are at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Leases


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on April 22, 2005

    TITLE: Lease Restatements Are Surging
    REPORTER: Eiya Gullapalli
    DATE: Apr 20, 2005
    PAGE: C4
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111396285894611651,00.html 
    TOPICS: Accounting, Advanced Financial Accounting, Lease Accounting, Restatement, Sarbanes-Oxley Act

    SUMMARY: Last winter, "the Big Four accounting firms...banded together to ask the Security and Exchange Commission's chief accountant to clarify rules on lease accounting...Now about 250 companies have announced restatements for lease accounting issues..."

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) Why is it curious that so many companies are now restating previous financial statements due to lease accounting problems? What does the fact that companies must restate previous results imply about previous accounting for these lease transactions?

    2.) What industries in particular are cited for these issues in the article? How do you think this industry uses leases?

    3.) While one company, Emeritus Corp., disclosed significant impacts on previously reported income amounts, companies are "...for the most part, not materially affecting their earnings, analysts say..." Are you surprised by this fact? What is the most significant impact of capitalizing a lease on a corporation's financial statements?  In your answer, define the terms operating lease and capitalized lease.

    4.) How do points made in the article show that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is accomplishing its intended effect?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    "Lease Restatements Are Surging:  Number Increases Daily; Accounting Experts Say GAAP Violations Are Rife," by Diya Gullapalli, The Wall Street Journal, April 20, 2005; Page C4 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111396285894611651,00.html

    When it comes to bookkeeping snafus, lease accounting may be the new revenue recognition.

    It all started in November, when KPMG LLP told fast-food chain CKE Restaurants Inc. that it had problems with the way CKE recognized rent expenses and depreciated buildings. That led CKE to restate its financials for 2002 as well as some prior years. CKE will also take a charge in its upcoming annual filing for 2003 through its just-ended 2005 fiscal year.

    By winter, the Big Four accounting firms had banded together to ask the Securities and Exchange Commission's chief accountant to clarify rules on lease accounting. Retail and restaurant trade groups began battling rule makers about the merits of issuing such guidance.

    Now, about 250 companies have announced restatements for lease-accounting issues similar to CKE's, and the number continues to rise daily.

    "We'd be shocked if this isn't the biggest category of restatements we've ever seen," says Jeff Szafran of Huron Consulting Group LLC, which tracks restatements.

    Given that so many publicly traded companies, especially retailers and restaurant chains, hold leases, it perhaps isn't surprising that lease restatements are snowballing. Accounting experts say the restatements also demonstrate that violations of generally accepted accounting principles still are widespread.

    "The whole subject has been a curiosity to me," says Jack Ciesielski, editor of the Analyst's Accounting Observer newsletter in Baltimore. "This was existing GAAP that hasn't changed, but I don't think we've seen the end of these restatements."

    Since many of the companies announcing restatements so far report on a January-ending fiscal year, Mr. Ciesielski and other accounting-industry watchers anticipate a slew of additional restatements in coming weeks as more companies prepare their books.

    Corporate-governance advocates say the volume of lease-problem restatements shows the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is doing its job. That 2002 law laid down guidelines for ensuring that companies had proper internal controls, systems to prevent accounting mistakes and improprieties. Indeed, many of the companies that have had to restate due to lease problems also have reported weakness in their internal controls.

    While Ernst & Young LLP clients Friendly Ice Cream Corp., Whole Foods Market Inc. and Cingular Wireless, a joint venture between SBC Communications Inc. and BellSouth Corp., all reported material weaknesses in internal controls in their latest annual reports due partly to lease issues, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP client J. Jill Group Inc. says its lease-driven restatement didn't signal such significant internal-control problems.

    The main rule on lease accounting hasn't changed much. Issued in 1976, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 13 is, in fact, one of the oldest rules written by the Financial Accounting Standards Board, which sets guidelines for publicly traded companies. While some parts of FAS 13 have been reinterpreted since then, auditors for the most part hadn't raised any concerns about clients' lease accounting -- until now.

    "Our industry has been accounting for leases using the same methodology for 20 years at least and had gotten clean opinions," says Carleen Kohut, chief financial officer of the National Retail Federation.

    The changes in lease accounting are "not the result of the discovery of new facts or information," reads a statement from Emeritus Corp., an assisted-living company that announced a restatement for lease accounting within a week of CKE.

    Had Emeritus correctly applied lease-accounting rules in 2003, it could have almost wiped out its profit. In a restated annual report released in January, the company said lease expenses and other adjustments lowered earnings to $204,000 for 2003 from the originally reported $4.5 million -- and such adjustments widened past years' losses even further.

    Emeritus didn't return calls for comment.

    Others companies such as home-furnishing store Bombay Co. announced a lease restatement in March and then withdrew the decision a week later, demonstrating lingering confusion over the matter.

    The SEC's letter released in February clarified three specific areas of lease accounting, focusing on leasehold improvement amortization, rent-expense recognition and tenant incentives.

    The bright side is that companies coming to grips with faulty lease accounting are, for the most part, not materially affecting their earnings, analysts say -- companies such as Emeritus being an exception. Rather, they say, the change is just a reshuffling of dollars across various line items.

    --- RELATED ARTICLES ---
     TITLE: FOOTNOTES: Recent US Earnings Restatements
    REPORTER: Dow Jones Newswires
    ISSUE: Apr 19, 2005
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,BT_CO_20050419_008924,00.html 

    A concise summary of the February 7, 2005 letter is provided at
    http://www.accountingobserver.com/blog/2005/02/secs-view-on-lease-accounting-do-overs/

    The complete February 7, 2005 letter from the SEC's Chief Accountant to Robert J. Kueppers is located at http://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/staffletters/cpcaf020705.htm

    In recent weeks, a number of public companies have issued press releases announcing restatements of their financial statements relating to lease accounting. You requested that the Office of the Chief Accountant clarify the staff's interpretation of certain accounting issues and their application under generally accepted accounting principles relating to operating leases. Of specific concern is the appropriate accounting for: (1) the amortization of leasehold improvements by a lessee in an operating lease with lease renewals, (2) the pattern of recognition of rent when the lease term in an operating lease contains a period where there are free or reduced rents (commonly referred to as "rent holidays"), and (3) incentives related to leasehold improvements provided by a landlord/lessor to a tenant/lessee in an operating lease. It should be noted that the Commission has neither reviewed this letter nor approved the staff's positions expressed herein. In addition, the staff's positions may be affected or changed by particular facts or conditions. Finally, this letter does not purport to express any legal conclusion on the questions presented.

    The staff's views on these issues are as follows:

    1. Amortization of Leasehold Improvements - The staff believes that leasehold improvements in an operating lease should be amortized by the lessee over the shorter of their economic lives or the lease term, as defined in paragraph 5(f) of FASB Statement 13 ("SFAS 13"), Accounting for Leases, as amended. The staff believes amortizing leasehold improvements over a term that includes assumption of lease renewals is appropriate only when the renewals have been determined to be "reasonably assured," as that term is contemplated by SFAS 13.
       
    2. Rent Holidays - The staff believes that pursuant to the response in paragraph 2 of FASB Technical Bulletin 85-3 ("FTB 85-3"), Accounting for Operating Leases with Scheduled Rent Increases, rent holidays in an operating lease should be recognized by the lessee on a straight-line basis over the lease term (including any rent holiday period) unless another systematic and rational allocation is more representative of the time pattern in which leased property is physically employed.
       
    3. Landlord/Tenant Incentives - The staff believes that: (a) leasehold improvements made by a lessee that are funded by landlord incentives or allowances under an operating lease should be recorded by the lessee as leasehold improvement assets and amortized over a term consistent with the guidance in item 1 above; (b) the incentives should be recorded as deferred rent and amortized as reductions to lease expense over the lease term in accordance with paragraph 15 of SFAS 13 and the response to Question 2 of FASB Technical Bulletin 88-1 ("FTB 88-1"), Issues Relating to Accounting for Leases, and therefore, the staff believes it is inappropriate to net the deferred rent against the leasehold improvements; and (c) a registrant's statement of cash flows should reflect cash received from the lessor that is accounted for as a lease incentive within operating activities and the acquisition of leasehold improvements for cash within investing activities. The staff recognizes that evaluating when improvements should be recorded as assets of the lessor or assets of the lessee may require significant judgment and factors in making that evaluation are not the subject of this letter.
       

    To the extent that SEC registrants have deviated from the lease accounting standards and related interpretations set forth by the FASB, those registrants, in consultation with their independent auditors, should assess the impact of the resulting errors on their financial statements to determine whether restatement is required. The SEC staff believes that the positions noted above are based upon existing accounting literature and registrants who determine their prior accounting to be in error should state that the restatement results from the correction of errors or, if restatement was determined by management to be unnecessary, state that the errors were immaterial to prior periods.

    Registrants should ensure that the disclosures regarding both operating and capital leases clearly and concisely address the material terms of and accounting for leases. Registrants should provide basic descriptive information about material leases, usual contract terms, and specific provisions in leases relating to rent increases, rent holidays, contingent rents, and leasehold incentives. The accounting for leases should be clearly described in the notes to the financial statements and in the discussion of critical accounting policies in MD&A if appropriate. Known likely trends or uncertainties in future rent or amortization expense that could materially affect operating results or cash flows should be addressed in MD&A. The disclosures should address the following:

    1. Material lease agreements or arrangements.
       
    2. The essential provisions of material leases, including the original term, renewal periods, reasonably assured rent escalations, rent holidays, contingent rent, rent concessions, leasehold improvement incentives, and unusual provisions or conditions.
       
    3. The accounting policies for leases, including the treatment of each of the above components of lease agreements.
       
    4. The basis on which contingent rental payments are determined with specificity, not generality.
       
    5. The amortization period of material leasehold improvements made either at the inception of the lease or during the lease term, and how the amortization period relates to the initial lease term.
       

    As you know, the SEC staff is continuing to consider these and related matters and may have further discussions on lease accounting with registrants and their independent auditors.

    We appreciate your inquiry and further questions about these matters can be directed to Tony Lopez, Associate Chief Accountant in the Office of the Chief Accountant (202-942-7104) or Louise Dorsey, Associate Chief Accountant in the Division of Corporation Finance (202-942-2960).

     


    AICPA PROVIDES GUIDANCE ON LEASE ACCOUNTING ---
    http://accountingeducation.com/index.cfm?page=newsdetails&id=141809

    Bob Jensen's threads on lease accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Leases


    Despite a Post-Enron Push, Companies Can Still Keep Big Debts Off Balance Sheets.
    "How Leases Play A Shadowy Role In Accounting," by Jonathan Weil, The Wall Street Journal, September 22, 2004, Page A1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB109580870299124246,00.html?mod=home%5Fpage%5Fone%5Fus 

    Despite the post-Enron drive to improve accounting standards, U.S. companies are still allowed to keep off their balance sheets billions of dollars of lease obligations that are just as real as financial commitments originating from bank loans and other borrowings.

    The practice spans the entire spectrum of American business and industry, relegating a key gauge of corporate health to obscure financial-statement footnotes, and leaving investors and analysts to do the math themselves. The scale of these off-balance-sheet obligations -- stemming from leases on everything from aircraft to retail stores to factory equipment -- can be huge:

    • US Airways Group Inc., which recently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, showed only $3.15 billion in long-term debt on its most recently audited balance sheet, for 2003, and didn't include the $7.39 billion in operating-lease commitments it had on its fleet of passenger jets.

    • Drugstore chain Walgreen Co. shows no debt on its balance sheet, but it is responsible for $19.3 billion of operating-lease payments mainly on stores over the next 25 years.

    • For the companies in the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index, off-balance-sheet operating-lease commitments, as revealed in the footnotes to their financial statements, total $482 billion.

    Debt levels are among the most important measures of a company's financial health. But the special accounting treatment for many leases means that a big slice of corporate financing remains in the shadows. For all the tough laws and regulations set up since Enron Corp.'s 2001 collapse, regulators have left lease accounting largely untouched. Members of the Financial Accounting Standards Board say they are considering adding the issue to their agenda next year.

    "Leasing is one of the areas of accounting standards that clearly merits review," says Donald Nicolaisen, the Securities and Exchange Commission's chief accountant. The current guidance, he says, depends on rigidly defined categories in which a slight variation has a major effect and relies too much on "on-off switches for determining whether a leased asset and the related payment obligations are reflected on the balance sheet."

    A case in point is the "90% test," part of the FASB's 28-year-old rules for lease accounting. If the present value of a company's minimum lease payments equals 90% or more of a property's value, the transaction must be treated as a "capital lease," with accounting treatment akin to that of debt. If the figure is slightly less, say 89%, the deal is treated as an "operating lease," subject to certain other conditions, meaning the lease doesn't count as debt. The lease commitment appears not in the main body of the financial statements but in footnotes, often obscurely written and of limited usefulness.

    The $482 billion figure for the S&P 500 was determined through a Wall Street Journal review of the companies' annual reports. That's equivalent to 8% of the $6.25 trillion reported as debt on the 500 companies' balance sheets, according to data provided by Reuters Research. For many companies, off-balance-sheet lease obligations are many times higher than their reported debt.

    Given the choice between leasing and owning real estate or equipment, many companies pick operating leases. Besides lowering reported debt, operating leases boost returns on assets and often plump up earnings through, among other things, lower depreciation expenses.

    "It's nonsense," Trevor Harris, an accounting analyst and managing director at Morgan Stanley, says of the 90% rule. "What's the difference between 89.9% and 90%, and 85% and 90%, or even 70% and 90%? It's the wrong starting point. You've purchased the right to some resources as an asset. The essence of accounting is supposed to be economic substance over legal form."

    This summer, Union Pacific Corp. opened its new 19-story, $260 million headquarters in Omaha, Neb. The railroad operator is the owner of the city's largest building, the Union Pacific Center, in virtually every respect except its accounting.

    Under an initial operating lease, Union Pacific guaranteed 89.9% of all construction costs through the building's completion date. After completing the building, the company signed a new operating lease, which guarantees 85% of the building's costs. Unlike most operating leases, both were "synthetic" leases, which allow the company to take income-tax deductions for interest and depreciation while maintaining complete operational control. A Union Pacific spokesman declined to comment.

    Neither lease has appeared on the balance sheet. Instead, they have stayed in the footnotes, resulting in lower reported assets and liabilities. On its balance sheet, Union Pacific shows about $8 billion of debt, while its footnotes show about $3 billion of operating-lease commitments, including for railroad engines and other equipment.

    The 90% test goes to the crux of investor complaints that U.S. accounting standards remain driven by arbitrary rules, around which companies can easily structure transactions to achieve desired outcomes.

    It means different companies entering nearly identical transactions can account for them in very different ways, depending on which side of the 90% test they reside. Meanwhile, as with disclosures showing employee stock-option compensation expenses, most investors and stock analysts tend to ignore the footnotes disclosing lease obligations.

    Three years ago, Enron's collapse revealed how easily a company could hide debt. A big part of the energy company's scandal centered on off-balance-sheet "special purpose entities." These obscure partnerships could be kept off the books -- with no footnote disclosures -- if an independent investor owned 3% of an entity's equity. Responding to public outcry, FASB members eliminated that rule and promised more "principles-based" standards, which spell out concise objectives and emphasize economic substance over form, rather than a "check the box" approach with rigid tests and exceptions that can be exploited.

    The accounting literature on leasing covers hundreds of pages. The FASB's original 1976 pronouncement, called Financial Accounting Standard No. 13, does state a broad principle: A lease that transfers substantially all the benefits and risks of ownership should be accounted for as such. But in practice, critics say, FAS 13 amounts to all rules and no principles, making it easy to manipulate its strict exceptions and criteria as needed. One key rule says a lease is a "capital lease" if it covers 75% or more of the property's estimated useful life. One day less, and it can stay off-balance-sheet, subject to other tests.

    Continued in the article

    "Group (the IASB) to Alter Rules On Lease Accounting," The Wall Street Journal, September 23, 2004, Page C4

    BRUSSELS -- The International Accounting Standards Board next week will unveil plans to overhaul the rules on accounting for leased assets, the board's chairman said yesterday.

    Critics long have contended that the rules for determining whether leases should be included as assets and liabilities on a company's balance sheet are easy to evade and encourage form-over-substance accounting. "It's going to be a very big deal," Chairman Sir David Tweedie told Dow Jones Newswires after testifying to the European Parliament. International accounting rules on leasing exist already, but they are useless, Mr. Tweedie said.

    Airlines that lease their aircraft, for instance, rarely include their planes on their balance sheets, he said. "So the aircraft is just a figment of your imagination," Mr. Tweedie said. The board will convene a meeting next week to discuss changes to current rules, he said.

    The Wall Street Journal yesterday reported (see the above article) that the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board is considering adding lease accounting to its agenda of items for overhaul.

    From The Wall Street Journal's The Weekly Review: Accounting on September 24, 2004

    TITLE: Lease Accounting Still Has an Impact 
    REPORTER: Jonathan Weil 
    DATE: Sep 22, 2004 
    PAGE: A1 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB109580870299124246,00.html  
    TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Financial Statement Analysis, Lease Accounting, off balance sheet financing

    SUMMARY: The on-line version of this article is entitled "How Leases Play a Shadowy Role in Accounting." The article highlights the typical practical ways in which entities avoid capitalizing leases; reports on a WSJ analysis of footnote disclosures to assess levels of off-balance sheet debt; and comments on the difficulties the FASB may face in trying to amend Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 13.

    QUESTIONS: 

    1.) What accounting standard governs the accounting for lease transactions under U.S. GAAP? When was that accounting standard written and first put into effect?

    2.) When is the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) considering working on improvements to the accounting for lease transactions? Why is the FASB likely to face challenges in any attempt to change accounting for leasing transactions?

    3.) What are the names of the two basic methods of accounting for leases by lessees under current U.S. standards? Which of these methods is he referring to when the author writes, "U.S. companies are...allowed to keep off their balance sheets billions of dollars of lease obligations..."

    4.) What are the required disclosures under each of the two methods of accounting for leases? What are the problems with financial statement users relying on footnote disclosures as opposed to including a caption and a numerical amount on the face of the balance sheet?

    5.) How do you think the Wall Street Journal identified the amounts of lease commitments that are kept off of corporate balance sheets? Specifically identify the steps you think would be required to measure obligations under operating leases in a way that is comparable to the amounts shown for capital leases recognized on the face of the balance sheet.

    6.) What four tests must be made in determining the accounting for any lease? Why do you think the author focuses on only one of these tests, the "90% test"?

    7.) What financial ratios are impacted by accounting for leases? List all that you can identify in the article, and that you can think of, and explain how they are affected by different accounting treatments for leases.

    8.) What is a "special purpose entity"? When are these entities used in leasing transactions?

    9.) What is a "synthetic lease"? When are these leases constructed?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island


    This is Auditing 101:  Where were the auditors?

    "SEC Uncovers Wide-Scale Lease Accounting Errors," AccountingWeb, March 1, 2005 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=100600

    Where were the auditors? That is the question being asked as more than 60 companies face the prospect of restating their earnings after apparently incorrectly dealing with their lease accounting, Dow Jones reported.

    Companies in the retail, restaurant and wireless-tower industries are among those affected in what is being called the most sweeping bookkeeping correction in such a short time period since the late 1990s.

    Among the companies on the list are Ann Taylor, Target and Domino's Pizza. You can view a full listing of the affected companies.

    "It's always disturbing when our accounting is not followed," Don Nicolaisen, chief accountant at the Securities and Exchange Commission, said last week during an interview. He published a letter on Feb. 7 urging companies to follow accounting standards that have been on the books for many years, Dow Jones reported.

    Based on the charges and restatement announcements that have come in the wake of the SEC letter it seems companies have failed for years to follow what regulators see as cut-and-dried lease-accounting rules. The SEC has yet to go so far as to accuse companies of wrongdoing, but it has led people to wonder why auditors hired to keep company books clean could have missed so many instances of failure to comply with the rule.

    "Where were the auditors?" J. Edward Ketz, an accounting professor at Pennsylvania State University, said to Dow Jones. "Where were the people approving these things? This doesn't seem like something that really requires new discussion. If we have to go back and revisit every single rule because companies and their professional advisers aren't going to follow the rules, then I think we're in very serious trouble in this country."

    Tom Fitzgerald, a spokesman for auditing firm KPMG, declined to comment. Representatives for Deloitte & Touche LLP, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLC, and Ernst & Young LLP, didn't return several phone calls, Dow Jones reported.

    The crux of the issue is that companies are supposed to book these "leasehold improvements" as assets on their balance sheets and then depreciate those assets, incurring an expense on their income statements, over the duration of the lease. Instead, companies such as Pep Boys-Manny Moe & Jack had been spreading those expenses out over the projected useful life of the property, which is usually a longer time period, Dow Jones reported.

    As a result, expenses were deferred and income was added to the current period. McDonald's Corp. took a charge of $139.1 million, or 8 cents a share, in its fourth quarter to correct a lease-accounting strategy that it says had been in place for 25 years, Dow Jones reported, adding that Pep Boys said it would book a charge of 80 cents a share, or $52 million, for the nine months through Oct. 30, 2004.


    Debt Versus Equity

    What is debt? What is equity? What is a Trup?
    Banks are going to create huge problems for accountants with newer hybrid instruments

    From Jim Mahar's Blog on February 6, 2005 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

    The Financial Times has a very cool article on financial engineering and the development of securities that combine debt and equity-like features.

    FT.com / Home UK - Banks hope to cash in on rush into hybrid securities: "Securities that straddle the debt and equity worlds are not new. They combine features of debt such as regular interest-like payments and equity-like characteristics such as long or perpetual maturities and the ability to defer payments."

    "About a decade ago, regulated financial institutions started issuing so-called trust preferred securities, or Trups, which are functionally similar to preferred stock but can be structured to achieve extra benefits such as tax deductibility for the issuing company. Other hybrid structures have also been tried.

    But bankers were still searching for what several called the “holy grail” – an instrument that looked like debt to its issuer, the tax man and investors, but like equity to credit rating agencies and regulators.

    That goal came closer a year ago when Moody’s, the credit rating agency, changed its previously conservative policies, opening the door for it to treat structures with some debt-like features more like equity."

    The link to the Financial Times article ---
    http://news.ft.com/cms/s/e22d70f2-9674-11da-a5ba-0000779e2340.html


    Question
    What are shareholder "earn-out"contracts"?
    (Another example of the increasing complexity of classifying debt versus equity.)

    How did eBay make a $1.43 dollar (or more) mistake?

    "Skype CEO steps down and parent company:  eBay takes $1.43 billion charge," MIT's Technology Review, October 1, 2007 --- http://www.technologyreview.com/Wire/19466/?nlid=575

    EBay Inc. announced Monday that the co-founder and chief executive of its Skype division was stepping down, and that the parent company would take $1.43 billion in charges for the Internet phone service division.

    Of the charges to be taken in the current quarter, $900 million will be a write-down in the value of Skype, eBay said. That charge, for what accountants call impairment, essentially acknowledges that San Jose-based eBay, one of the world's largest e-commerce companies, drastically overvalued the $2.6 billion Skype acquisition, which was completed in October 2005.

    EBay also said Monday it paid certain shareholders $530 million to settle future obligations.

    In 2005, eBay wooed Skype investors by offering an ''earn-out agreement'' up to $1.7 billion if Skype hit specific targets -- including a number of active users and a gross profit -- in 2008 and the first half of 2009. The Skype shareholders holding those agreements received the $530 million in an early, one-time payout, eBay spokesman Hani Durzy said.

    EBay also announced that Skype CEO Niklas Zennstrom will become non-executive chairman of Skype's board and likely spend more time working on independent projects.

    Durzy said the resignation of Zennstrom, a Swedish entrepreneur who started Skype, was not related to the impairment charge or Skype's performance.

    ''Niklas left of his own volition,'' Durzy said. ''He is an entrepreneur first and foremost, and he wanted to spend more time on some of his new projects that he has been working on.''

    Skype, which allows customers to place long-distance calls using their computers, reported second-quarter revenue of $89.13 million, up 102 percent from a year ago. It was the second consecutive quarter of profitability for the newest eBay division.

    Zennstrom is likely to work on developing Joost, an Internet TV service he started in 2006 with Skype co-founder Janus Friis, relying on peer-to-peer technology to distribute TV shows and other videos over the Web.

    Joost had at least 1 million beta testers in July and will launch at the end of the year, Zennstrom said earlier this summer.

    One of the pair's first collaborations was the peer-to-peer file-sharing network KaZaA, which launched in March 2000 and is used primarily to swap MP3 music files over the Internet. Zennstrom also co-founded the peer-to-peer network Altnet and the venture capital firm Atomico.

    Continued in article


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on July 16, 2004

    TITLE: Possible Accounting Change May Hurt Convertible Bonds 
    REPORTER: Aaron Lucchetti 
    DATE: Jul 08, 2004 
    PAGE: C1 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108923165610057603,00.html  
    TOPICS: Bonds, Convertible bonds, Earnings per share, Emerging Issues Task Force, Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board

    SUMMARY: The Emerging Issues Task Force is considering changing the requirements for including in the EPS calculation the potentially dilutive shares issuable from so-called CoCo bonds. These bonds have an interest-payment coupon and are contingently convertible, typically depending upon a specified percentage increase in the stock price.

    QUESTIONS: 

    1.) Describe the terms of CoCo Bonds. What do you think the term "CoCo" means? How do they differ from typical convertible bonds? Why do investors find typical convertible bonds attractive? Why do companies find it attractive to offer typical convertible bonds?

    2.) What is the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF)? How can the organization of that task force help to resolve issues, such as the questions surrounding CoCo bonds, more rapidly than the issues can be addressed by the FASB itself?

    3.) In general, what is the accounting issue being addressed by the EITF? What is the proposed change in accounting? Does any of this have to do with the actual accounting for the bonds and their associated interest expense?

    4.) Explain in detail the effect of these bonds on companies' earnings per share (EPS) calculations. Will the amount of companies' net income change under the proposed EITF resolution of this accounting issue? What will change? Is it certain that the change in treatment of these bonds will have a dilutive effect on EPS? Explain.

    5.) Why might an EITF ruling require retroactive restatement of earnings by companies issuing these bonds? How else could any change in treatment of these bonds be presented in the financial statements?

    6.) One investment analyst states that "the new accounting doesn't change economics, but investors [are] still likely to care." Why is this the case?

    7.) Why does one analyst describe CoCo bonds as a gimmick? Why then would we "probably be better off without it"?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University


    Coke:  Gone Flat at the Bright Lines of Accounting Rules and Marketing Ethics
    The king of carbonated beverages is still a moneymaker, but its growth has stalled and the stock has been backsliding since the late '90s.  Now it turns out that the company's glory days were as much a matter of accounting maneuvers as of marketing magic. 
    Guizuenta's most ingenious contribution to Coke, the ingredient that added rocket fuel to the stock price, was a bit of creative though perfectly legal balance-sheet rejeiggering that in some ways prefigured the Enron Corp. machinations.  Known inside the company as the "49% solution," it was the brain child of then-Chief Financial Officer M. Douglas Ivester.  It worked like this:  Coke spun off its U.S. bottling operations in late 1986 into a new company known as Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc., retaining a 49% state for itself.  That was enough to exert de facto control but a hair below the 50% threshold that requires companies to consolidate results of subsidiaries in their financials.  At a stroke, Coke erased $2.4 billion of debt from its balance sheet.
    Dean Foust, "Gone Flat," Business Week, December 20, 2004, Page 77.  
    This is a Business Week cover story.
    Coca Cola's outside independent auditor is Ernst & Young

    There were other problems, some of which did not do the famed Warren Buffet's reputation any good.  See "Fizzy Math and Fishy Marketing Lawsuit, Probes Prove Damaging to Coke," by Margaret Webb Pressler, Washington Post, June 20, 2003 --- http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A14384-2003Jun19&notFound=true 

    Coca Cola's marketing tactics were unethical and unhealthy for kids --- http://www.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ362/hallam/Coke%20Officials%20Beefed%20Up.pdf 

    Also see "The Ten Habits of Highly Defective Corporations," From The Nation --- http://www.greenmac.com/World_Events/thetenha.html 

     


    Contingent convertible bonds get a tax-treatment boost from a new IRS revenue ruling. But the window of opportunity may slam shut.
    "Cuckoo for Coco Puffs?" Robert Willens, Lehman Brothers, CFO.com, May 22, 2002
    Now the FASB intends to shut the loop-hole.  If the proposed rule (Section 404)  goes into effect, companies will have to record an increase in shares outstanding on the day they issue a Co-Co (Contingent Convertible Bond that can be converted only at threshold share prices), thus reducing EPS.  And the change would be retroactive, a step the board generally reserves for particularly egregious accounting practices, says Dennis Beresord, professor of accounting at the University of Georgia and FASB's former chief.
    "Too Much of a Good Thing," CFO Magazine, September 4, 2004, Page 21.


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on October 29, 2004

    TITLE: First Marblehead: Brilliance or Grade Inflation?
    REPORTER: Karen Richardson
    DATE: Oct 25, 2004
    PAGE: C3
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB109866115416054209,00.html 
    TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Allowance For Doubtful Accounts, Financial Statement Analysis, Securitization, Valuations

    SUMMARY: First Marblehead securitizes student loans and records assets based on significant estimates. Investors have significantly increased short selling on the stock because of concern over when the receivables recorded through securitization will ultimately be collected.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) Define the term securitization. What purpose does securitization serve?

    2.) What does the author mean by "gain-on-sale" accounting? When are gains recognized in securitization transactions?

    3.) What standard governs the accounting requirements for securitization transactions? Why does that standard focus on a question of discerning liabilities from sales? Is that accounting question a point of difficulty in the case described in this article? Explain.

    4.) Why are critics arguing that "it will be at least five years before any significant cash starts rolling in" on First Marblehead's assets?

    5.) According to what is listed in the article, how many factors must be estimated to record the assets and revenues under First Marblehead's business model? How uncertain do you think the company may be in its estimates of these of these items?

    6.) Why will it take time until "the company's massive earnings growth can be verified"? What evidence will help to evaluate the validity of the estimates made in First Marblehead's revenue recognition process?

    7.) What is the process of short selling? Why is it telling that there has been a significant increase in the number of short-sellers on First Marblehead's stock?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island


    FERF Newsletter, April 20, 2004

    Update on SFAS 150

    Halsey Bullen, Senior Project Manager at the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), gave an update on SFAS 150.

    Private Net last discussed SFAS 150 and FASB Staff Position (FSP) 150-3 in the February issue: http://www.fei.org/newsletters/privatenet/pnet204.cfm 

    Bullen said that SFAS 150 was originally designed to account for "ambiguous" instruments, such as convertible bonds, puttable stock, Co-Co No-Nos (conditionally convertible, no coupon, no interest instruments), and variable share forward sales contracts. Mandatorily redeemable shares of ownership issued by private companies were then included in the accounting for this class of instruments.

    Bullen said that FSP 150-3 allowed private companies to defer implementation of SFAS 150 until 2005 with respect to shares that were redeemable on fixed dates for fixed or externally indexed amounts, and indefinitely for other mandatorily redeemable shares. (We will assume indefinite deferral for mandatorily redeemable ownership shares issued by private companies.)

    As an update, Bullen said that in Phase 2, the FASB was considering several alternatives for "bifurcating" the ambiguous instruments into equity and liability components: * Fundamental components approach, * Narrow view of equity as common stock, * IASB 32 approach: bifurcate convertibles and treat any other obligation that might require transfer of assets as a liability for the full amount, * Minimum obligation approach, and * Reassessed expected outcomes approach.

    Bullen said that the FASB has encountered a number of challenges in trying to account for these ambiguous instruments, not the least of which are just basic conceptual definitions of shareholder equity and liability. For example, should equity be defined as assets minus liabilities, or should liabilities be first defined as assets minus shareholder equity?

    One FEI member asked Bullen, "Where is the concept of simplicity?" Bullen responded, "Simplicity is as simplicity does." In other words, if the financial instrument is not simple, how can its accounting be simple?

    Bullen told the participants to expect an exposure draft in late 2004 or early 2005.


    Accrual Accounting and Estimation

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on May 19, 2006

    TITLE: With Special Effects the Star, Hollywood Faces New Reality
    REPORTER: Merissa Marr and Kate Kelly
    DATE: May 12, 2006
    PAGE: A1
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114739949943750995.html 
    TOPICS: Accounting, Budgeting, Cost-Volume-Profit Analysis, Managerial Accounting

    SUMMARY: Special effects are driving a lot of movies to become box office hits. However, "in the area of special effects, technology can't deliver the kind of efficiencies to Hollywood that it generally provides to other industries...Amid the excitement, studios are beginning to realize that relying on special effects is financially risky. Such big budget films tend to be bonanzas or busts."

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) The author notes that studios are beginning to realize that films utilizing a lot of special effects might tend to be "bonanzas or busts." In terms of costs, why is this the case? In your answer, refer to the high level of costs associated with special effects work.

    2.) Why do special effects teams tend to amass significant costs? In your answer, define the terms "cost management" and "costs of quality" and explain how these cost concepts, that are typically associated with product manufacturing, can be applied to movie production.

    3.) Define the term "fixed cost." How does this concept relate to the financial riskiness of movies with significant special effects and resultant high cost? Also include in your answer a discussion of the formula for breaking even under cost-volume-profit analysis.

    4.) Define the term "variable cost." Cite some examples of variable costs you expect are incurred by studios such as Sony Pictures, Universal Pictures, and others.

    5.) Now consider firms such as Industrial Light & Magic, "a company set up by director George Lucas in 1975 to handle the special effects for his 'Star Wars' movies." Based on the discussion in the article, describe what you think are these firms' fixed and variable costs.

    6.) What manager do you think is responsible for costs of quality and cost control in producing movies? Suppose you are filling that role. What steps would you undertake to ensure that your hoped-for blockbuster film will have the greatest possible chance of financial success?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island


    Questions
    Is there a problem with how GAAP covers one's Fannie?
    Would fair value accounting help in this situation?

    "Fannie Execs Defend Accounting Change Friday," by Marcy Gordon, Yahoo News, November 16, 2007 --- http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/071116/fannie_mae_accounting.html 

    Fannie Mae executives on Friday defended a change in the way the mortgage lender discloses losses on home loans amid concern from analysts that it could mask the true impact of the credit crisis on its bottom line.

    The chief financial officer and other executives of the government-sponsored company, which reported a $1.4 billion third-quarter loss last week, held a conference call with Wall Street analysts to explain the recent change.

    Analysts peppered the executives with questions in a skeptical tone. The way Fannie discloses its mortgage losses, addressed in an article published online by Fortune, raises extra concern among analysts given that Fannie Mae was racked by a $6.3 billion accounting scandal in 2004 that tarnished its reputation and brought government sanctions against it.

    Moreover, the skepticism from Wall Street comes as Fannie seeks approval from the government to raise the cap of its investment portfolio.

    The chief financial officer, Stephen Swad, said in the call that some of the $670 million in provisions for credit losses on soured home loans that Fannie Mae wrote off in the third quarter likely would be recovered.

    "We book what we book under (generally accepted accounting principles) and we provide this disclosure to help you understand it," Swad said.

    Shares of Fannie Mae fell $4.30, or 10 percent, to $38.74 on Friday, following a 10 percent drop the day before.

    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue

    Bob Jensen's threads on Fannie Mae's enormous problem (the largest in history that led to the firing of KPMG from the audit and a multiple-year effort to restate financial statemetns) with applying FAS 133 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm#FannieMae

     


    Question
    When should warranty expenses be deducted all at once in a big bath rather than deferred like bad debt expenses in an Allowance for Future Warranty Expenses contra account?

    First Consider Some Problems of Estimation

    Speech by SEC Staff: Critical Accounting and Critical Disclosures
    by Robert K. Herdman
    Chief Accountant U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
    Speech Presented to the Financial Executives International —
    San Diego Chapter, Annual SEC Update
    San Diego, California January 24, 2002
    http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch537.htm

    Product Warranty Example For balance, let me go through an example of a manufacturer's warranty reserve. Consider a company that manufactures and sells or leases equipment through a network of dealerships. The equipment carries a warranty against manufacturer defects for a specified period and amount of use. Provisions for estimated product warranty expenses are made at the time of sale.

    Significant estimates and assumptions are required in determining the amount of warranty losses to initially accrue, and how that amount should be subsequently adjusted. The manufacturer may have a great deal of actual historical experience upon which to rely for existing products, and that experience can provide a basis to build its estimate of potential warranty claims for new models or products.

    Necessarily, management must make certain assumptions to adjust the historical experience to reflect the specific uncertainties associated with the new model or product. These assumptions about the expected warranty costs can have a significant impact on current and future operating results and financial position.

    In this example, investors may benefit from a clear description of such items as the nature of the costs that are included in or excluded from the liability measurement, how the estimation process differs for new models/product lines versus existing or established models and products, and the company's policies for continuously monitoring the warranty liability to determine its adequacy.

    In terms of sensitivity, investors would benefit from understanding what types of historical events led to differences between estimated and actual warranty claims or that resulted in a significant revisions to the accrual. For example, an investor could benefit from understanding if a new material or technique had recently been introduced into the manufacturing of the equipment and historically such changes have resulted in deviations of actual results from those previously expected. Similarly, if warranty claims tend to exceed estimates, say, if actual temperatures are higher or lower than assumed, that fact may also be relevant to investors.

    Obviously these examples don't address all of the possible scenarios. While each company will have differing critical accounting policies, the key points for everyone are to identify for investors the 1) types of assumptions that underlie the most significant and subjective estimates; 2) sensitivity of those estimates to deviations of actual results from management's assumptions; and 3) circumstances that have resulted in revised assumptions in the past. There is a great deal of flexibility in providing this information and some may choose to disclose ranges of possible outcomes.

    Continued in article

    Now Roll Ahead to Microsoft's Big Problem With Warranties in Year 2007

    Microsoft's Billion Dollar Attempted Fix
    Why isn't the need for this surprising from a company that almost always releases products in need of fixing before they're out of the box?

    In the face of staggering customer returns of the Xbox 360 console, the software maker announces a charge of at least $1.05 billion to address the problem In the quest for supremacy in next-generation gaming consoles, Microsoft (MSFT) had a big advantage by releasing the Xbox 360 a full year ahead of competing devices from Sony (SNE) and Nintendo (NTDOY). But hardware failures on the device are forcing Microsoft to cede some of its hard-won ground.
    Cliff Edwards, "Microsoft's Billion-Dollar Fix," Business Week, July 6, 2007 --- Click Here
    Also see http://www.technologyreview.com/Wire/19021/

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on July 13, 2007

    "Microsoft's Videogame Efforts Take a Costly Hit" by Nick Wingfield, The Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2007, Page: A3
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com

    TOPICS: Accounting, Financial Accounting, Financial Analysis, Reserves

    SUMMARY: Microsoft Corp. said it will take a $1.05 billion to $1.15 billion pretax charge to cover defects related to its Xbox 360 game console. Microsoft executives declined to discuss the technical problems in detail, but a person familiar with the matter said the problem related to too much heat being generated by the components inside the Xbox 360s. An analyst in the consumer-electronics industry, Richard Doherty, says the magnitude of the charge Microsoft is taking, which represents nearly $100 for every Xbox 360 shipped to retailers so far indicates Microsoft is concerned about widespread failures or that the company is being extremely conservative in taking this estimated charge. The charge will be taken in the quarter ended June 30, Microsoft's fiscal year end.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) Describe the accounting for warranty expenses. In general, why must companies report warranty expenses ahead of the time in which defective units are submitted for repair?

    2.) Why must Microsoft record this charge of over $1 billion entirely in one quarter, the last quarter of the company's fiscal year ended June 30, 2007? Support your answer with references to authoritative literature.

    3.) How are analysts using the disclosures about the warranty charge to assess Microsoft's expectations for the repairs that will be required and for the general success of this line of business at Microsoft?

    4.) Consider the analyst Richard Doherty's statement that either a high number of Xbox 360s will fail or the company is being overly conservative in its warranty estimate. What will happen in the accounting for warranty expense if the estimate of future repairs is overly conservative?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island


    Misleading Financial Statements:  Bankers Refusing to Recognize and Shed "Zombie Loans"
    One worrying lesson for bankers and regulators everywhere to bear in mind is post-bubble Japan. In the 1990s its leading bankers not only hung onto their jobs; they also refused to recognise and shed bad debts, in effect keeping “zombie” loans on their books. That is one reason why the country's economy stagnated for so long. The quicker bankers are to recognise their losses, to sell assets that they are hoarding in the vain hope that prices will recover, and to make markets in such assets for their clients, the quicker the banking system will get back on its feet.
    The Economist, as quoted in Jim Mahar's blog on November 10, 2007 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

    After the Collapse of Loan Markets Banks are Belatedly Taking Enormous Write Downs
    BTW one of the important stories that are coming out is the fact that this is affecting all tranches of the debt as even AAA rated debt is being marked down (which is why the rating agencies are concerned). The San Antonio Express News reminds us that conflicts of interest exist here too.
    Jime Mahar, November 10, 2007 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

    Jensen Comment
    The FASB and the IASB are moving ever closer to fair value accounting for financial instruments. FAS 159 made it an option in FAS 159. One of the main reasons it's not required is the tremendous lobbying effort of the banking industry. Although many excuses are given resisting fair value accounting for financial instruments, I suspect that the main underlying reasons are those "Zombie" loans that are overvalued at historical costs on current financial statements.

    Daniel Covitz and Paul Harrison of the Federal Reserve Board found no evidence of credit agency conflicts of interest problems of credit agencies, but thier study is dated in 2003 and may not apply to the recent credit bubble and burst --- http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/feds/2003/200368/200368pap.pdf

    In September 2007 some U.S. Senators accused the rating agencies of conflicts of interest
    "Senators accuse rating agencies of conflicts of interest in market turmoil," Bloomberg News, September 26, 2007 --- http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/09/26/business/credit.php
    Also see http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2007/05/rating-agencies-weak-link.html

    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue

    Bob Jensen's Rotten to the Core threads are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on July 9, 2004

    TITLE: Accrual Accounting Can Be Costly 
    REPORTER: Gene Colter 
    DATE: Jul 02, 2004 
    PAGE: C3 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108871005216853178,00.html  
    TOPICS: Earnings Management, Earnings Quality, Financial Accounting, Financial Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis, Restatement, Revenue Recognition

    SUMMARY: The article discusses a research study relating the extent of accrual accounting estimates to subsequent firm performance and incidence of shareholder litigation. The study was conducted by Criterion Research Group, LLC, and the article notes that the research is of interest to insurers that offer directors and officers policies.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) Summarize the research study described in the article. Who performed the research? What can you understand about the relationships examined in the project? What was the motivation for the research?

    2.) Define the term accrual accounting. Is it accurately compared to cash basis accounting by the description given in the article? Why must accrual accounting always involve estimates?

    3.) What is the overall impression of accrual accounting that is created in the article? In your answer, comment on the statement, "Accrual accounting is common and kosher."

    4.) Describe weaknesses of cash basis accounting as compared to the issues with accrual basis accounting that are presented in the article. Which basis do you think better presents information that is useful to financial statement readers? Support your answer; you may cite relevant accounting literature to do so.

    5.) What basis of accounting is being described using the computer network example in the article? What accounting standards prescribe this treatment? Name at least one other industry besides computer software sales in which this accounting treatment is required.

    6.) Refer again to question #5 and your answer. What alternative method must be used in this area if accrual accounting were to be avoided entirely? What are the disadvantages of this approach?

    7.) Why do you think some companies must record more extensive accruals and estimates than other companies must? Do these factors themselves lead to greater likelihood of shareholder litigation as is found in the article?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

    "Accrual Accounting Can Be Costly," by Gene Colter, The Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2004, Page C1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108871005216853178,00.html 

    Firms Booking Aggressively Are More Likely to Be Sued By Shareholders, Study Says

    Book now. Pay later.

    Pay the lawyers, maybe. A study to be released today suggests that companies that are most aggressive when booking noncash earnings are four times as likely to be sued by shareholders as less-aggressive peers.

    At issue is so-called accrual accounting, in which companies book revenue when they earn it and expenses when they incur them rather than when they actually receive the cash or pay out the expenses. Accrual accounting is common and kosher. Problems arise, however, when companies miscalculate how much revenue they've really earned in a given period or how much in related expenses it cost to get that money.

    For example, say Company A agrees to build a computer network for Company B over four years for $4 million, a job that Company A estimates it'll have to spend $1 million to complete. Company A works hard and estimates it ended up building half the computer network in the first year on the job, so it books $2 million of revenue that year. By accounting rules, it must accrue related costs in the same proportion as revenues, so it also books $500,000 of expenses in the same first year. But say it then turns out that Company A's costs to finish the network actually run to $2 million. Company A has to address that by booking $1.5 million of expenses in future years. In other words, Company A would end up increasing earnings in the first year, but at a cost to future earnings.

    Getting the numbers wrong isn't a violation of generally accepted accounting principles (though intentionally misestimating is). But companies have a lot of leeway, and those that make the most aggressive assumptions when booking what the green-visor guys call accruals can end up creating a misleading picture of their financial health in any given year. When skeptics refer to a company's "revenue recognition problems," this is often what they're talking about.

    The new study, based on six years of data, was conducted by Criterion Research Group LLC, an independent research firm in New York that caters primarily to institutional investors. It shows that companies that fall into what Criterion calls the highest accrual category are more likely to end up getting sued by shareholders.

    The study builds on earlier research by Criterion that showed companies that use more accruals underperform companies with fewer accruals. In that report, Criterion screened 3,500 nonfinancial companies over 40 years and found that those using the most accruals had poorer forward earnings and stock returns and also had more earnings restatements and Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement actions.

    None of this is to say that companies that end up in shareholder litigation set out to mislead shareholders. Rather, says Criterion Chairman Neil Baron, these companies simply run a higher risk of making mistakes with their books.

    "Accruals are estimates," Mr. Baron says. "If you're a company and a much higher percentage of your earnings come from accruals or estimates, it's much more likely that you're going to be wrong more often."

    Criterion screened companies involved in class-action suits from 1996 to 2003 for its new study. In each case it looked at a company's earnings for the year of the class start date, which is the year in which the alleged misbehavior began. Criterion then assigned these companies into one of 10 ranks, with those in the 10th group using the most accruals and those in 1st using the fewest. There were four times as many shareholder class-action suits among 10th group companies as there were among 1st group firms.

    A number of companies in the two highest accrual categories recently settled shareholder class actions related to accounting issues, including Rite Aid Corp., Waste Management Inc., MicroStrategy Inc. and Gateway Inc. Other companies still involved in ongoing shareholder class actions involving accounting issues also turned up in the aggressive-accruals group.

    Companies currently in Criterion's highest-accrual category include Chiron Corp., eBay Inc., General Motors Corp., Halliburton Co. and Yahoo Inc. -- none of which now face shareholder suits related to accounting -- among others.

    EBay spokesman Hani Durzy says he doesn't think his company belongs in the high-accruals gang, noting that the company's profit-and-loss statement "closely mirrors our cash flow." He adds: "We are essentially a cash business."

    A GM spokesman says, "All of GM's accounting policies and procedures are in full compliance with U.S. GAAP and are reviewed by our outside auditor and the audit committee, and we have, to the best of our knowledge, never had to restate earnings because of an accounting issue."

    An e-mail from Halliburton's public-relations office notes that Halliburton follows GAAP and adds that accruals "are universally required by GAAP."

    Representatives from Chiron and Yahoo said the companies had no comment.

    A Criterion analyst pointed out that accruals don't necessarily relate to everyday operations. For example, a company estimating and booking tax benefits from employee stock options is also using accruals. Estimates related to pension accounting are also accruals.

    Mr. Baron stresses that the vast majority of companies that book a lot of accruals are unlikely to face shareholder suits, restatements or SEC actions. Many may even outperform low-accrual companies. But he says investors should be "more scrutinizing" of financial statements from companies that make liberal use of accruals, because, statistically, they are most likely to run into these problems.

    Sophisticated investors, such as fund managers, might reckon they can spot bookkeeping alarms before the broad investing public and get out of a stock before the lawyers start filing briefs. But it's possible that companies with a lot of accruals can suffer even without litigation: Mr. Baron says his firm has been contacted by insurers that offer directors and officers policies, which large companies buy to protect executives and directors against lawsuits. The insurers are asking about Criterion's research as they weigh whether to charge D&O customers higher premiums, he says.

    Bob Jensen's threads on revenue accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm 


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on January 28, 2005

    TITLE: Quirk Could Hurt Mortgage Insurers  (Quirk = FAS 60)
    REPORTER: Karen Richardson 
    DATE: Jan 21, 2005 
    PAGE: C3 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110626962297132172,00.html  
    TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Insurance Industry, Loan Loss Allowance, loan guarantees, Contingent Liabilities

    SUMMARY: "Millions of people who can't afford to put down 10% or 20% of a home's price are required by their mortgage lenders to buy policies from mortgage insurers, which, by agreeing to shoulder some risk of missed loan payments, can lower the buyer's down payment to as little as 3%." However, as a result of a "quirk" in establishing Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 60, "Accounting and Reporting by Insurance Enterprises" in 1982, the FASB allowed an exclusion for mortgage insurers from requirements to reserve for future losses. This exclusion may lead to to delayed reporting of costs associated with the mortgage lending and of exacerbation of losses if default rates increase due to the type of borrowers taking advantage of this insurance in the hot real estate market.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) What is the purpose of mortgage insurance for a home buyer?

    2.) How do mortgage insurance providers, and insurance providers in general, earn profits on their activities? How are insurance rates determined? In general what costs are deducted against revenues determined from those insurance rates?

    3.) Access Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 60, "Accounting and Reporting by Insurance Enterprises," via the FASB's web site, located at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas60.pdf From the discussion in the summary of the standard, state the general accounting requirements contained in this statement.

    4.) Based on the discussion in the article, what is the exemption allowed for mortgage insurers from Statement No. 60's requirements? What is the reasoning for that exemption? What is your opinion about this reason?

    5.) Refer again to the FASB Statement No. 60 on the FASB's web site. Locate the exemption described in question 4 and give its citation.

    6.) Given this accounting requirement exemption, what are the concerns with measuring profit in the mortgage insurance industry in general (regardless of the issues with the current real estate market)? What is the technique used to handle that issue in financial reports? In your answer, specifically refer to, and define, the matching concept in accounting.

    7.) How does the potential caliber of the real estate buyers using mortgage insurance exacerbate the concerns raised in question 6?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island


    August 7, 2006 message from Ganesh M. Pandit, DBA, CPA, CMA [profgmp@hotmail.com]

    Hi Bob,

    How would you answer this question from a student: "I wonder if a company's Web site is considered a long-lived asset!"

    Ganesh M. Pandit
    Adelphi University

    August 9, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Ganesh,

    Accounting for Website investment is a classic example of the issue of "matching" versus "value" accounting. From an income statement perspective, matching requires the matching of current revenues with the expenses of generating that revenue, including the "using up" of fixed asset investments. But we don't depreciate investment in the site value of land because land site value, unlike a building, is not used up due to usage in generating revenue. Like land site value, a Website's "value" probably increases in value over time. One might argue that a Website should not be expensed since a successful Website, like land, is not used up when generating revenue. However, Websites do require maintenance fees and improvement outlays over time which makes it somewhat different than the site investment in land that requires no such added outlays other than property taxes that are expensed each year.

    I don't think current accounting rules for Websites are appropriate in theory --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm#Issue08

    It seems to me that you can partition your Website development and improvement outlays into various types of assets and expenses. For example, computers used in development and maintenance of the Website are accounted for like other computers. Software is accounted for under software amortization accounting rules. Purchased goodwill is accounted for like purchased goodwill under new impairment test rules. Labor costs for Website maintenance versus improvements are more problematic.

    Leased Website items are treated like leases, although there are some complications if a Website is leased entirely. For example, such a leased Website is not "used up" like airplanes that are typically contracted as operating leases. Leased Website space may be appropriately accounted for as an operating lease. But leasing an entire Website is more like the capital lease of a land in that the asset does not get "used up." My hunch is that most firms ignore this controversy and treat Website leases as operating leases. It is pretty easy to bury custom development costs into the "rental fee" for leased Website server space, thereby burying the development costs and deferring them over the contracted server space rental period. It would seem to me that rental fees for Websites that are strictly used for advertising are written off as advertising expenses. Of course many Websites are used for much more than advertising.

    Firms are taking rather rapid write-offs of purchased Websites such as write-offs over three years. I'm not certain I agree with this, but firms are "depreciating" these for tax purposes and you can see them in filed SEC financial statements such as the one at Briton International (under the Depreciation heading) ---
    http://sec.edgar-online.com/2006/01/27/0001127855-06-000047/Section27.asp

    It is more common in annual reports to see the term Website Amortization instead of Website Depreciation. A few sites amortize on the basis of Website traffic --- http://www.nexusenergy.com/presentation6.aspx
    This makes no sense to me since traffic does not use up a Website over time.

