Not everything that can be counted, counts. And not
everything that counts can be counted.
Albert Einstein
For a long time, elite accounting
researchers could find no “empirical evidence” of widespread earnings
management. All they had to do was look up from the computers where their heads
were buried.
There is an old expression "it's close
enough for government work." Lets say a speaker says "it's close enough for
accounting work." What word describes the relationship between those two
phrases? In other words, the audience knows the original phrase and they know
the speaker, in a sense, is modifying the phase to make a point.
Glen Gray
Probably be an accountant. I like to
figure out stuff. In accounting, if you miss one number you get the whole thing
wrong. You have to be perfect --- I'm a perfectionist.
Giovani Soto (catcher for the Chicago
Cubs when asked what he'd like to be if he wasn't in professional baseball), as
quoted in an interview with Mary Burns in Sports Illustrated, June
2008
Jensen Comment
If Soto only knew that accountants are second only to economists in terms of
inaccuracies. When accountants total up the numbers on a balance sheet the total
is always accurate, but the numbers being added up can be off by 1000% or more.
Accuracy varies of course. Cash counts are highly accurate. Fixed assets, net of
depreciation, are make-pretend within limits. Intangible asset valuations are
about as accurate as ground eyesight measurements of floating cloud dimensions
on a windy day. Accountants make highly inaccurate estimates of assets,
liabilities, and equities. Then accountants change hats and chairs and add these
estimates up very accurately and pretend that the total must mean something ---
but accountants aren't sure what.
If
Soto wants accuracy perhaps he should become a baseball statistician collecting
up subjective estimates of the umpires. In the business world, accountants are
the statisticians and the umpires. Therein lies the problem. An umpire decides
what's a ball/strike, hit/foul, etc. and then leaves it up to baseball
statisticians to book the numbers. In the world of business, accountants decide
what are current versus deferred revenues, current versus capitalized costs, and
additionally make highly subjective estimates about values of such things as
forward contracts and interest rate swaps. After making their inaccurate
estimates they then put on another hat, change chairs, and record their own
estimates to the nearest penny. They're the business world's umpires and
statisticians who simply change hats and chairs and wait for the investors to
file lawsuits against them.
Brief Summary of Accounting Theory
Bob Jensen at Trinity University
Warning 1: Many of the links were broken when
the FASB changed all of its links. If a link to a FASB site does not work
, go to the new FASB link and search for the document. The FASB home page
is at http://www.fasb.org/
Warning 2: In February 2008 the FASB for
the first time allowed users free access to its "FASB Accounting Standards
Codification" database. Access will be free for at least one year, although
registration is required for free access. Much, but not all, information in
separate booklets and PDF files may now be accessed much more efficiently as
hypertext in one database. The document below has not been updated for the
Codification Database. Although the database is off to a great start, there is
much information in this document and in the FASB standards that cannot be found
in the Codification Database. You can read the following at
http://asc.fasb.org/asccontent&trid=2273304&nav_type=left_nav
Welcome to the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) Accounting Standards Codification™ (Codification).
The Codification is the result of a major four-year
project involving over 200 people from multiple entities. The Codification
structure is significantly different from the structure of existing
accounting standards. The Notice to Constituents provides information you
should read to obtain a good understanding of the Codification history,
content, structure, and future consequences.
FASB's Accounting Standards Codification ---
http://asc.fasb.org/home
FASB Master Glossary ---
http://asc.fasb.org/glossary&letter=D
**************************
Accounting
History in a Nutshell
Islamic
and Social Responsibility Accounting
XBRL: The Next Big Thing
Key
Differences Between International (IFRS) and U.S. GAAP (SFAS)
Accounting
Research Versus the Accountancy Profession
Learning
at Research Schools Versus "Teaching Schools" Versus "Happiness"
With a Side Track into Substance Abuse
Why must all accounting doctoral programs be social
science (particularly econometrics) doctoral programs?
Why accountancy doctoral programs are drying up and
why accountancy is no longer required for admission or
graduation in an accountancy doctoral program
GMAT: Paying for Points
Accounting Journal Lack of Interest in
Publishing Replications
Role of Accounting Standards in
Efficient Equity Markets
Controversies in
Setting Accounting Standards
Should "principles-based"
standards replace more detailed requirements for complex
financial contracts such as structured financing contracts and financial
instruments derivatives contracts?
Why Let the I.R.S. See What the S.E.C.
Doesn't?
Radical Changes in Financial Reporting
Underlying
Bases of Balance Sheet Valuation
The Controversy
Between OCI versus Current Earnings
Accrual Accounting and
Estimation
Controversy Over the SEC's Rule 144a
Cookie Jar Accounting and FAS 106
FIN 48 Liability if Transaction Is Later
Disallowed by the IRS
Controversy Over FAS 2 on Research and
Development (R&D)
Earnings Management, Agency Theory, and Accounting Manipulations
Goodwill
Impairment Issues
Purchase Versus Pooling: The Never
Ending Debate
Off-Balance
Sheet Financing (OBSF)
Insurance:
A Scheme for Hiding Debt That Won't Go Away
CDOs: A Scheme for Hiding Debt That Won't Go Away
Pensions
and Post-retirement benefits:
Schemes for Hiding Debt
Leases:
A Scheme for Hiding Debt That Won't Go Away
Accounting for Executory Contracts Such as
Purchase/Sale Commitments and Loan Commitments
Debt Versus Equity (including
shareholder earn-out contracts)
Time versus Money
Intangibles
and Contingencies:
Theory Disputes Focus Mainly on the Tip of the Iceberg
Intangibles: An Accounting Paradox
Intangibles: Selected References On
Accounting for Intangibles
EBR: Enhanced Business Reporting
(including non-financial information)
The Controversy Over Revenue Reporting and HFV
The
Controversy Over Employee Stock Options as Compenation
Accounting for Options to Buy
Real Estate
The Controversy over Accounting
for Securitizations and Loan Guarantees
The Controversy Over
Pro Forma Reporting
Triple-Bottom
(Social, Environmental) Reporting
The Sad State of Government Accounting and
Accountability
Which is More Value-Relevant:
Earnings or Cash Flows?
The Controversy Over Fair Value (Mark-to-Market)
Financial Reporting
Online Resources for Business
Valuations
See
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
Understanding the Issues
Issues of Auditor
Independence
Quality of Earnings, Restatements,
and Core Earnings
Sale-Leaseback Accounting Controversies
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm#SaleLeasback
Economic Theory of Accounting
Socionomics Theory
of Finance and Fraud
Facts
Based on Assumptions: The Power of Postpositive Thinking
Critical Postmodern Theory ---
http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/
Mike Kearl's great social
theory site
Bob Jensen's threads on GAAP comparisons (with
particular stress upon derivative financial
instruments accounting rules) are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/canada.htm
The above site also links to more general GAAP comparison guides between
nations.
Implications of Bad Auditing on Capital Markets
and Client's Cost of Captial
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm#IncompetentAudits
Bob Jensen's threads on corporate governance are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#Governance
Great Minds in Management: The Process of Theory
Development ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/GreatMinds.htm
"Cornell Theory Center Aids Social Science Researchers,"
PR Web, June 19, 2006 ---
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2006/6/prweb400160.htm
How Do Scholars Search? ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Searchh.htm#Scholars
Some of the many, many lawsuits settled by auditing
firms can be found at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
FREE access to ANNUAL REPORTS in XBRL ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm#TimelineXBRL
From EDGAR Online ---
http://www.tryxbrl.org/
-
You can order back issues or relevant links management and accounting
books and journals from MAAW ---
http://maaw.info/
Free Access to Back Issues of The Accounting Review ---
http://maaw.info/TheAccountingReview.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on special purpose (variable interest)
entities are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm
"Visualization of Multidimensional Data" ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/352wpVisual/000DataVisualization.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on XBRL are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm#XBRLextended
Accounting for Electronic Commerce, Including Controversies
on Business Valuation, ROI, and Revenue Reporting ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce.htm
Comparisons of International IAS Versus FASB Standards ---
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/pocketiasus.pdf
Bob Jensen's Enron Quiz (with answers) ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnronQuiz.htm
Tom Selling's blog The Accounting Onion (great on theory and practice)
---
http://accountingonion.typepad.com/
"Corporate Reports Now Searchable Via EDGAR," SmartPros, June
16, 2006 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x53502.xml
Investors and analysts can now search the full
text of every SEC document filed by companies within the last two years.
They'll also be able to retrieve mutual fund filings by fund or share
class.
The company filing search engine enables
real-time, full-text searches of filings on the entirety of the SEC's
EDGAR (Electronic Document, Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval) database
of company filings for the last two years. The tool can be found at
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm.
SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, a strong
proponent of using the Internet to post dynamic financial reports and to
serve as a tool for investors and analysts made the announcement in his
opening remarks at the SEC's Interactive Data Roundtable in Washington,
D.C.
"This new full-text search capability will give
investors and analysts instant access to the specific information they
want," said Cox.
The new mutual fund search capability was made
possible when the SEC recently required that filings contain a unique
numerical identifier for each fund and share class. Investors will be
able to find relevant filings by searching for the name of their own
fund. In the past, searching for information on particular funds and
particular share classes within funds was very difficult, because a
single prospectus might contain information about many mutual funds and
share classes.
The SEC is asking users of this Web site
feature to supply feedback, including suggestions for additional
functions, so that further improvements to the site can be considered
and implemented.
Paul Pacter has been working hard to both maintain his international
accounting site and to produce a comparison guide between international and
Chinese GAAP. He states the following on May 26, 2005 at
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
May 26, 2005: Deloitte (China) has published
a comparison of accounting standards in the People's Republic of China and
International Financial Reporting Standards as of March 2005. The comparison
is available in both English and Chinese. China has different levels of
accounting standards that apply to different classes of entities. The
comparison relates to the standards applicable to the largest companies
(including all non-financial listed and foreign-invested enterprises) and
identifies major accounting recognition and measurement differences. Click
to download:
The chronology of events leading up to European adoption if common
international accounting standards ---
http://www.iasplus.com/restruct/resteuro.htm
Large International Accounting Firm History ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Four_auditors
Tom Selling's blog The Accounting Onion (great on theory and practice)
---
http://accountingonion.typepad.com/
This is a Good Summary of Various Forms of Business Risk
--- http://www.erisk.com/portal/Resources/resources_archive.asp
-
Enterprise Risk Management
-
Credit Risk
-
Market Risk
-
Operational Risk
-
Business Risk
-
Other Types of Risk?
Accounting
History in a Nutshell
Confucius is described, by Sima Qian and other sources, as having endured
a poverty-stricken and humiliating youth and been forced, upon reaching
manhood, to undertake such petty jobs as accounting and caring for
livestock.
Early accounting was a knotty issue
South American Indian culture apparently used layers of knotted strings as a
complicated ledger.
Two Harvard University researchers believe they
have uncovered the meaning of a group of Incan khipus, cryptic assemblages
of string and knots that were used by the South American civilization for
record-keeping and perhaps even as a written language. Researchers have long
known that some knot patterns represented a specific number. Archeologist
Gary Urton and mathematician Carrie Brezine report today in the journal
Science that computer analysis of 21 khipus showed how individual strings
were combined into multilayered collections that were used as a kind of
ledger.
Thomas H. Maugh, "Researchers Think They've Got the Incas' Numbers," Los
Angeles Times, August 12, 2005 ---
http://www.latimes.com/news/science/la-sci-khipu12aug12,1,6589325.story?coll=la-news-science&ctrack=1&cset=true
Also note
http://snipurl.com/incaknots [64_233_169_104
Jensen Comment: I'm told that accounting tallies in Africa and other
parts of the world preceded written language. However, tallies alone did
not permit aggregations such as accounting for such things as three goats
plus sixty apples. Modern accounting awaited a combination of the Arabic
numbering (
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arabic_numbers ) and a common valuation
scheme for valuing heterogeneous items (e.g., gold equivalents or currency
units) such that the values of goats and apples could be aggregated. It is
intriguing that Inca knot patterns were something more than simple tallies
since patterns could depict different numbers and aggregations could
possibly be achieved with "multilayered collections."
From Texas A&M University
Accounting History Outline ---
http://acct.tamu.edu/giroux/history.html
Accounting History (across
hundreds of years)
A Change Fifty-Years in the Making, by Jennie Mitchell, Project
Accounting WED Interconnect ---
http://accounting.smwc.edu/historyacc.htm
Serious Accounting Historians May Find Some Things of Use Here
Advanced Papyrological Information System from Columbia University ---
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/projects/digital/apis/
APIS is a collections-based repository hosting
information about and images of papyrological materials (e.g. papyri,
ostraca, wood tablets, etc) located in collections around the world. It
contains physical descriptions and bibliographic information about the
papyri and other written materials, as well as digital images and English
translations of many of these texts. When possible, links are also provided
to the original language texts (e.g. through the Duke Data Bank of
Documentary Papyri). The user can move back and forth among text,
translation, bibliography, description, and image. With the
specially-developed APIS Search System many different types of complex
searches can be carried out.
APIS includes both published and unpublished
material. Generally, much more detailed information is available about the
published texts. Unpublished papyri have often not yet been fully
transcribed, and the information available is sometimes very basic. If you
need more information about a papyrus, you should contact the appropriate
person at the owning institution. (See the list of contacts under Rights &
Permissions.)
APIS is still very much a work in progress; current
statistics are shown in the sidebar at right. Other statistics are available
on the statistics page in the project documentation. Curators of collections
interested in becoming part of APIS are invited to communicate with the
project director, Traianos Gagos.
More Than a Numbers Game: A Brief History of Accounting
Author: Thomas A. King
ISBN: 0-470-00873-3
Hardcover 242 pages
September 2006
Inspired by a 1998 speech by former SEC Chairman
Arthur Levitt, this book addresses the why of accounting instead of the how,
providing practitioners and students with a highly readable history of U.S.
corporate accounting. Each chapter explores a controversial accounting topic.
Author Thomas King is treasurer of Progressive Insurance.
SmartPros Newsletter, September 25, 2006
More Than a Numbers Game: A Brief History of Accounting
Author: Thomas A. King
ISBN: 0-470-00873-3
Hardcover 242 pages
September 2006
Inspired by a 1998 speech by former SEC Chairman
Arthur Levitt, this book addresses the why of accounting instead of the how,
providing practitioners and students with a highly readable history of U.S.
corporate accounting. Each chapter explores a controversial accounting topic.
Author Thomas King is treasurer of Progressive Insurance.
SmartPros Newsletter, September 25, 2006
Jensen Comment
The Chief Accountant of the SEC under Arthur Levitt was one of my heroes named
Lynn Turner.
Let me close by citing Harry
S. Truman who said, "I never give them hell; I just tell them the truth and they
think its hell!"
Great Speeches About the State of Accountancy
"20th Century Myths," by Lynn Turner when he was still Chief Accountant at the
SEC in 1999 ---
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch323.htm
It is
interesting to listen to people ask for simple, less complex
standards like in "the good old days." But I never hear them ask for
business to be like "the good old days," with smokestacks rather
than high technology, Glass-Steagall rather than Gramm-Leach, and
plain vanilla interest rate deals rather than swaps, collars, and
Tigers!! The bottom line is—things have changed. And so have people.
Today, we have enormous pressure on CEO’s and
CFO’s. It used to be that CEO’s would be in their positions for an
average of more than ten years. Today, the average is 3 to 4 years.
And Financial Executive Institute surveys show that the CEO and CFO
changes are often linked.
In such an environment, we in the auditing
and preparer community have created what I consider to be a
two-headed monster. The first head of this monster is what I call
the "show me" face. First, it is not uncommon to hear one say, "show
me where it says in an accounting book that I can’t do this?" This
approach to financial reporting unfortunately necessitates the level
of detail currently being developed by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board ("FASB"), the Emerging Issues Task Force, and the
AICPA’s Accounting Standards Executive Committee. Maybe this isn’t a
recent phenomenon. In 1961, Leonard Spacek, then managing partner at
Arthur Andersen, explained the motivation for less specificity in
accounting standards when he stated that "most industry
representatives and public accountants want what they call
‘flexibility’ in accounting principles. That term is never clearly
defined; but what is wanted is ‘flexibility’ that permits greater
latitude to both industry and accountants to do as they please." But
Mr. Spacek was not a defender of those who wanted to "do as they
please." He went on to say, "Public accountants are constantly
required to make a choice between obtaining or retaining a client
and standing firm for accounting principles. Where the choice
requires accepting a practice which will produce results that are
erroneous by a relatively material amount, we must decline the
engagement even though there is precedent for the practice desired
by the client."
We create the second head of our monster
when we ask for standards that absolutely do not reflect the
underlying economics of transactions. I offer two prime examples.
Leasing is first. We have accounting literature put out by the FASB
with follow-on interpretative guidance by the accounting
firms—hundreds of pages of lease accounting guidance that, I will be
the first to admit, is complex and difficult to decipher. But it is
due principally to people not being willing to call a horse a horse,
and a lease what it really is—a financing. The second example is
Statement 133 on derivatives. Some people absolutely howl about its
complexity. And yet we know that: (1) people were not complying with
the intent of the simpler Statements 52 and 80, and (2) despite the
fact that we manage risk in business by managing values rather than
notional amounts, people want to account only for notional amounts.
As a result, we ended up with a compromise position in Statement
133. To its credit, Statement 133 does advance the quality of
financial reporting. For that, I commend the FASB. But I believe
that we could have possibly achieved more, in a less complex
fashion, if people would have agreed to a standard that truly
reflects the underlying economics of the transactions in an unbiased
and representationally faithful fashion.
I certainly hope that we can find a way to
do just that with standards we develop in the future, both in the
U.S. and internationally. It will require a change in how we
approach standard setting and in how we apply those standards. It
will require a mantra based on the fact that transparent, high
quality financial reporting is what makes our capital markets the
most efficient, liquid, and deep in the world. |
In her notes compiled in 1979, Professor Linda
Plunkett of the College of Charleston S.C., calls accounting the "oldest
profession"; in fact, since prehistoric times families had to account for
food and clothing to face the cold seasons. Later, as man began to trade, we
established the concept of value and developed a monetary system. Evidence of
accounting records can be found in the Babylonian Empire (4500 B.C.), in
pharaohs' Egypt and in the Code of Hammurabi (2250 B.C.). Eventually, with the
advent of taxation, record keeping became a necessity for governments to sustain
social orders.
James deSantis, A BRIEF HISTORY OF ACCOUNTING: FROM PREHISTORY TO
THE INFORMATION AGE ---
http://www.ftlcomm.com/ensign/historyAcc/ResearchPaperFin.htm
Origins of Double Entry Accounting are Unknown
- 1300s A.D. crusades opened the Middle East and
Mediterranean trade routes
- Venice and Genoa became venture trading centers
for commerce
- 1296 A.D. Fini Ledgers in Florence
- 1340 City of Massri Treasurers Accounts are in
Double Entry form.
- 1494 Luca Pacioli's Summa de Arithmetica
Geometria Proportionalita (A Review of Arithmetic, Geometry and Proportions)
Recall that double entry bookkeeping supposedly evolved
in Italy long before it was put into algebraic form in the book Summa by
Luca Pacioli
. As a result the English term "Debit" really has a Latin origin.
You can read the following at
http://www.wikiverse.org/debit
**************
Debit is an accounting and bookkeeping term that comes from the Latin word
debere which means "to owe." The opposite of a debit is a credit. Debit is
abbreviated Dr while credit is abbreviated Cr.
**************
December 13, 2005 message from Robert Bowers
[M.Robert.Bowers@WHARTON.UPENN.EDU]
In the 14th Century, the Phoenicians sent trading
ships to Cathay (China) to trade for silk. Problem was, if a ship sank, the
merchant prob sank (bankrupt) with it. So the merchants pooled their
resources so if a ship sank no one merchant lost everything. Along with
this, an Italian Count named Paole (seriously) set up a system of
recordkeeping to keep track of the ventures. In this system, he created two
registers, a Debit Register (DR), and a Credit Register (CR)
I'll bet 95% of all CPA's don't know that which
makes me .... a trivia freak?
December 16, 2005 message from Robert B Walker
[walkerrb@ACTRIX.CO.NZ]
Luca Pacioli did not invent double entry
book-keeping. The rudiments of double entry book-keeping (DEBK) can be found
in Muslim government administration in the 10th Century. (See Book-keeping
and Accounting Systems in a tenth Century Muslim Administrative Office by
Hamid, Craig & Clark in Accounting, Business & Financial History Vol 3 No 5
1995).
As I understand it Pacioli saw the technique being
used by Arab traders and adapted and codified the technique allowing it to
spread to Northern Europe where it became a* key component in Western
economic dominance in the last 500 years.
This is logical if you think about it. DEBK is the
greatest expression of applied algebra – that Arab word betraying the origin
of the particular mathematical technique in which the world’s duality is
reflected.
RW
* but not the key component as Werner Sombart would
have it. But then his reason for wanting that to be was his extreme anti-semitism
… but that is another story.
December 13, 2005 reply from Earl Hall
[earl@PERSPLAN.COM]
From thefreedictionary.com
DR = Debit [Middle English debite, from Latin
dbitum, debt; see debt.]
CR=Credit [French, from Old French, from Old
Italian credito, from Latin crditum, loan, from neuter past participle of
crdere, to entrust; see kerd- in Indo-European roots.]
Who am I to argue with a free dictionary? The
answer is worth what I paid.
Accountancy and the da Vinci Code
April 12, 2007 message from Barry Rice
[brice@LOYOLA.EDU]
From the April 11 Brisbane Times:
Forgotten magic manual contains original da Vinci
code
AFTER lying almost untouched in the vaults of an Italian university for 500
years, a book on the magic arts written by Leonardo da Vinci's best friend
and teacher has been translated into English for the first time.
The world's oldest magic text, De viribus
quantitatis (On the Powers of Numbers), was penned by Luca Pacioli, a
Franciscan monk who shared lodgings with da Vinci.
Continued at
http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/articles/2007/04/10/1175971101054.html
.
E. Barry Rice, MBA, CPA
Director, Instructional Services
Emeritus Accounting Professor
Loyola College in Maryland
BRice@Loyola.edu
410-617-2478
www.barryrice.com
Facebook me!
http://www.facebook.com/p/Barry_Rice/20102311
The following is a controversial quotation from
http://www.cbs.dk/staff/hkacc/BOOK-ART.doc
"The power of double-entry bookkeeping has been
praised by many notable authors throughout history. In Wilhelm Meister, Goethe
states, "What advantage does he derive from the system of bookkeeping by
double-entry! It is among the finest inventions of the human mind"...
Werner Sombart, a German economic historian, says, "... double-entry
bookkeeping is borne of the same spirit as the system of Galileo and
Newton" and "Capitalism without double-entry bookkeeping is simply
inconceivable. They hold together as form and matter. And one may indeed doubt
whether capitalism has procured in double-entry bookkeeping a tool which
activates its forces, or whether double-entry bookkeeping has first given rise
to capitalism out of its own (rational and systematic) spirit".
If, for a moment, one considers the credibility
crisis of practical accounting, it would be quite impossible to dismiss the
following paradox: the conflict between the enthusiastic praise of the
system's strength on the one hand, and on the other, the many financial
failures in the real world. How can such a powerful system, even when applied
meticulously, still result in disasters? Although it is hardly necessary to
argue more in favour of double-entry book-keeping, I still want to underline
the two qualities of the system which I find are valid explanations of the
system's very important and world-wide role in financial development for five
centuries.
The Logic of Double-Entry Bookkeeping, by Henning
Kirkegaard
Department of Financial & Management Accounting
Copenhagen Business School
Howitzvej 60
Along this same double-entry thread I might mention my mentor at Stanford.
Nobody I know holds the mathematical wonderment of double-entry and historical
cost accounting more in awe than Yuji Ijiri. For example, see Theory of
Accounting Measurement, by Yuji Ijiri (Sarasota: American Accounting
Association Studies in Accounting Research No. 10, 1975).
Dr.
Ijirii also extended the concept to triple-entry bookkeeping in (Sarasota:
Triple-Entry Bookkeeping and Income Momentum
American Accounting Association Studies in Accounting Research No. 18, 1982).
http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aaa/market/studar.htm tm
Also see the following:
Brush up your Shakespeare:
Medieval manuscripts to hit Internet
Stanford University
Libraries, the University of Cambridge and
Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, will make
hundreds of medieval manuscripts, dating
from the sixth through the 16th centuries,
accessible on the Internet.
"Medieval manuscripts to hit Internet,"
Stanford Report, July 13, 2005 ---
http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2005/july13/parker-071305.html
A summary of the medieval times and
literature is available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medieval
Brush up your Shakespeare:
Medieval manuscripts to hit Internet
Stanford University
Libraries, the University of Cambridge and
Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, will make
hundreds of medieval manuscripts, dating
from the sixth through the 16th centuries,
accessible on the Internet.
"Medieval manuscripts to hit Internet,"
Stanford Report, July 13, 2005 ---
http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2005/july13/parker-071305.html
A summary of the medieval times and
literature is available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medieval
May 28, 2005 reply from Barbara Scofield
[scofield@GSM.UDALLAS.EDU]
Thank you for the notice about the availability of
the medieval manuscripts on the Internet through the project Parker on the
Web at Stanford University. Two manuscripts are currently available, and on
page 11 of the English translation of Matthew Paris's "English History From
1235 to 1273" I have already found references to accounting (see below).
Accountants are still using the principle "under
whatever name it may be called" and entities are still making up new names
for inconvenient economic events in the hopes of avoiding full disclosure.
At this Catholic liberal arts university
Shakespeare is modern, and the medieval world is revered, so I'm interested
in gaining some insight into the medieval worldview.
Barbara W. Scofield, PhD, CPA
Associate Professor of Accounting
University of Dallas
1845 E. Northgate Irving, TX 75062
Braniff 262
scofield@gsm.udallas.edu
Ancient Finance from Harvard Business School
From Jim Mahar's blog on May 17, 2006 ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
The
HBS
Working Knowledge site has an interesting
article by William Goetzmann on
financial instruments back in the time of the Romans and Greeks.
For instance on checks:
...bankers'
checks written in Greek on papyri appeared in ancient Egypt as far
back as 250 B.C. Papyri preserved well in Egypt thanks to its arid
climate, but Goetzmann thinks it's safe to say such checks changed
hands throughout the Mediterranean world . . . So the whole
tradition of bank checks predates the current era and has its roots
at least in Hellenistic Greek times," he says.
Going Concern and Accrual Accounting Evolved in
the 1500s
- Venture accounting over the life of a venture with
interim statements evolved in The Netherlands
- 1673 Code of Commerce in France requires biannual
balance sheet reporting
- Charge and Discharge Agency Responsibility and
Stewardship Accounting in English trust accounting
Limited liability Corporations (divorced
professional management from ownership shares)
- 1555 A.D. Russia Company
- 1600 A.D. East India Company
- 1670 A.D. Hudson's Bay Company
- England's Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844
required depreciation accounting for railroads, mining, and manufacturing (although the
concept of depreciation dates back to Roman times).
Speculation Fever
Fraud and corruption festered and grew with the trading of joint stock, especially after
1600 A.D. The South Seas Company scandal (reporting stock sales as income and paying
dividends out of capital) led to England's Bubble Act in 1720 A.D. that focused on
misleading accounting practices that helped managers rip off investors, especially by
crediting stock sales to income.
One of the earliest and probably the most famous accounting and
investment scandal was the South Sea Bubble in 1720
From the Harvard University Business School
Sunk in Lucre's Sordid Charms: South Sea Bubble Resources in the Kress
Collection at Baker Library ---
http://www.library.hbs.edu/hc/ssb/
Free online textbooks, cases, and tutorials in accounting, finance,
economics, and statistics ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ElectronicLiterature.htm#Textbooks
Laissez-Faire Accounting survived endless debates
and scandals until the Great Depression in 1933
- Much of the debate focused on capital maintenance
(e.g., failure to charge off depreciation and failure to provide for replacement of
operating assets), but governments did not legally impose auditing requirements and
serious GAAP until the U.S. securities laws in the early 1930s. Accountants were
vocal in reform movements, but governments were slow to react with legislation and courts
failed to establish consistent GAAP.
- Creation of the SEC in an effort to regain public
trust in financial reporting and equity investing.
- Many firms did have independent audits and
conformed to the best GAAP traditions of the day (thereby giving
some evidence that Agency Theory works sometimes.) Agency theory
hypothesizes that it is in the best interest of management to contract for protection of
investors and avoid scandalous asymmetries of information.
After 1933, the AICPA and the SEC seriously
attempted to generate accounting standards, enforce accounting standards, and provide
academic justification for promulgated standards.
- ASRs of the SEC
- In a 3-2 vote the SEC followed George O. May's
efforts to mandate external audits of securities traded across state lines in the U.S.
- 1939-1959 A.D.: Accounting standards were
generated by the AICPA's Committee on Accounting Procedure (CAP) that issued Accounting
Research Bulletins (51 ARBs) --- but the tendency was to overlook controversial issues
such as off-balance sheet financing, public disclosure of management forecasts,
price-level accounting, current cost accounting, and exit value accounting.
Controversial items avoided by the CAP included management compensation accounting,
pension accounting, post-employment benefits accounting, and off balance sheet financing
(OBSF). The CAP did very little to restrain diversity of reporting.
- 1960-1972 A.D.: Accounting standards in the
U.S. were generated by the AICPA's Accounting Principles Board (APB) that had more members
than the CAP and a mandate to attack more controversial reporting issues. The APB
attacked some controversial issues but often failed to resolve their own disputes on such
issues as pooling versus purchase accounting for mergers.
- 1972-???? A.D. Accounting standards in the
U.S. were, and still are, being generated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) that has seven members, including required members from industry, academe, and
financial analysts in addition to members from public accountancy. FASB members must
divorce themselves from previous income ties and work full time for the FASB. The
formation of the FASB was a desperation move by CPA's to stave off threatened takeover of
accounting standards by the Federal Government (there were the Moss and Metcalf bills to
do just that under pending legislation in the U.S. House and Senate). Unlike the CAP
and APB, the FASB has a full-time research staff and has issued highly controversial
standards forcing firms to abide by pension accounting rules, capitalization of many
leases, and booking of many previous OBSF items (capital leases, pensions, post-employment
benefits, income tax accounting, derivative financial instruments, pooling accounting,
etc.). The road has been long and hard on some other issues where attempts to issue
new standards (e.g., expensing of dry holes in oil and gas accounting and booking of
employee stock options) have been thwarted by highly-publicized political pressuring by
corporations.
History of the U.S.
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and earlier
accounting standard setting in the United States ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AccountingHistory
July 16, 2008 message from Brady, Joseph
[bradyj@LERNER.UDEL.EDU]
I recommend the book “More than a numbers game – a
brief history of accounting”, by Thomas A. King. Mr. King traces the
development of our accounting standards, from the railroad accounting era
through Enron. King describes the major accounting controversies in each
era. The reader gains an understanding of the differing points of view –
academic, management, enforcement, public accountants, internal accountants.
King writes clearly and is a good story teller, so the pace of the book is
fast.
I used the book in a senior level accounting
systems course last semester, covering all 15 chapters in 3 weeks. It would
be possible to go somewhat faster by jettisoning some chapters, without loss
of continuity. I am sure that all my 80 students learned from the book, and
most said they enjoyed learning some of the profession’s history. I liked it
because it allowed me to challenge students to think about what the nature
of our reporting system and of that system’s limitations. In their four
years, our students learn a lot of techniques and rules; the book puts these
into context and I liked the book for that reason, too.
Mr. King began his career in public accounting. He
is now Treasurer of Progressive Insurance.
Joe Brady
Accounting & MIS
Lerner College of Business & Economics
University of Delaware
In 1973 the International
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) was formed and evolved into the
International Accounting Standards Board IASC) in 1981.
A Timeline of development can be found
at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds
History
of the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) ---
http://www.iasb.org/About+Us/About+the+Foundation/History.htm
A more complete commentary on the history of the IASC and IASB by Paul Pacter
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/pacter.htm#001
lso see
http://static.managementboek.nl/pdf/9780471726883.pdf
Some of the many, many lawsuits settled by auditing
firms can be found at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
Wow Online Accounting History
Book (Free)
Thank you David A.R. Forrester for providing a great, full-length, and online book:
An Invitation to Accounting History --- http://accfinweb.account.strath.ac.uk/df/contents.html
Note especially Section B2 --- "Rational Administration, Finance And Control
Accounting: the Experience of Cameralism" --- http://accfinweb.account.strath.ac.uk/df/b2.html
Accounting history lecture worth noting --- http://newman.baruch.cuny.edu/digital/saxe/saxe_1978/baxter_79.htm
The for-free IASC comparison study of IAS 39 versus FAS 133 (by Paul
Pacter) at http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm
The non-free FASB comparison study of all standards entitled The IASC-U.S.
Comparison Project: A Report on the Similarities and Differences between IASC
Standards and U.S. GAAP
SECOND EDITION, (October 1999) at
http://stores.yahoo.com/fasbpubs/publications.html
In 1999 the Joint Working Group of the Banking
Associations sharply rebuffed the IAS 39 fair value accounting in two white
papers that can be downloaded from http://www.iasc.org.uk/frame/cen3_112.htm.
Also see the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
and the International Federation of Accountants Committee (IFAC).
Side by Side: IAS 39 Compared with FASB Standards (FAS 133), by Paul Pacter,
as published in Accountancy International Magazine, June 1999 ---
http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm
Also note "Comparisons of International IAS Versus FASB Standards" ---
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/pocketiasus.pdf
October 21, 2005 message from Scott Bonacker
[lister@BONACKERS.COM]
I remember a thread or two asking for information
on historical figures or accounting heros or something like that. I couldn't
come up with the right key words to find it by searching the archives
unfortunately.
When I saw this article, I thought this was someone that should be included:
"Mary T. Washington of Chicago stepped bravely beyond race and gender
boundaries in 1943, becoming the first black female certified public
accountant in the United States. Washington, 99 years old when she died in
late July, first opened an accounting practice for African-American clients
in her basement while working on her college degree.
Washington lived and led in a world not yet here, creating what her business
partner later called an "underground railroad" for aspiring black CPAs.
...."
Read the rest at:
http://www.sojo.net/index.cfm?action=magazine.article&issue=soj0511&article=051149
October 21, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Scott,
Although there are probably various interesting sites such as those you
mentioned, there are several sites that are of particular interest with
respect to famous accounting practitioners and academics.
The OSU Accounting Hall of Fame
It should be noted that members elected to this Hall of Fame include famous
accountants from around the world ---
http://fisher.osu.edu/acctmis/hall/
U.K. Accounting Hall of Fame
Professors David Otley and Ken Peasnell of the Department of Accounting and
Finance are two of the fourteen founding members of the British Accounting
Association’s Hall of Fame. The ceremony took place at the British
Accounting Association 2004 Annual conference at York in April 2004 ---
http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/news/3806/
Michigan State Video Archive
I've not yet seen anything about other accounting Hall of Fame sites.
Michigan State University has a video archive of famous accountants. These
accountants were invited to campus and then taped live. I don't think any of
this footage is available online, but it would be a nice thing to do now
that digitization hardware is so inexpensive. Don Edwards (U. of Georgia)
probably knows more about these videos than anybody else.
A few accountants who became famous in fields other than accounting are
listed at
http://www.educationwithattitude.com/catch/accounting.asp
The above site missed my favorite accounting celebrity John Cleese
The Unofficial Monty Python Website ---
http://www.educationwithattitude.com/catch/accounting.asp
Note especially The Accountancy Shanty (audio) at
http://www.educationwithattitude.com/catch/accounting.asp
Bob Jensen
October 23, 2005 reply from Tom Sentman
[TSentman@MSN.COM]
Here is a historical figure for consideration.
While not a CPA, Luca Pacioli is considered to be the father of accounting.
Although he did not invent dual-entry accounting, he described the system as
we know it today. I always use this question on my tests.
Visit
http://acct.tamu.edu/smith/ethics/pacioli.htm
for more.
Cheers,
Tom Sentman
Question
How does accounting for time differ from accounting for money?
Remember those Taylor
and
Gilbreth time and motion studies in cost accounting.
How has time accounting changed in the workplace (or should change)?
The link below was forwarded by Gregory Morrison at Trinity University
Studies have shown the alarming extent of the
problem: office workers are no longer able to stay focused on one specific task
for more than about three minutes, which means a great loss of productivity. The
misguided notion that time is money actually costs us money.
"Time Out of Mind," by Stefan Klein, The New York Times, March 7,
2008 ---
Click Here
In 1784, Benjamin Franklin composed a satire,
“Essay on Daylight Saving,” proposing a law that would oblige Parisians to
get up an hour earlier in summer. By putting the daylight to better use, he
reasoned, they’d save a good deal of money — 96 million livres tournois —
that might otherwise go to buying candles. Now this switch to daylight
saving time (which occurs early Sunday in the United States) is an annual
ritual in Western countries.
Even more influential has been something else
Franklin said about time in the same year: time is money. He meant this only
as a gentle reminder not to “sit idle” for half the day. He might be
dismayed if he could see how literally, and self-destructively, we take his
metaphor today. Our society is obsessed as never before with making every
single minute count. People even apply the language of banking: We speak of
“having” and “saving” and “investing” and “wasting” it.
But the quest to spend time the way we do money is
doomed to failure, because the time we experience bears little relation to
time as read on a clock. The brain creates its own time, and it is this
inner time, not clock time, that guides our actions. In the space of an
hour, we can accomplish a great deal — or very little.
Inner time is linked to activity. When we do
nothing, and nothing happens around us, we’re unable to track time. In 1962,
Michel Siffre, a French geologist, confined himself in a dark cave and
discovered that he lost his sense of time. Emerging after what he had
calculated were 45 days, he was startled to find that a full 61 days had
elapsed.
To measure time, the brain uses circuits that are
designed to monitor physical movement. Neuroscientists have observed this
phenomenon using computer-assisted functional magnetic resonance imaging
tomography. When subjects are asked to indicate the time it takes to view a
series of pictures, heightened activity is measured in the centers that
control muscular movement, primarily the cerebellum, the basal ganglia and
the supplementary motor area. That explains why inner time can run faster or
slower depending upon how we move our bodies — as any Tai Chi master knows.
Time seems to expand when our senses are aroused.
Peter Tse, a neuropsychologist at Dartmouth, demonstrated this in an
experiment in which subjects were shown a sequence of flashing dots on a
computer screen. The dots were timed to occur once a second, with five black
dots in a row followed by one moving, colored one. Because the colored dot
appeared so infrequently, it grabbed subjects’ attention and they perceived
it as lasting twice as long as the others did.
Another ingenious bit of research, conducted in
Germany, demonstrated that within a brief time frame the brain can shift
events forward or backward. Subjects were asked to play a video game that
involved steering airplanes, but the joystick was programmed to react only
after a brief delay. After playing a while, the players stopped being aware
of the time lag. But when the scientists eliminated the delay, the subjects
suddenly felt as though they were staring into the future. It was as though
the airplanes were moving on their own before the subjects had directed them
to do so.
The brain’s inclination to distort time is one
reason we so often feel we have too little of it. One in three Americans
feels rushed all the time, according to one survey. Even the cleverest use
of time-management techniques is powerless to augment the sum of minutes in
our life (some 52 million, optimistically assuming a life expectancy of 100
years), so we squeeze as much as we can into each one.
Believing time is money to lose, we perceive our
shortage of time as stressful. Thus, our fight-or-flight instinct is
engaged, and the regions of the brain we use to calmly and sensibly plan our
time get switched off. We become fidgety, erratic and rash.
Tasks take longer. We make mistakes — which take
still more time to iron out. Who among us has not been locked out of an
apartment or lost a wallet when in a great hurry? The perceived lack of time
becomes real: We are not stressed because we have no time, but rather, we
have no time because we are stressed.
Studies have shown the alarming extent of the
problem: office workers are no longer able to stay focused on one specific
task for more than about three minutes, which means a great loss of
productivity. The misguided notion that time is money actually costs us
money.
And it costs us time. People in industrial nations
lose more years from disability and premature death due to stress-related
illnesses like heart disease and depression than from other ailments. In
scrambling to use time to the hilt, we wind up with less of it.
Continued in article
March 12, 2008 reply from David Albrecht
[albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]
For those who don't remember these time and motion
studies (about 100 years ago), here is a summary:
http://www.netmba.com/mgmt/scientific/
Pondering your question, I keep coming back to a
humorous story I read in Reader's Digest years ago. A person's car breaks
down and a mechanic with a fine reputation is summoned. The mechanic looks
over the engine, pulls out a screwdriver, and in about three seconds
tightens a screw. The mechanic then hands the driver a bill for several
hundred dollars. The driver complains about paying so much for so little of
the mechanic's time. The mechanic replies that the itemization was $0.10
for the act of tightening the screw, and hundreds of dollars for knowing
what to tighten.
At this time I refrain from saying much about the Empire Club and it's
ability to charge thousands of dollars per hour for the time of its models.
I'm wondering if Governor Spitzer maintained personal financials according
to GAAP, would he have reported his time involvement with Empire Club as a
contingent liability.
Bob, you're retired and on pension, I'm still employed and getting paid.
The time you spend surfing, writing and sharing on AECM is unrecompensed,
but mine is not. Yet, you provide much more value to AECM than I.
David Albrecht
How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, & Co. Transformed the Intellectual Life of
the United States
"French Theory," by Scott McLemee, Inside Higher Ed, April 17, 2008 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2008/04/16/mclemee
Last week, while rushing to finish up a review of
Francois Cusset’s French Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, & Co.
Transformed the Intellectual Life of the United States (University of
Minnesota Press), I heard that Stanley Fish had just published a
column about the book for The New York Times.
Of course the only sensible thing to do was to ignore this development
entirely. The last thing you need when coming to the end of a piece of work
is to go off and do some more reading. The inner voice suggesting
that is procrastination disguised as conscientiousness. Better, sometimes,
to trust your own candlepower — however little wax and wick you may have
left.
Once my own cogitations were complete (the piece
will run in the next issue of Bookforum), of course, I took a look at the
Times Web site. By then, Fish’s column had drawn literally hundreds of
comments. This must warm some hearts in Minnesota. Any publicity is good
publicity as long as they spell your name right — so this must count as
great publicity, especially since French Theory itself won’t actually be
available until next month.
But in other ways it is unfortunate. Fish and his
interlocutors reduce Cusset’s rich, subtle, and paradox-minded book (now
arriving in translation) into one more tale of how tenured pseudoradicalism
rose to power in the United States. Of course there is always an audience
for that sort of thing. And it is true that Cusset – who teaches
intellectual history at the Institute d’Etudes Politiques and at Reid
Hall/Columbia University, in Paris – devotes some portions of the book to
explaining American controversies to his French readers. But that is only
one aspect of the story, and by no means the most interesting or rewarding.
When originally published five years ago, the cover
of Cusset’s book bore the slightly strange words French Theory. That the
title of a French book was in English is not so much lost in translation as
short-circuited by it. The bit of Anglicism is very much to the point: this
is a book about the process of cultural transmission, distortion, and
return. The group of thinkers bearing the (American) brand name “French
Theory” would not be recognized at home as engaged in a shared project, or
even forming a cohesive group. Nor were they so central to cultural and
political debate there, at least after the mid-1970s, as they were to become
for academics in the United States. So the very existence of a phenomenon
that could be called “French Theory” has to be explained.
To put it another way: the very category of “French
Theory” itself is socially constructed. Explaining how that construction
came to pass is Cusset’s project. He looks at the process as it unfolded at
various levels of academic culture: via translations and anthologies, in
certain disciplines, with particular sponsors, and so on. Along the way, he
recounts the American debates over postmodernism, poststructuralism, and
whatnot. But those disputes are part of his story, not the point of it.
While offering an outsider’s perspective on our interminable culture wars,
it is more than just a chronicle of them..
Instead, it would be much more fitting to say that
French Theory is an investigation of the workings of what C. Wright Mills
called the “cultural apparatus.” This term, as Mills defined it some 50
years ago, subsumes all the institutions and forms of communication through
which “learning, entertainment, malarky, and information are produced and
distributed ... the medium by which [people] interpret and report what they
see.” The academic world is part of this “apparatus,” but the scope of the
concept is much broader; it also includes the arts and letters, as well as
the media, both mass and niche.
The inspiration for Cusset’s approach comes from
the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, rather than Mills, his distant
intellectual cousin from Texas. Even so, the book is in some sense more
Millsian in spirit than the author himself may realize. Bourdieu preferred
to analyze the culture by breaking it up into numerous distinct “fields” –
with each scholarly discipline, art form, etc. constituting a separate
sub-sector, following more or less its own set of rules. By contrast, Cusset,
like Mills, is concerned with how the different parts of American culture
intersect and reinforce one another, even while remaining distinct. (I
didn’t say any of this in my review, alas. Sometimes the best ideas come as
afterthoughts.)
The boilerplate account of how poststructuralism
came to the United States usually begins with visit of Lacan, Derrida, and
company to Johns Hopkins University for a conference in 1966 – then never
really imagines any of their ideas leaving campus. By contrast, French
Theory pays attention to how their work connected up with artists,
musicians, writers, and sundry denizens of various countercultures. Cusset
notes the affinity of “pioneers of the technological revolution” for certain
concepts from the pomo toolkit: “Many among them, whether marginal academics
or self-taught technicians, read Deleuze and Guattari for their logic of
‘flows’ and their expanded definition of ‘machine,’ and they studied Paul
Virilio for his theory of speed and his essays on the self-destruction of
technical society, and they even looked at Baudrillard’s work, in spite of
his legendary technological incompetence.”
And a particularly sharp-eyed chapter titled
“Students and Users” offers an analysis of how adopting a theoretical
affiliation can serve as a phase in the psychodrama of late adolescence (a
phase of life with no clearly marked termination point, now). To become
Deleuzian or Foucauldian, or what have you, is not necessarily a step along
the way to the tenure track. It can also serve as “an alternative to the
conventional world of career-oriented choices and the pursuit of top grades;
it arms the student, affectively and conceptually, against the prospect of
alienation that looms at graduation under the cold and abstract notions of
professional ambition and the job market....This relationship with knowledge
is not unlike Foucault’s definition of curiosity: ‘not the curiosity that
seeks to assimilate what it is proper for one to know, but that which
enables one to get free of oneself’....”
Much of this will be news, not just to Cusset’s
original audience in France, but to readers here as well. There is more to
the book than another account of pseudo-subversive relativism and neocon
hyperventilation. In other words, French Theory is not just another Fish
story. It deserves a hearing — even, and perhaps especially, from people who
have already made up their minds about “deconstructionism,” whatever that
may be.
You can read more about Michael Foucault at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michel_Foucault
You can read about post-structuralism at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-structuralism
You can read about post-modernism at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Postmodernism
Jensen Comment
It's pretty difficult to trace these French theories to accounting research and
scholarship, but the leading accounting professor trying to do so is probably my
former doctoral student Ed Arrington who even moved to Europe for a while to
carry on his studies in these theories ---
http://www.uncg.edu/bae/acc/accfacul.htm#arrington
A Google search turns up some of his publications in this area as they relate
to accounting, economics, and business. His publications also branch off into
other areas since Ed has wide ranging interests and is an excellent speaker as
well as a researcher and writer. His thesis was an application of the Analytic
Hierarchy Process in decision modelling, but he's expanded well beyond that
since he got his PhD.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic_Hierarchy_Process
For years my interests and publications were in AHP, although in latter years I
was mostly critical of Saaty's precious and arbitrary eigenvector mathematical
scaling (but I was not critical of Ed's thesis).
See Accounting History Publications list 1998 ---
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3933/is_199905/ai_n8843886
A substantial listing of history papers is available from the Institute of
Chartered Accountants ---
http://www.icaew.co.uk/library/index.cfm?AUB=TB2I_27022
Accounting Historians Journal ---
http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aah/
The University of Sydney's Accounting Foundation provides some accounting
history publications ---
http://www.econ.usyd.edu.au/af /
History of Information Technology in Auditing (EDP Auditing) ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_information_technology_auditing
For additional information on the history of accountancy and the accountancy
profession see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accounting
Islamic and Social Responsibility Accounting
Islamic Accounting ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_accounting
The Islamic Accounting Web ---
http://www.iiu.edu.my/iaw/
The Differences of Conventional and Islamic Accounting ---
Click Here
"Islamic Accounting: Challenges, Opportunities and Terror,"
AccountingWeb, October 5, 2006 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102651
Recent events, from the start of Ramadan, to the
Pope’s controversial remarks about Islam, to the discovery of a new tape by
two of the September 11 attackers, to the release of Bob Woodward’s latest
book, have once more made Islam a topic of conversation. Beyond the
headlines, however, exists a complex religious and social system that
affects far more people than just Muslims. Islamic finance, particularly
Islamic banking, insurance and accounting, is playing a growing role around
the globe, especially in the business world.
Islamic accounting is generally defined as an alternative accounting system
which aims to provide users with information enabling them to operate
businesses and organizations according to Shariah, or Islamic law. With
little doubt, the greatest challenges to Islamic accounting and finance in
the United States stem from a lack of knowledge and understanding of Islam
and the intricacies of its financial laws and concerns regarding terrorism,
combined with the U.S. regulatory framework and guiding principles of
American business. The Muslim and Islamic financial markets within the U.S.
and around the world, currently represent an enormous opportunity for those
willing to overcome these challenges.
Islam & Islamic Financial Laws
“To professional accountants who have been
brought-up on the idea of accounting as an ‘objective’, technical and
value-free discipline, the idea of attaching a religious adjective to
accounting may seem embarrassing, unprofessional and even dangerous,” Dr.
Shahul Hameed bin Mohamed Ibrahim says in Islamic Accounting – A Primer.
Both conventional and Islamic accounting provide
information and define how that information is measured, valued, recorded
and communicated. Conventional accounting provides information about
economic events and transactions, measuring resources in terms of assets and
liabilities, and communicating that information through financial statements
users, typically investors, rely on to make decisions regarding their
investments. Islamic accounting, however, identifies socio-economic events
and transactions measured in both financial and non-financial terms and the
information is used to ensure Islamic organizations of all types adhere to
Shariah and achieve the socio-economic objectives promoted by Islam. This is
not to say, or imply, Islamic accounting is not concerned with money, rather
it is not concerned only with money.
Islamic accounting, in many ways, is more holistic.
Shariah prohibits interest-based income or usury and also gambling, so part
of what Islamic accounting does is help ensure companies do not harm others
while making money and achieve an equitable allocation and distribution of
wealth, not just among shareholders of a specific corporation but also among
society in general. Of course, as with conventional accounting, this is not
always achieved in practice, as an examination of the wide variances in
wealth among the populations of Arab nations, particularly those with
majority Muslim populations shows.
In addition, because a significant part of
operating within Shariah means delivering on Islam’s socio-economic
objectives, Islamic organizations have far wider interests and engage in
more diverse activities than their non-Islamic counterparts.
Concerns About Terrorism
The diverse activities and interests organizations
pursue under Shariah is a cause for concern when applying conventional
accounting to Islamic organizations. After all, conventional accounting can
be used to disguise unethical and even illegal activities within the very
organizations they were intended to provide information about. Imagine how
easy it is to overlook or just not identify such information when employing
an accounting system not designed for use with the type of organization it
is being applied to.
In the past, the issues raised by this mismatch
focused on the ability of users beyond the Muslim world to make appropriate
decisions regarding investments. Since September 11, 2001, however, the
concern has changed from the potential loss of investment to the possibility
of supporting terrorism.
This concern is particularly significant for
non-profit organizations involved in providing humanitarian relief outside
the U.S.. Fortunately, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (DoT) has issued
updated Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for
U.S.-based Charities (Guidelines).
“The abuse of charities by terrorist organizations
is a serious and urgent matter, and the Guidelines reinforce the need
for the U.S. Government and the charitable sector alike, to keep this
challenge at the forefront of our complementary efforts,” Pat O’Brien,
Assistant Secretary for the Treasury’s Office of Terrorist Financing and
Financial Crime, said in a statement announcing the updated guidelines. The
Treasury Department is committed to protecting and enabling legitimate and
vital charity worldwide, and will continue to work with the sector to
advance our mutual goals.”
The Guidelines urge charities to take a
proactive, risk-based approach to protecting against illicit abuse and are
intended to be applied by those charities vulnerable to such abuse, in a
manner commensurate with the risks they face and the resources with which
they work. At the request of the charitable sector, the Guidelines
contain extensive anti-terrorist financing guidance, as well as guidance on
sound governance and financial practices that helps prevent the exploitation
of charities.
Regulatory Issues
The regulatory environment Islamic individuals and
organizations are most concerned with, considering the current political
climate, are those relating to anti-terrorism and anti-money laundering. Yet
the tensions arising from regulatory requirements within the U.S. related to
American business practices often prove more difficult to resolve.
It is in trying to balance the expectations of
distinct business cultures that the differences between conventional and
Islamic accounting are most notable. For instance, depending upon the type
of transactions the organizations are engaged in, the roles,
responsibilities and rights assigned to each party can be contradictory and
even in direct conflict. In some situations, such as transactions involving
private equity, venture capital, profit sharing and liquidations,
organizations and individuals employing conventional accounting may actually
find they prefer Islamic accounting. Other issues, such as those related to
taxation, require significant effort to resolve. The inherent flexibility of
Shariah is a benefit under these circumstances, since the complexity of the
American tax code is highly inflexible.
The number of Muslim consumers, investors and
business owners has grown along with the Muslim American population which is
currently estimated to be between six and seven million. Although demand for
Islamic financial products and services has increased, both the supply and
the number of providers remain insufficient. It should also be noted that
Islamic orthodoxy, expressed as the desire to implement Shariah as the sole
legal foundation of a nation, is actually associated with progressive
economic principles, including increasing government for the poor, reducing
income inequality and increasing government ownership of industries and
industries, especially in the poorer nations of the Muslim world.
“While it is common to associate traditional
religious beliefs with conservative political stances on a wide range of
issues, this is only partly true,” said Robert V. Robinson, Chancellor’s
Professor and chair of Indiana University’s Department of Sociology. “The
Islamic orthodox are more conservative on issues having to do with gender,
sexuality and the family, but more liberal or left on economic issues.
Islamic Accounting Web ---
http://www.iiu.edu.my/iaw/
The Islamic Accounting Website is a project of the
Department of Accounting, Kulliyah of Economics and Management Sciences,
International Islamic University Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur. This project is
under the direction of Dr. Shahul Hameed bin Mohamed Ibrahim, Assistant
Professor and the current Head of the Department. The philosophy of the
University is to Islamize knowledge to solve the crisis in Muslim thinking
brought about by the secularization of knowledge and furthermore
contributing as a centre of educational excellence to revive the dynamism of
the Muslim Ummah in knowledge, learning and the professions. The Department
of Accounting is fully committed to this vision and strives to Islamicise
Accounting.
"ISLAMIC ACCOUNTING STANDARDS," by Shadia Rahman ---
http://islamic-finance.net/islamic-accounting/acctg5.html
Sharing site of Dr Shahul Hameed Bin Hj Mohamed Ibrahim ---
http://islamic-finance.net/islamic-accounting/
articles by the author
articles by other scholars
Forthcoming
Articles on Islamic Accounting
Alternative (conventional accounting) rules may, for
the individual citizen, mean the difference between employment and unemployment,
reliable products and dangerous ones, enriching experiences and oppressive ones,
stimulating work environments and dehumanising ones, care and compassion for the
old and sick versus intolerance and resentment.
Tony Tinker, 1985
Financial Reporting should provide information that
is useful to present and potential investors and creditors and other users in
making rational investment, credit and similar decisions ...(through the
provision of information that will help them to assess)..... the amount, timing
and uncertainty of net cash inflows to the related enterprise
FASB Concept Number 1 of the Conceptual Framework, 1978
"Bear Stearns: SEC Can't Serve
Brokerage Clients and Shareholders Simultaneously," by Tom Selling, The
Accounting Onion, March 19, 2008 ---
http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/03/the-sec-has-bee.html
The
SEC has been one of the most prominent
and well-respected of federal agencies
during most of its history. Strict
adherence to a focused mission on
disclosure in regards to the regulation
of financial reporting by public
companies has been its trademark.
Having said that, however, the SEC has
been far from pristine in implementing a
disclosure-only policy. Certain actions
could be characterized by some as a form
of “merit regulation”—some companies may
have been unfairly subject to undue
scrutiny, and others may have received
an undeserved pass. The SEC has also
used its broad powers to make rules
requiring added disclosures in some
circumstances, and allowing abbreviated
disclosures in others. For example, the
SEC has added disclosure requirements to
the offering documents of “blank check”
companies, and also provided disclosure
accommodations to smaller and foreign
companies.
But, if some were to criticize the SEC
for merit regulation, cavils of this
sort are on the fringes of SEC
activity. And, most important to the
criticisms I'm fixin' to deliver, they
all relate to the regulatory activities
concerning disclosures by
companies to the SEC. But now, an SEC
official -- the chair, no less -- has
seen fit to make gratuitous disclosures
for certain
public companies.
Here's the situation. Last Tuesday
(March 11, 2008), SEC Chair Christopher
Cox made the following statement to
reporters: "We have a good deal of
comfort about the capital cushions that
these firms [the five largest investment
banks, which included Bear Stearns] have
been on." (http://www.cnbc.com/id/23576630)
At the time,
Bear's stock was at $60, a five-year
low, and just the day before, Bear
issued a press release denying rumors of
liquidity problems. The stock tumbled
to $30 early Friday, and over the
weekend, JP Morgan struck a deal to buy
Bear Stearns for a paltry $2 per share.
(For reasons I don't want to cover here,
the current market price as I write this
is around $5 per share.)
It's a serious thing that investors may
have relied on false and misleading
information issued by
Bear Stearns, but it is quite another
for the SEC to have issued information
for Bear
Stearns. (I am trying to making a
principled statement here, so that fact
that investors who relied on that
information got taken to the cleaners is
notable, though not the sole basis of my
critique.) Heretofore, a company either
complies with the disclosure rules, or
it doesn’t; the SEC doesn’t make
congratulatory announcements for
companies it finds to have been
exemplary compliers, disclosers, or what
have you. But if you fail to comply,
then that’s when the SEC will tell the
world about you; there are thousands of
examples of the consistent
implementation of this policy.
I imagine that Cox would defend himself
on the basis that the SEC is in a
curious position with respect to
companies like Bear Stearns. One of the
many jobs given to the SEC by Congress
is to monitor the “capital adequacy” of
broker-dealers. The objective is to
provide a form of protection for the
assets of clients who have deposited
cash and securities with
broker-dealers. Thus, the SEC is
serving two masters, having very
different interests in Bear Stearns:
clients and shareholders.
When Cox chose to speak about Bear
Stearns last Tuesday, both groups of
Bear Stearns stakeholders were
listening, and at least some in each
group responded with diametrically
opposite courses of action:
• Some clients of Bear may have
been calmed, but too many disregarded
Cox’s assurances, took their money and
ran;
•
Some investors on the verge of selling
their shares had a change of mind -- and
some may have even bought stock based on
his assurances.
Cox should have known that he was
unavoidably sending a signal of
encouragement to jittery investors who
were trying to decide whether or not to
buy, hold, or sell shares of Bear
Stearns. If SEC history is any guide,
it was simply not appropriate for him to
have done so. Just as a real estate
agent cannot claim to represent parties
on both sides of a transaction, the SEC
cannot claim to be "the investor's
advocate" at the same moment they are
functioning as the public relations
spokesperson for the investee. It would
have been far better to have left the
public relations role to other
government officials.
The question of how much SEC credibility
has been lost is difficult for me to
judge. Assuming this were an isolated
instance, it would be significant. But
seen as the latest in a series of
questionable actions reflecting the
SEC's stance on investor protection, the
Bear Stearns case is just more
confirming evidence of an altered SEC
culture. I am sad to say that the
process of restoring credibility to a
once peerless agency cannot begin until
there is a new chair.
Bob Jensen's threads on the controversies of accounting standards ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting
Jensen Comment
As pointed out above, Islamic accounting is really in the realm of social
accounting by whatever name you want to call it. It is primarily concerned with
accounting for all constituencies without investors and creditors necessarily
being the primary constituencies. Certainly investors and creditors must provide
capital. But employees must provide their labor, customers must purchase
outputs, suppliers must provide the inputs, and society must provide an
environment within which all constituencies are to flourish.
See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Responsibility
Also see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AccountAbility_%28Institute_of_Social_and_Ethical_AccountAbility%29
The problem with Islamic accounting is that it has never delved
deeply into the details of accounting for complex contracts of structured
financing, derivative financial instruments, hedging, collateralized debt,
convertible debt, and intangibles accounting. Hence it is not yet a place where
one goes for learning about such contracting and theories of accounting for such
contracts. It is naive to think such complex contracting should be banned in
Islam, because business leaders in Islam must manage risks and hedge just like
everybody else.
Also see
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#TripleBottom
XBRL: The Next Big Thing
January 14, 2008 message
from Dennis Beresford
[dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]
Here's a link to a very interesting recent speech by SEC Chairman Chris
Cox -
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch011008cc.htm.
Among other things he says:
"So to sum up, this is what you need to know from the SEC's standpoint:
IFRS is coming. XBRL is coming. And mutual recognition is coming."
From this and many other recent activities at the SEC, FASB, Congress
and elsewhere, it appears that both IFRS and XBRL are nearer than some
might have imagined. And educators should be taking these developments
into consideration now, or may be left behind.
Denny Beresford
SEC releases new XBRL analytical tool
XBRL US, Inc., the nonprofit consortium dedicated to
the adoption of XBRL (eXtensible Business Reporting Language), a technology
standard for the reporting of financial and business information in the U.S.,
strongly supports the Securities and Exchange Commission's launch of an online,
interactive tool that allows investors to instantly extract, compare, and
analyze executive compensation for the largest 500 companies in the United
States . . . This tool relies on the power of XBRL for the compensation data and
underscores the flexibility and usefulness of "tagged" data. The SEC
announcement comes a year after it adopted stricter rules on executive pay
disclosure that now require more detail in annual shareholder proxy statements.
The new application uses XBRL data created by the SEC and allows investors and
researchers to immediately create reports showing salary, bonus, stock awards,
option awards, non-equity incentive plan compensation, change in pension value,
and other compensation figures for executives at the top 500 companies.
"SEC releases new XBRL analytical tool," AccountingWeb, January 10, 2008
---
http://www.accountingweb.com/item/104442
Bob Jensen's threads on XBRL are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm
Bob Jensen's video demos of XBRL are at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/video/Tutorials/
December 6, 2005 message from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@terry.uga.edu]
National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB
Developments. His talk is available at:
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch120505cc.htm
He had three main messages:
1. Accounting rules need to be simplified. "The
accounting scandals that our nation and the world have now mostly
weathered were made possible in part by the sheer complexity of the
rules." "The sheer accretion of detail has, in time, led to one of the
system's weaknesses - its extreme complexity. Convolution is now
reducing its usefulness."
2. The concentration of auditing services in
the Big 4 "quadropoly" is bad for the securities markets. The SEC will
try to do more to encourage the use of medium size and smaller firms
that receive good inspection reports from the PCAOB.
3. The SEC will continue to push XBRL. "The
interactive data that this initiative will create will lead to vast
improvements in the quality, timeliness, and usefulness of information
that investors get about the companies they're investing in."
A very interesting talk - one that seems to
promise a high level of cooperation with the accounting profession.
Denny
Bob Jensen's threads on XBRL are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm
Two XBRL Videos
XBRL is no longer something we only play with in academe. It is now
available to investors around the world, although it may take a while for
some companies to add the XBRL tags to their financial statements. Some
things that are now being done in XBRL such as time graphs and ratio graphs
can be done with things other than XBRL. What XBRL does, however, is make
it possible to:
(1) Compare different companies in a Web browser
(2)
Perform customized analyses if the XBRL statements are downloaded into
Excel
(3) Conduct easy searches that do not yield thousands of unwanted and
extraneous hits
Bob Jensen's New Video Tutorial on XBRL (about 30
minutes)
It's the XBRLdemos2005.wmv file at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/video/Tutorials/
But first read
the following and watch the KOSDAQ video before watching the above video.
Question
What are the two most significant events in the history of accounting,
financial reporting, and financial statement analysis?
Answers
Double Entry Bookkeeping and
XBRL
The origins of double entry bookkeeping are unknown.
It goes back over 100 years before
Luca Pacioli
made it famous by
algebraically describing it in the world's first algebra book called
Summa written in 1494. Pacioli's basic equation A=L+E simply shows
how recorded asset values in total equal the double-entry sum of creditor
liabilities plus owner equities in those assets. For over 500 years
accounting disputes mainly lie in defining the A, L, and E concepts and
measuring them in financial statements. Pacioli gave us the algebra
without the crucial and operational definitions of terms. Bob Jensen's
brief summary of the history of accounting is at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm
XBRL stands for eXtensible Business Reporting Language in
XML that can now be interpreted by every Web browser such as Microsoft's
Internet Explorer. In the future, virtually every all academic
disciplines such as Chemistry, Physics, and History will probably develop
their own taxonomies for XML reporting on the Web.
Hence, we one day may have XCHEM, XPHYS, and XHIST
eXtensible reporting languages.
Whereas the famous HTML tags on data are not extensible and
are more or less fixed in scope and time, XML extensible meta-tags will
become the world's most popular way of creating customized "meta-tags" that
attach to virtually every piece of Web data and describe attributes of each
piece of data. The history of data tags and meta-tags is briefly
outlined at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm
I also highly recommend the XBRL history and news site at XBRL headquarters
at http://www.xbrl.org/Home/
XBRL is a taxonomy for XML meta-tags to be placed on
virtually every number in a set of financial statements. For over a
decade, efforts have been made by huge companies and accounting firms to
develop standardized XBRL tags for key taxonomies in accounting. These
taxonomies may vary as to a particular set of accounting generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP) such as International GAAP or US GAAP.
Once a company or user selects which GAAP taxonomy to use, it's financial
statements can be "marked up" with XBRL meta-tags that facilitate
comparative financial statement analysis. Users may also take any set
of financial statements and add tags for a chosen set of GAAP tags.
For example, see Drag and Tag from Rivet Corporation ---
http://www.rivetsoftware.com/
Also see
http://www.xbrl.org/eu/CEBS-3/Rivet_Industry Day_Brussels_14 Sept 2005.pdf
Because adding XBRL meta-tags to a given set of financial
statements is time consuming, most large companies are in the process of
adding these tags to their own financial data so that investors will not
have to do their own tagging. The major stock exchanges of the world
are now urging companies to send in their financial reports marked up in
XBRL. Soon they will require all listed companies to submit XBRL-tagged
financial statements.
Bob Jensen's Old XBRL Video Tutorial called XBRLdemos.wmf
About four years ago (I can't remember exactly when) I prepared a XBRL
tutorial on how to use XBRL in financial statement analysis. The
tutorial itself was actually developed by NASDAQ, Microsoft, and PwC in a
NMP partnership. NASDAQ selected 20 companies and marked up their
financial statements in XBRL. Microsoft wrote a fancy Excel program to
analyze those financial statements in Excel. PwC served up the data on
the Web. This NMP tutorial was intended to have a short life since the
plan was eventually to use XBRL directly in Web browsers without having to
use Excel. Indeed, PwC no longer serves up this tutorial. Bob
Jensen probably has the only recorded history of this NMP tutorial on video
in the file XBRLdemos.wfm at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/video/Tutorials/
Bob Jensen's New 2005 XBRL Video Tutorial called
XBRLdemos2005.wmf
XBRL is now marked up on many financial statements on the Web and can be
used for financial statement analysis in Web browsers. I found a set
of such statements for various (Star) companies on the Korean KOSDAQ stock
exchange homepage.
Before looking at my new video, I want you to first view the
KOSDAQ Camtasia video at
http://www.ubmatrix.com/solutions/WebHelp/KOSDAQDemo.html
After viewing this video, you can then go to my new Camtasia
2005 video XBRLdemos2005.wmv file at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/video/Tutorials/
My new video is mainly a tutorial about how I learned to use
the XBRL financial statements made available by KOSDAQ for actual use by
investors in companies listed on the KOSDAQ stock exchange.
In particular, my new video shows how to perform the
following steps at the KOSDAQ site.
First
Watch the
http://www.ubmatrix.com/solutions/WebHelp/KOSDAQDemo.html
Second
Watch my XBRLdemos2005.wmv file at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/video/Tutorials/
The KOSDAQ homepage is at
http://www.ubmatrix.com/home/default.asp
Go to http://km.krx.co.kr/
You do not have to install
the Korean language pack
Note that it may take some time for the upper menu to
appear
Click on the English button in the upper right corner
after the menu appears
Third
Go directly to
http://english.kosdaq.com/
Click on the "XBRL Service" on the right side of the
screen
Click on a company's logo (ignore any pop ups to
install a language pack)
If you do not see a graph on the left side of a
company's report,
click
on the button/instruction below the graph's border
After you see a graph,
click
on the various financial statement line items to the right
of the graph
(Your mouse pointer will now be a small bar
graph)
Go to the bottom of the page and click on
"Ratios"
If your pointer is still a small graph,
click
on the ratios that you want to see in the graph
Go to the bottom of the page and click on
"Comparison"
Options for comparisons are given (they are also
demonstrated in my video)
Go to the bottom of the page and read about the
Excel Analyzer
See what you can download if you really get
interested in the analysis options
|
October 30, 2005 reply from Deborah Johnson
[Finance@WeFightFraud.com]
I followed the instructions you plan to give
your students for Monday and found a few bugs you might want to know
about.
