Not everything that can be counted, counts. And not
everything that counts can be counted.
Albert Einstein
Brief Summary of Accounting Theory
Bob Jensen at Trinity University
Accounting
History in a Nutshell
Islamic Accounting
XBRL: The Next Big Thing
Key
Differences Between International (IFRS) and U.S. GAAP (SFAS)
Accounting
Research Versus the Accountancy Profession
Learning
at Research Schools Versus "Teaching Schools" Versus "Happiness"
With a Side Track into Substance Abuse
Why must all accounting doctoral programs be social
science (particularly econometrics) doctoral programs?
Why accountancy doctoral programs are drying up and
why accountancy is no longer required for admission or
graduation in an accountancy doctoral program
GMAT: Paying for Points
Accounting Journal Lack of Interest in
Publishing Replications
Controversies in
Setting Accounting Standards
Why Let the I.R.S. See What the S.E.C.
Doesn't?
Radical Changes in Financial Reporting
Underlying
Bases of Balance Sheet Valuation
Accrual Accounting and
Estimation
Controversy Over the SEC's Rule 144a
FIN 48 Liability if Transaction Is Later
Disallowed by the IRS
Controversy Over FAS 2 on Research and
Development (R&D)
Earnings Management, Agency Theory, and Accounting Manipulations
Goodwill
Impairment Issues
Purchase Versus Pooling: The Never
Ending Debate
Off-Balance
Sheet Financing (OBSF)
Insurance:
A Scheme for Hiding Debt That Won't Go Away
CDOs: A Scheme for Hiding Debt That Won't Go Away
Pensions
and Post-retirement benefits:
Schemes for Hiding Debt
Leases:
A Scheme for Hiding Debt That Won't Go Away
Accounting for Executory Contracts Such as
Purchase/Sale Commitments and Loan Commitments
Debt Versus Equity (including
shareholder earn-out contracts)
Intangibles
and Contingencies:
Theory Disputes Focus Mainly on the Tip of the Iceberg
Intangibles: An Accounting Paradox
Intangibles: Selected References On
Accounting for Intangibles
EBR: Enhanced Business Reporting
(including non-financial information)
The Controversy Over Revenue Reporting and HFV
The
Controversy Over Employee Stock Options as Compenation
Accounting for Options to Buy
Real Estate
The Controversy over Accounting
for Securitizations and Loan Guarantees
The Controversy Over
Pro Forma Reporting
Triple-Bottom
(Social, Environmental) Reporting
Which is More Value-Relevant:
Earnings or Cash Flows?
The Controversy Over Fair Value (Mark-to-Market)
Financial Reporting
Online Resources for Business
Valuations
See
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
Understanding the Issues
Issues of Auditor
Independence
Quality of Earnings, Restatements,
and Core Earnings
Economic Theory of Accounting
Socionomics Theory
of Finance and Fraud
Facts
Based on Assumptions: The Power of Postpositive Thinking
Mike Kearl's great social
theory site
Bob Jensen's threads on GAAP comparisons (with
particular stress upon derivative financial
instruments accounting rules) are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/canada.htm
The above site also links to more general GAAP comparison guides between
nations.
Implications of Bad Auditing on Capital Markets
and Client's Cost of Captial
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm#IncompetentAudits
Bob Jensen's threads on corporate governance are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#Governance
Great Minds in Management: The Process of Theory
Development ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/GreatMinds.htm
"Cornell Theory Center Aids Social Science Researchers,"
PR Web, June 19, 2006 ---
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2006/6/prweb400160.htm
You can order back issues or relevant links management and accounting
books and journals from MAAW ---
http://maaw.info/
Free Access to Back Issues of The Accounting Review ---
http://maaw.info/TheAccountingReview.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on special purpose (variable interest)
entities are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm
"Visualization of Multidimensional Data" ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/352wpVisual/000DataVisualization.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on XBRL are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm#XBRLextended
Accounting for Electronic Commerce, Including Controversies
on Business Valuation, ROI, and Revenue Reporting ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce.htm
Comparisons of International IAS Versus FASB Standards ---
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/pocketiasus.pdf
Bob Jensen's Enron Quiz (with answers) ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnronQuiz.htm
"Corporate Reports Now Searchable Via EDGAR," SmartPros, June
16, 2006 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x53502.xml
Investors and analysts can now search the full
text of every SEC document filed by companies within the last two years.
They'll also be able to retrieve mutual fund filings by fund or share
class.
The company filing search engine enables
real-time, full-text searches of filings on the entirety of the SEC's
EDGAR (Electronic Document, Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval) database
of company filings for the last two years. The tool can be found at
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm.
SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, a strong
proponent of using the Internet to post dynamic financial reports and to
serve as a tool for investors and analysts made the announcement in his
opening remarks at the SEC's Interactive Data Roundtable in Washington,
D.C.
"This new full-text search capability will give
investors and analysts instant access to the specific information they
want," said Cox.
The new mutual fund search capability was made
possible when the SEC recently required that filings contain a unique
numerical identifier for each fund and share class. Investors will be
able to find relevant filings by searching for the name of their own
fund. In the past, searching for information on particular funds and
particular share classes within funds was very difficult, because a
single prospectus might contain information about many mutual funds and
share classes.
The SEC is asking users of this Web site
feature to supply feedback, including suggestions for additional
functions, so that further improvements to the site can be considered
and implemented.
Paul Pacter has been working hard to both maintain his international
accounting site and to produce a comparison guide between international and
Chinese GAAP. He states the following on May 26, 2005 at
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
May 26, 2005: Deloitte (China) has published
a comparison of accounting standards in the People's Republic of China and
International Financial Reporting Standards as of March 2005. The comparison
is available in both English and Chinese. China has different levels of
accounting standards that apply to different classes of entities. The
comparison relates to the standards applicable to the largest companies
(including all non-financial listed and foreign-invested enterprises) and
identifies major accounting recognition and measurement differences. Click
to download:
The chronology of events leading up to European adoption if common
international accounting standards ---
http://www.iasplus.com/restruct/resteuro.htm
Large International Accounting Firm History ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Four_auditors
This is a Good Summary of Various Forms of Business Risk
--- http://www.erisk.com/portal/Resources/resources_archive.asp
-
Enterprise Risk Management
-
Credit Risk
-
Market Risk
-
Operational Risk
-
Business Risk
-
Other Types of Risk?
Accounting
History in a Nutshell
Confucius is described, by Sima Qian and other sources, as having endured
a poverty-stricken and humiliating youth and been forced, upon reaching
manhood, to undertake such petty jobs as accounting and caring for
livestock.
Early accounting was a knotty issue
South American Indian culture apparently used layers of knotted strings as a
complicated ledger.
Two Harvard University researchers believe they
have uncovered the meaning of a group of Incan khipus, cryptic assemblages
of string and knots that were used by the South American civilization for
record-keeping and perhaps even as a written language. Researchers have long
known that some knot patterns represented a specific number. Archeologist
Gary Urton and mathematician Carrie Brezine report today in the journal
Science that computer analysis of 21 khipus showed how individual strings
were combined into multilayered collections that were used as a kind of
ledger.
Thomas H. Maugh, "Researchers Think They've Got the Incas' Numbers," Los
Angeles Times, August 12, 2005 ---
http://www.latimes.com/news/science/la-sci-khipu12aug12,1,6589325.story?coll=la-news-science&ctrack=1&cset=true
Jensen Comment: I'm told that accounting tallies in Africa and other
parts of the world preceded written language. However, tallies alone did
not permit aggregations such as accounting for such things as three goats
plus sixty apples. Modern accounting awaited a combination of the Arabic
numbering (
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arabic_numbers ) and a common valuation
scheme for valuing heterogeneous items (e.g., gold equivalents or currency
units) such that the values of goats and apples could be aggregated. It is
intriguing that Inca knot patterns were something more than simple tallies
since patterns could depict different numbers and aggregations could
possibly be achieved with "multilayered collections."
Accounting History (across
hundreds of years)
A Change Fifty-Years in the Making, by Jennie Mitchell, Project
Accounting WED Interconnect ---
http://accounting.smwc.edu/historyacc.htm
Serious Accounting Historians May Find Some Things of Use Here
Advanced Papyrological Information System from Columbia University ---
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/projects/digital/apis/
APIS is a collections-based repository hosting
information about and images of papyrological materials (e.g. papyri,
ostraca, wood tablets, etc) located in collections around the world. It
contains physical descriptions and bibliographic information about the
papyri and other written materials, as well as digital images and English
translations of many of these texts. When possible, links are also provided
to the original language texts (e.g. through the Duke Data Bank of
Documentary Papyri). The user can move back and forth among text,
translation, bibliography, description, and image. With the
specially-developed APIS Search System many different types of complex
searches can be carried out.
APIS includes both published and unpublished
material. Generally, much more detailed information is available about the
published texts. Unpublished papyri have often not yet been fully
transcribed, and the information available is sometimes very basic. If you
need more information about a papyrus, you should contact the appropriate
person at the owning institution. (See the list of contacts under Rights &
Permissions.)
APIS is still very much a work in progress; current
statistics are shown in the sidebar at right. Other statistics are available
on the statistics page in the project documentation. Curators of collections
interested in becoming part of APIS are invited to communicate with the
project director, Traianos Gagos.
More Than a Numbers Game: A Brief History of Accounting
Author: Thomas A. King
ISBN: 0-470-00873-3
Hardcover 242 pages
September 2006
Inspired by a 1998 speech by former SEC Chairman
Arthur Levitt, this book addresses the why of accounting instead of the how,
providing practitioners and students with a highly readable history of U.S.
corporate accounting. Each chapter explores a controversial accounting topic.
Author Thomas King is treasurer of Progressive Insurance.
SmartPros Newsletter, September 25, 2006
More Than a Numbers Game: A Brief History of Accounting
Author: Thomas A. King
ISBN: 0-470-00873-3
Hardcover 242 pages
September 2006
Inspired by a 1998 speech by former SEC Chairman
Arthur Levitt, this book addresses the why of accounting instead of the how,
providing practitioners and students with a highly readable history of U.S.
corporate accounting. Each chapter explores a controversial accounting topic.
Author Thomas King is treasurer of Progressive Insurance.
SmartPros Newsletter, September 25, 2006
Jensen Comment
The Chief Accountant of the SEC under Arthur Levitt was one of my heroes named
Lynn Turner.
Let me close by citing Harry
S. Truman who said, "I never give them hell; I just tell them the truth and they
think its hell!"
Great Speeches About the State of Accountancy
"20th Century Myths," by Lynn Turner when he was still Chief Accountant at the
SEC in 1999 ---
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch323.htm
It is
interesting to listen to people ask for simple, less complex
standards like in "the good old days." But I never hear them ask for
business to be like "the good old days," with smokestacks rather
than high technology, Glass-Steagall rather than Gramm-Leach, and
plain vanilla interest rate deals rather than swaps, collars, and
Tigers!! The bottom line is—things have changed. And so have people.
Today, we have enormous pressure on CEO’s and
CFO’s. It used to be that CEO’s would be in their positions for an
average of more than ten years. Today, the average is 3 to 4 years.
And Financial Executive Institute surveys show that the CEO and CFO
changes are often linked.
In such an environment, we in the auditing
and preparer community have created what I consider to be a
two-headed monster. The first head of this monster is what I call
the "show me" face. First, it is not uncommon to hear one say, "show
me where it says in an accounting book that I can’t do this?" This
approach to financial reporting unfortunately necessitates the level
of detail currently being developed by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board ("FASB"), the Emerging Issues Task Force, and the
AICPA’s Accounting Standards Executive Committee. Maybe this isn’t a
recent phenomenon. In 1961, Leonard Spacek, then managing partner at
Arthur Andersen, explained the motivation for less specificity in
accounting standards when he stated that "most industry
representatives and public accountants want what they call
‘flexibility’ in accounting principles. That term is never clearly
defined; but what is wanted is ‘flexibility’ that permits greater
latitude to both industry and accountants to do as they please." But
Mr. Spacek was not a defender of those who wanted to "do as they
please." He went on to say, "Public accountants are constantly
required to make a choice between obtaining or retaining a client
and standing firm for accounting principles. Where the choice
requires accepting a practice which will produce results that are
erroneous by a relatively material amount, we must decline the
engagement even though there is precedent for the practice desired
by the client."
We create the second head of our monster
when we ask for standards that absolutely do not reflect the
underlying economics of transactions. I offer two prime examples.
Leasing is first. We have accounting literature put out by the FASB
with follow-on interpretative guidance by the accounting
firms—hundreds of pages of lease accounting guidance that, I will be
the first to admit, is complex and difficult to decipher. But it is
due principally to people not being willing to call a horse a horse,
and a lease what it really is—a financing. The second example is
Statement 133 on derivatives. Some people absolutely howl about its
complexity. And yet we know that: (1) people were not complying with
the intent of the simpler Statements 52 and 80, and (2) despite the
fact that we manage risk in business by managing values rather than
notional amounts, people want to account only for notional amounts.
As a result, we ended up with a compromise position in Statement
133. To its credit, Statement 133 does advance the quality of
financial reporting. For that, I commend the FASB. But I believe
that we could have possibly achieved more, in a less complex
fashion, if people would have agreed to a standard that truly
reflects the underlying economics of the transactions in an unbiased
and representationally faithful fashion.
I certainly hope that we can find a way to
do just that with standards we develop in the future, both in the
U.S. and internationally. It will require a change in how we
approach standard setting and in how we apply those standards. It
will require a mantra based on the fact that transparent, high
quality financial reporting is what makes our capital markets the
most efficient, liquid, and deep in the world. |
In her notes compiled in 1979, Professor Linda
Plunkett of the College of Charleston S.C., calls accounting the "oldest
profession"; in fact, since prehistoric times families had to account for
food and clothing to face the cold seasons. Later, as man began to trade, we
established the concept of value and developed a monetary system. Evidence of
accounting records can be found in the Babylonian Empire (4500 B.C.), in
pharaohs' Egypt and in the Code of Hammurabi (2250 B.C.). Eventually, with the
advent of taxation, record keeping became a necessity for governments to sustain
social orders.
James deSantis, A BRIEF HISTORY OF ACCOUNTING: FROM PREHISTORY TO
THE INFORMATION AGE ---
http://www.ftlcomm.com/ensign/historyAcc/ResearchPaperFin.htm
Origins of Double Entry Accounting are Unknown
- 1300s A.D. crusades opened the Middle East and
Mediterranean trade routes
- Venice and Genoa became venture trading centers
for commerce
- 1296 A.D. Fini Ledgers in Florence
- 1340 City of Massri Treasurers Accounts are in
Double Entry form.
- 1494 Luca Pacioli's Summa de Arithmetica
Geometria Proportionalita (A Review of Arithmetic, Geometry and Proportions)
Recall that double entry bookkeeping supposedly evolved
in Italy long before it was put into algebraic form in the book Summa by
Luca Pacioli
. As a result the English term "Debit" really has a Latin origin.
You can read the following at
http://www.wikiverse.org/debit
**************
Debit is an accounting and bookkeeping term that comes from the Latin word
debere which means "to owe." The opposite of a debit is a credit. Debit is
abbreviated Dr while credit is abbreviated Cr.
**************
December 13, 2005 message from Robert Bowers
[M.Robert.Bowers@WHARTON.UPENN.EDU]
In the 14th Century, the Phoenicians sent trading
ships to Cathay (China) to trade for silk. Problem was, if a ship sank, the
merchant prob sank (bankrupt) with it. So the merchants pooled their
resources so if a ship sank no one merchant lost everything. Along with
this, an Italian Count named Paole (seriously) set up a system of
recordkeeping to keep track of the ventures. In this system, he created two
registers, a Debit Register (DR), and a Credit Register (CR)
I'll bet 95% of all CPA's don't know that which
makes me .... a trivia freak?
December 16, 2005 message from Robert B Walker
[walkerrb@ACTRIX.CO.NZ]
Luca Pacioli did not invent double entry
book-keeping. The rudiments of double entry book-keeping (DEBK) can be found
in Muslim government administration in the 10th Century. (See Book-keeping
and Accounting Systems in a tenth Century Muslim Administrative Office by
Hamid, Craig & Clark in Accounting, Business & Financial History Vol 3 No 5
1995).
As I understand it Pacioli saw the technique being
used by Arab traders and adapted and codified the technique allowing it to
spread to Northern Europe where it became a* key component in Western
economic dominance in the last 500 years.
This is logical if you think about it. DEBK is the
greatest expression of applied algebra – that Arab word betraying the origin
of the particular mathematical technique in which the world’s duality is
reflected.
RW
* but not the key component as Werner Sombart would
have it. But then his reason for wanting that to be was his extreme anti-semitism
… but that is another story.
December 13, 2005 reply from Earl Hall
[earl@PERSPLAN.COM]
From thefreedictionary.com
DR = Debit [Middle English debite, from Latin
dbitum, debt; see debt.]
CR=Credit [French, from Old French, from Old
Italian credito, from Latin crditum, loan, from neuter past participle of
crdere, to entrust; see kerd- in Indo-European roots.]
Who am I to argue with a free dictionary? The
answer is worth what I paid.
Accountancy and the da Vinci Code
April 12, 2007 message from Barry Rice
[brice@LOYOLA.EDU]
From the April 11 Brisbane Times:
Forgotten magic manual contains original da Vinci
code
AFTER lying almost untouched in the vaults of an Italian university for 500
years, a book on the magic arts written by Leonardo da Vinci's best friend
and teacher has been translated into English for the first time.
The world's oldest magic text, De viribus
quantitatis (On the Powers of Numbers), was penned by Luca Pacioli, a
Franciscan monk who shared lodgings with da Vinci.
Continued at
http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/articles/2007/04/10/1175971101054.html
.
E. Barry Rice, MBA, CPA
Director, Instructional Services
Emeritus Accounting Professor
Loyola College in Maryland
BRice@Loyola.edu
410-617-2478
www.barryrice.com
Facebook me!
http://www.facebook.com/p/Barry_Rice/20102311
The following is a controversial quotation from
http://www.cbs.dk/staff/hkacc/BOOK-ART.doc
"The power of double-entry bookkeeping has been
praised by many notable authors throughout history. In Wilhelm Meister, Goethe
states, "What advantage does he derive from the system of bookkeeping by
double-entry! It is among the finest inventions of the human mind"...
Werner Sombart, a German economic historian, says, "... double-entry
bookkeeping is borne of the same spirit as the system of Galileo and
Newton" and "Capitalism without double-entry bookkeeping is simply
inconceivable. They hold together as form and matter. And one may indeed doubt
whether capitalism has procured in double-entry bookkeeping a tool which
activates its forces, or whether double-entry bookkeeping has first given rise
to capitalism out of its own (rational and systematic) spirit".
If, for a moment, one considers the credibility
crisis of practical accounting, it would be quite impossible to dismiss the
following paradox: the conflict between the enthusiastic praise of the
system's strength on the one hand, and on the other, the many financial
failures in the real world. How can such a powerful system, even when applied
meticulously, still result in disasters? Although it is hardly necessary to
argue more in favour of double-entry book-keeping, I still want to underline
the two qualities of the system which I find are valid explanations of the
system's very important and world-wide role in financial development for five
centuries.
The Logic of Double-Entry Bookkeeping, by Henning
Kirkegaard
Department of Financial & Management Accounting
Copenhagen Business School
Howitzvej 60
Along this same double-entry thread I might mention my mentor at Stanford.
Nobody I know holds the mathematical wonderment of double-entry and historical
cost accounting more in awe than Yuji Ijiri. For example, see Theory of
Accounting Measurement, by Yuji Ijiri (Sarasota: American Accounting
Association Studies in Accounting Research No. 10, 1975).
Dr.
Ijirii also extended the concept to triple-entry bookkeeping in (Sarasota:
Triple-Entry Bookkeeping and Income Momentum
American Accounting Association Studies in Accounting Research No. 18, 1982).
http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aaa/market/studar.htm tm
Also see the following:
Brush up your Shakespeare:
Medieval manuscripts to hit Internet
Stanford University
Libraries, the University of Cambridge and
Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, will make
hundreds of medieval manuscripts, dating
from the sixth through the 16th centuries,
accessible on the Internet.
"Medieval manuscripts to hit Internet,"
Stanford Report, July 13, 2005 ---
http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2005/july13/parker-071305.html
A summary of the medieval times and
literature is available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medieval
Brush up your Shakespeare:
Medieval manuscripts to hit Internet
Stanford University
Libraries, the University of Cambridge and
Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, will make
hundreds of medieval manuscripts, dating
from the sixth through the 16th centuries,
accessible on the Internet.
"Medieval manuscripts to hit Internet,"
Stanford Report, July 13, 2005 ---
http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2005/july13/parker-071305.html
A summary of the medieval times and
literature is available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medieval
May 28, 2005 reply from Barbara Scofield
[scofield@GSM.UDALLAS.EDU]
Thank you for the notice about the availability of
the medieval manuscripts on the Internet through the project Parker on the
Web at Stanford University. Two manuscripts are currently available, and on
page 11 of the English translation of Matthew Paris's "English History From
1235 to 1273" I have already found references to accounting (see below).
Accountants are still using the principle "under
whatever name it may be called" and entities are still making up new names
for inconvenient economic events in the hopes of avoiding full disclosure.
At this Catholic liberal arts university
Shakespeare is modern, and the medieval world is revered, so I'm interested
in gaining some insight into the medieval worldview.
Barbara W. Scofield, PhD, CPA
Associate Professor of Accounting
University of Dallas
1845 E. Northgate Irving, TX 75062
Braniff 262
scofield@gsm.udallas.edu
Ancient Finance from Harvard Business School
From Jim Mahar's blog on May 17, 2006 ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
The
HBS
Working Knowledge site has an interesting
article by William Goetzmann on
financial instruments back in the time of the Romans and Greeks.
For instance on checks:
...bankers'
checks written in Greek on papyri appeared in ancient Egypt as far
back as 250 B.C. Papyri preserved well in Egypt thanks to its arid
climate, but Goetzmann thinks it's safe to say such checks changed
hands throughout the Mediterranean world . . . So the whole
tradition of bank checks predates the current era and has its roots
at least in Hellenistic Greek times," he says.
Going Concern and Accrual Accounting Evolved in
the 1500s
- Venture accounting over the life of a venture with
interim statements evolved in The Netherlands
- 1673 Code of Commerce in France requires biannual
balance sheet reporting
- Charge and Discharge Agency Responsibility and
Stewardship Accounting in English trust accounting
Limited liability Corporations (divorced
professional management from ownership shares)
- 1555 A.D. Russia Company
- 1600 A.D. East India Company
- 1670 A.D. Hudson's Bay Company
- England's Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844
required depreciation accounting for railroads, mining, and manufacturing (although the
concept of depreciation dates back to Roman times).
Speculation Fever
Fraud and corruption festered and grew with the trading of joint stock, especially after
1600 A.D. The South Seas Company scandal (reporting stock sales as income and paying
dividends out of capital) led to England's Bubble Act in 1720 A.D. that focused on
misleading accounting practices that helped managers rip off investors, especially by
crediting stock sales to income.
Laissez-Faire Accounting survived endless debates
and scandals until the Great Depression in 1933
- Much of the debate focused on capital maintenance
(e.g., failure to charge off depreciation and failure to provide for replacement of
operating assets), but governments did not legally impose auditing requirements and
serious GAAP until the U.S. securities laws in the early 1930s. Accountants were
vocal in reform movements, but governments were slow to react with legislation and courts
failed to establish consistent GAAP.
- Creation of the SEC in an effort to regain public
trust in financial reporting and equity investing.
- Many firms did have independent audits and
conformed to the best GAAP traditions of the day (thereby giving
some evidence that Agency Theory works sometimes.) Agency theory
hypothesizes that it is in the best interest of management to contract for protection of
investors and avoid scandalous asymmetries of information.
After 1933, the AICPA and the SEC seriously
attempted to generate accounting standards, enforce accounting standards, and provide
academic justification for promulgated standards.
- ASRs of the SEC
- In a 3-2 vote the SEC followed George O. May's
efforts to mandate external audits of securities traded across state lines in the U.S.
- 1939-1959 A.D.: Accounting standards were
generated by the AICPA's Committee on Accounting Procedure (CAP) that issued Accounting
Research Bulletins (51 ARBs) --- but the tendency was to overlook controversial issues
such as off-balance sheet financing, public disclosure of management forecasts,
price-level accounting, current cost accounting, and exit value accounting.
Controversial items avoided by the CAP included management compensation accounting,
pension accounting, post-employment benefits accounting, and off balance sheet financing
(OBSF). The CAP did very little to restrain diversity of reporting.
- 1960-1972 A.D.: Accounting standards in the
U.S. were generated by the AICPA's Accounting Principles Board (APB) that had more members
than the CAP and a mandate to attack more controversial reporting issues. The APB
attacked some controversial issues but often failed to resolve their own disputes on such
issues as pooling versus purchase accounting for mergers.
- 1972-???? A.D. Accounting standards in the
U.S. were, and still are, being generated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) that has seven members, including required members from industry, academe, and
financial analysts in addition to members from public accountancy. FASB members must
divorce themselves from previous income ties and work full time for the FASB. The
formation of the FASB was a desperation move by CPA's to stave off threatened takeover of
accounting standards by the Federal Government (there were the Moss and Metcalf bills to
do just that under pending legislation in the U.S. House and Senate). Unlike the CAP
and APB, the FASB has a full-time research staff and has issued highly controversial
standards forcing firms to abide by pension accounting rules, capitalization of many
leases, and booking of many previous OBSF items (capital leases, pensions, post-employment
benefits, income tax accounting, derivative financial instruments, pooling accounting,
etc.). The road has been long and hard on some other issues where attempts to issue
new standards (e.g., expensing of dry holes in oil and gas accounting and booking of
employee stock options) have been thwarted by highly-publicized political pressuring by
corporations.
Wow Online Accounting History
Book (Free)
Thank you David A.R. Forrester for providing a great, full-length, and online book:
An Invitation to Accounting History --- http://accfinweb.account.strath.ac.uk/df/contents.html
Note especially Section B2 --- "Rational Administration, Finance And Control
Accounting: the Experience of Cameralism" --- http://accfinweb.account.strath.ac.uk/df/b2.html
Accounting history lecture worth noting --- http://newman.baruch.cuny.edu/digital/saxe/saxe_1978/baxter_79.htm
The for-free IASC comparison study of IAS 39 versus FAS 133 (by Paul
Pacter) at http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm
The non-free FASB comparison study of all standards entitled The IASC-U.S.
Comparison Project: A Report on the Similarities and Differences between IASC
Standards and U.S. GAAP
SECOND EDITION, (October 1999) at
http://stores.yahoo.com/fasbpubs/publications.html
In 1999 the Joint Working Group of the Banking
Associations sharply rebuffed the IAS 39 fair value accounting in two white
papers that can be downloaded from http://www.iasc.org.uk/frame/cen3_112.htm.
Also see the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
and the International Federation of Accountants Committee (IFAC).
Side by Side: IAS 39 Compared with FASB Standards (FAS 133), by Paul Pacter,
as published in Accountancy International Magazine, June 1999 ---
http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm
Also note "Comparisons of International IAS Versus FASB Standards" ---
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/pocketiasus.pdf
October 21, 2005 message from Scott Bonacker
[lister@BONACKERS.COM]
I remember a thread or two asking for information
on historical figures or accounting heros or something like that. I couldn't
come up with the right key words to find it by searching the archives
unfortunately.
When I saw this article, I thought this was someone that should be included:
"Mary T. Washington of Chicago stepped bravely beyond race and gender
boundaries in 1943, becoming the first black female certified public
accountant in the United States. Washington, 99 years old when she died in
late July, first opened an accounting practice for African-American clients
in her basement while working on her college degree.
Washington lived and led in a world not yet here, creating what her business
partner later called an "underground railroad" for aspiring black CPAs.
...."
Read the rest at:
http://www.sojo.net/index.cfm?action=magazine.article&issue=soj0511&article=051149
October 21, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Scott,
Although there are probably various interesting sites such as those you
mentioned, there are several sites that are of particular interest with
respect to famous accounting practitioners and academics.
The OSU Accounting Hall of Fame
It should be noted that members elected to this Hall of Fame include famous
accountants from around the world ---
http://fisher.osu.edu/acctmis/hall/
U.K. Accounting Hall of Fame
Professors David Otley and Ken Peasnell of the Department of Accounting and
Finance are two of the fourteen founding members of the British Accounting
Association’s Hall of Fame. The ceremony took place at the British
Accounting Association 2004 Annual conference at York in April 2004 ---
http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/news/3806/
Michigan State Video Archive
I've not yet seen anything about other accounting Hall of Fame sites.
Michigan State University has a video archive of famous accountants. These
accountants were invited to campus and then taped live. I don't think any of
this footage is available online, but it would be a nice thing to do now
that digitization hardware is so inexpensive. Don Edwards (U. of Georgia)
probably knows more about these videos than anybody else.
A few accountants who became famous in fields other than accounting are
listed at
http://www.educationwithattitude.com/catch/accounting.asp
The above site missed my favorite accounting celebrity John Cleese
The Unofficial Monty Python Website ---
http://www.educationwithattitude.com/catch/accounting.asp
Note especially The Accountancy Shanty (audio) at
http://www.educationwithattitude.com/catch/accounting.asp
Bob Jensen
October 23, 2005 reply from Tom Sentman
[TSentman@MSN.COM]
Here is a historical figure for consideration.
While not a CPA, Luca Pacioli is considered to be the father of accounting.
Although he did not invent dual-entry accounting, he described the system as
we know it today. I always use this question on my tests.
Visit
http://acct.tamu.edu/smith/ethics/pacioli.htm
for more.
Cheers,
Tom Sentman
See Accounting History Publications list 1998 ---
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3933/is_199905/ai_n8843886
A substantial listing of history papers is available from the Institute of
Chartered Accountants ---
http://www.icaew.co.uk/library/index.cfm?AUB=TB2I_27022
Accounting Historians Journal ---
http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aah/
The University of Sydney's Accounting Foundation provides some accounting
history publications ---
http://www.econ.usyd.edu.au/af /
History of Information Technology in Auditing (EDP Auditing) ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_information_technology_auditing
For additional information on the history of accountancy and the accountancy
profession see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accounting
Islamic Accounting
Islamic Accounting ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_accounting
The Differences of Conventional and Islamic Accounting ---
Click Here
"Islamic Accounting: Challenges, Opportunities and Terror,"
AccountingWeb, October 5, 2006 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102651
Recent events, from the start of Ramadan, to the
Pope’s controversial remarks about Islam, to the discovery of a new tape by
two of the September 11 attackers, to the release of Bob Woodward’s latest
book, have once more made Islam a topic of conversation. Beyond the
headlines, however, exists a complex religious and social system that
affects far more people than just Muslims. Islamic finance, particularly
Islamic banking, insurance and accounting, is playing a growing role around
the globe, especially in the business world.
Islamic accounting is generally defined as an alternative accounting system
which aims to provide users with information enabling them to operate
businesses and organizations according to Shariah, or Islamic law. With
little doubt, the greatest challenges to Islamic accounting and finance in
the United States stem from a lack of knowledge and understanding of Islam
and the intricacies of its financial laws and concerns regarding terrorism,
combined with the U.S. regulatory framework and guiding principles of
American business. The Muslim and Islamic financial markets within the U.S.
and around the world, currently represent an enormous opportunity for those
willing to overcome these challenges.
Islam & Islamic Financial Laws
“To professional accountants who have been
brought-up on the idea of accounting as an ‘objective’, technical and
value-free discipline, the idea of attaching a religious adjective to
accounting may seem embarrassing, unprofessional and even dangerous,” Dr.
Shahul Hameed bin Mohamed Ibrahim says in Islamic Accounting – A Primer.
Both conventional and Islamic accounting provide
information and define how that information is measured, valued, recorded
and communicated. Conventional accounting provides information about
economic events and transactions, measuring resources in terms of assets and
liabilities, and communicating that information through financial statements
users, typically investors, rely on to make decisions regarding their
investments. Islamic accounting, however, identifies socio-economic events
and transactions measured in both financial and non-financial terms and the
information is used to ensure Islamic organizations of all types adhere to
Shariah and achieve the socio-economic objectives promoted by Islam. This is
not to say, or imply, Islamic accounting is not concerned with money, rather
it is not concerned only with money.
Islamic accounting, in many ways, is more holistic.
Shariah prohibits interest-based income or usury and also gambling, so part
of what Islamic accounting does is help ensure companies do not harm others
while making money and achieve an equitable allocation and distribution of
wealth, not just among shareholders of a specific corporation but also among
society in general. Of course, as with conventional accounting, this is not
always achieved in practice, as an examination of the wide variances in
wealth among the populations of Arab nations, particularly those with
majority Muslim populations shows.
In addition, because a significant part of
operating within Shariah means delivering on Islam’s socio-economic
objectives, Islamic organizations have far wider interests and engage in
more diverse activities than their non-Islamic counterparts.
Concerns About Terrorism
The diverse activities and interests organizations
pursue under Shariah is a cause for concern when applying conventional
accounting to Islamic organizations. After all, conventional accounting can
be used to disguise unethical and even illegal activities within the very
organizations they were intended to provide information about. Imagine how
easy it is to overlook or just not identify such information when employing
an accounting system not designed for use with the type of organization it
is being applied to.
In the past, the issues raised by this mismatch
focused on the ability of users beyond the Muslim world to make appropriate
decisions regarding investments. Since September 11, 2001, however, the
concern has changed from the potential loss of investment to the possibility
of supporting terrorism.
This concern is particularly significant for
non-profit organizations involved in providing humanitarian relief outside
the U.S.. Fortunately, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (DoT) has issued
updated Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for
U.S.-based Charities (Guidelines).
“The abuse of charities by terrorist organizations
is a serious and urgent matter, and the Guidelines reinforce the need
for the U.S. Government and the charitable sector alike, to keep this
challenge at the forefront of our complementary efforts,” Pat O’Brien,
Assistant Secretary for the Treasury’s Office of Terrorist Financing and
Financial Crime, said in a statement announcing the updated guidelines. The
Treasury Department is committed to protecting and enabling legitimate and
vital charity worldwide, and will continue to work with the sector to
advance our mutual goals.”
The Guidelines urge charities to take a
proactive, risk-based approach to protecting against illicit abuse and are
intended to be applied by those charities vulnerable to such abuse, in a
manner commensurate with the risks they face and the resources with which
they work. At the request of the charitable sector, the Guidelines
contain extensive anti-terrorist financing guidance, as well as guidance on
sound governance and financial practices that helps prevent the exploitation
of charities.
Regulatory Issues
The regulatory environment Islamic individuals and
organizations are most concerned with, considering the current political
climate, are those relating to anti-terrorism and anti-money laundering. Yet
the tensions arising from regulatory requirements within the U.S. related to
American business practices often prove more difficult to resolve.
It is in trying to balance the expectations of
distinct business cultures that the differences between conventional and
Islamic accounting are most notable. For instance, depending upon the type
of transactions the organizations are engaged in, the roles,
responsibilities and rights assigned to each party can be contradictory and
even in direct conflict. In some situations, such as transactions involving
private equity, venture capital, profit sharing and liquidations,
organizations and individuals employing conventional accounting may actually
find they prefer Islamic accounting. Other issues, such as those related to
taxation, require significant effort to resolve. The inherent flexibility of
Shariah is a benefit under these circumstances, since the complexity of the
American tax code is highly inflexible.
The number of Muslim consumers, investors and
business owners has grown along with the Muslim American population which is
currently estimated to be between six and seven million. Although demand for
Islamic financial products and services has increased, both the supply and
the number of providers remain insufficient. It should also be noted that
Islamic orthodoxy, expressed as the desire to implement Shariah as the sole
legal foundation of a nation, is actually associated with progressive
economic principles, including increasing government for the poor, reducing
income inequality and increasing government ownership of industries and
industries, especially in the poorer nations of the Muslim world.
“While it is common to associate traditional
religious beliefs with conservative political stances on a wide range of
issues, this is only partly true,” said Robert V. Robinson, Chancellor’s
Professor and chair of Indiana University’s Department of Sociology. “The
Islamic orthodox are more conservative on issues having to do with gender,
sexuality and the family, but more liberal or left on economic issues.
Islamic Accounting Web ---
http://www.iiu.edu.my/iaw/
The Islamic Accounting Website is a project of the
Department of Accounting, Kulliyah of Economics and Management Sciences,
International Islamic University Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur. This project is
under the direction of Dr. Shahul Hameed bin Mohamed Ibrahim, Assistant
Professor and the current Head of the Department. The philosophy of the
University is to Islamize knowledge to solve the crisis in Muslim thinking
brought about by the secularization of knowledge and furthermore
contributing as a centre of educational excellence to revive the dynamism of
the Muslim Ummah in knowledge, learning and the professions. The Department
of Accounting is fully committed to this vision and strives to Islamicise
Accounting.
"ISLAMIC ACCOUNTING STANDARDS," by Shadia Rahman ---
http://islamic-finance.net/islamic-accounting/acctg5.html
Sharing site of Dr Shahul Hameed Bin Hj Mohamed Ibrahim ---
http://islamic-finance.net/islamic-accounting/
articles by the author
articles by other scholars
Forthcoming
Articles on Islamic Accounting
XBRL: The Next Big Thing
December 6, 2005 message from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@terry.uga.edu]
National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB
Developments. His talk is available at:
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch120505cc.htm
He had three main messages:
1. Accounting rules need to be simplified. "The
accounting scandals that our nation and the world have now mostly
weathered were made possible in part by the sheer complexity of the
rules." "The sheer accretion of detail has, in time, led to one of the
system's weaknesses - its extreme complexity. Convolution is now
reducing its usefulness."
2. The concentration of auditing services in
the Big 4 "quadropoly" is bad for the securities markets. The SEC will
try to do more to encourage the use of medium size and smaller firms
that receive good inspection reports from the PCAOB.
3. The SEC will continue to push XBRL. "The
interactive data that this initiative will create will lead to vast
improvements in the quality, timeliness, and usefulness of information
that investors get about the companies they're investing in."
A very interesting talk - one that seems to
promise a high level of cooperation with the accounting profession.
Denny
Bob Jensen's threads on XBRL are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm
Two XBRL Videos
XBRL is no longer something we only play with in academe. It is now
available to investors around the world, although it may take a while for
some companies to add the XBRL tags to their financial statements. Some
things that are now being done in XBRL such as time graphs and ratio graphs
can be done with things other than XBRL. What XBRL does, however, is make
it possible to:
(1) Compare different companies in a Web browser
(2)
Perform customized analyses if the XBRL statements are downloaded into
Excel
(3) Conduct easy searches that do not yield thousands of unwanted and
extraneous hits
Bob Jensen's New Video Tutorial on XBRL (about 30
minutes)
It's the XBRLdemos2005.wmv file at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/video/Tutorials/
But first read
the following and watch the KOSDAQ video before watching the above video.
Question
What are the two most significant events in the history of accounting,
financial reporting, and financial statement analysis?
Answers
Double Entry Bookkeeping and
XBRL
The origins of double entry bookkeeping are unknown.
It goes back over 100 years before
Luca Pacioli
made it famous by
algebraically describing it in the world's first algebra book called
Summa written in 1494. Pacioli's basic equation A=L+E simply shows
how recorded asset values in total equal the double-entry sum of creditor
liabilities plus owner equities in those assets. For over 500 years
accounting disputes mainly lie in defining the A, L, and E concepts and
measuring them in financial statements. Pacioli gave us the algebra
without the crucial and operational definitions of terms. Bob Jensen's
brief summary of the history of accounting is at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm
XBRL stands for eXtensible Business Reporting Language in
XML that can now be interpreted by every Web browser such as Microsoft's
Internet Explorer. In the future, virtually every all academic
disciplines such as Chemistry, Physics, and History will probably develop
their own taxonomies for XML reporting on the Web.
Hence, we one day may have XCHEM, XPHYS, and XHIST
eXtensible reporting languages.
Whereas the famous HTML tags on data are not extensible and
are more or less fixed in scope and time, XML extensible meta-tags will
become the world's most popular way of creating customized "meta-tags" that
attach to virtually every piece of Web data and describe attributes of each
piece of data. The history of data tags and meta-tags is briefly
outlined at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm
I also highly recommend the XBRL history and news site at XBRL headquarters
at http://www.xbrl.org/Home/
XBRL is a taxonomy for XML meta-tags to be placed on
virtually every number in a set of financial statements. For over a
decade, efforts have been made by huge companies and accounting firms to
develop standardized XBRL tags for key taxonomies in accounting. These
taxonomies may vary as to a particular set of accounting generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP) such as International GAAP or US GAAP.
Once a company or user selects which GAAP taxonomy to use, it's financial
statements can be "marked up" with XBRL meta-tags that facilitate
comparative financial statement analysis. Users may also take any set
of financial statements and add tags for a chosen set of GAAP tags.
For example, see Drag and Tag from Rivet Corporation ---
http://www.rivetsoftware.com/
Also see
http://www.xbrl.org/eu/CEBS-3/Rivet_Industry Day_Brussels_14 Sept 2005.pdf
Because adding XBRL meta-tags to a given set of financial
statements is time consuming, most large companies are in the process of
adding these tags to their own financial data so that investors will not
have to do their own tagging. The major stock exchanges of the world
are now urging companies to send in their financial reports marked up in
XBRL. Soon they will require all listed companies to submit XBRL-tagged
financial statements.
Bob Jensen's Old XBRL Video Tutorial called XBRLdemos.wmf
About four years ago (I can't remember exactly when) I prepared a XBRL
tutorial on how to use XBRL in financial statement analysis. The
tutorial itself was actually developed by NASDAQ, Microsoft, and PwC in a
NMP partnership. NASDAQ selected 20 companies and marked up their
financial statements in XBRL. Microsoft wrote a fancy Excel program to
analyze those financial statements in Excel. PwC served up the data on
the Web. This NMP tutorial was intended to have a short life since the
plan was eventually to use XBRL directly in Web browsers without having to
use Excel. Indeed, PwC no longer serves up this tutorial. Bob
Jensen probably has the only recorded history of this NMP tutorial on video
in the file XBRLdemos.wfm at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/video/Tutorials/
Bob Jensen's New 2005 XBRL Video Tutorial called
XBRLdemos2005.wmf
XBRL is now marked up on many financial statements on the Web and can be
used for financial statement analysis in Web browsers. I found a set
of such statements for various (Star) companies on the Korean KOSDAQ stock
exchange homepage.
Before looking at my new video, I want you to first view the
KOSDAQ Camtasia video at
http://www.ubmatrix.com/solutions/WebHelp/KOSDAQDemo.html
After viewing this video, you can then go to my new Camtasia
2005 video XBRLdemos2005.wmv file at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/video/Tutorials/
My new video is mainly a tutorial about how I learned to use
the XBRL financial statements made available by KOSDAQ for actual use by
investors in companies listed on the KOSDAQ stock exchange.
In particular, my new video shows how to perform the
following steps at the KOSDAQ site.
First
Watch the
http://www.ubmatrix.com/solutions/WebHelp/KOSDAQDemo.html
Second
Watch my XBRLdemos2005.wmv file at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/video/Tutorials/
The KOSDAQ homepage is at
http://www.ubmatrix.com/home/default.asp
Go to http://km.krx.co.kr/
You do not have to install
the Korean language pack
Note that it may take some time for the upper menu to
appear
Click on the English button in the upper right corner
after the menu appears
Third
Go directly to
http://english.kosdaq.com/
Click on the "XBRL Service" on the right side of the
screen
Click on a company's logo (ignore any pop ups to
install a language pack)
If you do not see a graph on the left side of a
company's report,
click
on the button/instruction below the graph's border
After you see a graph,
click
on the various financial statement line items to the right
of the graph
(Your mouse pointer will now be a small bar
graph)
Go to the bottom of the page and click on
"Ratios"
If your pointer is still a small graph,
click
on the ratios that you want to see in the graph
Go to the bottom of the page and click on
"Comparison"
Options for comparisons are given (they are also
demonstrated in my video)
Go to the bottom of the page and read about the
Excel Analyzer
See what you can download if you really get
interested in the analysis options
|
October 30, 2005 reply from Deborah Johnson
[Finance@WeFightFraud.com]
I followed the instructions you plan to give
your students for Monday and found a few bugs you might want to know
about.
The Demos link at XBRL.org is not on the
home page. They need to know that this site requires them to navigate to
"Showcase" to find the Demo.
http://km.krx.co.kr/
selected English and then XBRL Services,
then chose the company. The graph is only available if you agree to
download and install additional software on your PC. If they do not have
administrator rights, this is not going to be an option for your
students. (say on college lab and classroom computers).
The company I selected, LG Micron, had an
obvious defect in the financial data being presented for this
demonstration. XBRL is clearly not going to minimize any human mistakes,
and the printed financials will still have to be carefully scrutinized
by management and the auditors. Do the math on the Trade Receivables at
Net. Demerits for any student who doesn't find the error. If you go to
the bottom of the table and select "Get these financials in XBRL" you
may get an XML Parsing Error. This is probably a higher version of XMl
required, and again the student would need administrator rights to
upgrade the software or install patches and plug ins.
Regards,
Deborah Johnson
October 30, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Deborah,
I agree with all your points and thank you for providing
some clarifications. With respect to needing administrative rights
to view the graphs (say on college lab computers and on classroom
computers), it behooves faculty to ask administrators to install the
software that can be downloaded free by clicking below the graph frame
for any company in the demo.
If students do not have administrative rights on a
college lab or classroom computer, I guess this makes my video tutorial
even more valuable since students can see what will happen if they try
this on their own computers where they automatically have administrative
rights.
Thanks,
Bob
Bob Jensen's threads on GAAP comparisons (with particular stress upon
derivative financial instruments accounting rules) are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/canada.htm
The above site also links to more general GAAP comparison guides between
nations.
International Standards from the IASB ---
Click Here
IASB homepage---
http://www.iasb.org/Home.htm
U.S. Standards from the FASB (Free Downloads) ---
http://www.fasb.org/public/
FASB homepage ---
http://www.fasb.org/
Management Accounting Standards from the IMA (Free
Downloads) ---
http://www.imanet.org/publications_statements.asp#C
IMA homepage ---
http://www.imanet.org/
Bob Jensen's summary of accounting theory and controversies ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm
Comparison of IFRSs and US GAAP (Educators can provide
free copies to students) ---
http://www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/0703ifrsusgaap.pdf
Comparisons for other nations ---
http://www.iasplus.com/country/compare.htm
From IAS Plus on March 14, 2007 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/0703ifrsusgaap.pdf
Deloitte's IFRS Global Office
has published a new
Comparison of International Financial Reporting
Standards and United States GAAP
(PDF 208k, 36 pages) as of 28
February 2007. While this comparison is
comprehensive, it does not attempt to capture all of
the differences that exist or that may be material
to a particular entity's financial statements. Our
focus is on differences that are commonly found in
practice. The significance of the differences
enumerated in this pubilcation – and others not
included – will vary with respect to individual
entities depending on such factors as the nature of
the entity's operations, the industry in which it
operates, and the accounting policy choices it has
made. We
are pleased to grant permission for accounting
educators and students to make copies for
educational purposes. |
|
|
Main News Site for International Accounting Happenings ---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
Paul Pacter and Deloitte provide a statistical database (with
data about international accounting) at
http://www.iasplus.com/stats/stats.htm
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Summary ---
http://www.iasplus.com/standard/standard.htm
Use of IFRS varies by nation ---
http://www.iasplus.com/country/useias.htm
If you click on the Search tab and enter something like (IFRS AND China)
to compare IFRS with the domestic standards of a given nation ---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
Standard Setting and Securities Markets: U.S. Versus Europe
November 29, 2007 message from Pacter, Paul (CN - Hong Kong)
[paupacter@DELOITTE.COM.HK]
Some similarities to Chair of SEC, but some
important differences. SEC has direct regulatory powers over securities
markets, entities that offer securities in those markets, broker/dealers in
securities, auditors, and others. SEC can impose penalties on those it
regulates.
In Europe there is no pan-European securities
regulator equivalent to the SEC with direct regulatory powers similar to the
SEC's. Rather, there are 27 securities regulators (one from each member
state) who have that power. Here's a link to the list:
http://www.cesr-eu.org/index.php?page=members_directory&mac=0&id=
There is a coordinating body of European securities
regulators called CESR (the Committee of European Securities Regulators
(http://www.cesr-eu.org/)
but CESR's role is advisory, not regulatory.
When the European Parliament adopts legislation
(such as securitieslegislation) the legislation first has to be transposed
(legally adopted) into the national laws of the Member States. Commissioner
McCreevy's role is to propose policies and propose legislation to adopt
those policies in Europe, oversee implementation of the legislation in the
27 Member States (plus 3 EEA countries), and (through both persuasion and
some legal authority) try to ensure consistent and coordinated
implementation. The Commissioner also has outreach and liaison
responsibilities outside the European Union. Because there is no
pan-European counterpart to the SEC Chairman, Commissioner McCreevy
generally handles top level policy liaison between the SEC and Europe.
Like the Chair of the SEC, EU Commissioners are
political appointees.
Paul Pacter
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting standard setting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting
Question
Will the U.S. adopt all IFRS international standards while the European Union
cherry picks which standards it will adopt?
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on
April 27, 2007
"SEC to Mull Letting U.S. Companies Use International Accounting Rules,"
by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, Page: C3 ---
http://snipurl.com/WSJ0425
TOPICS: Accounting, Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards
Board, Securities and Exchange Commission
SUMMARY: The article describes the SEC's willingness to consider allowing
U.S. companies to use USGAAP or International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
in their filings. This development stems from the initiative to allow
international firms traded on U.S. exchanges to file using IFRS without
reconciling to USGAAP-based net income and stockholders' equity as is now
required on Form 20F. "SEC Chairman Christopher Cox said the agency remains
committed to removing the reconciliation requirement by 2009. Such a move was
the subject of an SEC roundtable and is being closely watched by European Union
officials." The SEC will accept comments this summer on its proposal to
eliminate the reconciliation requirements. If the agency does implement this
change, then it will consider allowing U.S. companies the same alternative.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is a "foreign private issuer" (FPI)? Summarize the SEC's current filing
requirements for these entities.
2.) Why is the SEC considering allowing U.S. companies to submit filings
under IFRS rather than U.S. GAAP?
3.) Why might the SEC's decision in this matter "spell the demise of USGAAP"?
4.) Define "principles-based standards" and contrast with "rules-based
standards." Give an example in either USGAAP or IFRS requirements for each of
these items.
5.) "Some experts don't think a move away from U.S. GAAP would necessarily be
bad." Who do you think would hold this opinion? Who would disagree? Explain.
6.) Define the term convergence in relation to global standards. Who is
working towards this goal?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Jensen Comment
Canada has already decided to adopt the IFRS in place of domestic Canadian
standards.
Also see ""Strengthening the Transatlantic Economy," by José
Manuel Barroso (European Commission President), April 27, 2007 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/europe/0704barroso.pdf
Also don't assume that the European Union automatically adopts
each IASB international standard. For example, the EU may not adopt IFRS 8 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ifrs08.htm
iGAAP (International GAAP) 2007 Financial Instruments: IAS 32,
IAS 39 and IFRS 7 Explained (Third Edition)
Deloitte & Touche LLP (United Kingdom) has
developed iGAAP 2007 Financial Instruments: IAS 32, IAS 39 and IFRS
7 Explained (Third Edition), which has been published by CCH. This
publication is the authoritative guide for financial instruments
accounting under IFRSs. The 2007 edition expands last year's edition
with further interpretations, examples, discussions from the IASB
and the IFRIC, updates on comparisons of IFRSs with US GAAP for
financial instruments, as well as a new chapter on IFRS 7 Financial
Instruments Disclosures including illustrative disclosures. iGAAP
2007 Financial Instruments: IAS 32, IAS 39 and IFRS 7 Explained (628
pages, March 2007) can be purchased through
CCH Online or by phone at +44 (0) 870 777 2906 or by email:
customer.services@cch.co.uk
.
IAS Plus, March 24, 2007 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
Bob Jensen's tutorials on IAS 39 (Derivative Financial
Instruments) are linked at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm
CPA Examination
candidates and accounting faculty should check out the free database
at
http://www.cpa-exam.org/cpa/literature.htm
The Trinity University library has a single-user
license (with an academic discount) for PwC’s Comperio ---
http://www.pwcglobal.com/comperio
The single-user limitation really has not been problematic for us.
Our Library guru wrote some front end code that lets any Trinity
faculty member or student go directly into Comperio without having
to remember a password
Comperio
evolved out of a CD-Rom database that Price Waterhouse sold under
the name “Price Waterhouse Researcher.” Updated CDs were sent to us
each quarter in the old days before things were as networked on the
Web. Now it’s all Comperio on the Web.
Andersen
had a competing CD database called Research Manager. That was bought
out after Andersen fell, but I think it is now defunct (I could be
wrong about this).
Now
Comperio is the main commercial database available other than FARs
---
http://www.fasb.org/fars/
I think each student can buy this from Wiley, but there have been
numerous complaints about it.
PwC's Comperio Accounting
Research Manager
Comperio
is the most comprehensive on-line library of financial reporting
and assurance literature in the world. Over 1,500 financial
executives from around the world use Comperio on a daily basis.
Comperio content includes AICPA, DIG, EITF, FASB, IAS, ISB and the
SEC as well as pronouncements and standards from Australia,
Belgium, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
With
Comperio, the answers you need are always available - right now,
right at your fingertips. There is no software to install - just
go to the Comperio website and start researching!
The
entire online library can be immediately accessed by browsing a
pronouncement or topic directly, or by searching the entire
database for key words, topics or terms.
Visit the
Comperio product information site at http://www.pwcglobal.com/comperio
. You will find the necessary forms to order Comperio today or to
request a 30-day free trial.
Andersen's old Accounting
Research Manager is now updated and maintained by CCH. The AICPA
has accounting research literature in the FARs database.
For
national and international accounting rulings and online research, it is best to
subscribe for a fee to one of the leading services shown below:
PwC
Comperio ---
http://www.pwcglobal.com/comperio
CCH
Accounting Research Manager ---
http://www.accountingresearchmanager.com/ARMMenu.nsf/vwHTML/ARMSplash?OpenDocument
AICPA FARs
(marketed by Wiley) ---
http://www.fasb.org/fars/
For looking up filings with the SEC,
there are two major sources:
EDGAR ---
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/quickedgar.htm
PwC EdgarScan ---
http://edgarscan.pwcglobal.com/servlets/edgarscan
It is possible to do comparative
company financial analyses using the core earnings databases ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#CoreEarnings
Many IFRS and multiple nation standards
and reviews are available from Deloitte's IAS Plus ---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
Free International
Auditing Standards
All documents issued by IFAC and the International Auditing
and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) are now available for immediate download
at no charge. Visitors must simply fill out a one-time registration to gain
access to the documents. http://www.accountingweb.com/item/96952
PwC has a new helper comparing U.S. GAAP with international (IFRS) GAAP
---
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/74d6c09e0a4ee610802569a1003354c8
Download:
Similarities and Differences - A comparison of IFRS and US GAAP (2005
update) [PDF file, 469k]
Download:
Similarities and Differences - A comparison of IFRS and US GAAP (2004)
[PDF file, 314k]
Download:
publication order form [PDF file, 212k]
Other publications in the
Similarities and Differences series are also
available.
Updated in 2005: Some Key Differences
Between IFRs and U.S. GAAP ---
http://www.iasplus.com/usa/ifrsus.htm
By way of example, consider FAS 133 versus IAS 39:
IAS 39 Option to designate any financial
asset or financial liability to be measured at fair value through
profit or loss ('fair value option')
-
IFRS: Option is allowed.
-
US: No such option.
-
Status: This option was added in
the December 2003 revisions to IAS 39.
IAS 39 Option to designate loans and
receivables as available for sale to be measured at fair value
through equity ('available-for-sale option')
-
IFRS: Option is allowed.
-
US: No such option.
-
Status: This option was added in
the December 2003 revisions to IAS 39.
IAS 39 Investments in unlisted equity
instruments
-
IFRS: Measured at fair value if
reliably measurable; otherwise at cost.
-
US: Measured at cost.
-
Status: Not currently being
addressed.
IAS 39 Measurement of derivatives
-
IFRS: All derivatives are measured
at fair value except that a derivative that is linked to and
must be settled by delivery of an unquoted equity instrument
whose fair value cannot be reliably measured is measured at
cost.
-
US: All derivatives are measured
at fair value (though the definition of a derivative is not
identical to that of IAS 39).
-
Status: Not currently being
addressed.
IAS 39 Multiple embedded derivatives in
a single hybrid instrument
-
IFRS: Sometimes accounted for
separately.
-
US: Always treated as a single
compound embedded derivative.
-
Status: Not currently being
addressed.
IAS 39 Reclassification of financial
instruments into or out of the trading category
-
IFRS: Prohibited.
-
US: Permitted, but generally
transfers into or from the trading category should be rare.
-
Status: Not currently being
addressed.
IAS 39 Effect of selling investments
classified as held-to-maturity
-
IFRS: Prohibited from using
held-to-maturity classification for the next two years.
-
US: Prohibited from using
held-to-maturity classification. SEC indicates that prohibition
is generally for two years.
-
Status: Not currently being
addressed.
IAS 39 Subsequent reversal of an
impairment loss
-
IFRS: Required for loans and
receivables, held-to-maturity, and available-for-sale debt
instruments if certain criteria are met.
-
US: Prohibited for
held-to-maturity and available-for-sale securities. Reversal of
valuation allowances on loans is recognised in the income
statement.
-
Status: Not currently being
addressed.
IAS 39 Derecognition of financial
assets
-
IFRS: Combination of risks and
rewards and control approach. Can derecognise part of an asset.
No "isolation in bankruptcy" test. Partial derecognition allowed
only if specific criteria are complied with.
-
US: Derecognise assets when
transferor has surrendered control over the assets. One of the
conditions is legal isolation in bankruptcy. No partial
derecognition.
-
Status: This is a subject that
both Boards are likely to address in the future.
IAS 39 Use of "Qualifying SPEs"
-
IFRS: No such category of SPEs.
-
US: Necessary for derecognition of
financial assets if transferee is not free to sell or pledge
transferred assets.
-
Status: This is a subject that
both Boards are likely to address in the future.
IAS 39 Offsetting amounts due from and
owed to two different parties
-
IFRS: Required if legal right of
set-off and intent to settle net.
-
US: Prohibited.
-
Status: Not currently being
addressed.
IAS 39 Use of "partial-term hedges"
(hedge of a fair value exposure for only a part of the term of a
hedged item)
-
IFRS: Allowed.
-
US: Prohibited.
-
Status: Not currently being
addressed.
IAS 39 Hedging foreign currency risk in
a held-to-maturity investment
- IFRS: Can
qualify for hedge accounting.
- US: Cannot
qualify for hedge accounting.
- Status: Not
currently being addressed.
IAS 39 Hedging foreign currency risk in
a firm commitment to acquire a business in a business combination
- IFRS: Can
qualify for hedge accounting.
- US: Cannot
qualify for hedge accounting.
- Status: Not
currently being addressed.
IAS 39 Assuming perfect effectiveness
of a hedge if critical terms match
-
IFRS: Prohibited. Must always
measure effectiveness.
-
US: Allowed for hedge of interest
rate risk in a debt instrument if certain conditions are met –
"Shortcut Method".
-
Status: Not currently being
addressed.
IAS 39 Use of "basis adjustment"
-
IFRS:
Fair value hedge: Required.
Cash flow hedge of a transaction resulting in a financial
asset or liability: Same as US GAAP.
Cash flow hedge of a transaction resulting in a non-financial
asset or liability: Choice of US GAAP or basis adjustment.
-
US:
Fair value hedge: Required.
Cash flow hedge of a transaction resulting in an asset or
liability: Gain/loss on hedging instrument that had been
reported in equity remains in equity and is reclassified into
earnings in the same period the acquired asset or incurred
liability affects earnings.
-
Status: Not currently being
addressed.
IAS 39 Hedging gain or loss on net
investment in a foreign entity
-
IFRS: The portion determined to be
an effective hedge is recognised in equity.
-
US: Gains and losses relating to
hedge ineffectiveness is recognised in profit or loss
immediately.
-
Status: Not currently being
addressed.
IAS 39 Macro hedging
-
IFRS: Fair value hedge accounting
treatment for a portfolio hedge of interest rate risk is allowed
if certain specified conditions are met.
-
US: Hedge accounting treatment is
prohibited, though similar results may be achieved by
designating specific assets or liabilities as hedged items.
-
Status: FASB does not have a
project to address macro hedging.
|
Fair value accounting politics in the revised
IAS 39
From Paul Pacter's IAS Plus on July 13, 2005
---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
-
Why did the Commission
carve out the full fair
value option in the
original IAS 39
standard?
-
Do
prudential supervisors
support IAS 39 FVO as
published by the IASB?
-
When will the Commission
to adopt the amended
standard for the IAS 39
FVO?
-
Will companies be able
to apply the amended
standard for their 2005
financial statements?
-
Does the amended
standard for IAS 39 FVO
meet the EU endorsement
criteria?
-
What about the
relationship between the
fair valuation of own
liabilities under the
amended IAS 39 FVO
standard and under
Article 42(a) of the
Fourth Company Law
Directive?
-
Will the Commission now
propose amending Article
42(a) of the Fourth
Company Directive?
-
What about the remaining
IAS 39 carve-out
relating to certain
hedge accounting
provisions?
|
|
Bob Jensen's threads and tutorials on FAS
133 and IAS 39 are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm
IAS 39 Implementation Guidance
IAS 39 Amendments in 2005 ---
http://snipurl.com/IAS39amendments
Convergence of foreign and domestic accounting rules could catch some U.S.
companies by surprise
Although many differences remain between U.S. generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and international financial reporting
standards (IFRS), they are being eliminated faster than anyone, even Herz or
Tweedie, could have imagined. In April, FASB and the IASB agreed that all major
projects going forward would be conducted jointly. That same month, the
Securities and Exchange Commission said that, as soon as 2007, it might allow
foreign companies to use IFRS to raise capital in the United States, eliminating
the current requirement that they reconcile their statements to U.S. GAAP. The
change is all the more remarkable given that the IASB was formed only four years
ago, and has rushed to complete 25 new or revamped standards in time for all 25
countries in the European Union to adopt IFRS by this year. By next year, some
100 countries will be using IFRS. "We reckon it will be 150 in five years,"
marvels Tweedie. "That leaves only 50 out."
Tim Reason, "The Narrowing GAAP: The convergence of foreign and domestic
accounting rules could catch some U.S. companies by surprise," CFO Magazine
December 01, 2005 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/5193385/c_5243641?f=magazine_coverstory
Monumental Scholarship (The following book is not online.)
The Early History of Financial Economics 1478-1776
by Geoffrey Poitras (Simon Fraser University) ---
http://www.sfu.ca/~poitras/photo_pa.htm
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2000) --- http://www.e-elgar.co.uk/
Jack Anderson sent the following message:
A good book
on accounting history in the U.S. is
A
History of Accountancy in the United States by Gary John Previts and Barbara
Dubis Merino
It's
available through The Ohio State University Press (see web site
I'm
unaware of a good history of international accounting but would like to hear of one.
The FASB's website is at http://www.iasb.org/
- The FASB added Concepts and Standards at an
unprecedented rate.
- FASB standards have become increasingly complex
and cause a great deal of confusion among both preparers and users of financial
statements. The most dramatic example is the almost-incomprehensible FAS 133 on
Accounting for Derivative Instruments. In fairness, however, it should be noted that
industry has brought on a lot of its own troubles with almost-incomprehensible financing
and employment contracts (many of which are designed for the main purpose of getting
around having to book and/or disclose expenses and debt).
- The FASB has focused much more on the balance
sheet than on the income statement. Over one third of the standards deal with
industry OBSF schemes.
- The FASB does take costs into consideration as
well as benefits of its accounting standards. For example, after studying investor
use of FAS 33 requiring supplemental statements on price-level adjusted statements and
current cost statements, the FASB rescinded FAS 133.
- The FASB also issued a costly and controversial
set of Accounting Concepts. After some dormancy, the FASB is once again adding to
these concepts with its first new concepts statement in over 16 years (Present Value Based
Measurements and Fair Value). Trinity University students may read about this at
J:\courses\Acct5341\readings\Present Value-Based Measurements and Fair
Value.htm.
The future of the FASB and all national standard
setters is cloudy due to the globalization of business and increasing needs for
international standards. The primary body for setting international standards was
the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) that evolved into the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) having a homepage at http://www.iasc.org.uk/ For a
brief review of its history and the history of its standards, I recommend going to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/pacter.htm#003.04.
In 2001, the IASC was restructured into the new
and smaller International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). The majority of the
IASB members will be full-time, whereas the members of the IASC were only part-time and
did not have daily face-to-face encounters with other Board members or the IASC
staff. The IASB will operate more like the FASB in the U.S.
In the early years of its existence, the IASC
tended to avoid controversial issues and there was nothing to back up its standards
(except in the U.S. where lawyers will use almost anything to support litigation brought
by investors against corporations).
Times are changing at the IASC. It has been
restructured and is getting a much greater budget for accounting research. Most
importantly, IASC standards are becoming the standards required by large international
stock exchanges (IOSCO).
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) was established in late 1997 with the mission
of developing globally applicable guidelines for reporting on the economic,
environmental, and social performance, initially for corporations and eventually
for any business, governmental, or non-governmental organisation (NGO). Convened
by the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES)
in partnership with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),
the GRI incorporates the active participation of corporations, NGOs, accountancy
organisations, business associations, and other stakeholders from around the
world business plan --- http://www.globalreporting.org/
Jagdish Gangolly recommends the following book:
Dollars & scholars, scribes & bribes: The story of
accounting by Gary Giroux # Dame Publications, Inc (1996) # ASIN: B0006R6WQS
--- http://snipurl.com/Giroux
Jim McKinney recommends the following book;
It is not a lot more recent but I would consider the US centric text: A
History of Accountancy in the United States: The Cultural Significance of
Accounting by Previtz & Merino published in 1998. It is available in
paperback.
SHARPEN YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE (2005) YEAR'S FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS
AND DEVELOPMENTS ---
http://accountingeducation.com/index.cfm?page=newsdetails&id=141776
Accounting Research
Versus the Accountancy Profession
Perhaps I'm old and tired, but I always think that the chances of finding
out what really is going on are so absurdly remote that the only thing to do
is to say hang the sense of it and just keep yourself occupied.
Douglas Adams
There are two explanations one can give for this
state of affairs here. The first is due to the great English economist Maurice
Dobb according to whom the theory of value was replaced in the United States by
theory of price. May be, the consequence for us today is that we know the price
of everything but perhaps the value of nothing. Economics divorced from politics
and philosophy is vacuous. In accounting, we have inherited the vacuousness by
ignoring those two enduring areas of inquiry.
Professor Jagdish Gangolly, SUNY
Albany
The second is the comment that Joan Robinson made
about American Keynsians: that their theories were so flimsy that they had to
put math into them. In accounting academia, the shortest path to respectability
seems to be to use math (and statistics), whether meaningful or not.
Professor Jagdish Gangolly, SUNY
Albany
Question
Given the dire shortages of doctoral students in accountancy, should the
requirement for doctoral degrees be eliminated in higher education?
Perhaps I'm old and tired, but I always think that the chances of finding
out what really is going on are so absurdly remote that the only thing to do
is to say hang the sense of it and just keep yourself occupied.
Douglas Adams
There are two explanations one can give for this
state of affairs here. The first is due to the great English economist Maurice
Dobb according to whom the theory of value was replaced in the United States by
theory of price. May be, the consequence for us today is that we know the price
of everything but perhaps the value of nothing. Economics divorced from politics
and philosophy is vacuous. In accounting, we have inherited the vacuousness by
ignoring those two enduring areas of inquiry.
Professor Jagdish Gangolly, SUNY
Albany
The second is the comment that Joan Robinson made
about American Keynsians: that their theories were so flimsy that they had to
put math into them. In accounting academia, the shortest path to respectability
seems to be to use math (and statistics), whether meaningful or not.
Professor Jagdish Gangolly, SUNY
Albany
There are two
sides to nearly every profession (as opposed to a narrow trade). The first one
is the clinical side, and the second one is the research side. But this is not
to say that the twain do not meet.
I advocate
requiring that most (maybe not all) clinical instructors be grounded solidly in
research. Requiring a PhD is a traditional way to get groundings in research.
Probably more importantly is that doctoral studies are ways to motivate
clinically-minded students to attempt to do research on clinical issues and make
important contributions to the practicing profession.
I define
“research” as a contribution to new knowledge. Among other things a good
doctoral program should make scholars more appreciative of good research and
critical of bad/superficial research that does not contribute to much of
anything that is relevant, including research that should get
Senator William Proxmire's
Golden Fleece Awards. Like urban cowboys, our academic accounting
researchers are all hat (mathematical/statistical models) with no cows.
The problem with
accountancy doctoral programs is that they’ve become narrowly bounded by
accountics (especially econometrics and psychometrics) that in the past three
decades have made little progress toward helping the clinical side of our
profession of accountancy. This makes our doctoral programs very much unlike
those in economics, finance, medicine, science, and engineering where many
clinical advances in their disciplines have emerged from studies in doctoral
programs.
The problem with
higher education in accountancy is not that we require doctoral degrees
in our major colleges and universities. The problem is that our doctoral
programs shut out research methodologies that are perhaps better suited for
making research discoveries that really help the clinical side of our
profession. Accountics models just do not deal well with missing variables and
nonstationarities that must be allowed for on the clinical side of accountancy.
Humanities researchers face many of these same issues and have evolved a much
broader arsenal of research methodologies that are
verboten in accounting
doctoral programs --- (See below).
The related
problem is that our leading scholars running those doctoral programs have taken
a supercilious view of the clinical side of our profession. Or maybe it’s just
that these leaders do not want to take the time and trouble to learn the
clinical side of the profession. Once again I repeat the oft-quoted referee of
an Accounting Horizons rejection of Denny Beresford’s 2005 submission
I quote from
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
*************
1. The paper provides specific recommendations for things that accounting
academics should be doing to make the accounting profession better. However
(unless the author believes that academics' time is a free good) this would
presumably take academics' time away from what they are currently doing. While
following the author's advice might make the accounting profession better, what
is being made worse? In other words, suppose I stop reading current academic
research and start reading news about current developments in accounting
standards. Who is made better off and who is made worse off by this reallocation
of my time? Presumably my students are marginally better off, because I can tell
them some new stuff in class about current accounting standards, and this might
possibly have some limited benefit on their careers. But haven't I made my
colleagues in my department worse off if they depend on me for research advice,
and haven't I made my university worse off if its academic reputation suffers
because I'm no longer considered a leading scholar? Why does making the
accounting profession better take precedence over everything else an academic
does with their time?
**************
Joel Demski
steers us away from the clinical side of the accountancy profession by saying we
should avoid that pesky “vocational virus.” (See below).
The (Random House) dictionary defines "academic" as
"pertaining to areas of study that are not primarily vocational or applied , as
the humanities or pure mathematics." Clearly, the short answer to the question
is no, accounting is not an academic discipline.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline?" Accounting
Horizons, June 2007, pp. 153-157
Statistically there are a few youngsters who came to
academia for the joy of learning, who are yet relatively untainted by the
vocational virus.
I urge you to nurture your taste for learning, to follow your joy. That is the
path of scholarship, and it is the only one with any possibility of turning us
back toward the academy.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline? American
Accounting Association Plenary Session" August 9, 2006 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm
Too many
accountancy doctoral programs have immunized themselves against the “vocational
virus.” The problem lies not in requiring doctoral degrees in our leading
colleges and universities. The problem is that we’ve been neglecting the
clinical needs of our profession. Perhaps the real underlying reason is that our
clinical problems are so immense that academic accountants quake in fear of
having to make contributions to the clinical side of accountancy as opposed to
the clinical side of finance, economics, and psychology.
Our problems with doctoral programs in accountancy are shared with other
disciplines, notably education and nursing schools.
Bob Jensen's threads on controversies in higher education are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm
Question
Is accounting an "academic" discipline?
The (Random House) dictionary defines "academic" as
"pertaining to areas of study that are not primarily vocational or applied , as
the humanities or pure mathematics." Clearly, the short answer to the question
is no, accounting is not an academic discipline.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline?" Accounting Horizons,
June 2007, pp. 153-157
Statistically there are a few youngsters who came to
academia for the joy of learning, who are yet relatively untainted by the
vocational virus. I
urge you to nurture your taste for learning, to follow your joy. That is the
path of scholarship, and it is the only one with any possibility of turning us
back toward the academy.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline?
American Accounting Association Plenary Session" August 9, 2006 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm
Jensen Comment
Joel's lament is a bit confusing since for the past four decades, virtually all
doctoral programs have replaced accounting professional content with
mathematics, statistics, econometrics, psychometrics, and sociometrics content
to a fault and to a point where very few accountants are interested in applying
for accountancy doctoral programs ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
The decline in doctoral program graduates (to less than 100 per year in the
United States) combined with the scientific requirements for publication in
leading academic accounting research journals resulted in the academy serving
the accountancy profession less and less over the past few decades:
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/03MainDocumentMar2007.htm
It would help if Joel would be more explicit about what types of basic
"academic" research studies qualify as "accounting research" and why there is
virtually none of it being produced according to his paper and his address to
the AAA membership in August 2006. In particular, I would like to know what
types of academic "accounting" publications set academic accounting apart from
mathematical economics and mathematics disciplines such that these basic
research contributions can still be called "accounting" research that is not
applied (in the sense of his definition of "academic" research as not being
applied).
Following Joel's paper is a paper by the same title "is Accounting an
Academic Discipline?" by John C. Fellingham, Accounting Horizons, June
2007, pp. 159-163. John features the following quotation from Henry Rand
Hatfield in 1924:
I am sure that all of us who teach accounting in
the university suffer from the implied contempt of our colleagues, who look
upon accounting as an intruder, a Saul among the prophets, a paria whose
very presence detracts somewhat from the sanctity of the academic halls.
Henry Rand Hatfield, "An Historical Defense of Bookkeeping,"
Journal of Accountancy, 1924.
I consider this quotation to be inappropriate in 2007. Professor Hatfield was
referring to the teaching of bookkeeping which is no longer the mundane
vocational subject matter of college accounting in the past fifty or more years.
I consider most of what we now teach in college accountancy to be very
appropriate in service to the accountancy profession. You can read more about
accounting education in Hatfield's time in the following historic papers:
Allen, C. E. (1927), "The growth of accounting instruction since 1900," The
Accounting Review (June): 150-166 ---
http://maaw.info/TheAccountingReview.htm Click on the "Non USF User Link"
Atkins, P. M. (1928), "University instruction in industrial cost
accounting," The Accounting Review," (December): 345-363 ---
http://maaw.info/TheAccountingReview.htm Click on the "Non USF User
Link"
Atkins, P. M. (1929), "University instruction in
industrial cost accounting," The Accounting Review (March):
23-32 ---
http://maaw.info/TheAccountingReview.htm Click on the "Non USF User
Link"
I guess what I'm really trying to say is that accountancy is a profession
like law is a profession, medicine is a profession, architecture is a
profession, engineering is a profession, pharmacy is a profession, etc. Why does
the academy need to apologize for teaching to the profession of accountancy when
in fact the academy is very proud to serve those other highly esteemed
professions. I do not see schools of law and schools of medicine apologizing to
the world for nobly serving those professions.
Both Demski and Fellingham made emotional appeals for academic accounting
researchers to make noteworthy contributions to the "true academic disciplines"
as quoted by Fellingham on Page 163. Not only should this be a goal, but in a
sense they are arguing that this should be a primary goal far above the goal of
serving the accountancy profession. I fail to note similar appeals being made by
professors of law and medicine and engineering. These professions do distinguish
between clinical versus research publications and teaching, but in general they
do not further glorify their research if it cannot conceivably have some
relevance to their professions. Indeed, even the most basic chemical and
physiological research in medicine still takes place with an eye toward eventual
relevance to human health.
I might also note that both law and medicine also publish some academic
research that is not based upon esoteric mathematics and statistics. For
example, historical and philosophical research methodologies are still allowed
in their most prestigious academic law and science journals, which currently is
not the case for leading academic accounting research journals.
By way of example, since Joel Demski took charge of the accounting doctoral
program at the University of Florida, every applicant to that doctoral program
cannot even matriculate into the program before pre-requisites of advanced
mathematics are satisfied.
Students are required to demonstrate math
competency prior to matriculating the doctoral program. Each student's
background will be evaluated individually, and guidance provided on ways a
student can ready themselves prior to beginning the doctoral course work.
There are opportunities to complete preparatory course work at the
University of Florida prior to matriculating our doctoral program.
University of Florida Accounting Concentration
---
http://www.cba.ufl.edu/fsoa/docs/phd_AccConcentration.pdf
Why does every candidate have to qualify in advanced mathematics rather than
allowing substitutes such as advanced philosophy or advanced legal studies?
I might also add that science and medicine academic journals also still place
monumental priorities on replications of research findings. Leading academic
accounting research journals will not even publish replications and mostly as a
result it is very difficult to find replications of most of the top academic
accounting research papers published by so-called leading accounting researchers
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Replication
More of my rants on this can be found in the following links:
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/03MainDocumentMar2007.htm
Question
Are college students good surrogates for real life studies?
The majority of behavioral experiments in accounting have used students as
experimental subjects.
"Too Many Studies Use College Students As Their Guinea Pigs," by Carl Bialik,
The Wall Street Journal, August 10, 2007; Page B1---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118670089203393577.html?mod=todays_us_marketplace
Many of the numbers that make news about how we
feel, think and behave are derived from studying a narrow population:
college students. It's cheap for social scientists to tap into the on-campus
research pool -- everyone from psychology majors who must participate in
studies for course credit to students who respond to posters promising a few
bucks if they sign up.
Consider just three studies that have received
press in the past month. In one, muscular men were twice as likely as their
less well-built brethren to have had more than three sex partners -- at
least according to 99 UCLA undergraduates. Another, an examination of six
separate studies that tape-recorded college students' conversations, found
that women, despite being stereotyped as relatively chatty, spoke just 3%
more words each day than men. And in the third, 40 undergraduates at
Washington University in St. Louis were 6% more likely to complete verbal
jokes and 14% more likely to complete visual jests than 41 older study
participants.
College students are "essentially free," says Brian
Nosek, a psychology professor at the University of Virginia. "We walk out of
our office, and there they are." The epitome of a convenience sample, they
have become the basis for what some critics call the "science of the
sophomore."
But psychologists may be getting what they pay for.
College students aren't representative by age, wealth, income, educational
level or geographic location. "What if you studied 7-year-old kids and made
inferences about geriatrics?" asks Robert Peterson, a marketing professor at
the University of Texas, Austin. "Everyone would say you can't do that. But
you can use these college students."
Prof. Peterson scoured the literature for examples
of studies that examined the same psychological relationships in students
and nonstudents. In almost half of the 63 relationships he examined, there
were major discrepancies between students and nonstudents: The two groups
either produced contradictory results, or one showed an effect at least
twice as great as the other.
In a follow-up study, not yet published, Prof.
Peterson demonstrated that even college students are far from homogeneous.
With help from faculty at 58 schools in 31 states, he surveyed undergraduate
business students across the country and found that they vary widely from
school to school. That means a professor studying the relationship between
students' attitudes toward capitalism and business ethics at one school
could reach a sharply different conclusion than a professor at another
school.
"People have always been aware of this issue,"
Prof. Peterson says, but many have chosen to ignore it. A 1986 paper by
David Sears, a UCLA psychology professor, documented the increased use of
college students for research in the prior quarter century and explored the
potential biases that might introduce. In the meantime, the use of college
students has, if anything, risen, researchers say.
Authors of the recent studies on sex, chattiness
and humor acknowledge the limitations of their research pool. But they argue
that college students do just fine for purposes of studying basic cognitive
processes. Others agree. "If you think all people have the same attitudes as
introductory psychology students, that's really problematic," says Tony
Bogaert, a psychology professor at Brock University in St. Catharines,
Ontario. "But if you're looking at cognitive processes, intro psych students
probably work OK."
After all, every study is hampered by possible
differences between those who volunteer to participate and those who don't,
whether they're college students or a broader group.
In any case, the fault often lies not with the
researchers, who are careful not to overstate the impact of their findings,
but with the news articles suggesting the numbers apply to all humanity.
"Even if you only focus on college students, the results are still
generalizable to millions of Americans," says David Frederick, a UCLA
psychology graduate student and lead author of the study on muscularity and
sex partners.
Prof. Nosek, a critic of the science of the
sophomore, responds that college students are still developing their
personalities and behavior. "There is no other time outside my life as an
undergraduate where I thought it would be a good idea to wear all my clothes
inside out," he says, or to "stay up for as many hours in a row as I could
just to see what happens."
To widen the pool of people answering questions
about, say, all-nighters, Prof. Nosek has submitted a proposal to the
National Institutes of Health to fund the creation of an international,
online research panel. That would build on studies his laboratory has
already administered online at ProjectImplicit.net.
Online research has its own problems, but at least
it taps into the hundreds of millions of people who are online globally,
rather than just the hundreds of people enrolled in Psych 101.
"The scientific reward structure does not benefit
someone who puts in the enormous effort" to create a representative research
sample, Prof. Nosek says. "The way to change researchers' data habits is to
make it easier to collect data in a more generalizable way."
Question
When should professors add practitioners to their courses?
"Mixing Theory and Practice on Defense Policy," by Andy Guess, Inside
Higher Ed, August 8, 2007 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/08/08/defense
In a class about United Nations regulations on the
laws of war, the discussion turned inevitably to Star Trek.
When the U.N. authorizes sanctions against a
particular nation, said Ilan Berman, the professor, the institution acts
much like the Borg — in the show’s universe, a mechanized force of cyborg
mercenaries bent on assimilating all of mankind. The analogy was lost on
most of the class, but Berman drove the point home for those who didn’t
regularly tune in to syndicated science fiction programs in the early 1990s:
Each member nation must act as part of the collective.
The lecture, peppered as it was with the occasional
pop culture reference, covered a lot of ground, from the U.S. national
security strategy to the justifications for nations’ use of force. The
students in the class — five were present on a Monday night in July for the
elective — come from a range of backgrounds, several of them working
full-time, but all in the program with an eye toward defense policy, whether
in the government, consulting or think tanks.
In Washington, those are hardly unorthodox goals.
Programs in defense or security studies churn out students every year in the
nation’s capital, from well-known and respected institutions such as Johns
Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and Georgetown
University’s School of Foreign Service, and also outside the Beltway at
places like Harvard (Kennedy) and Princeton (Wilson). The students in
Berman’s class, tucked in a conference room on the seventh floor of a
corporate office building in Fairfax, Va., are part of a relatively new
experiment: What if a state school in Springfield, Mo., operated a satellite
campus alongside the established players in defense studies?
So far, enrollments have been growing each year
since the unit opened shop in 2005 within commuting distance from the city,
sandwiched between a rapidly developing apartment complex and an office
park. The Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, a part of Missouri
State University, caters to students who want to break into Beltway defense
circles with a public university price tag and the advantages of a more
practical approach. In doing so, it offers a two-year M.S. degree that
requires both coursework and internships.
Having access to actual practitioners in the
classroom means, in this case, connections to defense and foreign policy
officials in the government. As with others like it, the program has had a
long revolving-doors tradition, starting from its original incarnation in
the early 1970s at the University of Southern California, where it was
founded by a former defense official who served on the SALT I delegation,
William R. Van Cleave, and partially funded by the free-market Earhart
Foundation. But unlike at similar departments elsewhere, Missouri State’s
full-time faculty of three and its nine affiliated lecturers tend to come
mainly from positions in Republican administrations and conservative-leaning
institutions.
Continued in article
Jensen Comment
Some years back Professor Sharon Lightner (UC at San Diego) put together a
really interesting online course for students, practitioners, and accounting
standard setters in six different countries where the classes met synchronously.
"An Innovative Online International Accounting Course on Six Campuses Around the
World" ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/255light.htm
Question
Does faculty research improve student learning in the classrooms where
researchers teach?
Put another way, is research more important than scholarship that does not
contribute to new knowledge?
Major Issue
If the answer leans toward scholarship over research, it could monumentally
change criteria for tenure in many colleges and universities.
AACSB
International: the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business, has
released for comment
a report calling for the accreditation process for
business schools to evaluate whether faculty research improves the learning
process. The report expresses the concern that accreditors have noted the volume
of research, but not whether it is making business schools better from an
educational standpoint.
Inside Higher Ed, August 6, 2007 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/08/06/qt
"Controversial Report on Business School Research Released
for Comments," AACSB News Release, August 3, 2007 ---
http://www.aacsb.edu/Resource_Centers/Research/media_release-8-3-07.pdf
FL (August 3,
2007) ― A report released today evaluates the nature and purposes of
business school research and recommends steps to increase its value to
students, practicing managers and society. The report, issued by the Impact
of Research task force of AACSB International, is released as a draft to
solicit comments and feedback from business schools, their faculties and
others. The report includes recommendations that could profoundly change the
way business schools organize, measure, and communicate about research.
AACSB
International, the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business,
estimates that each year accredited business schools spend more than $320
million to support faculty research and another half a billion dollars
supports research-based doctoral education.
“Research is
now reflected in nearly everything business schools do, so we must find
better ways to demonstrate the impact of our contributions to advancing
management theory, practice and education” says task force chair Joseph A.
Alutto, of The Ohio State University. “But quality business schools are not
and should not be the same; that’s why the report also proposes
accreditation changes to strengthen the alignment of research expectations
to individual school missions.”
The task force
argues that a business school cannot separate itself from management
practice and still serve its function, but it cannot be so focused on
practice that it fails to develop rigorous, independent insights that
increase our understanding of organizations and management. Accordingly, the
task force recommends building stronger interactions between academic
researchers and practicing managers on questions of relevance and developing
new channels that make quality academic research more accessible to
practice.
According to
AACSB President and CEO John J. Fernandes, recommendations in this report
have the potential to foster a new generation of academic research. “In the
end,” he says, “it is a commitment to scholarship that enables business
schools to best serve the future needs of business and society through
quality management education.”
The Impact of
Research task force report draft for comments is available for download on
the AACSB website:
www.aacsb.edu/research. The website
also provides additional resources related to the issue and the opportunity
to submit comments on the draft report. The AACSB Committee on Issues in
Management Education and
Board of Directors
will use the feedback to determine the next steps for implementation.
The AACSB International Impact of Research Task Force
Chairs:
Joseph A. Alutto, interim president, and
John W. Berry, Senior Chair in Business, Max M. FisherCollege of Business,
The Ohio State University
K. C. Chan, The Hong Kong University of Science and
Technology
Richard A. Cosier, Purdue University
Thomas G. Cummings, University of Southern California
Ken Fenoglio, AT&T
Gabriel Hawawini, INSEAD and the University of Pennsylvania
Cynthia H. Milligan, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Myron Roomkin, Case Western Reserve University
Anthony J. Rucci, The Ohio State University
Teaching Excellence Secondary to Research for Promotion,
Tenure, and Pay ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm#TeachingVsResearch
Bob Jensen's threads on higher education controversies
are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm
My letter to Kate
Now that the 2007 Annual Meetings
are ended and it is public information that finance professor Erik Lie
(University of Iowa) won the AICPA/AAA Notable Contributions to Accounting
Literature Award, I feel compelled to make my letter to Kate written on May 17
public. This year I served on the Part 2 selection committee that chose Erik Lie
from the list of candidates submitted to us by the Part 1 Screening Committee.
Professor Lie's contribution was truly notable and deserving of this award for
2007.
But I have serious reservations
about the Part 1 Screening Committee's choices over the past two decades. I
think it's been a rigged game in which the Part 2 Selection Committee has no
choice but to choose an esoteric "accountics" article published in an academic
research journal.
My letter to Kate is entirely
consistent with the long tidbit below received from Paul Williams on August 10,
2007 after the AAA 2007 Annual Meetings in Chicago. Kate was chair of our 2007
Selection Committee but not the 2007 Screening Committee.
You can read my letter to Kate
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2007NotableLiteratureAward.htm
An Analysis of the
Contributions of The Accounting Review Across 80 Years: 1926-2005 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
Co-authored with Jean Heck and forthcoming in the December 2007 edition of the
Accounting Historians Journal.
Bob Jensen's threads on the sad state of
academic accounting research ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
David Dennis organized a
discussion panel to address the state of academic research in accounting. I
could not be at the AAA meetings this year. But Paul Williams was on the panel
and sent out the following message to panel members.
Paul Williams (North Carolina
State University) Weighs in Once Again on the Sad State of Accounting Research
in the Academy. Paul gave me permission to post his email message to the panel
members.
August 10, 2007 message from Paul
Williams [Paul_Williams@ncsu.edu]
It is a source of constant
frustration that there exists reams of "empirical evidence" that the US
academy is as we trouble makers say it is. For folks who claim to worship
empirical evidence there is a great reluctance to consider it. Jacci
Rodgers and I have another paper that you didn't include that was published
in The Accounting Historians Journal that dealt with authors during the same
period of time as our editors' paper.
We did a comparison of elite
school graduates appearances as authors in TAR (The Accounting
Review) with their proportion in the population of North American PhDs
(a procedure that was biased in that it overstates the proportion of elite
graduates who were in the effective population of people of publishing
age). In Table 3 of that paper we report the proportion of appearance by
elite grads and their proportion of the total North American PhD population
at the beginnning of each TAR editor's term starting with
Trumball, the first editor to have a published
editorial board, the first number is proportion of appearances and the
second is proportion of PhDs:
Editor
Trumball: 63.6/63.5
Griffin:
71.3/59.6
Hendrickson: 75/53.7
Keller:
61.1/50.3
Decoster:
63/45.2
Zeff:
51.9/43.1
Sundem:
47.1/38
Kinney:
50.6/34.7
Abdel-khalik: 56.6/33
Through Zeff and Sundems' editorships we start to see
the effects of the emergence of the many new doctoral programs that were
created during the 1970s. The dilution of elite school dominance proceeded
apace through time as the elite became a smaller proportion of the total
population. I had a paper accepted in TAR by both Zeff and Sundem: both
experiences were good. Both Zeff and Sundem were open-minded and quite
helpful during the process; the reviews were constructive.
But this expected demographically induced trend
dramatically reversed itself after Sundem's editorship. Since that time the
elite appearances among authors has hovered, Avogadro's number-like around
the mid-60 percent mark -- the proportion that prevailed when Trumball was
editor. All of a sudden the virtues of scholarship that Zeff and Sundem
were able to recognize in the work of people not trained at elite schools as
conventional economists disappeared. The ideologues took over by default
because of TAR's fear of losing so much reputational ground to JAR and JAE.
TAR became a JAR and JAE clone. It hasn't changed since.
So why doesn't Bill McCarthy get enough good systems
papers? Perhaps it's because we haven't been terribly interested, for nearly
25 years, in training in U.S. PhD programs people who could do quality
systems, or sociological, or historical, or legal, or anthropological work
in accounting. As Jagdish Gangolly noted on the AECM, finance types
reproduce like mosquitoes, but it is a struggle for anyone interested in
some "causal delta" other than neoclassical economics to find a place to
study.
Today, with the exception of a couple of places, you
have to go outside the United States. Why submit a paper to TAR when the
editorial process is not one to be trusted? Those of us who have been in
the AAA a long time have heard these promises of "inclusiveness" before.
They were hot air then, they're hot air now unless the TAR editorial process
is willing to take a laxative and publish some papers that may not be the
best (there are an awful lot of "main-stream" papers published that aren't
very good, either).
TAR has to signal it isn't telling us another fib and
that involves more than just passively sitting around waiting for papers to
come. Trust has been lost and you won't get it back by chastising the
mistrustful. Wouldn't it be refreshing to see someone from the editorial
board show up at conferences like IPA, APIRA, CPA, . . . etc. to press the
flesh and find out what the rest of the world thinks?
It is perhaps not a coincidence that the only two
papers ever published in TAR informed by critical literature (papers by Chua
and Hines) were ushered through the review process by Sundem. Nothing of
that kind has ever appeared in TAR since.
Even JAR published a paper by Peter Miller!
David: kudos on your item 8. As the U.S. has become
the O.E.C.D. country with the most skewed distribution of income and wealth
and as our great experiment in democracy appears more and more each day to
be less and less robust (see Prem Sikka's work on the extensiveness of
accounting corruption), we get a scholarly community primarily fixated on
individual career enhancement through the engineering of a linear model with
an R-squared of seldom double digits explaining yet some other absurdity
about why Nozickian justice is the sine qua non of human existence.
I have seen literally thousands of those models
over the years and no two have ever born any resemblance to each other.
What kind of "models" are really only unique
representations of themselves? Thank you for organizing the panel and
allowing me to participate.
Paul
Paul Williams
paul_williams@ncsu.edu
(919)515-4436
The Financial Accounting Standards Board recently approached Bloomfield
about studying how to create financial accounting standards that will assist
investors as much as possible, he quickly turned to the virtual world for
answers.
"Theory Meets Practice Online: Researchers and academics are looking to
online worlds such as Second Life to shed new light on old economic questions,"
by Francesca Di Meglio, Business Week, July 24, 2007 ---
Click Here
In fact, many economics researchers, including
Bloomfield, professor of accounting at Cornell's Johnson Graduate School of
Management, are using the virtual environment to test ideas involving
staples of economics such as game theory, the effects of regulation, and
issues involving money. Since 1989, Bloomfield has been running experiments
in the lab in which he creates small game economies to study narrow issues.
But when the Financial Accounting Standards Board recently approached
Bloomfield about studying how to create financial accounting standards that
will assist investors as much as possible, he quickly turned to the virtual
world for answers.
"It would be very difficult to look at the complex
issues that FASB is trying to address with eight people in a laboratory
playing a very simple economic game," he says. "I started looking for how I
could create a more realistic economy with more players dealing with a high
degree of complexity. It didn't take me long to realize that people in
virtual worlds are already doing just that."
. . .
At
Indiana University, researcher Edward Castronova has posed
the idea of creating multiple virtual economies to study the
effects of different regulatory policies. At Indiana,
Castronova is director of the Synthethic Worlds Initiative,
a research center to study virtual worlds. "The opportunity
is to conduct controlled research experiments at the level
of all society, something social scientists have never been
able to do before," the center's Web site notes (see
BusinessWeek.com, 5/1/06,
"Virtual World, Virtual Economies").
A
virtual stock market is certainly not the only online entity
that opens itself up to research. Marketers are already
using the virtual world to test campaigns, packaging, and
consumer satisfaction. Pepsi (PEP)
famously tracks use of its products in
There.com. Architects seek reaction to design. Starwood
Hotels (HOT)
test-marketed its new loft designs in Second Life
(see BusinessWeek.com, 8/23/06,
"Starwood Hotels Explore Second Life First").
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on tools and tricks of the trade are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/000aaa/thetools.htm
Summarizing Academic Accounting Research for Practitioners
April 14, 2007 message from Ron Huefner
[rhuefner@acsu.buffalo.edu]
The Journal of Accountancy (AICPA) has begun
a new series of articles to review accounting research papers and explain
them to practitioners. The April issue has an article on "Mining Auditing
Research."
It summarizes about a dozen research articles,
mostly from The Accounting Review, but also including articles from JAR,
CAR, AOS, and the European Accounting Review.
The link for this article is: <http://aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/apr2007/boltlee.htm>
This may be useful in bringing research findings
into classes
Ron
March 2007 Updates on the Sad State of Accounting Research in
Academe ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
Nearly two years ago I sent out an "Appeal" for accounting
educators, researchers, and practitioners to actively support what I call The
Accounting Review (TAR) Diversity Initiative as initiated by last year's
American Accounting Association President Judy Rayburn ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR.htm
In it I noted that a bright ray of hope for changing narrow
focus of The Accounting Review (TAR) was the appointment of Bill McCarthy
as Associate Editor for purposes of introducing Accounting Information Systems
research into TAR.
I now have an expanded paper written in partnership with Jean
Heck ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR\03MainDocumentMar2007.htm
The MS Word version is at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR\395wp.doc
This paper is forthcoming in the December 2007 edition of the Accounting
Historians Journal
March 27, 2007 message from McCarthy, William
[mccarthy@BUS.MSU.EDU]
This thread and other AECM posts regarding
information technology research in accounting casts a grim picture for
people who wish to do computer science related work aimed at the major
accounting academic journals. This has been an "us vs. them" problem for
most of my 30 years in AIS research.
While it is indeed true that JAR, JAE, and the
other private accounting journals remain in the Stone Age as far as
accounting technology issues are concerned, there have been significant
steps taken by TAR to open up the main AAA journal to this kind of work. Dan
Dhaliwal appointed me as an editor with the express purpose of having a
person knowledgeable in information systems and computer science research
methods available to the AIS research community for manuscript review and
decision-making.
Surprisingly, as I have outlined at both the
sectional and national AAA meetings, the problem has not been as much with
"them" as it has been with "us," at least in the last 15 months or so. Quite
simply, the number of AIS submissions to TAR has been alarmingly low. In
Washington last August, I set a target of 12-18 for the AIS community for
this academic year, a number I thought was modest and achievable. However,
it does not look like we will come close to that at our present rate.
*
As I mentioned in Washington, the submission
procedure is this:
*
Do the work and make sure it is rigorous according
to accounting, IS, and/or computer science standards,
*
Submit the paper and note or show that it deals
with an important accounting issue issue by using AIS, MIS or CS methods,
and
*
Ask that the paper be assigned to me as the editor
most familiar with IS and CS methods.
If you make a convincing case on these points and
if the senior editor thinks it is high quality, then I get it, I assign the
referees, and I get to make the consolidated judgment.
Paraphrasing the famous Canadian hockey player
Wayne Gretzky, the AIS research and the accounting practice communities will
miss on 100% of the good ideas that never get submitted to TAR. If we want
change the face of accounting research, the time for action is now. Do the
work and submit "that" paper. Additionally, send your name off to me as a
possible referee, outlining your particular expertise in either methods or
specific technologies.
Bill McCarthy,
Michigan State University
mccarthy@bus.msu.edu
http://www.msu.edu/user/mccarth4 <https://mercury.bus.msu.edu/exchweb/bin/redir.asp?URL=http://www.msu.edu/user/mccarth4>
March 27, 2007 reply from Paul Williams
[Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]
Bill,
What we may be paying as the price for dragging
doctoral education in accounting back to the Stone Age about 40 years ago,
is the phenomenon you describe. People have become so disenchanted with TAR
that they have found other more comfortable venues for pursuing their work.
In spite of public declarations about the new openness, we have heard this
before only to have it turn out to be disengenuous PR. I think your appeal
here might encourage people to trust you once and submit a paper, BUT it
better produce some postitive experiences.
Another issue is "rigor." Everything must be
RIGOROUS, but most GOOD IDEAS aren't "rigorous". They are typically fraught
with error, but they open new vistas and ways of thinking about things. The
history of science is filled with tales of earth changing ideas that were
not offered in a RIGOROUS way (we know Mendel fudged his data on sweet peas,
so did Milliken and Keynes General Theory... was notoriously cobbled
together). We have become so fixated on method and our public appearance as
rigorous scientists that all accounting scholarship in the U.S. at least
follows the same template. Our idea of rigor is, frankly, naïve, based more
on appearance than substance. Robert Heilbroner once remarked that
"Mathematics brought great rigor to economics.
Unfortunately it also brought mortis." Bill, you
now have some power (?). Take some chances. What is the point of an academic
discourse confined only to statistical model building where, simultaneously,
replication is emphatically discouraged? Empirical rigor means doing it over
and over by independent investigators with rigorous controls. We may not
even be doing what we currently do "rigorously."
March 27, 2007 reply from J. S. Gangolly
[gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
Methodological hangups, fetish about quantitative
rigour, phobia about normative research, all have afflicted most disciplines
at one time or the other. We in accounting seem to have them all at the same
time.
I remembering sitting on a doctoral committee with
folks from psychology, and was frightened to discover my own prejudices
after hearing a well known (Skinnerian) psychologist fellow committee member
asked me to be a bit more understanding of methodologies used by others.
I have found the accounting crowd reward conformity
with received wisdom from the self-anointed sages.
Much of my work has been normative, and therefore
considered "unsuitable" for publications in better known accounting journals
(statement made by editor of one of the top rated accounting journal). I
feel driven out of the field years ago into Operations Research, Information
Systems, Computing & Information Sciences.
In none of those fields have the journal editors/
referees used any litmus tests. On the other hand, the referees at an AAA
section journal, (about 20 years ago) was bold enough to state that my paper
was an insult to the excellent work done by others in the field (the paper
was later published in a respected journal in IS with few changes; it was
the last paper I submitted to any establishment accounting journals).
Bill's message gives me hope in a way I never
imagined. As a test balloon, I will submit TAR one of our papers that I had
targeted for a CSI journal.
We need a balance between rigour, relevance, and
methodological purity. Above all, we need tolerance for work that differs
from our own perspective on each of these. We also need a diversity of
approaches to the issues in the papers.
Jagdish
Academics Versus the Profession
The real world is only a special case, and not a very interesting one at
that.
--Attributed to C. E. Ferguson and forwarded by Ed Scribner
Imagination is not to be
divorced from facts: it is a way of illuminating the facts. It works by
eliciting the general principles which apply to the facts, as they exist,
and then by an intellectual survey of alternative possibilities which are
consistent with these principles. It enables men (sic) to construct an
intellectual vision of a new world, and it preserves the zest of life by the
suggestion of satisfying purposes.
Alfred North Whitehead in an address to the AACSB in 1927 and quoted in the
paper by Bennis and O'Toole cited below.
During the past several decades,
many leading B schools have quietly adopted an inappropriate --- and ultimately
self-defeating --- model of academic excellence. Instead of measuring
themselves in terms of the competence of their graduates, or by how well their
faculties understand important drivers of business performance, they measure
themselves almost solely by the rigor of their scientific research. They have
adopted a model of science that uses abstract financial and economic analysis,
statistical regressions, and laboratory psychology. Some of the research
produced is excellent, but because so little of it is grounded in actual
business practices. the focus of graduate business education has become
increasingly circumscribed --- and less and less relevant to practitioners ...We
are not advocating a return to the days when business schools were glorified
trade schools. In every business, decision making requires amassing and
analyzing objective facts, so B schools must continue to teach quantitative
skills. The challenge is to restore balance to the curriculum and the
faculty: We need rigor and relevance. The dirty little secret at
most of today's best business schools is that they chiefly serve the faculty's
research interests and career goals, with too little regard for the needs of
other stakehollders.
Warren G. Bennis and James O'Toole, "How Business Schools Lost Their
Way," Harvard Business Review, May 2005.
The article be downloaded for a fee of $6.00 ($3.70 to educators) ---
http://harvardbusinessonline.hbsp.harvard.edu/b02/en/hbr/hbr_home.jhtml
Bob Jensen's threads on higher education controversies are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm
The original Accounting
Hall of Fame is maintained by Ohio State University ---
http://fisher.osu.edu/departments/accounting-and-mis/hall-of-fame/
The distinguished set of
members selected to date are listed at
http://fisher.osu.edu/departments/accounting-and-mis/hall-of-fame/membership-in-hall/
At the forthcoming American
Accounting Association (AAA) annual meetings in Washington DC this year on
August 7, two new distinguished scholars will be inducted into the
Accounting Hall of Fame.
June
22, 2006 message from Hall of Famer Dennis Beresford
[dberesfo@terry.uga.edu]
Bob,
I don't know if you've seen the
news yet, but Bob Kaplan and Bob Sterling will be this year's inductees to
the Accounting Hall of Fame.
Denny
June
23, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi
Denny,
Thanks for the update. Both Bob and Bob are more than worthy of this honor.
Both accountancy professors have very distinguished teaching and research
accomplishments. Although I do not want to detract from those most
noteworthy accomplishments, I cannot resist this opportunity to point out
that both Bob Sterling and Bob Kaplan are
failed critics of the hijacking
of the leading academic accounting research journals by the Accountics/Positivist
Establishment. However, both of these scholars took vastly different
approaches in their efforts to maintain diversity of research methods and
topics in the leading research journals.
The
Accountics/Positivist Establishment virtually ignored both Sterling and
Kaplan!
The
following quotations appear in the following two documents:
An "Appeal" for accounting
educators, researchers, and practitioners to actively support what I call
The Accounting Review (TAR)
Diversity Initiative as initiated by American Accounting Association
President Judy Rayburn ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR.htm
An Analysis of the
Contributions of The Accounting Review
Across 80 Years: 1926-2005 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
Accountics is the mathematical science of
(accounting)
values.
Charles Sprague
(1887) as quoted by McMillan (2003, 1)
|
As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not
certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to
reality.
Albert Einstein
|
PG. #390
NONAKA
The chapter argues that building the theory of knowledge
creation needs to an epistemological and ontological discussion,
instead of just relying on a positivist approach, which has been
the implicit paradigm of social science.
The positivist rationality has become identified with analytical
thinking that focuses on generating and testing hypotheses
through formal logic. While providing a clear guideline for
theory building and empirical examinations, it poses problems
for the investigation of complex and dynamic social phenomena,
such as knowledge creation. In positivist-based research,
knowledge is still often treated as an exogenous variable or
distraction against linear economic rationale. The relative lack
of alternative conceptualization has meant that management
science has slowly been detached from the surrounding societal
reality. The understanding of social systems cannot be based
entirely on natural scientific facts.
Ikujiro Nonaka as
quoted at Great Minds in
Management: The Process of Theory Development ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/GreatMinds.htm
|
Bob
Sterling is rooted in economics and philosophy. He, like Tony Tinker,
Barbara Marino, and Paul Williams, relied upon his roots in philosophy to
attack the positivists from the standpoint of misinterpretation of the
writings of Karl Popper ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Popper
Sterling wrote the following in "Positive Accounting: An
Assessment," Abacus,Volume
26, Issue 2, September 1990:
*********Begin Quote
Positive accounting theory, using the book of the same name by Watts and
Zimmerman (1986) as the primary source of information about that theory, is
subjected to scrutiny. The two pillars — (a) value-free study of (b)
accounting practices — upon which the legitimacy of that theory are said to
rest (and the absence of which is said to make other theories illegitimate)
are found to be insubstantial. The claim that authorities — economic and
scientific — support the type of theory espoused is found to be mistaken.
The accomplishments — actual and potential — of positive theory are found to
have been nil, and are projected to continue to be nil. Based on these
findings, the recommendation is to classify positive accounting theory as a
'cottage industry' at the periphery of accounting thought and reject its
attempt to take centre stage by radically redefining the fundamental
question of accounting.
*********End Quote
I
might add that the above critique would've had zero chance of being
published in The Accounting Review
(TAR) or other leading U.S. accounting research journals. Professor Sterling
always wrote with interesting and simple analogies. He stated that if
anthropology research was limited to positivism, then the only research
would be the study of anthropologists rather than anthropology.
In
some ways, Bob Kaplan is the more interesting critic of the hijacking of
academic accounting research by the Accountics/Positivist Establishment.
This is because Professor Kaplan built his early reputation, while full time
at Carnegie-Mellon University, as an accountics expert in mathematical model
building. Later, after he took on joint appointments at Carnegie and the
Harvard Business School, he became more involved in case method research.
Now he's best noted as a case method researcher since moving full time to
Harvard.
In
1986 Steve Zeff was President of the AAA. I had the honor of being appointed
by Steve as Program Director for the 1986 AAA annual meetings in Times
Square in NYC. I persuaded Bob Kaplan and Joel Demski to share a plenary
session in debate of the hijacking of the leading academic accounting
research journals by the Accountics/Positivist Establishment (although since
the early 1900s the term "accountics" was no longer used in accounting in
favor of the term "analytics").
Bob
Kaplan's 1986 presentation lamented the fact that researchers using the case
method could no longer get their research published in TAR or other leading
accounting research journals. He also lamented that innovations generally
had their seminal roots in discoveries of practitioners rather than
researchers publishing in the leading academic accounting research journals.
Whereas practitioners once took a keen interest in academic accounting
research, this interest waned to almost nothing.
Joel
Demski's presentation defended mathematical model building and analysis as
the cornerstone of accounting as a a pure "academic discipline." I would not
describe Joel as an evangelist of positivism relative to the extremes of
Watts and Zimmerman. Joel typically has had less to say about positivism
than he has about mathematical model building and economic information
theory applied to accountancy. In this regard I would describe Joel as an
ardent defender of accountics. Joel admitted in 1986 that it was very
difficult to pinpoint discoveries in academe that were noteworthy in the
practicing profession. However, he claimed that this was not a leading
purpose of academic accounting research.
In
some ways the 2006 AAA annual meetings this year in Washington DC may be a
replay of the 1986 meetings in NYC. Taking Bob Kaplan's place at the August
8, 2006 plenary session will be ardent positivism critic Anthony Hopwood
from the United Kingdom. His message is somewhat predictable and he will
deliver it forcefully.
Joel
Demski's (with John Fellingham) presentation at the August 9, 2006 plenary
session is less predictable, but the title "Is Accounting an Academic
Discipline?" provides some clues that Joel will remain an ardent defender of
mathematical and statistical modeling as the core of academic accounting
research. It will be interesting to compare what Joel had to say in 1986
versus what he says after 20 years after continued accountics/positivism
hijacking of leading U.S. academic accounting research journals and, I might
add, U.S. doctoral programs.
Ohio
State University became one of the leading accountics/positivsim research
centers. Under the noteworthy leadership of Tom Burns, OSU became one of the
first major universities to drop traditional accounting courses from its
doctoral programs in favor of sending students outside the College of
Business to take graduate courses in mathematics, statistics, econometrics,
psychometrics, and sociometrics. In this context, it is a pleasure that
leaders at OSU, in conjunction with the outside Accounting Hall of Fame
nominating committee members, sees fit this year to honor two ardent critics
of the Accountics/Positivist Establishment.
Hopefully some of you will
heed my current "Appeal" for accounting educators, researchers, and
practitioners to actively support what I call
The Accounting Review (TAR)
Diversity Initiative as initiated by American Accounting Association
President Judy Rayburn ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR.htm
I examined the Vision being promoted, since November 8, 2006, by CEOs of the
largest accounting firms ---
http://www.globalpublicpolicysymposium.com/CEO_Vision.pdf
It struck me as yet another example of how small the role of academe is in shaping
the future of the profession of accountancy. I wonder if the professions of
medicine and law would chart the future of their own professions with so little
regard for schools of medicine and law. Large firms in accounting actively seek
to hire our students and have great public relations with professors. However,
when it comes to something as substantive as this it's very difficult to find
where leaders of the profession charted this change in course by building upon
academic accounting research. There are probably indirect links, but it would be
surprising if the writers of this proposed huge change in policy were influenced
heavily by published academic research. An exception might be the thrust toward XBRL, but the so-called leading academic accounting journals have paid scant
attention to XBRL,
On one hand we could blame the leaders of the profession for avoiding
academe in the generation of new vision for the future. On the other hand we
could blame the accounting researchers and their top journals for addressing
what they can study with scientific models rather than what the profession
wants to be studied. My threads on this issue are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
"Largest Accounting Firms See Coming Revolution in Business Reporting,"
AccountingWeb, November 27, 2006 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102827
As part of the Global Public Policy Symposium
in Paris, held on November 8 and attended by key players concerned with
ensuring the quality and reliability of financial reporting worldwide,
the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC)
International, Grant Thornton International, Deloitte, KPMG
International and Ernst & Young, published a joint statement of their
vision of what the future might hold for financial reporting and the
accounting profession.
Entitled “Global Capital Markets and the Global
Economy: A Vision from the CEOs of the International Audit Networks,”
the document envisions investors having access to real time company
financial information through XBRL, financial statements that go beyond
reporting past performance to projecting future performance based on
information about business intangibles that are not currently measured,
and a recommendation that companies choose to supplement regular audits
with periodic forensic audits. The report may be viewed at
www.globalpublicpolicysymposium.com/
“This essay is about one type of information
and its importance to all actors in the global economy; information
about the performance of management and companies that make and deliver
goods and services, and compete for capital,” the symposium paper says.
In a letter to the Wall Street Journal
published on November 8, the day their paper was released, the CEOs
wrote that when the basics of current accounting procedures were
written, the world’s investors were more a “private club than a global
network. Auditors used fountain pens, capital stayed pooled in a few
financial centers, and information moved by runner.” The world has
changed since then.
In the short term, the letter says, it will be
necessary to proceed as rapidly as possible with convergence in
international accounting standards, and with overcoming national
differences in oversight of auditors and in enforcement.
In the longer term, auditors themselves must
evaluate the usefulness to investors of information provided in the
current financial statement and footnote format and consider the
inclusion of more nonfinancial information.
But, the CEOs say in the Journal letter, “All
of these steps should include an emphasis on allowing auditors greater
room to exercise judgment. Accountants and auditors are trained
professionals who have the ability to apply the spirit of broad
principles in deciding how to account for and report financial and other
information. . . . Such [future] measures should also include an honest
assessment of the “expectations gap,” relating to material fraud and the
ability of auditors to uncover it at a reasonable cost.”
The paper looks forward to a world “where users
increasingly will want to customize the information they receive” in
which “the process for recording and classifying business information
will be as important, if not more important, than the static formats in
which today’s financial information is reported. Our jobs as auditors,
must therefore change to increasing focus on those business processes.”
An “important enabler” of future reporting will
be the Global XBRL Initiative, the paper says. XBRL users will be able
to view company data in any language, any currency and under different
accounting systems and get immediate answers to queries. “In fact the
new world is already here for the approximately 40,000 companies that
already use XBRL to input their data. . . . China, Spain, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom have required companies to use XBRL.”
The paper acknowledges that investors, analysts
and others will still want standardized reports to be issued by public
companies on a regular basis. But the CEOs say that investors have told
them they want more relevant information to be included. “The large
discrepancies between the “book” and “market” values of many, if not
most, public companies similarly provide strong evidence of the limited
usefulness of statements of assets and liabilities that are based on
historical costs. A range of intangibles, such as employee creativity
and loyalty and relationships with suppliers and customers, can drive a
company’s performance, yet the value of these intangibles is not
consistently reported."
In short, the CEO’s vision states “the same
forces that are reshaping economies at all levels are driving the need
to transform what kind of information various stakeholders want from
companies, in what form, and at what frequency. In a world of “mass
customization,” standard financial statements have less and less meaning
and relevance. The future of auditing in such an environment lies in the
need to verify that the process by which company-specific information is
collected, sorted and reported is reliable and the information presented
is relevant for decision making.”
Investors and regulatory bodies may expect
auditors to go further than is reasonable to detect fraud and the paper
recommends that all companies be subjected to a regular forensic audit,
or be subjected to forensic audits on a random basis.
Another option would be introducing more choice
regarding the intensity of audits for fraud. For example, since forensic
audits are conducted primarily for the benefit of investors, one
possibility would be to let shareholders decide on the intensity of the
fraud detection effort
they want auditors to perform. Shareholders could be assisted in making
this decision by disclosure in the proxy materials of the costs of the
different levels of audits, as well as the historical experience of the
company with fraud.
The CEO paper calls for both liability reform
and scope of service reform.
Considering the “Brave New World” of auditing
envisioned in the document and the scope of the questions it raises,
“Global Capital Markets and the Global Economy” has received little
attention in the financial press, Motley Fool reports. But, while
approving the idea of more timely information flows for the investor,
Fool says, “enough companies have trouble meeting their reporting
obligations as it is. I would prefer to both maintain those reports and
supplement them with additional data.”
That financial reporting will evolve and change
is inevitable, the International Herald Tribune says, but whether large
accounting firms will lead the dialogue is another matter that may be
influenced by their “life-threatening litigation risks.”
"Accounting Firms Seek Overhaul," by Tad Kopinski, Institutional
Shareholder Services ISS, November 20, 2006 ---
http://blog.issproxy.com/2006/11/accounting_firms_seek_overhaul.html
Bob Jensen's threads on proposed reforms ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudProposedReforms.htm
Redesigning an MBA Curriculum Toward the Action: Why Aren't
Accountants Headed on the Same Paths?
"Wall Street Warms To Finance Degree With Focus on Math," by Ronald
Alsop, The Wall Street Journal, November 14, 2006; Page B7 ---
Click Here
Just a few years ago, the University of
California, Berkeley, found its master's degree in financial engineering
a hard sell. Wall Street had cut back sharply on hiring, and many
recruiters were still fixated on M.B.A. graduates.
"The doors were shut on us at the
human-resource level on Wall Street," recalls Linda Kreitzman, executive
director of the financial engineering program at Berkeley's Haas School
of Business. "I had to go directly to managing directors to get our
students placed after we started the program in 2001."
Now, in a turnabout, it's often the banks and
hedge funds that are calling on Dr. Kreitzman and offering her graduates
six-figure compensation packages. "They have come to realize they really
need students with strong skills in financial economics, math and
computer modeling for more complex products like mortgage- and
asset-backed securities and credit and equity derivatives," she says.
This fall, all 58 financial engineering students seeking internships
found spots at such companies as Citigroup, Lehman Brothers and Merrill
Lynch. Their projects will include credit portfolio valuation,
artificial-intelligence trading models and structured fixed-income
products.
While the master's in business administration
certainly remains in high demand, companies are increasingly interested
in other graduate-level credentials, including Ph.D.s and master's
degrees in specific business fields. Deutsche Bank, for example, has
hired Ph.D. and master-of-finance graduates in Europe for some time and
is now recruiting more in the U.S. as well.
"We are continually looking for strong
quantitative skills," says Kristina Peters, global head of graduate
recruiting. With a master's degree in finance, "there tends to be more
applied finance knowledge such as derivatives pricing."
Continued in article
Jensen Comment
The big question is where will auditing firms find accountants that can
handle the exotic contracts written by the financial engineers?
The Sad State of English Literature Research
"Student Pressure and Your Average English Department," by Sanford
Pinsker, The Irascible Professor, January 2, 2006 ---
http://irascibleprofessor.com/comments-01-02-06.htm .
English professors reflect their graduate
school training long after they "graduate" as newly minted Ph.D.s. The
rub comes in if you happen to have been more deeply trained in literary
theory than you were in literature, and you were taught to believe that
theoreticians were much more interesting than novelists or poets.
The result is that many English professors of a
certain age find it easier to get excited about multiculturalism than
about great writers because they have read very few primary works of
consequence. Asking these folk about literature reminds me of the
Israeli army recruit who was asked if he could swim, "No," he replied,
then quickly added "But I know the theory of it." English departments
are likely to suffer through this joke for at least the next twenty more
years, as professors who got tenure because they were savvy about
Derrida and Foucault hang around to shape an English department
curriculum that is longer on deserts than it is on meat-and-potatoes.
That's why advanced seminars in
multiculturalism, Madonna, or "The Sopranos" are just a heart beat away
from making it into the college catalogue. Those who remember an Irish
poet named Yeats might remember what he said about things falling apart
and the center not holding. That is what is occurring across the land as
English department have a hard time resisting whatever fashionable
bandwagon squeaks its way down the road.
The Sad State of Academic Accounting Research
February 3, 2006 message from Jagdish S. Gangolly
[gangolly@INFOTOC.COM]
The well known mathematician GH Hardy once
observed that he would be disappointed if any one found mathematics
useful (I think he was referring to "Pure" mathematics), and that
mathematics is to be enjoyed to appreciate its intrinsic beauty.
Nevertheless, even "Pure" Mathematics Mathgematics is found useful by
many. One pertinent example I can give is of non-Euclidean Geometry
which has had a profound impact on data visualisation (See, for example,
http://iv.slis.indiana.edu/sw/hyptree.html ).
While mathematical propositions are
tautological and hence not "verifiable" in a positivist sense, the
underlying axiom system can be examined to see if it corresponds to
reality. That is how, for example, things work in Physics where
replication is an essential and valued activity. In accounting research
(especially of the financial accounting kind), replication is not well
regarded, and unlike in Physics there is no "competition" to reach the
top of the greasy pole or to prove each other wrong. The result is the
mutual admiration society that we have reduced ourselves to, with a few
citing each other and the rest of the world ignoring us all.
In human science such as ours is, research
should be relevant and useful. We have an obligation to be evaluated by
the society (all the stakeholders including the professional practice)
at large about this. In this, in my opinion, we in academics have failed
miserably.
Jagdish
February 4, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Jagdish,
You have pointed to the heart of the mess in modern day academic
accounting research. The pure mathematics term "mathgematics"
reminds me of the historic term "accountics."
After an intense turn-of-the-century debate over whether academic
accounting research should become the
"mathematical science of values," leading accounting researchers
rejected this "accountics" idea. Both the term and the movement died out
for the next 60 years.
In the 1960s the concept was born again without the revival of the
word "accountics." You aptly and concisely described how accountics has
taken over our top-tier journals that, in turn, have turned our doctoral
programs into virtually a singular very narrow research skills
curriculum.
I was greatly encouraged by Judy Rayburn's Presidential Address on
August 10, 2005 and the publishing of her remarks in Accounting
Education News, Fall 2005, pp. 1-4.
Accounting research is different from other business disciplines
in the area of citations: Top-tier accounting journals in total
have fewer citations than top-tier journals in finance, management,
and marketing. Our journals are not widely cited outside our
discipline. Our top-tier journals as a group project too narrow a
view of the breadth and diversity of (what should count as)
accounting research.
Rayburn (2005b, Page 4)
I might add that Judy's points are mostly echoing Andy Bailey's 1994
Presidential Address in which he claimed the AAA journals were at a
"crisis point." The AAA Publications Committees, TAR editors, and TAR
referees ignored Andy's appeals to broaden the scope of topics and
research methods that allowed in TAR. And after a long conversation with
the current editor of TAR on February 2, 2006, I fear that Judy's
appeals are also falling on deaf ears. TAR is not going to change in the
near future with the exception of adding some AIS papers that Bill
McCarthy, as the new AIS Associate Editor, allows to pass through the
gates. TAR will expand to five issues per hear in 2006 and six issues
per year after that. But accountics constraints will still dominate TAR
in years to come.
February 4, 2006 reply from Jagdish S. Gangolly
[gangolly@INFOTOC.COM]
Bob,
Mathgematics was an innocent typo on my part.
Your response worried me that there might really be such a term, and so
I googled it and went through each of those pages. And on each of those
pages the problem was a similar typo. While I would love to put my stamp
on lexicography, I need to improve my keyboarding skills first. (My Mac
keyboard is driving me up the wall.)
Hardy used the term pure mathematics (he wrote
a book with the same title that we used as text) in the same sense that
Immanuel Kant used it in the "Critique of Pure Reason" -- uncontaminated
by facts.
People were always uncomfortable with Euclid's
fifth postulate which says that given a straight line and a point not on
the line, it is possible to construct a straight line through the point
that is parallel to the given line (there are other equivalent ways to
state the postulate). For example, if you stand in the middle of
railroad tracks in Kansas and look into the horizon along the tracks, it
would appear to you that the two parallel tracks meet there, which would
"invalidate" the postulate.
Mathematicians before Lobachevsky were trying
to prove that the fifth postulate could be proved as a theorem from the
first four (which we all know from grade school). Lobachevsky thought
out of the box and showed that Euclidean Geometry was a special case of
general non-Euclidean Geometries. Lobachevsky was not alone in this
discovery. Gauss (German) and Bolyai (Hungarian) mathematicians
independently developed the area.
By the way, the tracks seem to meet at the
horizon in Kanbsas because earth is spherical. The non-Euclidean
Geometry I referred to in the earlier message was spherical Geometry
which is the staple of data visualisation in diverse fields as taxonomy,
genetics, forestry,...; We can even use it in Accounting, for example,
in visualising XBRL taxonomies.
Jagdish
So what is the history of accountics?
TAR Between 1926 and 1955: Ignoring Accountics
Accounting professor Charles
Sprague coined the word "accountics" in 1887. The word is not
used today in accounting and has some alternative meanings outside our
discipline. However, in the early 19th Century, accountics
was the centerpiece of some forward thrusting unpublished lectures by
Charles Sprague at Columbia University. McMillan (2003, 11) stated the
following:
These claims were not a pragmatic strategy to legitimize the
development of sophisticated bookkeeping theories. Rather, this
development of a science was seen as revealing long-hidden realities
within the economic environment and the double-entry bookkeeping system
itself. The science of accounts, through systematic mathematical
analysis, could discover hidden thrust of the reality of economic
value. The term, “accountics,” captured the imagination of the members
of the IA, connoting advances in bookkeeping that all these men were
experiencing.
By 1900 there was a
journal called Accountics according to Forrester (2003). Both
the journal and the term accountics had short lives, but belief that
mathematical analysis and empirical research can “discover hidden thrust
in the reality of economic value” underlies much of what has been
published in TAR over the past three decades. Hence we propose reviving
the term “accountics” in the context of research methods and
quantitative analysis tools that have become popular in TAR and other
leading accounting research journals.
The
American Association of University Instructors of Accounting, which in
December 1935 became the American Accounting Association, commenced
unofficially in 1915, (Zeff 1966, 5). It was proposed in October 1919
that the Association publish a Quarterly Journal of Accountics.
But this proposed accountics
journal never got off the ground while leaders in the Association argued
heatedly and fruitlessly about whether accountancy was a science. A
quarterly journal called The Accounting Review was subsequently
born in 1925 with its first issue being published in March of 1926. Its
accountics-like attributes did not commence in earnest until the 1960s.
Practitioner involvement, in a
large measure, was the reason for changing the name of the Association
by removing the words “University Instructors.” Practitioners interested
in accounting education participated actively in AAA meetings. TAR
articles in the first several decades were devoted heavily to education
issues and accounting issues in particular industries and trade groups.
Research methodologies were mainly normative (without mathematics),
case, and archival (history) methods. Anecdotal evidence and
hypothetical illustrations ruled the day. The longest serving editor of
TAR was a practitioner who determined what was published in TAR between
1929 and 1943. In those years the AAA leadership actually mandated that
TAR focus on development of accounting principles and to orient the
papers to both practitioners and educators, Chatfield (1975, Page 4).
Following World War II,
practitioners outnumbered educators in the AAA, (Chatfield 1975, 4).
Leading partners from accounting firms took pride in publishing papers
and books intended to inspire scholarship among professors and students.
Some practitioners, particularly those with scholarly publications, were
admitted over the years into the Accounting Hall of Fame formed by The
Ohio State University. Accounting educators were generally long on
practical experience and short on academic credentials such as doctoral
degrees prior to the 1960s.
A major
catalyst for change was the Ford Foundation that poured millions of
dollars into first the study of collegiate business schools and second
the funding of doctoral programs and students in business studies.
Gordon and Howell (1959) reported that business faculty in colleges
lacked research skills and academic esteem among their humanities and
science colleagues. The Ford Foundation thereafter funded doctoral
programs and top quality graduate students to pursue doctoral degrees in
business and accountancy. This Foundation even funded publication of
selected doctoral dissertations to give business discipline doctoral
studies more visibility. Great pressures were also brought to bear on
academic associations like the AAA to increase the academic standards
for publications in journals like TAR.
Competitors to TAR were launched in the early 1960s, including the
Journal of Accounting Research (1963), Abacus (1965) and
The International Journal of Accounting Education and Research
(1965). Clinging to its traditional normative roots and trade-article
style would have made TAR appear to be a journal for academic luddites.
Actually, many of the new mathematical approaches to theory development
were fundamentally normative, but they were couched in the formidable
language and rigors of mathematics. Publication of papers in traditional
normative theory, history, and systems slowly ground to almost zero in
the new age of accountics.
These
new spearheads in accountics were not without problems. It’s humorous
and sad to go back and discover how naïve and misleading some of TAR’s
bold and high risk thrusts were into quantitative methods. Statistical
models were employed without regard to underlying assumptions of
independence, temporal stationarity, multicollinearity,
homoscedasticity, missing variables, and departures from the normal
distribution. Mathematical applications were proposed for real-world
systems that failed to meet continuity and non-convexity assumptions
inherent in such models as linear programming and calculus
optimizations. Proposed applications of finite mathematics and discrete
(integer) programming failed because the fastest computers in the world
then, and now, could not solve most realistic integer programming
problems in less than 100 years.
After
financial databases provided a BETA covariance of each security in a
portfolio with the market portfolio, a flood of capital market events
studies were published by TAR and other leading accounting journals. In
the early years, accounting researchers did not challenge CAPM’s
assumptions and limitations, limitations that, in retrospect cast doubt
upon many of the findings based upon any single index of market risk, (Fama
and French 1992).
Leading
accounting professors have lamented as TAR’s preference for rigor over
relevancy, (Zeff 1978; Lee 1997; and Williams 1999). Sundem (1987)
provides revealing information about the changed perceptions of authors,
almost entirely from academe, who submitted manuscripts for review
between June 1982 and May 1986. Among the 1,148 submissions, only 39
used archival (history) methods and 34 of those submissions were
rejected. Also 34 used survey methods and 33 of those were rejected.
And 100 used traditional normative (deductive) methods with 85 of those
being rejected. Except for a small set of 28 manuscripts classified as
using “other” methods (mainly descriptive empirical according to Sundem),
the remaining larger subset submitted manuscripts used methods that
Sundem classified as follows for leading 1982-1986 submissions:
292
General Empirical
119
Capital Market
172
Behavioral
135
Analytical modeling
97
Economic modeling
40
Statistical modeling
29
Simulation
What’s clear is that by
1982 accounting researchers got the message that having mathematical or
statistical analysis in TAR publications made accountics virtually a
necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition for acceptance for
publication. It became increasingly difficult for a single editor to
have expertise in all the above methods. In the late 1960s editorial
decisions on publication shifted from the TAR editor alone to the TAR
editor in conjunction with specialized referees and eventually associate
editors, (Flesher 1991, 167). Fleming et al. (2000) wrote the following:
The big change was in research methods. Modeling and empirical
methods became prominent during 1966-1985, with analytical modeling and
general empirical methods leading the way. Although used to a
surprising extent, deductive-type methods declined in popularity,
especially in the second half of the 1966-1985 period.
Fleming
et al. (2000, Page 48) report that education articles in TAR declined
from 21% in 1966 to 8% before Issues in Accounting Education
began to publish education articles. Garcha, Harwood, and Hermanson
(1983) reported on the readership of TAR before any new specialty
journals commenced in the AAA. They reported that among their AAA
membership respondents, only 41.7% would subscribe if TAR was unbundled
in terms of dollar savings from AAA membership dues. TAR apparently was
not meeting the membership’s market test. Based heavily upon the written
comments of respondents, the authors’ conclusions were, in part, as
follows:
The findings of the survey reveal that opinions vary regarding
TAR and that emotions run high. At one extreme some respondents seem to
believe that TAR is performing its intended function very well. Those
sharing this view may believe that its mission is to provide a
high-quality outlet for those at the cutting-edge of accounting
research. The pay-off for this approach may be recognition by peers,
achieving tenure and promotion, and gaining mobility should one care to
move. This group may also believe that trying to affect current
practice is futile anyway, so why even try?
At the other extreme are those who believe that TAR is not
serving its intended purpose. This group may believe TAR should serve
the readership interests of the audiences identified by the Moonitz
Committee. Many in the intended audience cannot write for, cannot read,
or are not interested in reading the Main Articles which have been
published during approximately the last decade. As a result there is
the suggestion that this group believes that a change in editorial
policy is needed.
After a
study by
Abdel-khalik(1976) that revealed complaints about difficulties of
following the increased quantitative methods jargon in TAR, editors did
introduce abstracts in front of the articles to summarize major findings
with less jargon, (Flesher 1991, 169).
But the
problem was simultaneously exacerbated when TAR stopped publishing
commentaries and rebuttals that sometimes aid understanding of
complicated research. Science journals are much better about encouraging
commentaries and rebuttals.
The saddest and most
revealing state of accountics research is the lack of
interest of replicating the many findings of TAR's econometric and
psychometric methodologies ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Relication
Bob Jensen
Scientific Method in Accounting Has
Not Been a Method for Generating New Theories
The following is a quote from the 1993
President’s Message of Gary Sundem,
President’s Message. Accounting Education News 21
(3). 3.
Although empirical scientific method has made many positive
contributions to accounting research, it is not the
method that is likely to generate new theories, though
it will be useful in testing them. For example,
Einstein’s theories were not developed empirically, but
they relied on understanding the empirical evidence and
they were tested empirically. Both the development and
testing of theories should be recognized as acceptable
accounting research.
Question
What is the trend in the number of doctoral degrees awarded
in accountancy in the United States?
Answer
It all depends on who you ask and whether or not the alma
maters are AACSB accredited universities
(note that the AACSB accredits bachelors and masters degree
programs but not doctoral programs per se).
The data suggest that there are a lot of ABD doctoral
students who never complete the final hurdle of writing a
dissertation, although this is only my speculation based
upon the higher number of graduates that I would expect from
the size of the enrollments.
On January 27, 2006, Jean Heck at
Villanova sent me the following message:
This data is only for AACSB accredited schools, so the
numbers you had for Accounting in the slide are a little
bigger. I got these numbers straight from the AACSB data
director. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Accounting & Finance Historical Data 2000 - 2004 |
|
|
|
|
Accounting |
Full Time Enrollment |
Part Time Enrollment |
Degrees Conferred |
2000 |
552 |
36 |
122 |
|
|
|
|
2001 |
585 |
80 |
102 |
|
|
|
|
2002 |
578 |
13 |
97 |
|
|
|
|
2003 |
694 |
12 |
103 |
|
|
|
|
2004 |
631 |
16 |
86 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Finance |
|
|
|
2000 |
738 |
59 |
159 |
|
|
|
|
2001 |
771 |
109 |
129 |
|
|
|
|
2002 |
807 |
49 |
125 |
|
|
|
|
2003 |
939 |
40 |
136 |
|
|
|
|
2004 |
859 |
48 |
109 |
********************
Jensen Comment
Hasselback, J.R. (2006), Accounting Faculty Directory
2006-2007 (Prentice-Hall, Just Prior to Page 1) reports the
following doctoral graduates in accounting:
1998–99 122 - 18%
1999–00 095 - 22%
2000–01 108 +14%
2001–02 099 - 08%
2002–03 069 - 30%
In Slide 23 of her Presidential
Address at the American Accounting Association Annual Meetings in
San Francisco on August 10, Judy Rayburn presented the following
data regarding doctoral graduates in accounting ---
http://aaahq.org/AM2005/menu.htm
145 Accounting Ph.D.s were awarded in 2002-2003, an increase
over 2001-2002 estimates.
TABLE 3B
Accounting Ph.D’s Awarded 1998–99 Through 2002–03
Number of Graduates Rate of Growth
1998–99 185 – 3%
1999–00 195 + 5%
2000–01 115 – 41%
2001–02 110 – 4%
2002–03 145 + 32%
Data from the U.S. Department of Education
You can download an Excel spreadsheet of Doctor's degrees conferred
by degree-granting institutions, by discipline division: Selected
years, 1970-71 to 2002-03 ---
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d04/tables/dt04_252.asp
Part of that spreadsheet is shown below:
Table 252. Doctor's degrees
conferred by degree-granting institutions, by discipline
division:
Selected years, 1970-71 to 2002-03 |
_ |
_ |
_ |
_ |
_ |
_ |
Discipline division |
1998-99 |
1999-00 |
2000-01 |
2001-02 |
2002-03 |
|
_ |
_ |
_ |
_ |
_ |
Agriculture and natural
resources ................. |
1,231 |
1,168 |
1,127 |
1,148 |
1,229 |
Architecture and related
services ....................... |
123 |
129 |
153 |
183 |
152 |
Area, ethnic, cultural, and
gender studies ................................... |
187 |
205 |
216 |
212 |
186 |
Biological and biomedical
sciences ....................................... |
5,024 |
5,180 |
4,953 |
4,823 |
5,003 |
Business
........................................................... |
1,201 |
1,194 |
1,180 |
1,156 |
1,251 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Communication, journalism, and
related programs
.............................................. |
347 |
347 |
368 |
374 |
394 |
Communications technologies
.......................... |
5 |
10 |
2 |
9 |
4 |
Computer and information
sciences ........................... |
801 |
779 |
768 |
752 |
816 |
Education
............................................... |
6,394 |
6,409 |
6,284 |
6,549 |
6,835 |
Engineering
........................................... |
5,432 |
5,390 |
5,542 |
5,187 |
5,276 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Engineering technologies
................................ |
29 |
31 |
62 |
58 |
57 |
English language and
literature/letters ....................... |
1,407 |
1,470 |
1,330 |
1,291 |
1,246 |
Family and consumer
sciences/human sciences ........... |
323 |
327 |
354 |
311 |
372 |
Foreign languages, literatures,
and linguistics ......................... |
1,049 |
1,086 |
1,078 |
1,003 |
1,042 |
Health professions and related
clinical sciences ............................ |
1,920 |
2,053 |
2,242 |
2,913 |
3,328 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Legal professions and studies
................................... |
58 |
74 |
286 |
79 |
105 |
Liberal arts and sciences, |
|
|
|
|
|
general studies, and
humanities ................................. |
78 |
83 |
102 |
113 |
78 |
Library science
.......................................... |
55 |
68 |
58 |
45 |
62 |
Mathematics and statistics
........................................ |
1,090 |
1,075 |
997 |
923 |
1,007 |
Multi/interdisciplinary studies
................................ |
754 |
792 |
784 |
765 |
899 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Parks, recreation, leisure and
fitness studies ................... |
137 |
134 |
177 |
151 |
199 |
Philosophy and religious
studies .................................. |
584 |
598 |
600 |
610 |
662 |
Physical sciences and science
technologies ............................. |
4,142 |
3,963 |
3,911 |
3,760 |
3,858 |
Psychology
......................................... |
4,695 |
4,731 |
5,091 |
4,759 |
4,831 |
Public administration and
social services ........................ |
532 |
537 |
574 |
571 |
596 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Security and protective
services .................................... |
48 |
52 |
44 |
49 |
72 |
Social sciences and history
........................................ |
3,855 |
4,095 |
3,930 |
3,902 |
3,850 |
Theology and religious
vocations .................... |
1,440 |
1,630 |
1,461 |
1,350 |
1,321 |
Transportation and materials
moving ..................... |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Visual and performing arts
............................... |
1,130 |
1,127 |
1,167 |
1,114 |
1,293 |
Not classified by field of
study ................... |
6 |
71 |
63 |
0 |
0 |
Question
Why is supply of doctoral faculty, and possibly all business faculty, not a
sustainable process?
Jensen Answer
See Below
Question
Why do accounting doctoral students have to be more like science students
than medical students and law students?
Jensen Answer
With the explosion of demand for accounting faculty, production of only
about 100 doctoral graduates from AACSB schools is no longer a sustainable
process. Perhaps the time has come to have a Scholarship Track and a Research Track
in accounting doctoral studies. One of the real barriers to entry has been the
narrow quantitative method and science method curriculum now required in
virtually all doctoral programs in accountancy. Many accounting professionals
who contemplate returning to college for doctoral degrees are not interested
and/or not talented in our present narrow Ph.D. curriculum.
In my opinion this will work only if our most prestigious universities take
the lead in lending prestige to Scholarship Track doctoral students in
accounting. Case Western is one university that has already taken a small step
in this direction. Now lets open this alternative to younger students who have
perhaps only had a few years experience in accounting practice,
In the January 30, 2006 edition of New Bookmarks I presented tables of
the numbers of doctoral graduates in all disciplines with particular stress on
those in accounting, finance, and business in general. As baby boomers from the
World War II era commence to retire, the AACSB International predicts a crisis
shortage of new faculty to take their place and to meet the growth in popularity
of business programs in universities. In August
2002, the AACSB International Management Education Task Force (METF) issued a
landmark report, “Management Education at Risk.” The 2002 report on this is
available at
http://www.aacsb.edu/publications/dfc/default.asp
In particular, note the section on Rethinking Doctoral Education quoted below.
Rethinking Doctoral Education
Several issues in doctoral education are in need of
rethinking in light of doctoral faculty shortages. They include vertical
orientation, strategies for sourcing doctoral faculty, the relevance of
curricula, rewards and promotion, accreditation standards, and leveraging
technology.
Vertical Orientation
Doctoral education is built on vertical orientation
to disciplines, requiring prospective applicants to choose their field at
the point of entry. Many doctoral programs train students in narrowly
defined research agendas, giving them little, if any, exposure to research
problems and methodologies outside their discipline. In parallel, most
hiring adheres to traditional departmental tracks, with few instances of
cross-departmental appointments because they are inherently challenging to
the structure of most business schools. Among the schools that are
exceptions is IMD, in Switzerland, which eliminated departmental and rank
distinctions.
Meanwhile, advancement in business knowledge and
thinking requires research frameworks that can span functional and industry
boundaries. And businesses continue to call for more cross-functional
education in undergraduate and MBA programs. There is inevitable and
healthy tension between training and theory in vertical disciplines, on the
one hand, and the evolving issues of the marketplace that tend to defy such
neat categorization, on the other.
There is little question that schools need to add
to their doctoral curricula research training that encompasses questions and
methodologies across vertical boundaries. Unless some shifts are
instituted, the training ground for researchers in business will become less
relevant to the knowledge advances the marketplace needs and demands, and to
the teaching and learning needs within business schools.
Strategies for Sourcing Doctoral Faculty
To preserve the inimitable scholarship role of
business academics, faculty resources need to be better leveraged. Business
schools must address pervasive doctoral shortages creatively by reaching
beyond traditional sources for doctoral faculty. Though not without
challenges, the following are among possible alternative sources of doctoral
faculty:
- Ph.D. graduates of research disciplines
outside business schools (for example, psychology, sociology,
anthropology, physics, biotechnology), who bring alternative
perspectives on business education and research.
- Executive or professional doctoral
graduates from programs outside the advanced theoretical research
category, such as the Executive Doctor of Management program at Case
Western Reserve University.
- Ph.D. graduates from other fields who have
accumulated years of business experience and can serve as doctorally
qualified clinical professors.
- New models of qualification to the doctorate,
practiced by some European schools, that award doctoral degrees based
solely on published research.
Along with tapping new sources for doctoral
faculty, such strategies may have the added benefit of increasing the
"practice" flavor of curricula.
A concurrent approach to support continued, vibrant
scholarship of business research faculty is a productivity-enhancement
strategy, rather than a focus on faculty supply. The reason for suggesting
that approaches to enhance productivity are needed is that reduced teaching
loads alone do not ensure increased faculty research contributions.
Possible such approaches include faculty development in best research
practices; greater flexibility in faculty employment relationships, to
facilitate researcher collaboration and mobility across institutions; a
multilevel faculty model that fine-tunes faculty assignments to fit their
competencies; and differentiated performance accountability and rewards
around these assignments.
The quest for sustained research productivity also
hinges on our definition of research. EQUIS, the business school
accreditation program offered by the European Foundation for Management
Development, has proposed an expanded definition of research to include
research, development, and innovation (RDI). RDI includes activities
related to the origination, dissemination, and application of knowledge to
practical management.
I have always been one to distinguish scholarship from research. One can be a
scholar by mastering some important subset of what is already known. A
researcher must attempt to contribute new knowledge to this subset. Every
academic discipline has an obligation to conduct research in an effort to keep
the knowledge base dynamic and alive. However, this does not necessarily mean
that every tenured professor must have been a researcher at some point along the
way as long as the criteria for tenure include highly significant scholarship.
This tends not to be the model we work with in colleges and universities in
modern times. But given the extreme shortages in accounting doctoral students,
perhaps the time has come to attract more scholars into our discipline. It will
require a huge rethinking of curriculum and thesis requirements, and I do think
there should be a thesis requirement that demonstrates advanced scholarship. I
also think that the curriculum should cover a variety of disciplines without
aspirations to produce Super CPAs to teach accounting. Possibly universities
will even generate some doctoral theses other than the present ones that
everybody hopes, including the authors, that nobody will read.
Medical schools have used these two tracks for years. Some medical professors
are highly skilled clinically and teach medicine without necessarily devoting
80% of their time in research labs. Other medical professors spend more than 80%
of their time in research labs. In law, the distinction is less obvious, but I
think when push comes to shove there are many law professors who have mastered
case law without contributing significantly to what the legal profession would
call new knowledge. Other law professors are noted for their contributions to
new theory.
Along these lines follows an obligation to teach “professionalization” in
an effort to attract doctoral students
Donald E. Hall finishes his series with proposals to change the dissertation
process and a call to teach “professionalization.”
"Collegiality and Graduate School Training," by Donald E. Hall, Inside
Higher Ed, January 24, 2006 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/workplace/2006/01/24/hall
This emphasis on conversational skills
and commitments allows us then to fine tune also our
definition of what “professionalization” actually means.
Certainly in the venues above — the classroom and in
research mentorship — we work to make our students more
aware of the norms and best practices of academic
professional life. But the graduate programs that are most
concerned with meeting their students’ needs attend also to
that professionalization process by offering seminars,
roundtables, workshops, and other activities to students
intent on or just thinking about pursuing an academic
career. In all of these it is important to note that
aspiring academics are not only entering the conversation
represented by their research fields, but also the
conversation of a dynamic and multi-faceted profession.
This does mean encouraging literal
conversations among graduate students and recent graduates
who have taken a wide variety of positions — from high
profile academic, to teaching centered, to those in the
publishing industry and a wide variety of non-academic
fields. I started this essay by noting that when I was a
graduate student I had never heard from or about individuals
who had taken jobs like the one I eventually took. Certainly
I could have sought out those individuals on my own (though
I didn’t know them personally, since they were not part of
my cohort group), but it is also true that those individuals
were not generally recognized as ones to emulate.
One hopes, given the terrible
prospects that most new Ph.D.’s face today as they enter the
academic job market, that such snobbishness has waned.
However, I still would not go so far as to say that we
should tell students that “any job” is better than “no job”
or that they should simply “take what they can get.” Some
individuals would be terribly mismatched with certain
positions — weak teachers who live for research should not
take positions at teaching universities unless they are
willing to re-prioritize and devote their energies to
improving their pedagogies. Similarly, I have known superb
teachers with poor research habits and skills who have taken
wholly inappropriate positions at prestigious universities
and then lost those jobs for low research productivity
during third year or tenure reviews (unfortunately, they
sometimes got their jobs in the first place because they
were able to — and were counseled to — market themselves
within certain highly sought-after identity political fields
but with no recognition of their own individual needs or
abilities). A discussion of who will be happy and will
succeed where must be part of any broad conversation on the
academic profession, whether that conversation takes place
in seminars, workshops, or with groups of students about to
“go on the market.”
Indeed, it is vital to invite
students into conversation on these matters as often and as
early as possible. At the beginning of every meeting of
every graduate class I teach, I ask if there are any
questions on the minds of the students regarding their
program, general professional issues or processes, or the
often unexplained norms of academic life. Even if students
are sometimes too shy to ask what they really want to know
in class, their recognition of my willingness to address
such issues means they often show up during office hours to
ask what they consider an embarrassing question (“how much
do assistant professors typically make?” or “what do you say
in a cover letter when you send out an article for
consideration?”). We have to let students know that we are
willing to share information with them in an honest and
practical manner. We should be “open texts” for them to read
and learn from in their own processes of professional
interpretation and skill-building.
I believe it would be useful to
build some of the expectations above into the desired
outcomes of our graduate programs. In fact, I haven’t heard
of any programs that articulate specific goals for
professionalization processes, but I think we should be
asking what specifically we wish the end product to be of
those seminars, workshops, and other conversations about
academic life. I would offer that an overarching goal might
be to help our students become more supple and skilled
participants in the wide variety of conversations that
comprise an academic career. By necessity, acquiring this
conversational skill means learning the value of being both
multi-voiced and open to the perspectives of others.
This bears some explanation. By
multi-voiced I am not implying that students should learn to
be Machiavellian or duplicitous. Rather, I mean that all of
us who are thriving in our careers have learned to speak
within a wide variety of contexts and to choose our language
carefully depending upon the venue. I would never speak in
class as I do in some of my more theoretically dense
writings. I would never speak to administrators from other
departments as I do to those in my home department who use
the same terms and points of reference. And finally I would
never speak to the public exactly as I would to a scholarly
audience at a conference. Being multi-voiced in this way
means being aware of your conversation partners’ needs and
placing their need to understand above your own desire to
express yourself in intellectually self-serving ways.
And this is, in fact, an important
component of being open to the perspectives of others. Yet
that openness also means allowing one’s own beliefs, values,
and opinions to be challenged and transformed by contact
with those of conversation partners. This does not mean
being unwilling to defend one’s beliefs (whether on matters
of social justice or minute points of interpretation), but
it does mean being able to position oneself at least
partially outside of oneself in the process of
conversational exchange. It certainly means working to
understand how the general public perceives the academy (and
the debate over tenure, for example). It means trying to see
the world through the eyes of a different generation of
professors who may not use the same methodologies or
theoretical touchstones in their work. It means seeing one’s
own sacredly held positions as ones that exist in a
landscape of positions, many of which are also sacredly
held.
Continued in article
December 11, 2005 message from David Albrecht
[albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]
At Bowling Green, much institutional emphasis is
being placed on having undergraduates conduct or participate in research. Of
course, I'm pretty sure the program is slanted toward the hard sciences. An
economics professor here is active in this area. She suggests that I get
involved.
I'd love to get involved, there are significant
rewards being tossed about.
On what would my undergraduates do research?
Please help me.
David Albrecht
December 12, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi David,
At the college of business level, you might suggest that your college
become involved in the highly popular National Conferences on Undergraduate
Research (NCUR). This affords students the opportunity to travel a bit and
make presentations with other students at the excellent NCUR conferences. It
also is an opportunity to promote your college and its faculty. Your social
and physical science colleges may already be involved with NCUR ---
http://www.ncur.org/
As far as research goes, I think it would be great to have students write
responses to FASB, GASB, and IASB exposure drafts and other invitations to
comment. Undergraduate research is not as esoteric as PhD research and
leaves some room for normative methodology.
Along these lines I had an opportunity to view two absolutely absurd
referee reports sent to a professor, not me, with respect to a submission.
His submission suggested, among other things, that some accounting faculty
should spend more time responding to standard setters' invitations to
comment on matters that need more applied research. For lack of a better
term, I will call this applied research in accounting.
The reports of both referees were highly critical of professors trying to
publish applied research in any AAA journals (including Accounting Horizons
which they assert is read mostly by academics rather than practitioners).
Perhaps they might make an allowance for Issues in Accounting Education, but
no mention is made for IAE in these referee reports.
I think the following quotation (listed as the Number 1 criticism) from
one of the referee reports pretty much sums up the sad state of academic
accounting research today.
I quote:
*************
1. The paper provides specific recommendations for things that
accounting academics should be doing to make the accounting profession
better. However (unless the author believes that academics' time is a
free good) this would presumably take academics' time away from what
they are currently doing. While following the author's advice might make
the accounting profession better, what is being made worse? In other
words, suppose I stop reading current academic research and start
reading news about current developments in accounting standards. Who is
made better off and who is made worse off by this reallocation of my
time? Presumably my students are marginally better off, because I can
tell them some new stuff in class about current accounting standards,
and this might possibly have some limited benefit on their careers. But
haven't I made my colleagues in my department worse off if they depend
on me for research advice, and haven't I made my university worse off if
its academic reputation suffers because I'm no longer considered a
leading scholar? Why does making the accounting profession better take
precedence over everything else an academic does with their time?
**************
Both referees imply that studying accounting standards will take our
researchers away from what's really important in accounting academe, namely
publishing empirical and analytical research on problems that lend
themselves to esoteric statistics and mathematics. The irony is that most of
the esoteric research published research along those lines is more or less
focused on trivial hypotheses of little interest in and of themselves.
Certainly our academic friends in economics and finance are not subscribing
to our accounting research journals. We, of course, subscribe to their
esoteric journals.
Once again I make my case that that academic research hypotheses
published in top accounting research journals cannot be of much interest
since all top accounting research journals in academe have a policy against
publication of replication studies. What value can the findings have of the
replication studies are of no interest? See
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Replication
The bottom line is that real scientists, economists, medical researchers,
and legal researchers would laugh the above two arrogant AAA journal
referees off the face of the planet. I'm certainly glad that medical
researchers focus on professional practice problems and insist on
replication. I'm certainly glad that biology researchers focus on microbes
that are helping or hindering life on earth. I'm certainly glad that legal
research is almost entirely focused on real world case law. No respectable
academic discipline, other than accounting, divorces itself from the
practice of its own profession. I think this is the main reason academic
accounting research is held is such low esteem both by practitioners and by
other academic disciplines. We've become a sick joke.
What the two idiots, who are typical arrogant referees for AAA journals,
are doing, David, is leaving a whole lot of room for Bowling Green's
undergraduates to conduct research on the important problems of the academic
profession while they themselves go off and play in the sandbox of research
that their own top journals conclude is not worth replicating. I suggest to
you David that there is ample room for your undergraduates do applied
research that may benefit the profession. Just do not expect the arrogant
"philosophers" who guard the gates of our academic accounting research
journals to allow any of this research pass into the gates of heaven.
I think the two referee reports mentioned above are exactly what the
current AAA President (Judy Rayburn) and the Past President (Jane Mutchler)
are trying in vain to overcome by changing the refereeing policy of the
AAA's leading journals. I'm certain the prejudices of our arrogant ivory
tower academics are so ingrained that these two women are fighting losing
battles.
I suggest that you, David, conduct a lab experiment in your undergraduate
classes. Bring a scale to each class and have the students weigh the last
four issues of The Accounting Review. Then have students weigh the last four
issues of Accounting Horizons. You must first tear out only the research
articles themselves since both journals do publish some items that are not
research submissions to the journals. Please publish this comparative study
on the AECM. I think the results will speak for themselves about the sad
state of applied research in accounting academe.
Imagine the how academe might be shaken up if an AAA Doctoral Consortium
were entirely devoted one year to taking up current issues facing the FASB,
GASB, and IASB. The very foundations of academe might crumble if we let
outsiders into the tightly controlled esoteric program of the Doctoral
Consortium and corrupt the research biases of our new doctoral graduates in
accountancy.
Send your undergraduate researchers marching forward David. The
accounting world will be a better place. The profession is getting very
little help from unreplicated research articles that pass through the gates diligently
guarded by arrogant and narcisstic AAA journal referees.
Bob Jensen
December 12, 2005 reply from McCarthy, William
[mccarthy@BUS.MSU.EDU]
On Monday 12 December 2005, David Fordham wrote
on AECM:
...
No matter how good it is, no matter what
its form, systems research will not be published in accounting
journals given the current editorship and review staff
...
David and other AECM system researchers:
This has been generally true in the past and
there are certainly still a host of accounting journals that
underestimate the importance of accounting information systems (AIS)
research. Additionally, it is still true that almost all accounting
academics remain clueless about the different kinds of methodologies
that AIS, MIS, and computer science researchers generally use. Thus,
accounting systems people (like Dave and I plus many AECM members) are
forced to live in an academic world that understands neither “the what”
nor “the how” of AIS research and teaching.
However, the American Accounting Association
(in general) and The Accounting Review (in particular) are taking steps
to narrow this gap in understanding. Dan Dhaliwal, the senior editor of
The Accounting Review (TAR) has appointed me – a known maverick in
accounting circles and a long-time champion of AIS research and teaching
-- as an editor for TAR.
That was the good news; now the bad (sort of)
news. Since the announcement in August of a systems champion at the
Review, we have seen no changes because systems people are not
submitting manuscripts. I know that gearing up takes a while, but in the
interim, I think we need to speak less of our underprivileged past
status and concentrate more on how we are going to attack the myriad of
problems that accounting faces today with systems-informed thinking and
systems-informed methods. If you fervently believe that the practice of
accounting benefits little from what TAR, JAR, JAE, et al. produce, and
you also believe that accounting practice could benefit tremendously
from improvements researched and suggested by good AIS people and
computer scientists, you need to get busy.
I am going to give a speech on this at the AAA
Information Systems Section mid-year meeting on January 7th, 2006, but
in the interim, I hope people can use their inter-term break time to get
the flow to TAR increased. Let’s get going!!
Bill McCarthy
Michigan State
Dennis
Beresford, former Chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board and
current Ernst & Young Professor of Accounting at the University of Georgia,
had much to recommend on how academic accountants could improve. His
luncheon speech on August 10, 2005 at the AAA Annual Meetings in San
Francisco is provided at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/BeresfordAAAspeech2005.htm
I snipped the above URL to
http://snipurl.com/Beresford2005
My apologies
for some formatting that was lost when I converted Denny's DOC file into a
HTM file.
December 12, 2005 reply from David Albrecht
What is applied research?
I've never been able to figure this one out.
David Albrecht
December 13, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi David,
First let me point out that for over three
decades, Denny Beresford has been appealing for more applied research
among accounting educators. Two days ago I requested and received his
permission to post his luncheon speech at the annual 2005 AAA meetings
in San Francisco. His somewhat emotional appeal is at
http://snipurl.com/Beresford2005
You can obtain various definitions of applied
research by going to
http://www.google.com/advanced_search?hl=en
Type in the following in one of the search boxes:
Define "Applied Research"
Among the many definitions the one I like is
that basic research is "the systematic, intensive study directed toward
the practical application of knowledge and problem solving."
www.unlv.edu/depts/cas/glossary.htm
The key word in this definition is "practical
application." In the context of the accountancy profession I think of
this is as discovery of practical applications that can be put into
place by practicing accountants and their firms. Included here are
practical applications for standard setters such as the FASB, GASB, and
IASB.
By way of example, I would include virtually all
of the applied research papers published by Ira Kawaller on the
practical applications of derivative financial instruments and
accounting for derivative financial instruments ---
http://www.kawaller.com/articles.shtml
By way of a particular example, I like Ira's
applied research on when to use dollar-offset versus regression tests of
hedge effectiveness. Hedge effectiveness testing is required for hedge
accounting per Paragraph 62 in FAS 133. The FASB does not prescribe how
such testing should be done in practice. It only says such testing is
required. Ira makes some practical suggestions at
http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/AFP_Regression.pdf
I contend that most ABC costing research is of
an applied nature since most published papers and the seminal
discoveries of ABC by the John Deere Company back in the 1940s are
intended for practical application.
Lines between basic research and applied
research in accounting are really confusing because it is common to
associate quantitative methods and/or historical methodology with basic
research. Basic research should not be confused with tools and methods
of research. Basic research quite simply is a research discovery, new
knowledge, that has no perceived application in practice or at best has
some hope for possible discovery of practical applications in future
applied research.
I suspect that the discovery of the structure of
DNA by Watson and Crick is conceived as basic research. Applied
researchers later on found ways to put this to use in practice such as
the practice of using DNA evidence in criminal cases.
I suspect that portfolio theory in the 1959
doctoral dissertation of Harry Markowitz at Princeton would be
considered basic research that later led to the CAPM model and Options
Pricing Model applied in practice. The discovery by Markowitz was
totally impractical until simplified index models were later discovered
when trying to apply Markowitz theory to actual portfolio choices.
The best examples of basic versus applied
research discoveries probably come from the discipline of mathematics.