    Bob Jensen

    Bob Jensen's threads on e-Commerce and e-Business revenue accounting controversies are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm

     


    Earnings Management and Agency Theory
    The Controversy Over Earnings Smoothing and Other Manipulations

    Recall when "agency theory" assumed that CEO's had personal incentives to make accounting transparent without the need for outside regulation requirements? This is probably still being taught in accounting theory courses where instructors rely on old textbooks and journal articles.
    In the latest twist in the stock options game, some executives may have changed the so-called exercise date — the date options can be converted to stock — to avoid paying hundreds of thousands of dollars in income tax, federal investigators say . . . As those cases have progressed, at least 46 executives and directors have been ousted from their positions. Companies have taken charges totaling $5.3 billion to account for the impact of improper grants, according to Glass Lewis & Company, a research firm that advises big investors on shareholder issues. And further investigations, indictments and restatements are expected. Securities regulators are now focusing on several cases where it appears the exercise dates of the options were backdated, according to a senior S.E.C. enforcement official, who asked not to be identified because of the agency’s policy of not commenting on active cases. Besides raising disclosure and accounting problems, backdating an exercise date can result in tax fraud.
    Eric Dash, "Dodging Taxes Is a New Stock Options Scheme," The New York Times, October 30, 2006 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/30/business/30option.html?_r=1&oref=slogin

    You can read about agency theory at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agency_Theory

    You can read the following at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agency_Theory#Incentive-Intensity_Principle

    Incentive-Intensity Principle

    However, setting incentives as intense as possible is not necessarily optimal from the point of view of the employer. The Incentive-Intensity Principle states that the optimal intensity of incentives depends on four factors: the incremental profits created by additional effort, the precision with which the desired activities are assessed, the agent’s risk tolerance, and the agent’s responsiveness to incentives. According to Prendergast (1999, 8), “the primary constraint on [performance-related pay] is that [its] provision imposes additional risk on workers…” A typical result of the early principal-agent literature was that piece rates tend to 100% (of the compensation package) as the worker becomes more able to handle risk, as this ensures that workers fully internalize the consequences of their costly actions. In incentive terms, where we conceive of workers as self-interested rational individuals who provide costly effort (in the most general sense of the worker’s input to the firm’s production function), the more compensation varies with effort, the better the incentives for the worker to produce.

    Monitoring Intensity Principle

    The third principle – the Monitoring Intensity Principle – is complementary to the second, in that situations in which the optimal intensity of incentives is high correspond to situations in which the optimal level of monitoring is also high. Thus employers effectively choose from a “menu” of monitoring/incentive intensities. This is because monitoring is a costly means of reducing the variance of employee performance, which makes more difference to profits in the kinds of situations where it is also optimal to make incentives intense.


    Probably the best illustration of earnings management (both legitimate and fraudulent) is the saga of Enron --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnron.htm#Quotations 


    Earnings Management Deception
    The 1999 bulletin also said that if accounting practices were intentionally misleading "to impart a sense of increased earnings power, a form of earnings management, then by definition amounts involved would be considered material." AIG hinted some errors may have been intentional, saying that certain transactions "appear to have been structured for the sole or primary purpose of accomplishing a desired accounting result."
    Jonathan Weil, "AIG's Admission Puts the Spotlight On Auditor PWC," The Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2005 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111231915138095083,00.html?mod=home_whats_news_us
    Bob Jensen's threads on the AIG mess are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudRotten.htm#MutualFunds


    It's not clear who got the earnings game going (meeting earnings forecasts by one penny): executives or investors. But it's past time for it to stop. As the Progressive example shows, those companies that continue the charade do it by choice.
    Gretchen Morgenson, "Pennies That Aren't From Heaven," The New York Times, November 7, 2004 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/07/business/yourmoney/07watch.html?ex=1100836709&ei=1&en=8f6b67cd8cfe4757 

    Ask any chief executive officer if he or she practices the art of earnings management and you will undoubtedly hear an emphatic "Of course not!" But ask those same executives about their company's recent results, and you may very well hear a proud "we beat the analysts' estimate by a penny."

    While almost no one wants to admit to managing company earnings, the fact is, almost everybody does it. How else to explain the miraculous manner in which so many companies meet or beat, by the preposterous penny, the consensus earnings estimates of Wall Street analysts?

    After years of such miracles, investors finally seem to be wising up to the fact that an extra penny of profit is not only meaningless but may also be evidence of earnings management and, therefore, bad news. After all, the practice can hide 

    what's genuinely going on in a company's books.

    A study by Thomson Financial examined how many of the 30 companies in the Dow Jones industrial average missed, met or beat analysts' consensus earnings estimates during each quarter over the last five years. It also looked at how the companies' shares responded to the results.

    Over the period, on average, almost half of the companies - 46.1 percent - met consensus estimates or beat them by a penny.

    Pulling off such a feat in an uncertain world smacks of earnings management. "It is not possible for this percentage of reporting companies to hit the bull's-eye," said Bill Fleckenstein, principal at Fleckenstein Capital in Seattle. "Business is too complicated; there are too many moving parts."

    The precision has a purpose, of course: to keep stock prices aloft. According to Thomson's five-year analysis, companies whose results came in below analysts' estimates lost 1.08 percent of their value, on average, the day of the announcement. The loss averaged 1.59 percent over five days.

    Executives have lots of levers to pull to make their numbers. Lowering the company's tax rate is a favorite, as is recognizing revenues before they actually come in or monkeying with reserves set aside to cover future liabilities.

    If all else fails and a company faces the nightmare of an earnings miss, its spinmeisters can always begin a whispering campaign to persuade Wall Street analysts to trim their estimates, making them more attainable. Their stock might drift downward as a result, but the damage is not usually as horrific as it is when earnings miss the target unexpectedly.

    So it is not surprising that the strategy has become so widespread and that fewer companies in the Thomson study are coming in below their target these days. For the first three quarters of 2004, 10.9 percent missed their expected results, down from 11.7 percent in 2003 and 25 percent in 2002.

    At the heart of earnings management is - what else? - executive compensation. The greater the percentage of pay an executive receives in stock, the bigger the incentive to produce results that propel share prices.

    Continued in the article

    Coke:  Gone Flat at the Bright Lines of Accounting Rules and Marketing Ethics
    The king of carbonated beverages is still a moneymaker, but its growth has stalled and the stock has been backsliding since the late '90s.  Now it turns out that the company's glory days were as much a matter of accounting maneuvers as of marketing magic. 
    Guizuenta's most ingenious contribution to Coke, the ingredient that added rocket fuel to the stock price, was a bit of creative though perfectly legal balance-sheet rejeiggering that in some ways prefigured the Enron Corp. machinations.  Known inside the company as the "49% solution," it was the brain child of then-Chief Financial Officer M. Douglas Ivester.  It worked like this:  Coke spun off its U.S. bottling operations in late 1986 into a new company known as Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc., retaining a 49% state for itself.  That was enough to exert de facto control but a hair below the 50% threshold that requires companies to consolidate results of subsidiaries in their financials.  At a stroke, Coke erased $2.4 billion of debt from its balance sheet.
    Dean Foust, "Gone Flat," Business Week, December 20, 2004, Page 77.  
    This is a Business Week cover story.
    Coca Cola's outside independent auditor is Ernst & Young

    There were other problems, some of which did not do the famed Warren Buffet's reputation any good.  See "Fizzy Math and Fishy Marketing Lawsuit, Probes Prove Damaging to Coke," by Margaret Webb Pressler, Washington Post, June 20, 2003 --- http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A14384-2003Jun19&notFound=true 

    Coca Cola's marketing tactics were unethical and unhealthy for kids --- http://www.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ362/hallam/Coke%20Officials%20Beefed%20Up.pdf 

    Also see "The Ten Habits of Highly Defective Corporations," From The Nation --- http://www.greenmac.com/World_Events/thetenha.html 

     


    Goodwill and Other Asset Impairment

     

    "MCI Inc. Posts $3.4 Billion Loss For 3rd Quarter," by Shawn Young, The Wall Street Journal, November 5, 2004, Page B2 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB109956924948864745,00.html?mod=technology_main_whats_news 

    Results Reflect Write-Off Of $3.5 Billion on Assets; Revenue in 2004 to Drop 

    Results Reflect Write-Off Of $3.5 Billion on Assets; Revenue in 2004 to Drop By SHAWN YOUNG Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL November 5, 2004; Page B2

    MCI Inc. reported a $3.4 billion third-quarter loss, reflecting a $3.5 billion write-off the phone giant has said it is taking on assets that have lost value.

    The company also cautioned that 2004 revenue will be slightly below the $21 billion to $22 billion it had projected early in the year.

    "Slightly means slightly," said Chief Executive Michael Capellas. He noted that the company hadn't changed its projections since a regulatory setback led MCI and larger rival AT&T Corp. to virtually abandon marketing of home phone service to consumers. Both companies are now focused almost exclusively on business customers.

    Despite the revenue decline, MCI projects a fourth-quarter profit, the result of improving margins, lower costs and a little stabilization in the price wars that have wracked the long-distance industry. The profit would be the first for the former WorldCom Inc. in years. The company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 2002 in the wake of a massive accounting fraud. It emerged under the name MCI in April.

    The improving trends that could produce a fourth-quarter profit were also evident in operating results for the third quarter, which largely met investor expectations.

    Continued in the article

    Bob Jensen's threads on the Worldcom and MCI scandals are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnron.htm#WorldCom 


    "How to Avoid the Goodwill Asteroid," by Jon D. Markman, TheStreet.com, May 24, 2002 --- http://www.thestreet.com/funds/supermodels/10024147.html 

    One of the gravest fears of investors today is being totaled by an "asteroid" event -- moments when a stock gets pushed to the edge of extinction by a bolt from the blue, such as a drug application rejection, a securities probe revelation or a surprise earnings restatement.

    Yet many shareholders seem blithely unaware that at least one asteroid speeding toward their companies is entirely foreseeable: the likelihood that management will have to write down a decent-sized chunk of their net worth sometime this year and perhaps rather soon.

    This unfortunate prospect is faced, potentially, by companies such as AOL Time Warner (AOL:NYSE - news - commentary - research - analysis), Allied Waste Industries (AW:NYSE - news - commentary - research - analysis), Georgia-Pacific (GP:NYSE - news - commentary - research - analysis) and Cendant (CD:NYSE - news - commentary - research - analysis) that have accumulated a great deal of goodwill on their balance sheets over the past few years. That's accountant-speak for the amount a company pays for another company over its book value because of expectations that some of its intangible assets -- such as patented technology, a prized brand name or desirable executives -- will prove valuable in a concrete, earnings-enhancing sort of way.

    New Accounting Rules

    Companies carry goodwill on their balance sheets as if it were an asset as solid as a piece of machinery, and therefore it is one of many items balanced against liabilities, such as long-term debt, to measure shareholder equity or book value. Just as hard assets are depreciated, or expensed, by a certain amount each year to account for their diminished value as they age, intangibles have long been amortized by a certain amount annually to account for their waning value.

    The value of machinery rarely dissipates quickly, but the value of goodwill can evaporate in a flash if a company determines that it paid too much for intangible assets -- e.g., if a patent or brand turns out not to be as defensible as originally believed, or demand for a new technology falters. As you can imagine, companies typically don't want to admit they overpaid. But once they do, they must write down the vanished value so that the "intangibles" lines on their balance sheets reflect fair-market pricing. If the writedown leaves a company's assets at a level lower than liabilities, the company is left with a negative net worth, which, as you would expect, is frowned upon, and often results in a dramatically lower stock price.

    Until last year, companies tried to avoid recording goodwill after acquisitions by using a method of accounting called "pooling of interests." In these stock-for-stock deals, companies were allowed to record the acquiree's assets at book value even though the value of the stock it had given up was greater than the amount of real stuff its shareholders received. The advantage: No need to drag down earnings each quarter by amortizing, or expensing, goodwill.

    The rulebook changed this year, however, and pooling went the way of the dodo; now companies are forced to record goodwill on their books. As a compromise to serial acquirers, who have a powerful lobby, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) decided that companies would no longer have to amortize goodwill regularly against earnings. Instead, a new standard -- encompassed in Rule 142 -- requires companies to test goodwill for "impairment" periodically.

    Essentially, this means that while the diminished value of goodwill won't count against a company's earnings annually anymore, companies might need to write down huge gobs of it from time to time when accountants decide they can't ignore the fact that an acquisition didn't turn out as planned. It also means that because FASB 142 does not dictate a set of strictly objective rules for calculating impairment, writedowns will be somewhat subjective in both timing and amount.

    Don't Fall for These Three Ploys

    As a result, many market skeptics believe that FASB 142, which was intended to improve earnings transparency, may in some cases actually result in more egregious earnings manipulation than ever. Donn Vickrey, vice president at Camelback Research Alliance, a provider of analytical tools and consulting services for financial information, says he sees three ways that companies interested in managing their earnings could end-run shareholders using the new rule.

    The big bath. In this approach, companies will write off a big portion of the goodwill on their books, telling investors it is an insignificant "paper loss" that should have no impact on the firm's share price. The benefit: Future write-offs would be unnecessary, and the company's earnings stream could be more effectively smoothed out in future periods. This approach would work only if it does not put the company at risk of violating debt covenants that require it to maintain a certain ratio of assets vs. liabilities.

    Cosmetic earnings boost. Under FASB 142, many companies will record earnings that appear higher than last year's because of the elimination of goodwill amortization. However, the increase will be purely cosmetic, as the company's underlying cash flow and profitability would remain unchanged. Investors should thus ensure they are comparing prior periods with the current period on an apples-to-apples basis by eliminating goodwill amortization from comparable year-earlier financial statements. The amount might be buried in footnotes to the balance sheet, though Kellogg (K:NYSE - news - commentary - research - analysis) explains the issue clearly in its latest 10-k in the section devoted to its acquisition of cookie maker Keebler in March 2001. Kellogg says it recorded $90.4 million in intangible amortization expense during 2001 and would have recorded $121 million in 2002 had it not adopted FASB 142 at the start of the year.

    Avoid-a-write-off. Some companies might take advantage of the new rule by avoiding a goodwill write-off as long as possible to prevent the big charge to earnings. Since the tests for impairment are subjective, Camelback believes it will not be hard for firms to avoid write-offs in the short run -- a strategy that could both help them avoid violations in debt covenants and potentially provide a boost in executive compensation formulas.

    While any public company that does acquisitions will find itself facing decisions about how to account for goodwill impairment, companies with the greatest absolute levels of goodwill -- as well as ones with the greatest amount of goodwill relative to their market capitalization -- will be the most vulnerable in the future to having their earnings blasted by the FASB 142 asteroid.

    Continued at http://www.thestreet.com/funds/supermodels/10024147.html 


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on Junly 30, 2004

    TITLE: FASB May Bite Into Overseas Profits 
    REPORTER: Lingling Wei 
    DATE: Jul 28, 2004 
    PAGE: C3 
    LINK: Print Only 
    TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board, International Accounting Standards Board

    SUMMARY: The FASB has voted 4-3 to instruct the staff to examine "whether it is practical to require companies to book a liability for taxes they potentially owe on profits earned and held overseas."

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) What was the vote undertaken at the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)? Did this vote actually establish a new accounting requirement? Explain, commenting on the FASB's process for establishing a new accounting standard.

    2.) Why did the FASB undertake this step with respect to deferred taxes? How does it fit in with other work being undertaken in concert with the International Accounting Standards Board?

    3.) FASB member Michael Crooch comments that "there is a fair amount of opposition to the change" proposed by the FASB. Do you think such opposition is unusual or common for FASB proposals? Support your answer.

    4.) Define the term "deferred taxes". When must deferred taxes be recorded? Why do we bother to record them? That is, how does the process of reporting deferred taxes help to improve reporting in the balance sheet and income statement?

    5.) What taxes currently are recorded on foreign earnings? Why do companies currently not calculate deferred taxes for profits on foreign earnings? Why then would any change in this area result in "a major hit to earnings"?

    6.) Why do you think that companies might reconsider repatriating foreign earnings if they must begin to record deferred taxes on those amounts? What does your answer imply in regards to the economic consequences of accounting policies?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on December 13, 2002

    TITLE: International Body to Suggest Tighter Merger Accounting 
    REPORTER: Silvia Ascarelli and Cassell Bryan-Low 
    DATE: Dec 05, 2002 
    PAGE: A2 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1039033389416080833.djm,00.html  
    TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting, Financial Statement Analysis, Goodwill, International Accounting, International Accounting Standards Board, Restructuring

    SUMMARY: The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is proposing a new standard for business combination accounting. The proposal prescribes accounting treatment that is more stringent than U.S. standards. For example, it disallows recording restructuring charges at the outset of a business combination; such charges must simply be recorded as incurred.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) Compare and contrast the standard for business combinations proposed by the IASB to the current U.S. standard. To investigate these differences directly from the source, access the IASB's web site at http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp.

    2.) Why are U.S. companies expected to be concerned about recording restructuring charges as they are incurred in the process of implementing a business combination, rather than when these anticipated costs are identified at the outset of a business combination? Do these two accounting treatments result in differing amounts of expense being recorded for these restructuring charges? Will such U.S. companies be required to report according to this IAS, assuming it is implemented?

    3.) How are the goodwill disclosures proposed in the IAS expected to help financial statement analysis?

    4.) How are European companies expected to be impacted by this proposed IAS and future proposals currently planned in this area of accounting for business combinations? Provide your answer by considering not only the article under this review, but also by again accessing the IASB's web site referenced above.

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

    Program professors can search past editions of Educators' Reviews at http://ProfessorJournal.com.  
    Go to the Educators' Review section and click on "Search the Database." You can also change your discipline selection or remove yourself from the mailing list.

     

    Some intangible assets are booked and amortized.  Accounting guidance in this area dates back to APB 17.  Usually these are contractual or legal rights (patents, copyrights, etc.) and amortizations and write downs are to be based on the following provisions in Paragraph 27 of APB 17:

    The Board believes that the value of intangible assets at any one date eventually disappears and that the recorded costs of intangible assets should be amortized by systematic charges to income over the periods estimated to be benefited. Factors which should be considered in estimating the useful lives of intangible assets include:

    • Legal, regulatory, or contractual provisions may limit the maximum useful life.
    • Provisions for renewal or extension may alter a specified limit on useful life.
    • Effects of obsolescence, demand, competition, and other economic factors may reduce a useful life.
    • A useful life may parallel the service life expectancies of individuals or groups of employees.
    • Expected actions of competitors and others may restrict present competitive advantages.
    • An apparently unlimited useful life may in fact be indefinite and benefits cannot be reasonably projected.
    • An intangible asset may be a composite of many individual factors with varying effective lives.

    When a company purchases another company, the purchase price may soar way above the book value of the acquired firm.  The reason for the unbooked excess is the unbooked market values of booked and unbooked assets plus synergy increments  less negative value of unbooked liabilities. Paragraph 39 of FAS 141 requires the partitioning of the unbooked excess value into (1) separable versus (2) inseparable components of unbooked excess purchase value.  The inseparable portion is then booked as "goodwill."  This portion is then booked as goodwill and is carried forward as an asset subject to impairment tests of FAS 142.  Paragraph 39 of FAS 141 requires an intangible asset to be recognized as an asset apart from goodwill if it arises from:

    · contractual or other legal rights, regardless of whether those rights are transferable or separable from the acquired entity or from other rights and obligations; or

    · separable, that is, it is capable of being separated or divided from the acquired entity and sold, transferred, licensed, rented, or exchanged regardless of whether there is an intent to do so. An intangible asset is still considered separable if it can be sold transferred, licensed, rented, or exchanged in combination with a related contract, asset or liability.

    Paragraphs 10-28 of FAS 141 provides examples of intangible assets that are considered "separable" and are not to be confounded in the goodwill account. But the majority of the unbooked excess value is usually the inseparable goodwill arising from "knowledge capital" arising from the following components:

    Knowledge Capital Components

    • Spillover Knowledge (see above)
    • Human Resources (see above)
    • Structural Capital (see above)

    Knowledge capital arises generally from the conservatism concept that guides the FASB and other standard setters around the world.  For example, human resources are not owned, controlled, bought, and sold like tangible assets.  As a result, investment in training are expensed rather than capitalized.  Research and development expenditures are expensed rather than booked under the highly conservatism rulings in FAS 2.  This includes most R&D in database and software development except when impacted by FAS 86.

    Knowledge capital is often the major component of goodwill.  But "goodwill" as defined in FAS 141 and 142 is a hodgepodge of other positive and negative components that comprise the net excess value difference between the market value of total owners' equity and the value of the firm as a whole.  This is summarized below:

    Goodwill Components

    + Market value of Owners' Equity  ($10 billion)
    -     Book value of Owners' Equity  ($01 billion)
    = Market to book difference in value    ($09 billion)
    - Adjustment of booked items to fair value  ($04 billion)
    = Goodwill that includes the following components ($5 billion)
    • Unbooked synergy value of booked items (+$1 billion)
    • Unbooked knowledge capital value (+$04 billion)
    • Other unbooked  items (-$01 billion)
    • Joint effects, including other synergies (+$01 billion)

    The components of goodwill are not generally additive.  For example, a firm has just been purchased for $10 billion and has a book equity value of $1 billion.  The market to book ratio is therefore 10=$10/$1.  Suppose the value of the individual booked assets and liabilities sums to $5 billion even though the booked value on a historical cost basis is only $1 billion.  However, when combined as a bundle of booked items, assume there is a combined value of $6 billion, because the value of the combined booked items is worth more than the $5 billion sum of the parts.  For example, if an airline sells its booked airplanes and airport facilities, these many be worth more as a bundle than the sum of the values of all the pieces.  If there were no unbooked items, the value of the firm would be $6 billion, thereby, resulting in $1 billion in goodwill arising entirely from synergy of booked items. 

    However, the value of the equity is $10 billion rather than $6 billion.  This difference is due to the net value of the unbooked asset and liability items and the synergies they create in combination with one another.  For example, if an airline sells the entire business in addition to its airplanes and airport facilities, there is added value due to the intellectual capital components such as experienced mechanics, flight crews, computer systems, and ground crews.  There are also negative components such as unbooked operating lease obligations on airplanes not booked on the balance sheet.  

    The components of goodwill are not additve in value, but in combination they sum to the $5 billion in goodwill equal to the market value of the combined equity minus the sum of the market values of the booked items (without the $1 billion in unbooked synergy value).  When combined with the booked items, the unbooked knowledge capital takes on more value than $4 billion it can be sold for individually.  For example, if American Airlines sold its entire SABRE reservations system in one sale and the remainder of the company in another sale, the sum would probably be less than the combined value of the unbooked SABRE system plus all of the booked items belonging to American Airlines.  This is because there is synergy value between the booked and unbooked items.  One of the synergy items is leverage.  Values of booked debt and assets may be more additive in firms having low debt/equity ratios than in high leverage firms where there investors adjust added values for higher risk.

    If investors seek to extrapolate firm value from balance sheet value, they will discover that historical costs are useless and that adustments of booked items to fair value falls way short of total value.  The problem is that major components of value never appear on the balance sheets.  The unbooked knowledge capital components of firm value have become so enormous that it is not uncommon to find market to book values of equity way in excess of the ten to one ratio illustrated above. 

    Goodwill cannot be booked in the United States except when there is a combining of two companies that must now be accounted for as a purchase under FAS 141.  Goodwill is the purchase price less the current fair values of the booked items (not adjusted for synergy value).  No formal attempt is made to report the portion that is knowledge capital, although management may justify the business combination on some identified knowledge capital items.  For example, if Microsoft purchased PeopleSoft, Bill Gates would make a public explanation of why the value of PeopleSoft is almost entirely due to unbooked items relative to booked items in PeopleSoft's balance sheet.

    The main reason why goodwill cannot be booked, unless there is a business combination transaction, is that estimation of the value of the firm on an ongoing basis is too expensive and subject to enormous measurement error.  One common approach is to multiply the market price per share times the number of shares outstanding.  But this is usually far different from the price buyers are willing to pay for all of the shares outstanding.  This difference arises in part because acquiring control usually is far more valueable than the sum of the shares at current trading values.  This difference arises in part because current share prices are subject to transient market price movements of shares of all traded companies, whereas the value of the firm in a business combination deal is much more stable.

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on April 4, 2002

    TITLE: Why High-Fliers Built on Big Ideas, Are Such Fast Fallers 
    REPORTER: Greg Ip 
    DATE: Apr 04, 2002 
    PAGE: A1 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,4287,SB1017872963341079920,00.html  
    TOPICS: Intangible Assets, Electricity Markets, Goodwill, Managerial Accounting, Pharmaceutical Industry, Research & Development

    SUMMARY: Greg Ip reports on the perils of life-cycle differences based on products and services that are reliant on intangible rather than tangible assets. That value is created with either is undeniable, but significantly riskier when that value is supported by something intangible that may disappear entirely.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) What is a product life cycle? How many of the 5 basic stages of a product's life can you name? What has happened to the product life cycle that is heavily dependent on technological changes? What part does intangible assets have in this change? How could the $5 billion in assets of a firm sell for $42 million?

    2.) What does the author mean when he says "value today is increasingly derived from intangible assets - intellectual property, innovative technology, financial services or reputation"? Explain in terms of Alan Greenspan's statement "a firm is inherently fragile if its value-added emanates more from conceptual as distinct from physical assets."

    3.) The article relates the story of Polaroid, once a pioneer noted for its technological prowess. Its "technology" asset formed the basis of its early success. How did technology and innovation finally slay it?

    4.) Other industries are exposed to the same sorts of forces, including the pharmaceutical and fiber-optic industries. How have they fared?

    5.) Why have companies tried to cast off hard assets in favor of intangible assets? In 2000, Jeffrey Skilling said, " What's becoming clear is that there's nothing magic about hard assets. They don't generate cash. What does is a better solution for your customer. And increasingly that's intellectual, not physical assets, driven." Do you suppose he's changed his mind?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

    A common mistake is to assume that "goodwill" is comprised only of unbooked assets such as knowledge capital.  Nothing could be further from the truth in terms of how goodwill is calculated under FAS 141 rules.  Goodwill also includes downward value adjustments for unbooked risk items such as off-balance sheet financing, pending and potential litigation losses, pending and possible adverse legislative and taxation actions, estimated environmental protection expenses, and various industry-specific liabilities such as unbooked frequent flyer certificate obligations.

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Reviews on June 20, 2002

    TITLE: Frequent-Flier Programs Get an Overhaul 
    REPORTER: Ron Lieber 
    DATE: Jun 18, 2002 
    PAGE: D1 LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1024344325710894400.djm,00.html  
    TOPICS: Frequent-flier programs, Accounting

    SUMMARY: Many frequent-flier programs are offering alternative rewards in exchange for frequent-flier miles. Questions focus on accounting for frequent-flier programs and redemption of miles.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) What is a frequent-flier program? List three possible ways to account for frequent-flier miles awarded to customers in exchange for purchases. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each accounting method.

    2.) Why are companies offering alternative rewards in exchange for frequent-flier miles? How is the redemption of miles reported in the financial statements? Discuss accounting issues that arise if the miles are redeemed for awards that are less costly than originally anticipated.

    3.) The article states that the 'surge in unredeemed points is causing bookkeeping headaches.' Why would unredeemed points cause bookkeeping headaches? Would companies be better off if the points were never redeemed? If a company created a liability for awarded points, in what circumstances could the liability be removed from the balance sheet?

    4.) Refer to the related article. Describe Jet Blue's frequent-flier program. How does stipulating a one-year expiration on frequent-flier points change accounting for a frequent-flier program?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

    --- RELATED ARTICLES --- 
    TITLE: JetBlue Joins the Fray But With Big Caveat: Miles Expire in a Year 
    REPORTER: Ron Lieber 
    PAGE: D1 
    ISSUE: Jun 18, 2002 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB102434443936545600.djm,00.html 

     

    Liabilities and Equity of Microsoft Corporation

    The off-balance sheet liabilities of Microsoft dwarf the recorded liabilities.

    • The major risk of Microsoft is the ease with which its products can be duplicated elsewhere such as in China.  From a global perspective this gives rise to perhaps billions in lost revenues and enormous expenditures to protect copyrights.

    • There are enormous contingency risks and pending lawsuits, particularly government lawsuits alleging abuse of monopoly powers and civil lawsuits from companies claiming unfair marketing practices and copyright infringements.

     

     

    Entrenched Assets and Market Dominance

    • Microsoft Windows and MS Office
    • AMR Sabre
    • Oracle Databases
    • AOL 

    Market-to-Book (ratio of market value of net assets/book value of net assets) > 6.0

    Conservatism is Largely to Blame

    • R&D expensed under FASB, but only R expensed by IAS
    • Amazon.com's tremendous investment in systems, marketing, and distribution software
    • AOL's customer acquisition costs
    • Distrust of valuations that are highly subjective and subject to extreme volatility
    Managers and auditors "don't want to put anything on the balance sheet that may turn out to be worthless.  If they don't have to value intangible assets, such as AOL's customer acquisition costs, their legal liability is reduced."  Baruch Lev
    Source: "The New Math," by Jonathan R. Laing, Barrons Online, November 20, 2000 --- http://equity.stern.nyu.edu/News/news/levbarrons1120.html
    Trinity students may go to J:\courses\acct5341\readings\levNov2000.htm

    Institutional Investors and Security Analysts Are Also At Fault

    Institutional investors and financial analysts are also quite happy with the current system because they think that they've go inside networks and proprietary information."  Baruch Lev
    Source: "The New Math," by Jonathan R. Laing, Barrons Online, November 20, 2000 --- http://equity.stern.nyu.edu/News/news/levbarrons1120.html
    Trinity students may go to J:\courses\acct5341\readings\levNov2000.htm

     

     

    Wages of factory workers are traced directly into finished goods inventories and are "capitalized" costs rather than expenses.  They are carried in the balance sheet as "tangible assets" until the the inventory items are sold or perish.  Then these costs become "expenses" in the income statement and are written off to the Retained Earnings account.  Similarly, wages of construction workers on a building are capitalized into the Buildings asset account rather than expensed in the income statement.  These wages become expensed over time in periodic depreciation charges. Costs of labor and direct materials that can be traced to construction of tangible assets thereby become assets and are written off across future periods.  Even indirect labor and material charges may be capitalized as overhead applied to tangible assets.  Tangible assets depict "touchable" items that can be purchased and sold in established markets such as commodity markets, real estate markets, and equipment markets.  

    Wages and salaries of research workers can be traced to particular projects.  However, under most accounting standards worldwide, research costs, including all direct material, labor,  and overhead costs are expensed immediately rather than capitalized as assets even though the revenues from the projects may not commence until many years into the future.  Research projects are typically too unique and too uncertain to be traded in markets.  Accounting standard setters recognize that there are many "intangible" items having future benefits or losses that are not booked as assets or liabilities.  Outlays for development of intangibles are expensed rather than capitalized until they can be better matched with the revenues they generate.  Examples in include research for new or improved products.  Intangibles also include contractual items such as copyrights, advertising, product promotions, and public relations outlays.  When intangibles such as patents and copyrights are purchased, the outlays can be booked as intangible assets.  Costs are then amortized over time.  However, resources devoted to discovery and development of intangibles are generally not booked as assets.  They are expensed when incurred rather than capitalized.  Typical examples of intangible expenses include the following:

    • Research (including development of patent and copyright items)
    • Long-term development of patents, products, and copyrights
    • Advertising and trademarks
    • Employee training and development
    • Public relations

    When an entire firm is purchased, the difference between the total price and the current value of all intangibles is typically booked to a "Goodwill" asset account.  When purchased as a lump sum, goodwill can be carried as an asset until its value is deemed to be "impaired."  However, when developed internally, goodwill is not booked as an asset.  This creates all sorts of problems when comparing similar companies where one company purchased its goodwill and the other company developed it internally.  In the U.S., goodwill accounting must be treated under purchase rather than pooling methods that, in turn, result in booking of "purchased goodwill."  FAS 141 spells out the accounting standards for Goodwill.   

    One requirement under FAS 141 is that contractual items such as patents and copyrights that can be separated from goodwill must be valued separately and be immediately expensed.  This is an attempt in FAS 141 to make it easier to compare a firm that acquires R&D in a business combination with a firm that develops its own R&D.  However, implementation of FAS 141 rules in this regard becomes very murky.

    FAS 142 dictates that firms are no longer required to amortize capitalized goodwill costs.  Instead firms are required to run impairment tests and expense portions of goodwill that has been deemed "impaired."  FAS 142 does not alter standards for intangibles that are not acquired in a business combination.  Hence, standards such as FAS 2 (R&D), FAS 19 (Oil and Gas), FAS 50 (Recording Industry), and FAS 86 (Computer Software) remain intact in situations apart from business combinations.  Paragraph 39(b) of FAS 142 admits to the following:

    In some cases, the cost of generating an intangible asset internally 
    cannot be distinguished from the cost of maintaining or 
    enhancing ... internally generated goodwill.

    There is nothing new about the sad state of accounting for intangibles.   In a working paper entitled "The Measurement and Recognition of Intangible Assets:  Then and Now," Claire Eckstein from Fairleigh Dickinson University quotes the following footnote from 1928:

    The Gold Dust Corporation
    August 31, 1928

    In view of the available surplus, and in the fact that the corporation carries its most valuable asset, viz, its goodwill at $1, and also because of the uncertain market value of industrial plants, it was concluded that it would be entirely approprate for the corporation to carry its plants in a similar manner as its goodwill, viz, at the nominal value of $1.

    The FASB admits that accounting for intangibles is in a sad state in terms of providing relevant information to investors.  An agenda project has been created that is titled "Disclosure of Information about Intangible Assets not Recognized in Financial Statements."  Analysts bemoan the state of accounting for intangibles.  In April 2001, Fortune stated the following:

    In the Fortune 500 there are thousands upon thousands of statistics that reveal very little
    that's meaningful about the corporations they purportedly describe.  At least that's the
    verdict of a growing number of forward-thinking market watchdogs, academics, accountants,
    and others.  Convinced that accounting gives rotten information about the value of performance
    in modern knowledge-intensive companies, they are proposing changes that would be
    earthshaking to the profession.

    Because so much of the problem rests in "knowledge intensive companies," Baruch Lev and others have come to view unrecognized intangibles as being synonymous with unrecognized "knowledge capital."

    Measuring the Value of Intangibles and Valuation of the Firm

    Knowledge Capital Valuation Factors (terminology adapted from Baruch Lev's writings)
    Value Creators
    • Scalability
           Nonrivalry (e.g., the SABRE airline reservations system)
           Increasing Returns (due to initial fixed cost followed by low marginal cost)
    • Network Effects
           Positive Feedback ¨(customer discussion boards)
           Network Externalities (fast word of mouth)
           Industry Standard (Microsoft Windows)

    Value Destroyers

    • Partial Excludability (training of employees who cannot be indentured servants)
           Spillovers
           Fuzzy Property Rights
           Private vs. Social Returns (training that creates immense competition other nations)
    • Inherent Risk
           Sunk Cost
           Creative Destruction (Relational database and ERP destruction of COBOL systems)
           Volatility of value due to competition and technological change
           Risk Sharing (only a few products emerge as winners amidst a trail of road kill)
    • Non-tradability
           Contracting Problems
           Negligible Marginal Cost

    A few years ago a hardback set of the thirty-two volumes of the Britannica cost $1,600…In 1992 Microsoft decided to get into the encyclopedia business…[creating] a CD with some multimedia bells and whistles and a user friendly front end and sold it to end users for $49.95…Britannica started to see its market erode…The company's first move was to offer on-line access to libraries at a subscription rate of $2,000 per year…Britannica continued to lose market share…In 1996 the company offered a CD version for $200…Britannica now sells a CD for $89.99 that has the same content as the thirty-two volume print version that recently sold for $1,600.
    Shapiro and Varian (1999, pp. 19–20)

    On November 14, 2002 the following links were provided at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/intangibles.html 

    1. Announcement: Lev's Book: Intangibles-Management, Measurement and Reporting has been published by the Brookings Institution Press. Get your copy now at book stores and retailers.
    2. Paper with Feng Gu: Intangible Assets, discussing Lev's methodology for measuring intangible assets.
    - intangible-assets.doc
    - intangibles-tables.ppt
    (Accompany Tables in Microsoft Powerpoint)
    3.

    Paper with Feng Gu: Markets in Intangibles: Patent Licensing,
    - patent-licensing.doc
    (Microsoft Word)
    - patent-licensing-tables.doc
    (Microsoft Word)

    4. April 16, 2001 - "Accounting Gets Radical" - Fortune
    5. April 2001 - "Knowledge Capital Scoreboard: Treasures Revealed" - CFO online
    6. May 10, 2001 - Interview with Baruch Lev - (in spanish)
    7. May 14, 2001 - "How Do We Guage Value of New Web Technologies?" - Wall Street Journal
    8. May 14, 2001 - "How do you value intangible assets?" - National Law Journal (No Online Version Available)
    9. June 18, 2001 - "Taking Stock of a Company's Most Valuable Assets" - Business Week

     

    There are all sorts of models for valuing an entire firm such that estimates of the value of unbooked items (goodwill) can be derived as the difference between the sum of the values of booked items and the entire value of the firm.  However, derivation of values of knowledge capital becomes confounded by the synergy effects. 

    The major problem is all valuation models is that they entail forecasting into the future based upon extrapolations from past history.  This is not always a bad thing when forecasting in relatively stable industries and economic conditions.  The problem in modern times is that there are very few stable industries and economic conditions.  Equity values and underlying values of intangibles are impacted by highly unstable shifts in investor confidence in equity markets, manipulations of accounting reports, terrorism, global crises such as the Asian debt crises, emergence of China in the world economy, and massive litigation unknowns such as lawsuits regarding mold in buildings.  Forecasting the future from the past is easy in most steady-state systems.  It is subject to enormous error in forecasting in systems that are far from being in steady states.

    The popular models for valuing entire firms include the following:

    • Valuation based upon analyst forecasts.  These alternatives have the advantages of being rooted in data outside what is reported under GAAP in financial statements.  Analysts may meet with top management and consider intangibles.  But there are also drawbacks such as the following:
    • The cart is in front of the horse.  When the purpose of accounting data is to help help investors and analysts set stock prices in securities markets, the forecasts of users (especially leading multiples) for valuation entails circular reasoning.
    • The recent scandals involving security analysts of virtually all major investment firms and brokerages makes us tend to doubt the objectivity and ability of analysts to make forecasts that are not self-serving.  See http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#Cleland 
    • Analyst forecasts tend to be highly subjective.  Comparing them may be like finding the mean between a banana and a lemon.
    • Valuation using stock price multiples (usually limited to comparing firms in a given industry and adjusted for leverage).  Multiples can be based upon price forecasts (leading multiples) or past price trends (trailing multiples).  In either case, the valuations are suspect for the following reasons:
    • The cart is in front of the horse.  When the purpose of the valuation exercise is to help help investors set stock prices in securities markets, the use of stock prices (especially leading multiples) for valuation entails circular reasoning.
    • Use of the current prices of small numbers of shares traded is not the same as the per-share value of all the shares acquired in a single transaction.  This difference arises in part because acquiring control usually i
    • s far more valuable than the sum of the shares at current trading values.  This difference arises in part because current share prices are subject to transient market price movements of shares of all traded companies, whereas the value of the firm in a business combination deal is much more stable.  For example, Microsoft share prices have declined about 40% between Year 2000 and Year 2002, but it is not at all clear that the value of the firm and/or its knowledge capital value has declined so steeply in the bear market of securities pricing in Year 2002.
    • Present value valuation based upon forecasted dividends (usually including a forecasted dividend growth rate). 
      The problem with forecasted dividends is that firms have dividend policies that do not reflect future value.  For example, many firms do not pay dividends at all or their payout ratios are too small to be reflective of firm value.  There may be enormous dividends decades into the future, but these are too uncertain to be realistic for valuation purposes.  Another problem is that forecasted dividend models generally require the estimation of a "terminal value" of the firm, and this usually entails grasping for straws.
    • Discounted abnormal earnings and returns valuation (including Edwards-Bell-Ohlson (EBO) and Steward's EVA Models)
      Abnormal earnings  and returns valuation models generally use forcasted after-tax operating profits discounted at the firm's current weighted average cost of capital.   There are variations of methods such as the abnormal returns method, the abnormal earnings method, and the free cash flow method of valuing returns to debt and equity.   

      One of the nicer summaries of the EBO versus EVA models can be found in "Measuring Wealth," by Charles Lee, CA Magazine, April 1996, pp. 32-37 --- http://www.cica.ca/cica/camagazine.nsf/e1996-Apr/TOC 

      The value of the firm depends on its ability to generate "abnormal earnings" above what can be earned in riskless or near-riskless investment alternatives.  There are immense problems in this valuation approach for the following reasons:
    • Empirical studies both before and after the Enron scandal indicate that earnings management is systemic and pervasive such that managers can manipulate abnormal earnings valuations with their earnings management policies (that are generally secret).
    • Earnings measures are subject to all the limitations of GAAP including the failure to expense employee stock options, inclusion of income on pension funds, write-off of R&D under FAS 2, and the expensing of expenditures for knowledge capital intended to benefit the future.  Actually, this problem is not as serious as it might seem at first blush since many of the accounting distortions wash themselves out over time if they are do to timing.  However, when the timing is long-term such as in the case of long-term R&D projects, distortions persist due to discounting.  For example, if a firm deducts $1 billion per year on a research project that may only start to pay off 15 or more years into the future, the conservatism badly distorts the discounted abnormal earnings and return valuation methods.
    • Abnormal earnings and returns valuation models implicitly assume firms that carry massive amounts of excess cash, beyond what is needed for year-to-year operations, distribute the excess cash as dividends to owners.  This just is not the case in some firms like Microsoft that carry huge cash reserves.  As a result, abnormal earnings and returns valuation methods must take this into account since abnormal earnings do not accrue to free cash reserves.
    MicrosoftAssets00.jpg (18291 bytes)
    • Real Options
      There are various valuation methods that are less widely used.  One of these is the Real Options approach that shows some promise even though it is still quite impractical.  See http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/realopt.htm 

    • Market Transaction
      On rare occasion, a portion of a company's knowledge capital is sold in market transactions that give clues about total value.  The sale of a portion of the SABRE system by American Airlines is an excellent example of a clue to the immense value of this   unbooked asset on the balance sheet..  The problem with this is that market price of a portion of the SABRE system ignores the synergy values of the remaining portion still owned by AMR.

    In the final analysis, the most practical approach to date is to attempt to forecast the revenues and/or cost savings attributable to major components of intellectual capital.   This is much easier in the case of software and systems such as the SABRE system than it is in components like human resources where total future benefits are virtually impossible to drill down to present values at particular points in time.

    The valuation of intangibles will probably always be subject to enormous margins of error and risk.

    One way to help financial statement users analyze intangibles would be to expand upon the interactive spreadsheet/database approach currently used by Microsoft Corporation for making forecasts.  Although this approach is not currently used by Microsoft for detailed analysis of intangibles, we can envision how knowledge capital components might be expanded upon in a way that financial statement users themselves can make assumptions and then analyze the aggregative impacts of those assumptions.  Click on the Following from http://www.microsoft.com/msft/ 

    FY 2003 Microsoft "What-if?" (193 KB) Do your own forecasting for Microsoft’s FY 2003 income statements based on your assumptions with this Excel projection tool --- http://www.microsoft.com/msft/download/PivotTables/What_If.xls 

    Pivot tables might also be useful for slicing and dicing information about intangibles.  Although Microsoft does not employ this specifically for analysis of intangibles, the approach used at the following link might be extended for such purposes:

    Financial History PivotTable (122 KB) Allows you to view and analyze historical Microsoft financial data.  For example, you can look at income statement line items dating back to 1985 --- http://www.microsoft.com/msft/download/PivotTables/historypivot.xls 

    Click here to view references on intangibles 


    FAS 141 and the Question of Value By PricewaterhouseCoopers CFOdirect Network Newsdesk, January 16, 2003 --- http://www.cfodirect.com/cfopublic.nsf/vContentPrint/CA13B226B214A04085256CB000512D34?OpenDocument 

    Just as early reactions to FAS 142 seemed to have overlooked the complexities in reviewing and testing goodwill for impairment, so too have reactions to complying with the Financial Accounting Standards Board's Statement No. 141 – Business Combinations.

    Adopted and issued at the same time as Statement No. 142 in the summer of 2001, the headline news about FAS 141 was the elimination of the Pooling-of-Interest accounting method in mergers and acquisitions. Going forward from June 30, 2001, all acquisitions are to be accounted for using one method only – Purchase Accounting.

    This change is significant and one particular aspect of it – the identification and measurement of intangible assets outside of goodwill – seems to be somewhat under-appreciated.

    Stephen C. Gerard, Managing Director at Standard & Poor's Corporate Value Consulting, says that there is "general conceptual understanding of Statement 141 by corporate management and finance teams. But the real impact will not be felt until the next deal is done." And that deal in FAS 141 parlance will be a "purchase" since "poolings" are no longer recognized.

    Consistent M&A Accounting

    The FASB, in issuing Statement No. 141, concluded that "virtually all business combinations are acquisitions and, thus, all business combinations should be accounted for in the same way that other asset acquisitions are accounted for – based on the values exchanged."

    In defining how business combinations are to be accounted for, FAS 141 supersedes parts of APB Opinion No. 16. That Opinion allowed companies involved in a merger or acquisition to use either pooling-of-interest or purchase accounting. The choice hinged on whether the deal met 12 specified criteria. If so, pooling-of-interest was required.

    Over time, "pooling" became the accounting method of choice, especially in "mega-deal" transactions. That, in the words of the FASB, resulted in "…similar business combinations being accounted for using different methods that produced dramatically different financial statement results."

    FAS 141 seeks to level that playing field and improve M&A financial reporting by:
      • Better reflecting the investment made in an acquired entity based on the values exchanged.
      • Improving the comparability of reported financial information on an apples-to-apples basis.
      • Providing more complete financial information about the assets acquired and liabilities assumed in business combinations.
      • Requiring disclosure of information on the business strategy and reasons for the acquisition.

    When announcing FAS 141, the FASB wrote: "This Statement requires those (intangible assets) be recognized as assets apart from goodwill if they meet one of two criteria – the contractual-legal criterion or the separability criterion."

    Unchanged by the new rule are the fundamentals of purchase accounting and the purchase price allocation methodology for measuring goodwill: that is, goodwill represents the amount remaining after allocating the purchase price to the fair market values of the acquired assets, including recognized intangibles, and assumed liabilities at the date of the acquisition.

    "What has changed," says Steve Gerard, "is the rigor companies must apply in determining what assets to break out of goodwill and separately recognize and amortize."

    Thus, in an unheralded way, FAS 141 introduces a process of identifying and placing value on intangible assets that could prove to be a new experience for many in corporate finance, as well as a costly and time-consuming exercise. Nonetheless, an exercise critical to compliance with the new rule.

    Continued at  http://www.cfodirect.com/cfopublic.nsf/vContentPrint/CA13B226B214A04085256CB000512D34?OpenDocument  

     


    Intangibles:  An Accounting Paradox

    Transfer Pricing of Intellectual Property Rights --- http://www.buildingipvalue.com/05_TI/031_034.htm


    An Accounting Paradox

    If you are following the accounting saga following the implosion of Enron and Andersen, I strongly recommend the Summer 2002, Volume 21, Number 2 of the Journal of Accounting and Public Policy --- http://www.elsevier.nl/inca/publications/store/5/0/5/7/2/1/ 

    Enron:  An Accounting Perspective

    • Reforming corporate governance post Enron: Shareholders' Board of Trustees and the auditor 97 -- 103 
      A.R. Abdel-khalik
    • Enron: what happened and what we can learn from it pp. 105 -- 127 
      G.J. Benston, A.L. Hartgraves
    • Enron et al.--a comment pp.129 -- 130 
      J.S. Demski
    • Where have all of Enron's intangibles gone? pp.131 -- 135 
      Baruch Lev
    • Enron: sad but inevitable pp.137 -- 145 
      L. Revsine
    • Regulatory competition for low cost-of-capital accounting rules pp.147 -- 149 
      S. Sunder

    Regular Paper

    • How are loss contingency accruals affected by alternative reporting criteria and incentives? pp. 151 -- 167 
      V.B. Hoffman, J.M. Patton

    Question:
    Where were Enron's intangible assets?  In particular, what was its main intangible asset that has been overlooked in terms of accounting for intangibles?

     

    Answer by Baruch Lev:

    Baruch Lev Quote from Page 131 (from the reference above)

    On December 31, 2000, Enron's market value was $75.2 billion, while its book value (balance sheet equity) was $11.5 billion.  The market-to-book gap of almost $64 billion, while not equal to the value of intangibles (it reflects, among other things, differences between current and historical-cost values of physical assets), appears to indicate that Enron had substantial intangibles just half a year before it started its quick slide to extinction.  This naturally raises the questions: Where are Enron's intangibles now?  And even more troubling: Why did not those intangibles--a hallmark of modern corporations--prevent the firm's implosion?  In intangibles are "so good", as many believe, why is Enron's situation "so bad"?

    Baruch Lev Quite beginning on Page 133 (from the reference above)

    So the answer to the question posed at the opening of this note--where have Enron's intangible gone?--is a simple one: Nowhere.  Enron did not have substantial intangibles, that is, if hype, glib, and earnings manipulation did not count as intangibles.  Which, of course, also answers the second question--why did not the intangibles prevent Enron's implosion.

    Back to Greenspan's comment about the fragility of intangibles: "A physical asset, whether an office building or an automotive assembly plant, has the capability of producing goods even if the reputation of the managers of such facilities falls under a cloud.  The rapidity of Enron's decline is an effective illustration of the vulnerability of a firm whose market value largely rests on capitalized reputation."  Intangibles are indeed fragile, more on this later, but "true" intangibles are not totally dependent on managers' reputation.  IBMs management during the 1980s and early 1990s drove the company close to bankruptcy, and was completely discredited (though not ethically, as Enron's).  But IBMs intangibles--innovation capabilities and outstanding services personnel--were not seriously harmed.  Indeed, under Lou Gerster's management (commencing in 1993), IBM made an astounding comeback.  Hypothetically, would a tarnished reputation of Microsoft, Pfizer, or DuPont's management destroy the ability of these similarly innovative companies to continuously introduce new products and services and maintain dominant competitive positions?  Of course not.  Even when companies collapse, valuable patents, brands, R&D laboratories, trained employees, and unique information systems will find eager buyers.  Once more, Enron imploded, and its trading activities "acquired" for change not because its intangibles were tied to management's reputation, but partly, because it did not have any valuable intangibles--unique factors of production--that could be used by successor managers to resuscitate the company and create value.

    Finally, to the fragility of intangibles.  As I elaborate elsewhere,3 along with the ability of intangible assets to create value and growth, comes vulnerability, which emanates from the unique attributes of these factors of production:

    Partial excludability (spillover): The inability of owners of intangible assets to completely appropriate (prevent non-owners from enjoying) the benefits of the assets.  Patents can be "invented around", and ultimately expire; trained employees often move to competitors, and unique organizational structures (e.g., just-in-time production) are imitated by competitors.

    Inherently high risk: Certain intangible investments (e.g., basic research, franchise building for new products) are riskier than most physical and financial assets.  The majority of drugs under development do not make it to the market, and most of the billions of dollars spent by the dotcoms in the late 1990s to build franchise (customer base) were essentially lost.

    Nonmarketability: Market in intangibles are in infancy, and lack transparency (there are lots of patent licensing deals, for example, but no details released to the public).  Consequently, the valuation of intangible-intensive enterprises is very difficult (no "comparables"), and their management challenging.

    Intangibles are indeed different than tangible assets, and in some sense more vulnerable, due to their unique attributes.  Their unusual ability to create value and growth comes at a cost, at both the corporate and macroeconomy level, as stated by Chairman Greenspan: "The difficulty of valuing firms that deal primarily with concepts and the growing size and importance of these firms may make our economy more susceptible to this type of contagion".  Indeed, intangible-intensive firms are "growing in size and importance", a fact that makes the study of the measurement, management, and reporting of intangible assets so relevant and exciting, irrespective of Enron the intangibles-challenged sorry affair.

     

    Answer by Bob Jensen

    I have to disagree with Professor Lev with respect his statement:  " Enron did not have substantial intangibles."  I think Enron, like many other large multinational corporations, invested in a type of intangible asset that has never been mentioned to my knowledge in the accounting literature.  Enron invested enormously in the intangible asset of political power and favors.  There are really two types of investments of this nature for U.S. based corporations:

    1. Investments in bribes and political contributions allowed under U.S. law, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)

    2. Investments in bribes and political contributions not allowed under U.S. law, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)

    I contend that large corporate investment in political power is sometimes the main intangible asset of the company.  This varies by industry, but political favors are essential in agribusiness, pharmaceuticals, energy, and various other industries subject to government regulation and subsidies.  Enron took this type of investment to an extreme in both the U.S. and in many foreign nations.  Many of Enron's investments in political favors appear to violate the FCPA, but the FCPA is so poorly enforced that it seldom prevents huge bribes and other types of investments in political intangibles.

    I provide you with several examples below.

    Two Examples of Enron's Lost Millions in Political Intangibles
    India and Mozambique:  Enron Invests in U.S. Government Threats to Cut Off  Foreign Aid

    SHAMELESS:
    1995'S 10 WORST
    CORPORATIONS


    by Russell Mokhiber and Andrew Wheat
    http://www.essential.org/monitor/hyper/mm1295.04.html 

     

    The module about Enron in 1995 reads as follows:

    Enron's Political Profit Pipeline

    In early 1995, the world's biggest natural gas company began clearing ground 100 miles south of Bombay, India for a $2.8 billion, gas-fired power plant -- the largest single foreign investment in India.