The Demos link at XBRL.org is not on the
home page. They need to know that this site requires them to navigate to
"Showcase" to find the Demo.
http://km.krx.co.kr/
selected English and then XBRL Services,
then chose the company. The graph is only available if you agree to
download and install additional software on your PC. If they do not have
administrator rights, this is not going to be an option for your
students. (say on college lab and classroom computers).
The company I selected, LG Micron, had an
obvious defect in the financial data being presented for this
demonstration. XBRL is clearly not going to minimize any human mistakes,
and the printed financials will still have to be carefully scrutinized
by management and the auditors. Do the math on the Trade Receivables at
Net. Demerits for any student who doesn't find the error. If you go to
the bottom of the table and select "Get these financials in XBRL" you
may get an XML Parsing Error. This is probably a higher version of XMl
required, and again the student would need administrator rights to
upgrade the software or install patches and plug ins.
Regards,
Deborah Johnson
October 30, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Deborah,
I agree with all your points and thank you for providing
some clarifications. With respect to needing administrative rights
to view the graphs (say on college lab computers and on classroom
computers), it behooves faculty to ask administrators to install the
software that can be downloaded free by clicking below the graph frame
for any company in the demo.
If students do not have administrative rights on a
college lab or classroom computer, I guess this makes my video tutorial
even more valuable since students can see what will happen if they try
this on their own computers where they automatically have administrative
rights.
Thanks,
Bob
From the Publisher of the AccountingWeb on June 19,
2008
Some friends of ours are currently on vacation in
Russia, which got me to thinking, "I wonder what it's like to be an
accountant in Russia?" I have no idea. It wasn't all that long ago that
International Financial Reporting Standards were adopted by the Russian
Finance Ministry, so it's probably been a rather challenging profession as
of late! If you have any first-hand knowledge of accounting in the Russian
Federation, please
e-mail me so we can
share it with AccountingWEB readers.
In the meantime, here are some key Russian facts:
- Population: 142 million
- Largest city (and capital): Moscow
- Second largest city:
St. Petersburg
- Size: the largest country in the world by more
than 2.5 million square miles
- Ethnic groups:
Russian 79.8%,
Tatar 3.8%,
Ukrainian 2%,
other 14.4%
Rob Nance
Publisher
AccountingWEB, Inc.
publisher@accountingweb.com
Bob Jensen's reply to Rob Nance
Hi
Rob,
A
better question is to ask what accounting became in Russia after the breakup
of the Soviet Union ---
http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/janfeb99/pgs22-25.htm
The system is highly geared to tax reporting and has a long ways to go
relative to IFRS.
Accounting in the former Soviet Union was pretty much an exercise in
tabulating fiction ---
http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=6827120
Accounting was an
instrument of the planning and control process that substituted for
market-based controls ---
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-6281.1974.tb00002.x?cookieSet=1&journalCode=abac
Russia now has offices of the
Big 4 accounting firms and maybe other Western CPA firms as well. One of my
former students accepted a transfer to the PwC office in Moscow. It proved
to be a fast-track to becoming a partner in PwC. Russian companies are
seeking equity investors throughout the world, and to do so they have to add
accounting assurances much like the other companies in the global economy
seek assurances.
KPMG has a publication
comparing IFRS with Russian GAAP ---
http://snipurl.com/russiangaap
Also see
http://www.kpmg.ru/index.thtml/en/services/assurance/IFRS/IFRSpublications/
PwC has an IFRS Transition
document at
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/service.nsf/docid/90828387207B28F78025717B0038B2AD
Results of a 2006 survey are reported at
http://snipurl.com/russiangaapsurvey
Deloitte links to a Russian
translation of IFRS as well as providing information on transitioning to
IFRS in Russia ---
http://www.iasplus.com/country/russia.htm
A illustrative Russian set of
financial statements can be found at
http://www.dixy.ru/en_invest-report/
Hope this helps!
Bob Jensen
Bob Jensen's threads on GAAP comparisons (with particular stress upon
derivative financial instruments accounting rules) are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/canada.htm
The above site also links to more general GAAP comparison guides between
nations.
International Standards from the IASB ---
Click Here
IASB homepage---
http://www.iasb.org/Home.htm
U.S. Standards from the FASB (Free Downloads) ---
http://www.fasb.org/public/
FASB homepage ---
http://www.fasb.org/
Management Accounting Standards from the IMA (Free
Downloads) ---
http://www.imanet.org/publications_statements.asp#C
IMA homepage ---
http://www.imanet.org/
Bob Jensen's summary of accounting theory and controversies ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm
"Global Finance Leaders Release Comprehensive Proposals to Strengthen the
Financial Industry and Financial Markets," Institute for International
Finance, July 17, 2008 ---
http://www.iif.com/press/press+75.php
The world’s leading financial services firms today
released a far-reaching report 1 detailing best practice reforms for the
industry. The report represents the global industry’s response to the
turmoil in financial markets that was triggered by the U.S. subprime
mortgage market crisis in mid-2007. Today’s 200-page report is published by
the Institute of International Finance, the association of leading financial
services firms with more than 380 members across the world. The report
proposes Principles of Conduct together with Best Practice Recommendations
on critical issues such as risk management, compensation policies, valuation
of assets, liquidity management, underwriting and the rating of structured
products as well as boosting transparency and disclosure
Comparison of IFRSs and US GAAP (Educators can provide
free copies to students) ---
http://www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/0703ifrsusgaap.pdf
Comparisons for other nations ---
http://www.iasplus.com/country/compare.htm
From IAS Plus on March 14, 2007 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/0703ifrsusgaap.pdf
Deloitte's IFRS Global Office
has published a new
Comparison of International Financial Reporting
Standards and United States GAAP
(PDF 208k, 36 pages) as of 28
February 2007. While this comparison is
comprehensive, it does not attempt to capture all of
the differences that exist or that may be material
to a particular entity's financial statements. Our
focus is on differences that are commonly found in
practice. The significance of the differences
enumerated in this pubilcation – and others not
included – will vary with respect to individual
entities depending on such factors as the nature of
the entity's operations, the industry in which it
operates, and the accounting policy choices it has
made. We
are pleased to grant permission for accounting
educators and students to make copies for
educational purposes. |
|
|
Main News Site for International Accounting Happenings ---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
Paul Pacter and Deloitte provide a statistical database (with
data about international accounting) at
http://www.iasplus.com/stats/stats.htm
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Summary ---
http://www.iasplus.com/standard/standard.htm
Use of IFRS varies by nation ---
http://www.iasplus.com/country/useias.htm
If you click on the Search tab and enter something like (IFRS AND China)
to compare IFRS with the domestic standards of a given nation ---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
"Bye-bye, GAAP? Not yet SEC’s Cox says international standards still years
away for U.S. biz ," by Nicholas Rummell, Financial Week,
January 16, 2008 ---
http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080114/REG/885146278
or
Click Here
While the push toward merged accounting standards
has gained considerable momentum in recent months, finance chiefs may not
need to start boning up on principles-based accounting—yet. In fact,
Securities and Exchange Commission chairman Christopher Cox stated last week
that U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) aren’t going away
anytime soon.
Speaking at an American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants conference, Mr. Cox said the Financial Accounting
Standards Board will not be replaced for many years. He said that the
current push merely aims to converge U.S. accounting standards with
international ones. “I worry that people think there is something imminent
here,” he said. “U.S. GAAP is deeply entrenched in the United States.”
Mr. Cox stressed that there are too many
imperfections in international accounting standards to switch wholesale to
IFRS at this point. Additional work must be done—including changing language
in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act—before the SEC would be able to recognize the
International Accounting Standards Board as the sole accounting regulator.
That’s probably good news for Robert Herz, chairman
of FASB. Last month, Mr. Herz cautioned against switching to international
standards too swiftly. “We have to get beyond just common accounting
standards, we have to get to a common reporting system,” he said. “Standards
are a big element of this, but it requires common application of the
standards, common disclosures, audit practices, regulatory review, training.
We ain’t there yet.”
Nevertheless, some finance executives say the
switch to international standards could pay unexpected dividends. “We see
this as more of an opportunity if this [convergence] trend continues,” said
PepsiCo controller Peter Bridgman. About 30 of the company’s reporting
entities are already using IFRS. “We will be able to set up regional
accounting centers,” noted Mr. Bridgman, “be able to consolidate training
onto one platform, and we can simplify our auditing processes.”
Comments like that may explain, in part, why the
SEC has been working to end the need for companies to reconcile their
financial reports between the two standards. The commission is now
considering a plan that would allow U.S. companies to use IFRS. In November,
the regulatory agency voted to allow foreign companies raising capital in
U.S. markets to include addendums explaining the differences between IFRS
and U.S. GAAP.
Another sign of convergence: The International
Accounting Standards Board late last week published revised rules on mergers
and acquisitions. The new rules basically realign IASB’s standards for M&A
with U.S. GAAP. The new standards take effect in July 2009, though companies
can adopt them sooner.
During his speech at the AICPA meeting, Mr. Cox
noted that the fledgling XBRL reporting format—more widely embraced in
Europe—goes hand in hand with the shift to international accounting
standards. An internal cost-benefit study by the SEC of a two-year pilot
program, in which companies were allowed to voluntarily file using XBRL
taxonomies, is expected to be completed by the end of February.
“IFRS is coming,” the SEC chairman said. “XBRL is
coming. And mutual recognition [of foreign exchanges and securities
regulators] is coming.”
Standard Setting and Securities Markets: U.S. Versus Europe
November 29, 2007 message from Pacter, Paul (CN - Hong Kong)
[paupacter@DELOITTE.COM.HK]
Some similarities to Chair of SEC, but some
important differences. SEC has direct regulatory powers over securities
markets, entities that offer securities in those markets, broker/dealers in
securities, auditors, and others. SEC can impose penalties on those it
regulates.
In Europe there is no pan-European securities
regulator equivalent to the SEC with direct regulatory powers similar to the
SEC's. Rather, there are 27 securities regulators (one from each member
state) who have that power. Here's a link to the list:
http://www.cesr-eu.org/index.php?page=members_directory&mac=0&id=
There is a coordinating body of European securities
regulators called CESR (the Committee of European Securities Regulators
(http://www.cesr-eu.org/)
but CESR's role is advisory, not regulatory.
When the European Parliament adopts legislation
(such as securitieslegislation) the legislation first has to be transposed
(legally adopted) into the national laws of the Member States. Commissioner
McCreevy's role is to propose policies and propose legislation to adopt
those policies in Europe, oversee implementation of the legislation in the
27 Member States (plus 3 EEA countries), and (through both persuasion and
some legal authority) try to ensure consistent and coordinated
implementation. The Commissioner also has outreach and liaison
responsibilities outside the European Union. Because there is no
pan-European counterpart to the SEC Chairman, Commissioner McCreevy
generally handles top level policy liaison between the SEC and Europe.
Like the Chair of the SEC, EU Commissioners are
political appointees.
Paul Pacter
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting standard setting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting
Question
Will the U.S. adopt all IFRS international standards while the European Union
cherry picks which standards it will adopt?
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on
April 27, 2007
"SEC to Mull Letting U.S. Companies Use International Accounting Rules,"
by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, Page: C3 ---
http://snipurl.com/WSJ0425
TOPICS: Accounting, Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards
Board, Securities and Exchange Commission
SUMMARY: The article describes the SEC's willingness to consider allowing
U.S. companies to use USGAAP or International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
in their filings. This development stems from the initiative to allow
international firms traded on U.S. exchanges to file using IFRS without
reconciling to USGAAP-based net income and stockholders' equity as is now
required on Form 20F. "SEC Chairman Christopher Cox said the agency remains
committed to removing the reconciliation requirement by 2009. Such a move was
the subject of an SEC roundtable and is being closely watched by European Union
officials." The SEC will accept comments this summer on its proposal to
eliminate the reconciliation requirements. If the agency does implement this
change, then it will consider allowing U.S. companies the same alternative.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is a "foreign private issuer" (FPI)? Summarize the SEC's current filing
requirements for these entities.
2.) Why is the SEC considering allowing U.S. companies to submit filings
under IFRS rather than U.S. GAAP?
3.) Why might the SEC's decision in this matter "spell the demise of USGAAP"?
4.) Define "principles-based standards" and contrast with "rules-based
standards." Give an example in either USGAAP or IFRS requirements for each of
these items.
5.) "Some experts don't think a move away from U.S. GAAP would necessarily be
bad." Who do you think would hold this opinion? Who would disagree? Explain.
6.) Define the term convergence in relation to global standards. Who is
working towards this goal?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Jensen Comment
Canada has already decided to adopt the IFRS in place of domestic Canadian
standards.
Also see ""Strengthening the Transatlantic Economy," by José
Manuel Barroso (European Commission President), April 27, 2007 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/europe/0704barroso.pdf
Also don't assume that the European Union automatically adopts
each IASB international standard. For example, the EU may not adopt IFRS 8 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ifrs08.htm
"Is IFRS Compatible with U.S.-Style Corporate Governance?" by Tom
Selling, The Accounting Onion, December 10, 2007 ---
http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2007/12/is-ifrs-compati.html
I just finished reading a brief, highly
readable and interesting article by a
Columbia Law School professor, John C.
Coffee, Jr., entitled A Theory of
Corporate Scandals: Why the U.S. and
Europe Differ.* The purpose of
this post is to piggyback on his
framework to also provide an explanation
for the difference in basic approaches
between U.S. GAAP and IFRS; and most
importantly, why political pressure to
trash U.S. GAAP and adopt IFRS should be
resisted.
How and Why, According to
Coffee, U.S. and European Scandals
Differ
Coffee's thesis is that corporate
governance of majority-owned
corporations (predominant in Europe)
should be fundamentally different than
corporate governance of corporations
that lack a controlling shareholder
group (predominant in the U.S.). It's
not necessarily because there are fewer
incentives to rip off other
shareholders, but the feasible means to
do so will differ.
Scandals in Europe involving
majority-owned corporations usually do
not feature an accounting manipulation.
First, financial reporting is less
important to the majority owners because
they rarely sell shares; and if they do,
they usually receive a control premium
that is uncorrelated with recent
earnings (and generally larger than
control premia in U.S. transactions).
Second, fraud is more easily
accomplished by misappropriation of the
private benefits of control:
authorization of related-party
transactions at advantageous prices,
below-market tender offers, are prime
examples. Any trading that takes place
between minority owners has less to do
with recent earnings reports, and more
to do with an assessment of how minority
shareholders will be treated by
controlling interests.
In dispersed-ownership corporations,
managers do not possess private benefits
of control. Moreover, a significant
portion of manager's compensation may be
in the form of stock options or other
forms of equity. Therefore, stock price
can have a significant effect on a
manager's compensation, providing them
with strong incentives to manipulate
accounting earnings.
The Implications for Accounting
Professor Coffee's thesis is that
differences in ownership patterns have
important implications for the selection
of gatekeepers: auditors, analysts,
independent directors, etc. His
observations and recommendations are
interesting, but I want to advance a
related thesis, namely that different
ownership patterns call for different
types of accounting regimes.
It stands to reason that accounting
should be difficult to manipulate, if it
can be used to rip off shareholders.
Thus, the evolution of U.S. GAAP can be
seen as a response to the need for
specific rules that minimized the role
of management judgment because of their
strong self-interest in the reported
earnings and financial position. This
has occurred in part because U.S.
gatekeepers have shown themselves to
often lack sufficient resolve or power
to prevent management from
under-reserving, overvaluing, or just
plain ole making up numbers. U.S.
managers effectively control the
"independent" directors and auditors;
and prior to Regulation FD, analysts
bartered glowing assessment in exchange
for tidbits inside information. Without
empowered gatekeepers to prevent
accounting fraud, we have had to place
our hopes on very inflexible accounting
rules, and sheriffs like the SEC and
private attorneys to catch the cases
where management has attempted to
surreptitiously cross the bright line.
Thus, it should be self-evident that
IFRS-style accounting, replete with gray
areas, would be a gift to U.S.
managers. Outright fraud would be
replaced by more subtle means of
"earnings management," rendering the SEC
and private attorneys much less potent.
Is it any wonder why U.S. corporations
and their auditors are practically
begging to have IFRS available to them?
In short, it would be a grave mistake to
adopt IFRS in the U.S. simply because it
seems to work well elsewhere. As
corporate ownership patterns in Europe
change, it may well be that IFRS may
evolve to look more like U.S. GAAP.
Only after that occurs may it make more
sense to have a single worldwide
financial reporting regime.
Imagine if Enron Had Applied
IFRS
One of the scapegoats of the Enron
scandal was "rules-based" U.S. GAAP.
The libel was that Andrew Fastow was a
mad genius, capable of walking an
accounting tightrope by creating complex
special-purpose entities (SPEs). But,
GAAP wasn't the culprit in the Enron
scandal. Frustrated Fastow was only able
to get the accounting treatment he
needed past the auditors by hiding from
them side agreements that unwound
critical provisions requiring the new
investors to have a sufficient amount of
capital at risk in the SPEs.
The enduring legacy of the libel is the
erroneous conventional wisdom that GAAP
is responsible for Enron; and what's
more, Enron et. al. might not have
happened if our financial reporting
system were more like IFRS. More
likely, if IFRS had been the basis of
accounting for Enron instead of GAAP, it
might have taken longer to discover the
fraud, or to pin the blame for the
fraud where it belonged.
Neither GAAP nor IFRS are
principles-based, but GAAP certainly has
more rules and bright lines. At least
there seems to be some method to the
madness, but it would be nice if more of
the rules were based on sound
principles.
-------------------------------
*There
are two versions of this paper. The
working paper is available at no charge
from the Social Sciences Research
Network electronic library at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=694581.
The published version is in Oxford
Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 21,
No. 2 (2005).
Bob Jensen's threads on the differences between U.S. versus International
GAAP are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FASBvsIASB
iGAAP (International GAAP) 2007 Financial Instruments: IAS 32,
IAS 39 and IFRS 7 Explained (Third Edition)
Deloitte & Touche LLP (United Kingdom) has
developed iGAAP 2007 Financial Instruments: IAS 32, IAS 39 and IFRS
7 Explained (Third Edition), which has been published by CCH. This
publication is the authoritative guide for financial instruments
accounting under IFRSs. The 2007 edition expands last year's edition
with further interpretations, examples, discussions from the IASB
and the IFRIC, updates on comparisons of IFRSs with US GAAP for
financial instruments, as well as a new chapter on IFRS 7 Financial
Instruments Disclosures including illustrative disclosures. iGAAP
2007 Financial Instruments: IAS 32, IAS 39 and IFRS 7 Explained (628
pages, March 2007) can be purchased through
CCH Online or by phone at +44 (0) 870 777 2906 or by email:
customer.services@cch.co.uk
.
IAS Plus, March 24, 2007 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
Bob Jensen's tutorials on IAS 39 (Derivative Financial
Instruments) are linked at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm
CPA Examination
candidates and accounting faculty should check out the free database
at
http://www.cpa-exam.org/cpa/literature.htm
The Trinity University library has a single-user
license (with an academic discount) for PwC’s Comperio ---
http://www.pwcglobal.com/comperio
The single-user limitation really has not been problematic for us.
Our Library guru wrote some front end code that lets any Trinity
faculty member or student go directly into Comperio without having
to remember a password
Comperio
evolved out of a CD-Rom database that Price Waterhouse sold under
the name “Price Waterhouse Researcher.” Updated CDs were sent to us
each quarter in the old days before things were as networked on the
Web. Now it’s all Comperio on the Web.
Andersen
had a competing CD database called Research Manager. That was bought
out after Andersen fell, but I think it is now defunct (I could be
wrong about this).
Now
Comperio is the main commercial database available other than FARs
---
http://www.fasb.org/fars/
I think each student can buy this from Wiley, but there have been
numerous complaints about it.
PwC's Comperio Accounting
Research Manager
Comperio
is the most comprehensive on-line library of financial reporting
and assurance literature in the world. Over 1,500 financial
executives from around the world use Comperio on a daily basis.
Comperio content includes AICPA, DIG, EITF, FASB, IAS, ISB and the
SEC as well as pronouncements and standards from Australia,
Belgium, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
With
Comperio, the answers you need are always available - right now,
right at your fingertips. There is no software to install - just
go to the Comperio website and start researching!
The
entire online library can be immediately accessed by browsing a
pronouncement or topic directly, or by searching the entire
database for key words, topics or terms.
Visit the
Comperio product information site at http://www.pwcglobal.com/comperio
. You will find the necessary forms to order Comperio today or to
request a 30-day free trial.
Andersen's old Accounting
Research Manager is now updated and maintained by CCH. The AICPA
has accounting research literature in the FARs database.
For
national and international accounting rulings and online research, it is best to
subscribe for a fee to one of the leading services shown below:
PwC
Comperio ---
http://www.pwcglobal.com/comperio
CCH
Accounting Research Manager ---
http://www.accountingresearchmanager.com/ARMMenu.nsf/vwHTML/ARMSplash?OpenDocument
AICPA FARs
(marketed by Wiley) ---
http://www.fasb.org/fars/
For looking up filings with the SEC,
there are two major sources:
EDGAR ---
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/quickedgar.htm
PwC EdgarScan ---
http://edgarscan.pwcglobal.com/servlets/edgarscan
It is possible to do comparative
company financial analyses using the core earnings databases ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#CoreEarnings
Many IFRS and multiple nation standards
and reviews are available from Deloitte's IAS Plus ---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
Free International
Auditing Standards
All documents issued by IFAC and the International Auditing
and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) are now available for immediate download
at no charge. Visitors must simply fill out a one-time registration to gain
access to the documents. http://www.accountingweb.com/item/96952
PwC has a new helper comparing U.S. GAAP with international (IFRS) GAAP
---
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/74d6c09e0a4ee610802569a1003354c8
Download:
Similarities and Differences - A comparison of IFRS and US GAAP (2005
update) [PDF file, 469k]
Download:
Similarities and Differences - A comparison of IFRS and US GAAP (2004)
[PDF file, 314k]
Download:
publication order form [PDF file, 212k]
Other publications in the
Similarities and Differences series are also
available.
Updated in 2005: Some Key Differences
Between IFRs and U.S. GAAP -
Side by Side: IAS 39 Compared with FASB Standards (FAS 133), by Paul Pacter,
as published in Accountancy International Magazine, June 1999 ---
http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm
Also note "Comparisons of International IAS Versus FASB Standards" ---
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/pocketiasus.pdf
I.
Key Differences Between IAS 39 Versus FAS 133
A.
Some Key Differences That Remain
Definitions of derivatives
- IAS 39: Does
not define “net settlement” as being
required to be scoped into IAS 39 as a
derivative such as when interest rate swap
payments and receipts are not net settled
into a single payment.
- FAS 133: Net
settlement is an explicit requirement to be
scoped into FAS 133 as a derivative
financial instrument.
- Implications:
This is not a major difference since IAS 39
scoped out most of what is not net settled
such as Normal Purchases and Normal Sales (NPNS)
and other instances where physical delivery
transpires in commodities rather than cash
settlements. IAS 39 makes other concessions
to net settlement such as in deciding
whether a "loan obligation" is a derivative
Offsetting amounts due from and owed to
two different parties
- IAS 39:
Required if legal right of set-off and
intent to settle net.
- FAS 133:
Prohibited.
Multiple embedded derivatives in a single
hybrid instrument
- IAS 39:
Sometimes accounted for as separate
derivative contracts
- FAS 133: Always
combined into a single hybrid instrument.
- Implications:
FAS 133 does not allow hybrid instruments to
be hedged items. This restriction can be
overcome in some instances by disaggregating
for implementation of IAS 39.
Subsequent reversal of an impairment loss
- IAS 39:
Previous impairment losses may be reversed
under some circumstances.
- FAS 133:
Reversal is not allowed for HTM and AFS
securities.
- Implications:
The is a less serious difference since Fair
Value Options (FVOs) were adopted by both
the IASB and FASB. Companies can now avoid
HTM and AFS implications by adopting fair
values under the FVO hedged instrument.
Derecognition of financial assets
- IAS 39: It is
possible, under restrictive guidelines, to
derecognise part of an a financial
instrument and no "isolation in bankruptcy"
test is required.
- FAS 133:
Derecognise financial instruments when
transferor has surrendered control in part
or in whole. An isolation bankruptcy test is
required.
- Status: This
inconsistency in the two standards will
probably be resolved in future amendments.
Hedging foreign currency risk in a
held-to-maturity investment
- IAS 39: Can qualify
for hedge accounting for FX risk but not
cash flow or fair value risk.
- FAS 133: Cannot
qualify for hedge accounting.
IAS 39 Hedging foreign currency risk in a
firm commitment to acquire a business in a
business combination
- IAS 39: Can qualify
for hedge accounting.
- FAS 133: Cannot
qualify for hedge accounting.
Assuming perfect effectiveness of a hedge
if critical terms match
- IAS 39: Hedge
effectiveness must always be tested in order
to qualify for hedge accounting.
- FAS 133: The
“Shortcut Method” is allowed for interest
rate swaps.
- Implications:
This is am important difference that will
probably become more political due to
pressures from international bankers.
Use of "basis adjustment"
- IAS 39:
Fair value hedge: Basis is adjusted
when the hedge expires or is dedesignated.
Cash flow hedge: Basis is adjusted
when the hedge expires or is dedesignated.
- FAS 133:
Fair value hedge: Basis is adjusted
when the hedged item is sold or otherwise
utilized in operations such as using raw
material in production (Para 24)
Cash flow hedge of a transaction
resulting in an asset or liability: OCI
or other hedge accounting equity amount
remains in equity and is reclassified into
earnings when the earnings cycle is
completed such as when inventory is sold
rather than purchased or when inventory is
used in the production process. (Para 376)
IAS 39 Macro hedging
- IAS 39: Allows
hedge accounting for portfolios having
assets and/or liabilities with different
maturity dates.
- FAS 133: Hedge
accounting treatment is prohibited for
portfolios that are not homogeneous in
virtually all major respects.
- Implications:
This is pure theory pitched against
practicality, politics, and how industry
hedges portfolios. It is a very sore point
for companies having lots and lots of items
in portfolios that make it impractical to
hedge each item separately.
Fair value accounting politics in the revised
IAS 39
From Paul Pacter's IAS Plus on July 13, 2005
---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
-
Why did the Commission
carve out the full fair
value option in the
original IAS 39
standard?
-
Do
prudential supervisors
support IAS 39 FVO as
published by the IASB?
-
When will the Commission
to adopt the amended
standard for the IAS 39
FVO?
-
Will companies be able
to apply the amended
standard for their 2005
financial statements?
-
Does the amended
standard for IAS 39 FVO
meet the EU endorsement
criteria?
-
What about the
relationship between the
fair valuation of own
liabilities under the
amended IAS 39 FVO
standard and under
Article 42(a) of the
Fourth Company Law
Directive?
-
Will the Commission now
propose amending Article
42(a) of the Fourth
Company Directive?
-
What about the remaining
IAS 39 carve-out
relating to certain
hedge accounting
provisions?
|
|
Bob Jensen's threads and tutorials on FAS
133 and IAS 39 are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm
IAS 39 Implementation Guidance
IAS 39 Amendments in 2005 ---
http://snipurl.com/IAS39amendments
Convergence of foreign and domestic accounting rules could catch some U.S.
companies by surprise
Although many differences remain between U.S. generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and international financial reporting
standards (IFRS), they are being eliminated faster than anyone, even Herz or
Tweedie, could have imagined. In April, FASB and the IASB agreed that all major
projects going forward would be conducted jointly. That same month, the
Securities and Exchange Commission said that, as soon as 2007, it might allow
foreign companies to use IFRS to raise capital in the United States, eliminating
the current requirement that they reconcile their statements to U.S. GAAP. The
change is all the more remarkable given that the IASB was formed only four years
ago, and has rushed to complete 25 new or revamped standards in time for all 25
countries in the European Union to adopt IFRS by this year. By next year, some
100 countries will be using IFRS. "We reckon it will be 150 in five years,"
marvels Tweedie. "That leaves only 50 out."
Tim Reason, "The Narrowing GAAP: The convergence of foreign and domestic
accounting rules could catch some U.S. companies by surprise," CFO Magazine
December 01, 2005 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/5193385/c_5243641?f=magazine_coverstory
Monumental Scholarship (The following book is not online.)
The Early History of Financial Economics 1478-1776
by Geoffrey Poitras (Simon Fraser University) ---
http://www.sfu.ca/~poitras/photo_pa.htm
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2000) --- http://www.e-elgar.co.uk/
Jack Anderson sent the following message:
A good book
on accounting history in the U.S. is
A
History of Accountancy in the United States by Gary John Previts and Barbara
Dubis Merino
It's
available through The Ohio State University Press (see web site
I'm
unaware of a good history of international accounting but would like to hear of one.
The FASB's website is at http://www.iasb.org/
- The FASB added Concepts and Standards at an
unprecedented rate.
- FASB standards have become increasingly complex
and cause a great deal of confusion among both preparers and users of financial
statements. The most dramatic example is the almost-incomprehensible FAS 133 on
Accounting for Derivative Instruments. In fairness, however, it should be noted that
industry has brought on a lot of its own troubles with almost-incomprehensible financing
and employment contracts (many of which are designed for the main purpose of getting
around having to book and/or disclose expenses and debt).
- The FASB has focused much more on the balance
sheet than on the income statement. Over one third of the standards deal with
industry OBSF schemes.
- The FASB does take costs into consideration as
well as benefits of its accounting standards. For example, after studying investor
use of FAS 33 requiring supplemental statements on price-level adjusted statements and
current cost statements, the FASB rescinded FAS 133.
- The FASB also issued a costly and controversial
set of Accounting Concepts. After some dormancy, the FASB is once again adding to
these concepts with its first new concepts statement in over 16 years (Present Value Based
Measurements and Fair Value). Trinity University students may read about this at
J:\courses\Acct5341\readings\Present Value-Based Measurements and Fair
Value.htm.
The future of the FASB and all national standard
setters is cloudy due to the globalization of business and increasing needs for
international standards. The primary body for setting international standards was
the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) that evolved into the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) having a homepage at http://www.iasc.org.uk/ For a
brief review of its history and the history of its standards, I recommend going to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/pacter.htm#003.04.
In 2001, the IASC was restructured into the new
and smaller International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). The majority of the
IASB members will be full-time, whereas the members of the IASC were only part-time and
did not have daily face-to-face encounters with other Board members or the IASC
staff. The IASB will operate more like the FASB in the U.S.
In the early years of its existence, the IASC
tended to avoid controversial issues and there was nothing to back up its standards
(except in the U.S. where lawyers will use almost anything to support litigation brought
by investors against corporations).
Times are changing at the IASC. It has been
restructured and is getting a much greater budget for accounting research. Most
importantly, IASC standards are becoming the standards required by large international
stock exchanges (IOSCO).
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) was established in late 1997 with the mission
of developing globally applicable guidelines for reporting on the economic,
environmental, and social performance, initially for corporations and eventually
for any business, governmental, or non-governmental organisation (NGO). Convened
by the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES)
in partnership with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),
the GRI incorporates the active participation of corporations, NGOs, accountancy
organisations, business associations, and other stakeholders from around the
world business plan --- http://www.globalreporting.org/
Jagdish Gangolly recommends the following book:
Dollars & scholars, scribes & bribes: The story of
accounting by Gary Giroux # Dame Publications, Inc (1996) # ASIN: B0006R6WQS
--- http://snipurl.com/Giroux
Jim McKinney recommends the following book;
It is not a lot more recent but I would consider the US centric text: A
History of Accountancy in the United States: The Cultural Significance of
Accounting by Previtz & Merino published in 1998. It is available in
paperback.
SHARPEN YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE (2005) YEAR'S FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS
AND DEVELOPMENTS ---
http://accountingeducation.com/index.cfm?page=newsdetails&id=141776
Accounting Research
Versus the Accountancy Profession
Perhaps I'm old and tired, but I always think that the chances of finding
out what really is going on are so absurdly remote that the only thing to do
is to say hang the sense of it and just keep yourself occupied.
Douglas Adams
There are two explanations one can give for this
state of affairs here. The first is due to the great English economist Maurice
Dobb according to whom the theory of value was replaced in the United States by
theory of price. May be, the consequence for us today is that we know the price
of everything but perhaps the value of nothing. Economics divorced from politics
and philosophy is vacuous. In accounting, we have inherited the vacuousness by
ignoring those two enduring areas of inquiry.
Professor Jagdish Gangolly, SUNY
Albany
The second is the comment that Joan Robinson made
about American Keynsians: that their theories were so flimsy that they had to
put math into them. In accounting academia, the shortest path to respectability
seems to be to use math (and statistics), whether meaningful or not.
Professor Jagdish Gangolly, SUNY
Albany
Rough notes of David Dennis from an informal panel of veteran accounting
researchers at the American Accounting Association annual meetings in 2007 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Dennis2007.htm
This citation was forwarded by Don Ramsey
"Why business ignores the business schools," by Michael Skapinker,
Financial Times, January 7, 2008
Chief executives, on the other hand, pay little
attention to what business schools do or say. As long ago as 1993, Donald
Hambrick, then president of the US-based Academy of Management, described
the business academics' summer conference as "an incestuous closed loop", at
which professors "come to talk with each other". Not much has changed. In
the current edition of The Academy of Management Journal.
. . .
They have chosen an auspicious occasion on which to
beat themselves up: this year is The Academy of Management Journal's 50th
anniversary. A scroll through the most recent issues demonstrates why
managers may be giving the Journal a miss. "A multi-level investigation of
antecedents and consequences of team member boundary spanning behaviour" is
the title of one article.
Why do business academics write like this? The
academics themselves offer several reasons. First, to win tenure in a US
university, you need to publish in prestigious peer-reviewed journals.
Accessibility is not the key to academic advancement.
Similar pressures apply elsewhere. In France and
Australia, academics receive bonuses for placing articles in the top
academic publications. The UK's Research Assessment Exercise, which
evaluates university research and ties funding to the outcome, encourages
similarly arcane work.
But even without these incentives, many business
school faculty prefer to adorn their work with scholarly tables, statistics
and jargon because it makes them feel like real academics. Within the
university world, business schools suffer from a long-standing inferiority
complex.
The professors offer several remedies. Academic
business journals should accept fact-based articles, without demanding that
they propound a new theory. Professor Hambrick says that academics in other
fields "don't feel the need to sprinkle mentions of theory on every page,
like so much aromatic incense or holy water".
Others talk of the need for academics to spend more
time talking to managers about the kind of research they would find useful.
As well-meaning as these suggestions are, I suspect
the business school academics are missing something. Law, medical and
engineering schools are subject to the same academic pressures as business
schools - to publish in prestigious peer-reviewed journals and to buttress
their work with the expected academic vocabulary.
The schism between academic research and the
business world:
The outside world has little interest in research of the business school
professors
If our research findings were important, there would be more demand for
replication of findings
"Business Education Under the Microscope: Amid growing charges of
irrelevancy, business schools launch a study of their impact on business,"
Business Week, December 26, 2007 ---
http://www.businessweek.com/bschools/content/dec2007/bs20071223_173004.htm
The
business-school world has been besieged by criticism in the
past few months, with prominent professors and writers
taking bold swipes at management education. Authors such as
management expert Gary Hamel and
Harvard Business School Professor
Rakesh Khurana have published books this fall expressing
skepticism about the direction in which business schools are
headed and the purported value of an MBA degree. The
December/January issue of the Academy of Management
Journal includes a
special section in which 10 scholars question the value of
business-school research.
B-school
deans may soon be able to counter that criticism, following
the launch of an ambitious study that seeks to examine the
overall impact of business schools on society. A new Impact
of Business Schools task force convened by the the
Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB)—the
main organization of business schools—will mull over this
question next year, conducting research that will look at
management education through a variety of lenses, from
examining the link between business schools and economic
growth in the U.S. and other countries, to how management
ideas stemming from business-school research have affected
business practices. Most of the research will be new, though
it will build upon the work of past AACSB studies,
organizers said.
The
committee is being chaired by Robert Sullivan of the
University of California at San Diego's
Rady School of Management, and
includes a number of prominent business-school deans
including Robert Dolan of the University of Michigan's
Stephen M. Ross School of Business,
Linda Livingstone of Pepperdine University's
Graziado School of Business & Management, and
AACSB Chair Judy Olian, who is also the dean of UCLA's
Anderson School of Management.
Representatives from Google (GOOG)
and the Educational Testing Service will also participate.
The committee, which was formed this summer, expects to have
the report ready by January, 2009.
BusinessWeek.com reporter
Alison Damast recently spoke with Olian about the committee
and the potential impact of its findings on the
business-school community.
There has been a rising tide of
criticism against business schools recently, some of it from
within the B-school world. For example, Professor Rakesh
Khurana implied in his book
From Higher Aims to Hired Hands
(BusinessWeek.com, 11/5/07) that
management education needs to reinvent itself. Did this have
any effect on the AACSB's decision to create the Impact of
Business Schools committee?
I think that
is probably somewhere in the background, but I certainly
don't view that as in any way the primary driver or
particularly relevant to what we are thinking about here.
What we are looking at is a variety of ways of commenting on
what the impact of business schools is. The fact is, it
hasn't been documented and as a field we haven't really
asked those questions and we need to. I don't think a study
like this has ever been done before.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on the growing
irrelevance of academic accounting research are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
The dearth of research findings replications
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#Replication
Bob Jensen's threads on higher education
controversies are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm
January 2, 2008 reply from David Albrecht
[albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]
Bob,
AACSB chair Judy Olian (dean, UCLA school of biz)
is quoted as saying that 39% of Fortune 500 CEOs are graduates of a
businesss school.
I am surprised that this is such a low number. Why
shouldn't this number be very much higher? Given that corporations are run
by professional managers, why wouldn't the college degree that prepares
professional managers show up with greater frequency in the profile of the
top professional managers?
I don't know how it is possible for this group of
deans to design a research study to show the relevance of business school
education. Well, I don't know how it would be possible for anyone to design
it. Isn't relevance a judgment call?
David Albrecht
January 2, 2008 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi David,
CEOs rise up from many walks of life, especially engineering, economics,
law, and the specialties of an industry such as chemistry, medicine,
agriculture, etc. CFOs and CAOs are another matter entirely.
As far as research impacts are determined, subjective judgment is
certainly a huge factor but there are other indicators. Can executives
recall a single article published in The Accounting Review or other leading
academic accounting journal upon which academic reputations are built? Can
executives name one author who received the AAA Seminal Contributions Award
or any other academic award of major academic associations?
One indicator in accounting is practitioner membership in the American
Accounting Association. The AAA started out as primarily an association for
accounting practitioners and teachers of accounting. For four decades
practitioners were heavily involved in the AAA and the longest-running
editor of The Accounting Review was a practitioner (Kohler) ---
http://snipurl.com/aohkohler
All this changed with what Jean Heck and I call the "perfect storm" of
the 1960s. Since then, practitioner membership steadily declined in the AAA
and readership of academic accounting research journals plummeted to
virtually zero. Practitioners still send us their money and their
recruiters, but leading academic researchers like Joel Demski warn against
accounting researchers catching a "vocational virus" and cringe at aiming
our research talent toward practical problems of the profession for which we
seemingly have no comparative advantage due to our rather useless accountics
skills.
You can read much of the history of this schism at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
The schism is probably greatest in accounting and the smallest in finance
where there practitioners have relied more on research findings and fads in
economics and finance journals.
Some universities are more focused on industry than others. Harvard
certainly has tried very hard in this regard, but Harvard's case method
research just cannot pass the hurdles of the journal referees of our leading
accounting research journals.
And even accounting academics are bored with the (yawn) articles
appearing in our academic research journals. Ron Dye is probably one of our
most esoteric accountics researchers (his degrees are in mathematics and
economics even though he's an "accounting professor"). Ron stated the
following at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
Begin Quote from Ron Dye***************
About the question: by and large, I think it is
a mistake for someone interested in pursuing an academic career in
accounting not to get a phd in accounting. If you look at the "success"
stories, there aren't many: most of the people who make a post-phd
transition fail. I think that happens for a couple reasons. 1. I think
some of the people that transfer late do it for the money, and aren't
really all that interested in accounting. While the $ are nice, it is
impossible to think about $ when you are trying to come up with an idea,
and anyway, you're unlikely to come up with an idea unless you're really
interested in the subject. 2. I think, almost independent of the field,
unless you get involved in the field at an early age, for some reason it
becomes very hard to develop good intuition for the area - which is a
second reason good problems are often not generated by "crossovers."
The bigger thing - not related to the question
you raise - but maybe you could add to the discussion is that there are,
as far as I can tell, not a lot of new ideas being put forth by anyone
in accounting nowadays (with the possible exception of John Dickhaut's
neuro stuff). In most fields, the youngsters are supposed to come up
with the new problems, techniques, etc., but I see a lot more mimicry
than innovation among newly minted phds now.
Anyway, for what it's worth....
Ron
End Quote from Ron Dye****************
_________________
Perhaps the AACSB can make some progress toward bridging the schism. But
I leave you with a forthcoming quote in the January 6 edition of Tidbits:
Question "How many professors does it take to change a light bulb?"
Answer "Whadaya mean, "change"?" Bob Zemsky, Chronicle of Higher
Education's Chronicle Review, December 2007
"The "Bright Star" of B-School Research: Finance While other
academic fields lie almost fallow — drawing criticism for lack of relevance —
examples abound of finance research that makes a difference," by Roy Harris
CFO.com, March 27, 2008 ---
http://cfo.com/article.cfm/10927537/c_10923636
Our
Tuesday article, "Business School for
Dummies?" looked at the drive at
accrediting group ACCSB to move research in the
direction of providing more useful lessons for the
business world.
Even as
business schools draw fire for producing too little
research of real relevance to Corporate America, the
area of finance may be the single most notable exception
— an area in which theory after theory is used to solve
daily business problems.
"Finance is the bright
star," says professor Gabriel Hawawini, one member of the AACSB "Impact of
Research" task force, which strongly suggested in its recent report pressing
for academic studies to do more to fill the needs presented by American
business. "If you ask what contributions have been made, you would put
finance at the top of the list for models, principles, and theories that are
in use today," adds the Hawawini, currently a visiting professor of finance
at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School.
Continued in article
Question
What research methodology flaws are shared by studies in political science and
accounting science?
"Methodological Confusion: How indictments of
The Israel Lobby (by John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen M. Walt, ISBN-13:
9780374177720) expose political science's flaws" by Daniel W. Drezner, Chronicle
of Higher Education's Chronicle Review, February 22, 2008, Page B5 ---
http://chronicle.com/weekly/v54/i24/24b00501.htm
Does the public understand how political science
works? Or are political scientists the ones who need re-educating? Those
questions have been running through my mind in light of the drubbing that
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt received in the American news media
for their 2007 book, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy
(Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007). Pick your periodical — The Economist,
Foreign Affairs, The Nation, National Review, The New Republic, The New York
Times Book Review, The Washington Post Book World — and you'll find a
reviewer trashing the book.
From a political-science perspective, what's
interesting about those reviews is that they are largely grounded in
methodological critiques — which rarely break into the public sphere.
What's disturbing is that the methodologies used in The Israel Lobby and
U.S. Foreign Policy are hardly unique to Mearsheimer and Walt. Are the
indictments of their book overblown, or do they expose the methodological
flaws of the discipline in general?
The most persistent public criticism of Mearsheimer
and Walt has been their failure to empirically buttress their argument with
interviews. Writing in the Times Book Review, Leslie H. Gelb,
president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, criticized their
"writing on this sensitive topic without doing extensive interviews with the
lobbyists and the lobbied." David Brooks, a columnist for The New York
Times, recently seconded that notion: "If you try to write about
politics without interviewing policy makers, you'll wind up spewing all
sorts of nonsense."
That kind of critique has a long pedigree. For
decades public officials and commentators have decried the failure of social
scientists to engage more deeply with the objects of their studies.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson once objected to being treated as a
"dependent variable." The New Republic ran a cover story in 1999 with the
subhead, "When Did Political Science Forget About Politics?"
To the general reader, such critiques must sound
damning. International-relations scholars know full well, however, that
innumerable peer-reviewed articles and university-press books utilize the
same kind of empirical sources that appear in The Israel Lobby. Most
case studies in international relations rely on news-conference transcripts,
official documents, newspaper reportage, think-tank analyses, other
scholarly works, etc. It is not that political scientists never interview
policy makers — they do (and Mearsheimer and Walt aver that they have as
well). However, with a few splendid exceptions, interviews are not the bread
and butter of most international-relations scholarship. (This kind of
fieldwork is much more common in comparative politics.)
Indeed, the claim that political scientists can't
write about policy without talking to policy makers borders on the absurd.
The first rule about policy makers is that they always have agendas — even
in interviews with social scientists. That does not mean that those with
power lie. It does mean that they may not be completely candid in outlining
motives and constraints. One would expect that to be particularly true about
such "a sensitive topic."
Further, most empirical work in political science
is concerned with actions, not words. How much aid has the United States
disbursed to Israel? How did members of Congress vote on the issue? Without
talking to members of Congress, thousands of Congressional scholars study
how the legislative branch acts, by analyzing verifiable actions or words —
votes, speeches, committee hearings, and testimony. Statistical approaches
allow political scientists to test hypotheses through regression analysis.
By Brooks's criteria, any political analysis of, say, 19th-century policy
decisions would be pointless, since all the relevant players are dead.
Other methodological critiques are more difficult
to dismiss. Walter Russell Mead's dissection of The Israel Lobby in Foreign
Affairs does not pull any punches. Mead, a senior fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations, wrote that Mearsheimer and Walt "claim the clarity and
authority of rigorous logic, but their methods are loose and rhetorical.
This singularly unhappy marriage — between the pretensions of serious
political analysis and the standards of the casual op-ed — both undercuts
the case they wish to make and gives much of the book a disagreeably
disingenuous tone."
Mead enumerates several methodological sins, in
particular the imprecise manner in which the "Israel Lobby" is defined in
the book. For their part, the book's authors acknowledge that the term is
"somewhat misleading," conceding that "the boundaries of the Israel Lobby
cannot be identified precisely." It is certainly true that many of the
central concepts in international-relations theory — like "power" or
"regime" — have disputed definitions. But most political scientists deal
with nebulous concepts by explicitly offering their own definition to guide
their research. Even if others disagree, at least the definition is
transparent. In The Israel Lobby, however, Mearsheimer and Walt essentially
rely on a Potter Stewart definition of the lobby: They know it when they see
it. That makes it exceedingly difficult for other political scientists to
test or falsify their hypotheses.
Many of the reviews of the book highlight two flaws
that, disturbingly, are more pervasive in academic political science. The
first is the failure to compare the case in question to other cases. For
example, Mearsheimer and Walt go to great lengths to outline the
"extraordinary material aid and diplomatic support" the United States
provides to Israel. What they do not do, however, is systematically compare
Israel to similarly situated countries to determine if the U.S.-Israeli
relationship really is unique. An alternative, strategic explanation would
posit that Israel falls into a small set of countries: longstanding allies
bordering one or multiple enduring rivals. The category of states that meet
that criteria throughout the time period analyzed by Mearsheimer and Walt is
relatively small: Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey. Compared to
that smaller set of countries, the U.S. relationship with Israel does not
look anomalous. The United States has demonstrated a willingness to expend
blood, treasure, or diplomatic capital to ensure the security of all of
those countries — despite the wide variance in the strength of each's
"lobby."
Continued in article
Daniel W. Drezner is an associate professor of international politics
at the Fletcher School at Tufts University.
Jensen Comment
When I read the above review entitled "Metholological Confusiion" I kept
thinking of the thousands of empirical and analytical studies by accounting
faculty and students that have similar methodology confusions. How many
mathematical/empirical database studies relating accounting events (e.g., a new
standard) with capital market behavior also conduct formal interviews with
investors, analysts, fund managers, etc. Do analytical researchers conduct
formal interviews with real-world decision makers before building their
mathematical models? The majority of behavioral accounting studies conducted by
professors use students as surrogates for real-world decision makers. This
methodology is notoriously flawed and could be helped if the researchers had
also interviewed real-world players.
And Drezner overlooked another common flaw shared by both political science
and
accountics research. If the findings are as important as claimed by
authors, why aren't other researchers frantically trying to replicate the
results? The lack
of replication in accounting science (accountics research) is scandalous
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#Replication
Formal and well-crafted interviews with important players (investors, standard
setters, CEOs, etc.) constitute possible ways of replicating empirical and
analytical findings.
The closest things we have to in-depth contact with real world players in
accounting research is research conducted by the standard setters themselves
such as the FASB, the IASB, the GASB, etc. Sometimes these are interviews,
although more often then not they are comment letters. But accountics
researchers wave off such research as anecdotal and seldom even quote the public
archives of such interviews and comments. Surveys are frequently published but
these tend to be relegated to less prestigious academic research journals and
practitioner journals.
Most importantly of all in accountics is that the leading accounting research
journals for tenure, promotion, and performance evaluation in academe are
devoted to accountics paper. Normative methods, case studies, and interviews are
rarely used in studies published in such journals. The following is a quotation
from “An Analysis of the Evolution of Research Contributions by The Accounting
Review (TAR): 1926-2005,” by Jean L. Heck and Robert E. Jensen, Accounting
Historians Journal, Volume 34, No. 2, December 2007, Page 121.
Leading accounting
professors lamented TAR’s preference for rigor over relevancy [Zeff,
1978; Lee, 1997; and Williams, 1985 and 2003]. Sundem [1987] provides
revealing information about the changed perceptions of authors, almost
entirely from academe, who submitted manuscripts for review between June
1982 and May 1986. Among the 1,148 submissions,
only 39 used archival
(history) methods; 34 of those submissions were rejected.
Another 34
submissions used survey methods; 33 of those were rejected.
And 100 submissions
used traditional normative (deductive) methods with 85 of those being
rejected. Except for
a small set of 28 manuscripts classified as using “other” methods
(mainly descriptive empirical according to Sundem), the remaining larger
subset of submitted manuscripts used methods that Sundem [1987, p. 199]
classified these as follows:
292 General Empirical
172 Behavioral
135 Analytical modeling
119 Capital Market
97 Economic modeling
40 Statistical modeling
29 Simulation
It is clear that by
1982, accounting researchers realized that having mathematical or
statistical analysis in TAR submissions made accountics virtually a
necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition for acceptance for
publication. It became increasingly difficult for a single editor to
have expertise in all of the above methods. In the late 1960s, editorial
decisions on publication shifted from the TAR editor alone to the TAR
editor in conjunction with specialized referees and eventually associate
editors [Flesher, 1991, p. 167]. Fleming et al. [2000, p. 45] wrote the
following:
The big change was in
research methods. Modeling and empirical methods became prominent during
1966-1985, with analytical modeling and general empirical methods
leading the way. Although used to a surprising extent, deductive-type
methods declined in popularity, especially in the second half of the
1966-1985 period.
I think the emphasis highlighted in red above demonstrates
that "Methodological Confusion" reigns supreme in accounting science as well as
political science.
February 22, 2008 reply from James M. Peters
[jpeters@NMHU.EDU]
A couple of years ago, P. Kothari, one of the
Editors of JAE and a full professor at MIT, visited the U. of Maryland to
present a paper. In my private discussion with him, I asked him to identify
what he considered to the the settled findings associated with the last 30
years of capital markets research in accounting. I pointed out that
somewhere over half of all accounting research since Ball and Brown fit into
this category and I was curious as to what the effort had added to Ball and
Brown. That is, what conclusions have been drawn that could be considered
settled ground so that researchers could move on to other topics. His
response, and I quote, was "I understand your point, Jim." He could not
identify one issue that researchers had been able to "put to bed" after all
that effort.
Jim Peters
New Mexico Highlands University
February 22, 2008 reply from J. S. Gangolly
[gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
Jim,
P. Kothari's response is to be expected. I have had
similar responses from at least two ex-editors of TAR; how appropriate a TLA!
But who wants to bell the cats (or call off the naked emperors' bluff)?
Accounting academia knows which side of the bread is buttered.
That you needed to flaunt Kothari's resume to
legitimise his vacuous response shows the pathetic state of accounting
academia.
If accounting academia is not to be reduced to the
laughing stock of accounting practice, we better start listening to the
problems that practice faces. How else can we understand what we profess to
"research"? We accounting academics have been circling our wagons too long
as a ploy to keep our wages arbitrarily high.
In as much as we are a profession, any academic on
such a committee reduces the whole exercise to a farce.
Jagdish
Bob Jensen's threads on research methods in accounting can be found at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm
As David Bartholomae observes, “We make a huge
mistake if we don’t try to articulate more publicly what it is we value in
intellectual work. We do this routinely for our students — so it should not be
difficult to find the language we need to speak to parents and legislators.” If
we do not try to find that public language but argue instead that we are not
accountable to those parents and legislators, we will only confirm what our
cynical detractors say about us, that our real aim is to keep the secrets of our
intellectual club to ourselves. By asking us to spell out those secrets and
measuring our success in opening them to all, outcomes assessment helps make
democratic education a reality.
Gerald Graff, "Assessment Changes
Everything," Inside Higher Ed, February 21, 2008 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2008/02/21/graff
Gerald Graff is professor of English at the University of Illinois at Chicago
and president of the Modern Language Association. This essay is adapted from a
paper he delivered in December at the MLA annual meeting, a version of which
appears on the MLA’s Web site and is reproduced here with the association’s
permission. Among Graff’s books are Professing Literature, Beyond the
Culture Wars and Clueless in Academe: How School Obscures the Life of the Mind.
The consensus report, which was approved by the
group’s international board of directors, asserts that it is vital when
accrediting institutions to assess the “impact” of faculty members’ research on
actual practices in the business world.
"Measuring ‘Impact’ of B-School Research," by Andy Guess, Inside
Higher Ed, February 21, 2008 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/02/22/impact
Ask anyone with an M.B.A.: Business school provides
an ideal environment to network, learn management principles and gain access
to jobs. Professors there use a mix of scholarly expertise and business
experience to teach theory and practice, while students prepare for the life
of industry: A simple formula that serves the school, the students and the
corporations that recruit them.
Yet like
any other academic enterprise, business schools expect their
faculty to produce peer-reviewed research. The relevance,
purpose and merit of that research has been debated almost
since the institutions started appearing, and now a new
report promises to add to the discussion — and possibly stir
more debate. The Association to Advance Collegiate Schools
of Business on Thursday released the final report of its
Impact of Research Task Force, the
result of feedback from almost 1,000 deans, directors and
professors to a preliminary draft circulated in August.
The consensus
report, which was approved by the group’s international
board of directors, asserts that it is vital when
accrediting institutions to assess the “impact” of faculty
members’ research on actual practices in the business world.
But it does not settle on concrete metrics for impact,
leaving that discussion to a future implementation task
force, and emphasizes that a “one size fits all” approach
will not work in measuring the value of scholars’ work.
The report
does offer suggestions for potential measures of impact. For
a researcher studying how to improve manufacturing
practices, impact could be measured by counting the number
of firms adopting the new approach. For a professor who
writes a book about finance for a popular audience, one
measure could be the number of copies sold or the quality of
reviews in newspapers and magazines.
“In the
past, there was a tendency I think to look at the
[traditional academic] model as kind of the desired
situation for all business schools, and what we’re saying
here in this report is that there is not a one-size-fits-all
model in this business; you should have impact and
expectations dependent on the mission of the business school
and the university,” said Richard Cosier, the dean of the
Krannert School of Management at Purdue University and vice
chair and chair-elect of AACSB’s board. “It’s a pretty
radical position, if you know this business we’re in.”
That
position worried some respondents to the initial draft, who
feared an undue emphasis on immediate, visible impact of
research on business practices — essentially, clear
utilitarian value — over basic research. The final report
takes pains to alleviate those concerns, reassuring deans
and scholars that it wasn’t minimizing the contributions of
theoretical work or requiring that all professors at a
particular school demonstrate “impact” for the institution
to be accredited.
“Many
readers, for instance, inferred that the Task Force believes
that ALL intellectual contributions must be relevant to and
impact practice to be valued. The position of the Task Force
is that intellectual contributions in the form of basic
theoretical research can and have been extremely valuable
even if not intended to directly impact practice,” the
report states.
“It also is
important to clarify that the recommendations would not
require every faculty member to demonstrate impact from
research in order to be academically qualified for AACSB
accreditation review. While Recommendation #1 suggests that
AACSB examine a school’s portfolio of intellectual
contributions based on impact measures, it does not specify
minimum requirements for the maintenance of individual
academic qualification. In fact, the Task Force reminds us
that to demonstrate faculty currency, the current standards
allow for a breadth of other scholarly activities, many of
which may not result in intellectual contributions.”
Cosier, who
was on the task force that produced the report, noted that
business schools with different missions might require
differing definitions of impact. For example, a traditional
Ph.D.-granting institution would focus on peer-reviewed
research in academic journals that explores theoretical
questions and management concepts. An undergraduate
institution more geared toward classroom teaching, on the
other hand, might be better served by a definition of impact
that evaluated research on pedagogical concerns and learning
methods, he suggested.
A further
concern, he added, is that there simply aren’t enough
Ph.D.-trained junior faculty coming down the pipeline, let
alone resources to support them, to justify a single
research-oriented model across the board. “Theoretically,
I’d say there’s probably not a limit” to the amount of
academic business research that could be produced, “but
practically there is a limit,” Cosier said.
But
some critics have worried that the
report could encourage a focus on the immediate impact of
research at the expense of theoretical work that could
potentially have an unexpected payoff in the future.
Historically, as the report notes, business scholarship was
viewed as inferior to that in other fields, but it has
gained esteem among colleagues over the past 50 or so years.
In that context, the AACSB has pursued a concerted effort to
define and promote the role of research in business schools.
The report’s concrete recommendations also include an awards
program for “high-impact” research and the promotion of
links between faculty members and managers who put some of
their research to use in practice.
The
recommendations still have a ways to go before they become
policy, however. An implementation task force is planned to
look at how to turn the report into a set of workable
policies, with some especially worried about how the
“impact” measures would be codified. The idea, Cosier said,
was to pilot some of the ideas in limited contexts before
rolling them out on a wider basis.
Jensen Comment
It will almost be a joke to watch leading accountics researchers trying of show
how their esoteric findings have impacted the practice world when the professors
themselves cannot to point to any independent replications of their own work ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#Replication
Is the practice world so naive as to rely upon findings of scientific research
that has not been replicated?
Bob Jensen's threads on assessment are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Assess.htm
February 22, 2008 reply from Ed Scribner
[escribne@NMSU.EDU]
Bob,
I’d surprised to see much reaction from
“accountics” researchers as they are pretty secure, especially since the
report takes pains not to antagonize them. Anyway, in the words of Corporal
Klinger of the 4077th MASH Unit, “It takes a lot of manure to produce one
perfect rose.”
Ed
February 25, 2008 reply from Paul Williams
[Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]
On 24 Feb 2008 at 14:18, David Albrecht
wrote:
>
> I am struck by a
seeming incongruity.
>
> On one hand there is
no respect for accounting research in B-schools. On the other
> hand, publishing
accounting research in peer-reviewed pubs is a requirement for AQ
> status in B-schools.
>
> More and more I am
attracted to Ernest Boyer's description of multiple forms of
> scholarships and
multiple outlets of scholarship.
Re: this conversation.
Ian Shapiro, professor of
Political Science at Yale, has recently published a book "The Flight
from Reality in the Human Sciences" (Princeton U. Press, 2005) that
assures that the problem is not confined to accounting (though it is
more ludicrous a place for a discipline that is actually a practice).
All of the social sciences have succumbed to rational decision theory
and methodological purity to the point that academe now largely deals
with understanding human behavior only within a mathematically tractible
unreality made real in the academy essentially because of its
mathematical tractibility. Jagdish recent post is insightful (and
inciteful to the winners of this game in our academy). The problem the
US academy has defined for itself is not solvable. Optimal information
systems? Information useful for decision making (without any
consideration of the intervening "motives" (potentially infinite in
number) that convert assessments into actions)?
As Bob has so frequently
reminded us replication is the lifeblood of science, yet we never
replicate. But we couldn't replicate if we wanted to because
replication is not the point. Anyone with a passing familiarity with
laboratory sciences knows that a fundamental ethic of those sciences is
the laboratory journal. The purpose of the journal is to provide the
precise recipe of the experiments so that other scientists can
replicate. All research in accounting (that is published in the "top"
journals, at least) is "laboratory research." But do capital market or
principal/agent researchers maintain a log that decribes in minute
detail the innumerable decisions that they made along the way in
assembling and manipulating their data (as chemists and biologists are
bound to do by virtue of the research ethics of their disciplines) ?
No way. From any published article, it is nearly impossible to actually
replicate one of their experiments because the article is never
sufficient documentation. But, of course, that isn't the point.
Producing politically correct academic reputations is what our
enterprise is about. Ideology trumps science every time. We don't want
to know the "truth." Sadly, this suits the profession just fine. (It's
this dream world that permits such nonsensical statements like trading
off relevance for reliability -- how can I know how relevant a datum is
unless I know something about its reliability? Isn't the whole idea of
science to increase the relevance of data by increasing their
reliability?)
Bob Jensen's threads on the sad state of academic accounting research are
at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
Also see
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
Reviving Journalism Schools and Business Schools
For as long as doomsayers have predicted the decline of
civic-minded reportage as we know it, reformers have sought to draft a rewrite
of the institutions that train many undergraduate and graduate students pursuing
a career in journalism. Criticisms of journalism schools have ranged from
questioning whether the institutions are necessary in the first place (since
many journalists, and most senior ones, don’t have journalism degrees) to
debating the merits of teaching practical skills versus theory and whether
curriculums should emphasize broad knowledge or specialization in individual
fields . . . The sessions were part of an effort to evaluate the function of
journalism schools in an age of new media and the public’s declining faith in
the fourth estate: the
Carnegie-Knight
Initiative on the Future of Journalism Education,
which in 2005 enlisted top institutions in the country to bolster their
curriculums with interdisciplinary studies and expose students to different
areas of knowledge, including politics, economics, philosophy and the sciences.
The initiative, funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the John S.
and James L. Knight Foundation, also works with journalism schools to incubate
selected students working on national reporting projects.
Andy Guess, "Reviving the J-School," Inside Higher Ed, January 10, 2008
---
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/01/10/jschools
There are an
increasing number of scholarly videos on this topic at
BigThink: YouTube for Scholars (where
intellectuals may post their lectures on societal issues) ---
http://www.bigthink.com/
Some
of you may benefit by analyzing similarities and differences between the above
tidbit on J-Schools versus the AACSB effort to examine needs for change in
B-Schools.
Key AACSB sites
include the following:
http://www.aacsb.edu/Resource_Centers/AME/AME report.pdf
http://www.aacsb.edu/publications/metf/metfreportfinal-august02.pdf
http://www.aacsb.edu/publications/dfc/default.asp
http://www.aacsb.edu/wxyz/hp-sdc.asp
http://www.aacsb.edu/publications/ValueReport_lores.pdf
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on January 11,
2008
Talking B-School: Teaching the Gospel of Management
by Ron
Alsop
The Wall Street Journal
Jan 08, 2008
Page: B4
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119974268053072925.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
TOPICS: Accounting,
Internal Controls
SUMMARY: Professor
Charles Zech, director of the Center for the study of Church
Management and a professor of economics at Villanova
University, discusses their new MBA program. The article
mentions internal controls needed in church management
practices.
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: Familiarity with specific types of MBA
programs, general educational issues, and the issues of
internal control evident in recent church and clergy
scandals can be discussed in an introductory accounting,
accounting information systems, or auditing class.
QUESTIONS:
1.) You may have seen advertisements for MBA programs
targeted to golf course or ski resort management. In
general, why are different industries targeted in management
education?
2.) Why did Villanova University decide to offer an MBA in
church management? In what ways will Villanova target the
MBA program?
3.) Not all universities may be able to offer this targeted
MBA. Why not?
4.) What is transparency in financial reporting? How do
examples given in the article indicate insufficient
transparency in church management and reporting practices?
5.) What internal control weaknesses are identified in the
article? List each weakness and describe a solution for the
weakness.
6.) How do properly functioning internal controls support
sufficient transparency in financial reporting?
7.) What is the concept of stewardship? How is it discussed
in the objectives of financial reporting in both U.S. and
international conceptual frameworks of accounting?
8.) How do the comments in the article make it clear that
focusing on stewardship better fits church management than
does focusing on other objectives and qualitative
characteristics identified in the conceptual framework of
accounting?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
|
"Teaching the Gospel of Management Program Aims to Bring Transparency To
Church Business Practices," by Ron Alsop, January 8, 2008; Page B4---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119974268053072925.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
The reputations of many Roman Catholic parishes
have been tarnished in recent years, both by the priest sex-abuse scandals
and a growing number of embezzlement cases. That has prompted a burgeoning
movement to improve the management and leadership skills of church officials
through new programs being offered primarily at Catholic universities.
M.B.A. Track columnist Ron Alsop talked recently with Charles Zech, director
of the Center for the Study of Church Management and a professor of
economics at Villanova University's School of Business in Villanova, Pa.,
about the launch of its master's degree in church management in May and the
need for more sophisticated and more transparent business practices in
parishes and religious organizations.
WSJ: Why did Villanova decide to create a
master's degree in church management?
Dr. Zech: We find that business managers at both
the parish and diocesan level often have social work, theology or education
backgrounds and lack management skills. While pastors aren't expected to
know all the nitty-gritty of running a small business, they at least need
enough training in administration to supervise their business managers.
Before starting the degree, we ran some seminars in 2006 and 2007 as a trial
balloon to see if folks were interested enough to pay for management
education. The seminars proved to be quite popular, drawing people from all
over the country, including high-level officials from both Catholic dioceses
and religious orders.
How have the sexual-abuse scandals and
embezzlement cases put a spotlight on poor management and governance
practices?
The Catholic Church has some real managerial
problems that were brought to light by the clergy abuse scandals. It became
quite obvious that the church isn't very transparent and accountable in its
finances. Settlements had been made off the books with abuse victims and
priests had been sent off quietly for counseling, to the surprise of many
parishioners. Then came a string of embezzlement cases. Our center on church
management surveyed chief financial officers of U.S. Catholic dioceses in
2005 and found that 85% had experienced embezzlements in the previous five
years. One of our recommendations was that parishes be audited once a year
by an independent auditor. There clearly are serious questions about
internal financial controls at the parish level, and we are now doing
research on parish advisory councils and asking questions about such things
as who handles the Sunday collection and who has check-writing authority.
Does the same person count the collection, deposit the money and then
reconcile the checkbook? Obviously, you're just asking for problems if it's
the same person; you can imagine the temptations.
Beyond the need for better financial controls,
what other management issues should get more attention from church leaders?
Performance management is definitely an important
but neglected area. That's partly because it's a very touchy issue. Who is
going to appraise the performance of a priest or a church worker who is also
a member of the parish? There's great reluctance on the part of the clergy
to be appraiser or appraisee. You have to view the parish as a family
business and understand that it's like evaluating members of your family.
How will Villanova's church management degree be
different from what other universities have started offering?
Some schools combine standard business classes with
courses from theology and other departments. But if you're taking a regular
M.B.A. finance class, you're learning about Wall Street and other things
that aren't really relevant. What we're doing is creating courses
specifically for this degree program, so there are both business and
faith-based elements in every class. For example, the law course will deal
with civil law relative to church law so students understand the possible
conflicts. The accounting course will cover internal financial-control
issues for churches. And the human-resource management class will include
discussion of volunteers, a big part of the labor force for parishes.
Have you encountered any resistance from church
officials?
Yes, some people say a church is not a business.
But I point out that we still have to be good stewards of our resources --
our financial and human capital -- to carry out God's work on Earth. When
you use management terms with bishops, they often get turned off. But when
you use the word stewardship, it has more impact because it's in the Bible.
Jesus talked about the importance of our being good stewards who take care
of our talents and other gifts.
Is the degree restricted to Catholic clergy and
lay managers?
The courses will have a Catholic focus because as a
Catholic university, our mission is to try to meet the needs of our
community. But the degree is certainly not restricted to Catholics. Every
church has similar managerial problems. In fact, we're eager for other
Christian denominations to become part of the program and provide some
valuable contributions to class discussions. A typical course, however,
would not apply to other religions because of the different way Christian
churches are organized compared with synagogues and other religious
institutions.
Why is the degree being offered primarily
online, with only a one-week residency on campus?
Since we view the market for church-management
education as national and even global, a distance-learning degree will
attract clergy and church workers from any part of the world who can't take
off for two years to come to Villanova. In fact, we already have heard from
a priest in Ireland and a Presbyterian minister in Cameroon interested in
enrolling in the program.
The church management degree costs $23,400. How
can clergy and church workers afford it?
We expect the vast majority of students to be
supported by a diocese or other religious or social service organizations.
We will chop 25% off the price for anyone who can get their organization to
pay a third of the tuition. That cuts a student's out-of-pocket costs by
about half. We're trying to send the message to religious leaders that this
is important and that they should invest in management training.
Bob Jensen's threads on controversies in higher education are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm
"The Theory Fetish: Too Much of a Good Thing? Management journals
demand contributions to theory. But slavish devotion to theory inhibits other
valuable research," by Donald C. Hambrick, Business Week, January 13,
2008 ---
Click Here
Recently I was at a brown-bag seminar where a pair
of faculty colleagues in our business school's department of management
sought advice about a preliminary research idea. We all quickly agreed that
their research question was fascinating and would be of great interest to
both academics and practicing managers. The only problem: The presenters had
no theory.