Theoretical mathematicians like to prove things with no thought as to
possible relevance to anything in the real world.
It is much more difficult to find truly basic
research discoveries in accountancy. We should be grateful that we do
not have to select Nobel Prize Winners in accountancy. The Ball and
Brown study got the first Seminal Contribution Award from the AAA. But
this is an application of capital market research discovered previously
by researchers in finance and economics. Capital markets studies have
mostly applied models developed in finance, econometrics, and
statistics.
What I am saying is that it is possible to apply
theory and test hypotheses without intending to have the discoveries be
put directly into practice in a profession. For example an events study
such as the discovery by George Foster that the publication of a Barrons'
paper by Abe Briloff was highly correlated with a plunge in share prices
of McDonalds Corporation tells us something about an association between
Briloff's accounting publication and capital market events. But
correlation is not causation. Foster's study could not really tell us
if the accounting issue (dirty pooling) or the mere fact that Briloff
said something negative about McDonalds in Barrons actually caused the
plunge in share prices.
The bottom line here is that the basic versus
applied research distinction in mathematics and science does not carry
over well into accounting. I prefer to make the distinction more along
the lines of research not having versus having a direct impact on
practicing accountants. For example, Ira's paper on hedge effectiveness
techniques had immediate and direct impact on having firms use
dollar-offset testing for retrospective data and regression for
prospective data. Companies actually follow Ira's recommendations when
implementing FAS 133 rules.
So what makes Ira's study different from those
of Ball and Brown, Beaver, and Foster? I guess the distinction lies in
the "take home" for practicing accountants and standard setters. Most
capital markets research discoveries do not provide the CPA on the
street with something to immediately place into practice or take out of
practice. The Ira Kawaller studies linked above provide CFOs with
strategies for hedging and CAOs/CPAs with strategies for implementing
FAS 133.
Now the question is: What is Denny
Beresford asking us to provide to the standard setters? I think what
he's asking for is more along the lines of Ira Kawaller's
practical-application contributions. If Ira's studies had been done
before FAS 133 was issued, the standard itself in Paragraph 62 might
have suggested or even required specific types of hedge effectiveness
testing. Instead Paragraph 62 of FAS 133 offered no suggestions for how
to test for effectiveness. This has led to thousands of variations,
often inconsistent, of hedge effectiveness testing in practice.
Both while he was Chairman of the FASB and
after he became a professor of accounting at Georgia, Denny Beresford
has consistently been appealing for the academy to conduct research that
will have more direct benefit in the writing of accounting standards.
This of course entails a considerable effort in learning the issues
faced by standard setters on particular complicated issues like the
thousands of different types of derivative financial instruments
actually used in practice. Most academic accountants shun learning
about such contracts and instead turn to tried and true regression
models of data found in existing databases like those provided by
Compustat and Audit Analytics. My conclusion is that this so-called
basic research is actually easier than making creative contributions to
practicing accountants, i.e. providing them with discoveries that they
did not make themselves in practice. This is so tough that it is why
the academy tends to avoid Denny's appeal.
I repeat and lament the sad state of the
accountancy academy as reflected in the following quotation from a
referee that closed the gate on publishing a paper of a very close
friend of mine:
I quote:
*************
1. The paper provides
specific recommendations for things that accounting academics should
be doing to make the accounting profession better. However (unless
the author believes that academics' time is a free good) this would
presumably take academics' time away from what they are currently
doing. While following the author's advice might make the accounting
profession better, what is being made worse? In other words, suppose
I stop reading current academic research and start reading news
about current developments in accounting standards. Who is made
better off and who is made worse off by this reallocation of my
time? Presumably my students are marginally better off, because I
can tell them some new stuff in class about current accounting
standards, and this might possibly have some limited benefit on
their careers. But haven't I made my colleagues in my department
worse off if they depend on me for research advice, and haven't I
made my university worse off if its academic reputation suffers
because I'm no longer considered a leading scholar? Why does making
the accounting profession better take precedence over everything
else an academic does with their time?
**************
My bottom line conclusion is that the referee
acting superior above is really scared to death that he or she cannot be
creative enough to make a practical suggestion to the FASB that the FASB
itself has not already discovered.
Bob Jensen
January 19, 2006 reply from Paul Williams
[williamsp@COMFS1.COM.NCSU.EDU]
This type of review is all
too common and is symptomatic of what the accounting academy has become.
I recall a panel discussion that was organized for an AAA annual meeting
(I believe it was the last time we held it in Washington) to air an
issue that Bill Cooper was animated about at that time -- data sharing
and the bigger problem of research impropriety. One of the panelists was
a scientist from John Hopkins who had just started a research ethics
journal. As part of this program editors of many leading accounting
journals were invited to give their perspectives on the problem of
replication and potential research malfeasance. Of course none thought
there was any problem.
One editor (still an
editor of one of the most prominent journals) responding to the
scientist's contention that the scholarly enterprise is to ultimately
seek knowledge, concurred, but added, (paraphrased, but pretty close)
"An alternative hypothesis is that the academic enterprise is a game
constructed to identify the cleverest people so we know who to give the
money to."
His smirk revealed a great
deal about what he believed to be the silly idea that scholarship was
about knowledge. The reviewer's reply above is evidence that the
hypothesis about an academic game is more believable than one in which
the academic enterprise in accounting has understanding anything as its
objective. And the profession is certainly culpable. It created
professorships and awarded them to the winners of this game. It funded
the JAR conferences. It dropped out of the AAA. This may be because the
profession has never had any great respect for scholarship, at least not
in my lifetime. Medical scholarship is not about creating profit
opportunities for doctors; neither is legal scholarship about creating
profit opportunities for lawyers. Perhaps this is why we now have, as
Ray Chambers opined in his Abacus article in 1999 (just before he passed
away) that we had created vast tomes of incoherent rules "...as if for a
profession of morons."
The shift from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft.
"Notes from the
Underground," by Scott McLemee, Inside Higher Ed, January 18, 2006
---
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2006/01/18/mclemee
“Knowledge and competence
increasingly developed out of the internal dynamics of
esoteric disciplines rather than within the context of
shared perceptions of public needs,” writes Bender.
“This is not to say that professionalized disciplines or
the modern service professions that imitated them became
socially irresponsible. But their contributions to
society began to flow from their own self-definitions
rather than from a reciprocal engagement with general
public discourse.”
Now, there is a definite note of sadness in Bender’s
narrative – as there always tends to be in accounts of
the shift from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft.
Yet it is also clear that the
transformation from civic to disciplinary
professionalism was necessary.
“The new disciplines offered
relatively precise subject matter and procedures,”
Bender concedes, “at a time when both were greatly
confused. The new professionalism also promised
guarantees of competence — certification — in an era
when criteria of intellectual authority were vague and
professional performance was unreliable.”
But in the epilogue to
Intellect and Public Life, Bender suggests that the
process eventually went too far. “The risk now is
precisely the opposite,” he writes. “Academe is
threatened by the twin dangers of fossilization and
scholasticism (of three types: tedium, high tech, and
radical chic). The agenda for the next decade, at least
as I see it, ought to be the opening up of the
disciplines, the ventilating of professional communities
that have come to share too much and that have become
too self-referential.”
The above quotation does not contain beginning and ending parts of
the article
I loved the Marx Brothers
Analogy in This One: It shows what happens when government runs a business
"Is This Any Way to Run a Railroad? You think you've got problems?
Amtrak's got an overpaid workforce. Its trains and tracks are falling
apart. Worse, the carrier's balance sheet is a flat-out mess," by John
Goff, CFO Magazine,
November 2005 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/5077873/c_5101083?f=magazine_featured
As Marx Brothers movies go,
Go West isn't much. The aging comedy team was running out of ideas, and
it shows: the plot is predictable and the gags are stale.
Yet
there is one memorable scene in the 1940 film.
In it, the boys — desperate to keep a steam-powered locomotive chugging
along — feed the entire train to itself, car by car, piece by piece,
caboose to tender.
Management at the National
Railroad Passenger Corp., better known as Amtrak, performed a similar
sacrifice in 2001. Four years into an effort to wean itself from federal
operating subsidies, the rail carrier was running on empty. Executives
had already started diverting funds earmarked for capital projects to
help plug operating holes. But even that wasn't enough, and soon,
Amtrak's management began cannibalizing the railroad. Recalls Cliff
Black, Amtrak's director of media relations: "We mortgaged everything."
Things got so bad that the
railroad took out a loan on New York's Pennsylvania Station to cover
three months of expenses. It was a move the U.S. Office of Management
and Budget called "a financial absurdity equivalent to a family taking
out a second mortgage on its home to pay its grocery bills." Eventually,
Amtrak conceded it couldn't break even, and Congress continued pumping
funds back into the rail operator.
The damage to the balance
sheet had been done, however. During the five-year plan, the carrier's
debt load nearly tripled, from $1.7 billion to $4.8 billion. Once dubbed
the "Glide Path to Profitability," Amtrak's intended march to
self-sufficiency is termed something else by current CFO David Smith. "I
call it the slippery slope to hell," he says.
Since taking the reins last
November, Smith has personally spent considerable time in purgatory —
stuck awaiting vital federal funding for the carrier while politicians
dither over the future of passenger rail service. "Amtrak's never had
full support from any Administration. And it has no ongoing real capital
budget," notes James Coston, chairman of Corridor Capital LLC, which
specializes in finance and development for intercity and commuter rail
systems. "So each year, they go up to Capitol Hill with a tin cup."
And that cup remains far
from full. Last February, for example, the White House announced it
intended to cut off Amtrak's billion-dollar-plus annual subsidy — which
covers about half the railroad's total budget — unless the carrier
agreed to a radical restructuring. Both the House and the Senate defied
the Administration, calling for subsidies ranging from $1.17 billion to
$1.45 billion for 2006 (the carrier generated $1.9 billion in revenues
last year against $2.9 billion in costs). But the details have yet to be
ironed out, and it's still unclear just how much money Amtrak will get.
Amid the revenue
uncertainty, Smith must somehow pay down Amtrak's borrowings, upgrade
its information technology and financial skills, and wring concessions
from entrenched unions. He is also charged with mapping out long-term
capital investments on the railroad's antiquated infrastructure — a tall
order when you don't actually know what funds will be available to
finance the repairs. And he must do all this under the scrutiny of an
Administration whose purported goal, says Amtrak president and CEO David
Gunn, is "to destroy Amtrak."
It is, in sum, a nearly
impossible to-do list. But judging from his efforts so far, Smith has
what it takes to defy long odds: steadiness, belief, and a certain
imperviousness to the Coliseum crowd. Some observers say his first year
on the job could be used as a case study for grace under fire. Says
Coston: "I can't imagine a tougher job than being CFO at Amtrak."
December 5, 2005 reply from Paul Williams
Bob, Come on! This kind of argument is unfair. You
sound like the folks at Rochester. Outcomes I like I attribute to market
forces and the private sector; outcomes I don't like are the fault of
government meddling. I defy anyone to draw a line that demarcates private
from public outcomes. The intertwining of government and economics is today
the same as it has always been. Abandoning the messy world of political
economy for the mathematically elegant imaginary world of mere economics
makes for a nice living for a lot of mathematicians. Since my paycheck is
drawn on the account of the State of North Carolina I am legally a
government employee. NC State's Centennial Campus is living testament to the
impossibility, in a meaningful scientific sense (as opposed to a rhetorical
sense), of the distinction between pubic and private. All that exists are
organizations within a context of constraints and incentives mutually
determined by economic, political, and social forces (if force is the right
metaphor).
Paul Williams
paul_williams@ncsu.edu
(919)515-4436
December 6, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen
From the KPMG Audit Report on September 30, 2004
--- http://www.amtrak.com/pdf/04financial.pdf The Company (Amtrak) has a
history of substantial operating losses and is highly dependent upon
substantial Federal government subsidies to sustain its operations. There
are currently no Federal government subsidies authorized or appropriated for
any period subsequent to the fiscal year ending September 30, 2005 (“fiscal
year 2005”). Without such subsidies, Amtrak will not be able to continue to
operate in its current form and significant operating changes, restructuring
or bankruptcy may occur. Such changes or restructuring would likely result
in asset impairments.
************************
I guess I have to agree Paul that the difference
between Amtrak and other businesses, like farmers, dependent upon government
subsidies is largely semantic (rhetorical). In a sense, Amtrak is less like
Fanny Mae since Amtrak's debt is not guaranteed by the Federal government.
It is also less like the U.S. Post Office since Amtrak did sell equity (that
has nearly been wiped out by huge deficits). Like the Post Office, Amtrak
does negotiate directly with the government for appropriations to a
particular business. But unlike the Post Office, I think Amtrak can set
prices without an act of Congress.
The lines are indeed fuzzy between government
enterprises, private enterprises directly subsidized, private enterprises
indirectly subsidized, and the theoretical private firms that have no
government subsidies. There may not be any such private firms in modern
times since nearly every product or service is indirectly subsidized
somewhere along the supply chain.
One possible distinction between public and private
enterprises is whether the government is obligated to pay creditors off in
full if the enterprise fails. I gather that this is the case for NC state
universities, the U.S. Post Office, and Fannie Mae (even though Fanny Mae
also sells equity shares). Debt guarantees are not assured in the case of
Amtrak such that Amtrak is closer to being private in this context. In this
context, classifying public versus private enterprises becomes a sliding
scale as to what portion of the debt is guaranteed by the government.
Pension guarantees cloud this issue since these are a form of insurance that
enterprises must buy into to become partly covered.
I'm not certain where your argument bears much
fruit if we don't have some distinction between public and private. If
subsidies make every enterprise a government enterprise, wouldn't all
businesses become government enterprises? It would not be helpful to have no
definition of private enterprise since many equity owners and creditors can
still fail and do every day in firms where the government does not guarantee
repayment of all debt.
One problem of debt guarantees like we have in
Fanny Mae and the Post Office is that managers of those companies can be
tempted put their companies in extremely high levels of debt risk because
creditors are always willing to loan to the hilt if the government
guarantees repayment. Then cowboy managers
might be tempted to borrow great amounts to pay for highly inefficient
operating costs or make extremely high risk investments (as Fannie Mae did
with billions invested in losing manufactured housing mortgages).
When I started this thread I mistakenly thought
that Amtrak's debt was guaranteed by the government. What amazes me is how
Amtrak is still able to borrow money to finance losing operations. Creditors
(who are largely in Canada and France) must have faith that the U.S.
government will not allow Amtrak to fail in spite of Amtrak's bleak future
for ever earning a profit. Apparently the close association of Amtrak and
government make it not like Penn Central in the eyes of lenders.
A huge corporate finance textbook
From Jim Mahar's Blog on October 17, 2005 ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
Vernimmen.com ---
http://vernimmen.com/
What a great site!
When I was gone I received a message from the
authors of Corporate Finance by Vernimmen, Quiry, Le Fur, and Salvi.
The book, newsletter, and website are all very
interesting and useful.
The book is 48 chapters (about 1000 pages) full of
corporate finance. I have to agree with the authors "It is a book in which
theory and practice are constantly set off against each other...."
I really like it. Especially the emphasis not so
much on techniques ("which tend to shift and change over time."
VERY WELL DONE!
Moreover, the authors also put out a monthly
newsletter and have a web site that could stand alone as one of the best in
the business.
Vernimmen.com ---
http://vernimmen.com/
Jensen Comment:
Perhaps intermediate accounting textbooks will one day follow this lead of
contrasting theory and practice.
Accentuate the Obvious
Not every scientist can discover the double helix, or
the cellular basis of memory, or the fundamental building blocks of matter. But
fear not. For those who fall short of these lofty goals, another entry in the
"publications" section of the ol' c.v. is within your reach. The proliferation
of scientific journals and meetings makes it possible to publish or present
papers whose conclusion inspires less "Wow! Who would have guessed?" and more
"For this you got a Ph.D.?" In what follows (with thanks to colleagues who
passed along their favorites), names have been withheld to protect the silly.
Sharon Begley, "Scientists Research Questions Few Others Would Bother to Ask,"
The Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2005; Page B1 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB111715390781744684,00.html
Jensen Comment: Although some of the studies Begley cites are
well-intended, her article does remind me of some of the more extreme studies
that won Senator Proxmire's Golden Fleece Awards ---
http://www.taxpayer.net/awards/goldenfleece/about.htm
Also see
http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/G/GoldenF1l.asp
Accounting research in top accounting journals seldom is not so much a fleecing
as it is a disappointment in drawing "obvious" conclusions that practicing
accountants "would not bother to ask." Behavioral studies focus on what
can be studied rather than what is interesting to study. Studies based on
analytical mathematics often start with assumptions that guarantee the outcomes.
And capital markets event studies either "discover" the obvious or are
inconclusive.
A Populist Movement in Accounting Research
At the
2005 American Accounting Association meetings in San Francisco, the 2005-2006
President, Judy Rayburn from the University of Minnesota, gave a luncheon speech
about the State of the AAA. The AAA is not in the best of shape and comparisons
are made with other academic associations in business studies such as finance
and management.
What is
especially interesting is the current populist movement going on in the AAA. It
is built upon the argument that the AAA journals and meeting programs became too
detached from the accounting profession and problems within the profession.
There is a strong movement rising to change the editorial biases of the AAA’s
top journals that have been tightly controlled by positivists demanding great
rigor in empirical and analytical studies. One problem is that such demands for
rigor have limited researchers to rather uninteresting problems that derive
outcomes of little surprise or interest. In many respects there is a current
populist movement with respect to the entire academic tenure and performance
evaluation process. You can read a bit more about this at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
August 23, 2005 message from Tracey Sutherland
[tracey@AAAHQ.ORG]
Given the lively discussion about Judy Rayburn's
luncheon talk in San Francisco, I thought some would be interested in her
PowerPoint slides which are posted on the AAA website -- you'll find them at
http://aaahq.org/AM2005/menu.htm . It was
great to see many of you at the Annual Meeting -- special thanks to folks
for discussing ideas for some of the teaching/learning related sessions
developed by the VP for Education -- a session on using games in teaching
accounting was an outcome of conversations on AECM.
Best regards, Tracey
Jensen Comment: Katherine Schipper's Presidential Lecture slides are
also available"
I suspect the AAA is holding off on Denny Beresford's speech until it is determined if
Accounting Horizons is going to publish his paper.
Cynthia Cooper’s plenary speech on Wednesday is proprietary and will not be
published by the AAA. You can, however, find some of her remarks in various
places if you run a search on Google. There is a basketball star by that same
name, so I suggest you run the search on “Cooper” AND “Worldcom”.
Cooper was one of Time Magazine's 2002 "Persons of the Year" ---
http://www.time.com/time/personoftheyear/2002/
Also see
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m4153/is_6_60/ai_111737943
August 23 reply from Ken Crofts
[kcrofts@CSU.EDU.AU]
Judy Rayburn’s slides . . . are also interesting,
particularly drop in membership of AAA over the years.
Ken
The philosophy of science is a dying discipline
The philosophy of science is a dying discipline in part because it added
philosophical terminology and discourse that did not have enough value added to
scientists themselves as they got on with the work at hand, particularly social
scientists.
Social scientists have moved on from debates over the scientific paradigm. I
highly recommend examining how sociologists now proceed without getting all hung
up on positivist or anti-positivist dogma ---
http://www.trinity.edu/mkearl/methods.html#ms
I particularly like the following quotation from the above document:
Methodology
entails the procedures by which social research, whether quantitative and
qualitative, are conducted and ultimately evaluated--in other words, how
one's hypotheses are tested. Getting more specific, researchers'
methodologies guide them in defining, collecting, organizing, and
interpreting their data. Often the major breakthroughs in our understanding
of social processes occur because of the novelty of the data used, the
techniques by which it is gathered, or by the model or question directing
its acquisition and/or interpretation. And let's hear it for the findings
that don't support the hypotheses at the
Journal of Articles in
Support of the Null Hypothesis and in the
Index of Null Effects and
Replication Failures.
Defining one's
data: Precisely how does one go about and measure such theoretical
concepts as altruistic behavior, esprit de corps, or anomie? Even such
apparent "no brainers" as religiosity, happiness, or social class reveal how
methodological adequacy and validity are a function of the clarity of one's
theory and its part. Further, theory tends to be built into our measurement
tools. When, for instance, one measures temperature with a thermometer it
is not the temperature per se that one sees but rather a phenomenon
(mercury rising within a column) theoretically related to it.
For
strategies for data collection see Bill Trochim's
Research
Methods Tutorials, including material on:
Thinking
about using the web for conducting a survey? Available online is Matthias
Schonlau, Ronald D. Fricker, Jr., and Marc N. Elliott's
Conducting Research Surveys via E-mail and the Web.
August 22, 2005 reply from Paul
Williams at North Carolina State University
To add a bit more
to Michael, Ron, and Bob's comments: Even Popper, by the time he died wasn't
a Popperian, but an evolutionary epistimologist. Even he had to recognize
the implications of the linguistic turn and, particularly, Paul Feyerabend's
(a student of Popper) destruction of the pretenses of method. Bob is right
that philosophy of science is a dead horse replaced by a sociology and
history of science. Even scientists don't follow the scientific method.
Underlying every theory are propositions that don't enter into the specific
experiment or hypothesis being tested. I am with Ron, and many others, that
rigor is not obtained by running experiments within the context of a theory
that has absolutely pernicious underlying presuppostions.
Capital market theory and principal/agent theory are such theories.
The pernicious underlying proposition that is both empirically false (as
evolutionary biologists and anthropologists have provided ample evidence of
the kind you would consider rigorous) and morally repugnant is that of
humans' nature. What we in accounting seem never to consider is what
ramifications such presuppositions have for the very culture in which we
live. As Ed Arrington labeled it, Watts and Zimmerman are merely Hobbes in
drag. Hobbesian human nature was constructed to argue for Leviathan -- self-
government is beyond the ken of humans engaged in a war of all against all.
Certainly a libertarian philosophy is untenable in a Hobbesian world.
Solipsistic, vicious self-maximizers. The
project of the Scottish Enlightenment (of which Thomas Jefferson was a
diligent student) was to produce a human being who was capable of being free
of the rule of Kings or absolute sovereigns.
Jagdish provided
us a reference to Sumantra Ghoshal's article "Bad Management Theories Are
Destroying Good Management Practices." The bad management theories he speaks
of are those of agency theory. Why accounting should have been preoccupied
for the last 35 years in substance testing a theory of human nature is one
of the great mysteries. Principal/agent theory is a bad theory based on its
own empirical pretensions. What kind of Rsquares have we produced? Most of
human behavior is left unexplained by the theory. And after this last stock
market bubble, does anyone seriously believe in capital market efficiency?
How good a
"scientific" theory do you have when after 40 years of testing you are still
back at square one? And if capital markets aren't efficient, what does that
do to the 30 years of "information content" studies predicated on the
assumption that markets were at least semi-strong efficient? Let me ask this
question, of you and everyone else: How much of what you believe do you
believe on the basis of the "empirical evidence?" Very little. Indeed,
believing you are a Popperian is a belief not based on empirical evidence.
No one did an experiment and proved that Popper was
right.
But what makes capital market theory and principal agent theory bad is what
it forces me to believe about myself and Michael and Ron and You, which I
will not, nor do I have to, accept. To quote from Michael Shermer's The
Science of Good and Evil: "Still, something profound happened in the last
100,000 years that made us -- and no other species -- moral animals to a
degree unprecedented in nature (p. 31)." Accounting is a human practice.
It's objects are not atoms, or quarks, or stars, or planets. It's objects
are also its subjects (the double hermeneutic that our physicists friends
don't have to deal with). A human practice that investigates itself as if
human capacities are as impoverished as neo-classicists would have us
believe they are (both in terms of doing good and evil) might be missing
something exceedingly important to it.
Kurt Kleiner, "Most scientific papers are probably wrong," New
Scientist, August 30, 2005 ---
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7915&feedId=online-news_rss091
Most published scientific research papers are
wrong, according to a new analysis. Assuming that the new paper is itself
correct, problems with experimental and statistical methods mean that there
is less than a 50% chance that the results of any randomly chosen scientific
paper are true.
John Ioannidis, an epidemiologist at the University
of Ioannina School of Medicine in Greece, says that small sample sizes, poor
study design, researcher bias, and selective reporting and other problems
combine to make most research findings false. But even large, well-designed
studies are not always right, meaning that scientists and the public have to
be wary of reported findings.
"We should accept that most research findings will
be refuted. Some will be replicated and validated. The replication process
is more important than the first discovery," Ioannidis says.
In the paper, Ioannidis does not show that any
particular findings are false. Instead, he shows statistically how the many
obstacles to getting research findings right combine to make most published
research wrong.
Massaged conclusions Traditionally a study is said
to be "statistically significant" if the odds are only 1 in 20 that the
result could be pure chance. But in a complicated field where there are many
potential hypotheses to sift through - such as whether a particular gene
influences a particular disease - it is easy to reach false conclusions
using this standard. If you test 20 false hypotheses, one of them is likely
to show up as true, on average.
Odds get even worse for studies that are too small,
studies that find small effects (for example, a drug that works for only 10%
of patients), or studies where the protocol and endpoints are poorly
defined, allowing researchers to massage their conclusions after the fact.
Surprisingly, Ioannidis says another predictor of
false findings is if a field is "hot", with many teams feeling pressure to
beat the others to statistically significant findings.
But Solomon Snyder, senior editor at the
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, and a neuroscientist at
Johns Hopkins Medical School in Baltimore, US, says most working scientists
understand the limitations of published research.
"When I read the literature, I'm not reading it to
find proof like a textbook. I'm reading to get ideas. So even if something
is wrong with the paper, if they have the kernel of a novel idea, that's
something to think about," he says.
Journal reference: Public Library of Science
Medicine (DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124)
Jensen Comment: By analogy, this is a black eye against top accounting
research journals that refuse to publish replication studies. It is a special
problem for accounting behavior studies where sample sizes and validity are
enormous problems. It may be less of a problem in capital market studies where
sample sizes are often huge. But problems of poor study design and missing
variables in models are an enormous in accounting research that tries to be
scientific.
Always subject a research conclusion to the so-what
test! Even without technical skills you often can question that which your
common sense tells you is not correct, although you may have to endure slings
and arrows of paranoids in doing so. Sometimes a child's question is the best
kind of question ---
http://imagine.gsfc.nasa.gov/docs/ask_astro/answers/011021a.html
Never be overwhelmed by CAPM studies. The CAPM is such
a simplified model (reducing market risk to one index) that most studies based
on CAPM are probably correct versus incorrect by sheer chance. The problem with
multiple-index models, in turn, is that there are all sorts of specification
problems due missing variables and other things such as the following:
multicollinearity (http://seamonkey.ed.asu.edu/~alex/computer/sas/collinear.html
),
homoscedasticity (
http://davidmlane.com/hyperstat/A121947.html ),
nonstationarity (http://sepwww.stanford.edu/oldsep/matt/sdi/nstat/Fig/paper_html/node1.html)
And there are many other problems that editors often
overlook among "members of the club."
One common problem in our studies that have huge sample
sizes is that statistical inference is nonsense. For example, suppose that we
sample 50,000 men and 50,000 women to see if there is a difference in IQ.
Infinitesmal differences may be deemed "statistically significant." I once had
to critique a paper by a renowned researcher in accounting who somehow just did
not understand this problem with large samples.
Year 2005 American Accounting Association Annual Meeting in San Francisco
August 5-10, 2005
The AAA meetings were very good this year except for the first plenary
session. Bravo to Tracie, Dee, and their helpers for great logistics. The Hilton
did a great job. Bravo to Jane and her helpers for a great program.
I think Katherine's plenary (Tuesday) session on disclosures will be
posted by the AAA. Katherine made reference to quite a lot of academic
research. She might also make her PowerPoint file available at the FASB.
I hope the AAA will also post Denny's terrific luncheon speech. If not, I
think Denny will share it in some way with all of us on the AECM.
A highlight of the meetings for me was the XBRL workshop conducted by
Glen, Roger, and Skip. Eric Cohen also participated with a great demo of
Rivet Software's Dragon Tag software which finally makes it possible to
teach XBRL hands on to students.
Another highlight was the great debate between Katherine Schipper (for
fair value accounting) versus more negative positions taken by Ross Watts
and Zoe-Vanna Palmrose. All three did a great (actually unforgettable) job
on Monday afternoon.
This 2005 AAA meeting set a record with nearly 2,700 registrations plus
over 500 registered guests. This topped the previous record which was also
set in San Francisco some years ago. Such a registration number is very high
considering that there are only about 8,000 worldwide members of the AAA ---
http://aaahq.org/about/financials/KeyIndicators8_31_04.PDF
I returned to Trinity University from New Hampshire today. Trinity is
still seeking somebody to fill my chair (the Jesse H. Jones Distinguished
Professor of Business Chair) after I retire in May 2006. Anyone interested
in applying should contact Dan Walz at 210-999-7289 or dwalz@trinity.edu I
am very grateful to have had the privilege to fill it for 24 years.
Life is good!
August 13, 2005 reply from Glen Gray
[glen.gray@CSUN.EDU]
Gee, thanks for your kind words regarding our
XBRL workshop.
For those who want to know more about XBRL, you
should:
See XBRL cover story in August 2005 Journal of
Accountancy at
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/aug2005/tie.htm
Visit
http://www.xbrl.org
-- includes general and technical information
about XBRL
Check out the 5-years of XBRL abstracts at
http://bryant2.bryant.edu/~xbrl/index.html
Review FAQs at
http://xbrl.edgar-online.com/x/faqs/ , which cover a broad
range of XBRL questions
Visit
http://www.xbrlspy.org/ , a blog-like coverage of XBRL
Check out the free XBRL teaching materials that
will be available (Sept 1) at
www.eycarat.ku.edu/XBRLClassMaterials
Bob Jensen's threads on XBRL are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm#TimelineXBRL
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value reporting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue
August 15, 2005 reply from McCarthy, William
[mccarthy@BUS.MSU.EDU]
I agree that some of the annual meeting
sessions mentioned already were quite good this year, but for me, the
clear highlight of the convention was the policy speech given by new AAA
president Judy Rayburn at the Wednesday luncheon.
Judy made a strong case for expanding the scope
and volume of the AAA journal set by using comparisons to publication
trends and citation trends in management, marketing, and finance. She
also mentioned some specific AAA committee work that was going to assess
these matters. Judy finished by coming down to the floor and answering
all individual questions on rather difficult matters such as the
acceptability of research paradigms from other countries and
disciplines, and the effect of expansion on AAA section journals.
Many attendees did not have a ticket to the
Wednesday luncheon, but I am sure Judy's slides will be made available
to all.
Bill McCarthy
Michigan State
August 15, 2005 reply from Ali Mohammad J. Abdolmohammadi
I agree with Bill. While I found many
presentations to be excellent this year, I was particularly impressed
with Judy Rayburn's luncheon policy speech on Wednesday. I found the
speech to be honest and gutsy. My nonscientific observation of the crowd
was that the speech resonated well with the majority. It'll take a lot
of hard work to make serious changes to the current publication culture
of AAA journals, but it is well worth trying.
Ali Mohammad J. Abdolmohammadi, DBA, CPA
http://web.bentley.edu/empl/a/mabdolmohamm/
John E. Rhodes Professor of Accounting
Bentley College
175 Forest Street
Waltham, MA 02452
Fraudulent Conferences that Rip Off Colleges: Do you
really want to participate in these frauds?
I've written about this before, but I want to elaborate. Academics
either unwittingly or willingly sometimes allow themselves to get caught up in
fraudulent "conferences." Spam is on the rise for these frauds. The
degree of fraudulence varies. At worst, there is no conference and
organizers merely charge an exorbitant fee that allows the paper to be
"refereed" and published in a conference proceedings, thereby giving a
professor a "publication." See
http://lists.village.virginia.edu/lists_archive/Humanist/v18/0633.html
Even when the conferences meet, they may be fraudulent.
Generally these conferences are held in places where professors like to travel
in Europe, South America, Latin America, Las Vegas, Canada, the Virgin Islands,
or other nice locations for vacations that accompany a trip to a conference paid
for by a professor's employer. The professor gets credit for a
presentation and possibly a publication in the conference proceedings.
But wait a minute! Here are some warning signs for a
fraudulent conference:
-
Even though there is a high registration fee, there are no
conference-hosted receptions, luncheons, or plenary sessions. The
conference organizer is never called to account for the high registration
fee. The organizer may allude to the cost of meeting rooms in a hotel,
but often the meeting rooms are free as long as the organizer can guarantee
a minimum number of guests who will pay for rooms in the hotel.
-
All or nearly all submissions are accepted for presentation.
-
The only participants in most presentation audiences are
generally other presenters assigned to make a presentation in the same time
slot. There is virtually no non-participating audience. Hence
only a few people are in the room and each of them take turns making a
presentation. Most are looking at their watches and hoping to get out
of the room as soon as possible.
-
Presenters present their papers and then disappear for the
rest of the conference. There is virtually no interaction among all
conference presenters.
-
The papers presented are often journal rejects that are
cycled conference after conference if the professor can find a conference
that will accept anything submitted on paper. Check the dates on the
references listed for each paper. Chances are the papers have few if
any references from the current decade.
-
These conferences are almost always held in popular tourist
locations and are often scheduled between semesters for the convenience of
adding vacation time to the trip. They are especially popular in the
summer.
Bob Jensen's threads on various types of fraud in academe are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm
August 17, 2005 reply from Jagdish Patha
Bob:
I was about to be fleeced by one such conference
cheat claiming himself some Dr.----. generally organizes conferences at
almost all the exotic locations of US, Cancun, Venice etc. This organizer
double blind peer reviewed my submission (almost 35-40 pages) within 52
hours! Asked for per page charges if required to be placed in "proceedings"
which happens to be a CD-ROM. This organizer has also got 4-5 journals which
can ultimately accommodate any paper written from any angle of any sphere of
business. You may get into any journal of your choice which will claim to be
"double blind peer reviewed'!
I wish there should be some agency of regulators
who can tame them. These people are bogus, there conferences are bogus and
often I feel that what will be the face of a person who will come out and
claim a paper presented and published in such bogus outlet to be considered
suitable for tenure and promotion!
Jagdish Pathak, PhD
Guest Editor- Managerial Auditing Journal (Special Issue)
Associate Professor of Accounting & Systems Accounting & Finance Area
Odette School of Business
University of Windsor 401 Sunset Windsor, N9B 3P4, ON Canada
August 17, 2005 reply from David Albrecht
My answer is at the bottom of the paper, but please
read my supporting argument.
Generally speaking I am not in favor of my
department funding conference presentations for other faculty. I just don't
think much is gained from it, and it is a very expensive CV line. I'd say
that a lot of sponsored conferences haven't distinguished themselves from
the rip-offs. However, the research-oriented faculty at my school are funded
to attend conferences and conference presentations are the name of the game.
So like it or not, I have to play the game.
But are quality conferences, such as AAA
conferences, a rip-off? Is the phrase quality conference an oxymoron for the
AAA? Here's my experience at the recent AAA in San Francisco. Tell me what
you think.
I'm really upset with people making presentations,
but then refusing by their actions to share their paper with members of the
audience. I attended research presentations at eight of the nine time slots
in SF, and tried to surf over to a simultaneous session a couple of times.
In all of the sessions I attended, only 2 of 30 presenters had copies of the
paper to distribute. The responsible presenters (both in education-related
sessions) were Freddie Choo and the co-authoring team of Elizabeth Haywood,
Dorothy McMullen and Donald Wygal. In the non-education related sessions I
attended, there were no available copies of any paper. I then had to
approach each presenter afterward and ask for a copy of the paper to be sent
to me (seems reasonable that they would be available, as the papers had to
be submitted 8-9 months in advance). Not one of the non-education presenters
has sent anything to me. This is my usual experience. A few years ago I
asked for a copy of a conference paper, and was assured that I would be sent
one. Stereotypically, I received an e-mail two years later informing me that
the paper was now available in some journal's most recent edition, and I was
free to track it down. Of course, I was thanked for my interest in the
paper.
Most of the time when someone says that I will sent
a copy of the paper, it is an empty promise apparently designed to get rid
of me. I hardly ever get one.
If one of the purposes of the AAA is to share
research, then why are most of the presenters so proprietary and reluctant
to share details? I don't think that much knowledge is shared when a
presenter makes a very brief presentation using ineffective public speaking
methods and then has no copy of the paper to share.
I've attended three conferences so far this year,
two of which I had to pay for myself. In the Ohio AAA regional (BGSU paid
for this one) there were no copies available, but Tim Fogarty was very good
in sending me a copy of each of his papers presented. I learned so much from
actually reading the papers. At a second conference, I think I was the only
presenter at the conference to bring copies for attendees. I asked a few
people for a copy his/her paper, but I have yet to be sent one. In the third
conference, the SF AAA, I haven't received any requested papers from any
concurrent session presenter* except for Tom Buttross, and his paper is
education-related.
The teaching-related forums put on by the T&C
section (the best section of the AAA, IMHO) were good, and it's my guess
that about 20% had some write-up or paper to share at the forums. I picked
up material there from Torben Thomson, the co-authoring team of Graeme Dean,
Sandra Van Der Laan and Cameron Esslemont, the co-authoring team of Patsy
Lee, Cheryl Prachyl and Carol Sullivan, the team of Gary Siegel & Gail
Kucuiba, the team of Paul Mihalek, Milo Peck and Patricia Poli, the team of
Elsie Ameen, Daryl Guffey and Cynthia Jackson, the team of Violet Rogers and
Aileen Smith, the team of Michael Garner, Karen Papke-Shields, Ellen
Pettingill and Denise Rotondo, and the sole author Christie Johnson. Well,
maybe the rate is closer to 10%.
Following the conference, I've received materials
from teaching forum participants George Schmelzle, Wendy Tietz, Gail Kucuiba,
Yan Bao and Angela Lee. If I've misclassified anyone, I'm sorry.
My point is, the lid seems to be open for people
eager to share their teaching ideas, but when it comes to the
research-oriented presenters I'm SOL. Ironic, given that the major reason I
attended AAA was to get caught up on financial reporting and auditing
research ideas. Oh, I got my money's worth from the people mentioned above
(as well as Thomas Calderon and Denny Beresford), but I really wish the
conference would have been more research-oriented.
So, are AAA conferences rip-offs? Not entirely, but
pretty much so. And since I spend my own money to attend them, I'm much less
likely to attend one in the future.
David Albrecht
August 17, 2005 reply from Amy Dunbar
[Amy.Dunbar@BUSINESS.UCONN.EDU]
David,
Although I agree that a paper should be available
to you, I do not agree that the paper should be available in paper form.
Rather, the links to the papers should be provided by the author. Requiring
the author to haul papers to the conference is unreasonable, imo, but I
think the authors should provide a handout with the title of the paper, the
abstract, author information, and a link to the paper. As Bob Jensen
mentioned in an earlier posting, an author can easily put a file on his/her
web server. Personally, I would prefer to see links to the papers on an
electronic version of the AAA program, but many argue that such availability
could be construed to be a “publication” of the paper. I find this reasoning
suspect because no one has a problem with SSRN postings.
I missed this AAA conference for the first time in
years, and I really regret not being able to go. I find the meetings very
useful, not only for the various sessions, but also from a networking
perspective. This year, I heard there were also excellent CPE sessions. Far
from being a “rip-off,” the AAA annual meeting is a valuable resource that
takes incredible time on the part of the faculty volunteers who organize
that meeting with the help of the AAA staff.
Amy Dunbar
UConn
August 18, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi David,
Although I disagree with the general negativism of your opinions about
the AAA annual meetings, I will begin with one item of support. Years
ago when these meetings were held in San Diego, a CD recording company
recorded every session (concurrent sessions to panel discussions to
luncheons to plenary sessions). The company had a booth were
participants could buy the CD after each session at a rather modest cost
The sad part was that there was almost no demand to buy the CDs, especially
the CDs from the research presentation sessions. The reasons for this
are unknown. My own conclusion is that this is no fault of the AAA.
The problem is accounting research itself. Most of it is just not very
interesting whether or not it is presented at an AAA meeting.
The CD recording company lost a bundle on this venture and since then no
effort is made to record AAA meeting sessions other than occasional plenary
and luncheon sessions that are captured by the AAA itself on video as part
of the projection system for large audiences.
There is a general lack of interest in accounting research. Amy
mentioned the SSRN working paper series ---
http://www.ssrn.com/ . The big sellers in SSRN are economics and finance
papers. Demand for accounting research is dismal, especially when you
factor out those papers billed as accounting papers that are economics
research papers in accounting clothing. I can't get the ranking system
to work this morning, but the last time I looked there was not a single
accounting paper in the SSRN listing of top downloads ---
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/topten/topTenResults.cfm?groupingtype=3&groupingId=1
I discuss problems with accounting research at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
The biggest problem is that our accounting journals themselves do not even
judge it worthy to publish research replications. If our
findings were really of interest our journals would be like science journals
that actively seek out replications of findings in science.
Your comments focus on whether the benefit of sending a professor to the
AAA meetings justifies the cost. If we had interactive
teleconferencing or Webcasting of sessions available, perhaps you would be
correct in terms of the sessions themselves. But this fails to weigh
in the many other benefits of the AAA meetings, benefits that include the
following:
- Networking, especially encounters with old and new friends. A
scheduled or chance encounter during the meetings often changes the
entire career path of a professor, especially in terms of relocation.
Many of my best friends and correspondents over my entire career came
from encounters at AAA meetings. My close relationship with Amy
Dunbar began when she was in one of my CEP technology sessions years ago
at an AAA meeting. Subsequently she became a presenter in some of
my annual programs. My close relationship with Denny goes clear
back when he was still an Ernst and Ernst Research Partner who attended
every AAA annual meeting --- I'm talking almost 100 years ago.
- Interfacing of academia with the public accounting profession, the
business community, the publishers, the technology vendors, and the
professional associations like the AICPA, IMA, IIA, Certified Fraud
Examiners, and others. We also have interfacing with members of
the various section groupings such as the Teaching and Curriculum
Section.
- Interfacing between U.S. accounting professors and international
accounting professors. The AAA annual meetings are probably the
main reason why the AAA has become the leading international society for
accounting educators and researchers. Partly because the 2005
meetings were in San Francisco, the registration of Asian accounting
educators was especially high and contributed to the record setting
number of registrations.
- Serendipitous discovery of a research idea or teaching tool.
An immense amount of communication takes place at these meetings.
We get many course and curriculum changes throughout the world from
these meetings.
- Discovery of new textbooks and other teaching/learning aids,
especially the opportunity to fiddle around with new software that
vendors have set up on computers in the booths.
- The opportunity to question authors and presenters. The amount
of time allotted to this varies from session to session, but I certainly
asked some questions and got some good and bad answers. It also
helps to listen to the answers given to questions raised by other people
in the audience.
- The opportunity to present your own research or teaching ideas.
Your comments are all taken from the viewpoint of somebody in the
audience. Why did you not try to get on the program or made a CEP
presentation? Perhaps you should propose a session devoted to how
to improve the AAA meetings!
- The opportunity to vent frustrations. This has taking place
especially with gender issues and public interest accounting, and the
sessions that I attended in these areas have gotten better and better
each year. A public interest presentation by Carol Lawrence on on
Monday afternoon will stick in my mind the rest of my life. It was
entitled "Art and Semiotics: Signs, Symbols, Smoke, and Mirrors."
- I might add that Carol's presentation was a highly visual
presentation that would be very hard to present in a hard copy paper.
It could be done in video, which is one of the many reasons why I video
most sessions that I attend. There are sometimes presentations
that just cannot be captured in hard copy. I
have hundreds of video tapes of AAA meeting sessions that I've captured
over the years. I plan to donate these to the video
archives at the University of Mississippi in the near future. An
interesting research topic for some of you might be to examine these
tapes in an effort to determine what constitutes a bad presentation
versus a good presentation. I have filmed scores of both types of
presentations. (The University of Mississippi now has the largest
archive of accounting history in the world, including the recent gift of
the entire AICPA library).
I think you're asking too much in benefits from of the AAA meetings.
Such meetings serve many audiences from Glendale Community College to Ivy
League research centers. Such meetings serve many interests from
teaching ideas to empirical/analytical research methods to issues of great
concern in accountancy and business in the real world (that "other world").
Such meetings serve many audiences from the U.S. to Europe, to India, to
Africa, to Russia to Japan to China to Kangaroo and Kiwi lands.
All we can expect from the AAA meetings are peep holes to opportunities,
knowledge, and happenings in our corner on the world of teaching and
research and professional practice.
Lastly David, I might add that the annual AAA meetings pass the market
test. Thousands of people would not take the time, trouble, and cost to
come to these meetings from all over the world if they were not serving an
important purpose. You have every right to protest in an effort to make the
meetings better. However, I’m afraid that you must first demonstrate how to
make accounting research itself better.
Bob Jensen
August 18, 2005 reply from Ruth Bender
[r.bender@CRANFIELD.AC.UK]
The European Accounting Association has the papers
available for download from its website before the conference and for a week
after the conference has ended. My experience was that about 90% of what I
wanted was available, and a couple of other authors who I emailed for papers
were happy to oblige. Likewise, when I was emailed for a paper about a month
after the conference, I sent it by return.
The great advantage of having downloads available
before the conference was that it meant that the discussion at sessions
could be a bit better informed.
Mind you, I do wish you'd stop putting down the
'Fraudulent Conferences'. One of my minor enjoyments on a wet English
morning is looking at that conference email and working out which exotic
locations I could possibly get Cranfield to pay for me to visit :-)
Regards Ruth
Dr Ruth Bender
Cranfield School of Management
Thursday, April 28, 2005
The Chronicle of Higher Education
Business Schools' Focus on Research Has
Ensured Their Irrelevance, Says Scathing Article
By KATHERINE S. MANGAN
Business schools are
"institutionalizing their own irrelevance" by focusing on scientific
research rather than real-life business practices, according to a blistering
critique of M.B.A. programs that will be published today in the May issue of
the Harvard Business Review.
The article, "How Business Schools Lost Their Way,"
was written by Warren G. Bennis and James O'Toole, both prominent professors
at the University of Southern California's Marshall School of Business. Mr.
Bennis is also the founding chairman of the university's Leadership
Institute, and Mr. O'Toole is a research professor at Southern Cal's Center
for Effective Organizations.
Mr. Bennis and Mr. O'Toole conclude that business
schools are too focused on theory and quantitative approaches, and that, as
a result, they are graduating students who lack useful business skills and
sound ethical judgment. The authors call on business schools to become more
like medical and law schools, which treat their disciplines as professions
rather than academic departments, and to expect faculty members to be
practicing members of their professions.
"We cannot imagine a professor of surgery who has
never seen a patient or a piano teacher who doesn't play the instrument, and
yet today's business schools are packed with intelligent, highly skilled
faculty with little or no managerial experience," the two professors write.
"As a result, they can't identify the most important problems facing
executives and don't know how to analyze the indirect and long-term
implications of complex business decisions."
While business deans pay lip service to making
their courses more relevant, particularly when they are trying to raise
money, their institutions continue to promote and award tenure to faculty
members with narrow, scientific specialties, the authors contend.
"By allowing the scientific-research model to drive
out all others, business schools are institutionalizing their own
irrelevance," the authors write.
Most business problems cannot be solved neatly by
applying hypothetical models or formulas, they say. "When applied to
business -- essentially a human activity in which judgments are made with
messy, incomplete, and incoherent data -- statistical and methodological
wizardry can blind rather than illuminate."
Not surprisingly, the head of the association that
accredits business schools in the United States disagrees with the authors'
assessment. John J. Fernandes, president and chief executive officer of
AACSB International: the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of
Business, said most business schools today are making an effort to teach
broad skills that are directly applicable to real-world business practices.
He pointed out that in 2003, the association
updated its accreditation standards to emphasize the teaching of "soft
skills" like ethics and communication, and to require that business schools
assess how well students are learning a broad range of managerial skills.
"I think the authors are looking at a very limited
group of business schools that emphasize research," said Mr. Fernandes.
"Most schools have done an excellent job of producing graduates with a broad
range of skills who can hit the ground running when they're hired."
Mr. Bennis and Mr. O'Toole are not convinced. They
say that business schools, which in the early 20th century had the
reputation of being little more than glorified trade schools, have swung too
far in the other direction by focusing too heavily on research. The shift
began in 1959, they say, when the Ford and Carnegie Foundations issued
scathing reports about the state of business-school research.
While the Southern Cal professors say they do not
favor a return to the trade-school days, they think business schools, and
business professors, have grown too comfortable with an approach that serves
their own needs but hurts students.
"This model gives scientific respectability to the
research they enjoy doing and eliminates the vocational stigma that
business-school professors once bore," the article concludes. "In short, the
model advances the careers and satisfies the egos of the professoriate."
The authors point out a few bright spots in their
otherwise gloomy assessment of M.B.A. education. The business schools at the
University of California at Berkeley and the University of Dallas are among
those that emphasize softer, nonquantifiable skills like ethics and
communication, they write. In addition, some business schools operate their
own businesses, such as the student-run investment fund offered by Cornell
University's S.C. Johnson Graduate School of Management.
Learning at Research Schools
Versus "Teaching Schools"
Versus "Happiness"
With a Side Track into Substance Abuse
If you connect students to the real world, will they be happier?
Somehow it's nice to know that accountancy schools are not alone in this
dilemma!
"If You Teach Them, They Will Be Happy," by Jennifer Epstein, Inside
Higher Ed, June 19, 2007 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/06/19/lawstudents
Law students —
and the lawyers they become — are notoriously unhappy, but
the interests of their professors could make all the
difference in helping them through law school and in
preparing them to be good lawyers.
A study
published this month in the
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
compared recent classes at two law
schools with almost identical average undergraduate
grade-point averages and LSAT scores and found that students
at the school that encouraged its professors to be good
teachers rather than good scholars reported higher levels of
well-being and competence, and scored higher on bar exams.
The
study,
“Understanding the Negative Effects of Legal Education on
Law Students: A Longitudinal Test of Self-Determination
Theory,” was conducted by
Kennon
M. Sheldon, a psychology
professor at the University of Missouri at Columbia, and
Lawrence S. Krieger,
a law professor at Florida State University.
Students at
both law schools entered with similar statistics: average
undergraduate GPAs around 3.4 and LSAT averages near 156.
The schools differed significantly, however, in overall
ranking. Law School 1 (LS1), with a good reputation and an
emphasis on faculty scholarship, ranked in the second tier
(as defined by the study) while Law School 2 (LS2), with an
emphasis on hiring and training faculty to be good teachers,
ranked in the fourth tier.
Twenty-four
percent of the Law School 2 graduates who took the bar exam
in the summer of 2005 had “high” scores above 150, compared
to 14 percent of Law School 1 graduates. Nearly half of Law
School 1’s graduates, meanwhile, had “low” scores – below
130 – on the bar exam, compared with 22 percent of Law
School 2’s graduates. Though the scoring statistics are
representative of each law school overall, rather than just
those students who participated in the study, they are
“strongly suggestive that the teaching and learning at LS2
may be more effective,” the authors wrote.
Krieger, one
of the authors, said in an interview that it was “almost
shocking” to see “how significantly the fourth tier students
outperformed the second tier law students on the bar.” But,
he added, “it makes sense psychologically – the students at
the fourth tier school were happier – and it makes sense
that they would have learned more from better teachers.”
By the third
year of law school, students at Law School 2 reported
significantly higher levels of “subjective well-being,”
autonomy and competence than students at Law School 1.
But
Ann Althouse, a professor at the University of Wisconsin Law
School in Madison said that though it is “intuitively right
that the school that emphasizes teaching is the one with
students who are happier and score better,” those students
may not be better off in the long run.
She said
that if all a law school expects of its faculty is to teach,
then they can “put more time into teaching students to be
lawyers, but not necessarily how to think like lawyers.”
In
February, Althouse, a blogger on law and current events, was
a month-long guest columnist for The New York Times.
In
one column, she wrote that while “law
should connect to the real world … that doesn’t mean we
ought to devote our classes to the personal expression of
law students.”
Rather, she said, law professors should “deny ourselves the
comfort of trying to make [law students] happy and teach
them what they came to learn: how to think like lawyers.”
Continued in article
June 23, 2007 reply from Dan Stone, Univ. of Kentucky
[dstone@UKY.EDU]
Hi all,
Regarding Ken Sheldon
& Lawrence Krieger's law school study
(actually, they have published two studies on this topic: the one that Bob
cites is their second published study.)
Professor Althouse's
assertion that the students at the teaching school may not be learning "how
to think like lawyers" suggests that she has not read this study carefully.
The students at the teaching school were not only happier they also scored
HIGHER on the bar exam. Therefore, unless Professor Althouse argues that the
bar exam doesn't test critical thinking skills her argument doesn't accord
to the data.
So, perhaps one need not be unhappy to be a
competent professional? Perhaps at least some professor-induced suffering
merely creates unhappiness and doesn't improve the quality of the "product"?
Ok, now I am overstepping the data.....
FYI, I saw Ken present this paper a few weeks ago
at the self-determination theory conference and was left wondering if
similar results hold for professional accountancy programs. I chatted with
Ken about this and he is also interested this topic.
Relatedly, there is some evidence that lawyers have
higher alcohol and drug use rates than do some other professionals (though I
can't recall the cites just now).
Best,
Dan Stone
Reply from Bob Jensen
Thank you Dan for that helpful and somewhat personalized reply. Here
are a couple of citations of possible interest with respect to lawyer
substance abuse:
Title: Substance Abuse in Law Schools: A Tool Kit for Law School
Administrators
Authors: Orgena Lewis Singleton JD, Alfred "Cal" Baker L.C.D.C., more...
Publication Date: December 2005, American Bar Association
ISBN: 1-59031-628-2
Topics: Law School, Law Students, Lawyer Assistance Programs, Legal
Education & Admissions to the Bar
URL:
Click Here
Also see "Torts, Trials and ... Treatments," by Elia Powers, Issues in
Higher Ed, January 4, 2007 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/01/04/lawschool
The ABA report argues that the quality of the
legal profession is affected by lawyers who “are impaired as a result of
abuse of alcohol and drugs.” One of the co-authors who spoke at
Wednesday’s meeting in Washington, Cal Baker, is a recent law school
graduate and director of a company that provides chemical dependency
treatments.
Baker, a recovering alcoholic, said alcohol and
drug abuse are the two top problems he sees among law students. (Other
panelists said students often report depression and extreme anxiety, as
well as substance abuse issues. ) He said he would have been unable to
recover from his condition while in school, because nearly all the
planned social activities were centered around bar nights.
One of the largest hurdles, Baker said, is
convincing students that admitting their drinking problems won’t lead to
disciplinary action. Many who have previous alcohol-related citations
are concerned about their professional futures.
Continued in article
I do not know of comparable studies in the accounting profession. I do know
that substance abuse is a problem on two levels for accountants, particularly
auditors who are away from home a lot of the time. At level one is the
professional away from home more than many other professionals. At level two is
the family of a professional who is absent from home much of the time.
Some large CPA firms have hot lines where professionals and their family
members can seek counseling with complete confidentiality and possible
anonymity. These hot lines link directly with medical and family counseling
professionals who are outside the firm itself but are paid by the firm. I'm told
that an overwhelming proportion of the problems dealt with are substance abuse
and troubled family members.
I suspect that these are problems that are not dealt with at all well in our
schools of accountancy. One problem is that we want to attract students to this
profession and do not like to dwell on the dark side of this profession's
troubles. There are substance abuse problems in all professions. It would be
interesting to study whether some professions tend to keep substance abuse
problems in dark closets more than other professions. For example, perhaps there
is more perceived sensitivity among clients/patients who are more afraid of
substance abusers in accounting and medicine relative to law. That is only a
personal observation and not something that I've studied. My guess is that
substance abuse is highest among physicians and highest in terms of keeping
their dependencies secret.
A more general site on substance abuse is provided at
http://www.ndsn.org/links.html
June 25, 2007 reply from Bill Dent
[billdent@tx.rr.com]
Bob—
I don’t know about other states, but the Texas
State Board of Public Accountancy acknowledges the problem as evidenced by
the following link on their website:
http://www.tsbpa.state.tx.us/pi8.htm
Bill Dent
WILLIAM C. DENT, CPA (Retired)
Indirectly this relates to the current accounting doctoral program
controversies described at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
It also relates to the issues of whether it is best to spoon feed students
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/265wp.htm
June 19, 2007 reply from J. S. Gangolly
[gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
Bob,
In some ways, the situation in accounting is
similar to that in law. In others, there is substantial difference.
In law there are essentially two tiers in law
schools: those that are quite bar exam oriented, and those that emphasize
legal theory and philosophy. The kinds of placements they have are also very
different. The students at second sort of schools do clerkships with well
known or almost-well known judges, while those at the first sort of schools
do not. The students at the second sort of schools get hired by the large
well known law firms (for example, on the Wall Street) doing structured
finance and M&A work, whereas the first kind often may do work that could be
considered menial (uncontested divorces, fixing speeding tickets/DUI, etc.).
Of course there are crossovers.
Often, students at the second sort of schools do
not practice at all, but have a profound impact on the profession, and there
are some who practice only occasionally (Tribe, Dershowitz,...).
I agree with Ann Althouse that the second sort of
schools teach students to think like lawyers whereas the first kind teach
them to be lawyers.
In accounting, on the other hand, I think we have
only one kind of schools (the equivalent of second sort have no professional
accounting programs), and they teach students to BE accountants rather) than
to think like accountants.
This situation is convenient for many. It is much
easier to teach one to be like someone than to teach one to think like some
one.
Jagdish
June 23, 2007 reply from J. S. Gangolly
[gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
Dan,
I am not familiar with the Sheldon/Krieger studies,
but will read them soon.
However, I interact with law school faculty often,
and ask them questions just to find out how we in accounting can learn from
them. I also have an abiding interest in the relationship between
jurisprudence and accounting, and it is one of the few psychic benefits I
have enjoyed being an accounting academic.
The law school market is pretty much a
differentiated market. I think the missions of the top tier schools and
others are very different, and both conform to their missions well; there
are no pretensions as we have among the accounting schools where there is a
race to reach the greasy pole no matter what one's comparative advantages
are.
It is difficult to find students from non-top
schools doing clerkships with supreme court justices, or the top law firms
recruiting from such schools.
* The top tier schools emphasise law as an
interdisciplinary field rather than a field confined to narrowly defined
learning of existing laws.
* The top tier schools emphasise more critical
analyses of certain aspects of law such as constitutional law,
international law, jurisprudence... and de-emphasise other aspects such
as administrative law, criminal procedure,... as the other schools do.
* Many students graduating from top schools do
not enter law practice, and even when they do, they enter very different
practices where critical thinking, interdisciplinary, and liberal arts
type skills predominate. Many enter government and public service. Many
also enter the academia. Over my career I have had dozens of friends and
colleagues who went to top law schools (Harvard, Stanford, Cambridge,
...), and they have established their presence as scholars even outside
their narrow domain. On the other hand, most law academics that I have
known from non-top schools, on the other hand, have been in areas such
as tax law, business law,..., generally not considerer the intellectual
centers of gravity of law.
I do not mean to be an elitist when I make the
above observations. In fact, one of my heroes in law, the late Don Berman, a
Harvard educated lawyer at Northeastern, specialised in tax law. If I dig
deep, I am sure I can find some law academics from non-top schools who were
brilliant scholars in areas of law that are considered scholarly. The point
I make is that the two types of schools are just different.
About a dozen years ago, I was trying to establish
relationships with a local (non-top) law school to introduce our students in
accounting to topics such as the relationship between constitutional law and
accounting, and the role of jurisprudence in accounting. I got no where, and
we were in fact on different wavelengths. On the other hand, more recently
we did try to establish relationships for tax students and it has worked out
very well. Our graduate tax students take some tax courses at the law school
and it has helped them tremendously.
I attend law sort of conferences (usually at the
intersection of law and computer science), and almost all participants are
from the top tier law schools. Some from other law schools too attend, but
usually to meet CPE requirements to keep their licenses current. I also am
an avid reader of law literature (specially in constitutional law and
jurisprudence) and there too just about every author is from a top tier law
school.
There is nothing wrong in this dichotomy. Those
from non-top law schools have performed brilliantly in the corporate world,
and once in a while they do spectacular jobs for their clients (see OJ
Simpson's dream team)Sometimes they also excel as legal scholars
Another difference I find between the alums at the
two types of schools is that the contribution to legal literature from the
top law schools is disproportionately large. Ronald Dworkin, Lawrence Tribe,
and Richard Posner in the US, or Joseph Raz and HLA Hart in Britain,... one
has to stretch one's imagination to come up with those from non-top tier law
schools who come close.
And there is no cartel in law as we have in
accounting. Good scholarship gets recognised no matter where it originates,
and gatekeepers are generally powerless; quite unlike in accounting.
There is learning at both kinds of schools, they
are just different. Trying to compare them is like comparing apples and
oranges, or worse, like comparing apple to an ape.
I'll try to collect my thoughts on what we in
accounting can learn from legal education at both levels and post them to
AECM one of these days.
Regards,
Jagdish
Why accountancy doctoral programs are drying up
and
why accountancy is no longer required for admission or
graduation in an accountancy doctoral program
Question
How long does it take to get an accounting doctorate?
Answer
The answer varies with respect to how long it takes to get both the
undergraduate degree plus the requisite masters degree (or at least 150 credits
required in most states). Assuming the student is full time and on track as an
accounting major this makes it about 5.5 years before entering a doctoral
program, although some masters programs only require one year for the masters
degree for undergraduate accounting majors. To that we must add about four years
of doctoral studies. This adds up to 9.5 years of full time study in college
give or take a year. To this we must add the typical 1-5 years of experience
most doctoral students spend in practice between attainment of a masters degree
and eventual matriculation into a doctoral program.
The good news is that, unlike
masters of accountancy and MBA programs, virtually all accountancy doctoral
programs provide free tuition and rather generous living allowances from start
to finish, although some of the time doctoral students must work as teaching
and/or research assistants. Often fellowships in the fourth year allow students
to devote full time to finishing their doctoral thesis.
Accountancy doctoral programs
take at least four years in most cases for former accounting majors because
entering students typically must take advanced mathematics, statistics,
econometrics, and psychometrics prerequisites for doctoral seminars in
accounting ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
Students who get doctorates in
fields other than accounting can typically get a doctoral degree in less than
9.5 years of full-time college. For example, an economics PhD can realistically
spend only 7.5 years in college. He or she can then enter a bridge program to
become a business, finance, or even an accounting professor under the AACSB's
new
Bridge Program, but that program may take two or more years part time. There
just does not appear to be a short track into accounting tenure track positions.
But the added years may be worth it since accounting faculty salaries are
extremely high relative to most other academic disciplines. The high salaries,
in part, are do to the enormous shortage of accounting doctoral graduates
relative to the number of tenure-track openings in major colleges and
universities ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
"Exploring Ways to Shorten the Ascent to a Ph.D.," by Joseph Berger, The New
York Times, October 3, 2007 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/03/education/03education.html
Many of
us have known this scholar: The hair is
well-streaked with gray, the chin has begun to sag,
but still our tortured friend slaves away at a
masterwork intended to change the course of
civilization that everyone else just hopes will
finally get a career under way.
We even
have a name for this sometimes pitied species — the
A.B.D. — All But Dissertation. But in academia these
days, that person is less a subject of ridicule than
of soul-searching about what can done to shorten the
time, sometimes much of a lifetime, it takes for so
many graduate students to, well, graduate. The
Council of Graduate Schools, representing 480
universities in the United States and Canada, is
halfway through a seven-year project to explore ways
of speeding up the ordeal.
For
those who attempt it, the doctoral dissertation can
loom on the horizon like Everest, gleaming
invitingly as a challenge but often turning into a
masochistic exercise once the ascent is begun. The
average student takes 8.2 years to get a Ph.D.; in
education, that figure surpasses 13 years. Fifty
percent of students drop out along the way, with
dissertations the major stumbling block. At
commencement, the typical doctoral holder is 33, an
age when peers are well along in their professions,
and 12 percent of graduates are saddled with more
than $50,000 in debt.
These statistics, compiled by
the
National Science Foundation
and other government agencies
by studying the 43,354 doctoral recipients of 2005,
were even worse a few years ago. Now, universities
are setting stricter timelines and demanding that
faculty advisers meet regularly with protégés. Most
science programs allow students to submit three
research papers rather than a single grand work.
More universities find ways to ease financial
burdens, providing better paid teaching
assistantships as well as tuition waivers. And more
universities are setting up writing groups so that
students feel less alone cobbling together a thesis.
Fighting these trends, and stretching out the
process, is the increased competition for jobs and
research grants; in fields like English where
faculty vacancies are scarce, students realize they
must come up with original, significant topics.
Nevertheless, education researchers like Barbara E.
Lovitts, who has written a new book urging
professors to clarify what they expect in
dissertations; for example, to point out that
professors “view the dissertation as a training
exercise” and that students should stop trying for
“a degree of perfection that’s unnecessary and
unobtainable.”
There are probably few universities that nudge
students out the door as rapidly as Princeton, where
a humanities student now averages 6.4 years compared
with 7.5 in 2003. That is largely because Princeton
guarantees financial support for its 330 scholars
for five years, including free tuition and stipends
that range up to $30,000 a year. That means students
need teach no more than two courses during their
schooling and can focus on research.
“Princeton since the 1930s has felt that a Ph.D.
should be an education, not a career, and has valued
a tight program,” said William B. Russel, dean of
the graduate school.
And
students are grateful. “Every morning I wake up and
remind myself the university is paying me to do
nothing but write the dissertation,” said Kellam
Conover, 26, a classicist who expects to complete
his course of study in five years next May when he
finishes his dissertation on bribery in Athens.
“It’s a tremendous advantage compared to having to
work during the day and complete the dissertation
part time.”
But fewer than a dozen
universities have endowments or sources of financing
large enough to afford five-year packages. The rest
require students to teach regularly. Compare
Princetonians with Brian Gatten, 28, an English
scholar at the
University of Texas in
Austin. He has either been teaching or assisting in
two courses every semester for five years.
“Universities need us as cheap labor to teach their
undergraduates, and frankly we need to be needed
because there isn’t another way for us to fund our
education,” he said.
That
raises a question that state legislatures and
trustees might ponder: Would it be more cost
effective to provide financing to speed graduate
students into careers rather than having them drag
out their apprenticeships?
But
money is not the only reason Princeton does well. It
has developed a culture where professors keep after
students. Students talk of frequent meetings with
advisers, not a semiannual review. For example, Ning
Wu, 30, a father of two, works in Dr. Russel’s
chemical engineering lab and said Dr. Russel comes
by every Friday to discuss Mr. Wu’s work on polymer
films used in computer chips. He aims to get his
Ph.D. next year, his fifth.
While Dr. Russel values “the
critical thinking and independent digging students
have to do, either in their mind for an original
concept or in the archives,” others question the
necessity of book-length works. Some universities
have established what they call professional
doctorates for students who plan careers more as
practitioners than scholars. Since the 1970s,
Yeshiva University has not
only offered a Ph.D. in psychology but also a
separate doctor of psychology degree, or Psy.D., for
those more interested in clinical work than
research; that program requires a more modest
research paper.
OTHER institutions are reviving master’s degree
programs for, say, aspiring scientists who plan
careers in development of products rather than
research.
Those who insist on
dissertations are aware that they must reduce the
loneliness that defeats so many scholars. Gregory
Nicholson, completing his sixth and final year at
Michigan State, was able
to finish a 270-page dissertation on spatial
environments in novels like Kerouac’s “On the Road”
with relative efficiency because of a writing group
where he thrashed out his work with other thesis
writers.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on accountancy doctoral programs are at the following three
links:
The Fall 2007 Edition of Accounting Education News (AEN from the
American Accounting Association) ---
http://aaahq.org/pubs/AEN/2007/Fall2007.pdf
Two important things to note:
In his first President's Message, Gary Previts mentions the Plumlee report
on the dire shortage of accountancy doctoral students and provides a link to the
AAA's new site providing resources for research and experimentation on "Future
Accounting Faculty and Programs Projects" ---
http://aaahq.org/temp/phd/index.cfm
Note especially the Accounting PhD Program Info link with a picture) and the PhD
Project link (at the bottom):
Welcome to the
preliminary posting of a new resource for the
community participating in and supporting accounting
programs, students, faculty, and by that connection
practitioners of accounting. We plan to build this
collection of resources for the broad community
committed to a vital future for accounting education.
This page is an initial step to creating a place where
we can come together to gather resources and share data
and ideas.
New Research Projects by the AAA on the Trends and
Characteristics of Accounting Faculty, Students,
Curriculum, and Programs
Part I:
Future of Accounting Faculty Project (Report
December, 2007)
Part II: Future of Accounting Programs Project
Part I
will describe today's accounting academic workforce,
via demographics, work patterns, productivity, and
career progression of accounting faculty, as well as
of faculty in selected peer disciplines using data
from the national survey of postsecondary faculty (NSOPF)
to establish trends, and a set of measures will be
combined to benchmark the overall status of
accounting against (approximately) 150 fields. This
project will provide context and data to identify
factors affecting the pipeline and workplace.
Part II
will focus on expanding understanding of the
characteristics of accounting faculty, students, and
accounting programs, and implications of their
evolving environment. The need for the Part I
project illustrates how essential it is for the
discipline and profession of accounting that we
establish a more standard and comprehensive process
for collecting, analyzing, and reporting data about
accounting students, doctoral students, faculty,
curriculum, and programs.
More Resources
on the Changing Environment for Faculty:
The Reshaping of America's Academic Workforce
David W. Leslie, TIAA-CREF Institute Fellow
The College of William and Mary
TIAA Institute Research Dialogue Series, 2007
Jim Hasselback's* 2007 Analysis of Accounting
Faculty Birthdates
*Copyrighted – requests for use to J. R. Hasselback
- Among U.S.
Accounting Academics -- 53.4% are 55 or older
From the
Integrated Postsecondary Education System (IPEDS)
- 34.8% of all
full-time faculty in the U.S. are
non-tenure-track -- nearly 2 in 5 of all
full-time appointments
- Between 1993
and 2003 the proportion of all new full-time
hires into "off-track" appointments increased
each year from 50% to nearly 3 in 5 (58.6%)
- Reported in J.
Schuster & M. Finkelstein (Fall, 2006). "On the
Brink: Assessing the Status of the American
Faculty," Thought & Action 51-62.
Supply and
Demand for Accounting PhDs
American Accounting Association PhD Supply/Demand
Resource Page
A collection of resources, links, and reports related to
the pipeline of future Accounting faculty. Highlights
include:
- Report of the AAA/APLG
Committee to Assess the Supply and Demand of
Accounting PhDs
- Link to the
Doctoral Education Resource Center of AACSB
International (Association to Advance Collegiate
Schools of Business)
- AICPA's Journal of
Accountancy's article "Teaching for the Love of It"
Deloitte
Foundation Accounting Doctoral Student Survey
Survey Results (Summer, 2007)
Data collected by survey of attendees of the 2007
AAA/Deloitte J. Michael Cook Doctoral Consortium
The PhD Project
and Accounting Doctoral Students Association
The PhD Project is an information clearinghouse
created to increase the diversity of business school
faculty by attracting African Americans, Hispanic
Americans and Native Americans to business doctoral
programs and by providing a network of peer support.
In just 12 short years, the PhD Project has been the
catalyst for a dramatic increase in the number of
minority business school faculty—from 294 to 842,
with approximately 380 more candidates currently
immersed in doctoral studies.
The PhD Project Accounting Doctoral Students
Association is a voluntary association offering
moral support and encouragement to African-American,
Hispanic-American, and Native American Accounting
Doctoral Students as their pursue their degrees and
take their places in the teaching and research
profession, and serve as mentors to new doctoral
students.
PhD Project Surveys of Students, Professors, and
Deans
Results of a survey among students to understand the
impact of minority professors on minority and
non-minority students.
Accounting Firms
Supporting the AAA and Accounting Programs, Faculty, and
Students
Related
Organizations Sharing Interest in Accounting Faculty and
Programs
|
|
Professor Dan Deines at Kansas State University has a handful of
Outstanding Educator Awards, including one from the AICPA. Beginning on Page 5
of the Fall 2007 edition of AEN, Dan discusses the Taylor Research and
Consulting Group study of accounting education commissioned by the AICPA in
2002. The study identifies barriers to students that prevent many top students
from majoring in accounting. Dan then describes a pilot program initiated by KSU
in reaction to the Taylor Report. I think accounting educators outside KSU may
attend some of the pilot program events.
Bob Jensen's threads on the shortage of doctoral students in accountancy are
shown below.
Questions
Why must all accounting doctoral programs be social science (particularly
econometrics) doctoral programs?
What's wrong with humanities research methodologies?
What's wrong about studying accounting in accounting doctoral programs?
Why are we graduating so many new assistant professors of accounting who do not
know any accounting?
Hint: Similar problems exist in languages and education school PhD programs
Question
What drastic move is the AACSB
International (accrediting body) taking to deal with the shortage of
graduating students from business doctoral programs (including accountancy
doctoral programs)?
Hint:
It's called a “Postdoctoral Bridge to Business”
Answer
With many business schools reporting difficulty attracting
Ph.D. faculty members, the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business
has announced the first participating institutions in new
“Postdoctoral Bridge to Business” programs —
short-term programs that will train new Ph.D.’s in fields outside business for
faculty jobs at business schools. The programs are starting at the Grenoble
Ecole de Management, Tulane University, the University of Florida, the
University of Toledo and Virginia Tech.
Inside Higher Ed, September 20, 2007 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/09/20/qt
Bob Jensen's
threads on alleged reasons why there are such shortages in accountancy doctoral
programs can be found at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
A cynic might conclude that this
is a correctional option for naive students who earned an economics PhD in an
Economics Department rather than lucky students who earned virtual economics
PhDs in accountancy doctoral programs.
A realist might term this the
"Bridge Over Troubled Waters" that leads to higher salaries for "90-Day Wonders"
in business/accounting education ---
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=90+day+wonder
This reminds me of the Harvard
math professor (I can't recall which one at the moment) who said:
"Accounting is a fascinating discipline. I think I might take a couple of hours
to master it."
Question
The faculty shortage in nursing schools is even more severe than that of
accounting schools. Why are there "bridges over troubled waters" in schools of
nursing in the same context as the new bridges being built for non-accounting
PhDs mentioned above?
Answer with a Question
Would you really want an economics PhD who took a crash course in nursing
teaching the nurses who serve you?
Answer with an Answer ---
http://nln.allenpress.com/pdfserv/i1536-5026-028-04-0223.pdf
The fact of the matter is that the law of supply and demand works better in
schools of accounting than in schools of nursing. In general, accounting
educators are among the highest paid faculty on campus. The number of unfilled
tenure-track job openings in schools of accounting combined with starting
salaries in excess of $130,000 per year are the main reasons that the AACSB
International's "Postdoctoral Bridge to Business" just might work,
although I seriously doubt whether any of the bridged students will be able to
teach upper division financial accounting, auditing, and tax courses.
The fact is that the law of supply and demand works lousy in nursing schools.
In spite of shortages of qualified faculty, nursing educators remain among the
lowest paid faculty on campus. A Nursing International's "Postdoctoral Bridge to
Nursing" probably would not work, and given my cynacism about 90-0Day Wonders it
is some comfort to me that there is no such bridge over troubled waters in
nursing schools.
Question
What do accounting schools and nursing schools have in common?
"The Nursing Education Dilemma," by Elia Powers, Inside Higher Ed,
June 22, 2007 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/06/22/nursing
The
market for nursing graduates remains hot, and plenty of
students are vying for those open positions. Enrollment in
entry-level baccalaureate nursing programs increased by
nearly 8 percent in 2006 from the previous year, which
marked the
sixth straight year of gains.
Community College programs are also
seeing increases in applications
and enrollments.
It’s all
positive news for the health care industry, which has
suffered from a well-documented nursing shortage since the
1990s, when many hospitals cut their staffs and some
colleges cut back their programs.
But for
colleges of nursing, the increasing demand to accommodate
more students presents a dilemma: Who will teach them?
When it
comes to clinical nursing courses, college programs are
bound to strict faculty-to-student ratios, set by individual
states. One instructor to every 10 or 12 students is a
fairly common ratio. So even as administrators and state
lawmakers seek more slots for students, there’s a ceiling on
expansion unless more faculty are recruited or produced.
That’s not
happening quickly. A survey released last year by the
American Association of Colleges of Nursing identified at
least 637 faculty vacancies at more than 300 nursing schools
with baccalaureate or graduate programs — or what amounts to
a nearly 8 percent faculty vacancy rate. The majority of the
openings are tenure-track positions that require applicants
have a doctorate, the survey shows.
Meanwhile,
there continues to be a backlog of students. In 2006, more
than 38,000 nursing school candidates deemed “qualified” by
the AACN were turned away from entry-level baccalaureate
programs, while a total of 50,783 nursing school applicants
enrolled and registered in courses. When the new students
are added to the pool of all students enrolled, total
enrollment rises to 133,578.
Nearly three
quarters of the colleges that responded to the AACN survey
pointed to faculty shortages as a reason for not accepting
the applicants. Community colleges are turning away 3.3
“qualified” applicants for every one turned away by
four-year institutions, said Roxanne Fulcher, director of
health professions policy at the American Association of
Community Colleges.
At many
nursing schools, wait lists are shrinking after years of
growth, officials say, not because slots are opening up, but
because students are becoming frustrated that their chances
of enrolling are dim.
Continued in article
Question
What do accounting schools and nursing schools have in common?
"The Nursing Education Dilemma," by Elia Powers, Inside Higher Ed,
June 22, 2007 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/06/22/nursing
The
market for nursing graduates remains hot, and plenty of
students are vying for those open positions. Enrollment in
entry-level baccalaureate nursing programs increased by
nearly 8 percent in 2006 from the previous year, which
marked the
sixth straight year of gains.
Community College programs are also
seeing increases in applications
and enrollments.
It’s all
positive news for the health care industry, which has
suffered from a well-documented nursing shortage since the
1990s, when many hospitals cut their staffs and some
colleges cut back their programs.
But for
colleges of nursing, the increasing demand to accommodate
more students presents a dilemma: Who will teach them?
When it
comes to clinical nursing courses, college programs are
bound to strict faculty-to-student ratios, set by individual
states. One instructor to every 10 or 12 students is a
fairly common ratio. So even as administrators and state
lawmakers seek more slots for students, there’s a ceiling on
expansion unless more faculty are recruited or produced.
That’s not
happening quickly. A survey released last year by the
American Association of Colleges of Nursing identified at
least 637 faculty vacancies at more than 300 nursing schools
with baccalaureate or graduate programs — or what amounts to
a nearly 8 percent faculty vacancy rate. The majority of the
openings are tenure-track positions that require applicants
have a doctorate, the survey shows.
Meanwhile,
there continues to be a backlog of students. In 2006, more
than 38,000 nursing school candidates deemed “qualified” by
the AACN were turned away from entry-level baccalaureate
programs, while a total of 50,783 nursing school applicants
enrolled and registered in courses. When the new students
are added to the pool of all students enrolled, total
enrollment rises to 133,578.
Nearly three
quarters of the colleges that responded to the AACN survey
pointed to faculty shortages as a reason for not accepting
the applicants. Community colleges are turning away 3.3
“qualified” applicants for every one turned away by
four-year institutions, said Roxanne Fulcher, director of
health professions policy at the American Association of
Community Colleges.
At many
nursing schools, wait lists are shrinking after years of
growth, officials say, not because slots are opening up, but
because students are becoming frustrated that their chances
of enrolling are dim.
Continued in article
Rankings of Universities in Terms of
Doctoral Student Placements
The journal PS: Political Science & Politics has just published
an analysis that suggests
that there is not a direct relationship between the general
reputation of a department and its success at placing new
Ph.D.’s; some programs far exceed their reputation when it comes
to placing new Ph.D.’s while others lag. The analysis may
provide new evidence for the “halo effect” in which many experts
worry that general (and sometimes outdated) institutional
reputations cloud the judgment of those asked to fill out
surveys on departmental quality. And while the analysis was
prepared about political science, its authors believe the same
approach could be used in other fields in the humanities and
social sciences, with the method more problematic in other areas
because fewer Ph.D. students aspire to academic careers.
Scott Jaschik, "A Ranking That Would Matter," Inside Higher
Ed, August 21, 2007 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/08/21/ranking
Jensen Comment
The big problem here is defining what constitutes "a top job" or
a "a good job." There are so many elements in job satisfaction,
many of which are intangible and cannot be quantified, that I'm
suspect of any study that purports to identify top jobs.
Obviously prestigious universities have a bias for hiring
prestigious university graduates. But this is often due to the
reputations of the graduate student's teachers and thesis
advisors. And the quality of the dissertation may have a great
deal of impact on hiring even if the degree is from No-name
University. Also prestigious universities tend to have the
highest GMAT applicants, but this is not always the case. Often
the highest GMAT applicants are really tremendous graduates.
In disciplines
having great shortages of doctoral graduates, especially
doctoral graduates in accounting and finance, findings from
political science do not necessarily extrapolate.
Be that as it may, the findings of the
above study come as no surprise to me. Particularly in
accounting, some prestigious universities have taken a nose dive
in terms of reputations of faculty supervising dissertations.
And students may not have access to the most reputable faculty,
especially faculty who are too busy with consulting and world
travel. For example, a few years ago I encountered a doctoral
student in accounting at the University of Chicago who claimed
that it was very difficult to even find a faculty member who
would supervise a dissertation. But if he ever graduates from
Chicago, he will have the Chicago halo around his head. In
fairness, I've not had recent information regarding what is
happening with doctoral students in accounting at the University
of Chicago. Certainly it is still a very reputable university in
terms of its business studies and research programs.
Also there is a problem in accountancy that
mathematics-educated accountancy doctoral graduates from
prestigious universities may know very little about accountancy
and additionally have troubles with the English language. On
occasion prestige-university graduates do not get the "top jobs"
where accountancy is spoken.
Beyond Research Rankings," by Luis
M. Proenza, Inside Higher Ed, May 17, 2007 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2007/05/17/proenza
Controversies in media rankings of colleges are discussed at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/20/education/20colleges.html
Bob Jensen's threads on college rankings controversies are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm#BusinessSchoolRankings
All is Not Well in Modern Languages Education
Proposal to integrate languages with literature, history,
culture, economics and linguistics
Proposal to use fewer adjuncts who now teach language courses
The MLA created a special committee in
2004 to study the future of language education and
its
report, being issued today
(May 24, 2007)
is in many ways unprecedented for the association in that it is
urging departments to reorganize how languages are taught and
who does the teaching. In general, the critique of the committee
is that the traditional model has started with basic language
training (typically taught by those other than tenure-track
faculty members) and proceeded to literary study (taught by
tenure-track faculty members). The report calls for moving away
from this “two tiered” system, integrating language study with
literature, and placing much more emphasis on history, culture,
economics and linguistics — among other topics — of the
societies whose languages are being taught.
Scott Jaschik, Inside Higher Ed, May 24, 2007 ---
http://insidehighered.com/news/2007/05/24/mla
Who Teaches First-Year Language Courses?
Rank |
Doctoral-Granting Departments |
B.A.-Granting Departments |
Tenured or tenure-track professors |
7.4% |
41.8% |
Full-time, non-tenure track |
19.6% |
21.1% |
Part-time instructors |
15.7% |
34.7% |
Graduate students |
57.4% |
2.4% |
All is Not Well in Programs for Doctoral Students in Departments/Colleges
of Education
The education doctorate, attempting to
serve dual purposes—to prepare researchers and to prepare practitioners—is not
serving either purpose well. To address what they have termed this "crippling"
problem, Carnegie and the Council of Academic Deans in Research Education
Institutions (CADREI) have launched the Carnegie Project on the Education
Doctorate (CPED), a three-year effort to reclaim the education doctorate and to
transform it into the degree of choice for the next generation of school and
college leaders. The project is coordinated by David Imig, professor of practice
at the University of Maryland. "Today, the Ed.D. is perceived as 'Ph.D.-lite,'"
said Carnegie President Lee S. Shulman. "More important than the public
relations problem, however, is the real risk that schools of education are
becoming impotent in carrying out their primary missions to prepare leading
practitioners as well as leading scholars."
"Institutions Enlisted to Reclaim Education Doctorate," The Carnegie Foundation
for Advancement in Teaching ---
http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/news/sub.asp?key=51&subkey=2266
The EED does not focus enough on research, and the PhD program has become a
social science doctoral program without enough education content. Middle ground
is being sought.
All is Not Well in Programs for Doctoral Students in Departments/Colleges
of Business, Especially in Accounting
The problem is that not enough accounting is taught in what have become social
science doctoral programs
See
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
Partly the problem is the same as with PhD programs in colleges of
education.
The pool of accounting doctoral program applicants is drying up, especially
accounting doctoral program pool that is increasingly trickle-filled with
mathematically-educated foreign students who have virtually no background in
accounting. Twenty
years ago, over 200 accounting doctoral students were being graduated each year
in the United States. Now it's less than one hundred graduates per year, many of
whom know very little about accounting, especially U.S. accounting. This is
particularly problematic for financial accounting, tax, and auditing education
requiring knowledge of U.S. standards, regulations, and laws.
Accounting
doctoral programs are social science research programs that do not appeal to
accountants who are interested in becoming college educators but have no
aptitude for or interest in the five or more years of quantitative methods study
required for current accounting doctoral programs.
To meet the demand of thousands of colleges seeking accounting faculty, the
supply situation is revealed by Plumlee et al (2006) as quoted at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
There were only 29
doctoral students in auditing and 23 in tax out of the 2004 total of 391
accounting doctoral students enrolled in years 1-5 in the United States.
The answer here it seems to me is to open doctoral
programs to wider humanities and legal studies research methodologies and to put
accounting back into accounting doctoral programs.
Partly the problem is the same as with
“two-tiered”
departments of modern languages
The huge shortage of accounting doctoral graduates has bifurcated the teaching
of accounting. Increasingly, accounting, tax, systems, and auditing courses are
taught by adjunct part-time faculty or full-time adjunct faculty who are not on
a tenure track and often are paid much less than tenure-track faculty who teach
graduate research courses.
The short run answer here is difficult since there
are so few doctoral graduates who know enough accounting to take over for the
adjunct faculty. If doctoral programs open up more to accountants, perhaps more
adjunct faculty will enter the pool of doctoral program prospects. This might
help the long run problem. Meanwhile as former large doctoral programs (e.g., at
Illinois, Texas, Florida, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Michigan) shrink more and
more, we’re increasingly building two-tier accounting education programs due to
increasing demand and shrinking supply of doctoral graduates in accountancy.
We’re becoming more and more
like “two-tier” language departments in our large and small colleges.
Practitioners in education schools generally are K-12 teachers and school
administrators. In the case of accounting doctoral programs, our dual mission is
to prepare college teachers of accountancy as well as leading scholars. Our
accounting doctoral programs are drying up (less than 100 per year now
graduating in the United States, many of whom know virtually no accounting)
primarily because our doctoral programs have become five years of social science
and mathematics concentrations that do not appeal to accountants who might
otherwise enter the pool of doctoral program admission candidates.
Note that the above Carnegie study also claims that education
doctoral programs are also failing to "prepare researchers." I think the same
criticism applies to current accountancy doctoral programs in the United States.
We're failing in our own dual purpose accountancy doctoral programs and need a
concerted effort to become a "degree of choice" among the accounting
professionals who would like to move into academe in a role other than that of a
low-status and low-paid adjunct professor.
In the
United States, following the Gordon/Howell and Pierson reports, our
accounting doctoral programs and leading academic journals bet the farm on
the social sciences without taking the due cautions of realizing why the
social sciences are called "soft sciences." They're soft because "not
everything that can be counted, counts. And not everything that counts can
be counted."
Leading academic accounting
research journals commenced accepting only esoteric papers with complicated
mathematical models and trivial hypotheses of zero interest to accounting
practitioners ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
Accounting doctoral programs made a
concerted effort to recruit students with mathematics, economics, and social
science backgrounds even though these doctoral candidates knew virtually nothing
about accountancy. To compound the felony, the doctoral programs dropped all
accounting requirements except for some doctoral seminars on how to mine
accounting data archives with econometric and psychometric models and advanced
statistical inference testing.
I cannot find the exact quotation in my archives, but some years
ago Linda Kidwell complained that her university had recently hired a
newly-minted graduate from an accounting doctoral program who did not know any
accounting. When assigned to teach accounting courses, this new "accounting"
professor was a disaster since she knew nothing about the subjects she was
assigned to teach.
In the year following his assignment as President of the
American Accounting Association Joel Demski asserted that research focused on
the accounting profession will become a "vocational virus" leading us away from
the joys of mathematics and the social sciences and the pureness of the
scientific academy:
Statistically there are a few youngsters who
came to academia for the joy of learning, who are yet relatively
untainted by the vocational virus.
I urge you to nurture your taste for learning, to follow your joy. That
is the path of scholarship, and it is the only one with any possibility
of turning us back toward the academy.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic
Discipline? American Accounting Association Plenary Session" August 9,
2006 ---
http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/demski/Is_Accounting_an_Academic_Discipline.pdf
Accounting professors are no longer "leading scholars" if they focus on
accounting rather than mathematics and the social sciences ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR.htm
When
Professor Beresford attempted to publish his remarks, an Accounting
Horizons referee’s report to him contained the following revealing reply
about “leading scholars” in accounting research:
1. The paper provides specific
recommendations for things that accounting academics should be doing to make
the accounting profession better. However (unless the author believes that
academics' time is a free good) this would presumably take academics' time
away from what they are currently doing. While following the author's advice
might make the accounting profession better, what is being made worse? In
other words, suppose I stop reading current academic research and start
reading news about current developments in accounting standards. Who is made
better off and who is made worse off by this reallocation of my time?
Presumably my students are marginally better off, because I can tell them
some new stuff in class about current accounting standards, and this might
possibly have some limited benefit on their careers. But haven't I made my
colleagues in my department worse off if they depend on me for research
advice, and haven't I made my university worse off if its academic
reputation suffers because I'm no longer considered a leading scholar?
Why does making the accounting profession better take precedence over
everything else an academic does with their time?
As quoted in Jensen (2006a) ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
Advice to students planning to take standardized tests such as the SAT, GRE,
GMAT, LSAT, TOEFL, etc.
See Test Magic at
http://www.testmagic.com/
There is a forum here where students
interested in doctoral programs in business (e.g., accounting and finance) and
economics discuss the ins and outs of doctoral programs.
Question
Does faculty research improve student learning in the classrooms where
researchers teach?
Put another way, is research more important than scholarship that does not
contribute to new knowledge?
Major Issue
If the answer leans toward scholarship over research, it could monumentally
change criteria for tenure in many colleges and universities.
AACSB
International: the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business, has
released for comment
a report calling for the accreditation process for
business schools to evaluate whether faculty research improves the learning
process. The report expresses the concern that accreditors have noted the volume
of research, but not whether it is making business schools better from an
educational standpoint.
Inside Higher Ed, August 6, 2007 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/08/06/qt
"Controversial Report on Business School Research Released
for Comments," AACSB News Release, August 3, 2007 ---
http://www.aacsb.edu/Resource_Centers/Research/media_release-8-3-07.pdf
FL (August 3,
2007) ― A report released today evaluates the nature and purposes of
business school research and recommends steps to increase its value to
students, practicing managers and society. The report, issued by the Impact
of Research task force of AACSB International, is released as a draft to
solicit comments and feedback from business schools, their faculties and
others. The report includes recommendations that could profoundly change the
way business schools organize, measure, and communicate about research.
AACSB
International, the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business,
estimates that each year accredited business schools spend more than $320
million to support faculty research and another half a billion dollars
supports research-based doctoral education.
“Research is
now reflected in nearly everything business schools do, so we must find
better ways to demonstrate the impact of our contributions to advancing
management theory, practice and education” says task force chair Joseph A.
Alutto, of The Ohio State University. “But quality business schools are not
and should not be the same; that’s why the report also proposes
accreditation changes to strengthen the alignment of research expectations
to individual school missions.”
The task force
argues that a business school cannot separate itself from management
practice and still serve its function, but it cannot be so focused on
practice that it fails to develop rigorous, independent insights that
increase our understanding of organizations and management. Accordingly, the
task force recommends building stronger interactions between academic
researchers and practicing managers on questions of relevance and developing
new channels that make quality academic research more accessible to
practice.
According to
AACSB President and CEO John J. Fernandes, recommendations in this report
have the potential to foster a new generation of academic research. “In the
end,” he says, “it is a commitment to scholarship that enables business
schools to best serve the future needs of business and society through
quality management education.”
The Impact of
Research task force report draft for comments is available for download on
the AACSB website:
www.aacsb.edu/research. The website
also provides additional resources related to the issue and the opportunity
to submit comments on the draft report. The AACSB Committee on Issues in
Management Education and
Board of Directors
will use the feedback to determine the next steps for implementation.
The AACSB International Impact of Research Task Force
Chairs:
Joseph A. Alutto, interim president, and
John W. Berry, Senior Chair in Business, Max M. FisherCollege of Business,
The Ohio State University
K. C. Chan, The Hong Kong University of Science and
Technology
Richard A. Cosier, Purdue University
Thomas G. Cummings, University of Southern California
Ken Fenoglio, AT&T
Gabriel Hawawini, INSEAD and the University of Pennsylvania
Cynthia H. Milligan, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Myron Roomkin, Case Western Reserve University
Anthony J. Rucci, The Ohio State University
Teaching Excellence Secondary to Research for Promotion,
Tenure, and Pay ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm#TeachingVsResearch
Bob Jensen's threads on higher education controversies
are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm
The Parable Of Being In The Wrong
Paradigm
May 30, 2007 parable by David Albrecht
[albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]
Sorry to revive this thread (need a favor) after it
seemed to die 10 days ago. I present this parable with apologies to Ed
Scribner, our resident parable teller.
I call this The Parable Of Being In The Wrong
Paradigm.
A certain professor is the sad-sack of accounting
higher education. It seems as if he's always been a member of an
out-of-power paradigm. He started off college as a music major. He then
switched to chemistry to Spanish to creative writing to history to political
science. After graduation he discovered his degree qualified him to operate
the french frier at a fast food joint. Friends, unhappy with his
unhappiness, advised him to pursue an MBA degree. Our professor switched to
an MA in accounting.
After this graduation he failed to secure an
accounting or auditing job with the Big 8-7-6-5-4, probably due to a
combination of not being young enough and wearing a colored shirt to his
interviews. He wanted a true job, but it was not to be for him. Count him
out of the Big 8-7-6-5-4 paradigm, his first experience with the wrong
paradigm.
But lo and behold, a small school hired him to
teach accounting. He enjoyed it so much that he decided to pursue an
accounting doctorate for that academic union card. On the bright side, he
learned new ways of thinking, new ways to approach a problem, and mental
flexibility (this trait gets him in trouble, though). On the dark side he
tried to pass himself off as a quantoid, but he wasn't. Nor was his degree
from a powerful elite university. So count him out of the elite accounting
school paradigm, and count him out of a top level salary. He is again a
member of the wrong paradigm.
He's been a bust as a research/publishing hound,
never hitting a top four journal. Some of his pubs were practitioner
oriented and out of favor in his department. His last publication was too
many years ago. He hit with the Journal of Excellence in College Teaching,
but was told by his dean that it wouldn't count because his article wasn't
about accounting (and the journal is too lowly ranked anyway). So, count him
out of the dominant accounting research paradigm and from getting annual
raises from his department. He is again a member of the wrong paradigm.
He was curious fellow, though, and always eager to
contribute to making things better. Intrigued by how students learned, he
researched it (but never got anything published, of course). He invested the
results of the research back into his classrooms and became a popular
teacher. As he continued to learn about how students learn, he became more
popular. Eventually, students had to line up to get into one of his classes.
The department chair responded by putting in a special registration process
to keep excess students away from his classes and into other sections. The
lucky students in his classes thrived in his learning-centered environment,
it seems that they had been hungry to learn for a long time. The traditional
paradigm ("tell them and then test them") is alive and well at at his
school, though. He had to endure peer-to-peer evaluations of his teaching
from professors who had difficulty in helping students learn. One accounting
professor, notorious for his long lectures and lethal use of Power Point,
came into our professor's classroom on one of his more non-traditional
approach days. After a few minutes, the notorious accounting professor
angrily steamed out of the classroom, giving our professor the the lowest
score ever on a peer evaluation of teaching. It seems our professor didn't
cover enough content. So count him out of another dominant accounting
professor paradigm, and again a member of the wrong paradigm.
Despite being considered the worst accounting
professor (0 for 4) by his department, he received his university's highest
award for contributing to student learning.
One day he was asked how it felt not to be a part
of the crowd or a dominant accounting paradigm. He replied that not being in
a correct paradigm feels like not being invited to a party. He took solace,
though from reading posts to AECM. Contributors seemed to be out of at least
one power paradigm, just like him. They discussed it aud nauseum, year after
year. Eventually he concluded that the more people lament the power of a
dominant paradigm, the more things stay the same. It is like the
weather--people can talk about it a lot but no one can do anything to change
it. Leaving his computer, our professor went back to work, changing the
world one student at a time.
David Albrecht
What's wrong about studying accounting in accounting doctoral
programs?
May 2, 2007 message from Bob Jensen to the AECM Listserv
I have a former student and very good friend who’s interested in applying
for an accounting doctoral program. He’s a good student who became a better
student each year of his five year program. He’s somewhat experienced as a
tax accountant.
But he’s not especially interested in a doctoral program that is heavy in
quantitative methods (dare I say “accountics?”).
I have a couple of suggestions for him. But before I reply to him I would
like some other suggestions from the AECM regarding full-time doctoral
programs that are heavier on accounting and taxation skills and a bit
lighter on the quantitative methods focus of most (all?) respected
accounting doctoral programs at the moment.
You may send your suggestions privately to me or share them on the AECM
if you choose to do so.
Please let me know if I can forward your suggestions under your name or
if I should make your suggestions to him anonymous.
I do recommend this young man for a doctoral program. He’s become very
passionate about becoming an accounting educator.
Thanks,
Bob Jensen
May 2, 2007 reply from Michael Haselkorn
[MHASELKORN@bentley.edu]
Bob,
He should check out Bentley College’s new PhD
program. Feel free to use my name.
Mike Haselkorn
May 2, 2007 reply from Randy Kuhn
[jkuhn@bus.ucf.edu]
Bob,
I would definitely recommend your student speak to
some of the professors at UCF (Central Florida in Orlando)
like Robin Roberts and Steve Sutton. The general approach for the PhD
program here is to provide as much exposure as possible to all areas of
accounting scholarship and let the student decide what area best suits them.
We take five accounting seminars that include a general overview of research
(Kuhn, Burrell & Morgan, etc.), behavioral accounting, accounting
information systems, financial archival, and sociological. A nice mix
overall. Most of us take electives outside the College of Business in
psychology, sociology, education, etc. for our minor as well as for the
methods requirements. We can choose a more quantitative approach but no one
in the last three classes went that route. Of the nine students in the last
two classes, seven came from public accounting (six audit, one tax). The
program has definitely enlightened all of us to other views of accounting,
research, education, and the world in general. We only accept students every
other year and I believe there are one or two spots left for the Fall 2007
class. If you think our program might fit your student, then I strongly
recommend that he contact Robin ASAP.
Thanks,
Randy
May 2, 2007 reply from Steve Sutton
[ssutton@bus.ucf.edu]
Bob,
I’ve watched this discussion with some interest.
I’m always reluctant to speak of our own PhD program in this forum because
it can be taken and interpreted the wrong way. Our PhD program has carved a
niche out that is different from the ‘glamour’ programs. If we have a
student who applies and wishes to do “accountics” type work, we generally
steer them towards a more appropriate program.
Our program has basically focused on audit, tax and
systems with a focus on behavioral and public policy research. We have what
I believe to be some very accomplished and bright scholars working with our
students, but our research is primarily behavioral from an individual
(psychology-based), organizational (sociology), and societal (critical and
radical humanist perspectives) perspective(s). We believe dialogue about the
professions, accounting institutions, ethical implications and the
philosophy underlying all of those is critical to the role of accounting
academics.
That said, a PhD is still a research degree and not
a technical degree. We assume that a student that has attained an
undergraduate and masters level education in accounting has the technical
accounting knowledge. The PhD is about how to look at accounting with a
critical thinking mind and question the rules, processes and
institutions—and to ask if there is a better way.
We educate our PhD students in the traditional
areas as we believe this is critical to be good colleagues and appreciating
each other’s research. But we do a lot in non-traditional areas also. You
might find the structure of the programming interesting (or you may not):
http://www.graduate.ucf.edu/CurrentGradCatalog/content/Degrees/ACAD_PROG_94.cfm#BUPHD-ACCOUNTING
Hope you’re enjoying retirement in the mountains.
This is the time of year I miss New England.
Steve G. Sutton
KPMG Professor
Dixon School of Accounting, UCF
www.bus.ucf.edu/ssutton/
May 2, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
Bob,
What are your friend's aspirations? If he could
describe his ideal faculty position, including the sort of research (if any)
he would like to pursue, what would that be? (He may be uncertain, which is
fine.)
Recommending a set of inputs is easier if the
desired output is clear.
Richard Sansing
May 2, Reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Richard,
I think (surmising at this point) that he might aspire to teach
accounting/tax in a small liberal arts college where publishing in top
research journals is not deemed more important than a dedication for
teaching accounting and inspiring liberal arts students to pursue a career
in accountancy.
In spite of what some of us more familiar with research universities
think, there are many such liberal arts and even smaller state-supported
colleges that still place the highest emphasis on teaching and youth
inspiration.
What I've discovered is that all colleges want evidence of continued
scholarship, but some are much more willing to accept publication in what we
might call lower-tiered journals.
Then again, this young man showed such increased aptitude for accounting
theory. It may be possible that in the course of his doctoral program he
gets fired up for higher level research. His father is a good statistician
and systems analyst in a top university. His mother is a teacher.
Bob Jensen
May 2, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
Bob,
I would encourage your friend to think about the
real option aspect of this decision. He should be very confident of his
decision to not pursue a Ph.D. at a research-oriented program before
bypassing that option. If he studies at Chicago and makes an informed
decision not to pursue "mainstream" academic research, then he will be
over-trained for his dream job at the kind of liberal arts college you
describe. But he also has the option of pursuing the research route. But if
he studies at a place that puts less emphasis on research methods, he has
limited his options at the outset.
Richard Sansing
May 2, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Richard,
I used to think that way. Then I had one student named XXXXX who had
similar goals to YYYYY, although XXXXX was a much more brilliant math
student according to the Mathematics Department at Trinity University. I
made a special effort to have XXXXX admitted to an "accountics" doctoral
program without having as much as one week of experience in accounting
practice. XXXXX did not even intern and went straight from our Trinity
University masters program to an accounting doctoral program.
To my utter disappointment XXXXX dropped out after the end of the first
semester. He said he was just not interested in getting an econometrics PhD
in an accounting doctoral program. He wanted an accounting PhD and
discovered that he would have four or five years of econometrics,
statistics, and psychometrics.
Honestly Richard, I'm not making this up. XXXXX enrolled in this
accounting doctoral program about three years ago if my memory serves me
correctly. With his exceptional math skills XXXXX was capable of getting his
accounting (ergo econometrics PhD). He just wasn't interested in
econometrics before he applied for the doctoral program, when he was in the
doctoral program, or when he withdrew from the doctoral program.
I did not do XXXXX or that doctoral program any favors by pushing XXXXX
in the way that you would probably have pushed XXXXX. Now when it comes to
YYYYY, we have a similar situation except I don't think YYYYY has the
exceptional math skills of XXXXX. YYYYY admits that he's more like his
mother than his father in this regard.
YYYYY, like XXXXX, really wants to study accountancy rather than
econometrics. If XXXXX wanted to be an econometrics PhD, however, he
probably would have stuck it out in the accountancy doctoral program because
economics PhDs are a dime a dozen relative to accounting econometricians
masquerading as accountants.
My point, Richard, is that sometimes "keeping options open" is not the
best advice for some types of students, especially accounting students who
really do not want to become statisticians, econometricians,
psychometricians, and management scientists. We've pretty much taken the
study of accountancy out of doctoral programs. Those entering doctoral
programs learn very little accounting beyond what they learned before
entering the program.
What accountancy doctoral programs lack is imagination. Why can't there
be a joint accounting/JD doctoral program in law and accountancy? Why can't
there be an accounting/philosophy doctoral program? Why must virtually all
accountancy doctoral programs be accounting/ECONOMICS doctoral programs for
economists who want higher starting salaries?
That's my $.02.
Bob Jensen
May 2, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
1. Yes, sometimes options expire out of the money.
A bad outcome ex post does not imply a bad decision ex ante.
2. Not everything you learn has to be learned in a
classroom. I've learned a lot about non-profit organizations over the last
ten years without ever taking a class on the subject.If it is (relatively)
harder to learn about research methods on your own than it is to learn about
institutional detail on your own, a program that focuses on economics and
research methods is likely the most efficient way to learn. There is also an
economy of scale issue. If I have five doctoral students interested in five
different topics, a program that focuses on methods rather than subjects
seems like the way to go; each student can learn about the institutional
issues that interest them in another way.
Richard Sansing
May 2, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Richard
Plumlee et al. (2006) discovered that there were only 29
doctoral students in auditing and 23 in tax out of the 2004 total of 391
accounting doctoral students enrolled in years 1-5 in the United States.
With the excessive shortage of new PhDs in accounting
(especially in auditing, tax, and systems), I think those who get a PhD with
accounting skills will have pretty good "options" to become teachers and may
even become the highest paid teachers in smaller colleges.
And you have difficulty separating yourself from the
fundamental profit maximization economics assumption that plagues virtually
all economics models. You assume that all accounting graduates who elect to
go into academe want the highest salaries and probably the lowest teaching
loads possible. In fact, there are students like XXXXX and YYYYY who truly
want the psychic rewards of teaching rather than earn the highest dollar and
the lowest teaching load.
What may be my most important point in this exchange with
you is that there are many smaller colleges that would rather have dedicated
teachers of accounting rather than failed econmetricians belatedly wanting
to teach accounting because they were denied tenure in a top university's
accounting/econometrics program.
And your latter assumption is that accounting can be self
taught. Actually most anything can be self taught, including Egon Balas who
became a well known Carnegie-Mellon mathematics professor after having
taught himself mathematics during ten years of solitary confinement in a
Hungarian prison. But why should an accounting doctoral student have to
spend four or five years studying dreaded econometrics when their first love
is learning accounting, tax, auditing, or systems?
And you might've been interested in learning accountancy
after you earned an economics doctorate. But there are many econometrics
professors in accounting departments who do not share your view. Let me once
again dredge up the best example of the Accounting Horizon's referee who
rejected a paper submitted by Denny Beresford.
When Professor Beresford attempted to publish his paper
appealing for accounting researchers to have more interest in the accounting
profession, an Accounting Horizons referee’s report to him contained
the following revealing reply about “leading scholars” in accounting
research:
Begin Quote
*****************
1. The
paper provides specific recommendations for things that accounting
academics should be doing to make the accounting profession better.
However (unless the author believes that academics' time is a free good)
this would presumably take academics' time away from what they are
currently doing. While following the author's advice might make the
accounting profession better, what is being made worse? In other words,
suppose I stop reading current academic research and start reading news
about current developments in accounting standards. Who is made better
off and who is made worse off by this reallocation of my time?
Presumably my students are marginally better off, because I can tell
them some new stuff in class about current accounting standards, and
this might possibly have some limited benefit on their careers. But
haven't I made my colleagues in my department worse off if they depend
on me for research advice, and haven't I made my university worse off if
its academic reputation suffers because I'm no longer considered a
leading scholar? Why does making the accounting profession better
take precedence over everything else an academic does with their time?
As quoted at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
*****************
End Quote
Particularly relevant in this regard is Dennis Beresford’s
address to the AAA membership at the 2005 Annual AAA Meetings in San
Francisco
Begin Quote
*****************
In my eight years in teaching I’ve concluded that way too many of us
don’t stay relatively up to date on professional issues. Most of us
have some experience as an auditor, corporate accountant, or in some
similar type of work. That’s great, but things change quickly these
days.
Beresford (2005)
*****************
End Quote
I'm glad that you like accounting and tax. Unfortunately,
may of your econometrics friends in accounting academe hate having to teach
such courses as intermediate accounting, advanced accounting, auditing, or
introductory tax courses. And they interpret accounting theory as minimal
accounting and maximal economic theory.
Bob Jensen
May 2, 2007 reply from Randy Kuhn
[jkuhn@BUS.UCF.EDU]
When being recruited I recall my PhD coordinator
showing me statistics about the number of accounting PhD students graduating
each year and the general declining trend, down to around 70-75 per year.
The AAA placement center at the national conference last year listed over
300 job postings. What a dilemma and not getting any better given that many
of the baby boomers still have yet to retire.
The Plumlee et al. (2006) study paints an even
bleaker picture. The general lack of students specializing in non-financial
areas should raise a huge red flag. Will our non-financial accounting
classes eventually be taught by professors outside their research area and
interest? What kind of higher education will that provide? I have been
fervently recruiting friends in public accounting. My approach to date has
been to drop a bug in their ear during the worst of busy season then keep
plugging away. So far, only one success. Many would love to enter academia
but the thought of giving up four years of compensation is unpalatable and
just not feasible for their families. The barriers to entry are great.
Successful recruiting will take a concerted effort by us all.
May 2, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
---Bob Jensen wrote:
And you have difficulty separating yourself
from the fundamental profit maximization economics assumption that
plagues virtually all economics models. You assume that all accounting
graduates who elect to go into academe want the highest salaries and
probably the lowest teaching loads possible. In fact, there are students
like XXXXX and YYYYY who truly want the psychic rewards of teaching
rather than earn the highest dollar and the lowest teaching load.
---
Nonsense. From a purely financial perspective, an
academic career for an accoutant is a big negative NPV. But I wouldn't trade
careers with anyone.
Richard Sansing
May 3, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Richard,
Negative NPV makes no sense to me for new accounting PhDs. With
universities paying over $180,000 (including summer stipends) as starting
salaries plus generous amounts of free time for personal consulting fees and
textbook writing, I have a difficult time calculating a negative NPV. And
consulting opportunities are relatively easy to get in top universities
because the elite names of those universities are a draw for faculty
opportunities to consult and write books.
Most Harvard, Wharton, MIT, NYU, and Stanford professors that I know make
more in consulting and royalties than their paltry salaries over $200,000
per year plus relatively generous travel allowances. The very top
universities also provide incidental funding for research ranging from
$10,000 to $30,000 each year (plus summer stipends in the range of $40,000
to $60,000).
When you make the NPV calculations you must also factor in the current
fringe benefits averaging 30% of starting salaries. This includes health
care and TIAA-CREF contributions. The 30% probably does not even count
sabbatical leaves, discounts for child care, and entertainment opportunities
such as concerts and theatre.
Sure an accounting or finance professor may have cut off chances of
winning the CEO lottery, but this is a low-probability career track.
Becoming a partner in a large CPA firm can be lucrative, but not necessarily
on a present value basis considering the first ten years at relatively low
salary (around $50,000-$60,000 per year) and the necessity to buy into
(usually by borrowing) the partnership for those lucky few (less than 10% of
the staff accountants) who are eventually invited to become partners.
If our recent undergraduates really took the trouble to compare the NPVs,
I think newly-minted accounting professors have a comparable or even better
outlook if the competing alternatives are weighted by the relatively low
probabilities of becoming an executive partner in a large CPA firm. Smaller
CPA firms are harder to compare, because they vary to such a huge extent.
Some partners of small CPA firms net over a million dollars each year and
many others barely scrape out a living in their home offices.
When you couple this with the wonderful lifestyle opportunities and
sabbatical leaves, I always thought of myself as having lived in tall cotton
for 40 years before I retired. Now I live in grass that's becoming too tall
since I've put off mowing.
Bob Jensen
May 3, 2007 reply from Randy Kuhn
[jkuhn@BUS.UCF.EDU]
CPA firm salary ranges obviously vary
by location, but really not all that much honestly. Here in Orlando, staff
auditors fresh out of school or even experienced hires from smaller firms
into the new Big 6 are receiving offers of $50 with $2-3k signing bonuses
this semester. This is consistent across the more popular disciplines
(audit, tax, business advisory). Business advisory (business process & IT
audit/consulting) starts to pull ahead at the manager stage and takes 1-2
years less per level for promotion. Whereas audit typically takes 12 years
for partner, business advisory can be as quick as 9 years with a greater
probability of making partner due to the demand/supply (not many hybrids out
there that know financial, business process, and IT). As a 2nd year advisory
manager (10 yrs exp) my base was $100k two years ago while the first-year
audit senior manager with comparable experience received less than $90k
which I think is on the low-end. The month I started the PhD program, one of
my friends in a nearby office made audit partner at the age of 34 receiving
a bump in salary from $150k to $225k with the promotion. Not sure about his
loan though.
May 3, 2007 message from Bob Jensen
Hi
Richard (Sansing),
I’m
still trying to find a PhD program that extends beyond the blinders of the
social science research paradigm. I need to look a little closer at
Bentley’s new program. Also there are a few AIS tracks in existing programs,
but my guess is that the AIS majors still have to take the econometrics
qualifying courses and exams.
Your
NPV sidetrack took us off the main issue regarding why our leading academic
journals and virtually all of our accounting doctoral programs define
accounting research as a social science that requires the requisite skills
in advanced statistics, econometrics, psychometrics, sociometrics, etc.
The
fact of the matter is that our current doctoral programs are critically
unable to meet demand according to the AACSB and Plumlee et al ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/03MainDocumentMar2007.htm
The supply is steadily dwindling with less than 100 graduates per year (and
less than 20 a year in auditing, tax, and systems). The demand is at least
ten times the supply and probably higher. Accounting education programs will
soon be to the point were virtually all of the instructors have no
doctorates or have only doctorates in economics, law, education, etc.
The
problem as I pointed out in earlier correspondence is a mismatch between
accounting graduates who want to study and do research in accounting but
have neither the aptitude nor an interest in becoming social scientists (and
in particular econometricians studying capital markets).
Accounting doctoral programs increasingly have ignored other research
paradigms outside the social science paradigm. For example, I do not find
humanities or legal research paradigm choices being offered in any
accounting doctoral program. Philosophy departments, history departments,
and law schools give doctorates to students who have few, if any, social
science research skills.
Is
there any university in the U.S. where a doctoral student can major in
accounting history without having to become a social scientist? Is there a
doctoral program in the U.S. where a student can major in accounting
philosophy? Is there any doctoral program in the U.S. that uses a law school
research paradigm?
And
lastly, I would like to point out that our leading journals and award
selection committees tend to ignore submissions based upon any research
paradigm other than a social science research paradigm.
The AICPA and the AAA jointly award a "Notable Contributions to
Accounting Literature Award" of $2,500 and a plaque at the AAA's annual
meetings. For the past 20 years, these awards have virtually all gone to
empirical research using positivist research methodologies.
This year I'm on the Selection Committee for the first time. The fact
that the Screening Committee only gave us empirical studies to select from
for the 2007 award to be granted in Chicago makes me wonder why only
empirical studies are candidates for Selection Committee evaluation.
The criteria for the award are embedded in the following paragraphs at
http://aaahq.org/awards/nominat3.htm
Begin Quote
**************
The Screening Committee for the Joint AICPA/AAA Notable Contributions to
Accounting Literature Award invites nominations of outstanding articles,
books, monographs, or other publications for consideration. Nominations from
regular and irregular (e.g., AICPA-sponsored research studies or monographs)
publications, as well as from nonaccounting publications, may be submitted
as long as the nominated work is relevant to accounting. Both academic and
practitioner nominations will be accepted.
Nominated items must
have been published within the years 2002 to 2006. Each nomination must be
accompanied by a brief supporting statement (no more than 150 words)
summarizing reasons for the nomination that are consistent with the award
selection criteria. These criteria include: uniqueness and potential
magnitude of contribution to accounting education, practice and/or future
accounting research; breadth of potential interest; originality and
innovative content; clarity and organization of exposition; and soundness
and appropriateness of methodology.
End Quote
**************
This important award can go to both research and other scholarly
literature contributions in accountancy. The Award's research literature is
not restricted to empirical research and positivist methods. What is curious
to me is why only this subset of the literature is repeatedly the only
winning subset.
What is even more curious this is why even the literature pieces
forwarded this year are only esoteric empirical research studies of dubious
value to "accounting education and practice." I say of "dubious value" in
the sense of highly simplified modeling assumptions and no replication of
the findings by other researchers.
Shouldn't the award winning literature item be at least independently
replicated if it is an empirical research study? My previous lament over
lack of replication in academic accounting research can be found at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Replication
The accountics bias seems to be rearing up repeatedly in this award
process for the past two decades. Is it because of narrowness in the
nomination process? Have members of the AAA given up nominating literature
that is not of an esoteric accountics nature? Is it because only empirical
research is deemed notable by the Screening Committees?
For more on the accountics bias in academe, go to
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
Also see the various commentaries at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
May 3, 2007 reply from Paul Williams
[Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]
I agree that the conversation has drifted a bit
from the original question, but if Bob's friend has been following this
discussion, he might be inclined to think ill of his prospects for doing
what he wants. It is largely the case now that U.S. PhD programs are as
Jagdish and Bob have characterized them.
There are a few places in the U.S. where Bob's
friend might be able to pursue an interest in accounting. Central Florida
and South Florida are PhD programs that offer some diversity of faculty
talent that provide a doctoral student with flexibility for pursuing
whatever interest excites them.
North Texas and Case Western Reserve are other
places. There are probably others, but they are fewer and farther between
than they were when I went through the experience. If Bob's friend is
adventuresome, there are many excellent doctoral opportunities at schools
outside the U.S. For example, the University of Alberta has a diverse
faculty, which allows the pursuit of interests that would simply not be
tolerated in most U.S. doctoral programs.
Then there are schools in the UK and Australia.
Adelaide, Wollongong, Cardiff, Strathclyde, Essex, the list goes on. These
places afford someone a different experience from many US programs and
provide much greater freedom to follow one's intellectual bliss than the
stultifying places that are the U.S. "elite."
Paul
May 11, 2007 reply from Sue P. Ravenscroft [ACCT]
[sueraven@iastate.edu]
Sue gave me permission to forward a somewhat laundered version of her original
message. It confirms what I've been arguing aud nauseum. The number of
accounting student doctoral graduates in the U.S. plunged to less than 100 per
year to meet an exploding demand for accounting professors. A major cause of the
shortage of applicants to doctoral programs is that these econometrics programs
do not interest most accountants in the pool of possible applicants to such
doctoral programs. Nearly all available accounting doctoral programs
(not just Tier I
programs) are no longer accounting programs and have no dedicated
accounting courses. They’re literally social science methodology programs with
most emphasis on econometrics and no choices for other research methodologies
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
Dear Bob,
I was just contacted by a wonderful young woman,
who graduated from Iowa State University last year. She is bright,
personable, hard-working, and interested in going into a PhD program. She is
NOT interested in doing a highly quantitative economics-based program, but
can handle the math and statistics needed for behavioral research. I feel
fortunate in the timing of her inquiry, because I observed the discussion
about a young man you know who is looking into doctoral schools, and the
subsequent advice from Sansing that he consider only a Tier One school
because of the "alleged choices" such schools provide versus the
counter-advice of actually getting training to do what one loves.
The young woman has already received the Tier
One type advice and was totally taken aback and turned off by it. The
assistant professor who gave her that advice told her she should take two
years of college level advanced math courses and then apply, because she is
definitely bright enough to go to a Tier One school and should not even
consider going to a Tier Two type institution.
Her goal was to enter a program in fall of 2008. After that set-back she
wrote me, and I was far more encouraging.......I told her that I had just
seen a rather long (albeit sometimes almost hostile) exchange about the
types of programs available and the wisdom of going to the "Tier One"
schools even if that wasn't where one's interest or heart lay.....This
student is a wise young woman and doesn't want to be trained to do something
she doesn't want to do.....
So, I am writing to ask if you have a final listing
of schools that might be more open to a variety of research
approaches.....If so, could you please write to me (address above or to
her). I would be ever so grateful.
Thank you very much.
Best regards,
Sue Ravenscroft
May 15, 2007 reply from Dana Carpenter
[dcarpenter@MATCMADISON.EDU]
I have followed the need a favor thread with great
interest. I am in my mid 40'sand have taught at community colleges (with a
few years at bachelor granting universities) for 20 years following 3 years
with KPMG. I have always wanted to get my doctorate for personal
actualization and would be interested in teaching at a regional university.
I scored 99 percentile on the verbal portion of the GMAT but just average on
the Mathematics. Two years ago I was told during an interview with a very
prestigous school that with a few semesters of calculus I could probably
gain admission to their Ph. D Program. I was also admitted to a Ph. D in
management at a different college. I decided against both options. I would
definitely be interested in a DBA or some of the teaching oriented or
blended accounting Ph. D's that have been discussed. In my situation (with
fewer years left in my career) I am really not interested in a professorship
at a Top Tier University. For the same reasons I hesitate to give up a job I
love and earn no income for 4 or 5 years at a minimum. I would be interested
in your response to the Accounting DBA question as well as specific ideas as
to programs or perhaps a different field with a concentration in accounting.
Dana Carpenter
(608) 246-6590
May 4, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen
Your experience, Dana, is very typical of the many students at all ages
who are turned off by having to study five years of social science research
to obtain a tenure track position to be an accounting professor.
To my knowledge, the distinction between a PhD and a DBA from a Tier 1
research university is about as marked as the distinction between ketchup
vs. catsup. Both doctoral degrees are intended to instill research skills in
students intent on careers in academia. The DBA used to entail a more
rounded set of business courses (management, organization behavior, finance,
marketing, etc.) but I think most accounting PhD and DBA programs have
dropped required courses except for a few research seminars and possibly
some social science (especially economics) and statistics courses.
The DBA used to focus more on the "application of theory" as opposed to
the "development of new theory" in a PhD program ---
http://dr-hy.com/Menu-Bar/mVita/DBA-vs-PHD.html
In my opinion, these distinctions between the two degrees have largely
evaporated. The U.S. Department of Education and the National Science
Foundation recognize numerous research-oriented doctoral degrees such as the
D.B.A. as "equivalent" to the Ph.D. and do not discriminate between them ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doctor_of_Business_Administration
Certainly the distinction between DBA versus PhD in business schools
is not as great as the distinction between EED and PhD in schools of
education.
Probably the best known business school that offers DBA and PhD degrees
is the Harvard Business School. If you major in a traditional business area
(e.g., accounting, marketing, management strategy, information technology)
you get a DBA. If you major in business economics, health policy, or
organization behavior you get a PhD. The actual distinction between the two
designations is not at all clear to me. About the only thing I can tell is
that some HBS doctoral students get ketchup on their hamburgers and others
get catsup.
Most certainly, having a DBA will not change the criteria for obtaining
tenure later in life. I do not know of any serious university that will put
higher weightings on teaching performance for DBA faculty versus higher
weightings on research for PhD faculty.
Amy Dunbar provided a link to a good listing of international doctoral programs
---
http://aaahq.org/ata/_ATAMenu/phd-programs.htm
Questions raised are how large each program is and what have been the
trends in growth or shrinkage. As new doctoral programs came on line, the
very large doctoral programs such as those in Illinois, Michigan, Texas,
Indiana, and Michigan State greatly reduced doctoral program size in the
1986-2005 period. What used to be large programs shrank greatly in size.
Some smaller programs like Rice have gone out of accounting doctoral
programs entirely. Some like Minnesota seem to have disappeared without
making any official announcements.
A listing of the history of U.S. accounting doctoral programs is provided
in your free Prentice-Hall Hasselback Accounting Faculty Directory
(at least in the hard copy version). The Doctoral Program History table is
on the page preceding the start of the alphabetized listing of accounting
faculty by college. In don't think this table is available in Jim's Online
Directory at http://rarc.rutgers.edu/raw/hasselback/
There are some errors in the Hasselback table that are due mainly to
failures of some programs to accurately report their own data to Jim. But
except for Penn State, I think the recent undercounting is relatively minor.
Jim also provides the totals by year. The last column is generally way
off for the most recent year because of reporting time lags. However, the
preceding columns are relatively accurate.
In the past twenty years, the most accounting doctoral graduates reported
for the U.S. was 207 in 1988. The least was 69 in 2003. It has not been over
100 since 2001.
The
depressing Plumlee et al (2006) study is probably more accurate for the year
2004. Further analysis is provided at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
Bob Jensen
May 11, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen
A summary listing of non-traditional programs was provided by Paul
Williams in the listing of messages at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
The snipped version is
http://snipurl.com/1jb1g
One of the subsequent messages that I sent to my Student YYYYY is shown
below:
Message from Bob Jensen to YYYYY
I’m particularly happy that you’re now motivated to become an
accounting educator. I loved this profession.
First and foremost is your GMAT score that determines almost
everything regarding admission to any respectable doctoral program.
Consider all your options for having as high a score as possible.
Second you need to honestly evaluate your aptitude for statistics and
mathematics. Nearly all accounting doctoral programs are tantamount to
econometrics programs these days with great stress on econometrics
models of capital markets data.
I don’t know if you followed the recent AECM lively exchange on this
topic or not. You can read some of the messages at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
A listing of doctoral programs is provided at
http://aaahq.org/ata/_ATAMenu/phd-programs.htm
I know you are somewhat interested in taxation. In nearly all
instances, taxation doctoral students still have to master the
econometrics requirements of capital markets research.
If you are looking for the handful of programs that allow you to
customize your program and possibly cut back on the econometrics
hurdles, I recommend that you look into the following programs, messages
about which appear at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
Bentley College (Boston) This is a new program that I don’t yet know
much about. Bentley is a very good accounting and finance college,
although I would not expect it to be strong for a tax concentration.
Case Western University (Cleveland)
University of Central Florida (Orlando)
University of South Florida (Tampa)
University of North Texas (Denton)
Various programs outside the U.S. (Please scroll down to the
informative message from Paul Williams in this regard) ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
If I can be of further help, please let me know.
Bob Jensen
May 12, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
--- Sue Ravenscroft wrote (to Bob Jensen, who then
posted it here):
I feel fortunate in the timing of her inquiry,
because I observed the discussion about a young man you know who is
looking into doctoral schools, and the subsequent advice from Sansing
that he consider only a Tier One school because of the "alleged choices"
such schools provide versus the counter-advice of actually getting
training to do what one loves.
---
For those interested in what I actually said, as
opposed to how it is characterized above, I repeat it below.
"I would encourage your friend to think about the
real option aspect of this decision. He should be very confident of his
decision to not pursue a Ph.D. at a research-oriented program before
bypassing that option. If he studies at Chicago and makes an informed
decision not to pursue "mainstream" academic research, then he will be
over-trained for his dream job at the kind of liberal arts college you
describe. But he also has the option of pursuing the research route. But if
he studies at a place that puts less emphasis on research methods, he has
limited his options at the outset."
Later in the same thread, I also said:
"My point was that the decision Bob's friend makes
regarding a Ph.D. program will significantly affect the opportunities that
he or she faces upon graduation, which will in turn affect subsequent
academic opportunties as well. Unless one is very sure about what what one's
preferences will be in the future, the course of action that preserves
options has a lot to recommend it. Whether one ultimately prefers a career
that features both research and teaching, or wants to teach and do no
research, it would be nice to have the skill set needed to make have a real
choice."
Richard Sansing
May 12, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Richard,
Even better advice would be to avoid accounting
altogether if you want to be a top researcher in a Tier 1 accounting
research university. Consider the role model examples. Ron Dye (Northwestern
Accounting Professor) has his doctorate and undergraduate degrees in
mathematics and economics with almost no accounting. Some of our other top
accounting researchers have management science, mathematics, econometrics,
and psychometric doctorates with very little in the way of accountancy
education and/or experience in accounting practice. What accounting they
learned is when having to teach a little about it after they became
professors.
I'm not trying to be facetious or cynical here.
Those of us that majored in accounting for five years had to take a lot more
time in college to earn a doctorate in an accounting doctoral program. It is
actually quite costly in time and opportunity cost to first become an
accountant and then enter one of our present accounting doctoral programs.
It is far more efficient to major in economics and then earn an econometrics
doctorate from a prestigious Economics Department. Equally great is to earn
a doctorate in computer science.
The only risk of not having an accounting background
as far as I can tell is the risk of not getting tenure in a Tier 1
accounting university. Without accounting, it is more difficult for tenure
rejects to become accounting teachers in Tier 2 and Tier 3 colleges and
universities. Those universities typically require more knowledge of
accountancy.
Accounting majors realistically face 12 years of
full-time undergraduate and graduate studies before graduating with a
doctorate in an accounting program. On top of that, accounting doctoral
programs prefer that doctoral candidates have 1-5 years of accounting
practice experience. This adds up to 13-17 years to graduate from an
accounting doctoral program.
An economics major can earn an economics doctorate
in seven years of full-time studies before graduating with a doctorate from
an Economics Department. If she or he bothers to earn a MBA degree along the
way, it may take eight years to complete the doctorate. Under new AACSB
rules, doctoral graduates in economics, statistics, mathematics, psychology,
etc. are fully qualified to become accounting professors.
I must admit that I reasoned exactly like you,
Richard, until I pushed Student XXXXX into a Tier 1 accounting doctoral
program that he withdrew from after his first semester in spite of his being
a brilliant math student (double major with accounting).This unfortunate
outcome made me think more seriously about why the pool for accounting
doctoral students is drying up.
Once again consider the Plumlee et al findings:
Plumlee et al. (2006) discovered that there were only 29 doctoral students
in auditing and 23 in tax out of the 2004 total of 391 accounting doctoral
students enrolled in years 1-5 in the United States. The number of graduates
has shrunk to less than 100 per year.
If the Tier 1 accounting doctoral programs (and in
fact virtually all accounting doctoral programs) require that all applicants
have the advanced mathematics, statistics, and economics, we have in fact
added possibly two more years to a five-year accounting program just to
enter the accounting doctoral program applicant pool. Alternately, an
applicant might be admitted provisionally into an accounting doctoral
studies program and take the two years of econometrics preparatory courses
in what becomes tantamount to a six or seven year doctoral full-time studies
program in graduate school.
My conclusions are as follows.
1. To become an accounting professor in a Tier 1
accounting program it is far more efficient and possibly more effective
(toward tenure) to earn social science, mathematics, or statistics
doctorate outside accounting in a highly prestigious university.
Accounting doctoral programs are actually inefficient alternatives to
becoming an accounting professor in a Tier 1 accounting program unless
you cannot get into a highly prestigious non-accounting doctoral
program.
2. The pool of applicants for accounting
doctoral programs is drying up. Accountants with 1-5 years of experience
typically want to study accounting if they choose to enter a doctoral
program. Since virtually all accounting doctoral programs in the United
States are social science (particularly econometrics) programs with few
if any accounting courses, these programs do not appeal to accountants.
These doctoral programs might appeal to economists and statisticians,
but it is far more efficient to earn economics and statistics doctorates
from Departments of Economics and Statistics.
Thus I gave the wrong advice to my Student XXXXX who
was a brilliant dual major in accounting and mathematics. Instead of
recommending a doctoral program in accounting (where he really did not want
a forced feeding of econometrics), I should've recommended that he go
directly into a prestigious mathematics doctoral program. Then he could
ultimately apply to become an accounting professor in a Tier 1 accounting
research university after getting his mathematics doctorate.
Since the number of graduates from accounting
doctoral programs is less than 100 students per year, Tier 1 research
universities are often forced to seek top graduates from non-accounting
doctoral programs such as econometrics and management science programs in
prestigious universities.
Isn't it sad that for some accounting professors
like me, majoring in accounting was wasted time.
Bob Jensen
May 13, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
Bob,
I suspect that Ron Dye would recommend studying
under Ron Dye at Kellogg's accounting Ph.D. program! One way to find out--
I'll ask him and post his response.
Some of your analysis seems exaggerated. I came
into the doctoral program with a very weak math background. In my three
years of coursework, roughly 1/3 of my classes were accounting research
seminars and 2/3 were math and economics classes. When you say:
"If the Tier 1 accounting doctoral programs (and in
fact virtually all accounting doctoral programs) require that all applicants
have the advanced mathematics, statistics, and economics, we have in fact
added possibly two more years to a five-year accounting program just to
enter the accounting doctoral program applicant pool."
you are double counting. You take those "tools"
courses during the five-year accounting doctoral program, not in addition to
it.
I think that trying to become an accounting
researcher without taking the accounting research seminars and attending the
weekly accounting research workshops would be very difficult.
I would ask someone considering an accounting
academic career what sort of questions they would like to answer. Much of
this thread has framed the questions in negative terms "How do I avoid
course X during my doctoral program?" rather than in positive terms "How do
I learn how to answer question Y?"
Richard Sansing
May 14, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Richard,
"Three years" is bad advice these days! Your college (Dartmouth) does not
have a doctoral program. Let me use as a benchmark what I view as a typical
accounting doctoral program in the 21st Century. The University of Florida
writes that it takes 4-5 years to complete an accounting PhD for students
entering with strong mathematics backgrounds. Students who must additionally
take the "mathematics preparatory courses" must anticipate six or seven
years of full-time effort.
Apparently your experience (advice?) differs from the advice given by the
accounting professor who advised Sue's accounting graduate to take two more
years "advanced mathematics" before applying to accounting doctoral
programs.
It also differs from my experience trying to place some top accounting
graduates in accounting doctoral programs in recent years. Nearly all who
were admitted had significantly stronger mathematics credentials than those
that were rejected. Most programs now advise applicants that (even
those with math credentials and masters degrees) the accounting doctoral
program will take 4-5 years (See the University of Florida statement quoted
below).
In fact most universities make a concerted effort to recruit accounting
doctoral program candidates who do not have accounting degrees. Virtually
every accounting doctoral program has a mathematics matriculation
requirement that is now quite formidable (possibly more so for applicants
today than for us applicants in the 20th Century). Consider the following
statement at the Fisher School of Accounting Website at the University of
Florida.
Note in particular the suggested admission alternatives of "economics,
engineering, mathematics, operations research, psychology, and statistics."
No mention is made of such undergraduate degrees as history, philosophy, or
other humanities degrees, and I suspect that unless a humanities graduate is
very strong in mathematics, the chances are zero of being admitted to most
any U.S. accounting doctoral program even among humanities graduates that
are actively recruited by top law schools. By the way, top law schools in
particular recruit accounting graduates more aggressively than accounting
doctoral programs in my opinion. One of the major reasons for the shrinking
pool of applicants to accounting doctoral programs is the now preferred
option to go to law school (including some who want to specialize in tax and
eventually teach tax at the college level with a JD credential).
Begin Quote
*************
University of Florida Ph.D. in Business Administration
- Accounting
Ph.D.
Program - Accounting Concentration
This program is
open to all applicants who have completed an
undergraduate degree. Individuals with a degree in a
non-business discipline (e.g.,
economics, engineering, mathematics, operations
research, psychology, statistics) are encouraged
to apply.
Program Details (pdf)
Students are required to demonstrate
math competency prior to matriculating the doctoral
program. Each student's background will be evaluated
individually, and guidance provided on ways a student
can ready themselves prior to beginning the doctoral
course work. There are
opportunities to complete preparatory course work at the
University of Florida prior to matriculating our
doctoral program.
The accounting concentration is designed
to be completed in four to five years.
The first year of the program is
essentially lockstep with doctoral students in economics
and finance. Starting in the second year,
individual course work is designed by the student in
consultation with his or her supervisory committee and
the accounting graduate coordinator. Other than the
Accounting Seminars (listed below) there are no specific
required courses after the first year of the program.
Accounting Seminars :
ACG 7939 Theoretical Constructs
in Accounting
ACG 7979 Accounting Readings and Replication
ACG 7885 Empirical Research Methods in
Accounting
ACG 7979 Accounting Readings and Research
Project
ACG 7887 Research Analysis in Accounting
|
Ph.D. Co-Major Program with the
Department of Statistics
A program of
study for a single degree in which a student satisfies
co-major requirements in two separate academic
disciplines that offer the Ph.D.
|
End Quote
*************
Is there any accounting doctoral program in the United States that
encourages humanities graduates to apply? Is there an accounting doctoral
program in the entire United States that has a co-major with the Department
of Philosophy or the Department of History?
As of today, The University of Florida graduated four accounting PhDs
since Year 2000. As far as I can tell, none of them were undergraduate
accounting majors. Degrees in engineering, economics, and mathematics most
likely hastened completion of their doctoral degrees in accounting at
Florida in less than six or seven years. I mention Florida only because
Florida is not a unique accounting doctoral program in this regard. I
commend Florida for being more honest than some when stating the program
requirements.
The bottom line is that I don't think that the doctoral program that you
(Richard) entered "with a very weak math background" and completed in three
years makes you a relevant role model for today's applicants to doctoral
programs. My reading is that today you could not even be admitted to the
University of Florida accounting doctoral program unless you completed the "preparatory
course work at the University of Florida prior to matriculating our doctoral
program." We (you and me) are no longer role models in that regard
for applicants to accounting doctoral programs.
In my case I was admitted to the doctoral program but then had to take
all those extra undergraduate math, operations research, economics, and
statistics courses while in the program. My PhD graduation would've been
hastened at Stanford if I had majored in mathematics or statistics instead
of accounting as an undergraduate. I perhaps then could've graduated in
three years instead of the five full (and delightful) years that I spent in
Palo Alto. Now
I think it requires six or seven years in Palo Alto for candidates who must
take the preparatory undergraduate courses. In my day we did not have all
those accounting research seminars at the graduate level.
Bob Jensen
May 13, 2007 reply from
Bob,
You are not confused. And I am not brainwashed. ;-)
My point, as you well know, is that when we do
research using archival data we need math skills. Different types of
research appear to be rewarded differently, as evidenced by the salary
differentials across the schools at a university.
Amy
May 14, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi
Amy,
You
wrote that "when we do research using archival data we need
math skills."
To which I respectfully
reply as follows:
Not everything
that can be counted, counts. And not everything that counts can be counted.
Albert Einstein
I think that
you're confining doctoral scholarship to archives that can be counted and
overlooking the archives, possibly the most relevant archived information,
that cannot be counted.
In the
United States, following the Gordon/Howell and Pierson reports, our
accounting doctoral programs and leading academic journals bet the farm on
the social sciences without taking the due cautions of realizing why the
social sciences are called "soft sciences." They're soft because "not
everything that can be counted, counts. And not everything that counts can
be counted."
It seems to
me that history scholars have a much longer history of analyzing archival
data than most any other type of scholars, I wonder what the discipline of
history would’ve become if every history scholar over the past 1,000 years
had to have two years of preparatory “advanced mathematics” before entering
a doctoral program in history.
It seems to
me that legal scholars have a very long and scholarly history of doing
research on archival data, especially court records, I wonder what the
discipline of law would’ve become if every legal scholar over the past 1,000
years had to have two years of preparatory “advanced mathematics” before
entering a JD program.
Many of our
serious professional problems needing research in accounting are closer to
law than economics. Particularly vexing are the issues of how to account for
complex contracts (e.g., those with derivatives, contingencies, and
intangibles) in settings where the contracts are being written to deceive
investors and creditors. Must years of advanced mathematics and econometrics
necessary conditions for conducting academic research to help the profession
with these contracts?
Where would
we be in medicine, law, and most other professions if it was dictated on
high that all their doctoral programs had to require advanced mathematics?
Would they find themselves in the mess we have today in academic accounting
in the United States where the pool of potential doctoral candidates is
drying up?
Would we
find ourselves in the mess of having to rely on adjuncts to teach more of
the accounting courses than our tenure-track faculty who bargained for
minimal teaching and maximal salaries and benefits so they could conduct
econometric and psychometric research with models of dubious relevance to
the practicing profession?
Why is it
that virtually all of our doctoral programs in accounting are now being
shunned by so many accounting professionals who would like to teach
accounting, auditing, tax, or AIS but are turned off by having to first take
preparatory courses in advanced mathematics and not have the opportunity for
studying accounting in accounting doctoral programs?
In academic
accounting we’ve almost all been seduced by frustrated economists in the
U.S. who found a way to secure a monopoly by putting up barriers to entry
that shrinks the supply of accounting doctoral graduates and lifts the
salaries of accounting professors to the highest levels in every university.
Most of us, especially me, have benefited from these barriers to entry. But
in the process, we’ve widened the schism between professors of accounting
and the accounting profession and students of accounting.
These
barriers to entry to doctoral programs have frustrated practicing
accountants to a point where doctoral programs like the one at the
University of Florida are in many cases more appealing to non-accountants ("economics,
engineering, mathematics, operations research, psychology, and statistics")
who can matriculate into the program with their advanced mathematics skills
and graduate from the program without every having studied the things we
teach our undergraduates and masters students in accounting. In fairness,
the current body of eight accounting doctoral students at the University of
Florida has three candidates with undergraduate degrees in accounting.
Others include a mathematics major, a statistics major, a finance major, a
commerce major, and a student who majored in economics. The finance major
also earned a masters of accounting degree.
It seems to
me that in the United States after the Gordon/Howell and Pierson reports our
accounting doctoral programs and leading academic journals bet the farm on
the social sciences without heeding the due cautions of realizing why the
social sciences are called "soft sciences." They're soft because "not
everything that can be counted, counts. And not everything that counts can
be counted."
Why is it
that only outside the United States various accounting doctoral programs in
prestigious universities have seen the light regarding diversity of research
methodologies in academic accountancy?
Bob Jensen
May 13, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
--- Bob Jensen wrote:
Even better advice would be to avoid accounting
altogether if you want to be a top researcher in a Tier 1 accounting
research university. Consider the role model examples. Ron Dye
(Northwestern Accounting Professor) has his doctorate and undergraduate
degrees in mathematics and economics with almost no accounting. Some of
our other top accounting researchers have management science,
mathematics, econometrics, and psychometric doctorates with very little
in the way of accountancy education and/or experience in accounting
practice. What accounting they learned is when having to teach a little
about it after they became professors.
--- end of quote ---
Here is Ron's response, along with the question
that I posed to him.
About the question: by and large, I think it is
a mistake for someone interested in pursuing an academic career in
accounting not to get a phd in accounting. If you look at the "success"
stories, there aren't many: most of the people who make a post-phd
transition fail. I think that happens for a couple reasons. 1. I think
some of the people that transfer late do it for the money, and aren't
really all that interested in accounting. While the $ are nice, it is
impossible to think about $ when you are trying to come up with an idea,
and anyway, you're unlikely to come up with an idea unless you're really
interested in the subject. 2. I think, almost independent of the field,
unless you get involved in the field at an early age, for some reason it
becomes very hard to develop good intuition for the area - which is a
second reason good problems are often not generated by "crossovers."
The bigger thing - not related to the question
you raise - but maybe you could add to the discussion is that there are,
as far as I can tell, not a lot of new ideas being put forth by anyone
in accounting nowadays (with the possible exception of John Dickhaut's
neuro stuff). In most fields, the youngsters are supposed to come up
with the new problems, techniques, etc., but I see a lot more mimicry
than innovation among newly minted phds now.
Anyway, for what it's worth....
Ron
May 14, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Richard,
I thank you for obtaining a reply from Ron Dye. He's one among a number
of leading researchers who became an accounting professor without having a
background in accounting. He's also one of the finest mathematics
researchers in academic accounting.
What is especially interesting to me is Ron's conclusion that essentially
our highly touted and highly selective accounting doctoral programs (with
the highest-paid graduates in academe) in the United States are pretty much
failures if we define research as the creation of new and innovative
knowledge. I love his choice of the word "mimicry" in his following
conclusion:
Begin Quote
**********************
The bigger thing - not related to the question
you raise - but maybe you could add to the discussion is that there are,
as far as I can tell, not a lot of new ideas being put forth by anyone
in accounting nowadays (with the possible exception of John Dickhaut's
neuro stuff). In most fields, the youngsters are supposed to come up
with the new problems, techniques, etc., but I see a lot more mimicry
than innovation among newly minted phds now.
**********************
End Quote
I might add that John Dickhaut is nowhere close to being a newly-minted
doctoral student. He's an old guy who got his PhD at Ohio State in 1970
before Ohio State transitioned into its present highly mathematical
accounting doctoral program. This illustrates how innovative research can
come from graduates of accounting doctoral programs that do not (at least
way back then) require advanced mathematics.
I suggested that Ron Dye's route to becoming an accounting academic was
more efficient in the sense of taking less time (three years in an
economics doctoral program at Carnegie built upon his mathematics
undergraduate degree) rather than the route of entering an accounting
doctoral program where it now takes 4-5 years built upon a mathematics
undergraduate degree or 6-7 years built upon a typical accounting
undergraduate degree if the student has to take the two years of preparatory
mathematics required by many of our top accounting doctoral programs.
In terms of accountics, I think our econometrics-based accounting
doctoral programs are probably better for us than doctoral programs in the
economics departments because accounting doctoral students are more likely
to conduct research on archival databases that are more of interest in
accounting than are the databases of interest to economics departments. The
downside is that the econometrics studies published in leading accounting
research journals by graduates of accounting doctoral programs have probably
reflected mostly "mimicry" lamented by Professor Dye.
In his message Professor Dye does not recommend that his streamlined
route to becoming an accounting professor (without an accounting education
background) serve as a role model. I tend to agree, although I now have
newer doubts. I'm currently evaluating publications submitted for the 2007
AICPA/AAA Notable Contributions to Literature Award. The Award's Screening
Committee filtered out all submissions that were not accountics papers.
Among those accountics papers submitted to our Selection Committee by the
Screening Committee, many of the authors do not have accounting backgrounds
and some of the submissions are from such journals as Management Science
and the Journal of Financial Economics. My recommendation for the
award will actually be a finance professor's paper that made it through the
Screening Committee. Sadly we have to go to finance and management science
graduates to find our most notable contributions to accounting literature.
This is
consistent with Ron's claim that among graduates of accounting doctoral
programs "I see a lot more mimicry than innovation among newly minted phds
now." Even some of our so-called Seminal Contributions to Accounting
Research Award-winning studies mimicked a lot from prior research of
economics and finance professors
Thanks to Ron Dye's reply, I'm even more concerned about our doctoral
programs in accounting and our leading academic accounting journals ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
Thanks for the favor Richard!
Bob Jensen
May 3, 2007 reply from J. S. Gangolly
[gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
1.
Students consider many factors before deciding to enter an accounting PhD
program, some of them random and/or serendipitous (as in my case; my
would-be advisor in Operations Research passed away within four months of my
stay in the program). But we need to ask why there are no takers inspite of
the astronomical salaries we offer, while outstanding candidates are begging
to be admitted into Phd programs in disciplines where tenure-track positions
are almost non-existent, or where a doctoral degree is only ticket to years
of serfdom as Postdocs.
The simple answer is that our field, AS WE PORTRAY
IT, is just not exciting to a young inquiring mind. In accounting there is
no Fermat's last theorem to be proved (as in mathematics), nor Hilbert's
entscheidungsproblem to be solved (as in Computing), nor the mind-body
problem (as in philosophy), nor new chemicals to be synthesised (chemistry),
grammar of lost languages to be discovered (anthropology), genes to be
targeted (medicine)....
A long time ago, Yuji Ijiri tried to convince us
that there were fundamental problems in accounting that are equally
challenging. How many of us even remember them today, or even have heard of
them?
Most of us have sought to use statistics the same
way a drunk uses a lamp post -- more for support than for illumination
(apologies to Mark Twain).
I personally think that often, these days, people
get into a PhD for a wrong reason, and some times live to regret it.
We accounting academics, especially in the
so-called research universities, are living a lie, thanks to AACSB. We
portray ourselves as scholars and yet rarely interact with the scholarly
community on our campuses. We claim to be academics in a professional
discipline and yet hardly interact with the profession in a meaningful way.
Aren't we like race horses with blinders on and no jockies?
2.
The shortage of PhD students in non-financial areas is also rigged. We make
it clear to the students which side of the toast is buttered. We dump on
journals in accounting other than those in the financial area which publish
the so-called "mainstream" (I prefer the term stale) research. Then we make
life difficult at tenure time for those who have not toed the party line. We
tolerate third rate pedagogy as long as it releases time for prima donnas to
indulge in stale irrelevant research. Then we squabble over what is "real"
research, and why what every one else is doing is not that. Is this a recipe
for recruiting young inquiring minds into our discipline?
I left the corporate world in the early seventies
because I was fascinated with the problems I had to deal with there (mostly
in operations) and the promise that Operations Research offered. Today,
however, As someone at the front end of the baby boom generation, I
sometimes wonder if, were I shopping today for a PhD program, I would leave
the corporate world if my success depended on toeing the party line.
Jagdish
May 13, 2007 reply from Roger Debreceny
[Roger@DEBRECENY.COM]
Just a plug for the Shidler PhD program. Given the
strategic direction of the Shidler College in international management, our
PhD program is somewhat different than the usual program. The program is in
International Management, with specializations in accounting, marketing, MIS
and so on. Details at
http://shidler.hawaii.edu/Programs/Graduate/PhDinInternationalManagement/PhDOverview/tabid/382/Default.aspx
. We're always looking for high quality candidates,
Roger Debreceny
Shidler College Distinguished Professor of Accounting
School of Accountancy
Shidler College of Business
University of Hawai`i at Mānoa
2404 Maile Way, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA
roger@debreceny.com
rogersd@hawaii.edu
Office: +1 808 956 8545 Cell: +1 808 393 1352
www.debreceny.com
May 13, 2007 reply from Dan Stone, Univ. of Kentucky
[dstone@UKY.EDU]
Please add the Univ. of Kentucky to the list of
doctoral programs that seek students interested in, and support, a variety
of research methods and topics. For example, among the 12 doctoral students
in residence currently, we have students pursuing research related to:
1. XBRL
2. Accounting issues related to environmental
sustainability 3. Knowledge management in professional service firms 4.
Applications of self-determination theory to motivating accounting
professionals 5. Accounting methods to aid economic development in emerging
economies 6. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting
Information about the Univ. of Kentucky doctoral
program is available at:
http://gatton.uky.edu/Programs/ACC/DoctoralDegreeInformation.html
We typically admit 2-3 students per year to the
program.
Happy Mother's Day!
Dan Stone (dstone@uky.edu)
Director of Graduate Studies
University of Kentucky
June 12, 2007 reply from doctoral student Randy Kuhn
[jkuhn@BUS.UCF.EDU]
Later this week, I will be attending the AAA
doctoral consortium held in Tahoe each year as a representative of the
University of Central.
Later this week, I will be attending the AAA
doctoral consortium held in Tahoe each year as a representative of the
University of Central Florida. A few minutes ago I received the message
below from one of the professors who will be presenting to the doctoral
candidates. Apparently, some of the students attending do not feel his
non-archival style of research is worth discussing at the consortium and
complained to one of the organizers prompting a well-established professor
from an elite private institution to essentially justify his place on the
agenda BEFORE we even arrive. I find this behavior not only completely rude
and disrespectful but just plain anti-academic from many angles. These folks
are complaining about one article out of 21. Should I email the organizer
complaining that two-thirds of the material on the agenda is from a
neo-classical, efficient markets slant in which I have no interest? My head
was spinning in circles for hours trying to grapple with the analytical
models that ultimately told me what I already intuitively knew. I’m game for
new experiences and will embrace the opportunity to learn about others’
research. Isn’t that what academia is supposed to be about? In the back of
my mind I kind of hope one of the complainers is my roommate so I can bore
him to tears each night discussing how accounting choices exist, are made by
people, are quite often not rational, and have mega impacts to society. Ok
enough of my diatribe, see the lengthy note to the consortium participants
below.
-Randy
June 12, 2007 reply from doctoral student Randy Kuhn
[jkuhn@BUS.UCF.EDU]
Boy, did I misconstrue the original email from the
professor. I emailed the professor to express my interest in his subject
matter and he responded by stating that he did not mean to imply students
had complained negatively about his articles. Rather, several students
complained about the overwhelming econometrics-based research on the agenda
and lack of diversity in the consortium curriculum. Big oopsy on my part!
That is a much brighter situation!
June 12, 2007 reply from Sue P. Ravenscroft
[sueraven@IASTATE.EDU]
Randy,
Thanks for the update....I am delighted to hear
that doctoral students are finally expressing some dissatisfaction at the
constrained nature of what is considered "good" research! As we attempt to
replace the retiring professoriate, we need to attract more people, which
should mean that we become more catholic in our research approaches, rather
than more restrictive.
Sue Ravenscroft
June 12, 2007 reply from Paul Williams
[Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]
Randy, et al.,
This is encouraging. When I attended the doctoral
consortium the only thing that was on the agenda was EMH. The consortium has
historically been an avenue for the ideologues (just check out who the
faculty at that thing have been over the years). At the one I attended,
Sandy Burton was invited for what appeared to be the sole purpose of
humiliating him because of his "naïve" beliefs about accounting and security
markets (he was invited to be the "normative" that the "positives" aimed to
purge from the academy).
The tide may be turning. Given your interests,
there are some recent books you might find useful.
Bent Flyvbjerg, "Making Social Science Matter,"
Cambridge University Press, 2001. Relying on research mainly from cognitive
psych and sociology he makes the case that, "Predictive theories and
universals cannot be found in the study of human affairs. Concrete,
context-dependent knowledge is therefore more valuable than the vain search
for predictive theories and universals (p. 73)."
A much better book than The Black Swan is David
Orrell's (Oxford U. PhD in mathematics), "The Future of Everything: The
Science of Prediction," Thunder's Mouth Press, 2007. Using the phenomena of
weather, securities markets, and genetic variablility as examples he argues
that complexity makes such phenomena "uncomputable," thus predicting them
with mathematical precision is impossible. Those wanting to understand Bob's
animus to "accountics" might find this a useful read.
Related, but specific to environmental science is
Orrin H. Pilkey and Linda Pilkey-Jarvis, "useless arithmetic: Why
Environmental Scientists Can't Predict the Future," Columbia University
Press, 2007.
Paul
June 13, 2007 reply from Mac Wright
[mac.wright@VU.EDU.AU]
Dear Randy, et al.,
Another book which might lend an interesting
direction to a discourse on the SEC is Clarke, F., Dean, G., Oliver, K.
Corporate Collapse – Accounting, regulatory and ethical failure, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2003.
While directed at the Australian regulatory
framework, the argument could be applied with equal validity to the SEC.
Kind regards,
Mac Wright
Co-Ordinator Aviation Program
Victoria University
Melbourne Australia
Fabio's Grad School Rulez (not humor) ---
http://orgtheory.wordpress.com/grad-skool-rulz/
GMAT: Paying for Points
Test-prep services can be a big help as applicants
prepare for the B-school admissions exam. Here, a rundown of some well-known
players
by Francesca Di Meglio
Business Week, May 22, 2007
http://www.businessweek.com/bschools/content/may2007/bs20070522_855049.htm
If you're
thinking of applying to B-school, then you're likely also
wondering how to conquer the Graduate Management Admission
Test (GMAT)—and whether a commercial test-preparation
service, which can cost upwards of $1,000, is right for you.
Although admissions committees, even at the best-ranked
B-schools, will tell you that your GMAT score is only one of
many criteria for getting accepted, you still should plan on
earning between 600 and a perfect 800, especially if you're
gunning for the A-list. (To find the average and median GMAT
scores of accepted students in individual programs, scan the
BusinessWeek.com B-school profiles.)
. . .
One
popular option is consulting a test-prep company that
provides everything from group instruction to online
courses. Here's an overview of the most popular GMAT
test-preparation services in alphabetical order. For more
opinions on the various test-prep services from test takers
themselves, visit the
BusinessWeek.com B-School forums,
where this subject comes up a lot. And you can also check
out BusinessWeek.com's newly updated
GMAT Prep page ---
http://www.businessweek.com/bschools/gmat/
Continued in article
Jensen Comment
The above article then goes on to identify the main commercial players in GMAT
coaching for a fee, including those with coaching books, coaching CDs, coaching
Websites, coaching courses, and one-on-one coaching tutorials with a supposed
expert near where you live. The Business Week capsule summaries are
rather nice summaries about options, costs, pros and cons of each coaching
option.
Kaplan ---
http://www.kaptest.com/
Manhattan GMAT ---
http://www.manhattangmat.com/gmat-prep-global-home.cfm
Princeton Review ---
http://www.princetonreview.com/mba/default.asp
Veritas ---
http://www.veritasprep.com/
Business Week fails to mention one of the better sites
(Test Magic) , in my viewpoint, for GMAT, SAT, GRE, and other test coaching:
Advice to students planning to take standardized tests such as the SAT, GRE,
GMAT, LSAT, TOEFL, etc.
See Test Magic at
http://www.testmagic.com/
There is a forum here where students
interested in doctoral programs in business (e.g., accounting and finance) and
economics discuss the ins and outs of doctoral programs.
Bob Jensen's threads about higher education
controversies are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm
A scientist in any serious scientific discipline, such
as genetics, would be in serious trouble if his fellow scientists were unable to
confirm or replicate his claim to have found the gene for fatness. He would gain
a reputation as being 'unreliable' and universities would be reluctant to employ
him. This self-imposed insistence on rigorous methodology is however missing
from contemporary epidemiology; indeed the most striking feature is the
insouciance with which epidemiologists announce their findings, as if they do
not expect anybody to take them seriously. It would, after all, be a very
serious matter if drinking alcohol really did cause breast cancer.
James Le Fanu ---
http://www.open2.net/truthwillout/human_genome/article/genome_fanu.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on replication are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Replication
Natural blondes are going extinct. It's a published fact!
Suppose this study had actually been reported a leading accounting research
journal such as The Accounting Review.
Keep in mind that leading accounting research journals do not publish
replication studies.
As a result few accounting researchers conduct replication studies since they
cannot be published.
The logical deduction becomes that accountants would forever think that natural
blondes are going extinct.
From the WSJ Opinion Journal on March 6,
2006
"Media outlets around the world, from CBS, ABC and CNN to the British
tabloids" all fell for a hoax--a fake study from the World Health
Organization claiming blondes are going extinct.
The Washington Post reported
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30318-2002Oct1.html
(Actually I think the story was removed with some very red faces)
"The decline and fall of the blonde is most
likely being caused by bottle blondes, who researchers believe are more
attractive to men than true blondes," said CBS "Early Show" co-host
Gretchen Carlson.
"There's a study from the World Health
Organization--this is for real--that says that blondes are an endangered
species," Charlie Gibson said on "Good Morning America," prompting Diane
Sawyer to say she's "going the way of the snail darter." . . .
"We've certainly never conducted any research
into the subject," WHO spokeswoman Rebecca Harding said yesterday from
Geneva. "It's been impossible to find out where it came from. It just
seems like it was a hoax."
The health group traced the story to an account
Thursday on a German wire service, which in turn was based on a
two-year-old article in the German women's magazine Allegra, which cited
a WHO anthropologist. Harding could find no record of such a man working
for the WHO.