    Villagers claimed that the power plant was overpriced and that its effluent would destroy their fisheries and coconut and mango trees. One villager opposing Enron put it succinctly, "Why not remove them before they remove us?"

    As Pratap Chatterjee reported ["Enron Deal Blows a Fuse," Multinational Monitor, July/August 1995], hundreds of villagers stormed the site that was being prepared for Enron's 2,015-megawatt plant in May 1995, injuring numerous construction workers and three foreign advisers.

    After winning Maharashtra state elections, the conservative nationalistic Bharatiya Janata Party canceled the deal, sending shock waves through Western businesses with investments in India.

    Maharashtra officials said they acted to prevent the Houston, Texas-based company from making huge profits off "the backs of India's poor." New Delhi's Hindustan Times editorialized in June 1995, "It is time the West realized that India is not a banana republic which has to dance to the tune of multinationals."

    Enron officials are not so sure. Hoping to convert the cancellation into a temporary setback, the company launched an all-out campaign to get the deal back on track. In late November 1995, the campaign was showing signs of success, although progress was taking a toll on the handsome rate of return that Enron landed in the first deal. In India, Enron is now being scrutinized by the public, which is demanding contracts reflecting market rates. But it's a big world.

    In November 1995, the company announced that it has signed a $700 million deal to build a gas pipeline from Mozambique to South Africa. The pipeline will service Mozambique's Pande gas field, which will produce an estimated two trillion cubic feet of gas.

    The deal, in which Enron beat out South Africa's state petroleum company Sasol, sparked controversy in Africa following reports that the Clinton administration, including the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Embassy and even National Security adviser Anthony Lake, lobbied Mozambique on behalf of Enron.

    "There were outright threats to withhold development funds if we didn't sign, and sign soon," John Kachamila, Mozambique's natural resources minister, told the Houston Chronicle. Enron spokesperson Diane Bazelides declined to comment on the these allegations, but said that the U.S. government had been "helpful as it always is with American companies." Spokesperson Carol Hensley declined to respond to a hypothetical question about whether or not Enron would approve of U.S. government threats to cut off aid to a developing nation if the country did not sign an Enron deal.

    Enron has been repeatedly criticized for relying on political clout rather than low bids to win contracts. Political heavyweights that Enron has engaged on its behalf include former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, former U.S. Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher and retired General Thomas Kelly, U.S. chief of operations in the 1990 Gulf War. Enron's Board includes former Commodities Futures Trading Commission Chair Wendy Gramm (wife of presidential hopeful Senator Phil Gramm, R-Texas), former U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary Charles Walker and John Wakeham, leader of the House of Lords and former U.K. Energy Secretary.

     

    United States Deregulation of Energy That Needed a Change in the Law:  Enron's Investment in Wendy Gramm

    Forwarded by Dick Haar on February 11, 2002

    Senator Joseph Leiberman 
    706 Hart Senate Office Building 
    Washington, D.C. 20510

    RE: Enron Investigation

    Dear Senator Leiberman,

    I watched your Sunday morning appearance on Face the Nation with intense interest. Inasmuch as I own a fair amount of Enron stock in my SEP/IRA, I'm sure you can understand my curiosity relative to your investigation.

    Knowing you to be an honorable man, I feel secure that you will diligently pursue the below listed matters in an effort to determine what part, if any, these matters contributed to the collapse of Enron.

    1. Government records reveal the awarding of seats to Enron executives and Ken Lay on four Energy Department trade missions and seven Commerce Department trade trips during the Clinton administration's eight years.

    a. From January 13, 1995 through June 1996, Clinton Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and White House Counsel Mack McLarty assisted Ken Lay in closing a $3 billion dollar power plant deal with India. Four days before India gave final approval to the deal, Enron gave $100,000 to the DNC. Any quid pro quo?

    b. Clinton National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, threatened to withhold aid to Mozambique if it didn't approve an Enron pipeline project. Subsequent to Mr. Lake's threats, Mozambique approved the project, which resulted in a further $770 million dollar electric power contract with Enron. Perhaps, if NSA Advisor Lake had not been so busy strong-arming for Enron, he might have been focused on something obliquely related to national security like, say, Mr. Bin Laden? Could it be that a different, somewhat related, investigation is warranted?

    c. In 1999, Clinton Energy Secretary Bill Richardson traveled to Nigeria and helped arrange a joint, varied, energy development program which resulted in $882 million in power contracts for Enron from Nigeria. Perhaps if Energy Scretary Richardson had been more focused on domestic energy, we might have avoided:

    i. The severe loss of nuclear secrets to China and concurrently ii. developed more domestic sources of energy.

    d. Subsequent to leaving Clinton White House employ, Enron hired Mack McLarty (White House Counsel), Betsy Moler (Deputy Energy Secretary) and Linda Robertson (Treasury Official). Even a person without a high school diploma (no disrespect to airline security screeners) can see that this looks like Enron paying off political favors with fat-cat corporate jobs, at the expense of stockholders and Enron pension employees.

    e. Democratic Mayor Lee P. Brown of Houston (Enron headquarter city), received $250,000 just before Enron filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Isn't that an awful lot of money to throw away right before bankruptcy?

    The Democratic National Committee was the recipient of hundreds of thousands of dollars from 1990 through 2000. The above matters appear to be very troubling and look like, smack of, reek of, political favors for campaign payoffs. I know you will find out.

    2. Recently, former Clinton Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin called a top U. S. Treasury official, asking on Enron's behalf, for government help with credit agencies. As you well know, Rubin is the chairman of executive committee at Citigroup, which just coincidentally, is Enron's largest unsecured creditor at an estimated $3 billion dollars.

    3. As you well know, Mr. Leiberman, Citigroup is Senator Tom Daschle's largest contributor ($50,000) in addition to being your single largest contributor ($112,546). This fact brings to mind some disturbing questions I feel you must answer.

    a. Have you, any member of your staff, any Senate or House colleagues, any relatives or any friends of yours, been asked by Citigroup to intercede on their behalf, in an effort to recover part or all of Citigroup's $3 billion, at the expense of Enron's shareholders, employees and or Enron pensioners?

    b. Did your largest contributor, Citigroup, have anything to do with the collapse of Enron?

    c. Enron has tens of thousands of employees, stockholders and pensioners who have lost their life savings. How will you answer their most obvious question? Do you represent Citigroup, your largest contributor, or do you represent the Enron employees, et al, who stand to lose if Citigroup recovers any of its $3 billion?

    During Sunday's Face the Nation, both you and Senator McCain praised Attorney General Ashcroft for recusing himself from the Justice Department investigation because he had once received a contribution from Enron. I know in my heart, that, being the honest gentleman you are, you will now recuse yourself because of the glaring conflict of interest described above. I also know that you will pass this letter to your successor for his or her attention.

    Very truly yours,

    Robert Theodore Knalur


    Also see:  "Where Was Enron Getting a Return for Its Political Bribes?" at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#bribes 

    The extent to which Enron's investments and alleged investments in current and future political favors actually resulted in political favors will never be known.  Clearly, Enron invested in some enormous projects such as the $3 billion power plant in India knowing full well that the investment would be a total loss without Indian taxpayer subsidies.  Industry in India just could not pay the forward contract gas rates needed to run the plant.  

    Enron executives intended that purchased political influence would make it one of the largest and most profitable companies in the world.  In the case of India, the power plant became a total loss, because the tragedy of the September 11 terror made the U.S. dependent upon India in its war against the Taliban.  Even if the White House leaders had been inclined to muscle the Indian government to subsidize power generated from the new Enron plant in India, the September 11 tragedy destroyed  Enron's investment in political intangibles and its hopes to fire up its $3 billion gas-fired power plant in India.  The White House had greater immediate need for India's full support in the war against the Taliban.

    The point here is not whether Enron money spent for political favors did or did not actually result in favors.  The point is that to the extent that any company or wealthy employees invest heavily for future political favors, they have invested in an intangible asset and have taken on the intangible risk of loss of reputation and money if some of these investments become discovered and publicized in the media.  In fact, discovery and disclosure will set government officials scurrying to avoid being linked to political payoffs.

    Enron is a prime example of a major corporation focused almost entirely upon turning political favors into revenues, especially in the areas of energy trading and foreign power plant construction.  As such, these investments are extremely high risk.  

    It is doubtful that political intangibles will ever be disclosed or accounted for except in the case of bankruptcy or other media frenzies like the Enron media frenzies.  

    Question:
    Accountants and auditors face an enormous task of disclosing and accounting for political intangibles.

    Answer:
    Because disclosures and accounting of political intangibles will likely destroy their value.  Generally, accounting for assets does not destroy those assets.  This is not the case for many types of political intangibles that cost millions upon millions of dollars in corporations.


    August 28, 2002 reply from Craig Polhemus [Joedpo@AOL.COM

    -----Original Message----- 
    From: Craig Polhemus [mailto:Joedpo@AOL.COM]  
    Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2002 1:55 AM 
    To: AECM@LISTSERV.LOYOLA.EDU  
    Subject: Re: An Accounting Paradox: When will accounting for an asset destroy the asset?

    Bob Jensen writes:

    <<Question: Accountants and auditors face an enormous task of disclosing and accounting for political intangibles.

    Answer: Because disclosures and accounting of political intangibles will likely destroy their value. Generally, accounting for assets does not destroy those assets. This is not the case for many types of political intangibles that cost millions upon millions of dollars in corporations.>>

    Interesting. There are many instances where the reverse is true -- the marketing value to a lobbying firm of having made large contributions to the winning candidates (of whatever party) is greatest where it is well known. This applies regardless whether the contributions came from individual partners or (at least in those states where it's legal for state and local elections) from the firm itself.

    Even on a local level, if you're in a jurisdiction where judges are elected, would you prefer to go to a lawyer who contributed to the successful judge or to one who did not? I have a friend who asks this question directly whenever he's seeking local counsel. And if you're that lawyer, do you want that contribution to be secret or as public as possible? Maybe even exaggerated?

    Dita Beard is a classic example -- her initial "puffery" [whether truthful, partially truthful, or entirely false] about getting the IT&T antitrust case dropped based on a pledge of IT&T funding to support moving the 1972 Republican National Convention to Miami was a marketing aid to her ONLY if she let it be known, at least to her clients and potential clients.

    Similarly, Ed Rollins writes of a foreign "contributor" who apparently passed a million in cash to a middleman and thought it made it to the Reagan re-election campaign. Rollins believes the middleman (an unnamed Washington lawyer, by the way) held on to it all but the "contributor" felt he'd purchased access, and certainly the middleman benefited not just financially but also from the contributor's belief that the middleman had provided direct access to the campaign and hence the Administration.

    I express no opinion on how such things should be recorded in financial statements -- I'm just pointing out that publicity about large political contributions to successful candidates (whether within or exceeding legal limits) can be positive for some businesses, such as lobbying firms.

    Craig [Craig Polhemus, 
    Association Vitality International]


    August 28, 2002 reply from Bob Jensen

    Great to hear from you Craig.

    I agree that sometimes the accounting and/or media disclosure of investments in political favors may increase the value of those investments. Or it may have a neutral effect in some industries like agribusiness and oil where the public has come to expect that members of Congress and/or the Senate are heavily dependent upon those industries for election to office and maintenance of their power.

    On the other hand, it is unlikely that accounting and media disclosure of the Enron investments in political favors, including the favors of linking foreign aid payments to Enron's business deals, would have either a positive or neutral impact upon the expected value of those political favors to Enron.

    It is most certain that accounting and media disclosure political investments that are likely to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act would deal a severe blow to the value of those intangible assets.

    Thanks,

    Bob Jensen


    August 28 reply from mark-eckman@att.net 

    I think companies have invested a great deal in political intangibles outside the arena of government. Consider the current discussions on the importance of expensing stock option expensing as an example. Views are strong and vary widely on the issue but clearly, these positions exist only to gain visibility and increase political pressure.

    On the side that believes CPA stands for 'can't prove anything' we find the speech to the Stanford Director's College on June 3, 2002 by T. J. Rodgers, CEO of Cypress. Mr. Rodgers refers to expensing options as "...the next mistake..." and refers to "...accounting theology vs. business reality...." He opposes the Levin- McCain proposal and recounts the story you have on your website of the 1994 political storm in Silicon Valley when the FASB proposed expensing options. He believes that the free market will eliminate any abuse of option accounting. Contrast that with the opposition represented in the July 24, 2002 letter to CEOs from John Biggs at TIAA-CREF. Mr. Biggs also derides the profession by labeling APB 25 as an "...archaic method..." and that its use has the effect of “…eroding the quality of earnings…” by encouraging “…the use of one form of compensation.” Mr. Biggs completes his letter by equating option expensing to management credibility. Both of these men have made political investments with their comments, drawing lines in the sand. While the remarks were not made directly to any political body, and there is no tangible cost involved, this is still political pressure. It is also interesting both men focus on the accounting profession as the root cause rather than the value of the political intangibles that exist only in market capitalization.

    Consider how companies build political intangibles with analysts, institutional shareholders and others. ADP had an extended string of increased quarterly earnings – over 100 consecutive quarters. The PE multiple for the stock has been high for some time, due in no small part to the consistency of this trend. ADP management reminded shareholders with every quarter how long they had provided shareholders with higher earnings. When that streak recently ended, the stock dropped like a stone. Closing price moved down from $41.35 on July 17, 2002 to $31.60 the next day. The volume associated with that change was almost nine times the July 16 trading volume. How would anyone explain this event other than a reversal of political intangibles that did not exist on the financial statements?

    Power and politics are always with us. We just have to be smart enough to know which is for show and which is for $$$. (By the way, if you have a way to tell them apart, let me know.)


    August 28 reply from E. Scribner [escribne@NMSU.EDU

    Hi, Bob and Craig! 
    You've discovered an accounting application of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, which originated with the notion that to "see" an electron's position we have to "illuminate" it, which causes it to shift its position so it's not "there" any more. To quote from the American Insitutute of Physics ( http://www.aip.org/history/heisenberg/p08b.htm ), "At the moment the light is diffracted by the electron into the microscope lens, the electron is thrust to the right."

    When we "illuminate" political intangibles by disclosing them, they are not "there" any more.

    Ed Scribner 
    New Mexico State University
     Las Cruces, NM, USA ---
    --

    August 28, 2002 Reply from Bob Jensen
    Heisenberg's Theory Song
    "My get up and go got up an went." http://www.eakles.com/get_up_go.html  

     August 28, 2002 reply from Richard C. Sansing [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU

    There is an extensive literature on the economics of information. The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information by Jack Hirshleifer and John Riley is a good survey. Chapters 6 (The economics of emergent public information) and 7 (Research and invention) address the issues of the value of private information and the effects of disclosure on its value.

    Heisenberg's uncertainty principle both "originated" and (for practical purposes) terminated with the behavior of electrons and other sub-atomic particles. It applies to the joint indeterminacy of the position and momentum of electrons. It is only significant at the atomic level because Planck's constant is so small.

    Richard C. Sansing 
    Associate Professor of Business Administration 
    Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth 
    email: Richard.C.Sansing@dartmouth.edu 

     

     


    Accounting for Options to Buy Real Estate

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on July 14, 2006

    TITLE: Land-Value Erosion Seen As a Problem for Builders
    REPORTER: by Michael Corkery and Ian McDonald
    DATE: Jul 06, 2006
    PAGE: C1
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115214204821498941.html 
    TOPICS: Accounting, Advanced Financial Accounting, Impairment, Investments

    SUMMARY: "Land values are becoming a flash point for investors and analysts who watch the builders sector. Bears say the companies' land might not be worth what they paid for it, which could lead to painful write-downs. If they are right, it will be a blow to the already battered sector." Questions relate to the classification of land on building companies' balance sheets and the treatment of the write-down of the value of land.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) As an example of the type of building company discussed in this article, view the quarterly financial statements for Toll Brothers in their 10-Q filing with the SEC dated July 6, 2006. You may go directly through the following link or may access through the WSJ article on-line by clicking on Toll Brothers on the right-hand side of the page then SEC filings. http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/794170/000112528206003278/p413541-10q.htm  In what account does Toll Brothers classify Land on its balance sheet? Why is the Land classified this way?

    2.) Refer again to the Toll Brothers financial statements. By how much did Toll Brothers write down the values of land during the 6-month and 3-month periods ended on April 30, 2006 and 2005? Describe in words, the pattern of write-downs that you observe and compare it to the discussion given in the article.

    3.) How will adjustments to reflect decline in land values affect reported income and balance sheets of companies such as Toll Brothers, which hold land as inventory and a major component of their operations? How might these adjustments affect the company's stock price? Refer to information in the article in providing your answer.

    4.) Compare and contrast the accounting for land and recent decline in the market value of land described in question 2 above, to accounting by a company, such as a manufacturer or service entity, which owns land only in the location of its principal place of business (that is, as part of property, plant, and equipment).

    5.) Explain why the accounting differs under the two answers given to questions 2 and 3 above.

    6.) What are options? What type of option contracts do builders enter into? How much has Toll Brothers paid to enter into such contracts?

    7.) What is the book value of net assets? How is that measure used by analysts of companies in the building industry? How might the recent decline in land values affect the usefulness of book value for analyzing financial statements?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    "Land-Value Erosion Seen As a Problem for Builders," by Michael Corkery and Ian McDonald, The Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2006; Page C1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115214204821498941.html

    Already reeling from slowing housing sales and worries about the economy, shares of home builders face another issue: the value of the land on their books.

    Land values are becoming a flash point for investors and analysts who watch the builders sector. Bears say the companies' land might not be worth what they paid for it, which could lead to painful write-downs.

    If they are right, it will be a blow to the already battered sector. After a 28% average fall so far this year, many stocks of home builders trade close to -- or even at -- their "book value,'' which makes them tantalizing to bargain hunters. Book value is a company's assets minus its liabilities and is often seen as a rough approximation of how a business would be valued if liquidated.

    But if some land on builders' books is overvalued, their shares might also be overvalued.

    "People are looking at book value as a possible floor for the stock prices. The question is 'should that be a floor?' There could be some risk to that book value from land recently acquired or put under option contract," says Banc of America Securities analyst Daniel Oppenheim, whose firm does business with several builders.

    The debate is lively because the true extent of the land risk is tough to quantify. Many builders use options, where they put a deposit on a parcel to be purchased at a later date. Builders say options minimize their losses because they let them walk away from overpriced land, sacrificing typically no more than a 5% to 10% deposit.

    So far, the damage has been limited. In its last quarter, Centex Corp., a large builder based in Dallas, reduced its earnings by 14 cents a share in connection with walking away from option deposits and pre-acquisition costs in Washington, D.C., Sacramento, Calif., and San Diego. Last month, Hovnanian Enterprises Inc., based in Red Bank, N.J., said it plans to take $5 million in write-offs on land deposits, a small percentage of its total, and luxury home builder Toll Brothers Inc. in suburban Philadelphia wrote down roughly $12 million, mainly from land that it owned in the sluggish Detroit market. Builders say they often adjust their land values to the market, even in boom times, but some analysts expect charges to increase.

    Write-downs are "starting to happen,'' says Credit Suisse analyst Ivy Zelman, a longtime bear on the sector whose firm does business with several builders. "I don't think you can define what [the scope] is today and capture the risk."

    Parcels are valued at their purchase price on companies' books, so there isn't any way of determining the land's true market value until they sell houses on it. Older purchases are likely worth far more than their listed value on balance sheets, but newer land buys are probably worth less. Many builders say land prices are still fairly static, but Jeff Barcy, chief executive of Hearthstone, a large land investor based in San Rafael, Calif., says prices are declining in certain markets.

    "We expect the softening to continue for a while," Mr. Barcy says. "In the hottest markets you could see a 20% to 30% price decline."

    Ms. Zelman estimates that many companies are building houses on land that they bought or optioned a few years ago when land was less expensive. But some analysts say many companies purchased large amounts of land in 2005, at the height of the boom, and that could come back to hurt them if the housing market doesn't improve in a year or so.

    Some think these worries are overblown and creating an opportunity. Bulls acknowledge there may be scattered write-downs, but say undervalued land on company books likely outweighs any overpriced recent buys. They add that the sector's worries, from property values to job growth, are reflected in the stocks' prices. And they say home prices have to drop significantly to sink land values. Fans of the builder stocks also point to a flurry of recent share repurchases, indicating that insiders believe the stocks are cheap. NVR Inc., for example, has reduced its shares outstanding by more than 20% over the past five years, according to researcher CapitalIQ.

    Shares of the nation's five biggest home builders trade at about 1.3 times the their book value, compared with two times book on average over the past five years, according to Chicago researcher Morningstar Inc. The average U.S. stock trades at more than four times its book value.

    Pulte Homes Inc. and Beazer Homes USA Inc. trade at about 1.2 times book, while shares of M.D.C. Holdings Inc. trade at 1.1 times and shares of Standard Pacific Corp. trade at about book value.

    Home builders always have had a hard time getting respect on Wall Street, where investors often take a short-term view of the sector's performance potential. "The adage has been 'buy them at book value and sell when they get to two times book value,'" says Arthur Oduma, a senior stock analyst who covers the home builders at Morningstar. "So, that would tell you it's time to buy."

    And some are doing so. Henry Ramallo, a portfolio manager at Neuberger Berman, a Lehman Brothers company, with $116 billion under management, says he likes Toll Brothers because it takes the company about five years, on average, to develop land from the time the builder puts it under option. By the time Toll is ready to build on the land it optioned or bought in the past year, the housing market should have improved, Mr. Ramallo says. His firm has recently bought shares of Toll, which is trading at about 1.3 times book value.


     

     

     

    The Controversy over Accounting for Securitizations and Loan Guarantees

    Accounting for Loan Guarantees

    FASB Issues Accounting Guidance to Improve Disclosure Requirements for Guarantees --- http://www.fasb.org/news/nr112502.shtml 

    Accounting and Auditing Policy Committee Credit Reform Task Force --- http://www.fasab.gov/aapc/cdreform/98CR01Recpts.pdf 

    The new FAS 146 Interpretation 46 deals with loan guarantees of Variable Interest (Special Purpose) Entities --- at: http://www.fasb.org/interp46.pdf.


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on November 15, 2002

    TITLE: H&R Block's Mortgage-Lending Business Could Be Taxing 
    REPORTER: Joseph T. Hallinan 
    DATE: Nov 12, 2002 
    PAGE: C1 
    LINK:  http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB103706997739674188.djm,00.html 
    TOPICS: Accounting, Bad Debts, Cash Flow, Debt, Loan Loss Allowance, Securitization, Valuations

    SUMMARY: H&R Block's pretax income from mortgage operations grew by 146% during the fiscal year ending April 30, 2002. However, the accounting treatment for the securitization of these mortgages is being questioned.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) Describe the accounting treatment used by H&R Block for the sale of mortgages. Why is this accounting treatment controversial?

    2.) What alternative accounting methods are available to record H&R Block's sale of mortgages? Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each accounting treatment. Which accounting method is most conservative?

    3.) Why do companies, such as H&R Block, sell mortgages? Why does H&R Block retain the risks of non-payment? How could the sale be structured to transfer the risks of non-payment to the purchaser of the mortgages? How would this change the selling price of the mortgages? Support your answer.

    4.) How do economic conditions change the expected losses that will result from non-payment? How does the credit worthiness of borrowers change the expected losses that will result from non-payment? Support your answers.

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University


    "H&R Block Faces Issues With Mortgage Business," by Joseph T. Hallinan, The Wall Street Journal,  November 12, 2002, Page C1 ---- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB103706997739674188.djm,00.html

    Famous for its tax-preparation service, H&R Block Inc. last year prepared 16.9 million individual income-tax returns, or about 14% of all individual returns filed with the Internal Revenue Service.

    But the fastest-growing money maker for the Kansas City, Mo., company these days is its mortgage business, which last year originated nearly $11.5 billion in loans. The business, which caters to poor credit risks, has been growing much faster than its U.S. tax business. In the fiscal year ended April 30, Block's pretax income from mortgage operations grew 146% over the year before. The tax business, while still the largest in the U.S., grew just 23%.

    If those rates remain unchanged, the mortgage business will this year for the first time provide most of Block's pretax income. In the most-recent fiscal year, mortgage operations accounted for 47.3% of Block's pretax income.

    As Block's mortgage business has soared, so has its stock price, topping $53 a share earlier this year from less than $15 two years ago, though it has dropped in recent months as investors have fretted about the cost of lawsuits in federal court in Chicago and state court in Texas on behalf of tax clients who received refund-anticipation loans. But now, some investors and analysts are raising questions about the foundation beneath Block's mortgage earnings. "The game is up if interest rates rise and shut off the refinancing boom," says Avalon Research Group Inc., of Boca Raton, Fla., which has a "sell" rating on Block's shares.

    On Monday, the shares were up $1.53, or 4.8%, to $33.63 in 4 p.m. New York Stock Exchange composite trading -- a partial snapback from a $3.25, or 11%, drop on Friday in reaction to the litigation in Texas over fees H&R Block collected from customers in that state.

    The company dismisses concerns about its mortgage results. "We think it's a great time for our business right now," says Robert Dubrish, president and CEO of Block's mortgage unit, Option One Mortgage Corp.

    Much of Block's mortgage growth has come because the company uses a fairly common but controversial accounting treatment that allows it to accelerate revenue, and thus income. This treatment, known as gain-on-sale accounting, has come back to haunt other lenders, including Conseco Inc. and AmeriCredit Corp. At Block, gains from sales of mortgage loans accounted for 62% of revenue at the mortgage unit last year.

    In essence, under gain-on-sale accounting, lenders post upfront the estimated profit from a securitization transaction, which is the sale to investors of a pool of loans. Specifically, the company selling the loans records profit for the excess of the sales price and the present value of the estimated interest income that is expected to be received on the loans above the amounts funded on the loans and the present value of the interest agreed to be paid to the buyers of the loan-backed securities.

    But if the expected income stream is cut short -- say, because more borrowers refinance their loans than expected when the profit was calculated -- the company essentially has to reverse some of the gain, taking a charge.

    That is what happened at Conseco. The Carmel, Ind., mobile-home lender was forced to take a $350 million charge in 1998 after many of its loans were paid off early. It stopped using gain-on-sale accounting the following year, saying that the "clear preference" of investors was traditional loan accounting. AmeriCredit in Fort Worth, Texas, which lends money to car buyers with poor credit histories, abandoned the practice in September in the midst of a meltdown of its stock price.

    But Block says it faces nowhere near the downside faced by AmeriCredit and Conseco, which it says had different business models. Big Block holders seem to agree. "Block doesn't have anywhere near the scale of exposure [to gain on sale] that the other companies had," says Henry Berghoef, co-manager of the Oakmark Select mutual fund, which owns 7.7 million, or about 4.3%, of Block's shares.

    Another potential problem for Block is the way it treats what is left after it sells its loans. The bits and pieces that it keeps are known as residual interests. Block securitizes most of these residual interests, allowing it to accelerate a significant portion of the cash flow it expects to receive rather than taking it over the life of the underlying loans. The fair value of these interests is calculated by Block considering a number of factors, such as expected losses on its loans. If Block guesses wrong, it could be forced to take a charge down the road.

    Block says its assumptions underlying the valuation of these interests are appropriately conservative. It estimates lifetime losses on its loan pools at roughly 5%, which it says is one percentage point higher than the 4% turned in by its worst-performing pool of loans. (Comparable industry figures aren't available.) So Block says the odds of a write-up are much greater than those of a write-down and would, in a worst-case scenario that it terms "remote," probably not exceed $500 million. Block's net income for the fiscal year ended April 30 was $434.4 million, or $2.31 a share, on revenue of $3.32 billion.

    Block spokeswoman Linda McDougall says gain-on-sale provides an "insignificant" part of the company's revenue. She notes that Option One, Block's mortgage unit, recently increased the value of its residual interest by $57 million. She also says that the company's underwriting standards are typical of lenders who deal with borrowers lacking pristine credit histories.

    Bears contend that Block has limited experience in the mortgage business. It bought Option One in 1997, and Option One in Irvine, Calif., has itself been in business only since 1993. So its track record doesn't extend to the last recession of 1990 to 1991.

    On top of that, Block lends to some of the least creditworthy people, known in the trade as "subprime" borrowers. There is no commonly accepted definition of what constitutes a subprime borrower. One shorthand measure is available from credit-reports firm Fair, Isaac & Co. It produces so-called FICO scores that range from 300 to 850, with 850 being perfect. Anything less than 660 is usually considered subprime. Securities and Exchange Commission documents filed by Block's mortgage unit show its borrowers typically score around 600. Moreover, according to the filings, hundreds of recent Block customers, representing about 4% of borrowers, have FICO scores of 500 or less, or no score at all. A score below 500 would place an applicant among the bottom 5% of all U.S. consumers scored by Fair Isaac.

    Mr. Dubrish says Block stopped lending to people with FICO scores below 500 some two years ago and says he is puzzled as to why those with scores below 500 still appear in the company's loan pools.

    Block says its loans typically don't meet the credit standards set by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, which are the lending industry's norms. Block's customers may qualify for loans even if they have experienced a bankruptcy in the previous 12 months, according to underwriting guidelines it lists in the SEC documents.

    In many cases, according to Block's SEC filings, an applicant's income isn't verified but is instead taken as stated on the loan application. In other cases, an applicant with a poor credit rating may receive an upgraded rating, depending on factors including "pride of ownership." Most Block mortgages are for single-family detached homes, but Block also makes mobile-home loans, according to the filings.

    "We are doing a lot to help people own houses who wouldn't have the chance to do it otherwise," Mr. Dubrish says. "We think we're doing something that's good for the economy and good for our borrowers."

    A key figure in the mortgage business is the ratio of loan size to value of the property being mortgaged. Loans with LTV rates above 80% are thought to present a greater risk of loss. The LTV on many of Block's mortgages is just under 80%, according to the SEC filings. The value of these properties can be important if Block is forced to foreclose on the loans and resell the properties. Nationwide, roughly 4.17% of subprime mortgage loans are in foreclosure, according to LoanPerformance, a research firm in San Francisco. As of June 30, only 3.52% of Block's loans, on a dollar basis, were in foreclosure, even though its foreclosure ratio more than tripled between Dec. 31, 1999, and June 30.


    The Controversy Over Pro Forma Reporting and HFV

    Up Up and Away in My Beautiful Pro Forma

    "Creative Accounting Leads to Fuzzy Earns," SmartPros, December 27, 2005 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x51147.xml

    Dec. 27, 2005 (Associated Press) — If it weren't for some pesky accounting rules, telecom-equipment company Ciena Corp. would have lost a mere 2 cents a share in the fourth quarter. With those accounting rules, it lost 44 cents a share.

    The disparity is "the GAAP Gap" - the difference between "pro forma" earnings and earnings prepared according to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, or GAAP.

    GAAP is the nation's accounting standard. Pro forma earnings, by contrast, are governed by no fixed standard. Companies can toss out one-time charges, options expenses, goodwill write-downs - anything that looks bad. One-time windfalls, however, usually manage to stay in.

    Merrill Lynch's U.S. Strategist Richard Bernstein did the math on 1,600 stocks and found total earnings for their third calendar quarter grew 22 percent on a GAAP basis, but 31 percent on a pro forma basis.

    The gap was greater when the companies were subdivided by Standard & Poor's quality rankings. S&P grades stocks on their annual sales and dividend growth and actual earnings over a 10-year period. A company with very stable growth would rank "A+," while a company in bankruptcy would be a "D."

    "Lower quality companies are dramatically overstating their growth rates by using pro forma earnings," Bernstein wrote in a December 19 research report.

    Companies with a B- ranking have a GAAP growth rate of 1 percent, but a pro forma growth rate of 38 percent, according to Bernstein. B+ companies are more than doubling their growth rate: GAAP growth is 13 percent, but pro forma growth is 27 percent.

    Part of the problem, according to Bernstein, is that most post-bubble regulations focus on the quality of formal financial reporting, but "there appears to be no regulation" covering earnings conference calls and press releases.

    "Although the newer regulation is laudable, stocks trade on press releases and conference calls, and not on the formal financial statements that are released weeks after the announcement and call," he wrote. "We think regulation regarding company press releases and conference calls is sorely needed because of the significant deterioration in the quality of announced earnings."

    He calls for an end to pro forma earnings, saying they have made U.S. corporate earnings perhaps the most opaque they've been in his 23 years in the business.

    Continued in article

     


    Compilation and Review Standards Change
    As opposed to a formal audit, many accountants perform compilation and review services to generate unaudited financial statements for a client.  There is a new standard for these two services.

    According to SSARS, compilations and reviews are restricted to historical financial statements, even though clients often ask their accountants to provide financial statement elements and pro forma financial information. Michael Glynn, technical manager at the AICPA, reports on newly adopted standards allowing accountants to report on those financial statement elements or pro forma financial information under SSARS.
    "Compilations & Reviews New Standards," SmartPros, October 2005 --- http://education.smartpros.com/main1/extcoursedetail.asp?PartnerRed=accountingnet&CatalogNumber=APP515

     

    GAAP vs. Non-GAAP Earnings
    "Investors Applaud Oracle’s Non-GAAP Earnings," AccountingWeb, July 1. 2005 ---
    http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=101064

    SOX Regulation G, which went into effect in March 2003, defines non-GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) financial measures and creates disclosure standards for them. According to Strategic Finance magazine, the guidelines for non-GAAP financial measures stipulate that they may not:

    “The rapid integration of PeopleSoft into our business contributed to the strong growth in both applications sales and profits that we saw in the quarter,” Oracle President Safra Catz said in a written statement. “The combination of increased organic growth plus a carefully targeted acquisition strategy have pushed Oracle’s revenue and profits to record levels.”


    "Little Bitty Cisco," by Jesse Eisinger, The Wall Street Journal, November 6, 2003 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB106806983279057200,00.html?mod=technology%255Ffeatured%255Fstories%255Fhs 

    The way Wall Street eyes these things, including the liberal use of the words "pro forma," Cisco had an impressive fiscal first quarter.

    Revenue came in better than expected and grew 5.3% compared with a year ago, topping expectations of a flat top-line thanks in part to spending from the federal government (see article). How impressive is this? Well, the country's economy grew at 7.2%, and business spending on equipment and software rose 15%. Microsoft had revenue growth of 6%, IBM 8.6%, and Dell is estimated to come in at 15% growth. So Cisco Systems, one of the big tech dogs, looks like the runt of that particular litter. Is networking a growth industry anymore, or is it doomed to be troubled by overcapacity and a lack of business demand? The next few quarters are crucial.

    Earnings per share -- that is, pro forma earnings per share -- easily surpassed estimates, logging in at 17 cents a share, compared with the expectation of 15 cents a share and last year's 14 cents.

    The company's shareholder equity fell in the quarter to $27.4 billion from $28 billion a year ago. Cash flow from operations fell to $973 million from $1.1 billion a year earlier. Cash on hand and investments fell from $20.7 billion to $19.7 billion, which is still mountainous but lower year-over-year, nevertheless.

    Then there is the gross-margin story. Cisco has had Himalayan gross margins throughout the slowdown, because it was able to squeeze suppliers and find efficiencies. But now that revenue is finally increasing, gross margins fell. Product gross margins came in at 69%, down from 71% in the fourth quarter. Cisco is selling less profitable products, including some from its recent acquisition of Linksys. It also has outsourced much of its production. How much operating leverage does Cisco now have? That is the reason it sports its high valuation, after all.

    Then there is the outlook. Deferred revenue and backlog were down. Cisco's book-to-bill ratio, a measure that reflects order momentum, was below one. When book-to-bill is below one, orders are lower than billings, suggesting a slowdown, not acceleration. True, Cisco put out a forecast for modestly higher revenue for the second quarter compared with the first. But some questions should linger.


    Question:  How does former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling define HFV?
    Home Video Uncovered by the Houston Chronicle, December 19, 2002
    Skits for Enron ex-executive funny then, but full of irony now --- http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/metropolitan/1703624 
    (The above link includes a "See it Now" link to download the video itself which played well for me.)

    The tape, made for the January 1997 going-away party for former Enron President Rich Kinder, features nearly 30 minutes of absurd skits, songs and testimonials by company executives and prominent Houstonians. The collection is all meant in good fun, but some of the comments are ironic in the current climate of corporate scandal.

    In one skit, former administrative executive Peggy Menchaca plays the part of Kinder as he receives a budget report from then-President Jeff Skilling, who plays himself, and financial planning executive Tod Lindholm. When the pretend Kinder expresses doubt that Skilling can pull off 600 percent revenue growth for the coming year, Skilling reveals how it will be done.

    "We're going to move from mark-to-market accounting to something I call HFV, or hypothetical future value accounting," Skilling jokes as he reads from a script. "If we do that, we can add a kazillion dollars to the bottom line."

    Richard Causey, the former chief accounting officer who was embroiled in many of the business deals named in the indictments of other Enron executives, makes an unfortunate joke later on the tape.

    "I've been on the job for a week managing earnings, and it's easier than I thought it would be," Causey says, referring to a practice that is frowned upon by securities regulators. "I can't even count fast enough with the earnings rolling in."

    Texas' political elite also take part in the tribute, with then-Gov. George W. Bush pleading with Kinder: "Don't leave Texas. You're too good a man."

    Former President George Bush also offers a send-off to Kinder, thanking him for helping his son reach the Governor's Mansion.

    "You have been fantastic to the Bush family," he says. "I don't think anybody did more than you did to support George."


    "Bubble Redux," by Andrew Bary, Barron's, April 14, 2003, Page 17.

    Amazon's valuation is the most egregious of the 'Net trio.  It trades for 80 times projected "pro forma" 2003 profit of 32 cents a share.  Amazon's pro forma definition of profit, moreover, is dubious because it excludes re-structuring charges and, more important, the restricted stock that Amazon now is issuing to employees in lieu of stock options.  Amazon's reported profit this year under generally accepted accounting principles (which include restricted-stock costs) could be just 10 cents to 15 cents a share, meaning that Amazon's true P/E arguably is closer to 200.

    Yahoo, meanwhile, now commands 70 times estimated 2003 net of 35 cents a share, and eBay fetches 65 times projected 2003 net of $1.35 a share.

    What's fair value?  By our calculations, Amazon is worth, at best, roughly 90% of its projected 2003 revenue of $4.6 billion. That translates into $10 a share, or $4.1 billion.  This estimate is charitable because the country's two most successful brick-and-mortar retailers, Wal-Mart Stores and Home Depot, also trade for about 90% of 2003 sales.

    Yahoo ought to trade closer to 15.  That's a stiff 43 times projected 2003 earnings and gives the company credit for its strong balance sheet, featuring over $2 a share in cash and another $3 a share for its stake in Yahoo Japan, which has become that country's eBay.

    Sure, eBay undoubtedly is the most successful Internet company and the only one that has lived up to the growth projections made during the Bubble.  As the dominant online marketplace in the U.S. and Europe, eBay saw its earnings surge to 87 cents a share last year from three cents in 1998, when it went public at a split-adjusted $3.00 a share.

    Why would eBay be more fairly valued around 60, its price just several months ago?  At 60, eBay would trade at 44 times projected 2003 profit of $1.35 a share and 22 times an optimistic 2005 estimate of $2.75.  So confident are analysts about eBay's outlook that they're comfortable valuing the stock on a 2005 earnings estimate.

    Fans of eBay believe its profit can rise at a 35% annual clip in the next five years, a difficult rate for any company to maintain, even one, such as eBay, with a "scalable" business model that allows it to easily accommodate more transactions while maintaining its enviable gross margins of 80%.  If the company earns $5 a share in 2007--nearly six times last year's profit--it would still trade at 18 times that very optimistic profit level.

    Continued in the article.


    The New York Yankees today released their 4th Quarter 2001 pro forma results. Although generally accepted scorekeeping principles (GASP) indicate that the Yankees lost Games 1 and 2 of the 2001 World Series, their pro forma figures show that these reported losses were the result of nonrecurring items, specifically extraordinary pitching performances by Arizona Diamondbacks personnel Kurt Schilling and Randy Johnson. Games 3 and 4 results, already indicating Yankee wins, were not restated on a pro forma basis.
    Ed Scribner, New Mexico State

    Until recently, pro forma reporting was seen as a useful tool that could help companies show performance when unusual circumstances might cloud the picture. Today it finds itself in bad odour. 
    "Pro forma lingo Does the use of controversial non-GAAP reporting by some companies confuse or enlighten?," by Michael Lewis, CA Magazine, March 2002 --- http://www.cica.ca/cica/camagazine.nsf/e2002-mar/Features 

    For fans of JDS Uniphase Corp., the fibre-optics manufacturer with headquarters in Ottawa and San Jose, Calif., the report for fiscal 2001 provided the icing on a very delicious cake: following an uninterrupted series of positive quarterly earnings results, the corporate giant announced it was set to deliver US$67 million in pro forma profit.

    There was only one fly in the ointment. Like all such calculations, JDS's pro forma numbers were not prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), and as such they excluded goodwill, merger-related and stock-option charges, and losses on investments. Once those items were added back into the accounting mix, JDS suddenly showed a staggering US$50.6 billion in red ink - a US corporate record. Even so, many investors remained loyal, placing their trust in the boom-market philosophy that views onetime charges as largely irrelevant. The mantra was simple - operating results rule.

    "That was the view at the time," says Jim Hall, a Calgary portfolio manager with Mawer Canadian Equity Fund. "It just goes to show how wrong people can be."

    Since then, of course, the spectacular flameout of Houston's Enron Corp. has done much to change that point of view (though it's not a pro forma issue). Once the world's largest energy trader, the company now holds the title for the largest bankruptcy case in US history. The Chapter 11 filing in December came after Enron had to restate US$586 million in earnings because of apparent accounting irregularities. In its submission, the company admitted it had hidden assets and related debt charges since 1997 in order to inflate consolidated earnings. Enron's auditor, accounting firm Arthur Andersen LLP, later acknowledged that it had made "an [honest] error in judgement" regarding Enron's financial statements.

    While the Enron saga will continue in various courtrooms for many months to come, regulators on either side of the border have responded to the collapse with uncharacteristic swiftness. Both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States and the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) issued new guidelines on financial reporting just a few weeks after the Enron bust. In each instance, investors were reminded to redirect their focus to financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP, paying special attention to cash flow, liquidity and the intrinsic value of acquisitions. At the same time, issuers were warned to reduce their reliance on pro forma results and to explain to investors why they were not using GAAP in their reporting.

    SEC chairman Harvey Pitt moved furthest and fastest. In mid-January he announced plans to establish a private watchdog to discipline accountants and review company audits. Working with the largest accounting firms and professional organizations such as the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the SEC wants the new body to be able to punish accountants for incompetence and ethics violations. As Pitt emphasized, "The commission cannot, and in any event will not, tolerate this pattern of growing re-statements, audit failures, corporate failures and investor losses."

    The sheer scale of the Enron debacle has brought pro forma accounting under public scrutiny as never before, and, observers say, will provide a powerful impetus for financial reporting reform. "This will send a message to companies and accountants to cut back on some of the games they've been playing," says former SEC general counsel Harvey Goldschmid.

    Meanwhile, the CSA (the forum for the 13 securities regulators of Canada's provinces and territories) expressed its concern over the proliferation of non-standard measures, warning that they improve the appearance of a company's financial health, gloss over risks and make it exceedingly difficult for investors to compare issuers.

    "Investors should be cautious when looking at non-GAAP measures," says John Carchrae, chair of the CSA Chief Accountants Committee, when the guidelines were released in January. "These measures present only part of the picture and may selectively omit certain expenses, resulting in a more positive portrayal of a company's performance."

    As a result, Canadian issuers will now be expected to provide GAAP figures alongside non-standard earnings measures, explain how pro forma numbers are calculated, and detail why they exclude certain items required by GAAP. So far, the CSA has provided guidance rather than rules, but the committee cautions it could take regulatory action if issuers publish earnings reports deemed to be misleading to investors.

    Carchrae, who is also chief accountant of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), believes "moral suasion" is a good place to start. Nonetheless, he adds, the OSC intends to track press releases, cross-reference them to statutory earnings filings and supplemental information on websites, and monitor continuous disclosure to ensure a company meets its requirements under the securities act.

    Although pro forma reporting finds itself in bad odour, until recently it was regarded as a useful tool that could help companies show performance when unusual circumstances might cloud the picture. In cases involving a merger or acquisition, for example, where a company has made enormous expenditures that generate significant non-cash expenses on the income statement, pro forma can be used as a clarifying document, enabling investors to view economic performance outside of such onetime events. Over the years, however, the pro forma route has increasingly involved the selective use of press releases, websites, and other reports to put a favourable spin on earnings, often leading to a spike in the value of a firm's stock. Like management discussion and analysis, such communications are not within the ambit of GAAP, falling somewhere between the cracks of current accounting standards.

    "Obviously, this issue is of concern to everyone who uses financial statements," says Paul Cherry, chairman of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants' Accounting Standards Board. "Our worry as standard-setters is whether these non-GAAP, pro forma items confuse or enlighten."

    Regulators and standard-setters have agonized over this issue ever since the reporting lexicon began to expand with the rise of the dot-com sector in the late 1990s, a sector with little in the way of earnings that concentrated on revenue growth as a more meaningful performance indicator. New measures, such as "run-through rates" or "burn rates," were deemed welcome additions to traditional methodology because they helped determine how much financing a technology company might require during its risky startup phase.

    Critics, however, argued such terms were usurping easily understood language as part of a corporate scheme to hoodwink unwary investors. Important numbers were hidden or left out under a deluge of new and ever-more complex terminology. The new measurements, they warned, fell short of adequate financial disclosure.

    An OSC report published in February 2001 appears to support these claims. According to the report, Canadian technology companies have not provided investors with adequate information about how they disclose revenue, a shortcoming that may require some of them to restate their financial results.

    "Initial results of the review suggest a need for significant improvement in the nature and extent of disclosure," the report states, adding that the OSC wants more specific notes on accounting policy attached to financial statements. The report also observes that revenue is often recognized when goods are shipped, not when they are sold, despite the fact that the company may be exposed to returns.

    David Wright, a software analyst at BMO Nesbitt Burns in Toronto, says dealing with how technology companies record revenue is a perennial issue. The issue has gained greater prominence with the rise of vendor financing, a practice whereby companies act as a bank to buyers, lending customers the cash to complete purchase orders. If the customer is unable to pay for the goods or services subsequent to signing the sales agreement, the seller's revenue can be drastically overstated.

    But pro forma still has plenty of advocates - particularly when it comes to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). Such a measure, it is often argued, can provide a pure, meaningful and reliable diagnostic tool, albeit one that should be considered along with figures that accommodate charges to a balance sheet.

    Ron Blunn, head of investor relations firm Blunn & Co. Inc. in Toronto and chairperson of the issues committee of the Canadian Investor Relations Institute, says adjusted earnings can serve a legitimate purpose and are particularly helpful to analysts and money managers who must gauge the financial well-being of technology startups.

    The debate shows no signs of burning out anytime soon. On the one hand, the philosophy among Canadian and US standard-setters in recent years has appeared to favour removing constraints, rather than imposing them. New rules to apply to Canadian banks this year, for example, will no longer require the amortization of goodwill in earnings figures. On the other hand, it has become abundantly clear that companies will emphasize the reporting method that puts the best gloss on their operations. And while the use of pro forma accounting has remained most prevalent among technology companies, the movement to embrace more and varied language has spread to "old economy" companies such as Enron, gaining steam as the economy stumbled. Blunn theorizes the proliferation of nontraditional reporting and the increasing reliance on supplemental filings simply reflect the state of the North American economy.

    Carchrae has a slightly different diagnosis. When asked why pro forma reporting has mushroomed in recent years, he points to investors' slavish devotion to business box scores - that is, a company's ability to meet sales and earnings expectations as set out by equity analysts. Since companies can be severely punished for falling short of the Street's consensus forecast, there is intense pressure, especially in a bear market, to conjure up earnings that appear to satisfy forecasts.

    As a result, pro forma terminology has blossomed over the Canadian corporate landscape. Montreal-based telephone utility BCE Inc., for example, coined the term "cash baseline earnings" to describe its operating performance. Not to be outdone, Robert McFarlane, chief financial officer of Telus Corp., Canada's second-largest telecommunications company, cited a "revenue revision" and "EBITDA deficiency" to explain the drop in the Burnaby, BC-based phone service firm's "core baseline earnings" for its third quarter ended September 30, 2001. (According to company literature, core baseline earnings refers to common share income before discontinued operations, amortization of acquired intangible assets net of tax, restructuring and nonrecurring refinancing costs net of tax, revaluation of future tax assets and liabilities and goodwill amortization.)

    Meanwhile, IBM Corp. spinoff Celestica Inc. of Toronto neglected to mention the elimination of more than 8,700 jobs from a global workforce of 30,000, alluding to the cuts in its fiscal 2001 third-quarter report through references to "realignment" charges during the period.

    Many statements no longer use the term "profit" at all. And while statutory filings must present at least one version of earnings that conforms to GAAP, few rules have been set down by US or Canadian regulators to govern non-GAAP declarations. Accounting bodies in Canada and around the world are charged with policing their members and assuring statutory filings include income and revenue according to GAAP, using supportable interpretations. But pro forma numbers are typically distributed before a company's statutory filing is made.

    "Not to pass the buck," says Cherry, "but how can we set standards for something that's not part of GAAP?" Still, Cherry admits the use of non-GAAP terminology has become so widespread that accounting authorities are being forced to take notice. "The matter is gaining some prominence," he says, "because some of the numbers are just so different."

    Despite his reservations, Cherry acknowledges "the critical point is when information is released to the marketplace," which nowadays is almost always done via a press release. The duty to regulate such releases, he says, must rest with securities bodies - an opinion shared by Edmund Jenkins, chair of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the United States.

    Many authorities view the issue as a matter of education, believing that a high degree of sophistication must now be expected from the retail investing community. Others say the spread of non-GAAP reporting methodology, left unchecked, could distort markets, undermine investor confidence in regulatory regimes and ultimately impede the flow of investment capital. But pro forma devotees insist that introducing tough new measures to govern reporting would do little to protect consumers and encourage retail investment. Instead, new regulations might work to impede growth and limit available, useful financial information.

    Continued at http://www.cica.ca/cica/camagazine.nsf/e2002-mar/Features 


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators's Review on October 18, 2002

    TITLE: Motorola's Profit: 'Special' Again? 
    REPORTER: Jesse Drucker 
    DATE: Oct 15, 2002 
    PAGE: C1 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1034631975931460836.djm,00.html  
    TOPICS: Special Items, Pro Forma Earnings, Accounting, Earning Announcements, Earnings Forecasts, Financial Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis, Net Income

    SUMMARY: Motorola has announced both pro forma earnings and net income as determined by generally accepted accounting principles for 14 consecutive quarters. Ironically, pro forma earnings are always greater than net income calculated using generally accepted accounting principles

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) Distinguish between a special item and an extraordinary item. How are each reported on the income statement?

    2.) Distinguish between pro forma earnings and GAAP based earnings. What are the advantages and disadvantages of allowing companies to report multiple earnings numbers? What are the advantages and disadvantages of not allowing companies to report multiple earnings numbers?

    3.) What items were reported as special by Motorola? Are these items special? Support your answer.

    4.) Are you surprised that all the special items reduced earnings? What is the likelihood that there were positive nonrecurring items at Motorola? How are positive nonrecurring items reported?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University


    "Pro-Forma Earnings Reporting Persists," by Shaheen Pasha, Washington Post, August 16, 2002 --- http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25384-2002Aug16.html 

    While many on Wall Street are calling for an end to pro forma financial reporting given widespread jitters over corporate clarity, it's clear from second-quarter reports that the accounting practice is a hard habit to break.

    Publicly traded companies are required to report their results according to generally accepted accounting principles, or GAAP, under which all types of business expenses are deducted to arrive at the bottom line of a company's earnings report.

    But an ever-increasing number of companies in recent years has taken to also reporting earnings on a pro forma – or "as if" – basis under which they exclude various costs. Companies defend the practice, saying the inclusion of one-time events don't accurately reflect true performance.

    There is no universal agreement on which expenses should be omitted from pro forma results, but pro forma figures typically boost results.

    Indeed, as the second-quarter reporting season dwindles down with more than 90 percent of the Standard & Poor's 500 companies having reported, only Yahoo Inc., Compuware Corp. and Xilinx Inc. made the switch to reporting earnings under GAAP, according to Thomson First Call.

    While a number of S&P 500 companies, including Computer Associates International Inc. and Corning Inc., made the switch to GAAP in the first quarter, that still brings the number to 11 companies in total that have given up on pro forma over the last two quarters.

    "It's disappointing that at this stage we haven't seen more companies make the switch to GAAP earnings from pro forma," said Chuck Hill, director of research at Thomson First Call.

    Continued at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25384-2002Aug16.html  


    A new research report from Bear Stearns identifies the best earnings benchmarks by industry. GAAP earnings are cited as the best benchmarks for a few industries, but not many. The preferred benchmarks are generally pro forma earnings or pro forma earnings per share. http://www.accountingweb.com/item/91934 

    AccountingWEB US - Oct-1-2002 -  A new research report from Bear Stearns identifies the best earnings benchmarks by industry. GAAP earnings (earnings prepared according to generally accepted accounting principles) are cited as the best benchmarks for a few industries, but not many. Most use pro forma earnings or pro forma earnings per share (EPS).