No theory! Everyone knows that the top scholarly
journals in management require without exception that manuscripts make
contributions to theory. And so we spent the entire session that day going
through our collective mental catalogues of theories. Theories that I'd
never heard of were proposed. Things got a little frenzied: "Good God, there
must be a theory that we can latch onto," someone said.
Losing the Trees for the Forest
Because these researchers are savvy about academic
publishing, their project likely will appear some day in a leading journal.
But the straightforward beauty of the original research idea will probably
be largely lost. In its place will be what we too often see in our journals
and what undoubtedly puts non-scholars off: a contorted, misshapen,
inelegant product, in which an inherently interesting phenomenon has been
subjugated to an ill-fitting theoretical framework.
Many nice things can be said about theory. Theories
help us organize our thoughts, generate coherent explanations, and improve
our predictions. But they are not ends in themselves, and in academic
management we have allowed obsession with theory to compromise the larger
goal of understanding. Most important, perhaps, it prevents the reporting of
rich detail about interesting phenomena for which no theory yet exists but
which, once reported, might stimulate the search for an explanation.
Happily, our sister disciplines in business
education—accounting, finance, and marketing—are not afflicted to the extent
that those of us in management are. But the breadth and variety of the
subjects that fall under the category of management exceed those of the
other business school academic departments; a number of MBA-granting
institutions, in fact, call themselves schools of management. If management
scholars fail to connect with real-life managers or management scholarship
is shrugged off by managers as irrelevant—both of which happen with
regularity—the credibility of all business academe suffers.
Management's idolization of theory began after two
blue-ribbon reports of the late 1950s, from the Carnegie and Ford
foundations, levied withering attacks on business schools for their lack of
academic sophistication. As a result, in the 1960s and 1970s schools adopted
a new commitment to drawing from basic academic disciplines (e.g., economics
and psychology), and to analytic rigor, science, and—above all—theory. Since
then, however, other fields have relaxed their single-mindedness about
theory, while management scholars have not.
Trapped in Inertia?
To confirm this, I recently analyzed the 120
articles published in 2005 by three leading scholarly management
journals—the Academy of Management Journal, the Administrative Science
Quarterly, and Organization Science. Every one contained some variation of
the word "theory." In contrast, only 78% of the 178 articles published in
2005 in the Journal of Marketing, the Journal of Finance, and Accounting
Review contained those words. Moreover, they appeared 18 times, on average,
in each management article, but only eight times, on average, in each
non-management article. Finally, about two-thirds of the articles in the
management journals had section headings that trumpeted "theory," compared
with one in five headings in the non-management journals.
I must admit to uncertainty about the reason for
this continuing fetish; perhaps we in management academe are simply trapped
in our own inertia. But at what a cost! To illustrate, let me take a
hypothetical case from another field that has nothing to do with management
or business.
Continued in article
Great Minds in Management: The Process of Theory Development
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/GreatMinds.htm
"Cornell Theory Center Aids Social Science Researchers,"
PR Web, June 19, 2006 ---
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2006/6/prweb400160.htm
Bob Jensen’s threads
on the
schism between academic research and the business world ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
Question
Given the dire shortages of doctoral students in accountancy, should the
requirement for doctoral degrees be eliminated in higher education?
Perhaps I'm old and tired, but I always think that the chances of finding
out what really is going on are so absurdly remote that the only thing to do
is to say hang the sense of it and just keep yourself occupied.
Douglas Adams
There are two explanations one can give for this
state of affairs here. The first is due to the great English economist Maurice
Dobb according to whom the theory of value was replaced in the United States by
theory of price. May be, the consequence for us today is that we know the price
of everything but perhaps the value of nothing. Economics divorced from politics
and philosophy is vacuous. In accounting, we have inherited the vacuousness by
ignoring those two enduring areas of inquiry.
Professor Jagdish Gangolly, SUNY
Albany
The second is the comment that Joan Robinson made
about American Keynsians: that their theories were so flimsy that they had to
put math into them. In accounting academia, the shortest path to respectability
seems to be to use math (and statistics), whether meaningful or not.
Professor Jagdish Gangolly, SUNY
Albany
There are two
sides to nearly every profession (as opposed to a narrow trade). The first one
is the clinical side, and the second one is the research side. But this is not
to say that the twain do not meet.
I advocate
requiring that most (maybe not all) clinical instructors be grounded solidly in
research. Requiring a PhD is a traditional way to get groundings in research.
Probably more importantly is that doctoral studies are ways to motivate
clinically-minded students to attempt to do research on clinical issues and make
important contributions to the practicing profession.
I define
“research” as a contribution to new knowledge. Among other things a good
doctoral program should make scholars more appreciative of good research and
critical of bad/superficial research that does not contribute to much of
anything that is relevant, including research that should get
Senator William Proxmire's
Golden Fleece Awards. Like urban cowboys, our academic accounting
researchers are all hat (mathematical/statistical models) with no cows.
The problem with
accountancy doctoral programs is that they’ve become narrowly bounded by
accountics (especially econometrics and psychometrics) that in the past three
decades have made little progress toward helping the clinical side of our
profession of accountancy. This makes our doctoral programs very much unlike
those in economics, finance, medicine, science, and engineering where many
clinical advances in their disciplines have emerged from studies in doctoral
programs.
The problem with
higher education in accountancy is not that we require doctoral degrees
in our major colleges and universities. The problem is that our doctoral
programs shut out research methodologies that are perhaps better suited for
making research discoveries that really help the clinical side of our
profession. Accountics models just do not deal well with missing variables and
nonstationarities that must be allowed for on the clinical side of accountancy.
Humanities researchers face many of these same issues and have evolved a much
broader arsenal of research methodologies that are
verboten in accounting
doctoral programs --- (See below).
The related
problem is that our leading scholars running those doctoral programs have taken
a supercilious view of the clinical side of our profession. Or maybe it’s just
that these leaders do not want to take the time and trouble to learn the
clinical side of the profession. Once again I repeat the oft-quoted referee of
an Accounting Horizons rejection of Denny Beresford’s 2005 submission
I quote from
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
*************
1. The paper provides specific recommendations for things that accounting
academics should be doing to make the accounting profession better. However
(unless the author believes that academics' time is a free good) this would
presumably take academics' time away from what they are currently doing. While
following the author's advice might make the accounting profession better, what
is being made worse? In other words, suppose I stop reading current academic
research and start reading news about current developments in accounting
standards. Who is made better off and who is made worse off by this reallocation
of my time? Presumably my students are marginally better off, because I can tell
them some new stuff in class about current accounting standards, and this might
possibly have some limited benefit on their careers. But haven't I made my
colleagues in my department worse off if they depend on me for research advice,
and haven't I made my university worse off if its academic reputation suffers
because I'm no longer considered a leading scholar? Why does making the
accounting profession better take precedence over everything else an academic
does with their time?
**************
Joel Demski
steers us away from the clinical side of the accountancy profession by saying we
should avoid that pesky “vocational virus.” (See below).
The (Random House) dictionary defines "academic" as
"pertaining to areas of study that are not primarily vocational or applied , as
the humanities or pure mathematics." Clearly, the short answer to the question
is no, accounting is not an academic discipline.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline?" Accounting
Horizons, June 2007, pp. 153-157
Statistically there are a few youngsters who came to
academia for the joy of learning, who are yet relatively untainted by the
vocational virus.
I urge you to nurture your taste for learning, to follow your joy. That is the
path of scholarship, and it is the only one with any possibility of turning us
back toward the academy.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline? American
Accounting Association Plenary Session" August 9, 2006 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm
Too many
accountancy doctoral programs have immunized themselves against the “vocational
virus.” The problem lies not in requiring doctoral degrees in our leading
colleges and universities. The problem is that we’ve been neglecting the
clinical needs of our profession. Perhaps the real underlying reason is that our
clinical problems are so immense that academic accountants quake in fear of
having to make contributions to the clinical side of accountancy as opposed to
the clinical side of finance, economics, and psychology.
Our problems with doctoral programs in accountancy are shared with other
disciplines, notably education and nursing schools.
Bob Jensen's threads on controversies in higher education are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm
Linking Research and Teaching in History: Case Studies ---
http://www.hca.heacademy.ac.uk/resources/case_Studies/snas/index.php
Linking Research and Teaching in History For
academic historians the link between research and teaching is regarded as an
integral part of the provision of a high-quality history education: vital to
teachers and students and to the ongoing health of the discipline.
These resources have been compiled as part of a
Higher Education Academy project on linking teaching and research in the
disciplines. The project's aim is to provide case-studies of existing
practice alongside a review essay considering the nature of the
research-teaching relationship in each discipline. Whilst the resources are
intended in the first instance for new members of academic staff, they will
be of interest to anyone who wishes to reflect on the research-teaching
nexus in History and the ways in which academic historians have translated
this in the context of their teaching.
Our Subject Centre is very keen to build upon this
collection of case-studies. We would welcome further contributions so that
we can create a resource for our community that reflects the importance of
this topic and the wealth of experience that historians have in linking
their research and teaching at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels.
Jensen Comment
The above site may be of interest to the accounting academy for a number of
reasons:
- Accountancy doctoral programs over the past three decades have virtually
dropped all research methodologies other than social science methodologies (Click
Here). The above case studies lend insight to how research methodologies
from the humanities could give greater breadth to accounting doctoral
studies. This could serve at least two purposes. First, it might attract
more accountants into doctoral programs, especially those that have little
aptitude for and interest in studying four years of accountics (advanced
mathematics, econometrics, statistics, and psychometrics). Second, Second it
might allow doctoral programs to expose doctoral
students to instructors, mentors, and advisors who have specialties in
something other than accountics.
- There's a gray zone between research methods and research techniques.
Accounting researchers in general should learn more about the techniques of
history and other humanities researchers ---
http://www.hca.heacademy.ac.uk/resources/case_Studies/snas/lloyd-jones.doc
- There is presently an expectations/readership gap between academic
research papers in leading accounting research journals and the profession
of accountancy and students studying to enter that profession. Perhaps some
of the case studies in the site mentioned above can be extended to show the
links between academic accounting research and practice. In a limited way,
the AICPA has already undertaken such an effort.
April 14, 2007 message from Ron Huefner
[rhuefner@acsu.buffalo.edu]
The Journal of Accountancy (AICPA) has
begun a new series of articles to review accounting research papers and
explain them to practitioners. The April issue has an article on "Mining
Auditing Research."
It summarizes about a dozen research articles,
mostly from The Accounting Review, but also including articles from JAR,
CAR, AOS, and the European Accounting Review.
The link for this article is: <http://aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/apr2007/boltlee.htm>
This may be useful in bringing research
findings into classes
Ron
- The Higher Education Academy site mentioned above may inspire students
and faculty to have a greater appreciation how important history is to
knowledge and future research in virtually all disciplines of study.
Technology is perhaps helping history more than most disciplines. A problem
with history is that there's so much of it in our libraries, information
databases, and knowledge bases. Another problem is that history is so
compartmentalized by dates, cultures, topic areas, etc. Technology enables
researchers/scholars to more efficiently mine these stored bases of
information and knowledge. Efforts by Google and Microsoft to digitize
millions of collegiate and public library works will help bring history
together. See
http://books.google.com/advanced_book_search
Also note the "Reflective Log Case Study" at
http://www.hca.heacademy.ac.uk/resources/case_Studies/snas/drummond.doc
Question
Is accounting an "academic" discipline?
The (Random House) dictionary defines "academic" as
"pertaining to areas of study that are not primarily vocational or applied , as
the humanities or pure mathematics." Clearly, the short answer to the question
is no, accounting is not an academic discipline.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline?" Accounting Horizons,
June 2007, pp. 153-157
Statistically there are a few youngsters who came to
academia for the joy of learning, who are yet relatively untainted by the
vocational virus. I
urge you to nurture your taste for learning, to follow your joy. That is the
path of scholarship, and it is the only one with any possibility of turning us
back toward the academy.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline?
American Accounting Association Plenary Session" August 9, 2006 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm
Jensen Comment
Joel's lament is a bit confusing since for the past four decades, virtually all
doctoral programs have replaced accounting professional content with
mathematics, statistics, econometrics, psychometrics, and sociometrics content
to a fault and to a point where very few accountants are interested in applying
for accountancy doctoral programs ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
The decline in doctoral program graduates (to less than 100 per year in the
United States) combined with the scientific requirements for publication in
leading academic accounting research journals resulted in the academy serving
the accountancy profession less and less over the past few decades:
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/03MainDocumentMar2007.htm
It would help if Joel would be more explicit about what types of basic
"academic" research studies qualify as "accounting research" and why there is
virtually none of it being produced according to his paper and his address to
the AAA membership in August 2006. In particular, I would like to know what
types of academic "accounting" publications set academic accounting apart from
mathematical economics and mathematics disciplines such that these basic
research contributions can still be called "accounting" research that is not
applied (in the sense of his definition of "academic" research as not being
applied).
Following Joel's paper is a paper by the same title "is Accounting an
Academic Discipline?" by John C. Fellingham, Accounting Horizons, June
2007, pp. 159-163. John features the following quotation from Henry Rand
Hatfield in 1924:
I am sure that all of us who teach accounting in
the university suffer from the implied contempt of our colleagues, who look
upon accounting as an intruder, a Saul among the prophets, a paria whose
very presence detracts somewhat from the sanctity of the academic halls.
Henry Rand Hatfield, "An Historical Defense of Bookkeeping,"
Journal of Accountancy, 1924.
I consider this quotation to be inappropriate in 2007. Professor Hatfield was
referring to the teaching of bookkeeping which is no longer the mundane
vocational subject matter of college accounting in the past fifty or more years.
I consider most of what we now teach in college accountancy to be very
appropriate in service to the accountancy profession. You can read more about
accounting education in Hatfield's time in the following historic papers:
Allen, C. E. (1927), "The growth of accounting instruction since 1900," The
Accounting Review (June): 150-166 ---
http://maaw.info/TheAccountingReview.htm Click on the "Non USF User Link"
Atkins, P. M. (1928), "University instruction in industrial cost
accounting," The Accounting Review," (December): 345-363 ---
http://maaw.info/TheAccountingReview.htm Click on the "Non USF User
Link"
Atkins, P. M. (1929), "University instruction in
industrial cost accounting," The Accounting Review (March):
23-32 ---
http://maaw.info/TheAccountingReview.htm Click on the "Non USF User
Link"
I guess what I'm really trying to say is that accountancy is a profession
like law is a profession, medicine is a profession, architecture is a
profession, engineering is a profession, pharmacy is a profession, etc. Why does
the academy need to apologize for teaching to the profession of accountancy when
in fact the academy is very proud to serve those other highly esteemed
professions. I do not see schools of law and schools of medicine apologizing to
the world for nobly serving those professions.
Both Demski and Fellingham made emotional appeals for academic accounting
researchers to make noteworthy contributions to the "true academic disciplines"
as quoted by Fellingham on Page 163. Not only should this be a goal, but in a
sense they are arguing that this should be a primary goal far above the goal of
serving the accountancy profession. I fail to note similar appeals being made by
professors of law and medicine and engineering. These professions do distinguish
between clinical versus research publications and teaching, but in general they
do not further glorify their research if it cannot conceivably have some
relevance to their professions. Indeed, even the most basic chemical and
physiological research in medicine still takes place with an eye toward eventual
relevance to human health.
I might also note that both law and medicine also publish some academic
research that is not based upon esoteric mathematics and statistics. For
example, historical and philosophical research methodologies are still allowed
in their most prestigious academic law and science journals, which currently is
not the case for leading academic accounting research journals.
By way of example, since Joel Demski took charge of the accounting doctoral
program at the University of Florida, every applicant to that doctoral program
cannot even matriculate into the program before pre-requisites of advanced
mathematics are satisfied.
Students are required to demonstrate math
competency prior to matriculating the doctoral program. Each student's
background will be evaluated individually, and guidance provided on ways a
student can ready themselves prior to beginning the doctoral course work.
There are opportunities to complete preparatory course work at the
University of Florida prior to matriculating our doctoral program.
University of Florida Accounting Concentration
---
http://www.cba.ufl.edu/fsoa/docs/phd_AccConcentration.pdf
Why does every candidate have to qualify in advanced mathematics rather than
allowing substitutes such as advanced philosophy or advanced legal studies?
I might also add that science and medicine academic journals also still place
monumental priorities on replications of research findings. Leading academic
accounting research journals will not even publish replications and mostly as a
result it is very difficult to find replications of most of the top academic
accounting research papers published by so-called leading accounting researchers
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Replication
More of my rants on this can be found in the following links:
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/03MainDocumentMar2007.htm
Question
Are college students good surrogates for real life studies?
The majority of behavioral experiments in accounting have used students as
experimental subjects.
"Too Many Studies Use College Students As Their Guinea Pigs," by Carl Bialik,
The Wall Street Journal, August 10, 2007; Page B1---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118670089203393577.html?mod=todays_us_marketplace
Many of the numbers that make news about how we
feel, think and behave are derived from studying a narrow population:
college students. It's cheap for social scientists to tap into the on-campus
research pool -- everyone from psychology majors who must participate in
studies for course credit to students who respond to posters promising a few
bucks if they sign up.
Consider just three studies that have received
press in the past month. In one, muscular men were twice as likely as their
less well-built brethren to have had more than three sex partners -- at
least according to 99 UCLA undergraduates. Another, an examination of six
separate studies that tape-recorded college students' conversations, found
that women, despite being stereotyped as relatively chatty, spoke just 3%
more words each day than men. And in the third, 40 undergraduates at
Washington University in St. Louis were 6% more likely to complete verbal
jokes and 14% more likely to complete visual jests than 41 older study
participants.
College students are "essentially free," says Brian
Nosek, a psychology professor at the University of Virginia. "We walk out of
our office, and there they are." The epitome of a convenience sample, they
have become the basis for what some critics call the "science of the
sophomore."
But psychologists may be getting what they pay for.
College students aren't representative by age, wealth, income, educational
level or geographic location. "What if you studied 7-year-old kids and made
inferences about geriatrics?" asks Robert Peterson, a marketing professor at
the University of Texas, Austin. "Everyone would say you can't do that. But
you can use these college students."
Prof. Peterson scoured the literature for examples
of studies that examined the same psychological relationships in students
and nonstudents. In almost half of the 63 relationships he examined, there
were major discrepancies between students and nonstudents: The two groups
either produced contradictory results, or one showed an effect at least
twice as great as the other.
In a follow-up study, not yet published, Prof.
Peterson demonstrated that even college students are far from homogeneous.
With help from faculty at 58 schools in 31 states, he surveyed undergraduate
business students across the country and found that they vary widely from
school to school. That means a professor studying the relationship between
students' attitudes toward capitalism and business ethics at one school
could reach a sharply different conclusion than a professor at another
school.
"People have always been aware of this issue,"
Prof. Peterson says, but many have chosen to ignore it. A 1986 paper by
David Sears, a UCLA psychology professor, documented the increased use of
college students for research in the prior quarter century and explored the
potential biases that might introduce. In the meantime, the use of college
students has, if anything, risen, researchers say.
Authors of the recent studies on sex, chattiness
and humor acknowledge the limitations of their research pool. But they argue
that college students do just fine for purposes of studying basic cognitive
processes. Others agree. "If you think all people have the same attitudes as
introductory psychology students, that's really problematic," says Tony
Bogaert, a psychology professor at Brock University in St. Catharines,
Ontario. "But if you're looking at cognitive processes, intro psych students
probably work OK."
After all, every study is hampered by possible
differences between those who volunteer to participate and those who don't,
whether they're college students or a broader group.
In any case, the fault often lies not with the
researchers, who are careful not to overstate the impact of their findings,
but with the news articles suggesting the numbers apply to all humanity.
"Even if you only focus on college students, the results are still
generalizable to millions of Americans," says David Frederick, a UCLA
psychology graduate student and lead author of the study on muscularity and
sex partners.
Prof. Nosek, a critic of the science of the
sophomore, responds that college students are still developing their
personalities and behavior. "There is no other time outside my life as an
undergraduate where I thought it would be a good idea to wear all my clothes
inside out," he says, or to "stay up for as many hours in a row as I could
just to see what happens."
To widen the pool of people answering questions
about, say, all-nighters, Prof. Nosek has submitted a proposal to the
National Institutes of Health to fund the creation of an international,
online research panel. That would build on studies his laboratory has
already administered online at ProjectImplicit.net.
Online research has its own problems, but at least
it taps into the hundreds of millions of people who are online globally,
rather than just the hundreds of people enrolled in Psych 101.
"The scientific reward structure does not benefit
someone who puts in the enormous effort" to create a representative research
sample, Prof. Nosek says. "The way to change researchers' data habits is to
make it easier to collect data in a more generalizable way."
Question
When should professors add practitioners to their courses?
"Mixing Theory and Practice on Defense Policy," by Andy Guess, Inside
Higher Ed, August 8, 2007 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/08/08/defense
In a class about United Nations regulations on the
laws of war, the discussion turned inevitably to Star Trek.
When the U.N. authorizes sanctions against a
particular nation, said Ilan Berman, the professor, the institution acts
much like the Borg — in the show’s universe, a mechanized force of cyborg
mercenaries bent on assimilating all of mankind. The analogy was lost on
most of the class, but Berman drove the point home for those who didn’t
regularly tune in to syndicated science fiction programs in the early 1990s:
Each member nation must act as part of the collective.
The lecture, peppered as it was with the occasional
pop culture reference, covered a lot of ground, from the U.S. national
security strategy to the justifications for nations’ use of force. The
students in the class — five were present on a Monday night in July for the
elective — come from a range of backgrounds, several of them working
full-time, but all in the program with an eye toward defense policy, whether
in the government, consulting or think tanks.
In Washington, those are hardly unorthodox goals.
Programs in defense or security studies churn out students every year in the
nation’s capital, from well-known and respected institutions such as Johns
Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and Georgetown
University’s School of Foreign Service, and also outside the Beltway at
places like Harvard (Kennedy) and Princeton (Wilson). The students in
Berman’s class, tucked in a conference room on the seventh floor of a
corporate office building in Fairfax, Va., are part of a relatively new
experiment: What if a state school in Springfield, Mo., operated a satellite
campus alongside the established players in defense studies?
So far, enrollments have been growing each year
since the unit opened shop in 2005 within commuting distance from the city,
sandwiched between a rapidly developing apartment complex and an office
park. The Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, a part of Missouri
State University, caters to students who want to break into Beltway defense
circles with a public university price tag and the advantages of a more
practical approach. In doing so, it offers a two-year M.S. degree that
requires both coursework and internships.
Having access to actual practitioners in the
classroom means, in this case, connections to defense and foreign policy
officials in the government. As with others like it, the program has had a
long revolving-doors tradition, starting from its original incarnation in
the early 1970s at the University of Southern California, where it was
founded by a former defense official who served on the SALT I delegation,
William R. Van Cleave, and partially funded by the free-market Earhart
Foundation. But unlike at similar departments elsewhere, Missouri State’s
full-time faculty of three and its nine affiliated lecturers tend to come
mainly from positions in Republican administrations and conservative-leaning
institutions.
Continued in article
Jensen Comment
Some years back Professor Sharon Lightner (UC at San Diego) put together a
really interesting online course for students, practitioners, and accounting
standard setters in six different countries where the classes met synchronously.
"An Innovative Online International Accounting Course on Six Campuses Around the
World" ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/255light.htm
Question
Does faculty research improve student learning in the classrooms where
researchers teach?
Put another way, is research more important than scholarship that does not
contribute to new knowledge?
Major Issue
If the answer leans toward scholarship over research, it could monumentally
change criteria for tenure in many colleges and universities.
AACSB
International: the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business, has
released for comment
a report calling for the accreditation process for
business schools to evaluate whether faculty research improves the learning
process. The report expresses the concern that accreditors have noted the volume
of research, but not whether it is making business schools better from an
educational standpoint.
Inside Higher Ed, August 6, 2007 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/08/06/qt
"Controversial Report on Business School Research Released
for Comments," AACSB News Release, August 3, 2007 ---
http://www.aacsb.edu/Resource_Centers/Research/media_release-8-3-07.pdf
FL (August 3,
2007) ― A report released today evaluates the nature and purposes of
business school research and recommends steps to increase its value to
students, practicing managers and society. The report, issued by the Impact
of Research task force of AACSB International, is released as a draft to
solicit comments and feedback from business schools, their faculties and
others. The report includes recommendations that could profoundly change the
way business schools organize, measure, and communicate about research.
AACSB
International, the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business,
estimates that each year accredited business schools spend more than $320
million to support faculty research and another half a billion dollars
supports research-based doctoral education.
“Research is
now reflected in nearly everything business schools do, so we must find
better ways to demonstrate the impact of our contributions to advancing
management theory, practice and education” says task force chair Joseph A.
Alutto, of The Ohio State University. “But quality business schools are not
and should not be the same; that’s why the report also proposes
accreditation changes to strengthen the alignment of research expectations
to individual school missions.”
The task force
argues that a business school cannot separate itself from management
practice and still serve its function, but it cannot be so focused on
practice that it fails to develop rigorous, independent insights that
increase our understanding of organizations and management. Accordingly, the
task force recommends building stronger interactions between academic
researchers and practicing managers on questions of relevance and developing
new channels that make quality academic research more accessible to
practice.
According to
AACSB President and CEO John J. Fernandes, recommendations in this report
have the potential to foster a new generation of academic research. “In the
end,” he says, “it is a commitment to scholarship that enables business
schools to best serve the future needs of business and society through
quality management education.”
The Impact of
Research task force report draft for comments is available for download on
the AACSB website:
www.aacsb.edu/research. The website
also provides additional resources related to the issue and the opportunity
to submit comments on the draft report. The AACSB Committee on Issues in
Management Education and
Board of Directors
will use the feedback to determine the next steps for implementation.
The AACSB International Impact of Research Task Force
Chairs:
Joseph A. Alutto, interim president, and
John W. Berry, Senior Chair in Business, Max M. FisherCollege of Business,
The Ohio State University
K. C. Chan, The Hong Kong University of Science and
Technology
Richard A. Cosier, Purdue University
Thomas G. Cummings, University of Southern California
Ken Fenoglio, AT&T
Gabriel Hawawini, INSEAD and the University of Pennsylvania
Cynthia H. Milligan, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Myron Roomkin, Case Western Reserve University
Anthony J. Rucci, The Ohio State University
Teaching Excellence Secondary to Research for Promotion,
Tenure, and Pay ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm#TeachingVsResearch
Bob Jensen's threads on higher education controversies
are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm
My letter to Kate
Now that the 2007 Annual Meetings
are ended and it is public information that finance professor Erik Lie
(University of Iowa) won the AICPA/AAA Notable Contributions to Accounting
Literature Award, I feel compelled to make my letter to Kate written on May 17
public. This year I served on the Part 2 selection committee that chose Erik Lie
from the list of candidates submitted to us by the Part 1 Screening Committee.
Professor Lie's contribution was truly notable and deserving of this award for
2007.
But I have serious reservations
about the Part 1 Screening Committee's choices over the past two decades. I
think it's been a rigged game in which the Part 2 Selection Committee has no
choice but to choose an esoteric "accountics" article published in an academic
research journal.
My letter to Kate is entirely
consistent with the long tidbit below received from Paul Williams on August 10,
2007 after the AAA 2007 Annual Meetings in Chicago. Kate was chair of our 2007
Selection Committee but not the 2007 Screening Committee.
You can read my letter to Kate
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2007NotableLiteratureAward.htm
An important
aspect of this debate is the timing of the fall off of practitioner interest in
academic accounting research. Both public and managerial accountants at one time
followed very closely the theory and practice research of academic accountants
much like lawyers take an interest in law school research, physicians take an
interest in medical research, engineers take an interest in engineering school
research, etc. We had it made until the 1960s. Then accounting practitioner
interest in our research virtually zeroed out in the ensuing decades. We no
longer serve our profession, although we try and try to make a contribution to
the economics and finance professions. Joel Demski in a plenary speech in
Washington DC called serving the accounting profession a “vocational virus” to
avoid so that doing research can be “more fun.” As Judy Rayburn pointed out when
she was President Elect of the AAA, the citation records indicate that there is
little interest by anybody, including finance and economics professor, in our
leading accountics research.
I think the
telltale turning point was when accountics professors took over the refereeing
of articles in the leading accounting research journals in the 1960s and 1970s.
Before then practitioners took a keen interest in both our top journals like
The Accounting Review and our sessions/debates at AAA annual meetings.
Between 1925 and 1965 practitioners published articles in TAR and had more
members in the AAA than did colleges. In fact the longest running editor
(Kohler) of TAR was a practitioner ---
http://fisher.osu.edu/departments/accounting-and-mis/the-accounting-hall-of-fame/membership-in-hall/eric-louis-kohler/
Now practitioner
participation in the AAA is virtually zero except for PR partners and PR staff
employees of large firms. How long has it been since a practitioner
published/cited a paper in TAR or Accounting Horizons?
It’s very
revealing to compare the titles and authors of papers published in TAR between
1925 and 1965 versus those published 1966-2008.
Zeff and Granof claim that leading published research was just more
interesting before the 1960s.
You can read
more about the “Perfect Storm” of the 1960s that ended practitioner interest in
leading academic accounting research at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
The FASB now
sees little interest in even keeping an academic on the Board. I’m sure
Katherine and Tom did their best, but we did not give them enough good material
to bring to the Board.
An Analysis of the
Contributions of The Accounting Review Across 80 Years: 1926-2005 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
Co-authored with Jean Heck and forthcoming in the December 2007 edition of the
Accounting Historians Journal.
Bob Jensen's threads on the sad state of
academic accounting research ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
David Dennis organized a
discussion panel to address the state of academic research in accounting. I
could not be at the AAA meetings this year. But Paul Williams was on the panel
and sent out the following message to panel members.
Paul Williams (North Carolina
State University) Weighs in Once Again on the Sad State of Accounting Research
in the Academy. Paul gave me permission to post his email message to the panel
members.
August 10, 2007 message from Paul
Williams [Paul_Williams@ncsu.edu]
It is a source of constant
frustration that there exists reams of "empirical evidence" that the US
academy is as we trouble makers say it is. For folks who claim to worship
empirical evidence there is a great reluctance to consider it. Jacci
Rodgers and I have another paper that you didn't include that was published
in The Accounting Historians Journal that dealt with authors during the same
period of time as our editors' paper.
We did a comparison of elite
school graduates appearances as authors in TAR (The Accounting
Review) with their proportion in the population of North American PhDs
(a procedure that was biased in that it overstates the proportion of elite
graduates who were in the effective population of people of publishing
age). In Table 3 of that paper we report the proportion of appearance by
elite grads and their proportion of the total North American PhD population
at the beginnning of each TAR editor's term starting with
Trumball, the first editor to have a published
editorial board, the first number is proportion of appearances and the
second is proportion of PhDs:
Editor
Trumball: 63.6/63.5
Griffin:
71.3/59.6
Hendrickson: 75/53.7
Keller:
61.1/50.3
Decoster:
63/45.2
Zeff:
51.9/43.1
Sundem:
47.1/38
Kinney:
50.6/34.7
Abdel-khalik: 56.6/33
Through Zeff and Sundems' editorships we start to see
the effects of the emergence of the many new doctoral programs that were
created during the 1970s. The dilution of elite school dominance proceeded
apace through time as the elite became a smaller proportion of the total
population. I had a paper accepted in TAR by both Zeff and Sundem: both
experiences were good. Both Zeff and Sundem were open-minded and quite
helpful during the process; the reviews were constructive.
But this expected demographically induced trend
dramatically reversed itself after Sundem's editorship. Since that time the
elite appearances among authors has hovered, Avogadro's number-like around
the mid-60 percent mark -- the proportion that prevailed when Trumball was
editor. All of a sudden the virtues of scholarship that Zeff and Sundem
were able to recognize in the work of people not trained at elite schools as
conventional economists disappeared. The ideologues took over by default
because of TAR's fear of losing so much reputational ground to JAR and JAE.
TAR became a JAR and JAE clone. It hasn't changed since.
So why doesn't Bill McCarthy get enough good systems
papers? Perhaps it's because we haven't been terribly interested, for nearly
25 years, in training in U.S. PhD programs people who could do quality
systems, or sociological, or historical, or legal, or anthropological work
in accounting. As Jagdish Gangolly noted on the AECM, finance types
reproduce like mosquitoes, but it is a struggle for anyone interested in
some "causal delta" other than neoclassical economics to find a place to
study.
Today, with the exception of a couple of places, you
have to go outside the United States. Why submit a paper to TAR when the
editorial process is not one to be trusted? Those of us who have been in
the AAA a long time have heard these promises of "inclusiveness" before.
They were hot air then, they're hot air now unless the TAR editorial process
is willing to take a laxative and publish some papers that may not be the
best (there are an awful lot of "main-stream" papers published that aren't
very good, either).
TAR has to signal it isn't telling us another fib and
that involves more than just passively sitting around waiting for papers to
come. Trust has been lost and you won't get it back by chastising the
mistrustful. Wouldn't it be refreshing to see someone from the editorial
board show up at conferences like IPA, APIRA, CPA, . . . etc. to press the
flesh and find out what the rest of the world thinks?
It is perhaps not a coincidence that the only two
papers ever published in TAR informed by critical literature (papers by Chua
and Hines) were ushered through the review process by Sundem. Nothing of
that kind has ever appeared in TAR since.
Even JAR published a paper by Peter Miller!
David: kudos on your item 8. As the U.S. has become
the O.E.C.D. country with the most skewed distribution of income and wealth
and as our great experiment in democracy appears more and more each day to
be less and less robust (see Prem Sikka's work on the extensiveness of
accounting corruption), we get a scholarly community primarily fixated on
individual career enhancement through the engineering of a linear model with
an R-squared of seldom double digits explaining yet some other absurdity
about why Nozickian justice is the sine qua non of human existence.
I have seen literally thousands of those models
over the years and no two have ever born any resemblance to each other.
What kind of "models" are really only unique
representations of themselves? Thank you for organizing the panel and
allowing me to participate.
Paul
Paul Williams
paul_williams@ncsu.edu
(919)515-4436
The Financial Accounting Standards Board recently approached Bloomfield
about studying how to create financial accounting standards that will assist
investors as much as possible, he quickly turned to the virtual world for
answers.
"Theory Meets Practice Online: Researchers and academics are looking to
online worlds such as Second Life to shed new light on old economic questions,"
by Francesca Di Meglio, Business Week, July 24, 2007 ---
Click Here
In fact, many economics researchers, including
Bloomfield, professor of accounting at Cornell's Johnson Graduate School of
Management, are using the virtual environment to test ideas involving
staples of economics such as game theory, the effects of regulation, and
issues involving money. Since 1989, Bloomfield has been running experiments
in the lab in which he creates small game economies to study narrow issues.
But when the Financial Accounting Standards Board recently approached
Bloomfield about studying how to create financial accounting standards that
will assist investors as much as possible, he quickly turned to the virtual
world for answers.
"It would be very difficult to look at the complex
issues that FASB is trying to address with eight people in a laboratory
playing a very simple economic game," he says. "I started looking for how I
could create a more realistic economy with more players dealing with a high
degree of complexity. It didn't take me long to realize that people in
virtual worlds are already doing just that."
. . .
At
Indiana University, researcher Edward Castronova has posed
the idea of creating multiple virtual economies to study the
effects of different regulatory policies. At Indiana,
Castronova is director of the Synthethic Worlds Initiative,
a research center to study virtual worlds. "The opportunity
is to conduct controlled research experiments at the level
of all society, something social scientists have never been
able to do before," the center's Web site notes (see
BusinessWeek.com, 5/1/06,
"Virtual World, Virtual Economies").
A
virtual stock market is certainly not the only online entity
that opens itself up to research. Marketers are already
using the virtual world to test campaigns, packaging, and
consumer satisfaction. Pepsi (PEP)
famously tracks use of its products in
There.com. Architects seek reaction to design. Starwood
Hotels (HOT)
test-marketed its new loft designs in Second Life
(see BusinessWeek.com, 8/23/06,
"Starwood Hotels Explore Second Life First").
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on tools and tricks of the trade are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/000aaa/thetools.htm
Summarizing Academic Accounting Research for Practitioners
April 14, 2007 message from Ron Huefner
[rhuefner@acsu.buffalo.edu]
The Journal of Accountancy (AICPA) has begun
a new series of articles to review accounting research papers and explain
them to practitioners. The April issue has an article on "Mining Auditing
Research."
It summarizes about a dozen research articles,
mostly from The Accounting Review, but also including articles from JAR,
CAR, AOS, and the European Accounting Review.
The link for this article is: <http://aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/apr2007/boltlee.htm>
This may be useful in bringing research findings
into classes
Ron
March 2007 Updates on the Sad State of Accounting Research in
Academe ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
Nearly two years ago I sent out an "Appeal" for accounting
educators, researchers, and practitioners to actively support what I call The
Accounting Review (TAR) Diversity Initiative as initiated by last year's
American Accounting Association President Judy Rayburn ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR.htm
In it I noted that a bright ray of hope for changing narrow
focus of The Accounting Review (TAR) was the appointment of Bill McCarthy
as Associate Editor for purposes of introducing Accounting Information Systems
research into TAR.
I now have an expanded paper written in partnership with Jean
Heck ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR\03MainDocumentMar2007.htm
The MS Word version is at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR\395wp.doc
This paper is forthcoming in the December 2007 edition of the Accounting
Historians Journal
March 27, 2007 message from McCarthy, William
[mccarthy@BUS.MSU.EDU]
This thread and other AECM posts regarding
information technology research in accounting casts a grim picture for
people who wish to do computer science related work aimed at the major
accounting academic journals. This has been an "us vs. them" problem for
most of my 30 years in AIS research.
While it is indeed true that JAR, JAE, and the
other private accounting journals remain in the Stone Age as far as
accounting technology issues are concerned, there have been significant
steps taken by TAR to open up the main AAA journal to this kind of work. Dan
Dhaliwal appointed me as an editor with the express purpose of having a
person knowledgeable in information systems and computer science research
methods available to the AIS research community for manuscript review and
decision-making.
Surprisingly, as I have outlined at both the
sectional and national AAA meetings, the problem has not been as much with
"them" as it has been with "us," at least in the last 15 months or so. Quite
simply, the number of AIS submissions to TAR has been alarmingly low. In
Washington last August, I set a target of 12-18 for the AIS community for
this academic year, a number I thought was modest and achievable. However,
it does not look like we will come close to that at our present rate.
*
As I mentioned in Washington, the submission
procedure is this:
*
Do the work and make sure it is rigorous according
to accounting, IS, and/or computer science standards,
*
Submit the paper and note or show that it deals
with an important accounting issue issue by using AIS, MIS or CS methods,
and
*
Ask that the paper be assigned to me as the editor
most familiar with IS and CS methods.
If you make a convincing case on these points and
if the senior editor thinks it is high quality, then I get it, I assign the
referees, and I get to make the consolidated judgment.
Paraphrasing the famous Canadian hockey player
Wayne Gretzky, the AIS research and the accounting practice communities will
miss on 100% of the good ideas that never get submitted to TAR. If we want
change the face of accounting research, the time for action is now. Do the
work and submit "that" paper. Additionally, send your name off to me as a
possible referee, outlining your particular expertise in either methods or
specific technologies.
Bill McCarthy,
Michigan State University
mccarthy@bus.msu.edu
http://www.msu.edu/user/mccarth4 <https://mercury.bus.msu.edu/exchweb/bin/redir.asp?URL=http://www.msu.edu/user/mccarth4>
March 27, 2007 reply from Paul Williams
[Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]
Bill,
What we may be paying as the price for dragging
doctoral education in accounting back to the Stone Age about 40 years ago,
is the phenomenon you describe. People have become so disenchanted with TAR
that they have found other more comfortable venues for pursuing their work.
In spite of public declarations about the new openness, we have heard this
before only to have it turn out to be disengenuous PR. I think your appeal
here might encourage people to trust you once and submit a paper, BUT it
better produce some postitive experiences.
Another issue is "rigor." Everything must be
RIGOROUS, but most GOOD IDEAS aren't "rigorous". They are typically fraught
with error, but they open new vistas and ways of thinking about things. The
history of science is filled with tales of earth changing ideas that were
not offered in a RIGOROUS way (we know Mendel fudged his data on sweet peas,
so did Milliken and Keynes General Theory... was notoriously cobbled
together). We have become so fixated on method and our public appearance as
rigorous scientists that all accounting scholarship in the U.S. at least
follows the same template. Our idea of rigor is, frankly, naïve, based more
on appearance than substance. Robert Heilbroner once remarked that
"Mathematics brought great rigor to economics.
Unfortunately it also brought mortis." Bill, you
now have some power (?). Take some chances. What is the point of an academic
discourse confined only to statistical model building where, simultaneously,
replication is emphatically discouraged? Empirical rigor means doing it over
and over by independent investigators with rigorous controls. We may not
even be doing what we currently do "rigorously."
March 27, 2007 reply from J. S. Gangolly
[gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
Methodological hangups, fetish about quantitative
rigour, phobia about normative research, all have afflicted most disciplines
at one time or the other. We in accounting seem to have them all at the same
time.
I remembering sitting on a doctoral committee with
folks from psychology, and was frightened to discover my own prejudices
after hearing a well known (Skinnerian) psychologist fellow committee member
asked me to be a bit more understanding of methodologies used by others.
I have found the accounting crowd reward conformity
with received wisdom from the self-anointed sages.
Much of my work has been normative, and therefore
considered "unsuitable" for publications in better known accounting journals
(statement made by editor of one of the top rated accounting journal). I
feel driven out of the field years ago into Operations Research, Information
Systems, Computing & Information Sciences.
In none of those fields have the journal editors/
referees used any litmus tests. On the other hand, the referees at an AAA
section journal, (about 20 years ago) was bold enough to state that my paper
was an insult to the excellent work done by others in the field (the paper
was later published in a respected journal in IS with few changes; it was
the last paper I submitted to any establishment accounting journals).
Bill's message gives me hope in a way I never
imagined. As a test balloon, I will submit TAR one of our papers that I had
targeted for a CSI journal.
We need a balance between rigour, relevance, and
methodological purity. Above all, we need tolerance for work that differs
from our own perspective on each of these. We also need a diversity of
approaches to the issues in the papers.
Jagdish
Academics Versus the Profession
The real world is only a special case, and not a very interesting one at
that.
--Attributed to C. E. Ferguson and forwarded by Ed Scribner
Imagination is not to be
divorced from facts: it is a way of illuminating the facts. It works by
eliciting the general principles which apply to the facts, as they exist,
and then by an intellectual survey of alternative possibilities which are
consistent with these principles. It enables men (sic) to construct an
intellectual vision of a new world, and it preserves the zest of life by the
suggestion of satisfying purposes.
Alfred North Whitehead in an address to the AACSB in 1927 and quoted in the
paper by Bennis and O'Toole cited below.
During the past several decades,
many leading B schools have quietly adopted an inappropriate --- and ultimately
self-defeating --- model of academic excellence. Instead of measuring
themselves in terms of the competence of their graduates, or by how well their
faculties understand important drivers of business performance, they measure
themselves almost solely by the rigor of their scientific research. They have
adopted a model of science that uses abstract financial and economic analysis,
statistical regressions, and laboratory psychology. Some of the research
produced is excellent, but because so little of it is grounded in actual
business practices. the focus of graduate business education has become
increasingly circumscribed --- and less and less relevant to practitioners ...We
are not advocating a return to the days when business schools were glorified
trade schools. In every business, decision making requires amassing and
analyzing objective facts, so B schools must continue to teach quantitative
skills. The challenge is to restore balance to the curriculum and the
faculty: We need rigor and relevance. The dirty little secret at
most of today's best business schools is that they chiefly serve the faculty's
research interests and career goals, with too little regard for the needs of
other stakehollders.
Warren G. Bennis and James O'Toole, "How Business Schools Lost Their
Way," Harvard Business Review, May 2005.
The article be downloaded for a fee of $6.00 ($3.70 to educators) ---
http://harvardbusinessonline.hbsp.harvard.edu/b02/en/hbr/hbr_home.jhtml
Bob Jensen's threads on higher education controversies are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm
The original Accounting
Hall of Fame is maintained by Ohio State University ---
http://fisher.osu.edu/departments/accounting-and-mis/hall-of-fame/
The distinguished set of
members selected to date are listed at
http://fisher.osu.edu/departments/accounting-and-mis/hall-of-fame/membership-in-hall/
At the forthcoming American
Accounting Association (AAA) annual meetings in Washington DC this year on
August 7, two new distinguished scholars will be inducted into the
Accounting Hall of Fame.
June
22, 2006 message from Hall of Famer Dennis Beresford
[dberesfo@terry.uga.edu]
Bob,
I don't know if you've seen the
news yet, but Bob Kaplan and Bob Sterling will be this year's inductees to
the Accounting Hall of Fame.
Denny
June
23, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi
Denny,
Thanks for the update. Both Bob and Bob are more than worthy of this honor.
Both accountancy professors have very distinguished teaching and research
accomplishments. Although I do not want to detract from those most
noteworthy accomplishments, I cannot resist this opportunity to point out
that both Bob Sterling and Bob Kaplan are
failed critics of the hijacking
of the leading academic accounting research journals by the Accountics/Positivist
Establishment. However, both of these scholars took vastly different
approaches in their efforts to maintain diversity of research methods and
topics in the leading research journals.
The
Accountics/Positivist Establishment virtually ignored both Sterling and
Kaplan!
The
following quotations appear in the following two documents:
An "Appeal" for accounting
educators, researchers, and practitioners to actively support what I call
The Accounting Review (TAR)
Diversity Initiative as initiated by American Accounting Association
President Judy Rayburn ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR.htm
An Analysis of the
Contributions of The Accounting Review
Across 80 Years: 1926-2005 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
Accountics is the mathematical science of
(accounting)
values.
Charles Sprague
(1887) as quoted by McMillan (2003, 1)
|
As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not
certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to
reality.
Albert Einstein
|
PG. #390
NONAKA
The chapter argues that building the theory of knowledge
creation needs to an epistemological and ontological discussion,
instead of just relying on a positivist approach, which has been
the implicit paradigm of social science.
The positivist rationality has become identified with analytical
thinking that focuses on generating and testing hypotheses
through formal logic. While providing a clear guideline for
theory building and empirical examinations, it poses problems
for the investigation of complex and dynamic social phenomena,
such as knowledge creation. In positivist-based research,
knowledge is still often treated as an exogenous variable or
distraction against linear economic rationale. The relative lack
of alternative conceptualization has meant that management
science has slowly been detached from the surrounding societal
reality. The understanding of social systems cannot be based
entirely on natural scientific facts.
Ikujiro Nonaka as
quoted at Great Minds in
Management: The Process of Theory Development ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/GreatMinds.htm
|
Bob
Sterling is rooted in economics and philosophy. He, like Tony Tinker,
Barbara Marino, and Paul Williams, relied upon his roots in philosophy to
attack the positivists from the standpoint of misinterpretation of the
writings of Karl Popper ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Popper
Sterling wrote the following in "Positive Accounting: An
Assessment," Abacus,Volume
26, Issue 2, September 1990:
*********Begin Quote
Positive accounting theory, using the book of the same name by Watts and
Zimmerman (1986) as the primary source of information about that theory, is
subjected to scrutiny. The two pillars — (a) value-free study of (b)
accounting practices — upon which the legitimacy of that theory are said to
rest (and the absence of which is said to make other theories illegitimate)
are found to be insubstantial. The claim that authorities — economic and
scientific — support the type of theory espoused is found to be mistaken.
The accomplishments — actual and potential — of positive theory are found to
have been nil, and are projected to continue to be nil. Based on these
findings, the recommendation is to classify positive accounting theory as a
'cottage industry' at the periphery of accounting thought and reject its
attempt to take centre stage by radically redefining the fundamental
question of accounting.
*********End Quote
I
might add that the above critique would've had zero chance of being
published in The Accounting Review
(TAR) or other leading U.S. accounting research journals. Professor Sterling
always wrote with interesting and simple analogies. He stated that if
anthropology research was limited to positivism, then the only research
would be the study of anthropologists rather than anthropology.
In
some ways, Bob Kaplan is the more interesting critic of the hijacking of
academic accounting research by the Accountics/Positivist Establishment.
This is because Professor Kaplan built his early reputation, while full time
at Carnegie-Mellon University, as an accountics expert in mathematical model
building. Later, after he took on joint appointments at Carnegie and the
Harvard Business School, he became more involved in case method research.
Now he's best noted as a case method researcher since moving full time to
Harvard.
In
1986 Steve Zeff was President of the AAA. I had the honor of being appointed
by Steve as Program Director for the 1986 AAA annual meetings in Times
Square in NYC. I persuaded Bob Kaplan and Joel Demski to share a plenary
session in debate of the hijacking of the leading academic accounting
research journals by the Accountics/Positivist Establishment (although since
the early 1900s the term "accountics" was no longer used in accounting in
favor of the term "analytics").
Bob
Kaplan's 1986 presentation lamented the fact that researchers using the case
method could no longer get their research published in TAR or other leading
accounting research journals. He also lamented that innovations generally
had their seminal roots in discoveries of practitioners rather than
researchers publishing in the leading academic accounting research journals.
Whereas practitioners once took a keen interest in academic accounting
research, this interest waned to almost nothing.
Joel
Demski's presentation defended mathematical model building and analysis as
the cornerstone of accounting as a a pure "academic discipline." I would not
describe Joel as an evangelist of positivism relative to the extremes of
Watts and Zimmerman. Joel typically has had less to say about positivism
than he has about mathematical model building and economic information
theory applied to accountancy. In this regard I would describe Joel as an
ardent defender of accountics. Joel admitted in 1986 that it was very
difficult to pinpoint discoveries in academe that were noteworthy in the
practicing profession. However, he claimed that this was not a leading
purpose of academic accounting research.
Joel Demski
steers us away from the clinical side of the accountancy profession by
saying we should avoid that pesky “vocational virus.” (See below).
The (Random House) dictionary defines "academic"
as "pertaining to areas of study that are not primarily vocational or
applied , as the humanities or pure mathematics." Clearly, the short answer
to the question is no, accounting is not an academic discipline.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline?" Accounting
Horizons, June 2007, pp. 153-157
Statistically there are a few youngsters who
came to academia for the joy of learning, who are yet relatively untainted
by the vocational virus.
I urge you to nurture your taste for learning, to follow your joy. That is
the path of scholarship, and it is the only one with any possibility of
turning us back toward the academy.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline? American
Accounting Association Plenary Session" August 9, 2006 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm
Too many
accountancy doctoral programs have immunized themselves against the
“vocational virus.” The problem lies not in requiring doctoral degrees in
our leading colleges and universities. The problem is that we’ve been
neglecting the clinical needs of our profession. Perhaps the real underlying
reason is that our clinical problems are so immense that academic
accountants quake in fear of having to make contributions to the clinical
side of accountancy as opposed to the clinical side of finance, economics,
and psychology.
Our problems with doctoral programs in accountancy are shared with other
disciplines, notably education and nursing schools.
Bob Jensen's threads on controversies in higher education are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm
Ohio
State University became one of the leading accountics/positivsim research
centers. Under the noteworthy leadership of Tom Burns, OSU became one of the
first major universities to drop traditional accounting courses from its
doctoral programs in favor of sending students outside the College of
Business to take graduate courses in mathematics, statistics, econometrics,
psychometrics, and sociometrics. In this context, it is a pleasure that
leaders at OSU, in conjunction with the outside Accounting Hall of Fame
nominating committee members, sees fit this year to honor two ardent critics
of the Accountics/Positivist Establishment.
Hopefully some of you will
heed my current "Appeal" for accounting educators, researchers, and
practitioners to actively support what I call
The Accounting Review (TAR)
Diversity Initiative as initiated by American Accounting Association
President Judy Rayburn ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR.htm
Question
What is the new concept of phronesis in the context of accounting research?
"Case Study Research in Accounting," by David Cooper and Wane Morgan,
Accounting Horizons, Volume 22, No. 2, June 2008, pp. 159-178 ---
http://www.atypon-link.com/AAA/doi/abs/10.2308/acch.2008.22.2.159
SYNOPSIS:
We describe case study research
and explain its value for developing theory and informing practice.
While recognizing the complementary nature of many research methods, we
stress the benefits of case studies for understanding situations of
uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflict. We introduce
the concept of phronesis—the analysis of what actions are practical and
rational in a specific context— and indicate the value of case studies
for developing, and reflecting on, professional knowledge. Examples of
case study research in managerial accounting, auditing, and financial
accounting illustrate the strengths of case studies for theory
development and their potential for generating new knowledge. We
conclude by disputing common misconceptions about case study research
and suggesting how barriers to case study research may be overcome,
which we believe is an important step in making accounting research more
relevant.
Jensen Comment
In 1986 Steve Zeff was President of the AAA. I had the honor of
being appointed by Steve as Program Director for the 1986 AAA annual
meetings in Times Square in NYC. I persuaded Bob Kaplan and Joel
Demski to share a plenary session in debate of the hijacking of the
leading academic accounting research journals by the Accountics/Positivist
Establishment (although since the early 1900s the term "accountics"
was no longer used in accounting in favor of the term "analytics").
Bob Kaplan's 1986 presentation
lamented the fact that researchers using the case method could no
longer get their research published in TAR or other leading
accounting research journals. He also lamented that innovations
generally had their seminal roots in discoveries of practitioners
rather than researchers publishing in the leading academic
accounting research journals. Whereas practitioners once took a keen
interest in academic accounting research, this interest waned to
almost nothing.
Joel Demski's presentation defended
mathematical model building and analysis as the cornerstone of
accounting as a a pure "academic discipline." I would not describe
Joel as an evangelist of positivism relative to the extremes of
Watts and Zimmerman. Joel typically has had less to say about
positivism than he has about mathematical model building and
economic information theory applied to accountancy. In this regard I
would describe Joel as an ardent defender of accountics. Joel
admitted in 1986 that it was very difficult to pinpoint discoveries
in academe that were noteworthy in the practicing profession.
However, he claimed that this was not a leading purpose of academic
accounting research.
Joel
Demski steers us away from the clinical side of the accountancy
profession by saying we should avoid that pesky “vocational virus.”
(See below).
The (Random House) dictionary defines
"academic" as "pertaining to areas of study that are not primarily
vocational or applied , as the humanities or pure mathematics."
Clearly, the short answer to the question is no, accounting is not
an academic discipline.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline?"
Accounting Horizons, June 2007, pp. 153-157
I wrote the following on December 1, 2004 at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
Faculty interest in a
professor’s “academic” research may be greater for a number of
reasons. Academic research fits into a methodology that other
professors like to hear about and critique. Since academic
accounting and finance journals are methodology driven, there is
potential benefit from being inspired to conduct a follow up study
using the same or similar methods. In contrast, practitioners are
more apt to look at relevant (big) problems for which there are no
research methods accepted by the top journals.
Accounting Research Farmers Are More Interested in Their Tractors
Than in Their Harvests
For a long time I’ve argued
that top accounting research journals are just not interested in the
relevance of their findings (except in the areas of tax and AIS). If
the journals were primarily interested in the findings themselves,
they would abandon their policies about not publishing replications
of published research findings. If accounting researchers were more
interested in relevance, they would conduct more replication
studies. In countless instances in our top accounting research
journals, the findings themselves just aren’t interesting enough to
replicate. This is something that I attacked at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/book02q4.htm#Replication
At one point back in the
1980s there was a chance for accounting programs that were becoming
“Schools of Accountancy” to become more like law schools and to have
their elite professors become more closely aligned with the legal
profession. Law schools and top law journals are less concerned
about science than they are about case methodology driven by the
practice of law. But the elite professors of accounting who already
had vested interest in scientific methodology (e.g., positivism) and
analytical modeling beat down case methodology. I once heard Bob
Kaplan say to an audience that no elite accounting research journal
would publish his case research. Science methodologies work great in
the natural sciences. They are problematic in the psychology and
sociology. They are even more problematic in the professions of
accounting, law, journalism/communications, and political “science.”
We often criticize
practitioners for ignoring academic research Maybe they are just
being smart. I chuckle when I see our heroes in the mathematical
theories of economics and finance winning prizes for knocking down
theories that were granted earlier prizes (including Nobel prices).
The Beta model was the basis for thousands of academic studies, and
now the Beta model is a fallen icon. Fama got prizes for showing
that capital markets were efficient and then more prizes for showing
they were not so “efficient.” In the meantime, investment bankers,
stock traders, and mutual funds were just ripping off investors. For
a long time, elite accounting researchers could find no “empirical
evidence” of widespread earnings management. All they had to do was
look up from the computers where their heads were buried.
Few, if any, of the elite
“academic” researchers were investigating the dire corruption of the
markets themselves that rendered many of the published empirical
findings useless.
Academic researchers
worship at the feet of Penman and do not even recognize the name of
Frank Partnoy or Jim Copeland.
Bob Jensen
Apparently Cooper and Morgan in 2008 are trying to
infect us with the pesky vocational virus as well as lending value to
research with sample sizes of one that Zimmerman and other positivists
would not accept as legitimate accounting research from Kaplan or
anybody else.
The case study approach does
not prescribe what theories should inform the study or which methods
should be used for gathering and analyzing data. Based on the
problem and research questions being addressed, a variety of methods
may be used, including analysis of archival materials, observation,
interviews, and quantitative techniques. Case studies focus on
bounded and particular organizations, events, or phenomena, and
scrutinize the activities and experiences of those involved, as well
as the context in which these activities and experiences occur
Stake
2000.
The case study research
approach is useful where the researcher is investigating:
• complex and dynamic
phenomena where many variables
including
variables that are not quantifiable
are involved;
• actual practices,
including the details of significant activities that may be
ordinary, unusual, or infrequent
e.g.,
changes in accounting regulation; and
• phenomena in which the
context is crucial because the context affects the phenomena
being studied
and
where the phenomena may also interact with and influence its
context.
(Yin, 1989)
notes
that case studies are suited to answer “how” and “why” questions.
Furthermore, well-done case study research answers how and why so
compellingly and vividly that readers understand and remember the
findings the study reveals. Practitioners find “how” questions to be
particularly important—for example, case studies are valuable in
describing the details of how new accounting and auditing
innovations are actually done. Providing details helps convert
private knowledge
for example, the detailed
procedures and calculations that are otherwise hidden in the reports
or minds of innovators
into publicly available
knowledge. Unlike the “action research” some espouse
(Kaplan
,1998), a theory-oriented case study requires explicitness in the
theory underlying the case analysis, and in the contribution to
theory development or testing.
Case studies also address “why” questions, illustrating why
something was done or came to be, or when and why something works. (Schön,
1983),
50
argues that case studies are
valuable to the “entire process of reflection-in-action, which is
central to the ‘art’ by which practitioners sometimes deal well with
situations of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness and value
conflict.” Such case research considers the values, interests, and
operations of power involved—who gained, who lost, and why. While
researchers may disagree about what should be done, a good case will
stimulate reflection and learning about the actions of all involved,
including the researcher. Action or constructivist researchers often
use cases to describe examples of an accounting intervention, but
they too often neglect the theoretical lessons to be learned
(Jönsson
and Lukka, 2007).
Although any research approach can focus on how or why, non-case
approaches typically emphasize different questions. Statistical
analyses using large data sets1
have a
comparative advantage in answering “how much” questions, such as the
average size of CEO compensation or the average difference in
compensation for companies with, for example, high versus low ROA.
Experiments may be particularly helpful in answering “what”
questions such as what type of response individuals might have to a
proposed accounting measure or disclosure. Case studies, archival
research, and experiments are complementary research approaches. To
illustrate the complementary nature of different approaches,
consider that as part of an accounting firm’s efforts to improve its
audits, it may:
• statistically analyze data on the
properties of specific accounts;
• conduct pilot studies
experiments
before deploying new audit procedures; and
• study the best-practice
cases of audits, considering how the client, audit staff,
regulators, and partners might vary in their assessments of what
is best.
The quality of the accounting
firm’s overall analysis and decisions is improved by using all
approaches to acquiring and assessing knowledge. Whether used on
their own or in conjunction with other research approaches, case
studies can contribute insights to practitioners and researchers.
Continued in article
Also see
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
I examined the Vision being promoted, since November 8, 2006, by CEOs of the
largest accounting firms ---
http://www.globalpublicpolicysymposium.com/CEO_Vision.pdf
It struck me as yet another example of how small the role of academe is in shaping
the future of the profession of accountancy. I wonder if the professions of
medicine and law would chart the future of their own professions with so little
regard for schools of medicine and law. Large firms in accounting actively seek
to hire our students and have great public relations with professors. However,
when it comes to something as substantive as this it's very difficult to find
where leaders of the profession charted this change in course by building upon
academic accounting research. There are probably indirect links, but it would be
surprising if the writers of this proposed huge change in policy were influenced
heavily by published academic research. An exception might be the thrust toward XBRL, but the so-called leading academic accounting journals have paid scant
attention to XBRL,
On one hand we could blame the leaders of the profession for avoiding
academe in the generation of new vision for the future. On the other hand we
could blame the accounting researchers and their top journals for addressing
what they can study with scientific models rather than what the profession
wants to be studied. My threads on this issue are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
"Largest Accounting Firms See Coming Revolution in Business Reporting,"
AccountingWeb, November 27, 2006 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102827
As part of the Global Public Policy Symposium
in Paris, held on November 8 and attended by key players concerned with
ensuring the quality and reliability of financial reporting worldwide,
the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC)
International, Grant Thornton International, Deloitte, KPMG
International and Ernst & Young, published a joint statement of their
vision of what the future might hold for financial reporting and the
accounting profession.
Entitled “Global Capital Markets and the Global
Economy: A Vision from the CEOs of the International Audit Networks,”
the document envisions investors having access to real time company
financial information through XBRL, financial statements that go beyond
reporting past performance to projecting future performance based on
information about business intangibles that are not currently measured,
and a recommendation that companies choose to supplement regular audits
with periodic forensic audits. The report may be viewed at
www.globalpublicpolicysymposium.com/
“This essay is about one type of information
and its importance to all actors in the global economy; information
about the performance of management and companies that make and deliver
goods and services, and compete for capital,” the symposium paper says.
In a letter to the Wall Street Journal
published on November 8, the day their paper was released, the CEOs
wrote that when the basics of current accounting procedures were
written, the world’s investors were more a “private club than a global
network. Auditors used fountain pens, capital stayed pooled in a few
financial centers, and information moved by runner.” The world has
changed since then.
In the short term, the letter says, it will be
necessary to proceed as rapidly as possible with convergence in
international accounting standards, and with overcoming national
differences in oversight of auditors and in enforcement.
In the longer term, auditors themselves must
evaluate the usefulness to investors of information provided in the
current financial statement and footnote format and consider the
inclusion of more nonfinancial information.
But, the CEOs say in the Journal letter, “All
of these steps should include an emphasis on allowing auditors greater
room to exercise judgment. Accountants and auditors are trained
professionals who have the ability to apply the spirit of broad
principles in deciding how to account for and report financial and other
information. . . . Such [future] measures should also include an honest
assessment of the “expectations gap,” relating to material fraud and the
ability of auditors to uncover it at a reasonable cost.”
The paper looks forward to a world “where users
increasingly will want to customize the information they receive” in
which “the process for recording and classifying business information
will be as important, if not more important, than the static formats in
which today’s financial information is reported. Our jobs as auditors,
must therefore change to increasing focus on those business processes.”
An “important enabler” of future reporting will
be the Global XBRL Initiative, the paper says. XBRL users will be able
to view company data in any language, any currency and under different
accounting systems and get immediate answers to queries. “In fact the
new world is already here for the approximately 40,000 companies that
already use XBRL to input their data. . . . China, Spain, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom have required companies to use XBRL.”
The paper acknowledges that investors, analysts
and others will still want standardized reports to be issued by public
companies on a regular basis. But the CEOs say that investors have told
them they want more relevant information to be included. “The large
discrepancies between the “book” and “market” values of many, if not
most, public companies similarly provide strong evidence of the limited
usefulness of statements of assets and liabilities that are based on
historical costs. A range of intangibles, such as employee creativity
and loyalty and relationships with suppliers and customers, can drive a
company’s performance, yet the value of these intangibles is not
consistently reported."
In short, the CEO’s vision states “the same
forces that are reshaping economies at all levels are driving the need
to transform what kind of information various stakeholders want from
companies, in what form, and at what frequency. In a world of “mass
customization,” standard financial statements have less and less meaning
and relevance. The future of auditing in such an environment lies in the
need to verify that the process by which company-specific information is
collected, sorted and reported is reliable and the information presented
is relevant for decision making.”
Investors and regulatory bodies may expect
auditors to go further than is reasonable to detect fraud and the paper
recommends that all companies be subjected to a regular forensic audit,
or be subjected to forensic audits on a random basis.
Another option would be introducing more choice
regarding the intensity of audits for fraud. For example, since forensic
audits are conducted primarily for the benefit of investors, one
possibility would be to let shareholders decide on the intensity of the
fraud detection effort
they want auditors to perform. Shareholders could be assisted in making
this decision by disclosure in the proxy materials of the costs of the
different levels of audits, as well as the historical experience of the
company with fraud.
The CEO paper calls for both liability reform
and scope of service reform.
Considering the “Brave New World” of auditing
envisioned in the document and the scope of the questions it raises,
“Global Capital Markets and the Global Economy” has received little
attention in the financial press, Motley Fool reports. But, while
approving the idea of more timely information flows for the investor,
Fool says, “enough companies have trouble meeting their reporting
obligations as it is. I would prefer to both maintain those reports and
supplement them with additional data.”
That financial reporting will evolve and change
is inevitable, the International Herald Tribune says, but whether large
accounting firms will lead the dialogue is another matter that may be
influenced by their “life-threatening litigation risks.”
"Accounting Firms Seek Overhaul," by Tad Kopinski, Institutional
Shareholder Services ISS, November 20, 2006 ---
http://blog.issproxy.com/2006/11/accounting_firms_seek_overhaul.html
Bob Jensen's threads on proposed reforms ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudProposedReforms.htm
Redesigning an MBA Curriculum Toward the Action: Why Aren't
Accountants Headed on the Same Paths?
"Wall Street Warms To Finance Degree With Focus on Math," by Ronald
Alsop, The Wall Street Journal, November 14, 2006; Page B7 ---
Click Here
Just a few years ago, the University of
California, Berkeley, found its master's degree in financial engineering
a hard sell. Wall Street had cut back sharply on hiring, and many
recruiters were still fixated on M.B.A. graduates.
"The doors were shut on us at the
human-resource level on Wall Street," recalls Linda Kreitzman, executive
director of the financial engineering program at Berkeley's Haas School
of Business. "I had to go directly to managing directors to get our
students placed after we started the program in 2001."
Now, in a turnabout, it's often the banks and
hedge funds that are calling on Dr. Kreitzman and offering her graduates
six-figure compensation packages. "They have come to realize they really
need students with strong skills in financial economics, math and
computer modeling for more complex products like mortgage- and
asset-backed securities and credit and equity derivatives," she says.
This fall, all 58 financial engineering students seeking internships
found spots at such companies as Citigroup, Lehman Brothers and Merrill
Lynch. Their projects will include credit portfolio valuation,
artificial-intelligence trading models and structured fixed-income
products.
While the master's in business administration
certainly remains in high demand, companies are increasingly interested
in other graduate-level credentials, including Ph.D.s and master's
degrees in specific business fields. Deutsche Bank, for example, has
hired Ph.D. and master-of-finance graduates in Europe for some time and
is now recruiting more in the U.S. as well.
"We are continually looking for strong
quantitative skills," says Kristina Peters, global head of graduate
recruiting. With a master's degree in finance, "there tends to be more
applied finance knowledge such as derivatives pricing."
Continued in article
Jensen Comment
The big question is where will auditing firms find accountants that can
handle the exotic contracts written by the financial engineers?
The Sad State of English Literature Research
"Student Pressure and Your Average English Department," by Sanford
Pinsker, The Irascible Professor, January 2, 2006 ---
http://irascibleprofessor.com/comments-01-02-06.htm .
English professors reflect their graduate
school training long after they "graduate" as newly minted Ph.D.s. The
rub comes in if you happen to have been more deeply trained in literary
theory than you were in literature, and you were taught to believe that
theoreticians were much more interesting than novelists or poets.
The result is that many English professors of a
certain age find it easier to get excited about multiculturalism than
about great writers because they have read very few primary works of
consequence. Asking these folk about literature reminds me of the
Israeli army recruit who was asked if he could swim, "No," he replied,
then quickly added "But I know the theory of it." English departments
are likely to suffer through this joke for at least the next twenty more
years, as professors who got tenure because they were savvy about
Derrida and Foucault hang around to shape an English department
curriculum that is longer on deserts than it is on meat-and-potatoes.
That's why advanced seminars in
multiculturalism, Madonna, or "The Sopranos" are just a heart beat away
from making it into the college catalogue. Those who remember an Irish
poet named Yeats might remember what he said about things falling apart
and the center not holding. That is what is occurring across the land as
English department have a hard time resisting whatever fashionable
bandwagon squeaks its way down the road.
The Sad State of Academic Accounting Research
February 3, 2006 message from Jagdish S. Gangolly
[gangolly@INFOTOC.COM]
The well known mathematician GH Hardy once
observed that he would be disappointed if any one found mathematics
useful (I think he was referring to "Pure" mathematics), and that
mathematics is to be enjoyed to appreciate its intrinsic beauty.
Nevertheless, even "Pure" Mathematics Mathgematics is found useful by
many. One pertinent example I can give is of non-Euclidean Geometry
which has had a profound impact on data visualisation (See, for example,
http://iv.slis.indiana.edu/sw/hyptree.html ).