Hey, if you're a journalist, we've got a great human-interest story for
you: Did you hear about the blonde who invented the solar flashlight? ---
http://www.zelo.com/blonde/no_brains.asp
Now you see how ridiculous the accounting journal
policy of not publishing replications becomes. Hopefully this published story in
a leading U.S. newspaper (I mean The Washington Post that broke the
Watergate scandal) the next time you read the findings in a leading accounting
research journal.
A Fraudulent Paper Published in Nature, a Prestigious Science
Journal
Another Case for Better Replication in Research Reporting
"'Grape harvest dates are poor indicators of summer warmth', as well as about
scientific publication generally," by Douglas J. Keenan, Informath,
November 3, 2006 ---
http://www.informath.org/apprise/a3200.htm
That is, the authors had developed a method that
gave a falsely-high estimate of temperature in 2003 and falsely-low
estimates of temperatures in other very warm years. They then used those
false estimates to proclaim that 2003 was tremendously warmer than other
years.
The above is easy enough to understand. It does not
even require any specialist scientific training. So how could the peer
reviewers of the paper not have seen it? (Peer reviewers are the scientists
who check a paper prior to its publication.) I asked Dr. Chuine what data
was sent to Nature, when the paper was submitted to the journal. Dr. Chuine
replied, “We never sent data to Nature”.
I have since published a short note that details
the above problem (reference below). There are several other problems with
the paper of Chuine et al. as well. I have written a brief survey of those
(for people with an undergraduate-level background in science). As described
in that survey, problems would be obvious to anyone with an appropriate
scientific background, even without the data. In other words, the peer
reviewers could not have had appropriate background.
What is important here is not the truth or falsity
of the assertion of Chuine et al. about Burgundy temperatures. Rather, what
is important is that a paper on what is arguably the world's most important
scientific topic (global warming) was published in the world's most
prestigious scientific journal with essentially no checking of the work
prior to publication.
Moreover—and crucially—this lack of checking is not
the result of some fluke failures in the publication process. Rather, it is
common for researchers to submit papers without supporting data, and it is
frequent that peer reviewers do not have the requisite mathematical or
statistical skills needed to check the work (medical sciences largely
excepted). In other words, the publication of the work of Chuine et al. was
due to systemic problems in the scientific publication process.
The systemic nature of the problems indicates that
there might be many other scientific papers that, like the paper of Chuine
et al., were inappropriately published. Indeed, that is true and I could
list numerous examples. The only thing really unusual about the paper of
Chuine et al. is that the main problem with it is understandable for people
without specialist scientific training. Actually, that is why I decided to
publish about it. In many cases of incorrect research the authors will try
to hide behind an obfuscating smokescreen of complexity and sophistry. That
is not very feasible for Chuine et al. (though the authors did try).
Finally, it is worth noting that Chuine et al. had
the data; so they must have known that their conclusions were unfounded. In
other words, there is prima facie evidence of scientific fraud. What will
happen to the researchers as a result of this? Probably nothing. That is
another systemic problem with the scientific publication process.
This is replication doing its job
Purdue University is investigating “extremely
serious” concerns about the research of Rusi Taleyarkhan, a professor of
nuclear engineering who has published articles saying that he had produced
nuclear fusion in a tabletop experiment,
The New York Times reported. While the research
was published in Science in 2002, the findings have faced increasing
skepticism because other scientists have been unable to replicate them.
Taleyarkhan did not respond to inquiries from The Times about the
investigation.
Inside Higher Ed, March 08, 2006 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/index.php/news/2006/03/08/qt
The
New York Times March 9 report is at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/08/science/08fusion.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
Question
What is an "out of sample" test?
Hint: It's related to the concept of "replication" that almost seems to be
unheard of in academic accounting research?
From Jim Mahar's Blog on June 29, 2006 ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
I am a big fan of so called "out of sample" tests.
When researchers find some anomaly within a data set and then others test
for the presence in the same data set, we really do not learn much if they
find the same thing. But when a new data set is used for the test, we have a
much better understanding of the possible anomaly.
In the current
JFQA
there is just such an article by
Richard Grossman and Stephen Shore. Using a data
set that goes from 1870 to 1913 for British stocks, the authors find no
small firm effect, and only a limited value effect.
In their own words:
"Unlike modern CRSP data, stocks that do not pay
dividends do not outperform stocks that pay small dividends during this
period. But like modern CRSP data, there is a weak relationship between
dividend yield and performance for stocks that pay dividends. In sum,
the size and reversal anomalies present in modern data are not present
in our historical data, while there is some evidence for a value
anomaly."
Which makes me wonder how many other things we think
we "know" we really don't.
The current version of the paper is not listed on SSRN, but a past version
of the paper is available (at least right now)
here.
The evidence
lies in lack of interest in replication
I wrote the following on December 1, 2004 at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
Faculty interest in a
professor’s “academic” research may be greater for a number of reasons.
Academic research fits into a methodology that other professors like to
hear about and critique. Since academic accounting and finance journals
are methodology driven, there is potential benefit from being inspired
to conduct a follow up study using the same or similar methods. In
contrast, practitioners are more apt to look at relevant (big) problems
for which there are no research methods accepted by the top journals.
Accounting
Research Farmers Are More Interested in Their Tractors Than in Their
Harvests
For a long time I’ve argued
that top accounting research journals are just not interested in the
relevance of their findings (except in the areas of tax and AIS). If the
journals were primarily interested in the findings themselves, they
would abandon their policies about not publishing replications of
published research findings. If accounting researchers were more
interested in relevance, they would conduct more replication studies. In
countless instances in our top accounting research journals, the
findings themselves just aren’t interesting enough to replicate. This is
something that I attacked at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/book02q4.htm#Replication
At one point back in the 1980s
there was a chance for accounting programs that were becoming “Schools
of Accountancy” to become more like law schools and to have their elite
professors become more closely aligned with the legal profession. Law
schools and top law journals are less concerned about science than they
are about case methodology driven by the practice of law. But the elite
professors of accounting who already had vested interest in scientific
methodology (e.g., positivism) and analytical modeling beat down case
methodology. I once heard Bob Kaplan say to an audience that no elite
accounting research journal would publish his case research. Science
methodologies work great in the natural sciences. They are problematic
in the psychology and sociology. They are even more problematic in the
professions of accounting, law, journalism/communications, and political
“science.”
We often criticize
practitioners for ignoring academic research Maybe they are just being
smart. I chuckle when I see our heroes in the mathematical theories of
economics and finance winning prizes for knocking down theories that
were granted earlier prizes (including Nobel prices). The Beta model was
the basis for thousands of academic studies, and now the Beta model is a
fallen icon. Fama got prizes for showing that capital markets were
efficient and then more prizes for showing they were not so “efficient.”
In the meantime, investment bankers, stock traders, and mutual funds
were just ripping off investors. For a long time, elite accounting
researchers could find no “empirical evidence” of widespread earnings
management. All they had to do was look up from the computers where
their heads were buried.
Few, if any, of the elite
“academic” researchers were investigating the dire corruption of the
markets themselves that rendered many of the published empirical
findings useless.
Academic researchers worship at
the feet of Penman and do not even recognize the name of Frank Partnoy
or Jim Copeland.
Bob Jensen
Question
In science it is somewhat common for published papers to subsequently be
withdrawn because the outcomes could not be replicated.
In the history of
accounting research has any published paper ever been "withdrawn" or “retracted”
because the results could not be replicated?
"Columbia researcher retracts more studies," The New York
Times via PhysOrg, June 15, 2006 ---
http://www.physorg.com/news69601046.html
A Columbia University researcher has reportedly
retracted four more scientific papers because the findings could not be
replicated.
Chemistry Professor Dalibor Sames earlier this year
retracted two other papers and part of a third published in a scientific
journal, The New York Times reported Thursday. All of the papers involved
carbon-hydrogen bond activation research.
Although Sames is listed as senior author on all of
the papers, one of his former graduate students -- Bengu Sezen -- performed
most of the experiments, the Times said.
Sames said each experiment has been repeated by at
least two independent scientists who have not been able to replicate the
results.
Sezen, a doctoral student in another field at the
University of Heidelberg in Germany, disputed the retractions, questioning
whether other members of Sames's group had tried to exactly repeat her
experiments, the newspaper said.
The retraction of one paper, published in the
journal Organic Letters in 2003, appeared Thursday, while the three others
published in The Journal of the American Chemical Society in 2002 and 2003
are to be formally retracted later this month, the Times said.
Jensen Comment
What's disappointing and inconsistent is that leading universities pushed
accounting research into positivist scientific methods but did not require that
findings be verified by independent replication. In fact leading academic
accounting research journals discourage replication by their absurd policies of
not publishing replications of published research outcomes. They also do not
publish commentaries that challenge underlying assumptions of purely analytical
research. Hence I like to say that academic accounting
researchers became more interested in their tractors than their harvests.
My threads on the dearth of replication/debate and some of the reasons top
accounting research journals will not publish replications and commentaries are
at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Relication
June 17, 2006 reply from Jagdish S. Gangolly
[gangolly@INFOTOC.COM]
Bob,
I have not heard of any one in accounting
retracting his/her work. It does not surprise me because of what I see to be
the philosophical suppositions of most empirical accounting researchers.
In my opinion, most of us in empirical accounting
research are, in many ways, stuck with the philosophical suppositions of
late 19th and early 20th century positivists of the Vienna school, the most
vocal proponent of the ideas whose work I am familiar with is A.J. Ayer. In
his view of the world, a synthetic (that is, not an analytical) sentence
must be verifiABLE to be considered a scientific statement, and is added to
the stock of science when verified.
The physical sciences have passed by this view, and
in fact, in my opinion, regard the latter-day positivist Popperian ideas of
falsificationism to be the ideal. Here, a sentence is scientific if it is
FalsifIABLE. The stock of sentences that are not repeatedly falsified is
science in some sense. Therefore, in most physical sciences, when a
statement is falsified (by not being replicable) is treated as nonsense
rather than science. For example, when the theory about cold fusion in the
Utah experiments met failure in repeated attempts to replicate them, the
theory was treated as nonsensical and not scientific.
The unfortunate thing is that verification (or
falsification) is misinterpreted by most, since I don't think either Ayer or
Popper intended their views to form a theory of meaning.
The above approach has had a whole host of severe
critics. My shortlist would include C.S. Peirce, William James, Quine
(though a verificationist he did not accept logical positivism), Feyerabend,
Davidson, and a bunch of others.
We have twisted the meaning of Popperian as well as
Logical positivist thought to consider "scientific propositions" as those "veriFIED"
or "not falsiFIED". Philosopher of those schools, on the other hand used
veriFIABILITY and falsiFIABILITY as criterion to answer the question whether
a proposition is scientific or not. We mistake an epistemic community for a
theory of meaning. While it might help reaffirm our belief in our epistemic
community to do so, it certainly would not provide our community a resilient
philosophical foundation. It also would make us more of a theological
community.
Regards to all,
Jagdish
My 67th birthday April 30, 2005 commentary on how research in
business schools has run full circle since the 1950s. We've now
completed the circle of virtually no science (long on speculation without rigor)
to virtually all science (strong on rigor with irrelevant findings) to
criticisms that science is not going to solve our problems that are too complex
for rigorous scientific methods.
The U.S. led the way in bringing accounting, finance, and other business
education and research into respectability in separate schools or colleges
the business (so called B-schools) within top universities of the country.
The movement began in the 1960s and followed later in Europe after leading
universities like Harvard, Chicago, Columbia, Chicago, Pennsylvania, UC
Berkeley and Stanford showed how such schools could become important sources
of cash and respectability.
A major catalyst for change was the Ford Foundation that put a large
amount of money into first the study of business schools and second the
funding of doctoral programs and students in business studies. First
came the Ford-Foundation's Gordon and Howell Report (Gordon, R.A., & Howell,
J.E. (1959). Higher education for business. New York: Columbia
University Press) that investigated the state of business higher education
in general. You can read the following at
http://siop.org/tip/backissues/tipoct97/HIGHHO~1.HTM
The Gordon and Howell report, published in
1959, examined the state of business education in the United States.
This influential report recommended that managerial and organizational
issues be studied in business schools using more rigorous scientific
methods. Applied psychologists, well equipped to undertake such an
endeavor, were highly sought after by business schools. Today, new
psychology Ph.D.s continue to land jobs in business schools. However, we
believe that this source of academic employment will be less available
in the future because psychologists in the business schools have become
well established enough to have their own "off-spring," who hold
business Ph.D.s. More business school job ads these days contain the
requirement that applicants possess degrees in business administration.
Prior to 1960, business education either took place in economics
departments of major universities or in business schools that were viewed as
parochial training programs by the more "academic" departments in humanities
and sciences where most professors held doctoral degrees. Business
schools in that era had professors rooted in practice who had no doctoral
degrees and virtually no research skills. As a result some
universities avoided having business schools altogether and others were
ashamed of the ones they had.
The Gordon and Howell Report concluded that doctoral programs were both
insufficient and inadequate for business studies. Inspired by the
Gordon and Howell Report, the Ford Foundation poured millions of dollars
into universities that would upgrade doctoral programs for business studies.
I was one of the beneficiaries of this initiative. Stanford University
obtained a great deal of this Ford Foundation money and used a goodly share
of that money to attract business doctoral students. My relatively
large fellowship to Stanford (which actually turned into a five-year
fellowship for me) afforded me the opportunity to get a PhD in accounting.
The same opportunities were taking place for other business students at
major universities around the country.
Another initiative of the Gordon and Howell Report was that doctoral
studies in business would entail very little study in business.
Instead the focus would be on building research skills. In most
instances, the business doctoral programs generally sent their students to
doctoral studies in other departments in the university. In my own
case, I can only recall having one accounting course at Stanford University.
Instead I was sent to the Mathematics, Statistics, Economics, Psychology,
and Engineering (for Operations Research) graduate studies. It was
tough, because in most instances we were thrown into courses to compete
head-to-head with doctoral students in those disciplines. I was even
sent to the Political Science Department to study (critically) the current
research of Herb Simon and his colleagues at Carnegie Mellon. That
experience taught me that traditional social science researchers were highly
skeptical of this new thrust in "business" research.
Another example of the changing times was at Ohio State University when
Tom Burns took command of doctoral students. OSU took the Stanford
approach to an extreme to where accounting doctoral students took virtually
all courses outside the College of Business. The entire thrust was one
of building research skills that could then be applied to business problems.
The nature of our academic research journals also changed. Older
journals like The Accounting Review (TAR) became more and more biased
and often printed articles that were better suited for journals in
operations research, economics, and behavioral science. Accounting
research journal relevance to the profession was spiraling down and down.
I benefited from this bias in the 1960s and 1970s because I found it
relatively easy to publish quantitative studies that assumed away the real
world and allowed us to play in easier and simpler worlds that we could
merely assume existed somewhere in the universe if not on earth. In
fairness, I think that our journal editors today demand more earthly
grounding for even our most esoteric research studies. But in the many
papers I published in the 1960s and 1970s, I can only recall one that I
think made any sort of practical contribution to the profession of
accounting (and the world never noticed that paper published in TAR).
I even got a big head and commenced to think it was mundane to even teach
accounting. In my first university I taught mostly mathematical
programming to doctoral students. When I got a chair at a second
university, I taught mathematical programming and computer programming (yes
FORTRAN and COBOL) to graduate students. But my roots were in
accounting (as a CPA), my PhD was in accounting (well sort of), and I
discovered that the real opportunities for an academic were really in
accounting. The reasons for these opportunities are rooted the various
professional attractions of top students to major in accounting and the
shortage of doctoral faculty across the world in the field of accountancy.
So I came home so to speak, but I've always been frustrated by the
difficulty of making my research relevant to the profession. If you
look at my 75+ published research papers, you will find few contributions to
the profession itself. I'm one of the guilty parties that spend most
of my life conducting research of interest to me that had little relevance
to the accounting profession.
I was one of those accounting research farmers more interested in my
tractors than in my harvests. Most of my research during my entire
career devoted to a study of methods and techniques than on professional
problems faced by accounting standard setters, auditors, and business
managers. I didn't want to muck around the real world gathering data
from real businesses and real accounting firms. It was easier to live
in assumed worlds or, on occasion, to study student behavior rather than
have to go outside the campus.
What has rooted me to the real world in the past two decades is my
teaching. As contracting became exceedingly complex (e.g., derivative
financial instruments and complex financial structurings), I became
interested in finding ways of teaching about this contracting and in having
students contemplate unsolved problems of how to account for an increasingly
complex world of contracts.
In accounting research since the 1950s we've now completed the circle of
virtually no science (long on speculation without rigor) to virtually all
science (strong on rigor with irrelevant findings) to criticisms that
science is not going to solve our problems that are too complex for rigorous
scientific methods. We are also facing increasing hostility from
students and the profession that our accounting, finance, and business
faculties are really teaching in the wrong departments of our universities
--- that our faculties prefer to stay out of touch with people in the
business world and ignore the many problems faced in the real world of
business and financial reporting. For more on this I refer you to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
Things won’t change as long as our "scientists" control our editorial
boards, and they won’t give those up without a huge fight. I’m not sure that
even Accounting Horizons (AH) is aimed at practice research at the
moment. The rigor hurdles to get into AH are great as of late. Did you
compare the thicknesses of the recent AH juxtaposed against the latest
Accounting Review? Hold one in each of each in your hands.
What will make this year’s AAA plenary sessions interesting will be to
have Katherine defending our economic theorists and Denny Beresford saying
“we still don’t get it.” Katherine is now a most interesting case since, in
later life, she’s bridging the gap back to practice somewhat. Denny’s an
interesting case because he came out of practice into academe only to
discover that, like Pogo, “the enemy is us.”
I think what is misleading about the recent HBR article is that focusing
more on practice will help us solve our “big” problems. If you look at the
contributions of the HBR toward solving these problems in the last 25 years,
you will find their contributions are superficial and faddish (e.g.,
balanced score card). The real problem in accounting (and much of business
as well), is that our big problems don’t have practical solutions. I
summarize a few of those at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm#BadNews
Note the analogy with “your favorite greens.”
Focusing on practice will help our teaching. We can never say “never”
when it comes to research, but I pretty much stand by my claims at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm#BadNews
So what can we conclude from having traveled the whole circle from
virtually no scientific method to virtually all scientific method to new
calls to back off of scientific method and grub around in the real world?
What do we conclude from facing up to the fact that research rigor and our
most pressing problems don't mix?
My recommendation at the moment is to shift the focus from scientific
rigor to cleverness and creativity in dealing with our most serious
problems. We should put less emphasis on scientific rigor applied to
trivial problems. We should put more emphasis on clever and creative
approaches to our most serious problems. For example, rather than seek
optimal ways to classify complex financial instruments into traditional debt
and equity sections on the balance sheet, perhaps we should look into clever
ways to report those instruments in non-traditional ways in this new era of
electronic communications and multimedia graphics. Much of my earlier
research was spent in applying what is called cluster analysis to
classification and aggregation. I can envision all sorts of possible
ways of extending these rudimentary efforts into our new multimedia world.
Bob Jensen on my 67th birthday on April 30, 2005
A December 5,
2002 reply from David Stout about the replications thing --- an AAA
journal editor’s inside perspective!
Note that I think that a big
policy weakness is that the policy of accounting research journals
to not publish confirming replications (even in abstracted form) is
that this policy discourages efforts to perform confirming
replications.
But the most serious
problem is that the findings themselves may not be interesting
enough for researchers to perform replications whether or not those
replications will be published. Are the findings so uninteresting
that researchers aren’t really interested in seeking truth?
Bob Jensen
-----Original
Message-----
From: David E. Stout [mailto:david.stout@villanova.edu]
Sent:
Thursday,
December 05, 2002
To: Jensen, Robert
Subject: Re: Are we
really interested in truth?
I read through
the material you sent (below)--one thing caught my eye: the issue of
REPLICATIONS. This is a subject about which I am passionate. When I
assumed the editorship of Issues, I had to appear before the AAA
Publications Committee to present/defend a plan for the journal
during my (then) forthcoming tenure. One of my plans was to
institute a "Replications Section" in the journal. (The sad reality,
beyond the excellent points you make, is that the lack of
replications has a limiting effect on our ability to establish a
knowledge base. In short, there are not many things where, on the
basis of empirical research, we can draw firm conclusions.) After
listening to my presentation, the chair of the Publications
Committee posed the following question: "Why would we want to devote
precious journal space to that which we already know?" To say the
least, I was shocked--a rather stark reality check you might say.
The lack of replications precludes us, in a very real sense, from
"knowing."
I applaud your
frank comments regarding the whole issue of replications, and their
(proper) place within the conduct of "scientific" investigations.
You made my day!
------
David E. Stout
Villanova University |
December 15, 2004 message from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]
In a recent
issue of Golf World, a letter writer was commenting on the need for professional
golfers to be more "entertaining." He went on to say:
"Fans pay top dollar to
attend tournaments and to subscribe to cable coverage.
Not many would
pay to see an accountant work in his office or watch The Audit Channel."
That's probably a true
comment. On the other hand, wouldn't at least some of us have liked to
watch The Audit Channel and see what was being done on Enron, WorldCom,
HeathSouth, or some of the other recent interesting situations?
Denny Beresford
December 15, 2004 reply from Bob Jensen
You know better than the rest of us, Denny, that academic accounting
researchers won't tune in to watch practitioners on the Audit Channel. They're
locked into the SciFi Channel.
Bob Jensen
December 1, 2004 message from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]
Denny is now a professor of accounting at the University of Georgia. For
ten years he was Chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board and is a
member of the Accounting Hall of Fame.
I've enjoyed the recent
"debate" on AECM relating to the Economist article about the
auditing profession. I'm delighted to see this interest in such
professional issues. But I'm concerned that academic accountants, by and
large, aren't nearly enough involved in actually trying to help solve
professional issues. Let me give an illustration, and I'd certainly be
interested in reactions.
Last night our Beta Alpha Psi chapter was fortunate
to have Jim Copeland as a guest speaker. Jim retired as the managing
partner of Deloitte a couple of years ago and he continues to be a leading
voice in the profession through, among other things, his role in chairing a
major study by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on the auditing profession.
Jim also serves as a director of three major corporations and on their audit
committees. In short, he is the kind of person that all students and
faculty should be interested in meeting and hearing.
Students turned out in fairly large numbers, as did
quite a few practitioners who always are there to further their recruiting
efforts. However, only four faculty members attended (out of a group of
about 18) and this included our department head and the BAP advisor, both of
whom were pretty much obligated to be there. No PhD students attended.
I'm sure that some faculty members had good excuses but most simply weren't
sufficiently interested enough to attend. Perhaps at some other schools
more faculty would have been there but my own experience in speaking to about
100 schools over the years would indicate that this lack of interest is pretty
common.
On the other hand, this coming Friday a very young
professor from another university will present a research workshop and I
expect that nearly all faculty members and PhD students will be there.
The paper being discussed is replete with formulas using dubious (in my humble
view) proxies for real world economic matters that can't be observed directly.
The basic conclusion of the paper is that companies are more inclined to give
stock options rather than cash compensation because options don't have to be
charged to expense. Somehow I thought that this was a conclusion that
was pretty clear to most accountants and business people well before now.
I've heard some faculty members say that they feel
obligated to attend such workshops even if they aren't particularly interested
in the paper being discussed. They want to show support for the person
who is visiting as well as reinforce the importance of these events to the PhD
students. I certainly understand that thinking and tend to share it.
However, for the life of me I can't understand why faculty members don't feel
a similar "obligation" to show respect for a person like Jim
Copeland, one of the most important people in the accounting profession in
recent years and someone who is making a personal sacrifice to visit our
school.
My purpose in this brief note is not to belittle the
research paper. But I simply observe that it would be nice if there were
a little more balance between interest in professional matters and such high
level research among faculty members at research institutions. As the
Economist article noted, and as should be clear to all of us in the age of
Sarbanes-Oxley, etc., there are tremendous issues facing the accounting
profession. Rather than simply complaining about things, it seems to me
that academics could become more familiar with professionals and the issues
they face and then try to work with them to help resolve those issues.
When is the last time that you called an auditor or
corporate accountant and asked him or her to have lunch to just kick around
some of the tremendously interesting issues of the day?
Denny Beresford
December 1, 2004 reply from Bob Jensen
(The evidence lies in lack of interest in replication)
Hi Denny,
Jim gave a plenary session at the AAA meetings in Orlando. You may have
been in the audience. I thought Jim’s presentation was well received by the
audience. He handled himself very well in the follow up Q&A session.
I think academics have some preconceived notions about the auditing “establishment.”
They may be surprised at some of the positions taken by leaders of that
establishment if they took the time to learn about those positions. I
summarized some of Jim’s more controversial statements at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/book04q3.htm#090104
Note that he proposed eliminating the corporate income tax (but he said he
hoped none of his former partners were in the audience).
Faculty interest in a professor’s “academic” research may be greater
for a number of reasons. Academic research fits into a methodology that other
professors like to hear about and critique. Since academic accounting and
finance journals are methodology driven, there is potential benefit from being
inspired to conduct a follow up study using the same or similar methods. In
contrast, practitioners are more apt to look at relevant (big) problems for
which there are no research methods accepted by the top journals.
Accounting Research Farmers Are More Interested in Their Tractors Than in
Their Harvests
For a long time I’ve argued that top accounting research
journals are just not interested in the relevance of their findings (except in
the areas of tax and AIS). If the journals were primarily interested in the
findings themselves, they would abandon their policies about not publishing
replications of published research findings. If accounting researchers were
more interested in relevance, they would conduct more replication studies. In
countless instances in our top accounting research journals, the findings
themselves just aren’t interesting enough to replicate. This is something
that I attacked at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/book02q4.htm#Replication
At one point back in the 1980s there was a chance for accounting programs
that were becoming “Schools of Accountancy” to become more like law
schools and to have their elite professors become more closely aligned with
the legal profession. Law schools and top law journals are less concerned
about science than they are about case methodology driven by the practice of
law. But the elite professors of accounting who already had vested interest in
scientific methodology (e.g., positivism) and analytical modeling beat down
case methodology. I once heard Bob Kaplan say to an audience that no elite
accounting research journal would publish his case research. Science
methodologies work great in the natural sciences. They are problematic in the
psychology and sociology. They are even more problematic in the professions of
accounting, law, journalism/communications, and political “science.”
We often criticize practitioners for ignoring academic research Maybe they
are just being smart. I chuckle when I see our heroes in the mathematical
theories of economics and finance winning prizes for knocking down theories
that were granted earlier prizes (including Nobel prices). The Beta model was
the basis for thousands of academic studies, and now the Beta model is a
fallen icon. Fama got prizes for showing that capital markets were efficient
and then more prizes for showing they were not so “efficient.” In the
meantime, investment bankers, stock traders, and mutual funds were just
ripping off investors. For a long time, elite accounting researchers could
find no “empirical evidence” of widespread earnings management. All they
had to do was look up from the computers where their heads were buried.
Few, if any, of the elite “academic” researchers were investigating the
dire corruption of the markets themselves that rendered many of the published
empirical findings useless.
Academic researchers worship at the feet of Penman and do not even
recognize the name of Frank Partnoy or Jim Copeland.
Bob Jensen
As you recall, this thread was initiated when Denny Beresford raised concern
about the University of Georgia's accounting faculty lack of interest in
listening to an on-campus presentation by the recently retired CEO of Deloitte
& Touche (Jim Copeland). A leading faculty member from another major
research university raises much the same concern. Jane F. Mutchler is the
J. W. Holloway/Ernst & Young Professor of Accounting at Georgia State
University. She is also the current President of the American Accounting
Association.
"President's Message," Accounting Education News, Fall 2004,
Page 3. This is available online to paid subscribers but cannot be copied
due to a terrible policy established by the AAA Publications Committee.
Any typos in the following quotation are my own at 4:30 this morning.
- How many of us are now sitting down with the firms
that recruit our students and having good, critical discussions about the
state of practice?
- How many of us are spending our time writing
articles that critically analyze the state of the profession and
accounting and auditing practices for a journal like Accounting
Horizons?
- How many of us are conducting rigorous research
that is focused first on the crucial practice issues and then only
secondly on getting a publication in a top journal such as The
Accounting Review or one of the section journals?
- How many of us are evaluating and revamping our
courses to deal with the realities of the world today?
I raise these questions because I worry that we are
all too quick to blame all the problems on the practitioners. But we
must remember that we were the ones responsible for the education of the
practitioners. And unless we analyze the issues and the questions I
raised, I fear that we won't make any changes ourselves. So it is
important that we examine our approaches to the classes we are teaching and
ask ourselves if we are doing all we canto assure that our students are being
made aware of the pressures they will face in practice and if we are helping
them develop the skills they need to appropriately deal with those
pressures. In my mind these issues need to be dealt with in every class
we teach. It will do no good to simply mandate new stand alone ethics
courses where issues are examined in isolation.
Continued in Jane’s
Message to the Membership of the American Accounting Association
December 5, 2004 reply from Stone, Dan [Dan.Stone@UKY.EDU]
I enjoyed Denny's
commentary on the interplay between accounting research and practice, and,
Jane's AAA President's statement on this issue.
A few thoughts:
1. Yes, accounting
research is largely, though not entirely, divorced from accounting practice.
This is no coincidence or anomaly. It is by design. Large sample, archival,
financial accounting research -- which dominates mainstream academic
accounting -- is about the role of accounting information in markets. It is
not about understanding the institutions and individuals who produce and
disseminate this information, or, the technologies that make its production
possible. We could have an accounting scholarship takes seriously issues of
accounting practice. The US institutional structures of accounting scholarship
currently eliminate this possibility. Change these institutional structures
and we change accounting scholarship.
2. There is a
particular and peculiar hubris of financial accounting academics to assume
that all accounting scholarship is, or should be, about financial accounting.
Am I reading this into Denny's argument? Am I reading beyond the text here?
The unity model of
accounting scholarship increasingly, which says that all accounting
scholarship is or should be about financial accounting, is no coincidence or
anomaly. It is by design. The top disseminators of accounting scholarship in
the US increasingly publish, and the major producers of accounting scholars
increasingly produce scholars who know about, only 1 small sub-area of
accounting -- financial, archival accounting. Change the institutional
structures of the disseminators and the producers and we change accounting
scholarship.
Best,
Dan Stone
Gatton Endowed Chair
University of Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky
December 6, 2004 reply from Paul Williams
[williamsp@COMFS1.COM.NCSU.EDU]
To add to Dan's
observations. He is correct that until we change the structure of the US academy
nothing is going to change re practice. As Sara Reiter and I argued (with
evidence) in our AOS piece, accounting in the academy has been transformed from
an autonomous, professional discipline into a lab practice for a discipline for
which lab practices are incidental to the main activity, i.e, accounting is an
empirical sub discipline of a sub discipline of a sub discipline for which
empirical work is irrelevant. The purpose of scholarship in accounting is now
purely instrumental -- to create politically correct academic reputations.
The powers that be are
not interested in accounting research for its intrinsic value or for improving
practice broadly understood, but only as a means to enhance their own careers
(to get "hits" in the major journals). The profession is not powerless
to assist in changing that structure. For example, KPMG funds (or at least used
to) the JAR conferences. Stop doing that!! Why subsidize that which is doing you
more harm than good? The profession has abandoned the AAA in droves -- in the
mid-60s the AAA had nearly 15,000 members, 2/3 of which were practitioners. Now
we are approximately 8,000 of which only about 1/7 are practitioners. If
practitioners aren't happy about the academy they are not powerless to engage
it.
Bob sent us an excerpt
from Jane Mutchler's presidential address suggesting things that should be done.
They already have been. At the Critical Perspectives conference in New York in
2002 there were numerous sessions devoted to how academics have failed in their
educational responsibilities (someone credentialed Andy Fastow). Do the firms
help fund that conference? Of course not -- too left wing. Accounting Education:
An International Journal dedicated an entire issue to accounting education after
Enron, as has the European Accounting Review. Have any AAA journals done so? The
insularity of the US academy is evident in that Jane doesn't seem aware that
there already has been significant activity for at least the last three years,
but none of it as visible as that which is promoted by AAA. Let's have genuine
debates in Horizons where others besides those vetted for political correctness
are permitted to speak to the issues.
Let me remind you of
the Briloff affair -- Abe wrote a piece for Horizons critical of the COSO
report. Abe argued that the "problem" was not just small firms with
small auditors. Was Abe right? Less than two years after he wrote that article
we had Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Andersen's implosion, etc. See the special issue
of Critical Perspectives on Accounting, "AAA, Inc." to see first hand
how the structure of the academy handles candid discussion of the profession's
problems. If people aren't happy with the way the AAA manages the academy, they
are not powerless to change it. The structure stays the same because of the
apathy of the membership. It only takes 100 signatures to challenge for an AAA
office. Since less than 100 people bother to vote (out of 8,000) it wouldn't
take much effort for someone with the resources to effect significant changes.
Denny could get his colleagues' attention and get them interested in attending
his guests' talks by running for president of AAA -- I will gladly sign his
petition to be put on the ballot for 2005. That will shake them up! Change won't
happen unless enough members of the academy recognize that we have some very
real, serious problems that require candid, adult conversation and a willingness
to accept responsibility.
Realize that there are
more of us than there are of them (that is the whole idea of the current
structure - to keep the number of them very, very small). Change the executive
committee, select editors of the AAA journals that aren't committed to the
narrow notion of rigor that now predominates and, as Dan says, things will
change. There are plenty of qualified, thoughtful people who could manage an
academy more dedicated to the practice of accounting (in all its many
manifestations besides financial reporting, likely the most insignificant of
accounting's functions). It just takes people with the political and financial
leverage to put their efforts into altering that intellectually oppressive
structure. PFW
December 1, 2004 reply from Jagdish Gangolly [JGangolly@UAMAIL.ALBANY.EDU]
I could not agree more. May be most "top"
journals suffer a case of "analysis paralysis". In a practical field
such as accounting, how do we know what relevant problems are if we have
little contact with the real world (and I would not count sporadic consulting
as contact).
There are ways in which the academia and industry
mingle in a meaningful way. In the areas I am interested in (computationally
oriented work in information systems and auditing), for example, I have found
a very healthy relationship between the academia and industry, and in fact far
more exciting research reported in computing journals during the past three
years than in accounting/auditing journals during the past 30. (I can think of
work in computational auditing done by folks at Eindhoven and Delloitte &
Touche; work on role-based access control at George Mason and Singlesignonnet,
work on formal models of accounting systems as discrete dynamical systems done
also at Delloitte and Eindhoven, work on interface of formal models of
accounting systems and back-end databases done at Promatis and Goethe-Universität
Frankfurt & University of Karlsruhe, to name just a few). In fact it has
got to a point where I attend AAA meetings only to meet old friends and have a
good time, and not for intellectual stimulation. For that, I go to computing
meetings.
The reason for the schism between academia and the
profession in accounting, in my opinion, is the almost total lack of
accountability in academic accounting research. Once the control of
"academic" journals have been wrested, research is pursued not even
for its own sake, but for the preservation of control and perpetuation of ones
genes. We have not had a Kuhnian paradigm shift for close to 40 years in
accounting, because we haven't found the need for anomalies. We use
"academic" journals the same way that the proverbial Mark Twain's
drunk uses a lamp post, more for support than for illumination.
Respectfully submitted,
Jagdish
December 1, 2004 reply from Paul Williams [williamsp@COMFS1.COM.NCSU.EDU]
Bob is right that the accounting academy in the US
(not so much the rest of the world) is driven mainly by the interests of
methidoliters -- those that suffer from a terminal case of what McCloskey
described as the poverty of economic modernism. Sara Reiter and I had a study
published in AOS last summer that included an analysis of the rhetorical
behavior of the JAR conferences through time to see if the discursive
practices of the "leading" forum were conducive to progressive
critique -- all sciences "advance" via destruction -- received
wisdom is constantly under assault. When the JAR conferences started
practiioners and scholars from other disciplines like law and sociology were
invited to participate. These were the people that asked the most troublesome
questions, the ones who provided the most enervating critique. How did the
geniuses at JAR deal with the problem of heretics in the temple? They simply
stopped inviting practitioners and scholars from other disciplines. The
academy in the US is an exceedingly closed society of only true believers.
Accounting academics are now more interested in trying to prove that an
imaginary world is real, rather than confront a world too messy for the
methods (and, it must be noted, moral and political commitments) to which they
unshakeably devoted REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SAYS! (As Bob
notes, who in their right mind can still say market efficiency without a smirk
on their face. The stock exchange, after all, has members. Does anyone know of
any group of "members" that writes the rules of the organization to
benefit others equally to themselves? Invisible hands, my a..)
But it must be said the profession is not without
guilt in all of this. I avoid listening to big shots from the Big 4 myself
because they are as predictable as Jerry Falwell. Accountants have a license,
which is a privilege granted to them by the public to serve the broad society
of which they are citizens. But whenever you hear them speak, all they do is
whine about the evils of government regulation, the onerous burden of taxes on
the wealthy (I have never heard a partner of a Big 4 firm complain that taxes
were too regressive); they simply parrot the shiboleths that underlay the
methodologies of academics. No profession has failed as spectacularly as
accounting has just done. If medicine performed as poorly as public accounting
has just done in fulfilling its public responsibilities, there would be doctor
swinging from every tree. Spectacular audit failures, tax evasion schemes for
only the wealthiest people on the planet, liability caps, off-shore
incorporation, fraud, etc., a profession up to its neck in the corruption that
Bob mentioned. But have we heard one word of contrition from this profession?
Has it dedicated itself to adopting the skeptical posture toward its
"clients" required of anyone who wants to do a thorough audit? Don't
think so. All we still hear is the problem ain't us, it all those corrupt
politicians, etc. (Who corrupted them?). And PWC has the gall to run ads about
a chief courage officer -- do these guys have no shame? If the profession
wants to engage with the academy with an open mind and the courage to hear the
truth about itself, the courage to really want to become a learned profession
(which it isn't now), then maybe we could get somewhere. But for now, both
sides are comfortable where they are -- the chasm serves both of their
exceedingly narrow interests.
There are now 7 volumes of Carl's essays. Thanks to
Yuji Ijiri's efforts, the AAA published the first 5 volumes as Studies in
Accounting Research #22, Essays in Accounting Theory. A sixth volume, edited
by Harvey Hendrickson, Carl Thomas Devine Essays in Accounting Theory: A
Capstone was published by Garland Publishing in 1999. A seventh volume was
being edited by Harvey when he died. I was asked to finish Harvey's work and
that volume, Accounting Theory: Essays by Carl Thomas Devine has been
published by Routledge, 2004. Carl also had a collection of Readings in
Accounting Theory he compiled mainly for his teaching during his stint in
Indonesia (I think). Those were mimeographed as well, but, to my knowledge,
have never been published. I have copies of those 4 volumes but their
condition is not good -- paper is yellowed and brittle. Thoughtful, curious,
imaginative, humble, and kind -- we don't see the likes of Carl much anymore.
His daughter Beth told me that he even approach his death with the same
vibrant intellectual curiousity he brought to everything.
PFW
December 6, 2004 reply from Ed Scribner
[escribne@NMSU.EDU]
Seems to me that most
folks on this list take a pretty harsh view of the accounting research
"establishment" for being closed, methodology-driven, irrelevant to
practice, self-serving, and just generally in the wrong paradigm. Yet I see
things like the following in the JAR and the AR that appear relevant and
"practice-oriented" to me.
--- Journal of
Accounting Research, Volume 42: Issue 3 "Auditor Independence, Non-Audit
Services, and Restatements: Was the U.S. Government Right?"
Abstract Do fees for
non-audit services compromise auditor's independence and result in reduced
quality of financial reporting? The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 presumes that
some fees do and bans these services for audit clients. Also, some registrants
voluntarily restrict their audit firms from providing legally permitted
non-audit services. Assuming that restatements of previously issued financial
statements reflect low-quality financial reporting, we investigate detailed
fees for restating registrants for 1995 to 2000 and for similar nonrestating
registrants. We do not find a statistically significant positive association
between fees for either financial information systems design and
implementation or internal audit services and restatements, but we do find
some such association for unspecified non-audit services and restatements. We
find a significant negative association between tax services fees and
restatements, consistent with net benefits from acquiring tax services from a
registrant's audit firm. The significant associations are driven primarily by
larger registrants.
---
I also see articles
on topics other than financial accounting. Are these just window-dressing?
Journal editors are
always saying that they want work that has "policy implications."
Yet it seems to me that important questions in accounting tend to be more
complicated than, "Does this medication cause nausea in the control
group?" Tough questions are tough to address rigorously.
What are some
examples of specific questions (susceptible to rigorous research) that
academia should be addressing but is not?
Ed "Paton's
Advocate" (am I alone?)
P.S. Many years ago a
senior faculty member told me the "top" journals were a closed
society, and hitting them was a matter of whom you knew. I made some naïve
reply to the effect that the top journals reflected the best work--"the
cream rises to the top." Next morning I found in my mailbox photocopies
of the tables of contents of then-recent JARs, along with the editorial board,
with lines drawn connecting names on the board with names of authors, as if it
were a "matching question" on an exam.
December 1, 2004 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Paul,
During one of the early JAR conferences that I
attended had an assistant professor present a behavioral research study. A
noted psychologist, also from the University of Chicago, Sel Becker, was
assigned to critique the paper.
Sel got up and announced words to the affect that
this garbage wasn't worth discussing.
I'm not condoning the undiplomatic way Sel treated a
colleague. But this does support your argument as to why experts from other
disciplines were no longer invited to future JAR conferences.
Bob Jensen
December 1, 2004 reply from Roger Collins
[rcollins@CARIBOO.BC.CA]
Paul makes some
excellent points. Sociologists are interesting to listen to because they tend
to get folks' backs up (and if they didn't want to do that they probably
wouldn't be sociologists in the first place). That's especially the case in
accounting where both the profession and the academics are (with notable
exceptions) hidebound in their own way. If you want a new perspective on
things, get a sociologist to comment, throw away any half of what's been said
and the remainder will still be an interesting pathway to further thought,
whichever half you choose.
The scorn that
certain academics in other areas show for accounting academics (and indeed,
business academics in general) may be justified (sometimes? often?)- but
no-one ever built bridges out of scorn. I think that if Sel Becker was really
interested in advancing the cause of academic enquiry he would have figured
out that whatever was going on was, from his point of view, an immature
contribution and taken the time to give his views on the gap between the
contribution and the issues he considered important, and identify some
"road map" to move from one position to another.
But then, Sel is a
"big, important" person. (From what I can gather), instead of taking
a little time to build bridges he indulged in a spot of academic tribalism.
Trashing a colleagues paper (isn't that something a noted member of the
Rochester School was famous for?) is cheap in terms of effort and may generate
some petty self-satisfaction; it may even be justified if the presenter is
arrogant in turn -but again, arrogance is a destroyer rather than a builder.
On the other hand,
the JAR reaction is just as bad if not worse. Closing one's ears to
criticism will only lead to the prettification of the academy; the dogmatists
will have won.
Question - is there a
way of enticing the various parties out of their bunkers ? If there is, what
are the chances that the "generals" of the profession and academia
won't use their power to squash the proposals of the "subalterns" ?
Some years ago a
University of Alberta prof. had the temerity to suggest that the local oil
companies' financial statements weren't all that they should have been. He was
promptly jumped on from every direction. Why ? I suspect, because there is a
general (not inevitably true) assumption that business schools are the
"cash cows" of the university, and other academics tolerate them on
that basis. (Nowadays, pharmaceutical research departments seem to be vying
for that label). Maybe the only way out is poverty; poor accounting profs will
have less to lose and more reason to explore..
Regards - tongue
partly in cheek,
Roger Roger
Collins
UCC (soon to be TRU) School of Business.
December 2, 2004 reply from Paul Williams
[williamsp@COMFS1.COM.NCSU.EDU]
How do we bridge the
chasm?
Good question. We won't
be able to do that in the US until we change the structure of the AAA. I was on
Council when the great debate over Accounting Horizons occurred. Jerry Searfoss,
a person who served time on both sides of the chasm, was a vigorous proponent
for creating a medium through which academe and practice could communicate. If
you peruse the editorial board of the first issues of Horizons, it reflected
this eclectic approach to scholarship. What happened to it? Look at Horizons
now. Its editorial board looks just like the editorial board at The Accounting
Review and its editor is a University of Chicago PhD! The AAA has a particular
structure -- an organizational culture that reproduces itself generation after
generation. Horizons, as originally conceived by people like Searfoss, Sack,
Mautz, etc., posed a threat to the overwhelmingly anal retentive, ideological
commitments (the shadow of William Paton still chills the intellectual climate
of the US academy) of the organization. Anti-bodies were quickly mobilized and,
voila, Horizons looks just like TAR (two years ago a plan to eliminate Horizons
and Issues and roll them into one ill-defined journal was proposed). This body
will protect itself at all costs (even declining membership, banal research,
etc. will not dissuade them from jumping over the cliff).
The only way to
change that is to create a structure that fosters a place where Sel Beckers
and Big 4 partners can say what they have to say IN PRINT and be forced to
defend it as often as the Dopuchs, Demskis, Watts and Zimmermans, and
Schippers of the world (who never have to defend themselves in print). That
will only happen when the selection of executive committees, editors, etc. is
democratic. As long as the Politburo structure of the AAA exists and the
culture of fear and suspicion of ideas remains, nothing will change. Good
models for what the journals should look like are the proceedings of
conferences like Tinker's Critical Perspectives conference, Lee Parker's APIRA,
and the IPA sponsored by Manchester. Those conferences are so much more
exhilirating than the AAA meetings. I'm like Jagdish -- I go to AAA to see old
friends and work for the Public Interest Section. The "technical"
sessions are of little interest. When the AAA gives Seminal Contribution
Awards to "contributions" lifted wholesale from the radical Lockean/monetarist
wing of economics, how can you take such an organization seriously. This is
particularly true when there are genuinely seminal contributions possessed by
the discipline itself, e.g., Ijiri's work, Paton's Accounting Theory, Andy
Stredry's budget work, Bill Cooper's QM applications, Sterling/Edwards and
Bell/Chambers, etc. (the copyrights on these tell you how long it has been
since accounting acted like an autonomous discipline!).
PFW
December 2 reply from Paul Williams
(after a request that he elaborate on Bill Paton)
While Carl Devine was
still alive, I used to visit him whenever I could. When Jacci Rodgers and I did
our work on editorial boards at The Accounting Review I consulted Carl about how
the review process worked at TAR since the first time TAR published the members
of an editorial board was 1967 (I beleive). According to Carl, Paton edited TAR
for many years after its founding via a process that was, shall we say, less
than transparent. According to Carl, Paton and Littleton between them virtually
hand picked the AAA presidents for years. You can see a pattern of early
presidencies -- one president not from one of the elite 15, then two from, then
one, etc. This encouraged the illusion that the AAA was open to everyone, but in
fact it was pretty tightly controlled. Now there is no attempt whatsoever to
create the illusion of an open organization -- every president for the last 30
years (save one or two) is an elite school grad. It was never permitted to veer
too far from the nucleus of schools that founded it.
Everyone should be
familiar with Paton's politics -- he was conservative in the extreme (he
published a book that was a rather rabid screed on the evils of Fabian
socialism). There were competing root metaphors for accounting during the era of
Paton, e.g., the institutionalism of DR Scott (whose spin on the role of
accounting seems prescient now that we have a few years separating us from him),
there was the accounting as fulfilling social needs of Littleton etc. But what
clearly has emerged triumphant was the radical free market ideology of Paton.
So, even though accounting seems clearly part of the regulatory apparatus and
part of the justice system in the US, the language we use to talk about what
accountants are for is mainly that of efficent markets, rational economic
actors, etc. No wonder Brian West is able to build such a persuasive case that
accounting currently has no coherent cognitive foundation, thus, is not a
"learned" profession. Accounting enables market functions in a world
of economic competitors whose actions are harmoniously coordinated by the magic
fingers of invisible hands (a metaphor that Adam Smith didn't set too much stock
in -- it was merely an off-hand remark to which he never returned). Carl Devine
has a very useful essay in Essays in Accounting theory, volume six, edited by
Harvey Hendrickson (Garland) where he provides an insightful analysis of the
contributions to theory of those persons of his generation and his generation of
mentors (he particularly admired Mattesich.)
Carl noted that Paton
was a very effective rhetorician, so was perhaps more influential than his ideas
really merited (like the relative influence of the contemporaries Malthus and
Ricardo; Ricardo, the much better writer overshadowed Malthus in their day).
Paton influenced a disproportionate number of the next generation of accounting
academics; he was, after all, a classicaly trained economist.
There is, in my view,
absolutely no compelling reason why accountants should be the least bit
concerned with new classical economic theory, but Paton, because of his
influence, set the US academy on a path that brings us to where we are today. It
is an interesting thought experiment (ala Trevor Gambling's buddhist accounting)
to imagine what we would be doing and talking about if we had taken the
institutionalists, or Ijiri's legal imagery more seriously. But, as they say
here in NC, "It is what it is."
PFW
December 2, 2004 reply from Bob Jensen
Bill
Paton was all-powerful on the
Michigan
campus and was considered
an economist as well as an accountant. For
a time under his power, a basic course in accounting was in the common core
for all majors. One of the
most noted books advocating historical cost is called Introduction
to Corporate Accounting Standards by William Paton
and A.C. Littleton (Sarasota: American Accounting Association, 1940).
Probably no single book has ever had so much influence or is more widely cited
in accounting literature than this thin book by Paton
and
Littleton
. See http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases
Later
on Paton changed horses and was apologetic about
once being such a strong advocate of historical cost. He
subsequently favored fair value accounting, while his co-author clung to
historical cost. However, Paton
never became widely known as a valuation theorist compared to the likes of
Edwards,
Bell
, Canning, Chambers, and
Sterling
. (In case you did not know this,
former FASB Board Member and SEC Chief Accountant Walter Scheutz
is also a long-time advocate of fair value accounting.)
You
can read about the Hall of Fame’s Bill Paton at
http://fisher.osu.edu/Departments/Accounting-and-MIS/Hall-of-Fame/Membership-in-Hall/William-A.-Paton
Bob
Jensen
December 2, 2004 reply from Jagdish Gangolly
[JGangolly@UAMAIL.ALBANY.EDU]
My earlier posts
unfortunately may have implied that every onbe I mentioned continued to be a
historical cost advocate -- that is not true. Paton changed his mind, as Bob
mentioned.
The point I was
trying to make there was the approach to theory building in accounting
(something that crudely initates the axiomatic approach) that Paton
essentially started. However, Paton had a "theory" in the sense of a
set of axioms, but no theorems. In other words it was a sort of laundry list
of axioms with out a detailed study of their collective implications (this is
what struck me most while I was a student, but that might have been my problem
since I came to accounting via applied mathematics/statistics). In fact most
of the work of Paton & Littleton, Ijiri, Sprouse & Moonitz,... never
really followed through their thoughts to their logical conclusions. One
reason might have been that they did not really state their axioms in logic.
Mattesich, as I understand, went a bit further, but he must have realised that
a field like accounting where most sentences are deontic (normative, stated in
English sentences in the imperative mood) rather than alethic (descriptive,
stated in English sentences in the indicative mood). In normative systems, as
even Hans Kelsen has admitted, there is no concept of truth and therefore
logical deduction as we know it is not possible.
I think this becomes
clear in one of the later books of Mattesich on Instrumental Reasoning (all
but ignored by accountants because it is more philosophical, but in my opinion
one of his most fascinating works).
I would not put Paul
Grady, Carman Blough,... in the same group. For Paul Grady, for example,
accounting "principles" were no more than a grab bag of mundane
rules.
Leonard Spacek, one
of my heroes, on the other hand, tried to emphasize accounting as
communication of rights people had to resources UNDER LAW. He also emphasized
fairness as an objective.
One reason for this
chasm between practice and academia is that almost all practice is normatively
based, whereas in the academia in accounting, for the past 40 years we have
cared just about only for descriptive work of the naive positivist kind.
I hate peddling my
work, but those interested might like to take a look at an old paper of mine
(I consider it the best that I ever wrote) where some of these issues are
discussed :
Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles: Perspectives from Philosophy of Law, J. Gangolly &
M. Hussein Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol. 7 (1996), pp.
383-407.
I think we need to realise that we are not the only
discipline that has gone astray from the original lofty goals.
Consider economics in the United States. In Britain,
at least till the 70s (I haven't kept in touch since then), it was considered
important that Economics teaching devoid of political and philosophical
discussions was some how deficient; probably the main reason popular Oxford
undergraduate major is PPE (Politics, Philosophy, Economics, with Economics
taking the third seat). Specially in the US, attempts to make Economics
value-free (wertfrei) have, to an extent also succeeded in making it a bit
sterile. In his critique of Ludwig von Mises, Murray Rothbard ("Praxeology,
Value Judgments, and Public Policy") states:
"The trouble is that most economists burn to
make ethical pronouncements and to advocate political policies - to say, in
effect, that policy X is "good" and policy Y "bad."
Properly, an economist may only make such pronouncements in one of two ways:
either (1) to insert his own arbitrary, ad hoc personal value judgments and
advocate policy on that basis; or (2) to develop and defend a coherent ethical
system and make his pronouncement, not as an economist, but as an ethicist,
who also uses the data of economic science."
Or, that Economics is the "value-free handmaiden
of ethics".
In accounting too, the positivists have worked hard
over the past forty years or so to make it pretentiously value-free (remember
disparaging references to non-descriptive work, and Carl Nelson's virtual
jihad to rid accounting of "fairness" as an objective?). The result
has been that it is perhaps not unfair to speak of "fair" in the
audit reports just cheap talk.
Renaissance in accounting will come only when we look
as much at Politics and Law as at Economics to inspire research.
Jagdish
December 3, 2004 reply from Paul Williams
For many subscribers this thread may have started to
fray; to them I apologize, but I have to chime in to add a contrarian view to
Bob's contention that Paton, Edwards and Bell ,etc. were advocates of fair value
accounting. Fair value accounting is (in my view) a classic case of eliding into
a use of a concept as if it were what we traditionally understood it to be while
radically redefining it (see Feyerabend's analysis of Galileo's use of this same
ploy). None of the early theorists were proponents of fair value
accounting.
They may have been advocates of replacement cost or
opportunity cost, but never of "fair value," which is a purely
hypothetical number generated through heroic assumptions about an undivinable
future. As Carl Devine famously said, "No one has ever learned anything
from the future." All subscribed to the principle that accounting should
report only what actually occurred during a period of time -- this was the
essence of E&B's argument that accounting data are for evaluating decisions;
its value lies in its value as feedback and accounting data, therefore,
categorically should not be generated on assumptions about the outcomes
resulting from decisions that have already been made. The significant
accomplishment of these theorists was to provide a defense of accounting's
avoidance of subjective values. i.e., the accounting was in its essence
objective (anyone remember Five
Monographs on Business Income, particularly Sidney
Alexander's critique of accounting measures of profit?). Now we accept seemingly
without question the radical transformation of accounting affected by FASB to a
system of nearly exclusively subjective values, i.e., your guess is as good as
mine. In spite of the optimism people seem to express, we have no technology
(nor would a believer in rational expectations theory ever expect there to be)
that can divine the economic future. Perhaps a renaissance of some of these old
ideas is overdo. I believe it was Clarence Darrow who opined that "Contempt
for law is brought about by law making itself ridiculous." As writers of
LAW (kudos to Jagdish's paper) the FASB seems to make accounting more ridiculous
by the day.
PFW
December 3, 2004 reply from David Fordham
For those who don't know, Paul is an FSU alum, and
Bob is a former Seminole, too, although they pre-dated me and may have had
some professional interaction with Carl Devine. ...
David Fordham
December 3, 2004 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi David,
I arrived on the faculty at FSU in 1978. Carl was a recluse for all
practical purposes. I don' think anybody had contact with him except a very
devoted Ed McIntyre. Paul Williams was very close to Ed and may also have had
some contact. (Paul later reminded me that Carl grew interested in
discussing newer directions with Ed Arrington.)
I think Carl was still actively writing and to the walls. His labor of love
may have been lost if Ed and Paul didn't strive to share Carl's writings with
the world. Carl was a classic scholar who'd lived most of his life in
libraries.
Carl could've added a great deal to our intellectual growth and historical
foundations if he participated in some of our seminars. He was a renaissance
scholar.
It would've been interesting to know how Carl's behavior might've changed
in the era of email. Scholars who asked him challenging questions might've
gotten lengthy replies (Carl was not concise) that he would not provide
face-to-face.
Bob Jensen
Decemeber 3, 2004 reply from Mclelland, Malcolm J [mjmclell@INDIANA.EDU]
It almost seems there's a consensus on the AECM
listserv on all this! Given the widespread interest and existng intellectual
wherewithal among AECMs to do it, maybe it's time to start up the
"Journal of Neo-Classical Accounting Theory"? Revisiting Edwards,
Bell, Sterling, Chambers, Paton, et al. certainly seems worthwhile; especially
if it can be fit into or reconciled with the more recent literature in
accounting and finance.
Best regards,
Malcolm
Malcolm J. McLelland, Ph.D.
mjmclell@indiana.edu
website: http://www.uic.edu/~mclellan
research: http://ssrn.com/author=154711
December 1, 2004 reply from Glen Gray [glen.gray@CSUN.EDU]
Your story does surprise me. A few years ago I
convinced Barry Melancon (President) and Louis Matherne (at that time,
Director of IT) from the AICPA to come to L.A. and speak at a dinner meeting
of the L.A. chapter of the California Society of CPAs. The meeting was at
UCLA, not my campus, however, the chapter offered to waive the $35 dinner
charge for any CSUN faculty who want to attend. Other than myself, one (out of
about 20) other faculty member attended the dinner. I asked some of the
faculty members why they did not attend. The most common answer was something
like “We know what he (Barry) is going to say—use more computers in your
accounting courses.”
December 1, 2004 reply from Richard C. Sansing
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
Two thoughts in
response:
First, I agree with
the gist of your sentiment. Hanging around real world accountants can inform
both our teaching and research, and most of us underinvest in such activities.
Second, the effect of
"citizenship" considerations looks like an easy cost-benefit
tradeoff to me. Seminars are attended only by faculty and doctoral students,
so one's presence in the room is more noticable for a research seminar than a
presentation attended by lots of undergraduates. Furthermore, the personal
cost of attending a daytime event is much less than a nightime event. So if
one is driven by citizenship considerations, I expect many more faculty to
attend the daytime research seminar than the nightime practitioner
presentation.
Richard C.
Sansing
Associate Professor of Business Administration
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
email: Richard.C.Sansing@dartmouth.edu
December 1, 2004 reply from Chuck Pier [texcap@HOTMAIL.COM]
Dennis,
I think that you have put your finger on, or maybe
stumbled onto, one of the major splits in academic accounting today. You
happen to be looking at this situation from one of the "research"
universities. Most all of us (I use the term "us" to refer to
academic accountants) have been associated with a research university.
However, many of us have only been there as students during our doctoral
studies. These universities place heavy premiums on both their faculties and
students for what we call "basic research" that is quite replete
with formulas and theories and the like. Faculty are tenured, promoted and
financially rewarded to produce cutting edge research that is published in the
top journals, and doctoral students are judged on their ability to analyze and
conduct similar research.
On the other hand, many of "us" teach in
"teaching universities" that place more emphasis on teaching and
"professional" research. In other words, research that has a direct
application to either the accounting profession or the teaching of accounting.
There is usually not a penalty exerted on those who chose to do the more
academic research, but there is also not any special rewartds for that
research either.
I feel that many of "us" at teaching
schools attend the lectures that you describe with a lot more regularity than
your experience at your university. For example, at my school we have a weekly
meeting during the fall of our Beta Alpha Psi chapter that inculeds a
presentation on a topic by one of the firms in our area. These firms include
all of the big four, as well as other national, regional, and local firms. The
presentations run the gamut from interview techniques for the students to the
latest updates on SOX or forensic accounting. As with any sample, some are
better than others and many are appropriate to just the students. Despite the
uneveness of the presentations I would estimate that at least 80% of our
tenure track faculty are at each meeting, with the missing 20% having some
other engagement and unable to attend. There is not a single member of our
faculty that routinely does not attend. These meetings are not mandatory, but
most of us feel that it supports both or students and the presenters, who hire
our students to attend.
I am not trying to indite or point fingers at either
side of the academic accounting community but it is obvious that we each have
separate priorities. I for one chose the institution that I am at for the very
reason that we do have a heavy emphasis on the practioneer and the
undergraduate student. I know that many would abhor what I do and could not
picture themselves here. They, like me have decided what they like and what
they are best suited for. I do feel that at times we who are not at the big
research schools feel that we are overlooked, but I wouldn't trade my place
with anyone else. I think that I am providing a good service and enjoy the
opportunities that it presents.
Chuck
December 3, 2004 reply from Robin A
Alexander [alexande.robi@UWLAX.EDU]
Interesting. I too came from a math background and
finally realized there was no accounting theory in the scientific sense. I also
came to suspect it was not a system of measurement either because to be so,
there has to be something to measure independent of the measuring tool. Rather
it seemed to me accounting defined, for instance, income rather than measured
it.
Robin Alexander
December 3, 2004 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Robin,
I think the distinction lies not so much on "independence" of the
measuring tool as it does on behavior induced by the measurements themselves,
although this may be what you had in mind in your message to us.
Scientists measure the distance to the moon without fear that behavior of
either the earth or the moon will be affected by the measurement process.
There may some indirect behavioral impacts such as when designing fuel tanks
for a rocket to the moon. In natural science, except for quantum mechanics,
the measurers cannot re-define the distance to the moon for purposes of being
able to design smaller fuel tanks.
In economics, and social science in general, behavior resulting from
measurements is often more impacted by the definition of measurement itself.
Changed definitions of inflation or a consumer price index might result in
wealth transfers between economic sectors. Plus there is the added problem
that measurements in the social sciences are generally less precise and
stable, e.g., when people change behavior just because they have been
"measured" or diagnosed.
Similarly in accounting, changed definitions of what goes into things like
revenue, eps, asset values, and debt values may lead to wealth transfers. The
Silicon Valley executives certainly believe that lowering eps by booking stock
options will affect share prices vis-a-vis merely disclosing the same
information in a footnote rather than as a booked expense. Virtually all
earnings management efforts on the part of managers hinges on the notion that
accounting outcomes affect wealth transfers. In fact if they did not do so,
there probably would not be much interest in accounting numbers See
"Toting Up Stock Options," by Frederick Rose, Stanford Business,
November 2004, pp. 21 --- http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/bmag/sbsm0411/feature_stockoptions.shtml
Early accounting theorists such as Paton, Littleton, Hatfield, Edwards,
Bell, Chambers, etc. generally believed there was some kind of optimal set of
definitions that could be deduced without scientifically linking possible
wealth transfers to particular definitions. And it is doubtful that subsequent
events studies in capital market empiricism will ever solve that problem
because human behavior itself is too adaptive. Academic researchers are still
seeking to link behavior with accounting numbers, but they're often viewed as
chasing moving windmills with lances thrust forward.
Auditors are more concerned about being faithful to the definitions. If the
definition says book all leases that meet the FAS 13 criteria for a capital
lease, then leases that meet those tests should not have been accounted for as
operating leases. The audit mission is to do or die, not to question why. The
FASB and other standard setters are supposed to question why. But they are
often more impacted by the behavior of the preparers than the users. The
behavior of preparers trying to circumvent accounting standards seems to have
more bearing than the resulting impacts on wealth transfers that defy being
built into a conceptual framework. Where science fails accounting in this
regard is that the wealth transfer process is just too complicated to model
except in the case of blatant fraud that lines the pockets of a villain.
It is not surprising that accounting "theory" has plummeted in
terms of books and curricula. Theory debates never seem to go anywhere beyond
unsupportable conjectures. I teach a theory course, but it has degenerated to
one of studying intangibles and how preparers design complex contracts such as
hedging and SPE contracts that challenge students into thinking how these
contracts should be accounted for given our existing standards like FAS 133
and FIN 46. One course that I would someday like to teach is to design a new
standard (such as a new FAS 133) and then predict how preparers would change
behavior and contracting. Unfortunately my students are not interested in wild
blue yonder conjectures. The CPA exam is on their minds no matter where I try
to fly. They tolerate "theory" only to the point where they are also
learning about existing standards. In their minds, any financial accounting
course beyond intermediate should simply be an extension of intermediate
accounting.
Bob Jensen
"The Accounting Cycle: The Conceptual Framework for Financial
Reporting Op/Ed," by J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, September 2006
---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x54322.xml
The Financial Accounting Standards Board and the
International Accounting Standards Board have joined forces to flesh out a
common conceptual framework. Recently they issued some preliminary views on
the "objectives of financial reporting" and the "qualitative characteristics
of decision-useful financial reporting information" and have asked for
comment.
To obtain "coherent financial reporting," the
boards feel that they need "a framework that is sound, comprehensive, and
internally consistent" (paragraph P3). In P5, they also state their hope for
convergence between U.S. and international accounting standards.
P6 indicates a need to fill in certain gaps, such
as a "robust concept of a reporting entity." I presume that they will
accomplish this task later, as the current document does not develop such a
"robust concept."
Chapter 1 presents the objective for financial
reporting, and the description differs little from what is in Concepts
Statement No. 1. This objective is "to provide information that is useful to
present and potential investors and creditors and others in making
investment, credit, and similar resource allocation decisions." The emphasis
lay with capital providers, as it should. If anything, I would place greater
accent on this aspect, because in the last 10 years, so many managers have
defined the "business world" as including managers and excluding investors
and creditors. To our chagrin, we learned that managers actually believed
this lie, as they pretended that the resources supplied by the investment
community belonged to the management team.
FASB and IASB further explain that these users are
interested in the cash flows of the entity so they can assess the potential
returns and the potential variability of those returns (e.g., in paragraph
OB.23). I wish they had drawn the logical conclusion that financial
reporting ought to exclude income smoothing. Income smoothing leads the user
to assess a smaller variance of earnings than warranted by the underlying
economics; income smoothing biases downward the actual variability of the
earnings and thus the returns.
Later, in the basis of conclusions, the document
addresses the reporting of comprehensive income and its components (see
BC1.28-31). Currently, FASB has four items that enter other comprehensive
income: gains and losses on available-for-sale investments, losses when
incurring additional amounts to recognize a minimum pension liability,
exchange gains and losses from a foreign subsidiary under the all-current
method, and gains and losses from derivatives that hedge cash flows.
The purported reason for this demarcation between
earnings and other comprehensive income rests with the purported low
reliability of measurements of these four items; however, the real reason
for these other comprehensive items seems to be political. For example, FASB
capitulated in Statement No. 115 when a number of managers objected to
reporting gains and losses on available-for-sale securities because that
would create volatility in earnings. (I find it curious how FASB caters to
the whims of managers but claims that the primary rationale for financial
reporting is to serve the investment community.) Because one has a hard time
reconciling other comprehensive income with the needs of investors and
creditors, it would serve the investment community better if the boards
eliminate this notion of comprehensive income.
Two IASB members think that an objective for
financial reporting should encompass the stewardship function (see AV1.1-7).
Stewardship seems to be a subset of economic usefulness, so this objection
is pointless. It behooves these two IASB members to explain the consequences
of adopting a stewardship objective and how these consequences differ from
the usefulness objective before we can entertain their protestation
seriously.
Sections BC1.42 and 43 ask whether management
intent should be a part of the financial reporting process. Given management
intent during the last decade, I think decidedly not. Management intent is
merely a license to massage accounting numbers as managers please.
Fortunately, the Justice Department calls such tactics fraud.
Chapter 2 of this document concerns qualitative
characteristics. For the most part, this presentation is similar to that in
Concepts Statement No. 2, though arranged somewhat differently. Concepts 2
had as its overarching qualitative characteristics relevance and
reliability. This Preliminary Views expounds relevance, faithful
representation, comparability, and understandability as the qualitative
characteristics.
The discussion on faithful representation is
interesting (QC.16-19) inasmuch as they distinguish between accounts that
depict real world phenomena and accounts that are constructs with no real
world referents. They explain that deferred debits and credits do not
possess faithful representation because they are merely the creation of
accountants. I hope that analysis applies to deferred income tax debits and
credits.
Verifiability implies similar measures by different
measurers (QC.23-26). I wish FASB and IASB to include auditability as an
aspect of verifiability; after all, if you cannot audit something, it is
hardly verifiable. Yet, the soon to be released standard on fair value
measurements includes a variety of items that will prove difficult if not
impossible to audit.
Understandability is obvious, though the two boards
feel that users with a "reasonable knowledge of business and economic
activities" can understand financial statements. I no longer agree. Such a
person might employ a profit analysis model or ratio analysis on a set of
financial statements and mis-analyze a firm's condition because he or she
did not make analytical adjustments for off-balance sheet items and other
fanciful tricks by managers. This includes so many of Enron's investors and
creditors. No, to understand financial reporting today, you must be an
expert in accounting and finance.
Benefits-that-justify-costs acts as a constraint on
financial reporting. While this criterion is acceptable, too often the
boards view costs only from the perspective of the preparers. I wish the
boards explicitly acknowledged the fact that not reporting on some things
adds costs to users. When a business enterprise engages in aggressive
accounting, the expert user needs to employ analytical adjustments to
correct this overzealousness. These adjustments consume the investor's
economic resources and thus involve costs to the investment community.
In the basis-for-conclusions section, FASB and IASB
explain that the concept of substance over form is included in the concept
of faithful representation (see paragraphs BC2.17 and 18). While I don't
have a problem with that, I think they should at least emphasize this point
in Chapter 2 rather than bury it in this section. Substance over form is a
critically important doctrine, especially as it relates to business
combinations and leases, so it deserves greater stress.
On balance, the document is well written and
contains a good clarification of the objective of financial reporting and
the qualitative characteristics of decision-useful financial reporting
information. I offer the criticisms above as a hope to strengthen and
improve the Preliminary Views.
My most important comment, however, does not
address any particular aspects within the document itself. Instead, I worry
about the usefulness of this objective and these qualitative characteristics
to FASB and IASB. To enjoy coherent financial reporting, there not only is
need for a sound, comprehensive, and internally consistent framework, we
also must have a board with the political will to utilize the conceptual
framework. FASB ignored its own conceptual framework in its issuance of
standards on:
* Leases (Aren't the financial commitments of the
lessee a liability?) * Pensions (How can the pension intangible asset really
be an asset as it has no real world referent?) * Stock options (Why did the
board not require the expensing of stock options in the 1990s when stock
options clearly involve real costs to the firm?), and * Special purpose
entities (Why did the board wait for the collapse of Enron before dealing
with this issue?).
Clearly, the low power of FASB -- IASB likewise
possesses little power -- explains some of these decisions, but it is
frustrating nonetheless to see the board ignore its own conceptual
framework. Why engage in this deliberation unless FASB is prepared to follow
through?
J. EDWARD KETZ is accounting professor at The Pennsylvania
State University. Dr. Ketz's teaching and research interests focus on
financial accounting, accounting information systems, and accounting ethics.
He is the author of
Hidden Financial Risk, which explores the causes of recent
accounting scandals. He also has edited
Accounting Ethics, a four-volume set that explores ethical
thought in accounting since the Great Depression and across several
countries.
December 7, 2004 message from Carnegie President
[carnegiepresident@carnegiefoundation.org]
A different way to think about ... Professional
Education This month's Carnegie Perspective is written by Carnegie Senior
Scholar William Sullivan, whose extensively revised second edition of Work and
Integrity was just released by Jossey-Bass. The Perspective is based on the
book's argument that in today's environment of unrelenting economic and social
pressures, in which professional models of good work come under increasing
strain, the professions need their educational centers more than ever as
resources and as rallying points for renewal.
Since our goal in Carnegie Perspectives is to
contribute to the dialogue on issues and to provide a different way to think
and talk about concerns, we have opened up the conversation by creating a
forum—Carnegie Conversations—where you can engage publicly with the author
and read and respond to what others have to say.
However, if you would prefer that your comments not
be read by others, you may still respond to the author of the piece through CarnegiePresident@carnegiefoundation.org
.
If you would like to unsubscribe to Carnegie
Perspectives, use the same address and merely type unsubscribe in the subject
line of your email to us.
We look forward to hearing from you.
Sincerely,
Lee S. Shulman President
The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching
Preparing Professionals as Moral Agents By William
Sullivan
Breakdowns in institutional reliability and
professional self-policing, as revealed in waves of scandals in business,
accounting, journalism, and the law, have spawned a cancerous cynicism on the
part of the public that threatens the predictable social environment needed
for a healthy society. For professionals to overcome this public distrust,
they must embrace a new way of looking at their role to include civic
responsibility for themselves and their profession, and a personal commitment
to a deeper engagement with society.
The highly publicized unethical behavior that we see
today by professionals is still often thought by many—physicians, lawyers,
educators, scientists, engineers—as "marginal" matters in their
fields, to be overcome in due course by the application of the value-neutral,
learned techniques of their profession. But this conventional view fails to
recognize that professionals' "problems" arise outside the sterile,
neutral and technical and instead lie within human social contexts. These are
not simply physical environments or information systems. They are networks of
social engagement structured by shared meanings, purposes, and loyalties. Such
networks form the distinctive ecology of human life.
For example, a doctor faced with today's lifestyle
diseases—obesity, addictions, cancer, strokes—rather than with infectious
biological agents, soon realizes that he or she must take into account how
individuals, groups, or whole societies lead their lives. Or in education, it
is often assumed that schools can improve student achievement by setting clear
standards and then devising teaching techniques to reach them. But this
approach has been confounded when it encounters students who do not see a
relationship between academic performance and their own goals, or when the
experience of students and parents has made trusting school authorities appear
a dubious bargain.
In order to "solve" the apparently
intractable problems of health care, education, public distrust, or developing
a humane and sustainable technological order, the strategies of intervention
employed by professionals must engage with, and if possible, strengthen, the
social networks of meaning and connection in people's lives—or their efforts
will continue to misfire or fail. And not only will they be less effective in
meeting the needs of society and the individuals who entrust their lives to
their care, but they will also find in their midst colleagues who do not
uphold the moral tenets of the profession.
The idea of the professional as neutral problem
solver, above the fray, which was launched with great expectations a century
ago, is now obsolete. A new ideal of a more engaged, civic professionalism
must take its place. Such an ideal understands, as a purely technical
professionalism does not, that professionals are inescapably moral agents
whose work depends upon public trust for its success.
Since professional schools are the portals to
professional life, they bear much of the responsibility for the reliable
formation in their students of integrity of professional purpose and identity.
In addition to enabling students to become competent practitioners,
professional schools always must provide ways to induct students into the
distinctive habits of mind that define the domain of a lawyer, a physician,
nurse, engineer, or teacher. However, the basic knowledge of a professional
domain must be revised and recast as conditions change. Today, that means that
the definition of basic knowledge must be expanded to include an understanding
of the moral and social ecology within which students will practice.
Today's professional schools will not serve their
students well unless they foster forms of practice that open possibilities of
trust and partnership with those the professions serve. Such a reorientation
of professional education means nothing less than a broadening and rebalancing
of professional identity. It means an intentional abandonment of the image of
the professional as superior and detached problem-solver. It also requires a
positive engagement. Professional education must promote the opening of
professional life to meet clients and patients as also fellow citizens,
persons with whom teachers, physicians, lawyers, nurses, accountants,
engineers, and indeed all professionals share a larger, common
"practice"—that of citizen, working to contribute particular
knowledge and specialized skills toward improving the quality of life, perhaps
especially for those most in need.
Professional schools have too often held out to their
students a notion of expert knowledge that remains abstracted from context.
Since the displacement of apprenticeship on the job by academic training in a
university setting, professional schools have tilted the definition of
professional competence heavily toward cognitive capacity, while downplaying
other crucial aspects of professional maturity. This elective affinity between
the academy's penchant for theoretical abstraction and the distanced stance of
problem solving has often obscured the key role played by the face-to-face
transmission of professional understanding and judgment from teacher to
student. This is the core of apprenticeship that must not be allowed to wither
from lack of understanding and attention.
A new civic awareness within professional preparation
could go a long way toward awakening awareness that the authentic spirit of
each professional domain represents more than a body of knowledge or skills.
It is a living culture, painfully developed over time, which represents at
once the individual practitioner's most prized possession and an asset of
great social value. Its future worth, however, will depend in large measure on
how well professional culture gets reshaped to answer these new needs of our
time
"The Practitioner-Professor Link," by Bonita K. Peterson, Christie W.
Johnson, Gil W. Crain, and Scott J. Miller, Journal of Accountancy, June 2006
---
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/jun2005/kramer.htm
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY |
PERIODIC FEEDBACK FROM PRACTITIONERS
to faculty about the strengths and
weaknesses of their graduates and their
program can help to positively influence
the accounting profession.
CPAs ALSO CAN INSPIRE STUDENTS’
education by providing internship
opportunities for accounting students,
or serving as a guest speaker in class.
MEMBERSHIP ON A UNIVERSITY’S ACCOUNTING
advisory council permits a CPA to
interact with faculty on a regular basis
and directly affect the accounting
curriculum.
SERVING AS A “PROFESSOR FOR A DAY”
is another way a CPA can
promote the profession to accounting
students and answer any questions they
have.
CPAs CAN SUPPORT STUDENTS’ PROFESSIONAL
development by providing advice
on proper business attire and tips for
preparing resumes, and conducting mock
interviews.
CPAs CAN SHARE EXPERIENCES with
a professor to cowrite an instructional
case study for a journal, which can
reach countless students in classrooms
across the world.
ORGANIZING OR CONTRIBUTING to
an accounting education fund at the
university can help fund a variety of
educational purposes, such as student
scholarships and travel expenses to
professional meetings.
PARTICIPATION BY PRACTITIONERS
in the education of today’s accounting
students is a win-win-win situation for
students, CPAs and faculty. |
|
|
Controversies in Setting Accounting Standards
SEC Seeks Stronger GASB
Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher
Cox wants the Governmental Accounting Standards Board to have more clout, he
said Wednesday in a speech at a community town hall meeting in Los Angeles.
SmartPros, July 19, 2007 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x58440.xml
Neutrality Concept in Accounting Standard Setting
In
Concepts Statement No. 2, the FASB asserts it should not issue a standard
for the purpose of achieving some particular economic behavior. Among other
things, this statement implies that the board should not set accounting
standards in an attempt to bolster the economy or some industry sector. Ideally,
scorekeeping should not affect how the game is played. But this is an impossible
ideal since changes in rules for keeping score almost always change player
behavior. Hence, accounting standards cannot be ideally neutral. The FASB,
however, actively attempts not to not take political sides on changing behavior
that favors certain political segments of society. In other words, the FASB
still operates on the basis that fairness and transparency in the spirit of
neutrality override politics. However, there is a huge gray zone that, in large
measure, involves how companies, analysts, investors, creditors, and even the
media react to new accounting rules. Sometimes they react in ways that are not
anticipated by the FASB.
Questions
Is there a problem with how GAAP covers one's Fannie?
Would fair value accounting help in this situation?
"Fannie Execs Defend Accounting Change Friday,"
by Marcy Gordon, Yahoo News, November 16, 2007 ---
http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/071116/fannie_mae_accounting.html
Fannie Mae executives on
Friday defended a change in the way the mortgage lender discloses losses on
home loans amid concern from analysts that it could mask the true impact of
the credit crisis on its bottom line.
The chief financial officer and other executives of
the government-sponsored company, which reported a $1.4 billion
third-quarter loss last week, held a conference call with Wall Street
analysts to explain the recent change.
Analysts peppered the executives with questions in
a skeptical tone. The way Fannie discloses its mortgage losses, addressed in
an article published online by Fortune, raises extra concern among analysts
given that Fannie Mae was racked by a $6.3 billion accounting scandal in
2004 that tarnished its reputation and brought government sanctions against
it.
Moreover, the skepticism from Wall Street comes as
Fannie seeks approval from the government to raise the cap of its investment
portfolio.
The chief financial officer, Stephen Swad, said in
the call that some of the $670 million in provisions for credit losses on
soured home loans that Fannie Mae wrote off in the third quarter likely
would be recovered.
"We book what we book under (generally accepted
accounting principles) and we provide this disclosure to help you understand
it," Swad said.
Shares of Fannie Mae fell $4.30, or 10 percent, to
$38.74 on Friday, following a 10 percent drop the day before.
"Fannie Shares Continue Plunge," by Mike Barris,
The Wall Street Journal, November 16, 2007 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119522620923495790.html
Shares of Fannie Mae skidded further Friday, after
falling 10% Thursday amid worries over the way the mortgage giant reports
credit losses and a gloomy outlook for the housing market.
The latest decline in the company's share price
came as Chief Financial Officer Stephen Swad on Friday attempted to
alleviate investor concerns about the company's credit losses.
In morning trading, Fannie shares were at $41.30,
down $1.75, or 4%. The shares had fallen as much as 14% early in the day
before recovering somewhat. Shares of Fannie's counterpart, Freddie Mac,
also fell, down $1.98, or 4.8%, to $39.91.
Thursday's drop came after Fortune magazine's Web
site reported a change in the method Fannie uses to report credit losses.
Last week, the nation's biggest investor in
home-mortgage loans reported that its credit losses in the year's first nine
months equaled 0.04% of the company's $2.8 trillion of mortgages and related
securities owned or guaranteed, up from 0.018% a year earlier. That was in
line with the company's forecast.
But the company changed its method of presenting
the figure, excluding unrealized losses on
certain loans that were marked down to reflect current market conditions.
Including those unrealized losses, the rate for this year's first nine
months was 0.075%, up from 0.023% a year before.
Fannie officials said the change was made to
separate realized losses from ones that haven't been realized and depend on
fluctuating market values for loans. A report from J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.
analyst George Sacco said the new method is similar to that used by Freddie
Mac. Fannie officials noted that both the realized and unrealized losses
were reflected in the earnings reported last week.
Fannie's stock had already been falling for a few
weeks amid worries about how hard Fannie would be hurt by rising mortgage
defaults. At an investment conference Thursday in New York, Wells Fargo &
Co.'s chief executive, John Stumpf, predicted more pain for mortgage lenders
in the year ahead as falling home prices cut the value of collateral, saying
the nationwide decline in housing is the worst since the Great Depression.
Thursday, Fannie shares dropped $4.78, or 10%, to
$43.04.
On Friday, Mr. Swad tried to explain further how
the company was accounting for potential losses.
Last week, Fannie Mae reported roughly $670 million
in credit losses in the third quarter related to certain charge-offs
recorded when delinquent loans were purchased from mortgage-backed
securities trusts. Mr. Swad explained Friday that portions of the credit
losses would likely be recovered.
Though these third quarter losses were charged off,
they are not considered realized losses, Mr. Swad said, because the loans
backing these securities could still be "cured." Mr. Swad said the company
was "required to take a charge when the market estimate is below our
purchase price." The company's experience, he added, "has shown that the
majority of these loans don't result in any realized losses." But he
declined to be more specific about what percentage of the loans would
eventually "cure."
Fannie last week released earnings for the first
three quarters of the year. It reported an additional unrealized loss of
$955 million in the value of private-label securities backed by subprime and
Alt-A mortgages through the end of the third quarter. This was in addition
to $376 million the company had previously accounted as a loss for these
securities this year.
November 16, 2007 reply from Dennis Beresford
[dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]
For the record, there was no "accounting change" as
per this headline. A headline of "Fannie Mae follows GAAP" probably wouldn't
be quite as sexy but it would be 100% accurate. The company's clear
explanation of what it is required to do under GAAP is covered in the
conference call that is available on Fannie Mae's web site for those
accounting aficionados who want to learn more about AICPA Statement of
Position 03-03 that requires companies repurchasing loans to record them at
fair value. So the answer to your question is that fair value accounting
apparently only complicated analysts' understanding in this case.
Denny Beresford
November 17, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Denny,
Your comment sheds a lot of light on this apparent gap between analyst
expectations and GAAP rules in this case. The SEC, FASB, and the IASB are
pushing hard and steady toward fair value accounting with FAS 155, 157, and
159 just being intermediary steps along the way. At least in this case,
however, required fair value accounting is allegedly contributing to the
plunge in Fannie Mae’s share values.
This is another example of the unpredictability of the Neutrality Concept
in standard setting. You point out (see below) that FASB seriously considers
neutrality for every new standard and interpretation with the goal of having
scorekeeping not affect how the game is played, but in athletics and
business it is virtually impossible to change how something is scored
without affecting policies and strategies. For example, when long shots in
basketball commenced to earn three points rather than two points it
fundamentally changed the game of basketball.
Perhaps this is all an example of what you, in 1989,
termed "relevant financial information may bring about damaging
consequences." (see a quote from your article below). It would have been
interesting if the media reporters in 2007 had cited your 1989 article in
this beating Fannie Mae is now taking by adhering to GAAP.
Bob Jensen
"How well does the FASB consider the consequences of its
work?" by Dennis Beresford, All Business, March 1, 1989 ---
http://www.allbusiness.com/accounting/methods-standards/105127-1.html
Neutrality is the quality that distinguishes
technical decision-making from political decision-making. Neutrality is
defined in FASB Concepts Statement 2 as the absence of bias that is intended
to attain a predetermined result. Professor Paul B. W. Miller, who has held
fellowships at both the FASB and the SEC, has written a paper titled:
"Neutrality--The Forgotten Concept in Accounting Standards Setting." It is
an excellent paper, but I take exception to his title. The FASB has not
forgotten neutrality, even though some of its constituents may appear to
have. Neutrality is written into our mission statement as a primary
consideration. And the neutrality concept dominates every Board meeting
discussion, every informal conversation, and every memorandum that is
written at the FASB. As I have indicated, not even those who have a mandate
to consider public policy matters have a firm grasp on the macroeconomic or
the social consequences of their actions. The FASB has no mandate to
consider public policy matters. It has said repeatedly that it is not
qualified to adjudicate such matters and therefore does not seek such a
mandate. Decisions on such matters properly reside in the United States
Congress and with public agencies.
The only mandate the FASB has, or wants, is to
formulate unbiased standards that advance the art of financial reporting for
the benefit of investors, creditors, and all other users of financial
information. This means standards that result in information on which
economic decisions can be based with a reasonable degree of confidence.
A fear of information
Unfortunately, there is sometimes a fear that
reliable, relevant financial information may bring about damaging
consequences. But damaging to whom? Our
democracy is based on free dissemination of reliable information. Yes, at
times that kind of information has had temporarily damaging consequences for
certain parties. But on balance, considering all interests, and the future
as well as the present, society has concluded in favor of freedom of
information. Why should we fear it in financial reporting?
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on standard setting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on Accrual Accounting and
Estimation are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AccrualAccounting
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
Bob Jensen's threads on Fannie Mae's enormous problem
(the largest in history that led to the firing of KPMG from the audit and a
multiple-year effort to restate financial statemetns) with applying FAS 133 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm#FannieMae
Standard Setting and Securities Markets: U.S. Versus Europe
November 29, 2007 message from Pacter, Paul (CN - Hong Kong)
[paupacter@DELOITTE.COM.HK]
Some similarities to Chair of SEC, but some
important differences. SEC has direct regulatory powers over securities
markets, entities that offer securities in those markets, broker/dealers in
securities, auditors, and others. SEC can impose penalties on those it
regulates.
In Europe there is no pan-European securities
regulator equivalent to the SEC with direct regulatory powers similar to the
SEC's. Rather, there are 27 securities regulators (one from each member
state) who have that power. Here's a link to the list:
http://www.cesr-eu.org/index.php?page=members_directory&mac=0&id=
There is a coordinating body of European securities
regulators called CESR (the Committee of European Securities Regulators
(http://www.cesr-eu.org/)
but CESR's role is advisory, not regulatory.
When the European Parliament adopts legislation
(such as securitieslegislation) the legislation first has to be transposed
(legally adopted) into the national laws of the Member States. Commissioner
McCreevy's role is to propose policies and propose legislation to adopt
those policies in Europe, oversee implementation of the legislation in the
27 Member States (plus 3 EEA countries), and (through both persuasion and
some legal authority) try to ensure consistent and coordinated
implementation. The Commissioner also has outreach and liaison
responsibilities outside the European Union. Because there is no
pan-European counterpart to the SEC Chairman, Commissioner McCreevy
generally handles top level policy liaison between the SEC and Europe.
Like the Chair of the SEC, EU Commissioners are
political appointees.
Paul Pacter
Key differences between U.S. and International Standards ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FASBvsIASB
Question
Is a major overhaul of accounting standards on the way?
Hint
There may no longer be the tried and untrusted earnings per share number to
report!
Comment
It would be interesting to see a documentation of the academic research, if any,
that the FASB relied upon to commence this blockbuster initiative. I recommend
that some astute researcher commence to probe into the thinking behind this
proposal.
"Profit as We Know It Could Be Lost With New Accounting
Statements," by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, May 12, 2007; Page
A1 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117893520139500814.html?mod=DAT
Pretty soon the bottom line may not be, well, the
bottom line.
In coming months, accounting-rule makers are
planning to unveil a draft plan to rework financial statements, the bedrock
data that millions of investors use every day when deciding whether to buy
or sell stocks, bonds and other financial instruments. One possible result:
the elimination of what today is known as net income or net profit, the
bottom-line figure showing what is left after expenses have been met and
taxes paid.
It is the item many investors look to as a key
gauge of corporate performance and one measure used to determine executive
compensation. In its place, investors might find a number of profit figures
that correspond to different corporate activities such as business
operations, financing and investing.
Another possible radical change in the works:
assets and liabilities may no longer be separate categories on the balance
sheet, or fall to the left and right side in the classic format taught in
introductory accounting classes.
ACCOUNTING OVERHAUL
Get a glimpse of what new financial statements
could look like, according to an early draft recently provided by the
Financial Accounting Standards Board to one of its advisory groups.The
overhaul could mark one of the most drastic changes to accounting and
financial reporting since the start of the Industrial Revolution in the 19th
century, when companies began publishing financial information as they
sought outside capital. The move is being undertaken by accounting-rule
makers in the U.S. and internationally, and ultimately could affect
companies and investors around the world.
The project is aimed at providing investors with
more telling information and has come about as rule makers work to one day
come up with a common, global set of accounting standards. If adopted, the
changes will likely force every accounting textbook to be rewritten and
anyone who uses accounting -- from clerks to chief executives -- to relearn
how to compile and analyze information that shows what is happening in a
business.
This is likely to come as a shock, even if many
investors and executives acknowledge that net income has flaws. "If there
was no bottom line, I'd want to have a sense of what other indicators I
ought to be looking at to get a sense of the comprehensive health of the
company," says Katrina Presti, a part-time independent health-care
contractor and stay-at-home mom who is part of a 12-woman investment club in
Pueblo, Colo. "Net income might be a false indicator, but what would I look
at if it goes away?"
The effort to redo financial statements reflects
changes in who uses them and for what purposes. Financial statements were
originally crafted with bankers and lenders in mind. Their biggest question:
Is the business solvent and what's left if it fails? Stock investors care
more about a business's current and future profits, so the net-income line
takes on added significance for them.
Indeed, that single profit number, particularly
when it is divided by the number of shares outstanding, provides the most
popular measure of a company's valuation: the price-to-earnings ratio. A
company that trades at $10 a share, and which has net profit of $1 a share,
has a P/E of 10.
But giving that much power to one number has long
been a recipe for fraud and stock-market excesses. Many major accounting
scandals earlier this decade centered on manipulation of net income. The
stock-market bubble of the 1990s was largely based on investors' assumption
that net profit for stocks would grow rapidly for years to come. And the
game of beating a quarterly earnings number became a distraction or worse
for companies' managers and investors. Obviously it isn't known whether the
new format would cut down on attempts to game the numbers, but companies
would have to give a more detailed breakdown of what is going on.
The goal of the accounting-rule makers is to better
reflect how businesses are actually run and divert attention from the one
number. "I know the world likes single bottom-line numbers and all of that,
but complicated businesses are hard to translate into just one number," says
Robert Herz, chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the U.S.
rule-making body that is one of several groups working on the changes.
At the same time, public companies today are more
global than local, and as likely to be involved in services or lines of
business that involve intellectual property such as software rather than the
plants and equipment that defined the manufacturing age. "The income
statement today looks a lot like it did when I started out in this
profession," says William Parrett, the retiring CEO of accounting firm
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, who started as a junior accountant in 1967. "But
the kind of information that goes into it is completely different."
Along the way, figures such as net income have
become muddied. That is in part because more and more of the items used to
calculate net profit are based on management estimates, such as the value of
items that don't trade in active markets and the direction of interest
rates. Also, over the years rule makers agreed to corporate demands to
account for some things, such as day-to-day changes in the value of pension
plans or financial instruments used to protect against changes in interest
rates, in ways that keep them from causing swings in net income.
Rule makers hope reformatting financial statements
will address some of these issues, while giving investors more information
about what is happening in different parts of a business to better assess
its value. The project is being managed jointly by the FASB in the U.S. and
the London-based International Accounting Standards Board, and involves
accounting bodies in Japan, other parts of Asia and individual European
nations.
The entire process of adopting the revised approach
could take a few years to play out, so much could yet change. Plus, once
rule makers adopt the changes, they would have to be ratified by regulatory
authorities, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission in the U.S. and
the European Commission in Europe, before public companies would be required
to follow them.
As a first step, rule makers expect later this year
to publish a document outlining their preliminary views on what new form
financial statements might take. But already they have given hints of what's
in store. In March, the FASB provided draft, new financial statements at the
end of a 32-page handout for members of an advisory group. (See an example.)
Although likely to change, this preview showed an
income statement that has separate segments for the company's operating
business, its financing activities, investing activities and tax payments.
Each area has an income subtotal for that particular segment.
There is also a "total comprehensive income"
category that is wider ranging than net profit as it is known today, and so
wouldn't be directly comparable. That is because this total would likely
include gains and losses now kept in other parts of the financial
statements. These include some currency fluctuations and changes in the
value of financial instruments used to hedge against other items.
Comprehensive income could also eventually include
short-term changes in the value of corporate pension plans, which currently
are smoothed out over a number of years. As a result, comprehensive income
could be a lot more difficult to predict and could be volatile from quarter
to quarter or year to year.
As for the balance sheet, the new version would
group assets and liabilities together according to similar categories of
operating, investing and financing activities, although it does provide a
section for shareholders equity. Currently, a balance sheet is broken down
between assets and liabilities, rather than by operating categories.
Such drastic change isn't likely to happen without
a fight. Efforts to bring now-excluded figures into the income statement
could prompt battles with companies that fear their profit will be subject
to big swings. Companies may also balk at the expense involved.
"The cost of this change could be monumental," says
Gary John Previts, an accounting professor at Case Western Reserve
University in Cleveland. "All the textbooks are going to have to change,
every contract and every bank arrangement will have to change." Investors in
Europe and Asia, meanwhile, have opposed the idea of dropping net profit as
it appears today, David Tweedie, the IASB's chairman, said in an interview
earlier this year.
Analysts in the London office of UBS AG recently
published a report arguing this very point -- that even if net income is a
"simplistic measure," that doesn't mean it isn't a valid "starting point in
valuation" and that "its widespread use is justification enough for its
retention."
Such opposition doesn't surprise many accounting
experts. Net income is "the basis for bonuses and judgments about what a
company's stock is worth," says Stephen A. Zeff, an accounting professor at
Rice University. "I just don't know what the markets would do if companies
stopped reporting a bottom line somewhere." In the U.S., professional
investors and analysts have taken a more nuanced view, perhaps because the
manipulation of numbers was more pronounced in U.S. markets.
That said, net profit has been around for some
time. The income statement in use today, along with the balance sheet,
generally dates to the 1940s when the SEC laid out regulations on financial
disclosure. But many companies have included net profit in one form or
another since the 1800s.
In its fourth annual report, General Electric Co.
provided investors with a consolidated balance sheet and consolidated
profit-and-loss account for the year ended Jan. 31, 1896. The company, whose
board at the time included Thomas Edison, generated "profit of the year" --
what today would be called net income or net profit -- of $1,388,967.46.
For the moment, net profit will probably exist in
some form, although its days are likely numbered. "We've decided in the
interim to keep a net-income subtotal, but that's all up for discussion,"
the FASB's Mr. Herz says.
Accounting Rule Is Eased for Foreign Companies
Federal regulators tentatively agreed Wednesday to ease
an accounting requirement for foreign companies that trade on United States
exchanges. The action by the Securities and Exchange Commission paves the way
for a related change that would allow public companies to choose between
international and United States accounting standards when reporting financial
results. The step taken by the S.E.C. on Wednesday would eliminate a requirement
for foreign companies to reconcile their financial results with United States
standards called generally accepted accounting principles, or GAAP. Foreign
companies, which already adhere to what are called international financial
reporting standards, say the S.E.C. mandate is burdensome and costly. The
change, which awaits formal adoption after a 75-day public comment
period, would apply to 2008 annual reports, which are submitted in early 2009.
Associated Press, "Accounting Rule Is Eased for Foreign Companies," The New
York Times, June 21, 2007 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/21/business/worldbusiness/21sec.html
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on
March 30, 2007
Accounting
Standard Setters--Independent and Tough
by Robert E.
Denham
Mar 26, 2007
Page: A13
Click here to view the
full article on WSJ.com
---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117486496797748456.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
TOPICS: Accounting,
Financial Accounting Standards Board, Governmental Accounting
SUMMARY: Robert E. Denham is Chairman
of the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF), the oversight
organization of trustees for the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) and the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB).
In this editorial page discussion, he responds to concerns
expressed in a March 9, 2007, editorial by former SEC Chairman
Arthur Levitt, Jr. Mr. Denham discusses the benefits of stable
funding that has been achieved for the FASB through
Sarbanes-Oxley requirements and wishes for such a resource for
the GASB. He comments on the fact that the FASB and the GASB
recently have taken "concrete steps to improve user input to the
standard-setting process." He also describes how the Boards have
faced enormous opposition at times from corporations and
Congressional leaders to do things that have in hindsight turned
out to be "the right thing to do. "As they demonstrated in
standing up to corporate and governmental pressure on options
expensing, the trustees act to protect the independence of the
standards setters when they are attacked by special interest
groups seeking to block or reverse the decisions of the boards.
Students may answer questions by referring to the organizations'
web sites at http://www.fasb.org/faf/ http://www.fasb.org/
http://www.gasb.org/
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is the Financial Accounting Foundation? What is its
role in relation to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
and the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB)?
2.) Why is it important that the FASB and GASB operate on an
independent basis? How did implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley
law improve that ability for the FASB?
3.) What challenges do the FASB and GASB face in setting
standards that are controversial? How does independence help in
facing those challenges? Glean all you can from the articles or
from your own knowledge.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode
Island
RELATED ARTICLES:
Standards Deviation
by Arthur Levitt, Jr.
Mar 09, 2007
Page: A15
|
"Accounting Firms Seek Overhaul," by Tad Kopinski, Institutional
Shareholder Services ISS, November 20, 2006 ---
http://blog.issproxy.com/2006/11/accounting_firms_seek_overhaul.html
The six biggest international audit firms have
called for a complete overhaul of corporate financial reporting as
the U.S. and Europe move toward convergence of international audit
standards.
In a Nov. 8 report, the accounting firms
propose to replace static quarterly financial statements with
real-time, Internet-based reporting that encompasses a wider range
of performance measures, including non-financial ones. The report
was signed by the chiefs of PricewaterhouseCoopers International,
Grant Thornton International, Deloitte, KPMG International, BDO
International, and Ernst & Young. The report can be downloaded
here.
"We all believe the current model is
broken," Mike D. Rake, KPMG's chairman, told the Financial Times.
"There are significant shortcomings to U.S. GAAP [Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles] and issues of concern with International
Financial Reporting Standards. We're not in a very happy situation."
Rake noted that quarterly reporting and the
short-term focus on companies' ability to meet Wall Street earnings
expectations helped foster accounting scandals. The firms have been
working on their proposals for more than a year.
The large discrepancy between the "book"
and "market" values of many listed companies is clear evidence that
the content of traditional financial statements is of limited use,
the report said. The audit firms recommend using non-financial
measures that would provide more valuable indications of a company's
future prospects, such as customer satisfaction, product or service
defects, employee turnover, and patent awards.
The report said the following developments
need to occur to ensure capital market stability, efficiency, and
growth:
--Investor needs for information are well
defined and met;
--The roles of the various stakeholders in these markets--financial
statement preparers, regulators, investors, standards setters, and
auditors--are aligned and supported by effective forums for
continuous dialogue;
--The auditing profession is vibrant, sustainable, and provides
sufficient choice for all stakeholders in these markets;
--A new business-reporting model is developed to deliver relevant
and reliable information in a timely way;
--Large, collusive frauds are more and more rare; and
--Information is reported and audited pursuant to globally
consistent standards.
ICGN Expresses Concerns Over
ConvergenceMeanwhile, the
International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) has expressed
concerns about a draft proposal on harmonizing international and
U.S. accounting standards. The ICGN argues that the draft doesn't
pay sufficient attention to shareholder rights and the stewardship
role of boards and investors.
"Convergence must be there to raise
standards," ICGN Executive Director Anne Simpson told the Financial
Times. "Convergence for its own sake is not of value."
The ICGN letter was in response to a
request for comment by the International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB) and its U.S. counterpart, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) on a discussion paper on harmonization objectives. The
IASB and the FASB have been working on harmonizing the two
accounting systems since October 2002 and have set 2008 as the goal
for finalizing the process.
Unlike the current IASB auditing framework,
the discussion paper endorses a model more similar to U.S.
standards, dropping a key shareowner safeguard embedded in
U.K.-style standards, the ICGN noted. Rather than focusing audits on
past transactions, the discussion paper calls for audits to focus on
"decision-usefulness" that can affect company cash flows, the letter
said.
"We are concerned that this emphasis on the
ability to forecast the future does not fully capture the
requirements of stewardship, which is concerned with monitoring past
transactions and events," Mark Anson, the CEO of Hermes Pensions
Management who chairs the ICGN, wrote in the Nov. 2 letter. (A
Hermes affiliate is a part owner of ISS.)
"In many jurisdictions, financial
statements provide significant input into the decisions we make as
shareholders, by providing an account of past transactions and
events and the current financial position of the business," the ICGN
letter noted. "In de-emphasizing things that are particularly
[relevant to shareholders' risks and rights], the standards setters
could achieve the perverse effect of actually increasing the cost of
capital."
The ICGN includes more than 400
institutional and private investors, corporations, and advisers from
38 countries with capital under management in excess of $10
trillion, according to its Web site. The ICGN letter also was signed
by Claude Lamoureux, CEO of the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan.
A copy of the IASB discussion paper, which
was published in July, can be downloaded
here.
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue
Bob Jensen's threads on troubles in the big international accounting firms
are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on proposed reforms are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudProposedReforms.htm
Question
Will the U.S. adopt all IFRS international standards while the European Union
cherry picks which standards it will adopt?
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on
April 27, 2007
"SEC to Mull Letting U.S. Companies Use International Accounting Rules,"
by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, Page: C3 ---
http://snipurl.com/WSJ0425
TOPICS: Accounting, Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards
Board, Securities and Exchange Commission
SUMMARY: The article describes the SEC's willingness to consider allowing
U.S. companies to use USGAAP or International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
in their filings. This development stems from the initiative to allow
international firms traded on U.S. exchanges to file using IFRS without
reconciling to USGAAP-based net income and stockholders' equity as is now
required on Form 20F. "SEC Chairman Christopher Cox said the agency remains
committed to removing the reconciliation requirement by 2009. Such a move was
the subject of an SEC roundtable and is being closely watched by European Union
officials." The SEC will accept comments this summer on its proposal to
eliminate the reconciliation requirements. If the agency does implement this
change, then it will consider allowing U.S. companies the same alternative.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is a "foreign private issuer" (FPI)? Summarize the SEC's current filing
requirements for these entities.
2.) Why is the SEC considering allowing U.S. companies to submit filings
under IFRS rather than U.S. GAAP?
3.) Why might the SEC's decision in this matter "spell the demise of USGAAP"?
4.) Define "principles-based standards" and contrast with "rules-based
standards." Give an example in either USGAAP or IFRS requirements for each of
these items.
5.) "Some experts don't think a move away from U.S. GAAP would necessarily be
bad." Who do you think would hold this opinion? Who would disagree? Explain.
6.) Define the term convergence in relation to global standards. Who is
working towards this goal?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Jensen Comment
Canada has already decided to adopt the IFRS in place of domestic Canadian
standards.
Also see ""Strengthening the Transatlantic Economy," by José
Manuel Barroso (European Commission President), April 27, 2007 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/europe/0704barroso.pdf
Also don't assume that the European Union automatically adopts
each IASB international standard. For example, the EU may not adopt IFRS 8 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ifrs08.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on differences between the international
and U.S. standards are summarized at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FASBvsIASB
Complicated Accounting Rules and Employee Pressures
November 7, 2006 message from Amy Dunbar
[Amy.Dunbar@BUSINESS.UCONN.EDU]
I am teaching a class, Research for Accounting
Professionals, and I have been thinking about how to prepare my students for
the "real world." I am looking for some insight re: the apparent increased
pressure on accountants. For example, some say that the financial reporting
environment is rivaling the tax world for the number of new rules that come
out every year. I counted the number of statements issued since per year and
found that the 1980s was the busiest period, with 1982 being the highest
year with 18 statements. Does anyone know why that was? If the number of
statements isn't increasing, is it the guidance from SEC that has increased,
or is the pressure coming from the SOX environment with its emphasis on
internal controls? Has the internal control guidance stepped up? Or is the
pressure simply the same pressure that all business people are facing from
increased global competition?
1 1973
2 1974
9 1975
2 1976
6 1977
4 1978
10 1979
10 1980
9 1981
18 1982
7 1983
4 1984
6 1985
3 1986
6 1987
4 1988
3 1989
2 1990
2 1991
5 1992
4 1993
2 1994
7 1995
3 1996
4 1997
3 1998
3 1999
3 2000
4 2001
4 2002
3 2003
4 2004
1 2005
5 2006
Amy Dunbar
University of Connecticut
School of Business
Department of Accounting
2100 Hillside Road, Unit 1041 Storrs, CT 06269
November 8, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Amy,
I don’t think you can
compare numbers of FASB/SEC statements with any sort of confidence. How
do you compare FAS 133 (incredibly complex) with FAS 157 (relatively
simple)? The problem is not the number of new standards but the way new
standards merely add to a growing mountain of previous standards that
does not go away --- the mountain just grows higher and higher.
Our students must face
an exceedingly complex world of technology. They must have skills in
pivot tables, client databases, knowledge databases, ERP, and things
that were just not crashing down on our graduates in the 1980s.
I personally think
that a negative externality of technology has been increased risk of
fraud that increases pressures on auditors. For example, technology has
made it lucrative to steal IDs. Now we have huge conspiracies to steal
those IDs, as witnessed by the recent reporting of a gang, including
hotel owners, managers, and employees, that were stealing IDs at
multiple hotels. Internal controls have just not kept pace with the
level of theft risks and temptations, and our graduates are under
pressures to invent newer internal controls in complicated IT systems.
Hacker/Cracker criminals themselves are extremely sophisticated and
skilled. Our networked enemies can be anywhere on the globe.
Pressures are coming
from a wide variety of interacting causes, not the least of which is SOX
which is basically aimed at improving audit quality. What you had back
in the 1980s was auditing sham! Firms like Andersen were removing much
of the detail testing and trench work out of the audits, thereby taking
much of the pressure off of auditors in the field ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm#RiskBasedAuditing
The world’s worst audit in history, WorldCom, brought this sham into the
light.
The audit scandals
(spread rather evenly among firms), litigation losses, the nose dive of
reputation of the CPA profession, and SOX turned much of this around and
now the audit firms are trying to restore the professionalism of their
work with a dramatic increase in funding to do the job. But the
pressures are bound to increase as well if auditors really try to do
professional work.
You have audit firms
being fired (the way KPMG was fired from Fannie Mae and E&Y was fired
from TIAA/CREF). You have clients paying millions upon millions to
restate financial statements because of bad auditing (e.g., Fannie is
spending over $100 million to produce restatements). This is bound to
pressure auditors assigned to do the job right. One of my former
students brought in by PwC to help generate Fannie’s restatements said
that he had to become an expert on valuing derivatives using a Bloomberg
terminal (as part of the restatement effort). How many of our accounting
education programs teach students how to value interest rate swaps on a
Bloomberg terminal?
But mostly I think the
pressure is on our graduates to deal with incredibly tough contracts
that their professors and their supervisors themselves do not
understand. Pressure is put on our green-as-grass new graduates to
understand and explain contract complexity all the way up the food chain
in their firms.
Below is a message
that I received yesterday from a recent graduate who went to work
immediately for AT&T rather than one of the big auditing firms. It helps
explain how our young graduates encounter contracts that do not appear
in our textbooks and how they must have skills and knowledge well beyond
what we taught in the past Century.
Hey again Dr. Jensen,
I have another derivatives
situation! Do you know anything about zero coupon bonds that are
puttable? I guess they are a relatively new transaction type
that banks are trying to push. I guess the theory is that you
sacrifice some additional risk (by allowing the bondholder to
put to you) in return for a lower interest rate than a typical
zero coupon bond. It is my interpretation that written options
don't count for hedge accounting status unless they offset
another derivative instrument (FAS 133, P 396-401). It is also
my interpretation that this is a situation which would create a
difference in the bond value which would be reflected as an
income statement (other income/expense) effect.
However, I think the financial
components of the situation are over my head, and my boss is
trying to tell me that he thinks that all of this transaction
would either run through interest expense or there would be a
huge increase in income in the first period represented (with no
MTM throughout). I don't understand these arguments. Do you have
any idea what he is getting at?
I am really grateful for any help
you can provide, but I am starting to feel bad about emailing
you. I have always assumed that you enjoyed these kind of
discussions, but if you don't please don't feel obligated to
answer. Just let me know - I don't want to disturb your
retirement!
As always, hope things are well.
Thanks again so much.
Andrew |
My response to him is too long to repeat here, but you can read a bit
more about puttable bond accounting at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm
Each new message from a frustrated former student makes me happier that
I’m retired in the high hills. I would not want to be one of these
young men and women today.
Bob Jensen
November 8, 2006 reply from J. S. Gangolly
[gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
Years ago, I suggested one of my doctoral students
(now a colleague) to prepare a graph that shows how the various standards
are related. The result was the graph attached.
Here, we represent each standard as a point,
equidistant from each other, on the circumference of a circle. Then we draw
an arrow from standard A to standard B if standard A amended Standard B. The
result is the attached graph. It looks more like an oval because I had to
compress the image to fit powerpoint slide.
The graph helps us understand the dynamics of
standards, forces us to ask questions as to why standards may be frequently
revised, why interpretation of "the GAAP" as opposed to standards becomes
difficult, and behooves us to ask what needs to be done.
This sort of a graph is used in information
retrieval as well as exploratory data analysis. I teach using this figure in
my statistics course for accountants (and not Accounting "Theory" course).
Those interested in my first class of the semester,
please go to the following link:
http://www.albany.edu/acc/courses/acc522.fall2006/classnotes/acc522sept142006.ppt
Hope I am not too far off the mark.
Regards,
Jagdish
November 8, 2006 reply from Jim Formosa
[Jim.Formosa@NSCC.EDU]
I believe that SOX and the PCOAB shocked the FASB
for a while and I am not sure that the shock has worn off. I remember
reading in several journals that, with the advent of the PCOAB, the FASB
became tentative. Then I believe you have to consider the FASB process which
requires drafting and approvals with the constant threat of legislative
interference at the federal level. Many have questioned the long-term
efficacy of the FASB process itself. I believe in full disclosure and
feedback in the rule making process but it should not take years - expensing
options as only one of several examples.
I have also read that many believe the FASB is fast
becoming a dinosaur that has outlived its usefulness- it will certainly be
interesting.
Jim Formosa, M.S., CPA
Certified Senior WebCT Trainer
Associate Professor of Accounting
Nashville Community College 615-353-3420 FAX 615-356-1213
November 8, 2006 reply from J. S. Gangolly
[gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
1. Codification is a neanderthal concept and a
vestige of the disastrous Napoleonic rule in Europe. It is expensive, does
nothing to resolve whatever ambiguities that might be present (in fact it
might exacerbate them), has high maintenance, and totally ignores all the
developments in information technologies over the past century. In fact, in
my humble opinion, codification is the accounting equivalent of Iraq (I am,
of course, exaggerating here). What is needed is NOT radical reconstitutive
surgery of the body of accounting standards (as in Iraq) by first
disemboweling them, but a philosophical reflection of the way we draft
standards (and how we use them) that is informed by the developments in
information technology.
In my humble opinion, the emerging technologies
surrounding the semantic web initiative of W3C is the way to go, but that
involves considerable research investments.
Years ago I tried a dialogue with some firms (and
also with FASB through some friends) about supporting research in the area,
but my plea fell on deaf ears (except for Arthur Andersen - their Litigation
Support people, who showed considerable interest before they tragically
disbanded).
2. Your second question as to why people still
refer to SASes rather than their codification, I think I can safely rest my
case in 1. above. Codification adds little value at great cost. Codification
is for the lazy people who want their thinking done for them.
If the standards are drafted well, codification is
a trivial task. One can have an algorithm for codification in less than a
semester of a competent doctoral student's time. Drafting the standards well
is another matter, and is a profoundly intellectual activity. We can not do
that without adequate theories of language competence, language use,
reasoning, and theories of textual interpretation (similar to legal
hermeneutics). And having examined the standards as well as EDGAR filings
over the past few years, I can safely say that we in accounting are quite
lacking in each of these.
Regards,
Jagdish
November 8, 2006 reply from J. S. Gangolly
[gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
Bob,
1. That accounting standards standards have become
complex over the years is true. It is also perhaps true that they are
nowadays better drafted compared with the philosophical ramblings in very
early "standards". However, I personally don't think they are anywhere close
to the tax code in complexity (and of course length. For example, section 10
of SFAS 133, a relatively long paragraph for SFASes, is dwarfed by, for
example section 351 of the Tax code, a relatively average paragraph).
I will not resort to midieval torture of the reader
by reproducing the two sections side-by-side. But the elegance of the tax
code and the lack thereof is there plainly to be seen.
One of the problems with drafting in accounting
standards is in the way definitions are stated. In accounting, the
definitions are often given by examples rather than definitions with
exceptions to the definitions. That is not the only problem. There are a
slew of problems that I wrote about in an article titled "Some thoughts on
the Engineering of Financial Accounting Standards" that I wrote a long time
ago (in the second volume on AI in Accounting edited by Miklos Vasarhelyi.
It would be an interesting exercise comparing the
complexities between the two texts after developing appropriate metrics. I
am not sure accounting standards would measure up to the tax code, but I am
no expert in either field. Perhaps some one like Amy who is one in both can
enlighten us.
Jagdish
November 9, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Jagdish,
Codification with enforcement suppresses some types of atrocious
behavior. For example, thousands of CEOs commenced to steal from investors
by backdating stock options until disclosure rules were put in place.
Without codification and enforcement there's anarchy. With excess
codification freedom and creativity is suppressed. It's just very, very
difficult to set the bar optimally because Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
proved it to be impossible ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impossibility_theorem
We are thus doomed to forever debate codes of behavior ad infinitum.
As usual you make good points. However, financial contracting is so
complex that I'm like Amy is with tax accounting. I cannot imagine trying to
account on a subjective judgment basis without codification. Without
codification comparability is virtually impossible with exotic financial
structurings.
It's possible to reduce the problem with simplified rules/laws such as
eliminating 90% of the personal tax code with a new flat tax, eliminating
accrual accounting in favor of cash flow financial reporting, or reporting
on a "fair value" basis for all assets and liabilities. But the social
impacts of a flat tax are contentious. Cash flow reporting is a license for
CEOs to mislead and manipulate investors with cash flow timing
manipulations. Fair value reporting creates more fiction than fact (such as
wild earnings fluctuations of perfect hedges that eliminate cash flow or FX
risk).
Codification sets parameters on major types of behavior. What is "right"
versus "wrong" becomes anarchy if those parameters become subjective
variables. The never-ending debate becomes one of deciding what are the
"major types of behavior" to be codified since it is impractical and
undesirable to set a parameter for every element of behavior. In the case of
financial structuring we keep inventing new "major types." For example, the
interest rate swap was invented in 1984 and quickly became a major way to
raise capital before it even had to be disclosed (FAS 119) and eventually
booked (FAS 133) in Year 2000.
We are thus doomed to forever debate codes of behavior and accounting
standards ad infinitum.
My threads containing earlier arguments on this issue (e.g., Beresford
versus Ketz) are shown below.
Bob Jensen
March 28, 2006 message from Denny Beresford
[DBeresfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]
A House of Representatives subcommittee is going to
have a public hearing on Wednesday that has the objective of discussing
"ways to promote more transparent financial reporting, including current
initiatives by regulators and industry."
See the press release at:
http://financialservices.house.gov/news.asp?FormMode=release&id=777&NewsType=1
for further details.
Denny Beresford
House Committee on Financial Services ---
http://snipurl.com/BakerSub
Baker Subcommittee to Advocate Transparency in
Financial Reporting
The Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital
Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises, chaired by Rep.
Richard H. Baker (LA), will convene for a hearing entitled Fostering
Accuracy and Transparency in Financial Reporting. The hearing will take
place on Wednesday, March 29 at 10 a.m. in room 2128 of the Rayburn
building.
Members of the Subcommittee are expected to discuss
ways to promote more transparent financial reporting, including current
initiatives by regulators and industry.
For the capital markets to operate most
efficiently, information about public companies must be understandable,
accessible, and accurate. Corporate statements are mathematical summaries
meant to convey a company’s condition. The four basic documents which must
be filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are at the
heart of investor disclosure: the income statement, the cash flow statement,
the balance sheet, and the statement of changes in equity.
Among the current initiatives to improve the
clarity and usefulness of public company information is a trend away from
quarterly earnings forecasting, the use of technology to decrease
complexity, and a review of the various accounting standards and how they
interact.
Subcommittee Chairman Baker said, "If U.S. markets
are to remain on top in an increasingly competitive global marketplace, we
need to move away from the complex and cumbersome and explore technological
and other methods of enhancing the clarity, accuracy, and efficiency of our
accounting system. At the same time, we need to look at whether earnings
forecasting and the beat-the-street mentality, which appears to have
contributed to some of the executive malfeasance of the past several years,
truly serves the best interest of investors or the goal of long-term
economic growth."
The corporate scandals several years ago revealed
weaknesses in the financial reporting system. While many companies were
violating financial reporting requirements, regulatory complexity also may
have contributed to some lapses in compliance.
Fraud, general manipulation of statements, and
regulatory complexity all contribute to a reduction in the usefulness of
financial statements and all may obfuscate the picture of companies’
financial health. A number of recent studies have argued against the
practice of predicting future quarterly earnings, concluding that the drive
to “make the numbers” can lead to poor business decisions and the
manipulation of earnings.
Congress, regulators, and the industry subsequently
have assessed financial reporting failures and have reacted with efforts
aimed at strengthening the system, including many provisions of The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
More recent initiatives by regulators to streamline
financial reporting standards and accounting include:
- A Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
review of complex and outdated accounting standards;
- The use of principles-based, rather than
rules-based, accounting;
- FASB’s continued cooperation with the
International Accounting Standards Board on the convergence of
accounting standards; and
- The use of eXtensible Business Reporting
Language, or XBRL, a computer code which tags data in financial
statements. The use of XBRL allows investors to quickly download
financial data onto spreadsheets for analysis.
Public Companies have been filing financial
statements with the SEC since the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
March 28, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Denny,
I know that we disagree on the principles based
standards initiative. My negative position on this is outlined somewhat at
http://snipurl.com/JensenPBS
I just don't think the principles based Ten
Commandments are sufficient to discard all statutes on felony law. I don't
think we can discard all FDA rules on drug testing and replace them with
principles based guidelines for pharmaceutical companies to follow. The same
can be said for environmental protection regulations, child protective
services, and whatever. Sometimes we need detailed rules so we have better
guidance as to what is right and what is wrong in specific and complex
circumstances.
You and I go back to the old days (and we passed the
CPA exam). GAAP was much less complex and could virtually be memorized. We
go back to the days when much was left to "auditor judgment."
But we also go back to the days when CEOs were not
fanatics about hitting analyst forecasts. We go back to days when top-tier
management compensation did not swing heavily an eps number. We go back to
the days when debt was debt and equity was equity. More importantly we go
back to the days when an auditor could actually understand contracts being
written.
In the past CEOs respected auditor decisions and did
not threaten auditors like in so many companies are doing today. Too many
times in recent years we've seen where virtually all big auditing firms have
caved in to pressures from large clients such as the way KPMG caved in on
Fannie Mae and Andersen caved in on various big clients ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm#others
I think that less complex principles based
standards will only increase conflicts between clients and auditors. Neither
will know that rules (albeit complex rules as in the case of derivatives,
leases, VIEs, and pensions) are being broken if there are no detailed rules
to be broken.
I think the absence of detailed rules greatly
increase inconsistencies in "auditor judgment." I think absence of detailed
rules takes away auditor bargaining chips when dealing with clients.
I guess my bottom line conclusion is that the global
world of contracting, risk management, and mezzanine debt is totally unlike
the simpler world back in the old days when we were auditor whippersnappers.
Bob Jensen
Principles-Based Versus Rules-Based Accounting Standards
"Standing on Principles In a world with more regulation than ever, can the
accounting rulebook be thrown away?" byAlix Nyberg Stuart, CFO Magazine
September 01, 2006 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7852613/c_7873404?f=magazine_featured
As Groucho Marx once said, "Those are my
principles, and if you don't like them...well, I have others."
Groucho would enjoy the heated stalemate over
principles-based accounting. Four years after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
required the Securities and Exchange Commission to explore the feasibility
of developing principles-based accounting standards in lieu of detailed
rules, the move to such standards has gone exactly nowhere. ad
Broadly speaking, principles-based standards would
be consistent, concise, and general, requiring CFOs to apply common sense
rather than bright-lines. Instead of having, say, numerical thresholds to
define when leases must be capitalized, a CFO could use his or her own
judgment as to whether a company's interest was substantial enough to put a
lease on the balance sheet. If anything, though, accounting and auditing
standards have reached new levels of nitpickiness. "In the current
environment, CFOs are second-guessed by auditors, who are then third-guessed
by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [PCAOB], and then fourth-
and fifth-guessed by the SEC and the plaintiffs' bar," says Colleen
Cunningham, president and CEO of Financial Executives International (FEI).
Indeed, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
seems to have taken a principled stand in favor of rule-creation. The Board
continues to issue detailed rules and staff positions. Auditors have amped
up their level of scrutiny, in many cases leading to a tripling of audit
fees since 2002. And there is still scant mercy for anyone who breaks the
rules: the annual number of restatements doubled to more than 1,000 between
2003 and 2005, thanks to pressure from auditors and the SEC. The agency
pursued a record number of enforcement actions in the past three years,
while shareholder lawsuits, many involving accounting practices, continued
apace, claiming a record $7.6 billion in settlements last year and probably
more in 2006.
Yet the dream won't die. On the contrary,
principles are at the heart of FASB's latest thinking about changes to its
basic accounting framework, as reflected in the "preliminary views" the
board issued in July with the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)
as part of its plan to converge U.S. and international standards.
Principles-based accounting has been championed by FASB chairman Robert Herz,
SEC commissioner Paul Atkins, SEC deputy chief accountant Scott Taub, and
PCAOB member Charlie Niemeier in various speeches over the past six months.
And they're not just talking about editing a few lines in the rulebook.
"We need FASB, the SEC, the PCAOB, preparers,
users, auditors, and the legal profession to get together and check their
respective agendas at the door in order to collectively think through the
obstacles," says Herz. "And if it turns out some of the obstacles are
hardwired into our structure, then maybe we need some legal changes as
well," such as safe harbors that would protect executives and auditors from
having their judgments continually challenged. Even the SEC is talking about
loosening up. Most at the agency favor the idea of principles instead of
rules, says Taub, even knowing that "people will interpret them in different
ways and we'll have to deal with it."
Standards Deviation Why lawmakers are so set on
principles and what exactly those principles would look like is all a bit
hazy right now. "Post-Enron, the perception was that people were engineering
around the accounting rules. We looked around the world and saw that England
had principles-based accounting and they didn't have scandals there, so we
decided this was the way to go," recounts CVS Corp. CFO David Rickard, a
Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Committee (FASAC) member.
But Rickard considers the approach "naive." His
firsthand experience with principles-based accounting, as a group controller
for London-based Grand Metropolitan from 1991 to 1997, left him unimpressed.
"We had accounting rules we could drive trucks through," he says.
Would such a change be worth the trouble? A recent
study that compared the accrual quality of Canadian companies reporting
under a relatively principles-based GAAP to that of U.S. companies reporting
by the rules suggests that there may be no effective difference between the
two systems. The authors, Queen's University (Ontario) professors Daniel B.
Thornton and Erin Webster, found some evidence that the Canadian approach
yields better results, but conclude that "stronger U.S. oversight and
greater litigation risk" compensate for any differences.
U.S. GAAP is built on principles; they just happen
to be buried under hundreds of rules. The SEC, in its 2003 report on
principles-based accounting, labeled some standards as being either "rules"
or "principles." (No surprise to CFOs, FAS 133, stock-option accounting, and
lease accounting fall in the former category, while FAS 141 and 142 were
illustrative of the latter.) The difference: principles offer only "a
modicum" of implementation guidance and few scope exceptions or
bright-lines. ad
For FASB, the move to principles-based accounting
is part of a larger effort to organize the existing body of accounting
literature, and to eliminate internal inconsistencies. "Right now, we have a
pretty good conceptual framework, but the standards have often deviated from
the concepts," says Herz. He envisions "a common framework" with the IASB,
where "you take the concepts," such as how assets and liabilities should be
measured, and "from those you draw key principles" for specific areas of
accounting, like pensions and business combinations. In fact, that framework
as it now stands would change corporate accounting's most elemental
principle, that income essentially reflects the difference between revenues
and expenses. Instead, income would depend more on changes in the value of
assets and liabilities (see "Will Fair Value Fly?").
For its part, the SEC has also made clear that it
does not envisage an entirely free-form world. "Clearly, the standard
setters should provide some implementation guidance as a part of a newly
issued standard," its 2003 report states.
The catch is that drawing a line between rules and
principles is easier said than done. Principles need to be coupled with
implementation guidance, which is more of an art than a science, says Ben
Neuhausen, national director of accounting for BDO Seidman. That ambiguity
may explain why finance executives are so divided on support for this
concept. Forty-seven percent of the executives surveyed by CFO say they are
in favor of a shift to principles, another 25 percent are unsure of its
merits, and 17 percent are unfamiliar with the whole idea. Only 10 percent
oppose it outright, largely out of concern that it would be too difficult to
determine which judgments would pass muster.
A Road to Hell? As it stands now, many CFOs fear
that principles-based accounting would quickly lead to court. "The big
concern is that we make a legitimate judgment based on the facts as we
understand them, in the spirit of trying to comply, and that plaintiffs'
attorneys come along later with an expert accountant who says, 'I wouldn't
have done it that way,' and aha! — lawsuit! — several billion dollars,
please," says Rickard.
Massive shareholder lawsuits were a concern for 36
percent of CFOs who oppose ditching rules, according to CFO's survey, and
regulators are sympathetic. "There are institutional and behavioral issues,
and they're much broader than FASB or even the SEC," says Herz, citing "the
focus on short-term earnings, and the whole kabuki dance around quarterly
guidance."
Continued in article
"The Accounting Cycle: Herz Encourages Simpler Accounting: Again, Bah,
Humbug!" by: J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, December 2005 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x50933.xml
Robert Herz, chairman of the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, spoke at the AICPA National Conference on Current SEC and
PCAOB Developments* on December 6. Similar to the speech by SEC Chairman
Christopher Cox on the previous day, Mr. Herz directed his comments to the
proposition "that we need to reduce the complexity of our reporting system."
The proposition may be true, but Herz did little to advance the cause in his
speech.
In
particular, Robert Herz merely asserted his beliefs without adding
any logic or any evidence that the reporting system is too complex.
Worse, he touts principles-based accounting as the savior for the
world of financial reporting, but again provides no argumentation to
support his hypothesis. Maybe it’s because there is none. (Read
the full speech.) |
Given that we have two chairmen making some brash
comments about the complexity of accounting, let’s investigate this further.
Is complexity really bad? Is complexity really the major problem with
financial reporting?
Is complexity bad?
Suppose a patient visits his or her general
practitioner about some medical problem. After some initial testing, the
general practitioner refers the patient to a specialist. The patient obtains
a copy of the referral letter, but has difficulty reading it. Should a
government agency intervene, complaining that the letter is "too complex"
and require medical doctors to apply plain English?
I think the answer is obvious -- of course not.
When one doctor writes to another physician, he or she may employ scientific
jargon. They are both trained in biology, chemistry, and medicine. The
complex vocabulary and the complex theories that they utilize actually
improve the communication process. The additional complexity allows a doctor
to make more precise statements about the patient's condition and about
possible solutions to the medical problem. Requiring plain English
statements would create greater ambiguity and distort the communication
process.
Of course, when the doctor talks with the patient,
he or she must use plain English. Because the patient does not have medical
training, the patient will not understand the more precise language and
therefore the communication process will suffer if the physician employs
medical language. As the physician employs the less precise language of
everyday English, the patient will learn more about the medical problem and
possible future tests. Some communication with a less precise language is
better than virtually no communication with a more powerful language
designed for experts.
While the analogy isn't perfect, it fits the
accounting scenario. When business enterprises report on their financial
condition and on their results during the past year (or quarter), they can
more precisely convey their message by applying a more precise accounting
language. This text, however, is meant for those trained in finance and in
accounting. Complexity can actually improve the communication process when
the recipient is a sophisticated user.
Naïve financial statement readers may not
understand the language of accounting, but they are not necessarily hurt by
that situation. Just as general practitioners can revert from a medical
language to everyday language when they speak with patients, financial
analysts and brokers can employ plain English when they speak with clients.
In this manner, the messages contained in an annual (or quarterly) report
become disseminated to a wide audience.
More precise language and better economic theories
will improve the communication between business enterprises and
sophisticated users, even if the reports are complex. Sophisticated users
can then translate the messages into plain English and convey these stories
to naïve users.
Is complexity really the major problem?
When remonstrating the overly complex accounting
rules and when touting principles-based accounting, Chairman Herz points to
"bright lines" as an example of what's wrong with current-day standards. I
agree with him that such bright lines constitute a problem, but the problem
isn’t the complexity introduced by these bright lines. The problem is that
these bright lines are arbitrary and capricious. Instead of relying upon
economic theory, the FASB (and the SEC whenever it enters the skirmish) has
invented these bright lines that have no meaning and no empirical referent.
Consider leases: the FASB created the 90 percent
cutoff point for deciding whether a lessee had to capitalize a lease, but it
never informed us why. If the present value of the future cash commitments
equals 89.9 percent of the property's fair value, then the lease is an
operating lease; but if it equals 90 percent, then the lease is a capital
lease. What economic theory does the FASB rest its decision on? No theory at
all. The board randomly and recklessly introduced this bright line into the
literature.
If the board really wanted to improve financial
reporting, then it would require lessees to capitalize all leases that had
duration greater than one year. You introduce no fictitious bright lines and
ironically, you simplify the accounting! More importantly, the rule would
require corporations to tell it as it is rather than distort the economic
reality of the lease.
Continued in article
Jensen Comment
Although there is a ground swell of support for both principles-based accounting
standards and greatly simplified standards, I'm inclined to be against both
movements. Business contracting, especially risk diffusion and management
contracting, is becoming so complex that I think principles-based
standards and greatly simplified standards are moves in the wrong direction.
Powerful new financial analysis tools in networked communications, meta-tagging
(e.g., XBRL), and database sharing (eventually object-oriented database
elements) will be greatly harmed if complex standards do not accompany complex
contracting. I think Professor Ketz has taken a bold stand in the above
article, and I personally take the same stance. This, of course, puts me
at odds with the current and many former directors of standard setting bodies
(e.g., the FASB and the IASB), including my very good friend Dennis Beresford
who sides with Bob Herz and probably influenced Bob Herz. See
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm
I'm not necessarily arguing in favor of more bright lines. We can
perhaps avoid these bright lines with more details, albeit complex details,
about contracts, hedging strategies, hedging effectiveness, mezzanine debt
contracts, VIEs, etc. Years ago Bill Beaver (in an innovative unpublished
working paper) argued in favor of database reporting to get around some of the
bright lines problems. This is more complex reporting, but we can have
develop the technologies needed to analyze database reporting. What we
cannot do is do away with complex standards to deal with how complex contracts
are reported in the databases. The standards are what makes comparisons
between databases possible.
The analogy relating accounting to medicine is on target. In this era of DNA
advances in medicine, we do not want medical standards to become less complex in
a more complex world of knowledge. We hope the standards become more complex to
match the increased complexity of our understanding. Similarly, we hope the
standards of accounting become more complex to match the increased complexity of
contracts around the world.
"The Accounting Cycle: Herz Encourages Simpler Accounting: Again, Bah,
Humbug!" by: J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, December 2005 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x50933.xml
Robert Herz, chairman of the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, spoke at the AICPA National Conference on Current SEC and
PCAOB Developments* on December 6. Similar to the speech by SEC Chairman
Christopher Cox on the previous day, Mr. Herz directed his comments to the
proposition "that we need to reduce the complexity of our reporting system."
The proposition may be true, but Herz did little to advance the cause in his
speech.
In
particular, Robert Herz merely asserted his beliefs without adding
any logic or any evidence that the reporting system is too complex.
Worse, he touts principles-based accounting as the savior for the
world of financial reporting, but again provides no argumentation to
support his hypothesis. Maybe it’s because there is none. (Read
the full speech.) |
Given that we have two chairmen making some brash
comments about the complexity of accounting, let’s investigate this further.
Is complexity really bad? Is complexity really the major problem with
financial reporting?
Is complexity bad?
Suppose a patient visits his or her general
practitioner about some medical problem. After some initial testing, the
general practitioner refers the patient to a specialist. The patient obtains
a copy of the referral letter, but has difficulty reading it. Should a
government agency intervene, complaining that the letter is "too complex"
and require medical doctors to apply plain English?
I think the answer is obvious -- of course not.
When one doctor writes to another physician, he or she may employ scientific
jargon. They are both trained in biology, chemistry, and medicine. The
complex vocabulary and the complex theories that they utilize actually
improve the communication process. The additional complexity allows a doctor
to make more precise statements about the patient's condition and about
possible solutions to the medical problem. Requiring plain English
statements would create greater ambiguity and distort the communication
process.
Of course, when the doctor talks with the patient,
he or she must use plain English. Because the patient does not have medical
training, the patient will not understand the more precise language and
therefore the communication process will suffer if the physician employs
medical language. As the physician employs the less precise language of
everyday English, the patient will learn more about the medical problem and
possible future tests. Some communication with a less precise language is
better than virtually no communication with a more powerful language
designed for experts.
While the analogy isn't perfect, it fits the
accounting scenario. When business enterprises report on their financial
condition and on their results during the past year (or quarter), they can
more precisely convey their message by applying a more precise accounting
language. This text, however, is meant for those trained in finance and in
accounting. Complexity can actually improve the communication process when
the recipient is a sophisticated user.
Naïve financial statement readers may not
understand the language of accounting, but they are not necessarily hurt by
that situation. Just as general practitioners can revert from a medical
language to everyday language when they speak with patients, financial
analysts and brokers can employ plain English when they speak with clients.
In this manner, the messages contained in an annual (or quarterly) report
become disseminated to a wide audience.
More precise language and better economic theories
will improve the communication between business enterprises and
sophisticated users, even if the reports are complex. Sophisticated users
can then translate the messages into plain English and convey these stories
to naïve users.
Is complexity really the major problem?
When remonstrating the overly complex accounting
rules and when touting principles-based accounting, Chairman Herz points to
"bright lines" as an example of what's wrong with current-day standards. I
agree with him that such bright lines constitute a problem, but the problem
isn’t the complexity introduced by these bright lines. The problem is that
these bright lines are arbitrary and capricious. Instead of relying upon
economic theory, the FASB (and the SEC whenever it enters the skirmish) has
invented these bright lines that have no meaning and no empirical referent.
Consider leases: the FASB created the 90 percent
cutoff point for deciding whether a lessee had to capitalize a lease, but it
never informed us why. If the present value of the future cash commitments
equals 89.9 percent of the property's fair value, then the lease is an
operating lease; but if it equals 90 percent, then the lease is a capital
lease. What economic theory does the FASB rest its decision on? No theory at
all. The board randomly and recklessly introduced this bright line into the
literature.
If the board really wanted to improve financial
reporting, then it would require lessees to capitalize all leases that had
duration greater than one year. You introduce no fictitious bright lines and
ironically, you simplify the accounting! More importantly, the rule would
require corporations to tell it as it is rather than distort the economic
reality of the lease.
Continued in article
Jensen Comment
Although there is a ground swell of support for both principles-based accounting
standards and greatly simplified standards, I'm inclined to be against both
movements. Business contracting, especially risk diffusion and management
contracting, is becoming so complex that I think principles-based
standards and greatly simplified standards are moves in the wrong direction.
Powerful new financial analysis tools in networked communications, meta-tagging
(e.g., XBRL), and database sharing (eventually object-oriented database
elements) will be greatly harmed if complex standards do not accompany complex
contracting. I think Professor Ketz has taken a bold stand in the above
article, and I personally take the same stance. This, of course, puts me
at odds with the current and many former directors of standard setting bodies
(e.g., the FASB and the IASB), including my very good friend Dennis Beresford
who sides with Bob Herz and probably influenced Bob Herz. See
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm
I'm not necessarily arguing in favor of more bright lines. We can
perhaps avoid these bright lines with more details, albeit complex details,
about contracts, hedging strategies, hedging effectiveness, mezzanine debt
contracts, VIEs, etc. Years ago Bill Beaver (in an innovative unpublished
working paper) argued in favor of database reporting to get around some of the
bright lines problems. This is more complex reporting, but we can have
develop the technologies needed to analyze database reporting. What we
cannot do is do away with complex standards to deal with how complex contracts
are reported in the databases. The standards are what makes comparisons
between databases possible.
The analogy relating accounting to medicine is on target. In this era of DNA
advances in medicine, we do not want medical standards to become less complex in
a more complex world of knowledge. We hope the standards become more complex to
match the increased complexity of our understanding. Similarly, we hope the
standards of accounting become more complex to match the increased complexity of
contracts around the world.
"The Accounting Cycle: The Conceptual Framework for Financial
Reporting Op/Ed," by J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, September 2006
---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x54322.xml
The Financial Accounting Standards Board and the
International Accounting Standards Board have joined forces to flesh out a
common conceptual framework. Recently they issued some preliminary views on
the "objectives of financial reporting" and the "qualitative characteristics
of decision-useful financial reporting information" and have asked for
comment.
To obtain "coherent financial reporting," the
boards feel that they need "a framework that is sound, comprehensive, and
internally consistent" (paragraph P3). In P5, they also state their hope for
convergence between U.S. and international accounting standards.
P6 indicates a need to fill in certain gaps, such
as a "robust concept of a reporting entity." I presume that they will
accomplish this task later, as the current document does not develop such a
"robust concept."
Chapter 1 presents the objective for financial
reporting, and the description differs little from what is in Concepts
Statement No. 1. This objective is "to provide information that is useful to
present and potential investors and creditors and others in making
investment, credit, and similar resource allocation decisions." The emphasis
lay with capital providers, as it should. If anything, I would place greater
accent on this aspect, because in the last 10 years, so many managers have
defined the "business world" as including managers and excluding investors
and creditors. To our chagrin, we learned that managers actually believed
this lie, as they pretended that the resources supplied by the investment
community belonged to the management team.
FASB and IASB further explain that these users are
interested in the cash flows of the entity so they can assess the potential
returns and the potential variability of those returns (e.g., in paragraph
OB.23). I wish they had drawn the logical conclusion that financial
reporting ought to exclude income smoothing. Income smoothing leads the user
to assess a smaller variance of earnings than warranted by the underlying
economics; income smoothing biases downward the actual variability of the
earnings and thus the returns.
Later, in the basis of conclusions, the document
addresses the reporting of comprehensive income and its components (see
BC1.28-31). Currently, FASB has four items that enter other comprehensive
income: gains and losses on available-for-sale investments, losses when
incurring additional amounts to recognize a minimum pension liability,
exchange gains and losses from a foreign subsidiary under the all-current
method, and gains and losses from derivatives that hedge cash flows.
The purported reason for this demarcation between
earnings and other comprehensive income rests with the purported low
reliability of measurements of these four items; however, the real reason
for these other comprehensive items seems to be political. For example, FASB
capitulated in Statement No. 115 when a number of managers objected to
reporting gains and losses on available-for-sale securities because that
would create volatility in earnings. (I find it curious how FASB caters to
the whims of managers but claims that the primary rationale for financial
reporting is to serve the investment community.) Because one has a hard time
reconciling other comprehensive income with the needs of investors and
creditors, it would serve the investment community better if the boards
eliminate this notion of comprehensive income.
Two IASB members think that an objective for
financial reporting should encompass the stewardship function (see AV1.1-7).
Stewardship seems to be a subset of economic usefulness, so this objection
is pointless. It behooves these two IASB members to explain the consequences
of adopting a stewardship objective and how these consequences differ from
the usefulness objective before we can entertain their protestation
seriously.
Sections BC1.42 and 43 ask whether management
intent should be a part of the financial reporting process. Given management
intent during the last decade, I think decidedly not. Management intent is
merely a license to massage accounting numbers as managers please.
Fortunately, the Justice Department calls such tactics fraud.
Chapter 2 of this document concerns qualitative
characteristics. For the most part, this presentation is similar to that in
Concepts Statement No. 2, though arranged somewhat differently. Concepts 2
had as its overarching qualitative characteristics relevance and
reliability. This Preliminary Views expounds relevance, faithful
representation, comparability, and understandability as the qualitative
characteristics.
The discussion on faithful representation is
interesting (QC.16-19) inasmuch as they distinguish between accounts that
depict real world phenomena and accounts that are constructs with no real
world referents. They explain that deferred debits and credits do not
possess faithful representation because they are merely the creation of
accountants. I hope that analysis applies to deferred income tax debits and
credits.
Verifiability implies similar measures by different
measurers (QC.23-26). I wish FASB and IASB to include auditability as an
aspect of verifiability; after all, if you cannot audit something, it is
hardly verifiable. Yet, the soon to be released standard on fair value
measurements includes a variety of items that will prove difficult if not
impossible to audit.
Understandability is obvious, though the two boards
feel that users with a "reasonable knowledge of business and economic
activities" can understand financial statements. I no longer agree. Such a
person might employ a profit analysis model or ratio analysis on a set of
financial statements and mis-analyze a firm's condition because he or she
did not make analytical adjustments for off-balance sheet items and other
fanciful tricks by managers. This includes so many of Enron's investors and
creditors. No, to understand financial reporting today, you must be an
expert in accounting and finance.
Benefits-that-justify-costs acts as a constraint on
financial reporting. While this criterion is acceptable, too often the
boards view costs only from the perspective of the preparers. I wish the
boards explicitly acknowledged the fact that not reporting on some things
adds costs to users. When a business enterprise engages in aggressive
accounting, the expert user needs to employ analytical adjustments to
correct this overzealousness. These adjustments consume the investor's
economic resources and thus involve costs to the investment community.
In the basis-for-conclusions section, FASB and IASB
explain that the concept of substance over form is included in the concept
of faithful representation (see paragraphs BC2.17 and 18). While I don't
have a problem with that, I think they should at least emphasize this point
in Chapter 2 rather than bury it in this section. Substance over form is a
critically important doctrine, especially as it relates to business
combinations and leases, so it deserves greater stress.
On balance, the document is well written and
contains a good clarification of the objective of financial reporting and
the qualitative characteristics of decision-useful financial reporting
information. I offer the criticisms above as a hope to strengthen and
improve the Preliminary Views.
My most important comment, however, does not
address any particular aspects within the document itself. Instead, I worry
about the usefulness of this objective and these qualitative characteristics
to FASB and IASB. To enjoy coherent financial reporting, there not only is
need for a sound, comprehensive, and internally consistent framework, we
also must have a board with the political will to utilize the conceptual
framework. FASB ignored its own conceptual framework in its issuance of
standards on:
* Leases (Aren't the financial commitments of the
lessee a liability?) * Pensions (How can the pension intangible asset really
be an asset as it has no real world referent?) * Stock options (Why did the
board not require the expensing of stock options in the 1990s when stock
options clearly involve real costs to the firm?), and * Special purpose
entities (Why did the board wait for the collapse of Enron before dealing
with this issue?).
Clearly, the low power of FASB -- IASB likewise
possesses little power -- explains some of these decisions, but it is
frustrating nonetheless to see the board ignore its own conceptual
framework. Why engage in this deliberation unless FASB is prepared to follow
through?
J. EDWARD KETZ is accounting professor at The Pennsylvania
State University. Dr. Ketz's teaching and research interests focus on
financial accounting, accounting information systems, and accounting ethics.
He is the author of
Hidden Financial Risk, which explores the causes of recent
accounting scandals. He also has edited
Accounting Ethics, a four-volume set that explores ethical
thought in accounting since the Great Depression and across several
countries.
Suggestions for accountancy from the Directors of the SEC and the FASB
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on December
9, 2005
TITLE: SEC's Cox Wants Simpler Rules, More Competition for Accounting
REPORTER: Judith Burns
DATE: Dec 06, 2005
PAGE: C3
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113381176660114298.html
TOPICS: Accounting, Auditing, Auditing Services, Public Accounting,
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Securities and Exchange Commission
SUMMARY: Questions relate to helping students understand the status various
influences on the accounting profession from the AICPA, the SEC, the FASB, and
the legislature via the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Where did SEC Chairman Christopher Cox describe the ways in which he wants
to see change in the accounting and auditing professions? What is the purpose of
that organization? (Hint: you may find out about the organization's mission via
its web site at www.aicpa.org
2.) In accordance with law, how is the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) responsible for accounting and reporting requirements in the United
States? Hint: you may investigate the SEC's mission via its web site at
www.sec.gov
3.) What are the issues associated with complex accounting rules? Who
establishes those rules? In what way are those rules influenced by the SEC?
4.) The SEC has named an interim chairman of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB). How is this speech's topic related to the process of
change in leadership at the PCAOB?
5.) Commissioner Cox indicated his concern over the fact that only 4 public
accounting firms perform audit and accounting work for most of the publicly
traded companies in the U.S. and that regulators may have contributed to that
concentration. How is that the case? What might regulators do to change that
situation?
"SEC's Cox Wants Simpler Rules, More Competition for Accounting," by Judith
Burns, The Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2005; Page C3 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113381176660114298.html
U.S. securities regulators hope to make accounting
rules less complicated while increasing competition in a field now dominated
by just four firms, Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher
Cox said.
Addressing a meeting of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Mr. Cox called for clearer, more
straightforward accounting rules, saying that would benefit investors,
public companies and accountants.
"Plain English is just as important in
accountancy," he said.
Mr. Cox also raised concern about concentration in
the U.S. accounting profession, with the Big Four firms -- Deloitte & Touche
LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers -- handling the vast
majority of public-company audits. He said this "intense concentration"
isn't desirable, adding that regulators need to consider whether their rules
are inhibiting competition in the field.
SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins, who also addressed
the meeting, acknowledged that regulators were surprised by the cost of
internal-control rules that took effect for the largest U.S. companies last
year, and he said he hopes such costs will be lower this year.
The rules stem from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed
by Congress in 2002. They mandate that public companies make an annual
examination of their internal controls related to financial reporting,
subject to review by these companies' outside auditors.
The SEC is "at an early stage" in considering who
should head the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board now that William
McDonough, its former chairman, has stepped down, Mr. Atkins said.
Last week the SEC named oversight board member Bill
Gradison, a member of Congress, as interim oversight board chairman. Mr.
Atkins said Mr. Gradison, an Ohio Republican, could be in the running as a
permanent chair "if he wants to be."
In repeated speeches, Dennis Beresford, former Chairman of the FASB, has
called for simplification of accounting standards and guidelines. For
example see the following reference:
"Can We Go Back to the Good Old Days?" by Dennis R. Beresford, The CPA
Journal ---
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/1204/perspectives/p6.htm
December 6, 2005 message from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@terry.uga.edu]
National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB
Developments. His talk is available at:
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch120505cc.htm
He had three main messages:
1. Accounting rules need to be simplified. "The
accounting scandals that our nation and the world have now mostly weathered
were made possible in part by the sheer complexity of the rules." "The sheer
accretion of detail has, in time, led to one of the system's weaknesses -
its extreme complexity. Convolution is now reducing its usefulness."
2. The concentration of auditing services in the
Big 4 "quadropoly" is bad for the securities markets. The SEC will try to do
more to encourage the use of medium size and smaller firms that receive good
inspection reports from the PCAOB.
3. The SEC will continue to push XBRL. "The
interactive data that this initiative will create will lead to vast
improvements in the quality, timeliness, and usefulness of information that
investors get about the companies they're investing in."
A very interesting talk - one that seems to promise
a high level of cooperation with the accounting profession.
Denny
Bob Jensen's threads on XBRL are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm
Convergence of foreign and domestic accounting rules could catch some U.S.
companies by surprise
Although many differences remain between U.S. generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and international financial reporting
standards (IFRS), they are being eliminated faster than anyone, even Herz or
Tweedie, could have imagined. In April, FASB and the IASB agreed that all major
projects going forward would be conducted jointly. That same month, the
Securities and Exchange Commission said that, as soon as 2007, it might allow
foreign companies to use IFRS to raise capital in the United States, eliminating
the current requirement that they reconcile their statements to U.S. GAAP. The
change is all the more remarkable given that the IASB was formed only four years
ago, and has rushed to complete 25 new or revamped standards in time for all 25
countries in the European Union to adopt IFRS by this year. By next year, some
100 countries will be using IFRS. "We reckon it will be 150 in five years,"
marvels Tweedie. "That leaves only 50 out."
Tim Reason, "The Narrowing GAAP: The convergence of foreign and domestic
accounting rules could catch some U.S. companies by surprise," CFO Magazine
December 01, 2005 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/5193385/c_5243641?f=magazine_coverstory
David Fordham wrote the following after a very long and very interesting
illustration of corporate accounting:
*****************
Seeing businesses in Europe, I'm learning that the European laws are to
accountants what weight lifting is to the Mr. Atlas competition. The really
good European accountants are without peer when it comes to working within
the system to turn a profit under the rules. So this begs the question:
should we more agressively teach accountants how to help their managers?
Would we be more valuable as "trusted partners" to management if we could be
more helpful in this way?
******************
Jensen Comment:
First I would note that in Europe most financing was and still is raised
from banks who work in close partnership with companies. As in Japan, these
banks are almost insiders that can get most any kind of information they want
irrespective of accounting rules.
Until the IASB wanted to crack into the U.S. Stock exchanges, the IAS
standards were pretty much milk toast. If the former IASC (it was IASC in those
days) standards had replaced the FASB standards, U.S. Corporations would have
been ecstatic with IASC off-balance sheet financing opportunities and
opportunities to create hidden reserves and manage earnings. European companies
are notorious for managing earnings with hidden reserves.
Whether the two Davids (Albrecht and Fordham) like it or not, the FASB has
struggled to make management of earnings and the hiding of debt more difficult
in the U.S. The standards are now almost incomprehensible (especially for
derivatives, SPEs, mezzanine financing, re-insurance, etc.) because U.S.
companies countered the FASB standards with ever-increasing exotic financial
contracts.
Before complaining about the complexity of FASB standards, first take a
serious look at the absolute nightmare of complexity of the financial and
insurance contracting. Especially look at the absolutely ridiculous derivative
financial instrument contracts that are intentionally designed to be too complex
for accountants or trust investors to understand ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds
Many exotic contracts are relatively new. We now have over $100 trillion in
interest rate swaps that were not even invented until 1984.
One of my favorite quotations is a 1994 quotation from Denny Beresford while,
as Chairman of the FASB, he was making a presentation in NYC at the annual AAA
meetings. He was at the time being extremely pressured by the SEC to issue what
became FAS 133 in 1998.
The quotation went something like this:
*******************
"The Director of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, tells me the three main problems
for the SEC and FASB are derivatives, derivatives, and derivatives. I had to
ask some experts to tell me what a derivative is, because until now I
thought a derivative was something a person my age takes when prunes don't
quite do the job. John Stewart of Arthur Andersen tells me that there are
over 1,000 kinds of complex derivative contracts . . . "
********************
Once again, David, my main point to you is that accounting standards outside
the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, did not have to be too complex
since most financing was raised from insiders (mostly banks) who had inside
information sources. The countries with the complex standards rely more on
equity investors who only get the information provided to the public by
companies. The FASB has declared that protection of the public investors is its
number one priority (as is also the case with the SEC).
The real problem we are now facing is that corporations no longer take
accounting seriously other than as something to get around. This has led to an
ever-increasing game where the FASB discovers misleading accounting, writes a
new standard or interpretation, and subsequently discovers how corporations are
re-writing contracts to get around the new standard.
Will this vicious cycle ever cease? Not as long as corporate managers
continue to view accounting as an opportunity to creatively paint rosy
portraits.
David Albrecht asked:
"Has anyone a good definition of financial statement transparency?"
Jensen reply:
Here's one paper that discusses the problem of transparency ---http://www.accenture.com/xdoc/en/ideas/outlook/6_2005/pdf/share_value.pdf
The snipped version is
http://snipurl.com/ShareholderValue
October 18, 2005 reply from Bender, Ruth
[r.bender@CRANFIELD.AC.UK]
I just want to point out that the UK, which is in
Europe, doesn't meet Bob's description of mostly bank finance. Our financing
is much like that of the US - mostly equity, and our lenders are kept at
arm's length from the board.
And a lot of our accountants are howling at the way
IFRS change the accounts. It's not that people are trying to hide things by
using lax standards (although, from my experience as an auditor, I know that
this does of course happen). It's the fact that we and others don't
understand accounts any more! I'm doing some research at the moment that
involves interviewing experienced CFOs of large listed companies. Almost all
of them are complaining that the IFRS, being 'market' facing, are making a
nonsense of the numbers, because in most cases there isn't a market, and so
they are having to use poor proxies. It's taking us away from factually
based accounts and into a world of estimates - which in some ways makes
earnings management easier, not harder! That was the gist of the FT article
that David cited.
Incidentally, there is a really interesting paper
about the fundamental differences between US and UK approaches to financial
regulation and standards, that sets out why convergence is going to be a
problem - if it ever happens. The title is "Where economics meets the law:
US reporting systems compared to other markets" and you can download it from
the ICAEW's website at
http://www.icaew.co.uk/members/index.cfm?AUB=TB2I_79757|MNXI_79757
Outline is:
"In particular the paper examines: * the evolution
of the US financial reporting model; * contrasting approaches to accounting
and auditing: 'principles' versus 'prescription'; * shareholder rights and
the governance function of annual financial statements; * investor behaviour
and corporate governance; * accounting convergence with the US or
recognition of the differences.
Divided by common language is the first in the
Beyond the myth of Anglo-American corporate governance series which aims to:
Challenge commonly held assumptions regarding the
perceived similarity of US and UK corporate governance systems; Identify
possible areas for convergence and, where not practical, clarify why
elements of one system may not be appropriate for incorporation into
another; Anticipate developments and set out challenges for future thinking
about the US and UK models and encourage transatlantic dialogue."
Regards
Dr Ruth Bender
Cranfield School of Management UK
Dr. Ijiri was one of my major professors in the doctoral program at
Stanford. I'm naturally drawn to things he writes. He is one of the
long-time advocates of historical cost based accounting. He is in fact
much more dedicated to it than
Bill Paton (but not
Ananias Littleton) where Paton and Littleton are best known advocates of
historical cost accounting. The following is the lead article in the
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, July/August 2005, pp. 255-279.
US accounting standards and their
environment:
A dualistic study of their 75-years of transition
Yuji Ijiri
Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University
Abstract
This article examines the 75-year transition of the US accounting
standards and their environment. It consists of three parts, each having
two themes: Part (1) Past changes: 1. The first market crash and the
second market crash; 2. Facts-based accounting and forecasts-based
accounting, Part (II) Present issues: 3. The reform legislation
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act) and the reform administration; 4. Procedural fairness
and pure fairness, and Part (III) Future trends: 5. Forecast
protection and forecast separation; 6. Principles-based systems and
rules-based systems. These themes are each examined from dualistic
perspectives by contrasting two fundamental concepts or principles. The
article concludes with the strong need to focus on "procedural fairness" in
establishing accounting standards as well as in implementing the reform
legislation and administration, in contrast to "pure fairness" that is
almost impossible to achieve by anyone.
Accounting Rules So Plentiful "It's Nuts"
There are perhaps 2,000 accounting rules and standards
that, when written out, possibly exceed the U.S. tax code in length. Yet, there
are only the Ten Commandments. So Bob Herz, chairman of the rule-setting
Financial Accounting Standards Board, is asked this: How come there are 2,000
rules to prepare a financial statement but only 10 for eternal salvation? "It is
nuts," Herz allows. "But you're not going to get it down to ten commandments
because the transactions are so complicated. . . . And the people on the front
lines, the companies and their auditors, are saying: 'Give me principles, but
tell me exactly what to do; I don't want to be second-guessed.' " Nonetheless,
the FASB (pronounced, by accounting insiders, as "FAZ-bee") is embarking on
efforts to simplify and codify accounting rules while improving them and
integrating them with international standards.
"Accounting Rules So Plentiful 'It's Nuts' ; Standards Board Takes on Tough Job
to Simplify, Codify," SmartPros, June 8, 2005 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x48525.xml
Jensen Comment: Shyam Sunder (Yale University) is the 2005
President-Elect of the American Accounting Association ---
http://aaahq.org/about/Nominees2005.htm
From Jim Mahar's blog on July 18 2005 ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
SSRN-Social Norms versus Standards of
Accounting by Shyam Sunder ---
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=725821
A few highlights from the paper:
"Historically, norms of accounting played
an important role in corporate financial reporting. Starting with
the federal regulation of securities, accounting norms have been
progressively replaced by written standards....[and]enforcement
mechanisms, often supported by implicit or explicit power of the
state to impose punishment. The spate of accounting and auditing
failures of the recent years raise questions about the wisdom of
this transition from norms to standards....It is possible that the
pendulum of standardization in accounting may have swung too far,
and it may be time to allow for a greater role for social norms in
the practice of corporate financial reporting."
"The monopoly rights given to the FASB in
the U.S. (and the International Accounting Standards Board or IASB
in the EU) deprived the economies, and their rule makers, from the
benefits of experimentation with alternative rules and structures so
their consequences could be observed in the field before deciding on
which rules, if any, might be more efficient. Rule makers have
little idea, ex ante, of the important consequences (e.g., the
corporate cost of capital) of the alternatives they consider."