    Examples of the most useful earnings benchmarks for just a few of the 50+ industries included in the report:

    • Autos: Pro forma EPS
    • Industrial manufacturing: Pro forma EPS shifting to GAAP EPS
    • Trucking: Continuing EPS
    • Lodging: Pro forma EPS, EBITDA and FFO
    • Small & mid-cap biotechnology: Product-related events, Cash on hand, Cash burn rate
    • Advertising & marketing services: Pro forma EPS, EBITDA, Free cash flow
    • Business/professional services: Pro forma EPS, Cash EPS, EBITDA, Discounted free cash flow
    • Wireless services: GAAP EPS, EBITDA

    EBITDA=Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.
    FFO=funds from operations.

    The report also lists the most common adjustments made to arrive at pro forma earnings and tells whether securities analysts consider the adjustments valid. Patricia McConnell, senior managing director at Bear Stearns, explains, "Analysts rarely accept managements' suggested 'pro forma' adjustments without due consideration, and sometimes we reject them... We would not recommend using management's version of pro forma earnings without analysis and adjustment, but neither would we blindly advise using GAAP earnings without analysis and adjustment."


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on July 27, 2002

    TITLE: Merrill Changes Methods Analysts Use for Estimates 
    REPORTER: Karen Talley DATE: Jul 24, 2002 
    PAGE: C5 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,BT_CO_20020724_009399.djm,00.html  
    TOPICS: Accounting, Earnings Forecasts, Financial Accounting, Financial Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis

    SUMMARY: Merrill Lynch & Co. has reported that it will begin forecasting both GAAP based earnings estimates in addition to pro forma earnings measures. To accommodate Merrill Lynch & Co., Thomson First Call will collect and report GAAP estimates from other analysts.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) Compare and contrast GAAP earnings and pro forma earnings?

    2.) Why do analyst forecast pro forma earnings? Will GAAP earnings forecasts provide more useful information than pro forma earnings forecasts? Support your answer.

    3.) Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of analysts forecasting both pro forma and GAAP earnings. Should analysts continue to provide pro forma earnings forecasts? Should analysts also provide GAAP earnings forecasts? Support your answers.

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University


    Denny Beresford's Terry Breakfast Lecture
    Subtitle:  Does Accounting Still Matter in the "New Economy" 

    Every accounting educator and practitioner should read Professor Beresford's Lecture at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/beresford01.htm


    Readers might also want to go to http://www.npr.org/news/specials/enron/ 
    (Includes an interview with Lynn Turner talking about pro forma reporting.)


    Deferred Taxes Related to FAS123 Expense – Accounting and Administrative Issues on New Trends in Stock Compensation Accounting
    PWC Insight on FAS 123  --- http://www.fei.org/download/HRInsight02_21.pdf 
    A recent PWC HR Insight discusses the applicable rules and answers questions raised on accounting for income taxes related to FAS 123 expense (for both the pro forma disclosure and the recognized FAS 123 expense). Per PWC, the rules are complex and require that the tax benefits arising from stock options and other types of stock-based compensation be tracked on a grant-by-grant and country-by-country basis


    Corporate America's New Math:  Investors Now Face Two Sets of Numbers In Figuring a Company's Bottom Line
    By Justin Gillis
    The Washington Post
    Sunday, July 22, 2001; Page H01 
    http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/archives/front.htm   

    Cisco Systems Inc., a bellwether of the "new economy," prepared its books for the first three months of this year by slicing and dicing its financial results in the old ways mandated by the rules of Washington regulators and the accounting profession.

    Result: a quarterly loss of $2.7 billion.

    Cisco did more, though. It sliced and diced the same underlying numbers in ways preferred by Cisco, offering an alternative interpretation of its results to the investing public.

    Result: a quarterly profit of $230 million.

    That's an unusually large swing in a company's bottom line, but there's nothing unusual these days about the strategy Cisco employed. Across corporate America, companies are emphasizing something called "pro forma" earnings statements. Because there are no rules for how to prepare such statements, businesses have wide latitude to ignore various expenses in their pro forma results that have to be included under traditional accounting rules.

    Most of the time, the new numbers make companies look better than they would under standard accounting, and some evidence suggests investors are using the massaged numbers more and more to decide what value to attach to stocks. The pro forma results are often strongly emphasized in news releases announcing a corporation's earnings; sometimes the results computed under traditional accounting techniques are not disclosed until weeks later, when the companies file the official results with the Securities and Exchange Commission, as required by law.

    Cisco includes its results under both the pro forma and the traditional accounting methods in its news releases. People skeptical of the practice of using pro forma results worry that investors are being deceived. Karen Nelson, assistant professor of accounting at Stanford University, said some companies were "verging on fraudulent behavior" in their presentation of financial results.

    Companies that use these techniques say they are trying to help investors by giving them numbers that more accurately reflect the core operations of their businesses, in part because they exclude unusual expenses. Cisco's technique "gives readers of financial statements a clearer picture of the results of Cisco's normal business activities," the company said in a statement issued in response to questions about its accounting.

    Until recently, pro forma results had a well-understood and limited use. Most companies used pro forma accounting only to adjust previously reported financial statements so they could be directly compared with current results. This most frequently happened after a merger, when a company would adjust past results to reflect what they would have been had the merger been in effect earlier. Pro forma, Latin for "matter of form," refers to statements "where certain amounts are hypothetical," according to Barron's Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms.

    What's changed in recent years is that many companies now using the technique also apply it to the current quarter. They include some of the leading names of the Internet age, including Amazon.com Inc., Yahoo Inc. and JDS Uniphase Corp. These companies have received enthusiastic support from many Wall Street analysts for their use of pro forma results. The companies' arguments have also been bolstered by a broader attack on standard accounting launched by some academic researchers and accountants. They believe the nation's financial reporting system, rooted in the securities law reforms of the New Deal, is inadequate to modern needs. In testimony before Congress last year, Michael R. Young, a securities lawyer, called it a "creaky, sputtering, 1930s-vintage financial reporting system."

    The dispute over earnings statements has grown in intensity during the recent economic slide. To skeptics, more and more companies appear to be coping with bad news on their financial statements by redefining the concept of earnings. SEC staffers are worried about the trend and are weighing a crackdown.

    "People are using the pro forma earnings to present a tilted, biased picture to investors that I don't believe necessarily reflects the reality of what's going on with the business," said Lynn Turner, the SEC's chief accountant.

    For the rest of the article (and it is a long article), go to 
    http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/archives/front.htm 
    The full article is salted with quotes from accounting professors and Bob Elliott (KMPG and Chairman of the AICPA)


    The Future of Amazon.com:  Unlike Enron, Amazon.com seems to thrive without profits.  How long can it last?

    "Economy, the Web and E-Commerce: Amazon.com." An Interview With Jeff Bezos CEO, Amazon.com, The Washington Post,  December 6, 2001 --- http://discuss.washingtonpost.com/zforum/01/washtech_bezos120601.htm 


    Amazon.com is pinning its hopes on pro forma reporting to report the company's first profit in history.  But wait! Plans by U.S. regulators to crack down on "pro forma" abuses in accounting may take a toll on Internet firms, which like the financial reporting technique because it can make losses seem smaller than they really are.  

    "When Pro Forma Is Bad Form," by Joanna Glasner, Wired News, December 6, 2001 --- http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,48877,00.html 

    As part of efforts to improve the clarity of information given to investors, the Securities and Exchange Commission warned this week that it will crack down on companies that use creative accounting methods to pump up poor earnings results.

    In particular, the commission said it will focus on abuse of a popular form of financial reporting known as "pro forma" accounting, which allows companies to exclude certain expenses and gains from their earnings results. The SEC said the method "may not convey a true and accurate picture of a company's financial well-being."

    Experts say the practice is especially common among Internet firms, which began issuing earnings press releases with pro forma numbers en masse during the stock market boom of the late 1990s. The list of new-economy companies using pro forma figures includes such prominent firms as Yahoo (YHOO), AOL Time Warner (AOL), CNET (CNET) and JDS Uniphase (JDSU).

    Unprofitable firms are particularly avid users of pro forma numbers, said Brett Trueman, professor of accounting at the University of California at Berkeley's Haas School of Business.

    "I can't say for sure why, but I can take a guess: They're losing big time, and they want to give investors the impression that the losses are not as great as they appear," he said.

    Trueman said savvy investors tend to know that companies may have self-serving interests in mind when they release pro forma numbers. Experienced traders often put greater credence in numbers compiled according to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which firms are required to release alongside any pro forma numbers.

    A mounting concern, however, is the fact that many companies rely almost solely on pro forma numbers in projections for future performance.

    Perhaps the best-known proponent of pro forma is the perennially unprofitable Amazon.com, which has a history of guiding investor expectations using an accounting system that excludes charges for stock compensation, restructuring or the declining value of past acquisitions.

    Invariably, the pro forma numbers are better than the GAAP ones. In its most recent quarter, for example, Amazon (AMZN) reported a pro forma loss of $58 million. When measured according to GAAP, Amazon's net loss nearly tripled to $170 million.

    Things are apt to get even stranger in the last quarter of the year, when Amazon said it plans to deliver its first-ever pro forma operating profit. By regular accounting standards, the company will still be losing money.

    Those results might not sit too well with the folks at the SEC, however.

    In its statements this week, the SEC noted that although there's nothing inherently illegal about providing pro forma numbers, figures should not be presented in a deliberately misleading manner. Regulators may have been talking directly to Amazon in one paragraph of their warning, which said:

    "Investors are likely to be deceived if a company uses a pro forma presentation to recast a loss as if it were a profit."

    Neither Amazon nor AOL Time Warner returned phone calls inquiring if they planned to make changes to their pro forma accounting methods in light of the SEC's recent statements.

    According to Trueman, few members of the financial community would advocate getting rid of pro forma numbers altogether.

    Even the SEC said that pro forma numbers, when used appropriately, can provide investors with a great deal of useful information that might not be included with GAAP results. When presented correctly, pro forma numbers can offer insights into the performance of the core business, by excluding one-time events that can skew quarterly results.

    Rather than ditching pro forma, industry groups like Financial Executives International and the National Investor Relations Institute say a better plan is to set uniform guidelines for how to present the numbers. They have issued a set of recommendations, such as making sure companies don't arbitrarily change what's included in pro forma results from quarter to quarter.

    Certainly some consistency would make it easier for folks who try to track this stuff, said Joe Cooper, research analyst at First Call, which compiles analyst projections of earnings.

    The boom in pro forma reporting has created quite a bit of extra work for First Call, Cooper said, because it has to figure out which companies and analysts are using pro forma numbers and how they're using them.

    But the extra work of compiling pro forma numbers doesn't necessarily result in greater financial transparency for investors, Cooper said.

    "In days past, before it was abused, it was a way to give an honest apples-to-apples comparison," he said. "Now, it is being used as a way to continually put their company in a good light."

    See also:
    SEC Fires Warning Shot Over Tech Statements
    Earnings Downplay Stock Losses

    Change at the Top for AOL
    Where's the Money?, Huh?
    There's no biz like E-Biz


    The bellwether Internet firm says it will stop reporting earnings in pro forma, a controversial accounting method popular in the technology sector --- http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,51721,00.html 

    "Yahoo Gives Pro Forma the Boot." By Joanna Glasner, Wired News, April 11, 2002 --- 

    Following the release of its first-quarter results on Wednesday, Yahoo (YHOO) said it will stop reporting earnings using pro forma, a controversial accounting method popular among Internet and technology firms.

    Instead, the company said it plans to release all results according to generally accepted accounting principles, or GAAP. Executives said the shift would provide a clearer picture of the Yahoo's financial performance.

    "We do not believe the pro forma presentation continues to provide a useful purpose," said Sue Decker, Yahoo's chief financial officer. In the past, the company has used pro forma accounting as a way to separate one-time expenses -- such as the costs of closing a unit or acquiring another firm -- from costs stemming from its core business.

    Decker attributed the decision in part to new rules adopted by the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board that take effect this year. The new rules require companies to report the amount they overpaid for acquisitions as an upfront charge.

    Accounting experts, however, said the rule change was probably not the only reason for Yahoo to drop pro forma. The accounting practice, popularized by technology firms in the late 1990s, has come under fire from regulators in recent months who say some firms have used nonstandard metrics to mask poor financial performance.

    The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission warned in December that it will crack down on companies that use creative accounting methods to pump up poor earnings results.

    In particular, the commission said it will focus on abuses of pro forma accounting, which allows companies to exclude certain expenses and gains from their earnings results. The SEC said the method "may not convey a true and accurate picture of a company's financial well-being."

    Experts say use of pro forma is especially common among Internet firms. In addition to Yahoo, the list of prominent Internet and technology firms employing pro forma includes AOL Time Warner (AOL), Cnet (CNET) and JDS Uniphase (JDSU).

    Although pro forma accounting can be useful in helping to predict a company's future performance, investors have grown increasingly suspicious of the metric following the bursting of the technology stock bubble, said Sam Norwood, a partner at Tatum CFO Partners.

    "Once the concept of pro forma became accepted, there were in some cases abuses," Norwood said. "There was a tendency for management to exclude the negative events and to not necessarily exclude the positive events.'

    Brett Trueman, an accounting professor at the University of California at Berkeley's Haas School of Business, said he wouldn't be surprised if other firms follow Yahoo's lead in dropping pro forma.

    Continued at  http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,51721,00.html 


    Bob Jensen's threads on pro forma reporting can be found at the following site:

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm 


    Triple-Bottom (Social, Environmental) Reporting

    While some in the profession may question the long-term viability of audit-only accounting firms, proposed guidelines issued recently by the Global Reporting Initiative may help make the vision more feasible. The GRI's guidelines for "triple-bottom- line reporting" would broaden financial reporting into a three- dimensional model for economic, social and environmental reporting. http://www.accountingweb.com/item/78245 

    While some in the profession may question the long-term viability of audit-only accounting firms, proposed guidelines issued recently by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) may help make the vision more feasible. The GRI's guidelines for "triple-bottom-line reporting" would broaden financial reporting into a three-dimensional model for economic, social and environmental reporting. Each dimension of the model would contain information that is valuable to stakeholders and could be independently verified.

    Numbers, Ratios and Explanations

    Despite the convenient shorthand reference to bottom lines, many of the GRI indicators are multi-faceted, consisting of tables, ratios and qualitative descriptions of policies, procedures, and systems. Below are examples of indicators within each of the three dimensions:

    Economic performance indicators. Geographic breakdown of key markets, percent of contracts paid in accordance with agreed terms, and description of the organization's indirect economic impacts.

    Environmental performance indicators. Breakdown of energy sources used, (e.g., for electricity and heat), total water usage, breakdown of waste by type and destination, list of penalties paid for non-compliance with environmental laws and regulations, and description of policies and procedures to minimize adverse environmental impacts.

    Social performance indicators. Total workforce including temporary workers, percentage of employees represented by trade unions, schedule of average hours of training per year per employee for all major categories of employee, male/female ratios in upper management positions, and descriptions of policies and procedures to address such issues as human rights, product information and labeling, customer privacy, and political lobbying and contributions. The GRI was formed in 1997 by a partnership of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES). Several hundred organizations have participated in working groups to help form the guidelines for triple-bottom-line reporting. These organizations include corporations, accounting firms, investors, labor organizations and other stakeholders.

    "What Is Environmental Accounting?" AccountingWeb, January 6, 2006 ---
    http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=101639

    Environmental Management Accounting (EMA) is a cover title used to describe different aspects of this burgeoning field of accounting. The focus of EMA is as a management accounting tool used to make internal business decisions, especially for proactive environmental management activities. EMA was developed to recognize some limitations of conventional management accounting approaches to environmental costs, consequences, and impacts. For example, overhead accounts were the destination of many environmental costs in the past. Cost allocations were inaccurate and could not be traced back to processes, products, or process lines. Wasted raw materials were also inaccurately accounted for during production.

    Each aspect of EMA has a general accounting type that serves as its foundation, according to the EMA international website. The following examples indicate the general accounting type followed by the environmental accounting parallel:

    Management Accounting (MA) entails the identification, collection, estimation, analysis, and use of cost, or other information used for organizational decision-making. Environmental Management Accounting (EMA) is Management Accounting with a focus on materials and energy flow information, with environmental cost information.

    Financial Accounting (FA) comprises the development and organizational reporting of financial information to external parties, such as stockholders and bankers. Environmental Financial Accounting (EFA) builds on Financial Accounting, focusing on the reporting of environmental liability costs with other significant environmental costs.

    National Accounting (NA) is the development of economic and other information used to describe national income and economic health. Environmental National Accounting (ENA) is National Accounting focusing on the stocks of natural resources, their physical flows, environmental costs, and externality costs.

    EMA is a broad set of approaches and principles that provide views into the physical flows and costs critical to the successful completion of environmental management activities and increasingly, routine management activities, such as product and process design, capital budgeting, cost control and allocation, and product pricing, according to the EMA international website.

    Continued in article

     



     

    Question
    For investors, how informative is accrual accounting vis-a-vis cash flow reporting?
    Hint:  It all depends!

    From the Unknown Professor's Financial Rounds Blog on November 24, 2007 --- http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/

    More on The Accrual Anomaly and Abnormal Returns

    Here's another paper on "tradable" patterns in stock returns. The CXO Advisory Group recently put up a summary of the study titled "Repairing the Accruals Anomaly" by Hafzalla, Lunholm and Van Winkle. The paper examines the pattern that stock market performance of firms with low accruals (i.e. the difference between the firm's earnings and cash flows) is significantly greater than the performance of their higher accrual counterparts. It does a pretty good job of examining Sloan's "Accrual Anomaly" with a few tweaks:

    It corrects for the extent to which the firm is financially healthy, using Piotrowski's "financial health" indicator. It measures accruals in relation to earnings rather than to assets

    Their findings are that the accrual anomaly does a better job of sorting out investment performance for financially healthy firms. Their results are pretty strong (note- the following is CXO's summary):

    A hedge strategy that is long (short) firms of high (low) financial health (ignoring accruals) generates an average size-adjusted annual return of 9.36% across the entire sample. After excluding firms with the lowest financial health scores, a hedge strategy that is long (short) the 10% of firms with the lowest (highest) traditional accruals generates an average size-adjusted annual return of 13.64%, with 7.98% coming from the long side Using the total sample, a hedge strategy that is long (short) low-accrual, high financial health (high-accrual, low financial health) firms produces an average size-adjusted annual return of 22.93%, with a 14.92% from the long side.

    Here's a pretty good grapic of size adjusted abnormal returns on the various portfolios --- http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/

    "Repairing the Accruals Anomaly," by Russell J. Jundholm,  Nader Hafzalla,  and Edmund Matthew Van Winkle,

    Abstract:
    We document how the effectiveness of an accruals-based trading strategy changes systematically with the financial health of the sample firms or with the benchmark used to identify an extreme accrual. Our refinements significantly improve the strategy's annual hedge return, and do so mostly because they improve the return earned on the long position in low accrual stocks. These results are important because recent evidence has shown that, absent these “repairs,” the accrual strategy does not yield a significantly positive return in the long portion of the hedge portfolio. We also find that our new measure of accruals is not dependent on the presence or absence of special items and it identifies misvalued stocks just as well for loss firms as for gain firms, in contrast to the traditional accruals measure. Finally, we show that our repairs succeed where the traditional measure of accruals fails because they more effectively select firms where the difference between sophisticated and naïve forecasts are the most extreme. As such, our results are consistent with Sloan's earnings fixation hypothesis and are inconsistent with some alternative explanations for the accrual anomaly.

    Jensen Comment
    Current findings on these relationships may be more difficult to extrapolate as fair value accounting becomes more prevalent --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue


    It's elementary Watson! Of course the statement of cash flow matters.

    "Why the Statement of Cash Flows Matters," by Scott Rothbortm, TheStreet, September 21, 2007 --- Click Here
    Jensen Comment
    This really is elementary, but it does have some rather nice current examples.

    Perhaps a better topic would be "why accrual accounting still matters."

    "Which is More Value-Relevant: Earnings or Cash Flows?" by Ervin L. Black, Sr., SSRN, May 1998 ---
    http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=118089 
     

    Statements in the financial press and recent research suggest that controversy exists as to which accounting measure is more value-relevant: earnings or cash flows. This study examines the relative value-relevance of earnings and cash flow measures in the context of the firm life-cycle. Earnings are predicted to be more value-relevant in mature stages. Cash flows are expected to be more value relevant in stages characterized by growth and/or uncertainty. In general the hypotheses are supported using Wald chi-square tests (Biddle, Seow, and Siegel 1995) of the Edwards, Bell, Ohlson (1995) model. Evidence supports the hypothesis that earnings are more value-relevant than operating, investing, or financing cash flows in mature life-cycle stages. However, in the start-up stage investing cash flows are more value relevant than earnings. In growth and decline stages, operating cash flows are more value relevant than earnings.

    Jensen Comment
    The above paper by Professor Black is an illustration of a working paper that for quite a long time was available free from BYU. Now that it's on SSRN it's no longer free. SSRN did not necessarily contribute to the open sharing of research papers.

    By the way, even if cash flow statements were hypothetically more relevant in all instances, accrual accounting statements would still be vital. My DAH reason is that, if accountants only reported cash flows, it would be quite simple for managers to distort period-to-period performance by simply altering the contractual timings of cash in and cash out. This is much more simple to do for cash payments than for accrual transactions. There would also be the pesky problem of capital maintenance if depreciation and amortization gets overlooked. In theory capital maintenance is not overlooked in fair value accounting since values decline with asset deterioration. However, fair value accounting is quite another matter entirely --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue

     


    The Controversy Over Fair Value (Mark-to-Market) Financial Reporting


    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at various other links:

    I recently completed the first draft of a paper on fair value at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
    Comments would be helpful.

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes 

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms

    Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation, and Yield Curves for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm


    "FAS 157: Auditors are ready to assign fair value to financial assets," AccountingWeb, November 2007 --- 
    http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=104246

    When credit markets all but dried up as a result of the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the late summer, auditors of investment and commercial banks that elected to adopt Financial Accounting Standard 157, Fair Value Measurements, earlier than the effective date of November 15th were called upon to play a key role in determining the market value of mortgage-backed assets when few were being traded. Many of these banks had to report huge write-downs in the third quarter from declining assets values. But auditors of public companies have made it clear in three recently published white papers from their newly formed Center for Audit Quality that despite the severity of the current market crunch, they intend to apply the fair value standard consistently, and market problems will not influence their professional judgment about the quality of valuation models and assumptions used by banks.

    Continued in article

    Jensen Comment
    The following standards are especially pertinent to fair value accounting:
    FAS 105, 107, 115, 130, 133, 141, 142, 155, 157, 159
    FAS 157 is mainly a definitional standard. The key standard to date is FAS 159 that allows companies to cherry pick which contracts are to be carried at fair value and which are to be carried at amortized historical cost. To me FAS 159 is a terrible standard that can lead to all sorts of subjective manipulation, earnings management, and aggregation of apples and door knobs in summations of assets, liabilities, and earnings components. I think the FASB viewed FAS 159 as a political expedient way to expand fair value accounting into financial statements without having to fight the huge political battle with banks and other corporations who aggressively oppose required fair value accounting for all financial and derivative financial instruments.


    Why do bankers resist expanding FAS 159 into required accounting for all financial instruments?
    Misleading Financial Statements:  Bankers Refusing to Recognize and Shed "Zombie Loans"

    One worrying lesson for bankers and regulators everywhere to bear in mind is post-bubble Japan. In the 1990s its leading bankers not only hung onto their jobs; they also refused to recognise and shed bad debts, in effect keeping “zombie” loans on their books. That is one reason why the country's economy stagnated for so long. The quicker bankers are to recognise their losses, to sell assets that they are hoarding in the vain hope that prices will recover, and to make markets in such assets for their clients, the quicker the banking system will get back on its feet.
    The Economist, as quoted in Jim Mahar's blog on November 10, 2007 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

    After the Collapse of Loan Markets Banks are Belatedly Taking Enormous Write Downs
    BTW one of the important stories that are coming out is the fact that this is affecting all tranches of the debt as even AAA rated debt is being marked down (which is why the rating agencies are concerned). The San Antonio Express News reminds us that conflicts of interest exist here too.
    Jime Mahar, November 10, 2007 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

    Jensen Comment
    The FASB and the IASB are moving ever closer to fair value accounting for financial instruments. FAS 159 made it an option in FAS 159. One of the main reasons it's not required is the tremendous lobbying effort of the banking industry. Although many excuses are given resisting fair value accounting for financial instruments, I suspect that the main underlying reasons are those "Zombie" loans that are overvalued at historical costs on current financial statements.

    Daniel Covitz and Paul Harrison of the Federal Reserve Board found no evidence of credit agency conflicts of interest problems of credit agencies, but thier study is dated in 2003 and may not apply to the recent credit bubble and burst --- http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/feds/2003/200368/200368pap.pdf

    In September 2007 some U.S. Senators accused the rating agencies of conflicts of interest
    "Senators accuse rating agencies of conflicts of interest in market turmoil," Bloomberg News, September 26, 2007 --- http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/09/26/business/credit.php
    Also see http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2007/05/rating-agencies-weak-link.html

    Bob Jensen's Rotten to the Core threads are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm


    Questions
    How are auditors dealing with fair market value accounting and credit market issues?

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on October 19, 2007

    With New, United Voice, Auditors Stand Ground on How to Treat Crunch
    by David Reilly
    The Wall Street Journal

    Oct 17, 2007
    Page: C1
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
     

    TOPICS: Audit Quality, Auditing, Auditing Services, Auditor Independence, Auditor/Client Disagreements, Banking, Fair Value Accounting

    SUMMARY: The article discusses three papers issued by the Center for Audit Quality on the recent issues in credit markets. The topics included the use of market prices for hard-to-trade securities and issues of banks' exposure to losses in off-balance-sheet entities. Organization of the Center for Audit Quality is discussed, along with reaction to the purpose of this entity from Lynn Turner, former Chief Accountant at the SEC, and an academic researcher at the University of Tennessee, Joseph Carcello.

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The article may be used to discuss the current credit market issues in an auditing class as well as a financial reporting class.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) Based on discussions in the article and on information at its web site (see http://thecaq.aicpa.org/) discuss the purpose and organization of the Center for Audit Quality.

    2.) What is self-regulation of the auditing profession? When did auditors lose the ability to self-regulate?

    3.) Some reactions described in this article are positive about the role that is being played by the Center for Audit Quality, while others are negative. Which view do you hold? Support your position.

    4.) Summarize concerns with the complexity of financial reporting guidance in the U.S. How might the work from the Center for Audit Quality contribute to that complexity? How might its work alleviate the issue of complexity in reporting standards?
     

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
     

    RELATED ARTICLES: 
    Auditors to Street: Use Market Price
    by David Reilly and Randall Smith
    The Wall Street Journal
    Sep 18, 2007
    Page: C2
     

     

    Also see http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/FairValue/

     


    May 17, 2006 message from Peter Walton

    I would like to take this opportunity to let you know about a forthcoming book from Routledge:

    The Routledge Companion to Fair Value and Financial Reporting --- Click Here

    Edited by Peter Walton

    May 2007: 246x174: 406pp

    Hb: 978-0-415-42356-4: £95.00 $170.00

    Jensen Comment
    Even though I have a paper published in this book, I will receive no compensation from sales of the book. And since I'm retired, lines on a resume no longer matter.


    Introduction to Fair Value Accounting

    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at various other links:

    I recently completed the first draft of a paper on fair value at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
    Comments would be helpful.

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes 

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms

    Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation, and Yield Curves for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm


    The "Unknown Professor's Financial Rounds Blog states the following on September 21, 2007 --- http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/ 

    And They Say Accounting Doesn't Make Sense

    As a person who's trained primarily in finance, accounting rules sometimes look like they were designed by Monty Python. Here's the latest installment - your company's credit rating drops, so the market value of your liabilities fall. As a result, you show a profit. This is what happened to some Wall Street firms recently. Read the whole story here. IMO, the best line in the article is:

    But Moody’s Investors Service said buyers should beware of gains booked when brokers mark down their own debt liabilities. “Moody’s does not consider such gains to be high-quality, core earnings,” it said in a report issued Friday.

    Ya think?

    This is why we make all our Finance students take four accounting classes before they graduate. That way, they'll see these things often enough that they won't break out laughing.

    Question
    Why am I not laughing? Is it because I taught accounting for 40 years?

    Actually the fact that a lowered credit rating can lead to a realized gain should make sense even to a finance professor. Consider the following scenario:

    1. I sell a bond and record a liability for $100,000 that matures in ten years.
    2. My credit rating gets lowered the next day.
    3. I buy back the bond for $90,000 (the market value of the bond declines because of my lowered credit rating)
    4. I've made a $10,000 cash profit in one day because of a lowered credit rating
    5. I wonder if a finance professor can comprehend that this is a gain.
    6. I wonder if Moody's can understand that this is a very high quality earnings since its cash in the bank.

    Now what if I don't sell the bond but adopt the fair value accounting option for financial instruments under FAS 159. I did not realize a cash profit if I still owe $100,000 when the bond eventually matures. But the reason I report an unrealized holding gain follows the same logic as if I bought back the bond today. That's what the "fair value option" under FAS 159 is all about.

    If Moody's does not treat unrealized holding gains and losses as high-quality, core earnings, more power to them.

    Finance students who've taken four courses in accounting may not laugh because they understand why sometimes credit rating gains are high quality and sometimes low quality will not laugh because they understand why. But they may not understand why their finance professor is laughing.

    Bob Jensen's tutorials on fair value accounting are at the following two links:

     


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on October 5, 2007

    Virtuous Losses
    by WSJ Editors; Review & Outlook Page
    The Wall Street Journal

    Oct 02, 2007
    Page: A16
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
     

    TOPICS: Accounting, Accounting Theory, Advanced Financial Accounting, Bonds, Debt, Impairment

    SUMMARY: The editors laud UBS AG and Citigroup "for their announcements...that they'll soon take big writedowns for their mortgage bets." They react this way on the premise that "one question haunting the markets during the subprime meltdown has been where the financial bodies are buried." Similar reactions are evident for UBS and Citigroup shareholders; the companies' share prices both rose following the announcements. The editors conclude by offering evidence that credit markets are stabilizing and state that "by being forthright now, the banks can aid the process of bringing buyers back to the debt markets."

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: This article can be used to cover write-downs due to impairment losses on mortgage assets as well as to discuss debtholders as users of financial markets. The situation also could be described as a "big bath" write-down to clean house now while times are bad in credit markets in general and, at least for UBS, while corporate leadership is new.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) In the opinion page article, the editors argue that "marking asset to market is...better for the financial system as a whole, rather than hiding losses on the balance sheet and hoping for a rebound." What does this statement mean? In your answer, define the terms "historical cost" and "mark to market." Also, address the notion that a loss could be included in a balance sheet account.

    2.) Refer to the related articles. What are the assets on which losses were taken at UBS and Citigroup?

    3.) Some might argue that the losses being recorded by Citigroup and UBS AG constitute a "big bath" to pave the way for improving reported results in the future. How does a current writedown help to improve reported results in the future? What current circumstances at each of these firms and in the general economy might allow for taking this approach to writedowns?

    4.) Refer again to the opinion page article's conclusion that reporting losses now "can aid the process of bringing buyers back to the debt markets." Should financial reporting have a specific outcome, such as improving numbers of credit market participants, as its objective? Support your answer.
     

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
     

     


    When do market investors become market makers?
    When "quants" become market makers instead of market players, it throws fair value accounting into a turmoil.

    November 23, 2007 message from Amy Dunbar [Amy.Dunbar@BUSINESS.UCONN.EDU]

    The subprime crisis has captured my attention, and on the chance that others on this listserv are interested in this area, I am sending this email about the paper, What Happened to the Quants in August 2007?  I assumed the hedge funds went down because of subprime investments, but it appears that was just one of many possible causes.  I would love to hear what others think, particularly about the possibility of regulatory reform (mentioned at the end below) --- http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1015987

    The paper has 9011 abstract views and 4447 downloads.  Looks like a lot of people are interested in the hedge fund losses.

    The paper is fascinating.  Its objective is to suggest reasons for the hedge fund losses during the week of Aug 6,  2007.  The funds were quantitative, market-neutral funds. No major losses were reported in other hedge-fund sectors. The paper compares August 1998 (think LTCM collapse) with August 2007, and concludes the following:

     

    In August 1998, default of Russian government debt caused a flight to quality that ultimately resulted in the demise of LTCM and many other fixed-income arbitrage funds. This series of events caught even the most experienced traders by surprise because of the unrelated nature of Russian government debt and the broadly diversified portfolios of some of the most  successful fixed-income arbitrage funds. Similarly, the events of August 2007 caught some of the most experienced quantitative equity market-neutral managers by surprise. But August 2007 may be far more significant because it provides the first piece of evidence that problems in one corner of the financial system - possibly the sub-prime mortgage sector and related credit markets – can spill over so directly to a completely unrelated corner: long/short equity strategies. This is precisely the kind of ”shortcut" described in the theory of mathematical networks that generates the “small-world phenomenon" of Watts (1999) in which a small random shock in one part of the network can rapidly propagate throughout the entire network.

    The authors hypothesize an unwind of a large long/short equity portfolio, most likely a quantitative equity market-neutral portfolio.

    Likely factors contributing to the magnitude of the losses of this apparent unwind were: (a) the enormous growth in assets devoted to long/short equity strategies over the past decade and, more recently, to various 130/30 and other active-extension strategies; (b) the systematic decline in the profitability of quantitative equity market-neutral strategies, due to increasing competition, technological advances, and institutional and environmental changes such as decimalization, the decline in retail order flow, and the decline in equity-market volatility; (c) the increased leverage needed to maintain the levels of expected returns required by hedge-fund investors in the face of lower profitability; (d) the historical liquidity of U.S. equity markets and the general lack of awareness (at least prior to August 6, 2007) of just how crowded the long/short equity category had become; and (e) the unknown size and timing of new sub-prime-mortgage-related problems in credit markets, which created a climate of fear and panic, heightening the risk sensitivities of managers and investors across all markets and style categories.

    They also note that

     the timing of these losses - shortly after month-end of a very challenging month for many hedge-fund strategies - is also suggestive. The formal process of marking portfolios to market typically takes several business days after month-end, and August 7-9 may well be the first time managers and investors were forced to confront the extraordinary credit-related losses they suffered in July, which may have triggered the initial unwind of their more liquid investments, e.g., their equity portfolios, during this period.

    Question:  FAS 115 requires investment securities (actually only trading and available-for-sale securities) to be marked to market, but what is the driving force behind marking to market on a monthly basis?  Reporting to investors in the fund?

     Do the losses of August 2007 signal a breakdown in the basic economic relationships that yield attractive risk/reward profiles for such strategies, or is August 2007 an unavoidable and integral aspect of those risk/reward profiles? An instructive thought experiment is to consider a market-neutral portfolio strategy in which U.S. equities with odd-numbered CUSIP identifiers are held long and those with even-number CUSIPs are held short. Suppose such a portfolio strategy is quite popular and a

    number of large hedge funds have implemented it. Now imagine that one of these large hedge funds decides to liquidate its holdings because of some liquidity shock. Regardless of this portfolio's typical expected return during normal times, in the midst of a rapid and large unwind, all such portfolios will experience losses, with the magnitudes of those losses directly proportional to the size and speed of the unwind. Moreover, it is easy to see how such an unwind can generate losses for other types of portfolios, e.g., long-only portfolios of securities with prime-number CUSIPs, dedicated shortsellers that short only those securities with CUSIPs divisible by 10, etc. If a portfolio is of sufficient size, and it is based on a sufficiently popular strategy that is broadly implemented, then unwinding even a small fraction of it can cascade into a major market dislocation.

    . . .

    However, a successful investment strategy should include an assessment of the risk of ruin, and that risk should be managed appropriately. Moreover, the magnitude of tail risk should, in principle, be related to a strategy's expected return given the inevitable trade-off between risk and reward. Therefore, it is disingenuous to assert that “a strategy is successful except in the face of 25-standard-deviation events." Given the improbability of such events, we can only conclude that either the actual distribution of returns is extraordinarily leptokurtic, or the standard deviation is time-varying and exhibits occasional spikes.

    In particular, as Montier (2007) observed, risk has become “endogenous" in certain markets - particularly those that are recently flush with large inflows of assets - which is one of the reasons that the largest players can no longer assume that historical estimates of volatility and price impact are accurate measures of current risk exposures. Endogeneity is, in fact, an old economic concept illustrated by the well-known theory of imperfect competition: if an economic entity, or group of coordinated entities, is so large that it can unilaterally affect prices by its own actions, then the standard predictions of microeconomics under perfect competition no longer hold. Similarly, if a certain portfolio strategy is so popular that its liquidation can unilaterally affect the risks that it faces, then the standard tools of basic risk models such as Value-at-Risk and normal distributions no longer hold. In this respect, quantitative models may have failed in August 2007 by not adequately capturing the endogeneity of their risk exposures. Given the size and interconnectedness of the hedge-fund industry, we may require more sophisticated analytics to model the feedback implicit in current market dynamics.

     

    The authors commented several times on the lack of transparency in the hedge fund market. I found the authors’ comments on the need for  possible regulatory reform interesting.

    Given the role that hedge funds have begun to play in financial markets - namely, significant providers of liquidity and credit - they now impose externalities on the economy that are no longer negligible.  In this respect, hedge funds are becoming more like banks. The fact that the banking industry is so highly regulated is due to the enormous social externalities banks generate when they succeed, and when they fail. But unlike banks, hedge funds can decide to withdraw liquidity at a moment's notice, and while this may be benign if it occurs rarely and randomly, a coordinated withdrawal of liquidity among an entire sector of hedge funds could have disastrous consequences for the viability of the financial system if it occurs at the wrong time and in the wrong sector.

    November 23, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Amy,

    Why do bankers resist expanding FAS 159 into required accounting for all financial instruments?
    Misleading Financial Statements:  Bankers Refusing to Recognize and Shed "Zombie Loans"

    One worrying lesson for bankers and regulators everywhere to bear in mind is post-bubble Japan. In the 1990s its leading bankers not only hung onto their jobs; they also refused to recognise and shed bad debts, in effect keeping “zombie” loans on their books. That is one reason why the country's economy stagnated for so long. The quicker bankers are to recognise their losses, to sell assets that they are hoarding in the vain hope that prices will recover, and to make markets in such assets for their clients, the quicker the banking system will get back on its feet.
    The Economist, as quoted in Jim Mahar's blog on November 10, 2007 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

    But there are questions in theory about fair value accounting!
    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue

     

    I personally think the driving forces behind FAS 115 were tendencies of banks to not recognize those "zombie" investments and adequately disclose highly likely losses. Firstly I might note that FAS 115 adjusts available-for-sale (AFS) securities to fair value without impacting earnings volatility except in the case of securities traders. According to Paragraph 86 of FAS 115, the FASB wanted to require fair value accounting for all financial securities but got hung up on debt instruments (such as mortgage debt) that more commonly are not AFS  and more difficult to mark-to-market (i.e. debt is often more difficult to value due to not being traded with unique covenants and is more likely to be HTM, held-to-maturity). The FASB justification for FAS 115 can be found in Paragraphs 39-43, although the elaborations in Paragraphs 86-100 are enlightening. IFRS requirements are similar, although penalties for violating HTM classification are somewhat more onerous.

    An interesting November 12 video on the “cascade theory” of what might be termed quantitative models, like lemmings, cascading over a cliff --- http://www.ft.com/cms/bfba2c48-5588-11dc-b971-0000779fd2ac.html?_i_referralObject=593529134&fromSearch=n

    In that sense the comparison of the LTCM disaster in 1998 with the August 2007 downfall seems to hold some water. Although the big losers in both instances were big and sophisticated investors who’re well aware of the unique risks of unregulated hedge funds, the externalities affecting Main Street (read that CREF investors) are very real. The LTCM fiasco could well have brought down equity markets in all of Wall Street --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#LTCM 

    One of the hardcopy journals I read cover-to-cover each week is The Economist on October 25, 2007. The following is one of my favorite readable papers among the thousands of articles written about this controversy --- http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10026288

    WHEN markets wobbled in August, almost all the media attention was focused on the credit crunch and the links to American mortgage loans. But at exactly the same time, another crisis was occurring at the core of the stockmarket.

    This crisis stemmed from the obscure world of quantitative, or quant-based, finance, which uses computer models to find attractive stocks and to identify overpriced shares. Suddenly, in August, the models went wrong.

    The incident revealed a problem at the heart of the financial system. In effect, the quant groups were acting as marketmakers, trading so often (some are aiming for transaction times in terms of milliseconds) that they set prices for everyone else. But unlike traditional marketmakers, quant funds are not obliged to make markets come rain or shine. And unlike marketmakers, they use a lot of leverage. This means that instead of providing liquidity in a crisis, the quants added to instability. There is a lesson there.

    In a way, the crisis stemmed from the quants' success. Many firms, such as the American hedge fund Renaissance Technologies, had done fantastically well and had been able to charge hefty fees. But if one firm can hire top mathematicians and use the latest technology, so can others. An arms race developed, with some trading faster and faster—even siting their computers closer to the exchanges in order to cut the time it took orders to travel down the wires.

    And as the computers sifted through the data, some strategies became overcrowded. A paper* by Amir Khandani and Andrew Lo of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology back-tested a proxy for a typical strategy, involving buying the previous day's losing stocks and selling the winners. Such a strategy would have delivered a daily return of 1.38% before (substantial) costs in 1995 but the return fell steadily to 0.15% a day last year.

    In the face of declining returns, the authors reckon, the natural response of managers would have been to increase leverage. But that, of course, increased their vulnerability when things went wrong.

    Both the MIT academics and a paper by Cliff Asness of AQR Capital Management, a leading quant group, agree that August's problems probably began when a diversified, or multi-strategy, hedge fund experienced losses in the credit markets. The fund sought to reduce its exposures but its credit positions were impossible to sell. So it cut its quant positions instead, since that merely involved selling highly liquid stocks.

    However, that selling pressure caused other quant funds to lose money as their favoured stocks fell in price. Those that were leveraged were naturally forced to reduce their positions as well. These waves of selling played havoc with the models. Quant investors thought they were aware of the risks of their strategy and had built diversified portfolios to avoid it. But the parts of the portfolio that were previously uncorrelated suddenly fell in tandem.

    In theory, quant funds could have been bold and borrowed more; after all, the stocks they thought were cheap had become even cheaper. The traders who took on the positions of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), after the hedge fund failed in 1998, ended up making money. But the example of LTCM, which went bust before it could be proved right, argued in favour of a more cautious approach. “We could have rolled the dice but that would have risked the business,” said one quant-fund manager. “I don't know of anyone that did so.”

    Avoiding that trap simply led quant investors into another. On August 10th, the stocks that quants had favoured suddenly rebounded. Those who had cut their positions most could not benefit from the rally. That category clearly included Goldman Sachs's Global Alpha hedge fund, which lost a remarkable 23% on the month.

    If it were just a few hedge funds, backed by rich people, losing money, it might not matter. But the funds had become too important: rather than adding stability, as marketmakers are supposed to do, they added volatility.

    Quants will adjust their models and clients will become more discerning; AQR's. Mr Asness says his firm will look harder for “unique” factors, that is, not used by other fund managers. But regulators should also reflect that markets are less stable than they assumed. The presence of leveraged traders such as quants at their heart means conditions can now turn, at the flick of a switch, from stability to panic.

    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
    When "quants" become market makers instead of market players, it throws fair value accounting into a turmoil.


    Question
    Will “Minsky Moments” become “Minsky Accounting?”

    As both the FASB in the U.S. and the IASB international standards boards march ever onward toward "fair value" accounting by replacing historical costs with current values (mark-to-market accounting), it will plunge corporate accountants and their CPA auditors ever deeper into current value estimation. Financial statements will become increasingly volatile and fictional with market movements. It is becoming clear that the efficient markets hypothesis that drives much of the theory behind fair value accounting is increasingly on shaky ground.

    Especially problematic are moments in time like now (2007) when the bubble burst on subprime mortgage borrowing and investing that has caused tremors throughout the world of banking and investing and risk sharing. And once again, the ghost of long departed John Maynard Keynes seems to have risen from the grave. There's material for a great Stephen King horror novel here.

    It is time for accounting standard setters who set such new standards as FAS 157 and FAS 159 to dust off some old economics books and seriously consider whether they understand the theoretical underpinnings of new and pending fair value standards moving closer to show time. You can read more fair value accounting controversies in my work-in-process PowerPoint file called 10FairValue.ppt at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/JensenPowerPoint/

    Aside from badly mixing my metaphors here, the fundamental problem is that unrealized fair values painting rosy financial performance (as the speculative roller coaster rises with breath taking thrill toward the crest) become unrealized losses as the roller coaster swoops downward toward “Minsky Moments.” It's a fundamental problem in fair value accounting because an enormous portion of reported earnings on the way up become sheer Minsky mincemeat (before investments are sold and liabilities are not settled) and diabolical garbage on the way down. In other words in these boom/bust market cycles, financial statements (certified by independent auditors under new fair value accounting standards) become increasingly hypothetical fantasy replacing accustomed facts rooted in transactional accounting.

    Fair value standard setters are plunging accounting into the realm of economic theory that is itself less uncertain than astrology. It's time to rethink some of that Chicago School economic theory that we've taken for granted because of all the Nobel Prizes awarded to Chicago School economists.

     

    Question
    Did John Maynard Keynes rise from the grave?

    "In Time of Tumult, Obscure Economist Gains Currency:  Mr. Minsky Long Argued Markets Were Crisis Prone; His 'Moment' Has Arrived," by Justin Lahart, The Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2007; Page A1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118736585456901047.html?mod=todays_us_page_one

    The recent market turmoil is rocking investors around the globe. But it is raising the stock of one person: a little-known economist whose views have suddenly become very popular.

    Hyman Minsky, who died more than a decade ago, spent much of his career advancing the idea that financial systems are inherently susceptible to bouts of speculation that, if they last long enough, end in crises. At a time when many economists were coming to believe in the efficiency of markets, Mr. Minsky was considered somewhat of a radical for his stress on their tendency toward excess and upheaval.

    Today, his views are reverberating from New York to Hong Kong as economists and traders try to understand what's happening in the markets. The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, where Mr. Minsky worked for the last six years of his life, is planning to reprint two books by the economist -- one on John Maynard Keynes, the other on unstable economies. The latter book was being offered on the Internet for thousands of dollars.

    Christopher Wood, a widely read Hong Kong-based analyst for CLSA Group, told his clients that recent cash injections by central banks designed "to prevent, or at least delay, a 'Minsky moment,' is evidence of market failure."

    Indeed, the Minsky moment has become a fashionable catch phrase on Wall Street. It refers to the time when over-indebted investors are forced to sell even their solid investments to make good on their loans, sparking sharp declines in financial markets and demand for cash that can force central bankers to lend a hand.

    Mr. Minsky, who died in 1996 at the age of 77, was a tall man with unruly hair who wore unpressed suits. He approached the world as "one big research tank," says Diana Minsky, his daughter, an art history professor at Bard. "Economics was an integrated part of his life. It wasn't isolated. There wasn't a sense that work was something he did at the office."

    She recalls how, on a trip to a village in Italy to meet friends, Mr. Minsky ended up interviewing workers at a glove maker to understand how small-scale capitalism worked in the local economy.

    Although he was born in Chicago, Mr. Minsky didn't have many fans in the "Chicago School" of economists, who believed that markets were efficient. A follower of the economist John Maynard Keynes, he died just before a decade of financial crises in Asia, Russia, tech stocks, corporate credit and now mortgage debt, began to lend credence to his ideas.

    Following those periods of tumult, more investors turned to the investment classic "Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises," by Charles Kindleberger, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who leaned heavily on Mr. Minsky's work.

    Mr. Kindleberger showed that financial crises unfolded the way that Mr. Minsky said they would. Though a loyal follower, Mr. Kindleberger described Mr. Minsky as "a man with a reputation among monetary theorists for being particularly pessimistic, even lugubrious, in his emphasis on the fragility of the monetary system and its propensity to disaster."

    At its core, the Minsky view was straightforward: When times are good, investors take on risk; the longer times stay good, the more risk they take on, until they've taken on too much. Eventually, they reach a point where the cash generated by their assets no longer is sufficient to pay off the mountains of debt they took on to acquire them. Losses on such speculative assets prompt lenders to call in their loans. "This is likely to lead to a collapse of asset values," Mr. Minsky wrote.

    When investors are forced to sell even their less-speculative positions to make good on their loans, markets spiral lower and create a severe demand for cash. At that point, the Minsky moment has arrived.

    "We are in the midst of a Minsky moment, bordering on a Minsky meltdown," says Paul McCulley, an economist and fund manager at Pacific Investment Management Co., the world's largest bond-fund manager, in an email exchange.

    The housing market is a case in point, says Investment Technology Group Inc. economist Robert Barbera, who first met Mr. Minsky in the late 1980s. When home buyers were expected to have a down payment of 10% or 20% to qualify for a mortgage, and to provide income documentation that showed they'd be able to make payments, there was minimal risk. But as home prices rose, and speculators entered the market, lenders relaxed their guard and began offering loans with no money down and little or no documentation.

    Once home prices stalled and, in many of the more-speculative markets, fell, there was a big problem.

    "If you're lending to home buyers with 20% down and house prices fall by 2%, so what?" Mr. Barbera says. If most of a lender's portfolio is tied up in loans to buyers who "don't put anything down and house prices fall by 2%, you're bankrupt," he says.

    Several money managers are laying claim to spotting the Minsky moment first. "I featured him about 18 months ago," says Jeremy Grantham, chairman of GMO LLC, which manages $150 billion in assets. He pointed to a note in early 2006 when he wrote that investors had become too comfortable that financial markets were safe, and consequently were taking on too much risk, just as Mr. Minsky predicted. "Guinea pigs of the world unite. We have nothing to lose but our shirts," he concluded.

    It was Mr. McCulley at Pacific Investment, though, who coined the phrase "Minsky moment" during the Russian debt crisis in 1998.

    Continued in article

    Bob Jensen's fair value PowerPoint show ---  http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/JensenPowerPoint/

    August 18, 2007 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

    Bob,

    I thought we could all enjoy the following Keynes quotes:

    1. "Capitalism is the astounding belief that the most wickedest of men will do the most wickedest of things for the greatest good of everyone."

    2. How prophetic he was:

    "The day is not far off when the economic problem will take the back seat where it belongs, and the arena of the heart and the head will be occupied or reoccupied, by our real problems / the problems of life and of human relations, of creation and behavior and religion."

    3. How wonderfully Keynes anticipated stuff in games played by Bayesian players and stuff in self-fulfilling equilibria (which yielded three "Nobel" prizes), all without introducing any mathematics or economic mumbo jumbo:

    "Successful investing is anticipating the anticipations of others."

    4. The accountics folks might enjoy the following:

    "The difficulty lies not so much in developing new ideas as in escaping from old ones."

    "If economists could manage to get themselves thought of as humble, competent people on a level with dentists, that would be splendid."

    "When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?"

    5. This should thrill tax folks:

    "The avoidance of taxes is the only intellectual pursuit that still carries any reward."

    Jagdish

    August 20, 2007 reply from Paul Williams [Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]

    Apparently no economist ever dies -- they just come in and out of fashion. In George Akerlof's presidential address to the AEA in January 2006 ("The Missing Motivation in Macroeconomics") he concludes: "This lecture has shown that the early Keynesians got a great deal of the working of the economic system right in ways that are denied by the five neutralities (assumptions of the positivists).

    As quoted from Keynes earlier, they based their models on "our knowledge of human nature and from the detailed facts of experience."" Thus the recent interest in "norms" by Shyam Sunder and the urgency to provide "econonmic" explanations for "norms." So the very FIRST plenary speaker at the, Joe Henrich, at the Chicago 2007 AAA meeting, regaled us with his "evidence" that market integrated societies produce people who are more trusting and fair- minded because people from Missouri divide the spoils in a game that no one ever plays in their real lives more equitably than a hunter- gatherer from New Guinea for whom the game may have an entirely different meaning than someone from St.Louis (a synchresis, perhaps).

    Given that the integration of societies by "markets" represents the blink of an eye in evolutionary time (even for humans) one might consider that perhaps what makes Missourians different from hunter- gatherers is that they come from a Christian tradition that predates market integration by a couple thousand years (a tradition of Christian agape?).

    Linguists have long remarked that language is impossible without trust (how else can I believe that words mean what I am told they mean or how do I avoid starvation at birth unless I "trust" my mother? We are born trusting). Yet we get this facile rendering with regression equations of Adam Smith's argument stood completely on its head. For Smith markets were a possibility only within a society that was already integrated (in Smith's case by the kirk's dispositon of a stern Calvanist morality).

    Mike Royko (the columnist for the Chicago Tribune) once opined that he had finally figured out economic theory, to wit, "Economics says that almost anything can happen, and it usually does." The end of history? I bet not.