While mathematical propositions are
tautological and hence not "verifiable" in a positivist sense, the
underlying axiom system can be examined to see if it corresponds to
reality. That is how, for example, things work in Physics where
replication is an essential and valued activity. In accounting research
(especially of the financial accounting kind), replication is not well
regarded, and unlike in Physics there is no "competition" to reach the
top of the greasy pole or to prove each other wrong. The result is the
mutual admiration society that we have reduced ourselves to, with a few
citing each other and the rest of the world ignoring us all.
In human science such as ours is, research
should be relevant and useful. We have an obligation to be evaluated by
the society (all the stakeholders including the professional practice)
at large about this. In this, in my opinion, we in academics have failed
miserably.
Jagdish
February 4, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Jagdish,
You have pointed to the heart of the mess in modern day academic
accounting research. The pure mathematics term "mathgematics"
reminds me of the historic term "accountics."
After an intense turn-of-the-century debate over whether academic
accounting research should become the
"mathematical science of values," leading accounting researchers
rejected this "accountics" idea. Both the term and the movement died out
for the next 60 years.
In the 1960s the concept was born again without the revival of the
word "accountics." You aptly and concisely described how accountics has
taken over our top-tier journals that, in turn, have turned our doctoral
programs into virtually a singular very narrow research skills
curriculum.
I was greatly encouraged by Judy Rayburn's Presidential Address on
August 10, 2005 and the publishing of her remarks in Accounting
Education News, Fall 2005, pp. 1-4.
Accounting research is different from other business disciplines
in the area of citations: Top-tier accounting journals in total
have fewer citations than top-tier journals in finance, management,
and marketing. Our journals are not widely cited outside our
discipline. Our top-tier journals as a group project too narrow a
view of the breadth and diversity of (what should count as)
accounting research.
Rayburn (2005b, Page 4)
I might add that Judy's points are mostly echoing Andy Bailey's 1994
Presidential Address in which he claimed the AAA journals were at a
"crisis point." The AAA Publications Committees, TAR editors, and TAR
referees ignored Andy's appeals to broaden the scope of topics and
research methods that allowed in TAR. And after a long conversation with
the current editor of TAR on February 2, 2006, I fear that Judy's
appeals are also falling on deaf ears. TAR is not going to change in the
near future with the exception of adding some AIS papers that Bill
McCarthy, as the new AIS Associate Editor, allows to pass through the
gates. TAR will expand to five issues per hear in 2006 and six issues
per year after that. But accountics constraints will still dominate TAR
in years to come.
February 4, 2006 reply from Jagdish S. Gangolly
[gangolly@INFOTOC.COM]
Bob,
Mathgematics was an innocent typo on my part.
Your response worried me that there might really be such a term, and so
I googled it and went through each of those pages. And on each of those
pages the problem was a similar typo. While I would love to put my stamp
on lexicography, I need to improve my keyboarding skills first. (My Mac
keyboard is driving me up the wall.)
Hardy used the term pure mathematics (he wrote
a book with the same title that we used as text) in the same sense that
Immanuel Kant used it in the "Critique of Pure Reason" -- uncontaminated
by facts.
People were always uncomfortable with Euclid's
fifth postulate which says that given a straight line and a point not on
the line, it is possible to construct a straight line through the point
that is parallel to the given line (there are other equivalent ways to
state the postulate). For example, if you stand in the middle of
railroad tracks in Kansas and look into the horizon along the tracks, it
would appear to you that the two parallel tracks meet there, which would
"invalidate" the postulate.
Mathematicians before Lobachevsky were trying
to prove that the fifth postulate could be proved as a theorem from the
first four (which we all know from grade school). Lobachevsky thought
out of the box and showed that Euclidean Geometry was a special case of
general non-Euclidean Geometries. Lobachevsky was not alone in this
discovery. Gauss (German) and Bolyai (Hungarian) mathematicians
independently developed the area.
By the way, the tracks seem to meet at the
horizon in Kanbsas because earth is spherical. The non-Euclidean
Geometry I referred to in the earlier message was spherical Geometry
which is the staple of data visualisation in diverse fields as taxonomy,
genetics, forestry,...; We can even use it in Accounting, for example,
in visualising XBRL taxonomies.
Jagdish
So what is the history of accountics?
TAR Between 1926 and 1955: Ignoring Accountics
Accounting professor Charles
Sprague coined the word "accountics" in 1887. The word is not
used today in accounting and has some alternative meanings outside our
discipline. However, in the early 19th Century, accountics
was the centerpiece of some forward thrusting unpublished lectures by
Charles Sprague at Columbia University. McMillan (2003, 11) stated the
following:
These claims were not a pragmatic strategy to legitimize the
development of sophisticated bookkeeping theories. Rather, this
development of a science was seen as revealing long-hidden realities
within the economic environment and the double-entry bookkeeping system
itself. The science of accounts, through systematic mathematical
analysis, could discover hidden thrust of the reality of economic
value. The term, “accountics,” captured the imagination of the members
of the IA, connoting advances in bookkeeping that all these men were
experiencing.
By 1900 there was a
journal called Accountics according to Forrester (2003). Both
the journal and the term accountics had short lives, but belief that
mathematical analysis and empirical research can “discover hidden thrust
in the reality of economic value” underlies much of what has been
published in TAR over the past three decades. Hence we propose reviving
the term “accountics” in the context of research methods and
quantitative analysis tools that have become popular in TAR and other
leading accounting research journals.
The
American Association of University Instructors of Accounting, which in
December 1935 became the American Accounting Association, commenced
unofficially in 1915, (Zeff 1966, 5). It was proposed in October 1919
that the Association publish a Quarterly Journal of Accountics.
But this proposed accountics
journal never got off the ground while leaders in the Association argued
heatedly and fruitlessly about whether accountancy was a science. A
quarterly journal called The Accounting Review was subsequently
born in 1925 with its first issue being published in March of 1926. Its
accountics-like attributes did not commence in earnest until the 1960s.
Practitioner involvement, in a
large measure, was the reason for changing the name of the Association
by removing the words “University Instructors.” Practitioners interested
in accounting education participated actively in AAA meetings. TAR
articles in the first several decades were devoted heavily to education
issues and accounting issues in particular industries and trade groups.
Research methodologies were mainly normative (without mathematics),
case, and archival (history) methods. Anecdotal evidence and
hypothetical illustrations ruled the day. The longest serving editor of
TAR was a practitioner who determined what was published in TAR between
1929 and 1943. In those years the AAA leadership actually mandated that
TAR focus on development of accounting principles and to orient the
papers to both practitioners and educators, Chatfield (1975, Page 4).
Following World War II,
practitioners outnumbered educators in the AAA, (Chatfield 1975, 4).
Leading partners from accounting firms took pride in publishing papers
and books intended to inspire scholarship among professors and students.
Some practitioners, particularly those with scholarly publications, were
admitted over the years into the Accounting Hall of Fame formed by The
Ohio State University. Accounting educators were generally long on
practical experience and short on academic credentials such as doctoral
degrees prior to the 1960s.
A major
catalyst for change was the Ford Foundation that poured millions of
dollars into first the study of collegiate business schools and second
the funding of doctoral programs and students in business studies.
Gordon and Howell (1959) reported that business faculty in colleges
lacked research skills and academic esteem among their humanities and
science colleagues. The Ford Foundation thereafter funded doctoral
programs and top quality graduate students to pursue doctoral degrees in
business and accountancy. This Foundation even funded publication of
selected doctoral dissertations to give business discipline doctoral
studies more visibility. Great pressures were also brought to bear on
academic associations like the AAA to increase the academic standards
for publications in journals like TAR.
Competitors to TAR were launched in the early 1960s, including the
Journal of Accounting Research (1963), Abacus (1965) and
The International Journal of Accounting Education and Research
(1965). Clinging to its traditional normative roots and trade-article
style would have made TAR appear to be a journal for academic luddites.
Actually, many of the new mathematical approaches to theory development
were fundamentally normative, but they were couched in the formidable
language and rigors of mathematics. Publication of papers in traditional
normative theory, history, and systems slowly ground to almost zero in
the new age of accountics.
These
new spearheads in accountics were not without problems. It’s humorous
and sad to go back and discover how naïve and misleading some of TAR’s
bold and high risk thrusts were into quantitative methods. Statistical
models were employed without regard to underlying assumptions of
independence, temporal stationarity, multicollinearity,
homoscedasticity, missing variables, and departures from the normal
distribution. Mathematical applications were proposed for real-world
systems that failed to meet continuity and non-convexity assumptions
inherent in such models as linear programming and calculus
optimizations. Proposed applications of finite mathematics and discrete
(integer) programming failed because the fastest computers in the world
then, and now, could not solve most realistic integer programming
problems in less than 100 years.
After
financial databases provided a BETA covariance of each security in a
portfolio with the market portfolio, a flood of capital market events
studies were published by TAR and other leading accounting journals. In
the early years, accounting researchers did not challenge CAPM’s
assumptions and limitations, limitations that, in retrospect cast doubt
upon many of the findings based upon any single index of market risk, (Fama
and French 1992).
Leading
accounting professors have lamented as TAR’s preference for rigor over
relevancy, (Zeff 1978; Lee 1997; and Williams 1999). Sundem (1987)
provides revealing information about the changed perceptions of authors,
almost entirely from academe, who submitted manuscripts for review
between June 1982 and May 1986. Among the 1,148 submissions, only 39
used archival (history) methods and 34 of those submissions were
rejected. Also 34 used survey methods and 33 of those were rejected.
And 100 used traditional normative (deductive) methods with 85 of those
being rejected. Except for a small set of 28 manuscripts classified as
using “other” methods (mainly descriptive empirical according to Sundem),
the remaining larger subset submitted manuscripts used methods that
Sundem classified as follows for leading 1982-1986 submissions:
292
General Empirical
119
Capital Market
172
Behavioral
135
Analytical modeling
97
Economic modeling
40
Statistical modeling
29
Simulation
What’s clear is that by
1982 accounting researchers got the message that having mathematical or
statistical analysis in TAR publications made accountics virtually a
necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition for acceptance for
publication. It became increasingly difficult for a single editor to
have expertise in all the above methods. In the late 1960s editorial
decisions on publication shifted from the TAR editor alone to the TAR
editor in conjunction with specialized referees and eventually associate
editors, (Flesher 1991, 167). Fleming et al. (2000) wrote the following:
The big change was in research methods. Modeling and empirical
methods became prominent during 1966-1985, with analytical modeling and
general empirical methods leading the way. Although used to a
surprising extent, deductive-type methods declined in popularity,
especially in the second half of the 1966-1985 period.
Fleming
et al. (2000, Page 48) report that education articles in TAR declined
from 21% in 1966 to 8% before Issues in Accounting Education
began to publish education articles. Garcha, Harwood, and Hermanson
(1983) reported on the readership of TAR before any new specialty
journals commenced in the AAA. They reported that among their AAA
membership respondents, only 41.7% would subscribe if TAR was unbundled
in terms of dollar savings from AAA membership dues. TAR apparently was
not meeting the membership’s market test. Based heavily upon the written
comments of respondents, the authors’ conclusions were, in part, as
follows:
The findings of the survey reveal that opinions vary regarding
TAR and that emotions run high. At one extreme some respondents seem to
believe that TAR is performing its intended function very well. Those
sharing this view may believe that its mission is to provide a
high-quality outlet for those at the cutting-edge of accounting
research. The pay-off for this approach may be recognition by peers,
achieving tenure and promotion, and gaining mobility should one care to
move. This group may also believe that trying to affect current
practice is futile anyway, so why even try?
At the other extreme are those who believe that TAR is not
serving its intended purpose. This group may believe TAR should serve
the readership interests of the audiences identified by the Moonitz
Committee. Many in the intended audience cannot write for, cannot read,
or are not interested in reading the Main Articles which have been
published during approximately the last decade. As a result there is
the suggestion that this group believes that a change in editorial
policy is needed.
After a
study by
Abdel-khalik(1976) that revealed complaints about difficulties of
following the increased quantitative methods jargon in TAR, editors did
introduce abstracts in front of the articles to summarize major findings
with less jargon, (Flesher 1991, 169).
But the
problem was simultaneously exacerbated when TAR stopped publishing
commentaries and rebuttals that sometimes aid understanding of
complicated research. Science journals are much better about encouraging
commentaries and rebuttals.
The saddest and most
revealing state of accountics research is the lack of
interest of replicating the many findings of TAR's econometric and
psychometric methodologies ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Relication
Bob Jensen
Scientific Method in Accounting Has
Not Been a Method for Generating New Theories
The following is a quote from the 1993
President’s Message of Gary Sundem,
President’s Message. Accounting Education News 21
(3). 3.
Although empirical scientific method has made many positive
contributions to accounting research, it is not the
method that is likely to generate new theories, though
it will be useful in testing them. For example,
Einstein’s theories were not developed empirically, but
they relied on understanding the empirical evidence and
they were tested empirically. Both the development and
testing of theories should be recognized as acceptable
accounting research.
Question
What is the trend in the number of doctoral degrees awarded
in accountancy in the United States?
Answer
It all depends on who you ask and whether or not the alma
maters are AACSB accredited universities
(note that the AACSB accredits bachelors and masters degree
programs but not doctoral programs per se).
The data suggest that there are a lot of ABD doctoral
students who never complete the final hurdle of writing a
dissertation, although this is only my speculation based
upon the higher number of graduates that I would expect from
the size of the enrollments.
On January 27, 2006, Jean Heck at
Villanova sent me the following message:
This data is only for AACSB accredited schools, so the
numbers you had for Accounting in the slide are a little
bigger. I got these numbers straight from the AACSB data
director. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Accounting & Finance Historical Data 2000 - 2004 |
|
|
|
|
Accounting |
Full Time Enrollment |
Part Time Enrollment |
Degrees Conferred |
2000 |
552 |
36 |
122 |
|
|
|
|
2001 |
585 |
80 |
102 |
|
|
|
|
2002 |
578 |
13 |
97 |
|
|
|
|
2003 |
694 |
12 |
103 |
|
|
|
|
2004 |
631 |
16 |
86 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Finance |
|
|
|
2000 |
738 |
59 |
159 |
|
|
|
|
2001 |
771 |
109 |
129 |
|
|
|
|
2002 |
807 |
49 |
125 |
|
|
|
|
2003 |
939 |
40 |
136 |
|
|
|
|
2004 |
859 |
48 |
109 |
********************
Jensen Comment
Hasselback, J.R. (2006), Accounting Faculty Directory
2006-2007 (Prentice-Hall, Just Prior to Page 1) reports the
following doctoral graduates in accounting:
1998–99 122 - 18%
1999–00 095 - 22%
2000–01 108 +14%
2001–02 099 - 08%
2002–03 069 - 30%
In Slide 23 of her Presidential
Address at the American Accounting Association Annual Meetings in
San Francisco on August 10, Judy Rayburn presented the following
data regarding doctoral graduates in accounting ---
http://aaahq.org/AM2005/menu.htm
145 Accounting Ph.D.s were awarded in 2002-2003, an increase
over 2001-2002 estimates.
TABLE 3B
Accounting Ph.D’s Awarded 1998–99 Through 2002–03
Number of Graduates Rate of Growth
1998–99 185 – 3%
1999–00 195 + 5%
2000–01 115 – 41%
2001–02 110 – 4%
2002–03 145 + 32%
Data from the U.S. Department of Education
You can download an Excel spreadsheet of Doctor's degrees conferred
by degree-granting institutions, by discipline division: Selected
years, 1970-71 to 2002-03 ---
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d04/tables/dt04_252.asp
Part of that spreadsheet is shown below:
Table 252. Doctor's degrees
conferred by degree-granting institutions, by discipline
division:
Selected years, 1970-71 to 2002-03 |
_ |
_ |
_ |
_ |
_ |
_ |
Discipline division |
1998-99 |
1999-00 |
2000-01 |
2001-02 |
2002-03 |
|
_ |
_ |
_ |
_ |
_ |
Agriculture and natural
resources ................. |
1,231 |
1,168 |
1,127 |
1,148 |
1,229 |
Architecture and related
services ....................... |
123 |
129 |
153 |
183 |
152 |
Area, ethnic, cultural, and
gender studies ................................... |
187 |
205 |
216 |
212 |
186 |
Biological and biomedical
sciences ....................................... |
5,024 |
5,180 |
4,953 |
4,823 |
5,003 |
Business
........................................................... |
1,201 |
1,194 |
1,180 |
1,156 |
1,251 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Communication, journalism, and
related programs
.............................................. |
347 |
347 |
368 |
374 |
394 |
Communications technologies
.......................... |
5 |
10 |
2 |
9 |
4 |
Computer and information
sciences ........................... |
801 |
779 |
768 |
752 |
816 |
Education
............................................... |
6,394 |
6,409 |
6,284 |
6,549 |
6,835 |
Engineering
........................................... |
5,432 |
5,390 |
5,542 |
5,187 |
5,276 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Engineering technologies
................................ |
29 |
31 |
62 |
58 |
57 |
English language and
literature/letters ....................... |
1,407 |
1,470 |
1,330 |
1,291 |
1,246 |
Family and consumer
sciences/human sciences ........... |
323 |
327 |
354 |
311 |
372 |
Foreign languages, literatures,
and linguistics ......................... |
1,049 |
1,086 |
1,078 |
1,003 |
1,042 |
Health professions and related
clinical sciences ............................ |
1,920 |
2,053 |
2,242 |
2,913 |
3,328 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Legal professions and studies
................................... |
58 |
74 |
286 |
79 |
105 |
Liberal arts and sciences, |
|
|
|
|
|
general studies, and
humanities ................................. |
78 |
83 |
102 |
113 |
78 |
Library science
.......................................... |
55 |
68 |
58 |
45 |
62 |
Mathematics and statistics
........................................ |
1,090 |
1,075 |
997 |
923 |
1,007 |
Multi/interdisciplinary studies
................................ |
754 |
792 |
784 |
765 |
899 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Parks, recreation, leisure and
fitness studies ................... |
137 |
134 |
177 |
151 |
199 |
Philosophy and religious
studies .................................. |
584 |
598 |
600 |
610 |
662 |
Physical sciences and science
technologies ............................. |
4,142 |
3,963 |
3,911 |
3,760 |
3,858 |
Psychology
......................................... |
4,695 |
4,731 |
5,091 |
4,759 |
4,831 |
Public administration and
social services ........................ |
532 |
537 |
574 |
571 |
596 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Security and protective
services .................................... |
48 |
52 |
44 |
49 |
72 |
Social sciences and history
........................................ |
3,855 |
4,095 |
3,930 |
3,902 |
3,850 |
Theology and religious
vocations .................... |
1,440 |
1,630 |
1,461 |
1,350 |
1,321 |
Transportation and materials
moving ..................... |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Visual and performing arts
............................... |
1,130 |
1,127 |
1,167 |
1,114 |
1,293 |
Not classified by field of
study ................... |
6 |
71 |
63 |
0 |
0 |
Question
Why is supply of doctoral faculty, and possibly all business faculty, not a
sustainable process?
Jensen Answer
See Below
Question
Why do accounting doctoral students have to be more like science students
than medical students and law students?
Jensen Answer
With the explosion of demand for accounting faculty, production of only
about 100 doctoral graduates from AACSB schools is no longer a sustainable
process. Perhaps the time has come to have a Scholarship Track and a Research Track
in accounting doctoral studies. One of the real barriers to entry has been the
narrow quantitative method and science method curriculum now required in
virtually all doctoral programs in accountancy. Many accounting professionals
who contemplate returning to college for doctoral degrees are not interested
and/or not talented in our present narrow Ph.D. curriculum.
In my opinion this will work only if our most prestigious universities take
the lead in lending prestige to Scholarship Track doctoral students in
accounting. Case Western is one university that has already taken a small step
in this direction. Now lets open this alternative to younger students who have
perhaps only had a few years experience in accounting practice,
In the January 30, 2006 edition of New Bookmarks I presented tables of
the numbers of doctoral graduates in all disciplines with particular stress on
those in accounting, finance, and business in general. As baby boomers from the
World War II era commence to retire, the AACSB International predicts a crisis
shortage of new faculty to take their place and to meet the growth in popularity
of business programs in universities. In August
2002, the AACSB International Management Education Task Force (METF) issued a
landmark report, “Management Education at Risk.” The 2002 report on this is
available at
http://www.aacsb.edu/publications/dfc/default.asp
In particular, note the section on Rethinking Doctoral Education quoted below.
Rethinking Doctoral Education
Several issues in doctoral education are in need of
rethinking in light of doctoral faculty shortages. They include vertical
orientation, strategies for sourcing doctoral faculty, the relevance of
curricula, rewards and promotion, accreditation standards, and leveraging
technology.
Vertical Orientation
Doctoral education is built on vertical orientation
to disciplines, requiring prospective applicants to choose their field at
the point of entry. Many doctoral programs train students in narrowly
defined research agendas, giving them little, if any, exposure to research
problems and methodologies outside their discipline. In parallel, most
hiring adheres to traditional departmental tracks, with few instances of
cross-departmental appointments because they are inherently challenging to
the structure of most business schools. Among the schools that are
exceptions is IMD, in Switzerland, which eliminated departmental and rank
distinctions.
Meanwhile, advancement in business knowledge and
thinking requires research frameworks that can span functional and industry
boundaries. And businesses continue to call for more cross-functional
education in undergraduate and MBA programs. There is inevitable and
healthy tension between training and theory in vertical disciplines, on the
one hand, and the evolving issues of the marketplace that tend to defy such
neat categorization, on the other.
There is little question that schools need to add
to their doctoral curricula research training that encompasses questions and
methodologies across vertical boundaries. Unless some shifts are
instituted, the training ground for researchers in business will become less
relevant to the knowledge advances the marketplace needs and demands, and to
the teaching and learning needs within business schools.
Strategies for Sourcing Doctoral Faculty
To preserve the inimitable scholarship role of
business academics, faculty resources need to be better leveraged. Business
schools must address pervasive doctoral shortages creatively by reaching
beyond traditional sources for doctoral faculty. Though not without
challenges, the following are among possible alternative sources of doctoral
faculty:
- Ph.D. graduates of research disciplines
outside business schools (for example, psychology, sociology,
anthropology, physics, biotechnology), who bring alternative
perspectives on business education and research.
- Executive or professional doctoral
graduates from programs outside the advanced theoretical research
category, such as the Executive Doctor of Management program at Case
Western Reserve University.
- Ph.D. graduates from other fields who have
accumulated years of business experience and can serve as doctorally
qualified clinical professors.
- New models of qualification to the doctorate,
practiced by some European schools, that award doctoral degrees based
solely on published research.
Along with tapping new sources for doctoral
faculty, such strategies may have the added benefit of increasing the
"practice" flavor of curricula.
A concurrent approach to support continued, vibrant
scholarship of business research faculty is a productivity-enhancement
strategy, rather than a focus on faculty supply. The reason for suggesting
that approaches to enhance productivity are needed is that reduced teaching
loads alone do not ensure increased faculty research contributions.
Possible such approaches include faculty development in best research
practices; greater flexibility in faculty employment relationships, to
facilitate researcher collaboration and mobility across institutions; a
multilevel faculty model that fine-tunes faculty assignments to fit their
competencies; and differentiated performance accountability and rewards
around these assignments.
The quest for sustained research productivity also
hinges on our definition of research. EQUIS, the business school
accreditation program offered by the European Foundation for Management
Development, has proposed an expanded definition of research to include
research, development, and innovation (RDI). RDI includes activities
related to the origination, dissemination, and application of knowledge to
practical management.
I have always been one to distinguish scholarship from research. One can be a
scholar by mastering some important subset of what is already known. A
researcher must attempt to contribute new knowledge to this subset. Every
academic discipline has an obligation to conduct research in an effort to keep
the knowledge base dynamic and alive. However, this does not necessarily mean
that every tenured professor must have been a researcher at some point along the
way as long as the criteria for tenure include highly significant scholarship.
This tends not to be the model we work with in colleges and universities in
modern times. But given the extreme shortages in accounting doctoral students,
perhaps the time has come to attract more scholars into our discipline. It will
require a huge rethinking of curriculum and thesis requirements, and I do think
there should be a thesis requirement that demonstrates advanced scholarship. I
also think that the curriculum should cover a variety of disciplines without
aspirations to produce Super CPAs to teach accounting. Possibly universities
will even generate some doctoral theses other than the present ones that
everybody hopes, including the authors, that nobody will read.
Medical schools have used these two tracks for years. Some medical professors
are highly skilled clinically and teach medicine without necessarily devoting
80% of their time in research labs. Other medical professors spend more than 80%
of their time in research labs. In law, the distinction is less obvious, but I
think when push comes to shove there are many law professors who have mastered
case law without contributing significantly to what the legal profession would
call new knowledge. Other law professors are noted for their contributions to
new theory.
Along these lines follows an obligation to teach “professionalization” in
an effort to attract doctoral students
Donald E. Hall finishes his series with proposals to change the dissertation
process and a call to teach “professionalization.”
"Collegiality and Graduate School Training," by Donald E. Hall, Inside
Higher Ed, January 24, 2006 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/workplace/2006/01/24/hall
This emphasis on conversational skills
and commitments allows us then to fine tune also our
definition of what “professionalization” actually means.
Certainly in the venues above — the classroom and in
research mentorship — we work to make our students more
aware of the norms and best practices of academic
professional life. But the graduate programs that are most
concerned with meeting their students’ needs attend also to
that professionalization process by offering seminars,
roundtables, workshops, and other activities to students
intent on or just thinking about pursuing an academic
career. In all of these it is important to note that
aspiring academics are not only entering the conversation
represented by their research fields, but also the
conversation of a dynamic and multi-faceted profession.
This does mean encouraging literal
conversations among graduate students and recent graduates
who have taken a wide variety of positions — from high
profile academic, to teaching centered, to those in the
publishing industry and a wide variety of non-academic
fields. I started this essay by noting that when I was a
graduate student I had never heard from or about individuals
who had taken jobs like the one I eventually took. Certainly
I could have sought out those individuals on my own (though
I didn’t know them personally, since they were not part of
my cohort group), but it is also true that those individuals
were not generally recognized as ones to emulate.
One hopes, given the terrible
prospects that most new Ph.D.’s face today as they enter the
academic job market, that such snobbishness has waned.
However, I still would not go so far as to say that we
should tell students that “any job” is better than “no job”
or that they should simply “take what they can get.” Some
individuals would be terribly mismatched with certain
positions — weak teachers who live for research should not
take positions at teaching universities unless they are
willing to re-prioritize and devote their energies to
improving their pedagogies. Similarly, I have known superb
teachers with poor research habits and skills who have taken
wholly inappropriate positions at prestigious universities
and then lost those jobs for low research productivity
during third year or tenure reviews (unfortunately, they
sometimes got their jobs in the first place because they
were able to — and were counseled to — market themselves
within certain highly sought-after identity political fields
but with no recognition of their own individual needs or
abilities). A discussion of who will be happy and will
succeed where must be part of any broad conversation on the
academic profession, whether that conversation takes place
in seminars, workshops, or with groups of students about to
“go on the market.”
Indeed, it is vital to invite
students into conversation on these matters as often and as
early as possible. At the beginning of every meeting of
every graduate class I teach, I ask if there are any
questions on the minds of the students regarding their
program, general professional issues or processes, or the
often unexplained norms of academic life. Even if students
are sometimes too shy to ask what they really want to know
in class, their recognition of my willingness to address
such issues means they often show up during office hours to
ask what they consider an embarrassing question (“how much
do assistant professors typically make?” or “what do you say
in a cover letter when you send out an article for
consideration?”). We have to let students know that we are
willing to share information with them in an honest and
practical manner. We should be “open texts” for them to read
and learn from in their own processes of professional
interpretation and skill-building.
I believe it would be useful to
build some of the expectations above into the desired
outcomes of our graduate programs. In fact, I haven’t heard
of any programs that articulate specific goals for
professionalization processes, but I think we should be
asking what specifically we wish the end product to be of
those seminars, workshops, and other conversations about
academic life. I would offer that an overarching goal might
be to help our students become more supple and skilled
participants in the wide variety of conversations that
comprise an academic career. By necessity, acquiring this
conversational skill means learning the value of being both
multi-voiced and open to the perspectives of others.
This bears some explanation. By
multi-voiced I am not implying that students should learn to
be Machiavellian or duplicitous. Rather, I mean that all of
us who are thriving in our careers have learned to speak
within a wide variety of contexts and to choose our language
carefully depending upon the venue. I would never speak in
class as I do in some of my more theoretically dense
writings. I would never speak to administrators from other
departments as I do to those in my home department who use
the same terms and points of reference. And finally I would
never speak to the public exactly as I would to a scholarly
audience at a conference. Being multi-voiced in this way
means being aware of your conversation partners’ needs and
placing their need to understand above your own desire to
express yourself in intellectually self-serving ways.
And this is, in fact, an important
component of being open to the perspectives of others. Yet
that openness also means allowing one’s own beliefs, values,
and opinions to be challenged and transformed by contact
with those of conversation partners. This does not mean
being unwilling to defend one’s beliefs (whether on matters
of social justice or minute points of interpretation), but
it does mean being able to position oneself at least
partially outside of oneself in the process of
conversational exchange. It certainly means working to
understand how the general public perceives the academy (and
the debate over tenure, for example). It means trying to see
the world through the eyes of a different generation of
professors who may not use the same methodologies or
theoretical touchstones in their work. It means seeing one’s
own sacredly held positions as ones that exist in a
landscape of positions, many of which are also sacredly
held.
Continued in article
December 11, 2005 message from David Albrecht
[albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]
At Bowling Green, much institutional emphasis is
being placed on having undergraduates conduct or participate in research. Of
course, I'm pretty sure the program is slanted toward the hard sciences. An
economics professor here is active in this area. She suggests that I get
involved.
I'd love to get involved, there are significant
rewards being tossed about.
On what would my undergraduates do research?
Please help me.
David Albrecht
December 12, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi David,
At the college of business level, you might suggest that your college
become involved in the highly popular National Conferences on Undergraduate
Research (NCUR). This affords students the opportunity to travel a bit and
make presentations with other students at the excellent NCUR conferences. It
also is an opportunity to promote your college and its faculty. Your social
and physical science colleges may already be involved with NCUR ---
http://www.ncur.org/
As far as research goes, I think it would be great to have students write
responses to FASB, GASB, and IASB exposure drafts and other invitations to
comment. Undergraduate research is not as esoteric as PhD research and
leaves some room for normative methodology.
Along these lines I had an opportunity to view two absolutely absurd
referee reports sent to a professor, not me, with respect to a submission.
His submission suggested, among other things, that some accounting faculty
should spend more time responding to standard setters' invitations to
comment on matters that need more applied research. For lack of a better
term, I will call this applied research in accounting.
The reports of both referees were highly critical of professors trying to
publish applied research in any AAA journals (including Accounting Horizons
which they assert is read mostly by academics rather than practitioners).
Perhaps they might make an allowance for Issues in Accounting Education, but
no mention is made for IAE in these referee reports.
I think the following quotation (listed as the Number 1 criticism) from
one of the referee reports pretty much sums up the sad state of academic
accounting research today.
I quote:
*************
1. The paper provides specific recommendations for things that
accounting academics should be doing to make the accounting profession
better. However (unless the author believes that academics' time is a
free good) this would presumably take academics' time away from what
they are currently doing. While following the author's advice might make
the accounting profession better, what is being made worse? In other
words, suppose I stop reading current academic research and start
reading news about current developments in accounting standards. Who is
made better off and who is made worse off by this reallocation of my
time? Presumably my students are marginally better off, because I can
tell them some new stuff in class about current accounting standards,
and this might possibly have some limited benefit on their careers. But
haven't I made my colleagues in my department worse off if they depend
on me for research advice, and haven't I made my university worse off if
its academic reputation suffers because I'm no longer considered a
leading scholar? Why does making the accounting profession better take
precedence over everything else an academic does with their time?
**************
Both referees imply that studying accounting standards will take our
researchers away from what's really important in accounting academe, namely
publishing empirical and analytical research on problems that lend
themselves to esoteric statistics and mathematics. The irony is that most of
the esoteric research published research along those lines is more or less
focused on trivial hypotheses of little interest in and of themselves.
Certainly our academic friends in economics and finance are not subscribing
to our accounting research journals. We, of course, subscribe to their
esoteric journals.
Once again I make my case that that academic research hypotheses
published in top accounting research journals cannot be of much interest
since all top accounting research journals in academe have a policy against
publication of replication studies. What value can the findings have of the
replication studies are of no interest? See
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Replication
The bottom line is that real scientists, economists, medical researchers,
and legal researchers would laugh the above two arrogant AAA journal
referees off the face of the planet. I'm certainly glad that medical
researchers focus on professional practice problems and insist on
replication. I'm certainly glad that biology researchers focus on microbes
that are helping or hindering life on earth. I'm certainly glad that legal
research is almost entirely focused on real world case law. No respectable
academic discipline, other than accounting, divorces itself from the
practice of its own profession. I think this is the main reason academic
accounting research is held is such low esteem both by practitioners and by
other academic disciplines. We've become a sick joke.
What the two idiots, who are typical arrogant referees for AAA journals,
are doing, David, is leaving a whole lot of room for Bowling Green's
undergraduates to conduct research on the important problems of the academic
profession while they themselves go off and play in the sandbox of research
that their own top journals conclude is not worth replicating. I suggest to
you David that there is ample room for your undergraduates do applied
research that may benefit the profession. Just do not expect the arrogant
"philosophers" who guard the gates of our academic accounting research
journals to allow any of this research pass into the gates of heaven.
I think the two referee reports mentioned above are exactly what the
current AAA President (Judy Rayburn) and the Past President (Jane Mutchler)
are trying in vain to overcome by changing the refereeing policy of the
AAA's leading journals. I'm certain the prejudices of our arrogant ivory
tower academics are so ingrained that these two women are fighting losing
battles.
I suggest that you, David, conduct a lab experiment in your undergraduate
classes. Bring a scale to each class and have the students weigh the last
four issues of The Accounting Review. Then have students weigh the last four
issues of Accounting Horizons. You must first tear out only the research
articles themselves since both journals do publish some items that are not
research submissions to the journals. Please publish this comparative study
on the AECM. I think the results will speak for themselves about the sad
state of applied research in accounting academe.
Imagine the how academe might be shaken up if an AAA Doctoral Consortium
were entirely devoted one year to taking up current issues facing the FASB,
GASB, and IASB. The very foundations of academe might crumble if we let
outsiders into the tightly controlled esoteric program of the Doctoral
Consortium and corrupt the research biases of our new doctoral graduates in
accountancy.
Send your undergraduate researchers marching forward David. The
accounting world will be a better place. The profession is getting very
little help from unreplicated research articles that pass through the gates diligently
guarded by arrogant and narcisstic AAA journal referees.
Bob Jensen
December 12, 2005 reply from McCarthy, William
[mccarthy@BUS.MSU.EDU]
On Monday 12 December 2005, David Fordham wrote
on AECM:
...
No matter how good it is, no matter what
its form, systems research will not be published in accounting
journals given the current editorship and review staff
...
David and other AECM system researchers:
This has been generally true in the past and
there are certainly still a host of accounting journals that
underestimate the importance of accounting information systems (AIS)
research. Additionally, it is still true that almost all accounting
academics remain clueless about the different kinds of methodologies
that AIS, MIS, and computer science researchers generally use. Thus,
accounting systems people (like Dave and I plus many AECM members) are
forced to live in an academic world that understands neither “the what”
nor “the how” of AIS research and teaching.
However, the American Accounting Association
(in general) and The Accounting Review (in particular) are taking steps
to narrow this gap in understanding. Dan Dhaliwal, the senior editor of
The Accounting Review (TAR) has appointed me – a known maverick in
accounting circles and a long-time champion of AIS research and teaching
-- as an editor for TAR.
That was the good news; now the bad (sort of)
news. Since the announcement in August of a systems champion at the
Review, we have seen no changes because systems people are not
submitting manuscripts. I know that gearing up takes a while, but in the
interim, I think we need to speak less of our underprivileged past
status and concentrate more on how we are going to attack the myriad of
problems that accounting faces today with systems-informed thinking and
systems-informed methods. If you fervently believe that the practice of
accounting benefits little from what TAR, JAR, JAE, et al. produce, and
you also believe that accounting practice could benefit tremendously
from improvements researched and suggested by good AIS people and
computer scientists, you need to get busy.
I am going to give a speech on this at the AAA
Information Systems Section mid-year meeting on January 7th, 2006, but
in the interim, I hope people can use their inter-term break time to get
the flow to TAR increased. Let’s get going!!
Bill McCarthy
Michigan State
Dennis
Beresford, former Chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board and
current Ernst & Young Professor of Accounting at the University of Georgia,
had much to recommend on how academic accountants could improve. His
luncheon speech on August 10, 2005 at the AAA Annual Meetings in San
Francisco is provided at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/BeresfordAAAspeech2005.htm
I snipped the above URL to
http://snipurl.com/Beresford2005
My apologies
for some formatting that was lost when I converted Denny's DOC file into a
HTM file.
December 12, 2005 reply from David Albrecht
What is applied research?
I've never been able to figure this one out.
David Albrecht
December 13, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi David,
First let me point out that for over three
decades, Denny Beresford has been appealing for more applied research
among accounting educators. Two days ago I requested and received his
permission to post his luncheon speech at the annual 2005 AAA meetings
in San Francisco. His somewhat emotional appeal is at
http://snipurl.com/Beresford2005
You can obtain various definitions of applied
research by going to
http://www.google.com/advanced_search?hl=en
Type in the following in one of the search boxes:
Define "Applied Research"
Among the many definitions the one I like is
that basic research is "the systematic, intensive study directed toward
the practical application of knowledge and problem solving."
www.unlv.edu/depts/cas/glossary.htm
The key word in this definition is "practical
application." In the context of the accountancy profession I think of
this is as discovery of practical applications that can be put into
place by practicing accountants and their firms. Included here are
practical applications for standard setters such as the FASB, GASB, and
IASB.
By way of example, I would include virtually all
of the applied research papers published by Ira Kawaller on the
practical applications of derivative financial instruments and
accounting for derivative financial instruments ---
http://www.kawaller.com/articles.shtml
By way of a particular example, I like Ira's
applied research on when to use dollar-offset versus regression tests of
hedge effectiveness. Hedge effectiveness testing is required for hedge
accounting per Paragraph 62 in FAS 133. The FASB does not prescribe how
such testing should be done in practice. It only says such testing is
required. Ira makes some practical suggestions at
http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/AFP_Regression.pdf
I contend that most ABC costing research is of
an applied nature since most published papers and the seminal
discoveries of ABC by the John Deere Company back in the 1940s are
intended for practical application.
Lines between basic research and applied
research in accounting are really confusing because it is common to
associate quantitative methods and/or historical methodology with basic
research. Basic research should not be confused with tools and methods
of research. Basic research quite simply is a research discovery, new
knowledge, that has no perceived application in practice or at best has
some hope for possible discovery of practical applications in future
applied research.
I suspect that the discovery of the structure of
DNA by Watson and Crick is conceived as basic research. Applied
researchers later on found ways to put this to use in practice such as
the practice of using DNA evidence in criminal cases.
I suspect that portfolio theory in the 1959
doctoral dissertation of Harry Markowitz at Princeton would be
considered basic research that later led to the CAPM model and Options
Pricing Model applied in practice. The discovery by Markowitz was
totally impractical until simplified index models were later discovered
when trying to apply Markowitz theory to actual portfolio choices.
The best examples of basic versus applied
research discoveries probably come from the discipline of mathematics.
Theoretical mathematicians like to prove things with no thought as to
possible relevance to anything in the real world.
It is much more difficult to find truly basic
research discoveries in accountancy. We should be grateful that we do
not have to select Nobel Prize Winners in accountancy. The Ball and
Brown study got the first Seminal Contribution Award from the AAA. But
this is an application of capital market research discovered previously
by researchers in finance and economics. Capital markets studies have
mostly applied models developed in finance, econometrics, and
statistics.
What I am saying is that it is possible to apply
theory and test hypotheses without intending to have the discoveries be
put directly into practice in a profession. For example an events study
such as the discovery by George Foster that the publication of a Barrons'
paper by Abe Briloff was highly correlated with a plunge in share prices
of McDonalds Corporation tells us something about an association between
Briloff's accounting publication and capital market events. But
correlation is not causation. Foster's study could not really tell us
if the accounting issue (dirty pooling) or the mere fact that Briloff
said something negative about McDonalds in Barrons actually caused the
plunge in share prices.
The bottom line here is that the basic versus
applied research distinction in mathematics and science does not carry
over well into accounting. I prefer to make the distinction more along
the lines of research not having versus having a direct impact on
practicing accountants. For example, Ira's paper on hedge effectiveness
techniques had immediate and direct impact on having firms use
dollar-offset testing for retrospective data and regression for
prospective data. Companies actually follow Ira's recommendations when
implementing FAS 133 rules.
So what makes Ira's study different from those
of Ball and Brown, Beaver, and Foster? I guess the distinction lies in
the "take home" for practicing accountants and standard setters. Most
capital markets research discoveries do not provide the CPA on the
street with something to immediately place into practice or take out of
practice. The Ira Kawaller studies linked above provide CFOs with
strategies for hedging and CAOs/CPAs with strategies for implementing
FAS 133.
Now the question is: What is Denny
Beresford asking us to provide to the standard setters? I think what
he's asking for is more along the lines of Ira Kawaller's
practical-application contributions. If Ira's studies had been done
before FAS 133 was issued, the standard itself in Paragraph 62 might
have suggested or even required specific types of hedge effectiveness
testing. Instead Paragraph 62 of FAS 133 offered no suggestions for how
to test for effectiveness. This has led to thousands of variations,
often inconsistent, of hedge effectiveness testing in practice.
Both while he was Chairman of the FASB and
after he became a professor of accounting at Georgia, Denny Beresford
has consistently been appealing for the academy to conduct research that
will have more direct benefit in the writing of accounting standards.
This of course entails a considerable effort in learning the issues
faced by standard setters on particular complicated issues like the
thousands of different types of derivative financial instruments
actually used in practice. Most academic accountants shun learning
about such contracts and instead turn to tried and true regression
models of data found in existing databases like those provided by
Compustat and Audit Analytics. My conclusion is that this so-called
basic research is actually easier than making creative contributions to
practicing accountants, i.e. providing them with discoveries that they
did not make themselves in practice. This is so tough that it is why
the academy tends to avoid Denny's appeal.
I repeat and lament the sad state of the
accountancy academy as reflected in the following quotation from a
referee that closed the gate on publishing a paper of a very close
friend of mine:
I quote:
*************
1. The paper provides
specific recommendations for things that accounting academics should
be doing to make the accounting profession better. However (unless
the author believes that academics' time is a free good) this would
presumably take academics' time away from what they are currently
doing. While following the author's advice might make the accounting
profession better, what is being made worse? In other words, suppose
I stop reading current academic research and start reading news
about current developments in accounting standards. Who is made
better off and who is made worse off by this reallocation of my
time? Presumably my students are marginally better off, because I
can tell them some new stuff in class about current accounting
standards, and this might possibly have some limited benefit on
their careers. But haven't I made my colleagues in my department
worse off if they depend on me for research advice, and haven't I
made my university worse off if its academic reputation suffers
because I'm no longer considered a leading scholar? Why does making
the accounting profession better take precedence over everything
else an academic does with their time?
**************
My bottom line conclusion is that the referee
acting superior above is really scared to death that he or she cannot be
creative enough to make a practical suggestion to the FASB that the FASB
itself has not already discovered.
Bob Jensen
March 18, 2008
reply from Paul Williams
[Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]
Steve Zeff
has been saying this since his stint as editor of The Accounting
Review (TAR); nobody has listened. Zeff famously wrote at least two
editorials published in TAR over 30 years ago that lamented the
colonization of the accounting academy by the intellectually unwashed.
He and Bill Cooper wrote a comment on Kinney's tutorial on how to do
accounting research and it was rudely rejected by TAR. It gained a new
life only when Tony Tinker published it as part of an issue of
Critical Perspectives in Accounting devoted to the problem of dogma
in accounting research.
It has only been
since less subdued voices have been raised (outright rudeness has been
the hallmark of those who transformed accounting into the empirical
sub-discipline of a sub-discipline for which empirical work is
irrelevant) that any movement has occurred. Judy Rayburn's diversity
initiative and her invitation for Anthony Hopwood to give the
Presidential address at the D.C. AAA meeting came only after many years
of persistent unsubdued pointing out of things that were uncomfortable
for the comfortable to confront.
Paul Williams
paul_williams@ncsu.edu
(919)515-4436
January 19, 2006 reply from Paul Williams
[williamsp@COMFS1.COM.NCSU.EDU]
This type of review is all
too common and is symptomatic of what the accounting academy has become.
I recall a panel discussion that was organized for an AAA annual meeting
(I believe it was the last time we held it in Washington) to air an
issue that Bill Cooper was animated about at that time -- data sharing
and the bigger problem of research impropriety. One of the panelists was
a scientist from John Hopkins who had just started a research ethics
journal. As part of this program editors of many leading accounting
journals were invited to give their perspectives on the problem of
replication and potential research malfeasance. Of course none thought
there was any problem.
One editor (still an
editor of one of the most prominent journals) responding to the
scientist's contention that the scholarly enterprise is to ultimately
seek knowledge, concurred, but added, (paraphrased, but pretty close)
"An alternative hypothesis is that the academic enterprise is a game
constructed to identify the cleverest people so we know who to give the
money to."
His smirk revealed a great
deal about what he believed to be the silly idea that scholarship was
about knowledge. The reviewer's reply above is evidence that the
hypothesis about an academic game is more believable than one in which
the academic enterprise in accounting has understanding anything as its
objective. And the profession is certainly culpable. It created
professorships and awarded them to the winners of this game. It funded
the JAR conferences. It dropped out of the AAA. This may be because the
profession has never had any great respect for scholarship, at least not
in my lifetime. Medical scholarship is not about creating profit
opportunities for doctors; neither is legal scholarship about creating
profit opportunities for lawyers. Perhaps this is why we now have, as
Ray Chambers opined in his Abacus article in 1999 (just before he passed
away) that we had created vast tomes of incoherent rules "...as if for a
profession of morons."
The shift from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft.
"Notes from the
Underground," by Scott McLemee, Inside Higher Ed, January 18, 2006
---
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2006/01/18/mclemee
“Knowledge and competence
increasingly developed out of the internal dynamics of
esoteric disciplines rather than within the context of
shared perceptions of public needs,” writes Bender.
“This is not to say that professionalized disciplines or
the modern service professions that imitated them became
socially irresponsible. But their contributions to
society began to flow from their own self-definitions
rather than from a reciprocal engagement with general
public discourse.”
Now, there is a definite note of sadness in Bender’s
narrative – as there always tends to be in accounts of
the shift from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft.
Yet it is also clear that the
transformation from civic to disciplinary
professionalism was necessary.
“The new disciplines offered
relatively precise subject matter and procedures,”
Bender concedes, “at a time when both were greatly
confused. The new professionalism also promised
guarantees of competence — certification — in an era
when criteria of intellectual authority were vague and
professional performance was unreliable.”
But in the epilogue to
Intellect and Public Life, Bender suggests that the
process eventually went too far. “The risk now is
precisely the opposite,” he writes. “Academe is
threatened by the twin dangers of fossilization and
scholasticism (of three types: tedium, high tech, and
radical chic). The agenda for the next decade, at least
as I see it, ought to be the opening up of the
disciplines, the ventilating of professional communities
that have come to share too much and that have become
too self-referential.”
The above quotation does not contain beginning and ending parts of
the article
I loved the Marx Brothers
Analogy in This One: It shows what happens when government runs a business
"Is This Any Way to Run a Railroad? You think you've got problems?
Amtrak's got an overpaid workforce. Its trains and tracks are falling
apart. Worse, the carrier's balance sheet is a flat-out mess," by John
Goff, CFO Magazine,
November 2005 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/5077873/c_5101083?f=magazine_featured
As Marx Brothers movies go,
Go West isn't much. The aging comedy team was running out of ideas, and
it shows: the plot is predictable and the gags are stale.
Yet
there is one memorable scene in the 1940 film.
In it, the boys — desperate to keep a steam-powered locomotive chugging
along — feed the entire train to itself, car by car, piece by piece,
caboose to tender.
Management at the National
Railroad Passenger Corp., better known as Amtrak, performed a similar
sacrifice in 2001. Four years into an effort to wean itself from federal
operating subsidies, the rail carrier was running on empty. Executives
had already started diverting funds earmarked for capital projects to
help plug operating holes. But even that wasn't enough, and soon,
Amtrak's management began cannibalizing the railroad. Recalls Cliff
Black, Amtrak's director of media relations: "We mortgaged everything."
Things got so bad that the
railroad took out a loan on New York's Pennsylvania Station to cover
three months of expenses. It was a move the U.S. Office of Management
and Budget called "a financial absurdity equivalent to a family taking
out a second mortgage on its home to pay its grocery bills." Eventually,
Amtrak conceded it couldn't break even, and Congress continued pumping
funds back into the rail operator.
The damage to the balance
sheet had been done, however. During the five-year plan, the carrier's
debt load nearly tripled, from $1.7 billion to $4.8 billion. Once dubbed
the "Glide Path to Profitability," Amtrak's intended march to
self-sufficiency is termed something else by current CFO David Smith. "I
call it the slippery slope to hell," he says.
Since taking the reins last
November, Smith has personally spent considerable time in purgatory —
stuck awaiting vital federal funding for the carrier while politicians
dither over the future of passenger rail service. "Amtrak's never had
full support from any Administration. And it has no ongoing real capital
budget," notes James Coston, chairman of Corridor Capital LLC, which
specializes in finance and development for intercity and commuter rail
systems. "So each year, they go up to Capitol Hill with a tin cup."
And that cup remains far
from full. Last February, for example, the White House announced it
intended to cut off Amtrak's billion-dollar-plus annual subsidy — which
covers about half the railroad's total budget — unless the carrier
agreed to a radical restructuring. Both the House and the Senate defied
the Administration, calling for subsidies ranging from $1.17 billion to
$1.45 billion for 2006 (the carrier generated $1.9 billion in revenues
last year against $2.9 billion in costs). But the details have yet to be
ironed out, and it's still unclear just how much money Amtrak will get.
Amid the revenue
uncertainty, Smith must somehow pay down Amtrak's borrowings, upgrade
its information technology and financial skills, and wring concessions
from entrenched unions. He is also charged with mapping out long-term
capital investments on the railroad's antiquated infrastructure — a tall
order when you don't actually know what funds will be available to
finance the repairs. And he must do all this under the scrutiny of an
Administration whose purported goal, says Amtrak president and CEO David
Gunn, is "to destroy Amtrak."
It is, in sum, a nearly
impossible to-do list. But judging from his efforts so far, Smith has
what it takes to defy long odds: steadiness, belief, and a certain
imperviousness to the Coliseum crowd. Some observers say his first year
on the job could be used as a case study for grace under fire. Says
Coston: "I can't imagine a tougher job than being CFO at Amtrak."
December 5, 2005 reply from Paul Williams
Bob, Come on! This kind of argument is unfair. You
sound like the folks at Rochester. Outcomes I like I attribute to market
forces and the private sector; outcomes I don't like are the fault of
government meddling. I defy anyone to draw a line that demarcates private
from public outcomes. The intertwining of government and economics is today
the same as it has always been. Abandoning the messy world of political
economy for the mathematically elegant imaginary world of mere economics
makes for a nice living for a lot of mathematicians. Since my paycheck is
drawn on the account of the State of North Carolina I am legally a
government employee. NC State's Centennial Campus is living testament to the
impossibility, in a meaningful scientific sense (as opposed to a rhetorical
sense), of the distinction between pubic and private. All that exists are
organizations within a context of constraints and incentives mutually
determined by economic, political, and social forces (if force is the right
metaphor).
Paul Williams
paul_williams@ncsu.edu
(919)515-4436
December 6, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen
From the KPMG Audit Report on September 30, 2004
--- http://www.amtrak.com/pdf/04financial.pdf The Company (Amtrak) has a
history of substantial operating losses and is highly dependent upon
substantial Federal government subsidies to sustain its operations. There
are currently no Federal government subsidies authorized or appropriated for
any period subsequent to the fiscal year ending September 30, 2005 (“fiscal
year 2005”). Without such subsidies, Amtrak will not be able to continue to
operate in its current form and significant operating changes, restructuring
or bankruptcy may occur. Such changes or restructuring would likely result
in asset impairments.
************************
I guess I have to agree Paul that the difference
between Amtrak and other businesses, like farmers, dependent upon government
subsidies is largely semantic (rhetorical). In a sense, Amtrak is less like
Fanny Mae since Amtrak's debt is not guaranteed by the Federal government.
It is also less like the U.S. Post Office since Amtrak did sell equity (that
has nearly been wiped out by huge deficits). Like the Post Office, Amtrak
does negotiate directly with the government for appropriations to a
particular business. But unlike the Post Office, I think Amtrak can set
prices without an act of Congress.
The lines are indeed fuzzy between government
enterprises, private enterprises directly subsidized, private enterprises
indirectly subsidized, and the theoretical private firms that have no
government subsidies. There may not be any such private firms in modern
times since nearly every product or service is indirectly subsidized
somewhere along the supply chain.
One possible distinction between public and private
enterprises is whether the government is obligated to pay creditors off in
full if the enterprise fails. I gather that this is the case for NC state
universities, the U.S. Post Office, and Fannie Mae (even though Fanny Mae
also sells equity shares). Debt guarantees are not assured in the case of
Amtrak such that Amtrak is closer to being private in this context. In this
context, classifying public versus private enterprises becomes a sliding
scale as to what portion of the debt is guaranteed by the government.
Pension guarantees cloud this issue since these are a form of insurance that
enterprises must buy into to become partly covered.
I'm not certain where your argument bears much
fruit if we don't have some distinction between public and private. If
subsidies make every enterprise a government enterprise, wouldn't all
businesses become government enterprises? It would not be helpful to have no
definition of private enterprise since many equity owners and creditors can
still fail and do every day in firms where the government does not guarantee
repayment of all debt.
One problem of debt guarantees like we have in
Fanny Mae and the Post Office is that managers of those companies can be
tempted put their companies in extremely high levels of debt risk because
creditors are always willing to loan to the hilt if the government
guarantees repayment. Then cowboy managers
might be tempted to borrow great amounts to pay for highly inefficient
operating costs or make extremely high risk investments (as Fannie Mae did
with billions invested in losing manufactured housing mortgages).
When I started this thread I mistakenly thought
that Amtrak's debt was guaranteed by the government. What amazes me is how
Amtrak is still able to borrow money to finance losing operations. Creditors
(who are largely in Canada and France) must have faith that the U.S.
government will not allow Amtrak to fail in spite of Amtrak's bleak future
for ever earning a profit. Apparently the close association of Amtrak and
government make it not like Penn Central in the eyes of lenders.
The Timeline of the Recent History of Fannie Mae Scandals 2002-2008 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm#FannieMae
"Fannie Mayhem: A History," The Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2008
A huge corporate finance textbook
From Jim Mahar's Blog on October 17, 2005 ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
Vernimmen.com ---
http://vernimmen.com/
What a great site!
When I was gone I received a message from the
authors of Corporate Finance by Vernimmen, Quiry, Le Fur, and Salvi.
The book, newsletter, and website are all very
interesting and useful.
The book is 48 chapters (about 1000 pages) full of
corporate finance. I have to agree with the authors "It is a book in which
theory and practice are constantly set off against each other...."
I really like it. Especially the emphasis not so
much on techniques ("which tend to shift and change over time."
VERY WELL DONE!
Moreover, the authors also put out a monthly
newsletter and have a web site that could stand alone as one of the best in
the business.
Vernimmen.com ---
http://vernimmen.com/
Jensen Comment:
Perhaps intermediate accounting textbooks will one day follow this lead of
contrasting theory and practice.
Accentuate the Obvious
Not every scientist can discover the double helix, or
the cellular basis of memory, or the fundamental building blocks of matter. But
fear not. For those who fall short of these lofty goals, another entry in the
"publications" section of the ol' c.v. is within your reach. The proliferation
of scientific journals and meetings makes it possible to publish or present
papers whose conclusion inspires less "Wow! Who would have guessed?" and more
"For this you got a Ph.D.?" In what follows (with thanks to colleagues who
passed along their favorites), names have been withheld to protect the silly.
Sharon Begley, "Scientists Research Questions Few Others Would Bother to Ask,"
The Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2005; Page B1 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB111715390781744684,00.html
Jensen Comment: Although some of the studies Begley cites are
well-intended, her article does remind me of some of the more extreme studies
that won Senator Proxmire's Golden Fleece Awards ---
http://www.taxpayer.net/awards/goldenfleece/about.htm
Also see
http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/G/GoldenF1l.asp
Accounting research in top accounting journals seldom is not so much a fleecing
as it is a disappointment in drawing "obvious" conclusions that practicing
accountants "would not bother to ask." Behavioral studies focus on what
can be studied rather than what is interesting to study. Studies based on
analytical mathematics often start with assumptions that guarantee the outcomes.
And capital markets event studies either "discover" the obvious or are
inconclusive.
A Populist Movement in Accounting Research
At the
2005 American Accounting Association meetings in San Francisco, the 2005-2006
President, Judy Rayburn from the University of Minnesota, gave a luncheon speech
about the State of the AAA. The AAA is not in the best of shape and comparisons
are made with other academic associations in business studies such as finance
and management.
What is
especially interesting is the current populist movement going on in the AAA. It
is built upon the argument that the AAA journals and meeting programs became too
detached from the accounting profession and problems within the profession.
There is a strong movement rising to change the editorial biases of the AAA’s
top journals that have been tightly controlled by positivists demanding great
rigor in empirical and analytical studies. One problem is that such demands for
rigor have limited researchers to rather uninteresting problems that derive
outcomes of little surprise or interest. In many respects there is a current
populist movement with respect to the entire academic tenure and performance
evaluation process. You can read a bit more about this at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
August 23, 2005 message from Tracey Sutherland
[tracey@AAAHQ.ORG]
Given the lively discussion about Judy Rayburn's
luncheon talk in San Francisco, I thought some would be interested in her
PowerPoint slides which are posted on the AAA website -- you'll find them at
http://aaahq.org/AM2005/menu.htm . It was
great to see many of you at the Annual Meeting -- special thanks to folks
for discussing ideas for some of the teaching/learning related sessions
developed by the VP for Education -- a session on using games in teaching
accounting was an outcome of conversations on AECM.
Best regards, Tracey
Jensen Comment: Katherine Schipper's Presidential Lecture slides are
also available"
I suspect the AAA is holding off on Denny Beresford's speech until it is determined if
Accounting Horizons is going to publish his paper.
Cynthia Cooper’s plenary speech on Wednesday is proprietary and will not be
published by the AAA. You can, however, find some of her remarks in various
places if you run a search on Google. There is a basketball star by that same
name, so I suggest you run the search on “Cooper” AND “Worldcom”.
Cooper was one of Time Magazine's 2002 "Persons of the Year" ---
http://www.time.com/time/personoftheyear/2002/
Also see
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m4153/is_6_60/ai_111737943
August 23 reply from Ken Crofts
[kcrofts@CSU.EDU.AU]
Judy Rayburn’s slides . . . are also interesting,
particularly drop in membership of AAA over the years.
Ken
The philosophy of science is a dying discipline
The philosophy of science is a dying discipline in part because it added
philosophical terminology and discourse that did not have enough value added to
scientists themselves as they got on with the work at hand, particularly social
scientists.
Social scientists have moved on from debates over the scientific paradigm. I
highly recommend examining how sociologists now proceed without getting all hung
up on positivist or anti-positivist dogma ---
http://www.trinity.edu/mkearl/methods.html#ms
I particularly like the following quotation from the above document:
Methodology
entails the procedures by which social research, whether quantitative and
qualitative, are conducted and ultimately evaluated--in other words, how
one's hypotheses are tested. Getting more specific, researchers'
methodologies guide them in defining, collecting, organizing, and
interpreting their data. Often the major breakthroughs in our understanding
of social processes occur because of the novelty of the data used, the
techniques by which it is gathered, or by the model or question directing
its acquisition and/or interpretation. And let's hear it for the findings
that don't support the hypotheses at the
Journal of Articles in
Support of the Null Hypothesis and in the
Index of Null Effects and
Replication Failures.
Defining one's
data: Precisely how does one go about and measure such theoretical
concepts as altruistic behavior, esprit de corps, or anomie? Even such
apparent "no brainers" as religiosity, happiness, or social class reveal how
methodological adequacy and validity are a function of the clarity of one's
theory and its part. Further, theory tends to be built into our measurement
tools. When, for instance, one measures temperature with a thermometer it
is not the temperature per se that one sees but rather a phenomenon
(mercury rising within a column) theoretically related to it.
For
strategies for data collection see Bill Trochim's
Research
Methods Tutorials, including material on:
Thinking
about using the web for conducting a survey? Available online is Matthias
Schonlau, Ronald D. Fricker, Jr., and Marc N. Elliott's
Conducting Research Surveys via E-mail and the Web.
August 22, 2005 reply from Paul
Williams at North Carolina State University
To add a bit more
to Michael, Ron, and Bob's comments: Even Popper, by the time he died wasn't
a Popperian, but an evolutionary epistimologist. Even he had to recognize
the implications of the linguistic turn and, particularly, Paul Feyerabend's
(a student of Popper) destruction of the pretenses of method. Bob is right
that philosophy of science is a dead horse replaced by a sociology and
history of science. Even scientists don't follow the scientific method.
Underlying every theory are propositions that don't enter into the specific
experiment or hypothesis being tested. I am with Ron, and many others, that
rigor is not obtained by running experiments within the context of a theory
that has absolutely pernicious underlying presuppostions.
Capital market theory and principal/agent theory are such theories.
The pernicious underlying proposition that is both empirically false (as
evolutionary biologists and anthropologists have provided ample evidence of
the kind you would consider rigorous) and morally repugnant is that of
humans' nature. What we in accounting seem never to consider is what
ramifications such presuppositions have for the very culture in which we
live. As Ed Arrington labeled it, Watts and Zimmerman are merely Hobbes in
drag. Hobbesian human nature was constructed to argue for Leviathan -- self-
government is beyond the ken of humans engaged in a war of all against all.
Certainly a libertarian philosophy is untenable in a Hobbesian world.
Solipsistic, vicious self-maximizers. The
project of the Scottish Enlightenment (of which Thomas Jefferson was a
diligent student) was to produce a human being who was capable of being free
of the rule of Kings or absolute sovereigns.
Jagdish provided
us a reference to Sumantra Ghoshal's article "Bad Management Theories Are
Destroying Good Management Practices." The bad management theories he speaks
of are those of agency theory. Why accounting should have been preoccupied
for the last 35 years in substance testing a theory of human nature is one
of the great mysteries. Principal/agent theory is a bad theory based on its
own empirical pretensions. What kind of Rsquares have we produced? Most of
human behavior is left unexplained by the theory. And after this last stock
market bubble, does anyone seriously believe in capital market efficiency?
How good a
"scientific" theory do you have when after 40 years of testing you are still
back at square one? And if capital markets aren't efficient, what does that
do to the 30 years of "information content" studies predicated on the
assumption that markets were at least semi-strong efficient? Let me ask this
question, of you and everyone else: How much of what you believe do you
believe on the basis of the "empirical evidence?" Very little. Indeed,
believing you are a Popperian is a belief not based on empirical evidence.
No one did an experiment and proved that Popper was
right.
But what makes capital market theory and principal agent theory bad is what
it forces me to believe about myself and Michael and Ron and You, which I
will not, nor do I have to, accept. To quote from Michael Shermer's The
Science of Good and Evil: "Still, something profound happened in the last
100,000 years that made us -- and no other species -- moral animals to a
degree unprecedented in nature (p. 31)." Accounting is a human practice.
It's objects are not atoms, or quarks, or stars, or planets. It's objects
are also its subjects (the double hermeneutic that our physicists friends
don't have to deal with). A human practice that investigates itself as if
human capacities are as impoverished as neo-classicists would have us
believe they are (both in terms of doing good and evil) might be missing
something exceedingly important to it.
Kurt Kleiner, "Most scientific papers are probably wrong," New
Scientist, August 30, 2005 ---
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7915&feedId=online-news_rss091
Most published scientific research papers are
wrong, according to a new analysis. Assuming that the new paper is itself
correct, problems with experimental and statistical methods mean that there
is less than a 50% chance that the results of any randomly chosen scientific
paper are true.
John Ioannidis, an epidemiologist at the University
of Ioannina School of Medicine in Greece, says that small sample sizes, poor
study design, researcher bias, and selective reporting and other problems
combine to make most research findings false. But even large, well-designed
studies are not always right, meaning that scientists and the public have to
be wary of reported findings.
"We should accept that most research findings will
be refuted. Some will be replicated and validated. The replication process
is more important than the first discovery," Ioannidis says.
In the paper, Ioannidis does not show that any
particular findings are false. Instead, he shows statistically how the many
obstacles to getting research findings right combine to make most published
research wrong.
Massaged conclusions Traditionally a study is said
to be "statistically significant" if the odds are only 1 in 20 that the
result could be pure chance. But in a complicated field where there are many
potential hypotheses to sift through - such as whether a particular gene
influences a particular disease - it is easy to reach false conclusions
using this standard. If you test 20 false hypotheses, one of them is likely
to show up as true, on average.
Odds get even worse for studies that are too small,
studies that find small effects (for example, a drug that works for only 10%
of patients), or studies where the protocol and endpoints are poorly
defined, allowing researchers to massage their conclusions after the fact.
Surprisingly, Ioannidis says another predictor of
false findings is if a field is "hot", with many teams feeling pressure to
beat the others to statistically significant findings.
But Solomon Snyder, senior editor at the
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, and a neuroscientist at
Johns Hopkins Medical School in Baltimore, US, says most working scientists
understand the limitations of published research.
"When I read the literature, I'm not reading it to
find proof like a textbook. I'm reading to get ideas. So even if something
is wrong with the paper, if they have the kernel of a novel idea, that's
something to think about," he says.
Journal reference: Public Library of Science
Medicine (DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124)
Jensen Comment: By analogy, this is a black eye against top accounting
research journals that refuse to publish replication studies. It is a special
problem for accounting behavior studies where sample sizes and validity are
enormous problems. It may be less of a problem in capital market studies where
sample sizes are often huge. But problems of poor study design and missing
variables in models are an enormous in accounting research that tries to be
scientific.
Always subject a research conclusion to the so-what
test! Even without technical skills you often can question that which your
common sense tells you is not correct, although you may have to endure slings
and arrows of paranoids in doing so. Sometimes a child's question is the best
kind of question ---
http://imagine.gsfc.nasa.gov/docs/ask_astro/answers/011021a.html
Never be overwhelmed by CAPM studies. The CAPM is such
a simplified model (reducing market risk to one index) that most studies based
on CAPM are probably correct versus incorrect by sheer chance. The problem with
multiple-index models, in turn, is that there are all sorts of specification
problems due missing variables and other things such as the following:
multicollinearity (http://seamonkey.ed.asu.edu/~alex/computer/sas/collinear.html
),
homoscedasticity (
http://davidmlane.com/hyperstat/A121947.html ),
nonstationarity (http://sepwww.stanford.edu/oldsep/matt/sdi/nstat/Fig/paper_html/node1.html)
And there are many other problems that editors often
overlook among "members of the club."
One common problem in our studies that have huge sample
sizes is that statistical inference is nonsense. For example, suppose that we
sample 50,000 men and 50,000 women to see if there is a difference in IQ.
Infinitesmal differences may be deemed "statistically significant." I once had
to critique a paper by a renowned researcher in accounting who somehow just did
not understand this problem with large samples.
Year 2005 American Accounting Association Annual Meeting in San Francisco
August 5-10, 2005
The AAA meetings were very good this year except for the first plenary
session. Bravo to Tracie, Dee, and their helpers for great logistics. The Hilton
did a great job. Bravo to Jane and her helpers for a great program.
I think Katherine's plenary (Tuesday) session on disclosures will be
posted by the AAA. Katherine made reference to quite a lot of academic
research. She might also make her PowerPoint file available at the FASB.
I hope the AAA will also post Denny's terrific luncheon speech. If not, I
think Denny will share it in some way with all of us on the AECM.
A highlight of the meetings for me was the XBRL workshop conducted by
Glen, Roger, and Skip. Eric Cohen also participated with a great demo of
Rivet Software's Dragon Tag software which finally makes it possible to
teach XBRL hands on to students.
Another highlight was the great debate between Katherine Schipper (for
fair value accounting) versus more negative positions taken by Ross Watts
and Zoe-Vanna Palmrose. All three did a great (actually unforgettable) job
on Monday afternoon.
This 2005 AAA meeting set a record with nearly 2,700 registrations plus
over 500 registered guests. This topped the previous record which was also
set in San Francisco some years ago. Such a registration number is very high
considering that there are only about 8,000 worldwide members of the AAA ---
http://aaahq.org/about/financials/KeyIndicators8_31_04.PDF
I returned to Trinity University from New Hampshire today. Trinity is
still seeking somebody to fill my chair (the Jesse H. Jones Distinguished
Professor of Business Chair) after I retire in May 2006. Anyone interested
in applying should contact Dan Walz at 210-999-7289 or dwalz@trinity.edu I
am very grateful to have had the privilege to fill it for 24 years.
Life is good!