"Given the deliberate and premeditated
nature of financial fraud and misrepresentation (and other white
color crimes), "clarifications of the rules invite and facilitate
evasion"
And my favorite!
"Indeed the U.S. constitution, a document
that covers the entire governance system for the republic, has less
than 5,000 words. The United Kingdom has no written constitution. A
great part of the governance of both countries depends on norms. Do
accountants deal with greater stakes?"
BTW: I like the prescriptions called for as
well, but will allow you to read those (pages 20 to 22 of paper)
Cite: Sunder, Shyam, "Social Norms versus
Standards of Accounting" (May 2005). Yale ICF Working Paper No. 05-14.
http://ssrn.com/abstract=725821
Let me close by citing Harry
S. Truman who said, "I never give them hell; I just tell them the truth and they
think its hell!"
Great Speeches About the State of Accountancy
"20th Century Myths," by Lynn Turner when he was still Chief Accountant at the
SEC in 1999 ---
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch323.htm
It is
interesting to listen to people ask for simple, less complex
standards like in "the good old days." But I never hear them ask for
business to be like "the good old days," with smokestacks rather
than high technology, Glass-Steagall rather than Gramm-Leach, and
plain vanilla interest rate deals rather than swaps, collars, and
Tigers!! The bottom line is—things have changed. And so have people.
Today, we have enormous pressure on CEO’s and
CFO’s. It used to be that CEO’s would be in their positions for an
average of more than ten years. Today, the average is 3 to 4 years.
And Financial Executive Institute surveys show that the CEO and CFO
changes are often linked.
In such an environment, we in the auditing
and preparer community have created what I consider to be a
two-headed monster. The first head of this monster is what I call
the "show me" face. First, it is not uncommon to hear one say, "show
me where it says in an accounting book that I can’t do this?" This
approach to financial reporting unfortunately necessitates the level
of detail currently being developed by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board ("FASB"), the Emerging Issues Task Force, and the
AICPA’s Accounting Standards Executive Committee. Maybe this isn’t a
recent phenomenon. In 1961, Leonard Spacek, then managing partner at
Arthur Andersen, explained the motivation for less specificity in
accounting standards when he stated that "most industry
representatives and public accountants want what they call
‘flexibility’ in accounting principles. That term is never clearly
defined; but what is wanted is ‘flexibility’ that permits greater
latitude to both industry and accountants to do as they please." But
Mr. Spacek was not a defender of those who wanted to "do as they
please." He went on to say, "Public accountants are constantly
required to make a choice between obtaining or retaining a client
and standing firm for accounting principles. Where the choice
requires accepting a practice which will produce results that are
erroneous by a relatively material amount, we must decline the
engagement even though there is precedent for the practice desired
by the client."
We create the second head of our monster
when we ask for standards that absolutely do not reflect the
underlying economics of transactions. I offer two prime examples.
Leasing is first. We have accounting literature put out by the FASB
with follow-on interpretative guidance by the accounting
firms—hundreds of pages of lease accounting guidance that, I will be
the first to admit, is complex and difficult to decipher. But it is
due principally to people not being willing to call a horse a horse,
and a lease what it really is—a financing. The second example is
Statement 133 on derivatives. Some people absolutely howl about its
complexity. And yet we know that: (1) people were not complying with
the intent of the simpler Statements 52 and 80, and (2) despite the
fact that we manage risk in business by managing values rather than
notional amounts, people want to account only for notional amounts.
As a result, we ended up with a compromise position in Statement
133. To its credit, Statement 133 does advance the quality of
financial reporting. For that, I commend the FASB. But I believe
that we could have possibly achieved more, in a less complex
fashion, if people would have agreed to a standard that truly
reflects the underlying economics of the transactions in an unbiased
and representationally faithful fashion.
I certainly hope that we can find a way to
do just that with standards we develop in the future, both in the
U.S. and internationally. It will require a change in how we
approach standard setting and in how we apply those standards. It
will require a mantra based on the fact that transparent, high
quality financial reporting is what makes our capital markets the
most efficient, liquid, and deep in the world. |
Landmark Exposure Draft containing joint proposals to improve and align
accounting for business combinations
"IASB and FASB Publish First Major Exposure Draft Standard," AccountingWeb,
July 11, 2005 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=101084
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB),
based in London, and the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have
announced publication of an Exposure Draft containing joint proposals to
improve and align accounting for business combinations. The proposed
standard would replace IASB’s International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS)
3, Business Combinations and the FASB’s Statement 141, Business
Combinations.
Sir David Tweedie, IASB Chairman and Bob Herz, FASB
Chairman, emphasized the value of a single standard to users and preparers
of financial statements of companies around the world as it improves
comparability of financial information. "Development of a single standard
demonstrates the ability of the IASB and the FASB to work together,” Tweedie
continued.
Continued in article
"Can We Go Back to the Good Old Days?" by Dennis R. Beresford, The
CPA Journal --- http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/1204/perspectives/p6.htm
Recently I visited my pharmacy to pick up eyedrops
for my two golden retrievers. Before he would give me the prescription, the
pharmacist insisted I sign a form on behalf of Murphy and Millie, representing
that they had been apprised of their rights under the new medical privacy
rules. This ludicrous situation is a good illustration of how complicated life
has gotten.
I was still shaking my head later that same day when
I was clicking mindlessly through the 150 or so channels that my local cable
TV service makes available to me. I happened to land on The Andy Griffith
Show, and the few minutes I spent with Andy, Barney, Opie, and Aunt Bea got me
thinking about the Good Old Days. Wouldn’t it be nice, I thought, to go back
to the Good Old Days of the profession in the early 1960s when I graduated
from college?
Back then, accounting was really simple. The
Accounting Principles Board hadn’t issued any standards yet, and FASB didn’t
exist. So we didn’t have 880 pages listing all of the current rules and
guidance on derivative financial instruments, for example. The totality of
authoritative GAAP at that time fit in one softbound booklet about one-third
the size of the new derivatives guidance.
In those Good Old Days, the SEC had been around for
quite a while but it rarely got excited about accounting matters. Neither
mandatory quarterly reporting nor management’s discussion and analysis
(MD&A) had yet come into being, for example. And annual report footnotes
could actually be read in an hour or so.
The country had eight major accounting firms, and
becoming a partner in one was a truly big deal. Lawsuits against accounting
firms were rare, and almost none of them resulted in substantial damages
against the accountants.
In short, accounting seemed more like a true
profession, with good judgment and experience key requirements for success.
Of course, however much we might like to return to
simpler times, it’s easier said than done. And most of us would never give
up the many benefits of progress, such as photocopiers, personal computers,
e-mail, the Internet, and cellphones. But I think that accounting rules may
have become more complicated than necessary.
Let me start with a mea culpa. You may remember the
famous line from the comic strip Pogo: “We have met the enemy, and he is us!”
Well, you may be tempted to rephrase that quote to “We have met the enemy,
and he is … Beresford!”
I plead guilty to having led the development of 40 or
so new accounting standards over my time at FASB. A number of them had
pervasive effects on financial statements, and some have been costly to apply.
I always tried to be as practical as possible, however, although probably few
would say that I was 100% successful in meeting that objective.
In any event, more-recent accounting standards and
proposals seem to be getting increasingly complicated and harder to apply.
Even the best-intentioned accountants have difficulty keeping up with all of
the changes from FASB, the AICPA, the SEC, the EITF, and the IASB. And some
individual standards, such as those on derivatives and variable-interest
entities, are almost impossible for professionals, let alone laypeople, to
decipher.
Furthermore, these days, companies are subject to
what I’ll call quadruple jeopardy. They have to apply GAAP as best they can,
but they are then subject to as many as four levels of possible
second-guessing of their judgments.
First, the external auditors must weigh in. Second,
the SEC will now be reviewing all public companies’ reports at least once
every three years. Third, the PCAOB will be looking at a sample of accounting
firms’ audits, and that could include any given company’s reports.
Finally, the plaintiff’s bar is always looking for opportunities to
challenge accounting judgments and extort settlements. Broad Principles Versus
Detailed Rules
I suspect that all this second-guessing is what leads
many companies and auditors to ask for more-detailed accounting rules. But we
may have reached the point of diminishing returns. In response to the
complexity and sheer volume of many current standards, some have suggested
that accounting standards should be broad principles rather than detailed
rules. FASB and the SEC have expressed support for the general notion of a
principles-based approach to accounting standards. (It’s kind of like apple
pie and motherhood: Who can object to broad principles?) Of course,
implementing such an approach is problematic.
In 2002, FASB issued a proposal on this matter. And
last year the SEC reported to Congress on the same topic. Specific things that
FASB suggested could happen include the following:
Standards should always state very clear objectives.
Standards should have a clearly defined scope and there should be few, if any,
exceptions (e.g., for certain industries). Standards should contain fewer
alternative accounting treatments (e.g., unrealized gains and losses on
marketable securities could all be run through income rather than the various
approaches used at present). FASB also said that a principles-based approach
probably would include less in the way of detailed interpretive and
implementation guidance. Thus, companies and auditors would be expected to
rely more on professional judgment in applying the standards.
The SEC prefers to call this approach “objectives-based”
rather than “principles-based.” SEC Chief Accountant Donald Nicolaisen
recently repeated the SEC’s support for such an approach, agreeing with the
notion of clearly identifying and articulating the objective for each
standard. Although he also suggested that objectives-based standards should
avoid bright-line tests such as lease capitalization rules, he called for “sufficiently
detailed” implementation guidance, including real-world examples.
Although FASB and the SEC may have reached a meeting
of the minds on the overall notion of more general principles, they may
disagree on the key point of how much implementation guidance to provide. FASB
thinks that a principles-based approach should include less implementation
guidance and rely more on judgment, while the SEC thinks that “sufficiently
detailed” guidance is needed, and I suspect that would make it difficult to
significantly reduce complexity in some cases.
In any event, FASB recently said that it may take “several
years or more” for preparers and auditors to adjust to a change to less
detail. Meantime, little has changed with respect to individual standards,
which if anything are becoming even harder to understand and apply.
I’ve heard FASB board members say that FASB
Interpretation (FIN) 46, on variable-interest entities (VIE), is an example of
a principles-based standard. I assume they say this because FIN 46 states an
objective of requiring consolidation when control over a VIE exists. But the
definition of a VIE and the rules for determining when control exists are
extremely difficult to understand.
FASB recently described what it meant by the
operationality of an accounting standard. The first condition was that
standards have to be comprehensible to readers with a reasonable level of
knowledge and sophistication. This doesn’t seem to be the case for FIN 46.
Many auditors and financial executives have told me that only a few
individuals in the country truly know how to apply FIN 46. And those few
individuals often disagree among themselves!
Such complications make it difficult to get decisions
on many accounting matters from an audit engagement team. Decisions on VIEs,
derivatives, and securitization transactions, to name a few, must routinely be
cleared by an accounting firm’s national experts. And with section 404 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) and new concerns about auditor independence,
getting answers is now even harder. For example, in the past, companies would
commonly consult with their auditors on difficult accounting matters. But now
the PCAOB may view this as a control weakness, under the assumption that the
company lacks adequate internal expertise. And if auditors get too involved in
technical decisions before a complex transaction is completed, the SEC or the
PCAOB might decide that the auditors aren’t independent, because they’re
auditing their own decisions.
When things become this complicated, I wonder whether
it’s time for a new approach. Maybe we do need to go back to the Good Old
Days.
Internal Controls
Today, financial executives are probably more
concerned about internal controls than new accounting requirements. For the
first time, all public companies must report on the adequacy of their internal
controls over financial reporting, and outside auditors must express their
opinion on the company’s controls. Many people have questioned whether this
incredibly expensive activity is worth the presumed benefit to investors.
While one might argue that the section 404 rules are a regulatory
overreaction, shareholders should expect good internal controls. And audit
committees, as shareholders’ representatives, must demand those good
controls. So this has been by far the most time-consuming topic at all audit
committee meetings I’ve attended in the past couple of years.
Companies and auditors are spending huge sums this
year to ensure that transactions are properly processed and controlled. Yet
the most perfect system of internal controls and the best audit of them might
not catch an incorrect interpretation of GAAP. A good example of this was
contained in the PCAOB’s August 2004 report on its initial reviews of the
Big Four’s audit practices. The report noted that all four firms had missed
the fact that some clients had misapplied EITF Issue 95-22. As the New York
Times (August 27, 2004) noted, “The fact that all of the top firms had been
misapplying it raised issues of just how well they know the sometimes
complicated rules.”
Responding to a different criticism in that same
PCAOB report, KPMG noted, “Three knowledgeable informed bodies—the firm,
the PCAOB, and the SEC—had reached three different conclusions on proper
accounting, illustrating the complex accounting issues registrants, auditors
and regulators all face.”
Fair Value Accounting
Even those who are very confident about their
understanding of the current accounting rules shouldn’t get complacent: Fair
value accounting is right around the corner, making things even harder. In
fact, it is already required in several recent standards.
To be clear, I’m not opposed in general to fair
value accounting. It makes sense for marketable securities, derivatives, and
probably many other financial instruments. But expanding the fair value
concept to many other assets and liabilities is a challenge.
Consider this sentence from FASB’s recent exposure
draft on fair value measurements: “The Board agreed that, conceptually, the
fair value measurement objective and the approach for applying that objective
should be the same for all assets and liabilities.” In that same document,
FASB said, “Users of financial statements generally have agreed that fair
value information is relevant.”
So the overall objective of moving toward a fair
value accounting model seems clear. Of course, that doesn’t necessarily mean
that we will get there soon. In fact, in the same exposure draft the board
said that it would continue to use a project-by-project approach to decide on
fair value or some other measure. But in reality the board has been adopting a
fair value approach in most recent decisions:
SFAS 142, on goodwill, requires that impairment
losses for certain intangible assets be recognized based upon a decline in the
fair value of the asset. SFAS 143, on asset retirement obligations, requires
that these liabilities be recorded initially at fair value rather than what
the company expects to incur. SFAS 146, on exit or disposal activities, calls
for the fair value of exit liabilities to be recorded, not the amount actually
expected to be paid. FIN 45, on guarantees, says that a fair value must be
recorded even when the company doesn’t expect to have to make good on a
guarantee. A fair value approach is also integral to other pending projects,
including the conditional asset retirement obligation exposure draft. Under
such a standard, a company might have to record a fair value liability even
when it doesn’t expect to incur an obligation. Fair value is also key to
projects on business combination purchase procedures; differentiating between
liabilities and equity; share-based payments (stock options); and the
tremendously important revenue recognition project.
I have three major concerns about such pervasive use
of fair value accounting. First, in many cases determining fair value in any
kind of objective way will be difficult if not impossible. Second, the
resulting accounting will produce answers that won’t benefit users of
financial statements. Third, those answers will be very difficult to explain
to business managers, with the result that accounting will be further
discredited in their minds.
The approach that FASB is using for what I would call
operating liabilities is particularly troubling. Take, for example, a company
that owns and operates a facility that has some asbestos contamination. The
facility is safe and can be operated indefinitely, but if the company wanted
to sell the property it would have to remediate that contamination. The
company has no plans to sell the property. But FASB’s exposure draft on
conditional asset retirement obligations calls for the company to estimate and
record a fair value liability. This would be based on what someone else would
charge now to assume the obligation to clean up the problem at some
unspecified future date. The board admits that it might be difficult to
determine what the fair value would be in this case, and companies could omit
the liability if they simply couldn’t make a reasonable estimate.
Although FASB and the SEC expect most companies to be
able to make a reasonable estimate, in reality I think that will be possible
only rarely. Even more important, does it really make sense to record a
liability when the company might believe that there is only a 5% chance that
it will have to be paid? Consider how this line of reasoning might apply to
litigation. Presently, liabilities are recorded only when it’s probable that
a loss has been incurred and that a reasonable estimate of the loss can be
made. So if a company were sued for $1 billion but there were only a 1% chance
that it would lose, nothing would be recorded. The fair value approach would
seem to call for a liability of $10 million in this case, based on 1% of $1
billion.
One might think this kind of accounting will apply
only in the distant future, but FASB is due to release its proposal on
purchase accounting procedures in the next few months, and I understand that
the proposal will require exactly this kind of accounting.
In addition to the very questionable relevance of
this, I don’t know how anyone would ever be able to reasonably determine the
1% likelihood I assumed. How would an auditor attest to the reliability of
financial statements whose results depend significantly on such assumptions?
And where would an auditor go to obtain objective audit evidence against which
to evaluate such assumptions?
Fair value definitely makes sense in certain
instances, but FASB seems intent on extending the notion beyond the boundaries
of common sense. FASB also seems to have an exaggerated notion of what
companies and auditors are actually capable of doing. Perhaps we should
consider FASB’s faith in the profession to be a compliment. Rather than
feeling complimented, however, I think that this just makes many of us long
for the Good Old Days.
Fair Value Accounting and Revenue Recognition
Currently, asset retirement obligations and exit
costs apply to only a few companies, and even guarantees are not an everyday
issue. All companies, however, have revenues—or at least they hope to have
them. And for the past year or so, FASB has been engaged in a complete
rethinking of revenue recognition. This, of course, was precipitated by the
numerous SEC enforcement cases on improper revenue recognition. Most cases,
however, involved failure to follow existing standards, and most cases also
resulted in premature recognition of revenue.
Now there’s no doubt that the current revenue
accounting rules are overly complicated, with many specific rules depending on
the type of product or service being sold. But FASB’s current thinking would
replace these rules with an asset and liability–oriented approach based on
fair value accounting. This may well make revenue accounting even more
complicated than the detailed rules that we are at least used to working with.
For example, assume product A is being sold to a
customer. It costs $50 to produce product A and the customer has agreed to pay
a nonrefundable $100 in exchange for the company’s promise to deliver this
hot product next month. What should the company record at month-end?
Most accountants would probably think first of the
traditional approach and conclude that the earnings process had not been
completed. Because product A hasn’t been completed and shipped to the
customer, the $100 credit is unearned income. Some aggressive accountants
would probably say that the company should record the sale now because the
$100 is nonrefundable. In that case the company would probably also record a
liability for the $50 cost that will be incurred next month.
FASB has a surprise for both. The board is presently
thinking about whether revenue for what it calls the “selling activity”—the
difference between the $100 received and the assumed fair value of the
obligation to deliver the product—should be recorded now. This assumed fair
value would be the estimated amount that other companies would charge to
produce product A. In other words, it’s the hypothetical amount a company
would have to pay someone else to assume the obligation to produce the
product. The company would have to make this assumption even though it is 100%
sure that it will make the product itself rather than have someone else make
it.
If one could ever determine what other companies
would charge, I suspect that the amount would be higher than the $50 expected
cost, because another company probably would require a risk premium to produce
a product that it isn’t familiar with. It would want to earn a profit as
well. Let’s assume in this case that the fair value could be determined as
$80. If so, the company would record now $20 of revenue and profit for what
FASB calls the selling activity. Next month it would record the $80 remaining
amount of revenue, along with the $50 cost actually incurred. It’s unclear
when the company would record sales commissions, delivery costs, and similar
expenses, but I assume these would have to be allocated somehow.
Given that this project was added to FASB’s agenda
in large part because of premature recognition of revenue in some SEC cases—Enron
recognized income based on the supposed fair value of energy contracts
extending 30 years into the future—it is ironic that the project may well
mandate recognition earlier than most accountants would consider appropriate.
That kind of premature revenue recognition is now generally prohibited, but
other examples could follow, depending on the outcome of this FASB project.
Although the revenue recognition project is still in
an early stage and both my understanding and the board’s positions could
change, FASB seems determined to use some sort of fair value approach to
revenue recognition in many cases. If this happens, we will all be wishing for
the Good Old Days to return.
Is All That EITF Guidance Really Necessary?
In early 2004, FASB’s board members began reviewing
all EITF consensus positions. A majority of board members now have to “not
disagree” with the EITF before those positions become final and binding on
companies. This gives FASB more control over the EITF process, and it should
prevent the task force from developing positions that the board sees as
inconsistent with existing GAAP.
Although I think the task force has done a great deal
of good over its 20-year existence (I was a charter member), I think it’s
time to challenge whether everything that the EITF does is necessary or even
consistent with its original purpose. Too many of the task force’s topics in
recent years can’t really be called “emerging issues.” Rather, the task
force often takes up long-standing issues where it thinks that some
limitations need to be placed on professional judgment.
For example, a couple of years ago the SEC became
concerned about the accounting for certain investments in other companies. For
years we’ve had standards that call for recognition of losses when market
value declines are “other than temporary.” The EITF discussed this matter
at eight meetings over two years and also relied on a separate working group
of accounting experts. Earlier this year, a final consensus position was
issued. It includes a lengthy abstract that tells companies what factors to
consider, including the following matters:
Evidence to support the ability and intent to
continue to hold the investment; The severity of the decline in value; How
long the decline has lasted; and The evidence supporting a market price
recovery. So now we have a “detailed rule” on this matter. Will this
result in more consistency in practice? Will investors and other users of
financial statements receive better information as a result? Is the result
worth the additional effort?
Moreover, after two years of effort on this project,
FASB had to reconsider the whole thing because no one had considered the
effect on debt securities held as available for sale by financial
institutions. So now the board is developing even more specifics to deal with
the unintended consequences of the rule.
Again, I support the EITF, and I believe it has
generally done a great job. The members try to develop practical ways to deal
with current problems. Nonetheless, both the task force and FASB may need to
more carefully challenge whether all of the EITF’s projects are really
needed. If FASB actually issued relatively broad standards, there probably
would be a need for the EITF to provide supplemental guidance on some issues.
But we now seem to have the worst of all worlds, with quite detailed
accounting standards being accompanied by even more detailed EITF guidance.
A Multitude of Challenges
I don’t intend to seem overly critical of FASB and
others who are working to improve financial reporting. It’s a tough job, and
the brickbats always outnumber the bouquets. If I didn’t strongly support
accounting standards setting I wouldn’t have spent 10 Qs years on the inside
of the process. Still, those years at FASB, as well as my time before and
after, have caused me to develop strong views on these issues. And I truly do
believe that standards have gotten just too complicated.
The announced move to broader principles is one I
fully support. That job won’t be easy, but it has to be tried or the sea of
detail will become even deeper in the near future. FASB needs to actually
start doing this and not allow its actions to speak otherwise. And companies,
auditors, and regulators need to support such a move and resist the temptation
to seek answers to every imaginable question. Furthermore, companies and
auditors may have to become more principled before a principles-based approach
will work.
Part of this process could be for the EITF to be more
judicious in what it takes on. Also, I urge FASB to reevaluate its attitude
toward fair value accounting. I believe FASB is moving much faster in this
area than preparers, auditors, and users of financial statements can
accommodate. Furthermore, the SEC and other regulators may not yet be on board
with this new thinking.
In the final analysis, we won’t be able to return
to my so-called Good Old Days. But we have to make sure that what accounting
and accountants can do is meaningful and operational. We never want to look
back and ask, “Remember the Good Old Days, when accounting was important?”
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CPA Journal Editorial Board member Dennis R. Beresford, CPA, was recently
named the 2005 recipient of the Gold Medal for Distinguished Service from the
AICPA. He received the award on October 26, during the fall meeting of the
Institute’s governing council in Orlando. Beresford is the Ernst & Young
Executive Professor of Accounting at the J.M. Tull School of Accounting at the
University of Georgia, Terry College of Business. From 1987 to 1997, he was
chairman of FASB. Prior to joining FASB, he was national director of
accounting standards for Ernst & Young.ecently I visited my pharmacy to
pick up eyedrops for my two golden retrievers. Before he would give me the
prescription, the pharmacist insisted I sign a form on behalf of Murphy and
Millie, representing that they had been apprised of their rights under the new
medical privacy rules. This ludicrous situation is a good illustration of how
complicated life has gotten.
From the FASB in July 2004 "FASB Response to SEC Study on the Adoption
of a Principles-Based Accounting System" --- http://www.fasb.org/response_sec_study_july2004.pdf
Introduction
In July 2003, the staff of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) submitted to
Congress its Study
Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the
Adoption by the United States
Financial Reporting System of a Principles-Based Accounting
System (the Study). The Study
includes the following recommendations to the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB or Board):
1. The FASB should issue
objectives-oriented standards.
2. The FASB should address
deficiencies in the conceptual framework.
3. The FASB should be the only
organization setting authoritative accounting
guidance in the United States.
4. The FASB should continue its
convergence efforts.
5. The FASB should work to redefine
the GAAP hierarchy.
6. The FASB should increase access to
authoritative literature.
7. The FASB should perform a
comprehensive review of its literature to identify
standards that are more rules-based and adopt
a transition plan to change those standards.
The Board welcomes the SEC’s Study and
agrees with the recommendations. Indeed, a number of those recommendations
relate to initiatives the Board had under way at the time the Study was
issued.1 The Board is committed to continuously improving its standard-setting
process. The Board’s specific responses to the recommendations in the Study
are described in the following sections of this paper.
Objectives-Oriented Standards
In the Study, the SEC staff recommends
that "those involved in the standard-setting
process more consistently develop
standards on a principles-based or objectives-oriented
basis" (page 4).
2
According to the
Study (page 4), an objectives-oriented standard would
have the following characteristics:
•
Be
based on an improved and consistently applied conceptual framework;
•
Clearly
state the accounting objective of the standard;
•
Provide
sufficient detail and structure so that the standard can be operationalized
and applied on a consistent basis;1
•
Minimize
exceptions from the standard;
•
Avoid
use of percentage tests ("bright-lines") that allow financial
engineers to achieve technical compliance with
the standard while evading the
intent of the standard.
The “objectives-oriented” approach to setting
standards described above (and expanded
upon in the Study) is similar to the principles-based approach described in the
Board’s
Proposal. After discussing the comments received on its Proposal, the Board
agreed that
its conceptual framework needs to be improved. This is because an internally
consistent
and complete conceptual framework is critical to a standard-setting approach
that places
more emphasis on the underlying principles that are based on that framework.
Pages 8
and 9 of this paper further describe the Board’s activities related to the
conceptual
framework; the following sections address the other characteristics of an
objectivesoriented
approach addressed in the Study.
Format and Content of Standards
The Board agrees with the Study’s
recommendation to improve the format and content of
its standards. In particular, The Board agrees
that the objective and underlying principles of
a standard should be clearly articulated and prominently placed in FASB
standards. In response to comments
received on its Proposal, the Board agreed that although its existing
standards are based on concepts and principles, the understandability of its
standards could be improved by writing its
standards in ways that (a) clearly state the accounting
objective(s), (b) clearly articulate the underlying principles, and (c)
improve the explanation of the rationale
behind those principles and how they relate to the conceptual
framework.
The Board is working on developing a
format for its standards that will encompass the
attributes of an objectives-oriented standard
described in the Study, for example, describing
the underlying objective of the standard in the introductory paragraphs, using
bold type to set
off the principles,3 and
providing a glossary for defined terms.
In addition, the Board is working with a
consultant to identify changes in the organization
and exposition of its standards that will
increase the understandability of those standards. Accounting
standards by their nature will include many specific technical terms; however,
the Board believes it can do a better job simplifying the language used in its
standards to describe how to account for
complex transactions. In addition, the Board will
strive to apply other effective writing techniques to enhance constituents’
understanding of
FASB standards.
When discussing proposed accounting
standards or specific provisions of a standard,
many of the Board’s constituents comment on
whether a standard is "operational." Because
that term can mean different things to different people, the Board decided to
define the term operational
for its purposes. The Board uses the term operational
to mean
the following:
•
A
provision/standard is comprehensible by a reader who has a reasonable level
of knowledge
and sophistication,
•
The
information needed to apply the provision/standard is currently available or
can be created, and
•
The
provision/standard can be applied in the manner in which it was intended.
The Board believes that if its standards are
more understandable, they also will be more operational.
Implementation Guidance
As noted in the Board’s Proposal, an
approach to setting standards that places more emphasis on principles will not
eliminate the need to provide interpretive and implementation guidance for
applying those standards. Thus, the Board agrees that some amount of
implementation guidance is needed in objectives-oriented standards in order
for entities to apply those standards in a consistent manner. The Board uses
the term implementation guidance to refer to all of the guidance necessary to
explain and operationalize the principles (that is, the explanatory text in
the standards section, the definitions in the glossary, and guidance and
examples included in one or more appendices that help an entity apply the
provisions in the standards section). The Board believes that the amount of
necessary guidance will vary depending on the nature and complexity of the
arrangements that are the subject of the standard. The Board believes that
there should be enough guidance such that a principle is understandable,
operational, and capable of being applied consistently in similar situations.
Judgment is required to decide how much guidance is needed to achieve those
objectives, without providing so much guidance that the overall standard
combined with its implementation guidance becomes a collection of detailed
rules. Therefore, the amount and nature of implementation guidance will vary
from standard to standard.
The Board believes that its primary
focus should be providing broadly applicable implementation guidance, not
providing guidance on relatively narrow and less pervasive issues, including,
for example, issues that are specific to certain entities or industries. When
developing that implementation guidance, the Board plans to apply the same
guidelines that underpin objectives-oriented standards. For example, rather
than consisting of a list of rules or bright lines, the implementation
guidance would explain or expand on the principle(s) or objectives in the
standard. 4.
Continued in the report
From the FASB in October 2002 --- http://www.fasb.org/fasac/results2002.pdf
Results of the 2002
Annual FASAC Survey
FASAC's annual survey
on the priorities of the FASB provides valuable perspectives and observations
about the Board's process and direction. The 2002 survey asked Council
members, Board members, and other interested constituents to provide their
views about the FASB's priorities, the financial reporting issues of tomorrow,
principles-based standards, and the FASB's international activities.
Key observations and
conclusions from the responses to the 2002 survey are:
- Council members
most often mentioned revenue recognition as one of the five most important
issues that the Board should address currently. All seven Board members
also included revenue recognition as one of the most important issues for
the Board.
- FASAC members
most often cited valuation issues, such as the implication of using fair
value measurements in financial statements, as one of the issues of
tomorrow that the Board should start thinking about today.
- FASAC members
generally are prepared to accept differences in interpretation of
principles-based standards. They also are prepared to make the judgments
necessary to apply less-detailed standards despite the risk that their
judgment will be questioned. Some noted that for principles-based
standards to become a reality, the SEC is the primary organization that
needs to support the initiative.
- Nearly all
FASAC members agree that the Board's international activities are an
appropriate use of resources. All Board members also believe that those
activities are an appropriate use of resources.
Twenty-two current
Council members, 7 Board members, and 9 other constituents responded to the
survey.
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting
theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting
fraud are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting for
electronic commerce are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce.htm
There is a complete saga of attempts to establish a conceptual framework of
accounting. See
http://www.wku.edu/~halljo/attempts.html
Methods for setting accounting standards all have
advantages and disadvantages. It is not possible to set optimal standards for all
stakeholders. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem applies, which means that what is
optimal for one constituency must be sub-optimal for other constituencies.
Accounting standards are usually expensive to implement, and the benefits of any new
standard must be weighed against its costs to preparers and users of financial statements.
Deductive Accounting Theory (Mathematical
Methods)
- Assumes that optimal accounting standards and
reporting rules can be derived by deduction much in the way that Pythagoras derived the
rule for measuring the hypotenuse of a triangle based upon square root of the summed
squares of the other two sides (assuming one angle is a perfect 90-degree angle). Is
there ever a perfect 90-degree angle in the real world?
- If we assume that we have perfect definitions of
assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses, then derivations of optimal accounting rules
will follow. A+E=R+L+E before closing E and R to E.
- The FASB's Conceptual Framework is based heavily
upon
Inductive Accounting Theory (Scientific Methods)
- Assumes accounting standards are somewhat like evolution of
a species in nature --- survival of the fittest!
- Relies heavily upon controlled experimentation (e.g.,
behavioral accounting research) and statistical testing (e.g., capital markets
"events" studies of the impact of accounting information on market prices and
volume of transactions).
Normative Accounting Theory
- Normative theorists tend to advocate their
opinions on accounting based upon subjective opinion, deductive logic, and inductive
methods. In the final analysis, nearly all standards are based upon normative
theory.
- Generally conclude that some accounting rule is
better or worse than its alternatives.
- Normative theorists tend to rely heavily upon
anecdotal evidence (e.g., examples of fraud) that generally fails to meet tests of
academic rigor. For example, the Wizard reported that Montgomery Ward would
fail. However, the Wizard always reports that every company will fail or lose its
self identity in a pattern of acquisitions and mergers. Eventually, he will always
be correct.
Positive Accounting Theory
- Positive theorists tend to explain why some
accounting practices are more popular than others (e.g., because they increase management
compensation). They tend to support their conclusions with inductive theory and
empirical evidence as opposed to deductive methods.
- Generally avoid advocacy of one accounting rule as
being better or worse than its alternatives.
- Positivists are inspired by anecdotal evidence,
but anecdotal evidence is never permitted without more rigorous and controlled scientific
investigation.
April 2002 Document on SPEs
and Enron from the International Accounting Standards Board (This Document is Free)
WRITTEN EVIDENCE OF SIR DAVID TWEEDIE
CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD TO THE TREASURY COMMITTEE ---
http://www.iasc.org.uk/docs/speeches/020405-dpt.pdf
An excerpt is shown below:
Consolidations
Of the 16 topics on our research
agenda, one warrants special mention here. For several years, there has been an
international debate on the topic of consolidation policy. The failure to consolidate some
entities has been identified as a significant issue in the restatement of Enrons
financial statements. Accountants use the term consolidation policy as shorthand for
the principles that govern the preparation of consolidated financial statements that
include the assets and liabilities of a parent company and its subsidiaries. For an
example of consolidation, consider the simple example known to every accounting student.
Company A operates a branch office in Edinburgh. Company B also operates a branch office
in Edinburgh, but organises the branch as a corporation owned by Company B. Every
accounting student knows that the financial statements of each company should report all
of the assets and liabilities of their respective Edinburgh operations, without regard to
the legal form surrounding those operations.
Of course, real life is seldom as
straightforward as textbook examples. Companies often own less than 100 per cent of a
company that might be included in the consolidated group. Some special purpose entities
(SPEs) may not be organised in traditional corporate form. The challenge for accountants
is to determine which entities should be included in consolidated financial
statements.
There is a broad consensus among
accounting standard-setters that the decision to consolidate should be based on whether
one entity controls another. However, there is much disagreement over how control should
be defined and translated into accounting guidance. In some jurisdictions accounting
standards and practice seem to have gravitated toward a legal or ownership notion of
control, usually based on direct or indirect ownership of over 50 per cent of the
outstanding voting shares. In contrast, both international standards and the standards in
some national jurisdictions are based on a broader notion of control that includes
ownership, but extends to control over financial and operating policies, power to appoint
or remove a majority of the board of directors, and power to cast a majority of votes at
meetings of the board of directors.
A number of commentators,
including many in the USA, have questioned whether the control principle is consistently
applied. The IASB and its partner standard-setters are committed to an ongoing review of
the effectiveness of our standards. If they do not work as well as they should, we want to
find out why and fix the problem. Last summer we asked the UK ASB to help us by
researching the various national standards on consolidation and identifying any
inconsistencies or implementation problems. It has completed the first stage of that
effort and is moving now to more difficult questions.
The particular consolidation
problems posed by SPEs were addressed by the IASBs former Standing Interpretations
Committee in SIC-12. There are some kinds of SPE that pose particular problems for both an
ownership approach and a control-based approach to consolidations. It is not uncommon for
SPEs to have minimal capital, held by a third party, that bears little if any of the risks
and rewards usually associated with share ownership. The activities of some SPEs are
so precisely prescribed in the
documents that establish them that no active exercise of day-to-day control is needed or
allowed. These kinds of SPEs are commonly referred to as running on
auto-pilot. In these cases, control is exercised in a passive way. To discover
who has control it is necessary to look at which party receives the benefits and risks of
the SPE.
SIC-12 sets out four particular
circumstances that may indicate that an SPE should be consolidated:
(a) in substance, the activities
of the SPE are being conducted on behalf of the enterprise according to its specific
business needs so that the enterprise obtains benefits from the SPEs
operation.
(b) in substance, the enterprise
has the decision-making powers to obtain the majority of the benefits of the activities of
the SPE or, by setting up an autopilot mechanism, the enterprise has delegated
these decision-making powers.
(c) in substance, the enterprise
has rights to obtain the majority of the benefits of the SPE and therefore may be exposed
to risks incidental to the activities of the SPE.
(d) in substance, the enterprise
retains the majority of the residual or ownership risks related to the SPE or its assets
in order to obtain benefits from its activities.
The IASB recognises that we may
be able to improve our approach to SPEs. With this in mind, we have already asked our
interpretations committee if there are any ways in which the rules need to be strengthened
or clarified.
Current criticisms and
concerns about financial reporting
There some common threads that
pass through most of the topics on our active and research agendas. Each represents a
broad topic that has occupied the best accounting minds for several years. It is time to
bring many of these issues to a conclusion.
Off balance sheet items
When a manufacturer sells a car
or a dishwasher, the inventory is removed from the balance sheet (a process that
accountants refer to as derecognition) because the manufacturer no longerowns the item.
Similarly, when a company repays a loan, it no longer reports that loan as a liability.
However, the last 20 years have seen a number of attempts by companies to remove assets
and liabilities from balance sheets through transactions that may obscure the economic
substance of the companys financial position. There are four areas that warrant
mention here, each of which has the potential to obscure the extent of a companys
assets and liabilities.
Leasing transactions
A company that owns an asset, say
an aircraft, and finances that asset with debt reports an asset (the aircraft) and a
liability (the debt). Under existing accounting standards in most jurisdictions (including
ASB and IASB standards), a company that operates the same asset under a lease structured
as an operating lease reports neither the asset nor the liability. It is possible to
operate a company, say an airline, without reporting any of the companys principal
assets (aircraft) on the balance sheet. A balance sheet that presents an airline without
any aircraft is clearly not a faithful representation of economic reality.
Our predecessor body, working in
conjunction with our partners in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the USA,
published a research paper that invited comments on accounting for leases. The UK ASB is
continuing work on this topic and we are monitoring its work carefully. As noted above, we
expect to move accounting for leases to our active agenda at some point in the future.
There is a distinct possibility that such a project would lead us to propose that
companies recognise assets and related lease obligations for all leases.
Securitisation transactions
Under existing accounting
standards in many jurisdictions, a company that transfers assets (like loans or
credit-card balances) through a securitisation transaction recognises the transaction as a
sale and removes the amounts from its balance sheet. Some securitisations are
appropriately accounted for as sales, but many continue to expose the transferor to many
of the significant risks and rewards inherent in the transferred assets. In our project on
improvements to IAS 39 (page 5), we plan to propose an approach that will clarify
international standards governing a companys ability to derecognise assets in a
securitisation. Our approach, which will not allow sale treatment when the
seller has a continuing involvement with the assets, will be significantly
different from the one found in the existing standards of most jurisdictions.
Creation of unconsolidated
entities
Under existing accounting
standards in many jurisdictions, a company that transfers assets and liabilities to a
subsidiary company must consolidate that subsidiary in the parent companys financial
statements (see page 6). However, in some cases (often involving the use of an SPE), the
transferor may be able (in some jurisdictions) to escape the requirement to consolidate.
Standards governing the consolidation of SPEs are described on page 7.
Pension obligations
Under existing standards in many
jurisdictions (including existing international standards) a companys obligation to
a defined benefit pension plan is reported on the companys balance sheet. However,
the amount reported is not the current obligation, based on current information and
assumptions, but instead represents the result of a series of devices designed to spread
changes over several years. In contrast, the UK standard (FRS 17) has attracted
significant recent attention because it does not include a smoothing mechanism. The IASB
plans to examine the differences among the various national accounting standards for
pensions (in particular, the smoothing mechanism), as part of our ongoing work on
convergence.
Items not included in the profit
and loss account
Under existing accounting
standards in some jurisdictions, a company that pays for goods and services through the
use of its own shares, options on its shares, or instruments tied to the value of its
shares may not record any cost for those goods and services. The most common form of this
share-based transaction is the employee share option. In 1995, after what it called an
extraordinarily controversial debate, the FASB issued a standard that, in most
cases in the USA, requires disclosure of the effect of employee share options but does not
require recognition in the financial statements. In its Basis for Conclusions, the FASB
observed:
The Board chose a
disclosure-based solution for stock-based employee compensation to bring closure to the
divisive debate on this issuenot because it believes that solution is the best way
to improve financial accounting and reporting.
Most jurisdictions, including the
UK, do not have any standard on accounting for share-based payment, and the use of this
technique is growing outside of the USA. There is a clear need for international
accounting guidance. Last autumn, the IASB reopened the comment period on a discussion
document Accounting for Share-based Payment. This document was initially published by our
predecessor, in concert with standard-setters from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK
and the USA. We have now considered the comments received and have begun active
deliberation of this project. Accounting measurement
Under existing accounting
standards in most jurisdictions, assets and liabilities are reported at amounts based on a
mixture of accounting measurements. Some measurements are based on historical transaction
prices, perhaps adjusted for depreciation, amortisation, or impairment. Others are based
on fair values, using either amounts observed in the marketplace or estimates of fair
value. Accountants refer to this as the mixed attribute model. It is increasingly clear
that a mixed attribute system creates complexity and opportunities for accounting
arbitrage, especially for derivatives and financial instruments. Some have suggested that
financial reporting should move to a system that measures all financial instruments at
fair value.
Our predecessor body participated
in a group of ten accounting standard-setters (the Joint Working Group or JWG) to study
the problem of accounting for financial instruments. The JWG proposal (which recommended a
change to measuring all financial assets and liabilities at fair value) was published at
the end of 2000. Earlier this year the Canadian Accounting Standards Board presented an
analysis of comments on that proposal. The IASB has just begun to consider how this effort
should move forward.
Intangible assets
Under existing accounting
standards in most jurisdictions, the cost of an intangible asset (a patent, copyright, or
the like) purchased from a third party is capitalised as an asset. This is the same as the
accounting for acquired tangible assets (buildings and machines) and financial assets
(loans and accounts receivable). Existing accounting standards extend this approach to
self-constructed tangible assets, so a company that builds its own building capitalises
the costs incurred and reports that as the cost of its self-constructed asset. However, a
company that develops its own patent for a new drug or process is prohibited from
capitalising much (sometimes all) of the costs of creating that intangible asset. Many
have criticised this inconsistency, especially at a time when many view intangible assets
as significant drivers of company performance.
The accounting recognition and
measurement of internally generated intangibles challenges many long-cherished accounting
conventions. Applying the discipline of accounting concepts challenges many of the popular
conceptions of intangible assets and intellectual capital. We have this topic
on our research agenda. We also note the significant work that the FASB has done on this
topic and its recent decision to add a project to develop proposed disclosures about
internally generated intangible assets. We plan to monitor those efforts closely.
Bob Jensen's threads on the Enron/Andersen scandals are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
Bob Jensen's SPE threads are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm
Why Let the I.R.S. See What the S.E.C. Doesn't?
"Why Let the I.R.S. See What the S.E.C. Doesn't?," by Anna Bernasek,
The New York Times, February 5, 2006 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/05/business/yourmoney/05view.html
IMAGINE a company that makes a practice of keeping
two sets of accounts. One version is revealed to the public through periodic
Securities and Exchange Commission filings and public announcements. The
other is never made public and conveys a markedly different picture.
Does it sound scandalous? Actually, it's common
practice.
It isn't as if companies are breaking the law.
Public companies are required by the S.E.C. to keep their books in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, or GAAP, and to
announce their results each quarter. At the same time, companies keep a
separate and confidential set of books according to rules established by the
Internal Revenue Service. These accounts seldom match. After all, companies
typically have an incentive to state the highest possible earnings under
GAAP and the lowest possible under tax rules.
Economists have long understood that profits
reported to the I.R.S. may be a more reliable guide than those reported to
the S.E.C. and scrutinized on Wall Street. The public presentation of
accounts involves the exercise of an accountant's judgment on such topics as
the useful life of assets, the probability of uncertain events and the fair
value of property. Each exercise of judgment, on which reasonable people may
differ, offers a degree of flexibility in the final reporting of results.
In general, tax rules are less lenient. That is
because allowing companies too much leeway in stating how much tax they owe
would make collecting taxes difficult. So when economists analyze corporate
profits, they tend to focus on a measure derived from corporate tax returns.
Unfortunately, the government publishes only aggregate data, so it is
impossible to know what any particular company made, or paid, under I.R.S.
rules.
It doesn't have to be that way. Companies already
have basic tax information at hand that could be released to the public
without imposing significant costs. And some experts say they believe that
the benefits to investors, regulators and the overall tax system could be
substantial.
A study published in 2003 concluded that the
benefits of disclosing additional tax information would outweigh any costs.
It was conducted by David L. Lenter, a lawyer now on the staff of the
Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation; Joel B. Slemrod, an economist at
the University of Michigan; and Douglas A. Shackelford, an accountant at the
University of North Carolina.
In the study, published in the National Tax
Journal, they quickly agreed that corporate tax returns, which can run into
thousands of pages, should not be exposed in their entirety. That could
reveal sensitive information that companies have a legitimate need to keep
private, they said.
But a simple presentation of summary information —
the bottom-line numbers, for example — would have many attractions. Even
better, companies could release a simplified version of a schedule that they
already prepare. The I.R.S. currently requires companies to reconcile the
differences between the numbers on their financial reports and the
corresponding amounts on their tax return, but so far those reconciliations
have not been made public.
Greater disclosure of tax information would allow
investors and analysts to better appreciate the true economic condition of a
company. More transparent tax figures would also give analysts a tool to cut
through the sometimes confusing tax disclosures currently provided under
S.E.C. rules. Even more significantly, investors could track a company's
performance under an accounting system believed to be less susceptible to
manipulation than GAAP. Together, these effects would permit investors to
value securities with greater confidence. Over all, the researchers say they
believe that it would help financial markets function more efficiently.
Another significant benefit could be to improve the
transparency of the tax system to the voting public. Despite all the
information embedded in accounting footnotes, some basic questions go
unanswered. Under current S.E.C. rules, a public company does not have to
reveal precisely what it paid in taxes for a specific year. "Right now the
tax numbers companies release can contain things like taxes on audits 20
years ago," Professor Shackelford said. "What they don't tell us is how much
they paid the government in taxes in 2005, for instance. You can't find that
anywhere."
The study argued that if companies revealed that
figure, it would help clarify how much tax a company was paying relative to
its income and relative to other companies. And that would yield positive
benefits. For instance, the study says, it could put pressure on legislators
to improve the tax system. And it could discourage corporations from
aggressive tax-reduction strategies if they feared public criticism.
THERE is good cause for trying to understand what
is really going on with corporate taxes, company by company. The aggregate
figures suggest a disturbing trend. While companies have reported rising
profits in recent years, corporate tax receipts have been dwindling. In the
late 1990's, corporate tax receipts hovered between 2 percent and 2.2
percent of the country's overall gross domestic product. But from 2000 to
2004, the last year for which figures are available, the ratio of corporate
tax receipts to G.D.P. has dropped, ranging between 1.2 and 2 percent.
Without reliable tax information, we can only guess
at what companies are really up to. During the late 1990's, company profits
based on tax return information — the profit figure most watched by
economists — grew at a much slower rate than reported profits. The
divergence between the two measures implied that either companies were
finding new ways to minimize their tax bills or they were finding new ways
to overstate their accounting earnings. We now know that at least some
companies were indeed bolstering their earnings, through both legal and
illegal maneuvers.
After a brief reconciliation in 2001 and 2002,
reported earnings and taxed earnings are again diverging. While disclosing
some basic tax information won't by itself prevent the kinds of abuses that
multiplied in the 1990's, it is a step in the right direction. And that's
what good public policy is all about.
Radical Changes on the Way in Financial
Reporting
Five General Categories of Aggregation
"The Sums of All Parts: Redesigning Financials: As part of radical
changes to the income statement, balance sheet, and cash flow statement, FASB
signs off on a series of new subtotals to be contained in each," byMarie
Leone, CFO Magazine, November 14, 2007 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/10131571?f=rsspage
In another large step towards the most dramatic
overhaul of financial statements in decades, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board Wednesday laid out a series of subtotal figures that
companies would be required to include on their balance sheets, income
statements and cash flow statements.
The new look for financials will break all three
statements into five general categories: business, discontinued operations,
financing, income taxes, and equity (if needed). Each of those groupings
will carry its own total. In addition, the business, financing, and income
tax categories will be segmented into even more narrow sections, each of
which will include a subtotal. For example, the business category will be
broken down into operating assets, operating liabilities and a subtotal; and
investing assets, investing liabilities, and a second subtotal.
(Although FASB will not officially release its
proposal until the second quarter of 2008, it has made public some initial
peeks at the proposed format.)
The addition of totals and subtotals is an
extension of FASB's broader principle on disaggregating financial statement
line items. It is the board's belief that separating line items into their
components gives investors, creditors, analysts and other financial
statement users a better view of a company's financial health. For example,
the new format should make it easier for an investor to see how much cash a
company generates by selling its products versus how much it generates by
selling-off a business unit or through financial investments made by the
corporate treasurer.
FASB staffers say buy- and sell-side analysts
typically scrutinize financial statements by breaking them down into
categories similar to the ones the board is proposing.
In keeping with its promise to strip accounting
standards of complexity, the board also agreed to issue two overarching
principles in its draft document on financial statement presentation. One
principle instructs preparers to keep the category order consistent in each
of the three financial statements. For example, if income tax is the last
category shown in on the balance sheet, then it should also be the final
category on the cash flow and income statement. "We're not going to tell you
what order [to use], just that you should use the same order in all three
statements," noted FASB Chairman Robert Herz during the meeting.
In addition, the board wants companies to "clearly
distinguish" between operating assets and operating liabilities, as well as
short-term assets and liabilities and their long-term counterparts. But the
board is not going to prescribe how that should be done. Regarding the issue
of common sums, "the only requirement will be that totals and subtotals are
segmented by activities," noted board member George Batavick, "the rest will
be principles."
Updating the look and functionality of financial
statements is one of the joint projects that FASB is working on with the
International Accounting Standards Board as the two organizations work to
converge U.S. and global accounting rules. On Thursday, IASB will discuss
the common totals issue and is expected to release its recommendations.
FASB expects the draft proposal to spark a healthy
debate among users and preparers, and staffers are planning for a four- to
six-month comment period to follow its release. One issue that will have to
be thrashed out, for example, is whether discontinued operations should be
relegated to its own category, or run through the income statement or
financing activities.
To avoid any last-minute confusion with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Herz asked the FASB accountants working
on the project to "touch base with the SEC staff just to get their input."
Herz noted that last time the two groups discussed disaggregation
principles, Scott Taub, not James Kroeker, was the SEC's deputy chief
accountant.
Jensen Comment
Now is especially the time for accounting researchers to look into leading edge
alternatives for visualizing data. My threads on that topic are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/352wpVisual/000DataVisualization.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm
No Bottom Line
Question
Is a major overhaul of accounting standards on the way?
Hint
There may no longer be the tried and untrusted earnings per share number to
report!
Comment
It would be interesting to see a documentation of the academic research, if any,
that the FASB relied upon to commence this blockbuster initiative. I recommend
that some astute researcher commence to probe into the thinking behind this
proposal.
"Profit as We Know It Could Be Lost With New Accounting
Statements," by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, May 12, 2007; Page
A1 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117893520139500814.html?mod=DAT
Pretty soon the bottom line may not be, well, the
bottom line.
In coming months, accounting-rule makers are
planning to unveil a draft plan to rework financial statements, the bedrock
data that millions of investors use every day when deciding whether to buy
or sell stocks, bonds and other financial instruments. One possible result:
the elimination of what today is known as net income or net profit, the
bottom-line figure showing what is left after expenses have been met and
taxes paid.
It is the item many investors look to as a key
gauge of corporate performance and one measure used to determine executive
compensation. In its place, investors might find a number of profit figures
that correspond to different corporate activities such as business
operations, financing and investing.
Another possible radical change in the works:
assets and liabilities may no longer be separate categories on the balance
sheet, or fall to the left and right side in the classic format taught in
introductory accounting classes.
ACCOUNTING OVERHAUL
Get a glimpse of what new financial statements
could look like, according to an early draft recently provided by the
Financial Accounting Standards Board to one of its advisory groups. The
overhaul could mark one of the most drastic changes to accounting and
financial reporting since the start of the Industrial Revolution in the 19th
century, when companies began publishing financial information as they
sought outside capital. The move is being undertaken by accounting-rule
makers in the U.S. and internationally, and ultimately could affect
companies and investors around the world.
The project is aimed at providing investors with
more telling information and has come about as rule makers work to one day
come up with a common, global set of accounting standards. If adopted, the
changes will likely force every accounting textbook to be rewritten and
anyone who uses accounting -- from clerks to chief executives -- to relearn
how to compile and analyze information that shows what is happening in a
business.
This is likely to come as a shock, even if many
investors and executives acknowledge that net income has flaws. "If there
was no bottom line, I'd want to have a sense of what other indicators I
ought to be looking at to get a sense of the comprehensive health of the
company," says Katrina Presti, a part-time independent health-care
contractor and stay-at-home mom who is part of a 12-woman investment club in
Pueblo, Colo. "Net income might be a false indicator, but what would I look
at if it goes away?"
The effort to redo financial statements reflects
changes in who uses them and for what purposes. Financial statements were
originally crafted with bankers and lenders in mind. Their biggest question:
Is the business solvent and what's left if it fails? Stock investors care
more about a business's current and future profits, so the net-income line
takes on added significance for them.
Indeed, that single profit number, particularly
when it is divided by the number of shares outstanding, provides the most
popular measure of a company's valuation: the price-to-earnings ratio. A
company that trades at $10 a share, and which has net profit of $1 a share,
has a P/E of 10.
But giving that much power to one number has long
been a recipe for fraud and stock-market excesses. Many major accounting
scandals earlier this decade centered on manipulation of net income. The
stock-market bubble of the 1990s was largely based on investors' assumption
that net profit for stocks would grow rapidly for years to come. And the
game of beating a quarterly earnings number became a distraction or worse
for companies' managers and investors. Obviously it isn't known whether the
new format would cut down on attempts to game the numbers, but companies
would have to give a more detailed breakdown of what is going on.
The goal of the accounting-rule makers is to better
reflect how businesses are actually run and divert attention from the one
number. "I know the world likes single bottom-line numbers and all of that,
but complicated businesses are hard to translate into just one number," says
Robert Herz, chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the U.S.
rule-making body that is one of several groups working on the changes.
At the same time, public companies today are more
global than local, and as likely to be involved in services or lines of
business that involve intellectual property such as software rather than the
plants and equipment that defined the manufacturing age. "The income
statement today looks a lot like it did when I started out in this
profession," says William Parrett, the retiring CEO of accounting firm
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, who started as a junior accountant in 1967. "But
the kind of information that goes into it is completely different."
Along the way, figures such as net income have
become muddied. That is in part because more and more of the items used to
calculate net profit are based on management estimates, such as the value of
items that don't trade in active markets and the direction of interest
rates. Also, over the years rule makers agreed to corporate demands to
account for some things, such as day-to-day changes in the value of pension
plans or financial instruments used to protect against changes in interest
rates, in ways that keep them from causing swings in net income.
Rule makers hope reformatting financial statements
will address some of these issues, while giving investors more information
about what is happening in different parts of a business to better assess
its value. The project is being managed jointly by the FASB in the U.S. and
the London-based International Accounting Standards Board, and involves
accounting bodies in Japan, other parts of Asia and individual European
nations.
The entire process of adopting the revised approach
could take a few years to play out, so much could yet change. Plus, once
rule makers adopt the changes, they would have to be ratified by regulatory
authorities, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission in the U.S. and
the European Commission in Europe, before public companies would be required
to follow them.
As a first step, rule makers expect later this year
to publish a document outlining their preliminary views on what new form
financial statements might take. But already they have given hints of what's
in store. In March, the FASB provided draft, new financial statements at the
end of a 32-page handout for members of an advisory group. (See an example.)
Although likely to change, this preview showed an
income statement that has separate segments for the company's operating
business, its financing activities, investing activities and tax payments.
Each area has an income subtotal for that particular segment.
There is also a "total comprehensive income"
category that is wider ranging than net profit as it is known today, and so
wouldn't be directly comparable. That is because this total would likely
include gains and losses now kept in other parts of the financial
statements. These include some currency fluctuations and changes in the
value of financial instruments used to hedge against other items.
Comprehensive income could also eventually include
short-term changes in the value of corporate pension plans, which currently
are smoothed out over a number of years. As a result, comprehensive income
could be a lot more difficult to predict and could be volatile from quarter
to quarter or year to year.
As for the balance sheet, the new version would
group assets and liabilities together according to similar categories of
operating, investing and financing activities, although it does provide a
section for shareholders equity. Currently, a balance sheet is broken down
between assets and liabilities, rather than by operating categories.
Such drastic change isn't likely to happen without
a fight. Efforts to bring now-excluded figures into the income statement
could prompt battles with companies that fear their profit will be subject
to big swings. Companies may also balk at the expense involved.
"The cost of this change could be monumental," says
Gary John Previts, an accounting professor at Case Western Reserve
University in Cleveland. "All the textbooks are going to have to change,
every contract and every bank arrangement will have to change." Investors in
Europe and Asia, meanwhile, have opposed the idea of dropping net profit as
it appears today, David Tweedie, the IASB's chairman, said in an interview
earlier this year.
Analysts in the London office of UBS AG recently
published a report arguing this very point -- that even if net income is a
"simplistic measure," that doesn't mean it isn't a valid "starting point in
valuation" and that "its widespread use is justification enough for its
retention."
Such opposition doesn't surprise many accounting
experts. Net income is "the basis for bonuses and judgments about what a
company's stock is worth," says Stephen A. Zeff, an accounting professor at
Rice University. "I just don't know what the markets would do if companies
stopped reporting a bottom line somewhere." In the U.S., professional
investors and analysts have taken a more nuanced view, perhaps because the
manipulation of numbers was more pronounced in U.S. markets.
That said, net profit has been around for some
time. The income statement in use today, along with the balance sheet,
generally dates to the 1940s when the SEC laid out regulations on financial
disclosure. But many companies have included net profit in one form or
another since the 1800s.
In its fourth annual report, General Electric Co.
provided investors with a consolidated balance sheet and consolidated
profit-and-loss account for the year ended Jan. 31, 1896. The company, whose
board at the time included Thomas Edison, generated "profit of the year" --
what today would be called net income or net profit -- of $1,388,967.46.
For the moment, net profit will probably exist in
some form, although its days are likely numbered. "We've decided in the
interim to keep a net-income subtotal, but that's all up for discussion,"
the FASB's Mr. Herz says.
Bob Jensen's summary of accounting theory is at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm
Underlying
Bases of Balance Sheet Valuation
Levels of "Value" of an Entire Company
General
Theory |
Days Inns of
America
(As Reported September 30, 1987) |
Market
Value of the Entire Block of Common Shares at Today's Price Per Share
(Ignoring Blockage Factors) |
Not
Available
Day Inns of America
Was Privately Owned |
Exit
Value of Firm if Sold As a Firm
(Includes synergy factors and unbooked intangibles) |
Not
Available for
Days Inns of America |
Sum of
Exit Values of Booked Assets Minus Liabilities & Pref. Stock
(includes unbooked and unrealized gains and
losses) |
$194,812,000
as Reported by Days Inns |
Book
Value of the Firm as Reported in Financial Statements |
$87,356,000
as Reported |
Book Value of the Firm as
Reported in the Financial Statements After General Price Level
Adjustments |
Not Available
for Days Inns |
Analysts often examine the market to book ratios which is the green value
above divided by the book value. Usually the book value is not adjusted
for general price levels in calculating this ratio, but there is not reason
why it could not be PLA book value. But the green value often widely
misses the mark in measuring the value of the firm as a whole (the blue value
above). The green value is based upon marginal trades of the day that do
not adjust for blockage factors (large purchases that give total ownership or
effective ownership control of the company). Usually it is impossible to
know whether the green value above is higher or lower than the blue
value. In addition to the blockage factor, there is the huge problem
that the stock market prices have transitory movements up and down due to
changing moods of speculators that create short-term bubbles and bursts.
Buyers and sellers of an entire firm are looking at the long term and
generally ignore transitory price fluctuations of daily trades of relatively
small numbers of shares. For example, daily transaction prices on
100,000 shares in a bubble or burst market are hardly indicative of the long
term value of 100 million shares of a corporation.
Beginning in 1979, FAS 33 required large
corporations to provide a supplementary schedule of condensed balance sheets
and income statements comparing annual outcomes under three valuation bases
--- Unadjusted Historical Cost, Price Level Adjusted (PLA) Historical Cost,
and Current Cost Entry Value (adjusted for depreciation and
amortization). Companies complained heavily that users did not obtain
value that justified the cost of implementing FAS 33. Analysts
complained that the FASB allowed such crude estimates that the FAS 33
schedules were virtually useless, especially the Current Cost estimates.
The FASB rescinded FAS 33 when it issued FAS 89 in 1986.
FAS 33 had a significant impact on some
companies. For example the the earnings reported by United States
Steel in the 1981 Annual Report as required under FAS 33 were as follows:
1981 United States Steel Income Before Extraordinary items and
Changes in Acctg. Principles
Historical Cost (Non-PLA
Adjusted) |
Historical Cost (PLA
Adjusted) |
Market Value (Current
Cost) |
$1,077,000,000
Income |
$475,300,000
Income
Plus $164,500,000 PLA gain due to decline in purchasing power of debt |
$446,400,000
Income
Plus $164,500,000 PLA Gain
Less $168,000,000 Current cost increase less effect of increase in the
general price level |
Companies are no longer required to generate
FAS 33-type comparisons. The primary basis of accounting in the U.S. is
unadjusted historical cost with numerous exceptions in particular
instances. For example, price-level adjustments may be required for for
operations in hyperinflation nations. Exit value accounting is required
for firms deemed highly likely to become non-going concerns. Exit value
accounting is required for personal financial statements (whether an
individual or a personal partnership such as two married people).
Economic (discounted cash flow) valuations are required for certain types of
assets and liabilities such as pension liabilities.
Hence in the United States and virtually every
other nation, accounting standards do not require or even allow one single
basis of accounting. Beginning in January 2005, all nations in the
Eurpean Union adopted the IASB's international standards that have moved
closer and closer each year to the FASB/SEC standards of the United States.
New Fair Value Accounting Standards
From IAS Plus on August 28, 2006 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
At its
meeting on 16 August 2006, the US Financial Accounting Standards
Board authorised its staff to prepare a final draft of a Statement
on Fair Value Measurements for vote by written ballot. The FASB
plans to issue the Statement in September 2006. That Statement will
form the basis of the next step of the IASB's project to develop
fair value measurement guidance. The IASB plans to issue a
discussion paper in the fourth quarter of 2006 that would: |
- indicate the IASB's
preliminary views of the provisions of the FASB's Statement on Fair
Value Measurements; and
- identify differences
between the FASB Statement and fair value measurement guidance in
existing IFRSs.
The IASB will invite
respondents to comment on the provisions of the FASB's statement on fair
value measurements and on the IASB's preliminary views about FASB's
Statement. Those comments would be considered in conjunction with the
development of an IASB exposure draft on fair value measurements.
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at various other links:
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms
Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation, and Yield Curves
for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial
Instruments ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm
I recently completed the first draft of a paper on fair value at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
Comments would be helpful.
One of the major problems of using financial
statements to value firms is that sometimes the unbooked assets and liabilities
are much larger than some or all of the booked items.
SEC Staff Report on Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements, Special Purpose
Entities, and Related Issues
From IAS Plus, February 16, 2006 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
The US Financial Accounting Standards Board has
submitted its response to the SEC Staff Report on Off-Balance Sheet
Arrangements, Special Purpose Entities, and Related Issues released by
the US Securities and Exchange Commission in June 2005. The SEC report was
prepared pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and was submitted to the
President and several Congressional committees. The SEC staff report
includes an analysis of the filings of issuers as well as an analysis of
pertinent US generally accepted accounting principles and Commission
disclosure rules. The report contains several recommendations for
potentially sweeping changes in current accounting and reporting
requirements for pensions, leases, financial instruments, and consolidation:
- Pensions: The staff recommends
the accounting guidance for defined-benefit pension plans and
other post-retirement benefit plans be reconsidered. The trusts
that administer these plans are currently exempt from
consolidation by the issuers that sponsor them, effectively
resulting in the netting of assets and liabilities in the
balance sheet. In addition, issuers have the option to delay
recognition of certain gains and losses related to the
retirement obligations and the assets used to fund these
obligations.
- Leases: The staff recommends
that the accounting guidance for leases be reconsidered. The
current accounting for leases takes an 'all or nothing' approach
to recognizing leases on the balance sheet. This results in a
clustering of lease arrangements such that their terms approach,
but do not cross, the 'bright lines' in the accounting guidance
that would require a liability to be recognized. As a
consequence, arrangements with similar economic outcomes are
accounted for very differently.
- Financial instruments: The
staff recommends the continued exploration of the feasibility of
reporting all financial instruments at fair value.
- Consolidation: The staff
recommends that the Financial Accounting Standards Board
continue its work on the accounting guidance that determines
whether an issuer would consolidate other entities – including
SPEs – in which the issuer has an ownership or other interest.
- Disclosures: The staff believes
that, in general, certain disclosures in the filings of issuers
could be better organized and integrated.
|
FASB's response discusses a number of
"fundamental structural, institutional, cultural, and behavioral forces"
that it believes cause complexity and impede transparent financial
reporting. FASB provides an update on its activities and projects intended
to address and improve outdated, overly complex accounting standards. These
areas include accounting for leases; accounting for pensions and other post
employment benefits; consolidation policies; accounting for financial
instruments; accounting for intangible assets; and conceptual and disclosure
frameworks. The FASB also identifies several other initiatives aimed at
improving the understandability, consistency, and overall usability of
existing accounting literature, through codification, by attempting to stem
the proliferation of new pronouncements emanating from multiple sources, and
by developing new standards in a 'principles-based' or 'objectives-oriented'
approach. Click to download:
"FASB Responds to SEC Study," AccountingWeb, February 21, 2006
---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=101801
AccountingWEB.com - Feb-21-2006 - The Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) last week responded to the Security and
Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) Off Balance Sheet Report by
identifying forces causing complexity and impeding financial
transparency, as well as providing an update on the FASB’s
activities intended to address complex accounting standards. The
FASB also reaffirmed its commitment to improving the transparency
and usefulness of financial reporting.
“The FASB
remains fiercely committed to protecting the interests of investors
and the capital markets by developing accounting standards that, if
faithfully followed, provided relevant, reliable and useful
financial information,” FASB Chariman Robert Herz said in a prepared
statement. “Along these lines, we remain concerned about the root
causes and the effects that complexity continues to have on our
financial reporting system and believe that concerted and
coordinated action by the SEC, the FASB, and the PCAOB, together
with other parties in the financial reporting system, is critical.”
The FASB
has named several areas as key for overcoming the challenges facing
the financial reporting system including: accounting for leases;
accounting for pensions and other post-employment benefits;
consolidation policies; accounting for financial instruments;
accounting for intangible assets; and conceptual and disclosure
frameworks. Several initiatives have been undertaken to help improve
understandability, consistency, and overall usability of existing
accounting literature, through codification and by attempting to
limit the proliferation of pronouncements from multiple sources and
by developing new standards using a principles-based or
objectives-oriented approach.
The FASB Response to SEC Study on
Arrangements with Off-Balance Sheet Implications, Special Purpose
Entities, and Transparency of Filings by Issuers provides
comments on issues and recommendations included in the Report and
Recommendations Pursuant to Section 401(c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 on Arrangements with Off-Balance Sheet Implications, Special
Purpose Entities, and Transparency of Filings by Issuers
submitted in June 2005 by the staff of the SEC to the President of
the United States, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs and the Committee of Financial Services of the U.S.
House of Representatives. |
Bob Jensen's threads on special purpose (variable interest) entities are
at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm
How a firm reports an asset or
liability in a balance sheet typically is rooted in one of the following
valuation concepts. GAAP in the United States is historical cost by default, but
there are countless instances where departures from historical cost are either
allowed or required under certain standards in certain circumstances.
The Cost Approach for Financial Reporting
From IASPlus on November 21, 2006 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
The International Valuation Standards Committee has
published
Proposed Revisions to International Valuation Guidance Note 8 – The Cost
Approach for Financial Reporting {PDF 193k).
The proposed revisions are the result of requests for clarification and
suggestions of minor improvements to the 2005 version of GN8. Comment
deadline is 31 December 2006. The
IVSC has also released an update of its work
programme:
Historical Cost Accounting: Unadjusted for
General Price-Level Changes
Advantages of Historical Cost
-
Survival Concept ---
Historical cost accounting has met the Darwin survival test for thousands of
years. One of the most noted books advocating historical cost is called
Introduction to Corporate Accounting Standards by William Paton and A.C.
Littleton (Sarasota: American Accounting Association, 1940). Probably no
single book has ever had so much influence or is more widely cited in
accounting literature than this thin book by Paton and Littleton.
Except in hyperinflation nations, unadjusted historical cost is still the
primary basis of accounting, although there are numerous exceptions for
certain types of assets and liabilities. Most notable among these exceptions
are financial instruments assets and liabilities where FAS 115 and FAS 133
spell out highly controversial exceptions.
-
The Matching Concept ---
costs of resources consumed in production should be matched against the
revenues of the products and services of the production function. (Assumes
costs attach throughout the production process in spite of complicating
factors such as joint costs, indirect costs, fungible resources acquired at
different costs, changing price-levels, basket purchases such as products
and their warranties, changing technologies, and other complications).
Profit is the "residuum (as efforts) and revenues (as accomplishments) for
individual enterprises." This difference (profit) reflects the effectiveness
of management. One overriding concept, however, is conservatism that Paton
and Littleton concede must be resorted to as a basis for writing inventories
down to market when historical cost exceeds market. This leads to a
violation of the matching concept, but it is necessary if investors will be
misled into thinking that inventories historical costs are surrogates for
value.
-
The Audit Trail ---
historical costs can be traced to real rather than hypothetical market
transactions. They leave an audit trail that can be followed by auditors.
-
Predictive Value ---
empirical studies post to reasonably good predictive value of past
historical cost earnings on future historical cost earnings. In some cases,
historical cost statements are better predictors of bankruptcy than current
cost statements.
- Accuracy --- Historical
cost measurement is more accurate and, relative to its alternatives, is more
uniform, consistent, and less prone to measurement error.
Nobody I know holds the mathematical wonderment of double entry and
historical cost accounting more in awe than Yuji Ijiri. For example, see
Theory of Accounting Measurement, by Yuji Ijiri (Sarasota: American
Accounting Association Studies in Accounting Research No. 10, 1975) ---
http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aaa/market/studar.htm
Disadvantages of Historical Cost
-
Does not eliminate or solve such
controversial issues as what to include/exclude from balance sheets and does
not overcome complex schemes for off-balance-sheet financing (OBSF). It is
too simplistic for complex contracting. For example, many derivative
financial instruments having current values of millions of dollars (e.g.,
forward contracts and swaps) have zero or negligible historical costs. For
example, a firm may have an interest rate swap obligating it to pay millions
of dollars even though the historical cost of that swap is zero. Investors
might be easily misled by having such huge liabilities remain unbooked.
Historical cost accounting has induced game playing when writing contracts
(leases, employee compensation, etc.) in order to avoid having to book what
are otherwise assets and liabilities under fair value reporting.
-
Historical cost mixes apples and oranges such
as LIFO inventory dipping that may match costs measured in 1950s purchasing
power with inflated dollars in the 21st Century that have much less
purchasing power. Historical cost income in periods of rising prices
overstates earnings and understates how a firm is maintaining its capital
assets. Even historical cost advocates admit that historical cost accounting
is useless in economies subject to hyperinflation.
-
Historical cost accrual accounting assumes a
going concern. Under current U.S. GAAP, historical cost is the basis of
accounting for going concerns. If the firm is not deemed a going concern,
the basis of accounting shifts to exit (liquidation) values. For many firms,
however, it is difficult and/or misleading to make a binary designation of
going versus non-going. Many firms fall into the gray area on a continuum.
Personal financial statements seldom meet the going concern test since they
are generally used in estate and divorce settlements. Hence, exit
(liquidation) value is required instead of historical cost for personal
financial statements.
- Historical cost is
perpetuated by a myth of objectivity when there are countless underlying
subjective estimates of asset economic life, allocation of joint costs,
allocation of indirect costs, bad debt reserves, warranty liabilities,
pension liabilities, etc.
Example 1: Accounting for a Website
August 7, 2006 message from Ganesh M.
Pandit, DBA, CPA, CMA
[profgmp@hotmail.com]
Hi Bob,
How would you answer this question from a
student: "I wonder if a company's Web site is considered a long-lived
asset!"
Ganesh M. Pandit
Adelphi University
August 9, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Ganesh,
Accounting for Website investment is
a classic example of the issue of "matching" versus "value" accounting. From
an income statement perspective, matching requires the matching of current
revenues with the expenses of generating that revenue, including the "using
up" of fixed asset investments. But we don't depreciate investment in the
site value of land because land site value, unlike a building, is not used
up due to usage in generating revenue. Like land site value, a Website's
"value" probably increases in value over time. One might argue that a
Website should not be expensed since a successful Website, like land, is not
used up when generating revenue. However, Websites do require maintenance
fees and improvement outlays over time which makes it somewhat different
than the site investment in land that requires no such added outlays other
than property taxes that are expensed each year.
I don't think current accounting
rules for Websites are appropriate in theory ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm#Issue08
It seems to me that you can partition
your Website development and improvement outlays into various types of
assets and expenses. For example, computers used in development and
maintenance of the Website are accounted for like other computers. Software
is accounted for under software amortization accounting rules. Purchased
goodwill is accounted for like purchased goodwill under new impairment test
rules. Labor costs for Website maintenance versus improvements are more
problematic.
Leased Website items are treated like
leases, although there are some complications if a Website is leased
entirely. For example, such a leased Website is not "used up" like airplanes
that are typically contracted as operating leases. Leased Website space may
be appropriately accounted for as an operating lease. But leasing an entire
Website is more like the capital lease of a land in that the asset does not
get "used up." My hunch is that most firms ignore this controversy and treat
Website leases as operating leases. It is pretty easy to bury custom
development costs into the "rental fee" for leased Website server space,
thereby burying the development costs and deferring them over the contracted
server space rental period. It would seem to me that rental fees for
Websites that are strictly used for advertising are written off as
advertising expenses. Of course many Websites are used for much more than
advertising.
Firms are taking rather rapid
write-offs of purchased Websites such as write-offs over three years. I'm
not certain I agree with this, but firms are "depreciating" these for tax
purposes and you can see them in filed SEC financial statements such as the
one at Briton International (under the Depreciation heading) ---
http://sec.edgar-online.com/2006/01/27/0001127855-06-000047/Section27.asp
It is more common in annual reports
to see the term Website Amortization instead of Website Depreciation. A few
sites amortize on the basis of Website traffic ---
http://www.nexusenergy.com/presentation6.aspx
This makes
no sense to me since traffic does not use up a Website over time.
Bob Jensen
October 5, 2006 reply from Scott Bonacker
[cpas-l@BONACKER.US]
I can't think of anyone that would be more
knowledgeable than David Hardesty, at
http://davidhardesty.com/
His book, published by CCH, is excellent.
Hope this helps ....
Scott Bonacker, CPA
Springfield, Missouri
Bob Jensen's threads on e-Commerce and
e-Business revenue accounting controversies are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm
Example 2 --- Proposition 87 VAT Tax
An interesting accounting problem (or employment
opportunity?) posed by
Proposition 87 on the State of California November 7 ballot in 2006
Proposition 87 would tax every barrel of oil pumped
from an in-state well . . .But just to make sure, the proposition would fund
investigations of oil companies that try to "pass on" the tax increase in the
price. Severin Borenstein, director of University of California Energy Institute
at UC Berkeley, points out that this would lead to "constant investigation that
will yield no more than what past investigations (on why gasoline prices spike)
have yielded, or even less." The oil tax revenues would go to fund "alternative
energy." That approach didn't work for former President Carter, is not working
for President Bush, and won't work in California. Government funding, by
definition, is not subject to a market test. "Alternate energy" will make sense
only when its cost is less than the cost of using oil. The market will handle
this problem as it did over a century ago by replacing the depleting whale-oil
supply with petroleum. Amazingly, over $40 million of the $45.6 million
contributed to the campaign for the tax comes from one man, Hollywood big shot
Stephen Bing.
David Henderson, "'Sinful and Tyrannical'," The Wall Street Journal,
October 14, 2006; Page A7 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116078251442292601.html?mod=todays_us_opinion
Jensen Comment
Proposition 87 is like (well not entirely) a VAT tax. Although I'm not against
value added taxes (VAT), VAT taxes have been fought tooth and nail in U.S.
politics (unlike in Europe). Apart from the VAT economic debates that are well
known, Proposition 87 raises interesting accounting issues because it in effect
introduces cost-plus pricing controls where fuel prices in California would now
be in a sense regulated by California officials. Fuel companies in essence must
justify prices with a full analysis of costs to verify that the $50 per barrel
tax is not being passed on at the pump. In contrast, most VAT taxes are
typically passed on to consumers in other nations (I think)
Proposition 87 runs four square into the enormous and famous
joint costing problem that has generally never been solved by accountants. Joint
costs are always allocated arbitrarily unless laws govern (arbitrarily) such
allocations. Given the complexity of oil refining joint costs, it would seem
that unscrupulous oil refiners could devise ways of burying this new tax (in
fuel prices) in such a manner that it is impossible for state auditors to
detect. In practice, I think it is absurd to think that any type of corporate
taxes cannot be factored into product and service prices unless prices
themselves are to be regulated by the state. Price regulations themselves
generally become either a joke (if industry controls the regulators) or a
disaster (if regulators as central planners ignore the laws of supply and
demand).
Presumably California will not object to this Proposition 87 VAT
tax being passed along to out-of-state customers of oil refiners. It would be
difficult to pass along the tax if out-of-state customers had open access to
world markets. However, some Nevada and Oregon fueling stations may not have any
efficient source, at least in the short-run, of 92-octane gasoline other than
from California refiners.
Proposition 87 might then be viewed as a tax on surrounding
states if 100% of the Proposition 87 VAT tax can be passed on to states
surrounding California. Sounds like a good deal for California if those other
states are willing to be taxed for California schools. Nevada may in fact punch
a whole in the new immigration wall large enough for a gasoline pipe into
Mexico.
In any case, Proposition 87 might be
better termed California's Cost Accountant Employment Relief Act.
It would seem to be a whole lot easier to simply raise the corporate income tax,
which of course is what California voters are being asked to do in another
proposition, Proposition 89. It is totally naive to think that business taxes of
any kind will not be passed along to customers in one way or another. You can
fool some of the people some of the time, but not all the people all of the time
(didn't someone else think of that line first?).
As an aside, there is also Proposition 88 that will impose a $50
flat tax on every parcel of land, which of course is a tax that will be easily
raised in future years. This in reality is a state-wide property tax that will
grow and grow in spite of an older Proposition 13 assurance that property taxes
cannot grow and grow for long-time home owners. What happens in California when
new ballot propositions clash with older ballot propositions already voted in by
the public?
Historical Cost Accounting: Price-Level
Adjusted (PLA) Historical Cost Accounting
The primary basis of accounting in the U.S. is unadjusted historical cost
with numerous exceptions in particular instances. For example, price-level
adjustments may be required for operations in hyperinflation nations. The
international IASB standards require PLA accounting in hyperinflation nations.
The SEC issued ASR 190 requiring PLA supplemental reports. This was followed
by the FASB's 1979 FAS 33 short-lived standard. Follow-up studies did not point
to investor enthusiasm over such supplemental reports. Eventually, both ASR 190
and FAS 33 were rescinded, largely from lack of interest on the part of
financial analysts and investors due to relatively low inflation rates in the
United States. However, PLA adjustments are still required for operations in
nations subject to high rates of inflation.
Advantages of PLA Accounting
-
Attempts to perfect historical cost
accounting by converting costs to a common purchasing power unit of
measurement.
-
Has a dramatic impact upon ROI calculations
in many industries even in times of very low inflation.
-
Is essential in periods of hyperinflation.
- Uses a readily
available and reasonably accurate government-generated consumer price index
(usually the CPI for urban households).
Disadvantages of PLA Accounting
-
There is not general agreement regarding what
is the best inflation index to use in the PLA adjustment process. Computing
a price index for such purposes is greatly complicated by constantly
changing technologies, consumer preferences, etc.
-
There is no common index across nations, and
nations differ greatly with respect to the effort made to derive price
indices.
- Empirical studies in
the U.S. have not shown PLA accounting data to have better predictive powers
than historical cost data not adjusted for inflation.
Market Value Accounting:
Entry Value (Current Cost, Replacement Cost)
Accounting
Beginning in 1979, FAS 33 required large corporations to provide a
supplementary schedule of condensed balance sheets and income statements
comparing annual outcomes under three valuation bases --- Unadjusted Historical
Cost, Price Level Adjusted (PLA) Historical Cost, and Current Cost Entry Value
(adjusted for depreciation and amortization). Companies complained heavily that
users did not obtain value that justified the cost of implementing FAS 33.
Analysts complained that the FASB allowed such crude estimates that the FAS 33
schedules were virtually useless, especially the Current Cost estimates. The
FASB rescinded FAS 33 when it issued FAS 89 in 1986.
Current cost accounting by whatever name (e.g., current or replacement cost)
entails the historical cost of balance sheet items with current (replacement)
costs. Depreciation rates can be re-set based upon current costs rather than
historical costs.
Beginning in 1979, FAS 33 required large corporations to provide a
supplementary schedule of condensed balance sheets and income statements
comparing annual outcomes under three valuation bases --- Unadjusted Historical
Cost, PLA-Adjusted historical cost, and Current Cost Entry Value (adjusted for
depreciation and amortization). Companies are no longer required to generate FAS
33-type comparisons. The primary basis of accounting in the U.S. is unadjusted
historical cost with numerous exceptions in particular instances. For example,
price-level adjustments may be required for operations in hyperinflation
nations. Exit value accounting is required for firms deemed highly likely to
become non-going concerns. Exit value accounting is required for personal
financial statements (whether an individual or a personal partnership such as
two married people). Economic (discounted cash flow) valuations are required for
certain types of assets and liabilities such as pension liabilities. Hence in
the United States and virtually every other nation, accounting standards do not
require or even allow one single basis of accounting. Beginning in January 2005,
all nations in the Eurpean Union adopted the IASB's international standards that
have moved closer and closer each year to the FASB/SEC standards of the United
States.
Advantages of Entry Value (Current Cost, Replacement Cost) Accounting
- Conforms to capital
maintenance theory that argues in favor of matching current revenues with
what the current costs are of generating those revenues. For example, if
historical cost depreciation is $100 and current cost depreciation is $120,
current cost theory argues that an excess of $20 may be wrongly classified
as profit and distributed as a dividend. When it comes time to replace the
asset, the firm may have mistakenly eaten its seed corn.
- If the accurate
replacement cost is known and can be matched with current selling prices,
the problems of finding indices for price level adjustments are avoided.
Disadvantages of Entry Value (Current Cost,
Replacement Cost) Accounting
-
Discovery of accurate replacement costs is
virtually impossible in times of changing technologies and newer production
alternatives. For example, some companies are using data processing
hardware and software that no longer can be purchased or would never be
purchased even if it was available due to changes in technology. Some
companies are using buildings that may not be necessary as production
becomes more outsourced and sales move to the Internet. It is possible to
replace used assets with used assets rather than new assets. Must current
costs rely only upon prices of new assets?
-
Discovering current costs is prohibitively
costly if firms have to repeatedly find current replacement prices on
thousands or millions of items.
-
Accurate derivation of replacement cost is
very difficult for items having high variations in quality. For example,
some ten-year old trucks have much higher used prices than other used trucks
of the same type and vintage. Comparisons with new trucks is very difficult
since new trucks have new features, different expected economic lives,
warranties, financing options, and other differences that make comparisons
extremely complex and tedious. In many cases, items are bought in basket
purchases that cover warranties, insurance, buy-back options, maintenance
agreements, etc. Allocating the "cost" to particular components may be quite
arbitrary.
-
Use of "sector" price indices as surrogates
compounds the price-index problem of general price-level adjustments. For
example, if a "transportation" price index is used to estimate replacement
cost, what constitutes a "transportation" price index? Are such indices
available and are they meaningful for the purpose at hand? When FAS 33 was
rescinded in 1986, one of the major reasons was the cost and confusion of
using sector indices as surrogates for actual replacement costs.
- Current costs tend to
give rise to recognition of holding gains and losses not yet realized.
Market Value Accounting: Exit Value
(Liquidation, Fair Value) Accounting
Whereas entry value is what it will cost to replace an item, exit value is
the value of disposing of the item. It can even be negative in some instances
where costs of clean up and disposal make to exit price negative. Exit value accounting is required under GAAP for personal financial
statements (individuals and married couples) and companies that are deemed
likely to become non-going concerns. See "Personal Financial Statements," by
Anthony Mancuso, The CPA Journal, September 1992 ---
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/old/13606731.htm
Some theorists advocate exit value accounting for going concerns as well as
non-going concerns. Both nationally (particularly under FAS 115 and FAS 133) and
internationally (under IAS 32 and 39 for), exit value accounting is presently
required in some instances for financial instrument
assets and liabilities. Both the FASB and the IASB have exposure drafts
advocating fair value accounting for all financial instruments.
FASB's Exposure
Draft for Fair Value Adjustments to all Financial Instruments
On December 14, 1999 the FASB issued Exposure Draft 204-B entitled
Reporting Financial Instruments and Certain Related Assets and
Liabilities at Fair Value.
If an item is viewed as a
financial instrument rather than inventory, the accounting becomes
more complicated under FAS 115. Traders in financial instruments
adjust such instruments to fair value with all changes in value
passing through current earnings. Business firms who are not deemed
to be traders must designate the instrument as either
available-for-sale (AFS) or hold-to-maturity (HTM). A HTM instrument
is maintained at original cost. An AFS financial instrument must be
marked-to-market, but the changes in value pass through OCI rather
than current earnings until the instrument is actually sold or
otherwise expires. Under international standards, the IASB requires
fair value adjustments for most financial instruments. This has led
to strong reaction from businesses around the world, especially
banks. There are now two major working group debates. In 1999 the
Joint Working Group of the Banking Associations sharply rebuffed the
IAS 39 fair value accounting in two white papers that can be
downloaded from
http://www.iasc.org.uk/frame/cen3_112.htm.
·
Financial
Instruments: Issues Relating to Banks
(strongly argues for required fair value adjustments of financial
instruments). The issue date is August 31, 1999.
·
Accounting for
financial Instruments for Banks
(concludes that a modified form of
historical cost is optimal for bank accounting). The issue date is
October 4, 1999. |
Advantages of Exit Value (Liquidation, Fair Value) Accounting
-
In the case of financial assets and
liabilities, historical costs may be meaningless relative to current exit
values. For example, a forward contract or swap generally has zero
historical cost but may be valued at millions at the current time. Failure
to require fair value accounting provides all sorts of misleading earnings
management opportunities to firms. The above references provide strong
arguments in favor of fair value accounting.
-
Exit value does not require arbitrary cost
allocation decisions such as whether to use FIFO or LIFO or what
depreciation rate is best for allocating cost over time.
- In many instances exit
value accounting is easier to compute than entry values. For example, it is
easier to estimate what an old computer will bring in the used computer
market than to estimate what is the cost of "equivalent" computing power is
in the new computer market.
Exit value reporting is not deemed
desirable or practical for going concern businesses for a number of reasons that
I will not go into in great depth here.
Disadvantages of Exit Value (Liquidation, Fair
Value) Accounting
· Operating
assets are bought to use rather than sell. For example, as long as no
consideration is being given to selling or abandoning a manufacturing plant,
recording the fluctuating values of the land and buildings creates a misleading
fluctuation in earnings and balance sheet volatility. Who cares if the value of
the land went up by $1 million in 1994 and down by $2 million in 1998 if the
plant that sits on the land has been in operation for 60 years and no
consideration is being given to leaving this plant?
· Some assets like
software, knowledge databases, and Web servers for e-Commerce cost millions of
dollars to develop for the benefit of future revenue growth and future expense
savings. These assets may have immense value if the entire firm is sold, but
they may have no market as unbundled assets. In fact it may be impossible to
unbundle such assets from the firm as a whole. Examples include the Enterprise
Planning Model SAP system in firms such as Union Carbide. These systems costing
millions of dollars have no exit value in the context of exit value accounting
even though they are designed to benefit the companies for many years into the
future.
· Exit value
accounting records anticipated profits well in advance of transactions. For
example, a large home building company with 200 completed houses in inventory
would record the profits of these homes long before the company even had any
buyers for those homes. Even though exit value accounting is billed as a
conservative approach, there are instances where it is far from conservative.
· Value of a
subsystem of items differs from the sum of the value of its parts. Investors may
be lulled into thinking that the sum of all subsystem net assets valued at
liquidation prices is the value of the system of these net assets. Values may
differ depending upon how the subsystems are diced and sliced in a sale.
· Appraisals of
exit values are both to expensive to obtain for each accounting report date and
are highly subjective and subject to enormous variations of opinion. The U.S.
Savings and Loan scandals of the 1980s demonstrated how reliance upon appraisals
is an invitation for massive frauds. Experiments by some, mostly real estate
companies, to use exit value-based accounting died on the vine, including
well-known attempts decades ago by TRC, Rouse, and Days Inn.
· Exit values are
affected by how something is sold. If quick cash is needed, the best price may
only be half of what the price can be by waiting for the right time and the
right buyer.
· Financial
contracts that for one reason or another are deemed as to be "held-to-maturity"
items may cause misleading increases and decreases in reported values that will
never be realized. A good example is the market value of a fixed-rate bond that
may go up and down with interest rates but will always pay its face value at
maturity no matter what happens to interest rates.
·
Exit value markets are often thin
and inefficient markets.
Economic Value (Discounted Cash Flow, Present
Value) Accounting
There are over 100 instances where present GAAP requires that historical cost
accounting be abandoned in favor of discounted cash flow accounting (e.g., when
valuing pension liabilities and computing fair values of derivative financial
instruments). These apply in situations where future cash inflows and outflows
can be reliably estimated and are attributable to the particular asset or
liability being valued on a discounted cash flow basis.
Advantages of Economic Value (Discounted Cash Flow, Present Value) Accounting
-
Economic value is based upon management's
intended use for the item in question rather than upon some other use such
as disposal (Exit Value) or replacement (Entry Value).
- Economic value conforms
to the economic theory of the firm.
- Real options valuation models in place of present
value models under uncertainty ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/realopt.htm
Disadvantages of Economic Value (Discounted Cash Flow, Present Value)
Accounting
-
How does one allocate a portion of the cash
flows of General Motors to a single welding machine in Tennessee? Or how
does one allocate the portion of the sales price of a single car to the
robot that welded a single hinge on one of the doors? How does one allocate
the price of a bond to the basic obligation, the attached warrants, the call
option in the fine print, and other possible embedded derivatives in the
contract? The problem lies in the arbitrary nature of deciding what system
of assets and liabilities to value as a system rather than individual
components. Then what happens when the system is changed in some way? In
order to see how complex this can become, note the complicated valuation
assumptions in a paper entitled "Implementation of an Option Pricing-Based
Bond Valuation Model for Corporate Debt and Its Components," by M.E. Barth,
W.R. Landsman, and R.J. Rendleman, Jr., Accounting Horizons, December
2000, pp. 455-480.
-
Cash flows are virtually impossible to
estimate except when they are contractually specified. How can Amazon.com
accurately estimate the millions and millions of dollars it has invested in
online software?
-
Even when cash flows can be reliably
estimated, there are endless disputes regarding the appropriate discount
rates.
- Endless disputes arise
as to assumptions underlying economic valuations.
Theory
Disputes Focus Mainly on the Tip of the Iceberg
(Intangibles and Other Assets and Liabilities Beneath the Surface)
What is important to ship navigators is the giant mass that lies below the
icebergs. If we make an analogy that the financial statements contain only what
appears above the surface, over 99% of the accounting theory disputes have centered on the
top of the icebergs. We endlessly debate how to value what is seen above the surface
and provide investors virtually nothing about the really big stuff beneath the surface.
For example, what difference does it make how Microsoft Corporation values its tangible
assets if 98% of its value lies in intangible assets such as intellectual property, human
resources, market share, and other items of value that accountants do not know how to
value? One can argue that the difference between the capitalized value of
Microsoft's outstanding shares and the reported value of Shareholders' Equity is mostly
due to intangibles that accountants have no idea how to detect and value. If the
goal of accounting is to help investors value a company, it is backwards to value
intangibles from market prices. Our job is to help investors set those prices.
Question
Accountants talk a lot about "intangibles" and accountant inability to usefully
measure intangibles of companies. Economists also talk about intangibles and
economist inability build successful models incorporating intangibles and
externalities that give rise to troublesome omitted variables and
non-convexities in mathematical optimization.
What is the World Bank's definition that gives rise to a claim that "the
average American has access to over $418,000 in intangible wealth, while the
stay-at-home Mexican's intangible wealth is just $34,000?"
"The Secrets of Intangible Wealth: For once the World Bank says
something smart about the real causes of prosperity," by Ronald Bailey,
Reason Magazine, October 5, 2007 ---
http://www.reason.com/news/show/122854.html
A Mexican migrant to the U.S. is five times more
productive than one who stays home. Why is that?
The answer is not the obvious one: This country has more machinery or tools
or natural resources. Instead, according to some remarkable but largely
ignored research—by the World Bank, of all places—it is because the average
American has access to over $418,000 in intangible wealth, while the
stay-at-home Mexican's intangible wealth is just $34,000.
But what is intangible wealth, and how on earth is it measured? And what
does it mean for the world's people—poor and rich? That's where the story
gets even more interesting.
Two years ago the World Bank's environmental economics department set out to
assess the relative contributions of various kinds of capital to economic
development. Its study, "Where is the Wealth of Nations?: Measuring Capital
for the 21st Century," began by defining natural capital as the sum of
nonrenewable resources (including oil, natural gas, coal and mineral
resources), cropland, pasture land, forested areas and protected areas.
Produced, or built, capital is what many of us think of when we think of
capital: the sum of machinery, equipment, and structures (including
infrastructure) and urban land.
But once the value of all these are added up, the economists found something
big was still missing: the vast majority of world's wealth! If one simply
adds up the current value of a country's natural resources and produced, or
built, capital, there's no way that can account for that country's level of
income.
The rest is the result of "intangible" factors—such as the trust among
people in a society, an efficient judicial system, clear property rights and
effective government. All this intangible capital also boosts the
productivity of labor and results in higher total wealth. In fact,
the World Bank finds, "Human capital and the value of institutions (as
measured by rule of law) constitute the largest share of wealth in virtually
all countries."
Once one takes into account all of the world's natural resources and
produced capital, 80% of the wealth of rich countries and 60% of the wealth
of poor countries is of this intangible type. The bottom line: "Rich
countries are largely rich because of the skills of their populations and
the quality of the institutions supporting economic activity."
What the World Bank economists have brilliantly done is quantify the
intangible value of education and social institutions. According to their
regression analyses, for example, the rule of law explains 57 percent of
countries' intangible capital. Education accounts for 36 percent.
The rule-of-law index was devised using several hundred individual variables
measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 25 separate data sources
constructed by 18 different organizations. The latter include civil society
groups (Freedom House), political and business risk-rating agencies
(Economist Intelligence Unit) and think tanks (International Budget Project
Open Budget Index).
Switzerland scores 99.5 out of 100 on the rule-of-law index and the U.S.
hits 91.8. By contrast, Nigeria's score is a pitiful 5.8; Burundi's 4.3; and
Ethiopia's 16.4. The members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development—30 wealthy developed countries—have an average score of 90,
while sub-Saharan Africa's is a dismal 28.
The natural wealth in rich countries like the U.S. is a tiny proportion of
their overall wealth—typically 1 percent to 3 percent—yet they derive more
value from what they have. Cropland, pastures and forests are more valuable
in rich countries because they can be combined with other capital like
machinery and strong property rights to produce more value. Machinery,
buildings, roads and so forth account for 17% of the rich countries' total
wealth.
Overall, the average per capita wealth in the rich Organization for Economic
Cooperation Development (OECD) countries is $440,000, consisting of $10,000
in natural capital, $76,000 in produced capital, and a whopping $354,000 in
intangible capital. (Switzerland has the highest per capita wealth, at
$648,000. The U.S. is fourth at $513,000.)
By comparison, the World Bank study finds that total wealth for the low
income countries averages $7,216 per person. That consists of $2,075 in
natural capital, $1,150 in produced capital and $3,991 in intangible
capital. The countries with the lowest per capita wealth are Ethiopia
($1,965), Nigeria ($2,748), and Burundi ($2,859).
In fact, some countries are so badly run, that they actually have negative
intangible capital. Through rampant corruption and failing school systems,
Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are destroying their
intangible capital and ensuring that their people will be poorer in the
future.
In the U.S., according to the World Bank study, natural capital is $15,000
per person, produced capital is $80,000 and intangible capital is $418,000.
And thus, considering common measure used to compare countries, its annual
purchasing power parity GDP per capita is $43,800. By contrast, oil-rich
Mexico's total natural capital per person is $8,500 ($6,000 due to oil),
produced capital is $19,000 and intangible capita is $34,500—a total of
$62,000 per person. Yet its GDP per capita is $10,700. When a Mexican, or
for that matter, a South Asian or African, walks across our border, they
gain immediate access to intangible capital worth $418,000 per person. Who
wouldn't walk across the border in such circumstances?
The World Bank study bolsters the deep insights of the late development
economist Peter Bauer. In his brilliant 1972 book Dissent on
Development, Bauer wrote: "If all conditions for development other than
capital are present, capital will soon be generated locally or will be
available . . . from abroad. . . . If, however, the conditions for
development are not present, then aid . . . will be necessarily unproductive
and therefore ineffective. Thus, if the mainsprings of development are
present, material progress will occur even without foreign aid. If they are
absent, it will not occur even with aid."
The World Bank's pathbreaking "Where is the Wealth of Nations?" convincingly
demonstrates that the "mainsprings of development" are the rule of law and a
good school system. The big question that its researchers don't answer is:
How can the people of the developing world rid themselves of the kleptocrats
who loot their countries and keep them poor?
Ronald Bailey is Reason's science correspondent. His most recent book,
Liberation Biology: The Scientific and Moral Case for the Biotech Revolution,
is available from Prometheus Books.
Bob Jensen's threads on intangibles from the standpoint of accounting theory
and practice are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes
Intangibles ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intangibles
Externalities ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Externalities
Trivia Question
The fact that open source and free Office Software is getting closer and closer
to quality of MS Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, etc.) software is still not
really threatening Microsoft's worldwide monopoly for its relatively expensive
MS Office software. What is the main intangible that gives MS Office products
such value in world markets?
Jensen's Opinion
I think the main intangible here is the cost of retraining over 90% of the
computer users of the world. Related to this is the difficulty students and
"white-collar workers" will encounter if they do not know how to use MS Office
software when seeking employment. Whereas most of drivers can drive rental cars
of most any manufacturer, computer users who cannot "drive" Excel, Word,
PowerPoint, etc. face tremendous barriers that give rise to the main intangible
asset of Microsoft Corporation. Organizations spent billions in training that
gave rise to billions in intangible assets of Microsoft.
A Sad Time for Corporate Reputations
"Question for Corporate
America: Does Your Reputation Fall into the Liabilities Column on Your Balance
Sheet?" PR Web, June 19, 2006 ---
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2006/6/prweb399939.htm
In a survey conducted among 2,000 participants at
the 2004 Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum, more CEOs said that
corporate reputation, not profitability, was their most important measure of
success. Fortune Magazine calculates that a one-point change on its scale
used to rank its most admired companies translates to a difference of $107
million to a company’s market value.
Lord Levene, Chairman of Lloyd’s of London,
reported in a 2005 speech at the Philadelphia Club that loss of reputation
is now viewed as the second most serious threat to an organization’s
viability. (Business interruption is the first.)An Economist Intelligence
Unit survey ranked reputational risk as the greatest potential threat to an
organization's value. More than 30% of participating CEOs said that
reputational risk represents the greatest potential threat to their
company's market value. Of this same group of CEOs only 11% said that they
had taken any action against the threat.
If these data are not sufficient to jolt companies
into action, there is enough compelling data linking corporate reputation to
corporate performance that should. Fortune Magazine, which has been
publishing the results of its "America’s Most Admired Companies" survey for
20 years, calculates that a change of 1 point on its scale, either
positively or negatively, affects a company's market value by an average of
$107 million. The results of another study published in 2003 in Management
Today, Britain's leading monthly business magazine, demonstrate a clear
correlation between corporate reputation and equity return. Using existing
data from Fortune’s surveys to construct portfolios of the most and least
admired companies, the authors found that for the five years following
Fortune’s publication of the results, the portfolios of the most admired
companies had cumulative returns of 126% while those of the least admired
had cumulative returns of 80%.
"While executives may choose to spend time
analyzing these data and poking holes in research methodologies in order to
dismiss reputation as a strategic priority," says Wallace, "the effort would
simply provide another diversion from addressing the problem head-on. The
fact that corporate America's sullied reputation has lead to such dramatic
legislative change in the form of the Sarbannes-Oxley Act, and that it has
become routine front-page news, is as telling as any data. No company wants
bad press, but it may finally be what convinces American business that, left
unmanaged, a company’s reputation can become a terminal liability."
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on proposed reforms are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudProposedReforms.htm
Say what?
Why bother entering into contracts that are not enforceable?
Do unenforceable contracts create emerging problems in accounting theory and in
practice?
"The Best Way to Construct Unenforceable Contracts," by Erica Plambeck,
Stanford Graduate School of Business Newsletter, April 2007 ---
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/mfg_plambeck_contracts.shtml
Strong relationships are frequently more important
than legally binding contracts when companies outsource key operational
activities.
Researchers say that as more firms form
international relationships—particularly in innovation-intensive industries
such as biopharmaceuticals or high tech—ironclad legal agreements can be
impractical, if not impossible. Overburdened court systems around the world
and the growing complexity of the types of collaborative deals being forged
mean that increasingly firms rely on the threat of loss of future business
rather than the court system to enforce those deals.
“When an innovative product is under development
and a supplier must invest in capacity up front, it can be difficult—if not
impossible—to write a court-enforceable contract that specifies exactly what
will be delivered,” says Erica Plambeck, associate professor of operations,
information, and technology at the Stanford Graduate School of Business.
For example, she says, electronics giant Toshiba is
continually making design changes, frequently substantial ones, throughout
the development process. If Toshiba’s suppliers delayed making capacity
investment for manufacturing a new product until the design was finalized
and a court-enforceable procurement contract could be negotiated, Toshiba
would miss the small windows of opportunity that the consumer electronics
market allows for releasing state-of-the-art products. Therefore, Toshiba
needs suppliers to build capacity early, without a contract. In a one-off
transaction, a supplier would be likely to build far too little capacity,
anticipating that Toshiba would attempt to negotiate a low price for
production once the capacity investment was made. But within the context of
an ongoing, cooperative relationship, Toshiba could offer more generous
compensation, and convince the supplier to expand its capacity—and both
firms’ profits—even without a contract.
Alternatively, she says, there are cases where
assurances about the quality or quantity of output cannot be legally
enforceable. “Frequently, producing a viable product depends on the
collaborative efforts of both parties, and it’s difficult to determine fault
if something goes wrong,” she says. A case in point: A biopharmaceutical
firm could hand over genetically modified cells and the liquid medium in
which to multiply them to a supplier, who then would be responsible for
managing that fermentation process to produce a therapeutic protein. If the
protein yield is unexpectedly low, a court would have difficulty determining
whether the cells and medium were of poor quality or the supplier made
mistakes in managing the fermentation process.
“This kind of complicated business arrangement can
be difficult to specify in a contract in a manner that a court could
enforce,” says Plambeck. “Under such conditions, an ongoing relationship
between partners is critical to cooperation.”
Plambeck has written a series of papers on
so-called relational contracts—agreements enforced by the value of the
ongoing cooperative relationship—research she has conducted with Terry
Taylor, an associate professor in the business school at Columbia
University. Plambeck became interested in relational contracts after
realizing that there was an almost universal assumption in the operations
and supply chain management literature that all contracts were
court-enforced.
“By recognizing that the strength of incentives for
investment in design, capacity, and inventory are limited by the value of
the future business, one obtains qualitatively different managerial insights
and policies for operations and supply chain management,” she says. There is
a rich body of economics research in this area—indeed, it was a Stanford
economics professor, Robert Gibbons (now at MIT) who coined the phrase
“relational contracts.” Plambeck and Taylor build on this existing work by
taking the abstract idea of relational contracts and applying it to dynamic
problems of collaborative product development, capacity, production, and
inventory management.
Plambeck has some high-level recommendations for
managers.
Continued in article
Accounting Theory: The Vexing Problem of
Contingent Liabilities and Environmental Risk
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review
on November 2, 2007
BP Settles Charges, Submits to Watchdogs
by Ann
Davis, Amir Efrati, Matthew Dalton and Guy Chazan
The Wall Street Journal
Oct 26, 2007
Page: A3
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119332810057671536.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
TOPICS: Advanced
Financial Accounting, Contingent Liabilities, Environmental
Cleanup Costs
SUMMARY: "[British
Petroleum] BP PLC put a host of legal threats behind it with
far-reaching federal settlements yesterday [10/24/2007] and
$373 million in fines and restitution...The British energy
firm agreed to plead guilty to environmental crimes and
agreed to a three-year probation connected to a fatal
accident in Texas and an oil spill in Alaska." The article
describes the expected impact on BP PLC's operations; the
questions in this review focus on the company's Form 20-F
contingent liability disclosures, including environmental
and other contingent liabilities.
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: Environmental liabilities and other
contingencies are discussed in this article.
QUESTIONS:
1.) The article states that BP PLC (British Petroleum) "put
a host of legal threats behind it" through a settlement with
U.S. government authorities and fines. Summarize the legal
issues facing the company and the settlement that was
reached.
2.) In general, where can you find information about the
likely financial impact of legal and environmental issues
facing any company? Describe the authoritative literature
requiring disclosure of this information.
3.) BP PLC uses the term "provisions" in their corporate
balance sheet, rather than "contingent liabilities." What is
the meaning of the term "provisions"?
4.) Specifically investigate the extent of the legal and
environmental issues facing BP PLC by examining their annual
report filed on Form 20-F with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, available at:
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/313807/000115697307000346/b848881-20f.htm#p85
How extensive are the liabilities associated with these
issues, as measured on December 31, 2006?
5.) Examine footnote 40 to further investigate these
liabilities. What are the 3 major categories of provisions
for estimated liabilities recorded by BP PLC? How do they
estimate the amounts recorded for these liabilities?
6.) Which category of provisions do you think will be
impacted by the settlement, based on the disclosures in the
December 31, 2006, year end financial statements and the
description of the settlement in the article?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
|
FINANCIAL REPORTING: MORE SCIENCE, LESS ART
Governments and investors alike now demand more
financial transparency from public companies. And, given the impressive
evolution of technology and business practices, there is no excuse for reporting
that is anything but spot-on. Intangible factors that are not taken into account
when following U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (G.A.A.P.) -- such
as brand value, intellectual capital, growth expectations and forecasts, and
corporate citizenship -- are now being recognized as important drivers of
shareholder value. A new white paper from Accenture explores "Enhanced Business
Reporting" as a means for businesses to gain and communicate a clearer picture
of company goals and performance.
Frank D'Andrea, "FINANCIAL REPORTING: MORE SCIENCE, LESS ART," Double Entries,
September 21, 2005 ---
http://accountingeducation.com/news/news6481.html
The Accenture report is at
http://www.accenture.com/xdoc/en/ideas/outlook/6_2005/pdf/share_value.pdf
Gore and Blood
We see a lot of snide remarks and jokes about Al Gore the conservative media,
and he (like his counterpart George W. Bush) has made some rather dumb remarks
in highly boring speeches. But when teamed up with the former head of Goldman
Sachs Asset Management, Gore and Blood (not the best of last name combinations)
produced a rather good, albeit short, article about some severe accounting
limitations.
I commend The Wall Street Journal for carrying this
piece which I would normally expect to appear in the more liberal media.
"For People and Planet: When will companies start
accounting for environmental costs?" by Al gore and David Blood, The Wall
Street Journal, March 28, 2006 ---
http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110008151
Capitalism and sustainability are deeply and
increasingly interrelated. After all, our economic activity is based on the
use of natural and human resources. Not until we more broadly "price in" the
external costs of investment decisions across all sectors will we have a
sustainable economy and society.
The industrial revolution brought enormous
prosperity, but it also introduced unsustainable business practices. Our
current system for accounting was principally established in the 1930s by
Lord Keynes and the creation of "national accounts" (the backbone of today's
gross domestic product). While this system was precise in its ability to
account for capital goods, it was imprecise in its ability to account for
natural and human resources because it assumed them to be limitless. This,
in part, explains why our current model of economic development is
hard-wired to externalize as many costs as possible.
Externalities are costs created by industry but
paid for by society. For example, pollution is an externality which is
sometimes taxed by government in order to make the entity responsible
"internalize" the full costs of production. Over the past century, companies
have been rewarded financially for maximizing externalities in order to
minimize costs.
Today, the global context for business is clearly
changing. "Capitalism is at a crossroads," says Stuart Hart, professor of
management at Cornell University. We agree, and we think the financial
markets have a significant opportunity to chart the way forward. In fact, we
believe that sustainable development will be the primary driver of
industrial and economic change over the next 50 years. The interests of
shareholders, over time, will be best served by companies that maximize
their financial performance by strategically managing their economic,
social, environmental and ethical performance. This is increasingly true as
we confront the limits of our ecological system to hold up under current
patterns of use. "License to operate" can no longer be taken for granted by
business as challenges such as climate change, HIV/AIDS, water scarcity and
poverty have reached a point where civil society is demanding a response
from business and government. The "polluter pays" principle is just one
example of how companies can be held accountable for the full costs of doing
business. Now, more than ever, factors beyond the scope of Keynes's national
accounts are directly affecting a company's ability to generate revenues,
manage risks, and sustain competitive advantage. There are many examples of
the growing acceptance of this view.
In the corporate sector, companies like General
Electric are designing products to enable their clients to compete in a
carbon-constrained world. Novo Nordisk is taking a holistic view of
combating diabetes not only through treatment but also through prevention.
And Whole Foods and others are addressing the demand for quality food by
sourcing local and organic produce. Importantly, the business response is
about making money for shareholders, not altruism.
In the nongovernmental sector, organizations such
as World Resources Institute, Transparency International, the Coalition for
Environmentally Responsible Economies (Ceres) and AccountAbility are helping
companies explore how best to align corporate responsibility with business
strategy.
Over the past five years we have seen markets begin
to incorporate the external cost of carbon dioxide emissions. This is
happening through pricing mechanisms (price per ton of carbon dioxide) and
government-supported trading platforms such as the European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme in Europe. Even without a regulatory framework in the U.S.,
voluntary markets are emerging, such as the Chicago Climate Exchange and
state-level initiatives such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.
These market mechanisms increasingly enable companies to calculate project
returns and capital expenditures decisions with the price of carbon dioxide
fully integrated.
The investment community has also started to
respond. For example, the Enhanced Analytics Initiative, an international
collaboration between asset owners and managers, encourages investment
research that considers the impact of extrafinancial issues on long-term
company performance. The Equator Principles, designed to help financial
institutions manage environmental and social risk in project financing, have
now been adopted by 40 banks, which arrange over 75% of the world's project
loans. In addition, the rise in shareholder activism and the growing debate
on fiduciary responsibility, governance legislation and reporting
requirements (such as the Global Reporting Initiative and the EU Business
Review) indicate the mainstream incorporation of sustainability concerns.
While we are seeing evidence of leading public companies adopting
sustainable business practices in developed markets, there is still a long
way to go to make sustainability fully integrated and therefore truly
mainstream. A short-term focus still pervades both corporate and investment
communities, which hinders long-term value creation.
As some have said, "We are operating the Earth like
it's a business in liquidation." More mechanisms to incorporate
environmental and social externalities will be needed to enable capital
markets to achieve their intended purpose--to consistently allocate capital
to its highest and best use for the good of the people and the planet.
Mr. Gore, a former vice president of the United States, is chairman of
Generation Investment Management. Mr. Blood, formerly head of Goldman Sachs
Asset Management, is managing partner of Generation Investment Management,
which he co-founded with Mr. Gore.
"Kyoto? No Go. How to combat "global warming" without destroying the
economy," by Pete Du Pont, The Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2006
---
http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/pdupont/?id=110008113
What we teach just won't float?
Quite a few of you out there, like me, are trying to teach analysis of
financial statements and business analysis and valuation from books like Penman
or Palepu,
Healy, and Bernard. The current task of valuing MCI illustrates
how frustrating this can be in the real world and how financial statement
analysis that we teach, along with the revered Residual Income and Free Cash
Flow Models, are often Titanic tasks in rearranging the deck chairs on sinking
models. If you've not attempted valuations with these models I suggest
that you begin with my favorite case study:
"Questrom vs. Federated Department
Stores, Inc.: A Question of Equity Value," May 2001 edition of
Issues in Accounting Education, by University of Alabama faculty members Gary
Taylor, William Sampson, and Benton Gup, pp. 223-256.
In spite of all the sophistication in
models, it is ever so common for intangibles and forecasting problems to sink
the valuation models we teach.
My threads on valuation are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
A question I always ask my students
is: What is the major thing that has to be factored in when valuing
Microsoft Corporation?
The answer I'm looking for is certainly
not product innovation or something similar to that. The answer is also
not customer loyalty, although that probably is a huge factor. The big
factor is the massive cost of retraining the entire working world in something
that replaces MS Office products (Excel, Word, PowerPoint, Outlook, etc.).
It simply costs too much to retrain workers in MS Office substitues even if we
are so sick of security problems in Micosoft's systems. How do you
factor this "customer lock-in" into a Residual Income or FCF
Model? Our models are torpedoed by intangibles in the real world.
MCI's customer base is another torpedo
for valuation models. Here the value seems to lie in a "web of
corporate customers." And nobody seems to be able to value that.
"Valuing MCI in an Industry Awash in Questions," by Matt Richtel, The
New York Times, February 9, 2005 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/09/business/09phone.html
Industry bankers and accountants are trying to answer
just that: What is the value of MCI, a company for which Qwest Communications
has already made a tentative offer of about $6.3 billion, and on which Verizon
Communications has been running the numbers. Conversations between MCI and
Qwest have been suspended since late last week, and Verizon has yet to make a
formal offer, people close to the negotiations say.
Most analysts say MCI's extensive network assets in
this country and Europe may have diminishing value because of the industry's
continued capacity glut. Instead, they say, MCI's
worth lies more in its web of corporate customers.
But as MCI's revenue continues to tumble, the real
trick for the accountants is trying to forecast the future. Can the company meet
its stated goal of achieving profitable growth as a telecommunications company
emphasizing Internet technology before the bottom falls out of its traditional
voice and data business?
Continued in article
What we teach just won't float?
Quite a few of you out there, like me, are trying to teach analysis of
financial statements and business analysis and valuation from books like Penman
or Palepu,
Healy, and Bernard. The current task of valuing Amazon illustrates
how frustrating this can be in the real world and how financial statement
analysis that we teach, along with the revered Residual Income and Free Cash
Flow Models, are often Titanic tasks in rearranging the deck chairs on sinking
models.
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on
February 11, 2005
TITLE: Amazon's Net Is Curtailed by Costs
REPORTER: Mylene Mangalindan
DATE: Feb 03, 2005
PAGE: A3
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110735918865643669,00.html
TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Statement Analysis, Income Taxes,
Managerial Accounting, Net Operating Losses
SUMMARY: Amazon "...had forecast that profit margins would rise in the
fourth quarter, while Wall Street analysts had expected margins to remain
about the same." The company's operating profits fell in the fourth
quarter from 7.9% of revenue to 7%. The company's stock price plunged
"14% in after-hours trading."
QUESTIONS:
1.) "Amazon said net income rose nearly fivefold, to $346.7 million, or
82 cents a share, from $73.2 million, or 17 cents a share a year
earlier." Why then did their stock price drop 14% after this
announcement?
2.) Refer to the related article. How were some analysts' projections borne
out by the earnings Amazon announced?
3.) One analyst discussed in the related article, Ken Smith, disagrees with
the majority of analysts' views as discussed under #2 above. Do you think that
his viewpoint is supported by these results? Explain.
4.) Summarize the assessments made in answers to questions 2 and 3 with the
way in which Amazon's operating profits as a percentage of sales turned out
this quarter.
5.) Amazon's results "included a $244 million gain from tax benefits,
stemming from Amazon's heavy losses earlier in the decade." What does
that statement say about the accounting treatment of the deferred tax benefit
for operating loss carryforwards when those losses were experienced? Be
specific in describing exactly how these tax benefits were accounted for.
6.) Why does Amazon adjust out certain items, including the tax gain
described above, in assessing their earnings? In your answer, specifically
state which items are adjusted out of earnings and why that adjustment might
be made. What is a general term for announcing earnings in this fashion?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
--- RELATED ARTICLES ---
TITLE: Web Sales' Boom Could Leave Amazon Behind
REPORTER: Mylene Mangalindan
ISSUE: Jan 21, 2005
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110627113243532202,00.html
Bob
Jensen's threads on valuation are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on March 10,
2006
TITLE: Troll Call
REPORTER: Bruce Sewell
DATE: Mar 06, 2006
PAGE: A14
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114161297437490081.html
TOPICS: Accounting, Intangible Assets
SUMMARY: The author describes issues on both sides of patent disputes, based
on his experience as general counsel for Intel Corp., and relates them to the
patent infringement suit settlement by RIM.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What have been the events leading up to RIM (the company behind BlackBerry
hand held devices) paying $615 million to NTP? On what basis has that amount
increased over time? You may refer to the related articles to get a sense of
that issue.
2.) What are the accounting issues related to intellectual property? List all
that you can think of. How are these issues related to patent rights and
disputes as described in the article?
3.) How has RIM been accounting for the cost of defending against the patent
infringement suit by NTP? Determine the answer to this question based on
information in the second related article.
4.) What are the author' s proposals for reforming patent infringement law?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
--- RELATED ARTICLES ---
TITLE: BlackBerry maker Agrees to Settle Patent Dispute
REPORTER: Mark Heinzl
PAGE: B4
ISSUE: Mar 17, 2005
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111098088750681042,00.html
TITLE: BlackBerry Case Could Spur Patent-Revision efforts
REPORTER: Mark Heinzl
PAGE: B4
ISSUE: Mar 06, 2006
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114160263279289921.html
"Troll Call," by Bruce Sewell, The Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2006;
Page A14 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114161297437490081.html
RIM, the company that brings BlackBerry service to
four million subscribers, finally caved in to the threat of losing its
business. It paid NTP, a small patent holding company reputedly comprised of
just one inventor and one patent lawyer, $615 million to settle a four-year
patent dispute. For NTP it was like winning the lottery, but for the rest of
us, and for business in particular, it stinks. NTP used the patent system,
and the threat of shutting down BlackBerry service, to play chicken with RIM
and millions of BlackBerry users around the world. Unless the courts or
Congress do something to stop this kind of gamesmanship, we're only going to
see more cases like this.
NTP doesn't have a competitive product. It isn't
even in the business of making products. It's one of a large number of
companies known as patent trolls. Trolls acquire and use patents just to sue
companies that actually make products and generate revenue. A patent without
a product isn't worth much, whereas a patent tied to a revenue stream,
particularly someone else's, is a whole different matter. RIM was the best
thing that ever happened to NTP, because by last Friday the only question
left was how much of RIM's pie NTP could get.
The distressing part of this picture is that RIM's
contribution of complementary technologies, business acumen, product R&D and
marketing is what "enabled" the NTP invention to achieve commercial
relevance. The right question is: What would be a fair royalty for NTP,
given its contribution of the patent and RIM's contribution of everything
else? Unfortunately, that isn't where this case ended up. Because NTP had
the presumptive right to obtain an injunction against RIM and stop it dead
in its tracks, the issue on the table wasn't the value of NTP's patent in
the context of RIM's business; instead, it was the total value of RIM's
business. "Pay me a lot or lose everything" hardly leads to rational
settlements. Is this really what we want from our patent system?
At Intel, I see this problem every day and from
both sides of the fence. Intel owns a considerable portfolio of patents and
we believe strongly that inventors are entitled to fair compensation for
their efforts. But Intel is also a target for patent trolls because we run a
successful business. The fact that success creates leverage for trolls to
extract value above and beyond the true contribution of the patented
invention just doesn't seem quite . . . American.
Things got so lopsided in the world of patent
litigation not on account of the patent statute itself but from case law,
which has become increasingly protective of patent owners and tolerant of
excessive damages arguments by plaintiffs' lawyers. Our patent laws are
supposed to be about proliferation of technology. If there is actual
competition between patent owner and infringer, an injunction may be
appropriate -- it protects the patent owner's right to exclusivity and does
not deprive society of the benefits of the technology. On the other hand, if
the patent owner has not commercialized the invention, blocking others from
using it is a loss for all of us. The right to an injunction also needs to
be tempered by a commonsense look at how much real value the patented
technology adds to the whole commercial product. A fundamental invention
deserves greater value than a relatively minor tweak to work that went
before it. A broad application of the injunction remedy makes all patents
"crucial," whether they are or not.
What I'm suggesting here is not all that radical.
These concepts are already embedded in our patent laws; but unfortunately
they have been buried beneath the wrongheaded notion that all patents should
be treated equally.
There is a glimmer of hope. The Supreme Court will
hear eBay v. MercExchange, in which eBay faces the threat of an injunction
from MercExchange, a patent-holding company without a competitive product in
the online auction space. The eBay case is an opportunity for the highest
court to take the judiciary back to the language of the patent statute and
remind judges that they don't have to grant injunctions in every patent
case. Judges have the right to balance the interests of patent plaintiffs
with those of the defendant, and society at large. It may be with just a
touch of irony that we'll read about the eBay case on our now more costly
BlackBerries.
When do contingencies become liabilities and when should they be booked?
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on August 25,
2005
TITLE: Merck Loss Jolts Drug Giant, Industry: In Landmark Vioxx Case, Jury
Tuned Out Science, Explored Coverup Angle
REPORTER: Heather Won Tesoriero, Ilan Brat, Gary McWilliams, and Barbara
Martinez
DATE: Aug 22, 2005
PAGE: A1
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB112447069284018316,00.html
TOPICS: Contingent Liabilities, Disclosure, Accounting, Disclosure Requirements
SUMMARY: Merck lost its first case defending against a claim of death
stemming from the drug Vioxx. The company faces thousands of lawsuits over Vioxx
following the drug's removal from the market, but many observers had felt the
company had an ironclad defense in this one because the patient's cause of death
was not a risk identified in the drug's clinical trials. The primary article
describes the process of the lawsuit while the related articles post two
viewpoints on investment in the company's stock. (The first of those uses the
term "Stock Dividend" in its title when the author actually is referring to a
cash dividend.) Questions also ask students to examine Merck's most recent
quarterly filing for disclosures about the litigation.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Access Merck's most recent 10-Q filing with the SEC. You may do so through
the on-line version of this article by clicking on Merck & Co. under Companies
in the right hand side of the page, then clicking on SEC Filings under Web
Resources on the left hand side of the page, then choosing the 10-Q filed on
8/8/2005. Find all disclosures related to the recall of Vioxx and summarize the
various financial implications of this drug's withdrawal.
2.) What costs were recorded when the company issued the Vioxx recall?
Prepare summary journal entries based on the information in the financial
statement disclosures.
3.) What information is disclosed about the Ernst case on which the main
article reports? What accounting standard promulgates required accounting for
litigation cases such as these that Merck faces?
4.) Based on their disclosure as of the 8/8/2005 filing date, what do you
think was the company's assessment of the potential outcome of this case?
Support your answer with reference to the accounting standard identified in
answer to question 3 above.
5.) Based on the discussion in the end of the first related article, how are
analysts using the information in Merck's footnote disclosures? What do they
estimate from that information?
6.) Compare the arguments made in the two related articles about the
desirability of holding Merck stock at this point. Which argument do you
believe? Support your answer.
7.) What is incorrect about the use of the term "stock dividend" in the title
of the first related article?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
--- RELATED ARTICLES ---
TITLE: Merck's Stock Dividend May Ease Vioxx Pain
REPORTER: Barbara Martinez
PAGE: C1
ISSUE: Aug 24, 2005
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB112484944952621498,00.html
TITLE: First Vioxx Verdict Casts Doubt on Merck, But Not the Industry
REPORTER: James B.Stewart
PAGE: D2
ISSUE: Aug 24, 2005
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB112483560740621188,00.html
From Paul Pacter's IAS Plus on October 28, 2005 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
We have posted the Deloitte
Letter of Comment on Proposed Amendments to IAS 37 Provisions,
Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets (PDF 47k). On 30 June 2005, the
IASB proposed to amend IAS 37 (and to retitle it Non-financial Liabilities)
and complementary limited amendments to IAS 19 Employee Benefits. The
amendments to IAS 37 would change the conceptual approach to recognising
non-financial liabilities by requiring recognition of all obligations that
meet the definition of a liability in the IASB’s Framework, unless they
cannot be measured reliably. Uncertainty about the amount or timing of
settlement would be reflected in measuring the liability instead of (as is
currently required) affecting whether it is recognised.
Our response states:
With the exception of the proposals for
restructuring provisions, we do not support the ED, which we see as
largely unnecessary. In our view, the majority of the Board's proposals
are premature and pre-judge matters that should be discussed in the
context of the review of the IASB Framework rather than as an amendment
of IAS 37. We think that IAS 37 is operating satisfactorily within the
current operating model and environment. In addition, we do not think
that the Board's choice of a single measurement attribute is
appropriate. As such, we find the majority of the changes proposed in
the ED fail to achieve an improvement in financial reporting.
What lies below the surface of the financial reporting icebergs?
- The giant portion of the bulk of value (or negative value in the case of huge pending
liabilities) lies in intangibles such as intellectual property assets and liabilities,
human resource assets and liabilities (including unions who are militant in negotiating
higher benefits every time the company has some success, items valued at virtually zero on
the balance sheet (including in-process R&D, patents, copyrights, trademarks,
franchise rights, etc.)
The knowledge capital estimates that Lev and
Bothwell came up with during their run last fall of some 90 leading companies (see
accompanying table) were absolutely huge. Microsoft,
for example, boasted a number of $211 billion, while Intel,
General
Electric and Merck
weighed in with $170 billion, $112 billion and $110 billion, respectively. Source:
"The New Math," by Jonathan R. Laing, Barrons Online, November 20, 2000 --- http://equity.stern.nyu.edu/News/news/levbarrons1120.html
Trinity students may go to J:\courses\acct5341\readings\levNov2000.htm
|
- Market share momentum and trend, especially in terms of "rival
assets.". For example, the huge market share of Microsoft Office products makes
it extremely expensive for customers to change. For example, think of the retraining
that would have to take place if Trinity University ordered abandonment of Microsoft
Office products presently used by literally all departments on campus. The American
Airlines Sabre system has the major market share in terms of worldwide databases for
airline ticketing on the major airlines of the world. Lev reports that the SABRE
system accounts for far more market value than all of AMR Corporations other assets.
.In October 1996, AMR Corp. sold 18% of its
computer-reservations system, called SABRE, to the public. It held on to the remaining
82%. That one transaction provides a beautiful way of evaluating tangible and intangible
assets. When I recently checked the market, SABRE constituted 50% of AMR's value. This is
mind-boggling! You have one of the largest airlines in the world, with roughly 700 jets in
its fleet, nearly 100,000 employees, and exclusive and valuable landing rights in the
world's most heavily trafficked airports. On the other hand, you have a
computer-reservation system. It's a good system that's used by a lot of people, but it's
just a computer system nonetheless. And this system is valued as much as the entire
airline. Now, what makes this asset -- the computer system -- so valuable? One big difference is that when you're dealing with tangible assets, your
ability to leverage them -- to get additional business or value out of them -- is limited.
You can't use the same airplane on five different routes at the same time. You can't put
the same crew on five different routes at the same time. And the same goes for the
financial investment that you've made in the airplane.
But there's no limit to the number of people who can use AMR
Corp.'s SABRE system at once: It works as well with 5 million people as it does with 1
million people. The only limit to your ability to leverage a knowledge asset is the size
of the market.
Economists call physical assets "rival assets" --
meaning that users act as rivals for the specific use of an asset. With an airplane,
you've got to decide which route it's going to take. But knowledge assets aren't rivals.
Choosing isn't necessary. You can apply them in more than one place at the same time. In
fact, with many knowledge assets, the more places in which you apply them, the larger the
return. With many knowledge assets, you get what economists call "increasing returns
to scale." That's one key to intangible assets: The larger the network of users, the
greater the benefit to everyone.
Source: "New Math for the New Economy," by Alan M. Webber, Fast Company,
January/February, 2000 --- http://pf.fastcompany.com/online/31/lev.html
Trinity students may go to J:\courses\acct5341\readings\levJan2000.htm
|
- Purchase commitments that are not valued on the balance sheet. Sometimes these are
enormous in terms of contract value. However, long-term purchase commitments can
often be broken for damages amounts far below the contracted values (because the damages
from breach of contract may be very small on very long term contracts).
- OBSF items that firms are still able to scheme through clever contract
terminologies. These include employee compensation that is not booked.
- Contingency claims may be gigantic relative to booked debt. Even if a company has
a good defense against lawsuits, the frequency of lawsuits may drown it in litigation
costs such as the litigation costs of tobacco companies and pharmaceutical producers.
On August 28, 2002, the FASB met with representatives from the Financial
Valuation Group and the Phillips-Hitchner firm to discuss valuation of
intangible assets. See our news item for access to their presentation. More
details in our full news item at http://accountingeducation.com/news/news3225.html
Companies will have to place intangible assets, such as customer lists and
customer back orders, in their financial statements, under proposals released
last week by the International Accounting Standards Board --- http://www.smartpros.com/x36285.xml
Question
Do you really understand the SEC's Rule 144a?
What is it and why do accountants hate it?
And here's the real beauty of it: Companies that issue
stock under Rule 144a can access America's deep pools of capital without
submitting to public-company accounting rules or to the tender mercies of
Sarbanes-Oxley. In exchange, however, they must strictly limit the number of
qualified U.S. investors in their company -- to 500 total for U.S.-based firms
and 300 for foreign-based. They are also barred from offering comparable
securities for sale in the public market. The 144a market is also for the most
part nontransparent, often illiquid and thus in some ways riskier. But
increasingly, this is a trade that institutional investors and companies seeking
capital are willing to make.
"A Capital Idea," The Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2007; Page A18
---
Click Here
That America's public capital markets have lost
some of their allure is no longer much disputed. Eminences as unlikely as
Chuck Schumer and Eliot Spitzer have taken to bemoaning the fact and calling
for some sort of fix, albeit without doing much.
Tort reform -- to reduce jackpot justice in
securities class-action suits -- would certainly help. So would easing the
compliance costs and regulatory burden placed on publicly traded companies
by Sarbanes-Oxley, Regulation FD and the like. (See Robert Grady nearby.)
The good news is that, as usual, private-sector innovation is finding a way
around these government obstacles through the rapid growth of something
known as the Rule 144a market.
First, a little capital-markets background: Most
Americans are familiar with the "public markets," which consist of the New
York Stock Exchange, the Nasdaq and other stock markets. These are open to
investors of every stripe and are where the stocks of most of the world's
best-known companies are traded. Nearly anyone can invest, and these
exchanges are comprehensively regulated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
Less well understood is another, more restricted
market known after SEC Rule 144a that governs participation in it. As on
stock exchanges, this market allows for the buying and selling of the stock
of companies that offer their shares for sale. But participation is strictly
limited. To be what is called a "qualified buyer" in this market, you must
be a financial institution with at least $100 million in investable assets.
If you meet these criteria, you are free to buy stocks of both U.S. and
foreign companies that have never offered their shares to the investing
public.
And here's the real beauty of it: Companies that
issue stock under Rule 144a can access America's deep pools of capital
without submitting to public-company accounting rules or to the tender
mercies of Sarbanes-Oxley. In exchange, however, they must strictly limit
the number of qualified U.S. investors in their company -- to 500 total for
U.S.-based firms and 300 for foreign-based. They are also barred from
offering comparable securities for sale in the public market. The 144a
market is also for the most part nontransparent, often illiquid and thus in
some ways riskier. But increasingly, this is a trade that institutional
investors and companies seeking capital are willing to make.
There are estimated to be about 1,000 companies
whose stocks trade in the 144a market. And last year, for perhaps the first
time, more capital was raised in the U.S. by issuing these so-called
unregistered securities than through IPOs on all the major stock exchanges
combined. Even more telling is that the large institutional investors
eligible to buy these unregistered securities are more than happy to oblige.
There is no selling without buying, and for the 144a market to overtake the
giant stock exchanges, institutional investors who control trillions of
dollars in capital must see better opportunities outside the regulations
built by Congress and the SEC.
In a sign of these times, none other than Nasdaq is
now stepping in to bring some greater order, liquidity and transparency to
the Rule 144a market. Any day now, the SEC is expected to propose giving the
green light to a Nasdaq project called Portal. Portal aims to be a central
clearing house for buyers and sellers of Section 144a securities. You will
still need to be a "qualified institutional buyer" to purchase 144a
securities. And the companies whose stocks change hands on Portal will still
need to meet the limitations on numbers of investors to offer their stock
there.
So Portal will not bring unregistered securities to
the masses -- at least not directly. It is forbidden to do so because the
entire U.S. regulatory system is designed to protect individual investors
from such things. What Portal will do, if it operates as intended, is make
the trading of Rule 144a securities easier and less costly. And this could,
in turn, further increase their attractiveness to issuers and investors
alike. Average investors will at least be able to participate indirectly via
mutual and pension funds, most of which meet the standards for "qualified
institutional buyers."
Given the limitations on eligibility for Rule 144a
assets, they will never replace our public markets. But their growth is one
more sign that investors, far from valuing current regulation, are seeking
ways to avoid its costs and complications. Nasdaq's participation is
especially notable given its stake as an established public exchange. Nasdaq
seems to have concluded that there is a new market opportunity created by
overregulation, so it is following the money.
This leaves our politicians with two choices. They
can move to meddle with and diminish this second securities market -- which
will only drive more business away from U.S. shores. Or they can address the
overregulation that is hurting public markets and prompting both investors
and companies to seek alternatives.
New Accounting Rule Lays Bare A Firm's Liability if
Transaction Is Later Disallowed by the IRS
CPA auditors have always considered their primary role as attesting to
full and fair corporate disclosures to investors and creditors under Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Now it turns out that this extends,
perhaps unexpectedly, to the government as well.
"How Accounting Rule (FIN
48) Led to Probe Disclosure of Tax Savings Firms Regard as Vulnerable Leaves
Senate Panel a Trail," by Jesse Drucker, The Wall Street Journal,
September 11, 2007; Page A5 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118947026768923240.html?mod=todays_us_page_one
The probe, by the Senate's Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations, appears to have been sparked by an accounting rule known
as FIN 48, which took effect in January. The rule for the first time
requires companies to disclose how much they have set aside to pay tax
authorities if certain tax-cutting transactions are successfully challenged
by the government. The disclosures require companies to attach a dollar
figure to tax-savings arrangements they think could be vulnerable.
Although intended to inform investors, the
disclosures also serve as a kind of road map for government authorities,
guiding them to companies that may have taken an aggressive stance on
tax-related arrangements.
The probe, by the Senate's Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations, appears to have been sparked by an accounting rule known
as FIN 48, which took effect in January. The rule for the first time
requires companies to disclose how much they have set aside to pay tax
authorities if certain tax-cutting transactions are successfully challenged
by the government. The disclosures require companies to attach a dollar
figure to tax-savings arrangements they think could be vulnerable.
Although intended to inform investors, the
disclosures also serve as a kind of road map for government authorities,
guiding them to companies that may have taken an aggressive stance on
tax-related arrangements.
The FIN 48 disclosures generally reveal how much a
company has set aside in an accounting reserve called "unrecognized tax
benefits." The reserve represents the portion of the tax benefits realized
on a company's tax return that also hasn't been recognized in its financial
reporting.
In the letters, sent Aug. 23, Senate investigators
seek to obtain more details about the underlying transactions in the FIN 48
disclosures. One letter viewed by The Wall Street Journal asks the companies
to "describe any United States tax position or group of similar tax
positions that represents five percent or more of your total [unrecognized
tax benefit] for the period, including in the description of each whether
the tax position involved foreign entities or jurisdictions."
The subcommittee, led by Sen. Carl Levin (D.,
Mich.), has held numerous hearings on tax shelters, tax avoidance, and the
law firms and accounting firms that set up such structures.
The Senate's inquiry also includes questions about
other tax-cutting arrangements. For tax-cutting transactions on which
companies spent at least $1 million for legal fees or other costs, Senate
investigators are asking companies to identify the amount of the tax
benefit, as well as "the tax professional(s) who planned or designed the
transaction or structure and the law firm(s) that authored the tax opinion
or advice."
Continued in article
"Accounting for Uncertainty (FIN 48)," by Damon M. Fleming and Gerald
E. Whittenburg, Journal of Accountancy, October 2007 --- ---
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/oct2007/uncertainty.htm
FASB Interpretation no. 48 (FIN 48), Accounting for
Uncertainty in Income Taxes, sets the threshold for recognizing the benefits
of tax return positions in financial statements as “more likely than not”
(greater than 50%) to be sustained by a taxing authority. The effect is most
pronounced where the uncertainty arises in the timing, amount or validity of
a deduction.
Thresholds applicable to tax practitioners have
been revised from a “realistic possibility” to “more likely than not” that a
tax position will be sustained, as set forth in the U.S. Troop Readiness,
Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act
of 2007 that was signed into law in May.
A third threshold, that a tax position possesses a
“reasonable basis” in tax law, has been regarded as reflecting 25%
certainty. In addition, taxpayers are subject to penalties if an
understatement of liability is caused by a position that lacks “substantial
authority,” a threshold for which no percentage of certainty has been
established but has been regarded as between the reasonable-basis and
more-likely-than-not standards.
Being familiar with the different thresholds for
the reporting of uncertain tax positions can help CPAs effectively advocate
for their clients’ tax positions and be impartial in financial reporting.
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review
on June 1, 2007
Lifting the Veil on Tax Risk
by Jesse Drucker
The Wall Street Journal
May 25, 2007
Page: C1
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118005869184314270.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
TOPICS: Accounting,
Accounting Theory, Advanced Financial Accounting, Disclosure
Requirements, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Financial
Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis, Income Taxes
SUMMARY: FIN
48, entitled Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes--An
Interpretation of FASB Statement No. 109, was issued in June 2006
with an effective date of fiscal years beginning after December 15,
2006. As stated on the FASB's web site, "This Interpretation
prescribes a recognition threshold and measurement attribute for the
financial statement recognition and measurement of a tax position
taken or expected to be taken in a tax return. This Interpretation
also provides guidance on derecognition, classification, interest
and penalties, accounting in interim periods, disclosure, and
transition." See the summary of this interpretation at
http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/finsum48.shtml As noted in this
article, "in the past, companies had to reveal little information
about transactions that could face some risk in an audit by the IRS
or other government entities." Further, some concern about use of
deferred tax liability accounts to create so-called "cookie jar
reserves" useful in smoothing income contributed to development of
this interpretation's recognition, timing and disclosure
requirements. The article highlights an analysis of 361 companies by
Credit Suisse Group to identify those with the largest recorded
liabilities as an indicator of risk of future settlement with the
IRS over disputed amounts. One example given in this article is
Merck's $2.3 billion settlement with the IRS in February 2007 over a
Bermuda tax shelter; another is the same company's current dispute
with Canadian taxing authorities over transfer pricing. Financial
statement analysis procedures to compare the size of the uncertain
tax liability to other financial statement components and follow up
discussions with the companies showing the highest uncertain tax
positions also is described.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Summarize the requirements of Financial Interpretation No. 48,
Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes--An Interpretation of
FASB Statement No. 109 (FIN 48).
2.) In describing the FIN 48 requirements, the author of this
article states that "until now, there was generally no way to know
about" the accounting for reserves for uncertain tax positions. Why
is that the case?
3.) Some firms may develop "FIN 48 opinions" every time a tax
position is taken that could be questioned by the IRS or other tax
governing authority. Why might companies naturally want to avoid
having to document these positions very clearly in their own
records?
4.) Credit Suisse analysts note that the new FIN 48 disclosures
about unrecognized tax benefits provide investors with information
about risks companies are undertaking. Explain how this information
can be used for this purpose.
5.) How are the absolute amounts of unrecognized tax benefits
compared to other financial statement categories to provide a better
frame of reference for analysis? In your answer, propose a financial
statement ratio you feel is useful in assessing the risk described
in answer to question 4, and support your reasons for calculating
this amount.
6.) The amount of reserves recorded by Merck for unrecognized tax
benefits, tops the list from the analysis done by Credit Suisse and
the one done by Professors Blouin, Gleason, Mills and Sikes. Based
only on the descriptions given in the article, how did the two
analyses differ in their measurements? What do you infer from the
fact that Merck is at the top of both lists?
7.) Why are transfer prices among international operations likely to
develop into uncertain tax positions?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
|
Tutorial: FIN 48 from different perspectives
Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation
No. 48 (FIN 48), Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, is intended to
substantially reduce uncertainty in accounting for income taxes. Its
implementation and infrastructure requirements, however, generate a great deal
of uncertainty. This feature provides an overview of FIN 48, addresses some of
its federal and international tax issues, as well as issues arising at the state
and local level.
AccountingWeb, June 2007 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=103625
"GM Will Book $39 Billion Charge Write-Down of Tax
Credits Indicates That Profits Won't Come in Near Term," by John D. Stoll,
The Wall Street Journal, November 7, 2007; Page A3 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119438884709884385.html?mod=todays_us_page_one
General Motors Corp. will take a $39 billion,
noncash charge to write down deferred-tax credits, a signal that it expects
to continue to struggle financially despite significant restructuring and
cost cutting in the past two years.
The deferred-tax assets stem from losses and could
be used to offset taxes on current or future profits for a certain number of
years.
In after-hours trading, GM fell 2.9% to $35.14.
Before the disclosure, its shares finished at $36.16, up 16 cents, or less
than 1%, in New York Stock Exchange composite trading.
GM, the world's largest auto maker in vehicle
sales, was to report third-quarter financial results today. The company,
which was stung by big losses in 2005 and 2006, said the write-down was
triggered by three main issues: a string of adjusted losses in core North
American operations and Germany over the past three years, weakness at its
GMAC Financial Services unit, and the long duration of tax-deferred assets.
GM had appeared to be making progress in stemming
its losses. Its global automotive operations were profitable in the first
half of the year. It recently signed a labor deal with the United Auto
Workers that allows it to establish an independent trust to absorb its
approximately $50 billion in hourly retiree health-care liabilities. The
move promises to significantly reduce GM's cash health-care expenses and
combine with other labor-cost cuts in creating a more profitable North
American arm.
If it returns to steady profits, GM could remove
the valuation allowance and reclaim some or all of the $39 billion in
deferred credits.
For now, the massive charge promises to devastate
GM's headline financial results for the third quarter, and for the year,
likely leading to the worst annual loss in its 99-year history. Although the
charge is an accounting loss that doesn't involve cash, it is still a
staggering sum. By comparison, the company reported a total of $34 billion
in net income from 1996 to 2004.
GM will partially offset the charge with a gain of
more than $5 billion related to the sale of its Allison Transmission unit.
The charge follows more than $12 billion in losses
since the beginning of 2005. GM has been scrambling to cut the size of its
U.S. operation amid shrinking market share, rising costs and a rapidly
globalizing auto industry. Its restructuring has been complicated by a
slowdown in U.S. demand for automobiles and losses at GMAC.
The lending giant lost $1.6 billion in the third
quarter, the biggest quarterly setback since at least the 1960s. It made
money on auto lending and insurance but was dragged down by a $1.8 billion
setback at ResCap, its residential-mortgage business and a big player in
subprime loans. GM's exposure is limited because it sold 51% of GMAC to
Cerberus Capital Management LP last year. In the past, GMAC delivered
dividends to GM, including more than $9 billion in the decade before the
GMAC sale.
The write-down isn't expected to affect GM's
liquidity position, which stood at $27.2 billion as of June 30. GM has been
selling noncore assets in recent years to pad its bank account. In addition,
GM Chief Financial Officer Frederick "Fritz" Henderson said the write-down
won't preclude it from using loss carry-forwards or other deferred-tax
assets in the future. It is unclear whether GM's plunge deeper into negative
shareholder-equity status will affect it's borrowing capabilities or credit
rating.
The latest disclosure underscores the challenge
Chief Executive Officer Richard Wagoner faces in seeking a full-scale
turnaround as GM hangs on to its No. 1 global-sales ranking over Toyota
Motor Corp. by a thread. Delphi Corp., GM's top supplier, has failed in
attempts to emerge from bankruptcy protection, so GM must wait indefinitely
on cost savings it hopes to gain from a reorganized Delphi. Also, U.S.
automobile demand has withered to the lowest point in a decade, and, as oil
futures continue to escalate, pressure on high-profit trucks and SUVs
remains firm.
Denny Beresford provided a link to another reference ---
Click Here
November 7, 2008 reply from Amy Dunbar
[Amy.Dunbar@BUSINESS.UCONN.EDU]
>So they think it is more likely than not that they
will receive zero tax benefit from their tax loss carryforwards!
Hmmmmm, I doubt that is what GM thinks. As the news
release stated, "In making such judgments, significant weight is given to
evidence that can be objectively verified. A company's current or previous
losses are given more weight than its future outlook, and a recent
three-year historical cumulative loss is considered a significant factor
that is difficult to overcome." FAS 109, P 23 states, "Forming a conclusion
that a valuation allowance is not needed is difficult when there is negative
evidence such as cumulative losses in recent years."
As an aside, the more-likely-than-not standard in
FAS 109 existed before FIN 48 adopted the standard. FIN 48 doesn't talk
about objective evidence wrt the MLTN standard.
FIN 48, 6, states, "An enterprise shall initially
recognize the financial statement effects of a tax position when it is more
likely than not, based on the technical merits, that the position will be
sustained upon examination. As used in this Interpretation, the term more
likely than not means a likelihood of more than 50 percent; the terms
examined and upon examination also include resolution of the related appeals
or litigation processes, if any. The more-likely than- not recognition
threshold is a positive assertion that an enterprise believes it is entitled
to the economic benefits associated with a tax position. The determination
of whether or not a tax position has met the more-likely-than-not
recognition threshold shall consider the facts, circumstances, and
information available at the reporting date.
FIN 48, 7, states, "In assessing the
more-likely-than-not criterion as required by paragraph 6 of this
Interpretation: a. It shall be presumed that the tax position will be
examined by the relevant taxing authority that has full knowledge of all
relevant information. b. Technical merits of a tax position derive from
sources of authorities in the tax law (legislation and statutes, legislative
intent, regulations, rulings, and case law) and their applicability to the
facts and circumstances of the tax position. When the past administrative
practices and precedents of the taxing authority in its dealings with the
enterprise or similar enterprises are widely understood, those practices and
precedents shall be taken into account. c. Each tax position must be
evaluated without consideration of the possibility of offset or aggregation
with other positions."
In an appendix, FIN 48, B46, states, "In
considering the subsequent recognition of tax positions that do not
initially meet the more-likely-than-not recognition threshold and the
subsequent measurement of tax positions, the Board initially considered
whether specific external events should be required to effect a change in
judgment about the recognition of a tax position or the measurement of a
recognized tax position. The Board concluded in the Exposure Draft that a
change in estimate is a judgment that requires evaluation of all available
facts and circumstances, not a specific triggering event. Some respondents
to the Exposure Draft stated that the evidence supporting a change in
judgment should be objectively verifiable and that a triggering event is
normally required to subsequently recognize a tax benefit."
Since this language wasn't put in the standard, I
wonder if one could argue that the two MLTN standards are different. It
would be interesting to be a fly on the wall as some of the debate goes on
about uncertain tax positions.
Amy Dunbar
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on November 9,
2007
GM Will Book $39 Billion Charge
by John
D. Stoll
Nov 07, 2007
Page: A3
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119438884709884385.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
TOPICS: Advanced
Financial Accounting, Income Taxes
SUMMARY: "General
Motors Corp. will take a $39 billion, noncash charge to
write down deferred tax assets, "...a signal that it expects
to continue to struggle financially despite significant
restructuring and cost cutting in the past two years."
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: Use to cover accounting for deferred tax
assets and a related valuation account.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Define the terms deferred tax assets, deferred tax
liabilities, net operating loss carryforwards, and deferred
tax credits.
2.) Which of the above three items has General Motors
recorded for a total of $39 billion? In your answer, comment
on the opening statement in the article that GM will
write-down its "deferred tax credits."
3.) What is a valuation allowance against deferred tax
assets? When must such an allowance be recorded under
generally accepted accounting standards? Use GM's situation
as an example in your answer.
4.) GM states that its $39 billion write down was impacted
by three factors. Explain how each of these factors bears on
the determination of a valuation allowance against deferred
tax assets. Be specific.
5.) The author writes, "If it returns to steady profits, GM
could remove the valuation allowance and reclaim some or all
of the $39 billion in deferred credits," and that the
write-down does not preclude GM from future use of its net
operating loss carryforwards and deferred tax assets.
Explain these statements, including the entries that will be
recorded if the deferred tax assets are used in the future.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
RELATED
ARTICLES:
GM Statement on Noncash Charge
by General Motors, via PRNewswire
Nov 06, 2007
Online Exclusive
|
Controversy Over FAS 2 on Research and Development
(R&D)
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on April 23,
2004
TITLE: Brothers of Invention
REPORTER: Timothy Aeppel
DATE: Apr 19, 2004
PAGE: B1,3
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108233054158486127,00.html
TOPICS: Research & Development, Intangible Assets
SUMMARY: Lahart reports on the growing instances of designing variations of
new
patent-protected products in an attempt to skirt the patent laws and offer
virtual clones of those products at lower prices.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is a patent? How does one appropriately account for a patent that has
been granted to a firm? How does a patent differ from other intangible assets?
How is it similar? How does a patent give a firm a competitive advantage? In
the Aeppel article, what happens to this advantage when a design-around is
introduced?
2.) Explain impairment of an intangible asset. How do the "design
arounds"
described in the Aeppel article impair the value of the patent? How do you
account for such an impairment?
3.) What effect is this issue having on research & development (R&D)
expenditures for firms developing new patented products? Are R&D costs
expensed
or capitalized? What about R&D costs that result in the granting of a
patent?
4.) Why are valid patent-holders designing around their own products?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
"Brothers of Invention:
'Design-Arounds' Surge As More Companies Imitate Rivals' Patented
Products," by Timothy Aeppel, The Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2004, Page
B1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108233054158486127,00.html
Nebraska rancher Gerald Gohl had a
bright idea: Create a remote-controlled spotlight, so he wouldn't have to roll
down the window of his pickup truck and stick out a hand-held beacon to look
for his cattle on cold nights.
By 1997, Mr. Gohl held a patent on the
RadioRay, a wireless version of his spotlight that could rotate 360 degrees
and was mounted using suction cups or brackets. Retail price: more than $200.
RadioRay started to catch on with ranchers, boaters, hunters and even police.
Wal-Mart
Stores Inc. liked it, too. Mr. Gohl says a buyer for Wal-Mart's Sam's Club
stores called to discuss carrying the RadioRay as a "wow" item, an
unusual product that might attract lots of attention and sales. Mr. Gohl said
no, worrying that selling to Sam's Club could drive the spotlight's price
lower and poison his relationships with distributors.
Before long, though, Sam's Club was
selling its own wireless, remote-controlled searchlight -- for about $60. It
looked nearly identical to the RadioRay, except for a small, plastic part
restricting the light's rotation to slightly less than 360 degrees. Golight
Inc., Mr. Gohl's McCook, Neb., company, sued Wal-Mart in 2000, alleging patent
infringement. The retailer countered that Mr. Gohl's invention was obvious and
that its light wasn't an exact copy of the RadioRay's design.
The legal battle between Mr. Gohl and
the world's largest retailer -- which Wal-Mart lost in a federal district
court and on appeal and is now considering taking to the Supreme Court --
reflects a growing trend in the high-stakes, persnickety world of patents and
product design. Patent attorneys say that companies increasingly are imitating
rivals' inventions, while trying to make their own versions just different
enough to avoid infringing on a patent. The near-copycat procedure, which
among other things helps companies avoid paying royalties to patent holders,
is called a "design-around."
"The thinking in engineering
offices more and more boils down to, 'Let's see what the patent says and see
if we can get around it and get something as good -- or almost as good --
without violating the patent,' " says Ken Kuffner, a patent attorney
in Houston who represents a U.S. maker of retail-display stands that designed
around the patent on plastic displays it used to buy from another company. He
declines to identify his client.
Design-arounds are nearly as old as the
patent system itself, underscoring the pressure that companies feel to keep
pace with the innovations of competitors. And U.S. courts have repeatedly
concluded that designing around -- and even copying products left unprotected
-- can be good for consumers by lowering prices and encouraging innovation.
The practice appears to be surging as
companies shift more manufacturing outside the U.S. in an effort to drive
costs lower. No one tracks overall design-around numbers, but "there's
really been a spike in this sort of activity in the last few years," says
Jack Barufka, a patent-attorney specializing in design-arounds at Pillsbury
Winthrop LLP in McLean, Va.
Mr. Barufka, a former physicist, has
handled design-arounds on exercise equipment, industrial parts, and factory
machinery. A client recently brought him a household appliance, which he won't
identify, to be dissected part-by-part so that his client can try to make a
similar product at a cheaper price, probably by using foreign suppliers.
"We design around competitor
patents on a regular basis," says James O'Shaughnessy, vice president and
chief intellectual property counsel at Rockwell Automation Inc. in Milwaukee,
a maker of industrial automation equipment. "Anybody who is really paying
attention to the patent system, who respects it, will still nevertheless try
to find ways -- either offshore production or a design-around -- to produce an
equivalent product that doesn't infringe."
Design-arounds are particularly common
in auto parts, semiconductors and other industries with enormous markets that
are attractive to newcomers looking for a way to break in. The practice also
happens in mature industries, where there are few big breakthroughs and
competitors rely on relatively small changes to gain a competitive advantage.
Patented products are attractive targets for an attempted end run because they
command premium prices, making them irresistible amid razor-thin profit
margins and expanding global competition.
Few companies will talk about their
design-around efforts, since the results often look like little more than
clones of someone else's idea. Even companies with patented products that are
designed-around usually keep quiet, sometimes because their own engineers are
looking for ways to make an end run on rivals.
The surge in design-arounds is pushing
research-and-development costs higher, since some companies feel forced to
protect their inventions from being copied by coming up with as many
alternative ways to achieve the same result -- and patenting those, too.
"A patent is basically worthless
if someone else can design around it easily and make a high-performing
component for less," says Morgan Chu, a patent attorney at Irell &
Manella LLP in Los Angeles.
Because successful design-arounds also
force prices lower, they make it harder for companies to recover their
investment in new products. Danfoss
AS, a Danish maker of air conditioning, heating and other industrial
equipment, discovered in the late 1990s that a customer in England had
switched to buying a designed-around part for a Danfoss agricultural machine
at a lower price from an English supplier. Danfoss eventually won back the
customer, but only after agreeing to a price concession, says Georg Nissen,
the Danish company's intellectual property manager, who notes they lowered
their price about 5%.
The main way for companies to fight
design-arounds is in court -- or the threat of it. Dutton-Lainson Co., a
Hastings, Neb., maker of marine, agricultural, and industrial products,
recently discovered that a rival was selling a tool used by ranchers to
tighten the barbed wire on fences that was identical to its own patented tool,
with an ergonomic handle shaped to fit the palm of a hand.
Continued in the article
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on
October 14, 2005
TITLE: In R&D, Brains Beat Spending in Boosting Profit
REPORTER: Gary McWilliams
DATE: Oct 11, 2005
PAGE: A2
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB112898917962665021.html
TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis,
Research & Development
SUMMARY: The article reports on a study by management consultants Booz Allen
Hamilton on firms� levels of R&D spending and related performance metrics.
QUESTIONS:
1.) How must U.S. firms account for Research and Development expenditures?
What is the major reasoning behind the FASB's requirement to treat these costs
in this way? In your answer, reference the authoritative accounting literature
promulgating this treatment and the FASB's supporting reasoning.
2.) How does the U.S. treatment differ from the treatment of R&D costs under
accounting standards in effect in most countries of the world?
3.) Describe the study undertake by Booz Allen Hamilton as reported in the
article. In your answer, define each of the terms for variables used in the
analysis. Why would a management consulting firm undertake such a study?
4.) What were the major findings of the study? How does this finding support
the FASB�s reasoning as described in answer to question 1 above?
5.) As far as you can glean from the description in the article, what are the
potential weaknesses to the study? Do these weaknesses have any bearing on your
opinion about the support that the results give to the current R&D accounting
requirements in the U.S.? Explain.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"In R&D, Brains Beat Spending in Boosting Profit," by Gary McWilliams, The
Wall Street Journal, October 11, 2005, Page A2 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB112898917962665021.html
Booz Allen concluded that once a minimum level of
research and development spending is achieved, better oversight and culture
were more significant factors in determining financial results. The study
calculated the percentage of a company's revenue spent on R&D and compared
it with sales growth, gross profit, operating profit, market capitalization
and total shareholder result.
It found "no statistically significant difference"
when comparing the financial results of middle-of-the-pack companies with
those in the top 10% of their industry, said Barry Jaruzelski, Booz Allen's
vice president of Global Technology Practice. The result was the same when
viewed within 10 industry groups or across all industries evaluated.
"It is the culture, the skills and the process more
than the absolute amount of money available," he said. "It says tremendous
results can be achieved with relatively modest amounts" of spending.
He points to Toyota Motor Corp., which spent 4.1%
of revenue on R&D last year, but consistently has outperformed rivals such
as Ford Motor Co., which spent 4.3% of sales on research and development.
Toyota's success with hybrid, gasoline-electric cars resulted from better
spending, not more spending, Mr. Jaruzelski says.
The study rankles some. Allan C. Eberhart, a
professor of finance at Georgetown University, says the time period examined
is too short to catch companies whose results might have benefited from past
R&D spending. He co-authored a paper that found "economically significant"
increases in R&D spending did benefit operating profits. The paper, which
examined R&D spending at 8,000 companies over a 50-year period, found 1% to
2% increased operating profit at companies that increased R&D spending by 5%
or more in a single year.