     


    May 17, 2006 message from Peter Walton

    I would like to take this opportunity to let you know about a forthcoming book from Routledge:

    The Routledge Companion to Fair Value and Financial Reporting --- Click Here

    Edited by Peter Walton

    May 2007: 246x174: 406pp

    Hb: 978-0-415-42356-4: £95.00 $170.00

    Jensen Comment
    Even though I have a paper published in this book, I will receive no compensation from sales of the book. And since I'm retired, lines on a resume no longer matter.


    FASB Statement No. 107
    Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial Instruments
    (Issue Date 12/91)
    [Full Text] [Summary] [Status]

    This Statement extends existing fair value disclosure practices for some instruments by requiring all entities to disclose the fair value of financial instruments, both assets and liabilities recognized and not recognized in the statement of financial position, for which it is practicable to estimate fair value. If estimating fair value is not practicable, this Statement requires disclosure of descriptive information pertinent to estimating the value of a financial instrument. Disclosures about fair value are not required for certain financial instruments listed in paragraph 8.

    This Statement is effective for financial statements issued for fiscal years ending after December 15, 1992, except for entities with less than $150 million in total assets in the current statement of financial position. For those entities, the effective date is for fiscal years ending after December 15, 1995.

    FASB Statement No. 115
    Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities
    (Issue Date 5/93)
    [Full Text] [Summary] [Status]

    This Statement addresses the accounting and reporting for investments in equity securities that have readily determinable fair values and for all investments in debt securities. Those investments are to be classified in three categories and accounted for as follows:

    Debt securities that the enterprise has the positive intent and ability to hold to maturity are classified as held-to-maturity securities and reported at amortized cost.

    Debt and equity securities that are bought and held principally for the purpose of selling them in the near term are classified as trading securities and reported at fair value, with unrealized gains and losses included in earnings.

    Debt and equity securities not classified as either held-to-maturity securities or trading securities are classified as available-for-sale securities and reported at fair value, with unrealized gains and losses excluded from earnings and reported in a separate component of shareholders' equity.

    This Statement does not apply to unsecuritized loans. However, after mortgage loans are converted to mortgage-backed securities, they are subject to its provisions. This Statement supersedes FASB Statement No. 12, Accounting for Certain Marketable Securities, and related Interpretations and amends FASB Statement No. 65, Accounting for Certain Mortgage Banking Activities, to eliminate mortgage-backed securities from its scope.

    This Statement is effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1993. It is to be initially applied as of the beginning of an enterprise's fiscal year and cannot be applied retroactively to prior years' financial statements. However, an enterprise may elect to initially apply this Statement as of the end of an earlier fiscal year for which annual financial statements have not previously been issued.

    FASB Statement No. 130
    Reporting Comprehensive Income

    (Issue Date 6/97)
    [Full Text] [Summary] [Status]

    This Statement establishes standards for reporting and display of comprehensive income and its components (revenues, expenses, gains, and losses) in a full set of general-purpose financial statements. This Statement requires that all items that are required to be recognized under accounting standards as components of comprehensive income be reported in a financial statement that is displayed with the same prominence as other financial statements. This Statement does not require a specific format for that financial statement but requires that an enterprise display an amount representing total comprehensive income for the period in that financial statement.

    This Statement requires that an enterprise (a) classify items of other comprehensive income by their nature in a financial statement and (b) display the accumulated balance of other comprehensive income separately from retained earnings and additional paid-in capital in the equity section of a statement of financial position.

    This Statement is effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1997. Reclassification of financial statements for earlier periods provided for comparative purposes is required.

     

    FASB Statement No. 133 and Amendments in FAS 137, 138, 149, and 155
    Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities
    (Issue Date 6/98)
    [Full Text] [Summary] [Status]

    This Statement establishes accounting and reporting standards for derivative instruments, including certain derivative instruments embedded in other contracts, (collectively referred to as derivatives) and for hedging activities. It requires that an entity recognize all derivatives as either assets or liabilities in the statement of financial position and measure those instruments at fair value. If certain conditions are met, a derivative may be specifically designated as (a) a hedge of the exposure to changes in the fair value of a recognized asset or liability or an unrecognized firm commitment, (b) a hedge of the exposure to variable cash flows of a forecasted transaction, or (c) a hedge of the foreign currency exposure of a net investment in a foreign operation, an unrecognized firm commitment, an available-for-sale security, or a foreign-currency-denominated forecasted transaction. The accounting for changes in the fair value of a derivative (that is, gains and losses) depends on the intended use of the derivative and the resulting designation.

    For a derivative designated as hedging the exposure to changes in the fair value of a recognized asset or liability or a firm commitment (referred to as a fair value hedge), the gain or loss is recognized in earnings in the period of change together with the offsetting loss or gain on the hedged item attributable to the risk being hedged. The effect of that accounting is to reflect in earnings the extent to which the hedge is not effective in achieving offsetting changes in fair value. For a derivative designated as hedging the exposure to variable cash flows of a forecasted transaction (referred to as a cash flow hedge), the effective portion of the derivative's gain or loss is initially reported as a component of other comprehensive income (outside earnings) and subsequently reclassified into earnings when the forecasted transaction affects earnings. The ineffective portion of the gain or loss is reported in earnings immediately. For a derivative designated as hedging the foreign currency exposure of a net investment in a foreign operation, the gain or loss is reported in other comprehensive income (outside earnings) as part of the cumulative translation adjustment. The accounting for a fair value hedge described above applies to a derivative designated as a hedge of the foreign currency exposure of an unrecognized firm commitment or an available-for-sale security. Similarly, the accounting for a cash flow hedge described above applies to a derivative designated as a hedge of the foreign currency exposure of a foreign-currency-denominated forecasted transaction. For a derivative not designated as a hedging instrument, the gain or loss is recognized in earnings in the period of change. Under this Statement, an entity that elects to apply hedge accounting is required to establish at the inception of the hedge the method it will use for assessing the effectiveness of the hedging derivative and the measurement approach for determining the ineffective aspect of the hedge. Those methods must be consistent with the entity's approach to managing risk.

    This Statement applies to all entities. A not-for-profit organization should recognize the change in fair value of all derivatives as a change in net assets in the period of change. In a fair value hedge, the changes in the fair value of the hedged item attributable to the risk being hedged also are recognized. However, because of the format of their statement of financial performance, not-for-profit organizations are not permitted special hedge accounting for derivatives used to hedge forecasted transactions. This Statement does not address how a not-for-profit organization should determine the components of an operating measure if one is presented.

    This Statement precludes designating a nonderivative financial instrument as a hedge of an asset, liability, unrecognized firm commitment, or forecasted transaction except that a nonderivative instrument denominated in a foreign currency may be designated as a hedge of the foreign currency exposure of an unrecognized firm commitment denominated in a foreign currency or a net investment in a foreign operation.

    This Statement amends FASB Statement No. 52, Foreign Currency Translation, to permit special accounting for a hedge of a foreign currency forecasted transaction with a derivative. It supersedes FASB Statements No. 80, Accounting for Futures Contracts, No. 105, Disclosure of Information about Financial Instruments with Off-Balance-Sheet Risk and Financial Instruments with Concentrations of Credit Risk, and No. 119, Disclosure about Derivative Financial Instruments and Fair Value of Financial Instruments. It amends FASB Statement No. 107, Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial Instruments, to include in Statement 107 the disclosure provisions about concentrations of credit risk from Statement 105. This Statement also nullifies or modifies the consensuses reached in a number of issues addressed by the Emerging Issues Task Force.

    This Statement is effective for all fiscal quarters of fiscal years beginning after June 15, 1999. Initial application of this Statement should be as of the beginning of an entity's fiscal quarter; on that date, hedging relationships must be designated anew and documented pursuant to the provisions of this Statement. Earlier application of all of the provisions of this Statement is encouraged, but it is permitted only as of the beginning of any fiscal quarter that begins after issuance of this Statement. This Statement should not be applied retroactively to financial statements of prior periods.

    FASB Statement No. 142
    Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets
    (Issue Date 6/01)
    [Full Text] [Summary] [Status]

    This Statement changes the subsequent accounting for goodwill and other intangible assets in the following significant respects:

    • Acquiring entities usually integrate acquired entities into their operations, and thus the acquirers' expectations of benefits from the resulting synergies usually are reflected in the premium that they pay to acquire those entities. However, the transaction-based approach to accounting for goodwill under Opinion 17 treated the acquired entity as if it remained a stand-alone entity rather than being integrated with the acquiring entity; as a result, the portion of the premium related to expected synergies (goodwill) was not accounted for appropriately. This Statement adopts a more aggregate view of goodwill and bases the accounting for goodwill on the units of the combined entity into which an acquired entity is integrated (those units are referred to as reporting units).

     

    • Opinion 17 presumed that goodwill and all other intangible assets were wasting assets (that is, finite lived), and thus the amounts assigned to them should be amortized in determining net income; Opinion 17 also mandated an arbitrary ceiling of 40 years for that amortization. This Statement does not presume that those assets are wasting assets. Instead, goodwill and intangible assets that have indefinite useful lives will not be amortized but rather will be tested at least annually for impairment. Intangible assets that have finite useful lives will continue to be amortized over their useful lives, but without the constraint of an arbitrary ceiling.

     

    • Previous standards provided little guidance about how to determine and measure goodwill impairment; as a result, the accounting for goodwill impairments was not consistent and not comparable and yielded information of questionable usefulness. This Statement provides specific guidance for testing goodwill for impairment. Goodwill will be tested for impairment at least annually using a two-step process that begins with an estimation of the fair value of a reporting unit. The first step is a screen for potential impairment, and the second step measures the amount of impairment, if any. However, if certain criteria are met, the requirement to test goodwill for impairment annually can be satisfied without a remeasurement of the fair value of a reporting unit.

     

    • In addition, this Statement provides specific guidance on testing intangible assets that will not be amortized for impairment and thus removes those intangible assets from the scope of other impairment guidance. Intangible assets that are not amortized will be tested for impairment at least annually by comparing the fair values of those assets with their recorded amounts.

     

    • This Statement requires disclosure of information about goodwill and other intangible assets in the years subsequent to their acquisition that was not previously required. Required disclosures include information about the changes in the carrying amount of goodwill from period to period (in the aggregate and by reportable segment), the carrying amount of intangible assets by major intangible asset class for those assets subject to amortization and for those not subject to amortization, and the estimated intangible asset amortization expense for the next five years.

     

    FASB Statement No. 155
    Accounting for Certain Hybrid Financial Instruments—an amendment of FASB Statements No. 133 and 140
    (Issue Date 02/06)
    [Full Text] [Summary] [Status]
     

    This Statement amends FASB Statements No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, and No. 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities. This Statement resolves issues addressed in Statement 133 Implementation Issue No. D1, “Application of Statement 133 to Beneficial Interests in Securitized Financial Assets.”

    This Statement:

    Permits fair value remeasurement for any hybrid financial instrument that contains an embedded derivative that otherwise would require bifurcation

    Clarifies which interest-only strips and principal-only strips are not subject to the requirements of Statement 133

    Establishes a requirement to evaluate interests in securitized financial assets to identify interests that are freestanding derivatives or that are hybrid financial instruments that contain an embedded derivative requiring bifurcation

    Clarifies that concentrations of credit risk in the form of subordination are not embedded derivatives

    Amends Statement 140 to eliminate the prohibition on a qualifying special-purpose entity from holding a derivative financial instrument that pertains to a beneficial interest other than another derivative financial instrument.

    Reasons for Issuing This Statement

    In January 2004, the Board added this project to its agenda to address what had been characterized as a temporary exemption from the application of the bifurcation requirements of Statement 133 to beneficial interests in securitized financial assets.

    Prior to the effective date of Statement 133, the FASB received inquiries on the application of the exception in paragraph 14 of Statement 133 to beneficial interests in securitized financial assets. In response to the inquiries, Implementation Issue D1 indicated that, pending issuance of further guidance, entities may continue to apply the guidance related to accounting for beneficial interests in paragraphs 14 and 362 of Statement 140. Those paragraphs indicate that any security that can be contractually prepaid or otherwise settled in such a way that the holder of the security would not recover substantially all of its recorded investment should be subsequently measured like investments in debt securities classified as available-for-sale or trading under FASB Statement No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, and may not be classified as held-to-maturity. Further, Implementation Issue D1 indicated that holders of beneficial interests in securitized financial assets that are not subject to paragraphs 14 and 362 of Statement 140 are not required to apply Statement 133 to those beneficial interests until further guidance is issued.

    How the Changes in This Statement Improve Financial Reporting

    This Statement improves financial reporting by eliminating the exemption from applying Statement 133 to interests in securitized financial assets so that similar instruments are accounted for similarly regardless of the form of the instruments. This Statement also improves financial reporting by allowing a preparer to elect fair value measurement at acquisition, at issuance, or when a previously recognized financial instrument is subject to a remeasurement (new basis) event, on an instrument-by-instrument basis, in cases in which a derivative would otherwise have to be bifurcated. Providing a fair value measurement election also results in more financial instruments being measured at what the Board regards as the most relevant attribute for financial instruments, fair value.

    Effective Date and Transition

    This Statement is effective for all financial instruments acquired or issued after the beginning of an entity’s first fiscal year that begins after September 15, 2006. The fair value election provided for in paragraph 4(c) of this Statement may also be applied upon adoption of this Statement for hybrid financial instruments that had been bifurcated under paragraph 12 of Statement 133 prior to the adoption of this Statement. Earlier adoption is permitted as of the beginning of an entity’s fiscal year, provided the entity has not yet issued financial statements, including financial statements for any interim period for that fiscal year. Provisions of this Statement may be applied to instruments that an entity holds at the date of adoption on an instrument-by-instrument basis.

    At adoption, any difference between the total carrying amount of the individual components of the existing bifurcated hybrid financial instrument and the fair value of the combined hybrid financial instrument should be recognized as a cumulative-effect adjustment to beginning retained earnings. The cumulative-effect adjustment should be disclosed gross (that is, aggregating gain positions separate from loss positions) determined on an instrument-by-instrument basis. Prior periods should not be restated.

     

    FASB Statement No. 157
    Fair Value Measurements
    (Issue Date 09/06)
    [Full Text] [Summary] [Status]
     

    This Statement defines fair value, establishes a framework for measuring fair value in generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), and expands disclosures about fair value measurements. This Statement applies under other accounting pronouncements that require or permit fair value measurements, the Board having previously concluded in those accounting pronouncements that fair value is the relevant measurement attribute. Accordingly, this Statement does not require any new fair value measurements. However, for some entities, the application of this Statement will change current practice.

    Reason for Issuing This Statement

    Prior to this Statement, there were different definitions of fair value and limited guidance for applying those definitions in GAAP. Moreover, that guidance was dispersed among the many accounting pronouncements that require fair value measurements. Differences in that guidance created inconsistencies that added to the complexity in applying GAAP. In developing this Statement, the Board considered the need for increased consistency and comparability in fair value measurements and for expanded disclosures about fair value measurements.

    Differences between This Statement and Current Practice

    The changes to current practice resulting from the application of this Statement relate to the definition of fair value, the methods used to measure fair value, and the expanded disclosures about fair value measurements.

    The definition of fair value retains the exchange price notion in earlier definitions of fair value. This Statement clarifies that the exchange price is the price in an orderly transaction between market participants to sell the asset or transfer the liability in the market in which the reporting entity would transact for the asset or liability, that is, the principal or most advantageous market for the asset or liability. The transaction to sell the asset or transfer the liability is a hypothetical transaction at the measurement date, considered from the perspective of a market participant that holds the asset or owes the liability. Therefore, the definition focuses on the price that would be received to sell the asset or paid to transfer the liability (an exit price), not the price that would be paid to acquire the asset or received to assume the liability (an entry price).

    This Statement emphasizes that fair value is a market-based measurement, not an entity-specific measurement. Therefore, a fair value measurement should be determined based on the assumptions that market participants would use in pricing the asset or liability. As a basis for considering market participant assumptions in fair value measurements, this Statement establishes a fair value hierarchy that distinguishes between (1) market participant assumptions developed based on market data obtained from sources independent of the reporting entity (observable inputs) and (2) the reporting entity’s own assumptions about market participant assumptions developed based on the best information available in the circumstances (unobservable inputs). The notion of unobservable inputs is intended to allow for situations in which there is little, if any, market activity for the asset or liability at the measurement date. In those situations, the reporting entity need not undertake all possible efforts to obtain information about market participant assumptions. However, the reporting entity must not ignore information about market participant assumptions that is reasonably available without undue cost and effort.

    This Statement clarifies that market participant assumptions include assumptions about risk, for example, the risk inherent in a particular valuation technique used to measure fair value (such as a pricing model) and/or the risk inherent in the inputs to the valuation technique. A fair value measurement should include an adjustment for risk if market participants would include one in pricing the related asset or liability, even if the adjustment is difficult to determine. Therefore, a measurement (for example, a “mark-to-model” measurement) that does not include an adjustment for risk would not represent a fair value measurement if market participants would include one in pricing the related asset or liability.

    This Statement clarifies that market participant assumptions also include assumptions about the effect of a restriction on the sale or use of an asset. A fair value measurement for a restricted asset should consider the effect of the restriction if market participants would consider the effect of the restriction in pricing the asset. That guidance applies for stock with restrictions on sale that terminate within one year that is measured at fair value under FASB Statements No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, and No. 124, Accounting for Certain Investments Held by Not-for-Profit Organizations.

    This Statement clarifies that a fair value measurement for a liability reflects its nonperformance risk (the risk that the obligation will not be fulfilled). Because nonperformance risk includes the reporting entity’s credit risk, the reporting entity should consider the effect of its credit risk (credit standing) on the fair value of the liability in all periods in which the liability is measured at fair value under other accounting pronouncements, including FASB Statement No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities.

    This Statement affirms the requirement of other FASB Statements that the fair value of a position in a financial instrument (including a block) that trades in an active market should be measured as the product of the quoted price for the individual instrument times the quantity held (within Level 1 of the fair value hierarchy). The quoted price should not be adjusted because of the size of the position relative to trading volume (blockage factor). This Statement extends that requirement to broker-dealers and investment companies within the scope of the AICPA Audit and Accounting Guides for those industries.

    This Statement expands disclosures about the use of fair value to measure assets and liabilities in interim and annual periods subsequent to initial recognition. The disclosures focus on the inputs used to measure fair value and for recurring fair value measurements using significant unobservable inputs (within Level 3 of the fair value hierarchy), the effect of the measurements on earnings (or changes in net assets) for the period. This Statement encourages entities to combine the fair value information disclosed under this Statement with the fair value information disclosed under other accounting pronouncements, including FASB Statement No. 107, Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial Instruments, where practicable.

    The guidance in this Statement applies for derivatives and other financial instruments measured at fair value under Statement 133 at initial recognition and in all subsequent periods. Therefore, this Statement nullifies the guidance in footnote 3 of EITF Issue No. 02-3, “Issues Involved in Accounting for Derivative Contracts Held for Trading Purposes and Contracts Involved in Energy Trading and Risk Management Activities.” This Statement also amends Statement 133 to remove the similar guidance to that in Issue 02-3, which was added by FASB Statement No. 155, Accounting for Certain Hybrid Financial Instruments.

    How the Conclusions in This Statement Relate to the FASB’s Conceptual Framework

    The framework for measuring fair value considers the concepts in FASB Concepts Statement No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information. Concepts Statement 2 emphasizes that providing comparable information enables users of financial statements to identify similarities in and differences between two sets of economic events.

    The definition of fair value considers the concepts relating to assets and liabilities in FASB Concepts Statement No. 6, Elements of Financial Statements, in the context of market participants. A fair value measurement reflects current market participant assumptions about the future inflows associated with an asset (future economic benefits) and the future outflows associated with a liability (future sacrifices of economic benefits).

    This Statement incorporates aspects of the guidance in FASB Concepts Statement No. 7, Using Cash Flow Information and Present Value in Accounting Measurements, as clarified and/or reconsidered in this Statement. This Statement does not revise Concepts Statement 7. The Board will consider the need to revise Concepts Statement 7 in its conceptual framework project.

    The expanded disclosures about the use of fair value to measure assets and liabilities should provide users of financial statements (present and potential investors, creditors, and others) with information that is useful in making investment, credit, and similar decisions—the first objective of financial reporting in FASB Concepts Statement No. 1, Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business Enterprises.

     

    FASB Statement No. 159
    The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities—Including an amendment of FASB Statement No. 115

    (Issue Date 02/07)
    [Full Text] [Summary] [Status]
     

     

    Why Is the FASB Issuing This Statement?

    This Statement permits entities to choose to measure many financial instruments and certain other items at fair value. The objective is to improve financial reporting by providing entities with the opportunity to mitigate volatility in reported earnings caused by measuring related assets and liabilities differently without having to apply complex hedge accounting provisions. This Statement is expected to expand the use of fair value measurement, which is consistent with the Board’s long-term measurement objectives for accounting for financial instruments.

    What Is the Scope of This Statement—Which Entities Does It Apply to and What Does It Affect?

    This Statement applies to all entities, including not-for-profit organizations. Most of the provisions of this Statement apply only to entities that elect the fair value option. However, the amendment to FASB Statement No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, applies to all entities with available-for-sale and trading securities. Some requirements apply differently to entities that do not report net income.

    The following are eligible items for the measurement option established by this Statement:

    Recognized financial assets and financial liabilities except:

    An investment in a subsidiary that the entity is required to consolidate

    An interest in a variable interest entity that the entity is required to consolidate

    Employers’ and plans’ obligations (or assets representing net overfunded positions) for pension benefits, other postretirement benefits (including health care and life insurance benefits), postemployment benefits, employee stock option and stock purchase plans, and other forms of deferred compensation arrangements, as defined in FASB Statements No. 35, Accounting and Reporting by Defined Benefit Pension Plans, No. 87, Employers’ Accounting for Pensions, No. 106, Employers’ Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions, No. 112, Employers’ Accounting for Postemployment Benefits, No. 123 (revised December 2004), Share-Based Payment, No. 43, Accounting for Compensated Absences, No. 146, Accounting for Costs Associated with Exit or Disposal Activities, and No. 158, Employers’ Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans, and APB Opinion No. 12, Omnibus Opinion—1967

    Financial assets and financial liabilities recognized under leases as defined in FASB Statement No. 13, Accounting for Leases (This exception does not apply to a guarantee of a third-party lease obligation or a contingent obligation arising from a cancelled lease.)

    Deposit liabilities, withdrawable on demand, of banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, and other similar depository institutions

    Financial instruments that are, in whole or in part, classified by the issuer as a component of shareholder’s equity (including “temporary equity”). An example is a convertible debt security with a noncontingent beneficial conversion feature.

    Firm commitments that would otherwise not be recognized at inception and that involve only financial instruments

    Nonfinancial insurance contracts and warranties that the insurer can settle by paying a third party to provide those goods or services

    Host financial instruments resulting from separation of an embedded nonfinancial derivative instrument from a nonfinancial hybrid instrument.

    How Will This Statement Change Current Accounting Practices?

    The fair value option established by this Statement permits all entities to choose to measure eligible items at fair value at specified election dates. A business entity shall report unrealized gains and losses on items for which the fair value option has been elected in earnings (or another performance indicator if the business entity does not report earnings) at each subsequent reporting date. A not-for-profit organization shall report unrealized gains and losses in its statement of activities or similar statement.

    The fair value option:

    May be applied instrument by instrument, with a few exceptions, such as investments otherwise accounted for by the equity method

    Is irrevocable (unless a new election date occurs)

    Is applied only to entire instruments and not to portions of instruments.

    How Does This Statement Contribute to International Convergence?

    The fair value option in this Statement is similar, but not identical, to the fair value option in IAS 39, Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement. The international fair value option is subject to certain qualifying criteria not included in this standard, and it applies to a slightly different set of instruments.

    What Is the Effective Date of This Statement?

    This Statement is effective as of the beginning of an entity’s first fiscal year that begins after November 15, 2007. Early adoption is permitted as of the beginning of a fiscal year that begins on or before November 15, 2007, provided the entity also elects to apply the provisions of FASB Statement No. 157, Fair Value Measurements.

    No entity is permitted to apply this Statement retrospectively to fiscal years preceding the effective date unless the entity chooses early adoption. The choice to adopt early should be made after issuance of this Statement but within 120 days of the beginning of the fiscal year of adoption, provided the entity has not yet issued financial statements, including required notes to those financial statements, for any interim period of the fiscal year of adoption.

    This Statement permits application to eligible items existing at the effective date (or early adoption date).

     

    Many other U.S. and International Standards directly or indirectly impact on fair value accounting! In particular international IAS 32 and IAS 39 require fair value accounting in many circumstances.

     


    Introduction to Valuation

    Damodaran Online: A Great Sharing Site from a Finance Professor at New York University and Textbook Writer --- http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/%7Eadamodar/

    This site has great sections on corporate finance, investments, valuation, spreadsheets, research, etc. For example, take a look at the helpers on valuation --- http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/%7Eadamodar/

    You can pick the valuation approach that you would like to go to, to see illustrations, solutions and other supporting material.

       
      Discounted Cashflow Valuation
      Relative Valuation
      Option Pricing Approaches to Valuation
      Acquisition Valuation
      EVA, CFROI and other Value Enhancement Strategies

     

    Or you can pick the material that you are interested in.

           
    Spreadsheets Overheads Datasets References
    Problems & Solutions Derivations and Discussion Valuation Examples PowerPoint presentations

    Jim Mahar's finance sharing site (especially note his great blog link) --- http://financeprofessor.com/

    Financial Rounds from an anonymous finance professor --- http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/

    Bob Jensen's threads on valuation are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value controversies in accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue

    Bob Jensen's finance and investment helpers are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Bookbob1.htm


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on September 22, 2006

    TITLE: FASB to Issue Retooled Rule for Valuing Corporate Assets
    REPORTER: David Reilly
    DATE: Sep 15, 2006
    PAGE: C3
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115828639109763950.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac 
    TOPICS: Accounting, Advanced Financial Accounting, Fair Value Accounting

    SUMMARY: On 9/15/2006, the FASB issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157, Fair Value Measurements. The standard "...provides enhanced guidance for using fair value to measure assets and liabilities. The standard also responds to investors' requests for expanded information about the extent to which companies measure assets and liabilities at fair value, the information used to measure fair value, and the effect of fair value measurements on earnings." (Source: FASB News Release available on their web site at http://www.fasb.org/news/nr091506.shtml) This new standard must be used as guidance whenever reporting entities use fair value to measure value assets and liabilities as a required or acceptable method of applying GAAP.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) What is the purpose of issuing Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157? In your answer, describe how this standard should help to alleviate discrepancies in practice. To help answer this question, you may access the FASB's own news release about the standard, available at http://www.fasb.org/news/nr091506.shtml or the new standard itself, available on the FASB's web site.

    2.) From your own knowledge, cite an example in which fair value is used to measure an asset or liability in corporate balance sheets. Why is fair value an appropriate measure for including these assets and liabilities in corporate balance sheets?

    3.) What is the major difficulty with using fair values for financial reporting that is cited in the article?

    4.) Define the term "historical cost." Name two flaws with the use of historical costs, one cited in the article and one based on your own knowledge. Be sure to explain the flaw clearly.

    5.) How does this standard help to alleviate the issue described in answer to question 3? Again, you may access the FASB's web site, and the news release in particle, to answer this question.

    6.) The article closes with a statement that "The FASB hopes to counter some of [the issues cited in the article] by expanding disclosures required for all balance sheet items measure at fair value..." What could be the possible problem with that requirement?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    "FASB to Issue Retooled Rule For Valuing Corporate Assets New Method Repeals Limits Spurred by Enron Scandal; Critics Worry About Abuses," by David Reilly,  The Wall Street Journal, September 15, 2006; Page C3 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115828639109763950.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac

    Accounting rule makers have wrapped up an overhaul of a tricky but important method of valuing corporate assets, despite some critics' warning that the change could reopen the door to abuses like those seen at Enron Corp.

    The overhaul, contained in an accounting standard that could be issued as early as today, will repeal a ban put in place after Enron collapsed into bankruptcy court in late 2001 amid an array of accounting irregularities. The ban prohibited companies immediately booking gains or losses from complex financial instruments whose real value may not be known for years.

    The Financial Accounting Standards Board's new rule will require companies to base "fair" values for certain items on what they would fetch from a sale in an open market to a third party. In the past, firms often would use internal models to determine the value of instruments that didn't have a readily available price.

    FASB prohibited that practice after Enron used overly optimistic models to value multiyear power contracts in a bid to pad earnings. The ban was meant to give the board time to come up with a new approach to determining fair values.

    The accounting rule makers say the new standard will give companies, auditors and investors much needed, and more nuanced, guidance on how to measure market values. Companies will have to think, "it's not my own estimate of what something is worth to me, but what the market would demand for this," said Leslie Seidman, an FASB member. While clarifying how to come up with appropriate values for some instruments, the new standard doesn't expand the use of what is known as fair-value accounting.

    Critics say the new rule reopens the door to manipulation and possibly fraud by unscrupulous managers. Requiring market values for instruments where there isn't a ready price in a market can be "a license for management to invent the financial statements to be whatever they want them to be," Damon Silvers, associate general counsel for the AFL-CIO, said at a meeting of an FASB advisory group this spring.

    Jousting over the standard reflects a deep rift within accounting circles. For decades, accounting values were mostly based on historical cost, or what a company paid for a particular asset. In recent years, accounting rules have moved toward the use of market values, known as fair-value accounting. In some ways this reflects the shift in the U.S. from a manufacturing to a service economy, where intangible assets are more important than the plant and equipment that previously defined a company's financial strength.

    Starting in the mid-1980s, companies also began using ever-more-complicated financial instruments such as futures, options and swaps to manage interest-rate, currency and other risks. Such contracts often can't be measured based on their cost. This spurred the use of market values, thought to be more realistic. But these values can be tough to determine because many complex financial instruments are tailor-made and don't trade on open markets in the same way as stocks.

    Of course, valuations based on historical cost also have flaws. The savings-and-loan crisis of the late 1980s, for example, was prompted in part by thrifts carrying loans on their balance sheets at historical cost, even though the loans had plummeted in value.

    Robert Herz, the FASB's chairman, acknowledges the difficulty in coming up with a market, or fair, value for many instruments. In discussions, he often asks how a company could reasonably be expected to come up with a fair value for a 30-year swap agreement on the Thai currency, the baht, which is a bet on the future value of that currency against another.

    The answer, according to Mr. Herz and the FASB, is to base the value on what a willing third-party would pay in the market and possibly include a discount to reflect the uncertainty inherent in the approach.

    In an interview earlier this year, Mr. Herz said this valuation approach would reduce the likelihood of a recurrence of problems such as those seen at Enron. "The problem wasn't that Enron was using fair values, it was that they were using 'unfair' values," he said.

    Still, "the bottom line is that fair-value accounting is a great thing so long as you have market values," said J. Edward Ketz, an associate accounting professor at Pennsylvania State University, who is working on a book about the FASB's new standard. "If you don't, you get into some messy areas."

    The FASB hopes to counter some of these issues by expanding disclosures required for all balance-sheet items measured at fair value, the board's Ms. Seidman said.

    October 15, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    The original 157 Exposure Draft proposed a Fair Value Option (FVO) that would have allowed carrying of virtually any financial asset or liability at fair value rather than just limiting fair value accounting to selected items that are now required to be carried at fair value rather than historical cost. Business firms, and especially banks, generally are against fair value accounting (due to reporting instabilities that arise from fair value adjustments prior to contract settlements). The FASB backed off of the FVO when it issued FAS 157, thereby relegating FAS 157 to a standard that clarifies definitions of fair value in various circumstances. Hence FAS 157 is largely semantic and does not change the present fair value accounting rules.

    I asked Paul Pacter (at Deloitte in Hong Kong where he's still very active in helping to set IFRS and FASB standards) for an update on the FVO Project (commenced in 2004) that failed to impact the new FAS 157 standard. His reply is below.

    October 31 reply from Paul Pacter (CN - Hong Kong) [paupacter@deloitte.com.hk]

    Hi Bob,

    Yes, FASB's FV Option (FVO) t is very much active -- an ED on phase 1 was issued in January, and a final FAS is expected before year end.

    • Phase 1 addresses creating an FVO for financial assets and financial liabilities.
    • Phase 2 addresses creating an FVO for selected nonfinancial items.

    Thus phase 2 would go beyond IFRSs, though several IFRSs have FV options for individual types of assets. IAS 16 and IAS 38 allow it for PP&E and intangibles -- though the credit is to surplus, not P&L, no recycling, subsequent depreciation of revalued amounts. IAS 40 gives a FV option for investment property -- FV through P&L. IAS 41 isn't an option, it's a requirement for FV through P&L for agricultural assets.

    Phase 2 would commence in 2007.

    Re possible amendment to FAS 157, I don't think FASB plans to do that, though I suppose there might be some consequential amendment. But I don't think the FVO will change the definition of fair value that's in FAS 157.

    Here's FASB's web page: http://www.fasb.org/project/fv_option.shtml

    Warm regards,

    Paul

    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at various other links:

    I recently completed the first draft of a paper on fair value at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
    Comments would be helpful.

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes 

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms

    Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation, and Yield Curves for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm

    Robert Walker's First Blog Entry is About Fair Value Accounting, October 27, 2006 --- http://www.robertbwalkerca.blogspot.com/

    Introduction
    I have decided to begin a commentary which expresses my views on accounting. As I begin to do this I envisage the source of my commentary to comprise three different sorts of writing in which I may engage:
    § Simple notes directly to the ‘blog’ such as this.
    § Formal submissions I may make to various bodies including the IASB.
    § Letters or reports I may write for one reason or another that I think might have some general readership.

    The expression of my views will stray from the subject matter of accounting per se to deal with matters of enormous significance to me such as corporate or public administration. Such expressions will not be too substantial a digression from the core subject matter because I believe that the foundation of good ‘corporate governance’, to use a vogue term, is accounting.

    Source of my ideas on accounting
    I would have to confess that the foundation upon which I base my philosophy of accounting is derivative, as much of human knowledge is of course. It is not for nothing that Newtown said that if he can see so far it is because he stands on the shoulders of giants. In my case, that ‘giant’ is Yuiji Ijiri. As I begin a detailed exposition of my views I shall return to the lessons I learned many years ago from Theory of Accounting Measurement, a neglected work that will still be read in 1,000 years or so long as humankind survives whichever is the shorter. As the depredations of the standard setting craze are visited upon us with ever increasing complexity, the message delivered by Ijiri will be heeded more an more.

    The basic structure of accounting
    Without wishing to be too philosophical about it, I need to begin by outlining what I mean by accounting. Accounting, in my mind, comprises three inter-related parts. These are:
    § Book-keeping.
    § Accounting.
    § Financial reporting.

    Book-keeping is the process of recording financial data elements in the underlying books of account. These financial data elements represent, or purport to represent, real world events. The heart of book-keeping is the double entry process. For instance at the most basic level a movement in cash will result in the surrender or receipt of an asset, the incurring or settlement of a liability and so on.

    I have no complete and coherent theory of the limits of book-keeping. Clearly cash movement (change of ownership) or the movement of commodity is the proper subject matter of book-keeping. Whether all forms of contract should be similarly treated is not clear to me. I am inclined to say yes. That is to adopt Ijiri’s theory of commitment accounting, but I can foresee that this leads me to conclusions that I may find unpalatable later on. Incidentally I say this because an epiphany I had, based on the notion of commitment accounting, some years ago is beginning to unravel.

    Book-keeping goes beyond recording to encompass control. That is the process by which the integrity of the centre piece of book-keeping – the general ledger expressing double entry – is ensured. I will not concern myself with such processes though this is not to say that they are unimportant.

    Accounting is the process by which sense is made of what is a raw record expressed in the general ledger. It is the process of distillation and summation that enables the accountant to gain on overview of what has happened to the entity the subject of the accounting. Accounting fundamentally assumes that the accountant is periodically capable of saying something useful about the real world using his or her special form of notation.

    Financial reporting is the process by which data is assembled into a comprehensive view of the world in accordance with a body of rules. It differs, in the ideal, from accounting in a number of ways. Most benignly it differs, for instance, by including ancillary information for the benefit of a reader beyond the mere abstraction from the general ledger. Again in the ideal there is an inter-relationship between the three levels in the accounting hierarchy. That is, the rules of financial reporting will, to some degree shape the order and format of the basic, book-keeping level so that the process of distillation and summation follows naturally to the final level of reporting without dramatic alteration.

    Perhaps what concerns me is that the sentiment expressed above can be seen, without much effort, to be only ideal and that in reality it does not arise. In short the golden strand that links the detailed recording of real world phenonmena to its final summation is broken.

    An example
    I was asked recently by a student of accounting to explain IAS 41, the IASB standard on agriculture. As I don’t deal in primary production at all, I had not thought about this subject for years.

    IAS 41 admonishes the accountant to apply ‘fair value’ accounting. Fair value accounting is the process by which current sale prices, or their proxies, are substituted for the past cost of any given item.

    For instance, you may have a mature vineyard. The vineyard comprises land, the vine and its fruit, the plant necessary to sustain the vine (support structures, irrigation channels etc.). Subsumed within the vine are the materials necessary for it to grow and start producing fruit. This will include the immature plant, the chemical supplements necessary to nurture and protect it, and the labour necessary to apply it.

    The book-keeping process will faithfully record all of these components. Suppose for example the plant, fertliser and labour cost $1000. In the books will be recorded:

    Dr Vineyard $1000
    Cr Cash $1000

    At the end of the accounting period, the accountant will summarise this is a balance statement. He or she will then obtain, in some way, the current selling price of the vine. Presumably this will be the future cash stream of selling the fruit, suitably discounted. Assume that this is $1200.

    The accountant will then make the following incremental adjustment:

    Dr Vineyard $200
    Cr Equity $200

    Looked like this there is a connection between the original book-keeping and the periodic adjustment at the end of the accounting period. This is an illusion. The incremental entry disguises what is really happening. It is as follows:

    Dr Equity $1000
    Cr Vineyard $1000

    And

    Dr Vineyard $1200
    Cr Equity $1200

    Considered from the long perspective, the original book-keeping has been discarded and a substitute value put in its place. This is the truth of the matter. The subject matter of the first phase of accounting was a set of events arising in a bank and in the entity undertaking accounting. The subject matter of the second phase is a set of future sales to a party who does not yet exist.

    From a perspective of solvency determination, a vital element of corporate governance, the view produced by the first phase is next to useless. However, the disquiet I had in my mind which I had suppressed until recently, relates to the shattering of the linkages between the three levels of accounting in the final reporting process. This disquiet has returned as I contemplate the apparently unstoppable momentum of the standard setting process.

    October 28, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Robert,

    I hope you add many more entries to your blog.

    The problem with "original book-keeping" is that it provides no answer how to account for risk of many modern day contracts that were not imagined when "original book-keeping" evolved in a simple world of transactions. For example, historical costs of forward contracts and swaps are zero and yet these contracts may have risks that may outweigh all the recorded debt under "original book-keeping." Once we opened the door to fair value accounting to better account for risk, however, we opened the door to misleading the public that booked fair value adjustments can be aggregated much like we sum the current balances of assets and liabilities on the balance sheet. Such aggregations are generally nonsense.

    I don't know if you saw my recent hockey analogy or not. It goes as follows:

    Goal Tenders versus Movers and Shakers
    Skate to where the puck is going, not to where it is.

    Wayne Gretsky (as quoted for many years by Jerry Trites at http://www.zorba.ca/ )

    Jensen Comment
    This may be true for most hockey players and other movers and shakers, but for goal tenders the eyes should be focused on where the puck is at every moment ---  not where it's going. The question is whether an accountant is a goal tender (stewardship responsibilities) or a mover and shaker (part of the managerial decision making team). This is also the essence of the debate of historical accounting versus pro forma accounting.

    Graduate student Derek Panchuk and professor Joan Vickers, who discovered the Quiet Eye phenomenon, have just completed the most comprehensive, on-ice hockey study to determine where elite goalies focus their eyes in order to make a save. Simply put, they found that goalies should keep their eyes on the puck. In an article to be published in the journal Human Movement Science, Panchuk and Vickers discovered that the best goaltenders rest their gaze directly on the puck and shooter's stick almost a full second before the shot is released. When they do that they make the save over 75 per cent of the time.
    "Keep your eyes on the puck," PhysOrg, October 26, 2006 --- http://physorg.com/news81068530.html

    I have written a more serious piece about both theoretical and practical problems of fair value accounting. I should emphasize that this was written after the FASB Exposure Draft proposing fair value accounting as an option for all financial instruments and the culminating FAS 157 that is mainly definitional and removed the option to apply fair value accounting to all financial instruments even though it is still required in many instances by earlier FASB standards.

    My thoughts on this are at the following two links:

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue

    Bob Jensen

    October 30, 2006 reply from Robert B Walker [walkerrb@ACTRIX.CO.NZ]

    Bob

    Thanks for the support. I have answered you in my second installment ( www.robertbwalkerca.blogspot.com ).

    I shall continue to write if for no other reason than for myself. I have had it in mind to write a book. I shall begin doing so this way.

    Robert

    October 30, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    I have difficulty envisioning forward contracts as “executory contracts.” These appear to be to be executed contracts that are terminated when the cash finally flows.

    Fair value appears to be the only way to book forward contracts if they are to be booked at all, although fair value on the date they are signed is usually zero.

    Once you are in the fair value realm, you have all the aggregation problems, blockage problems, etc. that are mentioned at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm 

    I guess what I’d especially like you to address is the problem of aggregation in a balance sheet or income statement based upon heterogeneous measurements.

    Bob Jensen

    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at various other links:

    I recently completed the first draft of a paper on fair value at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
    Comments would be helpful.

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes 

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms

    Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation, and Yield Curves for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm


    Fair value is the estimated best disposal (exit, liquidation) value in any sale other than a forced sale.  It is defined as follows in Paragraph 540 on Page 243 of FAS 133:

    The amount at which an asset (liability) could be bought (incurred) or sold (settled) in a current transaction between willing parties, that is, other than in a forced or liquidation sale. Quoted market prices in active markets are the best evidence of fair value and should be used as the basis for the measurement, if available. If a quoted market price is available, the fair value is the product of the number of trading units times that market price. If a quoted market price is not available, the estimate of fair value should be based on the best information available in the circumstances. The estimate of fair value should consider prices for similar assets or similar liabilities and the results of valuation techniques to the extent available in the circumstances. Examples of valuation techniques include the present value of estimated expected future cash flows using discount rates commensurate with the risks involved, option- pricing models, matrix pricing, option-adjusted spread models, and fundamental analysis.  Valuation techniques for measuring assets and liabilities should be consistent with the objective of measuring fair value. Those techniques should incorporate assumptions that market participants would use in their estimates of values, future revenues, and future expenses, including assumptions about interest rates, default, prepayment, and volatility. In measuring forward contracts, such as foreign currency forward contracts, at fair value by discounting estimated future cash flows, an entity should base the estimate of future cash flows on the changes in the forward rate (rather than the spot rate). In measuring financial liabilities and nonfinancial derivatives that are liabilities at fair value by discounting estimated future cash flows (or equivalent outflows of other assets), an objective is to use discount rates at which those liabilities could be settled in an arm's-length transaction.

    This is old news, but it does provide some questions for students to ponder.  The main problem of fair value adjustment is that many ((most?) of the adjustments cause enormous fluctuations in earnings, assets, and liabilities that are washed out over time and never realized.  The main advantage is that interim impacts that “might be” realized are booked.  It’s a war between “might be” versus “might never.”  The war has been waging for over a century with respect to booked assets and two decades with respect to unbooked derivative instruments, contingencies, and intangibles.

    CFA analysts' group favors full fair value reporting
    The CFA Centre for Financial Market Integrity – a part of the CFA Institute – has published a new financial reporting model that, they believe, would greatly enhance the ability of financial analysts and investors to evaluate companies in making investment decisions. The Comprehensive Business Reporting Model proposes 12 principles to ensure that financial statements are relevant, clear, accurate, understandable, and comprehensive (See below).
    "Analysts' group favours full fair value reporting," IAS Plus, October 31, 2005 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

     

    CFA Institute Centre for Financial Market Integrity
    Comprehensive Business Reporting Model – Principles

    • 1. The company must be viewed from the perspective of a current investor in the company's common equity.
    • 2. Fair value information is the only information relevant for financial decision making.
    • 3. Recognition and disclosure must be determined by the relevance of the information to investment decision making and not based upon measurement reliability alone.
    • 4. All economic transactions and events should be completely and accurately recognized as they occur in the financial statements.
    • 5. Investors' wealth assessments must determine the materiality threshold.
    • 6. Financial reporting must be neutral.
    • 7. All changes in net assets must be recorded in a single financial statement, the Statement of Changes in Net Assets Available to Common Shareowners.
    • 8. The Statement of Changes in Net Assets Available to Common Shareowners should include timely recognition of all changes in fair values of assets and liabilities.
    • 9. The Cash Flow Statement provides information essential to the analysis of a company and should be prepared using the direct method only.
    • 10. Changes affecting each of the financial statements must be reported and explained on a disaggregated basis.
    • 11. Individual line items should be reported based upon the nature of the items rather than the function for which they are used.
    • 12. Disclosures must provide all the additional information investors require to understand the items recognized in the financial statements, their measurement properties, and risk exposures.

    Standards of Value: Theory and Applications
    Standards of Value covers the underlying assumption in many of the prominent standards of value, including Fair Market Value, investment value, and fair value. It discusses the specific purposes of the valuation, including divorce, shareholders' oppression, financial reporting, and how these standards are applied.
    Standards of Value: Theory and Applications, by Jay E. Fishman, Shannon P. Pratt, William J. Morrison Wiley:  ISBN: 0-471-69483-5 Hardcover 368 pages November 2006 US $95.00) --- http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-0471694835.html


    "Will Fair Value Fly? Fair-value accounting could change the very basis of corporate finance," by Ronald Fink, CFO Magazine September 01, 2006 --- http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7851757/c_7873404?f=magazine_featured

    Much has changed in financial reporting since Andrew Fastow and Scott Sullivan, the finance chiefs of Enron and WorldCom, respectively, brought disgrace upon themselves, their employers, and, to a degree, their profession. Regulators and investors have pressed companies to be more open and forthcoming about their results — and companies have responded. According to a new CFO magazine survey, 82 percent of public-company finance executives disclose more information in their financial statements today then they did three years ago. But that positive finding won't quell calls for further accounting reform.

    The U.S. reporting system "faces a number of important and difficult challenges," Robert Herz, chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, told the annual conference of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in Washington, D.C., last December. Chief among those, said Herz, is "the need to reduce complexity and improve the transparency and overall usefulness" of information reported to investors. ad

    Critics contend that generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) remain seriously flawed, even as companies have beefed up internal controls to comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. "We've done very little but play defense for the last five to six years," charges J. Michael Cook, chairman and CEO emeritus of Deloitte & Touche LLP. "It's time to play offense."

    Cook, a respected elder statesman in the accounting community, goes so far as to pronounce financial statements almost completely irrelevant to financial analysis as currently conducted. "The analyst community does workarounds based on numbers that have very little to do with the financial statements," says Cook. "Net income is a virtually useless number."

    How can financial statements become more relevant and useful? Many reformers, including Herz, believe that fair-value accounting must be part of the answer. In this approach, which FASB increasingly favors, assets and liabilities are marked to market rather than recorded on balance sheets at historical cost. Fair-value accounting, say its advocates, would give users of financial statements a far clearer picture of the economic state of a company.

    "I know what an asset is. I can see one, I can touch one, or I can see representations of one. I also know what liabilities are," says Thomas Linsmeier, a Michigan State University accounting professor who joined FASB in June. On the other hand, "I believe that revenues, expenses, gains, and losses are accounting constructs," he adds. "I can't say that I see a revenue going down the street. And so for me to have an accounting model that captures economic reality, I think the starting point has to be assets and liabilities."

    More than any other regulatory change, fair value promises to end the practice of earnings management. That's because a company's earnings would depend more on what happens on its balance sheet than on its income statement (see "The End of Earnings Management?" at the end of this article).

    But switching from historical cost would require enormous effort from overworked finance departments. Valuing assets in the absence of active markets could be overly subjective, making financial statements less reliable. Linsmeier's confidence notwithstanding, disputes could arise over the very definition of certain assets and liabilities. And using fair value could even distort a company's approach to deal-making and capital structure.

    A Familiar Concept Fair value is by no means unfamiliar to corporate-finance executives, as current accounting rules for such items as derivatives (FAS 133 and 155), securitizations (FAS 156), and employee stock option grants (FAS 123R) use it to varying degrees when recording assets and liabilities. So does a proposal issued last January for another rule, this one for accounting for all financial instruments. FASB's more recent proposals to include pensions and leases on balance sheets also embrace fair-value measurement (see "Be Careful What You Wish For" at the end of this article).

    While both Herz and Linsmeier are careful to note that they don't necessarily favor the application of fair value to assets and liabilities that lack a ready market, they clearly advocate its application where there's sufficient reason to believe the valuations are reliable. Corporate accounting, Herz says, is the only major reporting system that doesn't use fair value as its basis, and he points to the Federal Reserve's use of it in tracking the U.S. economy as sufficient reason for companies to adopt it.

    The corporate world, however, must grapple with its own complexities. For one, fair value could make it even more difficult to realize value from acquisitions. Take the question of contingent considerations, wherein the amount that acquirers pay for assets ultimately depends on their return. Under current GAAP, the balance-sheet value of assets that are transferred through such earnouts may reflect only the amount exchanged at the time the deal is completed, because the acquirer has considerable leeway in treating subsequent payments as expenses.

    Under fair value, the acquirer would also include on its balance sheet the present value of those contingent payments based on their likelihood of materializing. Since the money may never materialize, some finance executives contend those estimates could be unreliable and misleading. "I disagree with [this application of fair value] on principle," James Barge, senior vice president and controller for Time Warner, said during a conference on financial reporting last May. ad

    Barge cites the acquisition of intangible assets that a company does not intend to use as a further example of fair value's potentially worrisome effects. Under current GAAP, their value is included in goodwill and subject to annual impairment testing for possible write-off. But if, as FASB is contemplating, the value of those assets would be recorded on the balance sheet along with that of the associated tangible assets that were acquired, Barge worries that an immediate write-off would then be required — even though it would not reflect the acquiring company's economics.

    Fair value's defenders say such concerns are misplaced. The possibility that a contingent consideration won't materialize, for starters, is already reflected in an acquirer's bid, says Patricia McConnell, a Bear Stearns senior managing director who chairs the corporate-disclosure policy council of the CFA Institute, a group for financial analysts. "It's in the price," she says.

    As for intangibles that are acquired and then extinguished, the analyst says a write-off would not in fact be required under fair value if the transaction strengthens the acquirer's market position. That position would presumably be reflected in the value of the assets associated with those intangibles as recorded on the balance sheet under fair-value treatment.

    "It may be in buying a brand to gain monopolistic position that you don't have an expense," McConnell explains, "but rather you have the extinguishment of one asset and the creation of another." Yet McConnell, among others, admits that accounting for intangibles is an area that would need improvement even if FASB adopted fair value.

    Deceptive Debt? Another area of concern involves capital structure, with Barge suggesting that fair value may make it more difficult to finance growth with debt. He contends that marking a company's debt to market could make a company look more highly exposed to interest-rate risk than it really is, noting during the May conference that Time Warner's debt was totally hedged.

    Barge also cited as problematic the hypothetical case of a company whose creditworthiness is downgraded by the rating agencies. By marking down the debt's value on its balance sheet, the company would realize more income, a scenario Barge called "nonsensical." He warned of a host of such effects arising under fair value when a company changes its capital structure.

    Proponents find at least some of the complaints about fair value and corporate debt to be misplaced. Herz notes fair value would require the company to mark the hedge as well as the debt to market, so that if a company is hedging interest-rate risk effectively, its balance sheet should accurately reflect its lack of any exposure.

    What's more, fair value could also improve balance sheets in some cases. When, for instance, a company owns an interest in another whose results it need not consolidate, the equity holder's proportion of the other company's assets and liabilities is currently carried at historical cost. If, however, the other company's assets have gained value and were marked to market, the equity holder's own leverage might decrease.

    A real-life case in point: If the chemical company Valhi marked to market its 39 percent stake in Titanium Metals, Valhi's own ratio of long-term debt to equity would fall from 90 percent (at the end of 2005) to 56 percent, according to Jack T. Ciesielski, publisher of The Analyst's Accounting Observer newsletter. ad

    Still, even some fair-value proponents share Barge's concern about credit downgrades. As Ciesielski, a member of FASB's Emerging Issues Task Force, wrote last April in a report on the board's proposal for the use of fair value for financial instruments, it is "awfully counterintuitive" for a company to show rising earnings when its debt-repayment capacity is declining.

    Herz and other fair-value proponents disagree, noting that the income accrues to the benefit of the shareholders, not to bondholders. "It's not at all counterintuitive," asserts Rebecca McEnally, director for capital-markets policy of the CFA Institute Centre for Financial Market Integrity, citing the fact that the item is classified under GAAP as "income from forgiveness of indebtedness." But Ciesielski says investors are unlikely to understand that, and that fair value, in this case at least, may not produce useful results.