August 13, 2005 reply from Glen Gray
[glen.gray@CSUN.EDU]
Gee, thanks for your kind words regarding our
XBRL workshop.
For those who want to know more about XBRL, you
should:
See XBRL cover story in August 2005 Journal of
Accountancy at
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/aug2005/tie.htm
Visit
http://www.xbrl.org
-- includes general and technical information
about XBRL
Check out the 5-years of XBRL abstracts at
http://bryant2.bryant.edu/~xbrl/index.html
Review FAQs at
http://xbrl.edgar-online.com/x/faqs/ , which cover a broad
range of XBRL questions
Visit
http://www.xbrlspy.org/ , a blog-like coverage of XBRL
Check out the free XBRL teaching materials that
will be available (Sept 1) at
www.eycarat.ku.edu/XBRLClassMaterials
Bob Jensen's threads on XBRL are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm#TimelineXBRL
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value reporting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue
August 15, 2005 reply from McCarthy, William
[mccarthy@BUS.MSU.EDU]
I agree that some of the annual meeting
sessions mentioned already were quite good this year, but for me, the
clear highlight of the convention was the policy speech given by new AAA
president Judy Rayburn at the Wednesday luncheon.
Judy made a strong case for expanding the scope
and volume of the AAA journal set by using comparisons to publication
trends and citation trends in management, marketing, and finance. She
also mentioned some specific AAA committee work that was going to assess
these matters. Judy finished by coming down to the floor and answering
all individual questions on rather difficult matters such as the
acceptability of research paradigms from other countries and
disciplines, and the effect of expansion on AAA section journals.
Many attendees did not have a ticket to the
Wednesday luncheon, but I am sure Judy's slides will be made available
to all.
Bill McCarthy
Michigan State
August 15, 2005 reply from Ali Mohammad J. Abdolmohammadi
I agree with Bill. While I found many
presentations to be excellent this year, I was particularly impressed
with Judy Rayburn's luncheon policy speech on Wednesday. I found the
speech to be honest and gutsy. My nonscientific observation of the crowd
was that the speech resonated well with the majority. It'll take a lot
of hard work to make serious changes to the current publication culture
of AAA journals, but it is well worth trying.
Ali Mohammad J. Abdolmohammadi, DBA, CPA
http://web.bentley.edu/empl/a/mabdolmohamm/
John E. Rhodes Professor of Accounting
Bentley College
175 Forest Street
Waltham, MA 02452
Fraudulent Conferences that Rip Off Colleges: Do you
really want to participate in these frauds?
I've written about this before, but I want to elaborate. Academics
either unwittingly or willingly sometimes allow themselves to get caught up in
fraudulent "conferences." Spam is on the rise for these frauds. The
degree of fraudulence varies. At worst, there is no conference and
organizers merely charge an exorbitant fee that allows the paper to be
"refereed" and published in a conference proceedings, thereby giving a
professor a "publication." See
http://lists.village.virginia.edu/lists_archive/Humanist/v18/0633.html
Even when the conferences meet, they may be fraudulent.
Generally these conferences are held in places where professors like to travel
in Europe, South America, Latin America, Las Vegas, Canada, the Virgin Islands,
or other nice locations for vacations that accompany a trip to a conference paid
for by a professor's employer. The professor gets credit for a
presentation and possibly a publication in the conference proceedings.
But wait a minute! Here are some warning signs for a
fraudulent conference:
-
Even though there is a high registration fee, there are no
conference-hosted receptions, luncheons, or plenary sessions. The
conference organizer is never called to account for the high registration
fee. The organizer may allude to the cost of meeting rooms in a hotel,
but often the meeting rooms are free as long as the organizer can guarantee
a minimum number of guests who will pay for rooms in the hotel.
-
All or nearly all submissions are accepted for presentation.
-
The only participants in most presentation audiences are
generally other presenters assigned to make a presentation in the same time
slot. There is virtually no non-participating audience. Hence
only a few people are in the room and each of them take turns making a
presentation. Most are looking at their watches and hoping to get out
of the room as soon as possible.
-
Presenters present their papers and then disappear for the
rest of the conference. There is virtually no interaction among all
conference presenters.
-
The papers presented are often journal rejects that are
cycled conference after conference if the professor can find a conference
that will accept anything submitted on paper. Check the dates on the
references listed for each paper. Chances are the papers have few if
any references from the current decade.
-
These conferences are almost always held in popular tourist
locations and are often scheduled between semesters for the convenience of
adding vacation time to the trip. They are especially popular in the
summer.
Bob Jensen's threads on various types of fraud in academe are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm
August 17, 2005 reply from Jagdish Patha
Bob:
I was about to be fleeced by one such conference
cheat claiming himself some Dr.----. generally organizes conferences at
almost all the exotic locations of US, Cancun, Venice etc. This organizer
double blind peer reviewed my submission (almost 35-40 pages) within 52
hours! Asked for per page charges if required to be placed in "proceedings"
which happens to be a CD-ROM. This organizer has also got 4-5 journals which
can ultimately accommodate any paper written from any angle of any sphere of
business. You may get into any journal of your choice which will claim to be
"double blind peer reviewed'!
I wish there should be some agency of regulators
who can tame them. These people are bogus, there conferences are bogus and
often I feel that what will be the face of a person who will come out and
claim a paper presented and published in such bogus outlet to be considered
suitable for tenure and promotion!
Jagdish Pathak, PhD
Guest Editor- Managerial Auditing Journal (Special Issue)
Associate Professor of Accounting & Systems Accounting & Finance Area
Odette School of Business
University of Windsor 401 Sunset Windsor, N9B 3P4, ON Canada
August 17, 2005 reply from David Albrecht
My answer is at the bottom of the paper, but please
read my supporting argument.
Generally speaking I am not in favor of my
department funding conference presentations for other faculty. I just don't
think much is gained from it, and it is a very expensive CV line. I'd say
that a lot of sponsored conferences haven't distinguished themselves from
the rip-offs. However, the research-oriented faculty at my school are funded
to attend conferences and conference presentations are the name of the game.
So like it or not, I have to play the game.
But are quality conferences, such as AAA
conferences, a rip-off? Is the phrase quality conference an oxymoron for the
AAA? Here's my experience at the recent AAA in San Francisco. Tell me what
you think.
I'm really upset with people making presentations,
but then refusing by their actions to share their paper with members of the
audience. I attended research presentations at eight of the nine time slots
in SF, and tried to surf over to a simultaneous session a couple of times.
In all of the sessions I attended, only 2 of 30 presenters had copies of the
paper to distribute. The responsible presenters (both in education-related
sessions) were Freddie Choo and the co-authoring team of Elizabeth Haywood,
Dorothy McMullen and Donald Wygal. In the non-education related sessions I
attended, there were no available copies of any paper. I then had to
approach each presenter afterward and ask for a copy of the paper to be sent
to me (seems reasonable that they would be available, as the papers had to
be submitted 8-9 months in advance). Not one of the non-education presenters
has sent anything to me. This is my usual experience. A few years ago I
asked for a copy of a conference paper, and was assured that I would be sent
one. Stereotypically, I received an e-mail two years later informing me that
the paper was now available in some journal's most recent edition, and I was
free to track it down. Of course, I was thanked for my interest in the
paper.
Most of the time when someone says that I will sent
a copy of the paper, it is an empty promise apparently designed to get rid
of me. I hardly ever get one.
If one of the purposes of the AAA is to share
research, then why are most of the presenters so proprietary and reluctant
to share details? I don't think that much knowledge is shared when a
presenter makes a very brief presentation using ineffective public speaking
methods and then has no copy of the paper to share.
I've attended three conferences so far this year,
two of which I had to pay for myself. In the Ohio AAA regional (BGSU paid
for this one) there were no copies available, but Tim Fogarty was very good
in sending me a copy of each of his papers presented. I learned so much from
actually reading the papers. At a second conference, I think I was the only
presenter at the conference to bring copies for attendees. I asked a few
people for a copy his/her paper, but I have yet to be sent one. In the third
conference, the SF AAA, I haven't received any requested papers from any
concurrent session presenter* except for Tom Buttross, and his paper is
education-related.
The teaching-related forums put on by the T&C
section (the best section of the AAA, IMHO) were good, and it's my guess
that about 20% had some write-up or paper to share at the forums. I picked
up material there from Torben Thomson, the co-authoring team of Graeme Dean,
Sandra Van Der Laan and Cameron Esslemont, the co-authoring team of Patsy
Lee, Cheryl Prachyl and Carol Sullivan, the team of Gary Siegel & Gail
Kucuiba, the team of Paul Mihalek, Milo Peck and Patricia Poli, the team of
Elsie Ameen, Daryl Guffey and Cynthia Jackson, the team of Violet Rogers and
Aileen Smith, the team of Michael Garner, Karen Papke-Shields, Ellen
Pettingill and Denise Rotondo, and the sole author Christie Johnson. Well,
maybe the rate is closer to 10%.
Following the conference, I've received materials
from teaching forum participants George Schmelzle, Wendy Tietz, Gail Kucuiba,
Yan Bao and Angela Lee. If I've misclassified anyone, I'm sorry.
My point is, the lid seems to be open for people
eager to share their teaching ideas, but when it comes to the
research-oriented presenters I'm SOL. Ironic, given that the major reason I
attended AAA was to get caught up on financial reporting and auditing
research ideas. Oh, I got my money's worth from the people mentioned above
(as well as Thomas Calderon and Denny Beresford), but I really wish the
conference would have been more research-oriented.
So, are AAA conferences rip-offs? Not entirely, but
pretty much so. And since I spend my own money to attend them, I'm much less
likely to attend one in the future.
David Albrecht
August 17, 2005 reply from Amy Dunbar
[Amy.Dunbar@BUSINESS.UCONN.EDU]
David,
Although I agree that a paper should be available
to you, I do not agree that the paper should be available in paper form.
Rather, the links to the papers should be provided by the author. Requiring
the author to haul papers to the conference is unreasonable, imo, but I
think the authors should provide a handout with the title of the paper, the
abstract, author information, and a link to the paper. As Bob Jensen
mentioned in an earlier posting, an author can easily put a file on his/her
web server. Personally, I would prefer to see links to the papers on an
electronic version of the AAA program, but many argue that such availability
could be construed to be a “publication” of the paper. I find this reasoning
suspect because no one has a problem with SSRN postings.
I missed this AAA conference for the first time in
years, and I really regret not being able to go. I find the meetings very
useful, not only for the various sessions, but also from a networking
perspective. This year, I heard there were also excellent CPE sessions. Far
from being a “rip-off,” the AAA annual meeting is a valuable resource that
takes incredible time on the part of the faculty volunteers who organize
that meeting with the help of the AAA staff.
Amy Dunbar
UConn
August 18, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi David,
Although I disagree with the general negativism of your opinions about
the AAA annual meetings, I will begin with one item of support. Years
ago when these meetings were held in San Diego, a CD recording company
recorded every session (concurrent sessions to panel discussions to
luncheons to plenary sessions). The company had a booth were
participants could buy the CD after each session at a rather modest cost
The sad part was that there was almost no demand to buy the CDs, especially
the CDs from the research presentation sessions. The reasons for this
are unknown. My own conclusion is that this is no fault of the AAA.
The problem is accounting research itself. Most of it is just not very
interesting whether or not it is presented at an AAA meeting.
The CD recording company lost a bundle on this venture and since then no
effort is made to record AAA meeting sessions other than occasional plenary
and luncheon sessions that are captured by the AAA itself on video as part
of the projection system for large audiences.
There is a general lack of interest in accounting research. Amy
mentioned the SSRN working paper series ---
http://www.ssrn.com/ . The big sellers in SSRN are economics and finance
papers. Demand for accounting research is dismal, especially when you
factor out those papers billed as accounting papers that are economics
research papers in accounting clothing. I can't get the ranking system
to work this morning, but the last time I looked there was not a single
accounting paper in the SSRN listing of top downloads ---
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/topten/topTenResults.cfm?groupingtype=3&groupingId=1
I discuss problems with accounting research at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
The biggest problem is that our accounting journals themselves do not even
judge it worthy to publish research replications. If our
findings were really of interest our journals would be like science journals
that actively seek out replications of findings in science.
Your comments focus on whether the benefit of sending a professor to the
AAA meetings justifies the cost. If we had interactive
teleconferencing or Webcasting of sessions available, perhaps you would be
correct in terms of the sessions themselves. But this fails to weigh
in the many other benefits of the AAA meetings, benefits that include the
following:
- Networking, especially encounters with old and new friends. A
scheduled or chance encounter during the meetings often changes the
entire career path of a professor, especially in terms of relocation.
Many of my best friends and correspondents over my entire career came
from encounters at AAA meetings. My close relationship with Amy
Dunbar began when she was in one of my CEP technology sessions years ago
at an AAA meeting. Subsequently she became a presenter in some of
my annual programs. My close relationship with Denny goes clear
back when he was still an Ernst and Ernst Research Partner who attended
every AAA annual meeting --- I'm talking almost 100 years ago.
- Interfacing of academia with the public accounting profession, the
business community, the publishers, the technology vendors, and the
professional associations like the AICPA, IMA, IIA, Certified Fraud
Examiners, and others. We also have interfacing with members of
the various section groupings such as the Teaching and Curriculum
Section.
- Interfacing between U.S. accounting professors and international
accounting professors. The AAA annual meetings are probably the
main reason why the AAA has become the leading international society for
accounting educators and researchers. Partly because the 2005
meetings were in San Francisco, the registration of Asian accounting
educators was especially high and contributed to the record setting
number of registrations.
- Serendipitous discovery of a research idea or teaching tool.
An immense amount of communication takes place at these meetings.
We get many course and curriculum changes throughout the world from
these meetings.
- Discovery of new textbooks and other teaching/learning aids,
especially the opportunity to fiddle around with new software that
vendors have set up on computers in the booths.
- The opportunity to question authors and presenters. The amount
of time allotted to this varies from session to session, but I certainly
asked some questions and got some good and bad answers. It also
helps to listen to the answers given to questions raised by other people
in the audience.
- The opportunity to present your own research or teaching ideas.
Your comments are all taken from the viewpoint of somebody in the
audience. Why did you not try to get on the program or made a CEP
presentation? Perhaps you should propose a session devoted to how
to improve the AAA meetings!
- The opportunity to vent frustrations. This has taking place
especially with gender issues and public interest accounting, and the
sessions that I attended in these areas have gotten better and better
each year. A public interest presentation by Carol Lawrence on on
Monday afternoon will stick in my mind the rest of my life. It was
entitled "Art and Semiotics: Signs, Symbols, Smoke, and Mirrors."
- I might add that Carol's presentation was a highly visual
presentation that would be very hard to present in a hard copy paper.
It could be done in video, which is one of the many reasons why I video
most sessions that I attend. There are sometimes presentations
that just cannot be captured in hard copy. I
have hundreds of video tapes of AAA meeting sessions that I've captured
over the years. I plan to donate these to the video
archives at the University of Mississippi in the near future. An
interesting research topic for some of you might be to examine these
tapes in an effort to determine what constitutes a bad presentation
versus a good presentation. I have filmed scores of both types of
presentations. (The University of Mississippi now has the largest
archive of accounting history in the world, including the recent gift of
the entire AICPA library).
I think you're asking too much in benefits from of the AAA meetings.
Such meetings serve many audiences from Glendale Community College to Ivy
League research centers. Such meetings serve many interests from
teaching ideas to empirical/analytical research methods to issues of great
concern in accountancy and business in the real world (that "other world").
Such meetings serve many audiences from the U.S. to Europe, to India, to
Africa, to Russia to Japan to China to Kangaroo and Kiwi lands.
All we can expect from the AAA meetings are peep holes to opportunities,
knowledge, and happenings in our corner on the world of teaching and
research and professional practice.
Lastly David, I might add that the annual AAA meetings pass the market
test. Thousands of people would not take the time, trouble, and cost to
come to these meetings from all over the world if they were not serving an
important purpose. You have every right to protest in an effort to make the
meetings better. However, I’m afraid that you must first demonstrate how to
make accounting research itself better.
Bob Jensen
August 18, 2005 reply from Ruth Bender
[r.bender@CRANFIELD.AC.UK]
The European Accounting Association has the papers
available for download from its website before the conference and for a week
after the conference has ended. My experience was that about 90% of what I
wanted was available, and a couple of other authors who I emailed for papers
were happy to oblige. Likewise, when I was emailed for a paper about a month
after the conference, I sent it by return.
The great advantage of having downloads available
before the conference was that it meant that the discussion at sessions
could be a bit better informed.
Mind you, I do wish you'd stop putting down the
'Fraudulent Conferences'. One of my minor enjoyments on a wet English
morning is looking at that conference email and working out which exotic
locations I could possibly get Cranfield to pay for me to visit :-)
Regards Ruth
Dr Ruth Bender
Cranfield School of Management
Thursday, April 28, 2005
The Chronicle of Higher Education
Business Schools' Focus on Research Has
Ensured Their Irrelevance, Says Scathing Article
By KATHERINE S. MANGAN
Business schools are
"institutionalizing their own irrelevance" by focusing on scientific
research rather than real-life business practices, according to a blistering
critique of M.B.A. programs that will be published today in the May issue of
the Harvard Business Review.
The article, "How Business Schools Lost Their Way,"
was written by Warren G. Bennis and James O'Toole, both prominent professors
at the University of Southern California's Marshall School of Business. Mr.
Bennis is also the founding chairman of the university's Leadership
Institute, and Mr. O'Toole is a research professor at Southern Cal's Center
for Effective Organizations.
Mr. Bennis and Mr. O'Toole conclude that business
schools are too focused on theory and quantitative approaches, and that, as
a result, they are graduating students who lack useful business skills and
sound ethical judgment. The authors call on business schools to become more
like medical and law schools, which treat their disciplines as professions
rather than academic departments, and to expect faculty members to be
practicing members of their professions.
"We cannot imagine a professor of surgery who has
never seen a patient or a piano teacher who doesn't play the instrument, and
yet today's business schools are packed with intelligent, highly skilled
faculty with little or no managerial experience," the two professors write.
"As a result, they can't identify the most important problems facing
executives and don't know how to analyze the indirect and long-term
implications of complex business decisions."
While business deans pay lip service to making
their courses more relevant, particularly when they are trying to raise
money, their institutions continue to promote and award tenure to faculty
members with narrow, scientific specialties, the authors contend.
"By allowing the scientific-research model to drive
out all others, business schools are institutionalizing their own
irrelevance," the authors write.
Most business problems cannot be solved neatly by
applying hypothetical models or formulas, they say. "When applied to
business -- essentially a human activity in which judgments are made with
messy, incomplete, and incoherent data -- statistical and methodological
wizardry can blind rather than illuminate."
Not surprisingly, the head of the association that
accredits business schools in the United States disagrees with the authors'
assessment. John J. Fernandes, president and chief executive officer of
AACSB International: the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of
Business, said most business schools today are making an effort to teach
broad skills that are directly applicable to real-world business practices.
He pointed out that in 2003, the association
updated its accreditation standards to emphasize the teaching of "soft
skills" like ethics and communication, and to require that business schools
assess how well students are learning a broad range of managerial skills.
"I think the authors are looking at a very limited
group of business schools that emphasize research," said Mr. Fernandes.
"Most schools have done an excellent job of producing graduates with a broad
range of skills who can hit the ground running when they're hired."
Mr. Bennis and Mr. O'Toole are not convinced. They
say that business schools, which in the early 20th century had the
reputation of being little more than glorified trade schools, have swung too
far in the other direction by focusing too heavily on research. The shift
began in 1959, they say, when the Ford and Carnegie Foundations issued
scathing reports about the state of business-school research.
While the Southern Cal professors say they do not
favor a return to the trade-school days, they think business schools, and
business professors, have grown too comfortable with an approach that serves
their own needs but hurts students.
"This model gives scientific respectability to the
research they enjoy doing and eliminates the vocational stigma that
business-school professors once bore," the article concludes. "In short, the
model advances the careers and satisfies the egos of the professoriate."
The authors point out a few bright spots in their
otherwise gloomy assessment of M.B.A. education. The business schools at the
University of California at Berkeley and the University of Dallas are among
those that emphasize softer, nonquantifiable skills like ethics and
communication, they write. In addition, some business schools operate their
own businesses, such as the student-run investment fund offered by Cornell
University's S.C. Johnson Graduate School of Management.
Learning at Research Schools
Versus "Teaching Schools"
Versus "Happiness"
With a Side Track into Substance Abuse
"The Case Against Case Studies: How Columbia's B-school is teaching
MBAs to make decisions based on incomplete data," by Geoff Gloeckler,
Business Week, January 24, 2008 ---
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_05/b4069066093267.htm?link_position=link1
Shortly after R. Glenn Hubbard took over as dean of
Columbia Business School in 2004, he began hearing rumblings from executives
about the quality of MBA graduates. They were undoubtedly smart but often
unprepared to handle the most crucial of managerial responsibilities:
quickly solving problems with less than perfect information. Among those
wanting more from new hires is Henry Kravis, co-founder of the private
equity firm Kohlberg Kravis Roberts. "I want to see MBAs who can jump in and
make decisions, not jump in and learn to make decisions," he says.
Hubbard made his own executive decision. He devised
a new twist on the case study—the teaching format invented by Harvard
Business School almost a century ago and used by most B-schools. Hubbard's
so-called decision brief offers less information about a situation than the
case study, and it doesn't present the solution until students have grappled
with the issues on their own. "We want our students to be used to dealing
with incomplete data," Hubbard says. "They should be able to make decisions
out of uncertainty."
Even Michael J. Roberts, the executive director of
the Arthur Rock Center for Entrepreneurship at Harvard and author of more
than 100 HBS case studies, acknowledges the potential benefits of Hubbard's
approach, which was introduced to Columbia students last fall. "Framing
problems and finding the data to analyze those problems is a skill that MBAs
need and that the classic case doesn't fully exploit," Roberts says. Hubbard
expects such endorsements, as well as those of companies, will encourage
other business schools to make room one day for Columbia's decision briefs
in their curriculums. Hubbard, at least initially, doesn't plan to sell the
decision briefs but to use them to tap into faculty research.
Hubbard isn't giving up on the traditional case
study altogether. As part of an initiative called CaseWorks, Columbia will
produce cases designed to reflect contemporary issues (which other schools
do already), while also creating decision briefs that do away with the
Harvard formula (which no one else has done). To help guide the program,
Hubbard has turned to two people familiar with the deficits of the old
methods: Stephen P. Zeldes, who has been at Columbia for more than a decade
and is now chairman of the economics department at the B-school, and former
Harvard case writer Elizabeth Gordon.
TOO MUCH INFORMATION The stock case study presents
a tidy narrative arc, with a protagonist and a clear story line. One of the
more widely used HBS cases focuses on Intel's (INTC) former marketing
vice-president, Pamela Pollace, as she decides whether Intel should extend
the "Intel Inside" branding campaign to products other than computers. In 24
pages, students are provided with information on Intel and the history of
microprocessors, as well as details about market share and segmentation.
Pollace's major concern, they learn, is brand dilution; the potential reward
is likely worth the risk. In effect, the students are guided along the
decision-making process.
If this case were a Columbia decision brief,
students might see a video interview in which Pollace describes the
challenge. They would also be given a few documents on the background of the
campaign itself—the same data a manager at the company would have, but no
more. Then, students would discuss possible solutions. Afterward, the group
would see a second video of Pollace explaining how she handled the issue
before debating whether or not she made the right decision.
So far, Columbia has produced six briefs that take
on of-the-moment business challenges: Among them is one that focuses on
General Electric's (GE) business-process-outsourcing division in India.
Given increased competition, the company needed to consider a bigger
investment, as well as the possibility of serving non-GE customers. With
just a little more information than that, students are asked to come up with
various strategies. "The idea is to try to simulate what it will be like in
a real workplace," says Gordon. "There is uncertainty, things aren't
predigested, all the information won't be there."
The first field test for the new teaching technique
will be this summer, when the MBAs head out to their internships. At Goldman
Sachs (GS), which hires more Columbia interns than any other company, the
co-head of campus recruiting, Janet Raiffa, hopes to encounter students who
are more independent thinkers. As for Kravis, his firm doesn't employ summer
interns.
In some ways the pedagogy proposed by Columbia is a shorter and cheaper
version of the BAM approach first proposed by Catanach, Croll, and Grinacker.
The BAM approach uses a year-long case and students can seek out data in
virtually every way they will do it later on while on the job (including paying
for data if necessary) ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/265wp.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on Learning at Research Schools Versus "Teaching
Schools" Versus "Happiness" With a Side Track into Substance Abuse ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#Happiness
If you connect students to the real world, will they be happier?
Somehow it's nice to know that accountancy schools are not alone in this
dilemma!
"If You Teach Them, They Will Be Happy," by Jennifer Epstein, Inside
Higher Ed, June 19, 2007 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/06/19/lawstudents
Law students —
and the lawyers they become — are notoriously unhappy, but
the interests of their professors could make all the
difference in helping them through law school and in
preparing them to be good lawyers.
A study
published this month in the
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
compared recent classes at two law
schools with almost identical average undergraduate
grade-point averages and LSAT scores and found that students
at the school that encouraged its professors to be good
teachers rather than good scholars reported higher levels of
well-being and competence, and scored higher on bar exams.
The
study,
“Understanding the Negative Effects of Legal Education on
Law Students: A Longitudinal Test of Self-Determination
Theory,” was conducted by
Kennon
M. Sheldon, a psychology
professor at the University of Missouri at Columbia, and
Lawrence S. Krieger,
a law professor at Florida State University.
Students at
both law schools entered with similar statistics: average
undergraduate GPAs around 3.4 and LSAT averages near 156.
The schools differed significantly, however, in overall
ranking. Law School 1 (LS1), with a good reputation and an
emphasis on faculty scholarship, ranked in the second tier
(as defined by the study) while Law School 2 (LS2), with an
emphasis on hiring and training faculty to be good teachers,
ranked in the fourth tier.
Twenty-four
percent of the Law School 2 graduates who took the bar exam
in the summer of 2005 had “high” scores above 150, compared
to 14 percent of Law School 1 graduates. Nearly half of Law
School 1’s graduates, meanwhile, had “low” scores – below
130 – on the bar exam, compared with 22 percent of Law
School 2’s graduates. Though the scoring statistics are
representative of each law school overall, rather than just
those students who participated in the study, they are
“strongly suggestive that the teaching and learning at LS2
may be more effective,” the authors wrote.
Krieger, one
of the authors, said in an interview that it was “almost
shocking” to see “how significantly the fourth tier students
outperformed the second tier law students on the bar.” But,
he added, “it makes sense psychologically – the students at
the fourth tier school were happier – and it makes sense
that they would have learned more from better teachers.”
By the third
year of law school, students at Law School 2 reported
significantly higher levels of “subjective well-being,”
autonomy and competence than students at Law School 1.
But
Ann Althouse, a professor at the University of Wisconsin Law
School in Madison said that though it is “intuitively right
that the school that emphasizes teaching is the one with
students who are happier and score better,” those students
may not be better off in the long run.
She said
that if all a law school expects of its faculty is to teach,
then they can “put more time into teaching students to be
lawyers, but not necessarily how to think like lawyers.”
In
February, Althouse, a blogger on law and current events, was
a month-long guest columnist for The New York Times.
In
one column, she wrote that while “law
should connect to the real world … that doesn’t mean we
ought to devote our classes to the personal expression of
law students.”
Rather, she said, law professors should “deny ourselves the
comfort of trying to make [law students] happy and teach
them what they came to learn: how to think like lawyers.”
Continued in article
June 23, 2007 reply from Dan Stone, Univ. of Kentucky
[dstone@UKY.EDU]
Hi all,
Regarding Ken Sheldon
& Lawrence Krieger's law school study
(actually, they have published two studies on this topic: the one that Bob
cites is their second published study.)
Professor Althouse's
assertion that the students at the teaching school may not be learning "how
to think like lawyers" suggests that she has not read this study carefully.
The students at the teaching school were not only happier they also scored
HIGHER on the bar exam. Therefore, unless Professor Althouse argues that the
bar exam doesn't test critical thinking skills her argument doesn't accord
to the data.
So, perhaps one need not be unhappy to be a
competent professional? Perhaps at least some professor-induced suffering
merely creates unhappiness and doesn't improve the quality of the "product"?
Ok, now I am overstepping the data.....
FYI, I saw Ken present this paper a few weeks ago
at the self-determination theory conference and was left wondering if
similar results hold for professional accountancy programs. I chatted with
Ken about this and he is also interested this topic.
Relatedly, there is some evidence that lawyers have
higher alcohol and drug use rates than do some other professionals (though I
can't recall the cites just now).
Best,
Dan Stone
Reply from Bob Jensen
Thank you Dan for that helpful and somewhat personalized reply. Here
are a couple of citations of possible interest with respect to lawyer
substance abuse:
Title: Substance Abuse in Law Schools: A Tool Kit for Law School
Administrators
Authors: Orgena Lewis Singleton JD, Alfred "Cal" Baker L.C.D.C., more...
Publication Date: December 2005, American Bar Association
ISBN: 1-59031-628-2
Topics: Law School, Law Students, Lawyer Assistance Programs, Legal
Education & Admissions to the Bar
URL:
Click Here
Also see "Torts, Trials and ... Treatments," by Elia Powers, Issues in
Higher Ed, January 4, 2007 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/01/04/lawschool
The ABA report argues that the quality of the
legal profession is affected by lawyers who “are impaired as a result of
abuse of alcohol and drugs.” One of the co-authors who spoke at
Wednesday’s meeting in Washington, Cal Baker, is a recent law school
graduate and director of a company that provides chemical dependency
treatments.
Baker, a recovering alcoholic, said alcohol and
drug abuse are the two top problems he sees among law students. (Other
panelists said students often report depression and extreme anxiety, as
well as substance abuse issues. ) He said he would have been unable to
recover from his condition while in school, because nearly all the
planned social activities were centered around bar nights.
One of the largest hurdles, Baker said, is
convincing students that admitting their drinking problems won’t lead to
disciplinary action. Many who have previous alcohol-related citations
are concerned about their professional futures.
Continued in article
I do not know of comparable studies in the accounting profession. I do know
that substance abuse is a problem on two levels for accountants, particularly
auditors who are away from home a lot of the time. At level one is the
professional away from home more than many other professionals. At level two is
the family of a professional who is absent from home much of the time.
Some large CPA firms have hot lines where professionals and their family
members can seek counseling with complete confidentiality and possible
anonymity. These hot lines link directly with medical and family counseling
professionals who are outside the firm itself but are paid by the firm. I'm told
that an overwhelming proportion of the problems dealt with are substance abuse
and troubled family members.
I suspect that these are problems that are not dealt with at all well in our
schools of accountancy. One problem is that we want to attract students to this
profession and do not like to dwell on the dark side of this profession's
troubles. There are substance abuse problems in all professions. It would be
interesting to study whether some professions tend to keep substance abuse
problems in dark closets more than other professions. For example, perhaps there
is more perceived sensitivity among clients/patients who are more afraid of
substance abusers in accounting and medicine relative to law. That is only a
personal observation and not something that I've studied. My guess is that
substance abuse is highest among physicians and highest in terms of keeping
their dependencies secret.
A more general site on substance abuse is provided at
http://www.ndsn.org/links.html
June 25, 2007 reply from Bill Dent
[billdent@tx.rr.com]
Bob—
I don’t know about other states, but the Texas
State Board of Public Accountancy acknowledges the problem as evidenced by
the following link on their website:
http://www.tsbpa.state.tx.us/pi8.htm
Bill Dent
WILLIAM C. DENT, CPA (Retired)
Indirectly this relates to the current accounting doctoral program
controversies described at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
It also relates to the issues of whether it is best to spoon feed students
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/265wp.htm
June 19, 2007 reply from J. S. Gangolly
[gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
Bob,
In some ways, the situation in accounting is
similar to that in law. In others, there is substantial difference.
In law there are essentially two tiers in law
schools: those that are quite bar exam oriented, and those that emphasize
legal theory and philosophy. The kinds of placements they have are also very
different. The students at second sort of schools do clerkships with well
known or almost-well known judges, while those at the first sort of schools
do not. The students at the second sort of schools get hired by the large
well known law firms (for example, on the Wall Street) doing structured
finance and M&A work, whereas the first kind often may do work that could be
considered menial (uncontested divorces, fixing speeding tickets/DUI, etc.).
Of course there are crossovers.
Often, students at the second sort of schools do
not practice at all, but have a profound impact on the profession, and there
are some who practice only occasionally (Tribe, Dershowitz,...).
I agree with Ann Althouse that the second sort of
schools teach students to think like lawyers whereas the first kind teach
them to be lawyers.
In accounting, on the other hand, I think we have
only one kind of schools (the equivalent of second sort have no professional
accounting programs), and they teach students to BE accountants rather) than
to think like accountants.
This situation is convenient for many. It is much
easier to teach one to be like someone than to teach one to think like some
one.
Jagdish
June 23, 2007 reply from J. S. Gangolly
[gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
Dan,
I am not familiar with the Sheldon/Krieger studies,
but will read them soon.
However, I interact with law school faculty often,
and ask them questions just to find out how we in accounting can learn from
them. I also have an abiding interest in the relationship between
jurisprudence and accounting, and it is one of the few psychic benefits I
have enjoyed being an accounting academic.
The law school market is pretty much a
differentiated market. I think the missions of the top tier schools and
others are very different, and both conform to their missions well; there
are no pretensions as we have among the accounting schools where there is a
race to reach the greasy pole no matter what one's comparative advantages
are.
It is difficult to find students from non-top
schools doing clerkships with supreme court justices, or the top law firms
recruiting from such schools.
* The top tier schools emphasise law as an
interdisciplinary field rather than a field confined to narrowly defined
learning of existing laws.
* The top tier schools emphasise more critical
analyses of certain aspects of law such as constitutional law,
international law, jurisprudence... and de-emphasise other aspects such
as administrative law, criminal procedure,... as the other schools do.
* Many students graduating from top schools do
not enter law practice, and even when they do, they enter very different
practices where critical thinking, interdisciplinary, and liberal arts
type skills predominate. Many enter government and public service. Many
also enter the academia. Over my career I have had dozens of friends and
colleagues who went to top law schools (Harvard, Stanford, Cambridge,
...), and they have established their presence as scholars even outside
their narrow domain. On the other hand, most law academics that I have
known from non-top schools, on the other hand, have been in areas such
as tax law, business law,..., generally not considerer the intellectual
centers of gravity of law.
I do not mean to be an elitist when I make the
above observations. In fact, one of my heroes in law, the late Don Berman, a
Harvard educated lawyer at Northeastern, specialised in tax law. If I dig
deep, I am sure I can find some law academics from non-top schools who were
brilliant scholars in areas of law that are considered scholarly. The point
I make is that the two types of schools are just different.
About a dozen years ago, I was trying to establish
relationships with a local (non-top) law school to introduce our students in
accounting to topics such as the relationship between constitutional law and
accounting, and the role of jurisprudence in accounting. I got no where, and
we were in fact on different wavelengths. On the other hand, more recently
we did try to establish relationships for tax students and it has worked out
very well. Our graduate tax students take some tax courses at the law school
and it has helped them tremendously.
I attend law sort of conferences (usually at the
intersection of law and computer science), and almost all participants are
from the top tier law schools. Some from other law schools too attend, but
usually to meet CPE requirements to keep their licenses current. I also am
an avid reader of law literature (specially in constitutional law and
jurisprudence) and there too just about every author is from a top tier law
school.
There is nothing wrong in this dichotomy. Those
from non-top law schools have performed brilliantly in the corporate world,
and once in a while they do spectacular jobs for their clients (see OJ
Simpson's dream team)Sometimes they also excel as legal scholars
Another difference I find between the alums at the
two types of schools is that the contribution to legal literature from the
top law schools is disproportionately large. Ronald Dworkin, Lawrence Tribe,
and Richard Posner in the US, or Joseph Raz and HLA Hart in Britain,... one
has to stretch one's imagination to come up with those from non-top tier law
schools who come close.
And there is no cartel in law as we have in
accounting. Good scholarship gets recognised no matter where it originates,
and gatekeepers are generally powerless; quite unlike in accounting.
There is learning at both kinds of schools, they
are just different. Trying to compare them is like comparing apples and
oranges, or worse, like comparing apple to an ape.
I'll try to collect my thoughts on what we in
accounting can learn from legal education at both levels and post them to
AECM one of these days.
Regards,
Jagdish
Why accountancy doctoral programs are drying up
and
why accountancy is no longer required for admission or
graduation in an accountancy doctoral program
The American Accounting Association (AAA) has a new research report
on the future supply and demand for accounting faculty. There's a whole lot of
depressing colored graphics and white-knuckle handwringing about anticipated
shortages of new doctoral graduates and faculty aging, but there's no solution
offered ---
http://aaahq.org/temp/phd/AccountingFacultyUSCollegesUniv.pdf
April 2, 2008 message from David Fordham, James Madison University
[fordhadr@JMU.EDU]
I've been reading the AAA study on accounting
faculty status and trends:
http://aaahq.org/temp/phd/AccountingFacultyUSCollegesUniv.pdf and I have
to wonder, will anything be done -- other than the continued hand wringing?
My guess: probably not. I've concluded no one is
listening.
It seems to me that the long-term answer (more
Ph.D. students and expanded Ph.D. programs) will of necessity exacerbate the
short term crisis: shortage of experienced faculty teaching accounting
majors. If more of the experienced professors teach Ph.D. students, that
means even fewer teaching the undergrad accounting majors.
Of course, deans will point out that having more
Ph.D. students means more grad students will be available to teach
accounting majors. So more and more accounting classes will be taught by
grad students rather than experienced professors. Is this a good thing? My
guess: probably not.
And to be more cynical, does it really MATTER
whether or not it's a good thing? My guess: ... probably not.
Having raised four children during the era of
Winnie-the-Pooh, I can't help but see a parallel here with a character named
Eeyore. Poor ol' Eeyore.
I guess you could say we are living in interesting
times. *sigh*
The study is worth perusing. (Are our hands sore
yet?)
David Fordham
James Madison University
April 3, 2008 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi David,
I suspect that the most popular solution in the future to meet the shortage
of doctoral accounting faculty will be an explosion in the use of adjunct
accounting faculty at highly varying ranges of compensation. This will bring
us full circle back to the late 1950s when the scathing Pierson Carnegie
Report [1959] and the Gordon and Howell Ford Foundation Report [1959]
reports dramatically changed accounting doctoral education in the United
States ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
There are several remedies to relieve future shortages of accounting
faculty to meet expected continued growth of accounting majors in
undergraduate and masters programs (most states virtually require a fifth
year of advanced study to sit for the CPA examination):
- Make it more attractive for aging accounting faculty who are doing a
great job with students to continued beyond retirement age. This is not
a ideal solution in that it possibly blocks the flow of "fresh blood"
and revitalization into accounting departments, but it is more
affordable than paying over $200,000 in salary and fringe benefits for a
new accounting doctoral graduate. Even at higher salaries there are just
not enough new doctoral graduates (less than a hundred per year) to
spread around among a thousand or more colleges. One way to make it more
attractive is to assign aging faculty who want to live elsewhere (on the
beach?) and teach some distance education courses an opportunity
to do so.
- Make increasing use of good accounting teachers without doctorates
to teach full time. Most will be assigned adjunct status, but some
colleges may even let them be on a tenure track depending on the
uniqueness of their credentials. This is generally a mixed bag for
students, because adjunct professors are often poorly paid and forced to
moonlight for sometimes more than they are paid from the colleges.
Students generally benefit more from full-time teachers. It is also a
poor solution in that adjunct faculty are generally second-class
employees on a college campus.
- Lure increasing numbers of accounting faculty with doctorates who
are now teaching in foreign countries. One problem is that in these
countries their doctoral degrees often are not in accountancy (many
foreign countries do not even have accounting doctoral programs). In
addition there are problems with luring families to leave their home
countries. Plus there are the same problems as those noted below for
many foreign student graduates of U.S. accounting doctoral programs.
- Shorten North American accounting doctoral programs by making them
something other than accountics (econometrics, psychometrics, and
advanced mathematics) wolves in sheep clothing. Virtually all accounting
doctoral programs now take nearly five years beyond a masters degree in
large part because candidates with accounting backgrounds must take
years of accountics courses or candidates with mathematics,
econometrics, and psychometrics backgrounds must take years of
undergraduate accounting equivalents.
The essential problem is social science research methodology is now the
only acceptable research methodology in North American accounting
doctoral programs. This is an increasingly negative incentive for
younger practicing accountants to consider entering accounting doctoral
programs. Increasingly the applicants to these programs, especially at
our most prestigious universities, are foreign mathematicians who know
virtually nothing about accountancy but are seeking the salary,
prestige, and citizenship of accounting professors in North America.
The problem here is that our undergraduate and graduate students often
benefit more from taking accounting courses from instructors who have
rich backgrounds in five years of accounting courses and some years of
accounting practice. Foreign graduates of accounting doctoral programs
are often assigned AIS and doctoral research courses to teach since they
have such limited backgrounds in financial, tax, auditing, and
managerial accounting. There are of course noted exceptions and some of
these immigrant professors have become great accounting educators and
friends in the United States. But finding tax and auditing accounting
doctoral graduates is particularly problematic.To meet the demand of
thousands of colleges seeking accounting faculty, the supply situation
is revealed by Plumlee et al (2006) as quoted at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
There were only 29 doctoral students in
auditing and 23 in tax out of the 2004 total of 391 accounting
doctoral students enrolled in years 1-5 in the United States.
I suspect that the most popular solution in the future to meet the shortage
of doctoral accounting faculty will be an explosion in the use of adjunct
accounting faculty at highly varying ranges of compensation. This will bring
us full circle back to the late 1950s when the scathing Pierson Carnegie
Report [1959] and the Gordon and Howell Ford Foundation Report [1959]
reports dramatically changed accounting doctoral education in the United
States ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
You can find out more about the problems with accounting doctoral
programs at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
Bob Jensen
April 2, 2008 reply from Paul Williams
[Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]
David,
Eeyore analogy was spot on. Oh woe, Oh woe. For many reasons, most of which
have been touched upon or beaten to death on this listserv, we have brought
this on ourselves. Frankly, I took the report to be wonderful news! As one
of those folks over 41 (well over 41), I am becoming more valuable to NC
State all of the time. I make less than a new hire and I have so (so, so,
so) much more institutional knowledge and experience. I won't have to retire
until I can't remember how to find my classroom and there will be no real
incentive for the institution to want to get rid of me until then. I suspect
that many of those Plumlee predicts will retire, won't. Some of the supply
problem will be taken up by faculty working well past the retirement age.
Follow-up message from Paul on April 2, 2008
I was being somewhat facetious with my "delighted because they won't be in a
hurry to rush me out the door" comment. I think your observations are
correct. We must ask ourselves how it is that attracting students into PhD
programs where the pay prospects are considerably lower is easier than in
accounting. I am not surprised that bright, imaginative, bold people aren't
attracted to doctoral work in accounting -- it is so mind-numbingly boring.
It is all about technique, nothing about ideas. You and I are testimony to
what was typical of the generation of accounting academics to which we
belong. In my doctoral program, few of the students were undergraduate
accounting majors. In my program we had people with degrees in engineering,
forestry, sociology, education, and history. Now every candidate we
interview from a U.S. doctoral program has the same profile: undergraduate
accounting major, MAC, a few years of practice experience (perhaps to
manager level), then the standardized, universal doctoral education in
"applied" (whatever that could be is a mystery) economics. Based on my
experience with undergraduate accounting curricula, a B.S. in accounting is
about the worst preparation one could have for pursuing a Doctor of
Philosophy degree. Supplication to authority seems to be the thread that
runs through every accounting course. FASB (ooo!, GASBs (ooo!), SASs (ooo!),
PCAOB (ooo!), SEC (ooo!) , BIG 4 (ooo!). I would like to teach a course
(which I am not allowed to do) where we take the GAAP hierarchy and every
acronym that students are taught to be reverential toward and teach them to
be heretics -- a Dead Poets' Society for accounting students. There is
nothing sacred about "official pronouncements" and even less sacred are the
unexamined presumptions that underlay them. Even at the highest level of
education, the PhD. level, accounting has become, in Bourdieu's term, a
doxic society, which is anethema to scholarship.
April 2, 2008 reply from J. S. Gangolly
[gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
David and Paul,
I found the study very depressing.
First, it tells us that we are a geriatric
profession. Lack of new blood will have disastrous consequences.
Second, the study keeps harping on the shortage of
PhDs IN ACCOUNTING. This shortage is contrived. If four years of college and
four or five more years of graduate school is all it takes, the way
accounting is currently taught generally, a PhD IN ACCOUNTING is irrelevant.
AACSB, in my opinion, is ruining what is essentially a professional field by
forcing it with trappings of academic respectability.
If accounting is to succeed as an academic field, I
would strongly suggest that we get rid of this ridiculous idea that a PhD IN
ACCOUNTING is a requirement for college teaching. If AACSB can not relax the
requirement by allowing qualified practitioners to teach accounting, it
should relax the requirement of PhD in accounting.
There is no reason why a PhD in Economics,
Computing, Psychology, Sociology, Engineering, or even classics can not
teach accounting with some minimal retooling.
Third, salary inversion is a consequence of foolish
policies having to do with the second point (above).
Fourth, inspite of monstrous salary differentials,
we are unable to attract doctoral students. It is pathetic that fields with
virtually negligible job markets such as anthropology and classics can
attract good talent while we are languishing is a sign that our field is
intellectually stagnating and unattractive to the bright minds.
Fifth, the exaggerated salaries offered to new
entrants may be getting us the wrong type of people; the type of people
attracted to money rather than intellectual excitement. As department chair,
I have been put in the ridiculous position of recommending a ghigher
starting pay to an ABD than we pay to Guggenheim, McArthur, Fulbright
fellows, and NSF Young Investigator award winners with publications that our
candidates will not equal in several lifetimes.
We have an unsustainable business model for
academic accounting. The earlier the universities realise this the better
for the education of accountants. But that will not happen; we have a moral
hazard problem.
Being a member of the well-over-the-40-hill gang
and having been sidelined as one doing off-the-wall non-mainstream research
most of my academic life, the work I do outside of mainstream accounting
sustains me. The "mainstream" academic accounting "tent" has gotten
considerably smaller since I became an accountant late in life, and I found
myself an outsider almost right from the beginning. What has been
"mainstream" in academic accounting for the past over thirty years was then
the proverbial camel sticking its nose into the tent. The people who have
been pushed out of the tent are the professionals and the non-mainstream
researchers.
This should not be the case. It is not the case
with other fields in which I work.
Jagdish
"Research on Accounting Should Learn From the Past," by
Michael H. Granof and Stephen A. Zeff, Chronicle of Higher Education, March 21,
2008
Starting in the 1960s, academic research on
accounting became methodologically supercharged — far more quantitative and
analytical than in previous decades. The results, however, have been
paradoxical. The new paradigms have greatly increased our understanding of
how financial information affects the decisions of investors as well as
managers. At the same time, those models have crowded out other forms of
investigation. The result is that professors of accounting have contributed
little to the establishment of new practices and standards, have failed to
perform a needed role as a watchdog of the profession, and have created a
disconnect between their teaching and their research.
Before the 1960s, accounting research was primarily
descriptive. Researchers described existing standards and practices and
suggested ways in which they could be improved. Their findings were taken
seriously by standard-setting boards, CPA's, and corporate officers.
A
confluence of developments in the 1960s markedly changed the nature of
research — and, as a consequence, its impact on practice. First,
computers emerged as a means of collecting and analyzing vast amounts of
information, especially stock prices and data drawn from corporate financial
statements. Second, academic accountants themselves recognized the
limitations of their methodologies. Argument, they realized, was no
substitute for empirical evidence. Third, owing to criticism that their
research was decidedly second rate because it was insufficiently analytical,
business faculties sought academic respectability by employing the methods
of disciplines like econometrics, psychology, statistics, and mathematics.
In response to those developments, professors of
accounting not only established new journals that were restricted to
metric-based research, but they limited existing academic publications to
that type of inquiry. The most influential of the new journals was the
Journal of Accounting Research, first published in 1963 and sponsored by the
University of Chicago Graduate School of Business.
Acknowledging the primacy of the journals,
business-school chairmen and deans increasingly confined the rewards of
publication exclusively to those publications' contributors. That policy was
applied initially at the business schools at private colleges that had the
strongest M.B.A. programs. Then ambitious business schools at public
institutions followed the lead of the private schools, even when the public
schools had strong undergraduate and master's programs in accounting with
successful traditions of practice-oriented research.
The unintended consequence has been that
interesting and researchable questions in accounting are essentially being
ignored. By confining the major thrust in research to phenomena that can be
mathematically modeled or derived from electronic databases, academic
accountants have failed to advance the profession in ways that are expected
of them and of which they are capable.
Academic research has unquestionably broadened the
views of standards setters as to the role of accounting information and how
it affects the decisions of individual investors as well as the capital
markets. Nevertheless, it has had scant influence on the standards
themselves.
The research is hamstrung by restrictive and
sometimes artificial assumptions. For example, researchers may construct
mathematical models of optimum compensation contracts between an owner and a
manager. But contrary to all that we know about human behavior, the models
typically posit each of the parties to the arrangement as a "rational"
economic being — one devoid of motivations other than to maximize pecuniary
returns.
Moreover, research is limited to the homogenized
content of electronic databases, which tell us, for example, the prices at
which shares were traded but give no insight into the decision processes of
either the buyers or the sellers. The research is thus unable to capture the
essence of the human behavior that is of interest to accountants and
standard setters.
Further, accounting researchers usually look
backward rather than forward. They examine the impact of a standard only
after it has been issued. And once a rule-making authority issues a
standard, that authority seldom modifies it. Accounting is probably the only
profession in which academic journals will publish empirical studies only if
they have statistical validity. Medical journals, for example, routinely
report on promising new procedures that have not yet withstood rigorous
statistical scrutiny.
Floyd Norris, the chief financial correspondent of
The New York Times, titled a 2006 speech to the American Accounting
Association "Where Is the Next Abe Briloff?" Abe Briloff is a rare academic
accountant. He has devoted his career to examining the financial statements
of publicly traded companies and censuring firms that he believes have
engaged in abusive accounting practices. Most of his work has been published
in Barron's and in several books — almost none in academic journals. An
accounting gadfly in the mold of Ralph Nader, he has criticized existing
accounting practices in a way that has not only embarrassed the miscreants
but has caused the rule-making authorities to issue new and more-rigorous
standards. As Norris correctly suggested in his talk, if the academic
community had produced more Abe Briloffs, there would have been fewer
corporate accounting meltdowns.
The narrow focus of today's research has also
resulted in a disconnect between research and teaching. Because of the
difficulty of conducting publishable research in certain areas — such as
taxation, managerial accounting, government accounting, and auditing — Ph.D.
candidates avoid choosing them as specialties. Thus, even though those areas
are central to any degree program in accounting, there is a shortage of
faculty members sufficiently knowledgeable to teach them.
To be sure, some accounting research, particularly
that pertaining to the efficiency of capital markets, has found its way into
both the classroom and textbooks — but mainly in select M.B.A. programs and
the textbooks used in those courses. There is little evidence that the
research has had more than a marginal influence on what is taught in
mainstream accounting courses.
What needs to be done? First, and most
significantly, journal editors, department chairs, business-school deans,
and promotion-and-tenure committees need to rethink the criteria for what
constitutes appropriate accounting research. That is not to suggest that
they should diminish the importance of the currently accepted modes or that
they should lower their standards. But they need to expand the set of
research methods to encompass those that, in other disciplines, are
respected for their scientific standing. The methods include historical and
field studies, policy analysis, surveys, and international comparisons when,
as with empirical and analytical research, they otherwise meet the tests of
sound scholarship.
Second, chairmen, deans, and promotion and
merit-review committees must expand the criteria they use in assessing the
research component of faculty performance. They must have the courage to
establish criteria for what constitutes meritorious research that are
consistent with their own institutions' unique characters and comparative
advantages, rather than imitating the norms believed to be used in schools
ranked higher in magazine and newspaper polls. In this regard, they must
acknowledge that accounting departments, unlike other business disciplines
such as finance and marketing, are associated with a well-defined and
recognized profession. Accounting faculties, therefore, have a special
obligation to conduct research that is of interest and relevance to the
profession. The current accounting model was designed mainly for the
industrial era, when property, plant, and equipment were companies' major
assets. Today, intangibles such as brand values and intellectual capital are
of overwhelming importance as assets, yet they are largely absent from
company balance sheets. Academics must play a role in reforming the
accounting model to fit the new postindustrial environment.
Third, Ph.D. programs must ensure that young
accounting researchers are conversant with the fundamental issues that have
arisen in the accounting discipline and with a broad range of research
methodologies. The accounting literature did not begin in the second half of
the 1960s. The books and articles written by accounting scholars from the
1920s through the 1960s can help to frame and put into perspective the
questions that researchers are now studying.
For example, W.A. Paton and A.C. Littleton's 1940
monograph, An Introduction to Corporate Accounting Standards, profoundly
shaped the debates of the day and greatly influenced how accounting was
taught at universities. Today, however, many, if not most, accounting
academics are ignorant of that literature. What they know of it is mainly
from textbooks, which themselves evince little knowledge of the
path-breaking work of earlier years. All of that leads to superficiality in
teaching and to research without a connection to the past.
We fervently hope that the research pendulum will
soon swing back from the narrow lines of inquiry that dominate today's
leading journals to a rediscovery of the richness of what accounting
research can be. For that to occur, deans and the current generation of
academic accountants must give it a push.
Michael H. Granof is a professor of accounting at the McCombs School
of Business at the University of Texas at Austin. Stephen A. Zeff is a
professor of accounting at the Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Management
at Rice University.
March 18, 2008 reply
from Paul Williams
[Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]
Steve Zeff has
been saying this since his stint as editor of The Accounting Review
(TAR); nobody has listened. Zeff famously wrote at least two editorials
published in TAR over 30 years ago that lamented the colonization of the
accounting academy by the intellectually unwashed. He and Bill Cooper wrote
a comment on Kinney's tutorial on how to do accounting research and it was
rudely rejected by TAR. It gained a new life only when Tony Tinker published
it as part of an issue of Critical Perspectives in Accounting devoted
to the problem of dogma in accounting research.
It has only been since
less subdued voices have been raised (outright rudeness has been the
hallmark of those who transformed accounting into the empirical
sub-discipline of a sub-discipline for which empirical work is irrelevant)
that any movement has occurred. Judy Rayburn's diversity initiative and her
invitation for Anthony Hopwood to give the Presidential address at the D.C.
AAA meeting came only after many years of persistent unsubdued pointing out
of things that were uncomfortable for the comfortable to confront.
Paul Williams
paul_williams@ncsu.edu
(919)515-4436
Bob Jensen's threads on these matters are at the following links:
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#Replication
“An Analysis of the Evolution of Research Contributions by The Accounting
Review: 1926-2005,” by Jean Heck and Robert E. Jensen, Accounting Historians
Journal, Volume 34, No. 2, December 2007, pp. 109-142.
Praxiologies and the Philosophy of Economics, Edited by J. Lee Auspitz et
al. ---
Click Here
July 18, 2008 message from Roger Debreceny
[roger@DEBRECENY.COM]
American Accounting
Association Membership Trends:
Year |
Academic |
Practitioner |
Emeritus |
Life |
Associate |
Total |
1998 |
6,417 |
1,068 |
219 |
102 |
636 |
8,442 |
1999 |
6,473 |
965 |
207 |
94 |
610 |
8,349 |
2000 |
6,528 |
975 |
207 |
117 |
621 |
8,448 |
2001 |
6,643 |
972 |
217 |
130 |
594 |
8,556 |
2002 |
6,557 |
897 |
239 |
138 |
688 |
8,519 |
2003 |
6,373 |
810 |
238 |
146 |
750 |
8,317 |
2004 |
6,026 |
734 |
245 |
151 |
847 |
8,003 |
2005 |
6,019 |
676 |
209 |
235 |
918 |
8,057 |
2006 |
5,996 |
636 |
198 |
264 |
1,001 |
8,095 |
2007 |
5,859 |
605 |
213 |
277 |
1,155 |
8,109 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
10 Year change |
-9% |
-43% |
-3% |
172% |
82% |
-4% |
Proportions in 1998 |
76% |
13% |
3% |
1% |
8% |
100% |
Proportions in 2007 |
72% |
7% |
3% |
3% |
14% |
100% |
This table (with the three
summary rows I added) shows the 2007 report of AAA KPIs at aaahq.org/about/financials/KeyIndicators8_31_07.pdf
.. there are some interesting patterns here. The number of practitioners
has gone down by more than 40%. This has been a matter of concern for me
for many years. The AAA should be the natural place a well trained,
thoughtful accountant should go to for a professional experience that is
different than that provided by the AICPA, IIA, ISACA etc. Yet we seem
to be able to attract only 600 professional members – a statistical
blip. I have spoken to several professionals who are involved with the
AAA and even they seem to think that attracting professionals is a lost
cause. I don’t agree and I don’t think we should accept this number.
Other similar organizations such as the AEA and ACM have a much higher
proportion than we do.
New journals such as the
Auditing sections new journal (which is already providing much fodder
for my classes and my own professional improvement) is the way forward
as is a much more targeted approach to marketing to professionals. I
think that the AAA Annual Meeting is without parallel in terms of
receiving an update on current events .. especially if one went only
to the panels and keynotes. And at a price that is just a fraction of
equivalent events for professional organizations. This is something we
should be marketing strongly.
The second interesting
issue is the increase in proportion of associate members. This category
is (I imagine) mostly students. The category has increased by more than
80% and nearly doubled its share to 14%. But I imagine that this hides
considerable churn and losses. If it were not the case, the number of
academic and practitioner members would have increased. What are we
doing to actively convert Associate into Academic and Practitioner
classes, I wonder?
Roger
July 18, 2008 reply from Bob Jensen
Thanks for the
updates Tracey and Roger!
Not to detract
from Tracey’s current optimism, the membership in the AAA has been on a
steady decline for the past four decades (Craig Polhemus vs. Joel Demski)---
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/rjensen/001aaa/atlanta01.htm
The professionalism of Tracey and her staff have contributed greatly to
preventing a membership disaster in recent years.
In
my viewpoint, AAA membership decline is principally caused by the Perfect
Storm that hit doctoral programs over the past five decades ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
We lost over 90%
of our practitioner AAA members in the past five decades from a high point
where there were more practitioner members in the AAA than academic members.
Practitioners that remain today are mostly PR and recruiting specialists
from the large firms. I don’t think you will find them sitting in our
concurrent sessions at the annual meetings of the AAA. At the same time,
however, the large firms have greatly increased their financial support of
the AAA and, even more importantly, the private support of our accountancy
programs in colleges and universities throughout the world. As far as the
AAA is concerned, however, the increased financial support from practitioner
donations to the AAA is offset somewhat by the loss of the dues being paid
by almost 6,000 practitioners who abandoned the AAA ship.
FIGURE 2
Non-Academic Authorship in TAR

What is really
sad is the decline in academic members at a time when accounting professors
were becoming the highest paid professors on nearly every college campus
that has an accounting education program. The reason quite simply is the
decline in enrollments in accounting doctoral programs as they became solely
focused on producing accountics social scientists ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
FIGURE 3
Numbers of Doctoral Degrees
from 2000-2004

But the saddest
statistic is the longer run decline in the number of accounting doctoral
program graduates in the United States. In 1988 there were over 200
graduates from U.S. doctoral programs in accounting. In two decades this is
down by over 50%.
Doesn’t anybody
else see a correlation between the decline in practitioner membership in the
AAA with the decline in accounting doctoral program graduation rates? The
overwhelming majority of applicants in history have been drawn from the
practicing world of accountants, particularly practitioners from CPA firms.
There is a tremendous and growing pool of applicants who have been working
as practitioners from 1-5 years. Many would love to become accounting
professors but are totally turned off by our social science accounting
doctoral programs. They love accounting and hate accountics!
They also
hate to spend five years of their lives earning a PhD in accounting.
Our accounting
doctoral programs were hijacked by mathematicians, economists, and
psychologists in search of higher pay in accounting departments.
Bob Jensen
Question
How long does it take to get an accounting doctorate?
Answer
The answer varies with respect to how long it takes to get both the
undergraduate degree plus the requisite masters degree (or at least 150 credits
required in most states). Assuming the student is full time and on track as an
accounting major this makes it about 5.5 years before entering a doctoral
program, although some masters programs only require one year for the masters
degree for undergraduate accounting majors. To that we must add about four years
of doctoral studies. This adds up to 9.5 years of full time study in college
give or take a year. To this we must add the typical 1-5 years of experience
most doctoral students spend in practice between attainment of a masters degree
and eventual matriculation into a doctoral program.
The good news is that, unlike
masters of accountancy and MBA programs, virtually all accountancy doctoral
programs provide free tuition and rather generous living allowances from start
to finish, although some of the time doctoral students must work as teaching
and/or research assistants. Often fellowships in the fourth year allow students
to devote full time to finishing their doctoral thesis.
Accountancy doctoral programs
take at least four years in most cases for former accounting majors because
entering students typically must take advanced mathematics, statistics,
econometrics, and psychometrics prerequisites for doctoral seminars in
accounting ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
Update on the
AACSB's Bridge Program for Wannabe Accounting Professors
I'm sure glad the American Medical
Association does not have a bridging program where accounting PhDs can become
medical doctors by taking only four courses in medicine.
Students who get doctorates in
fields other than accounting can typically get a doctoral degree in less than
9.5 years of full-time college. For example, an economics PhD can realistically
spend only 7.5 years in college. He or she can then enter a bridge program to
become a business, finance, or even an accounting professor under the AACSB's
new
Bridge Program, but that program may take two or more years part time. There
just does not appear to be a short track into accounting tenure track positions.
But the added years may be worth it since accounting faculty salaries are
extremely high relative to most other academic disciplines. The high salaries,
in part, are do to the enormous shortage of accounting doctoral graduates
relative to the number of tenure-track openings in major colleges and
universities ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
Only four United States Universities currently
participate in the AACSB's Bridge program and one European business school whose
doctoral programs I have doubts about because of truly absurd faculty-to-student
ratios in the doctoral program.
The AACSB's domestic alternatives are as follows
http://snipurl.com/aacsbbridge
Also see
http://snipurl.com/aacsbbridge2
-
The University of Florida (USA)
-
Tulane University (USA)
-
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
(USA).
-
University of Toledo (USA).
When I mentioned the Bridge Program last year on the
AECM, Virginia Tech responded by saying they were participating but not for
accounting bridges.
The University of Toledo does not offer accounting
bridges ---
http://www.utoledo.edu/business/aacsbbridge/curriculum.html
Tulane only lists one full professor of accounting in my
Hasselback Directory such that I doubt that Tulane is a major player in an
accounting Bridge Program (Tulane may be more viable in management, marketing,
and finance).
The University of Florida does apparently have an
accounting bridge ---
http://www.cba.ufl.edu/academics/pdbp/
But this strangely does not appear to be affiliated with the well known Fisher
School of Accountancy at the University of Florida.
From what I can tell, Florida is bridging with only four
courses. Can four courses alone turn an economics or history professor into an
accounting professor?
The Bridge Program says yes! I think the Bridge Program has little to do with
it, although a person's prior background such as years of professional work as a
CPA may make all the difference in the world along with the type of doctoral
degree earned outside accounting.
June 20 message from Saeed Roohani
[sroohani@COX.NET]
AACSB
Announces May 2008 Bridge Program Graduates, there are many AACSB
certified PQ accounting faculty for hire, see
visit AACSB's online database
Saeed
Roohani
Bryant University
June 20, 2008 reply from Bob Jensen
There is a
surprisingly high proportion of the 78 candidates who want to teach
accounting and auditing given than most of the bridge programs like Virginia
Tech opted out of teaching accounting but do bridge business and finance
studies. However, 20 bridged candidates who want to teach accounting and
auditing will not make a big dent in the market where the number of
accounting faculty openings exceeds the new doctoral graduate supply (less
than 100 graduates) by over 1,000 openings.
The big
question now is whether those bridged candidates can get tenure track
positions and make tenure with sufficient research publications in
accounting. The leading schools willingly hire adjunct, non-tenure-track,
accounting instructors, but they’re pretty snooty when it comes to tenure
tracks.
In my
opinion the bridge program is absurd. Can four-courses in a typical bridge
program is tantamount to a “90-day Wonder Program” for college graduates to
become military officers ---
http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/90-day_wonder
There were great military officers that
emerged from the 90-Day Wonder officers' candidate programs. There will also
be great accounting, finance, and business professors that emerge from the
AACSB bridging program. However, the programs do not deserve much of the
credit, since the criteria for success are the credentials and personal
qualities of the persons who entered the program. In accounting there's
almost no chance of success unless the candidate was a good accountant
before entering the bridge program. There's just too much to accounting that
cannot be covered in less than about three years of full-time study in
accountancy modules alone. In most states it takes five years of college as
an accounting major just to sit for the CPA examination.
I'm sure glad the American Medical
Association does not have a bridging program where accounting PhDs can
become medical doctors by taking only four courses in medicine.
Bob Jensen
"Exploring Ways to Shorten the Ascent to a Ph.D.," by Joseph Berger, The New
York Times, October 3, 2007 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/03/education/03education.html
Many of
us have known this scholar: The hair is
well-streaked with gray, the chin has begun to sag,
but still our tortured friend slaves away at a
masterwork intended to change the course of
civilization that everyone else just hopes will
finally get a career under way.
We even
have a name for this sometimes pitied species — the
A.B.D. — All But Dissertation. But in academia these
days, that person is less a subject of ridicule than
of soul-searching about what can done to shorten the
time, sometimes much of a lifetime, it takes for so
many graduate students to, well, graduate. The
Council of Graduate Schools, representing 480
universities in the United States and Canada, is
halfway through a seven-year project to explore ways
of speeding up the ordeal.
For
those who attempt it, the doctoral dissertation can
loom on the horizon like Everest, gleaming
invitingly as a challenge but often turning into a
masochistic exercise once the ascent is begun. The
average student takes 8.2 years to get a Ph.D.; in
education, that figure surpasses 13 years. Fifty
percent of students drop out along the way, with
dissertations the major stumbling block. At
commencement, the typical doctoral holder is 33, an
age when peers are well along in their professions,
and 12 percent of graduates are saddled with more
than $50,000 in debt.
These statistics, compiled by
the
National Science Foundation
and other government agencies
by studying the 43,354 doctoral recipients of 2005,
were even worse a few years ago. Now, universities
are setting stricter timelines and demanding that
faculty advisers meet regularly with protégés. Most
science programs allow students to submit three
research papers rather than a single grand work.
More universities find ways to ease financial
burdens, providing better paid teaching
assistantships as well as tuition waivers. And more
universities are setting up writing groups so that
students feel less alone cobbling together a thesis.
Fighting these trends, and stretching out the
process, is the increased competition for jobs and
research grants; in fields like English where
faculty vacancies are scarce, students realize they
must come up with original, significant topics.
Nevertheless, education researchers like Barbara E.
Lovitts, who has written a new book urging
professors to clarify what they expect in
dissertations; for example, to point out that
professors “view the dissertation as a training
exercise” and that students should stop trying for
“a degree of perfection that’s unnecessary and
unobtainable.”
There are probably few universities that nudge
students out the door as rapidly as Princeton, where
a humanities student now averages 6.4 years compared
with 7.5 in 2003. That is largely because Princeton
guarantees financial support for its 330 scholars
for five years, including free tuition and stipends
that range up to $30,000 a year. That means students
need teach no more than two courses during their
schooling and can focus on research.
“Princeton since the 1930s has felt that a Ph.D.
should be an education, not a career, and has valued
a tight program,” said William B. Russel, dean of
the graduate school.
And
students are grateful. “Every morning I wake up and
remind myself the university is paying me to do
nothing but write the dissertation,” said Kellam
Conover, 26, a classicist who expects to complete
his course of study in five years next May when he
finishes his dissertation on bribery in Athens.
“It’s a tremendous advantage compared to having to
work during the day and complete the dissertation
part time.”
But fewer than a dozen
universities have endowments or sources of financing
large enough to afford five-year packages. The rest
require students to teach regularly. Compare
Princetonians with Brian Gatten, 28, an English
scholar at the
University of Texas in
Austin. He has either been teaching or assisting in
two courses every semester for five years.
“Universities need us as cheap labor to teach their
undergraduates, and frankly we need to be needed
because there isn’t another way for us to fund our
education,” he said.
That
raises a question that state legislatures and
trustees might ponder: Would it be more cost
effective to provide financing to speed graduate
students into careers rather than having them drag
out their apprenticeships?
But
money is not the only reason Princeton does well. It
has developed a culture where professors keep after
students. Students talk of frequent meetings with
advisers, not a semiannual review. For example, Ning
Wu, 30, a father of two, works in Dr. Russel’s
chemical engineering lab and said Dr. Russel comes
by every Friday to discuss Mr. Wu’s work on polymer
films used in computer chips. He aims to get his
Ph.D. next year, his fifth.
While Dr. Russel values “the
critical thinking and independent digging students
have to do, either in their mind for an original
concept or in the archives,” others question the
necessity of book-length works. Some universities
have established what they call professional
doctorates for students who plan careers more as
practitioners than scholars. Since the 1970s,
Yeshiva University has not
only offered a Ph.D. in psychology but also a
separate doctor of psychology degree, or Psy.D., for
those more interested in clinical work than
research; that program requires a more modest
research paper.