Mr. Jaruzelski said less isn't always better. The
study found that companies that ranked among the bottom 10% of R&D spenders
performed worse than average or top spenders. The result suggests there is a
base level of research and development needed to remain healthy but that
spending above a certain level doesn't confer additional benefits.
R&D spending was positively associated with one
performance measure: gross margins. Median gross margins of the top half of
companies measured by R&D to sales spending were 40% higher than those in
the bottom half.
This is a good
slide show!
"The Truth Behind the Earnings
Illusion: The profit picture has never been so distorted. The surprise? Things
aren't as ugly as they look" by Justin Fox, Fortune, July 22, 2002 --- http://www.fortune.com/indexw.jhtml?channel=artcol.jhtml&doc_id=208677
Question:
Where are the major differences between book income and taxable income that favor booked
income reported to the investing public?
Answer according to Justin Fox:
What the heck happened? The most
obvious explanations for the disconnect are disparities in accounting for stock options
and pension funds. When a company's employees exercise stock options, the gains are
treated for tax purposes as an expense to the company but are completely ignored in
reported earnings. And while investment gains made by a company's employee pension fund
are counted in reported earnings, they don't show up in tax profits.
Analysts at Standard & Poor's
are working to remove those two distortions by calculating a new "core earnings"
measure for S&P 500 companies that includes options costs and excludes pension fund
gains. When that exercise is completed in the coming weeks, most of the profit disconnect
may disappear. Then again, maybe not. In struggling to deliver the outsized profits to
which they and their investors had become accustomed in the mid-1990s, a lot more CEOs and
CFOs may have bent the rules than we know about. "There was some cheating around the
edges," says S&P chief economist David Wyss. "It's just not clear how big
the edges are."
While conservative accounting is
now back in vogue, it's impossible to say with certainty that reported earnings have
returned to reality: Comparing the earnings per share of the S&P 500 with the tax
profits of all American corporations, both public and private (which is what the Commerce
Department reports), is too much of an apples and oranges exercise. But over the long run
reported earnings and tax earnings do grow at about the same rate--just over 7% a year
since 1960, according to Prudential Securities chief economist Richard Rippe, Wall
Street's most devoted student of the Commerce Department profit numbers. So the fact that
Commerce says after-tax profits came in at an annualized rate of $615 billion in the first
quarter--a record-setting pace if it holds up for the full year--ought to be at least a
little reassuring to investors. "I do believe the hints of recovery that we're seeing
in tax profits will continue," Rippe says.
That does not mean we're
due for another profit boom. Declining interest rates were the biggest reason profits rose
so fast in the 1990s, says S&P's Wyss. Rates simply don't have that far to fall now.
So even when investors start believing again what companies say about their earnings, they
may still be shocked at how slowly those earnings are growing.
Continued at http://www.fortune.com/indexw.jhtml?channel=artcol.jhtml&doc_id=208677
Reply by Bob Jensen:
For a technical explanation of the stock option accounting alluded to in the above
quotation, go to one of my student examinations at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Exams/5341sp02/exam02/Exam02VersionATeachingNotes.htm
The exam02.xls Excel workbook answers can be downloaded from http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Exams/5341sp02/exam02/
The S&P revised GAAP core earnings model alluded to in the above quotation can be
examined in greater detail at http://www.standardandpoors.com/Forum/MarketAnalysis/coreEarnings/index.html
The pause that refreshes just got a bit more refreshing - Coca-Cola Co. announced
Sunday it will lead the corporate pack by treating future stock option grants as employee
compensation. http://www.accountingweb.com/item/86333
Question:
Where are the major differences between book income and economic income that understate
book income reported to the investing public?
Answer:
This question is too complex to even scratch the surface in a short paragraph. One
of the main bones of contention between the FASB and technology companies is FAS 2 that
requires the expensing of both research and development (R&D) even though it is
virtually certain that a great deal of the outlays for these items will have economic
benefit in future years. The FASB contends that the identification of which
projects, what future periods, and the amount of the estimated benefits per period are too
uncertain and subject to a high degree of accounting manipulation (book cooking) if such
current expenditures are allowed to be capitalized rather than expensed. Other bones
of contention concern expenditures for building up the goodwill, reputation, and training
"assets" of companies. The FASB requires that these be expensed rather
than capitalized except in the case of an acquisition of an entire company at a price that
exceeds the value of tangible assets less current market value of debt. In summary,
many firms have argued for "pro forma" earnings reporting such that companies
can make a case that huge expense reporting required by the FASB and GAAP can be adjusted
for better matching of future revenues with past expenditures.
You can read more about these problems in the
following two documents:
Accounting Theory --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm
State of the Profession of Accountancy --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm
Hard Assets Versus Intangible Assets
Intangible assets are difficult to define because there are so many types and
circumstances. For example some have contractual or statutory lives (e.g.,
copyrights, patents and human resources) whereas others have indefinite lives (e.g.,
goodwill and intellectual capital). Baruch Lev classifies intangibles as follows in
"Accounting for Intangibles: The New Frontier" --- http://www.nyssa.org/abstract/acct_intangibles.html
:
- Spillover knowledge that creates new products and enhances
valuepatents, drugs, chemicals, software, etc. (i.e., Merck, Cisco, Microsoft, IBM).
- Human Resources.
- Brands/Franchises.
- Structural capital, such as processes, and systems of doing
things. This is the fastest-growing group of intangibles.
He does not flesh in these groupings. I flesh in some examples below of unbooked
(unrecorded) intangible assets that may have value far in excess of all the booked assets
of a company.
- Spillover Knowledge
- Millions or billions expensed on R&D having good prospects for future economic
benefit
- Databases (e.g., prospective customer lists , knowledge bases, and AMR
Sabre System)
- Customer relationships including CRM software
- Operational software such as Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) installations and human
resource software
- Financial relationships such as credit reputation and international banking
contacts.
- Production backlog
- Human Resources.
- Highly skilled and experienced executives, staff, and labor (e.g., Steve Jobs, Bill
Gates, Warren Buffet, technicians, pilots, doctors, lawyers, accountants, etc.)
- Employee dedication and loyalty
- Mix of discipline and creative opportunity employment structure
- Brands/Franchises.
- Tradenames and logos
- Patents
- Copyrights
- Protections from many kinds of lawsuits (e.g., road builders are not sued for every
accident on roads they built and out of court settlements affording protections from
future lawsuits)
- Structural Capital, Processes, and Systems
- Machine and worker efficiencies and labor relations
- Risk management system and ethics environment
- Financial and operating leverage
- TQM
- Supply chain management AND marketing systems (the history of Dell Corporation)
- Political power (e.g., defense contractors, agricultural giants, and multinational oil
companies)
- Monopoly power (e.g., Microsoft corporation is worth more because there is so little
competition remaining in PC operating systems and MS Office products like Excel, Word, and
Powerpoint).
Baruch Lev's Value Chain Scorecard
Discovery/Learning
· Research and Development
· IT Development
· Employee Training
· Communities of Practice
· Customer Acquisition Costs
· Technology Purchase
· Reverse Engineering
-Spillovers
· IT Acquisition
· R&D Alliances/Joint Ventures
· Supplier/Customer Integration
Implementation
· Clinical Tests, FDA Approvals
· Beta Tests
· Unique Visitors
· Marketing Alliances
· Brand Support
· Stickiness and Loyalty Traffic Measures
· Work Practices
· Retention
· Hot Skills (Knowledge Workers
Commercialization
· Innovation Revenues
· Market Share/Growth
· Online Revenues
· Revenues from Alliances
· Revenue Growth by Segments
· Productivity Gains
· Online Supply Channels
· Earnings/Cash Flows
· Value Added
· Cash Burn Rate
· Product Pipeline
· Expected Restructuring Impact
· Market Potential/Growth
· Expected Capital Spending
|
The knowledge
capital estimates that Lev and Bothwell came up with during their run last fall of some 90
leading companies (see accompanying table) were absolutely huge. Microsoft,
for example, boasted a number of $211 billion, while Intel,
General
Electric and Merck
weighed in with $170 billion, $112 billion and $110 billion, respectively. Source: "The New Math," by Jonathan R. Laing, Barrons
Online, November 20, 2000 --- http://equity.stern.nyu.edu/News/news/levbarrons1120.html
Trinity students may go to J:\courses\acct5341\readings\levNov2000.htm |
- It is seldom, if ever mentioned, but Microsoft's
overwhelming huge asset is its customer lock-in to the Windows Operating System combined
with the enormous dominance of MS Office (Word, Excel, Outlook, etc) and MS Access.
The cost of shifting most any organization over to some other operating system and suite
software comparable to MS Office is virtually prohibitive. This
is the main asset of Microsoft, but measuring its value and variability is virtually
impossible.
- Intellectual property
- Trademarks, patents, copyrights
- In-process R&D
- Unrecorded goodwill
- Ways of doing business and adapting to technology
changes and shifts in consumer tastes
For example,
my (Baruch Lev's) recent computations show that Microsoft has
knowledge assets worth $211 billion -- by far the most of any company. Intel has knowledge
assets worth $170 billion, and Merck has knowledge assets worth $110 billion. Now, compare
those figures with DuPont's assets. DuPont has more employees than all of those companies
combined. And yet, DuPont's knowledge assets total only $41 billion -- there isn't much
extra profitability there. Source:
"The New Math," by Jonathan R. Laing, Barrons Online, November 20, 2000
--- http://equity.stern.nyu.edu/News/news/levbarrons1120.html
Trinity students may go to J:\courses\acct5341\readings\levNov2000.htm |
University logos of prestigious universities
(Stanford, Columbia, Carnegie-Mellon, Duke, etc.) are worth billions when discounting
their value in distance education of the future--- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/000aaa/0000start.htm
|
Purchase Versus Pooling: The Never Ending
Debate
FAS 141 and the Question of Value By
PricewaterhouseCoopers CFOdirect Network Newsdesk, January 16, 2003 --- http://www.cfodirect.com/cfopublic.nsf/vContentPrint/CA13B226B214A04085256CB000512D34?OpenDocument
Just as early reactions
to FAS 142 seemed to have overlooked the complexities in reviewing and testing
goodwill for impairment, so too have reactions to complying with the Financial
Accounting Standards Board's Statement No. 141 – Business Combinations.
Adopted and issued at the same time as Statement No. 142 in the summer of
2001, the headline news about FAS 141 was the elimination of the Pooling-of-Interest
accounting method in mergers and acquisitions. Going forward from June 30,
2001, all acquisitions are to be accounted for using one method only – Purchase
Accounting.
This change is significant and one particular aspect of it – the
identification and measurement of intangible assets outside of goodwill
– seems to be somewhat under-appreciated.
Stephen C. Gerard, Managing Director at Standard & Poor's Corporate Value
Consulting, says that there is "general conceptual understanding of
Statement 141 by corporate management and finance teams. But the real impact
will not be felt until the next deal is done." And that deal in FAS 141
parlance will be a "purchase" since "poolings" are no
longer recognized.
Consistent M&A Accounting
The FASB, in issuing Statement No. 141, concluded that "virtually all
business combinations are acquisitions and, thus, all business combinations
should be accounted for in the same way that other asset acquisitions are
accounted for – based on the values exchanged."
In defining how business combinations are to be accounted for, FAS 141
supersedes parts of APB Opinion No. 16. That Opinion allowed companies
involved in a merger or acquisition to use either pooling-of-interest
or purchase accounting. The choice hinged on whether the deal met 12 specified
criteria. If so, pooling-of-interest was required.
Over time, "pooling" became the accounting method of choice,
especially in "mega-deal" transactions. That, in the words of the
FASB, resulted in "…similar business combinations being accounted for
using different methods that produced dramatically different financial
statement results."
FAS 141 seeks to level that playing field and improve M&A financial
reporting by:
- Better
reflecting the investment made in an acquired entity based on the values
exchanged.
- Improving the
comparability of reported financial information on an apples-to-apples
basis.
- Providing more
complete financial information about the assets acquired and liabilities
assumed in business combinations.
- Requiring
disclosure of information on the business strategy and reasons for the
acquisition.
When announcing FAS 141, the FASB wrote: "This Statement requires those
(intangible assets) be recognized as assets apart from goodwill if they meet
one of two criteria – the contractual-legal criterion or the separability
criterion."
Unchanged by the new rule are the fundamentals of purchase accounting and the
purchase price allocation methodology for measuring goodwill: that is,
goodwill represents the amount remaining after allocating the purchase price
to the fair market values of the acquired assets, including recognized
intangibles, and assumed liabilities at the date of the acquisition.
"What has changed," says Steve Gerard, "is the rigor companies
must apply in determining what assets to break out of goodwill and separately
recognize and amortize."
Thus, in an unheralded way, FAS 141 introduces a process of identifying and
placing value on intangible assets that could prove to be a new experience for
many in corporate finance, as well as a costly and time-consuming exercise.
Nonetheless, an exercise critical to compliance with the new rule.
Continued at http://www.cfodirect.com/cfopublic.nsf/vContentPrint/CA13B226B214A04085256CB000512D34?OpenDocument
A Little Like Dirty Pooling Accounting
Tyco Undervalues Acquired Assets and Overvalues Acquired Liabilities:
Tyco International Ltd. said Monday it has agreed to
pay the Securities and Exchange Commission $50 million to settle charges related
to allegations of accounting fraud by the high-tech conglomerate's prior
management. The regulatory agency had accused Tyco of inflating operating
earnings, undervaluing acquired assets, overvaluing acquired liabilities and
using improper accounting rules, company spokeswoman Sheri Woodruff said. 'The
accounting practices violated federal securities laws,'' she said.
"Tyco to Pay S.E.C. $50 Million on Accounting Charges," The New York Times,
April 17, 2006 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/business/AP-Tyco-SEC-Fine.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
April 17, 2006 reply from Saeed Roohani
Bob,
Assuming improper accounting practices by Tyco
negatively impacted investors and creditors in the capital markets, why
SEC gets the $50 M? Shouldn't SEC give at least some of it back to the
people potentially hurt by such practices? Or damage to investors should
only come from auditors' pocket?
Saeed Roohani
April 18, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Saeed,
In a case like this it is difficult to identify particular victims
and the extent of the damage of this one small set of accounting
misdeeds in the complex and interactive multivariate world of
information.
The damage is also highly dispersed even if you confine the scope to
just existing shareholders in Tyco at the particular time of the
financial reports.
One has to look at motives. I'm guessing that one motive was to
provide overstated future ROIs from acquisitions in order to justify the
huge compensation packages that the CEO (Kozlowski) and the CFO
(Schwarz) were requesting from Tyco's Board of Directors for superior
acquisition performance. Suppose that they got $125 million extra in
compensation. The amount of damage for to each shareholder for each
share of stock is rather minor since there were so many shares
outstanding.
Also, in spite of the illegal accounting, Kozlowski's acquisitions
were and still are darn profitable for Tyco. I have a close friend (and
neighbor) in New Hampshire, a former NH State Trooper, who became
Koslowski's personal body guard. To this day my friend, Jack, swears
that Kozlowski did a great job for Tyco in spite of possibly "stealing"
some of Tyco's money. Many shareholders wish Kozlowski was still in
command even if he did steal a small portion of the huge amount he made
for Tyco. He had a skill at negotiating some great acquisition deals in
spite of trying to take a bit more credit for the future ROIs than was
justified under purchase accounting instead of virtual pooling
accounting.
I actually think Dennis Kozlowski was simply trying to get a bit
larger commission (than authorized by the Board) for some of his good
acquisition deals.
Would you rather have a smart crook or an unimaginative bean counter
managing your company? (Just kidding)
Bob Jensen
Bob Jensen's threads on the Tyco scandals are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm#PwC
April 18, 2006 message reply Gregg Wilson
Hi Bob Jensen
From Forbes:
<<But Briloff says what's particularly egregious is
the fact that Tyco did not file with the SEC disclosure forms (known as 8K
filings), which would have carried the exhibits setting forth the balance
sheets and income statements of the acquired companies.
"This is an even worse situation than under the old
pooling accounting, " Briloff says, "because under that now vestigial
method, investors and analysts could dig out the historical balance sheet
and income statement for the acquired companies." >>
Ah yes, the good old days, when accountants
understood what mattered.
Gregg
April 18, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Interesting but still does not mean Abe wanted to pool those statements.
Abe fought poolings like a tiger. He never said that accounting information
before an acquisition is totally useless. He did say it could be misleading
when pooled, especially in relation to terms of the acquisition.
Bob Jensen
Purchase Versus Pooling: The Never Ending Debate
March 29, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hope you don't mind another question.
I worked on Wall Street during the other tech mania
(late 60's) which included the conglomerate craze. I know
pooling-of-interest accounting was kind of tarred and feathered in the
ensuing meltdown, but I was never too clear why that was so. I am still
wondering why bogus goodwill is preferable to retaining the financial track
record of the combined companies. Are you aware of what the actual
objections to p-o-i are?
Gregg Wilson
March 29, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Some investors are impressed by high ROI or ROE
numbers. Keeping the denominator low with old historical cost numbers and
the numerator high with future earnings numbers "inflated" ROI and ROE and
made the mergers appear more successful than was actually the case.
There are other problems with "dirty pooling."
One of the best-known articles (from Barrons) was
written by Professor Abe Briloff about "Dirty Pooling at McDonalds."
McDonald's shares plummeted significantly the day that Briloff exposed dirty
pooling by McDonald's ---
http://www.jstor.org/view/00014826/ap010167/01a00060/0
Actually, one of the arguments in favor of purchase
accounting rather than pooling of interests is that in an arm's length
transaction goodwill can actually be measured, unlike the pie-in-the sky
valuations in a hypothetical world.
Bob Jensen
March 29, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Bob Jensen
Well I wasn't able to find a site where I could access Abe's article.
The "old numbers" are worth a lot to this user of financial statements,
and I would much rather have the combined track record of the two companies
than its obliteration. I am not sure why accountants feel that there is a
problem revealing what the past and current combined ROE has been. The
pooling-of-interest doesn't create that number, it only preserves it for
those who want to use it.
If you mean that the value of the exchanged stock is an actual
measurement of goodwill then I would take very serious issue. There is no
economic meaning to that number. Companies negotiate an exchange ratio. The
relative value of the two stocks may matter, but the value of the exchanged
stock has no relevance to the negotiation, so how could it be a measure of
anything economic? All you have to do is look at the real cases of stock
acquisitions that were made during the market boom to see how true that is
and how spurious the numbers became. I always assumed that the amortization
rules were changed because of the charade of company after company being
forced to report pro forma earnings due to the ludicrous mountains of
mythical goodwill.
But even if the goodwill number were determinable why would you want to
use it. The point isn't to have accurate values on the balance sheet. The
point is retaining the historical relationships of the earnings model.
Deferred costs are not assets that you want to value but the merely costs
that are going to be expensed and the historical relationship of those costs
to the resulting earnings is what tells you what the capital efficiency of
the company is. I want that information. Why obliterate it?
Gregg Wilson
March 29, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Generally there are market values of the stocks at the date of the
acquisition. These give some evidence of value at the time of the merger,
although there are blockage factor considerations.
In any case there is a long history of abuses of pooling to mislead
investors. In some cases that was the main purpose such that without being
able to use pooling accounting, acquisitions did not take place. In other
words the main purpose was to deceive.
A summary of FAS 141 is given at
http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/stsum141.shtml
The standard itself discusses a lot of both theory and abuses. In
general, academics fought against pooling. About the only parties in favor
of pooling were the corporations themselves.
Read the standard itself and you will learn a lot.
Bob Jensen
March 30, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Bob Jensen
Well I would call that entire FAS 141 a lot of
sophistries. Apples and oranges indeed. This is a case of trying to make an
apple into an orange and getting a rotten banana.
In the above example, if a company bought another
company for more than its net worth, the excess price paid was attributable
to goodwill and would have to be written off over a period of years. The
problem is that the writing off goodwill creates an expense that lowers
earnings. To get around this, companies use an accounting technique called
pooling of interest. This practice allows the acquiring company to buy other
companies at inflated prices and keep the goodwill charges off the company's
books. This strategy has resulted in merger mania. It enables a corporation
to buy another company at an inflated price using its own highly priced
stock as currency. In honest times, this process would create huge amounts
of goodwill that normally would have to be written off against future
earnings. Today, companies avoid this detriment to their bottom line by
pooling. The Merger Wave
These accounting abuses can be credited to what is
behind the current merger wave on Wall Street. Companies are using their
inflated stock prices to buy other companies. The result of buying more
companies brings in more sales and more profits, which Wall Street loves.
Using the pooling method of accounting, companies can acquire other
companies at high prices without the consequences of depressing future
earnings through the amortization of goodwill.
I was trying to find example of the abuses you were
talking about. I thought this was a terrific one. What fantastic
misinformation!
The thing that's so laughable about these arguments
is that they take investors for fools. In a stock acquisition not a nickel
of cash has been expended, so everyone understands that the purchase
goodwill is just a little paper farce that the accountants make us go
through. The amortization thing doesn't effect the price of the stock
because it has no e ffect whatsoever on the company's actual profitability
or cash flow. Have you read about the efficient market? I was really struck
in this last go around at the willingness of companies to take on billions
of dollars in goodwill that literally dwarfed everything else on their
balance sheets and caused their GAP earnings to be huge losses. They
reported their pro forma earnings and everyone understood that they hadn't
really paid 10 billion dollars for a company that was worth 100 million. I
looked at a couple of the deals and the share exchange ratios were really
very fair relative to the fundamentals (not the share prices). They were
good solid deals, between smallish tech companies that were very profitable
in the capex bubble and so were richly priced as one would expect. So the
accountants caved and changed the rule, and this little pint sized company
took some astounding goodwill writeoff the next year and the stock did
nothing. Did the guy who wrote 141 really think that phony made up good will
is the same thing as actual paid for with cash good will? I always get the
feeling that the companies relented on this one so they could fight their
battles on the ones that really matter. An orange is an orange, and an apple
is an apple.
I think accountants have really misunderstood the
whole abuse issue. I worked on Wall Street during the conglomerate fad and
spent hours analyzing stock acquisitions. There were some accounting abuses
but they were really not about pooling-of-interest. The people that really
got hurt were not the investors so much as the entrepreneurs who sold their
companies. Textron started the whole conglomerate thing and the business
schools wet their pants over the idea and pretty soon you could call
yourself a congolmerate and get a high stock price. I can't tell you how
tired I got of hearing the word "synergy". What was basically happening was
that the companies were making really good deals and getting a lot of value
for the stock they were giving up, partly because of the whole aura of the
thing. When you get a really good share exchange it makes your earnings
higher than they would be otherwise. Of course there is nothing abusive
about this. It's just the reality of doing a good deal. The real earnings
and cash flow are indeed and in fact actually higher per share for the
acquiring company. But of course that meant it took on the qualities of a
self-fullfilling prophecy. Investors were not fools then and they're not
fools now. They understood perfectly what was going on and hopped on for the
ride. It was the entrepreneurs that were selling their companies that were
duped. They were the ones that ended up with most of the stock when the
bubble burst.
I remember going out to talk to Henry Singleton at
Teledyne. What a brilliant man. He was telling me a story about a guy who
was peddling his company and wanted a certain price which he was evaluating
purely in terms of the value of the stock he was going to receive in the
exchange. Henry said that he sent him off to one of the schlock companies
that he knew would "pay" him what he wanted. We had our little moment of
bemusement, because even though it was early in the melt down stage, the guy
was obviously going to come up short. He just wasn't willing to look at what
he was getting a whole bunch of shares in, and he wasn't going to be able to
sell it for a while. So what do you think? Is it the accountants job to
protect that guy from his own greed?
By the way, Henry was playing his own games, and
they weren't really about pooling of interest. He was making literally
hundreds of stock acquisitions most of which were not really growth
companies but good solid little cash cows, and then he would slip in a nice
medium sized cash acquisitions once a quarter to make his "internal growth"
target. He would say that he was doing 15% external growth (the deal value
factor) and 15% internal growth. The thing about pooling was that you could
really see what the year-to-year growth of the combined companies was, so
Henry had to do his fix. Then after the stock tanked with the other
congomerates he was in great shape with all his cash flow so he started
doing debt swaps for the depressed stock. I was really sad when I heard he
had died prematurely. It would have been fun to see what his next move would
have been. The company languished without him.
Anyway I think the whole thing got interpreted as a
pooling-of-interest abuse, but as far as I'm concerned it really didn't have
anything to do with the accounting treatment. It's not the accountants
business to police the markets. In a stock deal the goodwill is all funny
money anyways, so the way I see it we are mucking up the balance sheet for
no good reason. You can amortize til you're blue in the face but it's not
really going to have any affect on anything real. It's not cash and it never
was. But you can pretend.
Gregg Wilson
March 30, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
FASB rules now require writing off goodwill only to the extent it is deemed impaired.
If you want to publish on such issues you have to provide something other
than off the top-of-your-head evidence. Do you have any evidence that
companies tend to buy other companies at inflated prices above what
companies are actually worth in terms of synergy and possibly oligopoly
benefits (such as when AT&T bought Bell South). You need to define "inflated
prices." About the only good examples I found of this on a large scale was
during the S&L bubble of the 1980s and the technology bubble of the 1990s
when almost everything was inflated in value. But at the time, who could've
predicted if and when the bubble would burst? It's always easier to assess
value in hindsight.
In general, it's very hard to define "inflated value" since the worth of
Company B to Company A may be far different than the worth of Company B to
Company C. You can always make an assumption that CEOs acquiring companies
are all stupid and/or crooks, but this assumption is just plain idiotic.
Many acquisitions pay off very nicely such as when Tyco bought most of its
acquisitions. Even crooks like Dennis Koswalski often make good acquisitions
for their companies. Koswalski simply thought he should get a bigger piece
of the action from his good deals.
Of course there are obvious isolated cases such as when Time Warner
bought AOL, but in this case AOL used fraudulent accounting that was not
detected.
I'm a little curious about what you would recommend for a balance sheet
of the merged AB Company when Company A buys Company B having the following
balance sheets:
Company A
Cash $200
Land $100 having a current exit value of $200
Equity ($300)
Company B
Land $10 having a current exit value of $100
Equity ($10)
Company A buys all Company B shares for $120 million in cash and merges
the accounts. Company A and B business operations are all merged such that
maintaining Company B as a subsidiary makes no sense. Employees of Company B
are highly skilled real estate investors who now work for Company AB. The
extra $20 million paid above the land current values of Company B was paid
mainly to acquire the highly skilled employees of Company B.
Company AB
Cash $ 80
Land ?
Equity ($ ?)
Why would a pooling be better than purchase accounting in the above
instance? I think not.
Bob Jensen
March 30, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
I certainly didn't mean to imply that cash
acquisitions should be treated as pooling-of-interest. On the contrary I was
trying to make the point that they are totally different situations, and
can't be treated effectively by the same accounting rule. The cash is the
whole point.
Gregg Wilson
March 30, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
I guess I still don't see a convincing argument why pooling is better for
non-cash deals since you still have the same problem as with cash deals.
That problem is badly out of date historical cost accounts on the books that
are totally meaningless in the acquisition negotiations. If they are totally
meaningless in negotiations, why should historical costs be pooled into the
acquiring firm's book instead of more relevant numbers reflecting the fair
values of the tangible assets at the time of the acquisition?
Of course there are many issues that your raise below, but I don't think
they argue for pooling.
Bob Jensen
March 30, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Bob Jensen
Because historical costs are the historical record
of the company's capital efficiency. As my old accounting teacher pointed
out, the earnings model is a gross approximation at best, but if persued
with consistency and conservativeness it can be a good indicator of the
capital efficiency of the firm and it's ability to generate a stream of
future cash returns. For me the killer argument in that regard is this. The
reality of a company is the stream of cash returns itself, dividends if you
will, and that's what the stock is worth. It makes no difference whether the
company has liberal accounting policies or conservative accounting policies.
If applied consistently then that rate of return on equity will define the
stream of future cash returns. It can be liberal accounting with a low ROE
and high E and a high reinvestment rate, or conservative accounting with a
high ROE and low E and a low reinvestment rate, but the resulting stream of
dividends is the same. The historical deferred costs and historical ROE are
the evidence of value, but they depend on consistent application of some
kind of accounting standards and rules whether they be liberal or
conservative (conservative has its advantages). I would rather have that
evidence than know what the current "fair value" of the assets is. Those
values don't help me determine the value of the stock. Pooling of interest
is terrific, because it recreates that earnings model history for the
combined companies. The historical costs are not meaningless to the
negotiations but rather are the basis for the negotiations, for they are the
evidence that the companies are using to determine the share exchange ratio
that they will accept. A low ROE company will have less to bargain with than
a high ROE company, all else being equal. There are potentials for abuse in
the differing accounting standards of the two entities, but if major changes
in the accounting standards of one of the companies occur, then the
accountants should disclose that material fact.
Gregg Wilson
March 30, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hardly a measure of capital efficiency. I have the 1981 U.S. Steel Annual
Report back when FAS 33 was still in force. U.S. Steel had to report under
both historical cost and current cost bases.
Under historical cost, U.S. Steel reported over $1 billion in net
earnings. On a current cost basis, all earnings disappeared and a net loss
of over $300 million was reported.
I consider the $1 billion net income reported under historical cost to be
a misleading figure of capital efficiency.
I think you should first read the FASB's standard on pooling versus
purchase accounting in detail. Then see if you still prefer pooling. Also
study
http://www.jstor.org/view/00014826/ap010167/01a00060/0
You might want to compare your analysis below with what Fama states at
http://library.dfaus.com/reprints/interview_fama_tanous/
Bob Jensen
March 31, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Gregg,
The law views this in reverse. Equity is a residual claim on assets under
securities laws. But the claim itself has no bearing on the historical
(deferred) cost amount since, in liquidation, the historical cost is
irrelevant. And in negotiating acquisition deals historical cost is
irrelevant. I have trouble imagining acquisitions where it would be relevant
since asset appraisals are essential in acquisitions.
Deferred cost such as book value of buildings and equipment is also
rendered meaningless by entirely arbitrary accumulated depreciation contra
accounts. Your argument does not convince me that pooling is better than
purchase accounting in acquisitions.
Since you feel so strongly about this, I suggest that you expose your
theories to the academic accounting world. Consider subscribing (free) to
the AECM at
http://pacioli.loyola.edu/aecm/ (Don't be mislead by the
technology description of this listserv. It has become the discussion forum
for all matters of accounting theory.)
Then carefully summarize your argument for pooling and see how accounting
professors respond to your arguments.
See if you can convince some accounting professors. You've not yet
convinced me that pooling is better.
Bob Jensen
April 5, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
I have been having an e-mail discussion with Bob
Jensen about accounting of stock acquisitions, and he kindly suggested that
I post my thoughts on the matter in this forum. I am not an academic and I
am here only because, as a user of financial statements, I find purchase
accounting of stock acquisitions puzzling.
(1) To me, the value of the exchanged shares is not
an economically relevant amount and is certainly not a purchase price. The
price of a stock acquisition is the share exchange ratio and what is
negotiated is the equity participation of the two groups of stockholders in
the combined companies. In the latest boom period purchase accounting often
produced extreme purchase prices many times what any cash buyer would have
paid and, when amortization was employed, large losses for the acquiror
which prompted pro forma reporting. If there was any economic reality to the
accounting treatment, why did those managements not lose their jobs? They
didn't "pay" the value of the exchanged shares. On the contrary, the share
exchange ratio that they negotiated was perfectly reasonable and beneficial.
(2) The exchanged stock value as purchase price is
a non-cash paper value which, regardless of the amortization or impairment
treatment, is ignored by this investor and, from what I have seen, investors
in general. It has no relevance to determining the discounted value of the
future cash returns, simply because the acquisition was in fact a
combination of equity interests and not a cash purchase and there was never
an economically relevant cash cost.
(3) Pooling-of-interest is good because it
preserves the historical profitability history of the combined companies and
accurately reflects the merger of equity interests which has in fact taken
place.
(4) There is nothing deceptive or abusive about
pooling accounting. If the ROE is higher it's because that's the right ROE.
It will result in a more accurate, and not a less accurate, projection of
future cash returns.
If company A and company B are very similar
fundamentally and both stocks are selling at 20 and they are negotiating a
share for share exchange and interest rates drop suddenly and both stocks go
to 25, then A isn't going to think oh-my-gosh we are "paying" 25% more for B
and drop out of the negotiations. On the contrary they will take the market
action as validation of the negotiated exchange ratio which is the price.
The stocks could go to 90 and it still wouldn't change anything except the
size of the goodwill on the balance sheet of the combined companies that I
have to back out of my analysis.
Gregg Wilson
April 5, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
--- Gregg Wilson wrote: I have been having an
e-mail discussion with Bob Jensen about accounting of stock acquisitions,
and he kindly suggested that I post my thoughts on the matter in this forum.
(snip) --- end of quote ---
Consider the following two sets of transactions:
1. P Corporation (P is for purchaser) raises $100
by issuing ten new shares to the capital market. It uses the $100 cash to
purchase 100% of the outstanding stock of T (as in Target) Corporation.
2. P issues ten new shares to the stockholders of T
in exchange for 100% of the outstanding stock of T.
Questions:
1. Should the accounting for the assets of T in the
consolidated financial statements of P differ between these two
transactions?
2. The crux of your critique of purchase accounting
seems to your assertion: "To me, the value of the exchanged shares is not an
economically relevant amount and is certainly not a purchase price."
a. Is the $100 cash raised by P in transaction #1
above an economically relevant amount?
b. Is the $100 cash transferred by P to the
shareholders of T in transaction #1 above a purchase price?
Richard C. Sansing
Associate Professor of Business Administration
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
100 Tuck Hall Hanover, NH 03755
April 5, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Richard Sansing
I would say the two transactions are not
equivalent.
In 1. the stockholders of T end out with $100. In
2. the stockholders of T end out with shares of stock in P.
1. is still a cash purchase and
2. is still an exchange of shares.
Say that P has 100 shares outstanding. In 2. what P
and T have negotiated is that in combining the two companies the
shareholders of T will end up with 10 shares in the combined companies and P
will end up with 100. That is obviously based on an assessment that the
value of P is 10 times the value of T based on their relative fundamentals
and ability to produce future cash returns. The price at which P can sell
it's stock to some third party is not relevant.
Gregg Wilson
April 6, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
--- Gregg Wilson wrote:
I would say the two transactions are not
equivalent.
In 1. the stockholders of T end out with $100. In
2. the stockholders of T end out with shares of stock in P.
1. is still a cash purchase and 2. is still an
exchange of shares.
--- end of quote ---
That the former shareholders of T wind up with
different assets in the two settings is not in dispute. Let's try this once
more.
In response to your original post, I posed three
questions. They were:
1. Should the accounting for the assets of T in the
consolidated financial statements of P differ between these two
transactions?
2. a. Is the $100 cash raised by P in transaction
#1 above an economically relevant amount?
b. Is the $100 cash transferred by P to the
shareholders of T in transaction #1 above a purchase price?
You answered none of them. You did remark:
"The price at which P can sell it's stock to some
third party is not relevant."
but I did not pose a question to which that is a
plausible answer. I have stipulated a transaction, that P sells--not could
sell, did sell--ten new shares of P stock in exchange for $100 cash as part
of transaction #1. Question 2a is a simple one. Is the $100 cash that P
received for its stock in the stipulated transaction an economically
relevant amount? If later in the discussion you want to dispute a premise in
an argument I advance, you are of course free to do so. But I have not yet
advanced an argument. I have simply posed some questions.
You have chosen to enter a community in which
abstract reasoning involving hypothetical examples the norm. You can
participate in this community, or not. If you answer the three questions, we
can proceed, because then I think I can understand what it is about the
purchase method of accounting that you find objectionable. But right now I
am unsure how you are thinking about the problem.
Richard C. Sansing
Associate Professor of Business Administration
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
100 Tuck Hall Hanover, NH 03755
April 6, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Richard Sansing
Maybe I should qualify my "Yes" answer. Answers 2
and 3 are yes to the extent they are economically relevant within
transaction set 1. They are not economically relevant to transaction set 2.
Gregg Wilson
April 6, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
---Gregg Wilson wrote:
Answer to all questions is yes.
Maybe I should qualify that. Answers 2 and 3 are
yes to the extent they are economically relevant within transaction set 1.
They are not economically relevant to transaction set 2.
--- end of quote ---
Okay, that helps. Given your answers, I think I can
put forward the case for purchase accounting. Transaction set #1 is recorded
in the following manner.
Sale of new equity for cash:
Cash 100
Stockholder equity 100
Purchase of T's assets for cash:
Assets 100
Cash 100
When the smoke clears, P has recorded assets with a
book value of 100 and stockholder equity of 100.
Purchase accounting takes the view that P's
acquisition of T's assets for stock essentially collapses these two
transactions into one, recording the value of the T assets at the market
price of the P stock. In contrast, if T's assets had a book value of 60,
pooling of interest would record assets of 60 and equity of 60.
The issue is whether this "collapsing" is
appropriate. P and T certainly wind up in the same position under both
transactions. Whether the shareholders of P and T are in the same position
depends on their portfolio choices.
Suppose first that I behave in accordance with the
principles of Capital Markets 101, in which I hold the market portfolio plus
the risk-free asset. Before either transaction #1 or #2, I hold (say) 10 P
shares (out of 100 outstanding) and 1 T share (out of 10 outstanding).
After either transaction, I own 11 P shares (out of
110
outstanding.) If all shareholders behave as I do,
then every party associated with the transaction is in the same position
under both sets of transactions. The burden seems to be on those advocating
the pooling method to explain why the accounting should differ when the
results to every party are the same.
Now suppose instead that shareholders, for whatever
reason, do not behave in this manner, and the two transactions lead to
substantive differences at the shareholder level (but not at the corporate
level). Should differences between the two transactions at the shareholder
level dictate different accounting treatments at the corporate level? Why?
Finally, let's consider the assertions you made in
your original post.
"To me, the value of the exchanged shares is not an
economically relevant amount and is certainly not a purchase price. (snip)
In the latest boom period purchase accounting often produced extreme
purchase prices many times what any cash buyer would have paid..."
When the stock was issued for cash, you considered
the cash price paid economically relevant (my question 2a); and when the
assets were sold for cash, you considered it a purchase price (my question
2b.) Yet when the transaction is collapsed, you
consider the market value of shares an not economically relevant amount and
not a purchase price. So if transaction were arranged as a stock deal, are
you arguing that P would issue more than ten shares to the shareholders of T
in exchange for their T stock? Why?
Richard Sansing
April 7, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Richard Sansing
I was going to followup this morning, and noticed
that you had already responded.
On the details of your case... What I didn't
understand was the equivalence of the subscribers to the P stock, and the T
shareholders. Why would we presume that they are one in the same? The
hypothetical subscribers to the P stock obviously would view the price of P
as economically relevant. But the T shareholders are only interested in the
shares of P that they end up with. From their point of view the collapsible
transaction could be executed at any price and it would still bear the same
result for them. It's a wash with regard to price. That is why I qualified
my response to question 2 by indicating that it was not economically
relevant to transaction 2. The price of P is an economic reality, but not
one which consititutes a purchase price of T.
I wouldn't say that pooling looks to the book value
as a value of the combined companies, any more than book value is the value
of any other company. What pooling does is reflect the merging of the two
historical earnings and financial records of the two companies to reflect
that the nature of the transaction as a merging of equity interests with an
indeterminate "purchase price".
I had never thought about the compensation issue.
I'll get back to you if I can figure something out.
Gregg
April 7, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
---Gregg Wilson wrote:
P and T have negotiated that P should issue ten shares in exchange for T
stock. That is the economic reality. (snip) And there is no economic reason
that we should pick the one that happens to coincide with the actual current
price of P's stock, because that was not an input of determining the
exchange ratio. The problem is that there is no determinant value for a
share exchange acquisition. Using the current P stock price is merely an
arbitrary convention (snip)
--- end of quote ---
The current market price of P is part of the
economic reality, as is the current book value of T. Purchase accounting
looks to the former to record the assets of T on the books of P; pooling
looks to the latter.
Okay, time for a new thought experiment. The CEO of
P corporation receives a salary of $400K plus 1,000 shares of P stock on
July 1. These are shares, not options, and they are not restricted. On July
1, when the shares were delivered to the CEO, the stock had a market value
of $60 per share, a book value of $40 per share, and a par value of $1 per
share. Note that the amount of shares delivered is not a function of the
stock price.
Record the entry for compensation expense for the
year. The accounts are provided below.
Compensation expense
Cash Stockholder's equity
Richard C. Sansing
Associate Professor of Business Administration
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
100 Tuck Hall Hanover, NH 03755
April 6, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Richard Sansing
I was going to follow up this morning, and noticed
that you had already responded.
On the details of your case... What I didn't
understand was the equivalence of the subscribers to the P stock, and the T
shareholders. Why would we presume that they are one in the same? The
hypothetical subscribers to the P stock obviously would view the price of P
as economically relevant. But the T shareholders are only interested in the
shares of P that they end up with. From their point of view the collapsible
transaction could be executed at any price and it would still bear the same
result for them. It's a wash with regard to price. That is why I qualified
my response to question 2 by indicating that it was not economically
relevant to transaction 2. The price of P is an economic reality, but not
one which consititutes a purchase price of T.
I wouldn't say that pooling looks to the book value
as a value of the combined companies, any more than book value is the value
of any other company. What pooling does is reflect the merging of the two
historical earnings and financial records of the two companies to reflect
that the nature of the transaction as a merging of equity interests with an
indeterminate "purchase price".
I had never thought about the compensation issue.
I'll get back to you if I can figure something out.
Gregg
April 7, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
--- Gregg Wilson wrote:
On the details of your case... What I didn't
understand was the equivalence of the subscribers to the P stock, and the T
shareholders. Why would we presume that they are one in the same? The
hypothetical subscribers to the P stock obviously would view the price of P
as economically relevant. But the T shareholders are only interested in the
shares of P that they end up with. From their point of view the collapsible
transaction could be executed at any price and it would still bear the same
result for them. (snip)
I had never thought about the compensation issue.
I'll get back to you if I can figure something out.
--- end of quote ---
The setting in which P and T shareholders are the
same is an interesting special case in which the distinction you regard as
crucial--the difference in what the T shareholders hold after transaction #1
and transaction #2--vanishes. And it is not a unreasonable case to consider,
as it is consistent with finance portfolio theory in which all investors
hold the market portfolio.
Let me restate what I hear you saying to see if I
understand. Investors that receive P stock for cash care about the price of
P stock. Investors that receive P stock in a merger care only about the
number of shares they receive, but do not care about the price of those
shares. Do I have that right?
Your answer to the compensation question will, I
think, help me understand how you are framing these issues.
Richard Sansing
April 7, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Richard Sansing
I am afraid I am not well-versed in the
compensation/option issues though I probably should do better. So without
the benefit of prior knowledge...
I guess if there is a compensation expense, it is
not necessarily one that is determinable. If there were 100,000 shares
outstanding, then from the owners point of view they expect that the
incremental net cash returns produced by the extra efforts of the CEO
motivated by the stock grant can be valued at a minimum of 1/100 of the
value of the company's future cash returns without the CEO's extra effort.
But relative values aren't costs and it's unclear to me whether the owners
care what the current price of the stock is. Maybe not since the grant is
not a function of the stock price. That's as far as I've gotten. I need to
get some other things done. I'll keep thinking on it, but I seem to be
stumped for now.
Gregg Wilson
April 7, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
Hi Gregg Wilson,
I think I am starting to understand your
perspective, but I need a little more input from you. First, here are some
excerpts from your recent contributions to this thread.
---Gregg Wilson wrote: I guess if there is a
compensation expense, it is not necessarily one that is determinable. (Note:
The compensation consisted of $400K cash and 1,000 shares of stock with a
market price of $60 per share--RS)
...it's unclear to me whether the owners care what
the current price of the stock is.
And there is no economic reason that we should pick
the one that happens to coincide with the actual current price of P's stock.
Using the current P stock price is merely an
arbitrary convention.
The price at which P can sell it's stock to some
third party is not relevant.
The price of P is relevant not as an absolute
number, but only in terms of its ratio to the real or imputed price of T.
---end of quotations
In the compensation issue that I posed, I
stipulated that the market value of the stock was $60 per share. Tell me
what that number means to you. At the most fundamental level, why do you
think the price might be $60 instead of $6 or $600? I'm not looking for a
"because that's where the market cleared that day" answer, but something
that gets at the most primitive, fundamental reasons stock prices are what
they are. And when they change, why do they change?
Richard Sansing
April 8, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Richard Sansing
That's easy. I subcribe to the
dividend-discount-model view of stock prices. Stock prices are basically a
function of interest rates and expected sustainable future profitability
(ROE; the best estimator we have (with reinvestment rate) for those future
cash returns).
In fact I use my own DDM to convert stock prices to
expectational ROEs. Such a DDM is a complete model of stock valuation, and
can fully explain stock price levels from the 10-12% ROE low reinvestment
low interest rate period of the late 30s, to the 12-15% ROE high interest
rate period of the 70s, to the 25% cap-weighted ROE and low interest rates
of the capex peak in 2000. Stock prices are extremely volatile because they
are a point-in-time market consensus of the future sustainable profitability
of the company. A decline in profitabliity expectations will typically
produce a price change of two or three times the magnitude, while a change
in discount rate will have a more subdued impact.
Gregg Wilson
April 8, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
--- Gregg Wilson wrote: I subscribe to the
dividend-discount-model view of stock prices. (snip) --- end of quote ---
Understood. The theme that has emerged in this
thread is that you are uncomfortable in situations in which GAAP would use
the current market price of the firm's stock as an input when determining an
accounting entry.
Let's put aside the purchase/pooling dispute to
look at the compensation question. Under the set of facts that I stipulated,
I don't think there is any controversy regarding the appropriate accounting
treatment. It would be:
Compensation expense $460K Cash $400K Equity $60K
A rationale for this treatment is to decompose the
equity transfer into two components. First, suppose the firm sells 1,000
shares of new equity to the CEO at the market price of $60 per share (debit
cash, credit equity); second, suppose the firm pays the CEO a cash salary of
$460K (credit cash, debit compensation expense.) Collapsing these two
transactions into one (transfer of $400K cash plus equity worth $60K in
exchange for services) doesn't change the accounting treatment.
Now change some of the numbers and labels around
and let the firm issue new P equity to T in exchange for all of its equity.
The purchase method uses the value of the P stock issued to record the
assets and liabilities of T.
Which brings us full circle to your original post.
You wrote:
"To me, the value of the exchanged shares is not an
economically relevant amount and is certainly not a purchase price."
I argue that the value of P stock is relevant and
is a purchase price, in both the compensation case and P's acquisition of T.
Richard Sansing
April 9, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Richard Sansing
I trust you are having a pleasant weekend. Before
tackling the compensation case etc, can you tell me how we account for open
market share repurchases.
Gregg Wilson
April 10, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
--- You wrote: Before tackling the compensation
case etc, can you tell me how we account for open market share repurchases.
--- end of quote ---
Credit cash, debit equity; details can vary
depending on whether the repurchase is a major retirement or acquiring the
shares to distribute as part of compensation. If the latter, the debit is to
Treasury Stock.
Richard Sansing
April 11, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Richard Sansing
Well I'm still in the same place. It seems to me
that when a company pays an employee $60,000 in cash they are compensating
them for services rendered in that value. When a company grants stock to an
employee they are diluting the interests of the current equity participants
in the expectation that the employee will be motivated to more than
compensate them by an improved stream of cash returns in the future; the
point of making the employee an equity participant in the first place,
rather than an immediately richer individual. So I don't see the relevance
of the price of the shares to the trans 2 again. Except in this case the use
of the market share price seems even more suspect in the collapsible
transaction, since the company and the CEO could execute the wash
transactions between themselves at any price. Also the dilution is the cost,
so adding an additional phantom non-cash cost seems to me to be a double
counting. It also has the same characteristics as the pooling transaction
where very bizarre results could be possible. If a company had a 50 PE then
a 2% dilution would erase the company's entire earnings for the period while
if the company had a 10 PE a 2% dilution would erase 20% of the earnings.
It's the same 2% dilution.
So is that it Richard? Am I a hopeless dolt? I'm
sorry but I can't get there on the collapsible transaction. Nor do I
understand why the lack of rational result doesn't matter to anyone. I don't
want to go look up the data again, but I know when JDS Uniphase bought E-tek
the share exchange was quite reasonable but the value of the exchanged stock
was in the multi billions and was probably like 500 times the eanrings of E-tek.
So when this pipsqueek company goes to raise billions of dollars at their
current market price, it's not just whether they could sell that much stock,
but rather how they would justify it to the buyers. "Use of Proceeds: we are
going to go out and make a cash acquisition of a company called E-tek and we
are going to pay billions of dollars and 500 times E-teks's earnings and
many many multiples of book value and sales." So what would their real
chances be of getting away with that, and why doesn't that seem like a
phoney number to anyone? Why doesn't it seem funny that the "prices" of
stock purchase acquisitions are basically randomly distributed from the
reasonable to the ludicrous to the sublime? Isn't that evidence that the
price is uneconomic? Is this really the basic justification for the economic
relevance of the purchase number, or is there something more?
Gregg Wilson
April 11, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
--- Gregg Wilson wrote:
It seems to me that when a company pays an employee
$60,000 in cash they are compensating them for services rendered in that
value. When a company grants stock to an employee they are diluting the
interests of the current equity participants in the expectation that the
employee will be motivated to more than compensate them by an improved
stream of cash returns in the future; the point of making the employee an
equity participant in the first place, rather than an immediately richer
individual. (snip) Why doesn't it seem funny that the "prices" of stock
purchase acquisitions are basically randomly distributed from the reasonable
to the ludicrous to the sublime? Isn't that evidence that the price is
uneconomic?
--- end of quote ---
I did not stipulate an assumption that the employee
had to hold the 1,000 shares granted.
The interests of the current stockholders are not
diluted in the specified transaction ($400K cash plus stock worth $60K)
relative to an alternative cash compensation arrangement of equal value
($460K cash.)
You had earlier indicated a belief that stock
prices are best explain by a dividend discount model. Now you suggest that
they are random. If you think they are random, of course, I quite understand
your discomfort using stock price as an input to the accounting system; but
GAAP can use stock price as an input in many transactions, and it is that,
not the purchase method per se, that appears to trouble you.
Anecdotes regarding one firm "over-paying" for
another in a stock deal don't add much to our understanding, and in any case
the issues involving merger premiums and acquisition method may be unrelated
to the financial accounting treatment of the acquisition. There is a large
and growing literature on this topic; see for example:
Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. 2003. Stock market
driven acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics 70 (December): 295-311.
Richard Sansing
April 11, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
--- Gregg Wilson wrote:
<<> The interests of the current stockholders are
not diluted in the specified > transaction ($400K cash plus stock worth
$60K) relative to an > alternative cash compensation arrangement of equal
value ($460K > cash.)>>
I'm confused. Aren't there 1,000 more shares
outstanding?
--- end of quote ---
Yes. Suppose before any compensation is paid, 100K
shares are outstanding and the firm is worth $6,460,000. After we pay $460K
compensation, the firm is worth $6,000,000, or $60 per share.
If instead we compensate the CEO with $400K and
1,000 shares, after compensating the CEO the firm is worth $6,460,000 -
$400,000 =$6,060,000 and 101K shares are outstanding, still with a value of
$60 per share (because $6,060,000/101,000 = $60).
With regard to the rest of the thread, I think we
are going around in circles. Purchase accounting uses the price of P shares
to record the assets of T on P's financial statements. If that price is
meaningful, goodwill is meaningful; if the price is random, goodwill is too.
Richard Sansing
April 11, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Richard Sansing
If I spend $460,000 I certainly hope that my
company isn't worth $460,000 less or I certainly wouldn't spend the money.
Hopefully the present value of the impact of the $460,000 on future net cash
returns will at least exceed the cash expenditure. The same could be said
for the 1,000 shares, although they are not a book cost but merely a
redistribution of equity participation.
But by your logic I should point out that the
company was worth $60.60 per share after the $400,000 total loss
expenditure. Now by issuing 1,000 shares the company is only worth $60.00
per share. Dilution?
Well it has certainly been an interesting
conversation, and I do thank you for your time and interest. I have learned
a great deal. I would agree that we are at an impasse. All my best to you
and yours.
Gregg Wilson
April 11, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Richard Sansing
Sorry for the confusion. I was referring to the
value of the exchanged shares of stock in the purchase acquisitions, the
"price" that purchase accounting puts on the deal which becomes in fact
random because it bears no relationship to the economic basis of the
negotiation.
<<> The interests of the current stockholders are
not diluted in the specified > transaction ($400K cash plus stock worth
$60K) relative to an > alternative cash compensation arrangement of equal
value ($460K > cash.)>>
I'm confused. Aren't there 1,000 more shares
outstanding?
> Anecdotes regarding one firm "over-paying" for
another in a stock > deal don't add much to our understanding,>>
Apparently not, but it should. We should be asking
why any of those managements still have a job. The point is they didn't
overpay. The share exchange ratio in the JDS/E-tek deal was quite reasonable
and resulting in a fair allocation of equity ownership between the two
groups of shareholders. It just had nothing to do with the market value of
the JDS stock that was exchanged. The monstrocity of the goodwill is a tip
off that something is wrong about the treatment, not that the buyer
overpaid.
<<> merger premiums and acquisition method may be
unrelated to the financial > accounting treatment of the acquisition.>>
I think that's right. Management has caught on that
the market doesn't care about the phony goodwill and they just do what's
right for the company. There's always pro forma reporting if the GAAP
reporting gets too messed up.
Gregg Wilson
April 12, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Gregg,
You wrote: "There's always pro forma reporting if
the GAAP reporting gets too messed up." End Quote
I hardly think pro forma does a whole lot for
investors when "GAAP gets messed up." The problem is that you can't compare
pro forma, anything-goes, reports with any benchmarks at all ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#ProForma
Appealing to pro forma reporting only weakens your
case for an already defenseless case for pooling.
Bob Jensen
April 11, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Bob Jensen
I think you misunderstand my point. I am surely not
defending pro forma reporting. I would assume that one reason goodwill
amortization was suspended was that it left companies with no other option.
Management rightly assumes that investors want to know what the company is
actually earning. If goodwill amortization was suspended for some other
reason, what might it have been?
Gregg Wilson
April 13, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Richard Sansing and anyone who would care to
reply.
We have come to an impasse on purchase accounting,
but I did have a question on pooling that I wanted to ask you about.
I am old enough to have been hanging around Wall
Street research departments in my misspent youth, and was there for the
conglomerate craze in the late sixties, and these are the things I remember.
After the Harvard B School did there endorsement of Textron, all you had to
do was call yourself a conglomerate and talk about synergy and you'd have an
immediate following for your stock. Not only that, but you seemed to be able
to make share exchange acquisitions on favorable terms which were accretive
to your earnings, and pretty soon you had a kind of self-fullfilling
prophecy going on. I did some work on Teledyne and even went out to
California and met Henry Singleton. He used to talk about 15% internal
growth, and 15% external growth. The external part was the accretion to
earnings from stock acquisitions. Well we know that the whole thing ended
badly, although Henry was nobody's fool and had been buying little cash-cow
companies all along despite the sales pitch, so he was in far better shape
than some.
Now for years afterwards you keep hearing this idea
that pooling is abusive because companies can use their "high priced" stock
to make acquisitions, especially in periods of market enthusiasm like the
late sixties. I guess what is really being said is that companies stand a
better chance of making accretive acquisitions when times are good and the
stock is selling at a high price, and the whole thing is in danger of
becoming another ponzi scheme like the conglomerate fad all over again,
because the accretion to earnings will then reinforce the high price of the
stock. There is a perception that the price of the stock matters and because
it matters we have to somehow account for that mattering in the accounting
treatment of the acquisition.
My biggest concern with this conclusion is that the
problem is not the accounting treatment. If a company makes a favorable
share exchange acquisition which is accretive to earnings, then that is what
has happened. That is an accurate portrayal of economic reality. There is no
denying that the company made a GOOD DEAL. They ended up with a share of the
combined companies that is quite favorable to their interests. The second
problem is that in many circumstances the value of the exchanged shares is
much less of a factor than we fear. If the acquired company has publically
traded shares, then the price of those shares will be reflecting the current
market expectations as well. There is little motivation on the part of the
seller to consider the deal in terms of the putative purchase value of the
exchanged shares, because they can already cash in at a "high price". It is
the relative values of the two share prices that will be the consideration.
JDS Uniphase negotiates a share exchange acquisition with E-tek. The share
exchange ratio is pretty fair to both companies, and is not really
particularly accretive or advantageous to JDS, despite the fact that the
value of the exchanged shares is in the multi billions of dollars and many
many times what any reasonable cash buyer would pay. E-tek has a "high
price" stock already. They don't need JDS to cash in on the market's current
enthusiasm for net stocks. Would there be anything abusive or deceptive
about accounting for this deal as a pooling-of-interest?
Now I won't deny the fact that the price of the
acquirors stock can influence the deal. Henry himself told me a story about
a seller that came to him and was looking for a certain "price" expressed in
terms of the value of the exchanged shares that he expected to get. The
seller was a private company owned by a single entrepreneur, not untypical
of the sellers at that time. Henry couldn't give him that many shares for
his company because it wouldn't have met his accretion requirments, but he
sent him to another conglomerator who he knew would, because that company's
stock was flying high relative to it's underlying profitability which didn't
compare to Teledyne's. The seller got his deal, but by the time the sellers
shares came out of lockup that company was almost bankrupt. Though we think
of the crash in conglomerate stocks in terms of the poor investors, it was
really the sellers who were the biggest victims of the conglomerate fad,
because they were left holding a much bigger proportion of the bag. And the
investors weren't really investors. They were speculators and knew perfetly
well they were playing a musical chairs game. There are two points (1) the
sellers may consider the deal in terms of the value of the exchanged shares,
particularly if they are non-publically-traded sellers, but they would
probably be well advised to also consider that the shares they receive
represent an equity interest in the combined companies, and (2) whatever the
seller's motivation, the buyer will always be looking at the deal in terms
of their equity share of the combined companies and whether the deal will be
accretive or dilutive to their interests.
When we say that pooling is abusive and deceptive
what are we really talking about? Is it pooling itself, or is it the fear
that rollup companies can make those self-fullfilling accretive acquisitions
because of the desire of sellers to cash in on the market value of that
stock, and that is somehow an evil thing? Is it really our responsibility as
accountants to police the market and try to keep that from happening? Is an
accretive acquistion really deceptive? Didn't the company actually make a
good deal? Whom are we really protecting from whom?
Gregg Wilson
April 13, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
-- end of quote ---
-
-- Gregg Wilson wrote:
Hi Richard Sansing and anyone who would care to
reply.
When we say that pooling is abusive and deceptive
what are we really talking about?
--- end of quote ---
I will pass on continuing this thread, except to
reiterate that your unhappiness with GAAP extends well beyond the purchase
method. If we can't agree that the transfer of $60K of a publicly traded
company's own stock, unrestricted, to an employee in exchanges for services
should be accounted for as an expense of $60K, I doubt we can come to
agreement on accounting for more complicated transactions that involve the
transfer of a company's stock for anything other than cash.
Richard Sansing
April 13, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Richard Sansing
Interesting argument. Sort of a combination of all
or none and falling back on good authority. Well you did better than Bob
Jensen's suggested reading approach, and for that I am grateful. My wife
once opined that we should be happy to have heretics for they help us test
the veracity of our faith. Still I better leave before I get burned at the
stake.
Regards,
Gregg Wilson
April 14, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
GAAP espouses the economic entity assumption. In
what way does transferring stock to an employee represent a cost to the
company? Is there any tangible evidence that the company is worse off? Does
it have less cash, dimmer prospects, damaged intangible assets? It is a cost
to the shareholders. According to GAAP they are distinct from the company.
Regards,
Gregg Wilson
April 15, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Gregg,
Following your logic to its conclusion, firms need not pay employees in
anything other than paper. Why bother giving them assets? Just print stock
certificates and have them toil for 60 years for 100 shares of stock per
week.
This is tantamount to what the Germans did after World War I. Rather than
have the banks create marks, the German government just printed millions of
marks that soon became worth less than the paper they were printed on. It
eventually took a wheel barrow full of marks to buy a slice of bread
(literally).
Suppose a firm pays $120 in cash to an employee and the employee pays $20
in income taxes and invests $40 in the open market for 40 shares of his
employer's common shares. What is different about this if the company pays
him $80 in cash and issues him 40 shares of treasury stock? The employee
ends up in the same situation under either alternative. And he or she owes
$20 in taxes in either case. Stock must often be issued from the treasury of
shares purchased by the company on the open market since new shares have
pre-emptive rights that make it difficult to pay employees in new shares.
If employees instead are given stock options or restricted stock, the
situation is more complicated but the principle is the same. The stock or
the options must be valued and taxes must eventually be paid on the value
received for his or her services.
As far as what is wrong with pooling, I told you before your exchanges
with Professor Sansing that the main problem with pooling is the reason
firms want pooling. They like to keep acquired net assets on the books at
very old and outdated historical costs so that future revenues divided by
outdated book values show high rates of return (ROIs) and make managers who
acquired the old assets look brilliant.
Other abuses are described in the paper by Abe Briloff on "Dirty Pooling"
that I sent to you --- Briloff, AJ 1967. Dirty pooling. The Accounting
Review (July): 489-496 ---
http://www.jstor.org/view/00014826/ap010167/01a00060/0
I hope you will read Abe's paper carefully before continuing this thread.
Bob Jensen
April 15, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
-- end of quote ---
These issues are covered Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 123, which you can find on the FASB website,
http://www.fasb.org .
The excerpt that follows states the general rule.
This Statement requires a public entity to measure
the cost of employee services received in exchange for an award of equity
instruments based on the grant-date fair value of the award.
Richard Sansing
April 15, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Bob Jensen,
Hope all is well with you.
I am not arguing from the employee's point of view.
What I am arguing is that the company can pay the employee cash, but if the
employee is being paid stock it is not the company but the shareholders who
are doing the paying, so it cannot be a cost to the company. The employee is
being paid something that belongs to the shareholders, and does not belong
to the company. The ownership interest is distinct from the company
according to the economic entity assumption.
<<As far as what is wrong with pooling, I told
you before your exchanges with Professor Sansing that the main problem
with pooling is the reason firms want pooling. They like to keep
acquired net assets on the books at very old and outdated historical
costs so that future revenues divided by outdated book values show high
rates of return (ROIs) and make managers who acquired the old assets
look brilliant.>>
I would argue that the costs of the acquired firm
are no more old and outdated than any other company that follows GAAP
accounting procedures. There is no such thing as an "outdated" book value.
The earnings model matches costs and revenues consistently and
conservatively over time and that is what makes the return on equity number
meaningful. Adjusting those costs to some other random value at a random
point in time makes the return on equity number NOT meaningful. The return
on equity of the combined companies under pooling is not an inflated return
on equity that is meant to make the management look brilliant. It is merely
the correct return on equity, and the correct measure of the capital
efficiency of the combined companies. It is the return on equity that should
be used to project future cash returns in order to determine the value of
the company as an ongoing enterprise.
Suppose there are two companies that are both
highly profitable and both have 30% ROEs. Is there something misleading
about a pooling acquisition where the combined ROE of the two companies is
pro forma'ed at a 30% ROE? Is it more meaningul to write up the assets of
the acquired company by some phoney goodwill amount so that the combined
number will now be 15% ROE? Which number is going to produce a more accurate
assessment of the value of the combined companies going forward? For a cash
acquisition there has been an additional economic cash cost and the ROE is
rightfully lower. But there is no such cost, cash or otherwise, when the
equity interests are combined through a share exchange.
Gregg Wilson
April 15, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Sorry Greg,
You show no evidence of countering Abe Briloff’s real contention that
pooling is likely to be “dirty.” It has little to do with stock valuation
since the same “cost” has been incurred for an acquisition irrespective of
whether the bean counters book it as a purchase or a pooling. The pooling
alternative has everything to do with manipulation of accounting numbers to
make managers look like they increased the ROI because of their clever
acquisition even if the acquisition is a bad deal in terms of underlying
economics.
Briloff, AJ 1967. Dirty pooling. The Accounting Review (July):
489-496 ---
http://www.jstor.org/view/00014826/ap010167/01a00060/0
I doubt that you’ve convinced a single professor around the world that
pooling provides better information to investors. Pooling was banned years
ago because of widespread opinion that pooling has a greater potential of
misleading investors than purchase accounting. If the historical cost net
book value of the acquired firm is only half of the current value relevant
to the acquisition price, there is no way that future ROIs under pooling and
purchasing can be the same. You’ve set up a straw man.
Please don’t bring stock dividends into this debate. Stock dividends and
stock splits only confuse the issue. Stock dividends must be distributed to
all shareholders and are merely a means, like stock splits, of lowering
share prices without changing the value of any shareholder’s investment.
Certainly stock dividends cannot be issued selectively to employees and not
outside investors. The main argument for large stock dividends/splits is to
lower share prices to attract smaller investors into buying blocks of shares
without having to pay odd-lot commissions in the market. The only argument
for small stock dividends is to mislead shareholders into thinking they are
getting something when they are not getting anything at all. Studies show
the market is very efficient in adjusting prices to stock dividends and
splits.
Certainly not a single professor around the world has come to your
defense. It’s time to come up with a new argument Gregg. You must counter
Abe’s arguments to convince us otherwise. The only valid argument for
pooling is that markets are perfectly efficient irrespective of bean counter
reporting. That argument holds some water but it is a leaky bucket according
to many studies in recent years. If that argument was really true,
management and shareholders would not care what bean counters do. Managers
are in reality very concerned about bean counting rules. Corporations
actually fought tooth and nail for pooling, but their arguments were not
convincing from the standpoint for shareholder interests.
If ABC Company is contemplating buying anything for $40 cash (wheat,
corn, Microsoft Shares, or ABC treasury shares) and making this part of a
future compensation payment in kind, it’s irrelevant how that $40 is paid to
an employee because the net cost to ABC Company is $40 in cash. As the
proportionate share of ABC Company has not been changed for remaining
shareholders whether the payment is salary cash or in treasury shares (which
need not be purchased if the salary is to be $40 in cash), the cash cost is
the same for the employment services as far as shareholders and the ABC
Company are concerned.
ABC Company might feel that payment in ABC’s treasury shares increases
the employee’s motivation level. The employee, however, may not view the two
alternatives as equivalent since he or she must incur an added transactions
cost to convert most any in-kind item into cash.
Your argument would make a little more sense if ABC Company could issue
new shares instead of paying $40 in cash. But in most states this is not
allowed without shareholder approval due to preemptive anti-dilution
protections for existing shareholders that prevent companies from acting
like the German government in the wake of World War I (when Germany started
printing Deutsch marks that weren’t worth the cost of the paper they were
printed on).
It’s very risky to buy shares of corporations that do not have preemptive
rights. I think you’ve ignored preemptive rights from get go on this thread.
Bob Jensen
April 17, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Bob Jensen
Maybe you could produce an example of how pooling
is "dirty in practice", OTHER THAN the fact that it produces a higher ROI.
Gregg Wilson
April 18, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Gregg,
High ROIs are the main reason pooling becomes dirty. It is “dirty” because
it is intended to deceive the public and distort future performance measures
relative to the underlying economics of the acquisition.
As
to other examples, I think Abe gives you ample illustrations of how
management tries to take credit (“feathers in their cap” on Page 494) for
“something shareholders are paying dearly for.” Also note his Case II where
“A Piddle Makes a Pool.” Briloff, AJ 1967. "Dirty pooling." The
Accounting Review (July): 489-496 ---
http://www.jstor.org/view/00014826/ap010167/01a00060/0
Additional examples have been provided over the years by Abe. The
following is Table 1 from a paper entitled "Briloff and the Capital Markets"
by George Foster, Journal of Accounting Research, Volume 17, Spring
1979 ---
http://www.jstor.org/view/00218456/di008014/00p0266h/0
As George Foster points out, what makes Briloff unique in academe are the
detailed real-world examples he provides. Briloff became so important that
stock prices reacted instantly to his publications, particularly those in
Barron's. George formally studied market reactions to Briloff articles.
Companies Professor Briloff criticized for misleading accounting reports
experienced an average drop in share prices of 8%.
TABLE 1
Articles of Briloff Examined
|
Article |
Journal/Publication Date |
Companies Cited That Are Examined
in This Note |
1. |
"Dirty Pooling" |
Barron's (July 15, 1968) |
Gulf and Wesern: Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV) |
2. |
"All a Fandangle?" |
Barron's (December 2, 1968) |
Leasco Data Processing: Levin-Townsend |
3. |
"Much-Abused Goodwill" |
Barron's (April 28, 1969) |
Levin-Townsend; National General Corp. |
4. |
"Out of Focus" |
Barron's (July 28, 1969) |
Perfect Film & Chemical Corp. |
5. |
"Castles of Sand?"
|
Barron's (February 2, 1970)
|
Amrep Corp.; Canaveral International; Deltona Corp.;
General Development Corp.; Great Southwest Corp.; Great Western
United, Major Realty; Penn Central |
6. |
"Tomorrow's Profits?" |
Barron's (May 11, 1970) |
Telex |
7. |
"Six Flags at Half-Mast?" |
Barron's (January 11, 1971) |
Great Southwest Corp.; Penn Central |
8. |
"Gimme Shelter"
|
Barron's (October 25, 1971)
|
Kaufman & Broad Inc.; U.S. Home Corp.; U.S.
Financial Inc. |
9. |
"SEC Questions Accounting"
|
Commercial and Financial Chronicle (November
2, 1972) |
Penn Central
|
10. |
"$200 Million Question" |
Barron's (December 18, 1972) |
Leasco Corp. |
11. |
"Sunrise, Sunset" |
Barron's (May 14, 1973) |
Kaufman & Broad |
12. |
"Kaufman & Broad--More Questions? |
Commercial and Financial Chronicle (July 12,
1973) |
Kaufman & Broad
|
13. |
"You Deserve a Break..." |
Barron's (July 8, 1974) |
McDonald's |
14. |
"The Bottom Line: What's Going on at I.T.T."
(Interview with Briloff) |
New York Magazine (August 12, 1974)
|
I.T.T.
|
15. |
"Whose Deep Pocket?" |
Barron's (July 19, 1976) |
Reliance Group Inc. |
Not all of the above illustrations are focused on pooling accounting,
but some of them provide real-world examples that you are looking for,
particularly dirty pooling at McDonalds Corporation.
It would would help your case if you followed Briloff’s example by
getting out of hypothetical (nonexistent?) examples and give us some real
world examples from your consulting. I don’t buy into any illustrations that
merely criticize goodwill accounting. What you need to demonstrate how
accounting for goodwill under purchase accounting was more misleading than
pooling accounting for at least one real-world acquisition. I realize,
however, that this may be difficult since the SEC will sue companies who use
pooling accounting illegally these days. Did you ever wonder why the SEC
made pooling illegal?
Perhaps for your clients you have prepared statements contrasting
purchase versus pooling in acquisitions. It would be nice if you could share
those (with names disguised).
Bob Jensen
April 17, 2006 reply from Paul Polinski [pwp3@CASE.EDU]
Gregg:
Please let me use a slightly different example to look at your views in the
purchase/pooling debate, and invite anyone else to contribute or to improve
the example.
Let's say you own and run several bed-and-breakfast
inns. About 20 years ago, you received as a gift an authentic Normal
Rockwell painting, which you put behind a false wall in your house to
protect your investment. You recently brought it back out, and several
reputable appraisers have put its value at $255,000.
You want to invest in an inn, and its lot, that the
current owner is selling. The current owner bought the inn and lot many
years ago for $100,000; the inn's $60,000 gross book value is fully
depreciated, while the lot (as land) is still recorded on current owner's
books at $40,000. You and another party agree to jointly purchase the inn
from the current owner; you exchange your Normal Rockwell painting for 51%
ownership in the inn/lot, and the other party pays $245,000 in cash for his
or her 49% ownership. You and the other party have rights and
responsibilities proportional to your ownership percentages in all aspects
under the joint ownership agreement.
To simplify matters, at my own risk, I'll say
"ignore tax treatments for now."
My questions to you are:
(1) For performance evaluation purposes, when you
and the other party are computing the returns on your respective investments
in this inn, what are your relevant investment amounts?
(2) (I'm wandering out on a limb here, so I'll
invite anyone who wants to improve or correct this to do so...)
Now let's say that all the other facts are the
same, except that:
- The other party pays $122,500 for 49% ownership
of the inn/lot;
- You get 51% ownership in the inn/lot in exchange
for giving the current owner a 50% transferable ownership interest in your
Norman Rockwell.
What are your relevant investment amounts in this
case?
Paul
April 18, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Paul Polinski
So what's the point? Your example is clearly a cash
acquisition. Pooling is appropriate only in the case of a share exchange
acquisition, and I would say pooling should only be used in the case of two
ongoing enterprise. The point is that a share exchange acquisition is a
combining of equity interests and there is no purchase price beyond the
exchange ratio. Say you had two inns and both are ongoing businesses so they
not only have real estate assets but furniture and equipment and supplies
and payables and receivables etc. Lets say they each have book assets of
$40,000 and they decide to combine their two enterprises on a share for
share basis. The owner of each inn ends up with half the equity in the
combined enterprise. Has a new value been placed on the assets by the share
exchange? Would the owners want to restate the assets to some different
value just because they have merged? Or would they prefer to retain the
combined financial statements as they are? Doesn't the meaningfulness of the
earnings model depend on following consistent rules of matching costs and
revenues over a period of time, and wouldn't revaluing those costs merely
represent an obliteration of the earnings model and the information it
imparts? Is not a share exchange acquisition a totally different animal from
a cash purchase, and shouldn't it be recorded in the financial statements in
a way that reflects that economic reality?
Gregg Wilson
April 19, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Sorry Gregg,
You’re too hung up on cash basis accounting. You only think transactions
can be valued if and when they are paid in cash. This is clearly absurd
since there are many purchase transactions that are not cash deals and
require value estimation on the part of both the buyer and the seller. We
use value estimates in countless transactions, and accounting would really
revert to the dark ages if we were forced to trace value of each item back
to some ancient surrogate cash transaction value years ago. Cash accounting
can badly mislead investors about risk, such as when interest rate swaps
were not even disclosed on financial statements until cash flowed. Our
estimates of current values and obligations may be imperfect, but they beat
non-estimation.
With respect to business combinations/acquisitions, GAAP requires that
the accounting come as close as possible to the value estimations upon which
the deal was actually transacted. I don’t know how many times we have to
tell you that the valuation estimation process is not perfect, but trying to
come as close to economic reality at the time of the current transaction is
our goal, not pulling values from transactions from olden times and ancient
history circumstances.
Be careful what you declare on this forum, because some students are also
in the forum and they may believe such declaratives as “Pooling is
appropriate only in the case of a share exchange acquisition.” Pooling is
not only a violation of FASB standards, it is against SEC law. Please do not
encourage students to break the law.
And there are good reasons for bans on pooling. You’ve not been able to
convince a single professor in this forum that pooling is better accounting
for stock trades. You’ve ranted against estimates of value and how these
estimates may become impaired shortly after deals go down, but GAAP says to
do the best job possible in booking the values that were in effect at the
time the deals actually went down. If values become impaired later on, GAAP
says to adjust the values.
You’ve not convinced a single one of us who watched pooling accounting
become dirty time and time again when it was legal. We don’t want to revert
to those days of allowing managers to repeatedly report inflated ROIs on
acquired companies.
I
think Richard Sansing is right. You’re beating a dead horse. Future
communications that only repeat prior rants are becoming time wasters in
this forum.
Forum members interested in our long and tedious exchange on this topic
can go to
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Pooling
Bob Jensen
April 18, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Again Bob Jensen
Let's put it this way. If we want to value the
acquisition at a non-cost current value, then we should use a fair appraisal
like something akin to what a cash buyer would be willing to pay, and not
the phoney share exchange value. Then we could actually have goodwill
numbers that made some sense and would avoid all those embarassing
impairment writedowns a year after the acquisition. I prefer pooling, but if
you insist on revaluing, then use an economic value. The value of the
exchanged shares is not, I repeat, not an economic value.
Gregg
April 20, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Sorry Gregg,
GAAP states that all tangible assets should be valued at what cash
purchasers would pay for them, so we have no argument.
Intangibles such as knowledge capital are more difficult to value, but
the ideal is to value them for what cash purchasers would pay for such
things as a skilled work force, customers, name recognition, etc.
The problem with using a cash price surrogate lies in situations where
there is really valuable synergy that is unique to the acquiring company.
For example, there is probably considerable synergy value (actually
monopoly) value when SBC acquired AT&T that probably made it much more
valuable to SBC than to any other buyer whether the deal would be done in
cash or stock.
Auditors are supposed to attest to the value at the time the acquisition
deal goes down. Not long afterwards it may be found that the best estimate
at the time the deal went down was either in error or it was reasonable at
the time but the value changed afterwards, possible because of the market
impact of the “new” company operating after the acquisition. For example,
when Time Warner acquired AOL it appears that Time Warner and its auditors
gave up way to much value to AOL in the deal, in part due to accounting
fraud in AOL.
Problems of valuation in purchase accounting should not, and cannot under
current law, be used as an excuse to use historical cost values that
typically have far greater deviation from accurate values at the time the
acquisition deal is consummated.
I think you made your points Gregg. Please stop repeating arguments that
you have hammered repeatedly at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Pooling
Bob Jensen
April 20, 2006 message reply Gregg Wilson
Hi Bob Jensen
You have masterfully skirted the issue as usual. Do
you believe that the value of the exchanged shares is either a "fair value"
and/or an "economic value"? If we are attesting to the value at the time of
the deal as the share exchange value then I would say we are attesting
badly. Use whatever fair value you want. The value of the exchanged shares
isn't one.
By the way. AOL purchased Time Warner, not the
other way around. From the 10K:
April 20, 2006 Reply from Bob Jensen
Sorry Gregg
I think you're wasting our time and embarrassing yourself until you can
back your wild claims with convincing research. Your wild speculations
appear to run counter to serious research.
If you are really convinced of evidence to the contrary, please go out
and conduct some rigorous research testing your hypotheses. Please don't
continue making wild claims in an academic forum until you've got some
convincing evidence.
Or as Richard Sansing would say, we seldom accept anecdotal evidence that
can be selectively cherry picked to show most any wild speculation.
If you bothered to do research rather than wildly speculate, you would
find that serious academic research points to the conclusions opposite to
your wild
speculations about revaluations and goodwill write-offs.
First consider the Steven L. Henning, Wayne H. Shaw, and Toby Stock
(2004) study:
This paper investigates criticisms that U.S.
GAAP had given firms too much discretion in determining the amount and
timing of goodwill write-offs. Using 1,576 U.S. and 563 U.K.
acquisitions, we find little evidence that U.S. firms managed the amount
of goodwill write-off or that U.K. firms managed the amount of
revaluations (write-ups of intangible assets). However, our results are
consistent with U.S. firms delaying goodwill write-offs and U.K. firms
timing revaluations strategically to avoid shareholder approval linked
to certain financial ratios.
Steven L. Henning, Wayne H. Shaw, and Toby Stock, "The Amount and Timing
of Goodwill Write-Offs and Revaluations: Evidence from U.S. and U.K.
Firms," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Volume 23,
Number 2, September 2004 Pages: 99 - 121
Also consider the Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2002a) conclusions
below:
We investigate two related questions. What
factors influence firms' use of acquisition accounting method, and are
firms willing to pay higher acquisition premiums to use the
pooling-of-interests accounting method? We analyze a comprehensive
sample of nontaxable corporate stock-for-stock acquisitions from 1990
through 1996. We use a two-stage, instrumental variables estimation
method that explicitly allows for simultaneity in the choice of
accounting method and acquisition premiums. After controlling for
economic differences across pooling and purchase transactions, our
evidence indicates that financial reporting incentives influence how
acquiring firms structure stock-for-stock acquisitions.
In addition, our two-stage analysis indicates that
higher acquisition premiums are associated with the pooling method. In
sum, our evidence suggests that acquiring firms structure acquisitions
and expend significant resources to secure preferential accounting
treatment in stock-for-stock acquisitions.
Benjamin C. Ayers , Craig E. Lefanowicz and John R. Robinson, "Do
Firms Purchase the Pooling Method?" Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 7, Number 1, March 2002 Pages: 5 - 32.
You apparently have evidence to contradict the Ayers, Lefanowicz, and
Robinson (2002a) study. Would you please enlighten us with some convincing
evidence.
Consider the Patrick E. Hopkins, Richard W. Houston, and Michael F.
Peters (2000) research:
We provide evidence that analysts' stock-price
judgments depend on (1) the method of accounting for a business
combination and (2) the number of years that have elapsed since the
business combination. Consistent with business-press reports of
managers' concerns, analysts' stock-price judgments are lowest when a
company applies the purchase method of accounting and ratably amortizes
the acquisition premium. The number of years since the business
combination affects analysts' price estimates only when the company
applies the purchase method and ratably amortizes goodwill—analysts'
price estimates are lower when the business-combination transaction is
further in the past. However, this joint effect of accounting method and
timing is mitigated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board's
proposed income-statement format requiring companies to report separate
line items for after-tax income before goodwill charges and net-of-tax
goodwill charges. When a company uses the purchase method of accounting
and writes off the acquisition premium as in-process research and
development, analysts' stock price judgments are not statistically
different from their judgments when a company applies
pooling-of-interest accounting.
Patrick E. Hopkins, Richard W. Houston, and Michael F. Peters,
"Purchase, Pooling, and Equity Analysts' Valuation Judgments," The
Accounting Review, Vol. 75, 2000, 257-281.
You seem to think that acquisition goodwill is based upon wild
speculation. Research studies discover rather sophisticated valuation
approaches that distinguish core from synergy goodwill components. See
Henning, Lewis, and Shaw, "Valuation of Components of Purchased Goodwill,"
The Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 38, Autumn 2000.
Also consider the Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2002b) study:
Accounting standard setters have become
increasingly concerned with the perceived manipulation of financial
statements afforded by the pooling-of-interests (pooling) method of
accounting for corporate acquisitions. While different restrictions have
been discussed, in September 1999 the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) issued an Exposure Draft to eliminate the pooling method.
This study provides a basis for evaluating restrictions on the pooling
method by analyzing the financial statement effects on pooling
acquisitions made by public corporations over the period 1992 through
1997. Using these acquisitions we (1) quantify the scope of the pooling
problem, (2) estimate the financial statement repercussions of
eliminating the pooling method, and (3) examine the effects of
restricting pooling accounting to business combinations meeting various
merger of equals restrictions.
While our analysis does not address whether
restrictions on the pooling method will influence the nature or level of
acquisition activity, the results indicate that the pooling method
generates enormous amounts of unrecognized assets, across individual
acquisitions, and in aggregate. In addition, our results suggest that
recording and amortizing these assets generate significant balance sheet
and income statement effects that vary with industry. Regarding
restrictions on the pooling method, our analysis indicates that size
restrictions would significantly reduce the number and value of pooling
acquisitions and unrecognized assets generated by these acquisitions.
. . .
Accounting standard setters have become
increasingly concerned with the perceived manipulation of financial
statements and the lack of comparability across firms financial
statements that have resulted from having two acquisition accounting
methods. Consistent with these concerns, the FASB issued an Exposure
Draft in September 1999 to eliminate the pooling-of-interests method.
Using a comprehensive set of pooling acquisitions by public corporations
over the period 1992 through 1997, this study analyzes the financial
statement effects of eliminating or severely restricting the pooling
method of accounting for business combinations. Although we make no
assumptions regarding the effects of pooling restrictions on either
acquisition activity or acquisition price, this study provides a useful
starting point for assessing the effects of different pooling
restrictions. Our evidence suggests that firms avoid recognition of
significant amounts of target firms purchase prices, both in aggregate
and per acquisition, via the pooling method. Further, we document that
these unrecognized assets are significant relative to the bidders book
value and that the quantity and dollar magnitude of pooling acquisitions
have increased dramatically in recent years. With respect to
industry-specific analyses, we find that the financial services industry
accounts for approximately one-third of all pooling acquisitions in
number and value.
The effects on bidder financial-reporting
ratios of precluding use of the pooling method for a typical acquisition
are substantial, though varying widely across industries. Decreases in
return on equity, assuming a ten-year amortization period for
unrecognized assets, range from a 65 percent decline for the hotel and
services industry to a13 percent decline for the financial services
industry.15For earnings per share, the effects are more moderate than
are those on return on equity. Decreases, assuming a ten-year
amortization period, range from a 42 percent decrease for the food,
textile, and chemicals industry to an 8 percent decrease for the
financial services industry. For market-to-book ratios, four industries
(the metal and mining industry; the food, textile, and chemicals
industry; the hotel and other services industry; and the health and
engineering industry) have decreases in bidder market-to-book ratio in
excess of 30 percent, whereas the financial services industry has only a
6 percent decrease. The relatively small effects for the financial
services industry suggests that the industry�s opposition to eliminating
the pooling method may be more driven by the quantity and aggregate
magnitude of pooling acquisitions than per-acquisition effects. Overall,
we find that eliminating the pooling method affects firm profitability
and capitalization ratios in all industries, but there is a wide
dispersion of the magnitude of these effects across industry.
Finally, we document that restricting pooling
treatment via a relative size criterion significantly decreases the
number and value of pooling acquisitions as well as the unrecognized
assets generated by these acquisitions. Nevertheless, we find that a
size restriction, depending on its exact implementation, can
simultaneously allow a number of acquisitions to be accounted for under
the pooling method. Regardless of the type of restriction, the magnitude
of past pooling transactions, both in total dollars and relative to the
individual bidder's financial condition, lends credibility to the
contention that the imposition of pooling restrictions has the potential
to seriously impact firm financial statements and related
financial-reporting ratios. These effects, of course, decrease with a
longer amortization period for unrecognized assets.
Benjamin C. Ayers , Craig E. Lefanowicz and John R. Robinson,
"The Financial Statement Effects of Eliminating the Pooling-of-Interests
Method of Acquisition," Accounting Horizons, Vol 14, March 2000.
There are many, many more such studies. If you are really convinced of
evidence to the contrary, please go out and conduct some rigorous research
testing your hypotheses. Please don't continue this until you've got some
convincing evidence.
Or as Richard Sansing would say, we seldom accept anecdotal evidence that
can be selectively cherry picked to show most any wild conclusion.
Nobody argues that the present system of accounting for acquisitions and
goodwill is perfect. Various alternatives have been proposed in the research
literature. But none to my knowledge support your advocacy of a return to
pooling-of-interests accounting.
Bob Jensen
PS
You are correct about the AOL purchase of Time Warner. I forgot this since
Time Warner runs the household. Later on it was Time Warner that tried to sell AOL (to Google). It's a
little like husband buys wife and later on wife puts husband for sale.
April 18, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Bob Jensen
I was really trying to go one step at a time, and
establish that the value of the exchanged shares is not an economic value or
a "fair appraisal" of the value of the acquired company. I am certainly not
a researcher, and as you know I do not have access to the fine studies that
you have referenced. I am not even sure what would qualify as evidence of
the point.
I was thinking one could send the following
questionnaire to companies that had made share exchange acquistions....
""""""""""" You recently made a share exchange for
XYZ company. After you determined the value of the target company to you,
[Target value], which of the following do you feel best describes the
decision process by which you arrived at the number of shares to offer the
target company:
(1) [Target value] / [Price of your stock]
(2) [Your shares outstanding] * ([Target value] /
[Your value]) where [Your value] is the value of your own company arrived at
by a similar valuation standard as [Target value].
(3) Some combination of the above, or other
decision process. Please explain________________________________.
""""""""""""""""
If the response came back overwhelmingly (2), then
would that be conclusive evidence that the value of the exchanged shares is
not an economic value or the price paid? I really wouldn't want to go to the
trouble, if the result wouldn't demonstrate what I am trying to demonstrate.
Gregg Wilson
April 23, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Sorry Gregg,
If you want
to communicate with the academy you must play by the academy’s rules. The
number one rule is that a hypothesis must be supported by irrefutable
(normative) arguments or convincing empirical evidence. We do accept idle
speculation but only for purposes of forming interesting hypotheses to be
tested later on.
In my
communications with you regarding pooling-of-interests accounting, I've
always focused on what I will term your Pooling-Preferred Hypothesis or PP
Hypothesis for short. Your hypothesis may be implied from a collection of
your earlier quotations from
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Pooling
Well I would call that entire FAS
141 a lot of sophistries. This is a case of trying to make an apple into
an orange and getting a rotten banana.
Gregg Wilson, March 30, 2006
I certainly didn't mean to
imply that cash acquisitions should be treated as pooling-of-interest.
On the contrary I was trying to make the point that they are totally
different situations, and can't be treated effectively by the same
accounting rule. The cash is the whole
point.
Gregg Wilson, March 30, 2006
Pooling of interest is
terrific, because it recreates that earnings model history for the
combined companies. The historical costs are not meaningless to the
negotiations but rather are the basis for the negotiations, for they are
the evidence that the companies are using to determine the share
exchange ratio that they will accept.
Gregg Wilson, March
30, 2006
Pooling is appropriate
only in the case of a share exchange acquisition, and I would say
pooling should only be used in the case of two ongoing enterprise(s).
Gregg Wilson, March
30, 2006
There's a bit of inconsistency in your quotations,
because in one case you say pooling is "terrific" for combined companies and
in the other quotation you claim pooling should only when the acquired
company carries on by itself. I will state your Pooling-Preferred (PP)
Hypothesis as follows:
Pooling-Preferred (PP) Hypothesis
FAS 141 is based upon sophistry.
Pooling-of--interest accounting is the best accounting approach when a
company is acquired in a stock-for-stock (non-cash) acquisition.
Purchase accounting required under FAS 141 is a
"case of trying to make an apple
into an orange and getting a rotten banana. "
What I've
tried to point out all along is that FAS 141 is not based upon sophistry. It
rests on the foundation of countless normative and empirical studies that
refute your PP Hypothesis.
Your only
support of the PP Hypothesis is another hypothesis that is stated by you
over and over ad nausea for two months as follows:
Exchanged Shares Non-Value (ESNV) Hypothesis
The
value of the exchanged shares is not an economic value or a "fair
appraisal" of the value of the acquired company.
Gregg Wilson,
April 22, 2006
In the academy we cannot accept an
untested hypothesis as a legitimate test of another hypothesis. Even if we
speculate that the ESNV Hypothesis is true, it does not support your PP
Hypothesis because it is totally disconnected to the real reason that
standard setters and the academic academy no longer want pooling accounting.
The "real reason" is that corporations are motivated to want pooling
accounting so they can inflate future ROIs and make most all acquisitions
look like great deals even though some of them are bad deals from an
economic perspective (to say nothing about wanting inflated ROIs to support
larger bonuses and sweetened future compensation plans for executives).
The preponderance of academic research
refutes the PP Hypothesis. One of the highlight studies in fact shows that
managers may enter into worse deals (in the past when it was legal) just to
get pooling accounting.
Some of the Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2002a) conclusions are as
follows:
We investigate two related questions. What
factors influence firms' use of acquisition accounting method, and are
firms willing to pay higher acquisition premiums to use the
pooling-of-interests accounting method? We analyze a comprehensive
sample of nontaxable corporate stock-for-stock acquisitions from 1990
through 1996. We use a two-stage, instrumental variables estimation
method that explicitly allows for simultaneity in the choice of
accounting method and acquisition premiums. After controlling for
economic differences across pooling and purchase transactions, our
evidence indicates that financial reporting incentives influence how
acquiring firms structure stock-for-stock acquisitions.
In addition, our two-stage analysis indicates that
higher acquisition premiums are associated with the pooling method. In
sum, our evidence suggests that acquiring firms structure acquisitions
and expend significant resources to secure preferential accounting
treatment in stock-for-stock acquisitions.
Benjamin C. Ayers , Craig E. Lefanowicz and John R. Robinson, "Do
Firms Purchase the Pooling Method?" Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 7, Number 1, March 2002 Pages: 5 - 32.
In fact the above study suggests that
pooling accounting creates a worse situation that you speculate in your ESNV
Hypothesis. My conclusion is that if we accept your ESNV hypothesis we most
certainly would not want pooling accounting due to the above findings of
Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson.
Your alleged
support of the PP Hypothesis is your
untested ESNV Hypothesis. As
mentioned above, you cannot support a hypothesis with an untested
hypothesis. Certainly the academy to date has not accepted your ESNV
Hypothesis. And even if it did, this hypothesis alone is disconnected to the
academic research pointing to why pooling accounting deceives investors.
Your only support of the ESNV
Hypothesis lies in conclusions drawn based upon your own anecdotal
experiences. Anecdotal experience is not an acceptable means of hypothesis
testing in the academy. Anecdotal evidence can be cherry picked to support
most any wild speculation.
As a result, I recommend the
following"
-
Admit that you do not have
sufficient evidence to support your PP Hypothesis. You must otherwise
refute a mountain of prior academic evidence that runs counter to the PP
Hypothesis.
-
Admit that you do not have
sufficient evidence in the academic world to support your ESNV
hypothesis. Certainly you've not convinced, to my knowledge, any members
of this academic (AECM) forum that virtually all managers are so
ignorant of values when putting together stock-for-stock acquisitions.
-
Stop hawking and repeating
your anecdotal speculations that are already documented on the Web at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Pooling
Come back to us only when you have sufficient academic evidence to
support your hypotheses.
April 22, 2006 reply from Henry Collier
[henrycollier@aapt.net.au]
You have been very gentle with Gregg Wilson … I
would suggest that we send him to Singapore and subject him to the cane that
is so liberally used there to the recalcitrant. He has ‘convinced’ not one
it seems. Many of us ‘old timers’ agree with you … perhaps Wilson just
doesn’t get it … or perhaps it’s his Warhol’s 15 minutes of fame (or infamy
in this case).
One comment that has always struck me as relevant
in business combinations … well perhaps 2 … (1) why would we revalue only
the acquired company’s assets to FMV in the combination and (2) why would we
bother to recognize ‘goodwill’ at all? In the recognition it seems as though
we’ve just ‘paid’ too much for the FMV of the assets … why wouldn’t we just
reduce the ‘retained earnings’ of the combination?
Just my old management accountant’s rant I suppose.
Over the years with my approach to the share markets, I’ve found ‘income
statements’ and ‘balance sheets’ somewhat less than useful … seems to me
that particularly in high risk companies, like pink sheet things being
offered / touted on certain websites and through phishing mails, one can
obtain both historical and pro-forma I/S and B/S, but seldom any real or
projected cash flow information.
With regards from the land down under …
Enjoy retirement, I’ve found it very rewarding …
thanks for all you’ve done for the profession …
Henry Collier
April 23, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
--
Bob,
---Bob Jensen wrote:
In my communications with you (Gregg Wilson)
regarding pooling-of-interests accounting, I've always focused on what I
will term your Pooling-Preferred Hypothesis or PP Hypothesis for short.
---
My exchanges with Gregg Wilson suggests that his
discomfort with GAAP goes well beyond the pooling vs. purchase debate. He
does not care for the GAAP treatment of simple transactions such as the
transfer of shares to employees in lieu of cash compensation. Why argue
about (relatively) complicated transactions with someone who does not
understand simple ones?
Richard Sansing
Strange as it may seem a losing company may have more value to someone
else than itself
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on April 27,
2006
TITLE: Alcatel Stands to Reap Tax Benefit on Merger
REPORTER: Jesse Drucker and Sara Silver
DATE: Apr 26, 2006
PAGE: C3
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114601908332236130.html
TOPICS: Accounting, International Accounting, Net Operating Losses, Taxation
SUMMARY: "Lucent's operating losses in [the] wake of [the] tech bubble may
allow big deductions" for the merged firm's U.S. operations.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is the purpose of allowing net operating losses (NOLs) to be deducted
against other years' income amounts?
2.) Summarize the U.S. tax law provisions regarding NOLs. Why has Lucent been
unable to use up all of its NOL carryforwards since the tech bubble burst in
2000-2001?
3.) Define the term deferred tax assets. Describe how NOLs fit the definition
you provide. What other types of deferred tax assets do you think that Lucent
has available and wants to take advantage of?
4.) How is it possible that the "federal, state and local deductions" from
the deferred tax assets described in answer to question #3 "will nearly double
the U.S. net income that the combined company [of Alcatel and Lucent
Technologies] will be able to report"?
5.) How does the availability of NOL carryforwards, and the expected timing
of their deductions based on an acquirer's earnings or the recent tax law change
referred to in the article, impact the price an acquirer is willing to pay in a
merger or acquisition transaction?
6.) How did the availability of deferred tax asset deductions drive Alcatel's
choice of its location for its headquarters? What other factors do you think
drive such a choice?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
From The Wall Street Journal Weekly Accounting Review on April 7, 2006
TITLE: Takeover of VNU to Begin with Explanation of Price
REPORTER: Jason Singer
DATE: Apr 03, 2006
PAGE: A2
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114405567166415142.html
TOPICS: Accounting, Mergers and Acquisitions
SUMMARY: The article offers an excellent description of the process
undertaken by VNU's Board of Directors in deciding to put the company "on the
auction block", consider alternative strategies, and finally accept an offer
price.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Describe the transaction agreed to by the Board of VNU NV and its acquirer,
AlpInvest Partners.
2.) What does the current stock price of VNU imply about the takeover
transaction? Why do you think that VNU is distributing the 210 page document
explaining the transaction and the Board's decision process?
3.) Connect to the press release dated March 8 through the on-line version of
the article. Scroll down to the section covering the "background of the offer."
Draw a timeline of the events, using abbreviations that are succinct but
understandable.
4.) What other alternatives did the VNU Board consider rather than selling
the company? Why did they decide against each of these alternatives?
5.) Based on the information in the article and the press releases, do you
think the acquirers will obtain value from the investment they are making?
Support your answer, including refuting possible arguments against your
position.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"Takeover of VNU to Begin With Explanation of Price," by Jason Singer, The
Wall Street Journal, April 3, 2006 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114405567166415142.html
A group of private-equity funds is beginning a $9
billion takeover of Dutch media giant VNU NV with the release of documents
that explain for the first time how VNU's board determined the purchase
price was high enough.
In the four weeks since VNU announced it would
recommend the private-equity group's offer, many shareholders have accused
the company of rushing to sell itself after being forced by investors to
abandon a big acquisition last year.
These critics said that the sale process was
halfhearted and that the agreed-upon price too low. Some have said they
preferred VNU to break itself up and separately sell the pieces.
At least two VNU shareholders, including
mutual-fund giant Fidelity Investments, have said publicly they are unlikely
to support the takeover; many others have said so privately.
VNU shares have traded far below the agreed
per-share offer price of €28.75 ($34.85) since the deal was announced,
suggesting the market expects the takeover bid to fail.
VNU – based in Haarlem, Netherlands, and the
world's largest market-research firm by sales – addresses these concerns in
the 210-page offer document to be sent to shareholders and outlines in
detail the steps it took to ensure the highest value.
Materials include two fairness opinions written by
VNU's financial advisers, one by Credit Suisse Group and the other by NM
Rothschild & Sons, evaluating the offer and concluding the price is
attractive for shareholders.
"This was a fully open auction," said Roger Altman,
chairman of Evercore Partners, another VNU financial adviser. The company's
board fully vetted all options, including a breakup of the business,
restructuring opportunities or proceeding with the status quo, he said.
"None provided a value as high as €28.75 [a share]. None of them."
Mr. Altman said that after being contacted by
private-equity funds interested in buying VNU after its failed attempt last
year to acquire IMS Health Inc., of Fairfield, Conn., VNU auctioned itself,
including seeking other strategic or private-equity bidders.
A second group of private-equity funds explored a
possible bid but dropped out when it concluded it couldn't pay as much as
the first group said it was prepared to offer. Another potential bidder, a
company, withdrew after refusing to sign a confidentiality agreement, VNU's
offer document says.
The initial group, which submitted the only firm
bid, consists of AlpInvest Partners of the Netherlands, and Blackstone
Group, Carlyle Group, Hellman & Friedman, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. and
Thomas H. Lee Partners, all of the U.S. The group formed Valcon Acquisition
BV to make the bid.
Some of the calculations provided in the offer
document suggest the company might be valued higher than the Valcon bid
price in certain circumstances. The Credit Suisse letter indicates the
company could be valued at as much as €29.60 a share based on prices paid
for businesses similar to VNU's in the past. It says a "sum of the parts
breakup analysis" indicates a range of €25.90 to €29.35.
The Rothschild letter also shows certain methods of
valuing the company reaching as high as €35.80 a share. But both advisers
said that when weighed against the many risks in VNU's future, the cash
payment being offered now by the Valcon group is the most attractive option
for shareholders.
COMPANIES
Dow Jon
|
PRICE
CHANGE
|
27.49
0.06
8:25a.m. |
|
PRICE
CHANGE
|
40.10
0.07
4/6 |
|
PRICE
CHANGE
|
25.99
0.02
4/6 |
From The Wall Street Journal Weekly Accounting Review on April 7, 2006
TITLE: Sign of the Times: A Deal for GMAC by Investor Group
REPORTER: Dennis K. Berman and Monica Langley
DATE: Apr 04, 2006
PAGE: A1 LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114406446238015171.html
TOPICS: Accounting, Advanced Financial Accounting, Banking, Bankruptcy, Board of
Directors, Financial Accounting, Investments, Mergers and Acquisitions, Spinoffs
SUMMARY: Cerberus Capital Management LP has led the group who will acquire
control of General Motors Acceptance Corp. (GMAC) from GM for $7.4 billion (plus
an additional payment from GMAC to GM of $2.7 billion). GM had expected to
receive offers for GMAC from big banks. Instead, they received offers from
private-equity and hedge funds, like the one from Cerberus. This article follows
up on last week's coverage of this topic; the related article identifies how CEO
Rick Wagoner is working with his Board to extend time for evaluating his own
performance there.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Describe the transaction GM is undertaking to sell control in GMAC.
Specifically, who owns the 51% ownership of GMAC that is being sold? What will
happen to the 49% ownership in GMAC following this transaction? To answer the
question, you may also refer to the GM statement available through the on-line
article link at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114406559238215183.html
2.) Again refer to the GM statement on the GMAC deal. In addition to the
purchase price, what other cash flows will accrue to GM from this transaction?
How do you think these items relate to the fact that GM is selling a 51%
interest in GMAC?
3.) What is the nature of GMAC's business? Specifically describe its
"portfolio of loans and lease receivables."
4.) Why do you think GM expected "...be courted by big banks..." to negotiate
a purchase of GMAC? Why do you think that expectation proved wrong, that other
entities ended up bidding for GMAC? To answer, consider the point made in the
article that even Citigroup, GM's primary bank and a significant player in the
ultimate deal, had decided that it couldn't structure a deal that GM wanted from
big banks.
5.) What are the risks associated with the acquisition of GMAC? In
particular, comment on the risk associated with GM's possible bankruptcy and its
relation to GMAC's business operations.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
--- RELATED ARTICLES ---
TITLE: GM's Wagoner Gains Some Time for Turnaround
REPORTER: Lee Hawkins, Jr., Monica Langley, and Joseph B. White
PAGE: A1
ISSUE: Apr 04, 2006
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114411090537615994.html
OBSF: Off Balance Sheet Financing
Off-Balance-Sheet Financing ---
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/obsf.asp
A form of financing in which large capital
expenditures are kept off of a company's balance sheet through various
classification methods. Companies will often use off-balance-sheet financing
to keep their debt to equity (D/E) and leverage ratios low, especially if
the inclusion of a large expenditure would break negative debt covenants.
Contrast to loans, debt and equity, which do appear
on the balance sheet. Examples of off-balance-sheet financing include joint
ventures, research and development partnerships, and operating leases
(rather than purchases of capital equipment).
Operating leases are one of the most common forms
of off-balance-sheet financing. In these cases, the asset itself is kept on
the lessor's balance sheet, and the lessee reports only the required rental
expense for use of the asset. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in
the U.S. have set numerous rules for companies to follow in determining
whether a lease should be capitalized (included on the balance sheet) or
expensed.
This term came into popular use during the Enron
bankruptcy. Many of the energy traders' problems stemmed from setting up
inappropriate off-balance-sheet entities.
The history of financial reporting is replete
with ploys to keep debt from being disclosed in financial statements. If
standard setters require disclosures, the history of financial reporting is
replete with ploys to keep the disclosed obligations from being booked under the
liabilities section of the balance sheet.
Examples of OBSF ploys in the past and some that still remain as
viable means of keeping debt off the balance sheets.
-
Underfunded Pensions, Post-Retirement
Obligations, and Other Debt
Probably the largest form of OBSF is booked debt that is badly
understated. Particularly problematic is variable debt that is badly
underestimated. For example, a company or a government unit (e.g., city or
county) may be obligated to pay medical bills or insurance premiums for
retired employees and their families. Until FAS 106 companies did not report
these obligations at all. Governmental agencies (not the Federal government)
are just not becoming obligated to report such obligations under GASB 45.
Accounting rules have been so lax that many of these obligations were never
disclosed or disclosed at absurdly low amounts relative to the explosion in
the costs of medical care and medical insurance. Pensions had to be booked,
but the rules allowed companies to greatly understate the amount of the
unfunded debt.
-
Forward contracts, swaps, and some other
derivative financial instruments.
Until FAS 119 in 1995, many derivative contracts did not even have to
disclose many derivative financial instruments contracts, some of which had
enormous obligations. FAS 119 was issued as a stop gap disclosure standard
after some enormous scandals in undisclosed derivative obligations. See
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds
In the Year 2000, FAS 133 kicked in as a complex standard requiring not only
disclosure but booking of derivative financial instruments in balance sheet
accounts and maintenance at fair values at all reporting dates. For
tutorials on this complex standard see
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm
-
Capital leases and leasing subsidiaries
Until FAS 13, leases did not have to be booked. Companies entered into
complex leasing arrangements to avoid showing debt on balance sheet. For
example, Safeway borrowed heavily to build hundreds of grocery stores across
the United States and then transferred the stores and their mortgages to a
leasing subsidiary. The stores were then leased from Safeway's leasing
subsidiary. The leasing subsidiary was not consolidated in Safeway's
financial statements. Hence all the debt on all Safeway stores was hidden on
Safeway balance sheets. Safeway was not unique. This ploy was used by
hundreds of companies to keep millions in debt off balance sheets. FAS 94
put an end to much of this type of OBSF by requiring consolidation of
financing subsidiary corporations ---
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/old/07551314.htm
The Financial Accounting Standards Board has
implemented Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 94, requiring
consolidated financial statements for all majority-owned subsidiaries with
their parent firms, in order to eliminate off balance sheet financing. The
manufacturing sector of the economy is expected to be heavily affected, with
highly leveraged subsidiaries causing an increase in total debt and the debt
to equity ratio after consolidation. The likely effects of SFAS 94 on extant
debt and management contracting agreements include increased operating costs
due to the: negative effects in the securities markets; increased costs
inherent in the recontracting of debt covenant restrictions in light of
likely violations; and the renegotiation of dividend restrictions,
management compensation agreements, and loan agreements.
FAS 13 put an end to much OBSF by setting up bright lines distinguishing
capital leases from operating leases. Capital leases that are essentially a
form of financing capital assets are required to be booked as debt on the
balance sheet ---
http://ez13.com/rules.htm
-
Operating Leases
In theory an operating lease is a lease without any intention of ever owning
the leased asset. For example, a company that rents a store in a shopping
mall signs an operating lease but can never become an owner of that rented
space in the mall. Many offices are rented in office buildings under similar
"operating leases." FAS 13 created some bright line tests of whether a lease
is an operating lease or a capital lease that is simply a means of financing
eventual ownership. The problem is that FAS 13 bright line tests allow many
companies to declare leases operating leases that are really capital leases
in disguise. For example, airline companies typically declare leases on
aircraft to be operating leases that meet the bright line tests in theory
but not in substance. Hence operating leases remain as one of the main ploys
of keeping debt off the balance sheet.
-
Unconsolidated ventures and financing
companies
FAS 94 did not put an end to all OBSF from unconsolidated subsidiares. For
example, the FASB still allows OBSF with Variable Interest Entities (VIEs
that were formerly called SPEs). FIN 46 dictates when OFSF is still allowed
with the key rule that the value of the VIE's assets should exceed the value
of the obligations and the requirement that an independent outside investor
place at least 10% interest in the VIE at risk. See
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm
Securitizations are popular forms of VIEs that keep debt off the
balance sheet. For example, a VIE (formerly called SPE) might be
formed to hold real estate and the issuance of debt carried by the VIE to
finance that real estate. The concept, however, is a bit more subtle as
explained at
http://www.securitization.net/knowledge/transactions/introduction.asp
The Nature of Securitization
Most attempts to define securitization
make the same mistake; they focus on the process of securitization instead
of on the substance, or meaning, of securitization. Hence, the most common
definition of securitization is that it consists of the pooling of assets
and the issuance of securities to finance the carrying of the pooled assets.
Yet, surely, this reveals no more about securitization than seeing one's
image reflected in a mirror reveals about one's inner character. In Lord
Kelvin's terms, it is knowledge of "a meager and unsatisfactory kind."
A better definition of securitization is
that it consists of the use of superior knowledge about the expected
financial behavior of particular assets, as opposed to knowledge about the
expected financial behavior of the originator of the chosen assets, with the
help of structure to more efficiently finance the assets. This definition is
superior because it better explains the need for the most essential aspects
of any securitization any where in the world under any legal system, and it
better defines the place of securitization within several of the broader
financial trends that have occurred at the end of our century.
The first trend has been the break down of
individual, segregated and protected, capital markets into one, increasingly
world-wide, capital market. The result of this trend has been a drive to
find ever more efficient forms of raising capital, particularly in the form
of debt financings. The more efficient forms will, by definition, in capital
markets that are not segregated or protected from other competing markets,
replace the less efficient forms.
Securitization, in the correct
circumstances, is one of the very most efficient forms of financing. This is
because of two additional trends. The first is the increasing importance of
the use of information to create wealth. The second is the increasing
sophistication of computers and their uses. Securitization is made possible
by the combination of these two trends. Computers enable one to store and
retrieve extensive data about the historical behavior of pools of assets.
This historical data in turn enables one to predict, under the right
circumstances, the behavior of pools of such assets subsequently originated
by the applicable originator. Because our knowledge about such behavior may
be so precise and reliable, when structured correctly, a securitization may
entail less risk than a financing of the entity that originated the
securitized assets. Again in Lord Kelvin's terms, our knowledge about the
likely behavior of pools of assets is "measurable" and we "express it in
numbers." It is a superior sort of knowledge from the perspective of the
world of finance. Accordingly, such a securitization may be fairly labeled
to be more efficient and indeed may require less over-all capital than
competing forms of financing.
The preferred definition of securitization
with which this essay began thus reveals why securitization often is
preferable to other forms of financing. It also explains most of the
structural requirements of securitization. For, to take advantage of
superior information of the expected behavior of a pool of assets, the
ability of the investor to rely on those assets for payment must not be
materially impaired by the financial behavior of the related originator or
any of its affiliates. In most legal systems, this is not practicable
without the isolation of those assets legally from the financial fortunes of
the originator. Isolation, in turn, is almost always accomplished by the
legal transfer of the assets to another entity, often a special purpose
entity ("SPE") that has no businesses other than holding, servicing,
financing and liquidating the assets in order to insure that the only
relevant event to the financial success of the investors' investment in the
assets is the behavior of such assets. Finally, almost all of the structural
complexities that securitization entails are required either to create such
isolation or to deal with the indirect effects of the creation of such
isolation. For example, the (i) attempt to cause such transfers to be "true
sales" in order to eliminate the ability of the originator to call on such
assets in its own bankruptcy, (ii) "perfection" of the purchaser's interest
in the transferred assets, (iii) protections built into the form of the SPE,
its administration and its capital structure all in order to render it
"bankruptcy remote", and (iv) limitation on the liabilities that an SPE may
otherwise incur are each attributes of the structure of a securitization
designed to insure that the isolation of the transferred assets is not only
theoretical but also real.
Similarly, attempts to (i) limit taxes on
the income of the SPE or the movement across borders of the interest accrued
by transferred receivables, (ii) comply with the various securities or
investment laws that apply to the securities issued by the various SPEs in
order to finance their purchases of the assets, or (iii) comply with the
bank regulatory restrictions that arise in connection with such transfers,
the creation of SPEs and the other various roles played by banks in
connection with sponsoring such transactions each constitute a reaction to
indirect problems caused by the structuring of the above described transfer
and the SPE to receive the transferred assets.
Synthetic leasing is motivated by the corporate tax code that allows
a company to a transaction to be booked as an OBSF VIE from an accounting
standpoint and as a loan from a tax standpoint. The end results are an
off-balance sheet account of the financing and the tax benefits, such as
depreciation, that accompany the financed asset.
There are many other ploys for hiding debt with unconsolidated "ventures."
One ploy is called a diamond structure. A diamond structure arises
when three or more companies form a financing venture in which all companies
own less than 50% of the venture. The venture can sometimes borrow millions
or billions of dollars because of business contracts between the venture and
its "owners." For example, pipeline ventures may be diamond structured
ventures where three or more major oil companies sign "throughput" contracts
to ship huge amounts of fuel through the venture's pipeline. Since these
major oil companies have very solid financial reputations (e.g., companies
like Exxon and Shell), the venture can borrow billions to build the
pipeline. That huge amount of debt never appears on the financial statements
of the companies who sign the throughput contracts. The throughput contracts
must be disclosed, but these are like purchase contracts that do not have to
be booked in advance.
-
Unconsolidated Suppliers and Customers
Whereas diamond structures are typically VIEs formed by "equity"
holders (the VIE may not actually issue equity shares per se) in the
venture, it is possible that long-term purchase contracts with suppliers or
long-term sales contracts with customers are sufficient for those customers
and suppliers to borrow huge amounts of debt. For example, suppose a paper
company needs an enormous supply of paper pulp. The company could borrow
money and invest in its own timber lands and pulp mills. But that might
entail putting an enormous amount of debt on the paper company's balance
sheet. Instead the company could sign a long-term purchase contract with a
relatively unknown pulp producer. The purchase contract alone might enable
the pulp producer to borrow enough for huge tracts of timberland and pulp
producing mill construction. The debt appears on the pulp producer's books
but never on the paper company's books. The paper company may be indirectly
obligated for an enormous amount of this debt, however, because if the
company should renege on its long-term purchase contracts it will be liable
for damages under the unbooked purchase contract (purchase contracts are not
booked like debt contracts).
Similar arrangements might be made with customers. Instead of borrowing to
finance retail stores, a company might sell franchises that, in turn, can
borrow money to build stores because of the franchise reputation such as a
McDonald's Restaurant franchise. The franchiser (e.g., McDonalds
Corporation) may have huge unbooked obligations for damages if it reneges on
the franchise contract. Sales contracts are not booked like debt is booked.
-
In-Substance Defeasance
In-substance defeasance used to be a ploy to take debt off the balance
sheet. It was invented by Exxon in 1982 as a means of capturing the millions
in a gain on debt (bonds) that had gone up significantly in value due to
rising interest rates. The debt itself was permanently "parked" with an
independent trustee as if it had been cancelled by risk free government
bonds also placed with the trustee in a manner that the risk free assets
would be sufficient to pay off the parked debt at maturity. The defeased
(parked) $515 million in debt was taken off of Exxon's balance sheet and the
$132 million gain of the debt was booked into current earnings ---
http://www.bsu.edu/majb/resource/pdf/vol04num2.pdf
Defeasance was thus looked upon as an alternative to outright extinguishment
of debt until the FASB passed FAS 125 that ended the ability of companies to
use in-substance defeasance to remove debt from the balance sheet. Prior to FAS
125, defeasance became enormously popular as an OBSF ploy.
Shocking Impact of GASB 45
Underfunded Pensions, Post-Retirement
Obligations, and Other Debt
Probably the largest form of OBSF is booked debt that is badly
understated. Particularly problematic is variable debt that is badly
underestimated. For example, a company or a government unit (e.g., city or
county) may be obligated to pay medical bills or insurance premiums for retired
employees and their families. Until FAS 106 companies did not report these
obligations at all. Governmental agencies (not the Federal government) are just
not becoming obligated to report such obligations under GASB 45. Accounting
rules have been so lax that many of these obligations were never disclosed or
disclosed at absurdly low amounts relative to the explosion in the costs of
medical care and medical insurance. Pensions had to be booked, but the rules
allowed companies to greatly understate the amount of the unfunded debt.
"A $2-Trillion Fiscal Hole," by Chris Edwards and Jagadeesh
Gokhale, The Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2006; Page A18 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116062308693690263.html?mod=opinion&ojcontent=otep
State and local governments are
amassing huge obligations in the form of unfunded retirement benefits for
their workers. Aside from underfunded pension plans, governments have also
run up large obligations from their retiree health plans. While a new
Governmental Accounting Standards Board rule will kick in next year and
reveal exactly how large this problem is, we estimate that retiree health
benefits are a $1.4 trillion fiscal time bomb.
The new GASB regulations will require
accrual accounting of state and local retiree health benefits, thus
revealing to taxpayers the true costs of the large bureaucracies that they
fund. We reviewed unfunded health costs across 16 states and 11 local
governments that have made actuarial estimates, and found an average accrued
liability per covered worker of $135,000. Multiplying that by the number of
covered state and local employees in the country yields a total unfunded
obligation of $1.4 trillion -- twice the reported underfunding in state and
local pension plans at $700 billion.
To put these costs in context,
consider the explicit net debt of state and local governments. According to
the Federal Reserve Board, state and local credit market debt has risen
rapidly in recent years, from $313 billion in 2001 to $568 billion in 2005.
But unfunded obligations from state and local pension and retiree health
plans -- about $2 trillion -- are still more than three times this net debt
amount.
The key problem is that the great
majority of state and local governments finance their retiree health
benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis. In coming years that will create pressure
to raise taxes as Baby Boomers age and government employees retire in
droves. New Jersey's accrued unfunded obligations in its retiree health plan
now stand at $20 billion, and the overall costs of its employee health plan
are expected to grow at 18% annually for the next four years.
To compound the problem,
defined-benefit pension and retirement health plans are much more common and
generous in the public sector than the private sector. Out of 15.9 million
state and local workers, about 65% are covered under retirement health
plans, compared to just 24% of workers in large firms in the private sector.
The prospect of funding $2 trillion
of obligations with higher taxes is frightening, especially when you
consider that state politicians would be imposing them on the same income
base as federal politicians trying to finance massive shortfalls in Social
Security and Medicare. Hopefully, most state policy makers appreciate that
hiking taxes in today's highly competitive global economy is a losing
proposition.
The only good options are to cut
benefits and move state and local retirement plans to a pre-funded basis
with personal savings plans. Two states, Alaska and Michigan, have moved to
savings-based (defined-contribution) pension plans for their new employees.
Alaska has also implemented a health-care plan for new state employees,
which includes high-deductible insurance and a Health Savings Account.
Expect to see more states following Alaska's lead.
State and local governments also need
to cut retirement benefits, which were greatly expanded during the 1990s
boom. From a fairness perspective, cutting benefits especially of younger
workers is reasonable given the generosity of state and local plans. Federal
data shows that state and local governments spend an average of $3.91 per
hour worked on employee health benefits, compared to $1.72 in the private
sector.
Underfunded -- or more accurately,
over-promised -- retirement plans for state and local workers have created a
$2 trillion fiscal hole. Every year that policy makers put off the tough
decisions, the hole gets bigger. Hopefully, the new GASB rules will prompt
them to enact the reforms needed to avert job-destroying tax increases on
the next generation.
Mr. Edwards is tax policy director at the Cato
Institute. Mr. Gokhale is a senior fellow at Cato and a former senior
economic adviser to the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
Question
What is the new European accounting ploy (termed the 2007 Accounting Miracle) to
hide debt until the instant it becomes due?
"Italy's Accounting Miracle," by Tito Boeri and Guido Tabellini, The Wall
Street Journal, November 28, 2006 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116466953696233804.html?mod=opinion&ojcontent=otep
The latest murky accounting ploy has received the
European Union's stamp of approval. As of 2007, Italy will be able to reduce
its official budget deficit with the cash proceeds of new liabilities. The
new debt will remain hidden until it comes due. If this is how the EU's
revised Stability and Growth Pact will work, it would be wiser to scrap the
budget rules altogether. At least then national capitals would not be so
tempted to artificially reduce their budget deficits, and citizens would be
better informed about the true state of public finances.
Here's how the new gimmick works. Under current
Italian law, employees must set aside a tax-exempt fraction of their gross
wages, nearly 7%, into a severance scheme called TFR. Instead of creating
personal accounts for their employees, each company collects the money in
one large fund. When an employee leaves the firm, he receives the money he
paid into the fund plus interest, currently about 3%. The TFR is thus debt
that companies owe to their employees. That's why firms list it as
liabilities in their financial statements.
Under the new Italian budget law, though, part of
the contributions to this severance scheme will be collected and held by
Italy's social security administration to finance public expenditures. When
the employee leaves his job or has health problems, the government, rather
than the employer, will disburse his severance payments. The bottom line is
that, by receiving the contributions for this new, implicit debt, the
Italian government expects to reduce its yearly budget deficit by almost
0.5% of GDP. A debt instrument has miraculously become a surplus.
This bookkeeping equivalent of turning water into
wine is possible because EU accounting rules for government finances are
much looser than the rules that the same governments apply to private firms.
The bloc's statistics service, Eurostat, does not consider the future
obligations implicit in public pensions as part of government liabilities.
Hence, the transfer of the TFR to the Italian social security system is
treated like the creation of a new pay-as-you go system.
The Stability Pact's 2005 reform, though,
specifically encourages Brussels to pay special attention to fiscal
sustainability in the long run, and in particular to the future liabilities
implicit in the pension systems. The Commission, however, has paid lip
service to the principle of long-run sustainability, while in practice is
giving its blessing to the Italian accounting miracle. In so doing, it has
shown that the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact will not be enforced.
This creates a dangerous precedent that other
member states might be tempted to follow. Germany, for instance, has a "book
reserve" system similar to the Italian TFR that automatically applies to a
significant portion of its work force. The contributions to the German
system are even more attractive as a potential source of government finance
since, unlike the TFR, they can only be claimed by the workers upon
retirement. Many other Europeans countries have sizable occupational pension
plans. The EU is implicitly saying that the proceeds from nationalizing
these plans can be used to meet its budget deficit targets. Firms in
financial difficulties with occupational pension plans are always tempted to
transfer to the state their pension liabilities, together with the annual
contributions to the fund. Now myopic governments will have an additional
incentive to meet these requests for "state aid." Public revenues increase
immediately, while the debt disappears once it is transferred to the public
sector.
Europe's public finances can ill afford these kinds
of miracles.
Messrs. Boeri and Tabellini are economics professors at Bocconi
University in Milan.
This could make a good case study for an accounting theory course
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on December 8, 2006
TITLE: Making Use of Frequent-Flier Miles Gets Harder
REPORTER: Scott McCartney
DATE: Dec 05, 2006
PAGE: D5
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116528094651740654.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
TOPICS: Accounting, Auditing
SUMMARY: The Department of Transportation (DOT) has undertaken audit
procedures on airlines to review how they are "living up to their 1999 'Customer
Service Commitment.'" This document was written when "airlines were under
pressure from Congress and consumers for lousy service and long delays" in order
to "stave off new legislation regulating their business." The airlines also
report little about the frequent flier mile plans they offer, and particularly
focus only on the financial aspects of these plans in their annual reports and
SEC filings, rather than, say, information about ease of redeeming miles in
which customers may be particularly interested.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What information do airlines provide about frequent flier mileage offerings
and redemptions in their annual reports and SEC filings?
2.) Why is this information important for financial statement users? In your
answer, describe your understanding of the business model and accounting for
frequent flier miles, based on the description in the article.
3.) Why did the Department of Transportation (DOT) undertake a review of
airline practices? What type of audit would you say that the DOT performed?
4.) What audit procedures did the airlines abandon due to financial
exigencies? What was the result of abandoning these audit procedures? In your
answer, describe the incentives provided by the act of undertaking audit
procedures on operational efficiencies and effectiveness.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"Making Use of Frequent-Flier Miles Gets Harder Falling Redemption Rate Is One
of Many Service Issues, Government Report Find," by Scott McCartney, The Wall
Street Journal, December 5, 2006; Page D5 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116528094651740654.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
Which airline is the most accommodating when it
comes to letting consumers cash in frequent-flier mileage awards? It's hard
to know, a new government report says, because airlines disclose so little
information.
One thing is clear: Over the past four years, the
percentage of travelers cashing in frequent-flier award tickets has declined
at four of the five biggest airlines, even though miles accumulated by
consumers have increased.
The Department of Transportation's inspector
general went back and checked how airlines were living up to their 1999
"Customer Service Commitment." Back then, airlines were under pressure from
Congress and consumers for lousy service and long delays, and they promised
reform to stave off new legislation regulating their business.
Seven years later, Inspector General Calvin L.
Scovel III found that under financial pressure, many airlines quit auditing
or quality control checks on their own customer service, leading to service
deterioration. Airlines don't provide enough training for employees who
assist passengers with disabilities, the investigation found, and don't
always follow rules when handling passengers who get bumped from flights.
And as travelers have long complained, government
auditors studying 15 carriers at 17 airports found airline employees often
don't provide timely and accurate information on flight delays and their
causes, and don't give consumers straightforward information about
frequent-flier award redemptions.
"They can do better and must do better, and if they
don't do better, Congress has authority to wield a big stick," said U.S. Rep
John Mica, the outgoing chairman of the House Aviation Subcommittee who
requested the inspector general's customer-service investigation. He said
he's eager to hear the airline industry's response before making final
judgments, but the report card gives airlines only "average to poor grades
in a range of areas that need improvement."
Since airlines are returning to profitability and
aggressively raising fares, there's more attention being paid to
customer-service issues. Delays have increased; baggage handling worsened.
As traffic has rebounded, airlines still under financial pressure because of
high oil prices may not have adequate staff to live up to the promises they
made on customer service.
The report called on the DOT to "strengthen its
oversight and enforcement of air-traveler consumer-protection rules" and
urged airlines to get back on the stick for customer service. The inspector
general also reminded consumers that since airlines incorporated the
customer-service commitment into their "contract of carriage" -- the legal
rules governing tickets -- carriers can be sued for not living up to their
customer-service commitment.
The industry says it is paying attention. The
inspector general's Nov. 21 report "is a good report card for reminding us
where we need to improve," said David Castelveter, a spokesman for the Air
Transport Association, the industry's lobbying group, which coordinated the
"Customer Service Commitment." Airlines will "react accordingly," he said.
One of the stickiest areas is frequent-flier
redemptions because airlines are loath to release detailed information about
their programs, considering it crucial competitive information.
Frequent-flier programs have become big money-makers for airlines since they
sell so many miles in advance to credit-card companies, merchants, charities
and others. That allows them to pocket cash years in advance of a ticket,
then incur very little expense when consumers eventually redeem the miles,
if they ever do.
In 1999, airlines pledged to publish "annual
reports" on frequent-flier redemptions. But at most carriers, the disclosure
didn't change at all. Today, as then, carriers typically bury numbers deep
in filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission and report only the
number of awards issued, the estimated liability they have for the cost of
awards earned but not yet redeemed and the number of awards as a percentage
either of passengers or passenger miles traveled.
The inspector general said the hard-to-find
information has only "marginal value to the consumer for purposes of
determining which frequent-flier program best meets their need."
What you'd really want to know is which airline
makes it easiest to get an award, particularly the cheapest domestic coach
ticket, typically 25,000 miles, which is the most popular award. But
airlines don't disclose how many awards are at the lowest level, and how
many consumers have to pay double miles or so for a premium award of an
"unrestricted" coach ticket.
The award market follows ticket prices and
availability, so recent years have seen an increase in the price people have
to pay to get the awards they want, and less availability of award seats,
particularly at the cheapest level, because some airlines have cut capacity
and demand for travel has been strong. Add in the flood of miles airlines
are issuing, and the value of a frequent-flier mile has declined sharply.
The inspector general's report compares
award-redemption rates at big airlines over the past four years and found a
relatively steady drop at four carriers: UAL Corp.'s United Airlines,
Continental Airlines Inc., AMR Corp.'s American Airlines and Northwest
Airlines Corp. US Airways Group Inc. actually saw higher rates of redemption
in 2005 than in 2002, and Delta Air Lines Inc. was unchanged. Both Delta and
US Airways had higher redemption rates than competitors.
to claim short-trip tickets, adding more seats to
award inventory this fall and offering a new credit card with easier
redemption features. Northwest said its numbers have remained relatively
consistent -- roughly one in every 12 seats is a reward seat.
Other airlines said declining redemption rates
result from factors including an increase in paying customers, fuller planes
and shifts in airline capacity. American says the number of awards it has
issued has remained fairly constant, and while the number of passengers it
carries has climbed, its seat capacity hasn't. In addition, several airlines
said customer preferences like using miles for first-class upgrades or
hoarding miles longer to land big international trips can affect the
redemption rate. "Reward traffic does not spool up and absorb capacity
increases as fast as revenue traffic does," said a Continental spokesman.
Those numbers don't include awards that their
customers redeem on partner airlines, so some of the decline could be
attributable to an increase in consumers' opting to grab award seats on
foreign airlines or other partners, says frequent-flier expert Randy
Petersen. American, for example, does disclose more redemption data on its
Web site and showed that last year, it issued more than 955,000 awards for
travel on its partners, compared with the 2.6 million used on American and
American Eagle flights.
"The data can be misleading," said Mr. Petersen,
founder of InsideFlyer.com. He'd like to see more data, including numbers on
how many customers made requests but couldn't find seats.
But further disclosure is unlikely to happen unless
the government forces it. "Left to their own devices," said Tim Winship,
publisher of FrequentFlier.com, "I see no reason to expect airlines to step
up and disclose more."
Insurance: A Scheme for Hiding Debt That
Won't Go Away
The SEC and Eliot Spitzer have launched probes into sales by insurance
firms of products that help customers burnish results. Industry
executives say companies can reap distinct accounting
benefits by obtaining loans dressed up as insurance products. Under
U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, companies are allowed to use
insurance recoveries to offset losses on their income statements -- often
without disclosing them. To qualify as insurance under the accounting rules,
financial contracts must involve a significant transfer of risk from one party
to another.
"Fresh Probes Target Insurers' Earnings Role," by Theo Francis
and Jonathan Weil, The Wall Street Journal, November 8, 2004, Page C1
--- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB109988032427267296,00.html?mod=home_whats_news_us
The Securities and Exchange
Commission and New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer each have launched
investigations into sales by insurance companies of questionable financial
products that help customers burnish their financial statements, according
to people familiar with the matter.
The SEC's enforcement division is
conducting an industrywide investigation into whether a variety of insurance
companies may have helped customers improperly smooth their earnings by
selling them financial-engineering products that were designed to look like
insurance but in some cases were little more than loans in disguise, people
familiar with the matter say. The agency is focusing on a universe of
products that are intended to achieve desired accounting results for
customers' financial statements, as opposed to traditional insurance, whose
primary goal is transferring risk of losses from a policyholder to the
insurer selling the coverage.
Meanwhile, New York state
investigators are preparing to issue subpoenas as soon as this week to
several large insurance companies. After months of combing through industry
documents in its continuing probe of insurance-broker compensation, Mr.
Spitzer's office has grown increasingly concerned about insurance-industry
products, detailed in The Wall Street Journal last month, that customers can
use to manipulate their income statements and balance sheets.
Although Mr. Spitzer's office and the
SEC began looking into the issue separately, they have discussed sharing
information and resources, according to a person familiar with the probes.
Normally, an insurer is paid a specific amount of
premiums to take on a risk of uncertain size and timing. In the
"insurance" at issue, the risk of loss to the insurer selling the
policy is limited and sometimes even eliminated -- partly because, in these
policies' simplest form, the premiums are so high; other times, the loss
already has occurred.
Industry executives say companies can reap distinct
accounting benefits by obtaining loans dressed up as insurance products.
Under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, companies are allowed
to use insurance recoveries to offset losses on their income statements --
often without disclosing them. To qualify as insurance under the accounting
rules, financial contracts must involve a significant transfer of risk from
one party to another.
Continued in the article
Insurance companies historically have been rancid with white collar
crime and consumer rip offs. Bob Jensen's threads on insurance company
scandals are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudRotten.htm#Insurance
Off-Balance-Sheet Entities: The Good, The Bad And The Ugly - This
article defines some typical off-balance-sheet items and discusses when they
are justified and when they are misleading.
The Good
Off-balance-sheet companies were created to help finance new ventures.
Theoretically, these separate companies were used to transfer the risk
of the new venture from the parent to the separate company. This way,
the parent could finance the new venture without diluting existing
shareholders or adding to the parent's debt burden. These separate legal
entities could be privately held partnerships or publicly traded
spin-offs.
Sometimes the separate companies were created
to pursue a business project that was a part of the parent's main line
of business. For example, oil-drilling companies established
off-balance-sheet subsidiaries as a way to finance oil exploration
projects. These subsidiaries were jointly funded by the parent and
outside investors who were willing to take the exploration risk. The
parent company could have sold shares or borrowed the money directly,
but the accounting and tax laws were designed to allow the project
funding come from investors who were interested in investing in specific
explorations rather than investing in the parent company.
Other times these separate companies were
created to house businesses that were decidedly different from the
parent's line of work (in order to unlock "value"). For example,
Williams Co's, created Williams Communications to pursue the
communications business. Williams Companies spun off Williams
Communications, but the bankers required the parent to guarantee the
debt of Williams Communications. Because Williams Communications was a
new company, this is not an unusual request.
This use of off-balance-sheet entities is good
in that it transfers risk from the parent's shareholders to others that
were willing to take the business risk. Investors in Williams Companies
(an energy resource company) may not have wanted to invest in a
communications company, so management created a separate entity to house
that business. Likewise, oil companies used off-balance-sheet entities
to remove the exploration risk from their business to share it with
others that wanted a bigger piece of the potential return from
exploration.
The Bad
While GAAP and tax laws allow off-balance-sheet entities for valid
reasons noted above, bad things happen when economic reality differs
significantly from the assumptions that were used to justify the
off-balance-sheet entity. Problems also occur when egos get too big.
In Williams's case, the decision to spin off
the communications business was reasonable at the time. The parent had
the infrastructure on which to build a communications network, but it
was an energy company. By spinning off the subsidiary, it was not
forcing its investors to take on the risk of a communications company,
and it was able to take advantage of the market's demand for
communication stocks. At the same time, the need to guarantee the debt
of a new subsidiary is a reasonable request that bankers make in this
type of transaction.
What went "wrong" was that economic reality
differed from the assumptions that were used to justify the spin off.
Dotcom mania resulted in over-capacity, causing problems for all
telecommunications companies. The loan guarantee, which is never
expected to be triggered, is now an issue for the company because of the
recession and the slump in the telecommunications sector.
Enron exemplifies how ego can be the basis for
the misuse of off-balance-sheet items. Here, off-balance-sheet vehicles
appear to have been used to pump up financial results rather than for
legitimate business purposes. What started as a plan to legitimately use
off-balance-sheet vehicles morphed into ways to manufacture earnings as
trades went bad. While one could argue that this is also a case of
economic reality differing from expectations, the way management reacted
to the situation allows us to classify it as an ego thing.
This financial engineering is usually fueled by
the need to reach certain operating targets established by Wall Street
or compensation plans. Once management succumbs to this "Dark Side",
more time is spent on trying to game the system than trying to manage
the core business. It is then only a matter of time before the house of
cards falls.
The Ugly
It gets ugly when the markets start to punish a stock just because it
has an off-balance-sheet item. Granted, it is not always easy to read a
company's SEC filings, let alone dig into the footnotes and figure out
how the off-balance-sheet items might impact results. But the companies
that provide full disclosure will probably be the better investments.
Conclusion The loss of faith in accounting's
ability to provide full disclosure could have a bigger impact on the
stock market than the events of September 11th. The attacks were an
exogenous factor and we bounced back nicely. The loss of confidence in
financial statements is an attack on one of the core elements of
investment decision making. To quote Johnny Cochran, "If the statements
aren't true, what will we do?"
However, the focus on off-balance-sheet
accounting will have two major benefits. First, it will result in new
regulations that will hopefully prevent future Enrons. Some of these
changes will likely be the following:
Prevention of officers of the parent from being
officers of the off-balance-sheet subsidiary
Increasing the percentage ownership by outside
and non-affiliated companies
Enforcing disclosure rules so that investors
can clearly understand the risk (if any) posed by off-balance-sheet
companies Second, market over-reaction creates a buying opportunity.
Markets always overreact, causing panic in the Street. Uncertainty
created by the loss of faith in financial disclosures could even cause
more damage to the market than extreme events like September 11th.
Bob Jensen's threads on VIE's (SPEs) are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm
Uncovering Hidden Debt - Understand how financing through operating
leases, synthetic leases, and securitizations affects companies' image of
performance.
Is the company whose stock you own carrying
more debt than the balance sheet is showing? Most of the information
about debt can be found on the balance sheet--but many debt obligations
are not disclosed there. Here is a review of some off-balance-sheet
transactions and what they mean for investors.
The term "off-balance-sheet" debt has recently
come under the spotlight. The reason, of course, is Enron, which used
underhanded techniques to shift debt off its balance sheet, making the
company's fundamentals look far stronger than they were. That said, not
all off–balance-sheet finance is shady. In fact, it can be a useful tool
that all sorts of companies can use for a variety of legitimate
purposes--such as tapping into extra sources of financing and reducing
liability risk that could hurt earnings.
As an investor, it's your job to understand the
differences between various off-balance-sheet transactions. Has the
company really reduced its risk by shifting the burden of debt to
another company, or has it simply come up with a devious way of
eliminating a liability from its balance sheet?
Operating Leases
A lot of investors don't know that there are two kinds of leases:
capital leases, which show up on the balance sheet, and operating
leases, which do not.
Under accounting rules, a capital lease is
treated like a purchase. Let's say an airline company buying an airplane
sets up a long-term payment lease plan and pays for the airplane over
time. Since the airline will ultimately own the plane, it shows up on
its books as an asset, and the lease obligations show up as liabilities.
If the airline sets up an operating lease, the
leasing group retains ownership of the plane; therefore, the transaction
does not appear on the airline's balance sheet. The lease payments
appear as operating expenses instead. Operating leases, which are
popular in industries that use expensive equipment, are disclosed in the
footnotes of the company's published financial statements.
Consider Federal Express Corp. In its 2004
annual report, the balance sheet shows liabilities totaling $11.1
billion. But dig deeper, and you will notice in the footnotes that
Federal Express discloses $XX worth of non-cancelable operating leases.
So, the company's total debt is clearly much higher than what's listed
on the balance sheet. Since operating leases keep substantial
liabilities away from plain sight, they have the added benefit of
boosting--artificially, critics say--key performance measures such as
return-on-assets and debt-to-capital ratios.
The accounting differences between capital and
operating leases impact the cash flow statement as well as the balance
sheet. Payments for operating leases show up as cash outflows from
operations. Capital lease payments, by contrast, are divided between
operating activities and financing activities. Therefore, firms that use
capital leases will typically report higher cash flows from operations
than those that rely on operating leases.
Synthetic Leases
Building or buying an office building can load up a company's debt on
the balance sheet. A lot of businesses therefore avoid the liability by
using synthetic leases to finance their property: a bank or other third
party purchases the property and rents it to the company. For accounting
purposes, the company is treated like a tenant in a traditional
operating lease. So, neither the building asset nor the lease liability
appears on the firm's balance sheet. However, a synthetic lease, unlike
a traditional lease, gives the company some benefits of ownership,
including the right to deduct interest payments and the depreciation of
the property from its tax bill.
Details about synthetic leases normally appear
in the footnotes of financial statements, where investors can determine
their impact on debt. Synthetic leases can become a big worry for
investors when the footnotes reveal that the company is responsible for
not only making lease payments but also guaranteeing property values. If
property prices fall, those guarantees represent a big source of
liability risk.
Securitizations
Banks and other financial organizations often hold assets--like credit
card receivables--that third parties might be willing to buy. To
distinguish the assets it sells from the ones it keeps, the company
creates a special purpose entity (SPE). The SPE purchases the credit
card receivables from the company with the proceeds from a bond offering
backed by the receivables themselves. The SPE then uses the money
received from cardholders to repay the bond investors. Since much of the
credit risk gets offloaded along with the assets, these liabilities are
taken off the company's balance sheet.
Capital One is just one of many credit card
issuers that securitize loans. In its 2004 first quarter report, the
bank highlights results of its credit card operations on a so-called
managed basis, which includes $38.4 billion worth of off-balance-sheet
securitized loans. The performance of Capital One's entire portfolio,
including the securitized loans, is an important indicator of how well
or poorly the overall business is being run.
Conclusion
Companies argue that off-balance-sheet techniques benefit investors
because they allow management to tap extra sources of financing and
reduce liability risk that could hurt earnings. That's true, but
off-balance-sheet finance also has the power to make companies and their
management teams look better than they are. Although most examples of
off-balance sheet debt are far removed from the shadowy world of Enron's
books, there are nonetheless billions of dollars worth of real financial
liabilities that are not immediately apparent in companies' financial
reports. It's important for investors to get the full story on company
liabilities.
Show and Tell: The Importance of Transparency - Clear and honest
financial statements not only reflect value, they also help ensure it.
Ask investors what kind of financial
information they want companies to publish and you'll probably hear two
words: more and better. Quality financial reports allow for effective,
informative fundamental analysis.
But let's face it, the financial statements of
some firms are designed to hide rather than reveal information.
Investors should steer clear of companies that lack transparency in
their business operations, financial statements or strategies. Companies
with inscrutable financials and complex business structures are riskier
and less valuable investments.
Transparency Is Assurance The word
"transparent" can be used to describe high-quality financial statements.
The term has quickly become a part of business vocabulary. Dictionaries
offer many definitions for the word, but those synonyms relevant to
financial reporting are "easily understood", "very clear", "frank", and
"candid".
Consider two companies with the same market
capitalization, same overall market-risk exposure, and the same
financial leverage. Assume that both also have the same earnings,
earnings growth rate and similar returns on capital. The difference is
that Company A is a single-business company with easy-to-understand
financial statements. Company B, by contrast, has numerous businesses
and subsidiaries with complex financials.
Which one will have more value? Odds are good
the market will value Company A more highly. Because of its complex and
opaque financial statements, Company B's value will be discounted.
The reason is simple: less information means
less certainty for investors. When financial statements are not
transparent, investors can never be sure about a company's real
fundamentals and true risk. For instance, a firm's growth prospects are
related to how it invests. It's difficult if not impossible to evaluate
a company's investment performance if its investments are funneled
through holding companies, making them hidden from view. Lack of
transparency may also obscure the company's level of debt. If a company
hides its debt, investors can't estimate their exposure to bankruptcy
risk.
High-profile cases of financial shenanigans,
such as those at Enron and Tyco, showed everyone that managers employ
fuzzy financials and complex business structures to hide unpleasant
news. Lack of transparency can mean nasty surprises to come.
Blurry Vision The reasons for inaccurate
financial reporting are varied: a small but dangerous minority of
companies actively intends to defraud investors; other companies may
release information that is misleading but technically conforms to legal
standards.
The rise of stock option compensation has
increased the incentives for companies to misreport key information.
Companies have increased their reliance on pro forma earnings and
similar techniques, which can include hypothetical transactions. Then
again, many companies just find it difficult to present financial
information that complies with fuzzy and evolving accounting standards.
Furthermore, some firms are simply more complex
than others. Many operate in multiple businesses that often have little
in common. For example, analyzing General Electric - an enormous
conglomerate with dozens of businesses, from GE Plastics to NBC - is
more challenging than examining the financials of a firm like Amazon.com,
a pure play online retailer.
When firms enter new markets or businesses, the
way they structure these new businesses can result in greater complexity
and less transparency. For instance, a firm that keeps each business
separate will be easier to value than one that squeezes all the
businesses into a single entity. Meanwhile, the increasing use of
derivatives, forward sales, off-balance-sheet financing, complex
contractual arrangements and new tax vehicles can befuddle investors.
The cause of poor transparency, however, is
less important than its effect on a company's ability to give investors
the critical information they need to value their investments. If
investors neither believe nor understand financial statements, the
performance and fundamental value of that company remains either
irrelevant or distorted.
Transparency Pays
Mounting evidence suggests that the market gives a higher value to firms
that are upfront with investors and analysts. Transparency pays,
according to Robert Eccles, author of "Building Public Trust – The Value
Reporting Revolution". Eccles shows that companies with fuller
disclosure win more trust from investors. Relevant and reliable
information means less risk to investors and thus a lower cost of
capital, which naturally translates into higher valuations. The key
finding is that companies that share the key metrics and performance
indicators that investors consider important are more valuable than
those companies that keep information to themselves.
Of course, there are two ways to interpret this
evidence. One is that the market rewards more transparent companies with
higher valuations because the risk of unpleasant surprises is believed
to be lower. The other interpretation is that companies with good
results usually release their earnings earlier. Companies that are doing
well have nothing to hide and are eager to publicize their good
performance as widely as possible. It is in their interest to be
transparent and forthcoming with information, so that the market can
upgrade their fair value.
Further evidence suggests that the tendency
among investors to mark down complexity explains the conglomerate
discount. Relative to single-market or pure play firms, conglomerates
are discounted by as much as 20%. The positive reaction associated with
spin-offs and divestment can be viewed as evidence that the market
rewards transparency.
Naturally, there could be other reasons for the
conglomerate discount. It could be the lack of focus of these companies
and the inefficiencies that follow. Or it could be that the absence of
market prices for the separate businesses makes it harder for investors
to assess value.
It's worth noting that, even if a company's
financial statements are totally transparent, investors may still not
understand them. If biotech specialist Amgen and semiconductor maker
Intel were totally forthcoming about their R&D spending, investors might
still lack the knowledge to properly value these companies.
Conclusion
Investors should seek disclosure and simplicity. The more companies say
about where they are making money and how they are spending their
resources, the more confident investors can be about the companies'
fundamentals.
It's even better when financial reports provide
a line-of-sight view into the company's growth drivers. Transparency
makes analysis easier and thus lowers an investor's risk when investing
in stocks. That way you, the investor, are less likely to face
unpleasant surprises.
Question
What are CDOs?
Should they be booked?
Why were they particularly troublesome in the Year 2007?
CDO ---
Click Here
Accounting for CDOs (including journal entries) under
U.S. and Foreign GAAP ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/TheoryOnFirmCommitments.htm
Why were CDOs particularly troublesome in the Year 2007?
The accounting standards are not resolved on whether or not CDOs should be
booked.
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review
on November 30, 2007
Citi's $41 Billion Issue: Should It Put CDOs On the Balance
Sheet?
by David
Reilly
The Wall Street Journal
Nov 26, 2007
Page: C1
Click here to view the
full article on WSJ.com
---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119604238679603556.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
TOPICS: Accounting,
CDO, Collateralized Debt Obligations, Consolidated Financial
Statements, Consolidations, Financial Accounting,
Reconsideration Events
SUMMARY: Does
Citigroup need to bring $41 billion in potentially shaky
securities onto its balance sheet? Opinions are divided,
reflecting a wider debate over how to interpret accounting
rules on off-balance-sheet treatment for some financing
vehicles.
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: This article offers a good basis for
discussion of CDOs, possible consolidation of CDOs, and the
balance sheet presentation of CDOs based on the rules
related to "reconsideration events."
QUESTIONS:
1.) What are CDOs? What are the recent problems connected
with CDOs? What is the cause of these problems? In general,
why are they especially a concern for Citigroup?
2.) What is the specific issue facing Citigroup, as detailed
in the article?
3.) What are the accounting rules regarding consolidation of
CDOs? How do banks avoid having to consolidate?
4.) Why is there controversy over the how the losses should
be booked by the bank? What is the potentially vague part of
the rules?
5.) What position does Citigroup take? What position are
some accounting experts taking? Is either side getting
support from other parties? If so, from whom?
6.) With what position do you agree? How did you reach this
conclusion? Please offer support from your answer.
Reviewed By: Linda Christiansen, Indiana University
Southeast
RELATED
ARTICLES:
Why Citi Struggles to Tally Losses
by Carrick Mollenkamp and David Reilly
Nov 05, 2007
Page: C1
The Nine Lives of CDOs
by
Nov 26, 2007
Page: C10
Goldman Says Citigroup Faces $15 Billion CDO Write-Downs
by Kimberly A. Vlach
Nov 20, 2007
Online Exclusive
|
"Citi's $41 Billion Issue: Should It Put CDOs On the
Balance Sheet?" by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, November 26,
2007; Page C1 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119604238679603556.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
A $41 billion question mark is hanging over
Citigroup Inc.
That is the amount, in a worst-case scenario, of
potentially shaky securities the bank would need to bring onto its balance
sheet. Citi has already taken billions of dollars of such securities onto
its balance sheet and expects to take big write-downs on those holdings.
The fate of the $41 billion rests on the outcome of
a debate going on in accounting circles over what constitutes a
"reconsideration event." Those who say Citi needs to put these securities,
known as collateralized debt obligations, onto its balance sheet argue that
because Citi acted over the summer to backstop some of them, its
relationship with them changed, prompting a reconsideration event.
At the moment, it seems unlikely Citigroup will be
forced to bring the assets onto its books. The bank doesn't believe such a
reconsideration event is in order. A spokeswoman says Citigroup is confident
its "financial statements fully comply with all applicable rules and
regulations."
But the division of opinion reflects debate within
accounting circles over just how to interpret rules that govern
off-balance-sheet treatment for some financing vehicles. That, in turn,
underscores what many consider to be a failure of these rules to ensure that
investors in the companies that create these vehicles are adequately
informed of the risks posed by them.
In recent months, investors have been shocked to
learn that many banks were exposed to big losses because of their
involvement with vehicles that issued commercial paper and purchased risky
assets such as mortgage securities. The troubles facing one kind of
off-balance-sheet entity, known as structured investment vehicles, have even
prompted Citigroup and other major banks to organize a rescue fund.
But CDO vehicles created by Citigroup have proved
to be a more immediate threat. The bank's announcement this month that it
expects to take $8 billion to $11 billion in write-downs in the fourth
quarter largely stems from its exposure to CDO assets. Citigroup was one of
the biggest arrangers of CDOs -- products that pool debt, often mortgage
securities, and then sell slices with varying degrees of risk.
If Citigroup had to include an additional $41
billion in CDO assets on its books, that could potentially spur a further $8
billion in write-downs, above and beyond those already signaled, according
to a report earlier this month by Howard Mason, an analyst at Sanford C.
Bernstein. Such losses could further weaken Citigroup's capital position,
threatening its dividend or forcing the bank to raise money.
The issue for Citigroup is when, and if, it has to
reconsider consolidation of the CDO vehicles it sponsors.
Like other banks, Citigroup structured these
vehicles so they wouldn't be included on its books. The vehicles are created
as corporate zombies that ostensibly aren't owned or controlled by anyone.
In that case, accounting rules say consolidation of such vehicles is
determined by who holds the majority of risks and rewards connected to them.
To deal with that, banks sell off the riskiest
pieces of the vehicles. This ensures they don't shoulder a majority of the
risk and so don't have to consolidate the vehicles. The assessment of who
absorbs the majority of losses is made when the vehicles are created.
Over time, though, rising losses within a vehicle
can lead a sponsor to shoulder more risk, or even a majority of it. That can
also happen if a sponsor takes on additional interests in the vehicle by
buying up the short-term IOUs it issues.
That is what happened to Citigroup. Over the
summer, the bank was forced to buy $25 billion in commercial paper issued by
its CDO vehicles because investors were no longer interested in the paper.
Citigroup already had an $18 billion exposure to these vehicles through
other funding it had provided.
This combined $43 billion exposure means that if
CDO losses climb high enough, the bank could be exposed to more than half
the losses, according to Bernstein's Mr. Mason. That would seem to argue for
Citigroup's consolidating all $84 billion of its CDO assets originally held
in off-balance-sheet vehicles.
But the accounting rules don't say that sponsors of
these vehicles have to reassess on any regular basis the question of who
bears the majority of risk of loss. Such "reconsideration events" occur when
there is a change in the "governing documents or contractual arrangements"
related to these vehicles, the rules say.
Citigroup believes that because it hasn't changed
the documents or contracts related to the vehicles, it shouldn't have to
reconsider its relationship to them, according to people familiar with the
bank's thinking.
But some accounting experts point out that the rule
also says a reconsideration event occurs when an institution acquires
additional interests in the vehicle. "If a bank is being forced to step in
and be a bigger holder of the commercial paper, to me that's pretty black
and white that it's a reconsideration event," says Ed Trott, a retired
member of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the body that wrote the
accounting rule.
An influential accounting-industry group, the
Center for Audit Quality, also seems to lean toward this view. In a paper
issued last month, the center said the purchase of commercial paper is an
example of a change in the contractual arrangements governing these
vehicles. This "may also result in a reconsideration event," the paper said.
But Citigroup believes its purchase of the CDO
vehicles' commercial paper is different, because it had taken on the
obligation to provide such assistance when the vehicles were created. This
means the bank was acting within the contractual arrangements governing the
vehicles, not changing them, according to the people familiar with
Citigroup's thinking.
Some accounting experts agree. "If all that's
happening is one set of [paper holders] is going out and another is coming
in, that's not a reconsideration event," says Stephen Ryan, an accounting
professor at New York University. "I don't think you reconsider moment by
moment; an event is not just bad luck happening."
"The Accounting Cycle: Poor Performance of
Credit Rating Agencies," by J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, December 2007
---
http://lyris.smartpros.com/t/204743/5562870/4383/0/
Soon after Merrill Lynch disclosed its $8.4 billion write-down because of
problems with collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and other financial
instruments relating to subprime mortgages, the credit rating agencies
started downgrading the securities. But, this is like the proverbial soldier
who watches a raging battle from afar; when the war is over, he proceeds to
bayonet the wounded.
Merrill Lynch and other banks got into the CDO
business several years ago. The CDOs received an imprimatur from agencies
such as Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch. Some CDOs were even evaluated
as investment grade securities. The analysts at Moody's, Standard & Poor's,
and Fitch apparently ignored the risks involved in the subprime mortgage
market as well as the risks in real estate prices.
This segment generated lots of money for Merrill
Lynch and the other banks. The CDO business brought in millions and millions
of revenues. This line of business was at least as profitable for the bond
rating agencies, too, as their ratings produced massive amounts of money.
Not surprisingly, problems developed because the
financial institutions were lending funds to marginal borrowers, those with
less-than-stellar credentials for loan applicants. When some of these
riskier borrowers defaulted on their mortgages, the CDOs started losing
value. The credit rating agencies did nothing; presumably, they felt that
the CDOs still had investment grade status.
With the losses by Merrill Lynch out in the open,
everybody knows not only that the CDOs have less fair value, but also that
the credit raters aren't earning their keep. Unfortunately, members of
Congress believe that they should hold investigations on the matter. I say
unfortunate because such a move would be a waste of time, energy, and money.
Recall the downfall of Enron and the high credit
ratings that Enron received from the credit rating agencies. These agencies
did not downgrade Enron's debt until after the 2001 third quarter results
became public and Enron's stock price started its nosedive. When Congress
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, section 702(b) required the SEC to
conduct a study of credit rating agencies to determine why these credit
rating agencies did not act as useful watchdogs and warn the public about
Enron's true situation. It accomplished little at the time; if Congress
holds hearings now, nothing new will be learned. Until policy makers focus
on the institution of credit ratings and follow the cash, they waste their
time with investigations.
Moody's and the other agencies make money by
charging the business entities who are issuing debt. It doesn't take a
genius to see the conflict of interest. The credit agencies lean on the
issuer for more money or risk receiving a poor rating. Payment not only
entitles one to a good rating, but also it gives one the privilege of not
receiving a downgrade unless bad news becomes public.
The SEC barely mentions this institutional feature
in its "Report on the Roles and Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the
Operation of the Securities Markets."
This essay, written in January, 2003, practically
ignores the problem. On page 41, the SEC report states, "The practice of
issuers paying for their own ratings creates the potential for a conflict of
interest." The SEC goes on to review comments by the large rating agencies
themselves on how they manage this potential conflict of interest.
The comments are pathetic. First, the SEC and the
managers at credit rating agencies mangle the English language when they
refuse to identify conflicts of interest for what they are. My dictionary
defines conflict of interest as "the circumstance of a public officeholder,
corporate officer, etc., whose personal interests might benefit from his or
her official actions or influence." The term does not mean that they
actually do benefit, but calls attention to the possibility. Calling such
circumstances "potential conflicts of interests" merely attempts to push
ethics aside. I can understand this behavior by the managers, but I don't
comprehend the words of the SEC staff.
Second, the comments rely heavily on the assertions
of the credit rating agencies themselves. Managers of these agencies claim
there is no problem, and of course the SEC should listen to them and accept
every word as truth. Yeah, right!
Third, on page 42 of the report, the SEC promises
to explore whether these credit rating agencies "should implement procedures
to manage potential conflicts of interest that arise when issuers [pay] for
ratings." Either the SEC did not keep its promise or such actions are
inadequate. Clearly, the credit rating agencies have not responded any
differently to the CDO problem than they did with Enron's circumstances.
Policy makers can reduce the problems by reducing
the very real conflict of interests that perniciously raises its ugly head
from time to time. The solution is to prohibit credit rating agencies to
receive any funds from the issuers. If the ratings have any merit, then
investors will be willing to pay for them.
This essay reflects the opinion of the author and not necessarily the
opinion of The Pennsylvania State University.
Bob Jensen's threads on credit rating industry frauds
are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#CreditRatingAgencies
Accounting for CDOs (including journal entries) under U.S. and Foreign
GAAP ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/TheoryOnFirmCommitments.htm
Pensions and Post-retirement Benefits:
Schemes for Hiding Debt
Horrible (shell game) accounting rules for pension accounting
Over the past three decades, we have allowed a system
of pension accounting to develop that is a shell game, misleading taxpayers and
investors about the true fiscal health of their cities and companies -- and
allowing management to make promises to workers that saddle future generations
with huge costs. The result: According to a recent estimate by Credit Suisse
First Boston, unfunded pension liabilities of companies in the S&P 500 could hit
$218 billion by the end of this year. Others estimate that public pensions --
the benefits promised by state and local governments -- could be in the red
upwards of $700 billion.
Arthur Levitt, Jr., "Pensions Unplugged," The Wall Street Journal,
November 10, 2005; Page A16 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113159015994793200.html?mod=opinion&ojcontent=otep
Question
What do American Airlines pensions have to do with funding of the Iraq war?
Answer
Plenty, but who knows why?
A pension measure tucked into last month’s Iraq war
spending bill is causing some leading members of Congress to complain that
American Airlines got a break worth almost $2 billion without proper scrutiny.