    Resolving the Issues Even some of FASB's critics agree, however, that the current system needs improvement, and that fair value can help provide it. "Fair value in general is more relevant than historical cost and can lead to reduced complexity and greater transparency," Barge admits, though he has noted that the use of fair value may also lead to "soft" results that "you can't audit."

    For much the same reason, Colleen Cunningham, president and CEO of Financial Executives International (FEI), expressed concern in testimony before Congress last March that "overly theoretical and complex standards can result in financial reporting of questionable accuracy and can create a significant cost burden, with little benefit to investors." In an interview, she explains that her biggest concern is that FASB is pushing ahead with fair-value-based rules without sufficient input from preparers. "Let's resolve the issues" before proceeding, she insists.

    Herz concedes that numerous issues surrounding fair value need to be addressed. But important users of financial statements are pressing him to move forward on fair value without delay. As a comment letter that the CFA Institute sent to FASB put it: "All financial decision-making should be based on fair value, the only relevant measurement for assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses."

    Meanwhile, Herz isn't waiting for the conceptual framework to be completed before enacting new rules that embrace fair value. "In the end, we're not going to get everybody agreeing," Herz says. "So we have to make decisions" despite lingering disagreement.

    Ironically, one fair-value-based proposal that FASB issued recently may have created an artful means of defusing opposition. The Board's proposal for financial instruments gives preparers of financial reports the choice of using historical cost or fair value in recording the instruments on their balance sheets. That worries some people, who say giving companies a choice of methods will make it harder to compare their results, even when they're in the same industry.

    Continued in article

     


    "Guidance on fair value measurements under FAS 123(R)," IAS Plus, May 8, 2006 ---
    http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

    Deloitte & Touche (USA) has updated its book of guidance on FASB Statement No. 123(R) Share-Based Payment: A Roadmap to Applying the Fair Value Guidance to Share-Based Payment Awards (PDF 2220k). This second edition reflects all authoritative guidance on FAS 123(R) issued as of 28 April 2006. It includes over 60 new questions and answers, particularly in the areas of earnings per share, income tax accounting, and liability classification. Our interpretations incorporate the views in SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin Topic 14 "Share-Based Payment" (SAB 107), as well as subsequent clarifications of EITF Topic No. D-98 "Classification and Measurement of Redeemable Securities" (dealing with mezzanine equity treatment). The publication contains other resource materials, including a GAAP accounting and disclosure checklist. Note that while FAS 123 is similar to IFRS 2 Share-based Payment, there are some measurement differences that are Described Here.

    Bob Jensen's threads on employee stock options are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/sfas123/jensen01.htm


    Fair Value Accounting Book Review (Meeting the New FASB Requirements)

    From SmartPros on May 1, 2006
    Fair Value for Financial Reporting by Alfred King highlights the accounting and auditing requirements for fair value information and offers a detailed explanation of how the FASB is going to change "fair value," from determining the fair value of intangible assets to selecting and working with an appraiser --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x35458.xml

    Fair Value for Financial Reporting: Meeting the New FASB Requirements
    by Alfred M. King
    ISBN: 0-471-77184-8
    Hardcover 352 pages April 2006

     

    Click to Download the Comprehensive Business Reporting Model from the CFA Institute website.
    Click here for Press Release (PDF 26k).

    As you can see below, the war is not over yet.  In fact it has intensified between corporations (especially banks) versus standard setters versus members of the academy.

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on April 2, 2004

    TITLE: As IASB Unveils New Rules, Dispute With EU Continues 
    REPORTER: David Reilly 
    DATE: Mar 31, 2004 
    PAGE: A2 LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108067939682469331,00.html  
    TOPICS: Generally accepted accounting principles, Fair Value Accounting, Insider trading, International Accounting, International Accounting Standards Board

    SUMMARY: Despite controversy with the European Union (EU), the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is expected to release a final set of international accounting standards. Questions focus on the role of the IASB, controversy with the EU, and harmonization of the accounting standards.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) What is the role of the IASB? What authority does the IASB have to enforce standards?

    2.) List three reasons that a country would choose to follow IASB accounting standards. Why has the U.S. not adopted IASB accounting standards?

    3.) Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of harmonization of accounting standards throughout the world. Why is it important the IASB reach a resolution with the EU over the disputed accounting standards?

    4.) What is fair value accounting? Why would fair value accounting make financial statements more volatile? Is increased volatility a valid argument for not adopting fair value accounting? Does GAAP in the United States require fair value accounting? Support your answers.

    There are a number of software vendors of FAS 133 valuation software.

    One of the major companies is Financial CAD --- http://www.financialcad.com/ 

    FinancialCAD provides software and services that support the valuation and risk management of financial securities and derivatives that is essential for banks, corporate treasuries and asset management firms. FinancialCAD’s industry standard financial analytics are a key component in FinancialCAD solutions that are used by over 25,000 professionals in 60 countries.

    See software.

    Fair value accounting politics in the revised IAS 39

    From Paul Pacter's IAS Plus on July 13, 2005 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
    Also see http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/IASBFairValueFAQ.pdf

     
    The European Commission has published Frequently Asked Questions – IAS 39 Fair Value Option (FVO) (PDF 94k), providing the Commission's views on the following questions:
    • Why did the Commission carve out the full fair value option in the original IAS 39 standard?
    • Do prudential supervisors support IAS 39 FVO as published by the IASB?
    • When will the Commission to adopt the amended standard for the IAS 39 FVO?
    • Will companies be able to apply the amended standard for their 2005 financial statements?
    • Does the amended standard for IAS 39 FVO meet the EU endorsement criteria?
    • What about the relationship between the fair valuation of own liabilities under the amended IAS 39 FVO standard and under Article 42(a) of the Fourth Company Law Directive?
    • Will the Commission now propose amending Article 42(a) of the Fourth Company Directive?
    • What about the remaining IAS 39 carve-out relating to certain

    On June 23, 2005, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued an Exposure Draft (ED) entitled "Fair Value Measurements."  The original ED can be downloaded free at
    http://www.fasb.org/draft/ed_fair_value_measurements.pdf

    "Response to the FASB's Exposure Draft on Fair Value Measurements," AAA Financial Standards Committee, Accounting Horizons, September 2005, pp. 187-195 --- http://aaahq.org/pubs/electpubs.htm

    RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC ISSUES

    The FASB invited comment on all matters related to the ED, but specifically requested comments on 14 listed issues.  The Committee's comments are limited to those issues for which empirical research provides some insights, or those sections of the ED that are conceptually inconsistent or unclear.  The Committee has previously commented on other fair-value-related documents issued by the FASB and other standard-setting bodies.  This letter reiterates comments expressed in those letters to the extent they are germane to the measurement issues contained in the ED.  However, to better understand our perspective on reporting fair value information in the financial statements and related notes, we refer readers to those comment letters (i.e., AAA FASC 1998, 2000).

    Issue 1: Definition of Fair Value

    The Committee believes that the ED contains some conceptual inconsistencies between the definition and application of the fair value measurement attribute.  The ED proposes a definition of fair value that is relatively independent of the entity-specific use of the assets held or settlement of the liabilities owed.  In contrast, the proposed standard and related implementation guidance includes measurement that is, at times, directly determined by the entity-specific use of the asset or settlement of the liability in question.

    Some of the inconsistencies with respect to fair value measurement might be attributable to the attempt to apply general, high-level fair value guidance to the idiosyncratic attributes of specific accounts and transactions.  In some cases, application to specific accounts and transactions requires deviation from an entity-independent notion of fair value to one that includes consideration of the specific types and uses of assets held or liabilities owed by companies.  For example, as we note in our discussion of Issue 6 (below), one of the examples in the ED suggests that the fair value of a machine should include an adjustment of quoted market prices (based on comparable machines) for installation costs.  However, such an adjustment is dependent on the individual circumstances of the company that purchases the equipment.  That is, installation costs are included in the fair value of an asset only when the firm intends to use that asset for income producing activities.  Alternatively, if the firm intends to sell the asset, then installation costs are ignored.

    Some members of the Committee, however, do not perceive an inconsistency between the definition and application of the fair value measurement attribute.  These members view the definition of fair value and the context within which it is applied (i.e., the valuation premise) to be distinct, albeit related, attributes.  Although the definition of fair value can be entity-independent, the valuation premise (e.g., value-in-use or value-in-exchange) cannot.  Further, these members argue that ignoring the valuation premise in determining fair value could lead to unsatisfactory outcomes.  For example, if installation costs are ignored regardless of the valuation premise, then immediately after purchasing an asset for use in income-producing activities, firms would suffer impairment losses equal to the installation costs incurred to prepare the assets for use.

    The Committee raises the example of machinery installation costs to illustrate the confusion we experienced trying to reconcile the high-level (seemingly entity-independent) definition of fair value with the contextually determined application standards.  We note that the Introduction of the Ed suggests that the intent of the proposed guidance in the ED is to establish fair value measures that would be referenced in other authoritative accounting to establish fair value measures that would be referenced in other authoritative accounting pronouncements.  Presumably, these other pronouncements would also establish reasonable deviations from the entity-independent notion of fair value.  The Committee believes the most effective general purpose fair value measurement standard would adopt a general notion of fair value that is consistent across the definition of fair value, the accounting standard, and the implementation guidance.  To the extent the Board generally believes that fair value is an entity-specific concept, the high-level definition should reflect this as well.

    Issues 4 and 5: Valuation Premise and Fair Value Hierarchy

    Related to our previous comments, some members of the Committee perceive a contradiction between the definition of fair value in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the ED and the valuation premise described in paragraph 13.  The definition of fair value provided in paragraph 5 suggests a pure value-in-exchange perspective where fair value is determined by the market price that would occur between willing parties.  In contrast, the valuation premise described in paragraph 13 suggests that the fair value estimate can follow either a value-in-use perspective or a value-in-exchange perspective.

    Moreover, the fair value hierarchy described in the ED gives the highest priority to fair value measurements based on market inputs regardless of the valuation premise.  Some members of the Committee believe that quoted market prices are not necessarily an appropriate measure of fair value when a value-in-use premise is being considered.  This is especially true when a quoted price for an identical asset in an active reference market (i.e., a Level 1 estimate) exists, but is significantly different from a value-in-use estimate computed by taking the present value of the firm-specific future cash flows expected to be generated by the asset (i.e., a Level 3 estimate).  In such instances, following the fair value hierarchy might lead to a fair value estimate more in character with a value-in-exchange premise than a value-in-use premise.

    In summary, the Committee believes that: (1) integrating the two valuation premises (i.e., value-in-use and value-in-exchange) into the definition of fair value itself and (2) elaborating on the differences between the two premises would help ensure more consistent application of the standard.

    Issue 6: Reference Market

    Some members of the Committee are confused by the guidance related to determining the appropriate reference market.  With respect to the Level 1 reference market, the ED states that when multiple active markets exist, the most advantageous market should be used.  The most advantageous market is determined by comparing prices across multiple markets net of transactions costs.  However, the ED requires that transactions costs be ignored subsequently in determining the fair value measurement.  In our view, ignoring transactions costs is problematic because we believe such costs are an ordinary and predictable part of executing a transaction.

    In Example 5 (paragraph B9 (b) of the ED) where two markets, A and B, are considered, the price in Market B ($35) is more advantageous than the price in Market A ($25), ignoring transaction costs.  However, the fair value estimate is determined using the price in Market A because the transactions cost in Market B ($20) is much higher than in Market A ($5).  The guidance is less clear if we modify the example by reducing the transaction costs for Market B to $15.  In this instance, neither market is advantageous in a "net" sense, but Market B would yield the highest fair value estimate (ignoring transactions costs), which provides managers an opportunity to pick the most desirable figure based on their reporting objectives.

    Omitting transactions costs from the fair value estimate in Example 5 contrasts sharply with Example 3 (Appendix B, paragraph B7 (a)) where the value-in-use fair value estimate of a machine is determined by adjusting the quoted market price of a comparable machine by installation costs.  Installation costs are ignored only if the firm intends to dispose of the asset (Appendix B, paragraph B7 (b)).  Thus, managerial intent plays an integral role in determining whether fair value is computed with or without installation costs, but the same does not hold for transaction costs.  Since transaction costs are not relevant unless management intends to dispose of the asset, the Committee agrees that ignoring transaction costs is justified when a value-in-use premise is appropriate, but the Committee questions the appropriateness of ignoring transaction costs when a value-in-exchange premise is adopted.

    Issue 7: Pricing in Active Dealer Markets

    The ED requires that the fair value of financial instruments traded in active dealer markets where bid and asked prices are readily available be estimated using bid prices for assets and asked prices for liabilities.  Some Committee members believe that this requirement is inconsistent with the general concept of fair value and seems to be biased toward valuing assets and liabilities at value-in-exchange instead of value-in-use.  Limiting our discussion to the asset case, if a buyer establishes a long position through a dealer, the buyer must pay the asked price.  By purchasing the asset at the asked price, the buyer clearly expects to earn an acceptable rate of return on the investment in the asset (at the higher price).  Moreover, if after purchasing the asset, the buyer immediately applies the ED's proposed fair value measurement guidance (i.e., bid price valuation), the buyer would incur a loss on the asset equal to the bid-ask spread.

    In general, the bid price seems relevant only if the holder wishes to liquidate his/her position.  Although the Committee is not largely in favor of managerial intent-based fair value measures, we are uncomfortable with a bias toward a value-in-exchange premise for assets in-use.  If the Board decides to retain bid-based (ask-based) accounting for dealer traded assets (liabilities) in the final standard, then we propose that the final standard more clearly describe the conceptual basis for liquidation basis asset and liability valuation.

    Issue 9: Level 3 Estimates

    Level 3 estimates require considerable judgment in terms of both the selection and application of valuation techniques.  As a result, estimates using different valuation techniques with different assumptions will likely yield widely varying fair value estimates.  Examples 7 and 8 in Appendix B of the ED illustrate the wide variance in fair value estimates obtained with different valuation techniques.  The ED allows considerable latitude in both the valuation technique and inputs used.  Due to their incentives, managers might use the flexibility afforded by the proposed standard to produce biased and unreliable estimates.  The measurement guidance proposed in the ED is similar to the unstructured and imprecise category of standards analyzed by Nelson et al.  (2002).  They find that managers are more likely to attempt (and auditors are less likely to question) earnings management under such standards compared to more precise standards.

    The income approach to determining a Level 3 fair value estimate encompasses a basket of valuation techniques including two different present value techniques--the discount rate adjustment technique and the expected present value technique.4  The ED conjectures that these two techniques should produce the same fair values (see paragraphs A12, A13 and FN 17).  But, from an application perspective, this conjecture is not consistent with empirical results from studies of human judgment and decision making.5  In particular, psychology research repeatedly shows that people are very poor intuitive statisticians (e.g., people consistently make axiomatic violations when estimating probabilistic outcomes).  In light of these findings, statements such as "the estimated fair values should be the same" provide preparers, auditors, and users with an unfounded (and descriptively false) belief that the techniques suggested in the ED will produce the same fair value estimates.

    Some members of the Committee believe that the ED should explicitly caution preparers, auditors, and users by stating that individuals consistently make these judgment errors.  Further, these Committee members recommend that the ED require companies (when practicable) to (1) independently use the discount rate adjustment and expected present value techniques if they decide to use a present value approach to determine fair value and (2) reconcile the results of the two techniques in a meaningful fashion and document the reconciliation so it can be audited for reasonableness.  Moreover, the application of the present value techniques should be independent of suggested or existing fair value figures when practicable (e.g., the fair value amount recorded in the previous year's financial statements), because psychology research finds that preconceived targets and legacy amounts unduly influence current judgments and decisions (e.g., through "anchoring" and insufficient adjustment).

    Although the disclosures required under paragraph 25 of the ED provide some information regarding the potential reliability of a Level 3 estimate, they do not provide alternative benchmark models that the firm may have considered in determining those fair value estimates.  Hence, the Committee also recommends that the FASB consider requiring firms to disclose (1) fair value estimates under alternative valuation techniques, and (2) sensitivity of fair value estimates to the specific assumptions and inputs used.

    Issue 11: Fair Value Disclosures

    As mentioned previously, the Committee believes that the proposed fair value measurement disclosures are not complete.  The Committee believes that when a firm uses alternative valuation methods to determine fair value, information regarding the alternative techniques and inputs employed should be provided.  Furthermore, users of financial statements would get a better understanding of the reliability of fair value estimates if the financial statements provide detailed disclosures related to (1) fair value estimates produced by alternative valuation techniques and reasons for selecting a preferred estimate, and (2) information about the sensitivity of fair value estimates to changes in assumptions and inputs.

    The Committee also notes that the ED requires the expanded set of reliability related disclosures only for fair value estimates reported in the balance sheet (paragraph 25).  A complete set of financial statements also includes many fair value estimates reported in the notes to the financial statements.  Some members of the Committee believe that financial statement users would also benefit from receiving the reliability related disclosures for fair values disclosed in the footnotes.  Moreover, application of the fair value hierarchy has implications for the reliability of the unrealized gains and losses reported in net (or comprehensive) income.  Accordingly, some members recommend that firms be required to disclose a breakdown of unrealized gains or losses based on how the related fair value amounts were determined (i.e., quoted prices of identical items, quoted prices of similar items, valuation models with significant market inputs, or valuation models with significant entity inputs.)

    CONCLUSION

    The Committee supports the formulation of a single standard that provides guidance on fair value measurement.  We believe that such a standard would improve the consistency of fair value measurement across the many standards that require fair value reporting and disclosure.  In this comment letter, we identify some potential inconsistencies between fair value definitions and fair value determination, and suggest ways to improve disclosures so that users of financial statements can better appreciate the reliability (or lack thereof) of fair value estimates.

    Although the Committee recognizes that the ED is intended to provide fair value measurement guidance, we wish to caution against promulgating pronouncements that completely eliminate historical cost information from the financial statements.  Evidence reported in Dietrich et al. (2000) suggests that historical cost information is incrementally informative even after fair value information is included in regression analyses.


    4    FASB Concept Statement No. 7, Using Cash Flow Information and Present Value in Accounting Measurements, describes these techniques, albeit using different terminology.  In that Concepts Statement, traditional present value refers to the discount rate adjustment technique, while expected cash flow approach refers to the expected present value technique.

    5    Probability-related judgments and decisions are among the oldest branches of psychology and decision-science research.  Two excellent resources that catalogue the problems that individuals have with probability judgments and statistical reasoning are Baron (2000) and Goldstein and Hogarth (1997).

     

    What are the advantages and disadvantages of requiring fair value accounting for all financial instruments as well as derivative financial instruments?

    Advantages:

     

    1. Eliminate arbitrary FAS 115 classifications that can be used by management to manipulate earnings (which is what Freddie Mac did in 2001 and 1002.
    2. Reduce problems of applying FAS 133 in hedge accounting where hedge accounting is now allowed only when the hedged item is maintained at historical cost.
    3. Provide a better snap shot of values and risks at each point in time.  For example, banks now resist fair value accounting because they do not want to show how investment securities have dropped in value.

     

    Disdvantages:

     

    1. Combines fact and fiction in the sense that unrealized gains and losses due to fair value adjustments are combined with “real” gains and losses from cash transactions.  Many, if not most, of the unrealized gains and losses will never be realized in cash.  These are transitory fluctuations that move up and down with transitory markets.  For example, the value of a $1,000 fixed-rate bond moves up and down with interest rates when at expiration it will return the $1,000 no matter how interest rates fluctuated over the life of the bond.
    2. Sometimes difficult to value, especially OTC securities.
    3. Creates enormous swings in reported earnings and balance sheet values.
    4. Generally fair value is the estimated exit (liquidation) value of an asset or liability.  For assets, this is often much less than the entry (acquisition) value for a variety of reasons such as higher transactions costs of entry value, installation costs (e.g., for machines), and different markets  (e.g., paying dealer prices for acquisition and blue book for disposal).  For example, suppose Company A purchases a computer for $2 million that it can only dispose of for $1 million a week after the purchase and installation.  Fair value accounting requires expensing half of the computer in the first week even though the computer itself may be utilized for years to come.  This violates the matching principle of matching expenses with revenues, which is one of the reasons why fair value proponents generally do not recommend fair value accounting for operating assets. 
       

    "Derivatives and hedging:  An Analyst's Response to US FAS 133," by Frank Will, Corporate Finance Magazine, June 2002, http://www.corporatefinancemag.com/pdf/122341.pdf 

    However, FAS 133 still needs further clarification and improvement as the example of Fannie Mae shows. Analysts focus more on the economic value of a company and less on unrealised gains and losses.  Much of the FAS 133 volatility in earnings and in equity does not consistently reflect the economic situation.  This makes it difficult to interpret the figures.  Therefore, analysts welcome the decision of some companies voluntarily to disclose a separate set of figures excluding the effect of FAS 133.

    For more on Frank Will's analysis of FAS 133, Fair Value Accounting, and Fannie Mae, go to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

    Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm 

    You can read more about fair value at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms 

    Forwarded on May 11, 2003 by Patrick E Charles [charlesp@CWDOM.DM

    Mark-to-market rule should be written off

    Richard A. Werner Special to The Daily Yomiuri

    Yomiuri

    Since 1996, comprehensive accounting reforms have been gradually introduced in Japan. Since fiscal 2000, the valuation of investment securities owned by firms has been based on their market value at book-closing. Since fiscal 2001, securities held on a long-term basis also have been subjected to the mark-to-market rule. Now, the Liberal Democratic Party is calling for the suspension of the newly introduced rule to mark investments to market, as well as for a delay in the introduction of a new rule that requires fixed assets to be valued at their market value.

    The proponents of so-called global standards are up in arms at this latest intervention by the LDP. If marking assets to market is delayed, they argue, the nation will lag behind in the globalization of accounting standards. Moreover, they argue that corporate accounts must be as transparent as possible, and therefore should be marked to market as often and as radically as possible. On the other hand, opponents of the mark-to-market rule argue that the recent slump in the stock market, which has reached a 21-year low, can at least partly be blamed on the new accounting rules.

    What are we to make of this debate? Let us consider the facts. Most leading industrialized countries, such as Britain, France and Germany, so far have not introduced mark-to-market rules. Indeed, the vast majority of countries currently do not use them.

    Nevertheless, there is enormous political pressure to utilize mark-to-market accounting, and many countries plan to introduce the standard in 2005 or thereafter.

    Japan decided to adopt the new standard ahead of everyone else, based on the advice given by a few accountants--an industry that benefits from the revision of accounting standards as any rule change guarantees years of demand for their consulting services.

    However, so far there has not been a broad public debate about the overall benefits and disadvantages of the new standard. The LDP has raised the important point that such accounting changes might have unintended negative consequences for the macroeconomy.

    Let us first reflect on the microeconomic rationale supporting mark-to-market rules. They are said to render company accounts more transparent by calculating corporate balance sheets using the values that markets happen to indicate on the day of book- closing. Since book-closing occurs only once, twice or, at best, four times a year, any sudden or temporary move of markets on these days--easily possible in these times of extraordinary market volatility--will distort accounts rather than rendering them more transparent.

    Second, it is not clear that marking assets to market reflects the way companies look at their assets. While they know that market values are highly volatile, there is one piece of information about corporate assets that have an undisputed meaning for

    firms: the price at which they were actually bought.

    The purchase price matters as it reflects actual transactions and economic activity. Marking to market, on the other hand, means valuing assets at values at which they were never transacted. The company has neither paid nor received this theoretical money in exchange for the assets. This market value is hence a purely fictitious value. Instead of increasing transparency, we end up increasing the part of the accounts that is fiction.

    While the history of marking to market is brief, we do have some track record from the United States, which introduced mark-to-market accounting in the 1990s.

    Did the introduction increase accounting transparency? The U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board last November concluded that the new rule of marking to market allowed Enron Energy Services Inc. to book profits from long-term energy contracts immediately rather than when the money was actually received.

    This enabled Enron executives to create the illusion of a profitable business unit despite the fact that the truth was far from it. Thanks to mark-to-market accounting, Enron's retail division managed to hide significant losses and book billions of dollars in profits based on inflated predictions of future energy prices. Enron's executives received millions of dollars in bonuses when the energy contracts were signed.

    The U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board task force recognized the problems and has hence recommended the mark-to-market accounting rule be scrapped. Since this year, U.S. energy companies will only be able to report profits as income actually is received.

    Marking to market thus creates the illusion that theoretical market values can actually be realized. We must not forget that market values are merely the values derived on the basis of a certain number of transactions during the day in case.

    Strictly speaking, it is a false assumption to extend the same values to any number of assets that were not actually transacted at that value on that day.

    When a certain number of the 225 stocks constituting the Nikkei Stock Average are traded at a certain price, this does not say anything about the price that all stocks that have been issued by these 225 companies would have traded on that day.

    As market participants know well, the volume of transactions is an important indicator of how representative stock prices can be considered during any given day. If the index falls 1 percent on little volume, this is quickly discounted by many observers as it means that only a tiny fraction of shares were actually traded. If the market falls 1 percent on record volume, then this may be a better proxy of the majority of stock prices on that day.

    The values at which U.S. corporations were marked to market at the end of December 1999, at the peak of a speculative bubble, did little to increase transparency. If all companies had indeed sold their assets on that day, surely this would have severely depressed asset prices.

    Consider this: If your neighbor decides to sell his house for half price, how would you feel if the bank that gave you a mortgage argued that, according to the mark-to- market rule, it now also must halve the value of your house--and, as a result, they regret to inform you that you are bankrupt.

    We discussed the case of traded securities. But in many cases a market for the assets on a company's books does not actually exist. In this case, accountants use so-called net present value calculations to estimate a theoretical value. This means even greater fiction because the theoretical value depends crucially on assumptions made about interest rates, economic growth, asset markets and so on.

    Given the dismal track record of forecasters in this area, it is astonishing to find that serious accountants wish corporate accounts to be based on them.

    There are significant macroeconomic costs involved with mark-to-market accounting. As all companies will soon be forced to recalculate their balance sheets more frequently, the state of financial markets on the calculation day will determine whether they are still "sound," or in accounting terms, "bankrupt." While book value accounting tends to reduce volatility in markets to some extent, the new rule can only increase it. The implications are especially far-reaching in the banking sector since banks are not ordinary businesses, but fulfill the public function of creating and providing the money supply on which economic growth depends.

    U.S. experts warned years ago that the introduction of marking to market could create a credit crunch. As banks will be forced to set aside larger loan-loss reserves to cover loans that may have declined in value on the day of marking, bank earnings could be reduced. Banks might thus shy away from making loans to small or midsize firms under the new rules, where a risk premium exists and hence the likelihood of marking losses is larger. As a result, banks would have a disincentive to lend to small firms. Yet, for all we know, the small firm loans may yet be repaid in full.

    If banks buy a 10-year Japanese government bond with the intention to hold it until maturity, and the economy recovers, thus pushing down bond prices significantly, the market value of the government bonds will decline. Banks would thus be forced to book substantial losses on their bond holdings despite the fact that, by holding until maturity, they would never actually have suffered any losses. Japanese banks currently have vast holdings of government bonds. The change in accounting rules likely will increase problems in the banking sector. As banks reduce lending, economic growth will fall, thereby depressing asset prices, after which accountants will quickly try to mark down everyone's books.

    Of course, in good times, the opposite may occur, as we saw in the case of Enron. During upturns, marking to market may boost accounting figures beyond the actual state of reality. This also will boost banks' accounts (similar to the Bank for International Settlements rules announced in 1988), thus encouraging excessive lending. This in turn will fuel an economic boom, which will further raise the accounting values of assets.

    Thus does it make sense to mark everything to fictitious market values? We can conclude that marking to market has enough problems on the micro level to negate any potential benefits. On the macro level, the disadvantages will be far larger as asset price volatility will rise, business cycles will be exacerbated and economic activity will be destabilized.

    The world economy has done well for several centuries without this new rule. There is no evidence that it will improve anything. To the contrary, it is likely to prove harmful. The LDP must be lauded for its attempt to stop the introduction of these new accounting rules.

    Werner is an assistant professor of economics at Sophia University and chief economist at Tokyo-based investment adviser Profit Research Center Ltd.


    Measuring the Business Value of Stakeholder Relationships – all about social capital and how high-trust relationships affect the bottom line. Plus a new measurement tool for benchmarking the quality of stakeholder relationships --- www.cim.sfu.ca/newsletter 

    Trust, shared values and strong relationships aren't typical financial indicators but perhaps they should be. A joint study by CIM and the Schulich School of Business is examining the link between high trust stakeholder relationships and business value creation. The study is sponsored by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA).

    The research team is looking at how social capital can be applied to business. The aim of this project is to better understand corporate social capital, measure the quality of relationships, and provide the business community with ways to improve those relationships and in turn improve their bottom line.

    Because stakeholder relationships all have common features, direct comparisons of the quality of relationships can be made across diverse stakeholder groups, companies and industries.

    Social capital is “the stock of active connections among people; the trust, mutual understanding, and shared values and behaviors that bind the members of human networks and communities and make cooperative action possible” (Cohen and Prusak, 2000).

    So far the research suggests that trust, a cooperative spirit and shared understanding between a company and its stakeholders creates greater coherence of action, better knowledge sharing, lower transaction costs, lower turnover rates and organizational stability. In the bigger picture, social capital appears to minimize shareholder risk, promote innovation, enhance reputation and deepen brand loyalty.

    Preliminary results show that high levels of social capital in a relationship can build upon themselves. For example, as a company builds reputation among its peers for fair dealing and reliability in keeping promises, that reputation itself becomes a prized asset useful for sustaining its current alliances and forming future ones.

    The first phase of the research is now complete and the study moves into its second phase involving detailed case studies with six companies that have earned a competitive business advantage through their stakeholder relationships. Click here for a full report

    Bob Jensen's discussion of valuation and aggregation issues can be found at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm 


    That scenario isn't as farfetched as you might think. It's called a prediction market, based on the notion that a marketplace is a better organizer of insight and predictor of the future than individuals are. Once confined to research universities, the idea of markets working within companies has started to seep out into some of the nation's largest corporations. Companies from Microsoft to Eli Lilly and Hewlett-Packard are bringing the market inside, with workers trading futures contracts on such "commodities" as sales, product success and supplier behavior. The concept: a work force contains vast amounts of untapped, useful information that a market can unlock. "Markets are likely to revolutionize corporate forecasting and decision making," says Robin Hanson, an economist at George Mason University, in Virginia, who has researched and developed markets. "Strategic decisions, such as mergers, product introductions, regional expansions and changing CEOs, could be effectively delegated to people far down the corporate hierarchy, people not selected by or even known to top management."
    Barbara Kiviat (See below)

    "The End Of Management? by Barbara Kiviat, Time Magazine, July 12, 2004, pp. 88-92 --- http://www.time.com/time/insidebiz/printout/0,8816,1101040712-660965,00.html 

    The end of management just might look something like this. You show up for work, boot up your computer and log onto your company's Intranet to make a few trades before getting down to work. You see how your stocks did the day before and then execute a few new orders. You think your company should step up production next month, and you trade on that thought. You sell stock for the production of 20,000 units and buy stock that represents an order for 30,000 instead. All around you, as co-workers arrive at their cubicles, they too flick on their computers and trade.

    Together, you are buyers and sellers of your company's future. Through your trades, you determine what is going to happen and then decide how your company should respond. With employees in the trading pits betting on the future, who needs the manager in the corner office?

    That scenario isn't as farfetched as you might think. It's called a prediction market, based on the notion that a marketplace is a better organizer of insight and predictor of the future than individuals are. Once confined to research universities, the idea of markets working within companies has started to seep out into some of the nation's largest corporations. Companies from Microsoft to Eli Lilly and Hewlett-Packard are bringing the market inside, with workers trading futures contracts on such "commodities" as sales, product success and supplier behavior. The concept: a work force contains vast amounts of untapped, useful information that a market can unlock. "Markets are likely to revolutionize corporate forecasting and decision making," says Robin Hanson, an economist at George Mason University, in Virginia, who has researched and developed markets. "Strategic decisions, such as mergers, product introductions, regional expansions and changing CEOs, could be effectively delegated to people far down the corporate hierarchy, people not selected by or even known to top management."

    To understand the hype, take a look at Hewlett-Packard's experience with forecasting monthly sales. A few years back, HP commissioned Charles Plott, an economist from the California Institute of Technology, to set up a software trading platform. A few dozen employees, mostly product and finance managers, were each given about $50 in a trading account to bet on what they thought computer sales would be at the end of the month. If a salesman thought the company would sell between, say, $201 million and $210 million worth, he could buy a security — like a futures contract — for that prediction, signaling to the rest of the market that someone thought that was a probable scenario. If his opinion changed, he could buy again or sell.

    When trading stopped, the scenario behind the highest-priced stock was the one the market deemed most likely. The traders got to keep their profits and won an additional dollar for every share of "stock" they owned that turned out to be the right sales range. Result: while HP's official forecast, which was generated by a marketing manager, was off 13%, the stock market was off only 6%. In further trials, the market beat official forecasts 75% of the time.

    Intrigued by that success, HP's business-services division ran a pilot last year with 14 managers worldwide, trying to determine the group's monthly sales and profit. The market was so successful (in one case, improving the prediction 50%) that it has since been integrated into the division's regular forecasts. Another division is running a pilot to see if a market would be better at predicting the costs of certain components with volatile prices. And two other HP divisions hope to be using markets to answer similar questions by the end of the year. "You could do zillions of things with this," says Bernardo Huberman, director of the HP group that designs and coordinates the markets. "The idea of being able to forecast something allows you to prepare, plan and make decisions. It's potentially huge savings."

    Eli Lilly, one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world, which routinely places multimillion-dollar bets on drug candidates that face overwhelming odds of failure, wanted to see if it could get a better idea of which compounds would succeed. So last year Lilly ran an experiment in which about 50 employees involved in drug development — chemists, biologists, project managers — traded six mock drug candidates through an internal market. "We wanted to look at the way scattered bits of information are processed in the course of drug development," says Alpheus Bingham, vice president for Lilly Research Laboratories strategy. The market brought together all the information, from toxicology reports to clinical results, and correctly predicted the three most successful drugs.

    What's more, the market data revealed shades of opinion that never would have shown up if the traders were, say, responding to a poll. A willingness to pay $70 for a particular drug showed greater confidence than a bid at $60, a spread that wouldn't show if you simply asked, Will this drug succeed? "When we start trading stock, and I try buying your stock cheaper and cheaper, it forces us to a way of agreeing that never really occurs in any other kind of conversation," says Bingham. "That is the power of the market."

    The current enthusiasm can be traced in part, oddly enough, to last summer's high-profile flop of a market that was supposed to help predict future terrorist attacks. A public backlash killed that Pentagon project a few months before its debut, but not before the media broadcast the notion that useful information embedded within a group of people could be drawn out and organized via a marketplace. Says George Mason's Hanson, who helped design the market: "People noticed." Another predictive market, the Iowa Electronic Markets at the University of Iowa, has been around since 1988. That bourse has accepted up to $500 from anyone wanting to wager on election results. Players buy and sell outcomes: Is Kerry a win or Bush a shoo-in? This is the same information that news organizations and pollsters chase in the run-up to election night. Yet Iowa outperforms them 75% of the time.

    Inspired by such results, researchers at Microsoft started running trials of predictive markets in February, finding the system inexpensive to set up. Now they're shopping around for the market's first real use. An early candidate: predicting how long it will take software testers to adopt a new piece of technology. Todd Proebsting, who is spearheading the initiative, explains, "If the market says they're going to be behind schedule, executives can ask, What does the market know that we don't know?" Another option: predicting how many patches, or corrections, will be issued in the first six months of using a new piece of software. "The pilots worked great, but we had little to compare it to," he says. "You can reason that this would do a good job. But what you really want to show is that this works better than the alternative."

    Ultimately, "you may someday see someone in a desk job or a manufacturing job doing day trading, knowing that's part of the job," says Thomas Malone, a management professor at M.I.T. who has written about markets. "I'm very optimistic about the long-term prospects."

    But no market is perfect. Economists are still unsure of the human factor: how to get people to play and do their best. In the stock market or even the Iowa prediction market, people put up their own money and trade to make more. That incentive ensures that people trade on their best information. But a company that asks employees to risk their own money raises ethical questions, so most corporate markets use play money to trade and small bonuses or prizes for good traders. "Though this may look like God's gift to business, there are problems with it," says Plott, who ran the first HP experiments. Tokyo-based Dentsu, one of the world's largest advertising firms, is still grappling with incentives for an ad forecasting market it will launch later this year with the help of News Futures, a U.S. consultancy.

    And even if companies can figure out how to make their internal markets totally efficient, there are plenty of reasons that corporate America isn't about to jump wholesale onto the markets bandwagon. For one thing, markets, based on individuals and individual interests, could threaten the kind of team spirit that many corporations have struggled to cultivate. Established hierarchies could be threatened too. After all, a market implies that the current data crunching and decision-making process may not be as good as a gamelike system that often includes lower-level employees. In a sense, an internal market's success suggests that if upper managers would just give up control, things would run better. Lilly, which is considering using a market to forecast actual drug success, is still grappling with the potential ramifications. "We already have a rigorous process," says Lilly's Bingham. "So what do you do if you use a market and get different data?" Throw it out? Or say that the market was smarter, impugning the tried-and-true system?

    There could be risks to individual workers in an internal trading system as well. If you lose money in the market, does that mean you're not knowledgeable about something you should be? "You have to get people used to the idea of being accountable in a very different way," says Mary Murphy-Hoye, senior principal engineer at Intel, which has been experimenting with internal markets. "I can now tell if planners are any good, because they're making money or they're not making money."

    Continued in article


    Robert Walker's First Blog Entry is About Fair Value Accounting, October 27, 2006 --- http://www.robertbwalkerca.blogspot.com/

    Introduction
    I have decided to begin a commentary which expresses my views on accounting. As I begin to do this I envisage the source of my commentary to comprise three different sorts of writing in which I may engage:
    § Simple notes directly to the ‘blog’ such as this.
    § Formal submissions I may make to various bodies including the IASB.
    § Letters or reports I may write for one reason or another that I think might have some general readership.

    The expression of my views will stray from the subject matter of accounting per se to deal with matters of enormous significance to me such as corporate or public administration. Such expressions will not be too substantial a digression from the core subject matter because I believe that the foundation of good ‘corporate governance’, to use a vogue term, is accounting.

    Source of my ideas on accounting
    I would have to confess that the foundation upon which I base my philosophy of accounting is derivative, as much of human knowledge is of course. It is not for nothing that Newtown said that if he can see so far it is because he stands on the shoulders of giants. In my case, that ‘giant’ is Yuiji Ijiri. As I begin a detailed exposition of my views I shall return to the lessons I learned many years ago from Theory of Accounting Measurement, a neglected work that will still be read in 1,000 years or so long as humankind survives whichever is the shorter. As the depredations of the standard setting craze are visited upon us with ever increasing complexity, the message delivered by Ijiri will be heeded more an more.

    The basic structure of accounting
    Without wishing to be too philosophical about it, I need to begin by outlining what I mean by accounting. Accounting, in my mind, comprises three inter-related parts. These are:
    § Book-keeping.
    § Accounting.
    § Financial reporting.

    Book-keeping is the process of recording financial data elements in the underlying books of account. These financial data elements represent, or purport to represent, real world events. The heart of book-keeping is the double entry process. For instance at the most basic level a movement in cash will result in the surrender or receipt of an asset, the incurring or settlement of a liability and so on.

    I have no complete and coherent theory of the limits of book-keeping. Clearly cash movement (change of ownership) or the movement of commodity is the proper subject matter of book-keeping. Whether all forms of contract should be similarly treated is not clear to me. I am inclined to say yes. That is to adopt Ijiri’s theory of commitment accounting, but I can foresee that this leads me to conclusions that I may find unpalatable later on. Incidentally I say this because an epiphany I had, based on the notion of commitment accounting, some years ago is beginning to unravel.

    Book-keeping goes beyond recording to encompass control. That is the process by which the integrity of the centre piece of book-keeping – the general ledger expressing double entry – is ensured. I will not concern myself with such processes though this is not to say that they are unimportant.

    Accounting is the process by which sense is made of what is a raw record expressed in the general ledger. It is the process of distillation and summation that enables the accountant to gain on overview of what has happened to the entity the subject of the accounting. Accounting fundamentally assumes that the accountant is periodically capable of saying something useful about the real world using his or her special form of notation.

    Financial reporting is the process by which data is assembled into a comprehensive view of the world in accordance with a body of rules. It differs, in the ideal, from accounting in a number of ways. Most benignly it differs, for instance, by including ancillary information for the benefit of a reader beyond the mere abstraction from the general ledger. Again in the ideal there is an inter-relationship between the three levels in the accounting hierarchy. That is, the rules of financial reporting will, to some degree shape the order and format of the basic, book-keeping level so that the process of distillation and summation follows naturally to the final level of reporting without dramatic alteration.

    Perhaps what concerns me is that the sentiment expressed above can be seen, without much effort, to be only ideal and that in reality it does not arise. In short the golden strand that links the detailed recording of real world phenonmena to its final summation is broken.

    An example
    I was asked recently by a student of accounting to explain IAS 41, the IASB standard on agriculture. As I don’t deal in primary production at all, I had not thought about this subject for years.

    IAS 41 admonishes the accountant to apply ‘fair value’ accounting. Fair value accounting is the process by which current sale prices, or their proxies, are substituted for the past cost of any given item.

    For instance, you may have a mature vineyard. The vineyard comprises land, the vine and its fruit, the plant necessary to sustain the vine (support structures, irrigation channels etc.). Subsumed within the vine are the materials necessary for it to grow and start producing fruit. This will include the immature plant, the chemical supplements necessary to nurture and protect it, and the labour necessary to apply it.

    The book-keeping process will faithfully record all of these components. Suppose for example the plant, fertliser and labour cost $1000. In the books will be recorded:

    Dr Vineyard $1000
    Cr Cash $1000

    At the end of the accounting period, the accountant will summarise this is a balance statement. He or she will then obtain, in some way, the current selling price of the vine. Presumably this will be the future cash stream of selling the fruit, suitably discounted. Assume that this is $1200.

    The accountant will then make the following incremental adjustment:

    Dr Vineyard $200
    Cr Equity $200

    Looked like this there is a connection between the original book-keeping and the periodic adjustment at the end of the accounting period. This is an illusion. The incremental entry disguises what is really happening. It is as follows:

    Dr Equity $1000
    Cr Vineyard $1000

    And

    Dr Vineyard $1200
    Cr Equity $1200

    Considered from the long perspective, the original book-keeping has been discarded and a substitute value put in its place. This is the truth of the matter. The subject matter of the first phase of accounting was a set of events arising in a bank and in the entity undertaking accounting. The subject matter of the second phase is a set of future sales to a party who does not yet exist.

    From a perspective of solvency determination, a vital element of corporate governance, the view produced by the first phase is next to useless. However, the disquiet I had in my mind which I had suppressed until recently, relates to the shattering of the linkages between the three levels of accounting in the final reporting process. This disquiet has returned as I contemplate the apparently unstoppable momentum of the standard setting process.

    October 28, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Robert,

    I hope you add many more entries to your blog.

    The problem with "original book-keeping" is that it provides no answers about how to account for risk of many modern day contracts that were not imagined when "original book-keeping" evolved in a simple world of transactions. For example, historical costs of forward contracts and swaps are zero and yet these contracts may have risks that may outweigh all the recorded debt under "original book-keeping." Once we opened the door to fair value accounting to better account for risk, however, we opened the door to misleading the public that booked fair value adjustments can be aggregated much like we sum the current balances of assets and liabilities on the balance sheet. Such aggregations are generally nonsense.

    I don't know if you saw my recent hockey analogy or not. It goes as follows:

    Goal Tenders versus Movers and Shakers
    Skate to where the puck is going, not to where it is.

    Wayne Gretsky (as quoted for many years by Jerry Trites at http://www.zorba.ca/ )

    Jensen Comment
    This may be true for most hockey players and other movers and shakers, but for goal tenders the eyes should be focused on where the puck is at every moment ---  not where it's going. The question is whether an accountant is a goal tender (stewardship responsibilities) or a mover and shaker (part of the managerial decision making team). This is also the essence of the debate of historical accounting versus pro forma accounting.

    Graduate student Derek Panchuk and professor Joan Vickers, who discovered the Quiet Eye phenomenon, have just completed the most comprehensive, on-ice hockey study to determine where elite goalies focus their eyes in order to make a save. Simply put, they found that goalies should keep their eyes on the puck. In an article to be published in the journal Human Movement Science, Panchuk and Vickers discovered that the best goaltenders rest their gaze directly on the puck and shooter's stick almost a full second before the shot is released. When they do that they make the save over 75 per cent of the time.
    "Keep your eyes on the puck," PhysOrg, October 26, 2006 --- http://physorg.com/news81068530.html

    I have written a more serious piece about both theoretical and practical problems of fair value accounting. I should emphasize that this was written after the FASB Exposure Draft proposing fair value accounting as an option for all financial instruments and the culminating FAS 157 that is mainly definitional and removed the option to apply fair value accounting to all financial instruments even though it is still required in many instances by earlier FASB standards.

    My thoughts on this are at the following link:

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm

    Bob Jensen

     


    E-COMMERCE AND AUDITING FAIR VALUES SUBJECTS OF NEW INTERNATIONAL GUIDANCE The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) invites comments on two new exposure drafts (EDs): Auditing Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures and Electronic Commerce: Using the Internet or Other Public Networks - Effect on the Audit of Financial Statements. Comments on both EDs, developed by IFAC's International Auditing Practices Committee (IAPC), are due by January 15, 2002. See http://accountingeducation.com/news/news2213.html  

    The IFAC link is at http://www.ifac.org/Guidance/EXD-Download.tmpl?PubID=1003772692151 

    The purpose of this International Standard on Auditing (ISA) is to establish standards and provide guidance on auditing fair value measurements and disclosures contained in financial statements. In particular, this ISA addresses audit considerations relating to the valuation, measurement, presentation and disclosure for material assets, liabilities and specific components of equity presented or disclosed at fair value in financial statements. Fair value measurements of assets, liabilities and components of equity may arise from both the initial recording of transactions and later changes in value.

     
    Download
    "Auditing Fair Value Measurements And Disclosures"
    in MS Word format.

    File Size: 123 Kbytes
    Download
    "Auditing Fair Value Measurements And Disclosures"
    in Adobe Acrobat format.

    File Size: 209 Kbytes


    The FASB's Statement No. 148

    FAS 148 improves disclosures for stock-based compensation and provides alternative transition methods for companies that switch to the fair value method of accounting for stock options --- http://www.fasb.org/news/nr123102.shtml 
    The transition guidance and annual disclosure provisions of Statement 148 are effective for fiscal years ending after December 15, 2002, with earlier application permitted in certain circumstances.  .  Fair value accounting is still optional (until the FASB finally makes up its mind on stock options.)

    FASB Amends Transition Guidance for Stock Options and Provides Improved Disclosures

    Norwalk, CT, December 31, 2002—The FASB has published Statement No. 148, Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation—Transition and Disclosure, which amends FASB Statement No. 123, Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation. In response to a growing number of companies announcing plans to record expenses for the fair value of stock options, Statement 148 provides alternative methods of transition for a voluntary change to the fair value based method of accounting for stock-based employee compensation. In addition, Statement 148 amends the disclosure requirements of Statement 123 to require more prominent and more frequent disclosures in financial statements about the effects of stock-based compensation.

    Under the provisions of Statement 123, companies that adopted the preferable, fair value based method were required to apply that method prospectively for new stock option awards. This contributed to a “ramp-up” effect on stock-based compensation expense in the first few years following adoption, which caused concern for companies and investors because of the lack of consistency in reported results. To address that concern, Statement 148 provides two additional methods of transition that reflect an entity’s full complement of stock-based compensation expense immediately upon adoption, thereby eliminating the ramp-up effect.

    Statement 148 also improves the clarity and prominence of disclosures about the pro forma effects of using the fair value based method of accounting for stock-based compensation for all companies—regardless of the accounting method used—by requiring that the data be presented more prominently and in a more user-friendly format in the footnotes to the financial statements. In addition, the Statement improves the timeliness of those disclosures by requiring that this information be included in interim as well as annual financial statements. In the past, companies were required to make pro forma disclosures only in annual financial statements.

    The transition guidance and annual disclosure provisions of Statement 148 are effective for fiscal years ending after December 15, 2002, with earlier application permitted in certain circumstances. The interim disclosure provisions are effective for financial reports containing financial statements for interim periods beginning after December 15, 2002.

    As previously reported, the FASB has solicited comments from its constituents relating to the accounting for stock-based compensation, including valuation of stock options, as part of its recently issued Invitation to Comment, Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation: A Comparison of FASB Statement No. 123, Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation, and Its Related Interpretations, and IASB Proposed IFRS, Share-based Payment. That Invitation to Comment explains the similarities of and differences between the proposed guidance on accounting for stock-based compensation included in the International Accounting Standards Board’s (IASB’s) recently issued exposure draft and the FASB’s guidance under Statement 123.

    After considering the responses to the Invitation to Comment, the Board plans to make a decision in the latter part of the first quarter of 2003 about whether it should undertake a more comprehensive reconsideration of the accounting for stock options. As part of that process, the Board may revisit its 1995 decision permitting companies to disclose the pro forma effects of the fair value based method rather than requiring all companies to recognize the fair value of employee stock options as an expense in the income statement. Under the provisions of Statement 123 that remain unaffected by Statement 148, companies may either recognize expenses on a fair value based method in the income statement or disclose the pro forma effects of that method in the footnotes to the financial statements.

    Copies of Statement 148 may be obtained by contacting the FASB’s Order Department at 800-748-0659 or by placing an order at the FASB’s website at www.fasb.org .


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Reviews on June 20, 2002

    TITLE: And, Now the Question is: Where's the Next Enron? 
    REPORTER: Cassell Bryan-Low and Ken Brown 
    DATE: Jun 18, 2002 PAGE: C1 LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1024356537931110920.djm,00.html  
    TOPICS: off balance sheet financing, Related-party transactions, loan guarantees, Accounting, Fair Value Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Regulation, Securities and Exchange Commission

    SUMMARY: In the wake of the Enron accounting debacle, investors are concerned that another Enron-like situation could occur. The article describes steps taken to improve the quality of financial reporting.

    QUESTIONS: 

    1.) Why is it important that investors and other financial statement users have confidence in financial reporting?

    2.) What is a related-party transaction? What accounting issues are associated with related-party transactions? What changes in disclosing and accounting for related party transactions are proposed? Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed changes.

    3.) What is off-balance sheet financing? How was Enron able to avoid reporting liabilities on its balance sheet? What changes concerning special-purpose entities are proposed? Will the proposed changes prevent future Enron-like situations? Support your answer.

    4.) When are companies required to report loan guarantees as liabilities? What changes are proposed? Do you agree with the proposed changes? Support your answer.

    5.) What is mark to market accounting? How did mark to market accounting contribute to the Enron debacle? Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of proposed changes related to mark to market accounting.

    6.) What are pro forma earnings? How can pro forma earnings be used to mislead investors? What changes in the presentation of pro forma earnings are proposed? Will the proposed changes protect investors?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

    Controversies over revenue reporting are discussed at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm 


    From the Free Wall Street Journal Educators' Reviews for December 6, 2001 

    TITLE: Audits of Arthur Andersen Become Further Focus of Investigation
    SEC REPORTER: Jonathan Weil
    DATE: Nov 30, 2001 PAGE: A3 LINK:
         http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1007059096430725120.djm
     
    TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Auditing

    SUMMARY: This article focuses on the issues facing Arthur Andersen now that their work on the Enron audit has become the subject of an SEC investigation. The on-line version of the article provides three questions that are attributed to "some accounting professors." The questions in this review expand on those three provided in the article.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) The first question the SEC might ask of Enron's auditors is "were financial statement disclosures regarding Enron's transactions too opaque to understand?" Are financial statement disclosures required to be understandable? To whom? Who is responsible for ensuring a certain level of understandability?

    2.) Another question that the SEC could consider is whether Andersen auditors were aware that certain off-balance-sheet partnerships should have been consolidated into Enron's balance sheet, as they were in the company's recent restatement. How could the auditors have been "unaware" that certain entities should have been consolidated? What is the SEC's concern with whether or not the auditors were aware of the need for consolidation?

    3.) A third question that the SEC could ask is, "Did Andersen auditors knowingly sign off on some 'immaterial' accounting violations, ignoring that they collectively distorted Enron's results?" Again, what is the SEC's concern with whether Andersen was aware of the collective impact of the accounting errors? Should Andersen have been aware of the collective amount of impact of these errors? What steps would you suggest in order to assess this issue?

    4.) The article finishes with a discussion of expected Congressional hearings into Enron's accounting practices and into the accounting and auditing standards setting process in general. What concern is there that the FASB "has been working on a project for more than a decade to tighten the rules governing when companies must consolidate certain off-balance sheet 'special purpose entities'"?

    5.) In general, how stringent are accounting and auditing requirements in the U.S. relative to other countries' standards? Are accounting standards in other countries set in the same way as in the U.S.? If not, who establishes standards? What incentives would the U.S. Congress have to establish a law-based system if they become convinced that our private sector standards setting practices are inadequate? Are you concerned about having accounting and reporting standards established by law?