OTHER institutions are reviving master’s degree
programs for, say, aspiring scientists who plan
careers in development of products rather than
research.
Those who insist on
dissertations are aware that they must reduce the
loneliness that defeats so many scholars. Gregory
Nicholson, completing his sixth and final year at
Michigan State, was able
to finish a 270-page dissertation on spatial
environments in novels like Kerouac’s “On the Road”
with relative efficiency because of a writing group
where he thrashed out his work with other thesis
writers.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on accountancy doctoral programs are at the following three
links:
This citation was forwarded by Don Ramsey
"Why business ignores the business schools," by Michael Skapinker,
Financial Times, January 7, 2008
Chief executives, on the other hand, pay little
attention to what business schools do or say. As long ago as 1993, Donald
Hambrick, then president of the US-based Academy of Management, described
the business academics' summer conference as "an incestuous closed loop", at
which professors "come to talk with each other". Not much has changed. In
the current edition of The Academy of Management Journal.
. . .
They have chosen an auspicious occasion on which to
beat themselves up: this year is The Academy of Management Journal's 50th
anniversary. A scroll through the most recent issues demonstrates why
managers may be giving the Journal a miss. "A multi-level investigation of
antecedents and consequences of team member boundary spanning behaviour" is
the title of one article.
Why do business academics write like this? The
academics themselves offer several reasons. First, to win tenure in a US
university, you need to publish in prestigious peer-reviewed journals.
Accessibility is not the key to academic advancement.
Similar pressures apply elsewhere. In France and
Australia, academics receive bonuses for placing articles in the top
academic publications. The UK's Research Assessment Exercise, which
evaluates university research and ties funding to the outcome, encourages
similarly arcane work.
But even without these incentives, many business
school faculty prefer to adorn their work with scholarly tables, statistics
and jargon because it makes them feel like real academics. Within the
university world, business schools suffer from a long-standing inferiority
complex.
The professors offer several remedies. Academic
business journals should accept fact-based articles, without demanding that
they propound a new theory. Professor Hambrick says that academics in other
fields "don't feel the need to sprinkle mentions of theory on every page,
like so much aromatic incense or holy water".
Others talk of the need for academics to spend more
time talking to managers about the kind of research they would find useful.
As well-meaning as these suggestions are, I suspect
the business school academics are missing something. Law, medical and
engineering schools are subject to the same academic pressures as business
schools - to publish in prestigious peer-reviewed journals and to buttress
their work with the expected academic vocabulary.
The Fall 2007 Edition of Accounting Education News (AEN from the
American Accounting Association) ---
http://aaahq.org/pubs/AEN/2007/Fall2007.pdf
Two important things to note:
In his first President's Message, Gary Previts mentions the Plumlee report
on the dire shortage of accountancy doctoral students and provides a link to the
AAA's new site providing resources for research and experimentation on "Future
Accounting Faculty and Programs Projects" ---
http://aaahq.org/temp/phd/index.cfm
Note especially the Accounting PhD Program Info link with a picture) and the PhD
Project link (at the bottom):
Welcome to the
preliminary posting of a new resource for the
community participating in and supporting accounting
programs, students, faculty, and by that connection
practitioners of accounting. We plan to build this
collection of resources for the broad community
committed to a vital future for accounting education.
This page is an initial step to creating a place where
we can come together to gather resources and share data
and ideas.
New Research Projects by the AAA on the Trends and
Characteristics of Accounting Faculty, Students,
Curriculum, and Programs
Part I:
Future of Accounting Faculty Project (Report
December, 2007)
Part II: Future of Accounting Programs Project
Part I
will describe today's accounting academic workforce,
via demographics, work patterns, productivity, and
career progression of accounting faculty, as well as
of faculty in selected peer disciplines using data
from the national survey of postsecondary faculty (NSOPF)
to establish trends, and a set of measures will be
combined to benchmark the overall status of
accounting against (approximately) 150 fields. This
project will provide context and data to identify
factors affecting the pipeline and workplace.
Part II
will focus on expanding understanding of the
characteristics of accounting faculty, students, and
accounting programs, and implications of their
evolving environment. The need for the Part I
project illustrates how essential it is for the
discipline and profession of accounting that we
establish a more standard and comprehensive process
for collecting, analyzing, and reporting data about
accounting students, doctoral students, faculty,
curriculum, and programs.
More Resources
on the Changing Environment for Faculty:
The Reshaping of America's Academic Workforce
David W. Leslie, TIAA-CREF Institute Fellow
The College of William and Mary
TIAA Institute Research Dialogue Series, 2007
Jim Hasselback's* 2007 Analysis of Accounting
Faculty Birthdates
*Copyrighted – requests for use to J. R. Hasselback
- Among U.S.
Accounting Academics -- 53.4% are 55 or older
From the
Integrated Postsecondary Education System (IPEDS)
- 34.8% of all
full-time faculty in the U.S. are
non-tenure-track -- nearly 2 in 5 of all
full-time appointments
- Between 1993
and 2003 the proportion of all new full-time
hires into "off-track" appointments increased
each year from 50% to nearly 3 in 5 (58.6%)
- Reported in J.
Schuster & M. Finkelstein (Fall, 2006). "On the
Brink: Assessing the Status of the American
Faculty," Thought & Action 51-62.
Supply and
Demand for Accounting PhDs
American Accounting Association PhD Supply/Demand
Resource Page
A collection of resources, links, and reports related to
the pipeline of future Accounting faculty. Highlights
include:
- Report of the AAA/APLG
Committee to Assess the Supply and Demand of
Accounting PhDs
- Link to the
Doctoral Education Resource Center of AACSB
International (Association to Advance Collegiate
Schools of Business)
- AICPA's Journal of
Accountancy's article "Teaching for the Love of It"
Deloitte
Foundation Accounting Doctoral Student Survey
Survey Results (Summer, 2007)
Data collected by survey of attendees of the 2007
AAA/Deloitte J. Michael Cook Doctoral Consortium
The PhD Project
and Accounting Doctoral Students Association
The PhD Project is an information clearinghouse
created to increase the diversity of business school
faculty by attracting African Americans, Hispanic
Americans and Native Americans to business doctoral
programs and by providing a network of peer support.
In just 12 short years, the PhD Project has been the
catalyst for a dramatic increase in the number of
minority business school faculty—from 294 to 842,
with approximately 380 more candidates currently
immersed in doctoral studies.
The PhD Project Accounting Doctoral Students
Association is a voluntary association offering
moral support and encouragement to African-American,
Hispanic-American, and Native American Accounting
Doctoral Students as their pursue their degrees and
take their places in the teaching and research
profession, and serve as mentors to new doctoral
students.
PhD Project Surveys of Students, Professors, and
Deans
Results of a survey among students to understand the
impact of minority professors on minority and
non-minority students.
Accounting Firms
Supporting the AAA and Accounting Programs, Faculty, and
Students
Related
Organizations Sharing Interest in Accounting Faculty and
Programs
|
|
Professor Dan Deines at Kansas State University has a handful of
Outstanding Educator Awards, including one from the AICPA. Beginning on Page 5
of the Fall 2007 edition of AEN, Dan discusses the Taylor Research and
Consulting Group study of accounting education commissioned by the AICPA in
2002. The study identifies barriers to students that prevent many top students
from majoring in accounting. Dan then describes a pilot program initiated by KSU
in reaction to the Taylor Report. I think accounting educators outside KSU may
attend some of the pilot program events.
Bob Jensen's threads on the shortage of doctoral students in accountancy are
shown below.
Questions
Why must all accounting doctoral programs be social science (particularly
econometrics) doctoral programs?
What's wrong with humanities research methodologies?
What's wrong about studying accounting in accounting doctoral programs?
Why are we graduating so many new assistant professors of accounting who do not
know any accounting?
Hint: Similar problems exist in languages and education school PhD programs
Question
What drastic move is the AACSB
International (accrediting body) taking to deal with the shortage of
graduating students from business doctoral programs (including accountancy
doctoral programs)?
Hint:
It's called a “Postdoctoral Bridge to Business”
Answer
With many business schools reporting difficulty attracting
Ph.D. faculty members, the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business
has announced the first participating institutions in new
“Postdoctoral Bridge to Business” programs —
short-term programs that will train new Ph.D.’s in fields outside business for
faculty jobs at business schools. The programs are starting at the Grenoble
Ecole de Management, Tulane University, the University of Florida, the
University of Toledo and Virginia Tech.
Inside Higher Ed, September 20, 2007 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/09/20/qt
Bob Jensen's
threads on alleged reasons why there are such shortages in accountancy doctoral
programs can be found at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
A cynic might conclude that this
is a correctional option for naive students who earned an economics PhD in an
Economics Department rather than lucky students who earned virtual economics
PhDs in accountancy doctoral programs.
A realist might term this the
"Bridge Over Troubled Waters" that leads to higher salaries for "90-Day Wonders"
in business/accounting education ---
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=90+day+wonder
This reminds me of the Harvard
math professor (I can't recall which one at the moment) who said:
"Accounting is a fascinating discipline. I think I might take a couple of hours
to master it."
Question
The faculty shortage in nursing schools is even more severe than that of
accounting schools. Why are there "bridges over troubled waters" in schools of
nursing in the same context as the new bridges being built for non-accounting
PhDs mentioned above?
Answer with a Question
Would you really want an economics PhD who took a crash course in nursing
teaching the nurses who serve you?
Answer with an Answer ---
http://nln.allenpress.com/pdfserv/i1536-5026-028-04-0223.pdf
The fact of the matter is that the law of supply and demand works better in
schools of accounting than in schools of nursing. In general, accounting
educators are among the highest paid faculty on campus. The number of unfilled
tenure-track job openings in schools of accounting combined with starting
salaries in excess of $130,000 per year are the main reasons that the AACSB
International's "Postdoctoral Bridge to Business" just might work,
although I seriously doubt whether any of the bridged students will be able to
teach upper division financial accounting, auditing, and tax courses.
The fact is that the law of supply and demand works lousy in nursing schools.
In spite of shortages of qualified faculty, nursing educators remain among the
lowest paid faculty on campus. A Nursing International's "Postdoctoral Bridge to
Nursing" probably would not work, and given my cynacism about 90-0Day Wonders it
is some comfort to me that there is no such bridge over troubled waters in
nursing schools.
Question
What do accounting schools and nursing schools have in common?
"The Nursing Education Dilemma," by Elia Powers, Inside Higher Ed,
June 22, 2007 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/06/22/nursing
The
market for nursing graduates remains hot, and plenty of
students are vying for those open positions. Enrollment in
entry-level baccalaureate nursing programs increased by
nearly 8 percent in 2006 from the previous year, which
marked the
sixth straight year of gains.
Community College programs are also
seeing increases in applications
and enrollments.
It’s all
positive news for the health care industry, which has
suffered from a well-documented nursing shortage since the
1990s, when many hospitals cut their staffs and some
colleges cut back their programs.
But for
colleges of nursing, the increasing demand to accommodate
more students presents a dilemma: Who will teach them?
When it
comes to clinical nursing courses, college programs are
bound to strict faculty-to-student ratios, set by individual
states. One instructor to every 10 or 12 students is a
fairly common ratio. So even as administrators and state
lawmakers seek more slots for students, there’s a ceiling on
expansion unless more faculty are recruited or produced.
That’s not
happening quickly. A survey released last year by the
American Association of Colleges of Nursing identified at
least 637 faculty vacancies at more than 300 nursing schools
with baccalaureate or graduate programs — or what amounts to
a nearly 8 percent faculty vacancy rate. The majority of the
openings are tenure-track positions that require applicants
have a doctorate, the survey shows.
Meanwhile,
there continues to be a backlog of students. In 2006, more
than 38,000 nursing school candidates deemed “qualified” by
the AACN were turned away from entry-level baccalaureate
programs, while a total of 50,783 nursing school applicants
enrolled and registered in courses. When the new students
are added to the pool of all students enrolled, total
enrollment rises to 133,578.
Nearly three
quarters of the colleges that responded to the AACN survey
pointed to faculty shortages as a reason for not accepting
the applicants. Community colleges are turning away 3.3
“qualified” applicants for every one turned away by
four-year institutions, said Roxanne Fulcher, director of
health professions policy at the American Association of
Community Colleges.
At many
nursing schools, wait lists are shrinking after years of
growth, officials say, not because slots are opening up, but
because students are becoming frustrated that their chances
of enrolling are dim.
Continued in article
Question
What do accounting schools and nursing schools have in common?
"The Nursing Education Dilemma," by Elia Powers, Inside Higher Ed,
June 22, 2007 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/06/22/nursing
The
market for nursing graduates remains hot, and plenty of
students are vying for those open positions. Enrollment in
entry-level baccalaureate nursing programs increased by
nearly 8 percent in 2006 from the previous year, which
marked the
sixth straight year of gains.
Community College programs are also
seeing increases in applications
and enrollments.
It’s all
positive news for the health care industry, which has
suffered from a well-documented nursing shortage since the
1990s, when many hospitals cut their staffs and some
colleges cut back their programs.
But for
colleges of nursing, the increasing demand to accommodate
more students presents a dilemma: Who will teach them?
When it
comes to clinical nursing courses, college programs are
bound to strict faculty-to-student ratios, set by individual
states. One instructor to every 10 or 12 students is a
fairly common ratio. So even as administrators and state
lawmakers seek more slots for students, there’s a ceiling on
expansion unless more faculty are recruited or produced.
That’s not
happening quickly. A survey released last year by the
American Association of Colleges of Nursing identified at
least 637 faculty vacancies at more than 300 nursing schools
with baccalaureate or graduate programs — or what amounts to
a nearly 8 percent faculty vacancy rate. The majority of the
openings are tenure-track positions that require applicants
have a doctorate, the survey shows.
Meanwhile,
there continues to be a backlog of students. In 2006, more
than 38,000 nursing school candidates deemed “qualified” by
the AACN were turned away from entry-level baccalaureate
programs, while a total of 50,783 nursing school applicants
enrolled and registered in courses. When the new students
are added to the pool of all students enrolled, total
enrollment rises to 133,578.
Nearly three
quarters of the colleges that responded to the AACN survey
pointed to faculty shortages as a reason for not accepting
the applicants. Community colleges are turning away 3.3
“qualified” applicants for every one turned away by
four-year institutions, said Roxanne Fulcher, director of
health professions policy at the American Association of
Community Colleges.
At many
nursing schools, wait lists are shrinking after years of
growth, officials say, not because slots are opening up, but
because students are becoming frustrated that their chances
of enrolling are dim.
Continued in article
Rankings of Universities in Terms of
Doctoral Student Placements
The journal PS: Political Science & Politics has just published
an analysis that suggests
that there is not a direct relationship between the general
reputation of a department and its success at placing new
Ph.D.’s; some programs far exceed their reputation when it comes
to placing new Ph.D.’s while others lag. The analysis may
provide new evidence for the “halo effect” in which many experts
worry that general (and sometimes outdated) institutional
reputations cloud the judgment of those asked to fill out
surveys on departmental quality. And while the analysis was
prepared about political science, its authors believe the same
approach could be used in other fields in the humanities and
social sciences, with the method more problematic in other areas
because fewer Ph.D. students aspire to academic careers.
Scott Jaschik, "A Ranking That Would Matter," Inside Higher
Ed, August 21, 2007 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/08/21/ranking
Jensen Comment
The big problem here is defining what constitutes "a top job" or
a "a good job." There are so many elements in job satisfaction,
many of which are intangible and cannot be quantified, that I'm
suspect of any study that purports to identify top jobs.
Obviously prestigious universities have a bias for hiring
prestigious university graduates. But this is often due to the
reputations of the graduate student's teachers and thesis
advisors. And the quality of the dissertation may have a great
deal of impact on hiring even if the degree is from No-name
University. Also prestigious universities tend to have the
highest GMAT applicants, but this is not always the case. Often
the highest GMAT applicants are really tremendous graduates.
In disciplines
having great shortages of doctoral graduates, especially
doctoral graduates in accounting and finance, findings from
political science do not necessarily extrapolate.
Be that as it may, the findings of the
above study come as no surprise to me. Particularly in
accounting, some prestigious universities have taken a nose dive
in terms of reputations of faculty supervising dissertations.
And students may not have access to the most reputable faculty,
especially faculty who are too busy with consulting and world
travel. For example, a few years ago I encountered a doctoral
student in accounting at the University of Chicago who claimed
that it was very difficult to even find a faculty member who
would supervise a dissertation. But if he ever graduates from
Chicago, he will have the Chicago halo around his head. In
fairness, I've not had recent information regarding what is
happening with doctoral students in accounting at the University
of Chicago. Certainly it is still a very reputable university in
terms of its business studies and research programs.
Also there is a problem in accountancy that
mathematics-educated accountancy doctoral graduates from
prestigious universities may know very little about accountancy
and additionally have troubles with the English language. On
occasion prestige-university graduates do not get the "top jobs"
where accountancy is spoken.
Beyond Research Rankings," by Luis
M. Proenza, Inside Higher Ed, May 17, 2007 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2007/05/17/proenza
Controversies in media rankings of colleges are discussed at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/20/education/20colleges.html
Bob Jensen's threads on college rankings controversies are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm#BusinessSchoolRankings
All is Not Well in Modern Languages Education
Proposal to integrate languages with literature, history,
culture, economics and linguistics
Proposal to use fewer adjuncts who now teach language courses
The MLA created a special committee in
2004 to study the future of language education and
its
report, being issued today
(May 24, 2007)
is in many ways unprecedented for the association in that it is
urging departments to reorganize how languages are taught and
who does the teaching. In general, the critique of the committee
is that the traditional model has started with basic language
training (typically taught by those other than tenure-track
faculty members) and proceeded to literary study (taught by
tenure-track faculty members). The report calls for moving away
from this “two tiered” system, integrating language study with
literature, and placing much more emphasis on history, culture,
economics and linguistics — among other topics — of the
societies whose languages are being taught.
Scott Jaschik, Inside Higher Ed, May 24, 2007 ---
http://insidehighered.com/news/2007/05/24/mla
Who Teaches First-Year Language Courses?
Rank |
Doctoral-Granting Departments |
B.A.-Granting Departments |
Tenured or tenure-track professors |
7.4% |
41.8% |
Full-time, non-tenure track |
19.6% |
21.1% |
Part-time instructors |
15.7% |
34.7% |
Graduate students |
57.4% |
2.4% |
All is Not Well in Programs for Doctoral Students in Departments/Colleges
of Education
The education doctorate, attempting to
serve dual purposes—to prepare researchers and to prepare practitioners—is not
serving either purpose well. To address what they have termed this "crippling"
problem, Carnegie and the Council of Academic Deans in Research Education
Institutions (CADREI) have launched the Carnegie Project on the Education
Doctorate (CPED), a three-year effort to reclaim the education doctorate and to
transform it into the degree of choice for the next generation of school and
college leaders. The project is coordinated by David Imig, professor of practice
at the University of Maryland. "Today, the Ed.D. is perceived as 'Ph.D.-lite,'"
said Carnegie President Lee S. Shulman. "More important than the public
relations problem, however, is the real risk that schools of education are
becoming impotent in carrying out their primary missions to prepare leading
practitioners as well as leading scholars."
"Institutions Enlisted to Reclaim Education Doctorate," The Carnegie Foundation
for Advancement in Teaching ---
http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/news/sub.asp?key=51&subkey=2266
The EED does not focus enough on research, and the PhD program has become a
social science doctoral program without enough education content. Middle ground
is being sought.
All is Not Well in Programs for Doctoral Students in Departments/Colleges
of Business, Especially in Accounting
The problem is that not enough accounting is taught in what have become social
science doctoral programs
See
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
Partly the problem is the same as with PhD programs in colleges of
education.
The pool of accounting doctoral program applicants is drying up, especially
accounting doctoral program pool that is increasingly trickle-filled with
mathematically-educated foreign students who have virtually no background in
accounting. Twenty
years ago, over 200 accounting doctoral students were being graduated each year
in the United States. Now it's less than one hundred graduates per year, many of
whom know very little about accounting, especially U.S. accounting. This is
particularly problematic for financial accounting, tax, and auditing education
requiring knowledge of U.S. standards, regulations, and laws.
Accounting
doctoral programs are social science research programs that do not appeal to
accountants who are interested in becoming college educators but have no
aptitude for or interest in the five or more years of quantitative methods study
required for current accounting doctoral programs.
To meet the demand of thousands of colleges seeking accounting faculty, the
supply situation is revealed by Plumlee et al (2006) as quoted at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
There were only 29
doctoral students in auditing and 23 in tax out of the 2004 total of 391
accounting doctoral students enrolled in years 1-5 in the United States.
The answer here it seems to me is to open doctoral
programs to wider humanities and legal studies research methodologies and to put
accounting back into accounting doctoral programs.
Partly the problem is the same as with
“two-tiered”
departments of modern languages
The huge shortage of accounting doctoral graduates has bifurcated the teaching
of accounting. Increasingly, accounting, tax, systems, and auditing courses are
taught by adjunct part-time faculty or full-time adjunct faculty who are not on
a tenure track and often are paid much less than tenure-track faculty who teach
graduate research courses.
The short run answer here is difficult since there
are so few doctoral graduates who know enough accounting to take over for the
adjunct faculty. If doctoral programs open up more to accountants, perhaps more
adjunct faculty will enter the pool of doctoral program prospects. This might
help the long run problem. Meanwhile as former large doctoral programs (e.g., at
Illinois, Texas, Florida, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Michigan) shrink more and
more, we’re increasingly building two-tier accounting education programs due to
increasing demand and shrinking supply of doctoral graduates in accountancy.
We’re becoming more and more
like “two-tier” language departments in our large and small colleges.
Practitioners in education schools generally are K-12 teachers and school
administrators. In the case of accounting doctoral programs, our dual mission is
to prepare college teachers of accountancy as well as leading scholars. Our
accounting doctoral programs are drying up (less than 100 per year now
graduating in the United States, many of whom know virtually no accounting)
primarily because our doctoral programs have become five years of social science
and mathematics concentrations that do not appeal to accountants who might
otherwise enter the pool of doctoral program admission candidates.
Note that the above Carnegie study also claims that education
doctoral programs are also failing to "prepare researchers." I think the same
criticism applies to current accountancy doctoral programs in the United States.
We're failing in our own dual purpose accountancy doctoral programs and need a
concerted effort to become a "degree of choice" among the accounting
professionals who would like to move into academe in a role other than that of a
low-status and low-paid adjunct professor.
In the
United States, following the Gordon/Howell and Pierson reports, our
accounting doctoral programs and leading academic journals bet the farm on
the social sciences without taking the due cautions of realizing why the
social sciences are called "soft sciences." They're soft because "not
everything that can be counted, counts. And not everything that counts can
be counted."
Leading academic accounting
research journals commenced accepting only esoteric papers with complicated
mathematical models and trivial hypotheses of zero interest to accounting
practitioners ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
Accounting doctoral programs made a
concerted effort to recruit students with mathematics, economics, and social
science backgrounds even though these doctoral candidates knew virtually nothing
about accountancy. To compound the felony, the doctoral programs dropped all
accounting requirements except for some doctoral seminars on how to mine
accounting data archives with econometric and psychometric models and advanced
statistical inference testing.
I cannot find the exact quotation in my archives, but some years
ago Linda Kidwell complained that her university had recently hired a
newly-minted graduate from an accounting doctoral program who did not know any
accounting. When assigned to teach accounting courses, this new "accounting"
professor was a disaster since she knew nothing about the subjects she was
assigned to teach.
In the year following his assignment as President of the
American Accounting Association Joel Demski asserted that research focused on
the accounting profession will become a "vocational virus" leading us away from
the joys of mathematics and the social sciences and the pureness of the
scientific academy:
Statistically there are a few youngsters who
came to academia for the joy of learning, who are yet relatively
untainted by the vocational virus.
I urge you to nurture your taste for learning, to follow your joy. That
is the path of scholarship, and it is the only one with any possibility
of turning us back toward the academy.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic
Discipline? American Accounting Association Plenary Session" August 9,
2006 ---
http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/demski/Is_Accounting_an_Academic_Discipline.pdf
Accounting professors are no longer "leading scholars" if they focus on
accounting rather than mathematics and the social sciences ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR.htm
When
Professor Beresford attempted to publish his remarks, an Accounting
Horizons referee’s report to him contained the following revealing reply
about “leading scholars” in accounting research:
1. The paper provides specific
recommendations for things that accounting academics should be doing to make
the accounting profession better. However (unless the author believes that
academics' time is a free good) this would presumably take academics' time
away from what they are currently doing. While following the author's advice
might make the accounting profession better, what is being made worse? In
other words, suppose I stop reading current academic research and start
reading news about current developments in accounting standards. Who is made
better off and who is made worse off by this reallocation of my time?
Presumably my students are marginally better off, because I can tell them
some new stuff in class about current accounting standards, and this might
possibly have some limited benefit on their careers. But haven't I made my
colleagues in my department worse off if they depend on me for research
advice, and haven't I made my university worse off if its academic
reputation suffers because I'm no longer considered a leading scholar?
Why does making the accounting profession better take precedence over
everything else an academic does with their time?
As quoted in Jensen (2006a) ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
Advice to students planning to take standardized tests such as the SAT, GRE,
GMAT, LSAT, TOEFL, etc.
See Test Magic at
http://www.testmagic.com/
There is a forum here where students
interested in doctoral programs in business (e.g., accounting and finance) and
economics discuss the ins and outs of doctoral programs.
Question
Does faculty research improve student learning in the classrooms where
researchers teach?
Put another way, is research more important than scholarship that does not
contribute to new knowledge?
Major Issue
If the answer leans toward scholarship over research, it could monumentally
change criteria for tenure in many colleges and universities.
AACSB
International: the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business, has
released for comment
a report calling for the accreditation process for
business schools to evaluate whether faculty research improves the learning
process. The report expresses the concern that accreditors have noted the volume
of research, but not whether it is making business schools better from an
educational standpoint.
Inside Higher Ed, August 6, 2007 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/08/06/qt
"Controversial Report on Business School Research Released
for Comments," AACSB News Release, August 3, 2007 ---
http://www.aacsb.edu/Resource_Centers/Research/media_release-8-3-07.pdf
FL (August 3,
2007) ― A report released today evaluates the nature and purposes of
business school research and recommends steps to increase its value to
students, practicing managers and society. The report, issued by the Impact
of Research task force of AACSB International, is released as a draft to
solicit comments and feedback from business schools, their faculties and
others. The report includes recommendations that could profoundly change the
way business schools organize, measure, and communicate about research.
AACSB
International, the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business,
estimates that each year accredited business schools spend more than $320
million to support faculty research and another half a billion dollars
supports research-based doctoral education.
“Research is
now reflected in nearly everything business schools do, so we must find
better ways to demonstrate the impact of our contributions to advancing
management theory, practice and education” says task force chair Joseph A.
Alutto, of The Ohio State University. “But quality business schools are not
and should not be the same; that’s why the report also proposes
accreditation changes to strengthen the alignment of research expectations
to individual school missions.”
The task force
argues that a business school cannot separate itself from management
practice and still serve its function, but it cannot be so focused on
practice that it fails to develop rigorous, independent insights that
increase our understanding of organizations and management. Accordingly, the
task force recommends building stronger interactions between academic
researchers and practicing managers on questions of relevance and developing
new channels that make quality academic research more accessible to
practice.
According to
AACSB President and CEO John J. Fernandes, recommendations in this report
have the potential to foster a new generation of academic research. “In the
end,” he says, “it is a commitment to scholarship that enables business
schools to best serve the future needs of business and society through
quality management education.”
The Impact of
Research task force report draft for comments is available for download on
the AACSB website:
www.aacsb.edu/research. The website
also provides additional resources related to the issue and the opportunity
to submit comments on the draft report. The AACSB Committee on Issues in
Management Education and
Board of Directors
will use the feedback to determine the next steps for implementation.
The AACSB International Impact of Research Task Force
Chairs:
Joseph A. Alutto, interim president, and
John W. Berry, Senior Chair in Business, Max M. FisherCollege of Business,
The Ohio State University
K. C. Chan, The Hong Kong University of Science and
Technology
Richard A. Cosier, Purdue University
Thomas G. Cummings, University of Southern California
Ken Fenoglio, AT&T
Gabriel Hawawini, INSEAD and the University of Pennsylvania
Cynthia H. Milligan, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Myron Roomkin, Case Western Reserve University
Anthony J. Rucci, The Ohio State University
Teaching Excellence Secondary to Research for Promotion,
Tenure, and Pay ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm#TeachingVsResearch
Bob Jensen's threads on higher education controversies
are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm
The Parable Of Being In The Wrong
Paradigm
May 30, 2007 parable by David Albrecht
[albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]
Sorry to revive this thread (need a favor) after it
seemed to die 10 days ago. I present this parable with apologies to Ed
Scribner, our resident parable teller.
I call this The Parable Of Being In The Wrong
Paradigm.
A certain professor is the sad-sack of accounting
higher education. It seems as if he's always been a member of an
out-of-power paradigm. He started off college as a music major. He then
switched to chemistry to Spanish to creative writing to history to political
science. After graduation he discovered his degree qualified him to operate
the french frier at a fast food joint. Friends, unhappy with his
unhappiness, advised him to pursue an MBA degree. Our professor switched to
an MA in accounting.
After this graduation he failed to secure an
accounting or auditing job with the Big 8-7-6-5-4, probably due to a
combination of not being young enough and wearing a colored shirt to his
interviews. He wanted a true job, but it was not to be for him. Count him
out of the Big 8-7-6-5-4 paradigm, his first experience with the wrong
paradigm.
But lo and behold, a small school hired him to
teach accounting. He enjoyed it so much that he decided to pursue an
accounting doctorate for that academic union card. On the bright side, he
learned new ways of thinking, new ways to approach a problem, and mental
flexibility (this trait gets him in trouble, though). On the dark side he
tried to pass himself off as a quantoid, but he wasn't. Nor was his degree
from a powerful elite university. So count him out of the elite accounting
school paradigm, and count him out of a top level salary. He is again a
member of the wrong paradigm.
He's been a bust as a research/publishing hound,
never hitting a top four journal. Some of his pubs were practitioner
oriented and out of favor in his department. His last publication was too
many years ago. He hit with the Journal of Excellence in College Teaching,
but was told by his dean that it wouldn't count because his article wasn't
about accounting (and the journal is too lowly ranked anyway). So, count him
out of the dominant accounting research paradigm and from getting annual
raises from his department. He is again a member of the wrong paradigm.
He was curious fellow, though, and always eager to
contribute to making things better. Intrigued by how students learned, he
researched it (but never got anything published, of course). He invested the
results of the research back into his classrooms and became a popular
teacher. As he continued to learn about how students learn, he became more
popular. Eventually, students had to line up to get into one of his classes.
The department chair responded by putting in a special registration process
to keep excess students away from his classes and into other sections. The
lucky students in his classes thrived in his learning-centered environment,
it seems that they had been hungry to learn for a long time. The traditional
paradigm ("tell them and then test them") is alive and well at at his
school, though. He had to endure peer-to-peer evaluations of his teaching
from professors who had difficulty in helping students learn. One accounting
professor, notorious for his long lectures and lethal use of Power Point,
came into our professor's classroom on one of his more non-traditional
approach days. After a few minutes, the notorious accounting professor
angrily steamed out of the classroom, giving our professor the the lowest
score ever on a peer evaluation of teaching. It seems our professor didn't
cover enough content. So count him out of another dominant accounting
professor paradigm, and again a member of the wrong paradigm.
Despite being considered the worst accounting
professor (0 for 4) by his department, he received his university's highest
award for contributing to student learning.
One day he was asked how it felt not to be a part
of the crowd or a dominant accounting paradigm. He replied that not being in
a correct paradigm feels like not being invited to a party. He took solace,
though from reading posts to AECM. Contributors seemed to be out of at least
one power paradigm, just like him. They discussed it aud nauseum, year after
year. Eventually he concluded that the more people lament the power of a
dominant paradigm, the more things stay the same. It is like the
weather--people can talk about it a lot but no one can do anything to change
it. Leaving his computer, our professor went back to work, changing the
world one student at a time.
David Albrecht
What's wrong about studying accounting in accounting doctoral
programs?
May 2, 2007 message from Bob Jensen to the AECM Listserv
I have a former student and very good friend who’s interested in applying
for an accounting doctoral program. He’s a good student who became a better
student each year of his five year program. He’s somewhat experienced as a
tax accountant.
But he’s not especially interested in a doctoral program that is heavy in
quantitative methods (dare I say “accountics?”).
I have a couple of suggestions for him. But before I reply to him I would
like some other suggestions from the AECM regarding full-time doctoral
programs that are heavier on accounting and taxation skills and a bit
lighter on the quantitative methods focus of most (all?) respected
accounting doctoral programs at the moment.
You may send your suggestions privately to me or share them on the AECM
if you choose to do so.
Please let me know if I can forward your suggestions under your name or
if I should make your suggestions to him anonymous.
I do recommend this young man for a doctoral program. He’s become very
passionate about becoming an accounting educator.
Thanks,
Bob Jensen
May 2, 2007 reply from Michael Haselkorn
[MHASELKORN@bentley.edu]
Bob,
He should check out Bentley College’s new PhD
program. Feel free to use my name.
Mike Haselkorn
May 2, 2007 reply from Randy Kuhn
[jkuhn@bus.ucf.edu]
Bob,
I would definitely recommend your student speak to
some of the professors at UCF (Central Florida in Orlando)
like Robin Roberts and Steve Sutton. The general approach for the PhD
program here is to provide as much exposure as possible to all areas of
accounting scholarship and let the student decide what area best suits them.
We take five accounting seminars that include a general overview of research
(Kuhn, Burrell & Morgan, etc.), behavioral accounting, accounting
information systems, financial archival, and sociological. A nice mix
overall. Most of us take electives outside the College of Business in
psychology, sociology, education, etc. for our minor as well as for the
methods requirements. We can choose a more quantitative approach but no one
in the last three classes went that route. Of the nine students in the last
two classes, seven came from public accounting (six audit, one tax). The
program has definitely enlightened all of us to other views of accounting,
research, education, and the world in general. We only accept students every
other year and I believe there are one or two spots left for the Fall 2007
class. If you think our program might fit your student, then I strongly
recommend that he contact Robin ASAP.
Thanks,
Randy
April 6, 2008 message from Steve Sutton
[ssutton@BUS.UCF.EDU]
As a quick point of clarification, the UCF doctoral
program came up in these earlier discussions as an alternative to the "accountics"
type programs common at most U.S. universities. Our Ph.D. degree is
definitely a heavy research degree, but our students tend to specialize in
audit, tax, systems, managerial and it would be unusual for one of our
students to complete an entirely economics-based archival study in their
thesis. Our students are heavily encouraged to use the three-paper
dissertation model and thus normally exit their Ph.D. program with three
papers from the dissertation that are very near to being in a submitable
form. These dissertations generally use multiple methodological approaches
to study an issue of interest from multiple perspectives. In addition,
virtually all students have published one or more academic papers before
working on the dissertation. I perceive UCF as a very heavy research
oriented PhD program, we just have a much more encompassing view of what
constitutes acceptable research methods than many other programs, and
strategically our program is structured to primarily focus on
Behavioral/Public Policy/IT-related research.
Sorry to jump into the flow on this, but thought we
should make sure there wasn't a misperception out there about our program.
Steve G. Sutton
KPMG Professor
Dixon School of Accounting, UCF
URL ---
www.bus.ucf.edu/ssutton/
May 2, 2007 reply from Steve Sutton
[ssutton@bus.ucf.edu]
Bob,
I’ve watched this discussion with some interest.
I’m always reluctant to speak of our own PhD program in this forum because
it can be taken and interpreted the wrong way. Our PhD program has carved a
niche out that is different from the ‘glamour’ programs. If we have a
student who applies and wishes to do “accountics” type work, we generally
steer them towards a more appropriate program.
Our program has basically focused on audit, tax and
systems with a focus on behavioral and public policy research. We have what
I believe to be some very accomplished and bright scholars working with our
students, but our research is primarily behavioral from an individual
(psychology-based), organizational (sociology), and societal (critical and
radical humanist perspectives) perspective(s). We believe dialogue about the
professions, accounting institutions, ethical implications and the
philosophy underlying all of those is critical to the role of accounting
academics.
That said, a PhD is still a research degree and not
a technical degree. We assume that a student that has attained an
undergraduate and masters level education in accounting has the technical
accounting knowledge. The PhD is about how to look at accounting with a
critical thinking mind and question the rules, processes and
institutions—and to ask if there is a better way.
We educate our PhD students in the traditional
areas as we believe this is critical to be good colleagues and appreciating
each other’s research. But we do a lot in non-traditional areas also. You
might find the structure of the programming interesting (or you may not):
http://www.graduate.ucf.edu/CurrentGradCatalog/content/Degrees/ACAD_PROG_94.cfm#BUPHD-ACCOUNTING
Hope you’re enjoying retirement in the mountains.
This is the time of year I miss New England.
Steve G. Sutton
KPMG Professor
Dixon School of Accounting, UCF
www.bus.ucf.edu/ssutton/
May 2, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
Bob,
What are your friend's aspirations? If he could
describe his ideal faculty position, including the sort of research (if any)
he would like to pursue, what would that be? (He may be uncertain, which is
fine.)
Recommending a set of inputs is easier if the
desired output is clear.
Richard Sansing
May 2, Reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Richard,
I think (surmising at this point) that he might aspire to teach
accounting/tax in a small liberal arts college where publishing in top
research journals is not deemed more important than a dedication for
teaching accounting and inspiring liberal arts students to pursue a career
in accountancy.
In spite of what some of us more familiar with research universities
think, there are many such liberal arts and even smaller state-supported
colleges that still place the highest emphasis on teaching and youth
inspiration.
What I've discovered is that all colleges want evidence of continued
scholarship, but some are much more willing to accept publication in what we
might call lower-tiered journals.
Then again, this young man showed such increased aptitude for accounting
theory. It may be possible that in the course of his doctoral program he
gets fired up for higher level research. His father is a good statistician
and systems analyst in a top university. His mother is a teacher.
Bob Jensen
May 2, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
Bob,
I would encourage your friend to think about the
real option aspect of this decision. He should be very confident of his
decision to not pursue a Ph.D. at a research-oriented program before
bypassing that option. If he studies at Chicago and makes an informed
decision not to pursue "mainstream" academic research, then he will be
over-trained for his dream job at the kind of liberal arts college you
describe. But he also has the option of pursuing the research route. But if
he studies at a place that puts less emphasis on research methods, he has
limited his options at the outset.
Richard Sansing
May 2, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Richard,
I used to think that way. Then I had one student named XXXXX who had
similar goals to YYYYY, although XXXXX was a much more brilliant math
student according to the Mathematics Department at Trinity University. I
made a special effort to have XXXXX admitted to an "accountics" doctoral
program without having as much as one week of experience in accounting
practice. XXXXX did not even intern and went straight from our Trinity
University masters program to an accounting doctoral program.
To my utter disappointment XXXXX dropped out after the end of the first
semester. He said he was just not interested in getting an econometrics PhD
in an accounting doctoral program. He wanted an accounting PhD and
discovered that he would have four or five years of econometrics,
statistics, and psychometrics.
Honestly Richard, I'm not making this up. XXXXX enrolled in this
accounting doctoral program about three years ago if my memory serves me
correctly. With his exceptional math skills XXXXX was capable of getting his
accounting (ergo econometrics PhD). He just wasn't interested in
econometrics before he applied for the doctoral program, when he was in the
doctoral program, or when he withdrew from the doctoral program.
I did not do XXXXX or that doctoral program any favors by pushing XXXXX
in the way that you would probably have pushed XXXXX. Now when it comes to
YYYYY, we have a similar situation except I don't think YYYYY has the
exceptional math skills of XXXXX. YYYYY admits that he's more like his
mother than his father in this regard.
YYYYY, like XXXXX, really wants to study accountancy rather than
econometrics. If XXXXX wanted to be an econometrics PhD, however, he
probably would have stuck it out in the accountancy doctoral program because
economics PhDs are a dime a dozen relative to accounting econometricians
masquerading as accountants.
My point, Richard, is that sometimes "keeping options open" is not the
best advice for some types of students, especially accounting students who
really do not want to become statisticians, econometricians,
psychometricians, and management scientists. We've pretty much taken the
study of accountancy out of doctoral programs. Those entering doctoral
programs learn very little accounting beyond what they learned before
entering the program.
What accountancy doctoral programs lack is imagination. Why can't there
be a joint accounting/JD doctoral program in law and accountancy? Why can't
there be an accounting/philosophy doctoral program? Why must virtually all
accountancy doctoral programs be accounting/ECONOMICS doctoral programs for
economists who want higher starting salaries?
That's my $.02.
Bob Jensen
May 2, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
1. Yes, sometimes options expire out of the money.
A bad outcome ex post does not imply a bad decision ex ante.
2. Not everything you learn has to be learned in a
classroom. I've learned a lot about non-profit organizations over the last
ten years without ever taking a class on the subject.If it is (relatively)
harder to learn about research methods on your own than it is to learn about
institutional detail on your own, a program that focuses on economics and
research methods is likely the most efficient way to learn. There is also an
economy of scale issue. If I have five doctoral students interested in five
different topics, a program that focuses on methods rather than subjects
seems like the way to go; each student can learn about the institutional
issues that interest them in another way.
Richard Sansing
May 2, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Richard
Plumlee et al. (2006) discovered that there were only 29
doctoral students in auditing and 23 in tax out of the 2004 total of 391
accounting doctoral students enrolled in years 1-5 in the United States.
With the excessive shortage of new PhDs in accounting
(especially in auditing, tax, and systems), I think those who get a PhD with
accounting skills will have pretty good "options" to become teachers and may
even become the highest paid teachers in smaller colleges.
And you have difficulty separating yourself from the
fundamental profit maximization economics assumption that plagues virtually
all economics models. You assume that all accounting graduates who elect to
go into academe want the highest salaries and probably the lowest teaching
loads possible. In fact, there are students like XXXXX and YYYYY who truly
want the psychic rewards of teaching rather than earn the highest dollar and
the lowest teaching load.
What may be my most important point in this exchange with
you is that there are many smaller colleges that would rather have dedicated
teachers of accounting rather than failed econmetricians belatedly wanting
to teach accounting because they were denied tenure in a top university's
accounting/econometrics program.
And your latter assumption is that accounting can be self
taught. Actually most anything can be self taught, including Egon Balas who
became a well known Carnegie-Mellon mathematics professor after having
taught himself mathematics during ten years of solitary confinement in a
Hungarian prison. But why should an accounting doctoral student have to
spend four or five years studying dreaded econometrics when their first love
is learning accounting, tax, auditing, or systems?
And you might've been interested in learning accountancy
after you earned an economics doctorate. But there are many econometrics
professors in accounting departments who do not share your view. Let me once
again dredge up the best example of the Accounting Horizon's referee who
rejected a paper submitted by Denny Beresford.
When Professor Beresford attempted to publish his paper
appealing for accounting researchers to have more interest in the accounting
profession, an Accounting Horizons referee’s report to him contained
the following revealing reply about “leading scholars” in accounting
research:
Begin Quote
*****************
1. The
paper provides specific recommendations for things that accounting
academics should be doing to make the accounting profession better.
However (unless the author believes that academics' time is a free good)
this would presumably take academics' time away from what they are
currently doing. While following the author's advice might make the
accounting profession better, what is being made worse? In other words,
suppose I stop reading current academic research and start reading news
about current developments in accounting standards. Who is made better
off and who is made worse off by this reallocation of my time?
Presumably my students are marginally better off, because I can tell
them some new stuff in class about current accounting standards, and
this might possibly have some limited benefit on their careers. But
haven't I made my colleagues in my department worse off if they depend
on me for research advice, and haven't I made my university worse off if
its academic reputation suffers because I'm no longer considered a
leading scholar? Why does making the accounting profession better
take precedence over everything else an academic does with their time?
As quoted at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
*****************
End Quote
Particularly relevant in this regard is Dennis Beresford’s
address to the AAA membership at the 2005 Annual AAA Meetings in San
Francisco
Begin Quote
*****************
In my eight years in teaching I’ve concluded that way too many of us
don’t stay relatively up to date on professional issues. Most of us
have some experience as an auditor, corporate accountant, or in some
similar type of work. That’s great, but things change quickly these
days.
Beresford (2005)
*****************
End Quote
I'm glad that you like accounting and tax. Unfortunately,
may of your econometrics friends in accounting academe hate having to teach
such courses as intermediate accounting, advanced accounting, auditing, or
introductory tax courses. And they interpret accounting theory as minimal
accounting and maximal economic theory.
Bob Jensen
May 2, 2007 reply from Randy Kuhn
[jkuhn@BUS.UCF.EDU]
When being recruited I recall my PhD coordinator
showing me statistics about the number of accounting PhD students graduating
each year and the general declining trend, down to around 70-75 per year.
The AAA placement center at the national conference last year listed over
300 job postings. What a dilemma and not getting any better given that many
of the baby boomers still have yet to retire.
The Plumlee et al. (2006) study paints an even
bleaker picture. The general lack of students specializing in non-financial
areas should raise a huge red flag. Will our non-financial accounting
classes eventually be taught by professors outside their research area and
interest? What kind of higher education will that provide? I have been
fervently recruiting friends in public accounting. My approach to date has
been to drop a bug in their ear during the worst of busy season then keep
plugging away. So far, only one success. Many would love to enter academia
but the thought of giving up four years of compensation is unpalatable and
just not feasible for their families. The barriers to entry are great.
Successful recruiting will take a concerted effort by us all.
May 2, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
---Bob Jensen wrote:
And you have difficulty separating yourself
from the fundamental profit maximization economics assumption that
plagues virtually all economics models. You assume that all accounting
graduates who elect to go into academe want the highest salaries and
probably the lowest teaching loads possible. In fact, there are students
like XXXXX and YYYYY who truly want the psychic rewards of teaching
rather than earn the highest dollar and the lowest teaching load.
---
Nonsense. From a purely financial perspective, an
academic career for an accoutant is a big negative NPV. But I wouldn't trade
careers with anyone.
Richard Sansing
May 3, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Richard,
Negative NPV makes no sense to me for new accounting PhDs. With
universities paying over $180,000 (including summer stipends) as starting
salaries plus generous amounts of free time for personal consulting fees and
textbook writing, I have a difficult time calculating a negative NPV. And
consulting opportunities are relatively easy to get in top universities
because the elite names of those universities are a draw for faculty
opportunities to consult and write books.
Most Harvard, Wharton, MIT, NYU, and Stanford professors that I know make
more in consulting and royalties than their paltry salaries over $200,000
per year plus relatively generous travel allowances. The very top
universities also provide incidental funding for research ranging from
$10,000 to $30,000 each year (plus summer stipends in the range of $40,000
to $60,000).
When you make the NPV calculations you must also factor in the current
fringe benefits averaging 30% of starting salaries. This includes health
care and TIAA-CREF contributions. The 30% probably does not even count
sabbatical leaves, discounts for child care, and entertainment opportunities
such as concerts and theatre.
Sure an accounting or finance professor may have cut off chances of
winning the CEO lottery, but this is a low-probability career track.
Becoming a partner in a large CPA firm can be lucrative, but not necessarily
on a present value basis considering the first ten years at relatively low
salary (around $50,000-$60,000 per year) and the necessity to buy into
(usually by borrowing) the partnership for those lucky few (less than 10% of
the staff accountants) who are eventually invited to become partners.
If our recent undergraduates really took the trouble to compare the NPVs,
I think newly-minted accounting professors have a comparable or even better
outlook if the competing alternatives are weighted by the relatively low
probabilities of becoming an executive partner in a large CPA firm. Smaller
CPA firms are harder to compare, because they vary to such a huge extent.
Some partners of small CPA firms net over a million dollars each year and
many others barely scrape out a living in their home offices.
When you couple this with the wonderful lifestyle opportunities and
sabbatical leaves, I always thought of myself as having lived in tall cotton
for 40 years before I retired. Now I live in grass that's becoming too tall
since I've put off mowing.
Bob Jensen
May 3, 2007 reply from Randy Kuhn
[jkuhn@BUS.UCF.EDU]
CPA firm salary ranges obviously vary
by location, but really not all that much honestly. Here in Orlando, staff
auditors fresh out of school or even experienced hires from smaller firms
into the new Big 6 are receiving offers of $50 with $2-3k signing bonuses
this semester. This is consistent across the more popular disciplines
(audit, tax, business advisory). Business advisory (business process & IT
audit/consulting) starts to pull ahead at the manager stage and takes 1-2
years less per level for promotion. Whereas audit typically takes 12 years
for partner, business advisory can be as quick as 9 years with a greater
probability of making partner due to the demand/supply (not many hybrids out
there that know financial, business process, and IT). As a 2nd year advisory
manager (10 yrs exp) my base was $100k two years ago while the first-year
audit senior manager with comparable experience received less than $90k
which I think is on the low-end. The month I started the PhD program, one of
my friends in a nearby office made audit partner at the age of 34 receiving
a bump in salary from $150k to $225k with the promotion. Not sure about his
loan though.
May 3, 2007 message from Bob Jensen
Hi
Richard (Sansing),
I’m
still trying to find a PhD program that extends beyond the blinders of the
social science research paradigm. I need to look a little closer at
Bentley’s new program. Also there are a few AIS tracks in existing programs,
but my guess is that the AIS majors still have to take the econometrics
qualifying courses and exams.
Your
NPV sidetrack took us off the main issue regarding why our leading academic
journals and virtually all of our accounting doctoral programs define
accounting research as a social science that requires the requisite skills
in advanced statistics, econometrics, psychometrics, sociometrics, etc.
The
fact of the matter is that our current doctoral programs are critically
unable to meet demand according to the AACSB and Plumlee et al ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/03MainDocumentMar2007.htm
The supply is steadily dwindling with less than 100 graduates per year (and
less than 20 a year in auditing, tax, and systems). The demand is at least
ten times the supply and probably higher. Accounting education programs will
soon be to the point were virtually all of the instructors have no
doctorates or have only doctorates in economics, law, education, etc.
The
problem as I pointed out in earlier correspondence is a mismatch between
accounting graduates who want to study and do research in accounting but
have neither the aptitude nor an interest in becoming social scientists (and
in particular econometricians studying capital markets).
Accounting doctoral programs increasingly have ignored other research
paradigms outside the social science paradigm. For example, I do not find
humanities or legal research paradigm choices being offered in any
accounting doctoral program. Philosophy departments, history departments,
and law schools give doctorates to students who have few, if any, social
science research skills.
Is
there any university in the U.S. where a doctoral student can major in
accounting history without having to become a social scientist? Is there a
doctoral program in the U.S. where a student can major in accounting
philosophy? Is there any doctoral program in the U.S. that uses a law school
research paradigm?
And
lastly, I would like to point out that our leading journals and award
selection committees tend to ignore submissions based upon any research
paradigm other than a social science research paradigm.
The AICPA and the AAA jointly award a "Notable Contributions to
Accounting Literature Award" of $2,500 and a plaque at the AAA's annual
meetings. For the past 20 years, these awards have virtually all gone to
empirical research using positivist research methodologies.
This year I'm on the Selection Committee for the first time. The fact
that the Screening Committee only gave us empirical studies to select from
for the 2007 award to be granted in Chicago makes me wonder why only
empirical studies are candidates for Selection Committee evaluation.
The criteria for the award are embedded in the following paragraphs at
http://aaahq.org/awards/nominat3.htm
Begin Quote
**************
The Screening Committee for the Joint AICPA/AAA Notable Contributions to
Accounting Literature Award invites nominations of outstanding articles,
books, monographs, or other publications for consideration. Nominations from
regular and irregular (e.g., AICPA-sponsored research studies or monographs)
publications, as well as from nonaccounting publications, may be submitted
as long as the nominated work is relevant to accounting. Both academic and
practitioner nominations will be accepted.
Nominated items must
have been published within the years 2002 to 2006. Each nomination must be
accompanied by a brief supporting statement (no more than 150 words)
summarizing reasons for the nomination that are consistent with the award
selection criteria. These criteria include: uniqueness and potential
magnitude of contribution to accounting education, practice and/or future
accounting research; breadth of potential interest; originality and
innovative content; clarity and organization of exposition; and soundness
and appropriateness of methodology.
End Quote
**************
This important award can go to both research and other scholarly
literature contributions in accountancy. The Award's research literature is
not restricted to empirical research and positivist methods. What is curious
to me is why only this subset of the literature is repeatedly the only
winning subset.
What is even more curious this is why even the literature pieces
forwarded this year are only esoteric empirical research studies of dubious
value to "accounting education and practice." I say of "dubious value" in
the sense of highly simplified modeling assumptions and no replication of
the findings by other researchers.
Shouldn't the award winning literature item be at least independently
replicated if it is an empirical research study? My previous lament over
lack of replication in academic accounting research can be found at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Replication
The accountics bias seems to be rearing up repeatedly in this award
process for the past two decades. Is it because of narrowness in the
nomination process? Have members of the AAA given up nominating literature
that is not of an esoteric accountics nature? Is it because only empirical
research is deemed notable by the Screening Committees?
For more on the accountics bias in academe, go to
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
Also see the various commentaries at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
May 3, 2007 reply from Paul Williams
[Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]
I agree that the conversation has drifted a bit
from the original question, but if Bob's friend has been following this
discussion, he might be inclined to think ill of his prospects for doing
what he wants. It is largely the case now that U.S. PhD programs are as
Jagdish and Bob have characterized them.
There are a few places in the U.S. where Bob's
friend might be able to pursue an interest in accounting. Central Florida
and South Florida are PhD programs that offer some diversity of faculty
talent that provide a doctoral student with flexibility for pursuing
whatever interest excites them.
North Texas and Case Western Reserve are other
places. There are probably others, but they are fewer and farther between
than they were when I went through the experience. If Bob's friend is
adventuresome, there are many excellent doctoral opportunities at schools
outside the U.S. For example, the University of Alberta has a diverse
faculty, which allows the pursuit of interests that would simply not be
tolerated in most U.S. doctoral programs.
Then there are schools in the UK and Australia.
Adelaide, Wollongong, Cardiff, Strathclyde, Essex, the list goes on. These
places afford someone a different experience from many US programs and
provide much greater freedom to follow one's intellectual bliss than the
stultifying places that are the U.S. "elite."
Paul
May 11, 2007 reply from Sue P. Ravenscroft [ACCT]
[sueraven@iastate.edu]
Sue gave me permission to forward a somewhat laundered version of her original
message. It confirms what I've been arguing aud nauseum. The number of
accounting student doctoral graduates in the U.S. plunged to less than 100 per
year to meet an exploding demand for accounting professors. A major cause of the
shortage of applicants to doctoral programs is that these econometrics programs
do not interest most accountants in the pool of possible applicants to such
doctoral programs. Nearly all available accounting doctoral programs
(not just Tier I
programs) are no longer accounting programs and have no dedicated
accounting courses. They’re literally social science methodology programs with
most emphasis on econometrics and no choices for other research methodologies
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
Dear Bob,
I was just contacted by a wonderful young woman,
who graduated from Iowa State University last year. She is bright,
personable, hard-working, and interested in going into a PhD program. She is
NOT interested in doing a highly quantitative economics-based program, but
can handle the math and statistics needed for behavioral research. I feel
fortunate in the timing of her inquiry, because I observed the discussion
about a young man you know who is looking into doctoral schools, and the
subsequent advice from Sansing that he consider only a Tier One school
because of the "alleged choices" such schools provide versus the
counter-advice of actually getting training to do what one loves.
The young woman has already received the Tier
One type advice and was totally taken aback and turned off by it. The
assistant professor who gave her that advice told her she should take two
years of college level advanced math courses and then apply, because she is
definitely bright enough to go to a Tier One school and should not even
consider going to a Tier Two type institution.
Her goal was to enter a program in fall of 2008. After that set-back she
wrote me, and I was far more encouraging.......I told her that I had just
seen a rather long (albeit sometimes almost hostile) exchange about the
types of programs available and the wisdom of going to the "Tier One"
schools even if that wasn't where one's interest or heart lay.....This
student is a wise young woman and doesn't want to be trained to do something
she doesn't want to do.....
So, I am writing to ask if you have a final listing
of schools that might be more open to a variety of research
approaches.....If so, could you please write to me (address above or to
her). I would be ever so grateful.
Thank you very much.
Best regards,
Sue Ravenscroft
May 15, 2007 reply from Dana Carpenter
[dcarpenter@MATCMADISON.EDU]
I have followed the need a favor thread with great
interest. I am in my mid 40'sand have taught at community colleges (with a
few years at bachelor granting universities) for 20 years following 3 years
with KPMG. I have always wanted to get my doctorate for personal
actualization and would be interested in teaching at a regional university.
I scored 99 percentile on the verbal portion of the GMAT but just average on
the Mathematics. Two years ago I was told during an interview with a very
prestigous school that with a few semesters of calculus I could probably
gain admission to their Ph. D Program. I was also admitted to a Ph. D in
management at a different college. I decided against both options. I would
definitely be interested in a DBA or some of the teaching oriented or
blended accounting Ph. D's that have been discussed. In my situation (with
fewer years left in my career) I am really not interested in a professorship
at a Top Tier University. For the same reasons I hesitate to give up a job I
love and earn no income for 4 or 5 years at a minimum. I would be interested
in your response to the Accounting DBA question as well as specific ideas as
to programs or perhaps a different field with a concentration in accounting.
Dana Carpenter
(608) 246-6590
May 4, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen
Your experience, Dana, is very typical of the many students at all ages
who are turned off by having to study five years of social science research
to obtain a tenure track position to be an accounting professor.
To my knowledge, the distinction between a PhD and a DBA from a Tier 1
research university is about as marked as the distinction between ketchup
vs. catsup. Both doctoral degrees are intended to instill research skills in
students intent on careers in academia. The DBA used to entail a more
rounded set of business courses (management, organization behavior, finance,
marketing, etc.) but I think most accounting PhD and DBA programs have
dropped required courses except for a few research seminars and possibly
some social science (especially economics) and statistics courses.
The DBA used to focus more on the "application of theory" as opposed to
the "development of new theory" in a PhD program ---
http://dr-hy.com/Menu-Bar/mVita/DBA-vs-PHD.html
In my opinion, these distinctions between the two degrees have largely
evaporated. The U.S. Department of Education and the National Science
Foundation recognize numerous research-oriented doctoral degrees such as the
D.B.A. as "equivalent" to the Ph.D. and do not discriminate between them ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doctor_of_Business_Administration
Certainly the distinction between DBA versus PhD in business schools
is not as great as the distinction between EED and PhD in schools of
education.
Probably the best known business school that offers DBA and PhD degrees
is the Harvard Business School. If you major in a traditional business area
(e.g., accounting, marketing, management strategy, information technology)
you get a DBA. If you major in business economics, health policy, or
organization behavior you get a PhD. The actual distinction between the two
designations is not at all clear to me. About the only thing I can tell is
that some HBS doctoral students get ketchup on their hamburgers and others
get catsup.
Most certainly, having a DBA will not change the criteria for obtaining
tenure later in life. I do not know of any serious university that will put
higher weightings on teaching performance for DBA faculty versus higher
weightings on research for PhD faculty.
Amy Dunbar provided a link to a good listing of international doctoral programs
---
http://aaahq.org/ata/_ATAMenu/phd-programs.htm
Questions raised are how large each program is and what have been the
trends in growth or shrinkage. As new doctoral programs came on line, the
very large doctoral programs such as those in Illinois, Michigan, Texas,
Indiana, and Michigan State greatly reduced doctoral program size in the
1986-2005 period. What used to be large programs shrank greatly in size.
Some smaller programs like Rice have gone out of accounting doctoral
programs entirely. Some like Minnesota seem to have disappeared without
making any official announcements.
A listing of the history of U.S. accounting doctoral programs is provided
in your free Prentice-Hall Hasselback Accounting Faculty Directory
(at least in the hard copy version). The Doctoral Program History table is
on the page preceding the start of the alphabetized listing of accounting
faculty by college. In don't think this table is available in Jim's Online
Directory at http://rarc.rutgers.edu/raw/hasselback/
There are some errors in the Hasselback table that are due mainly to
failures of some programs to accurately report their own data to Jim. But
except for Penn State, I think the recent undercounting is relatively minor.
Jim also provides the totals by year. The last column is generally way
off for the most recent year because of reporting time lags. However, the
preceding columns are relatively accurate.
In the past twenty years, the most accounting doctoral graduates reported
for the U.S. was 207 in 1988. The least was 69 in 2003. It has not been over
100 since 2001.
The
depressing Plumlee et al (2006) study is probably more accurate for the year
2004. Further analysis is provided at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
Bob Jensen
May 11, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen
A summary listing of non-traditional programs was provided by Paul
Williams in the listing of messages at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
The snipped version is
http://snipurl.com/1jb1g
One of the subsequent messages that I sent to my Student YYYYY is shown
below:
Message from Bob Jensen to YYYYY
I’m particularly happy that you’re now motivated to become an
accounting educator. I loved this profession.
First and foremost is your GMAT score that determines almost
everything regarding admission to any respectable doctoral program.
Consider all your options for having as high a score as possible.
Second you need to honestly evaluate your aptitude for statistics and
mathematics. Nearly all accounting doctoral programs are tantamount to
econometrics programs these days with great stress on econometrics
models of capital markets data.
I don’t know if you followed the recent AECM lively exchange on this
topic or not. You can read some of the messages at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
A listing of doctoral programs is provided at
http://aaahq.org/ata/_ATAMenu/phd-programs.htm
I know you are somewhat interested in taxation. In nearly all
instances, taxation doctoral students still have to master the
econometrics requirements of capital markets research.
If you are looking for the handful of programs that allow you to
customize your program and possibly cut back on the econometrics
hurdles, I recommend that you look into the following programs, messages
about which appear at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
Bentley College (Boston) This is a new program that I don’t yet know
much about. Bentley is a very good accounting and finance college,
although I would not expect it to be strong for a tax concentration.
Case Western University (Cleveland)
University of Central Florida (Orlando)
University of South Florida (Tampa)
University of North Texas (Denton)
Various programs outside the U.S. (Please scroll down to the
informative message from Paul Williams in this regard) ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
If I can be of further help, please let me know.
Bob Jensen
May 12, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
--- Sue Ravenscroft wrote (to Bob Jensen, who then
posted it here):
I feel fortunate in the timing of her inquiry,
because I observed the discussion about a young man you know who is
looking into doctoral schools, and the subsequent advice from Sansing
that he consider only a Tier One school because of the "alleged choices"
such schools provide versus the counter-advice of actually getting
training to do what one loves.
---
For those interested in what I actually said, as
opposed to how it is characterized above, I repeat it below.
"I would encourage your friend to think about the
real option aspect of this decision. He should be very confident of his
decision to not pursue a Ph.D. at a research-oriented program before
bypassing that option. If he studies at Chicago and makes an informed
decision not to pursue "mainstream" academic research, then he will be
over-trained for his dream job at the kind of liberal arts college you
describe. But he also has the option of pursuing the research route. But if
he studies at a place that puts less emphasis on research methods, he has
limited his options at the outset."
Later in the same thread, I also said:
"My point was that the decision Bob's friend makes
regarding a Ph.D. program will significantly affect the opportunities that
he or she faces upon graduation, which will in turn affect subsequent
academic opportunties as well. Unless one is very sure about what what one's
preferences will be in the future, the course of action that preserves
options has a lot to recommend it. Whether one ultimately prefers a career
that features both research and teaching, or wants to teach and do no
research, it would be nice to have the skill set needed to make have a real
choice."
Richard Sansing
May 12, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Richard,
Even better advice would be to avoid accounting
altogether if you want to be a top researcher in a Tier 1 accounting
research university. Consider the role model examples. Ron Dye (Northwestern
Accounting Professor) has his doctorate and undergraduate degrees in
mathematics and economics with almost no accounting. Some of our other top
accounting researchers have management science, mathematics, econometrics,
and psychometric doctorates with very little in the way of accountancy
education and/or experience in accounting practice. What accounting they
learned is when having to teach a little about it after they became
professors.
I'm not trying to be facetious or cynical here.
Those of us that majored in accounting for five years had to take a lot more
time in college to earn a doctorate in an accounting doctoral program. It is
actually quite costly in time and opportunity cost to first become an
accountant and then enter one of our present accounting doctoral programs.
It is far more efficient to major in economics and then earn an econometrics
doctorate from a prestigious Economics Department. Equally great is to earn
a doctorate in computer science.
The only risk of not having an accounting background
as far as I can tell is the risk of not getting tenure in a Tier 1
accounting university. Without accounting, it is more difficult for tenure
rejects to become accounting teachers in Tier 2 and Tier 3 colleges and
universities. Those universities typically require more knowledge of
accountancy.
Accounting majors realistically face 12 years of
full-time undergraduate and graduate studies before graduating with a
doctorate in an accounting program. On top of that, accounting doctoral
programs prefer that doctoral candidates have 1-5 years of accounting
practice experience. This adds up to 13-17 years to graduate from an
accounting doctoral program.
An economics major can earn an economics doctorate
in seven years of full-time studies before graduating with a doctorate from
an Economics Department. If she or he bothers to earn a MBA degree along the
way, it may take eight years to complete the doctorate. Under new AACSB
rules, doctoral graduates in economics, statistics, mathematics, psychology,
etc. are fully qualified to become accounting professors.
I must admit that I reasoned exactly like you,
Richard, until I pushed Student XXXXX into a Tier 1 accounting doctoral
program that he withdrew from after his first semester in spite of his being
a brilliant math student (double major with accounting).This unfortunate
outcome made me think more seriously about why the pool for accounting
doctoral students is drying up.
Once again consider the Plumlee et al findings:
Plumlee et al. (2006) discovered that there were only 29 doctoral students
in auditing and 23 in tax out of the 2004 total of 391 accounting doctoral
students enrolled in years 1-5 in the United States. The number of graduates
has shrunk to less than 100 per year.
If the Tier 1 accounting doctoral programs (and in
fact virtually all accounting doctoral programs) require that all applicants
have the advanced mathematics, statistics, and economics, we have in fact
added possibly two more years to a five-year accounting program just to
enter the accounting doctoral program applicant pool. Alternately, an
applicant might be admitted provisionally into an accounting doctoral
studies program and take the two years of econometrics preparatory courses
in what becomes tantamount to a six or seven year doctoral full-time studies
program in graduate school.
My conclusions are as follows.
1. To become an accounting professor in a Tier 1
accounting program it is far more efficient and possibly more effective
(toward tenure) to earn social science, mathematics, or statistics
doctorate outside accounting in a highly prestigious university.
Accounting doctoral programs are actually inefficient alternatives to
becoming an accounting professor in a Tier 1 accounting program unless
you cannot get into a highly prestigious non-accounting doctoral
program.
2. The pool of applicants for accounting
doctoral programs is drying up. Accountants with 1-5 years of experience
typically want to study accounting if they choose to enter a doctoral
program. Since virtually all accounting doctoral programs in the United
States are social science (particularly econometrics) programs with few
if any accounting courses, these programs do not appeal to accountants.
These doctoral programs might appeal to economists and statisticians,
but it is far more efficient to earn economics and statistics doctorates
from Departments of Economics and Statistics.
Thus I gave the wrong advice to my Student XXXXX who
was a brilliant dual major in accounting and mathematics. Instead of
recommending a doctoral program in accounting (where he really did not want
a forced feeding of econometrics), I should've recommended that he go
directly into a prestigious mathematics doctoral program. Then he could
ultimately apply to become an accounting professor in a Tier 1 accounting
research university after getting his mathematics doctorate.
Since the number of graduates from accounting
doctoral programs is less than 100 students per year, Tier 1 research
universities are often forced to seek top graduates from non-accounting
doctoral programs such as econometrics and management science programs in
prestigious universities.
Isn't it sad that for some accounting professors
like me, majoring in accounting was wasted time.
Bob Jensen
May 13, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
Bob,
I suspect that Ron Dye would recommend studying
under Ron Dye at Kellogg's accounting Ph.D. program! One way to find out--
I'll ask him and post his response.
Some of your analysis seems exaggerated. I came
into the doctoral program with a very weak math background. In my three
years of coursework, roughly 1/3 of my classes were accounting research
seminars and 2/3 were math and economics classes. When you say:
"If the Tier 1 accounting doctoral programs (and in
fact virtually all accounting doctoral programs) require that all applicants
have the advanced mathematics, statistics, and economics, we have in fact
added possibly two more years to a five-year accounting program just to
enter the accounting doctoral program applicant pool."
you are double counting. You take those "tools"
courses during the five-year accounting doctoral program, not in addition to
it.
I think that trying to become an accounting
researcher without taking the accounting research seminars and attending the
weekly accounting research workshops would be very difficult.
I would ask someone considering an accounting
academic career what sort of questions they would like to answer. Much of
this thread has framed the questions in negative terms "How do I avoid
course X during my doctoral program?" rather than in positive terms "How do
I learn how to answer question Y?"
Richard Sansing
May 14, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Richard,
"Three years" is bad advice these days! Your college (Dartmouth) does not
have a doctoral program. Let me use as a benchmark what I view as a typical
accounting doctoral program in the 21st Century. The University of Florida
writes that it takes 4-5 years to complete an accounting PhD for students
entering with strong mathematics backgrounds. Students who must additionally
take the "mathematics preparatory courses" must anticipate six or seven
years of full-time effort.
Apparently your experience (advice?) differs from the advice given by the
accounting professor who advised Sue's accounting graduate to take two more
years "advanced mathematics" before applying to accounting doctoral
programs.