The measure will allow American to greatly reduce its payments into its pension
fund over the next 10 years. At the end of 2006, the fund had assets of $8.5
billion and needed an additional $2.5 billion to cover all its obligations. The
new provision will allow American to recalculate those numbers, so that the
shortfall disappears and the plan looks fully funded. Continental, along with a
small number of regional airlines and a caterer, will also be able to take
advantage of the provision. But American, the nation’s largest airline, is by
far the biggest beneficiary, according to government calculations. Some
lawmakers who would normally be involved in tax and pension measures say they
were shut out of the process.
Mary Williams Walsh, "Pension Relief for Airlines Faulted by Some Legislators,"
The New York Times, June 21, 2007 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/21/business/21pension.html?ref=business
Jensen Question
How should accountants factor in politics in disclosing and reporting pension
obligations, especially for airlines that do not declare bankruptcy?
Changed pension accounting rules are in the wind
This week, the Financial Accounting Standards Board,
which writes the accounting rules for American business, will decide whether to
go ahead with plans to change the way pension accounting is done. The board's
current rule is 20 years old and has drawn fire from retirees and investors for
many of the same reasons that disturb Mr. Zydney, who has made his concerns
about his Lucent pension into something of a crusade. "Right now, the stuff
isn't transparent," Mr. Zydney said. "There's no accuracy. No consistency. And
everybody's trying to play some financial game to make things look better."
Mary Williams Walsh, "A Pension Rule, Sometimes Murky, Is Under Pressure,"
The New York Times, November 8, 2005 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/08/business/08pension.html?pagewanted=1
Off the government balance sheets - out of sight and
out of mind
This may be a helpful video to use when teaching
the new FAS 132(R) and the new FAS 158
"Can You Afford to Retire?" PBS ---
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/retirement/need/
Click the Tab "Watch Online" to view the video (not
free)!
"PBS Frontline: Can You Afford to Retire,"
Financial Page, November 8, 2006 --- Click Here
PBS Frontline has rebroadcast a critical
examination of the nation's retirement system. You can access the
interviews and written material for the program at
PBS Frontline: Can You Afford to Retire.
One can also view the program on-line, from the
referenced link.
The program highlights problems with both the Defined Benefit pension
system (rapidly becoming obsolete) and the rising Contributory Benefit
system, which brings with it a number of problems. The program
considers:
- Low levels of worker participation in these
plans
- Inadequate funding of these plans by workers
- Poor investment results for most employees
- The burden of self managing the plans
The program does not address the problem of high
intermediation costs in the Contributory Pension system, or the
preponderence of substandard investment vehicles (high cost annuities,
load funds, and high cost active funds) in many employer provided plans.
While the program explores the underfunding and closing of Corporate
Defined Benefit plans, it does not touch on underfunding in the
government pension system, nor does it address the fatal flaw of Defined
Benefit plans: the total lack of portability of these plans for the
employee.
FAS 158 improves financial reporting by
requiring an employer to recognize the overfunded or underfunded status of a
defined benefit postretirement plan (other than a multiemployer plan) as an
asset or liability in its statement of financial position and to recognize
changes in that funded status in the year in which the changes occur through
comprehensive income of a business entity or changes in unrestricted net assets
of a not-for-profit organization. This Statement also improves financial
reporting by requiring an employer to measure the funded status of a plan as of
the date of its year-end statement of financial position, with limited
exceptions.
FASB ---
http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/stsum158.shtml
"FASB Proposal Puts Pension
Plans on Balance Sheet," SmartPros, April 3, 2006 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x52449.xml
The Financial Accounting Standards Board issued a
proposal on Friday that would require employers to recognize the overfunded
or underfunded positions of defined benefit postretirement plans, including
pension plans, in their balance sheets. The proposal would also require that
employers measure plan assets and obligations as of the date of their
financial statements.
According to the standards board, the proposed
changes would increase the transparency and completeness of financial
statements for shareholders, creditors, employees, retirees, donors, and
other users.
The exposure draft applies to plan sponsors that
are public and private companies and nongovernmental not-for-profit
organizations. It results from the first phase of a comprehensive project to
reconsider guidance in Statement No. 87, Employers' Accounting for Pensions,
and Statement No. 106, Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits
Other Than Pensions. A second, broader phase will address remaining issues.
FASB expects to collaborate with the International Accounting Standards
Board on that phase.
In a statement released on Friday, FASB said the
current accounting standards do not provide complete information about
postretirement benefit obligations. For example, those standards allow an
employer to recognize an asset or liability in its balance sheet that almost
always differs from its overfunded or underfunded positions. Instead, they
require that information about the current funded status of such plans be
reported in the notes to financial statements. That incomplete reporting
results because existing standards allow delayed recognition of certain
changes in plan assets and obligations that affect the costs of providing
such benefits.
"Many constituents, including our advisory
councils, investors, creditors, and the SEC staff believe that the current
incomplete accounting makes it difficult to assess an employer's financial
position and its ability to carry out the obligations of its plans," said
George Batavick, FASB member. "We agree. Today's proposal, by requiring
sponsoring employers to reflect the current overfunded or underfunded
positions of postretirement benefit plans in the balance sheet, makes the
basic financial statements more complete, useful, and transparent. "
The proposed changes, other than the requirement to
measure plan assets and obligations as of the balance sheet date, would be
effective for fiscal years ending after December 15, 2006. Public companies
would be required to apply the proposed changes to the measurement date for
fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2006 and nonpublic entities,
including not-for-profit organizations, would become subject to that
requirement in fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2007.
FASB is seeking written comments on the proposal by
May 31, 2006. After the comment period, the board will hold a public
roundtable meeting on the proposal on June 27, 2006, in Norwalk,
Connecticut.
So Long Footnoted Liabilities
Pensions and other retiree benefits are graduating to the balance sheet; how far
should a company go to protect its compensation information?; choosing your
auditor wisely may help protect your stock price; and more.
"So Long Footnoted Liabilities," by Rob Garver, CFO Magazine, February
2006, pp. 16-17 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/5435560/c_5461573?f=magazine_alsoinside
Verizon, Ford, and ExxonMobil, pay attention. It
looks as though pensions and other retiree benefits are about to graduate
from the footnotes to the balance sheet. And companies that have previously
been able to hide underfunded retirement programs may have to count them as
liabilities — often multi-billion-dollar liabilities.
In November, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board voted to move toward a proposal that would require companies to report
the difference between the net present value of their pension- and other
retirement-benefit obligations and the amount the company has set aside to
meet those obligations. And although a final decision is a year or more
away, the numbers won't be pretty. (See "Will Washington Really Act?")
Standard & Poor's, in fact, estimates a
retirement-obligations shortfall of some $442 billion in the S&P 500 alone.
Indeed, it is difficult to understate the potential impact of the FASB plan,
which is expected to be only the first phase in a larger effort to overhaul
the accounting treatment of pensions and benefits. "We believe this FASB
project will have a significant impact on stock evaluations, income
statements, and balance sheets, and will become the major issue in financial
accounting over the next five years," S&P wrote in its December report.
The news was welcome to many in the accounting
business who have been concerned that current rules allow companies to hide
retiree obligations in the footnotes. John Hepp, a senior manager with Grant
Thornton LLP, praised the board's decision to move toward a "simplified
approach. We think this will be a big step forward."
But it won't be without pain for many companies
faced with adding a large negative number to their balance sheets, such as
telecom giant Verizon Communications Inc. Standard & Poor's reported in
December that Verizon has underfunded the nonpension portion of its
postretirement benefits by an estimated $22.5 billion. The company is
clearly trying to get a handle on retirement benefits and health-care costs,
announcing that same month that it will freeze the pension benefits of all
managers who currently receive them.
While the company refused to comment, Verizon is
far from alone. Ford and General Motors have underfunded their retirement
obligations by $44.7 billion and $69.0 billion, respectively, and other big
names facing a shortfall include ExxonMobil ($16.4 billion) and AT&T ($14.8
billion).
If any of these companies think the markets will
treat these obligations as a one-time problem, they had better think again,
says S&P equity market analyst Howard Silverblatt. "Moving this onto the
balance sheet is going to wake people up," he says. "The bottom line is that
shareholder equity [in the S&P 500] is going to be decreased by about 9
percent." And as companies begin to explore their legal options for limiting
the financial damage — including paring back benefits even further —
Silverblatt predicts that the issue will become more politicized and remain
in the public eye for years to come.
Pension Fund
Accounting Fraud in San Diego
"San Diego Charges," by Nicole
Gelinas, The Wall Street Journal, November 27, 2006; Page A12 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116459315111633209.html?mod=todays_us_opinion
The SEC has announced that it has resolved its
pension-fund fraud case against San Diego, with the city agreeing not to
commit illegal shenanigans in the future and to hire an "independent
monitor" to help it avoid doing so. Although the SEC went easy on the
residents and taxpayers of San Diego in its settlement, it still has an
opportunity to make an example of the former officials who the SEC
determined committed the fraud. The feds should seize that chance to show
they're serious about policing a sector of the investment world that remains
vulnerable to similar fraud.
San Diego ran into legal trouble with its pension
fund because elected officials wanted to keep its municipal workers happy by
awarding them more generous pension and health-care benefits, but also
wanted to keep taxpayers happy by sticking to a lean budget. The two goals
were mathematically irreconcilable. So San Diego officials, with the
cooperation of the board members of the city employees' retirement system
(the majority of whom were also city officials), intentionally underfunded
the pension plan for years. They used the "savings" to award workers and
retirees more benefits, some retroactive. Because taxpayers couldn't see how
much retirement benefits for public employees eventually would cost them,
they couldn't protest against those high future costs. The fund also
violated sound investment principles by using "surplus" earnings in boom
years to pay extra benefits to retirees, including a "13th check" in some
years. Trustees should have put such "surpluses" aside for years in which
the market was down.
But the alleged escalated in 2002 and 2003, when
city officials brushed aside warnings from outside groups, as well as from
an analyst it had itself commissioned, about the fund's parlous financial
straits. Although figures clearly showed that the pension fund would face a
seven-fold increase in its deficit, to more than $2 billion, over less than
a decade, San Diego didn't disclose what, according to the SEC, it "knew or
was reckless in not knowing" was an inevitability, instead maintaining its
charade. City officials disclosed not a word of the fund's financial
troubles to potential investors or bond analysts as it raised nearly $300
million in new municipal securities during those two years.
The SEC elected to go easy on the city. The feds
won't levy a fine against it, reasoning that it would end up being the
taxpayers who would pay. This argument has merit, since these taxpayers are
already on the hook for the $1.5 billion deficit -- roughly equal to the
city's operating budget -- the pension-fund fraud had concealed. Taxpayers
could face fallout if wronged investors sue the city. But while SEC won't
punish taxpayers, it can't afford to go so easy on the officials it's still
investigating. (The SEC doesn't name the current and former officials under
its scrutiny, but former Mayor Dick Murphy, former city manager Michael
Uberuaga and former auditor Ed Ryan, as well as members of the City Council,
all had degrees of responsibility for and knowledge of the pension fund's
operations.) The SEC must demonstrate that it considers the fraud officials
committed against the city's bondholders to be just as grave as similar
frauds in the private sector.
People who invest in municipal bonds do so because
they feel that such investments are safer than investing in the common
stocks of corporations. That's why cities and states enjoy access to capital
at affordable interest rates. And, for tax reasons, municipal-bond investors
often invest in the bonds of the city in which they reside, so they face
double jeopardy. In the first place, if city officials are committing fraud,
their bonds will turn out not to be as sound (and thus not as valuable) as
they thought they were. The second risk is that they will have to pay higher
taxes, or suffer lower government services, to cover pension-funding
shortfalls in their city's budget if that is the case.
Continued in article
"FASB Improves Employer Pension & Postretirement Plan
Accounting," AccountingWeb, October 4, 2006 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102640
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 158, Employers Accounting
for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans
last week, making it easier for users of financial
information to understand and assess an employer’s financial position and
its ability to fulfill benefit plan obligations. The new standard requires
that employers fully recognize those obligations associated with
single-employer defined benefit pension, retiree healthcare and other
postretirement plans in their financial statements. It amends Statements No.
87, 88, 106 and 132R.“Previous standards
covering these benefits went a long way toward improving financial
reporting. However, the Board at that time acknowledged that future changes
would be needed, and now our constituents share this view,” said George
Batavick, FASB member, in the statement announcing the new standard.
“Accordingly, today’s standard represents a significant improvement in
financial reporting as it provides employees, retirees, investors and other
financial statement users with access to more complete information. This
information will help users make more informed assessments about a company’s
financial position and its ability to carry out the benefit promises made
through these plans.”
The new standard requires an employer to:
- Recognize in its statement of financial
position an asset for a plan’s overfunded status or a liability for a
plan’s underfunded status.
- Measure a plan’s assets and its obligations
that determine its funded status as of the end of the employer’s fiscal
year (with limited exceptions).
- Recognize changes in the funded status of a
defined benefit postretirement plan in the year in which the changes
occur. Those changes will be reported in comprehensive income of
business entity and in changes in net assets of a not-for-profit
organization.
Statement No. 158 applies to plan sponsors that are
public and private companies and nongovernmental not-for-profit
organizations. The requirements recognize the funded status of a benefit
plan and disclosure requirements are effective as of the end of the fiscal
year ending after December 15, 2006, for employers with publicly traded
equity securities and the end of the fiscal year ending after June 15, 2007,
for all other entities. The requirement to measure plan assets and benefit
obligations as of the date of the employer’s fiscal year-end statement of
financial position is effective for fiscal years ending after December 15,
2008.
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas158.pdf Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 158, Employers Accounting for Defined
Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans was developed in direct
response to concerns expressed by many FASB constituents that past standards
of accounting for postretirement benefit plans needed to be revisited to
improve the transparency and usefulness of the information reported about
them. Among the Board’s constituents calling for change were many members of
the investment community, the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory
Council, the User Advisory Council, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and others.
The issuing of Statement No. 158 completes the
first phase of the Board’s comprehensive project to improve the accounting
and reporting for defined benefit pension and other postretirement plans. A
second, broader phase of this project will comprehensively address remaining
issues. The Board expects to collaborate with the International Accounting
Standards Board on that phase.
Like Texas (which has a bill pending to hide pension and health care
liabilities for retired government workers and families)
Connecticut has picked a fight with the independent
board that tells state and local governments how to report their financial
affairs.
Mary Williams Walsh, "Connecticut Takes Up Fight Over Accounting
Rules," The New York Times, June 2, 2007 ---
Click Here
Jensen Comment
Funny thing is Andy Fastow said the same thing about accounting standards and
auditors. If you're going to sell your bonds in the public capital markets, it
seems that hiding debt from bond purchasers is not an especially good idea.
At issue is the immense amount of such debt even when discounted back to a
present value amount.
Bob Jensen's threads on this controversial topic are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Pensions
"Shocks Seen in New Math for Pensions," by Mary Williams Walsh, The
New York Times, March 31, 2006 ---
Click Here
The board that writes accounting rules for American
business is proposing a new method of reporting pension obligations that is
likely to show that many companies have a lot more debt than was obvious
before.
In some cases, particularly at old industrial
companies like automakers, the newly disclosed obligations are likely to be
so large that they will wipe out the net worth of the company.
The panel, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board, said the new method, which it plans to issue today for public
comment, would address a widespread complaint about the current pension
accounting method: that it exposes shareholders and employees to billions of
dollars in risks that they cannot easily see or evaluate. The new accounting
rule would also apply to retirees' health plans and other benefits.
A member of the accounting board, George Batavick,
said, "We took on this project because the current accounting standards just
don't provide complete information about these obligations."
The board is moving ahead with the proposed pension
changes even as Congress remains bogged down on much broader revisions of
the law that governs company pension plans. In fact, Representative John A.
Boehner, Republican of Ohio and the new House majority leader, who has been
a driving force behind pension changes in Congress, said yesterday that he
saw little chance of a finished bill before a deadline for corporate pension
contributions in mid-April.
Congress is trying to tighten the rules that govern
how much money companies are to set aside in advance to pay for benefits.
The accounting board is working with a different set of rules that govern
what companies tell investors about their retirement plans.
The new method proposed by the accounting board
would require companies to take certain pension values they now report deep
in the footnotes of their financial statements and move the information onto
their balance sheets — where all their assets and liabilities are reflected.
The pension values that now appear on corporate balance sheets are almost
universally derided as of little use in understanding the status of a
company's retirement plan.
Mr. Batavick of the accounting board said the new
rule would also require companies to measure their pension funds' values on
the same date they measure all their other corporate obligations. Companies
now have delays as long as three months between the time they calculate
their pension values and when they measure everything else. That can yield
misleading results as market fluctuations change the values.
"Old industrial, old economy companies with heavily
unionized work forces" would be affected most sharply by the new rule, said
Janet Pegg, an accounting analyst with Bear, Stearns. A recent report by Ms.
Pegg and other Bear, Stearns analysts found that the companies with the
biggest balance-sheet changes were likely to include General Motors, Ford,
Verizon, BellSouth and General Electric.
Using information in the footnotes of Ford's 2005
financial statements, Ms. Pegg said that if the new rule were already in
effect, Ford's balance sheet would reflect about $20 billion more in
obligations than it now does. The full recognition of health care promised
to Ford's retirees accounts for most of the difference. Ford now reports a
net worth of $14 billion. That would be wiped out under the new rule. Ford
officials said they had not evaluated the effect of the new accounting rule
and therefore could not comment.
Applying the same method to General Motors' balance
sheet suggests that if the accounting rule had been in effect at the end of
2005, there would be a swing of about $37 billion. At the end of 2005, the
company reported a net worth of $14.6 billion. A G.M. spokesman declined to
comment, noting that the new accounting rule had not yet been issued.
Many complaints about the way obligations are now
reported revolve around the practice of spreading pension figures over many
years. Calculating pensions involves making many assumptions about the
future, and at the end of every year there are differences between the
assumptions and what actually happened. Actuaries keep track of these
differences in a running balance, and incorporate them into pension
calculations slowly.
That practice means that many companies' pension
disclosures do not yet show the full impact of the bear market of 2000-3,
because they are easing the losses onto their books a little at a time. The
new accounting rule will force them to bring the pension values up to date
immediately, and use the adjusted numbers on their balance sheets.
Not all companies would be adversely affected by
the new rule. A small number might even see improvement in their balance
sheets. One appears to be Berkshire Hathaway. Even though its pension fund
has a shortfall of $501 million, adjusting the numbers on its balance sheet
means reducing an even larger shortfall of $528 million that the company
recognized at the end of 2005.
Berkshire Hathaway's pension plan differs from that
of many other companies because it is invested in assets that tend to be
less volatile. Its assumptions about investment returns are also lower, and
it will not have to make a big adjustment for earlier-year losses when the
accounting rule takes effect. Berkshire also looks less indebted than other
companies because it does not have retiree medical plans.
Mr. Batavick said he did not know what kind of
public comments to expect, but hoped to have a final standard completed by
the third quarter of the year. Companies would then be expected to use it
for their 2006 annual reports. The rule will also apply to nonprofit
institutions like universities and museums, as well as privately held
companies.
The rule would not have any effect on corporate
profits, only on the balance sheets. The accounting board plans to make
additional pension accounting changes after this one takes effect. Those are
expected to affect the bottom line and could easily be more contentious.
First They Do
"Bill Requires Reporting Unfunded Federal Liabilities,"
AccountingWeb, April 12, 2006 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102016
With state and local governments scrambling to meet
the Government Accounting Standards Board’s (GASB) amended rules for
reporting on postretirement benefits, and private and public companies
getting ready for compliance with the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s
(FASB) proposed statement on recording pension liabilities, a congressman
from Indiana has introduced legislation that would require the federal
government to meet a similar standard. The Truth in Accounting Act,
sponsored by Rep. Chris Chocola (R-Ind) and co-sponsored by Reps. Jim Cooper
(D-Tenn) and Mark Kirk (R – Ill), would require the federal government to
accurately report the nation’s unfunded long-term liabilities, including
Social Security and Medicare, a debt that amounts to $43 trillion dollars,
during the next 75 years, Chocola says, according to wndu.com.
The U.S. Treasury Department is not currently
required to file an annual report of these debts to Congress, wndu.com says.
“When I was in business, the federal government
required our company to account for long-term liabilities using generally
accepted accounting principles,” Chocola told the South Bend Tribune. “This
bill would require the federal government to follow the same laws they
require every public business in America to follow. If any company accounted
for its business the way the government accounts, the business would be
bankrupt and the executives would be thrown into jail.”
The legislation doesn’t propose solutions for the
burgeoning liabilities, but it takes a crucial first step, according to
Chocola, “by requiring the Treasury Department to begin reporting and
tracking those liabilities according to net present value calculations and
accrual accounting principles,” the Tribune reports.
“In order to solve our problems and prevent an
impending fiscal crisis,” Chocola said, “we have to first identify where and
how large the problem is.”
Chocola clearly sees a looming fiscal crisis.
“Congress is the Levee Commission and the flood is coming,” he told the
Tribune. “This [bill] is intended to sound the warning bell.”
To support his position, according to the Tribune,
Chocola referred to an article written by David Walker, a Clinton appointee
who serves as Comptroller General of the United States and head of the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO). Walker wrote that the government was
on an “unsustainable path”.
Speaking to a British audience last month, Walker
said that the U.S. is headed for a financial crisis unless it changes its
course of racking up huge deficits, Reuters reported. Walker said some
combination of reforming Social Security and Medicare spending,
discretionary spending and possibly changes in tax policy would be required
to get the deficits under control.
“I think it’s going to take 20-plus years before we
are ultimately on a prudent and sustainable path,” Walker said, according to
Reuters, partly because so many American consumers follow the government’s
example. “Too many Americans are spending more than they take in and are
running up debt at record rates.”
Now They Don't
"Bill Requires Reporting Unfunded Federal Liabilities,"
AccountingWeb, April 12, 2006 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102016
With state and local
governments scrambling to meet the Government Accounting Standards Board’s (GASB)
amended rules for reporting on postretirement benefits, and private and public
companies getting ready for compliance with the Financial Accounting Standards
Board’s (FASB) proposed statement on recording pension liabilities, a
congressman from Indiana has introduced legislation that would require the
federal government to meet a similar standard. The Truth in Accounting Act,
sponsored by Rep. Chris Chocola (R-Ind) and co-sponsored by Reps. Jim Cooper (D-Tenn)
and Mark Kirk (R – Ill), would require the federal government to accurately
report the nation’s unfunded long-term liabilities, including Social Security
and Medicare, a debt that amounts to $43 trillion dollars, during the next 75
years, Chocola says, according to wndu.com.
The U.S. Treasury
Department is not currently required to file an annual report of these debts to
Congress, wndu.com says.
“When I was in business,
the federal government required our company to account for long-term liabilities
using generally accepted accounting principles,” Chocola told the South Bend
Tribune. “This bill would require the federal government to follow the same laws
they require every public business in America to follow. If any company
accounted for its business the way the government accounts, the business would
be bankrupt and the executives would be thrown into jail.”
The legislation doesn’t
propose solutions for the burgeoning liabilities, but it takes a crucial first
step, according to Chocola, “by requiring the Treasury Department to begin
reporting and tracking those liabilities according to net present value
calculations and accrual accounting principles,” the Tribune reports.
“In order to solve our
problems and prevent an impending fiscal crisis,” Chocola said, “we have to
first identify where and how large the problem is.”
Chocola clearly sees a
looming fiscal crisis. “Congress is the Levee Commission and the flood is
coming,” he told the Tribune. “This [bill] is intended to sound the warning
bell.”
To support his position,
according to the Tribune, Chocola referred to an article written by David
Walker, a Clinton appointee who serves as Comptroller General of the United
States and head of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Walker wrote
that the government was on an “unsustainable path”.
Speaking to a British
audience last month, Walker said that the U.S. is headed for a financial crisis
unless it changes its course of racking up huge deficits, Reuters reported.
Walker said some combination of reforming Social Security and Medicare spending,
discretionary spending and possibly changes in tax policy would be required to
get the deficits under control.
“I think it’s going to
take 20-plus years before we are ultimately on a prudent and sustainable path,”
Walker said, according to Reuters, partly because so many American consumers
follow the government’s example. “Too many Americans are spending more than they
take in and are running up debt at record rates.”
"The Next Retirement Time Bomb," by Milt Freudenheim and Mary Williams,
The New York Times, December 11, 2005 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/11/business/yourmoney/11retire.html
SINCE 1983, the city of Duluth, Minn., has been
promising free lifetime health care to all of its retired workers, their
spouses and their children up to age 26. No one really knew how much it
would cost. Three years ago, the city decided to find out.
It took an actuary about three months to identify
all the past and current city workers who qualified for the benefits. She
tallied their data by age, sex, previous insurance claims and other factors.
Then she estimated how much it would cost to provide free lifetime care to
such a group.
The total came to about $178 million, or more than
double the city's operating budget. And the bill was growing.
"Then we knew we were looking down the barrel of a
pretty high-caliber weapon," said Gary Meier, Duluth's human resources
manager, who attended the meeting where the actuary presented her findings.
Mayor Herb Bergson was more direct. "We can't pay
for it," he said in a recent interview. "The city isn't going to function
because it's just going to be in the health care business."
Duluth's doleful discovery is about to be repeated
across the country. Thousands of government bodies, including states,
cities, towns, school districts and water authorities, are in for the same
kind of shock in the next year or so. For years, governments have been
promising generous medical benefits to millions of schoolteachers,
firefighters and other employees when they retire, yet experts say that
virtually none of these governments have kept track of the mounting price
tag. The usual practice is to budget for health care a year at a time, and
to leave the rest for the future.
Off the government balance sheets - out of sight
and out of mind - those obligations have been ballooning as health care
costs have spiraled and as the baby-boom generation has approached
retirement. And now the accounting rulemaker for the public sector, the
Governmental Accounting Standards Board, says it is time for every
government to do what Duluth has done: to come to grips with the total value
of its promises, and to report it to their taxpayers and bondholders.
Continued in article
NEWS RELEASE 11/10/05 FASB Adds Comprehensive
Project to Reconsider Accounting for Pensions and Other Postretirement
Benefits
Board Seeks to Improve Transparency and
Usefulness for Investors, Creditors, Employees, Retirees and Other Users
of Financial Information
Norwalk, CT, November 10, 2005—The Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) voted today to add a project to its
agenda to reconsider guidance in Statement No. 87, Employers’ Accounting
for Pensions, and Statement No. 106, Employers’ Accounting for
Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions.
The Board’s objective in undertaking the
project is to improve the reporting of pensions and other postretirement
benefit plans in the financial statements by making information more
useful and transparent for investors, creditors, employees, retirees,
and other users. The agenda addition reflects the Board’s commitment to
ensure that its standards address current accounting issues and changing
business practices.
In making its decision, the Board considered
requests by various constituents, including members of the Financial
Accounting Standards Advisory Council (FASAC), the FASB’s User Advisory
Council (UAC), and the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).
Complex and Comprehensive
“We have heard many different views from our
constituents about how the current accounting model should be
reconsidered to improve transparency and usefulness. The breadth and
complexity of the issues involved and the views on how to address them
are deeply held. While the accounting and reporting issues do not appear
to lend themselves to a simple fix, the Board believes that immediate
improvements are necessary and will look for areas that can be improved
quickly,” said Robert Herz, Chairman of the Financial Accounting
Standards Board.
The accounting and reporting issues involved
touch on many fundamental areas of accounting, including measurement of
assets and liabilities, consolidation, and reporting of financial
performance. They are also impacted by complex funding and tax rules
that, while not directly associated with accounting standards, affect
the economics the accounting seeks to depict.
Comprehensive Approach with Initial
Improvements in 2006
Given these complexities, the Board believes
that a comprehensive project conducted in two phases is the most
effective way to address these issues. The first phase is expected to be
finalized by the end of 2006.
The first phase seeks to address the fact that
under current accounting standards, important information about the
financial status of a company’s plan is reported in the footnotes, but
not in the basic financial statements. Accordingly, this phase seeks to
improve financial reporting by requiring that the funded or unfunded
status of postretirement benefit plans, measured as the difference
between the fair value of plan assets and the benefit obligation - i.e.,
the projected benefit obligation (PBO) for pensions and the accumulated
postretirement benefit obligation (APBO) for other postretirement
benefits - be recognized on the balance sheet.
The second broader phase would comprehensively
address remaining issues, including:
How to best recognize and display in earnings
and other comprehensive income the various elements that affect the cost
of providing postretirement benefits
How to best measure the obligation, in
particular the obligations under plans with lump-sum settlement options
Whether more or different guidance should be
provided regarding measurement assumptions
Whether postretirement benefit trusts should be
consolidated by the plan sponsor
In conducting the project, the FASB will seek
the views of parties currently involved in other, independent reviews of
the pension system including the Department of Labor and the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation. Furthermore, consistent with its effort
toward international convergence of accounting standards, the FASB
expects to work with the International Accounting Standards Board and
other standards setters.
An Ongoing Improvement Effort
The agenda addition represents the latest step
in the FASB’s effort to ensure that standards for pensions and other
postretirement benefits provide credible, comparable, conceptually sound
and usable information to the public.
In 1987, the Board issued Statement 87, which
made significant improvements in the way the costs of defined benefit
plans were measured and disclosed. It is important to note that at that
time, the Board acknowledged that pension accounting was still in a
transitional stage and that future changes might be warranted.
Accordingly, additional enhancements since that
time have included:
Statement No. 106 (1990)—which made similar
significant improvements to those made in Statement No. 87 but for
postretirement benefits other than pensions
Statement No. 132, Employers’ Disclosures about
Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits, (1998)—which revised
employers’ disclosures about pension and other postretirement benefits
to enhance the information disclosed about changes in the benefit
obligation and fair value of plan assets
Statement No. 132R, Employers’ Disclosures
about Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits (Revised 2003)—which
provided expanded disclosures in several areas, including plan assets,
benefit obligations, and cash flows.
"Huge Rise Looms for Health Care in City's Budget," by Mary Williams Walsh
and Milt Freudenheim, The New York
Times, December 26, 2005 ---
http://snipurl.com/NYT122605
But the cost of pensions may look paltry next to
that of another benefit soon to hit New York and most other states and
cities: the health care promised to retired teachers, judges, firefighters,
bus drivers and other former employees, which must be figured under a new
accounting formula.
The city currently provides free health insurance
to its retirees, their spouses and dependent children. The state is almost
as generous, promising to pay, depending on the date of hire, 90 to 100
percent of the cost for individual retirees, and 82 to 86 percent for
retiree families.
Those bills - $911 million this year for city
retirees and $859 million for state retirees out of a total city and state
budget of $156.6 billion - may seem affordable now. But the New York
governments, like most other public agencies across the country, have been
calculating the costs in a way that sharply understates their price tag over
time.
Although governments will not have to come up with
the cash immediately, failure to find a way to finance the yearly total will
eventually hurt their ability to borrow money affordably.
When the numbers are added up under new accounting
rules scheduled to go into effect at the end of 2006, New York City's annual
expense for retiree health care is expected to at least quintuple, experts
say, approaching and maybe surpassing $5 billion, for exactly the same
benefits the retirees get today. The number will grow because the city must
start including the value of all the benefits earned in a given year, even
those that will not be paid until future years.
Some actuaries say the new yearly amount could be
as high as $10 billion. The increases for the state could be equally
startling. Most other states and cities also offer health benefits to
retirees, and will also be affected by the accounting change.
Continued in article
Jensen Comment
FAS 106 (effective December 15, 1992) prohibits keeping post-retirement benefits
such as medical benefits off private sector balance sheets of corporations
---
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas106.pdf . The equivalent for the public
sector is GASB 45, but the new rules do not go into effect until for cities as
large as Duluth and NYC until December 15, 2006 ---
http://www.gasb.org/pub/index.html
Effective Date:
The requirements of this Statement are
effective in three phases based on a government's total annual
revenues in the first fiscal year ending after June 15, 1999:
- Governments that were phase 1
governments for the purpose of implementation of Statement
34—those with annual revenues of $100 million or more—are
required to implement this Statement in financial statements
for periods beginning after December 15, 2006.
- Governments that were phase 2
governments for the purpose of implementation of Statement
34—those with total annual revenues of $10 million or more
but less than $100 million—are required to implement this
Statement in financial statements for periods beginning
after December 15, 2007.
- Governments that were phase 3
governments for the purpose of implementation of Statement
34—those with total annual revenues of less than $10
million—are required to implement this Statement in
financial statements for periods beginning after December
15, 2008.
|
The new GASB 25 implementation dates may trigger defaults and "The Next
Retirement Time Bomb."
January 2, 2006 reply from Mac Wright in Australia
Dear Bob,
In considering the problems faced by these bodies,
one has to remember that the promise of these benefits was held out to the
then potential employees as an inducement to work in the system. Thus
attempts at cutbacks are a form of theft. It is no different that finding
that commercial paer accepted some time back is worthless because the
acceptor has disappeared with his ill gotten gains (Ponzi)!
Perhaps the message to government workers is
"demand cash up front and do not trust any promise of future benefits!"
Kind regards,
Mac Wright
January 2, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Mac,
I think theft is too strong a word. In a sense, all bankruptcies are a
form of theft, but theft is hardly an appropriate word since the victims
(e.g., creditors) often favor declaration of bankruptcy and restructuring in
an attempt to salvage some of the amounts owing them. Also, employees,
creditors, and investors are aware that they are taking on some risks of
default.
The United Auto Workers Union and its membership have overwhelmingly
elected to reduce GM's post-retirement benefits for retirees since over
$1,500 per vehicle sold today for such purposes will end GM and reduce those
benefits to zero. Is this theft? No! Is this bad management? Most certainly!
In my viewpoint all organizations should fully fund post-retirement benefits
of employees on a pay-as-you-go basis?
The problem is more complex for national social security and national
medical plans for citizens (not just government employees). Fully funding
these in advance is probably infeasible for the nation as a whole and/or
will stifle economic growth needed to sustain any types of benefits.
What will happen to Duluth and NYC if the retired employee benefits are
not reduced? Due to exploding medical costs, we can easily imagine taxes
becoming so oppressive that there is a mass exodus from those cities,
especially among yuppies and senior citizens having greater discretion on
where to live. One can easily imagine industry migrations out of high-tax
cities. Texas, Delaware, Florida, and New Hampshire cities look inviting for
a Wall Street move since there would no longer be oppressive NY state income
taxes added to all the extra NYC taxes. It is not too far fetched to imagine
that post-retirement benefits will collapse to almost zero if retirees
themselves do not accept some concessions to save the post-retirement udder
from going completely dry.
What is interesting to me is how an accounting rule change suddenly
awakens city managers (e.g., the Duluth managers) to the fact that they
should actually try to find out how much they owe former city employees and
the dependents of those employees. This is just another example of where an
accounting rule change instigates better financial management. We might call
city management in Duluth and other cities abnormally stupid if it were not
for the history of so many companies that were oblivious to their
post-retirement obligations until FAS 106 was about to be required. A whole
lot of executives and directors had no idea they were in such deep trouble
until being faced with
FAS 106 requirements to report these huge obligations arising from past
promises of bad managers (many of whom are now trying to collect on what
they promised themselves and their kids in the way of medical care).
In fact, it leads us to question conflicts of interest when managers vote
themselves generous post-retirement benefits. When you use the term "theft,"
Mac, you might question who is stealing from whom. Perhaps some of the
retirees slipped these generous benefits in because they thought they could
get away with something that would not be noticed until it became too late.
Dumb managers may have been "dumb like foxes."
Bob Jensen
January 3, 2006 reply from Bill Herrmann
[billherr@ROCKETMAIL.COM]
An alternative to this discussion is the
realization is that the employee who accepts future "guarantee" of benefits
is in fact loaning the value of the expected benefits to the employer so has
a credit risk much the same as if they were sending in cash for bonds or
stock. There is a risk of bankruptcy or insolvency with any asset held by
another party. Anyone with a "guaranteed future benefit" is susceptible to
this risk.
Bill Herrmann
Spoon River College.
Leases: A Scheme for Hiding Debt
Accounting rules still allow companies to classify
lease obligations differently than debt, leaving billions of dollars off
corporate balance sheets and relegating a big slice of corporate financing to
the shadows.
Jonathan Weil, "How Leases Play A Shadowy Role In Accounting" (See
below)
At the FASB (Financial Accounting Standards
Board), Bob Herz says he thinks "lease accounting is probably an area
where people had good intentions way back when, but it evolved into a set of
rules that can result in form-over substance accounting." He
cautions that an overhaul wouldn't be easy: "Any attempts to change
the current accounting in an area where people have built their business
models around it become extremely controversial --- just like you see with
stock options."
Jonathan Weil, "How Leases Play A Shadowy Role In Accounting" (See
below)
By the phrase form over substance, Bob Herz is referring to the four bright
line tests of requiring leases to be booked on the balance sheet. Over
the past two decades corporations have been using these tests to skate on the
edge with leasing contracts that result in hundreds of billions of dollars of
debt being off balance sheets. The leasing industry has built an
enormously profitable business around financing contracts that just fall under
the wire of each bright line test, particularly the 90% rule that was far too
lenient in the first place. One might read Bob's statement that after
the political fight in the U.S. legislature over expensing of stock options,
the FASB is a bit weary and reluctant to take on the leasing industry. I
hope he did not mean this.
FASB Okays Project to Overhaul Lease Accounting
The Financial Accounting Standards Board voted
unanimously to formally add a project to its agenda to "comprehensively
reconsider" the current rules on lease accounting. Critics say those rules,
which haven't gotten a thorough revision in 30 years, make it too easy for
companies to keep their leases of real estate, equipment and other items off
their balance sheets. As such, FASB members said, they're concerned that
financial statements don't fully and clearly portray the impact of leasing
transactions under the current rules. "I think we have received a clear signal
from the investing community that current accounting standards are not providing
them with all the information they want," FASB member Leslie Seidman said before
the vote.
"FASB Okays Project to Overhaul Lease Accounting," SmartPros, July 20,
2006 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x53931.xml
Question
What's a "cookie-cutter" lease and why does it illustrate why accounting
standards are not neutral?
"FASB Launches Review of Accounting for Leases," AccountingWeb, June
12, 2006 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102240
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has
begun reviewing its guidance on one of the most complex areas of off-balance
sheet reporting, accounting for leases, Chairman Robert Herz told Forbes.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had requested that FASB review
off-balance sheet arrangements, special purpose entities and related issues
in a staff report issued in June 2005. The most prominent topics for review
were pension disclosure and accounting for leases.
Having issued its Exposure Draft to Improve
Accounting of Pensions and other Postretirement Benefits, FASB is now
considering moving lease obligations from the current footnote disclosure to
the balance sheet. But the sheer number of rules and regulations that relate
to leases – hundreds, according to Business Week – offers experts plenty of
opportunities to keep disclosure off the books and presents FASB with an
enormous challenge.
Companies are currently required to record future
lease obligations in a footnote, but actual rent payments are deducted in
quarterly income statements. Approximately 10 percent of leases are already
disclosed on the balance sheet as liabilities because the company can
purchase the equipment at the end of the lease, and therefore the lease is
treated as a loan, or because lease payments add up to 90 percent of the
value of the leased property.
Robert Herz says, according to Business Week, that
“cookie-cutter templates” have been created to design leases so that they
don’t add up to more than 89 percent of the value of the property. And to
add to the complexity, the AP says, if the contract describes a more
temporary rental-type arrangement, it can be treated as an operating lease
and recorded in the footnote.
Leasing footnotes do not reveal the interest
portion of future payments and require the analyst or investor to make
assumptions about the number of years over which the debt needs to be paid,
the AP says, as well as the interest rate the company will be paying. David
Zion, an analyst from Credit Suisse told the AP that many professionals
interpret the footnotes by multiplying a company’s annual rental costs by
eight.
Thomas J. Linsmeier, recently named a member of the
FASB, said that the current rule for accounting for leases needed to be
changed because it sets such specific criteria. “It is a poster child for
bright-line tests,” he said, according to the New York Times.
The SEC requested the review it said in a press
release because “the current accounting for leases takes an “all or nothing”
approach to recognizing leases on the balance sheet. This results in a
clustering of lease arrangements such that their terms approach, but do not
cross, “the bright lines” in the accounting guidance that would require a
liability to be recognized. As a consequence, arrangements with similar
economic outcomes are accounted for very differently.”
Finding a way to define a lease for accounting
purposes presents additional problems. Some accountants argue that since the
lessor does not own the property and cannot sell it, the property should not
be viewed as an asset, Business Week says. Others say that the promise to
pay a rent is equal to any other liability.
Of 200 companies reviewed by SEC staffers in 2005,
77 percent had off-balance-sheet operating leases, totaling about $1.25
trillion, the Wall Street Journal reported.
Among the companies with the biggest lease
obligations are Walgreen Co. with $15.2 billion, CVS Corp with $11.1 billion
and Fedex Corp. with $10.5 billion, the AP reports. Walgreens owns less that
one-fifth of its store locations and leases the rest. Fedex leases
airplanes, land and facilities.
Robert Herz, in an editorial response in Forbes to
Harvey Pitt, former SEC chairman, acknowledged that FASB’s current projects,
including the review of lease accounting, could generate controversy. But he
says that the complexity and volume of standards impedes transparency, and
that the FASB is working jointly with the IASB to develop more principles
based standards.
“Complexity has impeded the overall usefulness of
financial statements and added to the costs of preparing and auditing
financial statements – particularly for small and private enterprises – and
it is also viewed as a contributory factor to the unacceptably high number
of restatements,” Herz writes in Forbes.
Herz does not expect the new rules to be completed
before 2008 or 2009, Business Week says.
Let me close by citing Harry
S. Truman who said, "I never give them hell; I just tell them the truth and they
think its hell!"
Great Speeches About the State of Accountancy
"20th Century Myths," by Lynn Turner when he was still Chief Accountant at the
SEC in 1999 ---
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch323.htm
It is
interesting to listen to people ask for simple, less complex
standards like in "the good old days." But I never hear them ask for
business to be like "the good old days," with smokestacks rather
than high technology, Glass-Steagall rather than Gramm-Leach, and
plain vanilla interest rate deals rather than swaps, collars, and
Tigers!! The bottom line is—things have changed. And so have people.
Today, we have enormous pressure on CEO’s and
CFO’s. It used to be that CEO’s would be in their positions for an
average of more than ten years. Today, the average is 3 to 4 years.
And Financial Executive Institute surveys show that the CEO and CFO
changes are often linked.
In such an environment, we in the auditing
and preparer community have created what I consider to be a
two-headed monster. The first head of this monster is what I call
the "show me" face. First, it is not uncommon to hear one say, "show
me where it says in an accounting book that I can’t do this?" This
approach to financial reporting unfortunately necessitates the level
of detail currently being developed by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board ("FASB"), the Emerging Issues Task Force, and the
AICPA’s Accounting Standards Executive Committee. Maybe this isn’t a
recent phenomenon. In 1961, Leonard Spacek, then managing partner at
Arthur Andersen, explained the motivation for less specificity in
accounting standards when he stated that "most industry
representatives and public accountants want what they call
‘flexibility’ in accounting principles. That term is never clearly
defined; but what is wanted is ‘flexibility’ that permits greater
latitude to both industry and accountants to do as they please." But
Mr. Spacek was not a defender of those who wanted to "do as they
please." He went on to say, "Public accountants are constantly
required to make a choice between obtaining or retaining a client
and standing firm for accounting principles. Where the choice
requires accepting a practice which will produce results that are
erroneous by a relatively material amount, we must decline the
engagement even though there is precedent for the practice desired
by the client."
We create the second head of our monster
when we ask for standards that absolutely do not reflect the
underlying economics of transactions. I offer two prime examples.
Leasing is first. We have accounting literature put out by the FASB
with follow-on interpretative guidance by the accounting
firms—hundreds of pages of lease accounting guidance that, I will be
the first to admit, is complex and difficult to decipher. But it is
due principally to people not being willing to call a horse a horse,
and a lease what it really is—a financing. The second example is
Statement 133 on derivatives. Some people absolutely howl about its
complexity. And yet we know that: (1) people were not complying with
the intent of the simpler Statements 52 and 80, and (2) despite the
fact that we manage risk in business by managing values rather than
notional amounts, people want to account only for notional amounts.
As a result, we ended up with a compromise position in Statement
133. To its credit, Statement 133 does advance the quality of
financial reporting. For that, I commend the FASB. But I believe
that we could have possibly achieved more, in a less complex
fashion, if people would have agreed to a standard that truly
reflects the underlying economics of the transactions in an unbiased
and representationally faithful fashion.
I certainly hope that we can find a way to
do just that with standards we develop in the future, both in the
U.S. and internationally. It will require a change in how we
approach standard setting and in how we apply those standards. It
will require a mantra based on the fact that transparent, high
quality financial reporting is what makes our capital markets the
most efficient, liquid, and deep in the world. |
Bob Jensen's threads on lease accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Leases
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on April 22,
2005
TITLE: Lease Restatements Are Surging
REPORTER: Eiya Gullapalli
DATE: Apr 20, 2005
PAGE: C4
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111396285894611651,00.html
TOPICS: Accounting, Advanced Financial Accounting, Lease Accounting,
Restatement, Sarbanes-Oxley Act
SUMMARY: Last winter, "the Big Four accounting firms...banded together to ask
the Security and Exchange Commission's chief accountant to clarify rules on
lease accounting...Now about 250 companies have announced restatements for lease
accounting issues..."
QUESTIONS:
1.) Why is it curious that so many companies are now restating previous
financial statements due to lease accounting problems? What does the fact that
companies must restate previous results imply about previous accounting for
these lease transactions?
2.) What industries in particular are cited for these issues in the article?
How do you think this industry uses leases?
3.) While one company, Emeritus Corp., disclosed significant impacts on
previously reported income amounts, companies are "...for the most part, not
materially affecting their earnings, analysts say..." Are you surprised by this
fact? What is the most significant impact of capitalizing a lease on a
corporation's financial statements? In your answer, define the terms
operating lease and capitalized lease.
4.) How do points made in the article show that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is
accomplishing its intended effect?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"Lease Restatements Are Surging: Number Increases Daily; Accounting
Experts Say GAAP Violations Are Rife," by Diya Gullapalli, The Wall Street
Journal, April 20, 2005; Page C4 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111396285894611651,00.html
When it comes to bookkeeping snafus, lease
accounting may be the new revenue recognition.
It all started in November, when KPMG LLP told
fast-food chain CKE Restaurants Inc. that it had problems with the way CKE
recognized rent expenses and depreciated buildings. That led CKE to restate
its financials for 2002 as well as some prior years. CKE will also take a
charge in its upcoming annual filing for 2003 through its just-ended 2005
fiscal year.
By winter, the Big Four accounting firms had banded
together to ask the Securities and Exchange Commission's chief accountant to
clarify rules on lease accounting. Retail and restaurant trade groups began
battling rule makers about the merits of issuing such guidance.
Now, about 250 companies have announced
restatements for lease-accounting issues similar to CKE's, and the number
continues to rise daily.
"We'd be shocked if this isn't the biggest category
of restatements we've ever seen," says Jeff Szafran of Huron Consulting
Group LLC, which tracks restatements.
Given that so many publicly traded companies,
especially retailers and restaurant chains, hold leases, it perhaps isn't
surprising that lease restatements are snowballing. Accounting experts say
the restatements also demonstrate that violations of generally accepted
accounting principles still are widespread.
"The whole subject has been a curiosity to me,"
says Jack Ciesielski, editor of the Analyst's Accounting Observer newsletter
in Baltimore. "This was existing GAAP that hasn't changed, but I don't think
we've seen the end of these restatements."
Since many of the companies announcing restatements
so far report on a January-ending fiscal year, Mr. Ciesielski and other
accounting-industry watchers anticipate a slew of additional restatements in
coming weeks as more companies prepare their books.
Corporate-governance advocates say the volume of
lease-problem restatements shows the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is doing its job.
That 2002 law laid down guidelines for ensuring that companies had proper
internal controls, systems to prevent accounting mistakes and improprieties.
Indeed, many of the companies that have had to restate due to lease problems
also have reported weakness in their internal controls.
While Ernst & Young LLP clients Friendly Ice Cream
Corp., Whole Foods Market Inc. and Cingular Wireless, a joint venture
between SBC Communications Inc. and BellSouth Corp., all reported material
weaknesses in internal controls in their latest annual reports due partly to
lease issues, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP client J. Jill Group Inc. says its
lease-driven restatement didn't signal such significant internal-control
problems.
The main rule on lease accounting hasn't changed
much. Issued in 1976, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 13 is,
in fact, one of the oldest rules written by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, which sets guidelines for publicly traded companies. While
some parts of FAS 13 have been reinterpreted since then, auditors for the
most part hadn't raised any concerns about clients' lease accounting --
until now.
"Our industry has been accounting for leases using
the same methodology for 20 years at least and had gotten clean opinions,"
says Carleen Kohut, chief financial officer of the National Retail
Federation.
The changes in lease accounting are "not the result
of the discovery of new facts or information," reads a statement from
Emeritus Corp., an assisted-living company that announced a restatement for
lease accounting within a week of CKE.
Had Emeritus correctly applied lease-accounting
rules in 2003, it could have almost wiped out its profit. In a restated
annual report released in January, the company said lease expenses and other
adjustments lowered earnings to $204,000 for 2003 from the originally
reported $4.5 million -- and such adjustments widened past years' losses
even further.
Emeritus didn't return calls for comment.
Others companies such as home-furnishing store
Bombay Co. announced a lease restatement in March and then withdrew the
decision a week later, demonstrating lingering confusion over the matter.
The SEC's letter released in February clarified
three specific areas of lease accounting, focusing on leasehold improvement
amortization, rent-expense recognition and tenant incentives.
The bright side is that companies coming to grips
with faulty lease accounting are, for the most part, not materially
affecting their earnings, analysts say -- companies such as Emeritus being
an exception. Rather, they say, the change is just a reshuffling of dollars
across various line items.
--- RELATED ARTICLES ---
TITLE: FOOTNOTES: Recent US Earnings Restatements
REPORTER: Dow Jones Newswires
ISSUE: Apr 19, 2005
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,BT_CO_20050419_008924,00.html
A concise summary of the February 7, 2005 letter is provided at
http://www.accountingobserver.com/blog/2005/02/secs-view-on-lease-accounting-do-overs/
The complete February 7, 2005 letter from the SEC's Chief Accountant to
Robert J. Kueppers is located at
http://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/staffletters/cpcaf020705.htm
In recent weeks, a number of public companies
have issued press releases announcing restatements of their
financial statements relating to lease accounting. You requested
that the Office of the Chief Accountant clarify the staff's
interpretation of certain accounting issues and their application
under generally accepted accounting principles relating to operating
leases. Of specific concern is the appropriate accounting for: (1)
the amortization of leasehold improvements by a lessee in an
operating lease with lease renewals, (2) the pattern of recognition
of rent when the lease term in an operating lease contains a period
where there are free or reduced rents (commonly referred to as "rent
holidays"), and (3) incentives related to leasehold improvements
provided by a landlord/lessor to a tenant/lessee in an operating
lease. It should be noted that the Commission has neither reviewed
this letter nor approved the staff's positions expressed herein. In
addition, the staff's positions may be affected or changed by
particular facts or conditions. Finally, this letter does not
purport to express any legal conclusion on the questions presented.
The staff's views on these issues are as
follows:
- Amortization of Leasehold Improvements
- The staff believes that leasehold improvements in an operating
lease should be amortized by the lessee over the shorter of
their economic lives or the lease term, as defined in paragraph
5(f) of FASB Statement 13 ("SFAS 13"), Accounting for Leases, as
amended. The staff believes amortizing leasehold improvements
over a term that includes assumption of lease renewals is
appropriate only when the renewals have been determined to be
"reasonably assured," as that term is contemplated by SFAS 13.
- Rent Holidays - The staff believes
that pursuant to the response in paragraph 2 of FASB Technical
Bulletin 85-3 ("FTB 85-3"), Accounting for Operating Leases with
Scheduled Rent Increases, rent holidays in an operating lease
should be recognized by the lessee on a straight-line basis over
the lease term (including any rent holiday period) unless
another systematic and rational allocation is more
representative of the time pattern in which leased property is
physically employed.
- Landlord/Tenant Incentives - The staff
believes that: (a) leasehold improvements made by a lessee that
are funded by landlord incentives or allowances under an
operating lease should be recorded by the lessee as leasehold
improvement assets and amortized over a term consistent with the
guidance in item 1 above; (b) the incentives should be recorded
as deferred rent and amortized as reductions to lease expense
over the lease term in accordance with paragraph 15 of SFAS 13
and the response to Question 2 of FASB Technical Bulletin 88-1
("FTB 88-1"), Issues Relating to Accounting for Leases, and
therefore, the staff believes it is inappropriate to net the
deferred rent against the leasehold improvements; and (c) a
registrant's statement of cash flows should reflect cash
received from the lessor that is accounted for as a lease
incentive within operating activities and the acquisition of
leasehold improvements for cash within investing activities. The
staff recognizes that evaluating when improvements should be
recorded as assets of the lessor or assets of the lessee may
require significant judgment and factors in making that
evaluation are not the subject of this letter.
To the extent that SEC registrants have
deviated from the lease accounting standards and related
interpretations set forth by the FASB, those registrants, in
consultation with their independent auditors, should assess the
impact of the resulting errors on their financial statements to
determine whether restatement is required. The SEC staff believes
that the positions noted above are based upon existing accounting
literature and registrants who determine their prior accounting to
be in error should state that the restatement results from the
correction of errors or, if restatement was determined by management
to be unnecessary, state that the errors were immaterial to prior
periods.
Registrants should ensure that the
disclosures regarding both operating and capital leases clearly and
concisely address the material terms of and accounting for leases.
Registrants should provide basic descriptive information about
material leases, usual contract terms, and specific provisions in
leases relating to rent increases, rent holidays, contingent rents,
and leasehold incentives. The accounting for leases should be
clearly described in the notes to the financial statements and in
the discussion of critical accounting policies in MD&A if
appropriate. Known likely trends or uncertainties in future rent or
amortization expense that could materially affect operating results
or cash flows should be addressed in MD&A. The disclosures should
address the following:
- Material lease agreements or
arrangements.
- The essential provisions of material
leases, including the original term, renewal periods, reasonably
assured rent escalations, rent holidays, contingent rent, rent
concessions, leasehold improvement incentives, and unusual
provisions or conditions.
- The accounting policies for leases,
including the treatment of each of the above components of lease
agreements.
- The basis on which contingent rental
payments are determined with specificity, not generality.
- The amortization period of material
leasehold improvements made either at the inception of the lease
or during the lease term, and how the amortization period
relates to the initial lease term.
As you know, the SEC staff is continuing to
consider these and related matters and may have further discussions
on lease accounting with registrants and their independent auditors.
We appreciate your inquiry and further
questions about these matters can be directed to Tony Lopez,
Associate Chief Accountant in the Office of the Chief Accountant
(202-942-7104) or Louise Dorsey, Associate Chief Accountant in the
Division of Corporation Finance (202-942-2960). |
AICPA PROVIDES GUIDANCE ON LEASE ACCOUNTING ---
http://accountingeducation.com/index.cfm?page=newsdetails&id=141809
Bob Jensen's threads on lease accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Leases
Despite a Post-Enron Push, Companies Can Still
Keep Big Debts Off Balance Sheets.
"How Leases Play A Shadowy Role In Accounting," by Jonathan Weil, The
Wall Street Journal, September 22, 2004, Page A1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB109580870299124246,00.html?mod=home%5Fpage%5Fone%5Fus
Despite the post-Enron drive to improve accounting
standards, U.S. companies are still allowed to keep off their balance sheets
billions of dollars of lease obligations that are just as real as financial
commitments originating from bank loans and other borrowings.
The practice spans the entire spectrum of American
business and industry, relegating a key gauge of corporate health to obscure
financial-statement footnotes, and leaving investors and analysts to do the
math themselves. The scale of these off-balance-sheet obligations --
stemming from leases on everything from aircraft to retail stores to factory
equipment -- can be huge:
• US Airways Group Inc., which recently filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, showed only $3.15 billion in
long-term debt on its most recently audited balance sheet, for 2003, and
didn't include the $7.39 billion in operating-lease commitments it had on
its fleet of passenger jets.
• Drugstore chain Walgreen Co. shows no debt on
its balance sheet, but it is responsible for $19.3 billion of
operating-lease payments mainly on stores over the next 25 years.
• For the companies in the Standard &
Poor's 500-stock index, off-balance-sheet operating-lease commitments, as
revealed in the footnotes to their financial statements, total $482
billion.
Debt levels are among the most important measures
of a company's financial health. But the special accounting treatment for
many leases means that a big slice of corporate financing remains in the
shadows. For all the tough laws and regulations set up since Enron Corp.'s
2001 collapse, regulators have left lease accounting largely untouched.
Members of the Financial Accounting Standards Board say they are considering
adding the issue to their agenda next year.
"Leasing is one of the areas of accounting
standards that clearly merits review," says Donald Nicolaisen, the
Securities and Exchange Commission's chief accountant. The current guidance,
he says, depends on rigidly defined categories in which a slight variation
has a major effect and relies too much on "on-off switches for
determining whether a leased asset and the related payment obligations are
reflected on the balance sheet."
A case in point is the "90% test," part
of the FASB's 28-year-old rules for lease accounting. If the present value
of a company's minimum lease payments equals 90% or more of a property's
value, the transaction must be treated as a "capital lease," with
accounting treatment akin to that of debt. If the figure is slightly less,
say 89%, the deal is treated as an "operating lease," subject to
certain other conditions, meaning the lease doesn't count as debt. The lease
commitment appears not in the main body of the financial statements but in
footnotes, often obscurely written and of limited usefulness.
The $482 billion figure for the S&P 500 was
determined through a Wall Street Journal review of the companies' annual
reports. That's equivalent to 8% of the $6.25 trillion reported as debt on
the 500 companies' balance sheets, according to data provided by Reuters
Research. For many companies, off-balance-sheet lease obligations are many
times higher than their reported debt.
Given the choice between leasing and owning real
estate or equipment, many companies pick operating leases. Besides lowering
reported debt, operating leases boost returns on assets and often plump up
earnings through, among other things, lower depreciation expenses.
"It's nonsense," Trevor Harris, an
accounting analyst and managing director at Morgan Stanley, says of the 90%
rule. "What's the difference between 89.9% and 90%, and 85% and 90%, or
even 70% and 90%? It's the wrong starting point. You've purchased the right
to some resources as an asset. The essence of accounting is supposed to be
economic substance over legal form."
This summer, Union Pacific Corp. opened its new
19-story, $260 million headquarters in Omaha, Neb. The railroad operator is
the owner of the city's largest building, the Union Pacific Center, in
virtually every respect except its accounting.
Under an initial operating lease, Union Pacific
guaranteed 89.9% of all construction costs through the building's completion
date. After completing the building, the company signed a new operating
lease, which guarantees 85% of the building's costs. Unlike most operating
leases, both were "synthetic" leases, which allow the company to
take income-tax deductions for interest and depreciation while maintaining
complete operational control. A Union Pacific spokesman declined to comment.
Neither lease has appeared on the balance sheet.
Instead, they have stayed in the footnotes, resulting in lower reported
assets and liabilities. On its balance sheet, Union Pacific shows about $8
billion of debt, while its footnotes show about $3 billion of
operating-lease commitments, including for railroad engines and other
equipment.
The 90% test goes to the crux of investor
complaints that U.S. accounting standards remain driven by arbitrary rules,
around which companies can easily structure transactions to achieve desired
outcomes.
It means different companies entering nearly
identical transactions can account for them in very different ways,
depending on which side of the 90% test they reside. Meanwhile, as with
disclosures showing employee stock-option compensation expenses, most
investors and stock analysts tend to ignore the footnotes disclosing lease
obligations.
Three years ago, Enron's collapse revealed how
easily a company could hide debt. A big part of the energy company's scandal
centered on off-balance-sheet "special purpose entities." These
obscure partnerships could be kept off the books -- with no footnote
disclosures -- if an independent investor owned 3% of an entity's equity.
Responding to public outcry, FASB members eliminated that rule and promised
more "principles-based" standards, which spell out concise
objectives and emphasize economic substance over form, rather than a
"check the box" approach with rigid tests and exceptions that can
be exploited.
The accounting literature on leasing covers
hundreds of pages. The FASB's original 1976 pronouncement, called Financial
Accounting Standard No. 13, does state a broad principle: A lease that
transfers substantially all the benefits and risks of ownership should be
accounted for as such. But in practice, critics say, FAS 13 amounts to all
rules and no principles, making it easy to manipulate its strict exceptions
and criteria as needed. One key rule says a lease is a "capital
lease" if it covers 75% or more of the property's estimated useful
life. One day less, and it can stay off-balance-sheet, subject to other
tests.
Continued in the article
"Group (the IASB) to Alter Rules On Lease Accounting," The
Wall Street Journal, September 23, 2004, Page C4
BRUSSELS -- The International Accounting Standards
Board next week will unveil plans to overhaul the rules on accounting for
leased assets, the board's chairman said yesterday.
Critics long have contended that the rules for
determining whether leases should be included as assets and liabilities on a
company's balance sheet are easy to evade and encourage form-over-substance
accounting. "It's going to be a very big deal," Chairman Sir David
Tweedie told Dow Jones Newswires after testifying to the European
Parliament. International accounting rules on leasing exist already, but
they are useless, Mr. Tweedie said.
Airlines that lease their aircraft, for instance,
rarely include their planes on their balance sheets, he said. "So the
aircraft is just a figment of your imagination," Mr. Tweedie said. The
board will convene a meeting next week to discuss changes to current rules,
he said.
The Wall Street Journal yesterday reported (see
the above article) that the U.S. Financial Accounting
Standards Board is considering adding lease accounting to its agenda of
items for overhaul.
From The Wall Street Journal's The Weekly Review: Accounting on
September 24, 2004
TITLE: Lease Accounting Still Has an Impact
REPORTER: Jonathan Weil
DATE: Sep 22, 2004
PAGE: A1
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB109580870299124246,00.html
TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Financial
Statement Analysis, Lease Accounting, off balance sheet financing
SUMMARY: The on-line version of this article is entitled "How Leases
Play a Shadowy Role in Accounting." The article highlights the typical
practical ways in which entities avoid capitalizing leases; reports on a WSJ
analysis of footnote disclosures to assess levels of off-balance sheet debt;
and comments on the difficulties the FASB may face in trying to amend
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 13.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What accounting standard governs the accounting for lease transactions
under U.S. GAAP? When was that accounting standard written and first put into
effect?
2.) When is the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) considering
working on improvements to the accounting for lease transactions? Why is the
FASB likely to face challenges in any attempt to change accounting for leasing
transactions?
3.) What are the names of the two basic methods of accounting for leases by
lessees under current U.S. standards? Which of these methods is he referring
to when the author writes, "U.S. companies are...allowed to keep off
their balance sheets billions of dollars of lease obligations..."
4.) What are the required disclosures under each of the two methods of
accounting for leases? What are the problems with financial statement users
relying on footnote disclosures as opposed to including a caption and a
numerical amount on the face of the balance sheet?
5.) How do you think the Wall Street Journal identified the amounts of
lease commitments that are kept off of corporate balance sheets? Specifically
identify the steps you think would be required to measure obligations under
operating leases in a way that is comparable to the amounts shown for capital
leases recognized on the face of the balance sheet.
6.) What four tests must be made in determining the accounting for any
lease? Why do you think the author focuses on only one of these tests, the
"90% test"?
7.) What financial ratios are impacted by accounting for leases? List all
that you can identify in the article, and that you can think of, and explain
how they are affected by different accounting treatments for leases.
8.) What is a "special purpose entity"? When are these entities
used in leasing transactions?
9.) What is a "synthetic lease"? When are these leases
constructed?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
This is Auditing 101: Where were the auditors?
"SEC Uncovers Wide-Scale Lease Accounting Errors," AccountingWeb,
March 1, 2005 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=100600
Where were the auditors? That is the question being
asked as more than 60 companies face the prospect of restating their
earnings after apparently incorrectly dealing with their lease accounting,
Dow Jones reported.
Companies in the retail, restaurant and
wireless-tower industries are among those affected in what is being called
the most sweeping bookkeeping correction in such a short time period since
the late 1990s.
Among the companies on the list are Ann Taylor,
Target and Domino's Pizza. You can view a full listing of the affected
companies.
"It's always disturbing when our accounting is
not followed," Don Nicolaisen, chief accountant at the Securities and
Exchange Commission, said last week during an interview. He published a
letter on Feb. 7 urging companies to follow accounting standards that have
been on the books for many years, Dow Jones reported.
Based on the charges and restatement announcements
that have come in the wake of the SEC letter it seems companies have failed
for years to follow what regulators see as cut-and-dried lease-accounting
rules. The SEC has yet to go so far as to accuse companies of wrongdoing,
but it has led people to wonder why auditors hired to keep company books
clean could have missed so many instances of failure to comply with the
rule.
"Where were the auditors?" J. Edward
Ketz, an accounting professor at Pennsylvania State University, said to Dow
Jones. "Where were the people approving these things? This doesn't seem
like something that really requires new discussion. If we have to go back
and revisit every single rule because companies and their professional
advisers aren't going to follow the rules, then I think we're in very
serious trouble in this country."
Tom Fitzgerald, a spokesman for auditing firm KPMG,
declined to comment. Representatives for Deloitte & Touche LLP,
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLC, and Ernst & Young LLP, didn't return several
phone calls, Dow Jones reported.
The crux of the issue is that companies are
supposed to book these "leasehold improvements" as assets on their
balance sheets and then depreciate those assets, incurring an expense on
their income statements, over the duration of the lease. Instead, companies
such as Pep Boys-Manny Moe & Jack had been spreading those expenses out
over the projected useful life of the property, which is usually a longer
time period, Dow Jones reported.
As a result, expenses were deferred and income was
added to the current period. McDonald's Corp. took a charge of $139.1
million, or 8 cents a share, in its fourth quarter to correct a
lease-accounting strategy that it says had been in place for 25 years, Dow
Jones reported, adding that Pep Boys said it would book a charge of 80 cents
a share, or $52 million, for the nine months through Oct. 30, 2004.
Debt Versus Equity
What is debt? What is equity? What is a Trup?
Banks are going to create huge problems for accountants with newer hybrid
instruments
From Jim Mahar's Blog on February 6, 2005 ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
The Financial Times has a very cool article on
financial engineering and the development of securities that combine
debt and equity-like features.
FT.com / Home UK - Banks hope to cash in on
rush into hybrid securities: "Securities that straddle the debt and
equity worlds are not new. They combine features of debt such as regular
interest-like payments and equity-like characteristics such as long or
perpetual maturities and the ability to defer payments."
"About a decade ago, regulated financial
institutions started issuing so-called trust preferred securities, or
Trups, which are functionally similar to preferred stock but can be
structured to achieve extra benefits such as tax deductibility for the
issuing company. Other hybrid structures have also been tried.
But bankers were still searching for what
several called the “holy grail” – an instrument that looked like debt to
its issuer, the tax man and investors, but like equity to credit rating
agencies and regulators.
That goal came closer a year ago when Moody’s,
the credit rating agency, changed its previously conservative policies,
opening the door for it to treat structures with some debt-like features
more like equity."
The link to the Financial Times article ---
http://news.ft.com/cms/s/e22d70f2-9674-11da-a5ba-0000779e2340.html
Question
What are shareholder "earn-out"contracts"?
(Another example of the increasing complexity of classifying debt versus
equity.)
How did eBay make a $1.43 dollar (or more) mistake?
"Skype CEO steps down and parent company: eBay takes $1.43 billion
charge," MIT's Technology Review, October 1, 2007 ---
http://www.technologyreview.com/Wire/19466/?nlid=575
EBay Inc. announced Monday that the co-founder and
chief executive of its Skype division was stepping down, and that the parent
company would take $1.43 billion in charges for the Internet phone service
division.
Of the charges to be taken in the current quarter,
$900 million will be a write-down in the value of Skype, eBay said. That
charge, for what accountants call impairment, essentially acknowledges that
San Jose-based eBay, one of the world's largest e-commerce companies,
drastically overvalued the $2.6 billion Skype acquisition, which was
completed in October 2005.
EBay also said Monday it paid certain
shareholders $530 million to settle future obligations.
In 2005, eBay wooed Skype investors by offering an
''earn-out agreement'' up to $1.7 billion if Skype hit specific
targets -- including a number of active users and a gross profit -- in 2008
and the first half of 2009. The Skype shareholders holding those agreements
received the $530 million in an early, one-time payout, eBay spokesman Hani
Durzy said.
EBay also announced that Skype CEO Niklas Zennstrom
will become non-executive chairman of Skype's board and likely spend more
time working on independent projects.
Durzy said the resignation of Zennstrom, a Swedish
entrepreneur who started Skype, was not related to the impairment charge or
Skype's performance.
''Niklas left of his own volition,'' Durzy said.
''He is an entrepreneur first and foremost, and he wanted to spend more time
on some of his new projects that he has been working on.''
Skype, which allows customers to place
long-distance calls using their computers, reported second-quarter revenue
of $89.13 million, up 102 percent from a year ago. It was the second
consecutive quarter of profitability for the newest eBay division.
Zennstrom is likely to work on developing Joost, an
Internet TV service he started in 2006 with Skype co-founder Janus Friis,
relying on peer-to-peer technology to distribute TV shows and other videos
over the Web.
Joost had at least 1 million beta testers in July
and will launch at the end of the year, Zennstrom said earlier this summer.
One of the pair's first collaborations was the
peer-to-peer file-sharing network KaZaA, which launched in March 2000 and is
used primarily to swap MP3 music files over the Internet. Zennstrom also
co-founded the peer-to-peer network Altnet and the venture capital firm
Atomico.
Continued in article
From The Wall Street Journal
Accounting Educators' Review on July 16, 2004
TITLE: Possible Accounting Change May Hurt Convertible Bonds
REPORTER: Aaron Lucchetti
DATE: Jul 08, 2004
PAGE: C1
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108923165610057603,00.html
TOPICS: Bonds, Convertible bonds, Earnings per share, Emerging Issues Task
Force, Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board
SUMMARY: The Emerging Issues Task Force is considering changing the
requirements for including in the EPS calculation the potentially dilutive
shares issuable from so-called CoCo bonds. These bonds have an interest-payment
coupon and are contingently convertible, typically depending upon a specified
percentage increase in the stock price.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Describe the terms of CoCo Bonds. What do you think the term "CoCo"
means? How do they differ from typical convertible bonds? Why do investors find
typical convertible bonds attractive? Why do companies find it attractive to
offer typical convertible bonds?
2.) What is the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF)? How can the organization
of that task force help to resolve issues, such as the questions surrounding
CoCo bonds, more rapidly than the issues can be addressed by the FASB itself?
3.) In general, what is the accounting issue being addressed by the EITF?
What is the proposed change in accounting? Does any of this have to do with the
actual accounting for the bonds and their associated interest expense?
4.) Explain in detail the effect of these bonds on companies' earnings per
share (EPS) calculations. Will the amount of companies' net income change under
the proposed EITF resolution of this accounting issue? What will change? Is it
certain that the change in treatment of these bonds will have a dilutive effect
on EPS? Explain.
5.) Why might an EITF ruling require retroactive restatement of earnings by
companies issuing these bonds? How else could any change in treatment of these
bonds be presented in the financial statements?
6.) One investment analyst states that "the new accounting doesn't
change economics, but investors [are] still likely to care." Why is this
the case?
7.) Why does one analyst describe CoCo bonds as a gimmick? Why then would we
"probably be better off without it"?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
Coke: Gone Flat at the Bright Lines of Accounting Rules and Marketing
Ethics
The king of carbonated beverages is still a moneymaker, but its growth has
stalled and the stock has been backsliding since the late '90s. Now it
turns out that the company's glory days were as much a matter of accounting
maneuvers as of marketing magic.
Guizuenta's most ingenious contribution to Coke, the
ingredient that added rocket fuel to the stock price, was a bit of creative
though perfectly legal balance-sheet rejeiggering that in some ways prefigured
the Enron Corp. machinations. Known inside the company as the "49%
solution," it was the brain child of then-Chief Financial Officer M.
Douglas Ivester. It worked like this: Coke spun off its U.S.
bottling operations in late 1986 into a new company known as Coca-Cola
Enterprises Inc., retaining a 49% state for itself. That was enough to
exert de facto control but a hair below the 50% threshold that requires
companies to consolidate results of subsidiaries in their financials. At
a stroke, Coke erased $2.4 billion of debt from its balance sheet.
Dean Foust, "Gone Flat," Business Week, December 20, 2004,
Page 77.
This is a Business Week cover story.
Coca Cola's outside independent auditor is Ernst & Young
There were other problems, some of which did not do the famed Warren
Buffet's reputation any good. See "Fizzy Math and Fishy Marketing
Lawsuit, Probes Prove Damaging to Coke," by Margaret Webb Pressler, Washington
Post, June 20, 2003 --- http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A14384-2003Jun19¬Found=true
Coca Cola's marketing tactics were unethical and unhealthy for kids --- http://www.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ362/hallam/Coke%20Officials%20Beefed%20Up.pdf
Also see "The Ten Habits of Highly Defective Corporations," From The
Nation --- http://www.greenmac.com/World_Events/thetenha.html
Contingent convertible bonds get a tax-treatment
boost from a new IRS revenue ruling. But the window of opportunity may slam shut.
"Cuckoo for Coco Puffs?" Robert Willens, Lehman Brothers, CFO.com,
May 22, 2002
Now the FASB intends to shut the loop-hole. If
the proposed rule (Section 404) goes into effect, companies will have to
record an increase in shares outstanding on the day they issue a Co-Co
(Contingent Convertible Bond that can be converted only at threshold share
prices), thus reducing EPS. And the change would
be retroactive, a step the board generally reserves for particularly egregious
accounting practices, says Dennis Beresord, professor of accounting at the
University of Georgia and FASB's former chief.
"Too Much of a Good Thing," CFO Magazine, September
4, 2004, Page 21.
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on October 29,
2004
TITLE: First Marblehead: Brilliance or Grade Inflation?
REPORTER: Karen Richardson
DATE: Oct 25, 2004
PAGE: C3
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB109866115416054209,00.html
TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Allowance For Doubtful Accounts,
Financial Statement Analysis, Securitization, Valuations
SUMMARY: First Marblehead securitizes student loans and records assets
based on significant estimates. Investors have significantly increased short
selling on the stock because of concern over when the receivables recorded
through securitization will ultimately be collected.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Define the term securitization. What purpose does securitization serve?
2.) What does the author mean by "gain-on-sale" accounting? When
are gains recognized in securitization transactions?
3.) What standard governs the accounting requirements for securitization
transactions? Why does that standard focus on a question of discerning
liabilities from sales? Is that accounting question a point of difficulty in
the case described in this article? Explain.
4.) Why are critics arguing that "it will be at least five years
before any significant cash starts rolling in" on First Marblehead's
assets?
5.) According to what is listed in the article, how many factors must be
estimated to record the assets and revenues under First Marblehead's business
model? How uncertain do you think the company may be in its estimates of these
of these items?
6.) Why will it take time until "the company's massive earnings growth
can be verified"? What evidence will help to evaluate the validity of the
estimates made in First Marblehead's revenue recognition process?
7.) What is the process of short selling? Why is it telling that there has
been a significant increase in the number of short-sellers on First
Marblehead's stock?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
FERF Newsletter, April 20, 2004
Update on SFAS 150
Halsey Bullen, Senior Project Manager at the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), gave an update on SFAS 150.
Private Net last discussed SFAS 150 and FASB Staff
Position (FSP) 150-3 in the February issue: http://www.fei.org/newsletters/privatenet/pnet204.cfm
Bullen said that SFAS 150 was originally designed to
account for "ambiguous" instruments, such as convertible bonds,
puttable stock, Co-Co No-Nos (conditionally convertible, no coupon, no
interest instruments), and variable share forward sales contracts. Mandatorily
redeemable shares of ownership issued by private companies were then included
in the accounting for this class of instruments.
Bullen said that FSP 150-3 allowed private companies
to defer implementation of SFAS 150 until 2005 with respect to shares that
were redeemable on fixed dates for fixed or externally indexed amounts, and
indefinitely for other mandatorily redeemable shares. (We will assume
indefinite deferral for mandatorily redeemable ownership shares issued by
private companies.)
As an update, Bullen said that in Phase 2, the FASB
was considering several alternatives for "bifurcating" the ambiguous
instruments into equity and liability components: * Fundamental components
approach, * Narrow view of equity as common stock, * IASB 32 approach:
bifurcate convertibles and treat any other obligation that might require
transfer of assets as a liability for the full amount, * Minimum obligation
approach, and * Reassessed expected outcomes approach.
Bullen said that the FASB has encountered a number of
challenges in trying to account for these ambiguous instruments, not the least
of which are just basic conceptual definitions of shareholder equity and
liability. For example, should equity be defined as assets minus liabilities,
or should liabilities be first defined as assets minus shareholder equity?
One FEI member asked Bullen, "Where is the
concept of simplicity?" Bullen responded, "Simplicity is as
simplicity does." In other words, if the financial instrument is not
simple, how can its accounting be simple?
Bullen told the participants to expect an exposure
draft in late 2004 or early 2005.
Accrual Accounting and Estimation
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on May 19, 2006
TITLE: With Special Effects the Star, Hollywood Faces New Reality
REPORTER: Merissa Marr and Kate Kelly
DATE: May 12, 2006
PAGE: A1
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114739949943750995.html
TOPICS: Accounting, Budgeting, Cost-Volume-Profit Analysis, Managerial
Accounting
SUMMARY: Special effects are driving a lot of movies to become box office
hits. However, "in the area of special effects, technology can't deliver the
kind of efficiencies to Hollywood that it generally provides to other
industries...Amid the excitement, studios are beginning to realize that relying
on special effects is financially risky. Such big budget films tend to be
bonanzas or busts."
QUESTIONS:
1.) The author notes that studios are beginning to realize that films utilizing
a lot of special effects might tend to be "bonanzas or busts." In terms of
costs, why is this the case? In your answer, refer to the high level of costs
associated with special effects work.
2.) Why do special effects teams tend to amass significant costs? In your
answer, define the terms "cost management" and "costs of quality" and explain
how these cost concepts, that are typically associated with product
manufacturing, can be applied to movie production.
3.) Define the term "fixed cost." How does this concept relate to the
financial riskiness of movies with significant special effects and resultant
high cost? Also include in your answer a discussion of the formula for breaking
even under cost-volume-profit analysis.
4.) Define the term "variable cost." Cite some examples of variable costs you
expect are incurred by studios such as Sony Pictures, Universal Pictures, and
others.
5.) Now consider firms such as Industrial Light & Magic, "a company set up by
director George Lucas in 1975 to handle the special effects for his 'Star Wars'
movies." Based on the discussion in the article, describe what you think are
these firms' fixed and variable costs.
6.) What manager do you think is responsible for costs of quality and cost
control in producing movies? Suppose you are filling that role. What steps would
you undertake to ensure that your hoped-for blockbuster film will have the
greatest possible chance of financial success?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Questions
Is there a problem with how GAAP covers one's Fannie?
Would fair value accounting help in this situation?
"Fannie Execs Defend Accounting Change Friday,"
by Marcy Gordon, Yahoo News, November 16, 2007 ---
http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/071116/fannie_mae_accounting.html
Fannie Mae executives on
Friday defended a change in the way the mortgage lender discloses losses on
home loans amid concern from analysts that it could mask the true impact of
the credit crisis on its bottom line.
The chief financial officer and other executives of
the government-sponsored company, which reported a $1.4 billion
third-quarter loss last week, held a conference call with Wall Street
analysts to explain the recent change.
Analysts peppered the executives with questions in
a skeptical tone. The way Fannie discloses its mortgage losses, addressed in
an article published online by Fortune, raises extra concern among analysts
given that Fannie Mae was racked by a $6.3 billion accounting scandal in
2004 that tarnished its reputation and brought government sanctions against
it.
Moreover, the skepticism from Wall Street comes as
Fannie seeks approval from the government to raise the cap of its investment
portfolio.
The chief financial officer, Stephen Swad, said in
the call that some of the $670 million in provisions for credit losses on
soured home loans that Fannie Mae wrote off in the third quarter likely
would be recovered.
"We book what we book under (generally accepted
accounting principles) and we provide this disclosure to help you understand
it," Swad said.
Shares of Fannie Mae fell $4.30, or 10 percent, to
$38.74 on Friday, following a 10 percent drop the day before.
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
Bob Jensen's threads on Fannie Mae's enormous problem
(the largest in history that led to the firing of KPMG from the audit and a
multiple-year effort to restate financial statemetns) with applying FAS 133 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm#FannieMae
Question
When should warranty expenses be deducted all at once in a big bath rather than
deferred like bad debt expenses in an Allowance for Future Warranty Expenses
contra account?
First Consider Some Problems of Estimation
Speech by SEC Staff: Critical Accounting and Critical Disclosures
by Robert K. Herdman
Chief Accountant U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Speech Presented to the Financial Executives International —
San Diego Chapter, Annual SEC Update
San Diego, California January 24, 2002
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch537.htm
Product Warranty Example For balance, let me go
through an example of a manufacturer's warranty reserve. Consider a company
that manufactures and sells or leases equipment through a network of
dealerships. The equipment carries a warranty against manufacturer defects
for a specified period and amount of use. Provisions for estimated product
warranty expenses are made at the time of sale.
Significant estimates and assumptions are required
in determining the amount of warranty losses to initially accrue, and how
that amount should be subsequently adjusted. The manufacturer may have a
great deal of actual historical experience upon which to rely for existing
products, and that experience can provide a basis to build its estimate of
potential warranty claims for new models or products.
Necessarily, management must make certain
assumptions to adjust the historical experience to reflect the specific
uncertainties associated with the new model or product. These assumptions
about the expected warranty costs can have a significant impact on current
and future operating results and financial position.
In this example, investors may benefit from a clear
description of such items as the nature of the costs that are included in or
excluded from the liability measurement, how the estimation process differs
for new models/product lines versus existing or established models and
products, and the company's policies for continuously monitoring the
warranty liability to determine its adequacy.
In terms of sensitivity, investors would benefit
from understanding what types of historical events led to differences
between estimated and actual warranty claims or that resulted in a
significant revisions to the accrual. For example, an investor could benefit
from understanding if a new material or technique had recently been
introduced into the manufacturing of the equipment and historically such
changes have resulted in deviations of actual results from those previously
expected. Similarly, if warranty claims tend to exceed estimates, say, if
actual temperatures are higher or lower than assumed, that fact may also be
relevant to investors.
Obviously these examples don't address all of the
possible scenarios. While each company will have differing critical
accounting policies, the key points for everyone are to identify for
investors the 1) types of assumptions that underlie the most significant and
subjective estimates; 2) sensitivity of those estimates to deviations of
actual results from management's assumptions; and 3) circumstances that have
resulted in revised assumptions in the past. There is a great deal of
flexibility in providing this information and some may choose to disclose
ranges of possible outcomes.
Continued in article
Now Roll Ahead to Microsoft's Big Problem With Warranties in Year 2007
Microsoft's Billion Dollar Attempted Fix
Why isn't the need for this surprising from a company that almost always
releases products in need of fixing before they're out of the box?
In the face of staggering customer returns of the
Xbox 360 console, the software maker announces a charge of at least $1.05
billion to address the problem In the quest for supremacy in next-generation
gaming consoles, Microsoft (MSFT) had a big advantage by releasing the Xbox 360
a full year ahead of competing devices from Sony (SNE) and Nintendo (NTDOY). But
hardware failures on the device are forcing Microsoft to cede some of its
hard-won ground.
Cliff Edwards, "Microsoft's Billion-Dollar Fix," Business Week, July 6,
2007 ---
Click Here
Also see
http://www.technologyreview.com/Wire/19021/
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on July 13, 2007
"Microsoft's Videogame Efforts Take a Costly Hit" by Nick Wingfield, The
Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2007, Page: A3
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Accounting, Financial Accounting, Financial Analysis, Reserves
SUMMARY: Microsoft Corp. said it will take a $1.05 billion to $1.15 billion
pretax charge to cover defects related to its Xbox 360 game console. Microsoft
executives declined to discuss the technical problems in detail, but a person
familiar with the matter said the problem related to too much heat being
generated by the components inside the Xbox 360s. An analyst in the
consumer-electronics industry, Richard Doherty, says the magnitude of the charge
Microsoft is taking, which represents nearly $100 for every Xbox 360 shipped to
retailers so far indicates Microsoft is concerned about widespread failures or
that the company is being extremely conservative in taking this estimated
charge. The charge will be taken in the quarter ended June 30, Microsoft's
fiscal year end.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Describe the accounting for warranty expenses. In general, why must
companies report warranty expenses ahead of the time in which defective units
are submitted for repair?
2.) Why must Microsoft record this charge of over $1 billion entirely in one
quarter, the last quarter of the company's fiscal year ended June 30, 2007?
Support your answer with references to authoritative literature.
3.) How are analysts using the disclosures about the warranty charge to
assess Microsoft's expectations for the repairs that will be required and for
the general success of this line of business at Microsoft?
4.) Consider the analyst Richard Doherty's statement that either a high
number of Xbox 360s will fail or the company is being overly conservative in its
warranty estimate. What will happen in the accounting for warranty expense if
the estimate of future repairs is overly conservative?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Misleading Financial Statements:
Bankers Refusing to Recognize and Shed "Zombie Loans"
One worrying lesson for bankers and regulators
everywhere to bear in mind is post-bubble Japan. In the 1990s its leading
bankers not only hung onto their jobs; they also refused to recognise and shed
bad debts, in effect keeping “zombie” loans on their books. That is one reason
why the country's economy stagnated for so long. The quicker bankers are to
recognise their losses, to sell assets that they are hoarding in the vain hope
that prices will recover, and to make markets in such assets for their clients,
the quicker the banking system will get back on its feet.
The Economist, as quoted in Jim Mahar's blog on November 10, 2007 ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
After the Collapse of Loan Markets Banks
are Belatedly Taking Enormous Write Downs
BTW one of the important stories that are coming out is
the fact that this is affecting all tranches of the debt as even AAA rated debt
is being marked down (which is why the rating agencies are concerned). The
San Antonio Express News reminds us that conflicts of interest exist here
too.
Jime Mahar, November 10, 2007 ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
Jensen Comment
The FASB and the IASB are moving ever closer to fair value accounting for
financial instruments. FAS 159 made it an option in FAS 159. One of the main
reasons it's not required is the tremendous lobbying effort of the banking
industry. Although many excuses are given resisting fair value accounting for
financial instruments, I suspect that the main underlying reasons are those
"Zombie" loans that are overvalued at historical costs on current financial
statements.
Daniel Covitz and Paul Harrison of the
Federal Reserve Board found no evidence of credit agency conflicts of interest
problems of credit agencies, but thier study is dated in 2003 and may not apply
to the recent credit bubble and burst ---
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/feds/2003/200368/200368pap.pdf
In September 2007 some U.S. Senators
accused the rating agencies of conflicts of interest
"Senators accuse rating agencies of conflicts of interest in market turmoil,"
Bloomberg News, September 26, 2007 ---
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/09/26/business/credit.php
Also see
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2007/05/rating-agencies-weak-link.html
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
Bob Jensen's Rotten to the Core threads are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on July 9,
2004
TITLE: Accrual Accounting Can Be Costly
REPORTER: Gene Colter
DATE: Jul 02, 2004
PAGE: C3
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108871005216853178,00.html
TOPICS: Earnings Management, Earnings Quality, Financial Accounting, Financial
Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis, Restatement, Revenue Recognition
SUMMARY: The article discusses a research study relating the extent of
accrual accounting estimates to subsequent firm performance and incidence of
shareholder litigation. The study was conducted by Criterion Research Group,
LLC, and the article notes that the research is of interest to insurers that
offer directors and officers policies.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Summarize the research study described in the article. Who performed the
research? What can you understand about the relationships examined in the
project? What was the motivation for the research?
2.) Define the term accrual accounting. Is it accurately compared to cash
basis accounting by the description given in the article? Why must accrual
accounting always involve estimates?
3.) What is the overall impression of accrual accounting that is created in
the article? In your answer, comment on the statement, "Accrual accounting
is common and kosher."
4.) Describe weaknesses of cash basis accounting as compared to the issues
with accrual basis accounting that are presented in the article. Which basis do
you think better presents information that is useful to financial statement
readers? Support your answer; you may cite relevant accounting literature to do
so.
5.) What basis of accounting is being described using the computer network
example in the article? What accounting standards prescribe this treatment? Name
at least one other industry besides computer software sales in which this
accounting treatment is required.
6.) Refer again to question #5 and your answer. What alternative method must
be used in this area if accrual accounting were to be avoided entirely? What are
the disadvantages of this approach?
7.) Why do you think some companies must record more extensive accruals and
estimates than other companies must? Do these factors themselves lead to greater
likelihood of shareholder litigation as is found in the article?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
"Accrual Accounting Can Be Costly," by Gene Colter, The Wall
Street Journal, July 2, 2004, Page C1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108871005216853178,00.html
Firms Booking Aggressively Are More Likely to Be Sued By Shareholders, Study
Says
Book now. Pay later.
Pay the lawyers, maybe. A study to be
released today suggests that companies that are most aggressive when booking
noncash earnings are four times as likely to be sued by shareholders as
less-aggressive peers.
At issue is so-called accrual
accounting, in which companies book revenue when they earn it and expenses
when they incur them rather than when they actually receive the cash or pay
out the expenses. Accrual accounting is common and kosher. Problems arise,
however, when companies miscalculate how much revenue they've really earned in
a given period or how much in related expenses it cost to get that money.
For example, say Company A agrees to
build a computer network for Company B over four years for $4 million, a job
that Company A estimates it'll have to spend $1 million to complete. Company A
works hard and estimates it ended up building half the computer network in the
first year on the job, so it books $2 million of revenue that year. By
accounting rules, it must accrue related costs in the same proportion as
revenues, so it also books $500,000 of expenses in the same first year. But
say it then turns out that Company A's costs to finish the network actually
run to $2 million. Company A has to address that by booking $1.5 million of
expenses in future years. In other words, Company A would end up increasing
earnings in the first year, but at a cost to future earnings.
Getting the numbers wrong isn't a
violation of generally accepted accounting principles (though intentionally
misestimating is). But companies have a lot of leeway, and those that make the
most aggressive assumptions when booking what the green-visor guys call
accruals can end up creating a misleading picture of their financial health in
any given year. When skeptics refer to a company's "revenue recognition
problems," this is often what they're talking about.
The new study, based on six years of
data, was conducted by Criterion Research Group LLC, an independent research
firm in New York that caters primarily to institutional investors. It shows
that companies that fall into what Criterion calls the highest accrual
category are more likely to end up getting sued by shareholders.
The study builds on earlier research by
Criterion that showed companies that use more accruals underperform companies
with fewer accruals. In that report, Criterion screened 3,500 nonfinancial
companies over 40 years and found that those using the most accruals had
poorer forward earnings and stock returns and also had more earnings
restatements and Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement actions.
None of this is to say that companies
that end up in shareholder litigation set out to mislead shareholders. Rather,
says Criterion Chairman Neil Baron, these companies simply run a higher risk
of making mistakes with their books.
"Accruals are estimates," Mr.
Baron says. "If you're a company and a much higher percentage of your
earnings come from accruals or estimates, it's much more likely that you're
going to be wrong more often."
Criterion screened companies involved
in class-action suits from 1996 to 2003 for its new study. In each case it
looked at a company's earnings for the year of the class start date, which is
the year in which the alleged misbehavior began. Criterion then assigned these
companies into one of 10 ranks, with those in the 10th group using the most
accruals and those in 1st using the fewest. There were four times as many
shareholder class-action suits among 10th group companies as there were among
1st group firms.
A number of companies in the two
highest accrual categories recently settled shareholder class actions related
to accounting issues, including Rite
Aid Corp., Waste
Management Inc., MicroStrategy Inc. and Gateway
Inc. Other companies still involved in ongoing shareholder class actions
involving accounting issues also turned up in the aggressive-accruals group.
Companies currently in Criterion's
highest-accrual category include Chiron
Corp., eBay
Inc., General
Motors Corp., Halliburton
Co. and Yahoo
Inc. -- none of which now face shareholder suits related to accounting --
among others.
EBay spokesman Hani Durzy says he
doesn't think his company belongs in the high-accruals gang, noting that the
company's profit-and-loss statement "closely mirrors our cash flow."
He adds: "We are essentially a cash business."
A GM spokesman says, "All of GM's
accounting policies and procedures are in full compliance with U.S. GAAP and
are reviewed by our outside auditor and the audit committee, and we have, to
the best of our knowledge, never had to restate earnings because of an
accounting issue."
An e-mail from Halliburton's
public-relations office notes that Halliburton follows GAAP and adds that
accruals "are universally required by GAAP."
Representatives from Chiron and Yahoo
said the companies had no comment.
A Criterion analyst pointed out that
accruals don't necessarily relate to everyday operations. For example, a
company estimating and booking tax benefits from employee stock options is
also using accruals. Estimates related to pension accounting are also
accruals.
Mr. Baron stresses that the vast
majority of companies that book a lot of accruals are unlikely to face
shareholder suits, restatements or SEC actions. Many may even outperform
low-accrual companies. But he says investors should be "more
scrutinizing" of financial statements from companies that make liberal
use of accruals, because, statistically, they are most likely to run into
these problems.
Sophisticated investors, such as fund
managers, might reckon they can spot bookkeeping alarms before the broad
investing public and get out of a stock before the lawyers start filing
briefs. But it's possible that companies with a lot of accruals can suffer
even without litigation: Mr. Baron says his firm has been contacted by
insurers that offer directors and officers policies, which large companies buy
to protect executives and directors against lawsuits. The insurers are asking
about Criterion's research as they weigh whether to charge D&O customers
higher premiums, he says.
Bob Jensen's threads on revenue accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on January 28,
2005
TITLE: Quirk Could Hurt Mortgage Insurers (Quirk = FAS 60)
REPORTER: Karen Richardson
DATE: Jan 21, 2005
PAGE: C3
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110626962297132172,00.html
TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Insurance
Industry, Loan Loss Allowance, loan guarantees, Contingent Liabilities
SUMMARY: "Millions of people who can't afford to put down 10% or 20%
of a home's price are required by their mortgage lenders to buy policies from
mortgage insurers, which, by agreeing to shoulder some risk of missed loan
payments, can lower the buyer's down payment to as little as 3%."
However, as a result of a "quirk" in establishing Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 60, "Accounting and Reporting by
Insurance Enterprises" in 1982, the FASB allowed an exclusion for
mortgage insurers from requirements to reserve for future losses. This
exclusion may lead to to delayed reporting of costs associated with the
mortgage lending and of exacerbation of losses if default rates increase due
to the type of borrowers taking advantage of this insurance in the hot real
estate market.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is the purpose of mortgage insurance for a home buyer?
2.) How do mortgage insurance providers, and insurance providers in
general, earn profits on their activities? How are insurance rates determined?
In general what costs are deducted against revenues determined from those
insurance rates?
3.) Access Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 60,
"Accounting and Reporting by Insurance Enterprises," via the FASB's
web site, located at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas60.pdf From the discussion in
the summary of the standard, state the general accounting requirements
contained in this statement.
4.) Based on the discussion in the article, what is the exemption allowed
for mortgage insurers from Statement No. 60's requirements? What is the
reasoning for that exemption? What is your opinion about this reason?
5.) Refer again to the FASB Statement No. 60 on the FASB's web site. Locate
the exemption described in question 4 and give its citation.
6.) Given this accounting requirement exemption, what are the concerns with
measuring profit in the mortgage insurance industry in general (regardless of
the issues with the current real estate market)? What is the technique used to
handle that issue in financial reports? In your answer, specifically refer to,
and define, the matching concept in accounting.
7.) How does the potential caliber of the real estate buyers using mortgage
insurance exacerbate the concerns raised in question 6?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
August 7, 2006 message from Ganesh M. Pandit, DBA, CPA,
CMA
[profgmp@hotmail.com]
Hi Bob,
How would you answer this question from a student:
"I wonder if a company's Web site is considered a long-lived asset!"
Ganesh M. Pandit
Adelphi University
August 9, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Ganesh,
Accounting for Website investment is a classic
example of the issue of "matching" versus "value" accounting. From an income
statement perspective, matching requires the matching of current revenues
with the expenses of generating that revenue, including the "using up" of
fixed asset investments. But we don't depreciate investment in the site
value of land because land site value, unlike a building, is not used up due
to usage in generating revenue. Like land site value, a Website's "value"
probably increases in value over time. One might argue that a Website should
not be expensed since a successful Website, like land, is not used up when
generating revenue. However, Websites do require maintenance fees and
improvement outlays over time which makes it somewhat different than the
site investment in land that requires no such added outlays other than
property taxes that are expensed each year.
I don't think current accounting rules for Websites
are appropriate in theory ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm#Issue08
It seems to me that you can partition your Website
development and improvement outlays into various types of assets and
expenses. For example, computers used in development and maintenance of the
Website are accounted for like other computers. Software is accounted for
under software amortization accounting rules. Purchased goodwill is
accounted for like purchased goodwill under new impairment test rules. Labor
costs for Website maintenance versus improvements are more problematic.
Leased Website items are treated like leases,
although there are some complications if a Website is leased entirely. For
example, such a leased Website is not "used up" like airplanes that are
typically contracted as operating leases. Leased Website space may be
appropriately accounted for as an operating lease. But leasing an entire
Website is more like the capital lease of a land in that the asset does not
get "used up." My hunch is that most firms ignore this controversy and treat
Website leases as operating leases. It is pretty easy to bury custom
development costs into the "rental fee" for leased Website server space,
thereby burying the development costs and deferring them over the contracted
server space rental period. It would seem to me that rental fees for
Websites that are strictly used for advertising are written off as
advertising expenses. Of course many Websites are used for much more than
advertising.
Firms are taking rather rapid write-offs of
purchased Websites such as write-offs over three years. I'm not certain I
agree with this, but firms are "depreciating" these for tax purposes and you
can see them in filed SEC financial statements such as the one at Briton
International (under the Depreciation heading) ---
http://sec.edgar-online.com/2006/01/27/0001127855-06-000047/Section27.asp
It is more common in annual reports to see the term
Website Amortization instead of Website Depreciation. A few sites amortize
on the basis of Website traffic ---
http://www.nexusenergy.com/presentation6.aspx
This makes no
sense to me since traffic does not use up a Website over time.
Bob Jensen
Bob Jensen's threads on e-Commerce and e-Business
revenue accounting controversies are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm
Earnings Management and Agency Theory
The Controversy Over Earnings Smoothing and Other Manipulations
Recall when "agency theory" assumed that CEO's had personal incentives to
make accounting transparent without the need for outside regulation
requirements? This is probably still being taught in accounting theory courses
where instructors rely on old textbooks and journal articles.
In the latest twist in the stock options game, some
executives may have changed the so-called exercise date — the date options can
be converted to stock — to avoid paying hundreds of thousands of dollars in
income tax, federal investigators say . . . As those cases have progressed, at
least 46 executives and directors have been ousted from their positions.
Companies have taken charges totaling $5.3 billion to account for the impact of
improper grants, according to Glass Lewis & Company, a research firm that
advises big investors on shareholder issues. And further investigations,
indictments and restatements are expected. Securities regulators are now
focusing on several cases where it appears the exercise dates of the options
were backdated, according to a senior S.E.C. enforcement official, who asked not
to be identified because of the agency’s policy of not commenting on active
cases. Besides raising disclosure and accounting problems, backdating an
exercise date can result in tax fraud.
Eric Dash, "Dodging Taxes Is a New Stock Options Scheme," The New York Times,
October 30, 2006 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/30/business/30option.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
You can read about agency theory at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agency_Theory
You can read the following at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agency_Theory#Incentive-Intensity_Principle
Incentive-Intensity Principle
However, setting incentives as intense as possible
is not necessarily optimal from the point of view of the employer. The
Incentive-Intensity Principle states that the optimal intensity of
incentives depends on four factors: the incremental profits created by
additional effort, the precision with which the desired activities are
assessed, the agent’s risk tolerance, and the agent’s responsiveness to
incentives. According to Prendergast (1999, 8), “the primary constraint on
[performance-related pay] is that [its] provision imposes additional risk on
workers…” A typical result of the early principal-agent literature was that
piece rates tend to 100% (of the compensation package) as the worker becomes
more able to handle risk, as this ensures that workers fully internalize the
consequences of their costly actions. In incentive terms, where we conceive
of workers as self-interested rational individuals who provide costly effort
(in the most general sense of the worker’s input to the firm’s production
function), the more compensation varies with effort, the better the
incentives for the worker to produce.
Monitoring Intensity Principle
The third principle – the Monitoring Intensity
Principle – is complementary to the second, in that situations in which the
optimal intensity of incentives is high correspond to situations in which
the optimal level of monitoring is also high. Thus employers effectively
choose from a “menu” of monitoring/incentive intensities. This is because
monitoring is a costly means of reducing the variance of employee
performance, which makes more difference to profits in the kinds of
situations where it is also optimal to make incentives intense.
Probably the best illustration of earnings management (both legitimate and
fraudulent) is the saga of Enron --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnron.htm#Quotations
Earnings Management Deception
The 1999 bulletin also said that if accounting
practices were intentionally misleading "to impart a sense of increased earnings
power, a form of earnings management, then by definition amounts involved would
be considered material." AIG hinted some errors may have been intentional,
saying that certain transactions "appear to have been structured for the sole or
primary purpose of accomplishing a desired accounting result."
Jonathan Weil, "AIG's Admission Puts the Spotlight On Auditor PWC," The Wall
Street Journal, April 1, 2005 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111231915138095083,00.html?mod=home_whats_news_us
Bob Jensen's threads on the AIG mess are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudRotten.htm#MutualFunds
It's not clear who got the earnings game going (meeting
earnings forecasts by one penny): executives or
investors. But it's past time for it to stop. As the Progressive example shows,
those companies that continue the charade do it by choice.
Gretchen Morgenson, "Pennies That Aren't From Heaven," The
New York Times, November 7, 2004 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/07/business/yourmoney/07watch.html?ex=1100836709&ei=1&en=8f6b67cd8cfe4757
Ask any chief executive officer if he or she practices
the art of earnings management and you will undoubtedly hear an emphatic
"Of course not!" But ask those same executives about their company's
recent results, and you may very well hear a proud "we beat the analysts'
estimate by a penny."
While almost no one wants to admit to managing
company earnings, the fact is, almost everybody does it. How else to explain
the miraculous manner in which so many companies meet or beat, by the
preposterous penny, the consensus earnings estimates of Wall Street
analysts?
After years of such miracles, investors finally
seem to be wising up to the fact that an extra penny of profit is not only
meaningless but may also be evidence of earnings management and, therefore,
bad news. After all, the practice can hide
what's genuinely going on in a company's books.
A study by Thomson Financial examined how many of
the 30 companies in the Dow Jones industrial average missed, met or beat
analysts' consensus earnings estimates during each quarter over the last
five years. It also looked at how the companies' shares responded to the
results.
Over the period, on average, almost half of the
companies - 46.1 percent - met consensus estimates or beat them by a penny.
Pulling off such a feat in an uncertain world
smacks of earnings management. "It is not possible for this percentage
of reporting companies to hit the bull's-eye," said Bill Fleckenstein,
principal at Fleckenstein Capital in Seattle. "Business is too
complicated; there are too many moving parts."
The precision has a purpose, of course: to keep
stock prices aloft. According to Thomson's five-year analysis, companies
whose results came in below analysts' estimates lost 1.08 percent of their
value, on average, the day of the announcement. The loss averaged 1.59
percent over five days.
Executives have lots of levers to pull to make
their numbers. Lowering the company's tax rate is a favorite, as is
recognizing revenues before they actually come in or monkeying with reserves
set aside to cover future liabilities.
If all else fails and a company faces the nightmare
of an earnings miss, its spinmeisters can always begin a whispering campaign
to persuade Wall Street analysts to trim their estimates, making them more
attainable. Their stock might drift downward as a result, but the damage is
not usually as horrific as it is when earnings miss the target unexpectedly.
So it is not surprising that the strategy has
become so widespread and that fewer companies in the Thomson study are
coming in below their target these days. For the first three quarters of
2004, 10.9 percent missed their expected results, down from 11.7 percent in
2003 and 25 percent in 2002.
At the heart of earnings management is - what else?
- executive compensation. The greater the percentage of pay an executive
receives in stock, the bigger the incentive to produce results that propel
share prices.
Continued in the article
Coke: Gone Flat at the Bright Lines of Accounting Rules and Marketing
Ethics
The king of carbonated beverages is still a moneymaker, but its growth has
stalled and the stock has been backsliding since the late '90s. Now it
turns out that the company's glory days were as much a matter of accounting
maneuvers as of marketing magic.
Guizuenta's most ingenious contribution to Coke, the
ingredient that added rocket fuel to the stock price, was a bit of creative
though perfectly legal balance-sheet rejeiggering that in some ways prefigured
the Enron Corp. machinations. Known inside the company as the "49%
solution," it was the brain child of then-Chief Financial Officer M.
Douglas Ivester. It worked like this: Coke spun off its U.S.
bottling operations in late 1986 into a new company known as Coca-Cola
Enterprises Inc., retaining a 49% state for itself. That was enough to
exert de facto control but a hair below the 50% threshold that requires
companies to consolidate results of subsidiaries in their financials. At
a stroke, Coke erased $2.4 billion of debt from its balance sheet.
Dean Foust, "Gone Flat," Business Week, December 20, 2004,
Page 77.
This is a Business Week cover story.
Coca Cola's outside independent auditor is Ernst & Young
There were other problems, some of which did not do the famed Warren
Buffet's reputation any good. See "Fizzy Math and Fishy Marketing
Lawsuit, Probes Prove Damaging to Coke," by Margaret Webb Pressler, Washington
Post, June 20, 2003 --- http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A14384-2003Jun19¬Found=true
Coca Cola's marketing tactics were unethical and unhealthy for kids --- http://www.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ362/hallam/Coke%20Officials%20Beefed%20Up.pdf
Also see "The Ten Habits of Highly Defective Corporations," From The
Nation --- http://www.greenmac.com/World_Events/thetenha.html
Goodwill and Other Asset
Impairment
"MCI Inc. Posts $3.4 Billion Loss For 3rd Quarter," by
Shawn Young, The Wall Street Journal, November 5, 2004, Page B2 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB109956924948864745,00.html?mod=technology_main_whats_news
Results Reflect Write-Off Of $3.5 Billion on Assets; Revenue in 2004
to Drop
Results Reflect Write-Off Of $3.5 Billion on
Assets; Revenue in 2004 to Drop By SHAWN YOUNG Staff Reporter of THE
WALL STREET JOURNAL November 5, 2004; Page B2
MCI Inc. reported a $3.4 billion
third-quarter loss, reflecting a $3.5 billion write-off the phone
giant has said it is taking on assets that have lost value.
The company also cautioned that 2004 revenue
will be slightly below the $21 billion to $22 billion it had projected
early in the year.
"Slightly means slightly," said
Chief Executive Michael Capellas. He noted that the company hadn't
changed its projections since a regulatory setback led MCI and larger
rival AT&T Corp. to virtually abandon marketing of home phone
service to consumers. Both companies are now focused almost
exclusively on business customers.
Despite the revenue decline, MCI projects a
fourth-quarter profit, the result of improving margins, lower costs
and a little stabilization in the price wars that have wracked the
long-distance industry. The profit would be the first for the former
WorldCom Inc. in years. The company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection in 2002 in the wake of a massive accounting fraud. It
emerged under the name MCI in April.
The improving trends that could produce a
fourth-quarter profit were also evident in operating results for the
third quarter, which largely met investor expectations.
Continued in the article
Bob Jensen's threads on the Worldcom and MCI scandals are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnron.htm#WorldCom
"How to Avoid
the Goodwill Asteroid," by Jon D. Markman, TheStreet.com, May 24,
2002 --- http://www.thestreet.com/funds/supermodels/10024147.html
One of the
gravest fears of investors today is being totaled by an
"asteroid" event -- moments when a stock gets pushed to the
edge of extinction by a bolt from the blue, such as a drug application
rejection, a securities probe revelation or a surprise earnings
restatement.
Yet many
shareholders seem blithely unaware that at least one asteroid speeding
toward their companies is entirely foreseeable: the likelihood that
management will have to write down a decent-sized chunk of their net
worth sometime this year and perhaps rather soon.
This
unfortunate prospect is faced, potentially, by companies such as AOL
Time Warner (AOL:NYSE
- news
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- analysis),
Allied Waste Industries (AW:NYSE
- news
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- research
- analysis),
Georgia-Pacific (GP:NYSE
- news
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- research
- analysis)
and Cendant (CD:NYSE
- news
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- analysis)
that have accumulated a great deal of goodwill on their balance sheets
over the past few years. That's accountant-speak for the amount a
company pays for another company over its book value because of
expectations that some of its intangible assets -- such as patented
technology, a prized brand name or desirable executives -- will prove
valuable in a concrete, earnings-enhancing sort of way.
New
Accounting Rules
Companies carry
goodwill on their balance sheets as if it were an asset as solid as a
piece of machinery, and therefore it is one of many items balanced
against liabilities, such as long-term debt, to measure shareholder
equity or book value. Just as hard assets are depreciated, or
expensed, by a certain amount each year to account for their
diminished value as they age, intangibles have long been amortized by
a certain amount annually to account for their waning value.
The value of
machinery rarely dissipates quickly, but the value of goodwill can
evaporate in a flash if a company determines that it paid too much for
intangible assets -- e.g., if a patent or brand turns out not to be as
defensible as originally believed, or demand for a new technology
falters. As you can imagine, companies typically don't want to admit
they overpaid. But once they do, they must write down the vanished
value so that the "intangibles" lines on their balance
sheets reflect fair-market pricing. If the writedown leaves a
company's assets at a level lower than liabilities, the company is
left with a negative net worth, which, as you would expect, is frowned
upon, and often results in a dramatically lower stock price.
Until last
year, companies tried to avoid recording goodwill after acquisitions
by using a method of accounting called "pooling of
interests." In these stock-for-stock deals, companies were
allowed to record the acquiree's assets at book value even though the
value of the stock it had given up was greater than the amount of real
stuff its shareholders received. The advantage: No need to drag down
earnings each quarter by amortizing, or expensing, goodwill.
The rulebook
changed this year, however, and pooling went the way of the dodo; now
companies are forced to record goodwill on their books. As a
compromise to serial acquirers, who have a powerful lobby, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) decided that companies
would no longer have to amortize goodwill regularly against earnings.
Instead, a new standard -- encompassed in Rule 142 -- requires
companies to test goodwill for "impairment" periodically.
Essentially,
this means that while the diminished value of goodwill won't count
against a company's earnings annually anymore, companies might need to
write down huge gobs of it from time to time when accountants decide
they can't ignore the fact that an acquisition didn't turn out as
planned. It also means that because FASB 142 does not dictate a set of
strictly objective rules for calculating impairment, writedowns will
be somewhat subjective in both timing and amount.
Don't Fall
for These Three Ploys
As a result,
many market skeptics believe that FASB 142, which was intended to
improve earnings transparency, may in some cases actually result in
more egregious earnings manipulation than ever. Donn Vickrey, vice
president at Camelback Research Alliance, a provider of analytical
tools and consulting services for financial information, says he sees
three ways that companies interested in managing their earnings could
end-run shareholders using the new rule.
The big
bath.
In this approach, companies will write off a big portion of the
goodwill on their books, telling investors it is an insignificant
"paper loss" that should have no impact on the firm's share
price. The benefit: Future write-offs would be unnecessary, and the
company's earnings stream could be more effectively smoothed out in
future periods. This approach would work only if it does not put the
company at risk of violating debt covenants that require it to
maintain a certain ratio of assets vs. liabilities.
Cosmetic
earnings boost.
Under FASB 142, many companies will record earnings that appear higher
than last year's because of the elimination of goodwill amortization.
However, the increase will be purely cosmetic, as the company's
underlying cash flow and profitability would remain unchanged.
Investors should thus ensure they are comparing prior periods with the
current period on an apples-to-apples basis by eliminating goodwill
amortization from comparable year-earlier financial statements. The
amount might be buried in footnotes to the balance sheet, though Kellogg
(K:NYSE
- news
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- research
- analysis)
explains the issue clearly in its latest 10-k in the section devoted
to its acquisition of cookie maker Keebler in March 2001. Kellogg says
it recorded $90.4 million in intangible amortization expense during
2001 and would have recorded $121 million in 2002 had it not adopted
FASB 142 at the start of the year.
Avoid-a-write-off.
Some companies might take advantage of the new rule by avoiding a
goodwill write-off as long as possible to prevent the big charge to
earnings. Since the tests for impairment are subjective, Camelback
believes it will not be hard for firms to avoid write-offs in the
short run -- a strategy that could both help them avoid violations in
debt covenants and potentially provide a boost in executive
compensation formulas.
While any
public company that does acquisitions will find itself facing
decisions about how to account for goodwill impairment, companies with
the greatest absolute levels of goodwill -- as well as ones with the
greatest amount of goodwill relative to their market capitalization --
will be the most vulnerable in the future to having their earnings
blasted by the FASB 142 asteroid.
Continued at http://www.thestreet.com/funds/supermodels/10024147.html
From The Wall Street Journal
Accounting Educators' Review on Junly 30, 2004
TITLE: FASB May Bite Into Overseas Profits
REPORTER: Lingling Wei
DATE: Jul 28, 2004
PAGE: C3
LINK: Print Only
TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board,
International Accounting Standards Board
SUMMARY: The FASB has voted 4-3 to instruct the staff to examine
"whether it is practical to require companies to book a liability
for taxes they potentially owe on profits earned and held
overseas."
QUESTIONS:
1.) What was the vote undertaken at the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB)? Did this vote actually establish a new accounting
requirement? Explain, commenting on the FASB's process for establishing
a new accounting standard.
2.) Why did the FASB undertake this step with respect to deferred
taxes? How does it fit in with other work being undertaken in concert
with the International Accounting Standards Board?
3.) FASB member Michael Crooch comments that "there is a fair
amount of opposition to the change" proposed by the FASB. Do you
think such opposition is unusual or common for FASB proposals? Support
your answer.
4.) Define the term "deferred taxes". When must deferred
taxes be recorded? Why do we bother to record them? That is, how does
the process of reporting deferred taxes help to improve reporting in the
balance sheet and income statement?
5.) What taxes currently are recorded on foreign earnings? Why do
companies currently not calculate deferred taxes for profits on foreign
earnings? Why then would any change in this area result in "a major
hit to earnings"?
6.) Why do you think that companies might reconsider repatriating
foreign earnings if they must begin to record deferred taxes on those
amounts? What does your answer imply in regards to the economic
consequences of accounting policies?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
From The
Wall Street Journal
Accounting Educators' Review
on December 13, 2002
TITLE: International Body to Suggest Tighter Merger Accounting
REPORTER: Silvia Ascarelli and Cassell Bryan-Low
DATE: Dec 05, 2002
PAGE: A2
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1039033389416080833.djm,00.html
TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting, Financial
Statement Analysis, Goodwill, International Accounting, International
Accounting Standards Board, Restructuring
SUMMARY: The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is
proposing a new standard for business combination accounting. The
proposal prescribes accounting treatment that is more stringent than
U.S. standards. For example, it disallows recording restructuring
charges at the outset of a business combination; such charges must
simply be recorded as incurred.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Compare and contrast the standard for business combinations proposed
by the IASB to the current U.S. standard. To investigate these
differences directly from the source, access the IASB's web site at
http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp.
2.) Why are U.S. companies expected to be concerned about recording
restructuring charges as they are incurred in the process of
implementing a business combination, rather than when these anticipated
costs are identified at the outset of a business combination? Do these
two accounting treatments result in differing amounts of expense being
recorded for these restructuring charges? Will such U.S. companies be
required to report according to this IAS, assuming it is implemented?
3.) How are the goodwill disclosures proposed in the IAS expected to
help financial statement analysis?
4.) How are European companies expected to be impacted by this
proposed IAS and future proposals currently planned in this area of
accounting for business combinations? Provide your answer by considering
not only the article under this review, but also by again accessing the
IASB's web site referenced above.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
Program professors can search past editions of Educators' Reviews at http://ProfessorJournal.com.
Go to the Educators' Review section and click on "Search the
Database." You can also change your discipline selection or remove
yourself from the mailing list.
|
Some intangible assets are booked and amortized. Accounting guidance in this area
dates back to APB 17. Usually these are contractual or legal rights (patents,
copyrights, etc.) and amortizations and write downs are to be based on the following
provisions in Paragraph 27 of APB 17:
The Board believes that the value of intangible assets at any one
date eventually disappears and that the recorded costs of intangible assets should be
amortized by systematic charges to income over the periods estimated to be benefited.
Factors which should be considered in estimating the useful lives of intangible assets
include:
- Legal, regulatory, or contractual provisions may limit the maximum
useful life.
- Provisions for renewal or extension may alter a specified limit on
useful life.
- Effects of obsolescence, demand, competition, and other economic
factors may reduce a useful life.
- A useful life may parallel the service life expectancies of
individuals or groups of employees.
- Expected actions of competitors and others may restrict present
competitive advantages.
- An apparently unlimited useful life may in fact be indefinite and
benefits cannot be reasonably projected.
- An intangible asset may be a composite of many individual factors
with varying effective lives.
When a company purchases another company, the purchase price may soar way above the
book value of the acquired firm. The reason for the unbooked excess is the
unbooked market values of booked and unbooked assets plus synergy increments less
negative value of unbooked liabilities. Paragraph 39 of FAS 141 requires the partitioning
of the unbooked excess value into (1) separable versus (2) inseparable components of
unbooked excess purchase value. The inseparable portion is then booked as
"goodwill." This portion is then booked as goodwill and is carried forward
as an asset subject to impairment tests of FAS 142. Paragraph
39 of FAS 141 requires an intangible asset to be recognized as an asset apart from
goodwill if it arises from:
· contractual or other legal rights,
regardless of whether those rights are transferable or separable
from the acquired entity or from other rights and obligations; or
· separable,
that is, it is capable of being separated or divided from the acquired entity and sold, transferred, licensed, rented, or exchanged regardless of
whether there is an intent to do so. An intangible
asset is still considered separable if it can be sold transferred,
licensed, rented, or exchanged in combination with a related contract, asset or liability.
Paragraphs 10-28 of FAS 141 provides examples of intangible assets that are considered
"separable" and are not to be confounded in the goodwill account. But the
majority of the unbooked excess value is usually the inseparable goodwill arising from
"knowledge capital" arising from the following components:
Knowledge Capital Components |
- Spillover Knowledge (see above)
- Human Resources (see above)
- Structural Capital (see above)
|
Knowledge capital arises generally from the conservatism concept that guides the FASB
and other standard setters around the world. For example, human resources are not
owned, controlled, bought, and sold like tangible assets. As a result, investment in
training are expensed rather than capitalized. Research and development expenditures
are expensed rather than booked under the highly conservatism rulings in FAS 2. This
includes most R&D in database and software development except when impacted by FAS 86.
Knowledge capital is often the major component of goodwill. But
"goodwill" as defined in FAS 141 and 142 is a hodgepodge of other positive and
negative components that comprise the net excess value difference between the market value
of total owners' equity and the value of the firm as a whole. This is summarized
below:
Goodwill Components |
+ Market value of Owners' Equity ($10 billion)
- Book value of Owners' Equity ($01 billion)
= Market to book difference in value ($09 billion)
- Adjustment of booked items to fair value ($04 billion)
= Goodwill that includes the following components ($5 billion)
- Unbooked synergy value of booked items (+$1 billion)
- Unbooked knowledge capital value (+$04 billion)
- Other unbooked items (-$01 billion)
- Joint effects, including other synergies (+$01 billion)
|
The components of goodwill are not generally additive. For example, a firm has
just been purchased for $10 billion and has a book equity value of $1 billion. The
market to book ratio is therefore 10=$10/$1. Suppose the value of the individual
booked assets and liabilities sums to $5 billion even though the booked value on a
historical cost basis is only $1 billion. However, when combined as a bundle of
booked items, assume there is a combined value of $6 billion, because the value of the
combined booked items is worth more than the $5 billion sum of the parts. For
example, if an airline sells its booked airplanes and airport facilities, these many be
worth more as a bundle than the sum of the values of all the pieces. If there were
no unbooked items, the value of the firm would be $6 billion, thereby, resulting in $1
billion in goodwill arising entirely from synergy of booked items.
However, the value of the equity is $10 billion rather than $6 billion. This
difference is due to the net value of the unbooked asset and liability items and the
synergies they create in combination with one another. For example, if an airline
sells the entire business in addition to its airplanes and airport facilities, there is
added value due to the intellectual capital components such as experienced mechanics,
flight crews, computer systems, and ground crews. There are also negative components
such as unbooked operating lease obligations on airplanes not booked on the balance sheet.
The components of goodwill are not additve in value, but in combination they sum to the
$5 billion in goodwill equal to the market value of the combined equity minus the sum of
the market values of the booked items (without the $1 billion in unbooked synergy
value). When combined with the booked items, the unbooked knowledge capital takes on
more value than $4 billion it can be sold for individually. For example, if American
Airlines sold its entire SABRE reservations system in one sale and the remainder of the
company in another sale, the sum would probably be less than the combined value of the
unbooked SABRE system plus all of the booked items belonging to American Airlines.
This is because there is synergy value between the booked and unbooked items. One of
the synergy items is leverage. Values of booked debt and assets may be more additive
in firms having low debt/equity ratios than in high leverage firms where there investors
adjust added values for higher risk.
If investors seek to extrapolate firm value from balance sheet value, they will
discover that historical costs are useless and that adustments of booked items to fair
value falls way short of total value. The problem is that major components of value
never appear on the balance sheets. The unbooked knowledge capital components of
firm value have become so enormous that it is not uncommon to find market to book values
of equity way in excess of the ten to one ratio illustrated above.
Goodwill cannot be booked in the United States except when there is a combining of two
companies that must now be accounted for as a purchase under FAS 141. Goodwill is
the purchase price less the current fair values of the booked items (not adjusted for
synergy value). No formal attempt is made to report the portion that is knowledge
capital, although management may justify the business combination on some identified
knowledge capital items. For example, if Microsoft purchased PeopleSoft, Bill Gates
would make a public explanation of why the value of PeopleSoft is almost entirely due to
unbooked items relative to booked items in PeopleSoft's balance sheet.
The main reason why goodwill cannot be booked, unless there is a business combination
transaction, is that estimation of the value of the firm on an ongoing basis is too
expensive and subject to enormous measurement error. One common approach is to
multiply the market price per share times the number of shares outstanding. But this
is usually far different from the price buyers are willing to pay for all of the shares
outstanding. This difference arises in part because acquiring control usually is far
more valueable than the sum of the shares at current trading values. This difference
arises in part because current share prices are subject to transient market price
movements of shares of all traded companies, whereas the value of the firm in a business
combination deal is much more stable.
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on April
4, 2002 TITLE: Why High-Fliers Built on Big Ideas, Are Such Fast Fallers
REPORTER: Greg Ip
DATE: Apr 04, 2002
PAGE: A1
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,4287,SB1017872963341079920,00.html
TOPICS: Intangible Assets, Electricity Markets, Goodwill, Managerial Accounting,
Pharmaceutical Industry, Research & Development
SUMMARY: Greg Ip reports on the perils of life-cycle differences based on products and
services that are reliant on intangible rather than tangible assets. That value is created
with either is undeniable, but significantly riskier when that value is supported by
something intangible that may disappear entirely.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is a product life cycle? How many of the 5 basic stages of a product's life can
you name? What has happened to the product life cycle that is heavily dependent on
technological changes? What part does intangible assets have in this change? How could the
$5 billion in assets of a firm sell for $42 million?
2.) What does the author mean when he says "value today is increasingly derived
from intangible assets - intellectual property, innovative technology, financial services
or reputation"? Explain in terms of Alan Greenspan's statement "a firm is
inherently fragile if its value-added emanates more from conceptual as distinct from
physical assets."
3.) The article relates the story of Polaroid, once a pioneer noted for its
technological prowess. Its "technology" asset formed the basis of its early
success. How did technology and innovation finally slay it?
4.) Other industries are exposed to the same sorts of forces, including the
pharmaceutical and fiber-optic industries. How have they fared?
5.) Why have companies tried to cast off hard assets in favor of intangible assets? In
2000, Jeffrey Skilling said, " What's becoming clear is that there's nothing magic
about hard assets. They don't generate cash. What does is a better solution for your
customer. And increasingly that's intellectual, not physical assets, driven." Do you
suppose he's changed his mind?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University |
A common mistake is to assume that "goodwill" is comprised only of unbooked
assets such as knowledge capital. Nothing could be further from the truth in terms
of how goodwill is calculated under FAS 141 rules. Goodwill also includes downward
value adjustments for unbooked risk items such as off-balance sheet financing, pending and
potential litigation losses, pending and possible adverse legislative and taxation
actions, estimated environmental protection expenses, and various industry-specific
liabilities such as unbooked frequent flyer certificate obligations.
From The Wall Street Journal
Accounting Educators' Reviews on June 20, 2002 TITLE: Frequent-Flier Programs Get an Overhaul
REPORTER: Ron Lieber
DATE: Jun 18, 2002
PAGE: D1 LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1024344325710894400.djm,00.html
TOPICS: Frequent-flier programs, Accounting
SUMMARY: Many frequent-flier programs are
offering alternative rewards in exchange for frequent-flier miles. Questions focus on
accounting for frequent-flier programs and redemption of miles.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is a frequent-flier program? List three possible ways to account for
frequent-flier miles awarded to customers in exchange for purchases. Discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of each accounting method.
2.) Why are companies offering alternative
rewards in exchange for frequent-flier miles? How is the redemption of miles reported in
the financial statements? Discuss accounting issues that arise if the miles are redeemed
for awards that are less costly than originally anticipated.
3.) The article states that the 'surge in
unredeemed points is causing bookkeeping headaches.' Why would unredeemed points cause
bookkeeping headaches? Would companies be better off if the points were never redeemed? If
a company created a liability for awarded points, in what circumstances could the
liability be removed from the balance sheet?
4.) Refer to the related article. Describe Jet
Blue's frequent-flier program. How does stipulating a one-year expiration on
frequent-flier points change accounting for a frequent-flier program?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode
Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
--- RELATED ARTICLES ---
TITLE: JetBlue Joins the Fray But With Big Caveat: Miles Expire in a Year
REPORTER: Ron Lieber
PAGE: D1
ISSUE: Jun 18, 2002
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB102434443936545600.djm,00.html |
Liabilities and Equity
of Microsoft Corporation
The off-balance sheet liabilities of Microsoft dwarf the
recorded liabilities.
- The major risk of Microsoft is the ease with which its products can be duplicated elsewhere
such as in China. From a global perspective this gives rise to perhaps billions in
lost revenues and enormous expenditures to protect copyrights.
- There are enormous contingency risks and pending
lawsuits, particularly government lawsuits alleging abuse of monopoly powers and civil
lawsuits from companies claiming unfair marketing practices and copyright infringements.
|
Entrenched Assets and Market Dominance
- Microsoft Windows and MS Office
- AMR Sabre
- Oracle Databases
- AOL
Market-to-Book (ratio of market value of net
assets/book value of net assets) > 6.0
Conservatism is Largely to Blame
- R&D expensed under FASB, but only R expensed
by IAS
- Amazon.com's tremendous investment in systems,
marketing, and distribution software
- AOL's customer acquisition costs
- Distrust of valuations that are highly subjective
and subject to extreme volatility
Institutional Investors and Security Analysts Are
Also At Fault
|
Wages of factory workers are traced directly into finished goods inventories
and are "capitalized" costs rather than expenses. They are
carried in the balance sheet as "tangible assets" until the the
inventory items are sold or perish. Then these costs become
"expenses" in the income statement and are written off to the Retained
Earnings account. Similarly, wages of construction workers on a building
are capitalized into the Buildings asset account rather than expensed in the
income statement. These wages become expensed over time in periodic
depreciation charges. Costs of labor and direct materials that can be traced to
construction of tangible assets thereby become assets and are written off across
future periods. Even indirect labor and material charges may be
capitalized as overhead applied to tangible assets. Tangible assets depict
"touchable" items that can be purchased and sold in established
markets such as commodity markets, real estate markets, and equipment
markets.
Wages and salaries of research workers can be traced to particular
projects. However, under most accounting standards worldwide, research
costs, including all direct material, labor, and overhead costs are
expensed immediately rather than capitalized as assets even though the revenues
from the projects may not commence until many years into the future.
Research projects are typically too unique and too uncertain to be traded in
markets. Accounting standard setters recognize that there are many
"intangible" items having future benefits or losses that are not
booked as assets or liabilities. Outlays for development of intangibles
are expensed rather than capitalized until they can be better matched with the
revenues they generate. Examples in include research for new or improved
products. Intangibles also include contractual items such as copyrights,
advertising, product promotions, and public relations outlays. When
intangibles such as patents and copyrights are purchased, the outlays can be
booked as intangible assets. Costs are then amortized over time.
However, resources devoted to discovery and development of intangibles are
generally not booked as assets. They are expensed when incurred rather
than capitalized. Typical examples of intangible expenses include the
following:
- Research (including development of patent and copyright items)
- Long-term development of patents, products, and copyrights
- Advertising and trademarks
- Employee training and development
- Public relations
When an entire firm is purchased, the difference between the total price and
the current value of all intangibles is typically booked to a
"Goodwill" asset account. When purchased as a lump sum, goodwill
can be carried as an asset until its value is deemed to be
"impaired." However, when developed internally, goodwill is not
booked as an asset. This creates all sorts of problems when comparing
similar companies where one company purchased its goodwill and the other company
developed it internally. In the U.S., goodwill accounting must be treated
under purchase rather than pooling methods that, in turn, result in booking of
"purchased goodwill." FAS 141 spells out the accounting
standards for Goodwill.
One requirement under FAS 141 is that contractual items such as patents and
copyrights that can be separated from goodwill must be valued separately and be
immediately expensed. This is an attempt in FAS 141 to make it easier to
compare a firm that acquires R&D in a business combination with a firm that
develops its own R&D. However, implementation of FAS 141 rules in this
regard becomes very murky.
FAS 142 dictates that firms are no longer required to amortize capitalized
goodwill costs. Instead firms are required to run impairment tests and
expense portions of goodwill that has been deemed "impaired."
FAS 142 does not alter standards for intangibles that are not acquired in a
business combination. Hence, standards such as FAS 2 (R&D), FAS 19
(Oil and Gas), FAS 50 (Recording Industry), and FAS 86 (Computer Software)
remain intact in situations apart from business combinations. Paragraph
39(b) of FAS 142 admits to the following:
In some cases, the cost of generating an intangible asset
internally
cannot be distinguished from the cost of maintaining or
enhancing ... internally generated goodwill.
There is nothing new about the sad state of accounting for
intangibles. In a working paper entitled "The Measurement and
Recognition of Intangible Assets: Then and Now," Claire Eckstein from
Fairleigh Dickinson University quotes the following footnote from 1928:
The Gold Dust Corporation
August 31, 1928
In view of the available surplus, and in the fact that the
corporation carries its most valuable asset, viz, its goodwill at $1, and
also because of the uncertain market value of industrial plants, it was
concluded that it would be entirely approprate for the corporation to
carry its plants in a similar manner as its goodwill, viz, at the nominal
value of $1. |
The FASB admits that accounting for intangibles is in a sad state in terms of
providing relevant information to investors. An agenda project has been
created that is titled "Disclosure of Information about Intangible Assets
not Recognized in Financial Statements." Analysts bemoan the state of
accounting for intangibles. In April 2001, Fortune stated the
following:
In the Fortune 500 there are thousands upon thousands of statistics that
reveal very little
that's meaningful about the corporations they purportedly describe. At
least that's the
verdict of a growing number of forward-thinking market watchdogs, academics,
accountants,
and others. Convinced that accounting gives rotten information about the
value of performance
in modern knowledge-intensive companies, they are proposing changes that would
be
earthshaking to the profession.
Because so much of the problem rests in "knowledge intensive
companies," Baruch Lev and others have come to view unrecognized
intangibles as being synonymous with unrecognized "knowledge capital."
Measuring the Value of Intangibles and Valuation of the Firm
Knowledge Capital Valuation Factors (terminology adapted from Baruch
Lev's writings)
Value Creators
- Scalability
Nonrivalry (e.g., the SABRE airline reservations system)
Increasing Returns (due to initial fixed cost followed by
low marginal cost)
- Network Effects
Positive Feedback ¨(customer discussion boards)
Network Externalities (fast word of mouth)
Industry Standard (Microsoft Windows)
Value Destroyers
- Partial Excludability (training of employees who cannot be indentured servants)
Spillovers
Fuzzy Property Rights
Private vs. Social Returns (training that creates immense
competition other nations)
- Inherent Risk
Sunk Cost
Creative Destruction (Relational database and ERP destruction of
COBOL systems)
Volatility of value due to competition and technological change
Risk Sharing (only a few products emerge as winners amidst a
trail of road kill)
- Non-tradability
Contracting Problems
Negligible Marginal Cost
A few years ago a hardback set of the thirty-two volumes of the
Britannica cost $1,600
In 1992 Microsoft decided to get into the encyclopedia
business
[creating] a CD with some multimedia bells and whistles and a user friendly
front end and sold it to end users for $49.95
Britannica started to see its market
erode
The company's first move was to offer on-line access to libraries at a
subscription rate of $2,000 per year
Britannica continued to lose market share
In
1996 the company offered a CD version for $200
Britannica now sells a CD for $89.99
that has the same content as the thirty-two volume print version that recently sold for
$1,600.
Shapiro
and Varian (1999, pp. 1920)
|
On November 14, 2002 the following links were provided at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/intangibles.html
There are all sorts of models for valuing an entire firm such that estimates of the
value of unbooked items (goodwill) can be derived as the difference between the sum of the
values of booked items and the entire value of the firm. However, derivation of
values of knowledge capital becomes confounded by the synergy effects.
The major problem is all valuation models is that they entail forecasting into the
future based upon extrapolations from past history. This is not always a bad thing
when forecasting in relatively stable industries and economic conditions. The
problem in modern times is that there are very few stable industries and economic
conditions. Equity values and underlying values of intangibles are impacted by
highly unstable shifts in investor confidence in equity markets, manipulations of
accounting reports, terrorism, global crises such as the Asian debt crises, emergence of
China in the world economy, and massive litigation unknowns such as lawsuits regarding
mold in buildings. Forecasting the future from the past is easy in most steady-state
systems. It is subject to enormous error in forecasting in systems that are far from
being in steady states.
The popular models for valuing entire firms include the following:
- Valuation based upon analyst forecasts. These alternatives have
the advantages of being rooted in data outside what is reported under GAAP
in financial statements. Analysts may meet with top management and
consider intangibles. But there are also drawbacks such as the
following:
- The cart is in front of the horse. When the purpose of accounting
data is
to help help investors and analysts set stock prices in securities
markets, the forecasts of users (especially leading
multiples) for valuation entails circular reasoning.
- The recent scandals involving security analysts of virtually all major
investment firms and brokerages makes us tend to doubt the objectivity and
ability of analysts to make forecasts that are not self-serving. See
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#Cleland
- Analyst forecasts tend to be highly subjective. Comparing them may
be like finding the mean between a banana and a lemon.
- Valuation using stock price multiples (usually limited to comparing firms in a
given industry and adjusted for leverage). Multiples can be based upon price
forecasts (leading multiples) or past price trends (trailing multiples). In either
case, the valuations are suspect for the following reasons:
- The cart is in front of the horse. When the purpose of the valuation exercise is
to help help investors set stock prices in securities markets, the use of stock prices (especially leading
multiples) for valuation entails circular reasoning.
- Use of the current prices of small numbers of shares traded is not the same as the
per-share value of all the shares acquired in a single transaction. This difference
arises in part because acquiring control usually i
- s far more valuable than the sum of the
shares at current trading values. This difference arises in part because current
share prices are subject to transient market price movements of shares of all traded
companies, whereas the value of the firm in a business combination deal is much more
stable. For example, Microsoft share prices have declined about 40%
between Year 2000 and Year 2002, but it is not at all clear that the value
of the firm and/or its knowledge capital value has declined so steeply in
the bear market of securities pricing in Year 2002.
- Present value valuation based upon forecasted dividends (usually including a
forecasted dividend growth rate).
The problem with forecasted dividends is that firms have dividend policies that do not
reflect future value. For example, many firms do not pay dividends at all or their
payout ratios are too small to be reflective of firm value. There may be enormous
dividends decades into the future, but these are too uncertain to be realistic for
valuation purposes. Another problem is that forecasted dividend models generally
require the estimation of a "terminal value" of the firm, and this usually
entails grasping for straws.
- Discounted abnormal earnings and returns valuation (including
Edwards-Bell-Ohlson (EBO) and Steward's EVA Models)
Abnormal earnings and returns valuation models generally use forcasted after-tax
operating profits discounted at the firm's current weighted average cost of capital.
There are variations of methods such as the abnormal returns method, the abnormal
earnings method, and the free cash flow method of valuing returns to debt and equity.
One of the nicer summaries of the EBO versus EVA models can be found in
"Measuring Wealth," by Charles Lee, CA Magazine, April 1996, pp.
32-37 --- http://www.cica.ca/cica/camagazine.nsf/e1996-Apr/TOC
The value of the firm depends on its ability to generate "abnormal
earnings" above what can be earned in riskless or near-riskless investment
alternatives. There are immense problems in this valuation approach for the
following reasons:
- Empirical studies both before and after the Enron scandal indicate that earnings
management is systemic and pervasive such that managers can manipulate abnormal earnings
valuations with their earnings management policies (that are generally secret).
- Earnings measures are subject to all the limitations of GAAP including the failure to
expense employee stock options, inclusion of income on pension funds, write-off of R&D
under FAS 2, and the expensing of expenditures for knowledge capital intended to benefit
the future. Actually, this problem is not as serious as it might seem at first blush
since many of the accounting distortions wash themselves out over time if they are do to
timing. However, when the timing is long-term such as in the case of long-term
R&D projects, distortions persist due to discounting. For example, if a firm
deducts $1 billion per year on a research project that may only start to pay off 15 or
more years into the future, the conservatism badly distorts the discounted abnormal
earnings and return valuation methods.
- Abnormal earnings and returns valuation models implicitly assume firms that carry
massive amounts of excess cash, beyond what is needed for year-to-year operations,
distribute the excess cash as dividends to owners. This just is not the case in some
firms like Microsoft that carry huge cash reserves. As a result, abnormal earnings
and returns valuation methods must take this into account since abnormal earnings do not
accrue to free cash reserves.
- Real Options
There are various valuation methods that are less widely used. One of
these is the Real Options approach that shows some promise even though it is
still quite impractical. See http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/realopt.htm
- Market Transaction
On rare occasion, a portion of a company's knowledge capital is sold in market
transactions that give clues about total value. The sale of a portion of the SABRE system
by American Airlines is an excellent example of a clue to the immense value of this
unbooked asset on the balance sheet.. The problem with this is that market price of
a portion of the SABRE system ignores the synergy values of the remaining portion still
owned by AMR.
In the final analysis, the most practical approach to date is to attempt to forecast
the revenues and/or cost savings attributable to major components of intellectual capital.
This is much easier in the case of software and systems such as the SABRE system
than it is in components like human resources where total future benefits are virtually
impossible to drill down to present values at particular points in time.
The valuation of intangibles will probably always be subject to enormous margins of
error and risk.
One way to help financial statement users analyze intangibles would be to
expand upon the interactive spreadsheet/database approach currently used by
Microsoft Corporation for making forecasts. Although this approach is not
currently used by Microsoft for detailed analysis of intangibles, we can
envision how knowledge capital components might be expanded upon in a way that
financial statement users themselves can make assumptions and then analyze the
aggregative impacts of those assumptions. Click on the Following from http://www.microsoft.com/msft/
FY
2003 Microsoft "What-if?" (193 KB) Do your own forecasting for
Microsoft’s FY 2003 income statements based on your assumptions with this
Excel projection tool --- http://www.microsoft.com/msft/download/PivotTables/What_If.xls
Pivot tables might also be useful for slicing and dicing information about
intangibles. Although Microsoft does not employ this specifically for
analysis of intangibles, the approach used at the following link might be
extended for such purposes:
Financial
History PivotTable (122 KB) Allows you to view and analyze historical
Microsoft financial data. For example, you can look at income statement
line items dating back to 1985 --- http://www.microsoft.com/msft/download/PivotTables/historypivot.xls
Click here to view references on intangibles
FAS 141 and the Question of Value By
PricewaterhouseCoopers CFOdirect Network Newsdesk, January 16, 2003 --- http://www.cfodirect.com/cfopublic.nsf/vContentPrint/CA13B226B214A04085256CB000512D34?OpenDocument
Just as early reactions
to FAS 142 seemed to have overlooked the complexities in reviewing and testing
goodwill for impairment, so too have reactions to complying with the Financial
Accounting Standards Board's Statement No. 141 – Business Combinations.
Adopted and issued at the same time as Statement No. 142 in the summer of
2001, the headline news about FAS 141 was the elimination of the Pooling-of-Interest
accounting method in mergers and acquisitions. Going forward from June 30,
2001, all acquisitions are to be accounted for using one method only – Purchase
Accounting.
This change is significant and one particular aspect of it – the
identification and measurement of intangible assets outside of goodwill
– seems to be somewhat under-appreciated.
Stephen C. Gerard, Managing Director at Standard & Poor's Corporate Value
Consulting, says that there is "general conceptual understanding of
Statement 141 by corporate management and finance teams. But the real impact
will not be felt until the next deal is done." And that deal in FAS 141
parlance will be a "purchase" since "poolings" are no
longer recognized.
Consistent M&A Accounting
The FASB, in issuing Statement No. 141, concluded that "virtually all
business combinations are acquisitions and, thus, all business combinations
should be accounted for in the same way that other asset acquisitions are
accounted for – based on the values exchanged."
In defining how business combinations are to be accounted for, FAS 141
supersedes parts of APB Opinion No. 16. That Opinion allowed companies
involved in a merger or acquisition to use either pooling-of-interest
or purchase accounting. The choice hinged on whether the deal met 12 specified
criteria. If so, pooling-of-interest was required.
Over time, "pooling" became the accounting method of choice,
especially in "mega-deal" transactions. That, in the words of the
FASB, resulted in "…similar business combinations being accounted for
using different methods that produced dramatically different financial
statement results."
FAS 141 seeks to level that playing field and improve M&A financial
reporting by:
- Better
reflecting the investment made in an acquired entity based on the values
exchanged.
- Improving the
comparability of reported financial information on an apples-to-apples
basis.
- Providing more
complete financial information about the assets acquired and liabilities
assumed in business combinations.
- Requiring
disclosure of information on the business strategy and reasons for the
acquisition.
When announcing FAS 141, the FASB wrote: "This Statement requires those
(intangible assets) be recognized as assets apart from goodwill if they meet
one of two criteria – the contractual-legal criterion or the separability
criterion."
Unchanged by the new rule are the fundamentals of purchase accounting and the
purchase price allocation methodology for measuring goodwill: that is,
goodwill represents the amount remaining after allocating the purchase price
to the fair market values of the acquired assets, including recognized
intangibles, and assumed liabilities at the date of the acquisition.
"What has changed," says Steve Gerard, "is the rigor companies
must apply in determining what assets to break out of goodwill and separately
recognize and amortize."
Thus, in an unheralded way, FAS 141 introduces a process of identifying and
placing value on intangible assets that could prove to be a new experience for
many in corporate finance, as well as a costly and time-consuming exercise.
Nonetheless, an exercise critical to compliance with the new rule.
Continued at http://www.cfodirect.com/cfopublic.nsf/vContentPrint/CA13B226B214A04085256CB000512D34?OpenDocument
Intangibles: An Accounting Paradox
Transfer Pricing of Intellectual
Property Rights ---
http://www.buildingipvalue.com/05_TI/031_034.htm
An Accounting Paradox
If you are following the accounting saga
following the implosion of Enron and
Andersen, I strongly recommend the Summer
2002, Volume 21, Number 2 of the Journal
of Accounting and Public Policy --- http://www.elsevier.nl/inca/publications/store/5/0/5/7/2/1/
Enron: An Accounting Perspective
- Reforming corporate governance post Enron: Shareholders' Board of
Trustees and the auditor 97 -- 103
A.R. Abdel-khalik
- Enron: what happened and what we can learn from it pp. 105 -- 127
G.J. Benston, A.L. Hartgraves
- Enron et al.--a comment pp.129 -- 130
J.S. Demski
- Where have all of Enron's intangibles gone? pp.131 -- 135
Baruch Lev
- Enron: sad but inevitable pp.137 -- 145
L. Revsine
- Regulatory competition for low cost-of-capital accounting rules pp.147
-- 149
S. Sunder
Regular Paper
- How are loss contingency accruals affected by alternative reporting
criteria and incentives? pp. 151 -- 167
V.B. Hoffman, J.M. Patton
Question:
Where were Enron's intangible assets? In particular, what was its main
intangible asset that has been overlooked in terms of accounting for
intangibles?
|
Answer by Baruch Lev:
Baruch Lev Quote from Page 131 (from the reference above)
On December 31, 2000, Enron's market value was $75.2 billion,
while its book value (balance sheet equity) was $11.5 billion. The
market-to-book gap of almost $64 billion, while not equal to the value of
intangibles (it reflects, among other things, differences between current and
historical-cost values of physical assets), appears to indicate that Enron had
substantial intangibles just half a year before it started its quick slide to
extinction. This naturally raises the questions: Where are Enron's
intangibles now? And even more troubling: Why did not those intangibles--a
hallmark of modern corporations--prevent the firm's implosion? In
intangibles are "so good", as many believe, why is Enron's situation
"so bad"?
Baruch Lev Quite beginning on Page 133 (from the reference above)
So the answer to the question posed at the opening of this
note--where have Enron's intangible gone?--is a simple one: Nowhere. Enron
did not have substantial intangibles, that is, if hype, glib, and earnings
manipulation did not count as intangibles. Which, of course, also answers
the second question--why did not the intangibles prevent Enron's implosion.
Back to Greenspan's comment about the fragility of
intangibles: "A physical asset, whether an office building or an automotive
assembly plant, has the capability of producing goods even if the reputation of
the managers of such facilities falls under a cloud. The rapidity of
Enron's decline is an effective illustration of the vulnerability of a firm
whose market value largely rests on capitalized reputation."
Intangibles are indeed fragile, more on this later, but "true"
intangibles are not totally dependent on managers' reputation. IBMs
management during the 1980s and early 1990s drove the company close to
bankruptcy, and was completely discredited (though not ethically, as
Enron's). But IBMs intangibles--innovation capabilities and outstanding
services personnel--were not seriously harmed. Indeed, under Lou Gerster's
management (commencing in 1993), IBM made an astounding comeback.
Hypothetically, would a tarnished reputation of Microsoft, Pfizer, or DuPont's
management destroy the ability of these similarly innovative companies to
continuously introduce new products and services and maintain dominant
competitive positions? Of course not. Even when companies collapse,
valuable patents, brands, R&D laboratories, trained employees, and unique
information systems will find eager buyers. Once more, Enron imploded, and
its trading activities "acquired" for change not because its
intangibles were tied to management's reputation, but partly, because it did not
have any valuable intangibles--unique factors of production--that could be used
by successor managers to resuscitate the company and create value.
Finally, to the fragility of intangibles. As I elaborate
elsewhere,3 along with the ability of intangible assets to
create value and growth, comes vulnerability, which emanates from the unique
attributes of these factors of production:
Partial excludability (spillover): The inability of
owners of intangible assets to completely appropriate (prevent non-owners from
enjoying) the benefits of the assets. Patents can be "invented
around", and ultimately expire; trained employees often move to
competitors, and unique organizational structures (e.g., just-in-time
production) are imitated by competitors.
Inherently high risk: Certain intangible investments
(e.g., basic research, franchise building for new products) are riskier than
most physical and financial assets. The majority of drugs under
development do not make it to the market, and most of the billions of dollars
spent by the dotcoms in the late 1990s to build franchise (customer base) were
essentially lost.
Nonmarketability: Market in intangibles are in
infancy, and lack transparency (there are lots of patent licensing deals, for
example, but no details released to the public). Consequently, the
valuation of intangible-intensive enterprises is very difficult (no
"comparables"), and their management challenging.
Intangibles are indeed different than tangible assets, and in
some sense more vulnerable, due to their unique attributes. Their unusual
ability to create value and growth comes at a cost, at both the corporate and
macroeconomy level, as stated by Chairman Greenspan: "The difficulty of
valuing firms that deal primarily with concepts and the growing size and
importance of these firms may make our economy more susceptible to this type of
contagion". Indeed, intangible-intensive firms are "growing in
size and importance", a fact that makes the study of the measurement,
management, and reporting of intangible assets so relevant and exciting,
irrespective of Enron the intangibles-challenged sorry affair.
|
Answer by Bob
Jensen
I have to disagree with Professor Lev with respect his
statement: " Enron
did not have substantial intangibles." I think Enron, like
many other large multinational corporations, invested in a type of
intangible asset that has never been mentioned to my knowledge in the
accounting literature. Enron invested enormously in the intangible
asset of political power and favors. There are really two types of
investments of this nature for U.S. based corporations:
- Investments in bribes and political contributions allowed under
U.S. law, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
- Investments in bribes and political contributions not allowed
under U.S. law, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
I contend that large corporate investment in political power is
sometimes the main intangible asset of the company. This varies by
industry, but political favors are essential in agribusiness,
pharmaceuticals, energy, and various other industries subject to
government regulation and subsidies. Enron took this type of
investment to an extreme in both the U.S. and in many foreign
nations. Many of Enron's investments in political favors appear to
violate the FCPA, but the FCPA is so poorly enforced that it seldom
prevents huge bribes and other types of investments in political
intangibles.
I provide you with several examples below.
Two Examples of Enron's Lost Millions in Political
Intangibles
India
and Mozambique: Enron Invests in U.S. Government Threats
to Cut Off Foreign Aid
SHAMELESS:
1995'S 10 WORST
CORPORATIONS
by
Russell Mokhiber and Andrew Wheat
http://www.essential.org/monitor/hyper/mm1295.04.html
The module about Enron in 1995 reads as follows:
Enron's Political Profit Pipeline
In early 1995, the world's biggest natural gas
company began clearing ground 100 miles south of Bombay, India
for a $2.8 billion, gas-fired power plant -- the largest single foreign
investment in India.
Villagers claimed that the power plant was
overpriced and that its effluent would destroy their fisheries and coconut
and mango trees. One villager opposing Enron put it succinctly, "Why
not remove them before they remove us?"
As Pratap Chatterjee reported ["Enron Deal
Blows a Fuse," Multinational Monitor, July/August 1995],
hundreds of villagers stormed the site that was being prepared for Enron's
2,015-megawatt plant in May 1995, injuring numerous construction workers and
three foreign advisers.
After winning Maharashtra state elections, the
conservative nationalistic Bharatiya Janata Party canceled the deal, sending
shock waves through Western businesses with investments in India.
Maharashtra officials said they acted to prevent
the Houston, Texas-based company from making huge profits off "the
backs of India's poor." New Delhi's Hindustan Times
editorialized in June 1995, "It is time the West realized that India is
not a banana republic which has to dance to the tune of
multinationals."
Enron officials are not so sure. Hoping to convert
the cancellation into a temporary setback, the company launched an all-out
campaign to get the deal back on track. In late November 1995, the campaign
was showing signs of success, although progress was taking a toll on the
handsome rate of return that Enron landed in the first deal. In India, Enron
is now being scrutinized by the public, which is demanding contracts
reflecting market rates. But it's a big world.
In November 1995, the company announced that it has
signed a $700 million deal to build a gas pipeline from Mozambique to South
Africa. The pipeline will service Mozambique's Pande gas field, which will
produce an estimated two trillion cubic feet of gas.
The deal, in which Enron beat out South Africa's
state petroleum company Sasol, sparked controversy in Africa following
reports that the Clinton administration, including the U.S. Agency for
International Development, the U.S. Embassy and even National Security
adviser Anthony Lake, lobbied Mozambique on behalf of Enron.
"There were outright threats to withhold
development funds if we didn't sign, and sign soon," John Kachamila,
Mozambique's natural resources minister, told the Houston Chronicle. Enron
spokesperson Diane Bazelides declined to comment on the these allegations,
but said that the U.S. government had been "helpful as it always is
with American companies." Spokesperson Carol Hensley declined to
respond to a hypothetical question about whether or not Enron would approve
of U.S. government threats to cut off aid to a developing nation if the
country did not sign an Enron deal.
Enron has been repeatedly criticized for relying on
political clout rather than low bids to win contracts. Political
heavyweights that Enron has engaged on its behalf include former U.S.
Secretary of State James Baker, former U.S. Commerce Secretary Robert
Mosbacher and retired General Thomas Kelly, U.S. chief of operations in the
1990 Gulf War. Enron's Board includes former Commodities Futures Trading
Commission Chair Wendy Gramm (wife of presidential hopeful Senator Phil
Gramm, R-Texas), former U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary Charles Walker and
John Wakeham, leader of the House of Lords and former U.K. Energy Secretary.
|
|
United States
Deregulation of Energy That Needed a Change in the Law:
Enron's Investment in Wendy Gramm
Forwarded by Dick Haar on February 11, 2002
Senator
Joseph Leiberman
706 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510
RE:
Enron Investigation
Dear
Senator Leiberman,
I
watched your Sunday morning appearance on Face the
Nation with intense interest. Inasmuch as I own a
fair amount of Enron stock in my SEP/IRA, I'm sure
you can understand my curiosity relative to your
investigation.
Knowing
you to be an honorable man, I feel secure that you
will diligently pursue the below listed matters in
an effort to determine what part, if any, these
matters contributed to the collapse of Enron.
1.
Government records reveal the awarding of seats to
Enron executives and Ken Lay on four Energy
Department trade missions and seven Commerce
Department trade trips during the Clinton
administration's eight years.
a.
From January 13, 1995 through June 1996, Clinton
Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and White House Counsel
Mack McLarty assisted Ken Lay in closing a $3
billion dollar power plant deal with India. Four
days before India gave final approval to the deal,
Enron gave $100,000 to the DNC. Any quid pro quo?
b.
Clinton National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake,
threatened to withhold aid to Mozambique if it
didn't approve an Enron pipeline project. Subsequent
to Mr. Lake's threats, Mozambique approved the
project, which resulted in a further $770 million
dollar electric power contract with Enron. Perhaps,
if NSA Advisor Lake had not been so busy
strong-arming for Enron, he might have been focused
on something obliquely related to national security
like, say, Mr. Bin Laden? Could it be that a
different, somewhat related, investigation is
warranted?
c.
In 1999, Clinton Energy Secretary Bill Richardson
traveled to Nigeria and helped arrange a joint,
varied, energy development program which resulted in
$882 million in power contracts for Enron from
Nigeria. Perhaps if Energy Scretary Richardson had
been more focused on domestic energy, we might have
avoided:
i.
The severe loss of nuclear secrets to China and
concurrently ii. developed more domestic sources of
energy.
d.
Subsequent to leaving Clinton White House employ,
Enron hired Mack McLarty (White House Counsel),
Betsy Moler (Deputy Energy Secretary) and Linda
Robertson (Treasury Official). Even a person without
a high school diploma (no disrespect to airline
security screeners) can see that this looks like
Enron paying off political favors with fat-cat
corporate jobs, at the expense of stockholders and
Enron pension employees.
e.
Democratic Mayor Lee P. Brown of Houston (Enron
headquarter city), received $250,000 just before
Enron filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Isn't that an
awful lot of money to throw away right before
bankruptcy?
The
Democratic National Committee was the recipient of
hundreds of thousands of dollars from 1990 through
2000. The above matters appear to be very troubling
and look like, smack of, reek of, political favors
for campaign payoffs. I know you will find out.
2.
Recently, former Clinton Treasury Secretary Robert
Rubin called a top U. S. Treasury official, asking
on Enron's behalf, for government help with credit
agencies. As you well know, Rubin is the chairman of
executive committee at Citigroup, which just
coincidentally, is Enron's largest unsecured
creditor at an estimated $3 billion dollars.
3.
As you well know, Mr. Leiberman, Citigroup is
Senator Tom Daschle's largest contributor ($50,000)
in addition to being your single largest contributor
($112,546). This fact brings to mind some disturbing
questions I feel you must answer.
a.
Have you, any member of your staff, any Senate or
House colleagues, any relatives or any friends of
yours, been asked by Citigroup to intercede on their
behalf, in an effort to recover part or all of
Citigroup's $3 billion, at the expense of Enron's
shareholders, employees and or Enron pensioners?
b.
Did your largest contributor, Citigroup, have
anything to do with the collapse of Enron?
c.
Enron has tens of thousands of employees,
stockholders and pensioners who have lost their life
savings. How will you answer their most obvious
question? Do you represent Citigroup, your largest
contributor, or do you represent the Enron
employees, et al, who stand to lose if Citigroup
recovers any of its $3 billion?
During
Sunday's Face the Nation, both you and Senator
McCain praised Attorney General Ashcroft for
recusing himself from the Justice Department
investigation because he had once received a
contribution from Enron. I know in my heart, that,
being the honest gentleman you are, you will now
recuse yourself because of the glaring conflict of
interest described above. I also know that you will
pass this letter to your successor for his or her
attention.
Very
truly yours,
Robert
Theodore Knalur
|
|
Also see: "Where Was Enron Getting
a Return for Its Political Bribes?" at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#bribes
The extent to which Enron's investments and alleged investments in
current and future political favors actually resulted in political
favors will never be known. Clearly, Enron invested in some
enormous projects such as the $3 billion power plant in India knowing
full well that the investment would be a total loss without Indian
taxpayer subsidies. Industry in India just could not pay the
forward contract gas rates needed to run the plant.
Enron executives intended that purchased political influence would
make it one of the largest and most profitable companies in the
world. In the case of India, the power plant became a total loss,
because the tragedy of the September 11 terror made the U.S. dependent
upon India in its war against the Taliban. Even if the White House
leaders had been inclined to muscle the Indian government to subsidize
power generated from the new Enron plant in India, the September 11
tragedy destroyed Enron's investment in political intangibles and
its hopes to fire up its $3 billion gas-fired power plant in
India. The White House had greater immediate need for India's full
support in the war against the Taliban.
The point here is not whether Enron money spent for political favors
did or did not actually result in favors. The point is that to the
extent that any company or wealthy employees invest heavily for future
political favors, they have invested in an intangible asset and have
taken on the intangible risk of loss of reputation and money if some of
these investments become discovered and publicized in the media.
In fact, discovery and disclosure will set government officials
scurrying to avoid being linked to political payoffs.
Enron is a prime example of a major corporation focused almost
entirely upon turning political favors into revenues, especially in the
areas of energy trading and foreign power plant construction. As
such, these investments are extremely high risk.