    6.) The article describes revenue recognition practices at Enron that were based on "noncash unrealized gains." What standard allows, even requires, this practice? Why does the author state, "to date, the accounting standards board has given energy traders almost boundless latitude to value their energy contracts as they see fit"?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University


    CPA2Biz Unveils Business Valuation Resource Center --- http://www.smartpros.com/x31976.xml 

    The BV Center will include resources and information from the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and industry experts on various factors affecting the value of a business or a transaction, such as mergers and acquisitions; economic damages due to a patent infringement or breaches of contract; bankruptcy or a reorganization; or fraud due to anti-trust actions or embezzlement. The BV Center will provide a comprehensive combination of solutions that meet the professional needs of CPAs practicing business valuation, including those who have achieved the AICPA's Accredited in Business Valuation credential. The BV Center will also provide networking communities for BV practitioners as well as a public forum for discussion of business valuation trends, developments and issues.

    "Tremendous growth in the BV discipline, coupled with a dynamic group of factors affecting business valuation, means that CPAs need a consistent, timely and relevant vehicle through which BV-related information can be disseminated to them," said Erik Asgeirsson, Vice President of Product Management at CPA2Biz. "The BV Center on CPA2Biz will provide them with AICPA books, practice aids, newsletters and software, along with industry expert literature and complementary third-party products and solutions. Because the issues associated with valuation impact CPAs in both public and private sectors -- auditors, tax practitioners, personal financial planners as well as BV specialists -- the BV Center will have a powerful horizontal impact on the profession."

    "I think that CPAs who practice in business valuation ought to go to the BV Center for information and tools that are timely, relevant and easy to obtain," said Thomas Hilton, CPA/ABV, Chairman of the AICPA Business Valuation Subcommittee. "The BV Center is a source CPAs can use to offer their clients a higher level of service, as well as to connect with other CPAs who provide valuation services."

    The CPA2Biz Website is at www.cpa2biz.com/ 

    Selected References on Accounting for Intangibles 
    (most of which were published after the above paper was written)

    BARUCH LEV'S NEW BOOK Brookings Institution Press has just issued Baruch's new book, Intangibles: Management, Measurement and Reporting. Regardless of the "dot com" collapse, this subject continues to be high on the corporate executive's agenda. Baruch foresees increasing attention being paid to intangibles by both managers and investors. He feels there is an urgent need to improve both the management reporting and external disclosure about intellectual capital. He proposes that we seriously consider revamping our accounting model and significantly broaden the recognition of intangible assets on the balance sheet. The book can be ordered at https://www.brookings.edu/press/books/intangibles_book.htm 

    Professor Lev's free documents on this topic can be downloaded from  http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/newnew.html 

     

    SSRN's Top 10 Downloads 
    (The abstracts are free, but the downloads themselves are not free,. However, your library may provide you with free SSRN downloads if it subscribes to SSRN)

    One approach to finding the “top” papers is to download the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) Top 10 downloads in various categories --- http://papers.ssrn.com/toptens/tt_ntwk_all.html
    This database is limited to the selected papers included in the database.

    For accounting, SSRN’s Top 10 papers are at http://papers.ssrn.com/toptens/tt_ntwk_204_home.html#ARN 
    The average number of downloads of this top accounting research network paper is 227 per month.  In contrast the top economics network research paper has an average of 2,375 downloads per month.  Downloads in other disciplines depend heavily upon the number of graduate students and practitioners in that discipline.

    The top ten downloads from the accounting network are as follows (note that some authors like Mike Jensen are not accountants or accounting educators):

    16010 A Comparison of Dividend, Cash Flow, and Earnings Approaches to Equity Valuation
    THEODORE SOUGIANNIS and STEPHEN H. PENMAN
    University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and Columbia School of Business
    Date posted to database:March 31, 1997
    10201 Value Based Management: Economic Value Added or Cash Value Added?
    FREDRIK WEISSENRIEDER
    Anelda AB
    Date posted to database:April 5, 1999
    8041 Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
    Michael C. Jensen, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS, Harvard University Press, Dec. 2000, and The Journal Of Financial Economics, 1976.
    MICHAEL C. JENSEN and WILLIAM H. MECKLING
    The Monitor Company and Deceased, University of Rochester Simon School
    Date posted to database:July 19, 1998
    7607 Evidence on EVA®
    Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 12, No. 2, Summer 1999
    GARY C. BIDDLE, ROBERT M. BOWEN and JAMES S. WALLACE
    Hong Kong University of Science & Technology, University of Washington and University of California at Irvine
    Date posted to database:September 20, 1999
    5194 A Generalized Earnings Model of Stock Valuation
    ANDREW ANG and JUN LIU
    Columbia Business School and University of California, Los Angeles
    Date posted to database:July 18, 1998
    5046 Which is More Value-Relevant: Earnings or Cash Flows?
    ERVIN L. BLACK
    Brigham Young University
    Date posted to database:September 2, 1998
    4927 Combining Earnings and Book Value in Equity Valuation
    STEPHEN H. PENMAN
    Columbia School of Business
    Date posted to database:November 5, 1997
    4254 Separation of Ownership and Control
    Michael C. Jensen, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY, Harvard University Press, 1998, and Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, June 1983
    EUGENE F. FAMA and MICHAEL C. JENSEN
    University of Chicago and The Monitor Company
    Date posted to database:November 29, 1998
    3843 Value Creation and its Measurement: A Critical Look at EVA
    IGNACIO VELEZ-PAREJA
    Politecnico Grancolombiano
    Date posted to database:May 19, 1999
    3771 Ratio Analysis and Equity Valuation
    DORON NISSIM and STEPHEN H. PENMAN
    Columbia Business School and Columbia School of Business
    Date posted to database:May 11, 1999
     
    Other Links on Accounting for Intangibles

    "ACCOUNTING FOR INTANGIBLES: THE GREAT DIVIDE BETWEEN OBSCURITY IN INNOVATION ACTIVITIES AND THE BALANCE SHEET," by Anne Wyatt, The Singapore Economic Review, Vol. 46, No. 1 pp. 83-117 --- http://www.worldscinet.com/ser/46/sample/S0217590801000243.html 

    "Accounting for Intangibles: The New Frontier" by Baruch Lev (January 11, 2001) --- http://www.nyssa.org/abstract/acct_intangibles.html 

    FAS 141 and 142 Summary (October 22, 2001) --- http://www.aasb.com.au/workprog/board_papers/public/docs/Agenda_paper_9-1_Accounting_for_Intangibles.pdf 

    New Rules Summary by Paul Evans (February 24, 2002) --- http://bloodstone.atkinson.yorku.ca/domino/Html/users/pevans/pewwwdl.nsf/98615e08bc387dd385256709007822b0/ddc242fb07932d4f85256b6a00494e9c?OpenDocument 

    ACCOUNTING FOR INTANGIBLES: A LITERATURE REVIEW, Journal of Accounting Literature, Vol. 19, 2000  
    by Leandro Cañibano Autonomous University of Madrid Manuel García-Ayuso University of Seville Paloma Sánchez Autonomous University of Madrid --- http://www.finansanalytiker.no/innhold/aktiv_presinv/Conf050901/Jal.pdf 

    "‘ACCOUNTING FOR INTANGIBLES’ AT THE ACCOUNTING COURT," by Jan-Erik Gröjer and Ulf Johanson --- http://www.vn.fi/ktm/1/aineeton/seminar/johanback.htm 

    NYU Intangibles Research Project --- http://www.stern.nyu.edu/ross/ProjectInt/about/ 

    "Alan Kay talks with Baruch Lev," (June 19, 2001) --- http://www.kmadvantage.com/docs/Leadership/Baruch%20Lev%20on%20Intangible%20Assets.pdf 

    International Accounting Standard No. 38 --- http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp?s=1020299&sc={2954EE08-82A0-4BC0-8AC0-1DE567F35613}&sd=928976660&n=982 

    IAS 38: Intangible Assets

    IAS 38, Intangible Assets, was approved by the IASB Board in July 1998 and became operative for annual financial statements covering periods beginning on or after 1 July 1999.

    IAS 38 supersedes:

    • IAS 4, Depreciation Accounting, with respect to the amortisation (depreciation) of intangible assets; and
    • IAS 9, Research and Development Costs.

    In 1998, IAS 39: Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, amended a paragraph of IAS 38 to replace the reference to IAS 25, Accounting for Investments, by reference to IAS 39.

    One SIC Interpretation relates to IAS 38:


    Summary of IAS 38

    IAS 38 applies to all intangible assets that are not specifically dealt with in other International Accounting Standards. It applies, among other things, to expenditures on:

    • advertising,
    • training,
    • start-up, and
    • research and development (R&D) activities.

    IAS 38 supersedes IAS 9, Research and Development Costs. IAS 38 does not apply to financial assets, insurance contracts, mineral rights and the exploration for and extraction of minerals and similar non-regenerative resources. Investments in, and awareness of the importance of, intangible assets have increased significantly in the last two decades.

    The main features of IAS 38 are:

    • an intangible asset should be recognised initially, at cost, in the financial statements, if, and only if:

      (a) the asset meets the definition of an intangible asset. Particularly, there should be an identifiable asset that is controlled and clearly distinguishable from an enterprise's goodwill;

      (b) it is probable that the future economic benefits that are attributable to the asset will flow to the enterprise; and

      (c) the cost of the asset can be measured reliably.

      This requirement applies whether an intangible asset is acquired externally or generated internally. IAS 38 also includes additional recognition criteria for internally generated intangible assets;

       

    • if an intangible item does not meet both the definition, and the criteria for the recognition, of an intangible asset, IAS 38 requires the expenditure on this item to be recognised as an expense when it is incurred. An enterprise is not permitted to include this expenditure in the cost of an intangible asset at a later date;

       

    • it follows from the recognition criteria that all expenditure on research should be recognised as an expense. The same treatment applies to start-up costs, training costs and advertising costs. IAS 38 also specifically prohibits the recognition as assets of internally generated goodwill, brands, mastheads, publishing titles, customer lists and items similar in substance. However, some development expenditure may result in the recognition of an intangible asset (for example, some internally developed computer software);

       

    • in the case of a business combination that is an acquisition, IAS 38 builds on IAS 22: Business Combinations, to emphasise that if an intangible item does not meet both the definition and the criteria for the recognition for an intangible asset, the expenditure for this item (included in the cost of acquisition) should form part of the amount attributed to goodwill at the date of acquisition. This means that, among other things, unlike current practices in certain countries, purchased R&D-in-process should not be recognised as an expense immediately at the date of acquisition but it should be recognised as part of the goodwill recognised at the date of acquisition and amortised under IAS 22, unless it meets the criteria for separate recognition as an intangible asset;

       

    • after initial recognition in the financial statements, an intangible asset should be measured under one of the following two treatments:

      (a) benchmark treatment: historical cost less any amortisation and impairment losses; or

      (b) allowed alternative treatment: revalued amount (based on fair value) less any subsequent amortisation and impairment losses. The main difference from the treatment for revaluations of property, plant and equipment under IAS 16 is that revaluations for intangible assets are permitted only if fair value can be determined by reference to an active market. Active markets are expected to be rare for intangible assets;

       

    • intangible assets should be amortised over the best estimate of their useful life. IAS 38 does not permit an enterprise to assign an infinite useful life to an intangible asset. It includes a rebuttable presumption that the useful life of an intangible asset will not exceed 20 years from the date when the asset is available for use. IAS 38 acknowledges that, in rare cases, there may be persuasive evidence that the useful life of an intangible asset will exceed 20 years. In these cases, an enterprise should amortise the intangible asset over the best estimate of its useful life and:

      (a) test the intangible asset for impairment at least annually in accordance with IAS 36: Impairment of Assets; and

      (b) disclose the reasons why the presumption that the useful life of an intangible asset will not exceed 20 years is rebutted and also the factor(s) that played a significant role in determining the useful life of the asset;

       

    • required disclosures on intangible assets will enable users to understand, among other things, the types of intangible assets that are recognised in the financial statements and the movements in their carrying amount (book value) during the year. IAS 38 also requires disclosure of the amount of research and development expenditure recognised as an expense during the year; and

       

    • IAS 38 is operative for annual accounting periods beginning on or after 1 July 1999. IAS 38 includes transitional provisions that clarify when the Standard should be applied retrospectively and when it should be applied prospectively.

    To avoid creating opportunities for accounting arbitrage in an acquisition by recognising an intangible asset that is similar in nature to goodwill (such as brands and mastheads) as goodwill rather than an intangible asset (or vice versa), the amortisation requirements for goodwill in IAS 22: Business Combinations are consistent with those of IAS 38.

     


    FASB REPORT - BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL REPORTING, CHALLENGES FROM THE NEW ECONOMY NO. 219-A April 2001 Author: Wayne S. Upton, Jr. Source: Financial Accounting Standards Board --- http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/fasb/new_economy.html 
    Upton's book challenges Lev's contention that the existing standards are enormously inadequate for the "New Economy."


    The Garten SEC Report: A press release and an executive summary are available at http://www.mba.yale.edu  
    The Garten SEC Report supports Lev's contention that the existing standards are enormously inadequate for the "New Economy."
    (You can request a copy of the full report using an email address provided at the above URL)

    Trinity University students may access this report at J:\courses\acct5341\readings\sec\garten.doc 


    FEI BUSINESS COMBINATIONS VIDEO PROGRAM http://www.fei.org/confsem/bizcombo2k2/agenda.cfm 

    American Accounting Association (AAA) members may view a replay of a day-long webcast on accounting for business combinations and intangible valuations (SFAS 141 and 142) at half the price that will be charged to other non-FEI members ($149 versus $299). The FEI hopes to use funds generated from AAA members to help the FEI assume sponsorship of a Corporate Accounting Policy Seminar.

    The webcast encompassed five presentations by experts with question-and-answer periods: (1) Overview of SFAS 141/142, by G. Michael Crooch, FASB Board Member; (2) Recognition and Measurement of Intangibles, by Tony Aarron of E&Y Valuation Services and Steve Gerard of Standard and Poors's, (3) Impact on Doing Deals: Structure, Pricing and Process, by Raymond Beier of PWC and Elmer Huh, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, (4) Testing for Goodwill Impairment, by Mitch Danaher of GE, and (5) Transition Issues and Financial Statement Disclosures, by Julie A. Erhardt of Arthur Andersen's Professional Standards Group.


    As an example (Digital Island Inc.) of the impact of FAS 142 on impairment testing for goodwill, please print the following document: http://www.edgar-online.com/brand/businessweek/glimpse/glimpse.pl?symbol=ISLD 

    Amortization of intangible assets. Amortization expense increased to $153.7 million for the nine months ended June 30, 2001 from $106.4 million for the nine months ended June 30, 2000. This increase was primarily due to a full period

    of amortization of the goodwill and intangibles related to the acquisitions of Sandpiper, Live On Line and SoftAware, which were completed in December 1999, January 2000 and September 2000, respectively. This increase was offset by a decrease in the current quarter's amortization as a direct result of a $1.0 billion impairment charge on goodwill and intangible assets in the quarter ended March 31, 2001. Amortization of intangible assets is expected to decrease in future periods due to this impairment charge.

    Impairment of Goodwill and Intangible Assets. Impairment of goodwill and intangible assets was recorded in the amount of $1,039.2 million. The impairment charge was based on management performing an impairment assessment of the goodwill and identifiable intangible assets recorded upon the acquisitions of Sandpiper, Live On Line and SoftAware, which were completed during the year ended September 30, 2000. The assessment was performed primarily due to the significant decline in stock price since the date the shares issued in each acquisition were valued. As a result of this review, management recorded the impairment charge to reduce goodwill and acquisition-related intangible assets. The charge was determined as the excess of the carrying value of the assets over the related estimated discounted cash flows.


    Forwarded by Storhaug [storhaug@BTIGATE.COM

    To follow up on this list's earlier brief discussion on FASB 141 & 142, below is a bookmark to a site "CFO.COM" which has an excellent compendium of articles and links, all of which help you evaluate these new FASB's.

    http://www.cfo.com/fasbguide 

    "The Goodwill Games How to Tackle FASB's New Merger Rules," by Craig Schneider, CFO.com --- http://www.cfo.com/fasbguide 

    The thrill of victory and the agony of defeat. Chances are senior financial executives will experience a similar range of emotions while wrestling with the Financial Accounting Standards Board's new rules for business combinations, goodwill, and intangibles. Use CFO.com's special report for tips on tackling the impairment test, avoiding Securities & Exchange Commission inquiries, finding valuation experts, and much more. While accounting is not yet an Olympic sport, with the right training, you'll take home the gold. We welcome your questions and comments. E-mail craigschneider@cfo.com.
    Take Your First Steps

    How to Survive the SEC's Second Guessing
    New rules for recording goodwill and intangibles may inadvertently produce more restatements.

    Cramming for the Final
    Get up to speed on the latest accounting rule changes for treating goodwill and intangibles.

    Pool's Closed
    FASB's new merger-accounting rules have already won some fans among deal makers.
    (CFO Magazine)

    Intangibles Revealed
    Once you identify them, how much will the fair value assessments cost?

    Four Ways to Say Goodbye to Goodwill Amortization
    Expert tips for tackling the impairment test.

     

    Congratulations to Baruch Lev from NYU --- http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/main.html 

    Baruch's picture adorns the cover of Financial Executive, March/April 2002 --- http://www.fei.org/magazine/marapr-2002.cfm 

    The cover story entitled "Rethinking Accounting:  Intangibles at a Crossroads:  What Next?" on pp. 34-39 --- http://www.fei.org/magazine/articles/3-4-2002_CoverStory.cfm 
    The concluding passage is quoted below:

    The Inertness and Commoditization of Intangibles 

    Intangibles are inert - by themselves, they neither create value nor generate growth. In fact, without efficient support and enhancement systems, the value of intangibles dissipates much quicker than that of physical assets. Some examples of inertness: uHighly qualified scientists at Merck, Pfizer, or Ely Lilly (human capital intangibles) are unlikely to generate consistently winning products without innovative processes for drug research, such as the "scientific method," based on the biochemical roots of the target diseases, according to Rebecca Henderson, a specialist on scientific drug research, in Industrial and Corporate Change. Even exceptional scientists using the traditional "random search" methods for drug development will hit on winners only randomly, writes Henderson.

    uA large patent portfolio at DuPont or Dow Chemical (intellectual property) is by itself of little value without a comprehensive decision support system that periodically inventories all patents, slates them by intended use (internal or collaborative development, licensing out or abandonment) and systematically searches and analyzes the patent universe to determine whether the company's technology is state-of-the-art and competitive.

    uA rich customer database (customer intangibles) at Amazon.com or Circuit City will not generate value without efficient, user-friendly distribution channels and highly trained and motivated sales forces.

    Worse than just inert, intangibles are very susceptible to value dissipation (quick amortization) - much more so than other assets. Patents that are not constantly defended against infringement will quickly lose value due to "invention around" them. Highly trained employees will defect to competitors without adequate compensation systems and attractive workplace conditions. Valuable brands may quickly deteriorate to mere "names" when the firm - such as a Xerox, Yahoo! or Polaroid - loses its competitive advantage. The absence of active markets for most intangibles (with certain patents and trademark exceptions) strips them of value on a stand-alone basis.

    Witness the billions of dollars of intangibles (R&D, customer capital, trained employees) lost at all the defunct dot-coms, or at Enron, or at AOL Time Warner Co., which in January 2002 announced a whopping write-off of $40-60 billion - mostly from intangibles.

    Intangibles are not only inert, they are also, by and large, commodities in the current economy, meaning that most business enterprises have equal access to them. Baxter and Johnson & Johnson, along with the major biotech companies, have similar access to the best and brightest of pharmaceutical researchers (human capital); every retailer can acquire the state-of-the-art supply chains and distribution channel technologies capable of creating supplier and customer-related intangibles (such as mining customer information); most companies can license-in patents or acquire R&D capabilities via corporate acquisitions; and brands are frequently traded. The sad reality about commodities is that they fail to create considerable value. Since competitors have equal access to such assets, at best, they return the cost of capital (zero value added).

    The inertness and commoditization of most intangibles have important implications for the intangibles movement. They imply that corporate value creation depends critically on the organizational infrastructure of the enterprise - on the business processes and systems that transform "lifeless things," tangible and intangible, to bundles of assets generating cash flows and conferring competitive positions. Such organizational infrastructure, when operating effectively, is the major intangible of the firm. It is, by definition, noncommoditized, since it has to fit the specific mission, culture, and environment of the enterprise. Thus, by its idiosyncratic nature, organizational infrastructure is the major intangible of the enterprise.

    Focusing the Intangibles Efforts 

    Following Phase I of the intangibles work, which was primarily directed at documentation and awareness-creation, it's now time to focus on organizational infrastructure, the intangible that counts most and about which we know least. It's the engine for creating value from other assets. Like breaking the genetic code, an understanding of the "enterprise code" - the organizational blueprints, processes and recipes - will enable us to address fundamental questions of concern to managers and investors, such as those raised above in relation to H-P/Compaq and Enron.

    Organizational Infrastructure By Example: A company's organizational infrastructure is an amalgam of systems, processes and business practices (its operating procedures, recipes) aimed at streamlining operations toward achieving the company's objectives. Following is a concrete example of a business process, part of the organizational infrastructure, which was substantially modified and thereby created considerable value. This was adopted from "Turnaround," Business 2.0, January 2002.

    Nissan Motor Co. Ltd., Japan's third-largest automaker and a perennial loser and debt-ridden producer of lackluster cars, received in March 1999 a new major shareholder, Renault, and a new CEO, Carlos Ghosn, both imported from France. Ghosn moved quickly to transform Nissan into a viable competitor, and indeed, in the fiscal year ending March 2001, the company reported a profit of $2.7 billion, the largest in its 68-year history.

    How was this miracle performed? Primarily by cost-cutting, achieved by a drastic change in the procurement process. Here briefly, is the old process: Nissan's buyers were locked into ordering from keiretsu partners, suppliers in which Nissan owned stock. The guaranteed stream of Nissan orders insulated those suppliers from competition. Suppliers can't specialize and can't sell excess capacity elsewhere. Each supplier was assigned a shukotan, Nissan-speak for a relationship manager. It was the shukotan who would negotiate price discounts - but favors got in the way.

    Here, in brief, is the new procurement process, as drastically changed by Ghosn: Ghosn gave Itaru Koeda, the purchasing chief, authority to place orders without regard to keiretsu relationships - and, more important, insisted that he use it. Then, a Renault executive and Koeda dumped the shukotan system, instead assigning buyers responsibility by model and part. They formed a sourcing committee to review vendor price quotes on a global basis. "This is the best change in our process," Koeda says. "Suppliers are specializing in what they do best, making them more efficient."

    The results? An 18 percent drop in purchasing costs, which was the major contributor to Nissan's transformation from a loss to a profit. Ghosn's next major set of tasks: To change the car design process in order to enhance the top line, sales; to rid Nissan of the myriad design committees and hierarchies that stifle and slow innovation; and to institute an efficient, effective innovative process.

    Baruch's cover story is accompanied by "Fixing Financial Reporting:  Financial Statement Overhaul," by  Robert A Howell, pp. 40-42 --- http://www.fei.org/magazine/articles/3-4-2002_Howell_CoverStory.cfm 

    Financial reporting is broken and has to be fixed - and fast! If it isn't, we will continue to see more cases such as Xerox, Lucent, Cisco Systems, Yahoo! and Enron. Xerox's market value is down 90 percent, or $40 billion, in the past two years. In the same period other market losses include; Lucent, down more than $200 billion; Cisco Systems, off more than $400 billion; Yahoo!, more than $100 billion; and Enron, down more than $60 billion in the largest bankruptcy of all time.

    Some argue that these are extreme examples of "irrational exubuerance." Some in the accounting profession say that such cases represent a small percentage of the aggregate number of statements audited - some 15,000 public company registrants. Perhaps. But a financial reporting framework that permits these companies to suggest that they are doing well, and, by implication, to justify market valuations which, subsequently, cost investors trillions in the aggregate, is unconscionable.

    Financial reporting, especially in the U. S., with its very public capital markets, has reached the point where "accrual-based" earnings are almost meaningless. Reported earnings are driven as much by "earnings expectations" as they are by real business performance. Balance sheets fail to reflect the major drivers of future value creation - the research and product, process and software development that fuel high technology companies, and the brand value of leading consumer product companies. And, cash flow statements are such a hodge-podge of operating, investing and financing activities that they obfuscate, rather than illuminate, business cash flow performance.

    The FASB, in its Concept No. 1, states, "financial reporting should provide information that is useful to present and potential investors and creditors and other users in making rational investment, credit and similar decisions." This is simply not so.

    The primary financial statements - income statement, balance sheet and cash flow statement - which derive their foundation from an industrial age model, need major redesign if they are to serve as the starting point for meaningful financial analysis, interpretation and decision-making in today's knowledge-based and value-driven economy. Without significant redesign, ad hoc definitions such as pro forma earnings, returns and cash flows will continue to proliferate. So will significant reporting "surprises!"

    Starting Point: Market Value Creation
    The objective of a business is to increase real shareholder value - what Warren E. Buffett would call the "intrinsic value" of the firm. It's a very basic idea: Investors get "returns" from dividends and realized market appreciation. Both investments and returns are measured in cash terms, so individuals and investors invest cash in securities with the objective of realizing returns that meet or exceed their criteria. If their judgments are too high, and that later becomes clear, the market value of the firm will drop. If judgments are too low and cash flows turn out to be stronger, market values increase.

    From a managerial viewpoint, the objective of increasing shareholder (market) value really means increasing the net present value (NPV) of the future stream of cash flows. Note, "cash flows," not "profits." Cash is real; profits are anything, within reason, that management wants them to be. If revenues are recognized early - or overstated - and expenses are deferred or, in some cases, accelerated to "clear the decks" for future periods, resulting earnings may show a nice trend, but do not really reflect economic performance.

    There are only three ways management may increase the real market, or "intrinsic," value of a firm. First, increase the amount of cash flows expected at any point in time. Second, accelerate cash flows; given the time value of money, cash received earlier has a higher present value. Third, if a firm is able to lower the discount rate that it applies to its cash flows - which it frequently can - it can raise its NPV.

    Given that cash flows drive market value, financial statements should put much more emphasis on cash flows. The statement of cash flows now prescribed by the accounting community and presented by management is not easily related to value creation. Derived from the income statement and balance sheet, it's effectively a reconciliation statement for the change in the balance of the cash account. A major overhaul of the cash flow statement would directly relate to market valuations.

    Cash Earnings and Free Cash Flows
    Managers and investors should focus on "cash earnings" and the reinvestments that are made into the business in the form of "working capital" and "fixed and other (including intangible) investments." The net amount of these cash flows represent the business's "free cash flows."

    With negative cash flows - frequently the case for young startups and high-growth companies - a business must raise more capital in the form of debt or equity. The sooner it gets its free cash flows positive, the sooner it'll begin to create value for shareholders. Positive free cash flows provide resources to pay interest and pay down debt, to return cash to shareholders (through stock repurchases or dividends) or to invest in new business areas.

    The traditional cash flow statement purportedly distinguishes between operating, investing and financing cash flows, and has as its "bottom line" the change in cash and cash equivalents. In fact, the operating cash flows include the results of selling activities, investing in working capital and interest expense, a financing activity. Investing cash flows include capital expenditures, acquisitions, disposals of assets and the purchase and sale of financial assets. Financing cash flows consist of what's left over.

    Indeed, the bottom-line change in cash is not a useful number, other than to demonstrate that it may be reconciled with the change in the cash account. If one wants a positive change in cash, simply borrow more. These free cash flows ultimately drive market value, and should be the focus of managers and investors alike.

    Replacing Income With Cash Earnings
    The traditional "profit and loss," or "income," statement needs modification in three ways, two of which are touched on above, along with a name-change, to "Operating Statement." That would suggest a representation of the business' current operations, without the emphasis on accrual-based profits.

    Interest expense (income) should be eliminated from the statement, as it represents a financing cost rather than an operating cost. A number of companies do this internally to determine "net operating profit after taxes" (NOPAT). Also, NOPAT needs to be adjusted for the various non-cash items, such as depreciation, amortization, gains and losses on the sale of assets, tax-timing differences and restructuring charges - which affect income but not cash flows. The resultant "cash earnings" better represents the current economic performance of a business than accrual income and, very importantly, is much less susceptible to manipulation.

    A third adjustment is the order in which the classes of expenses are displayed. Traditional income statements report cost of goods sold or product costs first, frequently focus on product gross margins, and then deduct, as a group, other expenses such as technical, selling and administrative expenses. This order made sense in the industrial age when product costs dominated. It does not for many of today's high-tech or consumer product companies. It would be more useful for companies to report expenses in an order that reflects the flow of the business activities. One logical order that builds on the concept of a business' value chain, is to categorize costs into development costs, product (service) conversion costs, sales and customer support costs and administrative costs.

    Reinvesting in the Business
    For most companies - especially those with significant investments that are being depreciated or amortized - cash earnings will be significantly higher than NOPAT. Unfortunately, cash earnings are not free cash flows because most businesses have to reinvest in working capital, property, plant and equipment and intangible assets, just to sustain - let alone increase - their productive capabilities.

    As a business grows in sales volume, assuming that it offers credit to its customers who pay with the same frequency, accounts receivable will increase proportionately. As sales volumes increase, so, too, will product costs, inventories and accounts payable balances. Working capital - principally receivables, inventories, and payables - will tend to increase proportionately with sales growth, and will require cash to finance it. The degree to which it grows is a function of receivables terms and collection practices, inventory management and payables practices.

    Companies such as Dell Computer Corp. collect payments up front, turn inventories in a few days and pay their vendors when due. The net effect is that as Dell grows it actually throws off cash, rather than requiring it to support increases in working capital. Most companies are not as efficient; the amount of cash needed to support increases in working capital can be as much as 20-25 percent of any sales increase. The degree to which working capital increases as sales increase is an important performance metric. Lower is better, which absolutely flies in the face of such traditional measures of liquidity as "working capital" and "quick" ratios, for which higher has been considered better.

    Balance sheets ought to reflect investments that represent future value. What drives value for many businesses in today's knowledge-based economy - pharmaceuticals, high technology, software and brand-driven consumer product companies - is the investments in R&D, product, process and software development, brand equity and the continued training and development of the work force. Yet, based on generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) accounting, these "investments" in the future are not reflected on balance sheets, but, rather, expensed in the period in which they are incurred.

    A frequent argument for "expensing" is the unclear nature of the investments' future value. Apparently, investors believe otherwise, evidenced by the ratio of market values to book values having exploded in the past 25 years. In 1978, the average book-to-market ratio was around 80 percent; today it is around 25 percent. In the early 1970s, when accounting policies were established for R&D, product lines were narrower and life cycles longer, resulting in R&D being a much less significant element of cost. Expensing was less relevant. Now, with intangible assets having become so central and significant, expensing - rather than capitalizing and amortizing them over time - results in an absolute breakdown of the principle of "matching," which is at the heart of accrual accounting. The world of business has changed; accounting practices must also change.

    Financial Statement Overhaul
    Financial statements need marked overhaul to be useful for analysis and decision-making in today's knowledge-driven and shareholder value-creation environment. The proposed changes fall into three categories:

    First - Move to a much more explicit shareholder (market) value creation and cash orientation, and away from accrual accounting profits and return on investment calculations predicated on today's accounting policies. Start with a shareholder perspective for cash flows, then reconstruct the statement of cash flows to clearly provide the free cash flows that the business' operations are generating. Cash earnings and reinvestments in the business comprise free cash flows.

    Second - Expand the definition of investments to include intangibles, which should be capitalized as assets and amortized according to some thoughtful rules. This will better reflect investments that have potential future value.

    Third - Change the title to "operating statement" and other "housekeeping" of financial statements, to include categorizing costs in a more logical "value chain" sequence and aggregating all financial transactions, such as interest and the purchase and sale of securities, as financing activities.

    Value creation is ultimately measured in the marketplace, so it stands to reason that if a firm's market value increases consistently, over time, and can be supported by improvements in its cash generation performance, real value is being created. For this to happen, the place to start is by fixing the financial statements. 

    Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm 

     


    The Shareholder Action On-Line Handbook (1993) (history, finance, investing, law)--- http://www.ethics.fsnet.co.uk/0home.htm 

    These Web pages are the on-line version of The Shareholder Action Handbook, first published in paperback 1993 by New Consumer. The Handbook aims to give practical advice to individuals about how they may use shares to make companies more accountable. The need for such a guide is now stronger than ever. Public concern in Britain about the accountability of company directors has risen to the extent that the subject makes regular appearances in debates in the House of Commons. While there are many obstacles to taking shareholder action, shareholders can do much to alter the course of corporate behaviour. Indeed, since the original version of the guide appeared there have been a number of successful shareholder action campaigns. However, there is considerable need both for new legislation to make it easier for shareholders to hold companies to account, and for the large institutional shareholders who own much of global industry to take their responsibilities as shareholders rather more seriously.


    Online Resources for Business Valuations

    Go to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm


    Understanding the Issues

    From The Wall Street Journal's Accounting Educator Reviews on January 22, 2002

    TITLE: Deciphering the Black Box 
    REPORTER: Steve Liesman 
    DATE: Jan 23, 2002 PAGE: C1 LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011739030177303200.djm  TOPICS: Accounting, Accounting Theory, Creative Accounting, Disclosure, Disclosure Requirements, Earnings Management, Financial Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis, Fraudulent Financial Reporting, Regulation, Securities and Exchange Commission

    SUMMARY: The article discusses several factors that have led to financial reporting that is complex and difficult to understand. Related articles provide specific examples of complicated and questionable financial reporting practices.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) What economic factors have led to the complexity of financial reporting? Have accounting standard setters kept pace with the changing economic conditions? Support your answer.

    2.) What determines a company's cost of capital? What is the relation between the quantity and quality of financial information disclosed by a company and its cost of capital? Why are companies reluctant to disclose financial information?

    3.) Explain the difference between earnings management and fraudulent financial reporting? Is either earnings management or fraudulent financial reporting illegal? Is either unethical? Could earnings management ever improve the usefulness of financial reporting? Explain.

    4.) Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of allowing discretion in financial reporting.

    5.) Refer to related articles. Briefly discuss the major accounting or economic situation that has caused complexity in the financial reporting of each of these companies. What can be done to make the financial reporting more useful?

    SMALL GROUP ASSIGNMENT: How much discretion should Generally Accepted Accounting Principles allow in financial reporting? Support your position.

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

    --- RELATED ARTICLES --- 

    TITLE: GE: Some Seek More Light on the Finances 
    REPORTER: Rachel Emma Silverman and Ken Brown 
    PAGE: C1 ISSUE: Jan 23, 2002 
    LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011744147673133760.djm 

    TITLE: AIG: A Complex Industry, A Very Complex Company 
    REPORTER: Christopher Oster and Ken Brown 
    PAGE: C16 ISSUE: Jan 23, 2002 
    LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011740010747146240.djm 

    TITLE: Williams: Enron's Game, But Played with Caution 
    REPORTER: Chip Cummins 
    PAGE: C16 ISSUE: Jan 23, 2002 
    LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011739185631601680.djm 

    TITLE: IBM: 'Other Income' Can Mean Other Opinions 
    REPORTER: William Bulkeley 
    PAGE: C16 ISSUE: Jan 23, 2002 
    LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011744634389346680.djm 

    TITLE: Coca-Cola: Real Thing Can Be Hard to Measure 
    REPORTER: Betsy McKay 
    PAGE: C16 ISSUE: Jan 23, 2002 
    LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011739618177530480.djm 

    Bob Jensen's threads on accounting and securities fraud are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm 


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on June 11, 2004

    TITLE: Outside Audit: Goodyear and the Butterfly Effect 
    REPORTER: Timothy Aeppel 
    DATE: Jun 04, 2004 
    PAGE: C3 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108629544631828261,00.html  
    TOPICS: Accounting Changes and Error Corrections, Pension Accounting, Restatement

    SUMMARY: Goodyear Tire & Rubber has announced the amount of its restatement from problems identified in 2003. The company as well has announced further restatements due to changes in the discount rate it uses for pension liability calculations.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) For what reason is Goodyear Tire & Rubber restating earnings for the last five years?

    2.) What accounting standards require restatements of past financial results? Under what circumstances are restatements required? What other types of accounting changes are possible? How are these categories of accounting changes presented in the financial statements?

    3.) In general, what adjustment is Goodyear Tire & Rubber making to its accounting for defined benefit pension plans?

    4.) Discuss the details of the change in accounting for the defined benefit pension plan. Specifically, define the discount rate in question and state how it is used in pension accounting.

    5.) Had the company not uncovered the issues identified under question #1, do you think they would be making the changes identified in questions #3 and #4? Why or why not?

    6.) Do you think that changes in the discount rate used in pension accounting are made by other companies? When do you think companies might change this rate? In general, what type of accounting treatment would you recommend for such a change? Support your answer.

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

    "Outside Audit: Goodyear And the Butterfly Effect:  A Valuation Rate Is Shaved By Half a Point and Presto, $100.1 Million Goes Poof," by Timothy Aeppel, The Wall Street Journal, June 4, 2004, Page C3 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108629544631828261,00.html

    There's a costly oddity tucked into Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.'s recent earnings restatement.

    As part of a larger revision reaching back five years, the U.S.'s largest tire maker changed the interest-rate assumptions associated with its domestic retirement plans. The upshot: By slicing half a point off a rate used to value the company's obligations to its pension fund and other post-retirement benefit plans, Goodyear also lopped off a total of $100.1 million in earnings over that period.

    This may be the first time a major company has restated earnings for this reason, although it was just one of several accounting issues the Akron, Ohio, tire maker addressed in its restatement announced May 19. Goodyear has identified a series of accounting irregularities over the past year and is the target of a continuing investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

    "I have a feeling that while they were scrubbing, they decided to scrub everything," says Jack Ciesielski, publisher of Analyst's Accounting Observer.

    Keith Price, a Goodyear spokesman, says the change doesn't mean Goodyear sought to inflate earnings in the past by using an inappropriately high discount rate. Most of the reduction in earnings was the result of Goodyear having to record additional tax expenses, he notes. Mr. Price says Goodyear decided to change its methodology for calculating the rate it uses going forward and, since a broader restatement was already under way, chose to extend the new approach into the past as well.

    The root of Goodyear's problem appears to be that it used an uncommon way of calculating the so-called discount rate it assumes for its traditional pension plan. A discount rate is simply an interest rate companies use to convert future values into their present-day terms. Companies calculate the pension-fund discount rate at the end of every year in order to project cash outflows in their retirement plans. The number changes from year to year. But it also tends to get buried in financial footnotes and overlooked.

    The higher the discount rate, the less the current value of a company's future obligations to its retirees under its plans. So, in Goodyear's case, the older, higher discount rate lowered the company's projected benefit payments -- which also had the effect of raising its pretax income.

    Goodyear's old method of setting the rate was to use a six-month average of corporate-bond rates. That's unusual, though not a violation of generally accepted accounting principles, says Mr. Ciesielski.

    The more common and accurate approach is to pick a discount rate based on rates at a point in time near to when the calculations are being done. That provides a better snapshot of reality, especially in an era when rates are falling, as they have in recent years.

    Sure enough, Goodyear's old methodology resulted in discount rates that were higher than those used by most other companies during the period in question. For instance, in its restatement, Goodyear cut the rate it used in 2001 to 7.5% from 8%. But a study by Credit Suisse First Boston notes that the median discount rate used by S&P-500 component companies that year was a far lower 7.25%. In fact, the study found only seven companies used rates of 8% or higher in 2001.

    Goodyear's numbers are now more in line with other companies' and shouldn't require further adjustment, say analysts. But like many old-line companies with a relatively large cadre of older workers and retirees, Goodyear is expected to face pension problems for years to come, since its plans are underfunded by about $2.8 billion.

    While Goodyear's pension concerns are not unique, Mr. Ciesielski says it is unlikely other companies will rush to restate earnings to reflect a new discount-rate assumption. Besides, coming up with the rate is still far from an exact science.

    David Zion, CSFB's accounting analyst, says even companies that use identical methodologies can arrive at sharply different discount rates. Those with fiscal years ending in June would have different rates than those with years ending in December, for example. And multinational companies face another complication: "The discount rate for a Japanese pension plan will be different than the discount rate in Turkey," Mr. Zion points out.

    In its restatement, Goodyear decreased overall pretax income by $18.9 million for the past five years as a result of its reassessment of the discount rate. And since Goodyear's pension plan is underfunded, the cut in the discount rate also magnified that negative condition. As a result, Goodyear had to add $160.9 million in liabilities to its balance sheet. The new liabilities forced Goodyear to record $81.2 million in additional tax expenses for 2002.

    This restatement comes at a time Goodyear's accounting is still under heavy scrutiny. The company launched an internal probe last year after it said it found problems in internal billing and the implementation of a new computer system. It later said it had identified serious misdeeds by top managers in Europe and cases in which U.S. plants understated workers' compensation liabilities.


    Hi Robert,

    I added your document to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/WalkerToFarrington.htm 

    I would not say that we are so much timid as we are squashed by lobbying pressures from industry.

    Bob Jensen

    Bob

    I wish to ask you a favour again. I have written the attached as a submission to a review of the New Zealand Financial Reporting Act 1993. It is currently under review due to the imminent adoption of the IASB's standards. It has thrown New Zealand's application of differential reporting into confusion. My submission deals with the way in which accounting must be the pivot upon which creditor protection functions. What I would hope Americans find interesting is the degree to which we have played out your laws - the corporate solvency test and GAAP - in a way you are too timid to do.

    The Government's discussion document to which the submission is a response is on this link:

    http://www.med.govt.nz/buslt/bus_pol/bus_law/corporate-governance/financial-reporting/part-one/media/minister-20040315.html 

    The letter is self-contained aside from the specific commentary at the end. Could you find space for it on your web-site?

    Robert B Walker


    Stock Option Valuation Research Database

    From Syllabus News on December 13, 2002

    Wharton School Offers Stock Data Via the Web

    The University of Pennsylvania's Wharton business school is offering financial analysts access to historical information on stock options over the Internet. The data, supplied by research firm OptionMetrics's Ivy database, covers information on all U.S. listed index and equity options from January1996. The Ivy database adds to the 1.5 terabyte storehouse of financial information from a range of providers now available through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). The university said that by making data from the Center for Research in Security Prices, Standard & Poor's COMPUSTAT, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the New York Stock Exchange, and other data vendors accessible from a simple Web-based interface, WRDS hopes to become the preferred source among university scholars for data covering global financial markets.

    Note from Jensen:  the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) home page is at http://www.wharton.upenn.edu/research/wrds.html 

    Wharton Research Data Services, a revolutionary Internet-based research data service developed and marketed by the Wharton School, has become the standard for large-scale academic data research, providing instant web access to financial and business datasets for almost all top-tier business schools (including 23 of the top 25 schools as ranked by Business Week magazine).

    Subscribers to Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) gain instant access to the broadest array of business and economic data now available from a single source on the Web. From anywhere and at any time, WRDS functions as an application service provider (ASP) to deliver information drawn from 1.2 terabytes of comprehensive financial, accounting, management, marketing, banking and insurance data.

    Launched in July 1997, the unique data service's client list of over 60 institutions now includes Stanford University, Harvard University, Columbia University, Yale University, Northwestern University, London Business School, INSEAD, University of Chicago, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and dozens of other institutions. Subscribers to WRDS need only PCs or even less-expensive Web terminals to endow their units with supercomputer capabilities and tap a massive, constantly updated source of data. Users click on the WRDS database and interactively select data to extract. The requested information is instantly returned to the web browser, ready to be pasted into a spreadsheet or any other application for analysis.

    To learn more about WRDS or to get licensing information, contact: Nicole Carvalho, Marketing Director Wharton Research Data Services 400 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall 3620 Locust Walk Philadelphia, PA 19104-6302

    1-877-GET-WRDS (1-877-438-9737)


    Knowledge@Wharton is a free source of research reports and other materials in accounting, finance, and business research --- http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/ 


     

    Forwarded by Robert B Walker [walkerrb@ACTRIX.CO.NZ

    FASB Understanding the Issues: Vol 4 Series 1 --- 

    I refer to the monograph on credit standing & liability measurement written by Crooch & Upton. --- http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/fasb/statusreport_articles/vol4_series1.html  

    The article seems to suggest you wish to have feedback on this and other matters. Accordingly, I send my thoughts on this matter.

    I would begin by observing that I think Concepts Statement 7 is inconsistent with the earlier 1996 study from which it was derived. I found that study utterly persuasive so I do not now find CS-7 persuasive. In moments of cynicism, I think that Mr Upton’s apparent epiphany is related more to the politics of accountancy than to its conceptual purity.

    By this I mean that the measurement of liabilities at risk free interest rate rather than at a rate reflecting credit standing would be so anathema to the generality of accountants that it is futile to suggest it. Indeed the Crooch & Upton begin by stating a basic premise of axiomatic significance to their case – no gain or loss should arise when engaging in simple borrowing. The idea that no sooner one entered a loan agreement than a loss would arise (because it would invariably be a loss) would have most accountants in a state of high dudgeon.

    The issue then is one of gain or loss. But then that is only if you perceive the world from an income orientation perspective. I don’t, primarily because of the influence of the conceptual framework. This is reinforced by my work as a liquidator of companies. I see the world purely from a balance sheet perspective and one subject to realisable value at that. In other words, I see the utility of accounting only in terms of solvency determination with all that entails in regard to the going concern assumption.

    Unlike the United States, in the jurisdiction in which I live accounting has been rendered central to creditor protection in our corporate law. Central to this law, in turn, is the conceptual framework (at least in my view and to test the hypothesis I have a case before the courts now). I am then caused considerable misgiving as the final consequence of FASB’s view is the effective emasculation of our law built, essentially, on American conceptual development.

    The ultimate consequence of what FASB propose is that as a company slides toward insolvency its liability value declines, the value of its net worth increases. Presumably as it has no credit standing at all because it is insolvent, it has no liabilities. This may be practically true when the creditors miss out but in my jurisdiction at least it is not legally true because those responsible for the creditors loss are held accountable, the impediments of the legal system notwithstanding.

    I note that Crooch & Upton make reference in a footnote to the theory of Robert Merton in which it is implied that the residual assets are able to be ‘put’ to satisfy the claims of creditors. That may be true in an economist’s fantasy but it is not true in law, a rather more important arena.

    I say perceiving a decline in the value of a liability is considerably more counter-intuitive than the problem of accelerating the recognition of cost of debt. This is a mere triviality by comparison. After all the same amount of charge is recognised over time. The advantage of accelerating loss is that it causes an entity to be more inhibited in its distribution policy as it has less equity to draw upon. That is to the advantage of creditors.

    It seems to me that there needs to be an objective value at which to determine the value of a liability, this being central to the ability to liquidate. Mr Upton in his 1996 study demonstrates that such a value will represent the price the debtor has to pay to have the liability taken away. That price will be determined by the seller providing sufficient resources to the buyer to ensure that the buyer will avoid any risk. The resources would need to be enough to acquire a risk free asset with the same maturity profile as the liability.

    The effect of perceiving the ‘price’ of a liability in this way is to necessitate that it is discounted at a risk free rate.

    I note that the only way to make CS-7 coherent is to assume that such transfers of assets are always made between parties of the same credit standing. This pertains to one of the major practical difficulties of reflecting credit standing in accounting measurement – that is knowing what it is. It may be easily determined in the publicly listed world in which Crooch & Upton inhabit. It is not in the small, closely held corporate world in which I operate. For accounting to have long term validity it must be applicable in all circumstances.

    I think it fair to note that there is another dimension to this that tends to undermine what I believe. I have a theoretical notion that the world upon consolidation nets to nil. That is to say, my financial asset and your financial liability must have the same value in our respective records. Call this a principle of reciprocity.

    Theoretically, so far as I understand it a lender will discount the face value of a zero discount bond at the risk free rate after having adjusted for the probability of receiving nothing at all. The effect of doing that is, at the inception of an advance, to carry the value of the asset at the cash value paid at that time. If the application of the principle of reciprocity was applied when the liability was revalued in the books of the debtor, the creditor would take up a gain that denied any risk existed.

    I find this inconvenient as it causes me to abandon a notion in which I fundamentally believe. I will just have to suffer cognitive dissonance, won’t I? But then one should not underestimate the psychology that underlies accounting, particularly in the face of the paradoxes it is capable of generating.


    Also see other articles on related topics at  http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/fasb/statusreport_articles/ 

     

    Pro-Forma Earnings (Electronic Commerce, e-Commerce, eCommerce)

    From the Wall Street Journal's Accounting Educators' Reviews, October 4, 2001
    Educators interested in receiving these excellent reviews (on a variety of topics in addition to accounting) must firs subscribe to the electronic version of the WSJ and then go to http://209.25.240.94/educators_reviews/index.cfm 

    Sample from the October 4 Edition:

    TITLE: Sales Slump Could Derail Amazon's Profit Pledge 
    REPORTER: Nick Wingfield 
    DATE: Oct 01, 2001 
    PAGE: B1 
    LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1001881764244171560.djm  
    TOPICS: Accounting, Creative Accounting, Earnings Management, Financial Analysis, Net Income, Net Profit

    SUMMARY: Earlier this year Amazon promised analysts that it will report first-ever operating pro forma operating profit. However, Amazon is not commenting on whether it still expects to report a fourth-quarter profit this year. Questions focus on profit measures and accounting decisions that may enable Amazon to show a profit.

    QUESTIONS: 

    1.) What expenses are excluded from pro forma operating profits? Why are these expenses excluded? Are these expenses excluded from financial statements prepared in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles?

    2.) List three likely consequences of Amazon not reporting a pro forma operating profit in the fourth quarter. Do you think that Amazon feels pressure to report a pro forma operating profit? Why do analysts believe that reporting a fourth quarter profit is important for Amazon?

    3.) List three accounting choices that Amazon could make to increase the likelihood of reporting a pro forma operating profit. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of making accounting choices that will allow Amazon to report a pro forma operating profit.

    SMALL GROUP ASSIGNMENT: Assume that you are the accounting department for Amazon and preliminary analysis suggest that Amazon will not report a pro forma operating profit for the fourth quarter. The CEO has asked you to make sure that the company meets its financial reporting objectives. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of making adjustments to the financial statements. What adjustments, if any, would you make? Why?

    Reviewed 

    By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island Reviewed 
    By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University Reviewed 
    By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

    Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory can be found at 
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm
     

    Bob Jensen's threads on real options for valuing intangibles are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/realopt.htm 

     


    Baruch Lev has a very good site on accounting for intangibles at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/intangibles.html 

    Also note Wayne Upton's Special Report for the FASB at http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/fasb/new_economy.html 


    E-COMMERCE AND AUDITING FAIR VALUES SUBJECTS OF NEW INTERNATIONAL GUIDANCE The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) invites comments on two new exposure drafts (EDs): Auditing Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures and Electronic Commerce: Using the Internet or Other Public Networks - Effect on the Audit of Financial Statements. Comments on both EDs, developed by IFAC's International Auditing Practices Committee (IAPC), are due by January 15, 2002. See http://accountingeducation.com/news/news2213.html  

    The IFAC link is at http://www.ifac.org/Guidance/EXD-Download.tmpl?PubID=1003772692151 

    The purpose of this International Standard on Auditing (ISA) is to establish standards and provide guidance on auditing fair value measurements and disclosures contained in financial statements. In particular, this ISA addresses audit considerations relating to the valuation, measurement, presentation and disclosure for material assets, liabilities and specific components of equity presented or disclosed at fair value in financial statements. Fair value measurements of assets, liabilities and components of equity may arise from both the initial recording of transactions and later changes in value.

     

    Download
    "Auditing Fair Value Measurements And Disclosures"
    in MS Word format.

    File Size: 123 Kbytes
    Download
    "Auditing Fair Value Measurements And Disclosures"
    in Adobe Acrobat format.

    File Size: 209 Kbytes

     

     


     

    External Auditing Combined With Consulting and Other Assurance Services:  Audit Independence?

    TITLE:  "Auditor Independence and Earnings Quality"R
    AUTHORS:  
    Richard M. Frankel MIT Sloan School of Business 50 Memorial Drive, E52.325g Cambridge, MA 02459-1261 (617) 253-7084 frankel@mit.edu 
    Marilyn F. Johnson Michigan State University Eli Broad Graduate School of Management N270 Business College Complex East Lansing, MI 48824-1122 (517) 432-0152 john1614@msu.edu  
    Karen K. Nelson Stanford University Graduate School of Business Stanford, CA 94305-5015 (650) 723-0106 knelson@gsb.stanford.edu  
    DATE:  August 2001
    LINK:  http://gobi.stanford.edu/ResearchPapers/Library/RP1696.pdf 

    Stanford University Study Shows Consulting Does Affect Auditor Independence --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=54733 

    Academics have found that the provision of consulting services to audit clients can have a serious effect on a firm's perceived independence.

    And the new SEC rules designed to counter audit independence violations could increase the pressure to provide non-audit services to clients to an increasingly competitive market.

    The study (pdf format), by the Stanford Graduate School of Business, showed that forecast earnings were more likely to be exceeded when the auditor was paid more for its consultancy services.