It also differs from my experience trying to place some top accounting
graduates in accounting doctoral programs in recent years. Nearly all who
were admitted had significantly stronger mathematics credentials than those
that were rejected. Most programs now advise applicants that (even
those with math credentials and masters degrees) the accounting doctoral
program will take 4-5 years (See the University of Florida statement quoted
below).
In fact most universities make a concerted effort to recruit accounting
doctoral program candidates who do not have accounting degrees. Virtually
every accounting doctoral program has a mathematics matriculation
requirement that is now quite formidable (possibly more so for applicants
today than for us applicants in the 20th Century). Consider the following
statement at the Fisher School of Accounting Website at the University of
Florida.
Note in particular the suggested admission alternatives of "economics,
engineering, mathematics, operations research, psychology, and statistics."
No mention is made of such undergraduate degrees as history, philosophy, or
other humanities degrees, and I suspect that unless a humanities graduate is
very strong in mathematics, the chances are zero of being admitted to most
any U.S. accounting doctoral program even among humanities graduates that
are actively recruited by top law schools. By the way, top law schools in
particular recruit accounting graduates more aggressively than accounting
doctoral programs in my opinion. One of the major reasons for the shrinking
pool of applicants to accounting doctoral programs is the now preferred
option to go to law school (including some who want to specialize in tax and
eventually teach tax at the college level with a JD credential).
Begin Quote
*************
University of Florida Ph.D. in Business Administration
- Accounting
Ph.D.
Program - Accounting Concentration
This program is
open to all applicants who have completed an
undergraduate degree. Individuals with a degree in a
non-business discipline (e.g.,
economics, engineering, mathematics, operations
research, psychology, statistics) are encouraged
to apply.
Program Details (pdf)
Students are required to demonstrate
math competency prior to matriculating the doctoral
program. Each student's background will be evaluated
individually, and guidance provided on ways a student
can ready themselves prior to beginning the doctoral
course work. There are
opportunities to complete preparatory course work at the
University of Florida prior to matriculating our
doctoral program.
The accounting concentration is designed
to be completed in four to five years.
The first year of the program is
essentially lockstep with doctoral students in economics
and finance. Starting in the second year,
individual course work is designed by the student in
consultation with his or her supervisory committee and
the accounting graduate coordinator. Other than the
Accounting Seminars (listed below) there are no specific
required courses after the first year of the program.
Accounting Seminars :
ACG 7939 Theoretical Constructs
in Accounting
ACG 7979 Accounting Readings and Replication
ACG 7885 Empirical Research Methods in
Accounting
ACG 7979 Accounting Readings and Research
Project
ACG 7887 Research Analysis in Accounting
|
Ph.D. Co-Major Program with the
Department of Statistics
A program of
study for a single degree in which a student satisfies
co-major requirements in two separate academic
disciplines that offer the Ph.D.
|
End Quote
*************
Is there any accounting doctoral program in the United States that
encourages humanities graduates to apply? Is there an accounting doctoral
program in the entire United States that has a co-major with the Department
of Philosophy or the Department of History?
As of today, The University of Florida graduated four accounting PhDs
since Year 2000. As far as I can tell, none of them were undergraduate
accounting majors. Degrees in engineering, economics, and mathematics most
likely hastened completion of their doctoral degrees in accounting at
Florida in less than six or seven years. I mention Florida only because
Florida is not a unique accounting doctoral program in this regard. I
commend Florida for being more honest than some when stating the program
requirements.
The bottom line is that I don't think that the doctoral program that you
(Richard) entered "with a very weak math background" and completed in three
years makes you a relevant role model for today's applicants to doctoral
programs. My reading is that today you could not even be admitted to the
University of Florida accounting doctoral program unless you completed the "preparatory
course work at the University of Florida prior to matriculating our doctoral
program." We (you and me) are no longer role models in that regard
for applicants to accounting doctoral programs.
In my case I was admitted to the doctoral program but then had to take
all those extra undergraduate math, operations research, economics, and
statistics courses while in the program. My PhD graduation would've been
hastened at Stanford if I had majored in mathematics or statistics instead
of accounting as an undergraduate. I perhaps then could've graduated in
three years instead of the five full (and delightful) years that I spent in
Palo Alto. Now
I think it requires six or seven years in Palo Alto for candidates who must
take the preparatory undergraduate courses. In my day we did not have all
those accounting research seminars at the graduate level.
Bob Jensen
May 13, 2007 reply from
Bob,
You are not confused. And I am not brainwashed. ;-)
My point, as you well know, is that when we do
research using archival data we need math skills. Different types of
research appear to be rewarded differently, as evidenced by the salary
differentials across the schools at a university.
Amy
May 14, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi
Amy,
You
wrote that "when we do research using archival data we need
math skills."
To which I respectfully
reply as follows:
Not everything
that can be counted, counts. And not everything that counts can be counted.
Albert Einstein
I think that
you're confining doctoral scholarship to archives that can be counted and
overlooking the archives, possibly the most relevant archived information,
that cannot be counted.
In the
United States, following the Gordon/Howell and Pierson reports, our
accounting doctoral programs and leading academic journals bet the farm on
the social sciences without taking the due cautions of realizing why the
social sciences are called "soft sciences." They're soft because "not
everything that can be counted, counts. And not everything that counts can
be counted."
It seems to
me that history scholars have a much longer history of analyzing archival
data than most any other type of scholars, I wonder what the discipline of
history would’ve become if every history scholar over the past 1,000 years
had to have two years of preparatory “advanced mathematics” before entering
a doctoral program in history.
It seems to
me that legal scholars have a very long and scholarly history of doing
research on archival data, especially court records, I wonder what the
discipline of law would’ve become if every legal scholar over the past 1,000
years had to have two years of preparatory “advanced mathematics” before
entering a JD program.
Many of our
serious professional problems needing research in accounting are closer to
law than economics. Particularly vexing are the issues of how to account for
complex contracts (e.g., those with derivatives, contingencies, and
intangibles) in settings where the contracts are being written to deceive
investors and creditors. Must years of advanced mathematics and econometrics
necessary conditions for conducting academic research to help the profession
with these contracts?
Where would
we be in medicine, law, and most other professions if it was dictated on
high that all their doctoral programs had to require advanced mathematics?
Would they find themselves in the mess we have today in academic accounting
in the United States where the pool of potential doctoral candidates is
drying up?
Would we
find ourselves in the mess of having to rely on adjuncts to teach more of
the accounting courses than our tenure-track faculty who bargained for
minimal teaching and maximal salaries and benefits so they could conduct
econometric and psychometric research with models of dubious relevance to
the practicing profession?
Why is it
that virtually all of our doctoral programs in accounting are now being
shunned by so many accounting professionals who would like to teach
accounting, auditing, tax, or AIS but are turned off by having to first take
preparatory courses in advanced mathematics and not have the opportunity for
studying accounting in accounting doctoral programs?
In academic
accounting we’ve almost all been seduced by frustrated economists in the
U.S. who found a way to secure a monopoly by putting up barriers to entry
that shrinks the supply of accounting doctoral graduates and lifts the
salaries of accounting professors to the highest levels in every university.
Most of us, especially me, have benefited from these barriers to entry. But
in the process, we’ve widened the schism between professors of accounting
and the accounting profession and students of accounting.
These
barriers to entry to doctoral programs have frustrated practicing
accountants to a point where doctoral programs like the one at the
University of Florida are in many cases more appealing to non-accountants ("economics,
engineering, mathematics, operations research, psychology, and statistics")
who can matriculate into the program with their advanced mathematics skills
and graduate from the program without every having studied the things we
teach our undergraduates and masters students in accounting. In fairness,
the current body of eight accounting doctoral students at the University of
Florida has three candidates with undergraduate degrees in accounting.
Others include a mathematics major, a statistics major, a finance major, a
commerce major, and a student who majored in economics. The finance major
also earned a masters of accounting degree.
It seems to
me that in the United States after the Gordon/Howell and Pierson reports our
accounting doctoral programs and leading academic journals bet the farm on
the social sciences without heeding the due cautions of realizing why the
social sciences are called "soft sciences." They're soft because "not
everything that can be counted, counts. And not everything that counts can
be counted."
Why is it
that only outside the United States various accounting doctoral programs in
prestigious universities have seen the light regarding diversity of research
methodologies in academic accountancy?
Bob Jensen
May 13, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
--- Bob Jensen wrote:
Even better advice would be to avoid accounting
altogether if you want to be a top researcher in a Tier 1 accounting
research university. Consider the role model examples. Ron Dye
(Northwestern Accounting Professor) has his doctorate and undergraduate
degrees in mathematics and economics with almost no accounting. Some of
our other top accounting researchers have management science,
mathematics, econometrics, and psychometric doctorates with very little
in the way of accountancy education and/or experience in accounting
practice. What accounting they learned is when having to teach a little
about it after they became professors.
--- end of quote ---
Here is Ron's response, along with the question
that I posed to him.
About the question: by and large, I think it is
a mistake for someone interested in pursuing an academic career in
accounting not to get a phd in accounting. If you look at the "success"
stories, there aren't many: most of the people who make a post-phd
transition fail. I think that happens for a couple reasons. 1. I think
some of the people that transfer late do it for the money, and aren't
really all that interested in accounting. While the $ are nice, it is
impossible to think about $ when you are trying to come up with an idea,
and anyway, you're unlikely to come up with an idea unless you're really
interested in the subject. 2. I think, almost independent of the field,
unless you get involved in the field at an early age, for some reason it
becomes very hard to develop good intuition for the area - which is a
second reason good problems are often not generated by "crossovers."
The bigger thing - not related to the question
you raise - but maybe you could add to the discussion is that there are,
as far as I can tell, not a lot of new ideas being put forth by anyone
in accounting nowadays (with the possible exception of John Dickhaut's
neuro stuff). In most fields, the youngsters are supposed to come up
with the new problems, techniques, etc., but I see a lot more mimicry
than innovation among newly minted phds now.
Anyway, for what it's worth....
Ron
May 14, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Richard,
I thank you for obtaining a reply from Ron Dye. He's one among a number
of leading researchers who became an accounting professor without having a
background in accounting. He's also one of the finest mathematics
researchers in academic accounting.
What is especially interesting to me is Ron's conclusion that essentially
our highly touted and highly selective accounting doctoral programs (with
the highest-paid graduates in academe) in the United States are pretty much
failures if we define research as the creation of new and innovative
knowledge. I love his choice of the word "mimicry" in his following
conclusion:
Begin Quote
**********************
The bigger thing - not related to the question
you raise - but maybe you could add to the discussion is that there are,
as far as I can tell, not a lot of new ideas being put forth by anyone
in accounting nowadays (with the possible exception of John Dickhaut's
neuro stuff). In most fields, the youngsters are supposed to come up
with the new problems, techniques, etc., but I see a lot more mimicry
than innovation among newly minted phds now.
**********************
End Quote
I might add that John Dickhaut is nowhere close to being a newly-minted
doctoral student. He's an old guy who got his PhD at Ohio State in 1970
before Ohio State transitioned into its present highly mathematical
accounting doctoral program. This illustrates how innovative research can
come from graduates of accounting doctoral programs that do not (at least
way back then) require advanced mathematics.
I suggested that Ron Dye's route to becoming an accounting academic was
more efficient in the sense of taking less time (three years in an
economics doctoral program at Carnegie built upon his mathematics
undergraduate degree) rather than the route of entering an accounting
doctoral program where it now takes 4-5 years built upon a mathematics
undergraduate degree or 6-7 years built upon a typical accounting
undergraduate degree if the student has to take the two years of preparatory
mathematics required by many of our top accounting doctoral programs.
In terms of accountics, I think our econometrics-based accounting
doctoral programs are probably better for us than doctoral programs in the
economics departments because accounting doctoral students are more likely
to conduct research on archival databases that are more of interest in
accounting than are the databases of interest to economics departments. The
downside is that the econometrics studies published in leading accounting
research journals by graduates of accounting doctoral programs have probably
reflected mostly "mimicry" lamented by Professor Dye.
In his message Professor Dye does not recommend that his streamlined
route to becoming an accounting professor (without an accounting education
background) serve as a role model. I tend to agree, although I now have
newer doubts. I'm currently evaluating publications submitted for the 2007
AICPA/AAA Notable Contributions to Literature Award. The Award's Screening
Committee filtered out all submissions that were not accountics papers.
Among those accountics papers submitted to our Selection Committee by the
Screening Committee, many of the authors do not have accounting backgrounds
and some of the submissions are from such journals as Management Science
and the Journal of Financial Economics. My recommendation for the
award will actually be a finance professor's paper that made it through the
Screening Committee. Sadly we have to go to finance and management science
graduates to find our most notable contributions to accounting literature.
This is
consistent with Ron's claim that among graduates of accounting doctoral
programs "I see a lot more mimicry than innovation among newly minted phds
now." Even some of our so-called Seminal Contributions to Accounting
Research Award-winning studies mimicked a lot from prior research of
economics and finance professors
Thanks to Ron Dye's reply, I'm even more concerned about our doctoral
programs in accounting and our leading academic accounting journals ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
Thanks for the favor Richard!
Bob Jensen
May 3, 2007 reply from J. S. Gangolly
[gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
1.
Students consider many factors before deciding to enter an accounting PhD
program, some of them random and/or serendipitous (as in my case; my
would-be advisor in Operations Research passed away within four months of my
stay in the program). But we need to ask why there are no takers inspite of
the astronomical salaries we offer, while outstanding candidates are begging
to be admitted into Phd programs in disciplines where tenure-track positions
are almost non-existent, or where a doctoral degree is only ticket to years
of serfdom as Postdocs.
The simple answer is that our field, AS WE PORTRAY
IT, is just not exciting to a young inquiring mind. In accounting there is
no Fermat's last theorem to be proved (as in mathematics), nor Hilbert's
entscheidungsproblem to be solved (as in Computing), nor the mind-body
problem (as in philosophy), nor new chemicals to be synthesised (chemistry),
grammar of lost languages to be discovered (anthropology), genes to be
targeted (medicine)....
A long time ago, Yuji Ijiri tried to convince us
that there were fundamental problems in accounting that are equally
challenging. How many of us even remember them today, or even have heard of
them?
Most of us have sought to use statistics the same
way a drunk uses a lamp post -- more for support than for illumination
(apologies to Mark Twain).
I personally think that often, these days, people
get into a PhD for a wrong reason, and some times live to regret it.
We accounting academics, especially in the
so-called research universities, are living a lie, thanks to AACSB. We
portray ourselves as scholars and yet rarely interact with the scholarly
community on our campuses. We claim to be academics in a professional
discipline and yet hardly interact with the profession in a meaningful way.
Aren't we like race horses with blinders on and no jockies?
2.
The shortage of PhD students in non-financial areas is also rigged. We make
it clear to the students which side of the toast is buttered. We dump on
journals in accounting other than those in the financial area which publish
the so-called "mainstream" (I prefer the term stale) research. Then we make
life difficult at tenure time for those who have not toed the party line. We
tolerate third rate pedagogy as long as it releases time for prima donnas to
indulge in stale irrelevant research. Then we squabble over what is "real"
research, and why what every one else is doing is not that. Is this a recipe
for recruiting young inquiring minds into our discipline?
I left the corporate world in the early seventies
because I was fascinated with the problems I had to deal with there (mostly
in operations) and the promise that Operations Research offered. Today,
however, As someone at the front end of the baby boom generation, I
sometimes wonder if, were I shopping today for a PhD program, I would leave
the corporate world if my success depended on toeing the party line.
Jagdish
May 13, 2007 reply from Roger Debreceny
[Roger@DEBRECENY.COM]
Just a plug for the Shidler PhD program. Given the
strategic direction of the Shidler College in international management, our
PhD program is somewhat different than the usual program. The program is in
International Management, with specializations in accounting, marketing, MIS
and so on. Details at
http://shidler.hawaii.edu/Programs/Graduate/PhDinInternationalManagement/PhDOverview/tabid/382/Default.aspx
. We're always looking for high quality candidates,
Roger Debreceny
Shidler College Distinguished Professor of Accounting
School of Accountancy
Shidler College of Business
University of Hawai`i at Mānoa
2404 Maile Way, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA
roger@debreceny.com
rogersd@hawaii.edu
Office: +1 808 956 8545 Cell: +1 808 393 1352
www.debreceny.com
May 13, 2007 reply from Dan Stone, Univ. of Kentucky
[dstone@UKY.EDU]
Please add the Univ. of Kentucky to the list of
doctoral programs that seek students interested in, and support, a variety
of research methods and topics. For example, among the 12 doctoral students
in residence currently, we have students pursuing research related to:
1. XBRL
2. Accounting issues related to environmental
sustainability 3. Knowledge management in professional service firms 4.
Applications of self-determination theory to motivating accounting
professionals 5. Accounting methods to aid economic development in emerging
economies 6. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting
Information about the Univ. of Kentucky doctoral
program is available at:
http://gatton.uky.edu/Programs/ACC/DoctoralDegreeInformation.html
We typically admit 2-3 students per year to the
program.
Happy Mother's Day!
Dan Stone (dstone@uky.edu)
Director of Graduate Studies
University of Kentucky
June 12, 2007 reply from doctoral student Randy Kuhn
[jkuhn@BUS.UCF.EDU]
Later this week, I will be attending the AAA
doctoral consortium held in Tahoe each year as a representative of the
University of Central.
Later this week, I will be attending the AAA
doctoral consortium held in Tahoe each year as a representative of the
University of Central Florida. A few minutes ago I received the message
below from one of the professors who will be presenting to the doctoral
candidates. Apparently, some of the students attending do not feel his
non-archival style of research is worth discussing at the consortium and
complained to one of the organizers prompting a well-established professor
from an elite private institution to essentially justify his place on the
agenda BEFORE we even arrive. I find this behavior not only completely rude
and disrespectful but just plain anti-academic from many angles. These folks
are complaining about one article out of 21. Should I email the organizer
complaining that two-thirds of the material on the agenda is from a
neo-classical, efficient markets slant in which I have no interest? My head
was spinning in circles for hours trying to grapple with the analytical
models that ultimately told me what I already intuitively knew. I’m game for
new experiences and will embrace the opportunity to learn about others’
research. Isn’t that what academia is supposed to be about? In the back of
my mind I kind of hope one of the complainers is my roommate so I can bore
him to tears each night discussing how accounting choices exist, are made by
people, are quite often not rational, and have mega impacts to society. Ok
enough of my diatribe, see the lengthy note to the consortium participants
below.
-Randy
June 12, 2007 reply from doctoral student Randy Kuhn
[jkuhn@BUS.UCF.EDU]
Boy, did I misconstrue the original email from the
professor. I emailed the professor to express my interest in his subject
matter and he responded by stating that he did not mean to imply students
had complained negatively about his articles. Rather, several students
complained about the overwhelming econometrics-based research on the agenda
and lack of diversity in the consortium curriculum. Big oopsy on my part!
That is a much brighter situation!
June 12, 2007 reply from Sue P. Ravenscroft
[sueraven@IASTATE.EDU]
Randy,
Thanks for the update....I am delighted to hear
that doctoral students are finally expressing some dissatisfaction at the
constrained nature of what is considered "good" research! As we attempt to
replace the retiring professoriate, we need to attract more people, which
should mean that we become more catholic in our research approaches, rather
than more restrictive.
Sue Ravenscroft
June 12, 2007 reply from Paul Williams
[Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]
Randy, et al.,
This is encouraging. When I attended the doctoral
consortium the only thing that was on the agenda was EMH. The consortium has
historically been an avenue for the ideologues (just check out who the
faculty at that thing have been over the years). At the one I attended,
Sandy Burton was invited for what appeared to be the sole purpose of
humiliating him because of his "naïve" beliefs about accounting and security
markets (he was invited to be the "normative" that the "positives" aimed to
purge from the academy).
The tide may be turning. Given your interests,
there are some recent books you might find useful.
Bent Flyvbjerg, "Making Social Science Matter,"
Cambridge University Press, 2001. Relying on research mainly from cognitive
psych and sociology he makes the case that, "Predictive theories and
universals cannot be found in the study of human affairs. Concrete,
context-dependent knowledge is therefore more valuable than the vain search
for predictive theories and universals (p. 73)."
A much better book than The Black Swan is David
Orrell's (Oxford U. PhD in mathematics), "The Future of Everything: The
Science of Prediction," Thunder's Mouth Press, 2007. Using the phenomena of
weather, securities markets, and genetic variablility as examples he argues
that complexity makes such phenomena "uncomputable," thus predicting them
with mathematical precision is impossible. Those wanting to understand Bob's
animus to "accountics" might find this a useful read.
Related, but specific to environmental science is
Orrin H. Pilkey and Linda Pilkey-Jarvis, "useless arithmetic: Why
Environmental Scientists Can't Predict the Future," Columbia University
Press, 2007.
Paul
June 13, 2007 reply from Mac Wright
[mac.wright@VU.EDU.AU]
Dear Randy, et al.,
Another book which might lend an interesting
direction to a discourse on the SEC is Clarke, F., Dean, G., Oliver, K.
Corporate Collapse – Accounting, regulatory and ethical failure, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2003.
While directed at the Australian regulatory
framework, the argument could be applied with equal validity to the SEC.
Kind regards,
Mac Wright
Co-Ordinator Aviation Program
Victoria University
Melbourne Australia
Fabio's Grad School Rulez (not humor) ---
http://orgtheory.wordpress.com/grad-skool-rulz/
"Blog Comments and Peer Review Go Head to Head to See Which
Makes a Book Better," by Jeffrey Young, Chronicle of Higher Education,
January 22, 2008 ---
http://chronicle.com/free/2008/01/1322n.htm?utm_source=at&utm_medium=en
What if scholarly books were peer
reviewed by anonymous blog comments rather than by traditional, selected
peer reviewers?
That's the question being posed by an unusual
experiment that begins today. It involves a scholar studying video games, a
popular academic blog with the playful name Grand Text Auto, a nonprofit
group designing blog tools for scholars, and MIT Press.
The idea took shape when Noah Wardrip-Fruin, an
assistant professor of communication at the University of California at San
Diego, was talking with his editor at the press about peer reviewers for the
book he was finishing, The book, with the not-so-playful title Expressive
Processing: Digital Fictions, Computer Games, and Software Studies,
examines the importance of using both software design and traditional
media-studies methods in the study of video games.
One group of reviewers jumped to his mind: "I
immediately thought, you know it's the people on Grand Text Auto."
The blog, which takes
its moniker from the controversial video game Grand Theft Auto, is run by
Mr. Wardrip-Fruin and five colleagues. It offers an academic take on
interactive fiction and video games.
Inviting More Critics
The blog is read by many of the same
scholars he sees at academic conferences, and also attracts readers from the
video-game industry and teenagers who are hard-core video-game players. At
its peak, the blog has had more than 200,000 visitors per month, he says.
"This is the community whose response I want, not
just the small circle of academics," Mr. Wardrip-Fruin says.
So he called up the folks at the Institute for the
Future of the Book, who developed CommentPress, a tool for adding digital
margin notes to blogs (The
Chronicle, September 28, 2007). Would they
help out? He wondered if he could post sections of his book on Grand Text
Auto and allow readers, using CommentPress, to add critiques right in the
margins.
The idea was to tap the wisdom of his crowd.
Visitors to the blog might not read the whole manuscript, as traditional
reviewers do, but they might weigh in on a section in which they have some
expertise.
The institute, an unusual academic center run by
the University of Southern California but based in Brooklyn, N.Y., was game.
So was Mr. Wardrip-Fruin's editor at MIT Press, Doug Sery, but with one
important caveat. He insisted on running the manuscript through the
traditional peer-review process as well. "We are a peer-review press—we're
always going to want to have an honest peer review," says Mr. Sery, senior
editor for new media and game studies. "The reputation of MIT Press, or any
good academic press, is based on a peer-review model."
So the experiment will provide a side-by-side
comparison of reviewing—old school versus new blog. Mr. Wardrip-Fruin calls
the new method "blog-based peer review."
Each day he will post a new chunk of his draft to
the blog, and readers will be invited to comment. That should open the
floodgates of input, possibly generating thousands of responses by the time
all 300-plus pages of the book are posted. "My plan is to respond to
everything that seems substantial," says the author.
The institute is modifying its CommentPress
software for the project, with the help of a $10,000 grant from San Diego's
Academic Senate, to create a version that bloggers can more easily add to
their existing academic blogs.
A Cautious Look Forward
Mr. Wardrip-Fruin's friends have
warned him that sorting through all those comments will take over his life,
or at least take far more time than he expects. "It's been said to me enough
times by people who are not just naysayers that it is in the back of my
mind," he acknowledges. Still, the book's review process "will pale in
comparison to the work of writing it."
He expects the blog-based review to be more helpful
than the traditional peer review because of the variety of voices
contributing. "I am dead certain it will make the book better," he says.
Mr. Sery isn't so sure. "I don't know how this
general peer review is going to help," the editor says, except maybe to
catch small errors that have slipped through the cracks. Traditional peer
review involves carefully chosen experts in the same subject area, who can
point to big-picture issues as well as nitpick details. He bets that the
blog reviews might merely spark flame wars or other unhelpful arguments
about minor points. "I'm curious to see what kind of comments we get back,"
he says.
That probably "depends on what you're writing
about," says Clifford A. Lynch, executive director of the Coalition for
Networked Information, a group that supports the use of technology in
scholarly communication. "If, God help you, you're writing about current
religious or political issues, you're going to get a lot of people with
agendas who aren't interested in having a rational discussion. Some of them
are just psychos."
Even without flame wars, Mr. Sery equates the blog
review with the kind of informal sharing of drafts that many academics do
with close friends. It's useful, but it's still not formal peer review, he
argues. Carefully choosing reviewers "really allows for the expression of
their ideas on the book," he says. Scholars can say with authority, for
instance, that a book just isn't worth publishing.
Ben Vershbow, editorial director at the Institute
for the Future of the Book, concedes that comments on blogs are unlikely to
fully replace peer review. But he says academic blogging can play a role in
the publishing process.
Continued in article
Jensen Comment
This is one of those experiments that is impossible to extrapolate. Blog
comments are totally voluntary and impulsive such that blog comments are going
to be highly variable with respect to topics, errors in the original document,
and extent of the readership in the blog. Few blog activists are going to give
time and attention to reviews that are not going to be widely read.
Peer reviews are likely to be less impulsive since the
reviewer generally agrees ahead of time to conduct a review. But they are more
variable than blog comments. The reason is that peer reviewers spend less time
reviewing manuscripts that are outliers (i.e., those that are so good that there
are few recommendations for change or those that are so bad that there's little
hope for a future positive recommendation to publish). More time may be spend on
manuscripts that need a lot of repair but have high hopes.
The main problem with peer reviews is that there are so few
reviewers. Much depends upon which two or three reviewers are assigned to review
the manuscript. Three reviewers' garbage may be another three reviewers'
treasure. Another problem is that peer reviews are seldom published in the name
of the anonymous reviewers. Blog commentators generally do so in their own names
and get some reputation enhancement among their blog peers, especially if their
are praiseworthy replies on the blog to the blog review. Anonymous reviewers get
little incremental reputation enhancement for their unpublished reviews.
Still another problem with peer reviews is that editors and
their hand picked reviewers may be a biased subset of a scholarly community.
Others in the community may be shut out, which is now a raging problem in
academic accountancy ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
Bob Jensen's threads on open sharing are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/000aaa/updateee.htm#OKI
Bob Jensen's threads on oligopoly abuse of
scholarly publishing are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm#ScholarlyJournals
Potential Roles of ListServs and Blogs
Getting More Than We Give ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ListServRoles.htm
GMAT: Paying for Points
Test-prep services can be a big help as applicants
prepare for the B-school admissions exam. Here, a rundown of some well-known
players
by Francesca Di Meglio
Business Week, May 22, 2007
http://www.businessweek.com/bschools/content/may2007/bs20070522_855049.htm
If you're
thinking of applying to B-school, then you're likely also
wondering how to conquer the Graduate Management Admission
Test (GMAT)—and whether a commercial test-preparation
service, which can cost upwards of $1,000, is right for you.
Although admissions committees, even at the best-ranked
B-schools, will tell you that your GMAT score is only one of
many criteria for getting accepted, you still should plan on
earning between 600 and a perfect 800, especially if you're
gunning for the A-list. (To find the average and median GMAT
scores of accepted students in individual programs, scan the
BusinessWeek.com B-school profiles.)
. . .
One
popular option is consulting a test-prep company that
provides everything from group instruction to online
courses. Here's an overview of the most popular GMAT
test-preparation services in alphabetical order. For more
opinions on the various test-prep services from test takers
themselves, visit the
BusinessWeek.com B-School forums,
where this subject comes up a lot. And you can also check
out BusinessWeek.com's newly updated
GMAT Prep page ---
http://www.businessweek.com/bschools/gmat/
Continued in article
Jensen Comment
The above article then goes on to identify the main commercial players in GMAT
coaching for a fee, including those with coaching books, coaching CDs, coaching
Websites, coaching courses, and one-on-one coaching tutorials with a supposed
expert near where you live. The Business Week capsule summaries are
rather nice summaries about options, costs, pros and cons of each coaching
option.
Kaplan ---
http://www.kaptest.com/
Manhattan GMAT ---
http://www.manhattangmat.com/gmat-prep-global-home.cfm
Princeton Review ---
http://www.princetonreview.com/mba/default.asp
Veritas ---
http://www.veritasprep.com/
Business Week fails to mention one of the better sites
(Test Magic) , in my viewpoint, for GMAT, SAT, GRE, and other test coaching:
Advice to students planning to take standardized tests such as the SAT, GRE,
GMAT, LSAT, TOEFL, etc.
See Test Magic at
http://www.testmagic.com/
There is a forum here where students
interested in doctoral programs in business (e.g., accounting and finance) and
economics discuss the ins and outs of doctoral programs.
Bob Jensen's threads about higher education
controversies are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm
Lack of Replication in Academic Accounting Research
A scientist in any serious scientific discipline, such
as genetics, would be in serious trouble if his fellow scientists were unable to
confirm or replicate his claim to have found the gene for fatness. He would gain
a reputation as being 'unreliable' and universities would be reluctant to employ
him. This self-imposed insistence on rigorous methodology is however missing
from contemporary epidemiology; indeed the most striking feature is the
insouciance with which epidemiologists announce their findings, as if they do
not expect anybody to take them seriously. It would, after all, be a very
serious matter if drinking alcohol really did cause breast cancer.
James Le Fanu ---
http://www.open2.net/truthwillout/human_genome/article/genome_fanu.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on replication are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Replication
If you're going to attack empirical accounting research, hit it where it
has no defenses!
- One type of accounting research is "Spade Research" and our leading
Sam Spade in recent decades was Abe Briloff when he was at Baruch College in
NYC. Abe and his students diligently poured over accounting reports and
dug up where companies and/or their auditors violated accounting standards,
rules, and professional ethics. He was not at all popular in the accounting
profession because he was so good at his work. Zeff and Granof wrote as
follows:
Floyd Norris, the chief financial
correspondent of The New York Times, titled a 2006 speech to the
American Accounting Association "Where Is the Next Abe Briloff?" Abe
Briloff is a rare academic accountant. He has devoted his career to
examining the financial statements of publicly traded companies and
censuring firms that he believes have engaged in abusive accounting
practices. Most of his work has been published in Barron's and in
several books — almost none in academic journals. An accounting gadfly
in the mold of Ralph Nader, he has criticized existing accounting
practices in a way that has not only embarrassed the miscreants but has
caused the rule-making authorities to issue new and more-rigorous
standards. As Norris correctly suggested in his talk, if the academic
community had produced more Abe Briloffs, there would have been fewer
corporate accounting meltdowns.
"Research on Accounting Should Learn From the
Past," by Michael H. Granof and Stephen A. Zeff, Chronicle of Higher
Education, March 21, 2008
- In the 1960s and 1970s leading academic accounting researchers
abandoned "Spade" work and loosely organized what might be termed an
Accounting Center for Disease Control where spading was replaced with mining
of databases using increasingly-sophisticated accountics (mathematical)
models. Leading academic accounting research journals virtually stopped
publishing anything but accountics research ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
- In the past five decades readers of leading academic accounting
research journals had to accept on faith that there were no math errors in
the analysis. The reason is that no empirical accounting research is
ever exactly replicated and verified. In fact the leading academic
accounting research journals adopted policies against publishing
replications or even commentaries. The Accounting Review (TAR) does
technically allow commentaries, but in reality only about one appears each
decade.
- Many of the empirical research studies are rooted in privately
collected databases that are never verified for accuracy and freedom from
bias.
- On occasion empirical studies are partly verified with anecdotal
evidence. For example the excellent empirical study of Eric Lie in
Management Science on backdating of options was partly verified by court
decisions, fines, and prison sentences of some backdating executives.
However, anecdotal evidence has severe limitations since it can be cherry
picked to either validate or repudiate empirical findings at the same time.
See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Options_backdating
- Replication is part and parcel to the scientific method. All
important findings in the natural sciences are replicated our verified by
some rigorous approach that convinces scientists about accuracy and freedom
from bias.
- One of my most popular quotations is that "empirical
accounting farmers are more interested in their tractors than in their
harvests." When papers are presented at meetings most of the
focus is on the horsepower and driving capabilities of the tractors
(mathematical models). If the harvests were of importance to the accounting
profession, the profession would insist on replication and verification. But
the accounting profession mostly shrugs off academic accounting research as
sophisticated efforts to prove the obvious. There are few surprises in
empirical accounting research.
- Another sad part about our leading academic accounting research
journals is that they have such a poor citation record relative to our
academic brethren in finance, marketing, and management. American
Accounting Association President Judy Rayburn made citation outdomes the
centerpiece of her emotional (and failed) attempt to get leading academic
accounting research journals to accept research paradigms other than
accountics paradigms ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR.htm
- But the saddest part of all is that the Accounting Center for Disease
Control literally took over every doctoral program in the United States
(slightly excepting Central Florida University) by requiring that all
accounting doctoral graduates be econometricians or psychometricians. As
a result doctoral programs realistically require five years beyond the
masters degree. Accountants who enter these programs must spend years
learning mathematics, statistics, econometrics, and psychometrics.
Mathematicians who enter these programs must spend years learning
accounting. The bottom line is that practicing accountants who would like to
become accounting professors are turned off by having to study five years of
accountics. Each year the shortage of graduates from accounting doctoral
programs in North America becomes increasingly critical/
The American
Accounting Association (AAA) has a new research report on the future supply
and demand for accounting faculty. There's a whole lot of depressing
colored graphics and white-knuckle handwringing about anticipated shortages
of new doctoral graduates and faculty aging, but there's no solution offered
---
http://aaahq.org/temp/phd/AccountingFacultyUSCollegesUniv.pdf
- Zeff and Granof concluded the following:
Starting in the 1960s, academic research on
accounting became methodologically supercharged — far more quantitative and
analytical than in previous decades. The results, however, have been
paradoxical. The new paradigms have greatly increased our understanding of
how financial information affects the decisions of investors as well as
managers. At the same time, those models have crowded out other forms of
investigation. The result is that professors of accounting have contributed
little to the establishment of new practices and standards, have failed to
perform a needed role as a watchdog of the profession, and have created a
disconnect between their teaching and their research.
. . .
The unintended consequence has been that
interesting and researchable questions in accounting are essentially being
ignored. By confining the major thrust in research to phenomena that can be
mathematically modeled or derived from electronic databases, academic
accountants have failed to advance the profession in ways that are expected
of them and of which they are capable.
Academic research has unquestionably
broadened the views of standards setters as to the role of accounting
information and how it affects the decisions of individual investors as well
as the capital markets. Nevertheless, it has had scant influence on the
standards themselves.
The research is hamstrung by restrictive
and sometimes artificial assumptions. For example, researchers may construct
mathematical models of optimum compensation contracts between an owner and a
manager. But contrary to all that we know about human behavior, the models
typically posit each of the parties to the arrangement as a "rational"
economic being — one devoid of motivations other than to maximize pecuniary
returns.
Moreover, research is limited to the
homogenized content of electronic databases, which tell us, for example, the
prices at which shares were traded but give no insight into the decision
processes of either the buyers or the sellers. The research is thus unable
to capture the essence of the human behavior that is of interest to
accountants and standard setters.
Further, accounting researchers
usually look backward rather than forward. They examine the impact of a
standard only after it has been issued. And once a rule-making authority
issues a standard, that authority seldom modifies it. Accounting is probably
the only profession in which academic journals will publish empirical
studies only if they have statistical validity. Medical journals, for
example, routinely report on promising new procedures that have not yet
withstood rigorous statistical scrutiny.
"Research on Accounting Should Learn From the Past,"
by Michael H. Granof and Stephen A. Zeff, Chronicle of Higher Education,
March 21, 2008
Natural blondes are going extinct. It's a published fact!
Suppose this study had actually been reported a leading accounting research
journal such as The Accounting Review.
Keep in mind that leading accounting research journals do not publish
replication studies.
As a result few accounting researchers conduct replication studies since they
cannot be published.
The logical deduction becomes that accountants would forever think that natural
blondes are going extinct.
From the WSJ Opinion Journal on March 6,
2006
"Media outlets around the world, from CBS, ABC and CNN to the British
tabloids" all fell for a hoax--a fake study from the World Health
Organization claiming blondes are going extinct.
The Washington Post reported
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30318-2002Oct1.html
(Actually I think the story was removed with some very red faces)
"The decline and fall of the blonde is most
likely being caused by bottle blondes, who researchers believe are more
attractive to men than true blondes," said CBS "Early Show" co-host
Gretchen Carlson.
"There's a study from the World Health
Organization--this is for real--that says that blondes are an endangered
species," Charlie Gibson said on "Good Morning America," prompting Diane
Sawyer to say she's "going the way of the snail darter." . . .
"We've certainly never conducted any research
into the subject," WHO spokeswoman Rebecca Harding said yesterday from
Geneva. "It's been impossible to find out where it came from. It just
seems like it was a hoax."
The health group traced the story to an account
Thursday on a German wire service, which in turn was based on a
two-year-old article in the German women's magazine Allegra, which cited
a WHO anthropologist. Harding could find no record of such a man working
for the WHO.
Hey, if you're a journalist, we've got a great human-interest story for
you: Did you hear about the blonde who invented the solar flashlight? ---
http://www.zelo.com/blonde/no_brains.asp
Now you see how ridiculous the accounting journal
policy of not publishing replications becomes. Hopefully this published story in
a leading U.S. newspaper (I mean The Washington Post that broke the
Watergate scandal) the next time you read the findings in a leading accounting
research journal.
Question
What research methodology flaws are shared by studies in political science and
accounting science?
"Methodological Confusion: How indictments of
The Israel Lobby (by John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen M. Walt, ISBN-13:
9780374177720) expose political science's flaws" by Daniel W. Drezner, Chronicle
of Higher Education's Chronicle Review, February 22, 2008, Page B5 ---
http://chronicle.com/weekly/v54/i24/24b00501.htm
Does the public understand how political science
works? Or are political scientists the ones who need re-educating? Those
questions have been running through my mind in light of the drubbing that
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt received in the American news media
for their 2007 book, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy
(Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007). Pick your periodical — The Economist,
Foreign Affairs, The Nation, National Review, The New Republic, The New York
Times Book Review, The Washington Post Book World — and you'll find a
reviewer trashing the book.
From a political-science perspective, what's
interesting about those reviews is that they are largely grounded in
methodological critiques — which rarely break into the public sphere.
What's disturbing is that the methodologies used in The Israel Lobby and
U.S. Foreign Policy are hardly unique to Mearsheimer and Walt. Are the
indictments of their book overblown, or do they expose the methodological
flaws of the discipline in general?
The most persistent public criticism of Mearsheimer
and Walt has been their failure to empirically buttress their argument with
interviews. Writing in the Times Book Review, Leslie H. Gelb,
president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, criticized their
"writing on this sensitive topic without doing extensive interviews with the
lobbyists and the lobbied." David Brooks, a columnist for The New York
Times, recently seconded that notion: "If you try to write about
politics without interviewing policy makers, you'll wind up spewing all
sorts of nonsense."
That kind of critique has a long pedigree. For
decades public officials and commentators have decried the failure of social
scientists to engage more deeply with the objects of their studies.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson once objected to being treated as a
"dependent variable." The New Republic ran a cover story in 1999 with the
subhead, "When Did Political Science Forget About Politics?"
To the general reader, such critiques must sound
damning. International-relations scholars know full well, however, that
innumerable peer-reviewed articles and university-press books utilize the
same kind of empirical sources that appear in The Israel Lobby. Most
case studies in international relations rely on news-conference transcripts,
official documents, newspaper reportage, think-tank analyses, other
scholarly works, etc. It is not that political scientists never interview
policy makers — they do (and Mearsheimer and Walt aver that they have as
well). However, with a few splendid exceptions, interviews are not the bread
and butter of most international-relations scholarship. (This kind of
fieldwork is much more common in comparative politics.)
Indeed, the claim that political scientists can't
write about policy without talking to policy makers borders on the absurd.
The first rule about policy makers is that they always have agendas — even
in interviews with social scientists. That does not mean that those with
power lie. It does mean that they may not be completely candid in outlining
motives and constraints. One would expect that to be particularly true about
such "a sensitive topic."
Further, most empirical work in political science
is concerned with actions, not words. How much aid has the United States
disbursed to Israel? How did members of Congress vote on the issue? Without
talking to members of Congress, thousands of Congressional scholars study
how the legislative branch acts, by analyzing verifiable actions or words —
votes, speeches, committee hearings, and testimony. Statistical approaches
allow political scientists to test hypotheses through regression analysis.
By Brooks's criteria, any political analysis of, say, 19th-century policy
decisions would be pointless, since all the relevant players are dead.
Other methodological critiques are more difficult
to dismiss. Walter Russell Mead's dissection of The Israel Lobby in Foreign
Affairs does not pull any punches. Mead, a senior fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations, wrote that Mearsheimer and Walt "claim the clarity and
authority of rigorous logic, but their methods are loose and rhetorical.
This singularly unhappy marriage — between the pretensions of serious
political analysis and the standards of the casual op-ed — both undercuts
the case they wish to make and gives much of the book a disagreeably
disingenuous tone."
Mead enumerates several methodological sins, in
particular the imprecise manner in which the "Israel Lobby" is defined in
the book. For their part, the book's authors acknowledge that the term is
"somewhat misleading," conceding that "the boundaries of the Israel Lobby
cannot be identified precisely." It is certainly true that many of the
central concepts in international-relations theory — like "power" or
"regime" — have disputed definitions. But most political scientists deal
with nebulous concepts by explicitly offering their own definition to guide
their research. Even if others disagree, at least the definition is
transparent. In The Israel Lobby, however, Mearsheimer and Walt essentially
rely on a Potter Stewart definition of the lobby: They know it when they see
it. That makes it exceedingly difficult for other political scientists to
test or falsify their hypotheses.
Many of the reviews of the book highlight two flaws
that, disturbingly, are more pervasive in academic political science. The
first is the failure to compare the case in question to other cases. For
example, Mearsheimer and Walt go to great lengths to outline the
"extraordinary material aid and diplomatic support" the United States
provides to Israel. What they do not do, however, is systematically compare
Israel to similarly situated countries to determine if the U.S.-Israeli
relationship really is unique. An alternative, strategic explanation would
posit that Israel falls into a small set of countries: longstanding allies
bordering one or multiple enduring rivals. The category of states that meet
that criteria throughout the time period analyzed by Mearsheimer and Walt is
relatively small: Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey. Compared to
that smaller set of countries, the U.S. relationship with Israel does not
look anomalous. The United States has demonstrated a willingness to expend
blood, treasure, or diplomatic capital to ensure the security of all of
those countries — despite the wide variance in the strength of each's
"lobby."
Continued in article
Daniel W. Drezner is an associate professor of international politics
at the Fletcher School at Tufts University.
Jensen Comment
When I read the above review entitled "Metholological Confusiion" I kept
thinking of the thousands of empirical and analytical studies by accounting
faculty and students that have similar methodology confusions. How many
mathematical/empirical database studies relating accounting events (e.g., a new
standard) with capital market behavior also conduct formal interviews with
investors, analysts, fund managers, etc. Do analytical researchers conduct
formal interviews with real-world decision makers before building their
mathematical models? The majority of behavioral accounting studies conducted by
professors use students as surrogates for real-world decision makers. This
methodology is notoriously flawed and could be helped if the researchers had
also interviewed real-world players.
And Drezner overlooked another common flaw shared by both political science
and
accountics research. If the findings are as important as claimed by
authors, why aren't other researchers frantically trying to replicate the
results? The lack
of replication in accounting science (accountics research) is scandalous
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#Replication
Formal and well-crafted interviews with important players (investors, standard
setters, CEOs, etc.) constitute possible ways of replicating empirical and
analytical findings.
The closest things we have to in-depth contact with real world players in
accounting research is research conducted by the standard setters themselves
such as the FASB, the IASB, the GASB, etc. Sometimes these are interviews,
although more often then not they are comment letters. But accountics
researchers wave off such research as anecdotal and seldom even quote the public
archives of such interviews and comments. Surveys are frequently published but
these tend to be relegated to less prestigious academic research journals and
practitioner journals.
Most importantly of all in accountics is that the leading accounting research
journals for tenure, promotion, and performance evaluation in academe are
devoted to accountics paper. Normative methods, case studies, and interviews are
rarely used in studies published in such journals. The following is a quotation
from “An Analysis of the Evolution of Research Contributions by The Accounting
Review (TAR): 1926-2005,” by Jean L. Heck and Robert E. Jensen, Accounting
Historians Journal, Volume 34, No. 2, December 2007, Page 121.
Leading accounting
professors lamented TAR’s preference for rigor over relevancy [Zeff,
1978; Lee, 1997; and Williams, 1985 and 2003]. Sundem [1987] provides
revealing information about the changed perceptions of authors, almost
entirely from academe, who submitted manuscripts for review between June
1982 and May 1986. Among the 1,148 submissions,
only 39 used archival
(history) methods; 34 of those submissions were rejected.
Another 34
submissions used survey methods; 33 of those were rejected.
And 100 submissions
used traditional normative (deductive) methods with 85 of those being
rejected. Except for
a small set of 28 manuscripts classified as using “other” methods
(mainly descriptive empirical according to Sundem), the remaining larger
subset of submitted manuscripts used methods that Sundem [1987, p. 199]
classified these as follows:
292 General Empirical
172 Behavioral
135 Analytical modeling
119 Capital Market
97 Economic modeling
40 Statistical modeling
29 Simulation
It is clear that by
1982, accounting researchers realized that having mathematical or
statistical analysis in TAR submissions made accountics virtually a
necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition for acceptance for
publication. It became increasingly difficult for a single editor to
have expertise in all of the above methods. In the late 1960s, editorial
decisions on publication shifted from the TAR editor alone to the TAR
editor in conjunction with specialized referees and eventually associate
editors [Flesher, 1991, p. 167]. Fleming et al. [2000, p. 45] wrote the
following:
The big change was in
research methods. Modeling and empirical methods became prominent during
1966-1985, with analytical modeling and general empirical methods
leading the way. Although used to a surprising extent, deductive-type
methods declined in popularity, especially in the second half of the
1966-1985 period.
I think the emphasis highlighted in red above demonstrates
that "Methodological Confusion" reigns supreme in accounting science as well as
political science.
February 22, 2008 reply from James M. Peters
[jpeters@NMHU.EDU]
A couple of years ago, P. Kothari, one of the
Editors of JAE and a full professor at MIT, visited the U. of Maryland to
present a paper. In my private discussion with him, I asked him to identify
what he considered to the the settled findings associated with the last 30
years of capital markets research in accounting. I pointed out that
somewhere over half of all accounting research since Ball and Brown fit into
this category and I was curious as to what the effort had added to Ball and
Brown. That is, what conclusions have been drawn that could be considered
settled ground so that researchers could move on to other topics. His
response, and I quote, was "I understand your point, Jim." He could not
identify one issue that researchers had been able to "put to bed" after all
that effort.
Jim Peters
New Mexico Highlands University
February 22, 2008 reply from J. S. Gangolly
[gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
Jim,
P. Kothari's response is to be expected. I have had
similar responses from at least two ex-editors of TAR; how appropriate a TLA!
But who wants to bell the cats (or call off the naked emperors' bluff)?
Accounting academia knows which side of the bread is buttered.
That you needed to flaunt Kothari's resume to
legitimise his vacuous response shows the pathetic state of accounting
academia.
If accounting academia is not to be reduced to the
laughing stock of accounting practice, we better start listening to the
problems that practice faces. How else can we understand what we profess to
"research"? We accounting academics have been circling our wagons too long
as a ploy to keep our wages arbitrarily high.
In as much as we are a profession, any academic on
such a committee reduces the whole exercise to a farce.
Jagdish
Bob Jensen's threads on research methods in accounting can be found at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm
As David Bartholomae observes, “We make a huge
mistake if we don’t try to articulate more publicly what it is we value in
intellectual work. We do this routinely for our students — so it should not be
difficult to find the language we need to speak to parents and legislators.” If
we do not try to find that public language but argue instead that we are not
accountable to those parents and legislators, we will only confirm what our
cynical detractors say about us, that our real aim is to keep the secrets of our
intellectual club to ourselves. By asking us to spell out those secrets and
measuring our success in opening them to all, outcomes assessment helps make
democratic education a reality.
Gerald Graff, "Assessment Changes
Everything," Inside Higher Ed, February 21, 2008 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2008/02/21/graff
Gerald Graff is professor of English at the University of Illinois at Chicago
and president of the Modern Language Association. This essay is adapted from a
paper he delivered in December at the MLA annual meeting, a version of which
appears on the MLA’s Web site and is reproduced here with the association’s
permission. Among Graff’s books are Professing Literature, Beyond the
Culture Wars and Clueless in Academe: How School Obscures the Life of the Mind.
The consensus report, which was approved by the
group’s international board of directors, asserts that it is vital when
accrediting institutions to assess the “impact” of faculty members’ research on
actual practices in the business world.
"Measuring ‘Impact’ of B-School Research," by Andy Guess, Inside
Higher Ed, February 21, 2008 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/02/22/impact
Ask anyone with an M.B.A.: Business school provides
an ideal environment to network, learn management principles and gain access
to jobs. Professors there use a mix of scholarly expertise and business
experience to teach theory and practice, while students prepare for the life
of industry: A simple formula that serves the school, the students and the
corporations that recruit them.
Yet like
any other academic enterprise, business schools expect their
faculty to produce peer-reviewed research. The relevance,
purpose and merit of that research has been debated almost
since the institutions started appearing, and now a new
report promises to add to the discussion — and possibly stir
more debate. The Association to Advance Collegiate Schools
of Business on Thursday released the final report of its
Impact of Research Task Force, the
result of feedback from almost 1,000 deans, directors and
professors to a preliminary draft circulated in August.
The consensus
report, which was approved by the group’s international
board of directors, asserts that it is vital when
accrediting institutions to assess the “impact” of faculty
members’ research on actual practices in the business world.
But it does not settle on concrete metrics for impact,
leaving that discussion to a future implementation task
force, and emphasizes that a “one size fits all” approach
will not work in measuring the value of scholars’ work.
The report
does offer suggestions for potential measures of impact. For
a researcher studying how to improve manufacturing
practices, impact could be measured by counting the number
of firms adopting the new approach. For a professor who
writes a book about finance for a popular audience, one
measure could be the number of copies sold or the quality of
reviews in newspapers and magazines.
“In the
past, there was a tendency I think to look at the
[traditional academic] model as kind of the desired
situation for all business schools, and what we’re saying
here in this report is that there is not a one-size-fits-all
model in this business; you should have impact and
expectations dependent on the mission of the business school
and the university,” said Richard Cosier, the dean of the
Krannert School of Management at Purdue University and vice
chair and chair-elect of AACSB’s board. “It’s a pretty
radical position, if you know this business we’re in.”
That
position worried some respondents to the initial draft, who
feared an undue emphasis on immediate, visible impact of
research on business practices — essentially, clear
utilitarian value — over basic research. The final report
takes pains to alleviate those concerns, reassuring deans
and scholars that it wasn’t minimizing the contributions of
theoretical work or requiring that all professors at a
particular school demonstrate “impact” for the institution
to be accredited.
“Many
readers, for instance, inferred that the Task Force believes
that ALL intellectual contributions must be relevant to and
impact practice to be valued. The position of the Task Force
is that intellectual contributions in the form of basic
theoretical research can and have been extremely valuable
even if not intended to directly impact practice,” the
report states.
“It also is
important to clarify that the recommendations would not
require every faculty member to demonstrate impact from
research in order to be academically qualified for AACSB
accreditation review. While Recommendation #1 suggests that
AACSB examine a school’s portfolio of intellectual
contributions based on impact measures, it does not specify
minimum requirements for the maintenance of individual
academic qualification. In fact, the Task Force reminds us
that to demonstrate faculty currency, the current standards
allow for a breadth of other scholarly activities, many of
which may not result in intellectual contributions.”
Cosier, who
was on the task force that produced the report, noted that
business schools with different missions might require
differing definitions of impact. For example, a traditional
Ph.D.-granting institution would focus on peer-reviewed
research in academic journals that explores theoretical
questions and management concepts. An undergraduate
institution more geared toward classroom teaching, on the
other hand, might be better served by a definition of impact
that evaluated research on pedagogical concerns and learning
methods, he suggested.
A further
concern, he added, is that there simply aren’t enough
Ph.D.-trained junior faculty coming down the pipeline, let
alone resources to support them, to justify a single
research-oriented model across the board. “Theoretically,
I’d say there’s probably not a limit” to the amount of
academic business research that could be produced, “but
practically there is a limit,” Cosier said.
But
some critics have worried that the
report could encourage a focus on the immediate impact of
research at the expense of theoretical work that could
potentially have an unexpected payoff in the future.
Historically, as the report notes, business scholarship was
viewed as inferior to that in other fields, but it has
gained esteem among colleagues over the past 50 or so years.
In that context, the AACSB has pursued a concerted effort to
define and promote the role of research in business schools.
The report’s concrete recommendations also include an awards
program for “high-impact” research and the promotion of
links between faculty members and managers who put some of
their research to use in practice.
The
recommendations still have a ways to go before they become
policy, however. An implementation task force is planned to
look at how to turn the report into a set of workable
policies, with some especially worried about how the
“impact” measures would be codified. The idea, Cosier said,
was to pilot some of the ideas in limited contexts before
rolling them out on a wider basis.
Jensen Comment
It will almost be a joke to watch leading accountics researchers trying of show
how their esoteric findings have impacted the practice world when the professors
themselves cannot to point to any independent replications of their own work ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#Replication
Is the practice world so naive as to rely upon findings of scientific research
that has not been replicated?
Bob Jensen's threads on assessment are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Assess.htm
February 22, 2008 reply from Ed Scribner
[escribne@NMSU.EDU]
Bob,
I’d surprised to see much reaction from
“accountics” researchers as they are pretty secure, especially since the
report takes pains not to antagonize them. Anyway, in the words of Corporal
Klinger of the 4077th MASH Unit, “It takes a lot of manure to produce one
perfect rose.”
Ed
February 25, 2008 reply from Paul Williams
[Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]
On 24 Feb 2008 at 14:18, David Albrecht
wrote:
>
> I am struck by a
seeming incongruity.
>
> On one hand there is
no respect for accounting research in B-schools. On the other
> hand, publishing
accounting research in peer-reviewed pubs is a requirement for AQ
> status in B-schools.
>
> More and more I am
attracted to Ernest Boyer's description of multiple forms of
> scholarships and
multiple outlets of scholarship.
Re: this conversation.
Ian Shapiro, professor of
Political Science at Yale, has recently published a book "The Flight
from Reality in the Human Sciences" (Princeton U. Press, 2005) that
assures that the problem is not confined to accounting (though it is
more ludicrous a place for a discipline that is actually a practice).
All of the social sciences have succumbed to rational decision theory
and methodological purity to the point that academe now largely deals
with understanding human behavior only within a mathematically tractible
unreality made real in the academy essentially because of its
mathematical tractibility. Jagdish recent post is insightful (and
inciteful to the winners of this game in our academy). The problem the
US academy has defined for itself is not solvable. Optimal information
systems? Information useful for decision making (without any
consideration of the intervening "motives" (potentially infinite in
number) that convert assessments into actions)?
As Bob has so frequently
reminded us replication is the lifeblood of science, yet we never
replicate. But we couldn't replicate if we wanted to because
replication is not the point. Anyone with a passing familiarity with
laboratory sciences knows that a fundamental ethic of those sciences is
the laboratory journal. The purpose of the journal is to provide the
precise recipe of the experiments so that other scientists can
replicate. All research in accounting (that is published in the "top"
journals, at least) is "laboratory research." But do capital market or
principal/agent researchers maintain a log that decribes in minute
detail the innumerable decisions that they made along the way in
assembling and manipulating their data (as chemists and biologists are
bound to do by virtue of the research ethics of their disciplines) ?
No way. From any published article, it is nearly impossible to actually
replicate one of their experiments because the article is never
sufficient documentation. But, of course, that isn't the point.
Producing politically correct academic reputations is what our
enterprise is about. Ideology trumps science every time. We don't want
to know the "truth." Sadly, this suits the profession just fine. (It's
this dream world that permits such nonsensical statements like trading
off relevance for reliability -- how can I know how relevant a datum is
unless I know something about its reliability? Isn't the whole idea of
science to increase the relevance of data by increasing their
reliability?)
Bob Jensen's threads on the sad state of academic accounting research are
at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms
Also see
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
A Fraudulent Paper Published in Nature, a Prestigious Science
Journal
Another Case for Better Replication in Research Reporting
"'Grape harvest dates are poor indicators of summer warmth', as well as about
scientific publication generally," by Douglas J. Keenan, Informath,
November 3, 2006 ---
http://www.informath.org/apprise/a3200.htm
That is, the authors had developed a method that
gave a falsely-high estimate of temperature in 2003 and falsely-low
estimates of temperatures in other very warm years. They then used those
false estimates to proclaim that 2003 was tremendously warmer than other
years.
The above is easy enough to understand. It does not
even require any specialist scientific training. So how could the peer
reviewers of the paper not have seen it? (Peer reviewers are the scientists
who check a paper prior to its publication.) I asked Dr. Chuine what data
was sent to Nature, when the paper was submitted to the journal. Dr. Chuine
replied, “We never sent data to Nature”.
I have since published a short note that details
the above problem (reference below). There are several other problems with
the paper of Chuine et al. as well. I have written a brief survey of those
(for people with an undergraduate-level background in science). As described
in that survey, problems would be obvious to anyone with an appropriate
scientific background, even without the data. In other words, the peer
reviewers could not have had appropriate background.
What is important here is not the truth or falsity
of the assertion of Chuine et al. about Burgundy temperatures. Rather, what
is important is that a paper on what is arguably the world's most important
scientific topic (global warming) was published in the world's most
prestigious scientific journal with essentially no checking of the work
prior to publication.
Moreover—and crucially—this lack of checking is not
the result of some fluke failures in the publication process. Rather, it is
common for researchers to submit papers without supporting data, and it is
frequent that peer reviewers do not have the requisite mathematical or
statistical skills needed to check the work (medical sciences largely
excepted). In other words, the publication of the work of Chuine et al. was
due to systemic problems in the scientific publication process.
The systemic nature of the problems indicates that
there might be many other scientific papers that, like the paper of Chuine
et al., were inappropriately published. Indeed, that is true and I could
list numerous examples. The only thing really unusual about the paper of
Chuine et al. is that the main problem with it is understandable for people
without specialist scientific training. Actually, that is why I decided to
publish about it. In many cases of incorrect research the authors will try
to hide behind an obfuscating smokescreen of complexity and sophistry. That
is not very feasible for Chuine et al. (though the authors did try).
Finally, it is worth noting that Chuine et al. had
the data; so they must have known that their conclusions were unfounded. In
other words, there is prima facie evidence of scientific fraud. What will
happen to the researchers as a result of this? Probably nothing. That is
another systemic problem with the scientific publication process.
This is replication doing its job
Purdue University is investigating “extremely
serious” concerns about the research of Rusi Taleyarkhan, a professor of
nuclear engineering who has published articles saying that he had produced
nuclear fusion in a tabletop experiment,
The New York Times reported. While the research
was published in Science in 2002, the findings have faced increasing
skepticism because other scientists have been unable to replicate them.
Taleyarkhan did not respond to inquiries from The Times about the
investigation.
Inside Higher Ed, March 08, 2006 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/index.php/news/2006/03/08/qt
The
New York Times March 9 report is at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/08/science/08fusion.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
Question
What is an "out of sample" test?
Hint: It's related to the concept of "replication" that almost seems to be
unheard of in academic accounting research?
From Jim Mahar's Blog on June 29, 2006 ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
I am a big fan of so called "out of sample" tests.
When researchers find some anomaly within a data set and then others test
for the presence in the same data set, we really do not learn much if they
find the same thing. But when a new data set is used for the test, we have a
much better understanding of the possible anomaly.
In the current
JFQA
there is just such an article by
Richard Grossman and Stephen Shore. Using a data
set that goes from 1870 to 1913 for British stocks, the authors find no
small firm effect, and only a limited value effect.
In their own words:
"Unlike modern CRSP data, stocks that do not pay
dividends do not outperform stocks that pay small dividends during this
period. But like modern CRSP data, there is a weak relationship between
dividend yield and performance for stocks that pay dividends. In sum,
the size and reversal anomalies present in modern data are not present
in our historical data, while there is some evidence for a value
anomaly."
Which makes me wonder how many other things we think
we "know" we really don't.
The current version of the paper is not listed on SSRN, but a past version
of the paper is available (at least right now)
here.
The evidence
lies in lack of interest in replication
I wrote the following on December 1, 2004 at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
Faculty interest in a
professor’s “academic” research may be greater for a number of reasons.
Academic research fits into a methodology that other professors like to
hear about and critique. Since academic accounting and finance journals
are methodology driven, there is potential benefit from being inspired
to conduct a follow up study using the same or similar methods. In
contrast, practitioners are more apt to look at relevant (big) problems
for which there are no research methods accepted by the top journals.
Accounting
Research Farmers Are More Interested in Their Tractors Than in Their
Harvests
For a long time I’ve argued
that top accounting research journals are just not interested in the
relevance of their findings (except in the areas of tax and AIS). If the
journals were primarily interested in the findings themselves, they
would abandon their policies about not publishing replications of
published research findings. If accounting researchers were more
interested in relevance, they would conduct more replication studies. In
countless instances in our top accounting research journals, the
findings themselves just aren’t interesting enough to replicate. This is
something that I attacked at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/book02q4.htm#Replication
At one point back in the 1980s
there was a chance for accounting programs that were becoming “Schools
of Accountancy” to become more like law schools and to have their elite
professors become more closely aligned with the legal profession. Law
schools and top law journals are less concerned about science than they
are about case methodology driven by the practice of law. But the elite
professors of accounting who already had vested interest in scientific
methodology (e.g., positivism) and analytical modeling beat down case
methodology. I once heard Bob Kaplan say to an audience that no elite
accounting research journal would publish his case research. Science
methodologies work great in the natural sciences. They are problematic
in the psychology and sociology. They are even more problematic in the
professions of accounting, law, journalism/communications, and political
“science.”
We often criticize
practitioners for ignoring academic research Maybe they are just being
smart. I chuckle when I see our heroes in the mathematical theories of
economics and finance winning prizes for knocking down theories that
were granted earlier prizes (including Nobel prices). The Beta model was
the basis for thousands of academic studies, and now the Beta model is a
fallen icon. Fama got prizes for showing that capital markets were
efficient and then more prizes for showing they were not so “efficient.”
In the meantime, investment bankers, stock traders, and mutual funds
were just ripping off investors. For a long time, elite accounting
researchers could find no “empirical evidence” of widespread earnings
management. All they had to do was look up from the computers where
their heads were buried.
Few, if any, of the elite
“academic” researchers were investigating the dire corruption of the
markets themselves that rendered many of the published empirical
findings useless.
Academic researchers worship at
the feet of Penman and do not even recognize the name of Frank Partnoy
or Jim Copeland.
Bob Jensen
Question
In science it is somewhat common for published papers to subsequently be
withdrawn because the outcomes could not be replicated.
In the history of
accounting research has any published paper ever been "withdrawn" or “retracted”
because the results could not be replicated?
"Columbia researcher retracts more studies," The New York
Times via PhysOrg, June 15, 2006 ---
http://www.physorg.com/news69601046.html
A Columbia University researcher has reportedly
retracted four more scientific papers because the findings could not be
replicated.
Chemistry Professor Dalibor Sames earlier this year
retracted two other papers and part of a third published in a scientific
journal, The New York Times reported Thursday. All of the papers involved
carbon-hydrogen bond activation research.
Although Sames is listed as senior author on all of
the papers, one of his former graduate students -- Bengu Sezen -- performed
most of the experiments, the Times said.
Sames said each experiment has been repeated by at
least two independent scientists who have not been able to replicate the
results.
Sezen, a doctoral student in another field at the
University of Heidelberg in Germany, disputed the retractions, questioning
whether other members of Sames's group had tried to exactly repeat her
experiments, the newspaper said.
The retraction of one paper, published in the
journal Organic Letters in 2003, appeared Thursday, while the three others
published in The Journal of the American Chemical Society in 2002 and 2003
are to be formally retracted later this month, the Times said.
Jensen Comment
What's disappointing and inconsistent is that leading universities pushed
accounting research into positivist scientific methods but did not require that
findings be verified by independent replication. In fact leading academic
accounting research journals discourage replication by their absurd policies of
not publishing replications of published research outcomes. They also do not
publish commentaries that challenge underlying assumptions of purely analytical
research. Hence I like to say that academic accounting
researchers became more interested in their tractors than their harvests.
My threads on the dearth of replication/debate and some of the reasons top
accounting research journals will not publish replications and commentaries are
at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Relication
June 17, 2006 reply from Jagdish S. Gangolly
[gangolly@INFOTOC.COM]
Bob,
I have not heard of any one in accounting
retracting his/her work. It does not surprise me because of what I see to be
the philosophical suppositions of most empirical accounting researchers.
In my opinion, most of us in empirical accounting
research are, in many ways, stuck with the philosophical suppositions of
late 19th and early 20th century positivists of the Vienna school, the most
vocal proponent of the ideas whose work I am familiar with is A.J. Ayer. In
his view of the world, a synthetic (that is, not an analytical) sentence
must be verifiABLE to be considered a scientific statement, and is added to
the stock of science when verified.
The physical sciences have passed by this view, and
in fact, in my opinion, regard the latter-day positivist Popperian ideas of
falsificationism to be the ideal. Here, a sentence is scientific if it is
FalsifIABLE. The stock of sentences that are not repeatedly falsified is
science in some sense. Therefore, in most physical sciences, when a
statement is falsified (by not being replicable) is treated as nonsense
rather than science. For example, when the theory about cold fusion in the
Utah experiments met failure in repeated attempts to replicate them, the
theory was treated as nonsensical and not scientific.
The unfortunate thing is that verification (or
falsification) is misinterpreted by most, since I don't think either Ayer or
Popper intended their views to form a theory of meaning.
The above approach has had a whole host of severe
critics. My shortlist would include C.S. Peirce, William James, Quine
(though a verificationist he did not accept logical positivism), Feyerabend,
Davidson, and a bunch of others.
We have twisted the meaning of Popperian as well as
Logical positivist thought to consider "scientific propositions" as those "veriFIED"
or "not falsiFIED". Philosopher of those schools, on the other hand used
veriFIABILITY and falsiFIABILITY as criterion to answer the question whether
a proposition is scientific or not. We mistake an epistemic community for a
theory of meaning. While it might help reaffirm our belief in our epistemic
community to do so, it certainly would not provide our community a resilient
philosophical foundation. It also would make us more of a theological
community.
Regards to all,
Jagdish
My 67th birthday April 30, 2005 commentary on how research in
business schools has run full circle since the 1950s. We've now
completed the circle of virtually no science (long on speculation without rigor)
to virtually all science (strong on rigor with irrelevant findings) to
criticisms that science is not going to solve our problems that are too complex
for rigorous scientific methods.
The U.S. led the way in bringing accounting, finance, and other business
education and research into respectability in separate schools or colleges
the business (so called B-schools) within top universities of the country.
The movement began in the 1960s and followed later in Europe after leading
universities like Harvard, Chicago, Columbia, Chicago, Pennsylvania, UC
Berkeley and Stanford showed how such schools could become important sources
of cash and respectability.
A major catalyst for change was the Ford Foundation that put a large
amount of money into first the study of business schools and second the
funding of doctoral programs and students in business studies. First
came the Ford-Foundation's Gordon and Howell Report (Gordon, R.A., & Howell,
J.E. (1959). Higher education for business. New York: Columbia
University Press) that investigated the state of business higher education
in general. You can read the following at
http://siop.org/tip/backissues/tipoct97/HIGHHO~1.HTM
The Gordon and Howell report, published in
1959, examined the state of business education in the United States.
This influential report recommended that managerial and organizational
issues be studied in business schools using more rigorous scientific
methods. Applied psychologists, well equipped to undertake such an
endeavor, were highly sought after by business schools. Today, new
psychology Ph.D.s continue to land jobs in business schools. However, we
believe that this source of academic employment will be less available
in the future because psychologists in the business schools have become
well established enough to have their own "off-spring," who hold
business Ph.D.s. More business school job ads these days contain the
requirement that applicants possess degrees in business administration.