It is doubtful that political intangibles will ever be disclosed or
accounted for except in the case of bankruptcy or other media frenzies
like the Enron media frenzies.
Question:
Accountants and auditors face an enormous task of disclosing and
accounting for political intangibles.
Answer:
Because disclosures and accounting of political intangibles will likely
destroy their value. Generally, accounting for assets does not
destroy those assets. This is not the case for many types of
political intangibles that cost millions upon millions of dollars in
corporations.
August 28, 2002 reply from Craig Polhemus
[Joedpo@AOL.COM]
-----Original
Message-----
From: Craig Polhemus [mailto:Joedpo@AOL.COM]
Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2002 1:55
AM
To: AECM@LISTSERV.LOYOLA.EDU
Subject: Re: An Accounting Paradox: When
will accounting for an asset destroy the
asset?
Bob
Jensen writes:
<<Question:
Accountants and auditors face an enormous
task of disclosing and accounting for
political intangibles.
Answer:
Because disclosures and accounting of
political intangibles will likely destroy
their value. Generally, accounting for
assets does not destroy those assets. This
is not the case for many types of
political intangibles that cost millions
upon millions of dollars in
corporations.>>
Interesting.
There are many instances where the reverse
is true -- the marketing value to a
lobbying firm of having made large
contributions to the winning candidates
(of whatever party) is greatest where it
is well known. This applies regardless
whether the contributions came from
individual partners or (at least in those
states where it's legal for state and
local elections) from the firm itself.
Even
on a local level, if you're in a
jurisdiction where judges are elected,
would you prefer to go to a lawyer who
contributed to the successful judge or to
one who did not? I have a friend who asks
this question directly whenever he's
seeking local counsel. And if you're that
lawyer, do you want that contribution to
be secret or as public as possible? Maybe
even exaggerated?
Dita
Beard is a classic example -- her initial
"puffery" [whether truthful,
partially truthful, or entirely false]
about getting the IT&T antitrust case
dropped based on a pledge of IT&T
funding to support moving the 1972
Republican National Convention to Miami
was a marketing aid to her ONLY if she let
it be known, at least to her clients and
potential clients.
Similarly,
Ed Rollins writes of a foreign
"contributor" who apparently
passed a million in cash to a middleman
and thought it made it to the Reagan
re-election campaign. Rollins believes the
middleman (an unnamed Washington lawyer,
by the way) held on to it all but the
"contributor" felt he'd
purchased access, and certainly the
middleman benefited not just financially
but also from the contributor's belief
that the middleman had provided direct
access to the campaign and hence the
Administration.
I
express no opinion on how such things
should be recorded in financial statements
-- I'm just pointing out that publicity
about large political contributions to
successful candidates (whether within or
exceeding legal limits) can be positive
for some businesses, such as lobbying
firms.
Craig
[Craig Polhemus,
Association Vitality International]
August 28, 2002 reply from Bob
Jensen
Great
to hear from you Craig.
I
agree that sometimes the accounting and/or
media disclosure of investments in political
favors may increase the value of those
investments. Or it may have a neutral effect
in some industries like agribusiness and oil
where the public has come to expect that
members of Congress and/or the Senate are
heavily dependent upon those industries for
election to office and maintenance of their
power.
On
the other hand, it is unlikely that
accounting and media disclosure of the Enron
investments in political favors, including
the favors of linking foreign aid payments
to Enron's business deals, would have either
a positive or neutral impact upon the
expected value of those political favors to
Enron.
It
is most certain that accounting and media
disclosure political investments that are
likely to violate the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act would deal a severe blow to
the value of those intangible assets.
Thanks,
Bob Jensen
August 28 reply
from mark-eckman@att.net
I think companies have invested a great deal in
political intangibles outside the arena of government. Consider the
current discussions on the importance of expensing stock option
expensing as an example. Views are strong and vary widely on the issue
but clearly, these positions exist only to gain visibility and increase
political pressure.
On the side that believes CPA stands for 'can't
prove anything' we find the speech to the Stanford Director's College on
June 3, 2002 by T. J. Rodgers, CEO of Cypress. Mr. Rodgers refers to
expensing options as "...the next mistake..." and refers to
"...accounting theology vs. business reality...." He opposes
the Levin- McCain proposal and recounts the story you have on your
website of the 1994 political storm in Silicon Valley when the FASB
proposed expensing options. He believes that the free market will
eliminate any abuse of option accounting. Contrast that with the
opposition represented in the July 24, 2002 letter to CEOs from John
Biggs at TIAA-CREF. Mr. Biggs also derides the profession by labeling
APB 25 as an "...archaic method..." and that its use has the
effect of “…eroding the quality of earnings…” by encouraging
“…the use of one form of compensation.” Mr. Biggs completes his
letter by equating option expensing to management credibility. Both of
these men have made political investments with their comments, drawing
lines in the sand. While the remarks were not made directly to any
political body, and there is no tangible cost involved, this is still
political pressure. It is also interesting both men focus on the
accounting profession as the root cause rather than the value of the
political intangibles that exist only in market capitalization.
Consider how companies build political
intangibles with analysts, institutional shareholders and others. ADP
had an extended string of increased quarterly earnings – over 100
consecutive quarters. The PE multiple for the stock has been high for
some time, due in no small part to the consistency of this trend. ADP
management reminded shareholders with every quarter how long they had
provided shareholders with higher earnings. When that streak recently
ended, the stock dropped like a stone. Closing price moved down from
$41.35 on July 17, 2002 to $31.60 the next day. The volume associated
with that change was almost nine times the July 16 trading volume. How
would anyone explain this event other than a reversal of political
intangibles that did not exist on the financial statements?
Power and politics are always with us. We just
have to be smart enough to know which is for show and which is for $$$.
(By the way, if you have a way to tell them apart, let me know.)
August 28
reply from E. Scribner
[escribne@NMSU.EDU]
Hi,
Bob and Craig!
You've discovered an
accounting
application of
Heisenberg's
uncertainty
principle, which
originated with the
notion that to
"see" an
electron's position
we have to
"illuminate"
it, which causes it
to shift its
position so it's not
"there"
any more. To quote
from the American
Insitutute of Physics
( http://www.aip.org/history/heisenberg/p08b.htm
), "At the
moment the light is
diffracted by the
electron into the
microscope lens, the
electron is thrust
to the right."
When
we
"illuminate"
political
intangibles by
disclosing them,
they are not
"there"
any more.
Ed
Scribner
New Mexico State
University
Las Cruces,
NM, USA -----
August 28, 2002 Reply from Bob
Jensen
Heisenberg's
Theory Song
"My get up and go
got up an went." http://www.eakles.com/get_up_go.html
August 28, 2002 reply from Richard C. Sansing [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
There is an extensive literature on the
economics of information. The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information
by Jack Hirshleifer and John Riley is a good survey. Chapters 6 (The
economics of emergent public information) and 7 (Research and
invention) address the issues of the value of private information and
the effects of disclosure on its value.
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle both
"originated" and (for practical purposes) terminated with
the behavior of electrons and other sub-atomic particles. It applies
to the joint indeterminacy of the position and momentum of electrons.
It is only significant at the atomic level because Planck's constant
is so small.
Richard C. Sansing
Associate Professor of Business Administration
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
email: Richard.C.Sansing@dartmouth.edu
|
Accounting for Options to Buy Real Estate
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on July 14, 2006
TITLE: Land-Value Erosion Seen As a Problem for Builders
REPORTER: by Michael Corkery and Ian McDonald
DATE: Jul 06, 2006
PAGE: C1
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115214204821498941.html
TOPICS: Accounting, Advanced Financial Accounting, Impairment, Investments
SUMMARY: "Land values are becoming a flash point for investors and analysts
who watch the builders sector. Bears say the companies' land might not be worth
what they paid for it, which could lead to painful write-downs. If they are
right, it will be a blow to the already battered sector." Questions relate to
the classification of land on building companies' balance sheets and the
treatment of the write-down of the value of land.
QUESTIONS:
1.) As an example of the type of building company discussed in this article,
view the quarterly financial statements for Toll Brothers in their 10-Q filing
with the SEC dated July 6, 2006. You may go directly through the following link
or may access through the WSJ article on-line by clicking on Toll Brothers on
the right-hand side of the page then SEC filings.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/794170/000112528206003278/p413541-10q.htm
In what account does Toll Brothers classify Land on its balance sheet? Why is
the Land classified this way?
2.) Refer again to the Toll Brothers financial statements. By how much did
Toll Brothers write down the values of land during the 6-month and 3-month
periods ended on April 30, 2006 and 2005? Describe in words, the pattern of
write-downs that you observe and compare it to the discussion given in the
article.
3.) How will adjustments to reflect decline in land values affect reported
income and balance sheets of companies such as Toll Brothers, which hold land as
inventory and a major component of their operations? How might these adjustments
affect the company's stock price? Refer to information in the article in
providing your answer.
4.) Compare and contrast the accounting for land and recent decline in the
market value of land described in question 2 above, to accounting by a company,
such as a manufacturer or service entity, which owns land only in the location
of its principal place of business (that is, as part of property, plant, and
equipment).
5.) Explain why the accounting differs under the two answers given to
questions 2 and 3 above.
6.) What are options? What type of option contracts do builders enter into?
How much has Toll Brothers paid to enter into such contracts?
7.) What is the book value of net assets? How is that measure used by
analysts of companies in the building industry? How might the recent decline in
land values affect the usefulness of book value for analyzing financial
statements?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"Land-Value Erosion Seen As a Problem for Builders," by Michael Corkery and
Ian McDonald, The Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2006; Page C1 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115214204821498941.html
Already reeling from slowing housing sales and
worries about the economy, shares of home builders face another issue: the
value of the land on their books.
Land values are becoming a flash point for
investors and analysts who watch the builders sector. Bears say the
companies' land might not be worth what they paid for it, which could lead
to painful write-downs.
If they are right, it will be a blow to the already
battered sector. After a 28% average fall so far this year, many stocks of
home builders trade close to -- or even at -- their "book value,'' which
makes them tantalizing to bargain hunters. Book value is a company's assets
minus its liabilities and is often seen as a rough approximation of how a
business would be valued if liquidated.
But if some land on builders' books is overvalued,
their shares might also be overvalued.
"People are looking at book value as a possible
floor for the stock prices. The question is 'should that be a floor?' There
could be some risk to that book value from land recently acquired or put
under option contract," says Banc of America Securities analyst Daniel
Oppenheim, whose firm does business with several builders.
The debate is lively because the true extent of the
land risk is tough to quantify. Many builders use options, where they put a
deposit on a parcel to be purchased at a later date. Builders say options
minimize their losses because they let them walk away from overpriced land,
sacrificing typically no more than a 5% to 10% deposit.
So far, the damage has been limited. In its last
quarter, Centex Corp., a large builder based in Dallas, reduced its earnings
by 14 cents a share in connection with walking away from option deposits and
pre-acquisition costs in Washington, D.C., Sacramento, Calif., and San
Diego. Last month, Hovnanian Enterprises Inc., based in Red Bank, N.J., said
it plans to take $5 million in write-offs on land deposits, a small
percentage of its total, and luxury home builder Toll Brothers Inc. in
suburban Philadelphia wrote down roughly $12 million, mainly from land that
it owned in the sluggish Detroit market. Builders say they often adjust
their land values to the market, even in boom times, but some analysts
expect charges to increase.
Write-downs are "starting to happen,'' says Credit
Suisse analyst Ivy Zelman, a longtime bear on the sector whose firm does
business with several builders. "I don't think you can define what [the
scope] is today and capture the risk."
Parcels are valued at their purchase price on
companies' books, so there isn't any way of determining the land's true
market value until they sell houses on it. Older purchases are likely worth
far more than their listed value on balance sheets, but newer land buys are
probably worth less. Many builders say land prices are still fairly static,
but Jeff Barcy, chief executive of Hearthstone, a large land investor based
in San Rafael, Calif., says prices are declining in certain markets.
"We expect the softening to continue for a while,"
Mr. Barcy says. "In the hottest markets you could see a 20% to 30% price
decline."
Ms. Zelman estimates that many companies are
building houses on land that they bought or optioned a few years ago when
land was less expensive. But some analysts say many companies purchased
large amounts of land in 2005, at the height of the boom, and that could
come back to hurt them if the housing market doesn't improve in a year or
so.
Some think these worries are overblown and creating
an opportunity. Bulls acknowledge there may be scattered write-downs, but
say undervalued land on company books likely outweighs any overpriced recent
buys. They add that the sector's worries, from property values to job
growth, are reflected in the stocks' prices. And they say home prices have
to drop significantly to sink land values. Fans of the builder stocks also
point to a flurry of recent share repurchases, indicating that insiders
believe the stocks are cheap. NVR Inc., for example, has reduced its shares
outstanding by more than 20% over the past five years, according to
researcher CapitalIQ.
Shares of the nation's five biggest home builders
trade at about 1.3 times the their book value, compared with two times book
on average over the past five years, according to Chicago researcher
Morningstar Inc. The average U.S. stock trades at more than four times its
book value.
Pulte Homes Inc. and Beazer Homes USA Inc. trade at
about 1.2 times book, while shares of M.D.C. Holdings Inc. trade at 1.1
times and shares of Standard Pacific Corp. trade at about book value.
Home builders always have had a hard time getting
respect on Wall Street, where investors often take a short-term view of the
sector's performance potential. "The adage has been 'buy them at book value
and sell when they get to two times book value,'" says Arthur Oduma, a
senior stock analyst who covers the home builders at Morningstar. "So, that
would tell you it's time to buy."
And some are doing so. Henry Ramallo, a portfolio
manager at Neuberger Berman, a Lehman Brothers company, with $116 billion
under management, says he likes Toll Brothers because it takes the company
about five years, on average, to develop land from the time the builder puts
it under option. By the time Toll is ready to build on the land it optioned
or bought in the past year, the housing market should have improved, Mr.
Ramallo says. His firm has recently bought shares of Toll, which is trading
at about 1.3 times book value.
The Controversy over Accounting for Securitizations
and Loan Guarantees
Accounting for Loan Guarantees
FASB Issues Accounting Guidance to
Improve Disclosure Requirements for Guarantees --- http://www.fasb.org/news/nr112502.shtml
Accounting and Auditing Policy
Committee Credit Reform Task Force --- http://www.fasab.gov/aapc/cdreform/98CR01Recpts.pdf
The new FAS 146 Interpretation 46 deals
with loan guarantees of Variable Interest (Special Purpose) Entities --- at:
http://www.fasb.org/interp46.pdf.
From The Wall Street
Journal Accounting Educators' Review on November 15, 2002
TITLE: H&R Block's Mortgage-Lending
Business Could Be Taxing
REPORTER: Joseph T. Hallinan
DATE: Nov 12, 2002
PAGE: C1
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB103706997739674188.djm,00.html
TOPICS: Accounting, Bad Debts, Cash Flow, Debt, Loan Loss Allowance,
Securitization, Valuations
SUMMARY: H&R Block's pretax income
from mortgage operations grew by 146% during the fiscal year ending April 30,
2002. However, the accounting treatment for the securitization of these
mortgages is being questioned.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Describe the accounting treatment used by H&R Block for the sale of
mortgages. Why is this accounting treatment controversial?
2.) What alternative accounting methods
are available to record H&R Block's sale of mortgages? Discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of each accounting treatment. Which accounting
method is most conservative?
3.) Why do companies, such as H&R
Block, sell mortgages? Why does H&R Block retain the risks of non-payment?
How could the sale be structured to transfer the risks of non-payment to the
purchaser of the mortgages? How would this change the selling price of the
mortgages? Support your answer.
4.) How do economic conditions change
the expected losses that will result from non-payment? How does the credit
worthiness of borrowers change the expected losses that will result from
non-payment? Support your answers.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University
of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
"H&R
Block Faces Issues With Mortgage Business," by Joseph T. Hallinan, The Wall
Street Journal, November 12, 2002, Page C1 ---- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB103706997739674188.djm,00.html
Famous
for its tax-preparation service, H&R
Block Inc. last year prepared 16.9 million individual income-tax returns,
or about 14% of all individual returns filed with the Internal Revenue
Service.
But the
fastest-growing money maker for the Kansas City, Mo., company these days is
its mortgage business, which last year originated nearly $11.5 billion in
loans. The business, which caters to poor credit risks, has been growing much
faster than its U.S. tax business. In the fiscal year ended April 30, Block's
pretax income from mortgage operations grew 146% over the year before. The tax
business, while still the largest in the U.S., grew just 23%.
If
those rates remain unchanged, the mortgage business will this year for the
first time provide most of Block's pretax income. In the most-recent fiscal
year, mortgage operations accounted for 47.3% of Block's pretax income.
As
Block's mortgage business has soared, so has its stock price, topping $53 a
share earlier this year from less than $15 two years ago, though it has
dropped in recent months as investors have fretted about the cost of lawsuits
in federal court in Chicago and state court in Texas on behalf of tax clients
who received refund-anticipation loans. But now, some investors and analysts
are raising questions about the foundation beneath Block's mortgage earnings.
"The game is up if interest rates rise and shut off the refinancing
boom," says Avalon Research Group Inc., of Boca Raton, Fla., which has a
"sell" rating on Block's shares.
On
Monday, the shares were up $1.53, or 4.8%, to $33.63 in 4 p.m. New York Stock
Exchange composite trading -- a partial snapback from a $3.25, or 11%, drop on
Friday in reaction to the litigation in Texas over fees H&R Block
collected from customers in that state.
The
company dismisses concerns about its mortgage results. "We think it's a
great time for our business right now," says Robert Dubrish, president
and CEO of Block's mortgage unit, Option One Mortgage Corp.
Much of
Block's mortgage growth has come because the company uses a fairly common but
controversial accounting treatment that allows it to accelerate revenue, and
thus income. This treatment, known as gain-on-sale accounting, has come back
to haunt other lenders, including Conseco Inc. and AmeriCredit
Corp. At Block, gains from sales of mortgage loans accounted for 62% of
revenue at the mortgage unit last year.
In
essence, under gain-on-sale accounting, lenders post upfront the estimated
profit from a securitization transaction, which is the sale to investors of a
pool of loans. Specifically, the company selling the loans records profit for
the excess of the sales price and the present value of the estimated interest
income that is expected to be received on the loans above the amounts funded
on the loans and the present value of the interest agreed to be paid to the
buyers of the loan-backed securities.
But if
the expected income stream is cut short -- say, because more borrowers
refinance their loans than expected when the profit was calculated -- the
company essentially has to reverse some of the gain, taking a charge.
That is
what happened at Conseco. The Carmel, Ind., mobile-home lender was forced to
take a $350 million charge in 1998 after many of its loans were paid off
early. It stopped using gain-on-sale accounting the following year, saying
that the "clear preference" of investors was traditional loan
accounting. AmeriCredit in Fort Worth, Texas, which lends money to car buyers
with poor credit histories, abandoned the practice in September in the midst
of a meltdown of its stock price.
But
Block says it faces nowhere near the downside faced by AmeriCredit and Conseco,
which it says had different business models. Big Block holders seem to agree.
"Block doesn't have anywhere near the scale of exposure [to gain on sale]
that the other companies had," says Henry Berghoef, co-manager of the
Oakmark Select mutual fund, which owns 7.7 million, or about 4.3%, of Block's
shares.
Another
potential problem for Block is the way it treats what is left after it sells
its loans. The bits and pieces that it keeps are known as residual interests.
Block securitizes most of these residual interests, allowing it to accelerate
a significant portion of the cash flow it expects to receive rather than
taking it over the life of the underlying loans. The fair value of these
interests is calculated by Block considering a number of factors, such as
expected losses on its loans. If Block guesses wrong, it could be forced to
take a charge down the road.
Block
says its assumptions underlying the valuation of these interests are
appropriately conservative. It estimates lifetime losses on its loan pools at
roughly 5%, which it says is one percentage point higher than the 4% turned in
by its worst-performing pool of loans. (Comparable industry figures aren't
available.) So Block says the odds of a write-up are much greater than those
of a write-down and would, in a worst-case scenario that it terms
"remote," probably not exceed $500 million. Block's net income for
the fiscal year ended April 30 was $434.4 million, or $2.31 a share, on
revenue of $3.32 billion.
Block
spokeswoman Linda McDougall says gain-on-sale provides an
"insignificant" part of the company's revenue. She notes that Option
One, Block's mortgage unit, recently increased the value of its residual
interest by $57 million. She also says that the company's underwriting
standards are typical of lenders who deal with borrowers lacking pristine
credit histories.
Bears
contend that Block has limited experience in the mortgage business. It bought
Option One in 1997, and Option One in Irvine, Calif., has itself been in
business only since 1993. So its track record doesn't extend to the last
recession of 1990 to 1991.
On top
of that, Block lends to some of the least creditworthy people, known in the
trade as "subprime" borrowers. There is no commonly accepted
definition of what constitutes a subprime borrower. One shorthand measure is
available from credit-reports firm Fair, Isaac & Co. It produces so-called
FICO scores that range from 300 to 850, with 850 being perfect. Anything less
than 660 is usually considered subprime. Securities and Exchange Commission
documents filed by Block's mortgage unit show its borrowers typically score
around 600. Moreover, according to the filings, hundreds of recent Block
customers, representing about 4% of borrowers, have FICO scores of 500 or
less, or no score at all. A score below 500 would place an applicant among the
bottom 5% of all U.S. consumers scored by Fair Isaac.
Mr.
Dubrish says Block stopped lending to people with FICO scores below 500 some
two years ago and says he is puzzled as to why those with scores below 500
still appear in the company's loan pools.
Block
says its loans typically don't meet the credit standards set by Fannie Mae or
Freddie Mac, which are the lending industry's norms. Block's customers may
qualify for loans even if they have experienced a bankruptcy in the previous
12 months, according to underwriting guidelines it lists in the SEC documents.
In many
cases, according to Block's SEC filings, an applicant's income isn't verified
but is instead taken as stated on the loan application. In other cases, an
applicant with a poor credit rating may receive an upgraded rating, depending
on factors including "pride of ownership." Most Block mortgages are
for single-family detached homes, but Block also makes mobile-home loans,
according to the filings.
"We
are doing a lot to help people own houses who wouldn't have the chance to do
it otherwise," Mr. Dubrish says. "We think we're doing something
that's good for the economy and good for our borrowers."
A key
figure in the mortgage business is the ratio of loan size to value of the
property being mortgaged. Loans with LTV rates above 80% are thought to
present a greater risk of loss. The LTV on many of Block's mortgages is just
under 80%, according to the SEC filings. The value of these properties can be
important if Block is forced to foreclose on the loans and resell the
properties. Nationwide, roughly 4.17% of subprime mortgage loans are in
foreclosure, according to LoanPerformance, a research firm in San Francisco.
As of June 30, only 3.52% of Block's loans, on a dollar basis, were in
foreclosure, even though its foreclosure ratio more than tripled between Dec.
31, 1999, and June 30.
The Controversy Over Pro Forma
Reporting and HFV
Up Up and Away in My Beautiful Pro Forma
"Creative Accounting Leads to Fuzzy Earns," SmartPros, December 27,
2005 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x51147.xml
Dec. 27, 2005 (Associated Press) — If it weren't
for some pesky accounting rules, telecom-equipment company Ciena Corp. would
have lost a mere 2 cents a share in the fourth quarter. With those
accounting rules, it lost 44 cents a share.
The disparity is "the GAAP Gap" - the difference
between "pro forma" earnings and earnings prepared according to Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles, or GAAP.
GAAP is the nation's accounting standard. Pro forma
earnings, by contrast, are governed by no fixed standard. Companies can toss
out one-time charges, options expenses, goodwill write-downs - anything that
looks bad. One-time windfalls, however, usually manage to stay in.
Merrill Lynch's U.S. Strategist Richard Bernstein
did the math on 1,600 stocks and found total earnings for their third
calendar quarter grew 22 percent on a GAAP basis, but 31 percent on a pro
forma basis.
The gap was greater when the companies were
subdivided by Standard & Poor's quality rankings. S&P grades stocks on their
annual sales and dividend growth and actual earnings over a 10-year period.
A company with very stable growth would rank "A+," while a company in
bankruptcy would be a "D."
"Lower quality companies are dramatically
overstating their growth rates by using pro forma earnings," Bernstein wrote
in a December 19 research report.
Companies with a B- ranking have a GAAP growth rate
of 1 percent, but a pro forma growth rate of 38 percent, according to
Bernstein. B+ companies are more than doubling their growth rate: GAAP
growth is 13 percent, but pro forma growth is 27 percent.
Part of the problem, according to Bernstein, is
that most post-bubble regulations focus on the quality of formal financial
reporting, but "there appears to be no regulation" covering earnings
conference calls and press releases.
"Although the newer regulation is laudable, stocks
trade on press releases and conference calls, and not on the formal
financial statements that are released weeks after the announcement and
call," he wrote. "We think regulation regarding company press releases and
conference calls is sorely needed because of the significant deterioration
in the quality of announced earnings."
He calls for an end to pro forma earnings, saying
they have made U.S. corporate earnings perhaps the most opaque they've been
in his 23 years in the business.
Continued in article
Compilation and Review Standards Change
As opposed to a formal audit, many accountants perform compilation and
review services to generate unaudited financial statements for a client.
There is a new standard for these two services.
According to SSARS, compilations and reviews are
restricted to historical financial statements, even though clients often ask
their accountants to provide financial statement elements and pro forma
financial information. Michael Glynn, technical manager at the AICPA, reports on
newly adopted standards allowing accountants to report on those financial
statement elements or pro forma financial information under SSARS.
"Compilations & Reviews New Standards," SmartPros, October 2005 ---
http://education.smartpros.com/main1/extcoursedetail.asp?PartnerRed=accountingnet&CatalogNumber=APP515
GAAP vs. Non-GAAP Earnings
"Investors Applaud Oracle’s Non-GAAP Earnings," AccountingWeb, July
1. 2005 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=101064
SOX Regulation G, which went into effect in March
2003, defines non-GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) financial
measures and creates disclosure standards for them. According to Strategic
Finance magazine, the guidelines for non-GAAP financial measures stipulate
that they may not:
- Be given prominence over GAAP numbers
- Exclude any charges or liabilities requiring
cash settlement from non-GAAP liquidity measures
- Be inserted into GAAP financial statements or
accompanying notes. It should be noted that the June 29 announcement of
fiscal 2005 Q4 GAAP and non-GAAP earnings, revenues and net income
appears to adhere to all the SOX guidelines. Also, Oracle’s statements
provide more detail than most company reports according to MarketWatch.
“The rapid integration of PeopleSoft into our
business contributed to the strong growth in both applications sales and
profits that we saw in the quarter,” Oracle President Safra Catz said in a
written statement. “The combination of increased organic growth plus a
carefully targeted acquisition strategy have pushed Oracle’s revenue and
profits to record levels.”
"Little Bitty Cisco," by Jesse Eisinger, The Wall Street Journal,
November 6, 2003 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB106806983279057200,00.html?mod=technology%255Ffeatured%255Fstories%255Fhs
The way Wall Street eyes these things, including the
liberal use of the words "pro forma," Cisco had an impressive fiscal
first quarter.
Revenue came in better than expected and grew 5.3%
compared with a year ago, topping expectations of a flat top-line thanks in
part to spending from the federal government (see article). How impressive is
this? Well, the country's economy grew at 7.2%, and business spending on
equipment and software rose 15%. Microsoft had revenue growth of 6%, IBM 8.6%,
and Dell is estimated to come in at 15% growth. So Cisco Systems, one of the
big tech dogs, looks like the runt of that particular litter. Is networking a
growth industry anymore, or is it doomed to be troubled by overcapacity and a
lack of business demand? The next few quarters are crucial.
Earnings per share -- that is, pro forma earnings per
share -- easily surpassed estimates, logging in at 17 cents a share, compared
with the expectation of 15 cents a share and last year's 14 cents.
The company's shareholder equity fell in the quarter
to $27.4 billion from $28 billion a year ago. Cash flow from operations fell
to $973 million from $1.1 billion a year earlier. Cash on hand and investments
fell from $20.7 billion to $19.7 billion, which is still mountainous but lower
year-over-year, nevertheless.
Then there is the gross-margin story. Cisco has had
Himalayan gross margins throughout the slowdown, because it was able to
squeeze suppliers and find efficiencies. But now that revenue is finally
increasing, gross margins fell. Product gross margins came in at 69%, down
from 71% in the fourth quarter. Cisco is selling less profitable products,
including some from its recent acquisition of Linksys. It also has outsourced
much of its production. How much operating leverage does Cisco now have? That
is the reason it sports its high valuation, after all.
Then there is the outlook. Deferred revenue and
backlog were down. Cisco's book-to-bill ratio, a measure that reflects order
momentum, was below one. When book-to-bill is below one, orders are lower than
billings, suggesting a slowdown, not acceleration. True, Cisco put out a
forecast for modestly higher revenue for the second quarter compared with the
first. But some questions should linger.
Question: How does former Enron
CEO Jeff Skilling define HFV?
Home Video Uncovered by the Houston Chronicle, December 19, 2002
Skits for Enron ex-executive funny then, but full of
irony now --- http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/metropolitan/1703624
(The above link includes a "See it Now" link to download
the video itself which played well for me.)
The tape, made for
the January 1997 going-away party for former Enron President Rich Kinder,
features nearly 30 minutes of absurd skits, songs and testimonials by company
executives and prominent Houstonians. The collection is all meant in good fun,
but some of the comments are ironic in the current climate of corporate
scandal.
In one skit, former
administrative executive Peggy Menchaca plays the part of Kinder as he
receives a budget report from then-President Jeff Skilling, who plays himself,
and financial planning executive Tod Lindholm. When the pretend Kinder
expresses doubt that Skilling can pull off 600 percent revenue growth for the
coming year, Skilling reveals how it will be done.
"We're going to
move from mark-to-market accounting to something I call HFV,
or hypothetical future value accounting," Skilling jokes as he reads from
a script. "If we do that, we can add a kazillion dollars to the bottom
line."
Richard Causey, the
former chief accounting officer who was embroiled in many of the business
deals named in the indictments of other Enron executives, makes an unfortunate
joke later on the tape.
"I've been on
the job for a week managing earnings, and it's easier than I thought it would
be," Causey says, referring to a practice that is frowned upon by
securities regulators. "I can't even count fast enough with the earnings
rolling in."
Texas' political
elite also take part in the tribute, with then-Gov. George W. Bush pleading
with Kinder: "Don't leave Texas. You're too good a man."
Former President
George Bush also offers a send-off to Kinder, thanking him for helping his son
reach the Governor's Mansion.
"You have been
fantastic to the Bush family," he says. "I don't think anybody did
more than you did to support George."
"Bubble Redux," by Andrew Bary, Barron's, April 14, 2003,
Page 17.
Amazon's valuation is the most
egregious of the 'Net trio. It trades for 80 times projected "pro
forma" 2003 profit of 32 cents a share. Amazon's pro forma
definition of profit, moreover, is dubious because it excludes re-structuring
charges and, more important, the restricted stock that Amazon now is issuing
to employees in lieu of stock options. Amazon's reported profit this
year under generally accepted accounting principles (which include
restricted-stock costs) could be just 10 cents to 15 cents a share, meaning
that Amazon's true P/E arguably is closer to 200.
Yahoo, meanwhile, now commands
70 times estimated 2003 net of 35 cents a share, and eBay fetches 65 times
projected 2003 net of $1.35 a share.
What's fair value? By our
calculations, Amazon is worth, at best, roughly 90% of its projected 2003
revenue of $4.6 billion. That translates into $10 a share, or $4.1 billion.
This estimate is charitable because the country's two most successful
brick-and-mortar retailers, Wal-Mart Stores and Home Depot, also
trade for about 90% of 2003 sales.
Yahoo ought to trade closer to
15. That's a stiff 43 times projected 2003 earnings and gives the
company credit for its strong balance sheet, featuring over $2 a share in cash
and another $3 a share for its stake in Yahoo Japan, which has become that
country's eBay.
Sure, eBay undoubtedly is the
most successful Internet company and the only one that has lived up to the
growth projections made during the Bubble. As the dominant online
marketplace in the U.S. and Europe, eBay saw its earnings surge to 87 cents a
share last year from three cents in 1998, when it went public at a
split-adjusted $3.00 a share.
Why would eBay be more fairly
valued around 60, its price just several months ago? At 60, eBay would
trade at 44 times projected 2003 profit of $1.35 a share and 22 times an
optimistic 2005 estimate of $2.75. So confident are analysts about
eBay's outlook that they're comfortable valuing the stock on a 2005 earnings
estimate.
Fans of eBay believe its profit
can rise at a 35% annual clip in the next five years, a difficult rate for any
company to maintain, even one, such as eBay, with a "scalable"
business model that allows it to easily accommodate more transactions while
maintaining its enviable gross margins of 80%. If the company earns $5 a
share in 2007--nearly six times last year's profit--it would still trade at 18
times that very optimistic profit level.
Continued in the article.
The New York Yankees today released their 4th Quarter 2001 pro
forma results. Although generally accepted scorekeeping principles (GASP) indicate that
the Yankees lost Games 1 and 2 of the 2001 World Series, their pro forma figures show that
these reported losses were the result of nonrecurring items, specifically extraordinary
pitching performances by Arizona Diamondbacks personnel Kurt Schilling and Randy Johnson.
Games 3 and 4 results, already indicating Yankee wins, were not restated on a pro forma
basis.
Ed Scribner, New Mexico State
Until
recently, pro forma reporting was seen as a useful tool that could help
companies show performance when unusual circumstances might cloud the picture.
Today it finds itself in bad odour.
"Pro forma lingo Does the use of controversial non-GAAP reporting by some
companies confuse or enlighten?," by Michael Lewis, CA Magazine, March 2002
--- http://www.cica.ca/cica/camagazine.nsf/e2002-mar/Features
For fans of JDS
Uniphase Corp., the fibre-optics manufacturer with headquarters in Ottawa and
San Jose, Calif., the report for fiscal 2001 provided the icing on a very
delicious cake: following an uninterrupted series of positive quarterly
earnings results, the corporate giant announced it was set to deliver US$67
million in pro forma profit.
There was only one
fly in the ointment. Like all such calculations, JDS's pro forma numbers were
not prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP),
and as such they excluded goodwill, merger-related and stock-option charges,
and losses on investments. Once those items were added back into the
accounting mix, JDS suddenly showed a staggering US$50.6 billion in red ink -
a US corporate record. Even so, many investors remained loyal, placing their
trust in the boom-market philosophy that views onetime charges as largely
irrelevant. The mantra was simple - operating results rule.
"That was the
view at the time," says Jim Hall, a Calgary portfolio manager with Mawer
Canadian Equity Fund. "It just goes to show how wrong people can
be."
Since then, of
course, the spectacular flameout of Houston's Enron Corp. has done much to
change that point of view (though it's not a pro forma issue). Once the
world's largest energy trader, the company now holds the title for the largest
bankruptcy case in US history. The Chapter 11 filing in December came after
Enron had to restate US$586 million in earnings because of apparent accounting
irregularities. In its submission, the company admitted it had hidden assets
and related debt charges since 1997 in order to inflate consolidated earnings.
Enron's auditor, accounting firm Arthur Andersen LLP, later acknowledged that
it had made "an [honest] error in judgement" regarding Enron's
financial statements.
While the Enron saga
will continue in various courtrooms for many months to come, regulators on
either side of the border have responded to the collapse with uncharacteristic
swiftness. Both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United
States and the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) issued new guidelines
on financial reporting just a few weeks after the Enron bust. In each
instance, investors were reminded to redirect their focus to financial
statements prepared in accordance with GAAP, paying special attention to cash
flow, liquidity and the intrinsic value of acquisitions. At the same time,
issuers were warned to reduce their reliance on pro forma results and to
explain to investors why they were not using GAAP in their reporting.
SEC chairman Harvey
Pitt moved furthest and fastest. In mid-January he announced plans to
establish a private watchdog to discipline accountants and review company
audits. Working with the largest accounting firms and professional
organizations such as the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA), the SEC wants the new body to be able to punish accountants for
incompetence and ethics violations. As Pitt emphasized, "The commission
cannot, and in any event will not, tolerate this pattern of growing
re-statements, audit failures, corporate failures and investor losses."
The sheer scale of
the Enron debacle has brought pro forma accounting under public scrutiny as
never before, and, observers say, will provide a powerful impetus for
financial reporting reform. "This will send a message to companies and
accountants to cut back on some of the games they've been playing," says
former SEC general counsel Harvey Goldschmid.
Meanwhile, the CSA
(the forum for the 13 securities regulators of Canada's provinces and
territories) expressed its concern over the proliferation of non-standard
measures, warning that they improve the appearance of a company's financial
health, gloss over risks and make it exceedingly difficult for investors to
compare issuers.
"Investors
should be cautious when looking at non-GAAP measures," says John Carchrae,
chair of the CSA Chief Accountants Committee, when the guidelines were
released in January. "These measures present only part of the picture and
may selectively omit certain expenses, resulting in a more positive portrayal
of a company's performance."
As a result, Canadian
issuers will now be expected to provide GAAP figures alongside non-standard
earnings measures, explain how pro forma numbers are calculated, and detail
why they exclude certain items required by GAAP. So far, the CSA has provided
guidance rather than rules, but the committee cautions it could take
regulatory action if issuers publish earnings reports deemed to be misleading
to investors.
Carchrae, who is also
chief accountant of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), believes
"moral suasion" is a good place to start. Nonetheless, he adds, the
OSC intends to track press releases, cross-reference them to statutory
earnings filings and supplemental information on websites, and monitor
continuous disclosure to ensure a company meets its requirements under the
securities act.
Although pro forma
reporting finds itself in bad odour, until recently it was regarded as a
useful tool that could help companies show performance when unusual
circumstances might cloud the picture. In cases involving a merger or
acquisition, for example, where a company has made enormous expenditures that
generate significant non-cash expenses on the income statement, pro forma can
be used as a clarifying document, enabling investors to view economic
performance outside of such onetime events. Over the years, however, the pro
forma route has increasingly involved the selective use of press releases,
websites, and other reports to put a favourable spin on earnings, often
leading to a spike in the value of a firm's stock. Like management discussion
and analysis, such communications are not within the ambit of GAAP, falling
somewhere between the cracks of current accounting standards.
"Obviously, this
issue is of concern to everyone who uses financial statements," says Paul
Cherry, chairman of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants'
Accounting Standards Board. "Our worry as standard-setters is whether
these non-GAAP, pro forma items confuse or enlighten."
Regulators and
standard-setters have agonized over this issue ever since the reporting
lexicon began to expand with the rise of the dot-com sector in the late 1990s,
a sector with little in the way of earnings that concentrated on revenue
growth as a more meaningful performance indicator. New measures, such as
"run-through rates" or "burn rates," were deemed welcome
additions to traditional methodology because they helped determine how much
financing a technology company might require during its risky startup phase.
Critics, however,
argued such terms were usurping easily understood language as part of a
corporate scheme to hoodwink unwary investors. Important numbers were hidden
or left out under a deluge of new and ever-more complex terminology. The new
measurements, they warned, fell short of adequate financial disclosure.
An OSC report
published in February 2001 appears to support these claims. According to the
report, Canadian technology companies have not provided investors with
adequate information about how they disclose revenue, a shortcoming that may
require some of them to restate their financial results.
"Initial results
of the review suggest a need for significant improvement in the nature and
extent of disclosure," the report states, adding that the OSC wants more
specific notes on accounting policy attached to financial statements. The
report also observes that revenue is often recognized when goods are shipped,
not when they are sold, despite the fact that the company may be exposed to
returns.
David Wright, a
software analyst at BMO Nesbitt Burns in Toronto, says dealing with how
technology companies record revenue is a perennial issue. The issue has gained
greater prominence with the rise of vendor financing, a practice whereby
companies act as a bank to buyers, lending customers the cash to complete
purchase orders. If the customer is unable to pay for the goods or services
subsequent to signing the sales agreement, the seller's revenue can be
drastically overstated.
But pro forma still
has plenty of advocates - particularly when it comes to earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). Such a measure, it is
often argued, can provide a pure, meaningful and reliable diagnostic tool,
albeit one that should be considered along with figures that accommodate
charges to a balance sheet.
Ron Blunn, head of
investor relations firm Blunn & Co. Inc. in Toronto and chairperson of the
issues committee of the Canadian Investor Relations Institute, says adjusted
earnings can serve a legitimate purpose and are particularly helpful to
analysts and money managers who must gauge the financial well-being of
technology startups.
The debate shows no
signs of burning out anytime soon. On the one hand, the philosophy among
Canadian and US standard-setters in recent years has appeared to favour
removing constraints, rather than imposing them. New rules to apply to
Canadian banks this year, for example, will no longer require the amortization
of goodwill in earnings figures. On the other hand, it has become abundantly
clear that companies will emphasize the reporting method that puts the best
gloss on their operations. And while the use of pro forma accounting has
remained most prevalent among technology companies, the movement to embrace
more and varied language has spread to "old economy" companies such
as Enron, gaining steam as the economy stumbled. Blunn theorizes the
proliferation of nontraditional reporting and the increasing reliance on
supplemental filings simply reflect the state of the North American economy.
Carchrae has a
slightly different diagnosis. When asked why pro forma reporting has
mushroomed in recent years, he points to investors' slavish devotion to
business box scores - that is, a company's ability to meet sales and earnings
expectations as set out by equity analysts. Since companies can be severely
punished for falling short of the Street's consensus forecast, there is
intense pressure, especially in a bear market, to conjure up earnings that
appear to satisfy forecasts.
As a result, pro
forma terminology has blossomed over the Canadian corporate landscape.
Montreal-based telephone utility BCE Inc., for example, coined the term
"cash baseline earnings" to describe its operating performance. Not
to be outdone, Robert McFarlane, chief financial officer of Telus Corp.,
Canada's second-largest telecommunications company, cited a "revenue
revision" and "EBITDA deficiency" to explain the drop in the
Burnaby, BC-based phone service firm's "core baseline earnings" for
its third quarter ended September 30, 2001. (According to company literature,
core baseline earnings refers to common share income before discontinued
operations, amortization of acquired intangible assets net of tax,
restructuring and nonrecurring refinancing costs net of tax, revaluation of
future tax assets and liabilities and goodwill amortization.)
Meanwhile, IBM Corp.
spinoff Celestica Inc. of Toronto neglected to mention the elimination of more
than 8,700 jobs from a global workforce of 30,000, alluding to the cuts in its
fiscal 2001 third-quarter report through references to "realignment"
charges during the period.
Many statements no
longer use the term "profit" at all. And while statutory filings
must present at least one version of earnings that conforms to GAAP, few rules
have been set down by US or Canadian regulators to govern non-GAAP
declarations. Accounting bodies in Canada and around the world are charged
with policing their members and assuring statutory filings include income and
revenue according to GAAP, using supportable interpretations. But pro forma
numbers are typically distributed before a company's statutory filing is made.
"Not to pass the
buck," says Cherry, "but how can we set standards for something
that's not part of GAAP?" Still, Cherry admits the use of non-GAAP
terminology has become so widespread that accounting authorities are being
forced to take notice. "The matter is gaining some prominence," he
says, "because some of the numbers are just so different."
Despite his
reservations, Cherry acknowledges "the critical point is when information
is released to the marketplace," which nowadays is almost always done via
a press release. The duty to regulate such releases, he says, must rest with
securities bodies - an opinion shared by Edmund Jenkins, chair of the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the United States.
Many authorities view
the issue as a matter of education, believing that a high degree of
sophistication must now be expected from the retail investing community.
Others say the spread of non-GAAP reporting methodology, left unchecked, could
distort markets, undermine investor confidence in regulatory regimes and
ultimately impede the flow of investment capital. But pro forma devotees
insist that introducing tough new measures to govern reporting would do little
to protect consumers and encourage retail investment. Instead, new regulations
might work to impede growth and limit available, useful financial information.
Continued at http://www.cica.ca/cica/camagazine.nsf/e2002-mar/Features
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting
Educators's Review on October 18, 2002
TITLE: Motorola's Profit: 'Special'
Again?
REPORTER: Jesse Drucker
DATE: Oct 15, 2002
PAGE: C1
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1034631975931460836.djm,00.html
TOPICS: Special Items, Pro Forma Earnings, Accounting, Earning Announcements,
Earnings Forecasts, Financial Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis, Net Income
SUMMARY: Motorola has announced both
pro forma earnings and net income as determined by generally accepted accounting
principles for 14 consecutive quarters. Ironically, pro forma earnings are
always greater than net income calculated using generally accepted accounting
principles
QUESTIONS:
1.) Distinguish between a special item and an extraordinary item. How are each
reported on the income statement?
2.) Distinguish between pro forma
earnings and GAAP based earnings. What are the advantages and disadvantages of
allowing companies to report multiple earnings numbers? What are the advantages
and disadvantages of not allowing companies to report multiple earnings numbers?
3.) What items were reported as special
by Motorola? Are these items special? Support your answer.
4.) Are you surprised that all the
special items reduced earnings? What is the likelihood that there were positive
nonrecurring items at Motorola? How are positive nonrecurring items reported?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University
of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
"Pro-Forma Earnings Reporting
Persists," by Shaheen Pasha, Washington Post, August 16, 2002 --- http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25384-2002Aug16.html
While many on Wall
Street are calling for an end to pro forma financial reporting given
widespread jitters over corporate clarity, it's clear from second-quarter
reports that the accounting practice is a hard habit to break.
Publicly traded
companies are required to report their results according to generally accepted
accounting principles, or GAAP, under which all types of business expenses are
deducted to arrive at the bottom line of a company's earnings report.
But an
ever-increasing number of companies in recent years has taken to also
reporting earnings on a pro forma – or "as if" – basis under
which they exclude various costs. Companies defend the practice, saying the
inclusion of one-time events don't accurately reflect true performance.
There is no universal
agreement on which expenses should be omitted from pro forma results, but pro
forma figures typically boost results.
Indeed, as the
second-quarter reporting season dwindles down with more than 90 percent of the
Standard & Poor's 500 companies having reported, only Yahoo Inc.,
Compuware Corp. and Xilinx Inc. made the switch to reporting earnings under
GAAP, according to Thomson First Call.
While a number of
S&P 500 companies, including Computer Associates International Inc. and
Corning Inc., made the switch to GAAP in the first quarter, that still brings
the number to 11 companies in total that have given up on pro forma over the
last two quarters.
"It's
disappointing that at this stage we haven't seen more companies make the
switch to GAAP earnings from pro forma," said Chuck Hill, director of
research at Thomson First Call.
Continued at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25384-2002Aug16.html
A new research report from Bear Stearns
identifies the best earnings benchmarks by industry. GAAP earnings are cited as
the best benchmarks for a few industries, but not many. The preferred benchmarks
are generally pro forma earnings or pro forma earnings per share. http://www.accountingweb.com/item/91934
AccountingWEB US - Oct-1-2002 -
A new research report from Bear Stearns identifies
the best earnings benchmarks by industry. GAAP earnings (earnings prepared
according to generally accepted accounting principles) are cited as the best
benchmarks for a few industries, but not many. Most use pro forma earnings or
pro forma earnings per share (EPS).
Examples of the most
useful earnings benchmarks for just a few of the 50+ industries included in
the report:
- Autos: Pro forma
EPS
- Industrial
manufacturing: Pro forma EPS shifting to GAAP EPS
- Trucking:
Continuing EPS
- Lodging: Pro forma
EPS, EBITDA and FFO
- Small &
mid-cap biotechnology: Product-related events, Cash on hand, Cash burn
rate
- Advertising &
marketing services: Pro forma EPS, EBITDA, Free cash flow
- Business/professional
services: Pro forma EPS, Cash EPS, EBITDA, Discounted free cash flow
- Wireless services:
GAAP EPS, EBITDA
EBITDA=Earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.
FFO=funds from operations.
The report also lists
the most common adjustments made to arrive at pro forma earnings and tells
whether securities analysts consider the adjustments valid. Patricia
McConnell, senior managing director at Bear Stearns, explains, "Analysts
rarely accept managements' suggested 'pro forma' adjustments without due
consideration, and sometimes we reject them... We would not recommend using
management's version of pro forma earnings without analysis and adjustment,
but neither would we blindly advise using GAAP earnings without analysis and
adjustment."
From The Wall Street Journal
Accounting Educators' Review on July 27, 2002
TITLE: Merrill Changes Methods Analysts
Use for Estimates
REPORTER: Karen Talley DATE: Jul 24, 2002
PAGE: C5
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,BT_CO_20020724_009399.djm,00.html
TOPICS: Accounting, Earnings Forecasts, Financial Accounting, Financial
Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis
SUMMARY: Merrill Lynch & Co. has
reported that it will begin forecasting both GAAP based earnings estimates in
addition to pro forma earnings measures. To accommodate Merrill Lynch & Co.,
Thomson First Call will collect and report GAAP estimates from other analysts.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Compare and contrast GAAP earnings and pro forma earnings?
2.) Why do analyst forecast pro forma
earnings? Will GAAP earnings forecasts provide more useful information than pro
forma earnings forecasts? Support your answer.
3.) Discuss the advantages and
disadvantages of analysts forecasting both pro forma and GAAP earnings. Should
analysts continue to provide pro forma earnings forecasts? Should analysts also
provide GAAP earnings forecasts? Support your answers.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University
of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
Denny Beresford's Terry Breakfast Lecture
Subtitle: Does Accounting Still Matter in the "New Economy"
Every accounting educator and practitioner should
read Professor Beresford's Lecture at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/beresford01.htm
Readers might also want to go to http://www.npr.org/news/specials/enron/
(Includes an interview with Lynn Turner talking about pro forma reporting.)
Deferred Taxes Related to FAS123 Expense – Accounting and Administrative
Issues on New Trends in Stock Compensation Accounting
PWC Insight on FAS 123 --- http://www.fei.org/download/HRInsight02_21.pdf
A recent PWC HR Insight discusses the applicable rules and answers questions
raised on accounting for income taxes related to FAS 123 expense (for both the
pro forma disclosure and the recognized FAS 123 expense). Per PWC, the rules are
complex and require that the tax benefits arising from stock options and other
types of stock-based compensation be tracked on a grant-by-grant and
country-by-country basis
Corporate America's New
Math: Investors Now Face Two Sets of Numbers In Figuring a Company's Bottom Line
By Justin Gillis
The Washington Post
Sunday, July 22, 2001; Page H01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/archives/front.htm
Cisco Systems Inc., a bellwether
of the "new economy," prepared its books for the first three months of this year
by slicing and dicing its financial results in the old ways mandated by the rules of
Washington regulators and the accounting profession.
Result: a quarterly loss of $2.7
billion.
Cisco did more, though. It sliced
and diced the same underlying numbers in ways preferred by Cisco, offering an alternative
interpretation of its results to the investing public.
Result: a quarterly profit of
$230 million.
That's an unusually large swing
in a company's bottom line, but there's nothing unusual these days about the strategy
Cisco employed. Across corporate America, companies are emphasizing something called
"pro forma" earnings statements. Because there are no rules for how to prepare
such statements, businesses have wide latitude to ignore various expenses in their pro
forma results that have to be included under traditional accounting rules.
Most of the time, the new numbers
make companies look better than they would under standard accounting, and some evidence
suggests investors are using the massaged numbers more and more to decide what value to
attach to stocks. The pro forma results are often strongly emphasized in news releases
announcing a corporation's earnings; sometimes the results computed under traditional
accounting techniques are not disclosed until weeks later, when the companies file the
official results with the Securities and Exchange Commission, as required by law.
Cisco includes its results under
both the pro forma and the traditional accounting methods in its news releases. People
skeptical of the practice of using pro forma results worry that investors are being
deceived. Karen Nelson, assistant professor of accounting at Stanford University, said
some companies were "verging on fraudulent behavior" in their presentation of
financial results.
Companies that use these
techniques say they are trying to help investors by giving them numbers that more
accurately reflect the core operations of their businesses, in part because they exclude
unusual expenses. Cisco's technique "gives readers of financial statements a clearer
picture of the results of Cisco's normal business activities," the company said in a
statement issued in response to questions about its accounting.
Until recently, pro forma results
had a well-understood and limited use. Most companies used pro forma accounting only to
adjust previously reported financial statements so they could be directly compared with
current results. This most frequently happened after a merger, when a company would adjust
past results to reflect what they would have been had the merger been in effect earlier.
Pro forma, Latin for "matter of form," refers to statements "where certain
amounts are hypothetical," according to Barron's Dictionary of Finance and
Investment Terms.
What's changed in recent years is
that many companies now using the technique also apply it to the current quarter. They
include some of the leading names of the Internet age, including Amazon.com Inc., Yahoo
Inc. and JDS Uniphase Corp. These companies have received enthusiastic support from many
Wall Street analysts for their use of pro forma results. The companies' arguments have
also been bolstered by a broader attack on standard accounting launched by some academic
researchers and accountants. They believe the nation's financial reporting system, rooted
in the securities law reforms of the New Deal, is inadequate to modern needs. In testimony
before Congress last year, Michael R. Young, a securities lawyer, called it a
"creaky, sputtering, 1930s-vintage financial reporting system."
The dispute over earnings
statements has grown in intensity during the recent economic slide. To skeptics, more and
more companies appear to be coping with bad news on their financial statements by
redefining the concept of earnings. SEC staffers are worried about the trend and are
weighing a crackdown.
"People are using the pro
forma earnings to present a tilted, biased picture to investors that I don't believe
necessarily reflects the reality of what's going on with the business," said Lynn
Turner, the SEC's chief accountant.
For the rest of the article (and it is a long
article), go to
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/archives/front.htm
The full article is salted with quotes from accounting professors and Bob Elliott (KMPG
and Chairman of the AICPA)
The Future of
Amazon.com: Unlike Enron, Amazon.com seems to thrive without profits. How long
can it last?
"Economy, the Web and E-Commerce:
Amazon.com." An Interview With Jeff Bezos CEO, Amazon.com, The Washington Post,
December 6, 2001 --- http://discuss.washingtonpost.com/zforum/01/washtech_bezos120601.htm
Amazon.com is pinning its hopes on pro forma
reporting to report the company's first profit in history. But wait! Plans by U.S.
regulators to crack down on "pro forma" abuses in accounting may take a toll on
Internet firms, which like the financial reporting technique because it can make losses
seem smaller than they really are.
"When Pro Forma Is Bad Form," by Joanna
Glasner, Wired News, December 6, 2001 --- http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,48877,00.html
As part of efforts to improve the
clarity of information given to investors, the Securities and Exchange Commission warned
this week that it will crack down on companies that use creative accounting methods to
pump up poor earnings results.
In particular, the commission
said it will focus on abuse of a popular form of financial reporting known as "pro
forma" accounting, which allows companies to exclude certain expenses and gains from
their earnings results. The SEC said the method "may not convey a true and accurate
picture of a company's financial well-being."
Experts say the practice is
especially common among Internet firms, which began issuing earnings press releases with
pro forma numbers en masse during the stock market boom of the late 1990s. The list of
new-economy companies using pro forma figures includes such prominent firms as Yahoo
(YHOO), AOL Time Warner (AOL), CNET (CNET) and JDS Uniphase (JDSU).
Unprofitable firms are
particularly avid users of pro forma numbers, said Brett Trueman, professor of accounting
at the University of California at Berkeley's Haas School of Business.
"I can't say for sure why,
but I can take a guess: They're losing big time, and they want to give investors the
impression that the losses are not as great as they appear," he said.
Trueman said savvy investors tend
to know that companies may have self-serving interests in mind when they release pro forma
numbers. Experienced traders often put greater credence in numbers compiled according to
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which firms are required to release
alongside any pro forma numbers.
A mounting concern, however, is
the fact that many companies rely almost solely on pro forma numbers in projections for
future performance.
Perhaps the best-known proponent
of pro forma is the perennially unprofitable Amazon.com, which has a history of guiding
investor expectations using an accounting system that excludes charges for stock
compensation, restructuring or the declining value of past acquisitions.
Invariably, the pro forma numbers
are better than the GAAP ones. In its most recent quarter, for example, Amazon (AMZN)
reported a pro forma loss of $58 million. When measured according to GAAP, Amazon's net
loss nearly tripled to $170 million.
Things are apt to get even
stranger in the last quarter of the year, when Amazon said it plans to deliver its
first-ever pro forma operating profit. By regular accounting standards, the company will
still be losing money.
Those results might not sit too
well with the folks at the SEC, however.
In its statements this week, the
SEC noted that although there's nothing inherently illegal about providing pro forma
numbers, figures should not be presented in a deliberately misleading manner. Regulators
may have been talking directly to Amazon in one paragraph of their warning, which said:
"Investors are likely to be
deceived if a company uses a pro forma presentation to recast a loss as if it were a
profit."
Neither Amazon nor AOL Time
Warner returned phone calls inquiring if they planned to make changes to their pro forma
accounting methods in light of the SEC's recent statements.
According to Trueman, few members
of the financial community would advocate getting rid of pro forma numbers altogether.
Even the SEC said that pro forma
numbers, when used appropriately, can provide investors with a great deal of useful
information that might not be included with GAAP results. When presented correctly, pro
forma numbers can offer insights into the performance of the core business, by excluding
one-time events that can skew quarterly results.
Rather than ditching pro forma,
industry groups like Financial Executives International and the National Investor
Relations Institute say a better plan is to set uniform guidelines for how to present the
numbers. They have issued a set of recommendations, such as making sure companies don't
arbitrarily change what's included in pro forma results from quarter to quarter.
Certainly some consistency would
make it easier for folks who try to track this stuff, said Joe Cooper, research analyst at
First Call, which compiles analyst projections of earnings.
The boom in pro forma reporting
has created quite a bit of extra work for First Call, Cooper said, because it has to
figure out which companies and analysts are using pro forma numbers and how they're using
them.
But the extra work of compiling
pro forma numbers doesn't necessarily result in greater financial transparency for
investors, Cooper said.
"In days past, before it was
abused, it was a way to give an honest apples-to-apples comparison," he said.
"Now, it is being used as a way to continually put their company in a good
light."
See also:
SEC
Fires Warning Shot Over Tech Statements
Earnings Downplay Stock Losses
Change at
the Top for AOL
Where's the Money?, Huh?
There's no biz like E-Biz
The bellwether Internet firm says it will stop
reporting earnings in pro forma, a controversial accounting method popular in the
technology sector --- http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,51721,00.html
"Yahoo Gives Pro Forma the Boot." By
Joanna Glasner, Wired News, April 11, 2002 ---
Following the release of its
first-quarter results on Wednesday, Yahoo (YHOO) said it will stop reporting earnings
using pro forma, a controversial accounting method popular among Internet and technology
firms.
Instead, the company said it
plans to release all results according to generally accepted accounting principles, or
GAAP. Executives said the shift would provide a clearer picture of the Yahoo's financial
performance.
"We do not believe the pro
forma presentation continues to provide a useful purpose," said Sue Decker, Yahoo's
chief financial officer. In the past, the company has used pro forma accounting as a way
to separate one-time expenses -- such as the costs of closing a unit or acquiring another
firm -- from costs stemming from its core business.
Decker attributed the decision in
part to new rules adopted by the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board that take
effect this year. The new rules require companies to report the amount they overpaid for
acquisitions as an upfront charge.
Accounting experts, however, said
the rule change was probably not the only reason for Yahoo to drop pro forma. The
accounting practice, popularized by technology firms in the late 1990s, has come under
fire from regulators in recent months who say some firms have used nonstandard metrics to
mask poor financial performance.
The U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission warned in December that it will crack down on companies that use creative
accounting methods to pump up poor earnings results.
In particular, the commission
said it will focus on abuses of pro forma accounting, which allows companies to exclude
certain expenses and gains from their earnings results. The SEC said the method "may
not convey a true and accurate picture of a company's financial well-being."
Experts say use of pro forma is
especially common among Internet firms. In addition to Yahoo, the list of prominent
Internet and technology firms employing pro forma includes AOL Time Warner (AOL), Cnet
(CNET) and JDS Uniphase (JDSU).
Although pro forma accounting can
be useful in helping to predict a company's future performance, investors have grown
increasingly suspicious of the metric following the bursting of the technology stock
bubble, said Sam Norwood, a partner at Tatum CFO Partners.
"Once the concept of pro
forma became accepted, there were in some cases abuses," Norwood said. "There
was a tendency for management to exclude the negative events and to not necessarily
exclude the positive events.'
Brett Trueman, an accounting
professor at the University of California at Berkeley's Haas School of Business, said he
wouldn't be surprised if other firms follow Yahoo's lead in dropping pro forma.
Continued at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,51721,00.html
Bob Jensen's threads on pro forma reporting can be found at the following site:
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
Triple-Bottom
(Social, Environmental) Reporting
While some in the profession may question the
long-term viability of audit-only accounting firms, proposed guidelines issued recently by
the Global Reporting Initiative may help make the vision more feasible. The GRI's
guidelines for "triple-bottom- line reporting" would broaden financial reporting
into a three- dimensional model for economic, social and environmental reporting. http://www.accountingweb.com/item/78245
While some in the profession may
question the long-term viability of audit-only accounting firms, proposed guidelines
issued recently by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) may help make the vision more
feasible. The GRI's guidelines for "triple-bottom-line reporting" would broaden
financial reporting into a three-dimensional model for economic, social and environmental
reporting. Each dimension of the model would contain information that is valuable to
stakeholders and could be independently verified.
Numbers, Ratios and Explanations
Despite the convenient shorthand
reference to bottom lines, many of the GRI indicators are multi-faceted, consisting of
tables, ratios and qualitative descriptions of policies, procedures, and systems. Below
are examples of indicators within each of the three dimensions:
Economic performance indicators.
Geographic breakdown of key markets, percent of contracts paid in accordance with agreed
terms, and description of the organization's indirect economic impacts.
Environmental performance
indicators. Breakdown of energy sources used, (e.g., for electricity and heat), total
water usage, breakdown of waste by type and destination, list of penalties paid for
non-compliance with environmental laws and regulations, and description of policies and
procedures to minimize adverse environmental impacts.
Social performance indicators.
Total workforce including temporary workers, percentage of employees represented by trade
unions, schedule of average hours of training per year per employee for all major
categories of employee, male/female ratios in upper management positions, and descriptions
of policies and procedures to address such issues as human rights, product information and
labeling, customer privacy, and political lobbying and contributions. The GRI was formed
in 1997 by a partnership of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the
Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES). Several hundred organizations
have participated in working groups to help form the guidelines for triple-bottom-line
reporting. These organizations include corporations, accounting firms, investors, labor
organizations and other stakeholders.
"What Is Environmental Accounting?" AccountingWeb, January 6, 2006
---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=101639
Environmental Management Accounting (EMA) is a
cover title used to describe different aspects of this burgeoning field of
accounting. The focus of EMA is as a management accounting tool used to make
internal business decisions, especially for proactive environmental
management activities. EMA was developed to recognize some limitations of
conventional management accounting approaches to environmental costs,
consequences, and impacts. For example, overhead accounts were the
destination of many environmental costs in the past. Cost allocations were
inaccurate and could not be traced back to processes, products, or process
lines. Wasted raw materials were also inaccurately accounted for during
production.
Each aspect of EMA has a general accounting type
that serves as its foundation, according to the EMA international website.
The following examples indicate the general accounting type followed by the
environmental accounting parallel:
Management Accounting (MA) entails the
identification, collection, estimation, analysis, and use of cost, or
other information used for organizational decision-making. Environmental
Management Accounting (EMA) is Management Accounting with a focus on
materials and energy flow information, with environmental cost
information.
Financial Accounting (FA) comprises the
development and organizational reporting of financial information to
external parties, such as stockholders and bankers. Environmental
Financial Accounting (EFA) builds on Financial Accounting, focusing on
the reporting of environmental liability costs with other significant
environmental costs.
National Accounting (NA) is the development of
economic and other information used to describe national income and
economic health. Environmental National Accounting (ENA) is National
Accounting focusing on the stocks of natural resources, their physical
flows, environmental costs, and externality costs.
EMA is a broad set of approaches and principles
that provide views into the physical flows and costs critical to the
successful completion of environmental management activities and
increasingly, routine management activities, such as product and process
design, capital budgeting, cost control and allocation, and product pricing,
according to the EMA international website.
Continued in article
Question
For investors, how informative is accrual accounting vis-a-vis cash flow
reporting?
Hint: It all depends!
From the Unknown Professor's Financial Rounds Blog on November 24,
2007 ---
http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/
More on The Accrual Anomaly and Abnormal Returns
Here's another paper on "tradable" patterns in
stock returns. The CXO Advisory Group recently put up a summary of the study
titled "Repairing the Accruals Anomaly" by Hafzalla, Lunholm and Van Winkle.
The paper examines the pattern that stock market performance of firms with
low accruals (i.e. the difference between the firm's earnings and cash
flows) is significantly greater than the performance of their higher accrual
counterparts. It does a pretty good job of examining Sloan's "Accrual
Anomaly" with a few tweaks:
It corrects for the extent to which the firm is
financially healthy, using Piotrowski's "financial health" indicator. It
measures accruals in relation to earnings rather than to assets
Their findings are that the accrual anomaly does a
better job of sorting out investment performance for financially healthy
firms. Their results are pretty strong (note- the following is CXO's
summary):
A hedge strategy that is long (short) firms of high
(low) financial health (ignoring accruals) generates an average
size-adjusted annual return of 9.36% across the entire sample. After
excluding firms with the lowest financial health scores, a hedge strategy
that is long (short) the 10% of firms with the lowest (highest) traditional
accruals generates an average size-adjusted annual return of 13.64%, with
7.98% coming from the long side Using the total sample, a hedge strategy
that is long (short) low-accrual, high financial health (high-accrual, low
financial health) firms produces an average size-adjusted annual return of
22.93%, with a 14.92% from the long side.
Here's a pretty good grapic of size adjusted abnormal returns on the
various portfolios ---
http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/
"Repairing the Accruals Anomaly," by Russell J. Jundholm, Nader
Hafzalla, and Edmund Matthew Van Winkle,
Abstract:
We document how the effectiveness of an accruals-based trading strategy
changes systematically with the financial health of the sample firms or with
the benchmark used to identify an extreme accrual. Our refinements
significantly improve the strategy's annual hedge return, and do so mostly
because they improve the return earned on the long position in low accrual
stocks. These results are important because recent evidence has shown that,
absent these “repairs,” the accrual strategy does not yield a significantly
positive return in the long portion of the hedge portfolio. We also find
that our new measure of accruals is not dependent on the presence or absence
of special items and it identifies misvalued stocks just as well for loss
firms as for gain firms, in contrast to the traditional accruals measure.
Finally, we show that our repairs succeed where the traditional measure of
accruals fails because they more effectively select firms where the
difference between sophisticated and naïve forecasts are the most extreme.
As such, our results are consistent with Sloan's earnings fixation
hypothesis and are inconsistent with some alternative explanations for the
accrual anomaly.
Jensen Comment
Current findings on these relationships may be more difficult to extrapolate as
fair value accounting becomes more prevalent ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
It's elementary Watson! Of course the statement of cash flow matters.
"Why the Statement of Cash Flows Matters," by Scott Rothbortm, TheStreet,
September 21, 2007 ---
Click Here
Jensen Comment
This really is elementary, but it does have some rather nice current
examples.
Perhaps a better topic would be "why accrual accounting still matters."
"Which is More Value-Relevant: Earnings or Cash Flows?" by Ervin L. Black,
Sr., SSRN, May 1998 ---
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=118089
Statements in the financial press and recent
research suggest that controversy exists as to which accounting measure is
more value-relevant: earnings or cash flows. This study examines the
relative value-relevance of earnings and cash flow measures in the context
of the firm life-cycle. Earnings are predicted to be more value-relevant in
mature stages. Cash flows are expected to be more value relevant in stages
characterized by growth and/or uncertainty. In general the hypotheses are
supported using Wald chi-square tests (Biddle, Seow, and Siegel 1995) of the
Edwards, Bell, Ohlson (1995) model. Evidence supports the hypothesis that
earnings are more value-relevant than operating, investing, or financing
cash flows in mature life-cycle stages. However, in the start-up stage
investing cash flows are more value relevant than earnings. In growth and
decline stages, operating cash flows are more value relevant than earnings.
Jensen Comment
The above paper by Professor Black is an illustration of a working paper that
for quite a long time was available free from BYU. Now that it's on SSRN it's no
longer free. SSRN did not necessarily contribute to the open sharing of research
papers.
By the way, even if cash flow statements were hypothetically more relevant in
all instances, accrual accounting statements would still be vital. My DAH reason
is that, if accountants only reported cash flows, it would be
quite simple for managers to distort period-to-period performance by simply
altering the contractual timings of cash in and cash out. This is much more
simple to do for cash payments than for accrual transactions. There would also
be the pesky problem of capital maintenance if depreciation and amortization
gets overlooked. In theory capital maintenance is not overlooked in fair value
accounting since values decline with asset deterioration. However, fair value
accounting is quite another matter entirely ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
The Controversy Over Fair Value
(Mark-to-Market) Financial Reporting
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at various other links:
I recently completed the first draft of a paper on fair value at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
Comments would be helpful.
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms
Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation, and Yield Curves
for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial
Instruments ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm
"FAS 157: Auditors are ready to assign fair value to financial assets,"
AccountingWeb, November 2007 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=104246
When credit markets all but dried up as a
result of the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the late summer, auditors of
investment and commercial banks that elected to adopt Financial
Accounting Standard 157, Fair Value Measurements, earlier than
the effective date of November 15th were called upon to play a key role
in determining the market value of mortgage-backed assets when few were
being traded. Many of these banks had to report huge write-downs in the
third quarter from declining assets values. But auditors of public
companies have made it clear in
three recently published white papers
from their newly formed Center for Audit Quality that despite the
severity of the current market crunch, they intend to apply the fair
value standard consistently, and market problems will not influence
their professional judgment about the quality of valuation models and
assumptions used by banks.
Continued in article
Jensen Comment
The following standards are especially pertinent to fair value
accounting:
FAS 105, 107, 115, 130, 133, 141, 142, 155, 157, 159
FAS 157 is mainly a definitional standard. The key standard to date is
FAS 159 that allows companies to cherry pick which contracts are to be
carried at fair value and which are to be carried at amortized historical
cost. To me FAS 159 is a terrible standard that can lead to all sorts of
subjective manipulation, earnings management, and aggregation of apples and
door knobs in summations of assets, liabilities, and earnings components. I
think the FASB viewed FAS 159 as a political expedient way to expand fair
value accounting into financial statements without having to fight the huge
political battle with banks and other corporations who aggressively oppose
required fair value accounting for all financial and derivative financial
instruments.
Why do bankers resist expanding FAS
159 into required accounting for all financial instruments?
Misleading Financial Statements:
Bankers Refusing to Recognize and Shed "Zombie Loans"
One worrying lesson for bankers and regulators
everywhere to bear in mind is post-bubble Japan. In the 1990s its leading
bankers not only hung onto their jobs; they also refused to recognise and
shed bad debts, in effect keeping “zombie” loans on their books. That is one
reason why the country's economy stagnated for so long. The quicker bankers
are to recognise their losses, to sell assets that they are hoarding in the
vain hope that prices will recover, and to make markets in such assets for
their clients, the quicker the banking system will get back on its feet.
The Economist, as quoted in Jim Mahar's blog on November 10, 2007 ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
After the Collapse of Loan Markets
Banks are Belatedly Taking Enormous Write Downs
BTW one of the important stories that are coming
out is the fact that this is affecting all tranches of the debt as even AAA
rated debt is being marked down (which is why the rating agencies are
concerned). The San Antonio Express News reminds us that conflicts of
interest exist here too.
Jime Mahar, November 10, 2007 ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
Jensen Comment
The FASB and the IASB are moving ever closer to fair value accounting for
financial instruments. FAS 159 made it an option in FAS 159. One of the main
reasons it's not required is the tremendous lobbying effort of the banking
industry. Although many excuses are given resisting fair value accounting
for financial instruments, I suspect that the main underlying reasons are
those "Zombie" loans that are overvalued at historical costs on current
financial statements.
Daniel Covitz and Paul Harrison of the
Federal Reserve Board found no evidence of credit agency conflicts of
interest problems of credit agencies, but thier study is dated in 2003 and
may not apply to the recent credit bubble and burst ---
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/feds/2003/200368/200368pap.pdf
In September 2007 some U.S. Senators
accused the rating agencies of conflicts of interest
"Senators accuse rating agencies of conflicts of interest in market
turmoil," Bloomberg News, September 26, 2007 ---
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/09/26/business/credit.php
Also see
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2007/05/rating-agencies-weak-link.html
Bob Jensen's Rotten to the Core threads are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
Questions
How are auditors dealing with fair market value accounting and credit market
issues?
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on October
19, 2007
With New, United Voice, Auditors Stand Ground on How to
Treat Crunch
by
David Reilly
The Wall Street Journal
Oct 17, 2007
Page: C1
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Audit
Quality, Auditing, Auditing Services, Auditor Independence,
Auditor/Client Disagreements, Banking, Fair Value Accounting
SUMMARY: The
article discusses three papers issued by the Center for
Audit Quality on the recent issues in credit markets. The
topics included the use of market prices for hard-to-trade
securities and issues of banks' exposure to losses in
off-balance-sheet entities. Organization of the Center for
Audit Quality is discussed, along with reaction to the
purpose of this entity from Lynn Turner, former Chief
Accountant at the SEC, and an academic researcher at the
University of Tennessee, Joseph Carcello.
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: The article may be used to discuss the
current credit market issues in an auditing class as well as
a financial reporting class.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Based on discussions in the article and on information
at its web site (see http://thecaq.aicpa.org/) discuss the
purpose and organization of the Center for Audit Quality.
2.) What is self-regulation of the auditing profession? When
did auditors lose the ability to self-regulate?
3.) Some reactions described in this article are positive
about the role that is being played by the Center for Audit
Quality, while others are negative. Which view do you hold?
Support your position.
4.) Summarize concerns with the complexity of financial
reporting guidance in the U.S. How might the work from the
Center for Audit Quality contribute to that complexity? How
might its work alleviate the issue of complexity in
reporting standards?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
RELATED
ARTICLES:
Auditors to Street: Use Market Price
by David Reilly and Randall Smith
The
Wall Street Journal
Sep 18, 2007
Page: C2
|
Also see
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/FairValue/
May 17, 2006 message from Peter Walton
I would like to take this opportunity to let
you know about a forthcoming book from Routledge:
The Routledge Companion to Fair Value and
Financial Reporting ---
Click Here
Edited by Peter Walton
May 2007: 246x174: 406pp
Hb: 978-0-415-42356-4: £95.00 $170.00
Jensen Comment
Even though I have a paper published in this book, I will receive no
compensation from sales of the book. And since I'm retired, lines on a
resume no longer matter.
Introduction to Fair Value Accounting
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at various other links:
I recently completed the first draft of a paper on fair value at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
Comments would be helpful.
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms
Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation, and Yield Curves
for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm
The "Unknown Professor's Financial Rounds Blog states the following on
September 21, 2007 ---
http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/
And They Say Accounting Doesn't Make Sense
As a person who's trained primarily in finance,
accounting rules sometimes look like they were designed by Monty Python.
Here's the latest installment - your company's credit rating drops, so
the market value of your liabilities fall. As a result, you show a
profit. This is what happened to some Wall Street firms recently. Read
the whole story
here. IMO, the best line in the
article is:
But Moody’s Investors Service said buyers
should beware of gains booked when brokers mark down their own debt
liabilities. “Moody’s does not consider such gains to be
high-quality, core earnings,” it said in a report issued Friday.
Ya think?
This is why we make all our Finance students
take four accounting classes before they graduate. That way, they'll see
these things often enough that they won't break out laughing.
Question
Why am I not laughing? Is it because I taught accounting for 40 years?
Actually the fact that a lowered credit rating can lead to a realized
gain should make sense even to a finance professor. Consider the following
scenario:
- I sell a bond and record a liability for $100,000 that matures in
ten years.
- My credit rating gets lowered the next day.
- I buy back the bond for $90,000 (the market value of the bond
declines because of my lowered credit rating)
- I've made a $10,000 cash profit in one day because of a lowered
credit rating
- I wonder if a finance professor can comprehend that this is a gain.
- I wonder if Moody's can understand that this is a very high quality
earnings since its cash in the bank.
Now what if I don't sell the bond but adopt the fair value accounting
option for financial instruments under FAS 159. I did not realize a cash
profit if I still owe $100,000 when the bond eventually matures. But the
reason I report an unrealized holding gain follows the same logic as if I
bought back the bond today. That's what the "fair value option" under FAS
159 is all about.
If Moody's does not treat unrealized holding gains and losses as
high-quality, core earnings, more power to them.
Finance students who've taken four courses in accounting may not laugh
because they understand why sometimes credit rating gains are high quality
and sometimes low quality will not laugh because they understand why. But
they may not understand why their finance professor is laughing.
Bob Jensen's tutorials on fair value accounting are at the following
two links:
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly
Review on October 5, 2007
Virtuous Losses
by WSJ
Editors; Review & Outlook Page
The Wall Street Journal
Oct 02, 2007
Page: A16
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Accounting,
Accounting Theory, Advanced Financial Accounting, Bonds,
Debt, Impairment
SUMMARY: The editors laud UBS AG and Citigroup "for
their announcements...that they'll soon take big
writedowns for their mortgage bets." They react this way
on the premise that "one question haunting the markets
during the subprime meltdown has been where the
financial bodies are buried." Similar reactions are
evident for UBS and Citigroup shareholders; the
companies' share prices both rose following the
announcements. The editors conclude by offering evidence
that credit markets are stabilizing and state that "by
being forthright now, the banks can aid the process of
bringing buyers back to the debt markets."
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: This article can be used to
cover write-downs due to impairment losses on mortgage
assets as well as to discuss debtholders as users of
financial markets. The situation also could be described
as a "big bath" write-down to clean house now while
times are bad in credit markets in general and, at least
for UBS, while corporate leadership is new.
QUESTIONS:
1.) In the opinion page article, the editors argue that
"marking asset to market is...better for the financial
system as a whole, rather than hiding losses on the
balance sheet and hoping for a rebound." What does this
statement mean? In your answer, define the terms
"historical cost" and "mark to market." Also, address
the notion that a loss could be included in a balance
sheet account.
2.) Refer to the related articles. What are the assets
on which losses were taken at UBS and Citigroup?
3.) Some might argue that the losses being recorded by
Citigroup and UBS AG constitute a "big bath" to pave the
way for improving reported results in the future. How
does a current writedown help to improve reported
results in the future? What current circumstances at
each of these firms and in the general economy might
allow for taking this approach to writedowns?
4.) Refer again to the opinion page article's conclusion
that reporting losses now "can aid the process of
bringing buyers back to the debt markets." Should
financial reporting have a specific outcome, such as
improving numbers of credit market participants, as its
objective? Support your answer.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
|
When do market investors become market makers?
When "quants" become market makers instead of market players, it throws fair
value accounting into a turmoil.
November 23, 2007 message from Amy Dunbar
[Amy.Dunbar@BUSINESS.UCONN.EDU]
The
subprime crisis has captured my attention, and on the chance that others
on this listserv are interested in this area, I am sending this email
about the paper, What Happened to the Quants in August 2007? I assumed
the hedge funds went down because of subprime investments, but it
appears that was just one of many possible causes. I would love to hear
what others think, particularly about the possibility of regulatory
reform (mentioned at the end below) ---
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1015987
The paper has 9011
abstract views and 4447 downloads. Looks like a lot of people are
interested in the hedge fund losses.
The paper is
fascinating. Its objective is to suggest reasons for the hedge fund
losses during the week of Aug 6, 2007. The funds were quantitative,
market-neutral funds. No major losses were reported in other hedge-fund
sectors. The paper compares August 1998 (think LTCM collapse) with
August 2007, and concludes the following:
In
August 1998, default of Russian government debt caused a flight to
quality that ultimately resulted in the demise of LTCM and many
other fixed-income arbitrage funds. This series of events caught
even the most experienced traders by surprise because of the
unrelated nature of Russian government debt and the broadly
diversified portfolios of some of the most successful fixed-income
arbitrage funds. Similarly, the events of August 2007 caught some of
the most experienced quantitative equity market-neutral managers by
surprise. But August 2007 may be far more significant because it
provides the first piece of evidence that problems in one corner of
the financial system - possibly the sub-prime mortgage sector and
related credit markets – can spill over so directly to a completely
unrelated corner: long/short equity strategies. This is precisely
the kind of ”shortcut" described in the theory of mathematical
networks that generates the “small-world phenomenon" of Watts (1999)
in which a small random shock in one part of the network can rapidly
propagate throughout the entire network.
The authors hypothesize an unwind of a large
long/short equity portfolio, most likely a quantitative equity
market-neutral portfolio.
Likely
factors contributing to the magnitude of the losses of this apparent
unwind were: (a) the enormous growth in assets devoted to long/short
equity strategies over the past decade and, more recently, to
various 130/30 and other active-extension strategies; (b) the
systematic decline in the profitability of quantitative equity
market-neutral strategies, due to increasing competition,
technological advances, and institutional and environmental changes
such as decimalization, the decline in retail order flow, and the
decline in equity-market volatility; (c) the increased leverage
needed to maintain the levels of expected returns required by
hedge-fund investors in the face of lower profitability; (d) the
historical liquidity of U.S. equity markets and the general lack of
awareness (at least prior to August 6, 2007) of just how crowded the
long/short equity category had become; and (e) the unknown size and
timing of new sub-prime-mortgage-related problems in credit markets,
which created a climate of fear and panic, heightening the risk
sensitivities of managers and investors across all markets and style
categories.
They also note that
the
timing of these losses - shortly after month-end of a very
challenging month for many hedge-fund strategies - is also
suggestive. The formal process of marking portfolios to market
typically takes several business days after month-end, and August
7-9 may well be the first time managers and investors were forced to
confront the extraordinary credit-related losses they suffered in
July, which may have triggered the initial unwind of their more
liquid investments, e.g., their equity portfolios, during this
period.
Question: FAS 115 requires investment
securities (actually only trading and available-for-sale
securities) to be marked to market, but what is
the driving force behind marking to market on a monthly basis?
Reporting to investors in the fund?
Do
the losses of August 2007 signal a breakdown in the basic economic
relationships that yield attractive risk/reward profiles for such
strategies, or is August 2007 an unavoidable and integral aspect of
those risk/reward profiles? An instructive thought experiment is to
consider a market-neutral portfolio strategy in which U.S. equities
with odd-numbered CUSIP identifiers are held long and those with
even-number CUSIPs are held short. Suppose such a portfolio strategy
is quite popular and a
number
of large hedge funds have implemented it. Now imagine that one of
these large hedge funds decides to liquidate its holdings because of
some liquidity shock. Regardless of this portfolio's typical
expected return during normal times, in the midst of a rapid and
large unwind, all such portfolios will experience losses, with the
magnitudes of those losses directly proportional to the size and
speed of the unwind. Moreover, it is easy to see how such an unwind
can generate losses for other types of portfolios, e.g., long-only
portfolios of securities with prime-number CUSIPs, dedicated
shortsellers that short only those securities with CUSIPs divisible
by 10, etc. If a portfolio is of sufficient size, and it is based on
a sufficiently popular strategy that is broadly implemented, then
unwinding even a small fraction of it can cascade into a major
market dislocation.
. . .
However,
a successful investment strategy should include an assessment of the
risk of ruin, and that risk should be managed appropriately.
Moreover, the magnitude of tail risk should, in principle, be
related to a strategy's expected return given the inevitable
trade-off between risk and reward. Therefore, it is disingenuous to
assert that “a strategy is successful except in the face of
25-standard-deviation events." Given the improbability of such
events, we can only conclude that either the actual distribution of
returns is extraordinarily leptokurtic, or the standard deviation is
time-varying and exhibits occasional spikes.
In
particular, as Montier (2007) observed, risk has become “endogenous"
in certain markets - particularly those that are recently flush with
large inflows of assets - which is one of the reasons that the
largest players can no longer assume that historical estimates of
volatility and price impact are accurate measures of current risk
exposures. Endogeneity is, in fact, an old economic concept
illustrated by the well-known theory of imperfect competition: if an
economic entity, or group of coordinated entities, is so large that
it can unilaterally affect prices by its own actions, then the
standard predictions of microeconomics under perfect competition no
longer hold. Similarly, if a certain portfolio strategy is so
popular that its liquidation can unilaterally affect the risks that
it faces, then the standard tools of basic risk models such as
Value-at-Risk and normal distributions no longer hold. In this
respect, quantitative models may have failed in August 2007 by not
adequately capturing the endogeneity of their risk exposures. Given
the size and interconnectedness of the hedge-fund industry, we may
require more sophisticated analytics to model the feedback implicit
in current market dynamics.
The authors commented several times on the lack
of transparency in the hedge fund market. I found the authors’ comments
on the need for possible regulatory reform interesting.
Given
the role that hedge funds have begun to play in financial markets -
namely, significant providers of liquidity and credit - they now
impose externalities on the economy that are no longer negligible.
In this respect, hedge funds are becoming more like banks. The fact
that the banking industry is so highly regulated is due to the
enormous social externalities banks generate when they succeed, and
when they fail. But unlike banks, hedge funds can decide to withdraw
liquidity at a moment's notice, and while this may be benign if it
occurs rarely and randomly, a coordinated withdrawal of liquidity
among an entire sector of hedge funds could have disastrous
consequences for the viability of the financial system if it occurs
at the wrong time and in the wrong sector.
November 23, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Amy,
Why do bankers resist expanding FAS 159 into required accounting for all
financial instruments?
Misleading Financial Statements:
Bankers Refusing to Recognize and Shed "Zombie Loans"
One worrying lesson for bankers and regulators
everywhere to bear in mind is post-bubble Japan. In the 1990s its leading
bankers not only hung onto their jobs; they also refused to recognise and
shed bad debts, in effect keeping “zombie” loans on their books. That is one
reason why the country's economy stagnated for so long. The quicker bankers
are to recognise their losses, to sell assets that they are hoarding in the
vain hope that prices will recover, and to make markets in such assets for
their clients, the quicker the banking system will get back on its feet.
The Economist, as quoted in Jim Mahar's blog on November 10, 2007 ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
But there are questions in theory about fair value accounting!
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
I personally think the driving forces behind FAS 115 were tendencies of
banks to not recognize those "zombie" investments and adequately disclose
highly likely losses. Firstly I might note that FAS 115 adjusts
available-for-sale (AFS) securities to fair value without impacting earnings
volatility except in the case of securities traders. According to Paragraph
86 of FAS 115, the FASB wanted to require fair value accounting for all
financial securities but got hung up on debt instruments (such as mortgage
debt) that more commonly are not AFS and more difficult to
mark-to-market (i.e. debt is often more difficult to value due to not being
traded with unique covenants and is more likely to be HTM,
held-to-maturity). The FASB justification for FAS 115 can be found in
Paragraphs 39-43, although the elaborations in Paragraphs 86-100 are
enlightening. IFRS requirements are similar, although penalties for
violating HTM classification are somewhat more onerous.
An interesting November 12 video on the “cascade theory” of what might be
termed quantitative models, like lemmings, cascading over a cliff ---
http://www.ft.com/cms/bfba2c48-5588-11dc-b971-0000779fd2ac.html?_i_referralObject=593529134&fromSearch=n
In that sense the comparison of the LTCM disaster in 1998 with the August
2007 downfall seems to hold some water. Although the big losers in both
instances were big and sophisticated investors who’re well aware of the
unique risks of unregulated hedge funds, the externalities affecting Main
Street (read that CREF investors) are very real. The LTCM fiasco could well
have brought down equity markets in all of Wall Street ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#LTCM
One of the hardcopy journals I read cover-to-cover each week is The
Economist on October 25, 2007. The following is one of my favorite
readable papers among the thousands of articles written about this
controversy ---
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10026288
WHEN markets wobbled in August, almost all the
media attention was focused on the credit crunch and the links to
American mortgage loans. But at exactly the same time, another crisis
was occurring at the core of the stockmarket.
This crisis stemmed from the obscure world of
quantitative, or quant-based, finance, which uses computer models to
find attractive stocks and to identify overpriced shares. Suddenly, in
August, the models went wrong.
The incident revealed a problem at the heart of
the financial system. In effect, the quant groups were acting as
marketmakers, trading so often (some are aiming for transaction times in
terms of milliseconds) that they set prices for everyone else. But
unlike traditional marketmakers, quant funds are not obliged to make
markets come rain or shine. And unlike marketmakers, they use a lot of
leverage. This means that instead of providing liquidity in a crisis,
the quants added to instability. There is a lesson there.
In a way, the crisis stemmed from the quants'
success. Many firms, such as the American hedge fund Renaissance
Technologies, had done fantastically well and had been able to charge
hefty fees. But if one firm can hire top mathematicians and use the
latest technology, so can others. An arms race developed, with some
trading faster and faster—even siting their computers closer to the
exchanges in order to cut the time it took orders to travel down the
wires.
And as the computers sifted through the data,
some strategies became overcrowded. A paper* by Amir Khandani and Andrew
Lo of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology back-tested a proxy for
a typical strategy, involving buying the previous day's losing stocks
and selling the winners. Such a strategy would have delivered a daily
return of 1.38% before (substantial) costs in 1995 but the return fell
steadily to 0.15% a day last year.
In the face of declining returns, the authors
reckon, the natural response of managers would have been to increase
leverage. But that, of course, increased their vulnerability when things
went wrong.
Both the MIT academics and a paper by Cliff
Asness of AQR Capital Management, a leading quant group, agree that
August's problems probably began when a diversified, or multi-strategy,
hedge fund experienced losses in the credit markets. The fund sought to
reduce its exposures but its credit positions were impossible to sell.
So it cut its quant positions instead, since that merely involved
selling highly liquid stocks.
However, that selling pressure caused other
quant funds to lose money as their favoured stocks fell in price. Those
that were leveraged were naturally forced to reduce their positions as
well. These waves of selling played havoc with the models. Quant
investors thought they were aware of the risks of their strategy and had
built diversified portfolios to avoid it. But the parts of the portfolio
that were previously uncorrelated suddenly fell in tandem.
In theory, quant funds could have been bold and
borrowed more; after all, the stocks they thought were cheap had become
even cheaper. The traders who took on the positions of Long-Term Capital
Management (LTCM), after the hedge fund failed in 1998, ended up making
money. But the example of LTCM, which went bust before it could be
proved right, argued in favour of a more cautious approach. “We could
have rolled the dice but that would have risked the business,” said one
quant-fund manager. “I don't know of anyone that did so.”
Avoiding that trap simply led quant investors
into another. On August 10th, the stocks that quants had favoured
suddenly rebounded. Those who had cut their positions most could not
benefit from the rally. That category clearly included Goldman Sachs's
Global Alpha hedge fund, which lost a remarkable 23% on the month.
If it were just a few hedge funds, backed by
rich people, losing money, it might not matter. But the funds had become
too important: rather than adding stability, as marketmakers are
supposed to do, they added volatility.
Quants will adjust their models and clients
will become more discerning; AQR's. Mr Asness says his firm will look
harder for “unique” factors, that is, not used by other fund managers.
But regulators should also reflect that markets are less stable than
they assumed. The presence of leveraged traders such as quants at their
heart means conditions can now turn, at the flick of a switch, from
stability to panic.
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
When "quants" become market makers instead of market players, it throws fair
value accounting into a turmoil.
Question
Will “Minsky Moments” become “Minsky Accounting?”
As both the FASB in the U.S. and the IASB international standards boards
march ever onward toward "fair value" accounting by replacing historical
costs with current values (mark-to-market accounting), it will plunge
corporate accountants and their CPA auditors ever deeper into current value
estimation. Financial statements will become increasingly volatile and
fictional with market movements. It is becoming clear that the efficient
markets hypothesis that drives much of the theory behind fair value
accounting is increasingly on shaky ground.
Especially problematic are moments in time like now (2007) when the
bubble burst on
subprime mortgage borrowing and investing that has caused tremors
throughout the world of banking and investing and risk sharing. And once
again, the ghost of long departed John Maynard Keynes seems to have risen
from the grave. There's material for a great
Stephen
King horror novel here.
It is time for accounting standard setters who set such new standards as
FAS 157 and FAS 159 to dust off some old economics books and seriously
consider whether they understand the theoretical underpinnings of new and
pending fair value standards moving closer to show time. You can read more
fair value accounting controversies in my work-in-process PowerPoint file
called 10FairValue.ppt at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/JensenPowerPoint/
Aside from
badly mixing my metaphors here, the fundamental problem is that unrealized
fair values painting rosy financial performance (as the speculative roller
coaster rises with breath taking thrill toward the crest) become unrealized
losses as the roller coaster swoops downward toward “Minsky Moments.” It's a
fundamental problem in fair value accounting because an enormous portion of
reported earnings on the way up become sheer Minsky mincemeat (before
investments are sold and liabilities are not settled) and diabolical garbage
on the way down. In other words in these boom/bust market cycles, financial
statements (certified by independent auditors under new fair value
accounting standards) become increasingly hypothetical fantasy replacing
accustomed facts rooted in transactional accounting.
Fair value standard setters are plunging accounting into the realm of
economic theory that is itself less uncertain than astrology. It's time to
rethink some of that Chicago School economic theory that we've taken for
granted because of all the Nobel Prizes awarded to Chicago School
economists.
Question
Did John
Maynard Keynes rise from the grave?
"In Time of Tumult, Obscure Economist Gains Currency: Mr. Minsky
Long Argued Markets Were Crisis Prone; His 'Moment' Has Arrived," by Justin Lahart, The Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2007; Page A1 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118736585456901047.html?mod=todays_us_page_one
The recent market turmoil is rocking investors
around the globe. But it is raising the stock of one person: a
little-known economist whose views have suddenly become very popular.
Hyman Minsky, who died more than a decade ago, spent much of his
career advancing the idea that financial systems are inherently
susceptible to bouts of speculation that, if they last long enough, end
in crises. At a time when many economists were coming to believe in the
efficiency of markets, Mr. Minsky was considered somewhat of a radical
for his stress on their tendency toward excess and upheaval.
Today, his views are reverberating from New
York to Hong Kong as economists and traders try to understand what's
happening in the markets. The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College,
where Mr. Minsky worked for the last six years of his life, is planning
to reprint two books by the economist -- one on John Maynard Keynes, the
other on unstable economies. The latter book was being offered on the
Internet for thousands of dollars.
Christopher Wood, a widely read Hong Kong-based
analyst for CLSA Group, told his clients that recent cash injections by
central banks designed "to prevent, or at least delay, a 'Minsky
moment,' is evidence of market failure."
Indeed, the Minsky moment has become a
fashionable catch phrase on Wall Street. It refers to the time when
over-indebted investors are forced to sell even their solid investments
to make good on their loans, sparking sharp declines in financial
markets and demand for cash that can force central bankers to lend a
hand.
Mr. Minsky, who died in 1996 at the age of 77,
was a tall man with unruly hair who wore unpressed suits. He approached
the world as "one big research tank," says Diana Minsky, his daughter,
an art history professor at Bard. "Economics was an integrated part of
his life. It wasn't isolated. There wasn't a sense that work was
something he did at the office."
She recalls how, on a trip to a village in
Italy to meet friends, Mr. Minsky ended up interviewing workers at a
glove maker to understand how small-scale capitalism worked in the local
economy.
Although he was born in Chicago, Mr. Minsky
didn't have many fans in the "Chicago School" of economists, who
believed that markets were efficient. A follower of the economist John
Maynard Keynes, he died just before a decade of financial crises in
Asia, Russia, tech stocks, corporate credit and now mortgage debt, began
to lend credence to his ideas.
Following those periods of tumult, more
investors turned to the investment classic "Manias, Panics, and Crashes:
A History of Financial Crises," by
Charles Kindleberger, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology who leaned heavily on Mr. Minsky's work.
Mr. Kindleberger showed that financial crises
unfolded the way that Mr. Minsky said they would. Though a loyal
follower, Mr. Kindleberger described Mr. Minsky as "a man with a
reputation among monetary theorists for being particularly pessimistic,
even lugubrious, in his emphasis on the fragility of the monetary system
and its propensity to disaster."
At its core, the Minsky view was
straightforward: When times are good, investors take on risk; the longer
times stay good, the more risk they take on, until they've taken on too
much. Eventually, they reach a point where the cash generated by their
assets no longer is sufficient to pay off the mountains of debt they
took on to acquire them. Losses on such speculative assets prompt
lenders to call in their loans. "This is likely to lead to a collapse of
asset values," Mr. Minsky wrote.
When investors are forced to sell even their
less-speculative positions to make good on their loans, markets spiral
lower and create a severe demand for cash. At that point, the Minsky
moment has arrived.
"We are in the midst of a Minsky moment,
bordering on a Minsky meltdown," says Paul McCulley, an economist and
fund manager at Pacific Investment Management Co., the world's largest
bond-fund manager, in an email exchange.
The housing market is a case in point, says
Investment Technology Group Inc. economist Robert Barbera, who first met
Mr. Minsky in the late 1980s. When home buyers were expected to have a
down payment of 10% or 20% to qualify for a mortgage, and to provide
income documentation that showed they'd be able to make payments, there
was minimal risk. But as home prices rose, and speculators entered the
market, lenders relaxed their guard and began offering loans with no
money down and little or no documentation.
Once home prices stalled and, in many of the
more-speculative markets, fell, there was a big problem.
"If you're lending to home buyers with 20% down
and house prices fall by 2%, so what?" Mr. Barbera says. If most of a
lender's portfolio is tied up in loans to buyers who "don't put anything
down and house prices fall by 2%, you're bankrupt," he says.
Several money managers are laying claim to
spotting the Minsky moment first. "I featured him about 18 months ago,"
says Jeremy Grantham, chairman of GMO LLC, which manages $150 billion in
assets. He pointed to a note in early 2006 when he wrote that investors
had become too comfortable that financial markets were safe, and
consequently were taking on too much risk, just as Mr. Minsky predicted.
"Guinea pigs of the world unite. We have nothing to lose but our
shirts," he concluded.
It was Mr. McCulley at Pacific Investment,
though, who coined the phrase "Minsky moment" during the Russian debt
crisis in 1998.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's fair value PowerPoint show ---
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/JensenPowerPoint/
August 18, 2007 reply from J. S. Gangolly
[gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
Bob,
I thought we could all enjoy the following Keynes
quotes:
1. "Capitalism is the astounding belief that the
most wickedest of men will do the most wickedest of things for the greatest
good of everyone."
2. How prophetic he was:
"The day is not far off when the economic problem
will take the back seat where it belongs, and the arena of the heart and the
head will be occupied or reoccupied, by our real problems / the problems of
life and of human relations, of creation and behavior and religion."
3. How wonderfully Keynes anticipated stuff in
games played by Bayesian players and stuff in self-fulfilling equilibria
(which yielded three "Nobel" prizes), all without introducing any
mathematics or economic mumbo jumbo:
"Successful investing is anticipating the
anticipations of others."
4. The accountics folks might enjoy the following:
"The difficulty lies not so much in developing new
ideas as in escaping from old ones."
"If economists could manage to get themselves
thought of as humble, competent people on a level with dentists, that would
be splendid."
"When the facts change, I change my mind. What do
you do, sir?"
5. This should thrill tax folks:
"The avoidance of taxes is the only intellectual
pursuit that still carries any reward."
Jagdish
August 20, 2007 reply from Paul Williams
[Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]
Apparently no economist ever dies -- they just
come in and out of fashion. In George Akerlof's presidential address to
the AEA in January 2006 ("The Missing Motivation in Macroeconomics") he
concludes: "This lecture has shown that the early Keynesians got a great
deal of the working of the economic system right in ways that are denied
by the five neutralities (assumptions of the positivists).
As quoted from Keynes earlier, they based their
models on "our knowledge of human nature and from the detailed facts of
experience."" Thus the recent interest in "norms" by Shyam Sunder and
the urgency to provide "econonmic" explanations for "norms." So the very
FIRST plenary speaker at the, Joe Henrich, at the Chicago 2007 AAA
meeting, regaled us with his "evidence" that market integrated societies
produce people who are more trusting and fair- minded because people
from Missouri divide the spoils in a game that no one ever plays in
their real lives more equitably than a hunter- gatherer from New Guinea
for whom the game may have an entirely different meaning than someone
from St.Louis (a synchresis, perhaps).
Given that the integration of societies by
"markets" represents the blink of an eye in evolutionary time (even for
humans) one might consider that perhaps what makes Missourians different
from hunter- gatherers is that they come from a Christian tradition that
predates market integration by a couple thousand years (a tradition of
Christian agape?).
Linguists have long remarked that language is
impossible without trust (how else can I believe that words mean what I
am told they mean or how do I avoid starvation at birth unless I "trust"
my mother? We are born trusting). Yet we get this facile rendering with
regression equations of Adam Smith's argument stood completely on its
head. For Smith markets were a possibility only within a society that
was already integrated (in Smith's case by the kirk's dispositon of a
stern Calvanist morality).
Mike Royko (the columnist for the Chicago
Tribune) once opined that he had finally figured out economic theory, to
wit, "Economics says that almost anything can happen, and it usually
does." The end of history? I bet not.
May 17, 2006 message from Peter Walton
I would like to take this opportunity to
let you know about a forthcoming book from Routledge:
The Routledge Companion to Fair Value and
Financial Reporting ---
Click Here
Edited by Peter Walton
May 2007: 246x174: 406pp
Hb: 978-0-415-42356-4: £95.00 $170.00
Jensen Comment
Even though I have a paper published in this book, I will receive no
compensation from sales of the book. And since I'm retired, lines on a
resume no longer matter.
FASB Statement No. 107
Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial Instruments
(Issue Date 12/91)
[Full Text]
[Summary]
[Status]
This Statement
extends existing fair value disclosure practices for some instruments by
requiring all entities to disclose the fair value of financial instruments,
both assets and liabilities recognized and not recognized in the statement
of financial position, for which it is practicable to estimate fair value.
If estimating fair value is not practicable, this Statement requires
disclosure of descriptive information pertinent to estimating the value of a
financial instrument. Disclosures about fair value are not required for
certain financial instruments listed in paragraph 8.
This Statement is
effective for financial statements issued for fiscal years ending after
December 15, 1992, except for entities with less than $150 million in total
assets in the current statement of financial position. For those entities,
the effective date is for fiscal years ending after December 15, 1995.
FASB Statement No. 115
Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities
(Issue Date 5/93)
[Full Text]
[Summary]
[Status]
This Statement
addresses the accounting and reporting for investments in equity securities
that have readily determinable fair values and for all investments in debt
securities. Those investments are to be classified in three categories and
accounted for as follows:
Debt securities
that the enterprise has the positive intent and ability to hold to maturity
are classified as held-to-maturity securities and reported at amortized
cost.
Debt and equity
securities that are bought and held principally for the purpose of selling
them in the near term are classified as trading securities and reported at
fair value, with unrealized gains and losses included in earnings.
Debt and equity
securities not classified as either held-to-maturity securities or trading
securities are classified as available-for-sale securities and reported at
fair value, with unrealized gains and losses excluded from earnings and
reported in a separate component of shareholders' equity.
This Statement
does not apply to unsecuritized loans. However, after mortgage loans are
converted to mortgage-backed securities, they are subject to its provisions.
This Statement supersedes FASB Statement No. 12, Accounting for Certain
Marketable Securities, and related Interpretations and amends FASB Statement
No. 65, Accounting for Certain Mortgage Banking Activities, to eliminate
mortgage-backed securities from its scope.
This Statement is
effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1993. It is to be
initially applied as of the beginning of an enterprise's fiscal year and
cannot be applied retroactively to prior years' financial statements.
However, an enterprise may elect to initially apply this Statement as of the
end of an earlier fiscal year for which annual financial statements have not
previously been issued.
FASB Statement No. 130
Reporting Comprehensive Income
(Issue Date 6/97)
[Full Text]
[Summary]
[Status]
This Statement
establishes standards for reporting and display of comprehensive income and
its components (revenues, expenses, gains, and losses) in a full set of
general-purpose financial statements. This Statement requires that all items
that are required to be recognized under accounting standards as components
of comprehensive income be reported in a financial statement that is
displayed with the same prominence as other financial statements. This
Statement does not require a specific format for that financial statement
but requires that an enterprise display an amount representing total
comprehensive income for the period in that financial statement.
This Statement
requires that an enterprise (a) classify items of other comprehensive income
by their nature in a financial statement and (b) display the accumulated
balance of other comprehensive income separately from retained earnings and
additional paid-in capital in the equity section of a statement of financial
position.
This Statement is
effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1997.
Reclassification of financial statements for earlier periods provided for
comparative purposes is required.
FASB Statement No. 133 and Amendments in FAS 137, 138, 149, and 155
Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities
(Issue Date 6/98)
[Full Text]
[Summary]
[Status]
This Statement
establishes accounting and reporting standards for derivative instruments,
including certain derivative instruments embedded in other contracts,
(collectively referred to as derivatives) and for hedging activities. It
requires that an entity recognize all derivatives as either assets or
liabilities in the statement of financial position and measure those
instruments at fair value. If certain conditions are met, a derivative may
be specifically designated as (a) a hedge of the exposure to changes in the
fair value of a recognized asset or liability or an unrecognized firm
commitment, (b) a hedge of the exposure to variable cash flows of a
forecasted transaction, or (c) a hedge of the foreign currency exposure of a
net investment in a foreign operation, an unrecognized firm commitment, an
available-for-sale security, or a foreign-currency-denominated forecasted
transaction. The accounting for changes in the fair value of a derivative
(that is, gains and losses) depends on the intended use of the derivative
and the resulting designation.
For a derivative
designated as hedging the exposure to changes in the fair value of a
recognized asset or liability or a firm commitment (referred to as a fair
value hedge), the gain or loss is recognized in earnings in the period of
change together with the offsetting loss or gain on the hedged item
attributable to the risk being hedged. The effect of that accounting is to
reflect in earnings the extent to which the hedge is not effective in
achieving offsetting changes in fair value. For a derivative designated as
hedging the exposure to variable cash flows of a forecasted transaction
(referred to as a cash flow hedge), the effective portion of the
derivative's gain or loss is initially reported as a component of other
comprehensive income (outside earnings) and subsequently reclassified into
earnings when the forecasted transaction affects earnings. The ineffective
portion of the gain or loss is reported in earnings immediately. For a
derivative designated as hedging the foreign currency exposure of a net
investment in a foreign operation, the gain or loss is reported in other
comprehensive income (outside earnings) as part of the cumulative
translation adjustment. The accounting for a fair value hedge described
above applies to a derivative designated as a hedge of the foreign currency
exposure of an unrecognized firm commitment or an available-for-sale
security. Similarly, the accounting for a cash flow hedge described above
applies to a derivative designated as a hedge of the foreign currency
exposure of a foreign-currency-denominated forecasted transaction. For a
derivative not designated as a hedging instrument, the gain or loss is
recognized in earnings in the period of change. Under this Statement, an
entity that elects to apply hedge accounting is required to establish at the
inception of the hedge the method it will use for assessing the
effectiveness of the hedging derivative and the measurement approach for
determining the ineffective aspect of the hedge. Those methods must be
consistent with the entity's approach to managing risk.
This Statement
applies to all entities. A not-for-profit organization should recognize the
change in fair value of all derivatives as a change in net assets in the
period of change. In a fair value hedge, the changes in the fair value of
the hedged item attributable to the risk being hedged also are recognized.
However, because of the format of their statement of financial performance,
not-for-profit organizations are not permitted special hedge accounting for
derivatives used to hedge forecasted transactions. This Statement does not
address how a not-for-profit organization should determine the components of
an operating measure if one is presented.
This Statement
precludes designating a nonderivative financial instrument as a hedge of an
asset, liability, unrecognized firm commitment, or forecasted transaction
except that a nonderivative instrument denominated in a foreign currency may
be designated as a hedge of the foreign currency exposure of an unrecognized
firm commitment denominated in a foreign currency or a net investment in a
foreign operation.
This Statement
amends FASB Statement No. 52, Foreign Currency Translation, to permit
special accounting for a hedge of a foreign currency forecasted transaction
with a derivative. It supersedes FASB Statements No. 80, Accounting for
Futures Contracts, No. 105, Disclosure of Information about Financial
Instruments with Off-Balance-Sheet Risk and Financial Instruments with
Concentrations of Credit Risk, and No. 119, Disclosure about Derivative
Financial Instruments and Fair Value of Financial Instruments. It amends
FASB Statement No. 107, Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial
Instruments, to include in Statement 107 the disclosure provisions about
concentrations of credit risk from Statement 105. This Statement also
nullifies or modifies the consensuses reached in a number of issues
addressed by the Emerging Issues Task Force.
This Statement is
effective for all fiscal quarters of fiscal years beginning after June 15,
1999. Initial application of this Statement should be as of the beginning of
an entity's fiscal quarter; on that date, hedging relationships must be
designated anew and documented pursuant to the provisions of this Statement.
Earlier application of all of the provisions of this Statement is
encouraged, but it is permitted only as of the beginning of any fiscal
quarter that begins after issuance of this Statement. This Statement should
not be applied retroactively to financial statements of prior periods.
FASB Statement No. 142
Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets
(Issue Date 6/01)
[Full Text]
[Summary]
[Status]
This
Statement changes the subsequent accounting for goodwill and
other intangible assets in the following significant
respects:
-
Acquiring entities usually integrate acquired entities
into their operations, and thus the acquirers'
expectations of benefits from the resulting synergies
usually are reflected in the premium that they pay to
acquire those entities. However, the transaction-based
approach to accounting for goodwill under Opinion 17
treated the acquired entity as if it remained a
stand-alone entity rather than being integrated with the
acquiring entity; as a result, the portion of the
premium related to expected synergies (goodwill) was not
accounted for appropriately. This Statement adopts a
more aggregate view of goodwill and bases the accounting
for goodwill on the units of the combined entity into
which an acquired entity is integrated (those units are
referred to as reporting units).
-
Opinion 17 presumed that goodwill and all other
intangible assets were wasting assets (that is, finite
lived), and thus the amounts assigned to them should be
amortized in determining net income; Opinion 17 also
mandated an arbitrary ceiling of 40 years for that
amortization. This Statement does not presume that those
assets are wasting assets. Instead, goodwill and
intangible assets that have indefinite useful lives will
not be amortized but rather will be tested at least
annually for impairment. Intangible assets that have
finite useful lives will continue to be amortized over
their useful lives, but without the constraint of an
arbitrary ceiling.
-
Previous standards provided little guidance about how to
determine and measure goodwill impairment; as a result,
the accounting for goodwill impairments was not
consistent and not comparable and yielded information of
questionable usefulness. This Statement provides
specific guidance for testing goodwill for impairment.
Goodwill will be tested for impairment at least annually
using a two-step process that begins with an estimation
of the fair value of a reporting unit. The first step is
a screen for potential impairment, and the second step
measures the amount of impairment, if any. However, if
certain criteria are met, the requirement to test
goodwill for impairment annually can be satisfied
without a remeasurement of the fair value of a reporting
unit.
- In
addition, this Statement provides specific guidance on
testing intangible assets that will not be amortized for
impairment and thus removes those intangible assets from
the scope of other impairment guidance. Intangible
assets that are not amortized will be tested for
impairment at least annually by comparing the fair
values of those assets with their recorded amounts.
-
This Statement requires disclosure of information about
goodwill and other intangible assets in the years
subsequent to their acquisition that was not previously
required. Required disclosures include information about
the changes in the carrying amount of goodwill from
period to period (in the aggregate and by reportable
segment), the carrying amount of intangible assets by
major intangible asset class for those assets subject to
amortization and for those not subject to amortization,
and the estimated intangible asset amortization expense
for the next five years.
|
|
FASB Statement No. 155
Accounting for Certain Hybrid Financial Instruments—an amendment of FASB
Statements No. 133 and 140
(Issue Date 02/06)
[Full Text]
[Summary]
[Status]
This Statement
amends FASB Statements No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and
Hedging Activities, and No. 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of
Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities. This Statement resolves
issues addressed in Statement 133 Implementation Issue No. D1, “Application
of Statement 133 to Beneficial Interests in Securitized Financial Assets.”
This Statement:
Permits fair
value remeasurement for any hybrid financial instrument that contains an
embedded derivative that otherwise would require bifurcation
Clarifies which
interest-only strips and principal-only strips are not subject to the
requirements of Statement 133
Establishes a
requirement to evaluate interests in securitized financial assets to
identify interests that are freestanding derivatives or that are hybrid
financial instruments that contain an embedded derivative requiring
bifurcation
Clarifies that
concentrations of credit risk in the form of subordination are not embedded
derivatives
Amends Statement
140 to eliminate the prohibition on a qualifying special-purpose entity from
holding a derivative financial instrument that pertains to a beneficial
interest other than another derivative financial instrument.
Reasons for
Issuing This Statement
In January 2004,
the Board added this project to its agenda to address what had been
characterized as a temporary exemption from the application of the
bifurcation requirements of Statement 133 to beneficial interests in
securitized financial assets.
Prior to the
effective date of Statement 133, the FASB received inquiries on the
application of the exception in paragraph 14 of Statement 133 to beneficial
interests in securitized financial assets. In response to the inquiries,
Implementation Issue D1 indicated that, pending issuance of further
guidance, entities may continue to apply the guidance related to accounting
for beneficial interests in paragraphs 14 and 362 of Statement 140. Those
paragraphs indicate that any security that can be contractually prepaid or
otherwise settled in such a way that the holder of the security would not
recover substantially all of its recorded investment should be subsequently
measured like investments in debt securities classified as
available-for-sale or trading under FASB Statement No. 115, Accounting for
Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, and may not be classified
as held-to-maturity. Further, Implementation Issue D1 indicated that holders
of beneficial interests in securitized financial assets that are not subject
to paragraphs 14 and 362 of Statement 140 are not required to apply
Statement 133 to those beneficial interests until further guidance is
issued.
How the Changes
in This Statement Improve Financial Reporting
This Statement
improves financial reporting by eliminating the exemption from applying
Statement 133 to interests in securitized financial assets so that similar
instruments are accounted for similarly regardless of the form of the
instruments. This Statement also improves financial reporting by allowing a
preparer to elect fair value measurement at acquisition, at issuance, or
when a previously recognized financial instrument is subject to a
remeasurement (new basis) event, on an instrument-by-instrument basis, in
cases in which a derivative would otherwise have to be bifurcated. Providing
a fair value measurement election also results in more financial instruments
being measured at what the Board regards as the most relevant attribute for
financial instruments, fair value.
Effective Date
and Transition
This Statement
is effective for all financial instruments acquired or issued after the
beginning of an entity’s first fiscal year that begins after September 15,
2006. The fair value election provided for in paragraph 4(c) of this
Statement may also be applied upon adoption of this Statement for hybrid
financial instruments that had been bifurcated under paragraph 12 of
Statement 133 prior to the adoption of this Statement. Earlier adoption is
permitted as of the beginning of an entity’s fiscal year, provided the
entity has not yet issued financial statements, including financial
statements for any interim period for that fiscal year. Provisions of this
Statement may be applied to instruments that an entity holds at the date of
adoption on an instrument-by-instrument basis.
At adoption, any
difference between the total carrying amount of the individual components of
the existing bifurcated hybrid financial instrument and the fair value of
the combined hybrid financial instrument should be recognized as a
cumulative-effect adjustment to beginning retained earnings. The
cumulative-effect adjustment should be disclosed gross (that is, aggregating
gain positions separate from loss positions) determined on an
instrument-by-instrument basis. Prior periods should not be restated.
FASB Statement No. 157
Fair Value Measurements
(Issue Date 09/06)
[Full Text]
[Summary]
[Status]
This Statement
defines fair value, establishes a framework for measuring fair value in
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), and expands disclosures
about fair value measurements. This Statement applies under other accounting
pronouncements that require or permit fair value measurements, the Board
having previously concluded in those accounting pronouncements that fair
value is the relevant measurement attribute. Accordingly, this Statement
does not require any new fair value measurements. However, for some
entities, the application of this Statement will change current practice.
Reason for
Issuing This Statement
Prior to this
Statement, there were different definitions of fair value and limited
guidance for applying those definitions in GAAP. Moreover, that guidance was
dispersed among the many accounting pronouncements that require fair value
measurements. Differences in that guidance created inconsistencies that
added to the complexity in applying GAAP. In developing this Statement, the
Board considered the need for increased consistency and comparability in
fair value measurements and for expanded disclosures about fair value
measurements.
Differences
between This Statement and Current Practice
The changes to
current practice resulting from the application of this Statement relate to
the definition of fair value, the methods used to measure fair value, and
the expanded disclosures about fair value measurements.
The definition of
fair value retains the exchange price notion in earlier definitions of fair
value. This Statement clarifies that the exchange price is the price in an
orderly transaction between market participants to sell the asset or
transfer the liability in the market in which the reporting entity would
transact for the asset or liability, that is, the principal or most
advantageous market for the asset or liability. The transaction to sell the
asset or transfer the liability is a hypothetical transaction at the
measurement date, considered from the perspective of a market participant
that holds the asset or owes the liability. Therefore, the definition
focuses on the price that would be received to sell the asset or paid to
transfer the liability (an exit price), not the price that would be paid to
acquire the asset or received to assume the liability (an entry price).
This Statement
emphasizes that fair value is a market-based measurement, not an
entity-specific measurement. Therefore, a fair value measurement should be
determined based on the assumptions that market participants would use in
pricing the asset or liability. As a basis for considering market
participant assumptions in fair value measurements, this Statement
establishes a fair value hierarchy that distinguishes between (1) market
participant assumptions developed based on market data obtained from sources
independent of the reporting entity (observable inputs) and (2) the
reporting entity’s own assumptions about market participant assumptions
developed based on the best information available in the circumstances
(unobservable inputs). The notion of unobservable inputs is intended to
allow for situations in which there is little, if any, market activity for
the asset or liability at the measurement date. In those situations, the
reporting entity need not undertake all possible efforts to obtain
information about market participant assumptions. However, the reporting
entity must not ignore information about market participant assumptions that
is reasonably available without undue cost and effort.
This Statement
clarifies that market participant assumptions include assumptions about
risk, for example, the risk inherent in a particular valuation technique
used to measure fair value (such as a pricing model) and/or the risk
inherent in the inputs to the valuation technique. A fair value measurement
should include an adjustment for risk if market participants would include
one in pricing the related asset or liability, even if the adjustment is
difficult to determine. Therefore, a measurement (for example, a
“mark-to-model” measurement) that does not include an adjustment for risk
would not represent a fair value measurement if market participants would
include one in pricing the related asset or liability.
This Statement
clarifies that market participant assumptions also include assumptions about
the effect of a restriction on the sale or use of an asset. A fair value
measurement for a restricted asset should consider the effect of the
restriction if market participants would consider the effect of the
restriction in pricing the asset. That guidance applies for stock with
restrictions on sale that terminate within one year that is measured at fair
value under FASB Statements No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in
Debt and Equity Securities, and No. 124, Accounting for Certain Investments
Held by Not-for-Profit Organizations.
This Statement
clarifies that a fair value measurement for a liability reflects its
nonperformance risk (the risk that the obligation will not be fulfilled).
Because nonperformance risk includes the reporting entity’s credit risk, the
reporting entity should consider the effect of its credit risk (credit
standing) on the fair value of the liability in all periods in which the
liability is measured at fair value under other accounting pronouncements,
including FASB Statement No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and
Hedging Activities.
This Statement
affirms the requirement of other FASB Statements that the fair value of a
position in a financial instrument (including a block) that trades in an
active market should be measured as the product of the quoted price for the
individual instrument times the quantity held (within Level 1 of the fair
value hierarchy). The quoted price should not be adjusted because of the
size of the position relative to trading volume (blockage factor). This
Statement extends that requirement to broker-dealers and investment
companies within the scope of the AICPA Audit and Accounting Guides for
those industries.
This Statement
expands disclosures about the use of fair value to measure assets and
liabilities in interim and annual periods subsequent to initial recognition.
The disclosures focus on the inputs used to measure fair value and for
recurring fair value measurements using significant unobservable inputs
(within Level 3 of the fair value hierarchy), the effect of the measurements
on earnings (or changes in net assets) for the period. This Statement
encourages entities to combine the fair value information disclosed under
this Statement with the fair value information disclosed under other
accounting pronouncements, including FASB Statement No. 107, Disclosures
about Fair Value of Financial Instruments, where practicable.
The guidance in
this Statement applies for derivatives and other financial instruments
measured at fair value under Statement 133 at initial recognition and in all
subsequent periods. Therefore, this Statement nullifies the guidance in
footnote 3 of EITF Issue No. 02-3, “Issues Involved in Accounting for
Derivative Contracts Held for Trading Purposes and Contracts Involved in
Energy Trading and Risk Management Activities.” This Statement also amends
Statement 133 to remove the similar guidance to that in Issue 02-3, which
was added by FASB Statement No. 155, Accounting for Certain Hybrid Financial
Instruments.
How the
Conclusions in This Statement Relate to the FASB’s Conceptual Framework
The framework for
measuring fair value considers the concepts in FASB Concepts Statement No.
2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information. Concepts Statement
2 emphasizes that providing comparable information enables users of
financial statements to identify similarities in and differences between two
sets of economic events.
The definition of
fair value considers the concepts relating to assets and liabilities in FASB
Concepts Statement No. 6, Elements of Financial Statements, in the context
of market participants. A fair value measurement reflects current market
participant assumptions about the future inflows associated with an asset
(future economic benefits) and the future outflows associated with a
liability (future sacrifices of economic benefits).
This Statement
incorporates aspects of the guidance in FASB Concepts Statement No. 7, Using
Cash Flow Information and Present Value in Accounting Measurements, as
clarified and/or reconsidered in this Statement. This Statement does not
revise Concepts Statement 7. The Board will consider the need to revise
Concepts Statement 7 in its conceptual framework project.
The expanded
disclosures about the use of fair value to measure assets and liabilities
should provide users of financial statements (present and potential
investors, creditors, and others) with information that is useful in making
investment, credit, and similar decisions—the first objective of financial
reporting in FASB Concepts Statement No. 1, Objectives of Financial
Reporting by Business Enterprises.
FASB Statement No. 159
The Fair Value Option
for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities—Including an
amendment of FASB Statement No. 115
(Issue Date 02/07)
[Full Text]
[Summary]
[Status]
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Why Is the FASB
Issuing This Statement?
This Statement
permits entities to choose to measure many financial instruments and certain
other items at fair value. The objective is to improve financial reporting
by providing entities with the opportunity to mitigate volatility in
reported earnings caused by measuring related assets and liabilities
differently without having to apply complex hedge accounting provisions.
This Statement is expected to expand the use of fair value measurement,
which is consistent with the Board’s long-term measurement objectives for
accounting for financial instruments.
What Is the Scope
of This Statement—Which Entities Does It Apply to and What Does It Affect?
This Statement
applies to all entities, including not-for-profit organizations. Most of the
provisions of this Statement apply only to entities that elect the fair
value option. However, the amendment to FASB Statement No. 115, Accounting
for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, applies to all
entities with available-for-sale and trading securities. Some requirements
apply differently to entities that do not report net income.
The following are
eligible items for the measurement option established by this Statement:
Recognized
financial assets and financial liabilities except:
An investment in
a subsidiary that the entity is required to consolidate
An interest in a
variable interest entity that the entity is required to consolidate
Employers’ and
plans’ obligations (or assets representing net overfunded positions) for
pension benefits, other postretirement benefits (including health care and
life insurance benefits), postemployment benefits, employee stock option and
stock purchase plans, and other forms of deferred compensation arrangements,
as defined in FASB Statements No. 35, Accounting and Reporting by Defined
Benefit Pension Plans, No. 87, Employers’ Accounting for Pensions, No. 106,
Employers’ Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions, No.
112, Employers’ Accounting for Postemployment Benefits, No. 123 (revised
December 2004), Share-Based Payment, No. 43, Accounting for Compensated
Absences, No. 146, Accounting for Costs Associated with Exit or Disposal
Activities, and No. 158, Employers’ Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension
and Other Postretirement Plans, and APB Opinion No. 12, Omnibus Opinion—1967
Financial assets
and financial liabilities recognized under leases as defined in FASB
Statement No. 13, Accounting for Leases (This exception does not apply to a
guarantee of a third-party lease obligation or a contingent obligation
arising from a cancelled lease.)
Deposit
liabilities, withdrawable on demand, of banks, savings and loan
associations, credit unions, and other similar depository institutions
Financial
instruments that are, in whole or in part, classified by the issuer as a
component of shareholder’s equity (including “temporary equity”). An example
is a convertible debt security with a noncontingent beneficial conversion
feature.
Firm commitments
that would otherwise not be recognized at inception and that involve only
financial instruments
Nonfinancial
insurance contracts and warranties that the insurer can settle by paying a
third party to provide those goods or services
Host financial
instruments resulting from separation of an embedded nonfinancial derivative
instrument from a nonfinancial hybrid instrument.
How Will This
Statement Change Current Accounting Practices?
The fair value
option established by this Statement permits all entities to choose to
measure eligible items at fair value at specified election dates. A business
entity shall report unrealized gains and losses on items for which the fair
value option has been elected in earnings (or another performance indicator
if the business entity does not report earnings) at each subsequent
reporting date. A not-for-profit organization shall report unrealized gains
and losses in its statement of activities or similar statement.
The fair value
option:
May be applied
instrument by instrument, with a few exceptions, such as investments
otherwise accounted for by the equity method
Is irrevocable
(unless a new election date occurs)
Is applied only
to entire instruments and not to portions of instruments.
How Does This
Statement Contribute to International Convergence?
The fair value
option in this Statement is similar, but not identical, to the fair value
option in IAS 39, Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement. The
international fair value option is subject to certain qualifying criteria
not included in this standard, and it applies to a slightly different set of
instruments.
What Is the
Effective Date of This Statement?
This Statement is
effective as of the beginning of an entity’s first fiscal year that begins
after November 15, 2007. Early adoption is permitted as of the beginning of
a fiscal year that begins on or before November 15, 2007, provided the
entity also elects to apply the provisions of FASB Statement No. 157, Fair
Value Measurements.
No entity is
permitted to apply this Statement retrospectively to fiscal years preceding
the effective date unless the entity chooses early adoption. The choice to
adopt early should be made after issuance of this Statement but within 120
days of the beginning of the fiscal year of adoption, provided the entity
has not yet issued financial statements, including required notes to those
financial statements, for any interim period of the fiscal year of adoption.
This Statement permits
application to eligible items existing at the effective date (or early
adoption date).
Many other U.S. and International Standards directly or indirectly impact
on fair value accounting! In particular international IAS 32 and IAS 39
require fair value accounting in many circumstances.
Introduction to Valuation
Damodaran Online: A Great Sharing Site from a Finance Professor at New York
University and Textbook Writer ---
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/%7Eadamodar/
This site has great sections on corporate finance, investments,
valuation, spreadsheets, research, etc. For example, take a look at the
helpers on valuation ---
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/%7Eadamodar/
You can pick the valuation approach that you would like to go to, to
see illustrations, solutions and other supporting material.
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Discounted Cashflow Valuation |
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Relative Valuation |
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Option Pricing Approaches to Valuation |
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Acquisition Valuation |
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EVA, CFROI and other Value Enhancement Strategies |
Or you can pick the material that you are interested in.
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Spreadsheets |
Overheads |
Datasets |
References |
Problems & Solutions |
Derivations and Discussion |
Valuation Examples |
PowerPoint presentations |
Jim Mahar's finance sharing site (especially note his great blog link)
---
http://financeprofessor.com/
Financial Rounds from an anonymous finance professor ---
http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value controversies in accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue
Bob Jensen's finance and investment helpers are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Bookbob1.htm
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on September 22, 2006
TITLE: FASB to Issue Retooled Rule for Valuing Corporate Assets
REPORTER: David Reilly
DATE: Sep 15, 2006
PAGE: C3
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115828639109763950.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
TOPICS: Accounting, Advanced Financial Accounting, Fair Value Accounting
SUMMARY: On 9/15/2006, the FASB issued Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 157, Fair Value Measurements. The standard "...provides
enhanced guidance for using fair value to measure assets and liabilities.
The standard also responds to investors' requests for expanded information
about the extent to which companies measure assets and liabilities at fair
value, the information used to measure fair value, and the effect of fair
value measurements on earnings." (Source: FASB News Release available on
their web site at http://www.fasb.org/news/nr091506.shtml) This new standard
must be used as guidance whenever reporting entities use fair value to
measure value assets and liabilities as a required or acceptable method of
applying GAAP.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is the purpose of issuing Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 157? In your answer, describe how this standard should help to
alleviate discrepancies in practice. To help answer this question, you may
access the FASB's own news release about the standard, available at http://www.fasb.org/news/nr091506.shtml
or the new standard itself, available on the FASB's web site.
2.) From your own knowledge, cite an example in which fair value is used
to measure an asset or liability in corporate balance sheets. Why is fair
value an appropriate measure for including these assets and liabilities in
corporate balance sheets?
3.) What is the major difficulty with using fair values for financial
reporting that is cited in the article?
4.) Define the term "historical cost." Name two flaws with the use of
historical costs, one cited in the article and one based on your own
knowledge. Be sure to explain the flaw clearly.
5.) How does this standard help to alleviate the issue described in
answer to question 3? Again, you may access the FASB's web site, and the
news release in particle, to answer this question.
6.) The article closes with a statement that "The FASB hopes to counter
some of [the issues cited in the article] by expanding disclosures required
for all balance sheet items measure at fair value..." What could be the
possible problem with that requirement?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"FASB to Issue Retooled Rule For Valuing Corporate Assets New Method
Repeals Limits Spurred by Enron Scandal; Critics Worry About Abuses," by
David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, September 15, 2006; Page
C3 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115828639109763950.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
Accounting rule makers have wrapped up an
overhaul of a tricky but important method of valuing corporate assets,
despite some critics' warning that the change could reopen the door to
abuses like those seen at Enron Corp.
The overhaul, contained in an accounting
standard that could be issued as early as today, will repeal a ban put
in place after Enron collapsed into bankruptcy court in late 2001 amid
an array of accounting irregularities. The ban prohibited companies
immediately booking gains or losses from complex financial instruments
whose real value may not be known for years.
The Financial Accounting Standards Board's new
rule will require companies to base "fair" values for certain items on
what they would fetch from a sale in an open market to a third party. In
the past, firms often would use internal models to determine the value
of instruments that didn't have a readily available price.
FASB prohibited that practice after Enron used
overly optimistic models to value multiyear power contracts in a bid to
pad earnings. The ban was meant to give the board time to come up with a
new approach to determining fair values.
The accounting rule makers say the new standard
will give companies, auditors and investors much needed, and more
nuanced, guidance on how to measure market values. Companies will have
to think, "it's not my own estimate of what something is worth to me,
but what the market would demand for this," said Leslie Seidman, an FASB
member. While clarifying how to come up with appropriate values for some
instruments, the new standard doesn't expand the use of what is known as
fair-value accounting.
Critics say the new rule reopens the door to
manipulation and possibly fraud by unscrupulous managers. Requiring
market values for instruments where there isn't a ready price in a
market can be "a license for management to invent the financial
statements to be whatever they want them to be," Damon Silvers,
associate general counsel for the AFL-CIO, said at a meeting of an FASB
advisory group this spring.
Jousting over the standard reflects a deep rift
within accounting circles. For decades, accounting values were mostly
based on historical cost, or what a company paid for a particular asset.
In recent years, accounting rules have moved toward the use of market
values, known as fair-value accounting. In some ways this reflects the
shift in the U.S. from a manufacturing to a service economy, where
intangible assets are more important than the plant and equipment that
previously defined a company's financial strength.
Starting in the mid-1980s, companies also began
using ever-more-complicated financial instruments such as futures,
options and swaps to manage interest-rate, currency and other risks.
Such contracts often can't be measured based on their cost. This spurred
the use of market values, thought to be more realistic. But these values
can be tough to determine because many complex financial instruments are
tailor-made and don't trade on open markets in the same way as stocks.
Of course, valuations based on historical cost
also have flaws. The savings-and-loan crisis of the late 1980s, for
example, was prompted in part by thrifts carrying loans on their balance
sheets at historical cost, even though the loans had plummeted in value.
Robert Herz, the FASB's chairman, acknowledges
the difficulty in coming up with a market, or fair, value for many
instruments. In discussions, he often asks how a company could
reasonably be expected to come up with a fair value for a 30-year swap
agreement on the Thai currency, the baht, which is a bet on the future
value of that currency against another.
The answer, according to Mr. Herz and the FASB,
is to base the value on what a willing third-party would pay in the
market and possibly include a discount to reflect the uncertainty
inherent in the approach.
In an interview earlier this year, Mr. Herz
said this valuation approach would reduce the likelihood of a recurrence
of problems such as those seen at Enron. "The problem wasn't that Enron
was using fair values, it was that they were using 'unfair' values," he
said.
Still, "the bottom line is that fair-value
accounting is a great thing so long as you have market values," said J.
Edward Ketz, an associate accounting professor at Pennsylvania State
University, who is working on a book about the FASB's new standard. "If
you don't, you get into some messy areas."
The FASB hopes to counter some of these issues
by expanding disclosures required for all balance-sheet items measured
at fair value, the board's Ms. Seidman said.
October 15, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
The original 157 Exposure Draft proposed a Fair Value Option (FVO)
that would have allowed carrying of virtually any financial asset or
liability at fair value rather than just limiting fair value accounting
to selected items that are now required to be carried at fair value
rather than historical cost. Business firms, and especially banks,
generally are against fair value accounting (due to reporting
instabilities that arise from fair value adjustments prior to contract
settlements). The FASB backed off of the FVO when it issued FAS 157,
thereby relegating FAS 157 to a standard that clarifies definitions of
fair value in various circumstances. Hence FAS 157 is largely semantic
and does not change the present fair value accounting rules.
I asked Paul Pacter (at Deloitte in Hong Kong where he's still very
active in helping to set IFRS and FASB standards) for an update on the
FVO Project (commenced in 2004) that failed to impact the new FAS 157
standard. His reply is below.
October 31 reply from Paul Pacter (CN - Hong Kong)
[paupacter@deloitte.com.hk]
Hi Bob,
Yes, FASB's FV Option (FVO) t is very much
active -- an ED on phase 1 was issued in January, and a final FAS is
expected before year end.
- Phase 1 addresses creating an FVO for
financial assets and financial liabilities.
- Phase 2 addresses creating an FVO for
selected nonfinancial items.
Thus phase 2 would go beyond IFRSs, though
several IFRSs have FV options for individual types of assets. IAS 16 and
IAS 38 allow it for PP&E and intangibles -- though the credit is to
surplus, not P&L, no recycling, subsequent depreciation of revalued
amounts. IAS 40 gives a FV option for investment property -- FV through
P&L. IAS 41 isn't an option, it's a requirement for FV through P&L for
agricultural assets.
Phase 2 would commence in 2007.
Re possible amendment to FAS 157, I don't think
FASB plans to do that, though I suppose there might be some
consequential amendment. But I don't think the FVO will change the
definition of fair value that's in FAS 157.
Here's FASB's web page: http://www.fasb.org/project/fv_option.shtml
Warm regards,
Paul
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at various other links:
I recently completed the first draft of a paper on fair value at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
Comments would be helpful.
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms
Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation, and Yield
Curves for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial
Instruments ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm
Robert Walker's First Blog Entry is About Fair Value Accounting,
October 27, 2006 ---
http://www.robertbwalkerca.blogspot.com/
Introduction
I have decided to begin a commentary which expresses my views on accounting.
As I begin to do this I envisage the source of my commentary to comprise
three different sorts of writing in which I may engage:
§ Simple notes directly to the ‘blog’ such as this.
§ Formal submissions I may make to various bodies including the IASB.
§ Letters or reports I may write for one reason or another that I think
might have some general readership.
The expression of my views will stray from the subject matter of accounting
per se to deal with matters of enormous significance to me such as corporate
or public administration. Such expressions will not be too substantial a
digression from the core subject matter because I believe that the
foundation of good ‘corporate governance’, to use a vogue term, is
accounting.
Source of my ideas on accounting
I would have to confess that the foundation upon which I base my philosophy
of accounting is derivative, as much of human knowledge is of course. It is
not for nothing that Newtown said that if he can see so far it is because he
stands on the shoulders of giants. In my case, that ‘giant’ is Yuiji Ijiri.
As I begin a detailed exposition of my views I shall return to the lessons I
learned many years ago from Theory of Accounting Measurement, a neglected
work that will still be read in 1,000 years or so long as humankind survives
whichever is the shorter. As the depredations of the standard setting craze
are visited upon us with ever increasing complexity, the message delivered
by Ijiri will be heeded more an more.
The basic structure of accounting
Without wishing to be too philosophical about it, I need to begin by
outlining what I mean by accounting. Accounting, in my mind, comprises three
inter-related parts. These are:
§ Book-keeping.
§ Accounting.
§ Financial reporting.
Book-keeping is the process of recording financial data elements in the
underlying books of account. These financial data elements represent, or
purport to represent, real world events. The heart of book-keeping is the
double entry process. For instance at the most basic level a movement in
cash will result in the surrender or receipt of an asset, the incurring or
settlement of a liability and so on.
I have no complete and coherent theory of the limits of book-keeping.
Clearly cash movement (change of ownership) or the movement of commodity is
the proper subject matter of book-keeping. Whether all forms of contract
should be similarly treated is not clear to me. I am inclined to say yes.
That is to adopt Ijiri’s theory of commitment accounting, but I can foresee
that this leads me to conclusions that I may find unpalatable later on.
Incidentally I say this because an epiphany I had, based on the notion of
commitment accounting, some years ago is beginning to unravel.
Book-keeping goes beyond recording to encompass control. That is the process
by which the integrity of the centre piece of book-keeping – the general
ledger expressing double entry – is ensured. I will not concern myself with
such processes though this is not to say that they are unimportant.
Accounting is the process by which sense is made of what is a raw record
expressed in the general ledger. It is the process of distillation and
summation that enables the accountant to gain on overview of what has
happened to the entity the subject of the accounting. Accounting
fundamentally assumes that the accountant is periodically capable of saying
something useful about the real world using his or her special form of
notation.
Financial reporting is the process by which data is assembled into a
comprehensive view of the world in accordance with a body of rules. It
differs, in the ideal, from accounting in a number of ways. Most benignly it
differs, for instance, by including ancillary information for the benefit of
a reader beyond the mere abstraction from the general ledger. Again in the
ideal there is an inter-relationship between the three levels in the
accounting hierarchy. That is, the rules of financial reporting will, to
some degree shape the order and format of the basic, book-keeping level so
that the process of distillation and summation follows naturally to the
final level of reporting without dramatic alteration.
Perhaps what concerns me is that the sentiment expressed above can be seen,
without much effort, to be only ideal and that in reality it does not arise.
In short the golden strand that links the detailed recording of real world
phenonmena to its final summation is broken.
An example
I was asked recently by a student of accounting to explain IAS 41, the IASB
standard on agriculture. As I don’t deal in primary production at all, I had
not thought about this subject for years.
IAS 41 admonishes the accountant to apply ‘fair value’ accounting. Fair
value accounting is the process by which current sale prices, or their
proxies, are substituted for the past cost of any given item.
For instance, you may have a mature vineyard. The vineyard comprises land,
the vine and its fruit, the plant necessary to sustain the vine (support
structures, irrigation channels etc.). Subsumed within the vine are the
materials necessary for it to grow and start producing fruit. This will
include the immature plant, the chemical supplements necessary to nurture
and protect it, and the labour necessary to apply it.
The book-keeping process will faithfully record all of these components.
Suppose for example the plant, fertliser and labour cost $1000. In the books
will be recorded:
Dr Vineyard $1000
Cr Cash $1000
At the end of the accounting period, the accountant will summarise this is a
balance statement. He or she will then obtain, in some way, the current
selling price of the vine. Presumably this will be the future cash stream of
selling the fruit, suitably discounted. Assume that this is $1200.
The accountant will then make the following incremental adjustment:
Dr Vineyard $200
Cr Equity $200
Looked like this there is a connection between the original book-keeping and
the periodic adjustment at the end of the accounting period. This is an
illusion. The incremental entry disguises what is really happening. It is as
follows:
Dr Equity $1000
Cr Vineyard $1000
And
Dr Vineyard $1200
Cr Equity $1200
Considered from the long perspective, the original book-keeping has been
discarded and a substitute value put in its place. This is the truth of the
matter. The subject matter of the first phase of accounting was a set of
events arising in a bank and in the entity undertaking accounting. The
subject matter of the second phase is a set of future sales to a party who
does not yet exist.
From a perspective of solvency determination, a vital element of corporate
governance, the view produced by the first phase is next to useless.
However, the disquiet I had in my mind which I had suppressed until
recently, relates to the shattering of the linkages between the three levels
of accounting in the final reporting process. This disquiet has returned as
I contemplate the apparently unstoppable momentum of the standard setting
process.
October 28, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Robert,
I hope you add many more entries to your blog.
The problem with "original book-keeping" is that it provides
no answer how to account for risk of many modern day contracts that were not
imagined when "original book-keeping" evolved in a simple world of
transactions. For example, historical costs of forward contracts and swaps
are zero and yet these contracts may have risks that may outweigh all the
recorded debt under "original book-keeping." Once we opened the door to fair
value accounting to better account for risk, however, we opened the door to
misleading the public that booked fair value adjustments can be aggregated
much like we sum the current balances of assets and liabilities on the
balance sheet. Such aggregations are generally nonsense.
I don't know if you saw my recent hockey analogy or not. It
goes as follows:
Goal Tenders versus Movers and Shakers
Skate to where the puck is going, not to where it is.
Wayne Gretsky (as quoted for many years by Jerry Trites at
http://www.zorba.ca/ )
Jensen Comment
This may be true for most hockey players and other movers and shakers, but for
goal tenders the eyes should be focused on where the puck is at every moment ---
not where it's going. The question is whether an accountant is a goal tender
(stewardship responsibilities) or a mover and shaker (part of the managerial
decision making team). This is also the essence of the debate of historical
accounting versus pro forma accounting.
Graduate student Derek Panchuk and professor Joan
Vickers, who discovered the Quiet Eye phenomenon, have just completed the most
comprehensive, on-ice hockey study to determine where elite goalies focus their
eyes in order to make a save. Simply put, they found that goalies should keep
their eyes on the puck. In an article to be published in the journal Human
Movement Science, Panchuk and Vickers discovered that the best goaltenders rest
their gaze directly on the puck and shooter's stick almost a full second before
the shot is released. When they do that they make the save over 75 per cent of
the time.
"Keep your eyes on the puck," PhysOrg, October 26, 2006 ---
http://physorg.com/news81068530.html
I have written a more serious piece about both theoretical
and practical problems of fair value accounting. I should emphasize that
this was written after the FASB Exposure Draft proposing fair value
accounting as an option for all financial instruments and the culminating
FAS 157 that is mainly definitional and removed the option to apply fair
value accounting to all financial instruments even though it is still
required in many instances by earlier FASB standards.
My thoughts on this are at the following two links:
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue
Bob Jensen
October 30, 2006 reply from Robert B Walker
[walkerrb@ACTRIX.CO.NZ]
Bob
Thanks for the support. I have answered you in my
second installment (
www.robertbwalkerca.blogspot.com ).
I shall continue to write if for no other reason
than for myself. I have had it in mind to write a book. I shall begin doing
so this way.
Robert
October 30, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
I have difficulty envisioning forward contracts as “executory contracts.”
These appear to be to be executed contracts that are terminated when the
cash finally flows.
Fair value appears to be the only way to book forward contracts if they
are to be booked at all, although fair value on the date they are signed is
usually zero.
Once you are in the fair value realm, you have all the aggregation
problems, blockage problems, etc. that are mentioned at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
I guess what I’d especially like you to address is the problem of
aggregation in a balance sheet or income statement based upon heterogeneous
measurements.
Bob Jensen
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at various other links:
I recently completed the first draft of a paper on fair value at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
Comments would be helpful.
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms
Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation, and Yield Curves
for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial
Instruments ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm
Fair value is the
estimated best disposal (exit, liquidation) value in any sale other than a
forced sale. It is defined as follows in Paragraph 540 on Page 243 of
FAS 133:
The amount at which an asset
(liability) could be bought (incurred) or sold (settled) in a current
transaction between willing parties, that is, other than in a forced or
liquidation sale. Quoted market prices in active markets are the best
evidence of fair value and should be used as the basis for the measurement,
if available. If a quoted market price is available, the fair value is the
product of the number of trading units times that market price. If a quoted
market price is not available, the estimate of fair value should be based on
the best information available in the circumstances. The estimate of fair
value should consider prices for similar assets or similar liabilities and
the results of valuation techniques to the extent available in the
circumstances. Examples of valuation techniques include the present value of
estimated expected future cash flows using discount rates commensurate with
the risks involved, option- pricing models, matrix pricing, option-adjusted
spread models, and fundamental analysis. Valuation techniques for
measuring assets and liabilities should be consistent with the objective of
measuring fair value. Those techniques should incorporate assumptions that
market participants would use in their estimates of values, future revenues,
and future expenses, including assumptions about interest rates, default,
prepayment, and volatility. In measuring forward contracts, such as foreign
currency forward contracts, at fair value by discounting estimated future
cash flows, an entity should base the estimate of future cash flows on the
changes in the forward rate (rather than the spot rate). In measuring
financial liabilities and nonfinancial derivatives that are liabilities at
fair value by discounting estimated future cash flows (or equivalent
outflows of other assets), an objective is to use discount rates at which
those liabilities could be settled in an arm's-length transaction.
This is
old news, but it does provide some questions for students to ponder.
The main problem of fair value adjustment is that many ((most?) of the
adjustments cause enormous fluctuations in earnings, assets, and liabilities
that are washed out over time and never realized. The
main advantage is that interim impacts that “might be” realized are
booked. It’s a war between
“might be” versus “might never.” The
war has been waging for over a century with respect to booked assets and two
decades with respect to unbooked derivative instruments, contingencies, and
intangibles.
CFA analysts' group favors full fair value reporting
The CFA Centre for Financial Market Integrity – a
part of the CFA Institute – has published a new financial reporting model
that, they believe, would greatly enhance the ability of financial analysts
and investors to evaluate companies in making investment decisions. The
Comprehensive Business Reporting Model proposes 12 principles to ensure that
financial statements are relevant, clear, accurate, understandable, and
comprehensive (See below).
"Analysts' group favours full fair value reporting," IAS Plus,
October 31, 2005 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
CFA Institute Centre for Financial Market
Integrity
Comprehensive Business Reporting Model –
Principles
|
-
1. The company must be viewed from the
perspective of a current investor in the
company's common equity.
-
2. Fair value information is the only
information relevant for financial decision
making.
-
3. Recognition and disclosure must be
determined by the relevance of the
information to investment decision making
and not based upon measurement reliability
alone.
-
4. All economic transactions and events
should be completely and accurately
recognized as they occur in the financial
statements.
-
5. Investors' wealth assessments must
determine the materiality threshold.
-
6. Financial reporting must be neutral.
-
7. All changes in net assets must be
recorded in a single financial statement,
the Statement of Changes in Net Assets
Available to Common Shareowners.
-
8. The Statement of Changes in Net Assets
Available to Common Shareowners should
include timely recognition of all changes in
fair values of assets and liabilities.
-
9. The Cash Flow Statement provides
information essential to the analysis of a
company and should be prepared using the
direct method only.
-
10. Changes affecting each of the financial
statements must be reported and explained on
a disaggregated basis.
-
11. Individual line items should be reported
based upon the nature of the items rather
than the function for which they are used.
-
12. Disclosures must provide all the
additional information investors require to
understand the items recognized in the
financial statements, their measurement
properties, and risk exposures.
|
|
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Standards of Value: Theory and Applications
Standards of Value covers the underlying assumption
in many of the prominent standards of value, including Fair Market Value,
investment value, and fair value. It discusses the specific purposes of the
valuation, including divorce, shareholders' oppression, financial reporting, and
how these standards are applied.
Standards of Value: Theory and Applications, by Jay E. Fishman,
Shannon P. Pratt, William J. Morrison Wiley: ISBN: 0-471-69483-5 Hardcover
368 pages November 2006 US $95.00) ---
http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-0471694835.html
"Will Fair Value Fly? Fair-value accounting could change the very basis of
corporate finance,"
by Ronald Fink, CFO Magazine September 01, 2006 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7851757/c_7873404?f=magazine_featured
Much has changed in financial reporting since
Andrew Fastow and Scott Sullivan, the finance chiefs of Enron and
WorldCom, respectively, brought disgrace upon themselves, their
employers, and, to a degree, their profession. Regulators and investors
have pressed companies to be more open and forthcoming about their
results — and companies have responded. According to a new CFO magazine
survey, 82 percent of public-company finance executives disclose more
information in their financial statements today then they did three
years ago. But that positive finding won't quell calls for further
accounting reform.
The U.S. reporting system "faces a number of
important and difficult challenges," Robert Herz, chairman of the
Financial Accounting Standards Board, told the annual conference of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in Washington, D.C.,
last December. Chief among those, said Herz, is "the need to reduce
complexity and improve the transparency and overall usefulness" of
information reported to investors. ad
Critics contend that generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP) remain seriously flawed, even as companies
have beefed up internal controls to comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
"We've done very little but play defense for the last five to six
years," charges J. Michael Cook, chairman and CEO emeritus of Deloitte &
Touche LLP. "It's time to play offense."
Cook, a respected elder statesman in the
accounting community, goes so far as to pronounce financial statements
almost completely irrelevant to financial analysis as currently
conducted. "The analyst community does workarounds based on numbers that
have very little to do with the financial statements," says Cook. "Net
income is a virtually useless number."
How can financial statements become more
relevant and useful? Many reformers, including Herz, believe that
fair-value accounting must be part of the answer. In this approach,
which FASB increasingly favors, assets and liabilities are marked to
market rather than recorded on balance sheets at historical cost.
Fair-value accounting, say its advocates, would give users of financial
statements a far clearer picture of the economic state of a company.
"I know what an asset is. I can see one, I can
touch one, or I can see representations of one. I also know what
liabilities are," says Thomas Linsmeier, a Michigan State University
accounting professor who joined FASB in June. On the other hand, "I
believe that revenues, expenses, gains, and losses are accounting
constructs," he adds. "I can't say that I see a revenue going down the
street. And so for me to have an accounting model that captures economic
reality, I think the starting point has to be assets and liabilities."
More than any other regulatory change, fair
value promises to end the practice of earnings management. That's
because a company's earnings would depend more on what happens on its
balance sheet than on its income statement (see "The End of Earnings
Management?" at the end of this article).
But switching from historical cost would
require enormous effort from overworked finance departments. Valuing
assets in the absence of active markets could be overly subjective,
making financial statements less reliable. Linsmeier's confidence
notwithstanding, disputes could arise over the very definition of
certain assets and liabilities. And using fair value could even distort
a company's approach to deal-making and capital structure.
A Familiar Concept Fair value is by no means
unfamiliar to corporate-finance executives, as current accounting rules
for such items as derivatives (FAS 133 and 155), securitizations (FAS
156), and employee stock option grants (FAS 123R) use it to varying
degrees when recording assets and liabilities. So does a proposal issued
last January for another rule, this one for accounting for all financial
instruments. FASB's more recent proposals to include pensions and leases
on balance sheets also embrace fair-value measurement (see "Be Careful
What You Wish For" at the end of this article).
While both Herz and Linsmeier are careful to
note that they don't necessarily favor the application of fair value to
assets and liabilities that lack a ready market, they clearly advocate
its application where there's sufficient reason to believe the
valuations are reliable. Corporate accounting, Herz says, is the only
major reporting system that doesn't use fair value as its basis, and he
points to the Federal Reserve's use of it in tracking the U.S. economy
as sufficient reason for companies to adopt it.
The corporate world, however, must grapple with
its own complexities. For one, fair value could make it even more
difficult to realize value from acquisitions. Take the question of
contingent considerations, wherein the amount that acquirers pay for
assets ultimately depends on their return. Under current GAAP, the
balance-sheet value of assets that are transferred through such earnouts
may reflect only the amount exchanged at the time the deal is completed,
because the acquirer has considerable leeway in treating subsequent
payments as expenses.
Under fair value, the acquirer would also
include on its balance sheet the present value of those contingent
payments based on their likelihood of materializing. Since the money may
never materialize, some finance executives contend those estimates could
be unreliable and misleading. "I disagree with [this application of fair
value] on principle," James Barge, senior vice president and controller
for Time Warner, said during a conference on financial reporting last
May. ad
Barge cites the acquisition of intangible
assets that a company does not intend to use as a further example of
fair value's potentially worrisome effects. Under current GAAP, their
value is included in goodwill and subject to annual impairment testing
for possible write-off. But if, as FASB is contemplating, the value of
those assets would be recorded on the balance sheet along with that of
the associated tangible assets that were acquired, Barge worries that an
immediate write-off would then be required — even though it would not
reflect the acquiring company's economics.
Fair value's defenders say such concerns are
misplaced. The possibility that a contingent consideration won't
materialize, for starters, is already reflected in an acquirer's bid,
says Patricia McConnell, a Bear Stearns senior managing director who
chairs the corporate-disclosure policy council of the CFA Institute, a
group for financial analysts. "It's in the price," she says.
As for intangibles that are acquired and then
extinguished, the analyst says a write-off would not in fact be required
under fair value if the transaction strengthens the acquirer's market
position. That position would presumably be reflected in the value of
the assets associated with those intangibles as recorded on the balance
sheet under fair-value treatment.
"It may be in buying a brand to gain
monopolistic position that you don't have an expense," McConnell
explains, "but rather you have the extinguishment of one asset and the
creation of another." Yet McConnell, among others, admits that
accounting for intangibles is an area that would need improvement even
if FASB adopted fair value.
Deceptive Debt? Another area of concern
involves capital structure, with Barge suggesting that fair value may
make it more difficult to finance growth with debt. He contends that
marking a company's debt to market could make a company look more highly
exposed to interest-rate risk than it really is, noting during the May
conference that Time Warner's debt was totally hedged.
Barge also cited as problematic the
hypothetical case of a company whose creditworthiness is downgraded by
the rating agencies. By marking down the debt's value on its balance
sheet, the company would realize more income, a scenario Barge called
"nonsensical." He warned of a host of such effects arising under fair
value when a company changes its capital structure.
Proponents find at least some of the complaints
about fair value and corporate debt to be misplaced. Herz notes fair
value would require the company to mark the hedge as well as the debt to
market, so that if a company is hedging interest-rate risk effectively,
its balance sheet should accurately reflect its lack of any exposure.
What's more, fair value could also improve
balance sheets in some cases. When, for instance, a company owns an
interest in another whose results it need not consolidate, the equity
holder's proportion of the other company's assets and liabilities is
currently carried at historical cost. If, however, the other company's
assets have gained value and were marked to market, the equity holder's
own leverage might decrease.
A real-life case in point: If the chemical
company Valhi marked to market its 39 percent stake in Titanium Metals,
Valhi's own ratio of long-term debt to equity would fall from 90 percent
(at the end of 2005) to 56 percent, according to Jack T. Ciesielski,
publisher of The Analyst's Accounting Observer newsletter. ad
Still, even some fair-value proponents share
Barge's concern about credit downgrades. As Ciesielski, a member of
FASB's Emerging Issues Task Force, wrote last April in a report on the
board's proposal for the use of fair value for financial instruments, it
is "awfully counterintuitive" for a company to show rising earnings when
its debt-repayment capacity is declining.
Herz and other fair-value proponents disagree,
noting that the income accrues to the benefit of the shareholders, not
to bondholders. "It's not at all counterintuitive," asserts Rebecca
McEnally, director for capital-markets policy of the CFA Institute
Centre for Financial Market Integrity, citing the fact that the item is
classified under GAAP as "income from forgiveness of indebtedness." But
Ciesielski says investors are unlikely to understand that, and that fair
value, in this case at least, may not produce useful results.
Resolving the Issues Even some of FASB's
critics agree, however, that the current system needs improvement, and
that fair value can help provide it. "Fair value in general is more
relevant than historical cost and can lead to reduced complexity and
greater transparency," Barge admits, though he has noted that the use of
fair value may also lead to "soft" results that "you can't audit."
For much the same reason, Colleen Cunningham,
president and CEO of Financial Executives International (FEI), expressed
concern in testimony before Congress last March that "overly theoretical
and complex standards can result in financial reporting of questionable
accuracy and can create a significant cost burden, with little benefit
to investors." In an interview, she explains that her biggest concern is
that FASB is pushing ahead with fair-value-based rules without
sufficient input from preparers. "Let's resolve the issues" before
proceeding, she insists.
Herz concedes that numerous issues surrounding
fair value need to be addressed. But important users of financial
statements are pressing him to move forward on fair value without delay.
As a comment letter that the CFA Institute sent to FASB put it: "All
financial decision-making should be based on fair value, the only
relevant measurement for assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses."
Meanwhile, Herz isn't waiting for the
conceptual framework to be completed before enacting new rules that
embrace fair value. "In the end, we're not going to get everybody
agreeing," Herz says. "So we have to make decisions" despite lingering
disagreement.
Ironically, one fair-value-based proposal that
FASB issued recently may have created an artful means of defusing
opposition. The Board's proposal for financial instruments gives
preparers of financial reports the choice of using historical cost or
fair value in recording the instruments on their balance sheets. That
worries some people, who say giving companies a choice of methods will
make it harder to compare their results, even when they're in the same
industry.
Continued in article
"Guidance on fair value measurements under FAS 123(R)," IAS Plus, May 8,
2006 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
Deloitte & Touche (USA) has updated its book of
guidance on FASB Statement No. 123(R) Share-Based Payment:
A Roadmap to Applying the Fair Value Guidance to Share-Based Payment
Awards (PDF 2220k). This second edition
reflects all authoritative guidance on FAS 123(R) issued as of 28 April
2006. It includes over 60 new questions and answers, particularly in the
areas of earnings per share, income tax accounting, and liability
classification. Our interpretations incorporate the views in SEC Staff
Accounting Bulletin Topic 14 "Share-Based Payment" (SAB 107), as well as
subsequent clarifications of EITF Topic No. D-98 "Classification and
Measurement of Redeemable Securities" (dealing with mezzanine equity
treatment). The publication contains other resource materials, including
a GAAP accounting and disclosure checklist. Note that while FAS 123 is
similar to
IFRS 2 Share-based Payment, there are some
measurement differences that are
Described Here.
Bob Jensen's threads on employee stock options are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/sfas123/jensen01.htm
Fair Value Accounting Book Review (Meeting the New FASB Requirements)
From SmartPros on May 1, 2006
Fair Value for Financial Reporting by Alfred King
highlights the accounting and auditing requirements for fair value
information and offers a detailed explanation of how the FASB is going
to change "fair value," from determining the fair value of intangible
assets to
selecting and working with an appraiser ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x35458.xml
Fair Value for Financial Reporting: Meeting the New FASB Requirements
by Alfred M. King
ISBN: 0-471-77184-8
Hardcover 352 pages April 2006
Click to
Download the Comprehensive Business Reporting Model from the CFA
Institute website.