    This suggests that earnings management was an important factor for audit firms that earn large consulting fees. And such firms worked at companies that would offer little surprise to the market, given that investors react negatively when the auditor also generates a high non-audit fee from its client.

    The study used data collected from over 4,000 proxies filed between February 5, 2001 and June 15, 2001.

    It concluded: "We find a significant negative market reaction to proxy statements filed by firms with the least independent auditors. Our evidence also indicates an inverse relation between auditor independence and earnings management.

    "Firms with the least independent auditors are more likely to just meet or beat three earnings benchmarks – analysts' expectations, prior year earnings, and zero earnings – and to report large discretionary accruals. Taken together, our results suggest that the provision of non-audit services impairs independence and reduces the quality of earnings."

    New SEC rules mean that auditors have to disclose their non-audit fees in reports. This could have an interesting effect, the study warned: "The disclosure of fee data could increase the competitiveness of the audit market by reducing the cost to firms of making price comparisons and negotiating fees.

    "In addition, firms may reduce the purchase of non-audit services from their auditor to avoid the appearance of independence problems."

    A Lancaster University study in February this year found that larger auditors are less likely to compromise their independence than smaller ones when providing non-audit services to their clients.

    And our sister site, AccountingWEB-UK, reports that research by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW) showed that, despite the prevalence of traditional standards of audit independence, the principal fear for an audit partner was the loss of the client. 

     

    External Auditing Combined With Consulting and Other Assurance Services:  The Enron Scandal

    One of the most prominent CPAs in the world sent me the following message and sent the WSJ link:

    Bob, More on Enron. 
    It's interesting that this matter of performing internal audits didn't come up in the testimony Joe Beradino of Andersen presented to the House Committee a couple of days ago

    "Arthur Andersen's 'Double Duty' Work Raises Questions About Its Independence," by Jonathan Weil, The Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2001 --- http://interactive.wsj.com/fr/emailthis/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1008289729306300000.djm 

    In addition to acting as Enron Corp.'s outside auditor, Arthur Andersen LLP also performed internal-auditing services for Enron, raising further questions about the Big Five accounting firm's independence and the degree to which it may have been auditing its own work.

    That Andersen performed "double duty" work for the Houston-based energy concern likely will trigger greater regulatory scrutiny of Andersen's role as Enron's independent auditor than would ordinarily be the case after an audit failure, accounting and securities-law specialists say.

    It also potentially could expose Andersen to greater liability for damages in shareholder lawsuits, depending on whether the internal auditors employed by Andersen missed key warning signs that they should have caught. Once valued at more than $77 billion, Enron is now in proceedings under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.

    Internal-audit departments, among other things, are used to ensure that a company's control systems are adequate and working, while outside independent auditors are hired to opine on the accuracy of a company's financial statements. Every sizable company relies on outside auditors to check whether its internal auditors are working effectively to prevent fraud, accounting irregularities and waste. But when a company hires its outside auditor to monitor internal auditors working for the same firm, critics say it creates an unavoidable conflict of interest for the firm.

    Still, such arrangements have become more common over the past decade. In response, the Securities and Exchange Commission last year passed new rules, which take effect in August 2002, restricting the amount of internal-audit work that outside auditors can perform for their clients, though not banning it outright.

    "It certainly runs totally contrary to my concept of independence," says Alan Bromberg, a securities-law professor at Southern Methodist University in Dallas. "I see it as a double duty, double responsibility and, therefore, double potential liability."

    Andersen officials say their firm's independence wasn't impaired by the size or nature of the fees paid by Enron -- $52 million last year. An Enron spokesman said, "The company believed and continues to believe that Arthur Andersen's role as Enron's internal auditor would not compromise Andersen's role as independent auditor for Enron."

    Andersen spokesman David Tabolt said Enron outsourced its internal-audit department to Andersen around 1994 or 1995. He said Enron began conducting some of its own internal-audit functions in recent years. Enron, Andersen's second-largest U.S. client, paid $25 million for audit fees in 2000, according to Enron's proxy last year. Mr. Tabolt said that figure includes both internal and external audit fees, a point not explained in the proxy, though he declined to specify how much Andersen was paid for each. Additionally, Enron paid Andersen a further $27 million for other services, including tax and consulting work.

    Following audit failures, outside auditors frequently claim that their clients withheld crucial information from them. In testimony Wednesday before a joint hearing of two House Financial Services subcommittees, which are investigating Enron's collapse, Andersen's chief executive, Joseph Berardino, made the same claim about Enron. However, given that Andersen also was Enron's internal auditor, "it's going to be tough for Andersen to take that traditional tack that 'management pulled the wool over our eyes,' " says Douglas Carmichael, an accounting professor at Baruch College in New York.

    Mr. Tabolt, the Andersen spokesman, said it is too early to make judgments about Andersen's work. "None of us knows yet exactly what happened here," he said. "When we know the facts we'll all be able to make informed judgments. But until then, much of this is speculation."

    Though it hasn't received public attention recently, Andersen's double-duty work for Enron wasn't a secret. A March 1996 Wall Street Journal article, for instance, noted that a growing number of companies, including Enron, had outsourced their internal-audit departments to their outside auditors, a development that had prompted criticism from regulators and others. At other times, Mr. Tabolt said, Andersen and Enron officials had discussed their arrangement publicly.

    Accounting firms say the double-duty arrangements let them become more familiar with clients' control procedures and that such arrangements are ethically permissible, as long as outside auditors don't make management decisions in handling the internal audits. Under the new SEC rules taking effect next year, an outside auditor impairs its independence if it performs more than 40% of a client's internal-audit work. The SEC said the restriction won't apply to clients with assets of $200 million or less. Previously, the SEC had imposed no such percentage limitation.

    The Gottesdiener Law Firm, the Washington, D.C. 401(k) and pension class action law firm prosecuting the most comprehensive of the 401(k) cases pending against Enron Corporation and related defendants, added new allegations to its case today, charging Arthur Andersen of Chicago with knowingly participating in Enron's fraud on employees.
    Lawsuit Seeks to Hold Andersen Accountable for Defrauding Enron Investors, Employees --- http://www.smartpros.com/x31970.xml 

    Bob Jensen's threads on the Enron scandal are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm


    Quality of Earnings, Restatements, and  Core Earnings

    Question
    What are the primary alleged causes for the rapid increase in revisions to financial statements in the past few years?

    June 14, 2006 message from Denny Beresford [DBeresfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]

    An official in Washington DC sent me a note today saying that he is " interested in understanding the cause for the increased number of restatements. Can you recommend any good articles or research that explains the root causes, trends, etc?

    Can anyone suggest some good references to pass along?

    Denny Beresford

    June 14, 2006 reply from Ganesh M. Pandit, DBA, CPA, CMA [profgmp@HOTMAIL.COM]

    Perhaps this might help...Financial Restatements: Causes, Consequences, and Corrections By Erik Linn, CPA, and Kori Diehl, CPA, published in the September 2005 issue of Strategic Finance, Vol.87, Iss. 3; pg. 34, 6 pgs.

    Ganesh M. Pandit Adelphi University

    June 15, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Evidence seems to be mounting that Section 404 of SOX is working in uncovering significant errors in past financial statements. This is to be expected in the early phases of 404 implementation. But the revisions should subside after 404 is properly rolling. Companies like Kodak found huge internal control weaknesses that led to reporting errors.

    One of the most popular annual study if restatements is free from the Huron Consulting Group.

    Free from the Huron Consulting Group (Registration Required) --- http://www.huronconsultinggroup.com/

    "Restatements Should Subside as 404, Lease Issues Subside" --- http://www.huronconsultinggroup.com/uploadedFiles/CW-Restatements-021406.pdf

    "2004 Annual Review of Financial Reporting Matters - Summary" --- Click Here
    (I could not yet find the 2005 update, which is understandable since 2005 annual reports were just recently published.)

    There also is an interesting 1999 paper entitled "Accounting Defects, Financial Statement Credibility, and Equity Valuation" by W. Bruce Johnson and D. Shores --- http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/acct/papers/workingpapers/99-01.pdf

    Bob Jensen

    Core Earnings

    Bob Jensen's Overview --- Go to  http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/CoreEarnings.htm 

    "Beyond The Balance Sheet Earnings Quality," by  Kurt Badanhausen, Jack Gage, Cecily Hall, Michael K. Ozanian, Forbes, January 28, 2005 --- http://www.forbes.com/home/business/2005/01/26/bbsearnings.html 

    It's not how much money a company is making that counts, it's how it makes its money. The earnings quality scores from RateFinancials aim to evaluate how closely reported earnings reflect the cash that the companies' businesses are generating and how well their balance sheets reflect their true economic position. Companies in the winners table have the best earnings quality (they are generating a lot of sustainable cash from their operations), while companies in the losers table have been boosting their reported earnings with such tricks as unexpensed stock options, low tax rates, asset sales, off-balance-sheet financing and deferred maintenance of the pension fund.

    Krispy kreme doughnuts is the latest illustration of the fact that stunning earnings growth can mask a lot of trouble. Not long ago the doughnut maker was a glamour stock with a 60% earnings-per-share growth rate and a multiple to match-70 times trailing earnings. Now the stock is at $9.61, down 72% from May, when the company first issued an earnings warning. Turns out Krispy Kreme may have leavened profits in the way it accounted for the purchase of franchised stores and by failing to book adequate reserves for doubtful accounts. So claims a shareholder lawsuit against the company. Krispy Kreme would not comment on the suit. 

    Investors are not auditors, they don't have subpoena power, and they can't know about such disasters in advance. But sometimes they can get hints that the quality of a company's earnings is a little shaky. In Krispy's case an indication that it was straining to deliver its growth story came three years ago in its use of synthetic leases to finance expansion. Forbes described these leases in a Feb. 18, 2002 story that did not please the company. Another straw in the wind: weak free cash flow from operations. You get that number by taking the "cash flow from operations" reported on the "consolidated statement of cash flows," then subtracting capital expenditures. Solid earners usually throw off lots of positive free cash flow. At Krispy the figure was negative.

     Is there a Krispy Kreme lurking in your portfolio? For this, the fifth installment in our Beyond the Balance Sheet series, we asked the experts at RateFinancials of New York City ( www.ratefinancials.com ) to look into earnings quality among the companies included in the S&P 500 Index. The tables at right display the outfits that RateFinancials puts at the top and at the bottom of the quality scale. The ratings are to a degree subjective and, not surprisingly, some of the companies at the bottom take exception. General Motors feels that RateFinancials understates its cash flow. But at minimum RateFinancials' work warns investors to look closely at the financial statements of the suspect companies. 

    A lot of factors went into the ratings produced by cofounders Victor Germack and Harold Paumgarten, research director Allan Young and ten analysts. A company that expenses stock options is probably not straining to meet earnings forecasts, so it gets a plus. Overoptimistic assumptions about future earnings on a pension fund artificially prop up earnings and thus rate a minus. A low tax rate is a potential indicator of trouble: Maybe the low profit reported to the Internal Revenue Service is all too true and the high profit reported to shareholders an exaggeration. Other factors relate to discontinued operations (booking a one-time gain from selling a business is bad), corporate governance (companies get black marks for having poison pills), inventory (if it piles up faster than sales, then business may be weakening) and free cash flow (a declining number is bad).

    Continued in this section of Forbes

    Included in Standard & Poor's definition of Core Earnings are 

    • employee stock options grant expenses, 
    • restructuring charges from on-going operations, 
    • write-downs of depreciable or amortizable operating assets, 
    • pensions costs 
    • purchased research and development. 

    Excluded from this definition are 

    • impairment of goodwill charges, 
    • gains or losses from asset sales, pension gains, 
    • unrealized gains or losses from hedging activities, merger and acquisition related fees
    • litigation settlements

     


    The Quality of Earnings Controversy in Accounting Theory

    From The Wall Street Journal Weekly Accounting Review on April 13, 2007

    These Days, Detective Skills Are Key to Gauging a Stock
    by Herb Greenberg
    The Wall Street Journal

    Page: B3
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117590470676662738.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
     

    TOPICS: Accounting, Disclosure, Disclosure Requirements, Earnings Quality, Financial Accounting, Sarbanes-Oxley Act

    SUMMARY: "When Circuit City Stores Inc. reported an unexpected fiscal fourth-quarter loss this past week, with its stock in the doldrums, Victor Germack felt vindicated. Last summer, when quite a few analysts were upgrading their ratings on the electronics retailer's stock, his research firm, RateFinancials, published a report blasting Circuit City for "very poor quality of earnings" and "poor accounting policies, footnotes and management discussion and analysis."" The concerns arose from a "preponderance of year-end lease terminations and the disproportional influence [on earnings from] the sales of extended warranties..." Circuit City's spokesman, Bill Cimino, cites other factors, such as a rapid decline in the price of flat-panel television sets, that impacted the results.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) What is the "quality" of a company's earnings?

    2.) What factors raised questions in some analysts' minds about the quality of Circuit City's earnings? List all that you find in the main article and in the related one, and explain the impact of the issue on the notion of "quality of earnings" or "quality of financial reporting."

    3.) Why did this question of quality of earnings not arise the minds of other analysts besides those of RateFinancials Inc.?

    4.) How does the corporate spokesperson address the question of the quality of Circuit City's earnings? How does his answer benefit Circuit City in its dealings with financial markets?
     

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
     

    RELATED ARTICLES: 
    Circuit City Highlights Doubts About Analysts
    by Steven D. Jones
    Sep 08, 2006
    Online Exclusive
     

     


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on May 27, 2004

    TITLE: J.C. Penney Profit Hurt by Eckerd 
    REPORTER: Kortney Stringer 
    DATE: May 19, 2004 
    PAGE: B4 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108488326393314408,00.html  
    TOPICS: Accounting, Earnings Quality, Financial Accounting, Financial Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis, Income from Continuing Operations, Net Income, Operating Income

    SUMMARY: Despite an earnings increase, J.C. Penney reported a 33% decline in net income. Questions focus on the components and usefulness of the income statement.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) Describe the primary purpose(s) of the income statement. Distinguish between the single-step and multi-step format for the income statement. Which type of statement is more common? Support your answer.

    2.) Explain the components of gross margin, operating income, income from continuing operations, net income, and comprehensive income. What is persistence? Which income statement total is likely to have the greatest persistence? Which income statement total is likely to have the least persistence?

    3.) Where are results from discontinued operations reported on the income statement? Why are results from discontinued operations separated from income from continuing operations?

    4.) What impact does the loss from the sale of Eckerd have on J.C. Penney's expected future net income? What impact does results from continuing operations have on expected future net income?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on May 23, 2002

    TITLE: SEC Broadens Investigation Into Revenue-Boosting Tricks; Fearing Bogus Numbers Are Widespread, Agency Probes Lucent and Others 
    REPORTER: Susan Pulliam and Rebecca Blumenstein 
    DATE: May 16, 2002 
    PAGE: A1 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1021510491566948760.djm,00.html  
    TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Statement Analysis

    SUMMARY: "Securities and Exchange Commission officials, concerned about an explosion of transactions that falsely created the impression of booming business across many industries, are conducting a sweeping investigation into a host of practices that pump up revenue."

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) "Probing revenue promises to be a much broader inquiry than the earlier investigations of Enron and other companies accused of using accounting tricks to boost their profits." What is the difference between inflating profits vs. revenues?

    2.) What are the ways in which accounting information is used (both in general and in ways specifically cited in this article)? What are the concerns about using accounting information that has been manipulated to increase revenues? To increase profits?

    3.) Describe the specific techniques that may be used to inflate revenues that are enumerated in this article and the related one. Why would a practice of inflating revenues be of particular concern during the ".com boom"?

    4.) "[L90 Inc.] L90 lopped $8.3 million, or just over 10%, off revenue previously reported for 2000 and 2001, while booking the $250,000 [net difference in the amount of wire transfers that had been used in one of these transactions] as 'other income' rather than revenue." What is the difference between revenues and other income? Where might these items be found in a multi-step income statement? In a single-step income statement?

    5.) What are "vendor allowances"? How might these allowances be used to inflate revenues? Consider the case of Lucent Technologies described in the article. Might their techniques also have been used to boost profits?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

    --- RELATED ARTICLES --- 
    TITLE: CMS Energy Admits Questionable Trades Inflated Its Volume 
    REPORTER: Chip Cummins and Jonathan Friedland 
    PAGE: A1 
    ISSUE: May 16, 2002 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1021494984503313400.djm,00.html 

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on May 27, 2004

    TITLE: SEC Gets Tough With Settlement in Lucent Case
    REPORTER: Deborah Solomon and Dennis K. Berman
    DATE: May 17, 2004
    PAGE: A1
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108474447102812763,00.html 
    TOPICS: Criminal Procedure, Financial Accounting, Legal Liability, Revenue Recognition, Securities and Exchange Commission, Accounting

    SUMMARY: After a lengthy investigation into the accounting practices of Lucent Technologies Inc., the Securities and Exchange Commission is expected to file civil charges and impose a $25 million fine against the company. Questions focus on the role of the SEC in financial reporting.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) What is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)? When was the SEC established? Why was the SEC established? Does the SEC have the responsibility of establishing financial reporting guidelines?

    2.) What role does the SEC currently play in the financial reporting process? What power does the SEC have to sanction companies that violate financial reporting guidelines?

    3.) What is the difference between a civil and a criminal charge? What is the difference between a class-action suit by investors and a civil charge by the SEC?

    4.) What personal liability do individuals have for improper accounting? Why does the SEC object to companies indemnifying individuals for consequences associated with improper accounting?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

    Bob Jensen's threads on revenue accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm 


    Standard & Poor's News Release on May 14, 2002 --- http://www.standardandpoors.com/PressRoom/index.html 

    Standard & Poor's To Change System For Evaluating Corporate Earnings

    Widely-Supported "Core Earnings" Approach to be Applied to Earnings Analyses and Forecasts for US Indices, Company Data and Equity Research

    New York, May 14, 2002 -- Standard & Poor's today published a set of new definitions it will use for equity analysis to evaluate corporate operating earnings of publicly held companies in the United States. Release of "Measures of Corporate Earnings" completes a process Standard & Poor's began in August 2001 when the firm began discussions with securities and accounting analysts, portfolio managers, academic research groups and others to build a consensus for changes that will reduce investor frustration and confusion over growing differences in the reporting of corporate earnings. The text of "Measures of Corporate Earnings" may be found at www.standardandpoors.com/PressRoom/index.html

    At the center of Standard & Poor's effort to return transparency and consistency to corporate reporting is a focus on what it refers to as Core Earnings, or the after-tax earnings generated from a corporation's principal business or businesses. Since Standard & Poor's believes that there is a general understanding of what is included in As Reported Earnings, its definition of Core Earnings begins with As Reported and then makes a series of adjustments. As Reported Earnings are earnings as defined by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) which excludes two items - discontinued operations and extraordinary items, both as defined by GAAP.

    Included in Standard & Poor's definition of Core Earnings are employee stock options grant expenses, restructuring charges from on-going operations, write-downs of depreciable or amortizable operating assets, pensions costs and purchased research and development. Excluded from this definition are impairment of goodwill charges, gains or losses from asset sales, pension gains, unrealized gains or losses from hedging activities, merger and acquisition related fees and litigation settlements.

    "For over 140 years, Standard & Poor's has stood for the investor's right to know. Central to that objective is a clear, consistent, definition of a company's financial position," said Leo O'Neill, president of Standard & Poor's. "The increased use of so-called pro forma earnings and other measures to report corporate performance has generated controversy and confusion and has not served investor interests. Standard & Poor's Core Earnings definition will help build consensus and restore investor trust and confidence in the data used to make investment decisions."

    "A number of recent high profile bankruptcies have renewed investors' concerns about the reliability of corporate reporting," said David M. Blitzer, Standard & Poor's chief investment strategist. "From the work we have just completed, our hope is to generate additional public discussion on earnings measures. Once there are more generally accepted definitions, it will be much easier for analysts and investors to evaluate varying investment opinions and recommendations and form their own views of which companies are the most attractive."

    Beginning shortly, Standard & Poor's will include the components of its definition for Core Earnings in its COMPUSTAT database for the U.S., the leading source for corporate financial data. In addition, Core Earnings will be calculated and reported for Standard & Poor's U.S. equity indices, including the S&P 500. Finally, Standard & Poor's own equity research team, which provides opinions on over 1100 stocks, will adopt Core Earnings in its analyses.

    "Core Earnings is an excellent analytical tool for the individual and professional investor alike," said Kenneth Shea, managing director for global equity research at Standard & Poor's. "It allows investors to better evaluate and compare the underlying earnings power of the companies they are examining. In addition, it enhances an investor's ability to construct and maintain investment portfolios that will adhere to a pre-determined set of investment objectives. With Core Earnings, Standard & Poor's equity analysts will be able to provide our clients with even more insightful forecasts and buy, hold and sell recommendations."

    From the outset, Standard & Poor's has sought to achieve agreement surrounding broad earnings measures that address a company's potential for profitability. In addition to emphasizing this approach in its equity analysis, Standard & Poor's will also make Core Earnings a part of its credit ratings analysis. The accuracy of earnings and earnings trends has always been a component of credit analysis and Core Earnings adds value to this process. Earnings are also a major element in cash flow analysis and are therefore a part of Standard & Poor's debt rating methodology.

    Standard & Poor's, a division of The McGraw-Hill Companies (NYSE:MHP), provides independent financial information, analytical services, and credit ratings to the world's financial markets. Among the company's many products are the S&P Global 1200, the premier global equity performance benchmark, the S&P 500, the premier U.S. portfolio index, and credit ratings on more than 220,000 securities and funds worldwide. With more than 5,000 employees located in 18 countries, Standard & Poor's is an integral part of the global financial infrastructure. For more information, visit www.standardandpoors.com


    S&P Main Core Earnings Site (including a Flash Presentation) --- http://snipurl.com/SPCoreEarnings 

    Subtopics
              Standard & Poor's Core Earnings Data
              Latest Standard & Poor's Research
              Previous Standard & Poor's Research
              Press Releases
              Bios
              Media Coverage
              Standard & Poor's Core Earnings Data and Services

     


    S&P PowerPoint Show on Core Earnings

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/corePowerpoint.ppt 

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/corePowerpoint.htm 


    Other Related Core Earnings Files

    Bob Jensen's Overview --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/CoreEarnings.htm 

    Updates, including FAS 133 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/CoreEarningsMisc.pdf 

    Pensions and Pension Interest --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/CoreEarningsPensions.pdf 


    Question:
    What ten companies have the most "inflated" measures of profit?

    Answer:
    "Shining A New Light on Earnings, BusinessWeek Editorial, June 21, 2002 --- http://www.standardandpoors.com/Forum/MarketAnalysis/coreEarnings/Articles/062102_coredata.html 

    How much does a company truly make? It's hard to tell these days. To boost the performance of their stocks, companies have come up with a slew of self-defined "pro forma" numbers that put their financials in a favorable light. Now ratings agency Standard & Poor's has devised a truer measure known as Core Earnings.

    The Goal: to provide a standardized definition of the profits produced by a company's ongiong operations. Of the three main changes from more traditional measures of profits two reduce earmings: Income from pension funds is excluded and the cost of stock options are deducted as an expense. The other big change boosts earnings by adding back in the charges taken to adjust for overpriced acquisitions. Here are the top 10 losers and winners under Core Earnings:


     


    Enhanced Business Reporting

    I attended the following CPE Workshop at the AAA Meetings in Orlando

    CPE Session 3: Saturday, August 7, 1:00 PM – 4:00 PM 
    Value Measurement and Reporting—Moving toward Measuring and Reporting Value Creation Activities and Opportunities

    Presenters: William J. L. Swirsky, Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants  
    Paul Herring, AICPA Director Business Reporting Assurance and Advisory Service 

    Description/Objectives: 
    Content – Presentations and dialogue about measuring the activities and opportunities that drive an entity’s value and, once measured, reporting these value creation prospects, in financial or nonfinancial terms, in addition to current financial information. The session will include information about research by the Value Measurement and Reporting Collaborative (VMRC) that will provide the foundation for the development of a framework of market-driven principles that characterize value measurement and reporting on a global basis.

    Objectives – To continue the dialogue on more transparent, consistent, and reliable reporting of an entity’s value; to provide participants with information about the research being undertaken by VMRC; to talk about disclosure; and to solicit feedback from the attendees about where they see gaps in the current practices on value measurement and reporting.

    Plan – To (1) provide context for value measurement and reporting; (2) describe research to date; and (3) describe reporting initiatives.

    The above workshop focused mainly upon the early stages of the Value Measurement and Reporting Collaborative that evolved into the Enhanced Business Reporting (EBR) Consortium)  for providing more structure, uniformity, and measurement of non-financial information reported to managers and other stakeholders --- http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/cpaltr/nov2002/supps/edu1.htm 
    This initiative that began in 2002 with hope that a collaboration between the AICPA, the Canadian CICA, leading consulting firms, and others could initiate a new business reporting model as follows:

    The Value Measurement and Reporting Collaborative, in which the AICPA is a participant, will play a crucial role in the new business reporting model. VMRC is a global effort of the accounting profession, along with corporate directors, businesses, business associations and organizations, institutional investors, investment analysts, software companies and academics. The key purpose of the collaborative is to help boards of directors and senior management make better strategic decisions using value measurement and reporting. It is anticipated that the current financial reporting model would, over time, migrate to this new model and would be used to communicate a more complete picture to stakeholders.

    Also see Grant Thornton's summary in 2004
    Grant Thornton in the US has posted a new publication of Directors Monthly, which focuses on "Business Reporting: New Initiative Will Guide Voluntary Enhancements." The publication discusses how non-financial information offers a better picture of corporate financial health. 
    Double Entries, September 9, 2004 --- http://accountingeducation.com/news/news5395.html 

    For years researchers and businesses have been attempting to find a better way to report on business performance beyond the traditional financial reporting effort.  Bob Jensen even wrote a 1976 book called Phantasmagoric Accounting --- See Volume 14 at http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aaa/market/studar.htm 

    Studies of reporting on non-financial business performance over the past 50 years have generally been disappointing.  Numbers attached to such things as cost of pollution and value of human capital were generally derived from overly-simplified models that really did not deal with externalities, interaction effects, non-stationarity, and important missing variables.  There is an immense need, especially by managers and lawmakers, for better business reporting that will help making tradeoffs between stakeholders.  At the Orlando workshop mentioned above, we heard a great deal about the need for a new business reporting model.  But when the presenters got down to what had been accomplished to date, I felt like the presentations lacked scholarship, especially in terms of the history of research on this topic over the past 50 years.  What was presented as "new" really had been hashed over many times in the past.  I left the Enhanced Business Reporting Consortium workshop feeling that this initiative is long on hype and short on hope.

    But I do not want to give the impression that the EBR initiative is not important.  Little is gained by the traditional accounting research tradition, especially in academe, of ignoring huge and seemingly intractable problems that seem to defy all known research methodologies.  High on the list of intractable problems are problems of measuring intangibles and human/environmental performance.  If nothing else, the Value Measurement and Reporting Collaborative will help to keep researchers focused on the bigger problems rather than less relevant minutiae.  At a minimum some progress may be made toward standardization of non-financial reporting.  

    You can track the progress of the Enhanced Business Reporting Consortium  at http://www.ebrconsortium.org/ 


    Economic Theory of Accounting

    Financial Statements Are Still Valuable Tools for Predicting Bankruptcy
    Despite growing public skepticism over how useful financial statements are in providing information to investors, researchers at Stanford’s Graduate School of Business have found that the value of financial ratios for predicting bankruptcy has not declined significantly over time. Professors Maureen McNichols and William Beaver and graduate student Jung-Wu Rhie have reexamined the usefulness for predicting bankruptcy of financial ratios such as return on assets (net income divided by total assets), cash flow to total liabilities (earnings before interest, depreciation, and taxes divided by both short- and long-term debt), and leverage (total liabilities to total assets). The study explored how three forces have influenced this predictive value over the past 40 years.
    "Financial Statements Are Still Valuable Tools for Predicting Bankruptcy," Stanford Graduate School of Business Newsletter, November 2005 --- http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/acctg_mcnichols-beaver_bankruptcy.shtml

    "Financial Statements Still Significant In Predicting Bankruptcy," AccountingWeb, May 17, 2006 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102159

    Researchers have found that financial ratios are still valuable tools in predicting bankruptcy. The significance of financial ratios found in statements was explored in a study examining their predictive value over the last four decades, according to the Stanford Graduate School of Business (GSB).

    The GSB reported that the premise of the study was motivated by regulatory organizations, such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the Securities and Exchange Commission, seeking to increase the usefulness of information found in financial statements.

    The study, completed by Professors Maureen McNichols and William Beaver, with graduate student Jung-Wu Rhie, reexamined the use of financial ratios such as cash flow to total liabilities (earnings before interest, depreciation, and taxes divided by short-term debt plus long-term debt), return on assets (net income divided by total assets), leverage (total liabilities compared to total assets), according to the GSB.

    McNichols is the Marriner S. Eccles Professor of Public and Private Management at the GSB. Beaver is the Joan E. Horngren Professor of Accounting there.

    McNichols told the GSB, “One prediction is that if standard-setters are successful at incorporating additional information about fair values into financial statements, then we might expect their predictive ability for bankruptcy to increase.”

    On the other hand, traditional accounting standards may capture only a portion of current companies’ scope of activities. Also, financial statements may be seen as more “managed” than from other times in the past, according to the GSB.

    “If we look back in the 1960s, intangible assets -– as represented by investments in brands, research and development and technology -– were much less pervasive than they are today. These kinds of transactions are not well captured by our current accounting model,” Professor McNichols told the GSB. Concerning the “management” of financial statements, McNichols said, “Certainly, there is much more documentation of earnings management today than we’ve seen historically.”

    McNichols went on to say that any shift in the economic activities of companies might also offset any improvements in standards and informativeness of financial statements made by regulatory standard-setters, according to the GSB.

    In study results released in March 2005, financial statements were found to be highly significant in predicting bankruptcy over the two periods of the study, according to the GSB. Period 1 was 1962 to 1993 and Period 2 was 1994 to 2002. There was a decline in predictive ability from Period 1 to Period 2, although it was not statistically significant. Companies’ “hazard rate”, reflecting their risk of going bankrupt and using the three ratios, predicted higher risk in the year before bankruptcy, as well as other years before their insolvency. Beaver said, “In fact, we see differences in the ratios of bankrupt and nonbankrupt firms up to five years prior to bankruptcy.”

    The researchers then shifted their predictors toward more market-based values. These were cumulative stock returns over a year; the market capitalization of the firm (or common stock price per share, times the common shares outstanding); and the variability of stock returns. The use of these values was very predictive as well, according to the GSB.

    Predictability actually increased over time. Ninety-two percent of bankrupt companies were in the highest three deciles of Period 1 hazard rates and 93 percent for Period 2. The slight rise was attributed to market prices reflecting broader information, in addition to the information found in financial statements. The GSB reported that the incremental significance of non-financial statement information is reflected in the resulting difference between the two time periods.

    The researchers then merged the financial-ratio and market-based models into a hybrid model. Their results improved, coming up with a 96 percent chance of predicting bankruptcy for Period 1 and 93 percent over Period 2. This seems to show that market prices may compensate for even slight decreases in the predictivity of financial ratios. These results further indicate that the market draws upon additional information not available in financial ratios.

    McNichols told the GSB, “But it’s comforting to know that the behavior of the combined model, over time, is so stable.” The stability of their combined model suggests that bankruptcy can be predicted reliably in capital markets and this ability has not been eroded by changes in reporting.

    Dr. Edward Altman, Ph.D., developed his Z-score formula for predicting bankruptcy in 1968, according to Value Based Management. It consists of three different models, each for specific business organizations, including public manufacturers, private manufacturers and private general firms.

    The American Bankruptcy Institute collects and publishes metrics on bankruptcies. Review their listing of annual business and non-business filings by state (2000-2005) breaks down total bankruptcies into business and non-business numbers, as well as consumer bankruptcies as a percentage of the non-business metrics.

     


    October 30, 2002 message from JerryFeltham [gerald.feltham@commerce.ubc.ca

    Peter Christensen and I are pleased to announce that the first of two volumes on the fundamentals of the economic analysis of accounting has been published by Kluwer. This two volume series is based on two analytical Ph.D. seminars I have taught for several years, and is designed to provide efficient coverage of key information economic models and results that are pertinent to accounting research.

    The first volume is entitled:  Economics of Accounting: Volume I - Information in Markets.

    The attached file provides the table of contents of this volume, plus the preface - which gives a brief overview of the two volumes. The second volume is

    Economics of Accounting: Volume II - Performance Evaluation.

    We expect to complete it in the next few months.

    The two volumes can be used to provide the foundation for Ph.D. courses on information economic research in accounting. Furthermore, it is our hope that analytical researchers, as well as empiricists and experimentalists who use information economic analysis to motivate their hypotheses, will find our book to be a useful reference.

    We plan to maintain a website for the book. It will primarily be used to provide some problems Peter and I have developed in teaching courses based on the two books. In addition, the website will include any errata. The website address is:

    http://people.commerce.ubc.ca/faculty/feltham/economicsofaccounting.html 

    Also attached is a flyer from our publisher Kluwer. It announces a 25% discount in the price if the book is purchased prior to December 31.

    The publisher has also informed us that: "If students buy the book through your university bookstore (6 or more copies) they will receive an adoption price of $79.95 US."

    Information regarding discounts on this book for course use and bulk purchases can be obtained by sending an e-mail message to kluwer@wkap.com  (their customer service department).

    Jerry Feltham 
    Faculty of Commerce 
    University of British Columbia 
    2053 Main Mall 
    Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Z2 
    Tel. 604-822-8397 Fax 604-822-9470
    jerry.feltham@commerce.ubc.ca 


    Question
    What's "institutional structure?"
    What's the theory entwined in the works of the three 2007 recipients of the Nobel Prize in Economics?

    Hint:
    Nobel Prizes --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nobel_Prize
    Nobel Prizes in Economics tend to go to mathematicians and/or conservative market theorists.
    Nobel Peace Prices tend to reflect liberal political biases, perhaps even not-so-hidden Nobel agendas.
    Nobel Prizes for accounting and mathematics are nonexistent, probably since both disciplines are built upon assumptions rather than reality. Actually this is also true for economics, although somehow an exception was made for this branch of astrology.

    "A Market Nobel," by Peter Boettke, The Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2007; Page A21 ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119249811353060179.html?mod=todays_us_opinion

    Yesterday Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson won the Nobel Prize in Economic Science for their pioneering work in the field of "mechanism design." Strangely, some have used this occasion to disparage free-market economics. But the truth is the deserving recipients owe a direct debt to free-market thinkers who came before them.

    Mechanism design is an area of economic research that focuses on how institutional structures can be manipulated by changing the rules of the game in order to produce socially optimal results. The best intentions for the public good will go astray if the institutional arrangements are not consistent with the self-interest of decision makers.

    Mr. Myerson's work on how to design auctions to elicit information about the value of the good being auctioned -- and how to maximize the revenue extracted from the auction -- has informed numerous privatizations of publicly owned assets over the past quarter-century. Mr. Maskin also contributed to auction theory, and applied the idea of mechanism design to assess political institutions such as voting systems.

    Mechanism design theory was established to try to address the main challenge posed by Ludwig von Mises and F.A. Hayek. It all starts with Mr. Hurwicz's response to Hayek's famous paper, "The Use of Knowledge in Society." In the 1930s and '40s, Hayek was embroiled in the "socialist calculation debate." Mises, Hayek's mentor in Vienna, had raised the challenge in his book "Socialism," and before that in an article, that without having the means of production in private hands, the economic system will not create the incentives or the information to properly decide between the alternative uses of scarce resources. Without the production process of the market economy, socially desirable outcomes will be impossible to achieve.

    In the mid-1930s, Hayek published Mises's essay in English in his book, "Collectivist Economic Planning." From there the discussion moved to the U.K. and the U.S. Hayek summarized the fundamental challenge that advocates of socialism needed to come to grips with. Hayek's argument, a refinement of Mises, basically stated that the economic problem society faced was not how to allocate given resources, but rather how to mobilize and utilize the knowledge dispersed throughout the economy.

    Hayek argued that mathematical modeling, which relied on a set of given assumptions, had obscured the fundamental problem. These questions were not being probed since they were assumed away in the mathematical models of market socialism presented by Oskar Lange and, later, Abba Lerner. Milton Friedman, when he reviewed Lerner's "Economics of Control," stated that it was as if economic analysis of policy was being conducted in a vacuum. Lange actually argued that questions of bureaucratic incentives did not belong in economics and were best left to other disciplines such as psychology and sociology.

    Leonid Hurwicz, in his classic papers "On the Concept and Possibility of Informational Decentralization" (1969), "On Informationally Decentralized Systems" (1972), and "The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation" (1973), embraced Hayek's challenge. He developed mechanism-design theory to test the logic of the Mises-Hayek contention that socialism could not possibly mobilize the dispersed knowledge in society in a way that would permit rational economic calculation for the alternative uses of scarce resources. Mises and Hayek argued that replacing the invisible hand of the market with the guided one of government would not work. Mr. Hurwicz wanted to see if they were right, and under what conditions one could say they were wrong.

    Those efforts are at the foundation of the field that was honored by the Nobel Prize committee. To function properly, any economic system must, as Hayek pointed out, structure incentives so that the dispersed and sometimes conflicting knowledge in society is mobilized to realize the gains from exchange and innovation.

    Last year Mr. Myerson acknowledged his own debt to Mr. Hurwicz -- and thus Hayek -- in "Fundamental Theory of Institutions: A Lecture in Honor of Leo Hurwicz." The incentive-compatibility issue has highlighted the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection (perverse behavior due to incentives caused by rules that are supposed protect us and selection problems due to imperfect information). Mr. Hurwicz helped repair a mid-20th century neglect of institutions in economic analysis.

    While we celebrate the brilliance of Messrs. Hurwicz, Maskin and Myerson, we should also remember that Hayek's challenge provided their inspiration. Hayek concluded that the private-property rights that come with the rule of law, freedom of contract, and freedom of association is still the one mechanism design that mobilizes and utilizes the dispersed information in an economy. Furthermore, it does so in a way that tends to capture the gains from trade and innovation so that wealth is continually created and humanity is made better off.

    Mr. Boettke is a professor of economics at George Mason University and the Mercatus Center.

    October 17, 2007 reply from Paul Williams [Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]

    Bob, et al.

    As I think I have mentioned before there is no Nobel Prize in economics. Alfred Nobel established his trust fund because of guilt over inventing dynamite. He awarded prizes only to those branches of intellectual endeavor that he believed had the potential to bring "goodness" to human kind and end wars forever (chemistry, physics, medicine, literature, and peace (essentially noble political acts because peace is largely about politics perhaps explaining why right- wingers don't tend to win the Peace Prize).

    In 1964 the Nobel Committee agreed to include within the prizes The Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Science in Honor of Alfred Nobel, funded not by the Nobel Trust, but by financial interests. This was a political move to bring legitimacy to economic "science" whose scientific prescriptions for policy always manage somehow to benefit financial interests.

    Apparently we have now "scientific" proof that labor is our punishment for the Fall from Grace. Science my a uh foot.

    October 17, 2007 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

    Paul and Bob,

    The controversies involving the economics prize include:

    1. Theoretical v. Practical: Kantorovich, the Russian mathematician is supposed to have expressed disbelief at receiving one of the earliest economics Nobels (1975), since he had done virtually no work in economics except for laying the groundwork for what later became linear programming. But that was just a footnote in his life's work.

    The same can be said of the work of Reinhard Selten, John Nash, and to an extent Janos Kornai. Later, a number of other theoreticians were also awarded the economics Nobel, leading to grumbling among the applied/ empirical crowd. Probably the series of Nobel's awarded to Milton Friedman and others later were a reaction to this criticism.

    2. Left-wing v. Right-wing: In general, more Nobels have been awarded to quite-a-bit right-of-center economists, and hell has broken loose when one has been awarded to some one even an iota left-of-center. An example was Amartya Sen, who single-handedly revived the fascinating fields of economics of poverty and development.

    Milton Friedman was awarded the prize in 1976 right after the controversy surrounding the 1975 award to Kantorovich.

    I think economics Nobel's have generally tarnished the reputation of Nobels in general, but one feels good when some one like John Nash gets it. I was thrilled that Leonid Hurwicz got it this year, though I am not sure about Maskin and Myerson. With the latter two, it is way down hill from Selten, Nash, Harsanyi, Aumannn, Kantorovich, Arrow, Debreu, ...

    So far as I know, one "accountant" has won the economics Nobel. It is Richard Stone, who worked in the area of national income accounting.

    Incidentally, I stumbled upon a fascinating book titled "Against Mechanism: Protecting Economics from Science" By Philip Mirowski

    One quote from the book:

    "Contrary to popular misconceptions, I shall claim that economics needs protection from science, and especially from scientists such as Richard Feynman, or any other physicist who thinks he knows just what is needed for economists to clean up their act. Economics needs protection from the scientists in its midst, the Paul Samuelsons and the Tjalling Koopmans and all the others who took their training in the physical sciences and parlayed it into easy victories among their less technically inclined colleagues. And worst of all, economics needs protection from itself. For years, economics has enjoyed an impression of superiority over all the other "social sciences" in rigor, precision, and technical expertise. The reason it has been able to assume this mantle is that economics has consistently striven to be the nearest thing to social physics in the constellation of human knowledge."

    Jagdish

     

     


    Socionomic Theory of Finance and Fraud

    From Jim Mahar's Blog on July 21, 2006 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

    Socionomics and the Enron Scandal

    Right after my posting of the 1952 cartoon, B. C. emailed me the following video that is a documentary on Socionomics and even has Finance Professor John Nofsinger in it speaking about Enron and other scandals!

    What is socionomics?

    From Socionomics.org:
     
    "Socionomics is a new theory of social causality that offers fresh insights into collective human behavior. Over twenty years of empirical research demonstrates that social actions are not causal to changes in social mood, but rather changes in social mood motivate changes in social action."


    For instance, rather than suggesting that a rising economy (or stock market) makes people happy, this takes the related, but reversed, view that the economy improves because people are happy.

    While I do not want to argue the theory (for or against), Nofsinger makes an interesting point by saying that Enron and other scandals may have come when they did (after the tech bubble burst etc), not because of the scandals being worse, but because people were upset and hence "looking for trouble."

    Sort of a chicken or the egg argument that has many finance and economic implications (not least of which might be a predictable component in stock markets--for instance this builds upon the Elliot Wave Theory that was mentioned via Fibonacci sequences in the DaVinci Code.).

    Here is the description from video:

     
    " The Enron and Martha Stewart scandals made headlines at about the same time. It wasn't just coincidence. This four minute clip about socionomics from History's Hidden Engine explains why some scandals make news when they do, while others go unnoticed."

    I have to admit it is a thought provoking idea and it does fit some scenarios, but I am not yet willing to buy into it, although I may buy the book.

    Bob Jensen's theory threads are linked at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm

     


    Facts Based on Assumptions:  The Power of Postpositive Thinking

    Everyone is entitled to their own opinion, but not their own facts.
    Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan --- FactCheck.org ---
    http://www.factcheck.org/

    Then again, maybe we're all entitled to our own facts!

    "The Power of Postpositive Thinking," Scott McLemee, Inside Higher Ed, August 2, 2006 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2006/08/02/mclemee

    In particular, a dominant trend in critical theory was the rejection of the concept of objectivity as something that rests on a more or less naive epistemology: a simple belief that “facts” exist in some pristine state untouched by “theory.” To avoid being naive, the dutiful student learned to insist that, after all, all facts come to us embedded in various assumptions about the world. Hence (ta da!) “objectivity” exists only within an agreed-upon framework. It is relative to that framework. So it isn’t really objective....

    What Mohanty found in his readings of the philosophy of science were much less naïve, and more robust, conceptions of objectivity than the straw men being thrashed by young Foucauldians at the time. We are not all prisoners of our paradigms. Some theoretical frameworks permit the discovery of new facts and the testing of interpretations or hypotheses. Others do not. In short, objectivity is a possibility and a goal — not just in the natural sciences, but for social inquiry and humanistic research as well.

    Mohanty’s major theoretical statement on PPR arrived in 1997 with Literary Theory and the Claims of History: Postmodernism, Objectivity, Multicultural Politics (Cornell University Press). Because poststructurally inspired notions of cultural relativism are usually understood to be left wing in intention, there is often a tendency to assume that hard-edged notions of objectivity must have conservative implications. But Mohanty’s work went very much against the current.

    “Since the lowest common principle of evaluation is all that I can invoke,” wrote Mohanty, complaining about certain strains of multicultural relativism, “I cannot — and consequently need not — think about how your space impinges on mine or how my history is defined together with yours. If that is the case, I may have started by declaring a pious political wish, but I end up denying that I need to take you seriously.”

    PPR did not require throwing out the multicultural baby with the relativist bathwater, however. It meant developing ways to think about cultural identity and its discontents. A number of Mohanty’s students and scholarly colleagues have pursued the implications of postpositive identity politics. I’ve written elsewhere about Moya, an associate professor of English at Stanford University who has played an important role in developing PPR ideas about identity. And one academic critic has written an interesting review essay on early postpositive scholarship — highly recommended for anyone with a hankering for more cultural theory right about now.

    Not everybody with a sophisticated epistemological critique manages to turn it into a functioning think tank — which is what started to happen when people in the postpositive circle started organizing the first Future of Minority Studies meetings at Cornell and Stanford in 2000. Others followed at the University of Michigan and at the University of Wisconsin in Madison. Two years ago FMS applied for a grant from Mellon Foundation, receiving $350,000 to create a series of programs for graduate students and junior faculty from minority backgrounds.

    The FMS Summer Institute, first held in 2005, is a two-week seminar with about a dozen participants — most of them ABD or just starting their first tenure-track jobs. The institute is followed by a much larger colloquium (the part I got to attend last week). As schools of thought in the humanities go, the postpositivists are remarkably light on the in-group jargon. Someone emerging from the Institute does not, it seems, need a translator to be understood by the uninitated. Nor was there a dominant theme at the various panels I heard.

    Rather, the distinctive quality of FMS discourse seems to derive from a certain very clear, but largely unstated, assumption: It can be useful for scholars concerned with issues particular to one group to listen to the research being done on problems pertaining to other groups.

    That sounds pretty simple. But there is rather more behind it than the belief that we should all just try to get along. Diversity (of background, of experience, of disciplinary formation) is not something that exists alongside or in addition to whatever happens in the “real world.” It is an inescapable and enabling condition of life in a more or less democratic society. And anyone who wants it to become more democratic, rather than less, has an interest in learning to understand both its inequities and how other people are affected by them.

    A case in point might be the findings discussed by Claude Steele, a professor of psychology at Stanford, in a panel on Friday. His paper reviewed some of the research on “identity contingencies,” meaning “things you have to deal with because of your social identity.” One such contingency is what he called “stereotype threat” — a situation in which an individual becomes aware of the risk that what you are doing will confirm some established negative quality associated with your group. And in keeping with the threat, there is a tendency to become vigilant and defensive.

    Steele did not just have a string of concepts to put up on PowerPoint. He had research findings on how stereotype threat can affect education. The most striking involved results from a puzzle-solving test given to groups of white and black students. When the test was described as a game, the scores for the black students were excellent — conspicuously higher, in fact, than the scores of white students. But in experiments where the very same puzzle was described as an intelligence test, the results were reversed. The black kids scores dropped by about half, while the graph for their white peers spiked.

    The only variable? How the puzzle was framed — with distracting thoughts about African-American performance on IQ tests creating “stereotype threat” in a way that game-playing did not.

    Steele also cited an experiment in which white engineering students were given a mathematics test. Just beforehand, some groups were told that Asian students usually did really well on this particular test. Others were simply handed the test without comment. Students who heard about their Asian competitors tended to get much lower scores than the control group.

    Extrapolate from the social psychologist’s experiments with the effect of a few innocent-sounding remarks — and imagine the cumulative effect of more overt forms of domination. The picture is one of a culture that is profoundly wasteful, even destructive, of the best abilities of many of its members.

    “It’s not easy for minority folks to discuss these things,” Satya Mohanty told me on the final day of the colloquium. “But I don’t think we can afford to wait until it becomes comfortable to start thinking about them. Our future depends on it. By ‘our’ I mean everyone’s future. How we enrich and deepen our democratic society and institutions depends on the answers we come up with now.”

    Portions of the Colloquium will be made available online. For updates, and more information on the Future of Minority Studies project, check the FMS Web site.

    A version of the keynote speech from this year’s Colloquium, “Multiculturalism, Universalism, and the 21st Century Academy,” by Nancy Cantor, chancellor and president of Syracuse University, will appear soon at Inside Higher Ed.

    Earlier this year, Oxford University Press published a major new work on postpositivist theory, Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self,by Linda Martin Alcoff, a professor of philosophy at Syracuse University. Several essays from the book are available at the author’s Web site.

     


    Mike Kearl's great social theory site --- http://www.trinity.edu/~mkearl/

    Some sites to stimulate the sociological imagination --- http://www.trinity.edu/~mkearl/theory.html#imag

    According to Karl Popper (Logik der Forschung, 1935: p.26), Theory is "the net which we throw out in order to catch the world--to rationalize, explain, and dominate it." Through history, sociological theory arose out of attempts to make sense of times of dramatic social change. As Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills observed in Character and Social Structure (Harbinger Books, 1964:xiii), "Problems of the nature of human nature are raised most urgently when the life-routines of a society are disturbed, when men are alienated from their social roles in such a way as to open themselves up for new insight." Consider the historical contexts spawning the theoretical insights below:

    Neither the life of an individual nor the history of a society can be understood without understanding both. Yet men do not usually define the troubles they endure in terms of historical change and institutional contradiction. ... The sociological imagination enables its possessor to understand the larger historical scene in terms of its meaning for the inner life and the external career of a variety of individuals. ... The first fruit of this imagination--and the first lesson of the social science that embodies it--is the idea that the individual can understand his own experience and gauge his own fate only by locating himself within this period, that he can know his own chances in life only by becoming aware of those of all individuals in his circumstances. ...We have come to know that every individual lives, from one generation to the next, in some society; that he lives out a biography, and that he lives it out within some historical sequence (The Sociological Imagination, 1959:3-10).

    Judge a man by his questions rather than by his answers. --Voltaire (1694-1778)

    A definition is no proof. --William Pinkney, American diplomat (1764-1822)

    A theory is more impressive the greater the simplicity of its premises, the more different the kinds of things it relates and the more extended its range of applicability. --
    Albert Einstein, 1949

     

    SocioSite: Noted Sociological Theorists and Samplings of their Works

    Alan Liu's Voice of the Shuttle: Great collection of synopses and primary works of the great theorists

    Society for Social Research Page: Classical Sociological Theory. Good site for excerpts from the classics, courtesy of the University of Chicago.

    Serdar Kaya's The Sociology Professor, a portal of social theories and theorists

    Sociolog: many phenomenological links

    Larry Ridener's Dead Sociologists Index: Biographies of and excerpts from those who carved the discipline

    SociologyCafe's "Social Thinkers, Sociologists, and Online Texts" and Theory Outline

    PRAXIS: The Insurgent Sociology Web Site at University of California, Riverside

    Ed Stephan's "A Sociology Timeline from 1600"

    Carl Cuneo's Course on Theories of Inequality

    Marxist Internet Archive

    Marxism/ Leninism

    Marxism Made Simple

    Marx and Engels' Writings

    Engels' The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State

    Antonio Gramsci site from Queens College 

    Habermas links collected by Antti Kauppinen

    Durkheimian links

    Durkheim Homepage

    Weberian links

    Mannheim Centre for European Social Research

    Charles Horton Cooley's Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind

    George Herbert Mead Repository at Brock University

    All Things Simmelian--Georg Simmel Homepage

    Erving Goffman

    Game Theory Society--mathematically modeling "strategic interaction in competitive and cooperative environments"

    Thorsten Veblen's The Theory of the Leisure Class

    Foucault Homepage

    Jean Baudrillard speaks

    Anthony Giddens

    Howard S. Becker's Home Page--replete with recent papers, biographical updates and web recommendations

    Amitai Etzioni's Articles in Professional Journals and Books

    "Contemporary Philosophy, Critical Theory and Postmodern Thought" from the University of Denver

    Norbert Elias site from University of Sydney

    FreudNet: The A.A. Brill Library

    An evolving site to keep an eye on is Jim Spickard's Social Theory Pages, with historical backgrounds and intellectual biographies of the key players

    Need a dictionary for those works of critical theorists and postmodernists? Try the Red Feather Dictionary of Critical Social Science

    Gene Shackman's Social, Economic and Political Change--featuring links to theory, data and research about large scale long term political, economic and social systems change at the national and international level 

    World-Systems Archive
    The Research Committee on Sociocybernetics (of the Intl. Sociological Association)

    Want to see what theories sociologists are currently cooking up? Below is a sampling of sociological journals.

    Electronic Journal of Sociology Home Page
    Sociological Research Online
    Journal of World-Systems Research
    Journal of Mundane Behavior (first issue February 2000)
    Annual Review of Sociology--with 12-years of searchable abstracts
    Sociological Abstracts Home Page
    The Canadian Journal of Sociology
    Tables of Contents for all issues of Postmodern Culture