Click here for
Press Release (PDF 26k).
As you
can see below, the war is not over yet. In
fact it has intensified between corporations (especially banks) versus
standard setters versus members of the academy.
From The Wall
Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on April 2, 2004
TITLE: As IASB
Unveils New Rules, Dispute With EU Continues
REPORTER: David Reilly
DATE: Mar 31, 2004
PAGE: A2 LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108067939682469331,00.html
TOPICS: Generally accepted accounting principles, Fair Value Accounting,
Insider trading, International Accounting, International Accounting
Standards Board
SUMMARY: Despite
controversy with the European Union (EU), the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB) is expected to release a final set of international
accounting standards. Questions focus on the role of the IASB, controversy
with the EU, and harmonization of the accounting standards.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is the role of the IASB? What authority does the IASB have to
enforce standards?
2.) List three
reasons that a country would choose to follow IASB accounting standards. Why
has the U.S. not adopted IASB accounting standards?
3.) Discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of harmonization of accounting standards
throughout the world. Why is it important the IASB reach a resolution with
the EU over the disputed accounting standards?
4.) What is fair
value accounting? Why would fair value accounting make financial statements
more volatile? Is increased volatility a valid argument for not adopting
fair value accounting? Does GAAP in the United States require fair value
accounting? Support your answers.
There are a number of software vendors of FAS 133 valuation
software.
One of the major companies is Financial CAD --- http://www.financialcad.com/
FinancialCAD provides software and services that
support the valuation and risk management of financial securities and
derivatives that is essential for banks, corporate treasuries and asset
management firms. FinancialCAD’s industry standard financial analytics are
a key component in FinancialCAD solutions that are used by over 25,000
professionals in 60 countries.
See software.
Fair value accounting politics in the revised
IAS 39
From Paul Pacter's IAS Plus on July 13, 2005
---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
Also see
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/IASBFairValueFAQ.pdf
-
Why did the Commission
carve out the full fair
value option in the
original IAS 39
standard?
-
Do
prudential supervisors
support IAS 39 FVO as
published by the IASB?
-
When will the Commission
to adopt the amended
standard for the IAS 39
FVO?
-
Will companies be able
to apply the amended
standard for their 2005
financial statements?
-
Does the amended
standard for IAS 39 FVO
meet the EU endorsement
criteria?
-
What about the
relationship between the
fair valuation of own
liabilities under the
amended IAS 39 FVO
standard and under
Article 42(a) of the
Fourth Company Law
Directive?
-
Will the Commission now
propose amending Article
42(a) of the Fourth
Company Directive?
-
What about the remaining
IAS 39 carve-out
relating to certain
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|
On June 23, 2005, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
issued an Exposure Draft (ED) entitled "Fair Value Measurements." The
original ED can be downloaded free at
http://www.fasb.org/draft/ed_fair_value_measurements.pdf
"Response to the FASB's Exposure Draft on Fair Value Measurements," AAA
Financial Standards Committee, Accounting Horizons, September 2005, pp. 187-195
---
http://aaahq.org/pubs/electpubs.htm
RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC ISSUES
The FASB invited comment on all matters related to
the ED, but specifically requested comments on 14 listed issues. The
Committee's comments are limited to those issues for which empirical
research provides some insights, or those sections of the ED that are
conceptually inconsistent or unclear. The Committee has previously
commented on other fair-value-related documents issued by the FASB and other
standard-setting bodies. This letter reiterates comments expressed in those
letters to the extent they are germane to the measurement issues contained
in the ED. However, to better understand our perspective on reporting fair
value information in the financial statements and related notes, we refer
readers to those comment letters (i.e., AAA FASC 1998, 2000).
Issue 1: Definition of Fair Value
The Committee believes that the ED contains some
conceptual inconsistencies between the definition and application of the
fair value measurement attribute. The ED proposes a definition of fair
value that is relatively independent of the entity-specific use of the
assets held or settlement of the liabilities owed. In contrast, the
proposed standard and related implementation guidance includes measurement
that is, at times, directly determined by the entity-specific use of the
asset or settlement of the liability in question.
Some of the inconsistencies with respect to fair
value measurement might be attributable to the attempt to apply general,
high-level fair value guidance to the idiosyncratic attributes of specific
accounts and transactions. In some cases, application to specific accounts
and transactions requires deviation from an entity-independent notion of
fair value to one that includes consideration of the specific types and uses
of assets held or liabilities owed by companies. For example, as we note in
our discussion of Issue 6 (below), one of the examples in the ED suggests
that the fair value of a machine should include an adjustment of quoted
market prices (based on comparable machines) for installation costs.
However, such an adjustment is dependent on the individual circumstances of
the company that purchases the equipment. That is, installation costs are
included in the fair value of an asset only when the firm intends to use
that asset for income producing activities. Alternatively, if the firm
intends to sell the asset, then installation costs are ignored.
Some members of the Committee, however, do not
perceive an inconsistency between the definition and application of the fair
value measurement attribute. These members view the definition of fair
value and the context within which it is applied (i.e., the valuation
premise) to be distinct, albeit related, attributes. Although the
definition of fair value can be entity-independent, the valuation premise
(e.g., value-in-use or value-in-exchange) cannot. Further, these members
argue that ignoring the valuation premise in determining fair value could
lead to unsatisfactory outcomes. For example, if installation costs are
ignored regardless of the valuation premise, then immediately after
purchasing an asset for use in income-producing activities, firms would
suffer impairment losses equal to the installation costs incurred to prepare
the assets for use.
The Committee raises the example of machinery
installation costs to illustrate the confusion we experienced trying to
reconcile the high-level (seemingly entity-independent) definition of fair
value with the contextually determined application standards. We note that
the Introduction of the Ed suggests that the intent of the proposed guidance
in the ED is to establish fair value measures that would be referenced in
other authoritative accounting to establish fair value measures that would
be referenced in other authoritative accounting pronouncements. Presumably,
these other pronouncements would also establish reasonable deviations from
the entity-independent notion of fair value. The Committee believes the
most effective general purpose fair value measurement standard would adopt a
general notion of fair value that is consistent across the definition of
fair value, the accounting standard, and the implementation guidance. To
the extent the Board generally believes that fair value is an
entity-specific concept, the high-level definition should reflect this as
well.
Issues 4 and 5: Valuation Premise and Fair Value
Hierarchy
Related to our previous comments, some members of
the Committee perceive a contradiction between the definition of fair value
in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the ED and the valuation premise described in
paragraph 13. The definition of fair value provided in paragraph 5 suggests
a pure value-in-exchange perspective where fair value is determined by the
market price that would occur between willing parties. In contrast, the
valuation premise described in paragraph 13 suggests that the fair value
estimate can follow either a value-in-use perspective or a value-in-exchange
perspective.
Moreover, the fair value hierarchy described in the
ED gives the highest priority to fair value measurements based on market
inputs regardless of the valuation premise. Some members of the Committee
believe that quoted market prices are not necessarily an appropriate measure
of fair value when a value-in-use premise is being considered. This is
especially true when a quoted price for an identical asset in an active
reference market (i.e., a Level 1 estimate) exists, but is significantly
different from a value-in-use estimate computed by taking the present value
of the firm-specific future cash flows expected to be generated by the asset
(i.e., a Level 3 estimate). In such instances, following the fair value
hierarchy might lead to a fair value estimate more in character with a
value-in-exchange premise than a value-in-use premise.
In summary, the Committee believes that: (1)
integrating the two valuation premises (i.e., value-in-use and
value-in-exchange) into the definition of fair value itself and (2)
elaborating on the differences between the two premises would help ensure
more consistent application of the standard.
Issue 6: Reference Market
Some members of the Committee are confused by the
guidance related to determining the appropriate reference market. With
respect to the Level 1 reference market, the ED states that when multiple
active markets exist, the most advantageous market should be used. The most
advantageous market is determined by comparing prices across multiple
markets net of transactions costs. However, the ED requires that
transactions costs be ignored subsequently in determining the fair value
measurement. In our view, ignoring transactions costs is problematic
because we believe such costs are an ordinary and predictable part of
executing a transaction.
In Example 5 (paragraph B9 (b) of the ED) where two
markets, A and B, are considered, the price in Market B ($35) is more
advantageous than the price in Market A ($25), ignoring transaction costs.
However, the fair value estimate is determined using the price in Market A
because the transactions cost in Market B ($20) is much higher than in
Market A ($5). The guidance is less clear if we modify the example by
reducing the transaction costs for Market B to $15. In this instance,
neither market is advantageous in a "net" sense, but Market B would yield
the highest fair value estimate (ignoring transactions costs), which
provides managers an opportunity to pick the most desirable figure based on
their reporting objectives.
Omitting transactions costs from the fair value
estimate in Example 5 contrasts sharply with Example 3 (Appendix B,
paragraph B7 (a)) where the value-in-use fair value estimate of a machine is
determined by adjusting the quoted market price of a comparable machine by
installation costs. Installation costs are ignored only if the firm intends
to dispose of the asset (Appendix B, paragraph B7 (b)). Thus, managerial
intent plays an integral role in determining whether fair value is computed
with or without installation costs, but the same does not hold for
transaction costs. Since transaction costs are not relevant unless
management intends to dispose of the asset, the Committee agrees that
ignoring transaction costs is justified when a value-in-use premise is
appropriate, but the Committee questions the appropriateness of ignoring
transaction costs when a value-in-exchange premise is adopted.
Issue 7: Pricing in Active Dealer Markets
The ED requires that the fair value of financial
instruments traded in active dealer markets where bid and asked prices are
readily available be estimated using bid prices for assets and asked prices
for liabilities. Some Committee members believe that this requirement is
inconsistent with the general concept of fair value and seems to be biased
toward valuing assets and liabilities at value-in-exchange instead of
value-in-use. Limiting our discussion to the asset case, if a buyer
establishes a long position through a dealer, the buyer must pay the asked
price. By purchasing the asset at the asked price, the buyer clearly
expects to earn an acceptable rate of return on the investment in the asset
(at the higher price). Moreover, if after purchasing the asset, the buyer
immediately applies the ED's proposed fair value measurement guidance (i.e.,
bid price valuation), the buyer would incur a loss on the asset equal to the
bid-ask spread.
In general, the bid price seems relevant only if
the holder wishes to liquidate his/her position. Although the Committee is
not largely in favor of managerial intent-based fair value measures, we are
uncomfortable with a bias toward a value-in-exchange premise for assets
in-use. If the Board decides to retain bid-based (ask-based) accounting for
dealer traded assets (liabilities) in the final standard, then we propose
that the final standard more clearly describe the conceptual basis for
liquidation basis asset and liability valuation.
Issue 9: Level 3 Estimates
Level 3 estimates require considerable judgment in
terms of both the selection and application of valuation techniques. As a
result, estimates using different valuation techniques with different
assumptions will likely yield widely varying fair value estimates. Examples
7 and 8 in Appendix B of the ED illustrate the wide variance in fair value
estimates obtained with different valuation techniques. The ED allows
considerable latitude in both the valuation technique and inputs used. Due
to their incentives, managers might use the flexibility afforded by the
proposed standard to produce biased and unreliable estimates. The
measurement guidance proposed in the ED is similar to the unstructured and
imprecise category of standards analyzed by Nelson et al. (2002). They
find that managers are more likely to attempt (and auditors are less likely
to question) earnings management under such standards compared to more
precise standards.
The income approach to determining a Level 3 fair
value estimate encompasses a basket of valuation techniques including two
different present value techniques--the discount rate adjustment technique
and the expected present value technique.4 The ED conjectures
that these two techniques should produce the same fair values (see
paragraphs A12, A13 and FN 17). But, from an application perspective, this
conjecture is not consistent with empirical results from studies of human
judgment and decision making.5 In particular, psychology
research repeatedly shows that people are very poor intuitive statisticians
(e.g., people consistently make axiomatic violations when estimating
probabilistic outcomes). In light of these findings, statements such as
"the estimated fair values should be the same" provide preparers, auditors,
and users with an unfounded (and descriptively false) belief that the
techniques suggested in the ED will produce the same fair value estimates.
Some members of the Committee believe that the ED
should explicitly caution preparers, auditors, and users by stating that
individuals consistently make these judgment errors. Further, these
Committee members recommend that the ED require companies (when practicable)
to (1) independently use the discount rate adjustment and expected
present value techniques if they decide to use a present value approach to
determine fair value and (2) reconcile the results of the two techniques in
a meaningful fashion and document the reconciliation so it can be audited
for reasonableness. Moreover, the application of the present value
techniques should be independent of suggested or existing fair value figures
when practicable (e.g., the fair value amount recorded in the previous
year's financial statements), because psychology research finds that
preconceived targets and legacy amounts unduly influence current judgments
and decisions (e.g., through "anchoring" and insufficient adjustment).
Although the disclosures required under paragraph
25 of the ED provide some information regarding the potential reliability of
a Level 3 estimate, they do not provide alternative benchmark models that
the firm may have considered in determining those fair value estimates.
Hence, the Committee also recommends that the FASB consider requiring firms
to disclose (1) fair value estimates under alternative valuation techniques,
and (2) sensitivity of fair value estimates to the specific assumptions and
inputs used.
Issue 11: Fair Value Disclosures
As mentioned previously, the Committee believes
that the proposed fair value measurement disclosures are not complete. The
Committee believes that when a firm uses alternative valuation methods to
determine fair value, information regarding the alternative techniques and
inputs employed should be provided. Furthermore, users of financial
statements would get a better understanding of the reliability of fair value
estimates if the financial statements provide detailed disclosures related
to (1) fair value estimates produced by alternative valuation techniques and
reasons for selecting a preferred estimate, and (2) information about the
sensitivity of fair value estimates to changes in assumptions and inputs.
The Committee also notes that the ED requires the
expanded set of reliability related disclosures only for fair value
estimates reported in the balance sheet (paragraph 25). A complete set of
financial statements also includes many fair value estimates reported in the
notes to the financial statements. Some members of the Committee believe
that financial statement users would also benefit from receiving the
reliability related disclosures for fair values disclosed in the footnotes.
Moreover, application of the fair value hierarchy has implications for the
reliability of the unrealized gains and losses reported in net (or
comprehensive) income. Accordingly, some members recommend that firms be
required to disclose a breakdown of unrealized gains or losses based on how
the related fair value amounts were determined (i.e., quoted prices of
identical items, quoted prices of similar items, valuation models with
significant market inputs, or valuation models with significant entity
inputs.)
CONCLUSION
The Committee supports the formulation of a single
standard that provides guidance on fair value measurement. We believe that
such a standard would improve the consistency of fair value measurement
across the many standards that require fair value reporting and disclosure.
In this comment letter, we identify some potential inconsistencies between
fair value definitions and fair value determination, and suggest ways to
improve disclosures so that users of financial statements can better
appreciate the reliability (or lack thereof) of fair value estimates.
Although the Committee recognizes that the ED is
intended to provide fair value measurement guidance, we wish to caution
against promulgating pronouncements that completely eliminate historical
cost information from the financial statements. Evidence reported in
Dietrich et al. (2000) suggests that historical cost information is
incrementally informative even after fair value information is included in
regression analyses.
4
FASB Concept Statement No. 7, Using Cash Flow Information and Present
Value in Accounting Measurements, describes these techniques, albeit
using different terminology. In that Concepts Statement, traditional
present value refers to the discount rate adjustment technique, while
expected cash flow approach refers to the expected present value technique.
5
Probability-related judgments and decisions are among the oldest branches of
psychology and decision-science research. Two excellent resources that
catalogue the problems that individuals have with probability judgments and
statistical reasoning are Baron (2000) and Goldstein and Hogarth (1997).
What are the
advantages and disadvantages of requiring fair value accounting for all
financial instruments as well as derivative financial instruments?
Advantages:
- Eliminate
arbitrary FAS 115 classifications that can be used by management to
manipulate earnings (which is what Freddie Mac did in 2001 and 1002.
- Reduce problems
of applying FAS 133 in hedge accounting where hedge accounting is now
allowed only when the hedged item is maintained at historical cost.
- Provide a
better snap shot of values and risks at each point in time.
For example, banks now resist fair value accounting because they do
not want to show how investment securities have dropped in value.
Disdvantages:
- Combines fact
and fiction in the sense that unrealized gains and losses due to fair
value adjustments are combined with “real” gains and losses from cash
transactions. Many, if not
most, of the unrealized gains and losses will never be realized in cash.
These are transitory fluctuations that move up and down with
transitory markets. For
example, the value of a $1,000 fixed-rate bond moves up and down with
interest rates when at expiration it will return the $1,000 no matter how
interest rates fluctuated over the life of the bond.
- Sometimes
difficult to value, especially OTC securities.
- Creates
enormous swings in reported earnings and balance sheet values.
- Generally
fair value is the estimated exit (liquidation) value of an asset or
liability. For assets, this is often much less than the entry
(acquisition) value for a variety of reasons such as higher transactions
costs of entry value, installation costs (e.g., for machines), and different
markets (e.g., paying dealer prices for acquisition and blue book for
disposal). For example, suppose Company A purchases a computer for $2
million that it can only dispose of for $1 million a week after the purchase
and installation. Fair value accounting requires expensing half of the
computer in the first week even though the computer itself may be utilized
for years to come. This violates the matching principle of matching
expenses with revenues, which is one of the reasons why fair value
proponents generally do not recommend fair value accounting for operating
assets.
"Derivatives
and hedging: An Analyst's Response to US FAS 133," by Frank Will, Corporate
Finance Magazine, June 2002, http://www.corporatefinancemag.com/pdf/122341.pdf
However,
FAS 133 still needs further clarification and improvement as the example of
Fannie Mae shows. Analysts focus more on the economic value of a
company and less on unrealised gains and losses. Much of the FAS 133
volatility in earnings and in equity does not consistently reflect the
economic situation. This makes it difficult to interpret the figures.
Therefore, analysts welcome the decision of some companies voluntarily to
disclose a separate set of figures excluding the effect of FAS 133.
For
more on Frank Will's analysis of FAS 133, Fair Value Accounting, and Fannie
Mae, go to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm
Bob
Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm
You can read more about fair value at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms
Forwarded on May 11, 2003 by Patrick E Charles
[charlesp@CWDOM.DM]
Mark-to-market rule
should be written off
Richard A. Werner
Special to The Daily Yomiuri
Yomiuri
Since 1996,
comprehensive accounting reforms have been gradually introduced in Japan.
Since fiscal 2000, the valuation of investment securities owned by firms has
been based on their market value at book-closing. Since fiscal 2001,
securities held on a long-term basis also have been subjected to the
mark-to-market rule. Now, the Liberal Democratic Party is calling for the
suspension of the newly introduced rule to mark investments to market, as well
as for a delay in the introduction of a new rule that requires fixed assets to
be valued at their market value.
The proponents of
so-called global standards are up in arms at this latest intervention by the
LDP. If marking assets to market is delayed, they argue, the nation will lag
behind in the globalization of accounting standards. Moreover, they argue that
corporate accounts must be as transparent as possible, and therefore should be
marked to market as often and as radically as possible. On the other hand,
opponents of the mark-to-market rule argue that the recent slump in the stock
market, which has reached a 21-year low, can at least partly be blamed on the
new accounting rules.
What are we to make
of this debate? Let us consider the facts. Most leading industrialized
countries, such as Britain, France and Germany, so far have not introduced
mark-to-market rules. Indeed, the vast majority of countries currently do not
use them.
Nevertheless, there
is enormous political pressure to utilize mark-to-market accounting, and many
countries plan to introduce the standard in 2005 or thereafter.
Japan decided to
adopt the new standard ahead of everyone else, based on the advice given by a
few accountants--an industry that benefits from the revision of accounting
standards as any rule change guarantees years of demand for their consulting
services.
However, so far there
has not been a broad public debate about the overall benefits and
disadvantages of the new standard. The LDP has raised the important point that
such accounting changes might have unintended negative consequences for the
macroeconomy.
Let us first reflect
on the microeconomic rationale supporting mark-to-market rules. They are said
to render company accounts more transparent by calculating corporate balance
sheets using the values that markets happen to indicate on the day of book-
closing. Since book-closing occurs only once, twice or, at best, four times a
year, any sudden or temporary move of markets on these days--easily possible
in these times of extraordinary market volatility--will distort accounts
rather than rendering them more transparent.
Second, it is not
clear that marking assets to market reflects the way companies look at their
assets. While they know that market values are highly volatile, there is one
piece of information about corporate assets that have an undisputed meaning
for
firms: the price at
which they were actually bought.
The purchase price
matters as it reflects actual transactions and economic activity. Marking to
market, on the other hand, means valuing assets at values at which they were
never transacted. The company has neither paid nor received this theoretical
money in exchange for the assets. This market value is hence a purely
fictitious value. Instead of increasing transparency, we end up increasing the
part of the accounts that is fiction.
While the history of
marking to market is brief, we do have some track record from the United
States, which introduced mark-to-market accounting in the 1990s.
Did the introduction
increase accounting transparency? The U.S. Financial Accounting Standards
Board last November concluded that the new rule of marking to market allowed
Enron Energy Services Inc. to book profits from long-term energy contracts
immediately rather than when the money was actually received.
This enabled Enron
executives to create the illusion of a profitable business unit despite the
fact that the truth was far from it. Thanks to mark-to-market accounting,
Enron's retail division managed to hide significant losses and book billions
of dollars in profits based on inflated predictions of future energy prices.
Enron's executives received millions of dollars in bonuses when the energy
contracts were signed.
The U.S. Financial
Accounting Standards Board task force recognized the problems and has hence
recommended the mark-to-market accounting rule be scrapped. Since this year,
U.S. energy companies will only be able to report profits as income actually
is received.
Marking to market
thus creates the illusion that theoretical market values can actually be
realized. We must not forget that market values are merely the values derived
on the basis of a certain number of transactions during the day in case.
Strictly speaking, it
is a false assumption to extend the same values to any number of assets that
were not actually transacted at that value on that day.
When a certain number
of the 225 stocks constituting the Nikkei Stock Average are traded at a
certain price, this does not say anything about the price that all stocks that
have been issued by these 225 companies would have traded on that day.
As market
participants know well, the volume of transactions is an important indicator
of how representative stock prices can be considered during any given day. If
the index falls 1 percent on little volume, this is quickly discounted by many
observers as it means that only a tiny fraction of shares were actually
traded. If the market falls 1 percent on record volume, then this may be a
better proxy of the majority of stock prices on that day.
The values at which
U.S. corporations were marked to market at the end of December 1999, at the
peak of a speculative bubble, did little to increase transparency. If all
companies had indeed sold their assets on that day, surely this would have
severely depressed asset prices.
Consider this: If
your neighbor decides to sell his house for half price, how would you feel if
the bank that gave you a mortgage argued that, according to the mark-to-
market rule, it now also must halve the value of your house--and, as a result,
they regret to inform you that you are bankrupt.
We discussed the case
of traded securities. But in many cases a market for the assets on a company's
books does not actually exist. In this case, accountants use so-called net
present value calculations to estimate a theoretical value. This means even
greater fiction because the theoretical value depends crucially on assumptions
made about interest rates, economic growth, asset markets and so on.
Given the dismal
track record of forecasters in this area, it is astonishing to find that
serious accountants wish corporate accounts to be based on them.
There are significant
macroeconomic costs involved with mark-to-market accounting. As all companies
will soon be forced to recalculate their balance sheets more frequently, the
state of financial markets on the calculation day will determine whether they
are still "sound," or in accounting terms, "bankrupt."
While book value accounting tends to reduce volatility in markets to some
extent, the new rule can only increase it. The implications are especially
far-reaching in the banking sector since banks are not ordinary businesses,
but fulfill the public function of creating and providing the money supply on
which economic growth depends.
U.S. experts warned
years ago that the introduction of marking to market could create a credit
crunch. As banks will be forced to set aside larger loan-loss reserves to
cover loans that may have declined in value on the day of marking, bank
earnings could be reduced. Banks might thus shy away from making loans to
small or midsize firms under the new rules, where a risk premium exists and
hence the likelihood of marking losses is larger. As a result, banks would
have a disincentive to lend to small firms. Yet, for all we know, the small
firm loans may yet be repaid in full.
If banks buy a
10-year Japanese government bond with the intention to hold it until maturity,
and the economy recovers, thus pushing down bond prices significantly, the
market value of the government bonds will decline. Banks would thus be forced
to book substantial losses on their bond holdings despite the fact that, by
holding until maturity, they would never actually have suffered any losses.
Japanese banks currently have vast holdings of government bonds. The change in
accounting rules likely will increase problems in the banking sector. As banks
reduce lending, economic growth will fall, thereby depressing asset prices,
after which accountants will quickly try to mark down everyone's books.
Of course, in good
times, the opposite may occur, as we saw in the case of Enron. During upturns,
marking to market may boost accounting figures beyond the actual state of
reality. This also will boost banks' accounts (similar to the Bank for
International Settlements rules announced in 1988), thus encouraging excessive
lending. This in turn will fuel an economic boom, which will further raise the
accounting values of assets.
Thus does it make
sense to mark everything to fictitious market values? We can conclude that
marking to market has enough problems on the micro level to negate any
potential benefits. On the macro level, the disadvantages will be far larger
as asset price volatility will rise, business cycles will be exacerbated and
economic activity will be destabilized.
The world economy has
done well for several centuries without this new rule. There is no evidence
that it will improve anything. To the contrary, it is likely to prove harmful.
The LDP must be lauded for its attempt to stop the introduction of these new
accounting rules.
Werner is an
assistant professor of economics at Sophia University and chief economist at
Tokyo-based investment adviser Profit Research Center Ltd.
Measuring the Business Value of Stakeholder
Relationships all about social capital and how high-trust relationships affect the
bottom line. Plus a new measurement tool for benchmarking the quality of stakeholder
relationships --- www.cim.sfu.ca/newsletter
Trust, shared values and strong
relationships aren't typical financial indicators but perhaps they should be. A joint
study by CIM and the Schulich School of Business is examining the link between high trust
stakeholder relationships and business value creation. The study is sponsored by the
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA).
The research team is looking at
how social capital can be applied to business. The aim of this project is to better
understand corporate social capital, measure the quality of relationships, and provide the
business community with ways to improve those relationships and in turn improve their
bottom line.
Because stakeholder relationships
all have common features, direct comparisons of the quality of relationships can be made
across diverse stakeholder groups, companies and industries.
Social capital is the stock
of active connections among people; the trust, mutual understanding, and shared values and
behaviors that bind the members of human networks and communities and make cooperative
action possible (Cohen and Prusak, 2000).
So far the research suggests that
trust, a cooperative spirit and shared understanding between a company and its
stakeholders creates greater coherence of action, better knowledge sharing, lower
transaction costs, lower turnover rates and organizational stability. In the bigger
picture, social capital appears to minimize shareholder risk, promote innovation, enhance
reputation and deepen brand loyalty.
Preliminary results show that
high levels of social capital in a relationship can build upon themselves. For example, as
a company builds reputation among its peers for fair dealing and reliability in keeping
promises, that reputation itself becomes a prized asset useful for sustaining its current
alliances and forming future ones.
The first phase of the
research is now complete and the study moves into its second phase involving detailed case
studies with six companies that have earned a competitive business advantage through their
stakeholder relationships. Click here for a full report
Bob Jensen's discussion of valuation and
aggregation issues can be found at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm
That scenario isn't as farfetched as you might
think. It's called a prediction market, based on the notion that a marketplace
is a better organizer of insight and predictor of the future than individuals
are. Once confined to research universities, the idea of markets working
within companies has started to seep out into some of the nation's largest
corporations. Companies from Microsoft to Eli Lilly and Hewlett-Packard are
bringing the market inside, with workers trading futures contracts on such
"commodities" as sales, product success and supplier behavior. The
concept: a work force contains vast amounts of untapped, useful information
that a market can unlock. "Markets are likely to revolutionize corporate
forecasting and decision making," says Robin Hanson, an economist at
George Mason University, in Virginia, who has researched and developed
markets. "Strategic decisions, such as mergers, product introductions,
regional expansions and changing CEOs, could be effectively delegated to
people far down the corporate hierarchy, people not selected by or even known
to top management."
Barbara Kiviat (See below)
"The End Of Management? by Barbara Kiviat, Time Magazine, July
12, 2004, pp. 88-92 --- http://www.time.com/time/insidebiz/printout/0,8816,1101040712-660965,00.html
The end of management just might look something
like this. You show up for work, boot up your computer and log onto your
company's Intranet to make a few trades before getting down to work. You see
how your stocks did the day before and then execute a few new orders. You
think your company should step up production next month, and you trade on
that thought. You sell stock for the production of 20,000 units and buy
stock that represents an order for 30,000 instead. All around you, as
co-workers arrive at their cubicles, they too flick on their computers and
trade.
Together, you are buyers and sellers of your
company's future. Through your trades, you determine what is going to happen
and then decide how your company should respond. With employees in the
trading pits betting on the future, who needs the manager in the corner
office?
That scenario isn't as farfetched as you might
think. It's called a prediction market, based on the notion that a
marketplace is a better organizer of insight and predictor of the future
than individuals are. Once confined to research universities, the idea of
markets working within companies has started to seep out into some of the
nation's largest corporations. Companies from Microsoft to Eli Lilly and
Hewlett-Packard are bringing the market inside, with workers trading futures
contracts on such "commodities" as sales, product success and
supplier behavior. The concept: a work force contains vast amounts of
untapped, useful information that a market can unlock. "Markets are
likely to revolutionize corporate forecasting and decision making,"
says Robin Hanson, an economist at George Mason University, in Virginia, who
has researched and developed markets. "Strategic decisions, such as
mergers, product introductions, regional expansions and changing CEOs, could
be effectively delegated to people far down the corporate hierarchy, people
not selected by or even known to top management."
To understand the hype, take a look at
Hewlett-Packard's experience with forecasting monthly sales. A few years
back, HP commissioned Charles Plott, an economist from the California
Institute of Technology, to set up a software trading platform. A few dozen
employees, mostly product and finance managers, were each given about $50 in
a trading account to bet on what they thought computer sales would be at the
end of the month. If a salesman thought the company would sell between, say,
$201 million and $210 million worth, he could buy a security — like a
futures contract — for that prediction, signaling to the rest of the
market that someone thought that was a probable scenario. If his opinion
changed, he could buy again or sell.
When trading stopped, the scenario behind the
highest-priced stock was the one the market deemed most likely. The traders
got to keep their profits and won an additional dollar for every share of
"stock" they owned that turned out to be the right sales range.
Result: while HP's official forecast, which was generated by a marketing
manager, was off 13%, the stock market was off only 6%. In further trials,
the market beat official forecasts 75% of the time.
Intrigued by that success, HP's business-services
division ran a pilot last year with 14 managers worldwide, trying to
determine the group's monthly sales and profit. The market was so successful
(in one case, improving the prediction 50%) that it has since been
integrated into the division's regular forecasts. Another division is
running a pilot to see if a market would be better at predicting the costs
of certain components with volatile prices. And two other HP divisions hope
to be using markets to answer similar questions by the end of the year.
"You could do zillions of things with this," says Bernardo
Huberman, director of the HP group that designs and coordinates the markets.
"The idea of being able to forecast something allows you to prepare,
plan and make decisions. It's potentially huge savings."
Eli Lilly, one of the largest pharmaceutical
companies in the world, which routinely places multimillion-dollar bets on
drug candidates that face overwhelming odds of failure, wanted to see if it
could get a better idea of which compounds would succeed. So last year Lilly
ran an experiment in which about 50 employees involved in drug development
— chemists, biologists, project managers — traded six mock drug
candidates through an internal market. "We wanted to look at the way
scattered bits of information are processed in the course of drug
development," says Alpheus Bingham, vice president for Lilly Research
Laboratories strategy. The market brought together all the information, from
toxicology reports to clinical results, and correctly predicted the three
most successful drugs.
What's more, the market data revealed shades of
opinion that never would have shown up if the traders were, say, responding
to a poll. A willingness to pay $70 for a particular drug showed greater
confidence than a bid at $60, a spread that wouldn't show if you simply
asked, Will this drug succeed? "When we start trading stock, and I try
buying your stock cheaper and cheaper, it forces us to a way of agreeing
that never really occurs in any other kind of conversation," says
Bingham. "That is the power of the market."
The current enthusiasm can be traced in part, oddly
enough, to last summer's high-profile flop of a market that was supposed to
help predict future terrorist attacks. A public backlash killed that
Pentagon project a few months before its debut, but not before the media
broadcast the notion that useful information embedded within a group of
people could be drawn out and organized via a marketplace. Says George
Mason's Hanson, who helped design the market: "People noticed."
Another predictive market, the Iowa Electronic Markets at the University of
Iowa, has been around since 1988. That bourse has accepted up to $500 from
anyone wanting to wager on election results. Players buy and sell outcomes:
Is Kerry a win or Bush a shoo-in? This is the same information that news
organizations and pollsters chase in the run-up to election night. Yet Iowa
outperforms them 75% of the time.
Inspired by such results, researchers at Microsoft
started running trials of predictive markets in February, finding the system
inexpensive to set up. Now they're shopping around for the market's first
real use. An early candidate: predicting how long it will take software
testers to adopt a new piece of technology. Todd Proebsting, who is
spearheading the initiative, explains, "If the market says they're
going to be behind schedule, executives can ask, What does the market know
that we don't know?" Another option: predicting how many patches, or
corrections, will be issued in the first six months of using a new piece of
software. "The pilots worked great, but we had little to compare it
to," he says. "You can reason that this would do a good job. But
what you really want to show is that this works better than the
alternative."
Ultimately, "you may someday see someone in a
desk job or a manufacturing job doing day trading, knowing that's part of
the job," says Thomas Malone, a management professor at M.I.T. who has
written about markets. "I'm very optimistic about the long-term
prospects."
But no market is perfect. Economists are still
unsure of the human factor: how to get people to play and do their best. In
the stock market or even the Iowa prediction market, people put up their own
money and trade to make more. That incentive ensures that people trade on
their best information. But a company that asks employees to risk their own
money raises ethical questions, so most corporate markets use play money to
trade and small bonuses or prizes for good traders. "Though this may
look like God's gift to business, there are problems with it," says
Plott, who ran the first HP experiments. Tokyo-based Dentsu, one of the
world's largest advertising firms, is still grappling with incentives for an
ad forecasting market it will launch later this year with the help of News
Futures, a U.S. consultancy.
And even if companies can figure out how to make
their internal markets totally efficient, there are plenty of reasons that
corporate America isn't about to jump wholesale onto the markets bandwagon.
For one thing, markets, based on individuals and individual interests, could
threaten the kind of team spirit that many corporations have struggled to
cultivate. Established hierarchies could be threatened too. After all, a
market implies that the current data crunching and decision-making process
may not be as good as a gamelike system that often includes lower-level
employees. In a sense, an internal market's success suggests that if upper
managers would just give up control, things would run better. Lilly, which
is considering using a market to forecast actual drug success, is still
grappling with the potential ramifications. "We already have a rigorous
process," says Lilly's Bingham. "So what do you do if you use a
market and get different data?" Throw it out? Or say that the market
was smarter, impugning the tried-and-true system?
There could be risks to individual workers in an
internal trading system as well. If you lose money in the market, does that
mean you're not knowledgeable about something you should be? "You have
to get people used to the idea of being accountable in a very different
way," says Mary Murphy-Hoye, senior principal engineer at Intel, which
has been experimenting with internal markets. "I can now tell if
planners are any good, because they're making money or they're not making
money."
Continued in article
Robert Walker's First Blog Entry is About Fair Value Accounting,
October 27, 2006 ---
http://www.robertbwalkerca.blogspot.com/
Introduction
I have decided to begin a commentary which expresses my views on
accounting. As I begin to do this I envisage the source of my
commentary to comprise three different sorts of writing in which
I may engage:
§ Simple notes directly to the ‘blog’ such as this.
§ Formal submissions I may make to various bodies including the
IASB.
§ Letters or reports I may write for one reason or another that
I think might have some general readership.
The expression of my views will stray from the subject matter of
accounting per se to deal with matters of enormous significance
to me such as corporate or public administration. Such
expressions will not be too substantial a digression from the
core subject matter because I believe that the foundation of
good ‘corporate governance’, to use a vogue term, is accounting.
Source of my ideas on accounting
I would have to confess that the foundation upon which I base my
philosophy of accounting is derivative, as much of human
knowledge is of course. It is not for nothing that Newtown said
that if he can see so far it is because he stands on the
shoulders of giants. In my case, that ‘giant’ is Yuiji Ijiri. As
I begin a detailed exposition of my views I shall return to the
lessons I learned many years ago from Theory of Accounting
Measurement, a neglected work that will still be read in 1,000
years or so long as humankind survives whichever is the shorter.
As the depredations of the standard setting craze are visited
upon us with ever increasing complexity, the message delivered
by Ijiri will be heeded more an more.
The basic structure of accounting
Without wishing to be too philosophical about it, I need to
begin by outlining what I mean by accounting. Accounting, in my
mind, comprises three inter-related parts. These are:
§ Book-keeping.
§ Accounting.
§ Financial reporting.
Book-keeping is the process of recording financial data elements
in the underlying books of account. These financial data
elements represent, or purport to represent, real world events.
The heart of book-keeping is the double entry process. For
instance at the most basic level a movement in cash will result
in the surrender or receipt of an asset, the incurring or
settlement of a liability and so on.
I have no complete and coherent theory of the limits of
book-keeping. Clearly cash movement (change of ownership) or the
movement of commodity is the proper subject matter of
book-keeping. Whether all forms of contract should be similarly
treated is not clear to me. I am inclined to say yes. That is to
adopt Ijiri’s theory of commitment accounting, but I can foresee
that this leads me to conclusions that I may find unpalatable
later on. Incidentally I say this because an epiphany I had,
based on the notion of commitment accounting, some years ago is
beginning to unravel.
Book-keeping goes beyond recording to encompass control. That is
the process by which the integrity of the centre piece of
book-keeping – the general ledger expressing double entry – is
ensured. I will not concern myself with such processes though
this is not to say that they are unimportant.
Accounting is the process by which sense is made of what is a
raw record expressed in the general ledger. It is the process of
distillation and summation that enables the accountant to gain
on overview of what has happened to the entity the subject of
the accounting. Accounting fundamentally assumes that the
accountant is periodically capable of saying something useful
about the real world using his or her special form of notation.
Financial reporting is the process by which data is assembled
into a comprehensive view of the world in accordance with a body
of rules. It differs, in the ideal, from accounting in a number
of ways. Most benignly it differs, for instance, by including
ancillary information for the benefit of a reader beyond the
mere abstraction from the general ledger. Again in the ideal
there is an inter-relationship between the three levels in the
accounting hierarchy. That is, the rules of financial reporting
will, to some degree shape the order and format of the basic,
book-keeping level so that the process of distillation and
summation follows naturally to the final level of reporting
without dramatic alteration.
Perhaps what concerns me is that the sentiment expressed above
can be seen, without much effort, to be only ideal and that in
reality it does not arise. In short the golden strand that links
the detailed recording of real world phenonmena to its final
summation is broken.
An example
I was asked recently by a student of accounting to explain IAS
41, the IASB standard on agriculture. As I don’t deal in primary
production at all, I had not thought about this subject for
years.
IAS 41 admonishes the accountant to apply ‘fair value’
accounting. Fair value accounting is the process by which
current sale prices, or their proxies, are substituted for the
past cost of any given item.
For instance, you may have a mature vineyard. The vineyard
comprises land, the vine and its fruit, the plant necessary to
sustain the vine (support structures, irrigation channels etc.).
Subsumed within the vine are the materials necessary for it to
grow and start producing fruit. This will include the immature
plant, the chemical supplements necessary to nurture and protect
it, and the labour necessary to apply it.
The book-keeping process will faithfully record all of these
components. Suppose for example the plant, fertliser and labour
cost $1000. In the books will be recorded:
Dr Vineyard $1000
Cr Cash $1000
At the end of the accounting period, the accountant will
summarise this is a balance statement. He or she will then
obtain, in some way, the current selling price of the vine.
Presumably this will be the future cash stream of selling the
fruit, suitably discounted. Assume that this is $1200.
The accountant will then make the following incremental
adjustment:
Dr Vineyard $200
Cr Equity $200
Looked like this there is a connection between the original
book-keeping and the periodic adjustment at the end of the
accounting period. This is an illusion. The incremental entry
disguises what is really happening. It is as follows:
Dr Equity $1000
Cr Vineyard $1000
And
Dr Vineyard $1200
Cr Equity $1200
Considered from the long perspective, the original book-keeping
has been discarded and a substitute value put in its place. This
is the truth of the matter. The subject matter of the first
phase of accounting was a set of events arising in a bank and in
the entity undertaking accounting. The subject matter of the
second phase is a set of future sales to a party who does not
yet exist.
From a perspective of solvency determination, a vital element of
corporate governance, the view produced by the first phase is
next to useless. However, the disquiet I had in my mind which I
had suppressed until recently, relates to the shattering of the
linkages between the three levels of accounting in the final
reporting process. This disquiet has returned as I contemplate
the apparently unstoppable momentum of the standard setting
process.
October 28, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Robert,
I hope you add many more entries to your blog.
The problem with "original book-keeping" is that it
provides no answers about how to account for risk of many modern day
contracts that were not imagined when "original book-keeping" evolved in
a simple world of transactions. For example, historical costs of forward
contracts and swaps are zero and yet these contracts may have risks that
may outweigh all the recorded debt under "original book-keeping." Once
we opened the door to fair value accounting to better account for risk,
however, we opened the door to misleading the public that booked fair
value adjustments can be aggregated much like we sum the current
balances of assets and liabilities on the balance sheet. Such
aggregations are generally nonsense.
I don't know if you saw my recent hockey analogy or not.
It goes as follows:
Goal Tenders versus Movers and Shakers
Skate to where the puck is going, not to where it is.
Wayne Gretsky (as quoted for many years by Jerry Trites at
http://www.zorba.ca/ )
Jensen Comment
This may be true for most hockey players and other movers and shakers, but for
goal tenders the eyes should be focused on where the puck is at every moment ---
not where it's going. The question is whether an accountant is a goal tender
(stewardship responsibilities) or a mover and shaker (part of the managerial
decision making team). This is also the essence of the debate of historical
accounting versus pro forma accounting.
Graduate student Derek Panchuk and professor Joan
Vickers, who discovered the Quiet Eye phenomenon, have just completed the most
comprehensive, on-ice hockey study to determine where elite goalies focus their
eyes in order to make a save. Simply put, they found that goalies should keep
their eyes on the puck. In an article to be published in the journal Human
Movement Science, Panchuk and Vickers discovered that the best goaltenders rest
their gaze directly on the puck and shooter's stick almost a full second before
the shot is released. When they do that they make the save over 75 per cent of
the time.
"Keep your eyes on the puck," PhysOrg, October 26, 2006 ---
http://physorg.com/news81068530.html
I have written a more serious piece about both
theoretical and practical problems of fair value accounting. I should
emphasize that this was written after the FASB Exposure Draft proposing
fair value accounting as an option for all financial instruments and the
culminating FAS 157 that is mainly definitional and removed the option
to apply fair value accounting to all financial instruments even though
it is still required in many instances by earlier FASB standards.
My thoughts on this are at the following link:
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
Bob Jensen
E-COMMERCE AND AUDITING FAIR VALUES SUBJECTS OF NEW INTERNATIONAL GUIDANCE
The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) invites comments on two new
exposure drafts (EDs): Auditing Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures and
Electronic Commerce: Using the Internet or Other Public Networks - Effect on the
Audit of Financial Statements. Comments on both EDs, developed by IFAC's
International Auditing Practices Committee (IAPC), are due by January 15, 2002.
See http://accountingeducation.com/news/news2213.html
The IFAC link is at http://www.ifac.org/Guidance/EXD-Download.tmpl?PubID=1003772692151
The purpose of this International Standard on Auditing (ISA) is to establish
standards and provide guidance on auditing fair value measurements and
disclosures contained in financial statements. In particular, this ISA addresses
audit considerations relating to the valuation, measurement, presentation and
disclosure for material assets, liabilities and specific components of equity
presented or disclosed at fair value in financial statements. Fair value
measurements of assets, liabilities and components of equity may arise from both
the initial recording of transactions and later changes in value.
The FASB's Statement No.
148
FAS 148 improves disclosures for
stock-based compensation and provides alternative transition methods for
companies that switch to the fair value method of accounting for stock options
--- http://www.fasb.org/news/nr123102.shtml
The transition guidance and annual disclosure provisions of Statement 148 are
effective for fiscal years ending after December 15, 2002, with earlier
application permitted in certain circumstances. . Fair
value accounting is still optional (until the FASB finally makes up its mind on
stock options.)
FASB Amends
Transition Guidance for Stock Options and Provides Improved Disclosures
Norwalk, CT,
December 31, 2002—The
FASB has published Statement No. 148, Accounting for Stock-Based
Compensation—Transition and Disclosure, which amends FASB Statement No.
123, Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation. In response to a growing
number of companies announcing plans to record expenses for the fair value of
stock options, Statement 148 provides alternative methods of transition for a
voluntary change to the fair value based method of accounting for stock-based
employee compensation. In addition, Statement 148 amends the disclosure
requirements of Statement 123 to require more prominent and more frequent
disclosures in financial statements about the effects of stock-based
compensation.
Under the provisions
of Statement 123, companies that adopted the preferable, fair value based
method were required to apply that method prospectively for new stock option
awards. This contributed to a “ramp-up” effect on stock-based compensation
expense in the first few years following adoption, which caused concern for
companies and investors because of the lack of consistency in reported
results. To address that concern, Statement 148 provides two additional
methods of transition that reflect an entity’s full complement of
stock-based compensation expense immediately upon adoption, thereby
eliminating the ramp-up effect.
Statement 148 also
improves the clarity and prominence of disclosures about the pro forma effects
of using the fair value based method of accounting for stock-based
compensation for all companies—regardless of the accounting method used—by
requiring that the data be presented more prominently and in a more
user-friendly format in the footnotes to the financial statements. In
addition, the Statement improves the timeliness of those disclosures by
requiring that this information be included in interim as well as annual
financial statements. In the past, companies were required to make pro forma
disclosures only in annual financial statements.
The transition
guidance and annual disclosure provisions of Statement 148 are effective for
fiscal years ending after December 15, 2002, with earlier application
permitted in certain circumstances. The interim disclosure provisions are
effective for financial reports containing financial statements for interim
periods beginning after December 15, 2002.
As previously
reported, the FASB has solicited comments from its constituents relating to
the accounting for stock-based compensation, including valuation of stock
options, as part of its recently issued Invitation to Comment, Accounting
for Stock-Based Compensation: A Comparison of FASB Statement No. 123,
Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation, and Its Related Interpretations,
and IASB Proposed IFRS, Share-based Payment. That Invitation to Comment
explains the similarities of and differences between the proposed guidance on
accounting for stock-based compensation included in the International
Accounting Standards Board’s (IASB’s) recently issued exposure draft and
the FASB’s guidance under Statement 123.
After considering the
responses to the Invitation to Comment, the Board plans to make a decision in
the latter part of the first quarter of 2003 about whether it should undertake
a more comprehensive reconsideration of the accounting for stock options. As
part of that process, the Board may revisit its 1995 decision permitting
companies to disclose the pro forma effects of the fair value based method
rather than requiring all companies to recognize the fair value of employee
stock options as an expense in the income statement. Under the provisions of
Statement 123 that remain unaffected by Statement 148, companies may either
recognize expenses on a fair value based method in the income statement or
disclose the pro forma effects of that method in the footnotes to the
financial statements.
Copies of Statement 148 may be
obtained by contacting the FASB’s Order Department at 800-748-0659 or by
placing an order at the FASB’s website at www.fasb.org
.
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting
Educators' Reviews on June 20, 2002
TITLE: And, Now the Question is: Where's the Next Enron?
REPORTER: Cassell Bryan-Low and Ken Brown
DATE: Jun 18, 2002 PAGE: C1 LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1024356537931110920.djm,00.html
TOPICS: off balance sheet financing, Related-party transactions, loan guarantees,
Accounting, Fair Value Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Regulation,
Securities and Exchange Commission
SUMMARY: In the wake of the Enron accounting debacle, investors are concerned that
another Enron-like situation could occur. The article describes steps taken to improve the
quality of financial reporting.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Why is it important that investors and other financial statement users have
confidence in financial reporting?
2.) What is a related-party transaction? What accounting issues are associated with
related-party transactions? What changes in disclosing and accounting for related party
transactions are proposed? Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed changes.
3.) What is off-balance sheet financing? How was Enron able to avoid reporting
liabilities on its balance sheet? What changes concerning special-purpose entities are
proposed? Will the proposed changes prevent future Enron-like situations? Support your
answer.
4.) When are companies required to report loan guarantees as liabilities? What changes
are proposed? Do you agree with the proposed changes? Support your answer.
5.) What is mark to market accounting? How did mark to market accounting contribute to
the Enron debacle? Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of proposed changes related to
mark to market accounting.
6.) What are pro forma earnings? How can pro forma earnings be used to mislead
investors? What changes in the presentation of pro forma earnings are proposed? Will the
proposed changes protect investors?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
Controversies over revenue reporting are discussed at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm
From the Free Wall Street Journal Educators'
Reviews for December 6, 2001
TITLE: Audits of Arthur Andersen Become Further Focus of Investigation
SEC REPORTER: Jonathan Weil
DATE: Nov 30, 2001 PAGE: A3 LINK:
http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1007059096430725120.djm
TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Auditing
SUMMARY: This article focuses on the issues facing Arthur Andersen now that their work
on the Enron audit has become the subject of an SEC investigation. The on-line version of
the article provides three questions that are attributed to "some accounting
professors." The questions in this review expand on those three provided in the
article.
QUESTIONS:
1.) The first question the SEC might ask of Enron's auditors is "were financial
statement disclosures regarding Enron's transactions too opaque to understand?" Are
financial statement disclosures required to be understandable? To whom? Who is responsible
for ensuring a certain level of understandability?
2.) Another question that the SEC could consider is whether Andersen auditors were
aware that certain off-balance-sheet partnerships should have been consolidated into
Enron's balance sheet, as they were in the company's recent restatement. How could the
auditors have been "unaware" that certain entities should have been
consolidated? What is the SEC's concern with whether or not the auditors were aware of the
need for consolidation?
3.) A third question that the SEC could ask is, "Did Andersen auditors knowingly
sign off on some 'immaterial' accounting violations, ignoring that they collectively
distorted Enron's results?" Again, what is the SEC's concern with whether Andersen
was aware of the collective impact of the accounting errors? Should Andersen have been
aware of the collective amount of impact of these errors? What steps would you suggest in
order to assess this issue?
4.) The article finishes with a discussion of expected Congressional hearings into
Enron's accounting practices and into the accounting and auditing standards setting
process in general. What concern is there that the FASB "has been working on a
project for more than a decade to tighten the rules governing when companies must
consolidate certain off-balance sheet 'special purpose entities'"?
5.) In general, how stringent are accounting and auditing requirements in the U.S.
relative to other countries' standards? Are accounting standards in other countries set in
the same way as in the U.S.? If not, who establishes standards? What incentives would the
U.S. Congress have to establish a law-based system if they become convinced that our
private sector standards setting practices are inadequate? Are you concerned about having
accounting and reporting standards established by law?
6.) The article describes revenue recognition practices at Enron that were based on
"noncash unrealized gains." What standard allows, even requires, this practice?
Why does the author state, "to date, the accounting standards board has given energy
traders almost boundless latitude to value their energy contracts as they see fit"?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
CPA2Biz Unveils Business Valuation Resource Center --- http://www.smartpros.com/x31976.xml
The BV Center will include resources and information from the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and industry experts on various
factors affecting the value of a business or a transaction, such as mergers and
acquisitions; economic damages due to a patent infringement or breaches of contract;
bankruptcy or a reorganization; or fraud due to anti-trust actions or embezzlement. The BV
Center will provide a comprehensive combination of solutions that meet the professional
needs of CPAs practicing business valuation, including those who have achieved the AICPA's
Accredited in Business Valuation credential. The BV Center will also provide networking
communities for BV practitioners as well as a public forum for discussion of business
valuation trends, developments and issues.
"Tremendous growth in the BV discipline, coupled with a
dynamic group of factors affecting business valuation, means that CPAs need a consistent,
timely and relevant vehicle through which BV-related information can be disseminated to
them," said Erik Asgeirsson, Vice President of Product Management at CPA2Biz.
"The BV Center on CPA2Biz will provide them with AICPA books, practice aids,
newsletters and software, along with industry expert literature and complementary
third-party products and solutions. Because the issues associated with valuation impact
CPAs in both public and private sectors -- auditors, tax practitioners, personal financial
planners as well as BV specialists -- the BV Center will have a powerful horizontal impact
on the profession."
"I think that CPAs who practice in business valuation ought
to go to the BV Center for information and tools that are timely, relevant and easy to
obtain," said Thomas Hilton, CPA/ABV, Chairman of the AICPA Business Valuation
Subcommittee. "The BV Center is a source CPAs can use to offer their clients a higher
level of service, as well as to connect with other CPAs who provide valuation
services."
The CPA2Biz Website is at www.cpa2biz.com/
Selected References
on Accounting for Intangibles
(most of which were published after the above paper
was written)
BARUCH LEV'S NEW BOOK Brookings Institution Press
has just issued Baruch's new book, Intangibles: Management, Measurement and Reporting.
Regardless of the "dot com" collapse, this subject continues to be high on the
corporate executive's agenda. Baruch foresees increasing attention being paid to
intangibles by both managers and investors. He feels there is an urgent need to improve
both the management reporting and external disclosure about intellectual capital. He
proposes that we seriously consider revamping our accounting model and significantly
broaden the recognition of intangible assets on the balance sheet. The book can be ordered
at https://www.brookings.edu/press/books/intangibles_book.htm
Professor Lev's free documents on this topic can
be downloaded from http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/newnew.html
SSRN's Top 10
Downloads
(The abstracts are free, but the downloads themselves are not free,.
However, your library may provide you with free SSRN downloads if it
subscribes to SSRN)
One
approach to finding the “top” papers is to download the Social Science
Research Network (SSRN) Top 10 downloads in various categories --- http://papers.ssrn.com/toptens/tt_ntwk_all.html
This database is limited to the selected papers included in the database.
For
accounting, SSRN’s Top 10 papers are at http://papers.ssrn.com/toptens/tt_ntwk_204_home.html#ARN
The average number of downloads of this top accounting research network
paper is 227 per month. In contrast the top economics network
research paper has an average of 2,375 downloads per month.
Downloads in other disciplines depend heavily upon the number of graduate
students and practitioners in that discipline.
The
top ten downloads from the accounting network are as follows (note that
some authors like Mike Jensen are not accountants or accounting
educators):
|
16010 |
A
Comparison of Dividend, Cash Flow, and Earnings Approaches to
Equity Valuation
THEODORE SOUGIANNIS
and STEPHEN H. PENMAN
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
and Columbia School of Business
Date posted to database:March 31, 1997
|
10201 |
Value
Based Management: Economic Value Added or Cash Value Added?
FREDRIK WEISSENRIEDER
Anelda AB
Date posted to database:April 5, 1999
|
8041 |
Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure
Michael C. Jensen, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL
CLAIMS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS, Harvard University Press, Dec.
2000, and The Journal Of Financial Economics, 1976.
MICHAEL C. JENSEN
and WILLIAM H. MECKLING
The Monitor Company and Deceased, University of Rochester Simon School
Date posted to database:July 19, 1998
|
7607 |
Evidence
on EVA®
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 12, No. 2, Summer
1999
GARY C. BIDDLE,
ROBERT M. BOWEN
and JAMES S. WALLACE
Hong Kong University of Science & Technology,
University of Washington and University of California at Irvine
Date posted to database:September 20, 1999
|
5194 |
A
Generalized Earnings Model of Stock Valuation
ANDREW ANG
and JUN LIU
Columbia Business School and University of California, Los Angeles
Date posted to database:July 18, 1998
|
5046 |
Which
is More Value-Relevant: Earnings or Cash Flows?
ERVIN L. BLACK
Brigham Young University
Date posted to database:September 2, 1998
|
4927 |
Combining
Earnings and Book Value in Equity Valuation
STEPHEN H. PENMAN
Columbia School of Business
Date posted to database:November 5, 1997
|
4254 |
Separation
of Ownership and Control
Michael C. Jensen, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY,
Harvard University Press, 1998, and Journal of Law and
Economics, Vol. 26, June 1983
EUGENE F. FAMA
and MICHAEL C. JENSEN
University of Chicago and The Monitor Company
Date posted to database:November 29, 1998
|
3843 |
Value
Creation and its Measurement: A Critical Look at EVA
IGNACIO VELEZ-PAREJA
Politecnico Grancolombiano
Date posted to database:May 19, 1999
|
3771 |
Ratio
Analysis and Equity Valuation
DORON NISSIM
and STEPHEN H. PENMAN
Columbia Business School and Columbia School of Business
Date posted to database:May 11, 1999
|
Other Links on Accounting for
Intangibles
"ACCOUNTING FOR INTANGIBLES: THE GREAT
DIVIDE BETWEEN OBSCURITY IN INNOVATION ACTIVITIES AND THE BALANCE SHEET," by Anne
Wyatt, The Singapore Economic Review, Vol. 46, No. 1 pp. 83-117 --- http://www.worldscinet.com/ser/46/sample/S0217590801000243.html
"Accounting for Intangibles: The New
Frontier" by Baruch Lev (January 11, 2001) --- http://www.nyssa.org/abstract/acct_intangibles.html
FAS 141 and 142 Summary (October 22, 2001) --- http://www.aasb.com.au/workprog/board_papers/public/docs/Agenda_paper_9-1_Accounting_for_Intangibles.pdf
New Rules Summary by Paul Evans (February 24,
2002) --- http://bloodstone.atkinson.yorku.ca/domino/Html/users/pevans/pewwwdl.nsf/98615e08bc387dd385256709007822b0/ddc242fb07932d4f85256b6a00494e9c?OpenDocument
ACCOUNTING FOR INTANGIBLES: A LITERATURE REVIEW, Journal
of Accounting Literature, Vol. 19, 2000
by Leandro Cañibano Autonomous University of Madrid Manuel García-Ayuso University of
Seville Paloma Sánchez Autonomous University of Madrid --- http://www.finansanalytiker.no/innhold/aktiv_presinv/Conf050901/Jal.pdf
"ACCOUNTING FOR INTANGIBLES AT
THE ACCOUNTING COURT," by Jan-Erik Gröjer and Ulf Johanson --- http://www.vn.fi/ktm/1/aineeton/seminar/johanback.htm
NYU Intangibles Research Project --- http://www.stern.nyu.edu/ross/ProjectInt/about/
"Alan Kay talks with Baruch Lev," (June
19, 2001) --- http://www.kmadvantage.com/docs/Leadership/Baruch%20Lev%20on%20Intangible%20Assets.pdf
International Accounting Standard No. 38 --- http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp?s=1020299&sc={2954EE08-82A0-4BC0-8AC0-1DE567F35613}&sd=928976660&n=982
IAS 38: Intangible Assets
|
IAS 38, Intangible Assets,
was approved by the IASB Board in July 1998 and became operative for annual financial
statements covering periods beginning on or after 1 July 1999.
IAS 38 supersedes:
- IAS 4, Depreciation Accounting,
with respect to the amortisation (depreciation) of intangible assets; and
- IAS 9, Research and Development
Costs.
In 1998, IAS
39: Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, amended a paragraph of IAS 38
to replace the reference to IAS 25, Accounting for Investments, by reference to IAS 39.
One SIC Interpretation relates to IAS 38:
Summary of IAS 38
IAS 38 applies to all intangible
assets that are not specifically dealt with in other International Accounting Standards.
It applies, among other things, to expenditures on:
- advertising,
- training,
- start-up, and
- research and development (R&D)
activities.
IAS 38 supersedes IAS 9, Research
and Development Costs. IAS 38 does not apply to financial assets, insurance contracts,
mineral rights and the exploration for and extraction of minerals and similar
non-regenerative resources. Investments in, and awareness of the importance of, intangible
assets have increased significantly in the last two decades.
The main features of IAS 38 are:
- an intangible asset should be
recognised initially, at cost, in the financial statements, if, and only if:
(a) the asset meets the
definition of an intangible asset. Particularly, there should be an identifiable asset
that is controlled and clearly distinguishable from an enterprise's goodwill;
(b) it is probable that the
future economic benefits that are attributable to the asset will flow to the enterprise;
and
(c) the cost of the asset can be
measured reliably.
This requirement applies whether
an intangible asset is acquired externally or generated internally. IAS 38 also includes
additional recognition criteria for internally generated intangible assets;
- if an intangible item does not
meet both the definition, and the criteria for the recognition, of an intangible asset,
IAS 38 requires the expenditure on this item to be recognised as an expense when it is
incurred. An enterprise is not permitted to include this expenditure in the cost of an
intangible asset at a later date;
- it follows from the recognition
criteria that all expenditure on research should be recognised as an expense. The same
treatment applies to start-up costs, training costs and advertising costs. IAS 38 also
specifically prohibits the recognition as assets of internally generated goodwill, brands,
mastheads, publishing titles, customer lists and items similar in substance. However, some
development expenditure may result in the recognition of an intangible asset (for example,
some internally developed computer software);
- in the case of a business
combination that is an acquisition, IAS 38 builds on IAS
22: Business Combinations, to emphasise that if an intangible item does not meet both
the definition and the criteria for the recognition for an intangible asset, the
expenditure for this item (included in the cost of acquisition) should form part of the
amount attributed to goodwill at the date of acquisition. This means that, among other
things, unlike current practices in certain countries, purchased R&D-in-process should
not be recognised as an expense immediately at the date of acquisition but it should be
recognised as part of the goodwill recognised at the date of acquisition and amortised
under IAS 22, unless it meets the criteria for separate recognition as an intangible
asset;
- after initial recognition in the
financial statements, an intangible asset should be measured under one of the following
two treatments:
(a) benchmark
treatment: historical cost less any amortisation and impairment losses; or
(b) allowed alternative
treatment: revalued amount (based on fair value) less any subsequent amortisation and
impairment losses. The main difference from the treatment for revaluations of property,
plant and equipment under IAS 16 is that revaluations for intangible assets are permitted
only if fair value can be determined by reference to an active market. Active markets are
expected to be rare for intangible assets;
- intangible assets should be
amortised over the best estimate of their useful life. IAS 38 does not permit an
enterprise to assign an infinite useful life to an intangible asset. It includes a
rebuttable presumption that the useful life of an intangible asset will not exceed 20
years from the date when the asset is available for use. IAS 38 acknowledges that, in rare
cases, there may be persuasive evidence that the useful life of an intangible asset will
exceed 20 years. In these cases, an enterprise should amortise the intangible asset over
the best estimate of its useful life and:
(a) test the intangible asset for impairment at least annually in
accordance with IAS
36: Impairment of Assets; and
(b) disclose the reasons why the
presumption that the useful life of an intangible asset will not exceed 20 years is
rebutted and also the factor(s) that played a significant role in determining the useful
life of the asset;
- required disclosures on intangible
assets will enable users to understand, among other things, the types of intangible assets
that are recognised in the financial statements and the movements in their carrying amount
(book value) during the year. IAS 38 also requires disclosure of the amount of research
and development expenditure recognised as an expense during the year; and
- IAS 38 is operative for annual
accounting periods beginning on or after 1 July 1999. IAS 38 includes transitional
provisions that clarify when the Standard should be applied retrospectively and when it
should be applied prospectively.
To avoid creating opportunities
for accounting arbitrage in an acquisition by recognising an intangible asset that is
similar in nature to goodwill (such as brands and mastheads) as goodwill rather than an
intangible asset (or vice versa), the amortisation requirements for goodwill in IAS
22: Business Combinations are consistent with those of IAS 38.
|
FASB REPORT - BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL REPORTING,
CHALLENGES FROM THE NEW ECONOMY NO. 219-A April 2001 Author: Wayne S. Upton, Jr. Source:
Financial Accounting Standards Board --- http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/fasb/new_economy.html
Upton's book challenges Lev's contention that the existing standards are enormously
inadequate for the "New Economy."
The Garten SEC Report: A press release and an
executive summary are available at http://www.mba.yale.edu
The Garten SEC Report supports Lev's contention that the existing standards are enormously
inadequate for the "New Economy."
(You can request a copy of the full report using an email address provided at the above
URL)
Trinity University students may access this
report at J:\courses\acct5341\readings\sec\garten.doc
FEI BUSINESS COMBINATIONS VIDEO PROGRAM http://www.fei.org/confsem/bizcombo2k2/agenda.cfm
American Accounting Association (AAA) members may view a replay of a day-long webcast
on accounting for business combinations and intangible valuations (SFAS 141 and 142) at
half the price that will be charged to other non-FEI members ($149 versus $299). The FEI
hopes to use funds generated from AAA members to help the FEI assume sponsorship of a
Corporate Accounting Policy Seminar.
The webcast encompassed five presentations by experts with question-and-answer periods:
(1) Overview of SFAS 141/142, by G. Michael Crooch, FASB Board Member; (2) Recognition and
Measurement of Intangibles, by Tony Aarron of E&Y Valuation Services and Steve Gerard
of Standard and Poors's, (3) Impact on Doing Deals: Structure, Pricing and Process, by
Raymond Beier of PWC and Elmer Huh, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, (4) Testing for Goodwill
Impairment, by Mitch Danaher of GE, and (5) Transition Issues and Financial Statement
Disclosures, by Julie A. Erhardt of Arthur Andersen's Professional Standards Group.
As an example (Digital Island Inc.) of the impact of FAS 142 on impairment testing for
goodwill, please print the following document: http://www.edgar-online.com/brand/businessweek/glimpse/glimpse.pl?symbol=ISLD
Amortization of intangible assets. Amortization expense increased
to $153.7 million for the nine months ended June 30, 2001 from $106.4 million for the nine
months ended June 30, 2000. This increase was primarily due to a full period
of amortization of the goodwill and intangibles related to the
acquisitions of Sandpiper, Live On Line and SoftAware, which were completed in December
1999, January 2000 and September 2000, respectively. This increase was offset by a
decrease in the current quarter's amortization as a direct result of a $1.0 billion
impairment charge on goodwill and intangible assets in the quarter ended March 31, 2001.
Amortization of intangible assets is expected to decrease in future periods due to this
impairment charge.
Impairment of Goodwill and Intangible Assets. Impairment of
goodwill and intangible assets was recorded in the amount of $1,039.2 million. The
impairment charge was based on management performing an impairment assessment of the
goodwill and identifiable intangible assets recorded upon the acquisitions of Sandpiper,
Live On Line and SoftAware, which were completed during the year ended September 30, 2000.
The assessment was performed primarily due to the significant decline in stock price since
the date the shares issued in each acquisition were valued. As a result of this review,
management recorded the impairment charge to reduce goodwill and acquisition-related
intangible assets. The charge was determined as the excess of the carrying value of the
assets over the related estimated discounted cash flows.
Forwarded by Storhaug [storhaug@BTIGATE.COM]
To follow up on this list's earlier brief discussion on FASB 141
& 142, below is a bookmark to a site "CFO.COM" which has an excellent
compendium of articles and links, all of which help you evaluate these new FASB's.
http://www.cfo.com/fasbguide
"The Goodwill Games How to Tackle FASB's New Merger Rules," by Craig
Schneider, CFO.com --- http://www.cfo.com/fasbguide
The thrill of victory and the agony of
defeat. Chances are senior financial executives will experience a similar range of
emotions while wrestling with the Financial Accounting Standards Board's new rules for
business combinations, goodwill, and intangibles. Use CFO.com's special report for tips on
tackling the impairment test, avoiding Securities & Exchange Commission inquiries,
finding valuation experts, and much more. While accounting is not yet an Olympic sport,
with the right training, you'll take home the gold. We welcome your questions and
comments. E-mail craigschneider@cfo.com. |
Take Your First Steps
|

|
How to
Survive the SEC's Second Guessing
New rules for recording goodwill and intangibles may inadvertently produce more
restatements.
Cramming
for the Final
Get up to speed on the latest accounting rule changes for treating goodwill and
intangibles.
Pool's
Closed
FASB's new merger-accounting rules have already won some fans among deal makers.
(CFO Magazine)
Intangibles
Revealed
Once you identify them, how much will the fair value assessments cost?
Four
Ways to Say Goodbye to Goodwill Amortization
Expert tips for tackling the impairment test.
|
Congratulations to Baruch Lev from NYU --- http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/main.html
Baruch's picture adorns the cover of Financial
Executive, March/April 2002 --- http://www.fei.org/magazine/marapr-2002.cfm
The cover story entitled "Rethinking
Accounting: Intangibles at a Crossroads: What Next?" on pp. 34-39 --- http://www.fei.org/magazine/articles/3-4-2002_CoverStory.cfm
The concluding passage is quoted below:
The Inertness and
Commoditization of Intangibles
Intangibles are inert - by
themselves, they neither create value nor generate growth. In fact, without efficient
support and enhancement systems, the value of intangibles dissipates much quicker than
that of physical assets. Some examples of inertness: uHighly qualified scientists at
Merck, Pfizer, or Ely Lilly (human capital intangibles) are unlikely to generate
consistently winning products without innovative processes for drug research, such as the
"scientific method," based on the biochemical roots of the target diseases,
according to Rebecca Henderson, a specialist on scientific drug research, in Industrial
and Corporate Change. Even exceptional scientists using the traditional "random
search" methods for drug development will hit on winners only randomly, writes
Henderson.
uA large patent portfolio at
DuPont or Dow Chemical (intellectual property) is by itself of little value without a
comprehensive decision support system that periodically inventories all patents, slates
them by intended use (internal or collaborative development, licensing out or abandonment)
and systematically searches and analyzes the patent universe to determine whether the
company's technology is state-of-the-art and competitive.
uA rich customer database
(customer intangibles) at Amazon.com or Circuit City will not generate value without
efficient, user-friendly distribution channels and highly trained and motivated sales
forces.
Worse than just inert,
intangibles are very susceptible to value dissipation (quick amortization) - much more so
than other assets. Patents that are not constantly defended against infringement will
quickly lose value due to "invention around" them. Highly trained employees will
defect to competitors without adequate compensation systems and attractive workplace
conditions. Valuable brands may quickly deteriorate to mere "names" when the
firm - such as a Xerox, Yahoo! or Polaroid - loses its competitive advantage. The absence
of active markets for most intangibles (with certain patents and trademark exceptions)
strips them of value on a stand-alone basis.
Witness the billions of dollars
of intangibles (R&D, customer capital, trained employees) lost at all the defunct
dot-coms, or at Enron, or at AOL Time Warner Co., which in January 2002 announced a
whopping write-off of $40-60 billion - mostly from intangibles.
Intangibles are not only inert,
they are also, by and large, commodities in the current economy, meaning that most
business enterprises have equal access to them. Baxter and Johnson & Johnson, along
with the major biotech companies, have similar access to the best and brightest of
pharmaceutical researchers (human capital); every retailer can acquire the
state-of-the-art supply chains and distribution channel technologies capable of creating
supplier and customer-related intangibles (such as mining customer information); most
companies can license-in patents or acquire R&D capabilities via corporate
acquisitions; and brands are frequently traded. The sad reality about commodities is that
they fail to create considerable value. Since competitors have equal access to such
assets, at best, they return the cost of capital (zero value added).
The inertness and commoditization
of most intangibles have important implications for the intangibles movement. They imply
that corporate value creation depends critically on the organizational infrastructure of
the enterprise - on the business processes and systems that transform "lifeless
things," tangible and intangible, to bundles of assets generating cash flows and
conferring competitive positions. Such organizational infrastructure, when operating
effectively, is the major intangible of the firm. It is, by definition, noncommoditized,
since it has to fit the specific mission, culture, and environment of the enterprise.
Thus, by its idiosyncratic nature, organizational infrastructure is the major intangible
of the enterprise.
Focusing the Intangibles
Efforts
Following Phase I of the
intangibles work, which was primarily directed at documentation and awareness-creation,
it's now time to focus on organizational infrastructure, the intangible that counts most
and about which we know least. It's the engine for creating value from other assets. Like
breaking the genetic code, an understanding of the "enterprise code" - the
organizational blueprints, processes and recipes - will enable us to address fundamental
questions of concern to managers and investors, such as those raised above in relation to
H-P/Compaq and Enron.
Organizational Infrastructure By
Example: A company's organizational infrastructure is an amalgam of systems, processes and
business practices (its operating procedures, recipes) aimed at streamlining operations
toward achieving the company's objectives. Following is a concrete example of a business
process, part of the organizational infrastructure, which was substantially modified and
thereby created considerable value. This was adopted from "Turnaround," Business
2.0, January 2002.
Nissan Motor Co. Ltd., Japan's
third-largest automaker and a perennial loser and debt-ridden producer of lackluster cars,
received in March 1999 a new major shareholder, Renault, and a new CEO, Carlos Ghosn, both
imported from France. Ghosn moved quickly to transform Nissan into a viable competitor,
and indeed, in the fiscal year ending March 2001, the company reported a profit of $2.7
billion, the largest in its 68-year history.
How was this miracle performed?
Primarily by cost-cutting, achieved by a drastic change in the procurement process. Here
briefly, is the old process: Nissan's buyers were locked into ordering from keiretsu
partners, suppliers in which Nissan owned stock. The guaranteed stream of Nissan orders
insulated those suppliers from competition. Suppliers can't specialize and can't sell
excess capacity elsewhere. Each supplier was assigned a shukotan, Nissan-speak for a
relationship manager. It was the shukotan who would negotiate price discounts - but favors
got in the way.
Here, in brief, is the new
procurement process, as drastically changed by Ghosn: Ghosn gave Itaru Koeda, the
purchasing chief, authority to place orders without regard to keiretsu relationships -
and, more important, insisted that he use it. Then, a Renault executive and Koeda dumped
the shukotan system, instead assigning buyers responsibility by model and part. They
formed a sourcing committee to review vendor price quotes on a global basis. "This is
the best change in our process," Koeda says. "Suppliers are specializing in what
they do best, making them more efficient."
The results? An 18 percent drop
in purchasing costs, which was the major contributor to Nissan's transformation from a
loss to a profit. Ghosn's next major set of tasks: To change the car design process in
order to enhance the top line, sales; to rid Nissan of the myriad design committees and
hierarchies that stifle and slow innovation; and to institute an efficient, effective
innovative process.
Baruch's cover story is accompanied by
"Fixing Financial Reporting: Financial Statement Overhaul," by
Robert A Howell, pp. 40-42 --- http://www.fei.org/magazine/articles/3-4-2002_Howell_CoverStory.cfm
Financial
reporting is broken and has to be fixed - and fast! If it isn't, we will continue to see
more cases such as Xerox, Lucent, Cisco Systems, Yahoo! and Enron. Xerox's market value is
down 90 percent, or $40 billion, in the past two years. In the same period other market
losses include; Lucent, down more than $200 billion; Cisco Systems, off more than $400
billion; Yahoo!, more than $100 billion; and Enron, down more than $60 billion in the
largest bankruptcy of all time.
Some argue that
these are extreme examples of "irrational exubuerance." Some in the accounting
profession say that such cases represent a small percentage of the aggregate number of
statements audited - some 15,000 public company registrants. Perhaps. But a financial
reporting framework that permits these companies to suggest that they are doing well, and,
by implication, to justify market valuations which, subsequently, cost investors trillions
in the aggregate, is unconscionable.
Financial
reporting, especially in the U. S., with its very public capital markets, has reached the
point where "accrual-based" earnings are almost meaningless. Reported earnings
are driven as much by "earnings expectations" as they are by real business
performance. Balance sheets fail to reflect the major drivers of future value creation -
the research and product, process and software development that fuel high technology
companies, and the brand value of leading consumer product companies. And, cash flow
statements are such a hodge-podge of operating, investing and financing activities that
they obfuscate, rather than illuminate, business cash flow performance.
The FASB, in its
Concept No. 1, states, "financial reporting should provide information that is useful
to present and potential investors and creditors and other users in making rational
investment, credit and similar decisions." This is simply not so.
The primary
financial statements - income statement, balance sheet and cash flow statement - which
derive their foundation from an industrial age model, need major redesign if they are to
serve as the starting point for meaningful financial analysis, interpretation and
decision-making in today's knowledge-based and value-driven economy. Without significant
redesign, ad hoc definitions such as pro forma earnings, returns and cash flows will
continue to proliferate. So will significant reporting "surprises!"
Starting
Point: Market Value Creation
The objective of a business is to increase real shareholder value - what Warren E. Buffett
would call the "intrinsic value" of the firm. It's a very basic idea: Investors
get "returns" from dividends and realized market appreciation. Both investments
and returns are measured in cash terms, so individuals and investors invest cash in
securities with the objective of realizing returns that meet or exceed their criteria. If
their judgments are too high, and that later becomes clear, the market value of the firm
will drop. If judgments are too low and cash flows turn out to be stronger, market values
increase.
From a managerial
viewpoint, the objective of increasing shareholder (market) value really means increasing
the net present value (NPV) of the future stream of cash flows. Note, "cash
flows," not "profits." Cash is real; profits are anything, within reason,
that management wants them to be. If revenues are recognized early - or overstated - and
expenses are deferred or, in some cases, accelerated to "clear the decks" for
future periods, resulting earnings may show a nice trend, but do not really reflect
economic performance.
There are only
three ways management may increase the real market, or "intrinsic," value of a
firm. First, increase the amount of cash flows expected at any point in time. Second,
accelerate cash flows; given the time value of money, cash received earlier has a higher
present value. Third, if a firm is able to lower the discount rate that it applies to its
cash flows - which it frequently can - it can raise its NPV.
Given that cash
flows drive market value, financial statements should put much more emphasis on cash
flows. The statement of cash flows now prescribed by the accounting community and
presented by management is not easily related to value creation. Derived from the income
statement and balance sheet, it's effectively a reconciliation statement for the change in
the balance of the cash account. A major overhaul of the cash flow statement would
directly relate to market valuations.
Cash
Earnings and Free Cash Flows
Managers and investors should focus on "cash earnings" and the reinvestments
that are made into the business in the form of "working capital" and "fixed
and other (including intangible) investments." The net amount of these cash flows
represent the business's "free cash flows."
With negative
cash flows - frequently the case for young startups and high-growth companies - a business
must raise more capital in the form of debt or equity. The sooner it gets its free cash
flows positive, the sooner it'll begin to create value for shareholders. Positive free
cash flows provide resources to pay interest and pay down debt, to return cash to
shareholders (through stock repurchases or dividends) or to invest in new business areas.
The traditional
cash flow statement purportedly distinguishes between operating, investing and financing
cash flows, and has as its "bottom line" the change in cash and cash
equivalents. In fact, the operating cash flows include the results of selling activities,
investing in working capital and interest expense, a financing activity. Investing cash
flows include capital expenditures, acquisitions, disposals of assets and the purchase and
sale of financial assets. Financing cash flows consist of what's left over.
Indeed, the
bottom-line change in cash is not a useful number, other than to demonstrate that it may
be reconciled with the change in the cash account. If one wants a positive change in cash,
simply borrow more. These free cash flows ultimately drive market value, and should be the
focus of managers and investors alike.
Replacing
Income With Cash Earnings
The traditional "profit and loss," or "income," statement needs
modification in three ways, two of which are touched on above, along with a name-change,
to "Operating Statement." That would suggest a representation of the business'
current operations, without the emphasis on accrual-based profits.
Interest expense
(income) should be eliminated from the statement, as it represents a financing cost rather
than an operating cost. A number of companies do this internally to determine "net
operating profit after taxes" (NOPAT). Also, NOPAT needs to be adjusted for the
various non-cash items, such as depreciation, amortization, gains and losses on the sale
of assets, tax-timing differences and restructuring charges - which affect income but not
cash flows. The resultant "cash earnings" better represents the current economic
performance of a business than accrual income and, very importantly, is much less
susceptible to manipulation.
A third
adjustment is the order in which the classes of expenses are displayed. Traditional income
statements report cost of goods sold or product costs first, frequently focus on product
gross margins, and then deduct, as a group, other expenses such as technical, selling and
administrative expenses. This order made sense in the industrial age when product costs
dominated. It does not for many of today's high-tech or consumer product companies. It
would be more useful for companies to report expenses in an order that reflects the flow
of the business activities. One logical order that builds on the concept of a business'
value chain, is to categorize costs into development costs, product (service) conversion
costs, sales and customer support costs and administrative costs.
Reinvesting
in the Business
For most companies - especially those with significant investments that are being
depreciated or amortized - cash earnings will be significantly higher than NOPAT.
Unfortunately, cash earnings are not free cash flows because most businesses have to
reinvest in working capital, property, plant and equipment and intangible assets, just to
sustain - let alone increase - their productive capabilities.
As a business
grows in sales volume, assuming that it offers credit to its customers who pay with the
same frequency, accounts receivable will increase proportionately. As sales volumes
increase, so, too, will product costs, inventories and accounts payable balances. Working
capital - principally receivables, inventories, and payables - will tend to increase
proportionately with sales growth, and will require cash to finance it. The degree to
which it grows is a function of receivables terms and collection practices, inventory
management and payables practices.
Companies such as
Dell Computer Corp. collect payments up front, turn inventories in a few days and pay
their vendors when due. The net effect is that as Dell grows it actually throws off cash,
rather than requiring it to support increases in working capital. Most companies are not
as efficient; the amount of cash needed to support increases in working capital can be as
much as 20-25 percent of any sales increase. The degree to which working capital increases
as sales increase is an important performance metric. Lower is better, which absolutely
flies in the face of such traditional measures of liquidity as "working capital"
and "quick" ratios, for which higher has been considered better.
Balance sheets
ought to reflect investments that represent future value. What drives value for many
businesses in today's knowledge-based economy - pharmaceuticals, high technology, software
and brand-driven consumer product companies - is the investments in R&D, product,
process and software development, brand equity and the continued training and development
of the work force. Yet, based on generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)
accounting, these "investments" in the future are not reflected on balance
sheets, but, rather, expensed in the period in which they are incurred.
A frequent
argument for "expensing" is the unclear nature of the investments' future value.
Apparently, investors believe otherwise, evidenced by the ratio of market values to book
values having exploded in the past 25 years. In 1978, the average book-to-market ratio was
around 80 percent; today it is around 25 percent. In the early 1970s, when accounting
policies were established for R&D, product lines were narrower and life cycles longer,
resulting in R&D being a much less significant element of cost. Expensing was less
relevant. Now, with intangible assets having become so central and significant, expensing
- rather than capitalizing and amortizing them over time - results in an absolute
breakdown of the principle of "matching," which is at the heart of accrual
accounting. The world of business has changed; accounting practices must also change.
Financial
Statement Overhaul
Financial statements need marked overhaul to be useful for analysis and decision-making in
today's knowledge-driven and shareholder value-creation environment. The proposed changes
fall into three categories:
First - Move to a
much more explicit shareholder (market) value creation and cash orientation, and away from
accrual accounting profits and return on investment calculations predicated on today's
accounting policies. Start with a shareholder perspective for cash flows, then reconstruct
the statement of cash flows to clearly provide the free cash flows that the business'
operations are generating. Cash earnings and reinvestments in the business comprise free
cash flows.
Second - Expand
the definition of investments to include intangibles, which should be capitalized as
assets and amortized according to some thoughtful rules. This will better reflect
investments that have potential future value.
Third - Change
the title to "operating statement" and other "housekeeping" of
financial statements, to include categorizing costs in a more logical "value
chain" sequence and aggregating all financial transactions, such as interest and the
purchase and sale of securities, as financing activities.
Value creation is
ultimately measured in the marketplace, so it stands to reason that if a firm's market
value increases consistently, over time, and can be supported by improvements in its cash
generation performance, real value is being created. For this to happen, the place to
start is by fixing the financial statements.
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm
The Shareholder Action On-Line Handbook (1993) (history, finance, investing,
law)--- http://www.ethics.fsnet.co.uk/0home.htm
These Web pages are the on-line version of The Shareholder
Action Handbook, first published in paperback 1993 by New Consumer. The Handbook aims to
give practical advice to individuals about how they may use shares to make companies more
accountable. The need for such a guide is now stronger than ever. Public concern in
Britain about the accountability of company directors has risen to the extent that the
subject makes regular appearances in debates in the House of Commons. While there are many
obstacles to taking shareholder action, shareholders can do much to alter the course of
corporate behaviour. Indeed, since the original version of the guide appeared there have
been a number of successful shareholder action campaigns. However, there is considerable
need both for new legislation to make it easier for shareholders to hold companies to
account, and for the large institutional shareholders who own much of global industry to
take their responsibilities as shareholders rather more seriously.
Online Resources for Business
Valuations
Go to
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
Understanding the Issues
From The Wall Street Journal's Accounting Educator Reviews on January 22, 2002
TITLE: Deciphering the Black Box
REPORTER: Steve Liesman
DATE: Jan 23, 2002 PAGE: C1 LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011739030177303200.djm
TOPICS: Accounting, Accounting Theory, Creative Accounting, Disclosure, Disclosure
Requirements, Earnings Management, Financial Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis,
Fraudulent Financial Reporting, Regulation, Securities and Exchange Commission
SUMMARY: The article discusses several factors that have led to financial reporting
that is complex and difficult to understand. Related articles provide specific examples of
complicated and questionable financial reporting practices.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What economic factors have led to the complexity of financial reporting? Have
accounting standard setters kept pace with the changing economic conditions? Support your
answer.
2.) What determines a company's cost of capital? What is the relation between the
quantity and quality of financial information disclosed by a company and its cost of
capital? Why are companies reluctant to disclose financial information?
3.) Explain the difference between earnings management and fraudulent financial
reporting? Is either earnings management or fraudulent financial reporting illegal? Is
either unethical? Could earnings management ever improve the usefulness of financial
reporting? Explain.
4.) Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of allowing discretion in financial
reporting.
5.) Refer to related articles. Briefly discuss the major accounting or economic
situation that has caused complexity in the financial reporting of each of these
companies. What can be done to make the financial reporting more useful?
SMALL GROUP ASSIGNMENT: How much discretion should Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles allow in financial reporting? Support your position.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
--- RELATED ARTICLES ---
TITLE: GE: Some Seek More Light on the Finances
REPORTER: Rachel Emma Silverman and Ken Brown
PAGE: C1 ISSUE: Jan 23, 2002
LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011744147673133760.djm
TITLE: AIG: A Complex Industry, A Very Complex Company
REPORTER: Christopher Oster and Ken Brown
PAGE: C16 ISSUE: Jan 23, 2002
LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011740010747146240.djm
TITLE: Williams: Enron's Game, But Played with Caution
REPORTER: Chip Cummins
PAGE: C16 ISSUE: Jan 23, 2002
LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011739185631601680.djm
TITLE: IBM: 'Other Income' Can Mean Other Opinions
REPORTER: William Bulkeley
PAGE: C16 ISSUE: Jan 23, 2002
LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011744634389346680.djm
TITLE: Coca-Cola: Real Thing Can Be Hard to Measure
REPORTER: Betsy McKay
PAGE: C16 ISSUE: Jan 23, 2002
LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011739618177530480.djm
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting and securities fraud are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on June 11,
2004
TITLE: Outside Audit: Goodyear and the Butterfly Effect
REPORTER: Timothy Aeppel
DATE: Jun 04, 2004
PAGE: C3
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108629544631828261,00.html
TOPICS: Accounting Changes and Error Corrections, Pension Accounting,
Restatement
SUMMARY: Goodyear Tire & Rubber has announced the amount of its
restatement from problems identified in 2003. The company as well has announced
further restatements due to changes in the discount rate it uses for pension
liability calculations.
QUESTIONS:
1.) For what reason is Goodyear Tire & Rubber restating earnings for the
last five years?
2.) What accounting standards require restatements of past financial results?
Under what circumstances are restatements required? What other types of
accounting changes are possible? How are these categories of accounting changes
presented in the financial statements?
3.) In general, what adjustment is Goodyear Tire & Rubber making to its
accounting for defined benefit pension plans?
4.) Discuss the details of the change in accounting for the defined benefit
pension plan. Specifically, define the discount rate in question and state how
it is used in pension accounting.
5.) Had the company not uncovered the issues identified under question #1, do
you think they would be making the changes identified in questions #3 and #4?
Why or why not?
6.) Do you think that changes in the discount rate used in pension accounting
are made by other companies? When do you think companies might change this rate?
In general, what type of accounting treatment would you recommend for such a
change? Support your answer.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
"Outside Audit: Goodyear And the Butterfly Effect: A Valuation
Rate Is Shaved By Half a Point and Presto, $100.1 Million Goes Poof," by
Timothy Aeppel, The Wall Street Journal, June 4, 2004, Page C3 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108629544631828261,00.html
There's a costly oddity tucked into Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co.'s recent earnings restatement.
As part of a larger revision reaching
back five years, the U.S.'s largest tire maker changed the interest-rate
assumptions associated with its domestic retirement plans. The upshot: By
slicing half a point off a rate used to value the company's obligations to its
pension fund and other post-retirement benefit plans, Goodyear also lopped off
a total of $100.1 million in earnings over that period.
This may be the first time a major
company has restated earnings for this reason, although it was just one of
several accounting issues the Akron, Ohio, tire maker addressed in its
restatement announced May 19. Goodyear has identified a series of accounting
irregularities over the past year and is the target of a continuing
investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
"I have a feeling that while they
were scrubbing, they decided to scrub everything," says Jack Ciesielski,
publisher of Analyst's Accounting Observer.
Keith Price, a Goodyear spokesman, says
the change doesn't mean Goodyear sought to inflate earnings in the past by
using an inappropriately high discount rate. Most of the reduction in earnings
was the result of Goodyear having to record additional tax expenses, he notes.
Mr. Price says Goodyear decided to change its methodology for calculating the
rate it uses going forward and, since a broader restatement was already under
way, chose to extend the new approach into the past as well.
The root of Goodyear's problem appears
to be that it used an uncommon way of calculating the so-called discount rate
it assumes for its traditional pension plan. A discount rate is simply an
interest rate companies use to convert future values into their present-day
terms. Companies calculate the pension-fund discount rate at the end of every
year in order to project cash outflows in their retirement plans. The number
changes from year to year. But it also tends to get buried in financial
footnotes and overlooked.
The higher the discount rate, the less
the current value of a company's future obligations to its retirees under its
plans. So, in Goodyear's case, the older, higher discount rate lowered the
company's projected benefit payments -- which also had the effect of raising
its pretax income.
Goodyear's old method of setting the
rate was to use a six-month average of corporate-bond rates. That's unusual,
though not a violation of generally accepted accounting principles, says Mr.
Ciesielski.
The more common and accurate approach
is to pick a discount rate based on rates at a point in time near to when the
calculations are being done. That provides a better snapshot of reality,
especially in an era when rates are falling, as they have in recent years.
Sure enough, Goodyear's old methodology
resulted in discount rates that were higher than those used by most other
companies during the period in question. For instance, in its restatement,
Goodyear cut the rate it used in 2001 to 7.5% from 8%. But a study by Credit
Suisse First Boston notes that the median discount rate used by S&P-500
component companies that year was a far lower 7.25%. In fact, the study found
only seven companies used rates of 8% or higher in 2001.
Goodyear's numbers are now more in line
with other companies' and shouldn't require further adjustment, say analysts.
But like many old-line companies with a relatively large cadre of older
workers and retirees, Goodyear is expected to face pension problems for years
to come, since its plans are underfunded by about $2.8 billion.
While Goodyear's pension concerns are
not unique, Mr. Ciesielski says it is unlikely other companies will rush to
restate earnings to reflect a new discount-rate assumption. Besides, coming up
with the rate is still far from an exact science.
David Zion, CSFB's accounting analyst,
says even companies that use identical methodologies can arrive at sharply
different discount rates. Those with fiscal years ending in June would have
different rates than those with years ending in December, for example. And
multinational companies face another complication: "The discount rate for
a Japanese pension plan will be different than the discount rate in
Turkey," Mr. Zion points out.
In its restatement, Goodyear decreased
overall pretax income by $18.9 million for the past five years as a result of
its reassessment of the discount rate. And since Goodyear's pension plan is
underfunded, the cut in the discount rate also magnified that negative
condition. As a result, Goodyear had to add $160.9 million in liabilities to
its balance sheet. The new liabilities forced Goodyear to record $81.2 million
in additional tax expenses for 2002.
This restatement comes at a time
Goodyear's accounting is still under heavy scrutiny. The company launched an
internal probe last year after it said it found problems in internal billing
and the implementation of a new computer system. It later said it had
identified serious misdeeds by top managers in Europe and cases in which U.S.
plants understated workers' compensation liabilities.
Hi Robert,
I added your document to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/WalkerToFarrington.htm
I would not say that we are so much timid as we are squashed by lobbying
pressures from industry.
Bob Jensen
Bob
I wish to ask you a favour again. I have written the
attached as a submission to a review of the New Zealand Financial Reporting
Act 1993. It is currently under review due to the imminent adoption of the
IASB's standards. It has thrown New Zealand's application of differential
reporting into confusion. My submission deals with the way in which accounting
must be the pivot upon which creditor protection functions. What I would hope
Americans find interesting is the degree to which we have played out your laws
- the corporate solvency test and GAAP - in a way you are too timid to do.
The Government's discussion document to which the
submission is a response is on this link:
http://www.med.govt.nz/buslt/bus_pol/bus_law/corporate-governance/financial-reporting/part-one/media/minister-20040315.html
The letter is self-contained aside from the specific
commentary at the end. Could you find space for it on your web-site?
Robert B Walker
Stock Option Valuation Research Database
From Syllabus News on December 13, 2002
Wharton School Offers Stock Data Via the Web
The University of Pennsylvania's Wharton business
school is offering financial analysts access to historical information on
stock options over the Internet. The data, supplied by research firm
OptionMetrics's Ivy database, covers information on all U.S. listed index and
equity options from January1996. The Ivy database adds to the 1.5 terabyte
storehouse of financial information from a range of providers now available
through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). The university said that by
making data from the Center for Research in Security Prices, Standard &
Poor's COMPUSTAT, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the New York
Stock Exchange, and other data vendors accessible from a simple Web-based
interface, WRDS hopes to become the preferred source among university scholars
for data covering global financial markets.
Note from Jensen: the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) home page
is at http://www.wharton.upenn.edu/research/wrds.html
Wharton Research Data Services, a revolutionary
Internet-based research data service developed and marketed by the Wharton
School, has become the standard for large-scale academic data research,
providing instant web access to financial and business datasets for almost all
top-tier business schools (including 23 of the top 25 schools as ranked by
Business Week magazine).
Subscribers to Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS)
gain instant access to the broadest array of business and economic data now
available from a single source on the Web. From anywhere and at any time, WRDS
functions as an application service provider (ASP) to deliver information
drawn from 1.2 terabytes of comprehensive financial, accounting, management,
marketing, banking and insurance data.
Launched in July 1997, the unique data service's
client list of over 60 institutions now includes Stanford University, Harvard
University, Columbia University, Yale University, Northwestern University,
London Business School, INSEAD, University of Chicago, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology and dozens of other institutions. Subscribers to WRDS need only
PCs or even less-expensive Web terminals to endow their units with
supercomputer capabilities and tap a massive, constantly updated source of
data. Users click on the WRDS database and interactively select data to
extract. The requested information is instantly returned to the web browser,
ready to be pasted into a spreadsheet or any other application for analysis.
To learn more about WRDS or to get licensing
information, contact: Nicole Carvalho, Marketing Director Wharton Research
Data Services 400 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall 3620 Locust Walk Philadelphia,
PA 19104-6302
1-877-GET-WRDS (1-877-438-9737)
Knowledge@Wharton is a free source of research reports and other materials in
accounting, finance, and business research --- http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
Forwarded by Robert B Walker [walkerrb@ACTRIX.CO.NZ]
FASB Understanding the Issues: Vol 4 Series 1 ---
I refer to the monograph on credit standing & liability
measurement written by Crooch & Upton. --- http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/fasb/statusreport_articles/vol4_series1.html
The article seems to suggest you wish to have feedback on this
and other matters. Accordingly, I send my thoughts on this matter.
I would begin by observing that I think Concepts Statement 7 is
inconsistent with the earlier 1996 study from which it was derived. I found that study
utterly persuasive so I do not now find CS-7 persuasive. In moments of cynicism, I think
that Mr Uptons apparent epiphany is related more to the politics of accountancy than
to its conceptual purity.
By this I mean that the measurement of liabilities at risk free
interest rate rather than at a rate reflecting credit standing would be so anathema to the
generality of accountants that it is futile to suggest it. Indeed the Crooch & Upton
begin by stating a basic premise of axiomatic significance to their case no gain or
loss should arise when engaging in simple borrowing. The idea that no sooner one entered a
loan agreement than a loss would arise (because it would invariably be a loss) would have
most accountants in a state of high dudgeon.
The issue then is one of gain or loss. But then that is only if
you perceive the world from an income orientation perspective. I dont, primarily
because of the influence of the conceptual framework. This is reinforced by my work as a
liquidator of companies. I see the world purely from a balance sheet perspective and one
subject to realisable value at that. In other words, I see the utility of accounting only
in terms of solvency determination with all that entails in regard to the going concern
assumption.
Unlike the United States, in the jurisdiction in which I live
accounting has been rendered central to creditor protection in our corporate law. Central
to this law, in turn, is the conceptual framework (at least in my view and to test the
hypothesis I have a case before the courts now). I am then caused considerable misgiving
as the final consequence of FASBs view is the effective emasculation of our law
built, essentially, on American conceptual development.
The ultimate consequence of what FASB propose is that as a
company slides toward insolvency its liability value declines, the value of its net worth
increases. Presumably as it has no credit standing at all because it is insolvent, it has
no liabilities. This may be practically true when the creditors miss out but in my
jurisdiction at least it is not legally true because those responsible for the creditors
loss are held accountable, the impediments of the legal system notwithstanding.
I note that Crooch & Upton make reference in a footnote to
the theory of Robert Merton in which it is implied that the residual assets are able to be
put to satisfy the claims of creditors. That may be true in an
economists fantasy but it is not true in law, a rather more important arena.
I say perceiving a decline in the value of a liability is
considerably more counter-intuitive than the problem of accelerating the recognition of
cost of debt. This is a mere triviality by comparison. After all the same amount of charge
is recognised over time. The advantage of accelerating loss is that it causes an entity to
be more inhibited in its distribution policy as it has less equity to draw upon. That is
to the advantage of creditors.
It seems to me that there needs to be an objective value at which
to determine the value of a liability, this being central to the ability to liquidate. Mr
Upton in his 1996 study demonstrates that such a value will represent the price the debtor
has to pay to have the liability taken away. That price will be determined by the seller
providing sufficient resources to the buyer to ensure that the buyer will avoid any risk.
The resources would need to be enough to acquire a risk free asset with the same maturity
profile as the liability.
The effect of perceiving the price of a liability in
this way is to necessitate that it is discounted at a risk free rate.
I note that the only way to make CS-7 coherent is to assume that
such transfers of assets are always made between parties of the same credit standing. This
pertains to one of the major practical difficulties of reflecting credit standing in
accounting measurement that is knowing what it is. It may be easily determined in
the publicly listed world in which Crooch & Upton inhabit. It is not in the small,
closely held corporate world in which I operate. For accounting to have long term validity
it must be applicable in all circumstances.
I think it fair to note that there is another dimension to this
that tends to undermine what I believe. I have a theoretical notion that the world upon
consolidation nets to nil. That is to say, my financial asset and your financial liability
must have the same value in our respective records. Call this a principle of reciprocity.
Theoretically, so far as I understand it a lender will discount
the face value of a zero discount bond at the risk free rate after having adjusted for the
probability of receiving nothing at all. The effect of doing that is, at the inception of
an advance, to carry the value of the asset at the cash value paid at that time. If the
application of the principle of reciprocity was applied when the liability was revalued in
the books of the debtor, the creditor would take up a gain that denied any risk existed.
I find this inconvenient as it causes me to abandon a notion in
which I fundamentally believe. I will just have to suffer cognitive dissonance, wont
I? But then one should not underestimate the psychology that underlies accounting,
particularly in the face of the paradoxes it is capable of generating.
Also see other articles on related topics at http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/fasb/statusreport_articles/
Pro-Forma Earnings (Electronic Commerce,
e-Commerce, eCommerce) From the Wall Street Journal's Accounting
Educators' Reviews, October 4, 2001
Educators interested in receiving these excellent reviews (on a variety of topics in
addition to accounting) must firs subscribe to the electronic version of the WSJ and then
go to http://209.25.240.94/educators_reviews/index.cfm
Sample from the October 4 Edition:
TITLE: Sales Slump Could Derail Amazon's Profit Pledge
REPORTER: Nick Wingfield
DATE: Oct 01, 2001
PAGE: B1
LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1001881764244171560.djm
TOPICS: Accounting, Creative Accounting, Earnings Management, Financial Analysis, Net
Income, Net Profit
SUMMARY: Earlier this year Amazon promised analysts that it will report first-ever
operating pro forma operating profit. However, Amazon is not commenting on whether it
still expects to report a fourth-quarter profit this year. Questions focus on profit
measures and accounting decisions that may enable Amazon to show a profit.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What expenses are excluded from pro forma operating profits? Why are these expenses
excluded? Are these expenses excluded from financial statements prepared in accordance
with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles?
2.) List three likely consequences of Amazon not reporting a pro forma operating profit
in the fourth quarter. Do you think that Amazon feels pressure to report a pro forma
operating profit? Why do analysts believe that reporting a fourth quarter profit is
important for Amazon?
3.) List three accounting choices that Amazon could make to increase the likelihood of
reporting a pro forma operating profit. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of making
accounting choices that will allow Amazon to report a pro forma operating profit.
SMALL GROUP ASSIGNMENT: Assume that you are the accounting department for Amazon and
preliminary analysis suggest that Amazon will not report a pro forma operating profit for
the fourth quarter. The CEO has asked you to make sure that the company meets its
financial reporting objectives. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of making
adjustments to the financial statements. What adjustments, if any, would you make? Why?
Reviewed
By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island Reviewed
By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University Reviewed
By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
Bob
Jensen's threads on accounting theory can be found at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm
Bob
Jensen's threads on real options for valuing intangibles are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/realopt.htm
|
Baruch Lev has a very good site on accounting for intangibles at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/intangibles.html
Also note Wayne Upton's Special Report for the FASB at http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/fasb/new_economy.html
E-COMMERCE AND AUDITING FAIR VALUES SUBJECTS OF NEW INTERNATIONAL GUIDANCE The
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) invites comments on two new exposure drafts
(EDs): Auditing Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures and Electronic Commerce: Using the
Internet or Other Public Networks - Effect on the Audit of Financial Statements. Comments
on both EDs, developed by IFAC's International Auditing Practices Committee (IAPC), are
due by January 15, 2002. See http://accountingeducation.com/news/news2213.html
The IFAC link is at http://www.ifac.org/Guidance/EXD-Download.tmpl?PubID=1003772692151
The purpose of this International Standard on Auditing (ISA) is to establish standards
and provide guidance on auditing fair value measurements and disclosures contained in
financial statements. In particular, this ISA addresses audit considerations relating to
the valuation, measurement, presentation and disclosure for material assets, liabilities
and specific components of equity presented or disclosed at fair value in financial
statements. Fair value measurements of assets, liabilities and components of equity may
arise from both the initial recording of transactions and later changes in value.
External Auditing Combined With Consulting and
Other Assurance Services: Audit Independence?
TITLE:
"Auditor Independence and Earnings Quality"R
AUTHORS:
Richard M. Frankel MIT Sloan School of Business 50 Memorial Drive, E52.325g Cambridge, MA
02459-1261 (617) 253-7084 frankel@mit.edu
Marilyn F. Johnson Michigan State University Eli Broad Graduate School of Management N270
Business College Complex East Lansing, MI 48824-1122 (517) 432-0152 john1614@msu.edu
Karen K. Nelson Stanford University Graduate School of Business Stanford, CA 94305-5015
(650) 723-0106 knelson@gsb.stanford.edu
DATE: August 2001
LINK: http://gobi.stanford.edu/ResearchPapers/Library/RP1696.pdf
Stanford University Study Shows Consulting Does Affect Auditor Independence --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=54733
Academics have found that the provision of consulting services to
audit clients can have a serious effect on a firm's perceived independence.
And the new SEC rules designed to counter audit independence
violations could increase the pressure to provide non-audit services to clients to an
increasingly competitive market.
The study (pdf format),
by the Stanford Graduate School of Business, showed that forecast earnings were more
likely to be exceeded when the auditor was paid more for its consultancy services.
This suggests that earnings management was an important factor
for audit firms that earn large consulting fees. And such firms worked at companies that
would offer little surprise to the market, given that investors react negatively when the
auditor also generates a high non-audit fee from its client.
The study used data collected from over 4,000 proxies filed
between February 5, 2001 and June 15, 2001.
It concluded: "We find a significant negative market
reaction to proxy statements filed by firms with the least independent auditors. Our
evidence also indicates an inverse relation between auditor independence and earnings
management.
"Firms with the least independent auditors are more likely
to just meet or beat three earnings benchmarks analysts' expectations, prior year
earnings, and zero earnings and to report large discretionary accruals. Taken
together, our results suggest that the provision of non-audit services impairs
independence and reduces the quality of earnings."
New SEC rules mean that auditors have to disclose their non-audit
fees in reports. This could have an interesting effect, the study warned: "The
disclosure of fee data could increase the competitiveness of the audit market by reducing
the cost to firms of making price comparisons and negotiating fees.
"In addition, firms may reduce the purchase of non-audit
services from their auditor to avoid the appearance of independence problems."
A Lancaster
University study in February this year found that larger auditors are less likely to
compromise their independence than smaller ones when providing non-audit services to their
clients.
And our sister site, AccountingWEB-UK, reports that research
by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW) showed that,
despite the prevalence of traditional standards of audit independence, the principal fear
for an audit partner was the loss of the client.
|
External Auditing Combined With Consulting and
Other Assurance Services: The Enron Scandal
.
One of the most prominent CPAs in the world sent me the following message and sent the
WSJ link:
Bob, More on Enron.
It's interesting that this matter of performing internal audits didn't come up in the
testimony Joe Beradino of Andersen presented to the House Committee a couple of days ago
"Arthur Andersen's 'Double Duty' Work Raises Questions About Its
Independence," by Jonathan Weil, The Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2001 --- http://interactive.wsj.com/fr/emailthis/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1008289729306300000.djm
In addition to acting as Enron
Corp.'s outside auditor, Arthur Andersen LLP also performed internal-auditing services for
Enron, raising further questions about the Big Five accounting firm's independence and the
degree to which it may have been auditing its own work.
That Andersen performed
"double duty" work for the Houston-based energy concern likely will trigger
greater regulatory scrutiny of Andersen's role as Enron's independent auditor than would
ordinarily be the case after an audit failure, accounting and securities-law specialists
say.
It also potentially could expose
Andersen to greater liability for damages in shareholder lawsuits, depending on whether
the internal auditors employed by Andersen missed key warning signs that they should have
caught. Once valued at more than $77 billion, Enron is now in proceedings under Chapter 11
of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
Internal-audit departments, among
other things, are used to ensure that a company's control systems are adequate and
working, while outside independent auditors are hired to opine on the accuracy of a
company's financial statements. Every sizable company relies on outside auditors to check
whether its internal auditors are working effectively to prevent fraud, accounting
irregularities and waste. But when a company hires its outside auditor to monitor internal
auditors working for the same firm, critics say it creates an unavoidable conflict of
interest for the firm.
Still, such arrangements have
become more common over the past decade. In response, the Securities and Exchange
Commission last year passed new rules, which take effect in August 2002, restricting the
amount of internal-audit work that outside auditors can perform for their clients, though
not banning it outright.
"It certainly runs totally
contrary to my concept of independence," says Alan Bromberg, a securities-law
professor at Southern Methodist University in Dallas. "I see it as a double duty,
double responsibility and, therefore, double potential liability."
Andersen officials say their
firm's independence wasn't impaired by the size or nature of the fees paid by Enron -- $52
million last year. An Enron spokesman said, "The company believed and continues to
believe that Arthur Andersen's role as Enron's internal auditor would not compromise
Andersen's role as independent auditor for Enron."
Andersen spokesman David Tabolt
said Enron outsourced its internal-audit department to Andersen around 1994 or 1995. He
said Enron began conducting some of its own internal-audit functions in recent years.
Enron, Andersen's second-largest U.S. client, paid $25 million for audit fees in 2000,
according to Enron's proxy last year. Mr. Tabolt said that figure includes both internal
and external audit fees, a point not explained in the proxy, though he declined to specify
how much Andersen was paid for each. Additionally, Enron paid Andersen a further $27
million for other services, including tax and consulting work.
Following audit failures, outside
auditors frequently claim that their clients withheld crucial information from them. In
testimony Wednesday before a joint hearing of two House Financial Services subcommittees,
which are investigating Enron's collapse, Andersen's chief executive, Joseph Berardino,
made the same claim about Enron. However, given that Andersen also was Enron's internal
auditor, "it's going to be tough for Andersen to take that traditional tack that
'management pulled the wool over our eyes,' " says Douglas Carmichael, an accounting
professor at Baruch College in New York.
Mr. Tabolt, the Andersen
spokesman, said it is too early to make judgments about Andersen's work. "None of us
knows yet exactly what happened here," he said. "When we know the facts we'll
all be able to make informed judgments. But until then, much of this is speculation."
Though it hasn't received public
attention recently, Andersen's double-duty work for Enron wasn't a secret. A March 1996
Wall Street Journal article, for instance, noted that a growing number of companies,
including Enron, had outsourced their internal-audit departments to their outside
auditors, a development that had prompted criticism from regulators and others. At other
times, Mr. Tabolt said, Andersen and Enron officials had discussed their arrangement
publicly.
Accounting firms say the
double-duty arrangements let them become more familiar with clients' control procedures
and that such arrangements are ethically permissible, as long as outside auditors don't
make management decisions in handling the internal audits. Under the new SEC rules taking
effect next year, an outside auditor impairs its independence if it performs more than 40%
of a client's internal-audit work. The SEC said the restriction won't apply to clients
with assets of $200 million or less. Previously, the SEC had imposed no such percentage
limitation.
The Gottesdiener Law Firm, the Washington, D.C. 401(k) and
pension class action law firm prosecuting the most comprehensive of the 401(k) cases
pending against Enron Corporation and related defendants, added new allegations to its
case today, charging Arthur Andersen of Chicago with
knowingly participating in Enron's fraud on employees.
Lawsuit Seeks to Hold Andersen Accountable for Defrauding Enron Investors, Employees
--- http://www.smartpros.com/x31970.xml |
Bob Jensen's threads on the Enron scandal are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
Quality of Earnings,
Restatements, and Core Earnings
Question
What are the primary alleged causes for the rapid increase in revisions to
financial statements in the past few years?
June 14, 2006 message from Denny Beresford
[DBeresfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]
An official in Washington DC sent me a note today
saying that he is " interested in understanding the cause for the increased
number of restatements. Can you recommend any good articles or research that
explains the root causes, trends, etc?
Can anyone suggest some good references to pass
along?
Denny Beresford
June 14, 2006 reply from Ganesh M. Pandit, DBA, CPA, CMA
[profgmp@HOTMAIL.COM]
Perhaps this might help...Financial Restatements:
Causes, Consequences, and Corrections By Erik Linn, CPA, and Kori Diehl,
CPA, published in the September 2005 issue of Strategic Finance,
Vol.87, Iss. 3; pg. 34, 6 pgs.
Ganesh M. Pandit Adelphi University
June 15, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Evidence seems to be mounting that Section 404 of SOX is working in
uncovering significant errors in past financial statements. This is to be
expected in the early phases of 404 implementation. But the revisions should
subside after 404 is properly rolling. Companies like Kodak found huge internal
control weaknesses that led to reporting errors.
One of the most popular annual study if restatements is free from the
Huron Consulting Group.
Free from the Huron Consulting Group (Registration Required) ---
http://www.huronconsultinggroup.com/
"Restatements Should Subside as 404, Lease Issues Subside" ---
http://www.huronconsultinggroup.com/uploadedFiles/CW-Restatements-021406.pdf
"2004 Annual Review of Financial Reporting Matters - Summary" ---
Click Here
(I could not yet find the 2005 update, which is understandable since
2005 annual reports were just recently published.)
There also is an interesting 1999 paper entitled "Accounting Defects,
Financial Statement Credibility, and Equity Valuation" by W. Bruce Johnson
and D. Shores ---
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/acct/papers/workingpapers/99-01.pdf
Bob Jensen
Core Earnings
Bob Jensen's Overview --- Go to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/CoreEarnings.htm
"Beyond The Balance Sheet Earnings Quality," by Kurt
Badanhausen, Jack Gage, Cecily Hall, Michael K. Ozanian, Forbes, January 28,
2005 --- http://www.forbes.com/home/business/2005/01/26/bbsearnings.html
It's not how much money a company is making that
counts, it's how it makes its money. The earnings quality scores from
RateFinancials aim to evaluate how closely reported earnings reflect the
cash that the companies' businesses are generating and how well their
balance sheets reflect their true economic position. Companies in the
winners table have the best earnings quality (they are generating a lot of
sustainable cash from their operations), while companies in the losers table
have been boosting their reported earnings with such tricks as unexpensed
stock options, low tax rates, asset sales, off-balance-sheet financing and
deferred maintenance of the pension fund.
Krispy kreme doughnuts is the latest illustration
of the fact that stunning earnings growth can mask a lot of trouble. Not
long ago the doughnut maker was a glamour stock with a 60% earnings-per-share
growth rate and a multiple to match-70 times trailing earnings. Now the
stock is at $9.61, down 72% from May, when the company first issued an
earnings warning. Turns out Krispy Kreme may have leavened profits in the
way it accounted for the purchase of franchised stores and by failing to
book adequate reserves for doubtful accounts. So claims a shareholder
lawsuit against the company. Krispy Kreme would not comment on the
suit.
Investors are not auditors, they don't have
subpoena power, and they can't know about such disasters in advance. But
sometimes they can get hints that the quality of a company's earnings is a
little shaky. In Krispy's case an indication that it was straining to
deliver its growth story came three years ago in its use of synthetic leases
to finance expansion. Forbes described these leases in a Feb. 18, 2002 story
that did not please the company. Another straw in the wind: weak free cash
flow from operations. You get that number by taking the "cash flow from
operations" reported on the "consolidated statement of cash
flows," then subtracting capital expenditures. Solid earners usually
throw off lots of positive free cash flow. At Krispy the figure was
negative.
Is there a Krispy Kreme lurking in your
portfolio? For this, the fifth installment in our Beyond the Balance Sheet
series, we asked the experts at RateFinancials of New York City ( www.ratefinancials.com
) to look into earnings quality among the companies included in the S&P
500 Index. The tables at right display the outfits that RateFinancials puts
at the top and at the bottom of the quality scale. The ratings are to a
degree subjective and, not surprisingly, some of the companies at the bottom
take exception. General Motors feels that RateFinancials understates its
cash flow. But at minimum RateFinancials' work warns investors to look
closely at the financial statements of the suspect companies.
A lot of factors went into the ratings produced by
cofounders Victor Germack and Harold Paumgarten, research director Allan
Young and ten analysts. A company that expenses stock options is probably
not straining to meet earnings forecasts, so it gets a plus. Overoptimistic
assumptions about future earnings on a pension fund artificially prop up
earnings and thus rate a minus. A low tax rate is a potential indicator of
trouble: Maybe the low profit reported to the Internal Revenue Service is
all too true and the high profit reported to shareholders an exaggeration.
Other factors relate to discontinued operations (booking a one-time gain
from selling a business is bad), corporate governance (companies get black
marks for having poison pills), inventory (if it piles up faster than sales,
then business may be weakening) and free cash flow (a declining number is
bad).
Continued in this section of Forbes
Included in Standard &
Poor's definition of Core Earnings are
- employee stock options grant expenses,
- restructuring charges from on-going
operations,
- write-downs of depreciable or amortizable
operating assets,
- pensions costs
- purchased research and development.
Excluded from this definition
are
- impairment of goodwill charges,
- gains or losses from asset sales, pension
gains,
- unrealized gains or losses from hedging
activities, merger and acquisition related fees
- litigation settlements
The Quality of Earnings
Controversy in Accounting Theory
From The Wall Street
Journal Weekly Accounting Review on April 13, 2007
These Days, Detective Skills
Are Key to Gauging a Stock
by Herb Greenberg
The Wall Street Journal
Page: B3
Click here to view the
full article on WSJ.com
---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117590470676662738.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
TOPICS: Accounting,
Disclosure, Disclosure Requirements, Earnings Quality,
Financial Accounting, Sarbanes-Oxley Act
SUMMARY: "When Circuit City Stores
Inc. reported an unexpected fiscal fourth-quarter loss this
past week, with its stock in the doldrums, Victor Germack
felt vindicated. Last summer, when quite a few analysts were
upgrading their ratings on the electronics retailer's stock,
his research firm, RateFinancials, published a report
blasting Circuit City for "very poor quality of earnings"
and "poor accounting policies, footnotes and management
discussion and analysis."" The concerns arose from a
"preponderance of year-end lease terminations and the
disproportional influence [on earnings from] the sales of
extended warranties..." Circuit City's spokesman, Bill
Cimino, cites other factors, such as a rapid decline in the
price of flat-panel television sets, that impacted the
results.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is the "quality" of a company's earnings?
2.) What factors raised questions in some analysts' minds
about the quality of Circuit City's earnings? List all that
you find in the main article and in the related one, and
explain the impact of the issue on the notion of "quality of
earnings" or "quality of financial reporting."
3.) Why did this question of quality of earnings not arise
the minds of other analysts besides those of RateFinancials
Inc.?
4.) How does the corporate spokesperson address the question
of the quality of Circuit City's earnings? How does his
answer benefit Circuit City in its dealings with financial
markets?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of
Rhode Island
RELATED ARTICLES:
Circuit City
Highlights Doubts About Analysts
by Steven D. Jones
Sep 08, 2006
Online Exclusive
|
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators'
Review on May 27, 2004
TITLE: J.C. Penney Profit Hurt by Eckerd
REPORTER: Kortney Stringer
DATE: May 19, 2004
PAGE: B4
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108488326393314408,00.html
TOPICS: Accounting, Earnings Quality, Financial Accounting, Financial Analysis,
Financial Statement Analysis, Income from Continuing Operations, Net Income,
Operating Income
SUMMARY: Despite an earnings increase, J.C. Penney reported a 33% decline in
net income. Questions focus on the components and usefulness of the income
statement.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Describe the primary purpose(s) of the income statement. Distinguish between
the single-step and multi-step format for the income statement. Which type of
statement is more common? Support your answer.
2.) Explain the components of gross margin, operating income, income from
continuing operations, net income, and comprehensive income. What is
persistence? Which income statement total is likely to have the greatest
persistence? Which income statement total is likely to have the least
persistence?
3.) Where are results from discontinued operations reported on the income
statement? Why are results from discontinued operations separated from income
from continuing operations?
4.) What impact does the loss from the sale of Eckerd have on J.C. Penney's
expected future net income? What impact does results from continuing operations
have on expected future net income?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
From The Wall Street Journal
Accounting Educators' Review on May 23, 2002
TITLE: SEC Broadens Investigation Into
Revenue-Boosting Tricks; Fearing Bogus Numbers Are Widespread, Agency Probes
Lucent and Others
REPORTER: Susan Pulliam and Rebecca Blumenstein
DATE: May 16, 2002
PAGE: A1
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1021510491566948760.djm,00.html
TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Statement Analysis
SUMMARY: "Securities and Exchange
Commission officials, concerned about an explosion of transactions that falsely
created the impression of booming business across many industries, are
conducting a sweeping investigation into a host of practices that pump up
revenue."
QUESTIONS:
1.) "Probing revenue promises to be a much broader inquiry than the earlier
investigations of Enron and other companies accused of using accounting tricks
to boost their profits." What is the difference between inflating profits
vs. revenues?
2.) What are the ways in which
accounting information is used (both in general and in ways specifically cited
in this article)? What are the concerns about using accounting information that
has been manipulated to increase revenues? To increase profits?
3.) Describe the specific techniques
that may be used to inflate revenues that are enumerated in this article and the
related one. Why would a practice of inflating revenues be of particular concern
during the ".com boom"?
4.) "[L90 Inc.] L90 lopped $8.3
million, or just over 10%, off revenue previously reported for 2000 and 2001,
while booking the $250,000 [net difference in the amount of wire transfers that
had been used in one of these transactions] as 'other income' rather than
revenue." What is the difference between revenues and other income? Where
might these items be found in a multi-step income statement? In a single-step
income statement?
5.) What are "vendor
allowances"? How might these allowances be used to inflate revenues?
Consider the case of Lucent Technologies described in the article. Might their
techniques also have been used to boost profits?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University
of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
--- RELATED ARTICLES ---
TITLE: CMS Energy Admits Questionable Trades Inflated Its Volume
REPORTER: Chip Cummins and Jonathan Friedland
PAGE: A1
ISSUE: May 16, 2002
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1021494984503313400.djm,00.html
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on May 27,
2004
TITLE: SEC Gets Tough With Settlement in Lucent Case
REPORTER: Deborah Solomon and Dennis K. Berman
DATE: May 17, 2004
PAGE: A1
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108474447102812763,00.html
TOPICS: Criminal Procedure, Financial Accounting, Legal Liability, Revenue
Recognition, Securities and Exchange Commission, Accounting
SUMMARY: After a lengthy investigation into the accounting practices of
Lucent Technologies Inc., the Securities and Exchange Commission is expected to
file civil charges and impose a $25 million fine against the company. Questions
focus on the role of the SEC in financial reporting.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)? When was the SEC
established? Why was the SEC established? Does the SEC have the responsibility
of establishing financial reporting guidelines?
2.) What role does the SEC currently play in the financial reporting process?
What power does the SEC have to sanction companies that violate financial
reporting guidelines?
3.) What is the difference between a civil and a criminal charge? What is the
difference between a class-action suit by investors and a civil charge by the
SEC?
4.) What personal liability do individuals have for improper accounting? Why
does the SEC object to companies indemnifying individuals for consequences
associated with improper accounting?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
Bob Jensen's threads on revenue accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm
Standard & Poor's News Release on May 14,
2002 --- http://www.standardandpoors.com/PressRoom/index.html
Standard & Poor's To
Change System For Evaluating Corporate Earnings
Widely-Supported "Core
Earnings" Approach to be Applied to Earnings Analyses and Forecasts for US Indices,
Company Data and Equity Research
New York, May 14, 2002 --
Standard & Poor's today published a set of new definitions it will use for equity
analysis to evaluate corporate operating earnings of publicly held companies in the United
States. Release of "Measures of Corporate Earnings" completes a process Standard
& Poor's began in August 2001 when the firm began discussions with securities and
accounting analysts, portfolio managers, academic research groups and others to build a
consensus for changes that will reduce investor frustration and confusion over growing
differences in the reporting of corporate earnings. The text of "Measures of
Corporate Earnings" may be found at www.standardandpoors.com/PressRoom/index.html.
At the center of Standard &
Poor's effort to return transparency and consistency to corporate reporting is a focus on
what it refers to as Core Earnings, or the after-tax earnings generated from a
corporation's principal business or businesses. Since Standard & Poor's believes that
there is a general understanding of what is included in As Reported Earnings, its
definition of Core Earnings begins with As Reported and then makes a series of
adjustments. As Reported Earnings are earnings as defined by Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) which excludes two items - discontinued operations and extraordinary
items, both as defined by GAAP.
Included in Standard & Poor's
definition of Core Earnings are employee stock options grant expenses, restructuring
charges from on-going operations, write-downs of depreciable or amortizable operating
assets, pensions costs and purchased research and development. Excluded from this
definition are impairment of goodwill charges, gains or losses from asset sales, pension
gains, unrealized gains or losses from hedging activities, merger and acquisition related
fees and litigation settlements.
"For over 140 years,
Standard & Poor's has stood for the investor's right to know. Central to that
objective is a clear, consistent, definition of a company's financial position," said
Leo O'Neill, president of Standard & Poor's. "The increased use of so-called pro
forma earnings and other measures to report corporate performance has generated
controversy and confusion and has not served investor interests. Standard & Poor's
Core Earnings definition will help build consensus and restore investor trust and
confidence in the data used to make investment decisions."
"A number of recent high
profile bankruptcies have renewed investors' concerns about the reliability of corporate
reporting," said David M. Blitzer, Standard & Poor's chief investment strategist.
"From the work we have just completed, our hope is to generate additional public
discussion on earnings measures. Once there are more generally accepted definitions, it
will be much easier for analysts and investors to evaluate varying investment opinions and
recommendations and form their own views of which companies are the most attractive."
Beginning shortly, Standard &
Poor's will include the components of its definition for Core Earnings in its COMPUSTAT
database for the U.S., the leading source for corporate financial data. In addition, Core
Earnings will be calculated and reported for Standard & Poor's U.S. equity indices,
including the S&P 500. Finally, Standard & Poor's own equity research team, which
provides opinions on over 1100 stocks, will adopt Core Earnings in its analyses.
"Core Earnings is an
excellent analytical tool for the individual and professional investor alike," said
Kenneth Shea, managing director for global equity research at Standard & Poor's.
"It allows investors to better evaluate and compare the underlying earnings power of
the companies they are examining. In addition, it enhances an investor's ability to
construct and maintain investment portfolios that will adhere to a pre-determined set of
investment objectives. With Core Earnings, Standard & Poor's equity analysts will be
able to provide our clients with even more insightful forecasts and buy, hold and sell
recommendations."
From the outset, Standard &
Poor's has sought to achieve agreement surrounding broad earnings measures that address a
company's potential for profitability. In addition to emphasizing this approach in its
equity analysis, Standard & Poor's will also make Core Earnings a part of its credit
ratings analysis. The accuracy of earnings and earnings trends has always been a component
of credit analysis and Core Earnings adds value to this process. Earnings are also a major
element in cash flow analysis and are therefore a part of Standard & Poor's debt
rating methodology.
Standard & Poor's, a division
of The McGraw-Hill Companies (NYSE:MHP), provides independent financial information,
analytical services, and credit ratings to the world's financial markets. Among the
company's many products are the S&P Global 1200, the premier global equity performance
benchmark, the S&P 500, the premier U.S. portfolio index, and credit ratings on more
than 220,000 securities and funds worldwide. With more than 5,000 employees located in 18
countries, Standard & Poor's is an integral part of the global financial
infrastructure. For more information, visit www.standardandpoors.com.
S&P Main Core Earnings Site (including a Flash Presentation) --- http://snipurl.com/SPCoreEarnings
S&P PowerPoint Show on Core Earnings
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/corePowerpoint.ppt
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/corePowerpoint.htm
Other Related Core Earnings Files
Bob Jensen's Overview --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/CoreEarnings.htm
Updates, including FAS 133 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/CoreEarningsMisc.pdf
Pensions and Pension Interest --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/CoreEarningsPensions.pdf
Question:
What ten companies have the most "inflated" measures of profit?
Answer:
"Shining A New Light on Earnings, BusinessWeek Editorial, June 21,
2002 --- http://www.standardandpoors.com/Forum/MarketAnalysis/coreEarnings/Articles/062102_coredata.html
How much does a company
truly make? It's hard to tell these days. To boost the performance of their
stocks, companies have come up with a slew of self-defined "pro
forma" numbers that put their financials in a favorable light. Now
ratings agency Standard & Poor's has devised a truer measure known as Core
Earnings.
The Goal: to provide a
standardized definition of the profits produced by a company's ongiong
operations. Of the three main changes from more traditional measures of
profits two reduce earmings: Income from pension funds is excluded and the
cost of stock options are deducted as an expense. The other big change boosts
earnings by adding back in the charges taken to adjust for overpriced
acquisitions. Here are the top 10 losers and winners under Core Earnings:

Enhanced Business Reporting
I attended the following CPE Workshop at the AAA Meetings in Orlando
CPE Session 3: Saturday, August 7, 1:00 PM – 4:00 PM
Value Measurement and Reporting—Moving toward Measuring and Reporting Value
Creation Activities and Opportunities
Presenters: William J. L. Swirsky, Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants
Paul Herring, AICPA Director Business Reporting Assurance and Advisory
Service
Description/Objectives:
Content – Presentations and dialogue about measuring the activities and
opportunities that drive an entity’s value and, once measured, reporting
these value creation prospects, in financial or nonfinancial terms, in
addition to current financial information. The session will include
information about research by the Value Measurement and Reporting
Collaborative (VMRC) that will provide the foundation for the development of a
framework of market-driven principles that characterize value measurement and
reporting on a global basis.
Objectives – To continue the dialogue on more
transparent, consistent, and reliable reporting of an entity’s value; to
provide participants with information about the research being undertaken by
VMRC; to talk about disclosure; and to solicit feedback from the attendees
about where they see gaps in the current practices on value measurement and
reporting.
Plan – To (1) provide context for value measurement
and reporting; (2) describe research to date; and (3) describe reporting
initiatives.
The above workshop focused mainly upon the early stages of the Value
Measurement and Reporting Collaborative that evolved into the Enhanced
Business Reporting (EBR) Consortium) for providing more structure,
uniformity, and measurement of non-financial information reported to managers
and other stakeholders --- http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/cpaltr/nov2002/supps/edu1.htm
This initiative that began in 2002 with hope that a collaboration between the
AICPA, the Canadian CICA, leading consulting firms, and others could initiate a
new business reporting model as follows:
The Value Measurement and Reporting Collaborative, in
which the AICPA is a participant, will play a crucial role in the new business
reporting model. VMRC is a global effort of the accounting profession, along
with corporate directors, businesses, business associations and organizations,
institutional investors, investment analysts, software companies and
academics. The key purpose of the collaborative is to help boards of directors
and senior management make better strategic decisions using value measurement
and reporting. It is anticipated that the current financial reporting model
would, over time, migrate to this new model and would be used to communicate a
more complete picture to stakeholders.
Also see Grant Thornton's summary in 2004
Grant Thornton in the US has posted a new
publication of Directors Monthly, which focuses on "Business Reporting: New
Initiative Will Guide Voluntary Enhancements." The publication discusses
how non-financial information offers a better picture of corporate financial
health.
Double Entries, September 9, 2004 --- http://accountingeducation.com/news/news5395.html
For years researchers and businesses have been attempting to find a better
way to report on business performance beyond the traditional financial reporting
effort. Bob Jensen even wrote a 1976 book called Phantasmagoric
Accounting --- See Volume 14 at http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aaa/market/studar.htm
Studies of reporting on non-financial business performance over the past 50
years have generally been disappointing. Numbers attached to such things
as cost of pollution and value of human capital were generally derived from
overly-simplified models that really did not deal with externalities,
interaction effects, non-stationarity, and important missing variables.
There is an immense need, especially by managers and lawmakers, for better
business reporting that will help making tradeoffs between stakeholders.
At the Orlando workshop mentioned above, we heard a great deal about the need
for a new business reporting model. But when the presenters got down to
what had been accomplished to date, I felt like the presentations lacked
scholarship, especially in terms of the history of research on this topic over
the past 50 years. What was presented as "new" really had been
hashed over many times in the past. I left the Enhanced Business Reporting
Consortium workshop feeling that this initiative is long on hype and short on
hope.
But I do not want to give the impression that the EBR initiative is not
important. Little is gained by the traditional accounting research
tradition, especially in academe, of ignoring huge and seemingly intractable
problems that seem to defy all known research methodologies. High on the
list of intractable problems are problems of measuring intangibles and
human/environmental performance. If nothing else, the Value Measurement
and Reporting Collaborative will help to keep researchers focused on the bigger
problems rather than less relevant minutiae. At a minimum some progress
may be made toward standardization of non-financial reporting.
You can track the progress of the Enhanced Business Reporting
Consortium at http://www.ebrconsortium.org/
Economic Theory of
Accounting
Financial Statements Are Still Valuable Tools for Predicting Bankruptcy
Despite growing public skepticism over how useful
financial statements are in providing information to investors, researchers at
Stanford’s Graduate School of Business have found that the value of financial
ratios for predicting bankruptcy has not declined significantly over time.
Professors Maureen McNichols and William Beaver and graduate student Jung-Wu Rhie have reexamined the usefulness for predicting bankruptcy of financial
ratios such as return on assets (net income divided by total assets), cash flow
to total liabilities (earnings before interest, depreciation, and taxes divided
by both short- and long-term debt), and leverage (total liabilities to total
assets). The study explored how three forces have influenced this predictive
value over the past 40 years.
"Financial Statements Are Still Valuable Tools for Predicting Bankruptcy,"
Stanford Graduate School of Business Newsletter, November 2005 ---
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/acctg_mcnichols-beaver_bankruptcy.shtml
"Financial Statements Still Significant
In Predicting Bankruptcy," AccountingWeb, May 17, 2006 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102159
Researchers have
found that financial ratios are still valuable tools in predicting
bankruptcy. The significance of financial ratios found in statements was
explored in a study examining their predictive value over the last four
decades, according to the Stanford Graduate School of Business (GSB).
The GSB reported
that the premise of the study was motivated by regulatory organizations,
such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the Securities and
Exchange Commission, seeking to increase the usefulness of information found
in financial statements.
The study,
completed by Professors Maureen McNichols and William Beaver, with graduate
student Jung-Wu Rhie, reexamined the use of financial ratios such as cash
flow to total liabilities (earnings before interest, depreciation, and taxes
divided by short-term debt plus long-term debt), return on assets (net
income divided by total assets), leverage (total liabilities compared to
total assets), according to the GSB.
McNichols is the
Marriner S. Eccles Professor of Public and Private Management at the GSB.
Beaver is the Joan E. Horngren Professor of Accounting there.
McNichols told the
GSB, “One prediction is that if standard-setters are successful at
incorporating additional information about fair values into financial
statements, then we might expect their predictive ability for bankruptcy to
increase.”
On the other hand,
traditional accounting standards may capture only a portion of current
companies’ scope of activities. Also, financial statements may be seen as
more “managed” than from other times in the past, according to the GSB.
“If we look back in
the 1960s, intangible assets -– as represented by investments in brands,
research and development and technology -– were much less pervasive than
they are today. These kinds of transactions are not well captured by our
current accounting model,” Professor McNichols told the GSB. Concerning the
“management” of financial statements, McNichols said, “Certainly, there is
much more documentation of earnings management today than we’ve seen
historically.”
McNichols went on
to say that any shift in the economic activities of companies might also
offset any improvements in standards and informativeness of financial
statements made by regulatory standard-setters, according to the GSB.
In
study results released in March 2005, financial
statements were found to be highly significant in predicting bankruptcy over
the two periods of the study, according to the GSB. Period 1 was 1962 to
1993 and Period 2 was 1994 to 2002. There was a decline in predictive
ability from Period 1 to Period 2, although it was not statistically
significant. Companies’ “hazard rate”, reflecting their risk of going
bankrupt and using the three ratios, predicted higher risk in the year
before bankruptcy, as well as other years before their insolvency. Beaver
said, “In fact, we see differences in the ratios of bankrupt and nonbankrupt
firms up to five years prior to bankruptcy.”
The researchers
then shifted their predictors toward more market-based values. These were
cumulative stock returns over a year; the market capitalization of the firm
(or common stock price per share, times the common shares outstanding); and
the variability of stock returns. The use of these values was very
predictive as well, according to the GSB.
Predictability
actually increased over time. Ninety-two percent of bankrupt companies were
in the highest three deciles of Period 1 hazard rates and 93 percent for
Period 2. The slight rise was attributed to market prices reflecting broader
information, in addition to the information found in financial statements.
The GSB reported that the incremental significance of non-financial
statement information is reflected in the resulting difference between the
two time periods.
The researchers
then merged the financial-ratio and market-based models into a hybrid model.
Their results improved, coming up with a 96 percent chance of predicting
bankruptcy for Period 1 and 93 percent over Period 2. This seems to show
that market prices may compensate for even slight decreases in the
predictivity of financial ratios. These results further indicate that the
market draws upon additional information not available in financial ratios.
McNichols told the
GSB, “But it’s comforting to know that the behavior of the combined model,
over time, is so stable.” The stability of their combined model suggests
that bankruptcy can be predicted reliably in capital markets and this
ability has not been eroded by changes in reporting.
Dr. Edward
Altman, Ph.D., developed his
Z-score formula for predicting bankruptcy in 1968,
according to Value Based Management. It consists of three different models,
each for specific business organizations, including public manufacturers,
private manufacturers and private general firms.
The American
Bankruptcy Institute collects and publishes metrics on bankruptcies. Review
their
listing of annual business and non-business
filings by state (2000-2005) breaks down total bankruptcies into business
and non-business numbers, as well as consumer bankruptcies as a percentage
of the non-business metrics.
October 30, 2002 message from JerryFeltham [gerald.feltham@commerce.ubc.ca]
Peter Christensen and
I are pleased to announce that the first of two volumes on the fundamentals of
the economic analysis of accounting has been published by Kluwer. This two
volume series is based on two analytical Ph.D. seminars I have taught for
several years, and is designed to provide efficient coverage of key
information economic models and results that are pertinent to accounting
research.
The first volume is
entitled: Economics of
Accounting: Volume I - Information in Markets.
The attached file
provides the table of contents of this volume, plus the preface - which gives
a brief overview of the two volumes. The second volume is
Economics of
Accounting: Volume II - Performance Evaluation.
We expect to complete
it in the next few months.
The two volumes can
be used to provide the foundation for Ph.D. courses on information economic
research in accounting. Furthermore, it is our hope that analytical
researchers, as well as empiricists and experimentalists who use information
economic analysis to motivate their hypotheses, will find our book to be a
useful reference.
We plan to maintain a
website for the book. It will primarily be used to provide some problems Peter
and I have developed in teaching courses based on the two books. In addition,
the website will include any errata. The website address is:
http://people.commerce.ubc.ca/faculty/feltham/economicsofaccounting.html
Also attached is a
flyer from our publisher Kluwer. It announces a 25% discount in the price if
the book is purchased prior to December 31.
The publisher has
also informed us that: "If students buy the book through your university
bookstore (6 or more copies) they will receive an adoption price of $79.95
US."
Information regarding
discounts on this book for course use and bulk purchases can be obtained by
sending an e-mail message to kluwer@wkap.com
(their customer service department).
Jerry Feltham
Faculty of Commerce
University of British Columbia
2053 Main Mall
Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Z2
Tel. 604-822-8397 Fax 604-822-9470 jerry.feltham@commerce.ubc.ca
Question
What's "institutional structure?"
What's the theory entwined in the works of the three 2007 recipients of the
Nobel Prize in Economics?
Hint:
Nobel Prizes ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nobel_Prize
Nobel Prizes in Economics tend to go to mathematicians and/or conservative market theorists.
Nobel Peace Prices tend to reflect liberal political biases, perhaps even
not-so-hidden Nobel agendas.
Nobel Prizes for accounting and mathematics are nonexistent, probably since both
disciplines are built upon assumptions rather than reality. Actually this is
also true for economics, although somehow an exception was made for this branch
of astrology.
"A Market Nobel," by Peter Boettke, The Wall Street Journal,
October 16, 2007; Page A21 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119249811353060179.html?mod=todays_us_opinion
Yesterday Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin and Roger
Myerson won the Nobel Prize in Economic Science for their pioneering work in
the field of "mechanism design." Strangely, some have used this occasion to
disparage free-market economics. But the truth is the deserving recipients
owe a direct debt to free-market thinkers who came before them.
Mechanism design is an area of economic research
that focuses on how institutional structures can be manipulated by changing
the rules of the game in order to produce socially optimal results. The best
intentions for the public good will go astray if the institutional
arrangements are not consistent with the self-interest of decision makers.
Mr. Myerson's work on how to design auctions to
elicit information about the value of the good being auctioned -- and how to
maximize the revenue extracted from the auction -- has informed numerous
privatizations of publicly owned assets over the past quarter-century. Mr.
Maskin also contributed to auction theory, and applied the idea of mechanism
design to assess political institutions such as voting systems.
Mechanism design theory was established to try to
address the main challenge posed by Ludwig von Mises and F.A. Hayek. It all
starts with Mr. Hurwicz's response to Hayek's famous paper, "The Use of
Knowledge in Society." In the 1930s and '40s, Hayek was embroiled in the
"socialist calculation debate." Mises, Hayek's mentor in Vienna, had raised
the challenge in his book "Socialism," and before that in an article, that
without having the means of production in private hands, the economic system
will not create the incentives or the information to properly decide between
the alternative uses of scarce resources. Without the production process of
the market economy, socially desirable outcomes will be impossible to
achieve.
In the mid-1930s, Hayek published Mises's essay in
English in his book, "Collectivist Economic Planning." From there the
discussion moved to the U.K. and the U.S. Hayek summarized the fundamental
challenge that advocates of socialism needed to come to grips with. Hayek's
argument, a refinement of Mises, basically stated that the economic problem
society faced was not how to allocate given resources, but rather how to
mobilize and utilize the knowledge dispersed throughout the economy.
Hayek argued that mathematical modeling, which
relied on a set of given assumptions, had obscured the fundamental problem.
These questions were not being probed since they were assumed away in the
mathematical models of market socialism presented by Oskar Lange and, later,
Abba Lerner. Milton Friedman, when he reviewed Lerner's "Economics of
Control," stated that it was as if economic analysis of policy was being
conducted in a vacuum. Lange actually argued that questions of bureaucratic
incentives did not belong in economics and were best left to other
disciplines such as psychology and sociology.
Leonid Hurwicz, in his classic papers "On the
Concept and Possibility of Informational Decentralization" (1969), "On
Informationally Decentralized Systems" (1972), and "The Design of Mechanisms
for Resource Allocation" (1973), embraced Hayek's challenge. He developed
mechanism-design theory to test the logic of the Mises-Hayek contention that
socialism could not possibly mobilize the dispersed knowledge in society in
a way that would permit rational economic calculation for the alternative
uses of scarce resources. Mises and Hayek argued that replacing the
invisible hand of the market with the guided one of government would not
work. Mr. Hurwicz wanted to see if they were right, and under what
conditions one could say they were wrong.
Those efforts are at the foundation of the field
that was honored by the Nobel Prize committee. To function properly, any
economic system must, as Hayek pointed out, structure incentives so that the
dispersed and sometimes conflicting knowledge in society is mobilized to
realize the gains from exchange and innovation.
Last year Mr. Myerson acknowledged his own debt to
Mr. Hurwicz -- and thus Hayek -- in "Fundamental Theory of Institutions: A
Lecture in Honor of Leo Hurwicz." The incentive-compatibility issue has
highlighted the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection (perverse
behavior due to incentives caused by rules that are supposed protect us and
selection problems due to imperfect information). Mr. Hurwicz helped repair
a mid-20th century neglect of institutions in economic analysis.
While we celebrate the brilliance of Messrs.
Hurwicz, Maskin and Myerson, we should also remember that Hayek's challenge
provided their inspiration. Hayek concluded that the private-property rights
that come with the rule of law, freedom of contract, and freedom of
association is still the one mechanism design that mobilizes and utilizes
the dispersed information in an economy. Furthermore, it does so in a way
that tends to capture the gains from trade and innovation so that wealth is
continually created and humanity is made better off.
Mr. Boettke is a professor of economics at George Mason University and
the Mercatus Center.
October 17, 2007 reply from Paul
Williams [Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]
Bob, et al.
As I think I have
mentioned before there is no Nobel Prize in economics. Alfred Nobel
established his trust fund because of guilt over inventing dynamite. He
awarded prizes only to those branches of intellectual endeavor that he
believed had the potential to bring "goodness" to human kind and end wars
forever (chemistry, physics, medicine, literature, and peace (essentially
noble political acts because peace is largely about politics perhaps
explaining why right- wingers don't tend to win the Peace Prize).
In 1964 the Nobel
Committee agreed to include within the prizes The Bank of Sweden Prize in
Economic Science in Honor of Alfred Nobel, funded not by the Nobel Trust,
but by financial interests. This was a political move to bring legitimacy to
economic "science" whose scientific prescriptions for policy always manage
somehow to benefit financial interests.
Apparently we have
now "scientific" proof that labor is our punishment for the Fall from Grace.
Science my a uh foot.
October 17, 2007 reply from J. S.
Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
Paul and Bob,
The controversies
involving the economics prize include:
1. Theoretical v.
Practical: Kantorovich, the Russian mathematician is supposed to have
expressed disbelief at receiving one of the earliest economics Nobels
(1975), since he had done virtually no work in economics except for laying
the groundwork for what later became linear programming. But that was just a
footnote in his life's work.
The same can be
said of the work of Reinhard Selten, John Nash, and to an extent Janos
Kornai. Later, a number of other theoreticians were also awarded the
economics Nobel, leading to grumbling among the applied/ empirical crowd.
Probably the series of Nobel's awarded to Milton Friedman and others later
were a reaction to this criticism.
2. Left-wing v.
Right-wing: In general, more Nobels have been awarded to quite-a-bit
right-of-center economists, and hell has broken loose when one has been
awarded to some one even an iota left-of-center. An example was Amartya Sen,
who single-handedly revived the fascinating fields of economics of poverty
and development.
Milton Friedman was
awarded the prize in 1976 right after the controversy surrounding the 1975
award to Kantorovich.
I think economics
Nobel's have generally tarnished the reputation of Nobels in general, but
one feels good when some one like John Nash gets it. I was thrilled that
Leonid Hurwicz got it this year, though I am not sure about Maskin and
Myerson. With the latter two, it is way down hill from Selten, Nash,
Harsanyi, Aumannn, Kantorovich, Arrow, Debreu, ...
So far as I know,
one "accountant" has won the economics Nobel. It is Richard Stone, who
worked in the area of national income accounting.
Incidentally, I
stumbled upon a fascinating book titled "Against Mechanism: Protecting
Economics from Science" By Philip Mirowski
One quote from the
book:
"Contrary to
popular misconceptions, I shall claim that economics needs protection
from science, and especially from scientists such as Richard Feynman, or
any other physicist who thinks he knows just what is needed for
economists to clean up their act. Economics needs protection from the
scientists in its midst, the Paul Samuelsons and the Tjalling Koopmans
and all the others who took their training in the physical sciences and
parlayed it into easy victories among their less technically inclined
colleagues. And worst of all, economics needs protection from itself.
For years, economics has enjoyed an impression of superiority over all
the other "social sciences" in rigor, precision, and technical
expertise. The reason it has been able to assume this mantle is that
economics has consistently striven to be the nearest thing to social
physics in the constellation of human knowledge."
Jagdish
Socionomic Theory of
Finance and Fraud
Socionomics and the
Enron Scandal
Right after
my posting of the 1952 cartoon, B. C. emailed me
the following video that is a documentary on Socionomics and even
has Finance Professor John Nofsinger in it speaking about Enron and
other scandals!
What is socionomics?
From
Socionomics.org:
"Socionomics
is a new theory of social causality that offers fresh insights into
collective human behavior. Over twenty years of empirical research
demonstrates that social actions are not causal to changes in social
mood, but rather changes in social mood motivate changes in social
action."
For instance, rather than suggesting that a rising
economy (or stock market) makes people happy, this takes the related,
but reversed, view that the economy improves because people are happy.
While I do not want to argue the theory (for or against), Nofsinger
makes an interesting point by saying that Enron and other scandals may
have come when they did (after the tech bubble burst etc), not because
of the scandals being worse, but because people were upset and hence
"looking for trouble."
Sort of a chicken or the egg argument that has many finance and economic
implications (not least of which might be a predictable component in
stock markets--for instance this builds upon the Elliot Wave Theory that
was mentioned via Fibonacci sequences in the DaVinci Code.).
Here is the description from video:
"
The Enron and Martha Stewart scandals made headlines at about the
same time. It wasn't just coincidence. This four minute clip about
socionomics from History's
Hidden Engine explains why some scandals make news when they do,
while others go unnoticed."
I have to
admit it is a thought provoking idea and it does fit some scenarios, but
I am not yet willing to buy into it, although
I may buy the book.
Bob Jensen's theory threads are linked
at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm
Facts Based on Assumptions:
The Power of Postpositive Thinking
Everyone is
entitled to their own opinion, but not their own facts.
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan --- FactCheck.org ---
http://www.factcheck.org/
Then again, maybe we're all entitled
to our own facts!
"The Power of Postpositive Thinking,"
Scott McLemee, Inside Higher Ed, August 2, 2006 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2006/08/02/mclemee
In particular, a
dominant trend in critical theory was the rejection of the concept of
objectivity as something that rests on a more or less naive epistemology: a
simple belief that “facts” exist in some pristine state untouched by
“theory.” To avoid being naive, the dutiful student learned to insist that,
after all, all facts come to us embedded in various assumptions about the
world. Hence (ta da!) “objectivity” exists only within an agreed-upon
framework. It is relative to that framework. So it isn’t really
objective....
What Mohanty found
in his readings of the philosophy of science were much less naïve, and more
robust, conceptions of objectivity than the straw men being thrashed by
young Foucauldians at the time. We are not all prisoners of our paradigms.
Some theoretical frameworks permit the discovery of new facts and the
testing of interpretations or hypotheses. Others do not. In short,
objectivity is a possibility and a goal — not just in the natural sciences,
but for social inquiry and humanistic research as well.
Mohanty’s major
theoretical statement on PPR arrived in 1997 with Literary Theory and the
Claims of History: Postmodernism, Objectivity, Multicultural Politics
(Cornell University Press). Because poststructurally inspired notions of
cultural relativism are usually understood to be left wing in intention,
there is often a tendency to assume that hard-edged notions of objectivity
must have conservative implications. But Mohanty’s work went very much
against the current.
“Since the lowest
common principle of evaluation is all that I can invoke,” wrote Mohanty,
complaining about certain strains of multicultural relativism, “I cannot —
and consequently need not — think about how your space impinges on mine or
how my history is defined together with yours. If that is the case, I may
have started by declaring a pious political wish, but I end up denying that
I need to take you seriously.”
PPR did
not require throwing out the multicultural baby with the relativist
bathwater, however. It meant developing ways to think about cultural
identity and its discontents. A number of Mohanty’s students and scholarly
colleagues have pursued the implications of postpositive identity politics.
I’ve written elsewhere
about Moya, an associate professor of English at Stanford University who has
played an important role in developing PPR ideas about identity. And one
academic critic has written
an interesting review essay
on early postpositive scholarship — highly recommended for anyone with a
hankering for more cultural theory right about now.
Not everybody with
a sophisticated epistemological critique manages to turn it into a
functioning think tank — which is what started to happen when people in the
postpositive circle started organizing the first Future of Minority Studies
meetings at Cornell and Stanford in 2000. Others followed at the University
of Michigan and at the University of Wisconsin in Madison. Two years ago FMS
applied for a grant from Mellon Foundation, receiving $350,000 to create a
series of programs for graduate students and junior faculty from minority
backgrounds.
The FMS Summer
Institute, first held in 2005, is a two-week seminar with about a dozen
participants — most of them ABD or just starting their first tenure-track
jobs. The institute is followed by a much larger colloquium (the part I got
to attend last week). As schools of thought in the humanities go, the
postpositivists are remarkably light on the in-group jargon. Someone
emerging from the Institute does not, it seems, need a translator to be
understood by the uninitated. Nor was there a dominant theme at the various
panels I heard.
Rather, the
distinctive quality of FMS discourse seems to derive from a certain very
clear, but largely unstated, assumption: It can be useful for scholars
concerned with issues particular to one group to listen to the research
being done on problems pertaining to other groups.
That sounds pretty
simple. But there is rather more behind it than the belief that we should
all just try to get along. Diversity (of background, of experience, of
disciplinary formation) is not something that exists alongside or in
addition to whatever happens in the “real world.” It is an inescapable and
enabling condition of life in a more or less democratic society. And anyone
who wants it to become more democratic, rather than less, has an interest in
learning to understand both its inequities and how other people are affected
by them.
A case in point
might be the findings discussed by Claude Steele, a professor of psychology
at Stanford, in a panel on Friday. His paper reviewed some of the research
on “identity contingencies,” meaning “things you have to deal with because
of your social identity.” One such contingency is what he called “stereotype
threat” — a situation in which an individual becomes aware of the risk that
what you are doing will confirm some established negative quality associated
with your group. And in keeping with the threat, there is a tendency to
become vigilant and defensive.
Steele did not just
have a string of concepts to put up on PowerPoint. He had research findings
on how stereotype threat can affect education. The most striking involved
results from a puzzle-solving test given to groups of white and black
students. When the test was described as a game, the scores for the black
students were excellent — conspicuously higher, in fact, than the scores of
white students. But in experiments where the very same puzzle was described
as an intelligence test, the results were reversed. The black kids scores
dropped by about half, while the graph for their white peers spiked.
The only variable?
How the puzzle was framed — with distracting thoughts about African-American
performance on IQ tests creating “stereotype threat” in a way that
game-playing did not.
Steele also cited
an experiment in which white engineering students were given a mathematics
test. Just beforehand, some groups were told that Asian students usually did
really well on this particular test. Others were simply handed the test
without comment. Students who heard about their Asian competitors tended to
get much lower scores than the control group.
Extrapolate from
the social psychologist’s experiments with the effect of a few
innocent-sounding remarks — and imagine the cumulative effect of more overt
forms of domination. The picture is one of a culture that is profoundly
wasteful, even destructive, of the best abilities of many of its members.
“It’s not easy for
minority folks to discuss these things,” Satya Mohanty told me on the final
day of the colloquium. “But I don’t think we can afford to wait until it
becomes comfortable to start thinking about them. Our future depends on it.
By ‘our’ I mean everyone’s future. How we enrich and deepen our democratic
society and institutions depends on the answers we come up with now.”
Portions of the Colloquium will
be made available online. For updates, and more information on the Future of
Minority Studies project, check the
FMS Web site.
A version of the keynote speech
from this year’s Colloquium, “Multiculturalism, Universalism, and the 21st
Century Academy,” by Nancy Cantor, chancellor and president of Syracuse
University, will appear soon at Inside Higher Ed.
Earlier this year, Oxford
University Press published a major new work on postpositivist theory,
Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self,by Linda Martin Alcoff,
a professor of philosophy at Syracuse University. Several essays from the
book are available at
the author’s Web
site.
Mike Kearl's great social theory site ---
http://www.trinity.edu/~mkearl/
Some sites to stimulate the sociological
imagination ---
http://www.trinity.edu/~mkearl/theory.html#imag
According to Karl Popper (Logik
der Forschung, 1935: p.26), Theory is "the net which we throw out in order
to catch the world--to rationalize, explain, and dominate it." Through
history, sociological theory arose out of attempts to make sense of times of
dramatic social change. As Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills observed in
Character and Social Structure (Harbinger Books, 1964:xiii), "Problems of
the nature of human nature are raised most urgently when the life-routines
of a society are disturbed, when men are alienated from their social roles
in such a way as to open themselves up for new insight." Consider the
historical contexts spawning the theoretical insights below:
Neither the life of an
individual nor the history of a society can be understood without
understanding both. Yet men do not usually define the troubles they endure
in terms of historical change and institutional contradiction. ... The
sociological imagination enables its possessor to understand the larger
historical scene in terms of its meaning for the inner life and the external
career of a variety of individuals. ... The first fruit of this
imagination--and the first lesson of the social science that embodies it--is
the idea that the individual can understand his own experience and gauge his
own fate only by locating himself within this period, that he can know his
own chances in life only by becoming aware of those of all individuals in
his circumstances. ...We have come to know that every individual lives, from
one generation to the next, in some society; that he lives out a biography,
and that he lives it out within some historical sequence (The Sociological
Imagination, 1959:3-10).
Judge a man by his
questions rather than by his answers. --Voltaire (1694-1778)
A definition is no
proof. --William Pinkney, American diplomat (1764-1822)
A theory is more
impressive the greater the simplicity of its premises, the more different
the kinds of things it relates and the more extended its range of
applicability. --
Albert Einstein, 1949
-
SocioSite: Noted Sociological Theorists and Samplings of their Works
Alan Liu's Voice of the
Shuttle: Great collection of synopses and primary works of the great
theorists
Society for Social Research Page: Classical Sociological Theory. Good
site for excerpts from the classics, courtesy of the University of
Chicago.
Serdar Kaya's
The
Sociology Professor, a portal of social theories and theorists
Sociolog: many
phenomenological links
Larry Ridener's Dead Sociologists Index: Biographies of and excerpts
from those who carved the discipline
SociologyCafe's
"Social Thinkers, Sociologists, and Online Texts" and
Theory Outline
PRAXIS: The
Insurgent Sociology Web Site at University of California, Riverside
Ed Stephan's "A Sociology Timeline from 1600"
Carl Cuneo's Course on Theories of Inequality
Marxist Internet
Archive
Marxism/ Leninism
Marxism Made Simple
Marx
and Engels' Writings
Engels' The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State
Antonio Gramsci
site from Queens College
Habermas links
collected by Antti Kauppinen
Durkheimian links
Durkheim
Homepage
Weberian links
Mannheim Centre for European Social Research
Charles Horton Cooley's Social Organization: A Study of the Larger
Mind
George
Herbert Mead Repository at Brock University
All Things Simmelian--Georg Simmel Homepage
Erving Goffman
Game Theory
Society--mathematically modeling "strategic interaction in
competitive and cooperative environments"
Thorsten Veblen's The Theory of the Leisure Class
Foucault Homepage
Jean Baudrillard speaks
Anthony
Giddens
Howard S.
Becker's Home Page--replete with recent papers, biographical updates
and web recommendations
Amitai Etzioni's Articles in Professional Journals and Books
"Contemporary Philosophy, Critical Theory and Postmodern Thought" from
the University of Denver
Norbert Elias site from University of Sydney
FreudNet: The
A.A. Brill Library
An evolving site to
keep an eye on is
Jim Spickard's Social Theory Pages, with historical backgrounds and
intellectual biographies of the key players
Need a dictionary for
those works of critical theorists and postmodernists?
Try the Red Feather Dictionary of Critical Social Science
Gene Shackman's
Social, Economic
and Political Change--featuring links to theory, data and research
about large scale long term political, economic and social systems
change at the national and international level
World-Systems Archive
The Research
Committee on Sociocybernetics (of the Intl. Sociological Association)
Want to see what theories
sociologists are currently cooking up? Below is a sampling of sociological
journals.
-
Electronic Journal
of Sociology Home Page
-
Sociological Research Online
-
Journal of World-Systems Research
-
Journal of
Mundane Behavior (first issue February 2000)
-
Annual
Review of Sociology--with 12-years of searchable abstracts
-
Sociological Abstracts
Home Page
-
The Canadian Journal of Sociology
-
Tables of Contents for all issues of Postmodern Culture
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