Prior to 1960, business education either took place in economics
departments of major universities or in business schools that were viewed as
parochial training programs by the more "academic" departments in humanities
and sciences where most professors held doctoral degrees. Business
schools in that era had professors rooted in practice who had no doctoral
degrees and virtually no research skills. As a result some
universities avoided having business schools altogether and others were
ashamed of the ones they had.
The Gordon and Howell Report concluded that doctoral programs were both
insufficient and inadequate for business studies. Inspired by the
Gordon and Howell Report, the Ford Foundation poured millions of dollars
into universities that would upgrade doctoral programs for business studies.
I was one of the beneficiaries of this initiative. Stanford University
obtained a great deal of this Ford Foundation money and used a goodly share
of that money to attract business doctoral students. My relatively
large fellowship to Stanford (which actually turned into a five-year
fellowship for me) afforded me the opportunity to get a PhD in accounting.
The same opportunities were taking place for other business students at
major universities around the country.
Another initiative of the Gordon and Howell Report was that doctoral
studies in business would entail very little study in business.
Instead the focus would be on building research skills. In most
instances, the business doctoral programs generally sent their students to
doctoral studies in other departments in the university. In my own
case, I can only recall having one accounting course at Stanford University.
Instead I was sent to the Mathematics, Statistics, Economics, Psychology,
and Engineering (for Operations Research) graduate studies. It was
tough, because in most instances we were thrown into courses to compete
head-to-head with doctoral students in those disciplines. I was even
sent to the Political Science Department to study (critically) the current
research of Herb Simon and his colleagues at Carnegie Mellon. That
experience taught me that traditional social science researchers were highly
skeptical of this new thrust in "business" research.
Another example of the changing times was at Ohio State University when
Tom Burns took command of doctoral students. OSU took the Stanford
approach to an extreme to where accounting doctoral students took virtually
all courses outside the College of Business. The entire thrust was one
of building research skills that could then be applied to business problems.
The nature of our academic research journals also changed. Older
journals like The Accounting Review (TAR) became more and more biased
and often printed articles that were better suited for journals in
operations research, economics, and behavioral science. Accounting
research journal relevance to the profession was spiraling down and down.
I benefited from this bias in the 1960s and 1970s because I found it
relatively easy to publish quantitative studies that assumed away the real
world and allowed us to play in easier and simpler worlds that we could
merely assume existed somewhere in the universe if not on earth. In
fairness, I think that our journal editors today demand more earthly
grounding for even our most esoteric research studies. But in the many
papers I published in the 1960s and 1970s, I can only recall one that I
think made any sort of practical contribution to the profession of
accounting (and the world never noticed that paper published in TAR).
I even got a big head and commenced to think it was mundane to even teach
accounting. In my first university I taught mostly mathematical
programming to doctoral students. When I got a chair at a second
university, I taught mathematical programming and computer programming (yes
FORTRAN and COBOL) to graduate students. But my roots were in
accounting (as a CPA), my PhD was in accounting (well sort of), and I
discovered that the real opportunities for an academic were really in
accounting. The reasons for these opportunities are rooted the various
professional attractions of top students to major in accounting and the
shortage of doctoral faculty across the world in the field of accountancy.
So I came home so to speak, but I've always been frustrated by the
difficulty of making my research relevant to the profession. If you
look at my 75+ published research papers, you will find few contributions to
the profession itself. I'm one of the guilty parties that spend most
of my life conducting research of interest to me that had little relevance
to the accounting profession.
I was one of those accounting research farmers more interested in my
tractors than in my harvests. Most of my research during my entire
career devoted to a study of methods and techniques than on professional
problems faced by accounting standard setters, auditors, and business
managers. I didn't want to muck around the real world gathering data
from real businesses and real accounting firms. It was easier to live
in assumed worlds or, on occasion, to study student behavior rather than
have to go outside the campus.
What has rooted me to the real world in the past two decades is my
teaching. As contracting became exceedingly complex (e.g., derivative
financial instruments and complex financial structurings), I became
interested in finding ways of teaching about this contracting and in having
students contemplate unsolved problems of how to account for an increasingly
complex world of contracts.
In accounting research since the 1950s we've now completed the circle of
virtually no science (long on speculation without rigor) to virtually all
science (strong on rigor with irrelevant findings) to criticisms that
science is not going to solve our problems that are too complex for rigorous
scientific methods. We are also facing increasing hostility from
students and the profession that our accounting, finance, and business
faculties are really teaching in the wrong departments of our universities
--- that our faculties prefer to stay out of touch with people in the
business world and ignore the many problems faced in the real world of
business and financial reporting. For more on this I refer you to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
Things won’t change as long as our "scientists" control our editorial
boards, and they won’t give those up without a huge fight. I’m not sure that
even Accounting Horizons (AH) is aimed at practice research at the
moment. The rigor hurdles to get into AH are great as of late. Did you
compare the thicknesses of the recent AH juxtaposed against the latest
Accounting Review? Hold one in each of each in your hands.
What will make this year’s AAA plenary sessions interesting will be to
have Katherine defending our economic theorists and Denny Beresford saying
“we still don’t get it.” Katherine is now a most interesting case since, in
later life, she’s bridging the gap back to practice somewhat. Denny’s an
interesting case because he came out of practice into academe only to
discover that, like Pogo, “the enemy is us.”
I think what is misleading about the recent HBR article is that focusing
more on practice will help us solve our “big” problems. If you look at the
contributions of the HBR toward solving these problems in the last 25 years,
you will find their contributions are superficial and faddish (e.g.,
balanced score card). The real problem in accounting (and much of business
as well), is that our big problems don’t have practical solutions. I
summarize a few of those at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm#BadNews
Note the analogy with “your favorite greens.”
Focusing on practice will help our teaching. We can never say “never”
when it comes to research, but I pretty much stand by my claims at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm#BadNews
So what can we conclude from having traveled the whole circle from
virtually no scientific method to virtually all scientific method to new
calls to back off of scientific method and grub around in the real world?
What do we conclude from facing up to the fact that research rigor and our
most pressing problems don't mix?
My recommendation at the moment is to shift the focus from scientific
rigor to cleverness and creativity in dealing with our most serious
problems. We should put less emphasis on scientific rigor applied to
trivial problems. We should put more emphasis on clever and creative
approaches to our most serious problems. For example, rather than seek
optimal ways to classify complex financial instruments into traditional debt
and equity sections on the balance sheet, perhaps we should look into clever
ways to report those instruments in non-traditional ways in this new era of
electronic communications and multimedia graphics. Much of my earlier
research was spent in applying what is called cluster analysis to
classification and aggregation. I can envision all sorts of possible
ways of extending these rudimentary efforts into our new multimedia world.
Bob Jensen on my 67th birthday on April 30, 2005
A December 5,
2002 reply from David Stout about the replications thing --- an AAA
journal editor’s inside perspective!
Note that I think that a big
policy weakness is that the policy of accounting research journals
to not publish confirming replications (even in abstracted form) is
that this policy discourages efforts to perform confirming
replications.
But the most serious
problem is that the findings themselves may not be interesting
enough for researchers to perform replications whether or not those
replications will be published. Are the findings so uninteresting
that researchers aren’t really interested in seeking truth?
Bob Jensen
-----Original
Message-----
From: David E. Stout [mailto:david.stout@villanova.edu]
Sent:
Thursday,
December 05, 2002
To: Jensen, Robert
Subject: Re: Are we
really interested in truth?
I read through
the material you sent (below)--one thing caught my eye: the issue of
REPLICATIONS. This is a subject about which I am passionate. When I
assumed the editorship of Issues, I had to appear before the AAA
Publications Committee to present/defend a plan for the journal
during my (then) forthcoming tenure. One of my plans was to
institute a "Replications Section" in the journal. (The sad reality,
beyond the excellent points you make, is that the lack of
replications has a limiting effect on our ability to establish a
knowledge base. In short, there are not many things where, on the
basis of empirical research, we can draw firm conclusions.) After
listening to my presentation, the chair of the Publications
Committee posed the following question: "Why would we want to devote
precious journal space to that which we already know?" To say the
least, I was shocked--a rather stark reality check you might say.
The lack of replications precludes us, in a very real sense, from
"knowing."
I applaud your
frank comments regarding the whole issue of replications, and their
(proper) place within the conduct of "scientific" investigations.
You made my day!
------
David E. Stout
Villanova University |
December 15, 2004 message from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]
In a recent
issue of Golf World, a letter writer was commenting on the need for professional
golfers to be more "entertaining." He went on to say:
"Fans pay top dollar to
attend tournaments and to subscribe to cable coverage.
Not many would
pay to see an accountant work in his office or watch The Audit Channel."
That's probably a true
comment. On the other hand, wouldn't at least some of us have liked to
watch The Audit Channel and see what was being done on Enron, WorldCom,
HeathSouth, or some of the other recent interesting situations?
Denny Beresford
December 15, 2004 reply from Bob Jensen
You know better than the rest of us, Denny, that academic accounting
researchers won't tune in to watch practitioners on the Audit Channel. They're
locked into the SciFi Channel.
Bob Jensen
December 1, 2004 message from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]
Denny is now a professor of accounting at the University of Georgia. For
ten years he was Chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board and is a
member of the Accounting Hall of Fame.
I've enjoyed the recent
"debate" on AECM relating to the Economist article about the
auditing profession. I'm delighted to see this interest in such
professional issues. But I'm concerned that academic accountants, by and
large, aren't nearly enough involved in actually trying to help solve
professional issues. Let me give an illustration, and I'd certainly be
interested in reactions.
Last night our Beta Alpha Psi chapter was fortunate
to have Jim Copeland as a guest speaker. Jim retired as the managing
partner of Deloitte a couple of years ago and he continues to be a leading
voice in the profession through, among other things, his role in chairing a
major study by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on the auditing profession.
Jim also serves as a director of three major corporations and on their audit
committees. In short, he is the kind of person that all students and
faculty should be interested in meeting and hearing.
Students turned out in fairly large numbers, as did
quite a few practitioners who always are there to further their recruiting
efforts. However, only four faculty members attended (out of a group of
about 18) and this included our department head and the BAP advisor, both of
whom were pretty much obligated to be there. No PhD students attended.
I'm sure that some faculty members had good excuses but most simply weren't
sufficiently interested enough to attend. Perhaps at some other schools
more faculty would have been there but my own experience in speaking to about
100 schools over the years would indicate that this lack of interest is pretty
common.
On the other hand, this coming Friday a very young
professor from another university will present a research workshop and I
expect that nearly all faculty members and PhD students will be there.
The paper being discussed is replete with formulas using dubious (in my humble
view) proxies for real world economic matters that can't be observed directly.
The basic conclusion of the paper is that companies are more inclined to give
stock options rather than cash compensation because options don't have to be
charged to expense. Somehow I thought that this was a conclusion that
was pretty clear to most accountants and business people well before now.
I've heard some faculty members say that they feel
obligated to attend such workshops even if they aren't particularly interested
in the paper being discussed. They want to show support for the person
who is visiting as well as reinforce the importance of these events to the PhD
students. I certainly understand that thinking and tend to share it.
However, for the life of me I can't understand why faculty members don't feel
a similar "obligation" to show respect for a person like Jim
Copeland, one of the most important people in the accounting profession in
recent years and someone who is making a personal sacrifice to visit our
school.
My purpose in this brief note is not to belittle the
research paper. But I simply observe that it would be nice if there were
a little more balance between interest in professional matters and such high
level research among faculty members at research institutions. As the
Economist article noted, and as should be clear to all of us in the age of
Sarbanes-Oxley, etc., there are tremendous issues facing the accounting
profession. Rather than simply complaining about things, it seems to me
that academics could become more familiar with professionals and the issues
they face and then try to work with them to help resolve those issues.
When is the last time that you called an auditor or
corporate accountant and asked him or her to have lunch to just kick around
some of the tremendously interesting issues of the day?
Denny Beresford
December 1, 2004 reply from Bob Jensen
(The evidence lies in lack of interest in replication)
Hi Denny,
Jim gave a plenary session at the AAA meetings in Orlando. You may have
been in the audience. I thought Jim’s presentation was well received by the
audience. He handled himself very well in the follow up Q&A session.
I think academics have some preconceived notions about the auditing “establishment.”
They may be surprised at some of the positions taken by leaders of that
establishment if they took the time to learn about those positions. I
summarized some of Jim’s more controversial statements at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/book04q3.htm#090104
Note that he proposed eliminating the corporate income tax (but he said he
hoped none of his former partners were in the audience).
Faculty interest in a professor’s “academic” research may be greater
for a number of reasons. Academic research fits into a methodology that other
professors like to hear about and critique. Since academic accounting and
finance journals are methodology driven, there is potential benefit from being
inspired to conduct a follow up study using the same or similar methods. In
contrast, practitioners are more apt to look at relevant (big) problems for
which there are no research methods accepted by the top journals.
Accounting Research Farmers Are More Interested in Their Tractors Than in
Their Harvests
For a long time I’ve argued that top accounting research
journals are just not interested in the relevance of their findings (except in
the areas of tax and AIS). If the journals were primarily interested in the
findings themselves, they would abandon their policies about not publishing
replications of published research findings. If accounting researchers were
more interested in relevance, they would conduct more replication studies. In
countless instances in our top accounting research journals, the findings
themselves just aren’t interesting enough to replicate. This is something
that I attacked at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/book02q4.htm#Replication
At one point back in the 1980s there was a chance for accounting programs
that were becoming “Schools of Accountancy” to become more like law
schools and to have their elite professors become more closely aligned with
the legal profession. Law schools and top law journals are less concerned
about science than they are about case methodology driven by the practice of
law. But the elite professors of accounting who already had vested interest in
scientific methodology (e.g., positivism) and analytical modeling beat down
case methodology. I once heard Bob Kaplan say to an audience that no elite
accounting research journal would publish his case research. Science
methodologies work great in the natural sciences. They are problematic in the
psychology and sociology. They are even more problematic in the professions of
accounting, law, journalism/communications, and political “science.”
We often criticize practitioners for ignoring academic research Maybe they
are just being smart. I chuckle when I see our heroes in the mathematical
theories of economics and finance winning prizes for knocking down theories
that were granted earlier prizes (including Nobel prices). The Beta model was
the basis for thousands of academic studies, and now the Beta model is a
fallen icon. Fama got prizes for showing that capital markets were efficient
and then more prizes for showing they were not so “efficient.” In the
meantime, investment bankers, stock traders, and mutual funds were just
ripping off investors. For a long time, elite accounting researchers could
find no “empirical evidence” of widespread earnings management. All they
had to do was look up from the computers where their heads were buried.
Few, if any, of the elite “academic” researchers were investigating the
dire corruption of the markets themselves that rendered many of the published
empirical findings useless.
Academic researchers worship at the feet of Penman and do not even
recognize the name of Frank Partnoy or Jim Copeland.
Bob Jensen
As you recall, this thread was initiated when Denny Beresford raised concern
about the University of Georgia's accounting faculty lack of interest in
listening to an on-campus presentation by the recently retired CEO of Deloitte
& Touche (Jim Copeland). A leading faculty member from another major
research university raises much the same concern. Jane F. Mutchler is the
J. W. Holloway/Ernst & Young Professor of Accounting at Georgia State
University. She is also the current President of the American Accounting
Association.
"President's Message," Accounting Education News, Fall 2004,
Page 3. This is available online to paid subscribers but cannot be copied
due to a terrible policy established by the AAA Publications Committee.
Any typos in the following quotation are my own at 4:30 this morning.
- How many of us are now sitting down with the firms
that recruit our students and having good, critical discussions about the
state of practice?
- How many of us are spending our time writing
articles that critically analyze the state of the profession and
accounting and auditing practices for a journal like Accounting
Horizons?
- How many of us are conducting rigorous research
that is focused first on the crucial practice issues and then only
secondly on getting a publication in a top journal such as The
Accounting Review or one of the section journals?
- How many of us are evaluating and revamping our
courses to deal with the realities of the world today?
I raise these questions because I worry that we are
all too quick to blame all the problems on the practitioners. But we
must remember that we were the ones responsible for the education of the
practitioners. And unless we analyze the issues and the questions I
raised, I fear that we won't make any changes ourselves. So it is
important that we examine our approaches to the classes we are teaching and
ask ourselves if we are doing all we canto assure that our students are being
made aware of the pressures they will face in practice and if we are helping
them develop the skills they need to appropriately deal with those
pressures. In my mind these issues need to be dealt with in every class
we teach. It will do no good to simply mandate new stand alone ethics
courses where issues are examined in isolation.
Continued in Jane’s
Message to the Membership of the American Accounting Association
December 5, 2004 reply from Stone, Dan [Dan.Stone@UKY.EDU]
I enjoyed Denny's
commentary on the interplay between accounting research and practice, and,
Jane's AAA President's statement on this issue.
A few thoughts:
1. Yes, accounting
research is largely, though not entirely, divorced from accounting practice.
This is no coincidence or anomaly. It is by design. Large sample, archival,
financial accounting research -- which dominates mainstream academic
accounting -- is about the role of accounting information in markets. It is
not about understanding the institutions and individuals who produce and
disseminate this information, or, the technologies that make its production
possible. We could have an accounting scholarship takes seriously issues of
accounting practice. The US institutional structures of accounting scholarship
currently eliminate this possibility. Change these institutional structures
and we change accounting scholarship.
2. There is a
particular and peculiar hubris of financial accounting academics to assume
that all accounting scholarship is, or should be, about financial accounting.
Am I reading this into Denny's argument? Am I reading beyond the text here?
The unity model of
accounting scholarship increasingly, which says that all accounting
scholarship is or should be about financial accounting, is no coincidence or
anomaly. It is by design. The top disseminators of accounting scholarship in
the US increasingly publish, and the major producers of accounting scholars
increasingly produce scholars who know about, only 1 small sub-area of
accounting -- financial, archival accounting. Change the institutional
structures of the disseminators and the producers and we change accounting
scholarship.
Best,
Dan Stone
Gatton Endowed Chair
University of Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky
December 6, 2004 reply from Paul Williams
[williamsp@COMFS1.COM.NCSU.EDU]
To add to Dan's
observations. He is correct that until we change the structure of the US academy
nothing is going to change re practice. As Sara Reiter and I argued (with
evidence) in our AOS piece, accounting in the academy has been transformed from
an autonomous, professional discipline into a lab practice for a discipline for
which lab practices are incidental to the main activity, i.e, accounting is an
empirical sub discipline of a sub discipline of a sub discipline for which
empirical work is irrelevant. The purpose of scholarship in accounting is now
purely instrumental -- to create politically correct academic reputations.
The powers that be are
not interested in accounting research for its intrinsic value or for improving
practice broadly understood, but only as a means to enhance their own careers
(to get "hits" in the major journals). The profession is not powerless
to assist in changing that structure. For example, KPMG funds (or at least used
to) the JAR conferences. Stop doing that!! Why subsidize that which is doing you
more harm than good? The profession has abandoned the AAA in droves -- in the
mid-60s the AAA had nearly 15,000 members, 2/3 of which were practitioners. Now
we are approximately 8,000 of which only about 1/7 are practitioners. If
practitioners aren't happy about the academy they are not powerless to engage
it.
Bob sent us an excerpt
from Jane Mutchler's presidential address suggesting things that should be done.
They already have been. At the Critical Perspectives conference in New York in
2002 there were numerous sessions devoted to how academics have failed in their
educational responsibilities (someone credentialed Andy Fastow). Do the firms
help fund that conference? Of course not -- too left wing. Accounting Education:
An International Journal dedicated an entire issue to accounting education after
Enron, as has the European Accounting Review. Have any AAA journals done so? The
insularity of the US academy is evident in that Jane doesn't seem aware that
there already has been significant activity for at least the last three years,
but none of it as visible as that which is promoted by AAA. Let's have genuine
debates in Horizons where others besides those vetted for political correctness
are permitted to speak to the issues.
Let me remind you of
the Briloff affair -- Abe wrote a piece for Horizons critical of the COSO
report. Abe argued that the "problem" was not just small firms with
small auditors. Was Abe right? Less than two years after he wrote that article
we had Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Andersen's implosion, etc. See the special issue
of Critical Perspectives on Accounting, "AAA, Inc." to see first hand
how the structure of the academy handles candid discussion of the profession's
problems. If people aren't happy with the way the AAA manages the academy, they
are not powerless to change it. The structure stays the same because of the
apathy of the membership. It only takes 100 signatures to challenge for an AAA
office. Since less than 100 people bother to vote (out of 8,000) it wouldn't
take much effort for someone with the resources to effect significant changes.
Denny could get his colleagues' attention and get them interested in attending
his guests' talks by running for president of AAA -- I will gladly sign his
petition to be put on the ballot for 2005. That will shake them up! Change won't
happen unless enough members of the academy recognize that we have some very
real, serious problems that require candid, adult conversation and a willingness
to accept responsibility.
Realize that there are
more of us than there are of them (that is the whole idea of the current
structure - to keep the number of them very, very small). Change the executive
committee, select editors of the AAA journals that aren't committed to the
narrow notion of rigor that now predominates and, as Dan says, things will
change. There are plenty of qualified, thoughtful people who could manage an
academy more dedicated to the practice of accounting (in all its many
manifestations besides financial reporting, likely the most insignificant of
accounting's functions). It just takes people with the political and financial
leverage to put their efforts into altering that intellectually oppressive
structure. PFW
December 1, 2004 reply from Jagdish Gangolly [JGangolly@UAMAIL.ALBANY.EDU]
I could not agree more. May be most "top"
journals suffer a case of "analysis paralysis". In a practical field
such as accounting, how do we know what relevant problems are if we have
little contact with the real world (and I would not count sporadic consulting
as contact).
There are ways in which the academia and industry
mingle in a meaningful way. In the areas I am interested in (computationally
oriented work in information systems and auditing), for example, I have found
a very healthy relationship between the academia and industry, and in fact far
more exciting research reported in computing journals during the past three
years than in accounting/auditing journals during the past 30. (I can think of
work in computational auditing done by folks at Eindhoven and Delloitte &
Touche; work on role-based access control at George Mason and Singlesignonnet,
work on formal models of accounting systems as discrete dynamical systems done
also at Delloitte and Eindhoven, work on interface of formal models of
accounting systems and back-end databases done at Promatis and Goethe-Universität
Frankfurt & University of Karlsruhe, to name just a few). In fact it has
got to a point where I attend AAA meetings only to meet old friends and have a
good time, and not for intellectual stimulation. For that, I go to computing
meetings.
The reason for the schism between academia and the
profession in accounting, in my opinion, is the almost total lack of
accountability in academic accounting research. Once the control of
"academic" journals have been wrested, research is pursued not even
for its own sake, but for the preservation of control and perpetuation of ones
genes. We have not had a Kuhnian paradigm shift for close to 40 years in
accounting, because we haven't found the need for anomalies. We use
"academic" journals the same way that the proverbial Mark Twain's
drunk uses a lamp post, more for support than for illumination.
Respectfully submitted,
Jagdish
December 1, 2004 reply from Paul Williams [williamsp@COMFS1.COM.NCSU.EDU]
Bob is right that the accounting academy in the US
(not so much the rest of the world) is driven mainly by the interests of
methidoliters -- those that suffer from a terminal case of what McCloskey
described as the poverty of economic modernism. Sara Reiter and I had a study
published in AOS last summer that included an analysis of the rhetorical
behavior of the JAR conferences through time to see if the discursive
practices of the "leading" forum were conducive to progressive
critique -- all sciences "advance" via destruction -- received
wisdom is constantly under assault. When the JAR conferences started
practiioners and scholars from other disciplines like law and sociology were
invited to participate. These were the people that asked the most troublesome
questions, the ones who provided the most enervating critique. How did the
geniuses at JAR deal with the problem of heretics in the temple? They simply
stopped inviting practitioners and scholars from other disciplines. The
academy in the US is an exceedingly closed society of only true believers.
Accounting academics are now more interested in trying to prove that an
imaginary world is real, rather than confront a world too messy for the
methods (and, it must be noted, moral and political commitments) to which they
unshakeably devoted REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SAYS! (As Bob
notes, who in their right mind can still say market efficiency without a smirk
on their face. The stock exchange, after all, has members. Does anyone know of
any group of "members" that writes the rules of the organization to
benefit others equally to themselves? Invisible hands, my a..)
But it must be said the profession is not without
guilt in all of this. I avoid listening to big shots from the Big 4 myself
because they are as predictable as Jerry Falwell. Accountants have a license,
which is a privilege granted to them by the public to serve the broad society
of which they are citizens. But whenever you hear them speak, all they do is
whine about the evils of government regulation, the onerous burden of taxes on
the wealthy (I have never heard a partner of a Big 4 firm complain that taxes
were too regressive); they simply parrot the shiboleths that underlay the
methodologies of academics. No profession has failed as spectacularly as
accounting has just done. If medicine performed as poorly as public accounting
has just done in fulfilling its public responsibilities, there would be doctor
swinging from every tree. Spectacular audit failures, tax evasion schemes for
only the wealthiest people on the planet, liability caps, off-shore
incorporation, fraud, etc., a profession up to its neck in the corruption that
Bob mentioned. But have we heard one word of contrition from this profession?
Has it dedicated itself to adopting the skeptical posture toward its
"clients" required of anyone who wants to do a thorough audit? Don't
think so. All we still hear is the problem ain't us, it all those corrupt
politicians, etc. (Who corrupted them?). And PWC has the gall to run ads about
a chief courage officer -- do these guys have no shame? If the profession
wants to engage with the academy with an open mind and the courage to hear the
truth about itself, the courage to really want to become a learned profession
(which it isn't now), then maybe we could get somewhere. But for now, both
sides are comfortable where they are -- the chasm serves both of their
exceedingly narrow interests.
There are now 7 volumes of Carl's essays. Thanks to
Yuji Ijiri's efforts, the AAA published the first 5 volumes as Studies in
Accounting Research #22, Essays in Accounting Theory. A sixth volume, edited
by Harvey Hendrickson, Carl Thomas Devine Essays in Accounting Theory: A
Capstone was published by Garland Publishing in 1999. A seventh volume was
being edited by Harvey when he died. I was asked to finish Harvey's work and
that volume, Accounting Theory: Essays by Carl Thomas Devine has been
published by Routledge, 2004. Carl also had a collection of Readings in
Accounting Theory he compiled mainly for his teaching during his stint in
Indonesia (I think). Those were mimeographed as well, but, to my knowledge,
have never been published. I have copies of those 4 volumes but their
condition is not good -- paper is yellowed and brittle. Thoughtful, curious,
imaginative, humble, and kind -- we don't see the likes of Carl much anymore.
His daughter Beth told me that he even approach his death with the same
vibrant intellectual curiousity he brought to everything.
PFW
December 6, 2004 reply from Ed Scribner
[escribne@NMSU.EDU]
Seems to me that most
folks on this list take a pretty harsh view of the accounting research
"establishment" for being closed, methodology-driven, irrelevant to
practice, self-serving, and just generally in the wrong paradigm. Yet I see
things like the following in the JAR and the AR that appear relevant and
"practice-oriented" to me.
--- Journal of
Accounting Research, Volume 42: Issue 3 "Auditor Independence, Non-Audit
Services, and Restatements: Was the U.S. Government Right?"
Abstract Do fees for
non-audit services compromise auditor's independence and result in reduced
quality of financial reporting? The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 presumes that
some fees do and bans these services for audit clients. Also, some registrants
voluntarily restrict their audit firms from providing legally permitted
non-audit services. Assuming that restatements of previously issued financial
statements reflect low-quality financial reporting, we investigate detailed
fees for restating registrants for 1995 to 2000 and for similar nonrestating
registrants. We do not find a statistically significant positive association
between fees for either financial information systems design and
implementation or internal audit services and restatements, but we do find
some such association for unspecified non-audit services and restatements. We
find a significant negative association between tax services fees and
restatements, consistent with net benefits from acquiring tax services from a
registrant's audit firm. The significant associations are driven primarily by
larger registrants.
---
I also see articles
on topics other than financial accounting. Are these just window-dressing?
Journal editors are
always saying that they want work that has "policy implications."
Yet it seems to me that important questions in accounting tend to be more
complicated than, "Does this medication cause nausea in the control
group?" Tough questions are tough to address rigorously.
What are some
examples of specific questions (susceptible to rigorous research) that
academia should be addressing but is not?
Ed "Paton's
Advocate" (am I alone?)
P.S. Many years ago a
senior faculty member told me the "top" journals were a closed
society, and hitting them was a matter of whom you knew. I made some naïve
reply to the effect that the top journals reflected the best work--"the
cream rises to the top." Next morning I found in my mailbox photocopies
of the tables of contents of then-recent JARs, along with the editorial board,
with lines drawn connecting names on the board with names of authors, as if it
were a "matching question" on an exam.
December 1, 2004 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Paul,
During one of the early JAR conferences that I
attended had an assistant professor present a behavioral research study. A
noted psychologist, also from the University of Chicago, Sel Becker, was
assigned to critique the paper.
Sel got up and announced words to the affect that
this garbage wasn't worth discussing.
I'm not condoning the undiplomatic way Sel treated a
colleague. But this does support your argument as to why experts from other
disciplines were no longer invited to future JAR conferences.
Bob Jensen
December 1, 2004 reply from Roger Collins
[rcollins@CARIBOO.BC.CA]
Paul makes some
excellent points. Sociologists are interesting to listen to because they tend
to get folks' backs up (and if they didn't want to do that they probably
wouldn't be sociologists in the first place). That's especially the case in
accounting where both the profession and the academics are (with notable
exceptions) hidebound in their own way. If you want a new perspective on
things, get a sociologist to comment, throw away any half of what's been said
and the remainder will still be an interesting pathway to further thought,
whichever half you choose.
The scorn that
certain academics in other areas show for accounting academics (and indeed,
business academics in general) may be justified (sometimes? often?)- but
no-one ever built bridges out of scorn. I think that if Sel Becker was really
interested in advancing the cause of academic enquiry he would have figured
out that whatever was going on was, from his point of view, an immature
contribution and taken the time to give his views on the gap between the
contribution and the issues he considered important, and identify some
"road map" to move from one position to another.
But then, Sel is a
"big, important" person. (From what I can gather), instead of taking
a little time to build bridges he indulged in a spot of academic tribalism.
Trashing a colleagues paper (isn't that something a noted member of the
Rochester School was famous for?) is cheap in terms of effort and may generate
some petty self-satisfaction; it may even be justified if the presenter is
arrogant in turn -but again, arrogance is a destroyer rather than a builder.
On the other hand,
the JAR reaction is just as bad if not worse. Closing one's ears to
criticism will only lead to the prettification of the academy; the dogmatists
will have won.
Question - is there a
way of enticing the various parties out of their bunkers ? If there is, what
are the chances that the "generals" of the profession and academia
won't use their power to squash the proposals of the "subalterns" ?
Some years ago a
University of Alberta prof. had the temerity to suggest that the local oil
companies' financial statements weren't all that they should have been. He was
promptly jumped on from every direction. Why ? I suspect, because there is a
general (not inevitably true) assumption that business schools are the
"cash cows" of the university, and other academics tolerate them on
that basis. (Nowadays, pharmaceutical research departments seem to be vying
for that label). Maybe the only way out is poverty; poor accounting profs will
have less to lose and more reason to explore..
Regards - tongue
partly in cheek,
Roger Roger
Collins
UCC (soon to be TRU) School of Business.
December 2, 2004 reply from Paul Williams
[williamsp@COMFS1.COM.NCSU.EDU]
How do we bridge the
chasm?
Good question. We won't
be able to do that in the US until we change the structure of the AAA. I was on
Council when the great debate over Accounting Horizons occurred. Jerry Searfoss,
a person who served time on both sides of the chasm, was a vigorous proponent
for creating a medium through which academe and practice could communicate. If
you peruse the editorial board of the first issues of Horizons, it reflected
this eclectic approach to scholarship. What happened to it? Look at Horizons
now. Its editorial board looks just like the editorial board at The Accounting
Review and its editor is a University of Chicago PhD! The AAA has a particular
structure -- an organizational culture that reproduces itself generation after
generation. Horizons, as originally conceived by people like Searfoss, Sack,
Mautz, etc., posed a threat to the overwhelmingly anal retentive, ideological
commitments (the shadow of William Paton still chills the intellectual climate
of the US academy) of the organization. Anti-bodies were quickly mobilized and,
voila, Horizons looks just like TAR (two years ago a plan to eliminate Horizons
and Issues and roll them into one ill-defined journal was proposed). This body
will protect itself at all costs (even declining membership, banal research,
etc. will not dissuade them from jumping over the cliff).
The only way to
change that is to create a structure that fosters a place where Sel Beckers
and Big 4 partners can say what they have to say IN PRINT and be forced to
defend it as often as the Dopuchs, Demskis, Watts and Zimmermans, and
Schippers of the world (who never have to defend themselves in print). That
will only happen when the selection of executive committees, editors, etc. is
democratic. As long as the Politburo structure of the AAA exists and the
culture of fear and suspicion of ideas remains, nothing will change. Good
models for what the journals should look like are the proceedings of
conferences like Tinker's Critical Perspectives conference, Lee Parker's APIRA,
and the IPA sponsored by Manchester. Those conferences are so much more
exhilirating than the AAA meetings. I'm like Jagdish -- I go to AAA to see old
friends and work for the Public Interest Section. The "technical"
sessions are of little interest. When the AAA gives Seminal Contribution
Awards to "contributions" lifted wholesale from the radical Lockean/monetarist
wing of economics, how can you take such an organization seriously. This is
particularly true when there are genuinely seminal contributions possessed by
the discipline itself, e.g., Ijiri's work, Paton's Accounting Theory, Andy
Stredry's budget work, Bill Cooper's QM applications, Sterling/Edwards and
Bell/Chambers, etc. (the copyrights on these tell you how long it has been
since accounting acted like an autonomous discipline!).
PFW
December 2 reply from Paul Williams
(after a request that he elaborate on Bill Paton)
While Carl Devine was
still alive, I used to visit him whenever I could. When Jacci Rodgers and I did
our work on editorial boards at The Accounting Review I consulted Carl about how
the review process worked at TAR since the first time TAR published the members
of an editorial board was 1967 (I beleive). According to Carl, Paton edited TAR
for many years after its founding via a process that was, shall we say, less
than transparent. According to Carl, Paton and Littleton between them virtually
hand picked the AAA presidents for years. You can see a pattern of early
presidencies -- one president not from one of the elite 15, then two from, then
one, etc. This encouraged the illusion that the AAA was open to everyone, but in
fact it was pretty tightly controlled. Now there is no attempt whatsoever to
create the illusion of an open organization -- every president for the last 30
years (save one or two) is an elite school grad. It was never permitted to veer
too far from the nucleus of schools that founded it.
Everyone should be
familiar with Paton's politics -- he was conservative in the extreme (he
published a book that was a rather rabid screed on the evils of Fabian
socialism). There were competing root metaphors for accounting during the era of
Paton, e.g., the institutionalism of DR Scott (whose spin on the role of
accounting seems prescient now that we have a few years separating us from him),
there was the accounting as fulfilling social needs of Littleton etc. But what
clearly has emerged triumphant was the radical free market ideology of Paton.
So, even though accounting seems clearly part of the regulatory apparatus and
part of the justice system in the US, the language we use to talk about what
accountants are for is mainly that of efficent markets, rational economic
actors, etc. No wonder Brian West is able to build such a persuasive case that
accounting currently has no coherent cognitive foundation, thus, is not a
"learned" profession. Accounting enables market functions in a world
of economic competitors whose actions are harmoniously coordinated by the magic
fingers of invisible hands (a metaphor that Adam Smith didn't set too much stock
in -- it was merely an off-hand remark to which he never returned). Carl Devine
has a very useful essay in Essays in Accounting theory, volume six, edited by
Harvey Hendrickson (Garland) where he provides an insightful analysis of the
contributions to theory of those persons of his generation and his generation of
mentors (he particularly admired Mattesich.)
Carl noted that Paton
was a very effective rhetorician, so was perhaps more influential than his ideas
really merited (like the relative influence of the contemporaries Malthus and
Ricardo; Ricardo, the much better writer overshadowed Malthus in their day).
Paton influenced a disproportionate number of the next generation of accounting
academics; he was, after all, a classicaly trained economist.
There is, in my view,
absolutely no compelling reason why accountants should be the least bit
concerned with new classical economic theory, but Paton, because of his
influence, set the US academy on a path that brings us to where we are today. It
is an interesting thought experiment (ala Trevor Gambling's buddhist accounting)
to imagine what we would be doing and talking about if we had taken the
institutionalists, or Ijiri's legal imagery more seriously. But, as they say
here in NC, "It is what it is."
PFW
December 2, 2004 reply from Bob Jensen
Bill
Paton was all-powerful on the
Michigan
campus and was considered
an economist as well as an accountant. For
a time under his power, a basic course in accounting was in the common core
for all majors. One of the
most noted books advocating historical cost is called Introduction
to Corporate Accounting Standards by William Paton
and A.C. Littleton (Sarasota: American Accounting Association, 1940).
Probably no single book has ever had so much influence or is more widely cited
in accounting literature than this thin book by Paton
and
Littleton
. See http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases
Later
on Paton changed horses and was apologetic about
once being such a strong advocate of historical cost. He
subsequently favored fair value accounting, while his co-author clung to
historical cost. However, Paton
never became widely known as a valuation theorist compared to the likes of
Edwards,
Bell
, Canning, Chambers, and
Sterling
. (In case you did not know this,
former FASB Board Member and SEC Chief Accountant Walter Scheutz
is also a long-time advocate of fair value accounting.)
You
can read about the Hall of Fame’s Bill Paton at
http://fisher.osu.edu/Departments/Accounting-and-MIS/Hall-of-Fame/Membership-in-Hall/William-A.-Paton
Bob
Jensen
December 2, 2004 reply from Jagdish Gangolly
[JGangolly@UAMAIL.ALBANY.EDU]
My earlier posts
unfortunately may have implied that every onbe I mentioned continued to be a
historical cost advocate -- that is not true. Paton changed his mind, as Bob
mentioned.
The point I was
trying to make there was the approach to theory building in accounting
(something that crudely initates the axiomatic approach) that Paton
essentially started. However, Paton had a "theory" in the sense of a
set of axioms, but no theorems. In other words it was a sort of laundry list
of axioms with out a detailed study of their collective implications (this is
what struck me most while I was a student, but that might have been my problem
since I came to accounting via applied mathematics/statistics). In fact most
of the work of Paton & Littleton, Ijiri, Sprouse & Moonitz,... never
really followed through their thoughts to their logical conclusions. One
reason might have been that they did not really state their axioms in logic.
Mattesich, as I understand, went a bit further, but he must have realised that
a field like accounting where most sentences are deontic (normative, stated in
English sentences in the imperative mood) rather than alethic (descriptive,
stated in English sentences in the indicative mood). In normative systems, as
even Hans Kelsen has admitted, there is no concept of truth and therefore
logical deduction as we know it is not possible.
I think this becomes
clear in one of the later books of Mattesich on Instrumental Reasoning (all
but ignored by accountants because it is more philosophical, but in my opinion
one of his most fascinating works).
I would not put Paul
Grady, Carman Blough,... in the same group. For Paul Grady, for example,
accounting "principles" were no more than a grab bag of mundane
rules.
Leonard Spacek, one
of my heroes, on the other hand, tried to emphasize accounting as
communication of rights people had to resources UNDER LAW. He also emphasized
fairness as an objective.
One reason for this
chasm between practice and academia is that almost all practice is normatively
based, whereas in the academia in accounting, for the past 40 years we have
cared just about only for descriptive work of the naive positivist kind.
I hate peddling my
work, but those interested might like to take a look at an old paper of mine
(I consider it the best that I ever wrote) where some of these issues are
discussed :
Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles: Perspectives from Philosophy of Law, J. Gangolly &
M. Hussein Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol. 7 (1996), pp.
383-407.
I think we need to realise that we are not the only
discipline that has gone astray from the original lofty goals.
Consider economics in the United States. In Britain,
at least till the 70s (I haven't kept in touch since then), it was considered
important that Economics teaching devoid of political and philosophical
discussions was some how deficient; probably the main reason popular Oxford
undergraduate major is PPE (Politics, Philosophy, Economics, with Economics
taking the third seat). Specially in the US, attempts to make Economics
value-free (wertfrei) have, to an extent also succeeded in making it a bit
sterile. In his critique of Ludwig von Mises, Murray Rothbard ("Praxeology,
Value Judgments, and Public Policy") states:
"The trouble is that most economists burn to
make ethical pronouncements and to advocate political policies - to say, in
effect, that policy X is "good" and policy Y "bad."
Properly, an economist may only make such pronouncements in one of two ways:
either (1) to insert his own arbitrary, ad hoc personal value judgments and
advocate policy on that basis; or (2) to develop and defend a coherent ethical
system and make his pronouncement, not as an economist, but as an ethicist,
who also uses the data of economic science."
Or, that Economics is the "value-free handmaiden
of ethics".
In accounting too, the positivists have worked hard
over the past forty years or so to make it pretentiously value-free (remember
disparaging references to non-descriptive work, and Carl Nelson's virtual
jihad to rid accounting of "fairness" as an objective?). The result
has been that it is perhaps not unfair to speak of "fair" in the
audit reports just cheap talk.
Renaissance in accounting will come only when we look
as much at Politics and Law as at Economics to inspire research.
Jagdish
December 3, 2004 reply from Paul Williams
For many subscribers this thread may have started to
fray; to them I apologize, but I have to chime in to add a contrarian view to
Bob's contention that Paton, Edwards and Bell ,etc. were advocates of fair value
accounting. Fair value accounting is (in my view) a classic case of eliding into
a use of a concept as if it were what we traditionally understood it to be while
radically redefining it (see Feyerabend's analysis of Galileo's use of this same
ploy). None of the early theorists were proponents of fair value
accounting.
They may have been advocates of replacement cost or
opportunity cost, but never of "fair value," which is a purely
hypothetical number generated through heroic assumptions about an undivinable
future. As Carl Devine famously said, "No one has ever learned anything
from the future." All subscribed to the principle that accounting should
report only what actually occurred during a period of time -- this was the
essence of E&B's argument that accounting data are for evaluating decisions;
its value lies in its value as feedback and accounting data, therefore,
categorically should not be generated on assumptions about the outcomes
resulting from decisions that have already been made. The significant
accomplishment of these theorists was to provide a defense of accounting's
avoidance of subjective values. i.e., the accounting was in its essence
objective (anyone remember Five
Monographs on Business Income, particularly Sidney
Alexander's critique of accounting measures of profit?). Now we accept seemingly
without question the radical transformation of accounting affected by FASB to a
system of nearly exclusively subjective values, i.e., your guess is as good as
mine. In spite of the optimism people seem to express, we have no technology
(nor would a believer in rational expectations theory ever expect there to be)
that can divine the economic future. Perhaps a renaissance of some of these old
ideas is overdo. I believe it was Clarence Darrow who opined that "Contempt
for law is brought about by law making itself ridiculous." As writers of
LAW (kudos to Jagdish's paper) the FASB seems to make accounting more ridiculous
by the day.
PFW
December 3, 2004 reply from David Fordham
For those who don't know, Paul is an FSU alum, and
Bob is a former Seminole, too, although they pre-dated me and may have had
some professional interaction with Carl Devine. ...
David Fordham
December 3, 2004 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi David,
I arrived on the faculty at FSU in 1978. Carl was a recluse for all
practical purposes. I don' think anybody had contact with him except a very
devoted Ed McIntyre. Paul Williams was very close to Ed and may also have had
some contact. (Paul later reminded me that Carl grew interested in
discussing newer directions with Ed Arrington.)
I think Carl was still actively writing and to the walls. His labor of love
may have been lost if Ed and Paul didn't strive to share Carl's writings with
the world. Carl was a classic scholar who'd lived most of his life in
libraries.
Carl could've added a great deal to our intellectual growth and historical
foundations if he participated in some of our seminars. He was a renaissance
scholar.
It would've been interesting to know how Carl's behavior might've changed
in the era of email. Scholars who asked him challenging questions might've
gotten lengthy replies (Carl was not concise) that he would not provide
face-to-face.
Bob Jensen
Decemeber 3, 2004 reply from Mclelland, Malcolm J [mjmclell@INDIANA.EDU]
It almost seems there's a consensus on the AECM
listserv on all this! Given the widespread interest and existng intellectual
wherewithal among AECMs to do it, maybe it's time to start up the
"Journal of Neo-Classical Accounting Theory"? Revisiting Edwards,
Bell, Sterling, Chambers, Paton, et al. certainly seems worthwhile; especially
if it can be fit into or reconciled with the more recent literature in
accounting and finance.
Best regards,
Malcolm
Malcolm J. McLelland, Ph.D.
mjmclell@indiana.edu
website: http://www.uic.edu/~mclellan
research: http://ssrn.com/author=154711
December 1, 2004 reply from Glen Gray [glen.gray@CSUN.EDU]
Your story does surprise me. A few years ago I
convinced Barry Melancon (President) and Louis Matherne (at that time,
Director of IT) from the AICPA to come to L.A. and speak at a dinner meeting
of the L.A. chapter of the California Society of CPAs. The meeting was at
UCLA, not my campus, however, the chapter offered to waive the $35 dinner
charge for any CSUN faculty who want to attend. Other than myself, one (out of
about 20) other faculty member attended the dinner. I asked some of the
faculty members why they did not attend. The most common answer was something
like “We know what he (Barry) is going to say—use more computers in your
accounting courses.”
December 1, 2004 reply from Richard C. Sansing
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
Two thoughts in
response:
First, I agree with
the gist of your sentiment. Hanging around real world accountants can inform
both our teaching and research, and most of us underinvest in such activities.
Second, the effect of
"citizenship" considerations looks like an easy cost-benefit
tradeoff to me. Seminars are attended only by faculty and doctoral students,
so one's presence in the room is more noticable for a research seminar than a
presentation attended by lots of undergraduates. Furthermore, the personal
cost of attending a daytime event is much less than a nightime event. So if
one is driven by citizenship considerations, I expect many more faculty to
attend the daytime research seminar than the nightime practitioner
presentation.
Richard C.
Sansing
Associate Professor of Business Administration
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
email: Richard.C.Sansing@dartmouth.edu
December 1, 2004 reply from Chuck Pier [texcap@HOTMAIL.COM]
Dennis,
I think that you have put your finger on, or maybe
stumbled onto, one of the major splits in academic accounting today. You
happen to be looking at this situation from one of the "research"
universities. Most all of us (I use the term "us" to refer to
academic accountants) have been associated with a research university.
However, many of us have only been there as students during our doctoral
studies. These universities place heavy premiums on both their faculties and
students for what we call "basic research" that is quite replete
with formulas and theories and the like. Faculty are tenured, promoted and
financially rewarded to produce cutting edge research that is published in the
top journals, and doctoral students are judged on their ability to analyze and
conduct similar research.
On the other hand, many of "us" teach in
"teaching universities" that place more emphasis on teaching and
"professional" research. In other words, research that has a direct
application to either the accounting profession or the teaching of accounting.
There is usually not a penalty exerted on those who chose to do the more
academic research, but there is also not any special rewartds for that
research either.
I feel that many of "us" at teaching
schools attend the lectures that you describe with a lot more regularity than
your experience at your university. For example, at my school we have a weekly
meeting during the fall of our Beta Alpha Psi chapter that inculeds a
presentation on a topic by one of the firms in our area. These firms include
all of the big four, as well as other national, regional, and local firms. The
presentations run the gamut from interview techniques for the students to the
latest updates on SOX or forensic accounting. As with any sample, some are
better than others and many are appropriate to just the students. Despite the
uneveness of the presentations I would estimate that at least 80% of our
tenure track faculty are at each meeting, with the missing 20% having some
other engagement and unable to attend. There is not a single member of our
faculty that routinely does not attend. These meetings are not mandatory, but
most of us feel that it supports both or students and the presenters, who hire
our students to attend.
I am not trying to indite or point fingers at either
side of the academic accounting community but it is obvious that we each have
separate priorities. I for one chose the institution that I am at for the very
reason that we do have a heavy emphasis on the practioneer and the
undergraduate student. I know that many would abhor what I do and could not
picture themselves here. They, like me have decided what they like and what
they are best suited for. I do feel that at times we who are not at the big
research schools feel that we are overlooked, but I wouldn't trade my place
with anyone else. I think that I am providing a good service and enjoy the
opportunities that it presents.
Chuck
December 3, 2004 reply from Robin A
Alexander [alexande.robi@UWLAX.EDU]
Interesting. I too came from a math background and
finally realized there was no accounting theory in the scientific sense. I also
came to suspect it was not a system of measurement either because to be so,
there has to be something to measure independent of the measuring tool. Rather
it seemed to me accounting defined, for instance, income rather than measured
it.
Robin Alexander
December 3, 2004 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Robin,
I think the distinction lies not so much on "independence" of the
measuring tool as it does on behavior induced by the measurements themselves,
although this may be what you had in mind in your message to us.
Scientists measure the distance to the moon without fear that behavior of
either the earth or the moon will be affected by the measurement process.
There may some indirect behavioral impacts such as when designing fuel tanks
for a rocket to the moon. In natural science, except for quantum mechanics,
the measurers cannot re-define the distance to the moon for purposes of being
able to design smaller fuel tanks.
In economics, and social science in general, behavior resulting from
measurements is often more impacted by the definition of measurement itself.
Changed definitions of inflation or a consumer price index might result in
wealth transfers between economic sectors. Plus there is the added problem
that measurements in the social sciences are generally less precise and
stable, e.g., when people change behavior just because they have been
"measured" or diagnosed.
Similarly in accounting, changed definitions of what goes into things like
revenue, eps, asset values, and debt values may lead to wealth transfers. The
Silicon Valley executives certainly believe that lowering eps by booking stock
options will affect share prices vis-a-vis merely disclosing the same
information in a footnote rather than as a booked expense. Virtually all
earnings management efforts on the part of managers hinges on the notion that
accounting outcomes affect wealth transfers. In fact if they did not do so,
there probably would not be much interest in accounting numbers See
"Toting Up Stock Options," by Frederick Rose, Stanford Business,
November 2004, pp. 21 --- http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/bmag/sbsm0411/feature_stockoptions.shtml
Early accounting theorists such as Paton, Littleton, Hatfield, Edwards,
Bell, Chambers, etc. generally believed there was some kind of optimal set of
definitions that could be deduced without scientifically linking possible
wealth transfers to particular definitions. And it is doubtful that subsequent
events studies in capital market empiricism will ever solve that problem
because human behavior itself is too adaptive. Academic researchers are still
seeking to link behavior with accounting numbers, but they're often viewed as
chasing moving windmills with lances thrust forward.
Auditors are more concerned about being faithful to the definitions. If the
definition says book all leases that meet the FAS 13 criteria for a capital
lease, then leases that meet those tests should not have been accounted for as
operating leases. The audit mission is to do or die, not to question why. The
FASB and other standard setters are supposed to question why. But they are
often more impacted by the behavior of the preparers than the users. The
behavior of preparers trying to circumvent accounting standards seems to have
more bearing than the resulting impacts on wealth transfers that defy being
built into a conceptual framework. Where science fails accounting in this
regard is that the wealth transfer process is just too complicated to model
except in the case of blatant fraud that lines the pockets of a villain.
It is not surprising that accounting "theory" has plummeted in
terms of books and curricula. Theory debates never seem to go anywhere beyond
unsupportable conjectures. I teach a theory course, but it has degenerated to
one of studying intangibles and how preparers design complex contracts such as
hedging and SPE contracts that challenge students into thinking how these
contracts should be accounted for given our existing standards like FAS 133
and FIN 46. One course that I would someday like to teach is to design a new
standard (such as a new FAS 133) and then predict how preparers would change
behavior and contracting. Unfortunately my students are not interested in wild
blue yonder conjectures. The CPA exam is on their minds no matter where I try
to fly. They tolerate "theory" only to the point where they are also
learning about existing standards. In their minds, any financial accounting
course beyond intermediate should simply be an extension of intermediate
accounting.
Bob Jensen
"The Accounting Cycle: The Conceptual Framework for Financial
Reporting Op/Ed," by J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, September 2006
---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x54322.xml
The Financial Accounting Standards Board and the
International Accounting Standards Board have joined forces to flesh out a
common conceptual framework. Recently they issued some preliminary views on
the "objectives of financial reporting" and the "qualitative characteristics
of decision-useful financial reporting information" and have asked for
comment.
To obtain "coherent financial reporting," the
boards feel that they need "a framework that is sound, comprehensive, and
internally consistent" (paragraph P3). In P5, they also state their hope for
convergence between U.S. and international accounting standards.
P6 indicates a need to fill in certain gaps, such
as a "robust concept of a reporting entity." I presume that they will
accomplish this task later, as the current document does not develop such a
"robust concept."
Chapter 1 presents the objective for financial
reporting, and the description differs little from what is in Concepts
Statement No. 1. This objective is "to provide information that is useful to
present and potential investors and creditors and others in making
investment, credit, and similar resource allocation decisions." The emphasis
lay with capital providers, as it should. If anything, I would place greater
accent on this aspect, because in the last 10 years, so many managers have
defined the "business world" as including managers and excluding investors
and creditors. To our chagrin, we learned that managers actually believed
this lie, as they pretended that the resources supplied by the investment
community belonged to the management team.
FASB and IASB further explain that these users are
interested in the cash flows of the entity so they can assess the potential
returns and the potential variability of those returns (e.g., in paragraph
OB.23). I wish they had drawn the logical conclusion that financial
reporting ought to exclude income smoothing. Income smoothing leads the user
to assess a smaller variance of earnings than warranted by the underlying
economics; income smoothing biases downward the actual variability of the
earnings and thus the returns.
Later, in the basis of conclusions, the document
addresses the reporting of comprehensive income and its components (see
BC1.28-31). Currently, FASB has four items that enter other comprehensive
income: gains and losses on available-for-sale investments, losses when
incurring additional amounts to recognize a minimum pension liability,
exchange gains and losses from a foreign subsidiary under the all-current
method, and gains and losses from derivatives that hedge cash flows.
The purported reason for this demarcation between
earnings and other comprehensive income rests with the purported low
reliability of measurements of these four items; however, the real reason
for these other comprehensive items seems to be political. For example, FASB
capitulated in Statement No. 115 when a number of managers objected to
reporting gains and losses on available-for-sale securities because that
would create volatility in earnings. (I find it curious how FASB caters to
the whims of managers but claims that the primary rationale for financial
reporting is to serve the investment community.) Because one has a hard time
reconciling other comprehensive income with the needs of investors and
creditors, it would serve the investment community better if the boards
eliminate this notion of comprehensive income.
Two IASB members think that an objective for
financial reporting should encompass the stewardship function (see AV1.1-7).
Stewardship seems to be a subset of economic usefulness, so this objection
is pointless. It behooves these two IASB members to explain the consequences
of adopting a stewardship objective and how these consequences differ from
the usefulness objective before we can entertain their protestation
seriously.
Sections BC1.42 and 43 ask whether management
intent should be a part of the financial reporting process. Given management
intent during the last decade, I think decidedly not. Management intent is
merely a license to massage accounting numbers as managers please.
Fortunately, the Justice Department calls such tactics fraud.
Chapter 2 of this document concerns qualitative
characteristics. For the most part, this presentation is similar to that in
Concepts Statement No. 2, though arranged somewhat differently. Concepts 2
had as its overarching qualitative characteristics relevance and
reliability. This Preliminary Views expounds relevance, faithful
representation, comparability, and understandability as the qualitative
characteristics.
The discussion on faithful representation is
interesting (QC.16-19) inasmuch as they distinguish between accounts that
depict real world phenomena and accounts that are constructs with no real
world referents. They explain that deferred debits and credits do not
possess faithful representation because they are merely the creation of
accountants. I hope that analysis applies to deferred income tax debits and
credits.
Verifiability implies similar measures by different
measurers (QC.23-26). I wish FASB and IASB to include auditability as an
aspect of verifiability; after all, if you cannot audit something, it is
hardly verifiable. Yet, the soon to be released standard on fair value
measurements includes a variety of items that will prove difficult if not
impossible to audit.
Understandability is obvious, though the two boards
feel that users with a "reasonable knowledge of business and economic
activities" can understand financial statements. I no longer agree. Such a
person might employ a profit analysis model or ratio analysis on a set of
financial statements and mis-analyze a firm's condition because he or she
did not make analytical adjustments for off-balance sheet items and other
fanciful tricks by managers. This includes so many of Enron's investors and
creditors. No, to understand financial reporting today, you must be an
expert in accounting and finance.
Benefits-that-justify-costs acts as a constraint on
financial reporting. While this criterion is acceptable, too often the
boards view costs only from the perspective of the preparers. I wish the
boards explicitly acknowledged the fact that not reporting on some things
adds costs to users. When a business enterprise engages in aggressive
accounting, the expert user needs to employ analytical adjustments to
correct this overzealousness. These adjustments consume the investor's
economic resources and thus involve costs to the investment community.
In the basis-for-conclusions section, FASB and IASB
explain that the concept of substance over form is included in the concept
of faithful representation (see paragraphs BC2.17 and 18). While I don't
have a problem with that, I think they should at least emphasize this point
in Chapter 2 rather than bury it in this section. Substance over form is a
critically important doctrine, especially as it relates to business
combinations and leases, so it deserves greater stress.
On balance, the document is well written and
contains a good clarification of the objective of financial reporting and
the qualitative characteristics of decision-useful financial reporting
information. I offer the criticisms above as a hope to strengthen and
improve the Preliminary Views.
My most important comment, however, does not
address any particular aspects within the document itself. Instead, I worry
about the usefulness of this objective and these qualitative characteristics
to FASB and IASB. To enjoy coherent financial reporting, there not only is
need for a sound, comprehensive, and internally consistent framework, we
also must have a board with the political will to utilize the conceptual
framework. FASB ignored its own conceptual framework in its issuance of
standards on:
* Leases (Aren't the financial commitments of the
lessee a liability?) * Pensions (How can the pension intangible asset really
be an asset as it has no real world referent?) * Stock options (Why did the
board not require the expensing of stock options in the 1990s when stock
options clearly involve real costs to the firm?), and * Special purpose
entities (Why did the board wait for the collapse of Enron before dealing
with this issue?).
Clearly, the low power of FASB -- IASB likewise
possesses little power -- explains some of these decisions, but it is
frustrating nonetheless to see the board ignore its own conceptual
framework. Why engage in this deliberation unless FASB is prepared to follow
through?
J. EDWARD KETZ is accounting professor at The Pennsylvania
State University. Dr. Ketz's teaching and research interests focus on
financial accounting, accounting information systems, and accounting ethics.
He is the author of
Hidden Financial Risk, which explores the causes of recent
accounting scandals. He also has edited
Accounting Ethics, a four-volume set that explores ethical
thought in accounting since the Great Depression and across several
countries.
December 7, 2004 message from Carnegie President
[carnegiepresident@carnegiefoundation.org]
A different way to think about ... Professional
Education This month's Carnegie Perspective is written by Carnegie Senior
Scholar William Sullivan, whose extensively revised second edition of Work and
Integrity was just released by Jossey-Bass. The Perspective is based on the
book's argument that in today's environment of unrelenting economic and social
pressures, in which professional models of good work come under increasing
strain, the professions need their educational centers more than ever as
resources and as rallying points for renewal.
Since our goal in Carnegie Perspectives is to
contribute to the dialogue on issues and to provide a different way to think
and talk about concerns, we have opened up the conversation by creating a
forum—Carnegie Conversations—where you can engage publicly with the author
and read and respond to what others have to say.
However, if you would prefer that your comments not
be read by others, you may still respond to the author of the piece through CarnegiePresident@carnegiefoundation.org
.
If you would like to unsubscribe to Carnegie
Perspectives, use the same address and merely type unsubscribe in the subject
line of your email to us.
We look forward to hearing from you.
Sincerely,
Lee S. Shulman President
The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching
Preparing Professionals as Moral Agents By William
Sullivan
Breakdowns in institutional reliability and
professional self-policing, as revealed in waves of scandals in business,
accounting, journalism, and the law, have spawned a cancerous cynicism on the
part of the public that threatens the predictable social environment needed
for a healthy society. For professionals to overcome this public distrust,
they must embrace a new way of looking at their role to include civic
responsibility for themselves and their profession, and a personal commitment
to a deeper engagement with society.
The highly publicized unethical behavior that we see
today by professionals is still often thought by many—physicians, lawyers,
educators, scientists, engineers—as "marginal" matters in their
fields, to be overcome in due course by the application of the value-neutral,
learned techniques of their profession. But this conventional view fails to
recognize that professionals' "problems" arise outside the sterile,
neutral and technical and instead lie within human social contexts. These are
not simply physical environments or information systems. They are networks of
social engagement structured by shared meanings, purposes, and loyalties. Such
networks form the distinctive ecology of human life.
For example, a doctor faced with today's lifestyle
diseases—obesity, addictions, cancer, strokes—rather than with infectious
biological agents, soon realizes that he or she must take into account how
individuals, groups, or whole societies lead their lives. Or in education, it
is often assumed that schools can improve student achievement by setting clear
standards and then devising teaching techniques to reach them. But this
approach has been confounded when it encounters students who do not see a
relationship between academic performance and their own goals, or when the
experience of students and parents has made trusting school authorities appear
a dubious bargain.
In order to "solve" the apparently
intractable problems of health care, education, public distrust, or developing
a humane and sustainable technological order, the strategies of intervention
employed by professionals must engage with, and if possible, strengthen, the
social networks of meaning and connection in people's lives—or their efforts
will continue to misfire or fail. And not only will they be less effective in
meeting the needs of society and the individuals who entrust their lives to
their care, but they will also find in their midst colleagues who do not
uphold the moral tenets of the profession.
The idea of the professional as neutral problem
solver, above the fray, which was launched with great expectations a century
ago, is now obsolete. A new ideal of a more engaged, civic professionalism
must take its place. Such an ideal understands, as a purely technical
professionalism does not, that professionals are inescapably moral agents
whose work depends upon public trust for its success.
Since professional schools are the portals to
professional life, they bear much of the responsibility for the reliable
formation in their students of integrity of professional purpose and identity.
In addition to enabling students to become competent practitioners,
professional schools always must provide ways to induct students into the
distinctive habits of mind that define the domain of a lawyer, a physician,
nurse, engineer, or teacher. However, the basic knowledge of a professional
domain must be revised and recast as conditions change. Today, that means that
the definition of basic knowledge must be expanded to include an understanding
of the moral and social ecology within which students will practice.
Today's professional schools will not serve their
students well unless they foster forms of practice that open possibilities of
trust and partnership with those the professions serve. Such a reorientation
of professional education means nothing less than a broadening and rebalancing
of professional identity. It means an intentional abandonment of the image of
the professional as superior and detached problem-solver. It also requires a
positive engagement. Professional education must promote the opening of
professional life to meet clients and patients as also fellow citizens,
persons with whom teachers, physicians, lawyers, nurses, accountants,
engineers, and indeed all professionals share a larger, common
"practice"—that of citizen, working to contribute particular
knowledge and specialized skills toward improving the quality of life, perhaps
especially for those most in need.
Professional schools have too often held out to their
students a notion of expert knowledge that remains abstracted from context.
Since the displacement of apprenticeship on the job by academic training in a
university setting, professional schools have tilted the definition of
professional competence heavily toward cognitive capacity, while downplaying
other crucial aspects of professional maturity. This elective affinity between
the academy's penchant for theoretical abstraction and the distanced stance of
problem solving has often obscured the key role played by the face-to-face
transmission of professional understanding and judgment from teacher to
student. This is the core of apprenticeship that must not be allowed to wither
from lack of understanding and attention.
A new civic awareness within professional preparation
could go a long way toward awakening awareness that the authentic spirit of
each professional domain represents more than a body of knowledge or skills.
It is a living culture, painfully developed over time, which represents at
once the individual practitioner's most prized possession and an asset of
great social value. Its future worth, however, will depend in large measure on
how well professional culture gets reshaped to answer these new needs of our
time
"The Practitioner-Professor Link," by Bonita K. Peterson, Christie W.
Johnson, Gil W. Crain, and Scott J. Miller, Journal of Accountancy, June 2006
---
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/jun2005/kramer.htm
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY |
PERIODIC FEEDBACK FROM PRACTITIONERS
to faculty about the strengths and
weaknesses of their graduates and their
program can help to positively influence
the accounting profession.
CPAs ALSO CAN INSPIRE STUDENTS’
education by providing internship
opportunities for accounting students,
or serving as a guest speaker in class.
MEMBERSHIP ON A UNIVERSITY’S ACCOUNTING
advisory council permits a CPA to
interact with faculty on a regular basis
and directly affect the accounting
curriculum.
SERVING AS A “PROFESSOR FOR A DAY”
is another way a CPA can
promote the profession to accounting
students and answer any questions they
have.
CPAs CAN SUPPORT STUDENTS’ PROFESSIONAL
development by providing advice
on proper business attire and tips for
preparing resumes, and conducting mock
interviews.
CPAs CAN SHARE EXPERIENCES with
a professor to cowrite an instructional
case study for a journal, which can
reach countless students in classrooms
across the world.
ORGANIZING OR CONTRIBUTING to
an accounting education fund at the
university can help fund a variety of
educational purposes, such as student
scholarships and travel expenses to
professional meetings.
PARTICIPATION BY PRACTITIONERS
in the education of today’s accounting
students is a win-win-win situation for
students, CPAs and faculty. |
|
|
Role of Accounting Standards in Efficient
Equity Markets
Questions
Should you believe these many claims that the equity capital markets are
inefficient and that it's worth investing the time and money to beat the market?
Answer
A Dartmouth College finance professor would have us conclude that in recent
years the equity markets are a bit like Las Vegas. It's possible to leave Las
Vegas more than a million dollars ahead if you take high risks, but the odds are
decidedly in favor of the casinos. Similarly, it's possible to beat the stock
index funds if you take the risks, but the odds are definitely against beating
the index funds.
This we return to the age old paradox. It's rather useless to carefully
conduct a financial analysis of audited accounting reports in an effort to gain
superior knowledge to take advantage of more naive investors. On the other hand
if a sufficiently large number of investors did not make a sufficient number of
"sophisticated-knowledge" buys and sells the equity markets might be less
efficient. The sophisticated investors (apart from insiders) cannot take
advantage of naive investors because there are so many sophisticated investors.
Of course insiders can exploit efficient markets, but the SEC spends most of its
budget trying to prevent insider trading. If the SEC was not successful in this
effort by and large, the equity capital markets would cease to exist.
"Can You Beat the Market? It’s a $100 Billion Question," by Mark Hulbert,
The New York Times, March 9, 2008 ---
Click Here
The study, “The Cost of Active Investing,” began
circulating earlier this year as an academic working paper. Its author is
Kenneth R. French, a finance professor at Dartmouth; he is known for his
collaboration with Eugene F. Fama, a finance professor at the University of
Chicago, in creating the Fama-French model that is widely used to calculate
risk-adjusted performance.
In his new study, Professor French tried to make
his estimate of investment costs as comprehensive as possible. He took into
account the fees and expenses of domestic equity mutual funds (both open-
and closed-end, including exchange-traded funds), the investment management
costs paid by institutions (both public and private), the fees paid to hedge
funds, and the transactions costs paid by all traders (including commissions
and bid-asked spreads). If a fund or institution was only partly allocated
to the domestic equity market, he counted only that portion in computing its
investment costs.
Professor French then deducted what domestic equity
investors collectively would have paid if they instead had simply bought and
held an index fund benchmarked to the overall stock market, like the
Vanguard Total Stock Market Index fund, whose retail version currently has
an annual expense ratio of 0.19 percent.
The difference between those amounts, Professor
French says, is what investors as a group pay to try to beat the market.
In 2006, the last year for which he has
comprehensive data, this total came to $99.2 billion. Assuming that it grew
in 2007 at the average rate of the last two decades, the amount for last
year was more than $100 billion. Such a total is noteworthy for its sheer
size and its growth over the years — in 1980, for example, the comparable
total was just $7 billion, according to Professor French.
The growth occurred despite many developments that
greatly reduced the cost of trading, like deeply discounted brokerage
commissions, a narrowing in bid-asked spreads, and a big reduction in
front-end loads, or sales charges, paid to mutual fund companies.
These factors notwithstanding, Professor French
found that the portion of stocks’ aggregate market capitalization spent on
trying to beat the market has stayed remarkably constant, near 0.67 percent.
That means the investment industry has found new revenue sources in direct
proportion to the reductions caused by these factors.
What are the investment implications of his
findings? One is that a typical investor can increase his annual return by
just shifting to an index fund and eliminating the expenses involved in
trying to beat the market. Professor French emphasizes that this typical
investor is an average of everyone aiming to outperform the market —
including the supposedly best and brightest who run hedge funds.
Professor French’s study can also be used to show
just how different the investment arena is from a so-called zero-sum game.
In such a game, of course, any one individual’s gains must be matched by
equal losses by other players, and vice versa. Investing would be a zero-sum
game if no costs were associated with trying to beat the market. But with
the costs of that effort totaling around $100 billion a year, active
investing is a significantly negative-sum game. The very act of playing
reduces the size of the pie that is divided among the various players.
Even that, however, underestimates the difficulties
of beating an index fund. Professor French notes that while the total cost
of trying to beat the market has grown over the years, the percentage of
individuals who bear this cost has declined — precisely because of the
growing popularity of index funds.
From 1986 to 2006, according to his calculations,
the proportion of the aggregate market cap that is invested in index funds
more than doubled, to 17.9 percent. As a result, the negative-sum game
played by active investors has grown ever more negative.
The bottom line is this: The best course for the
average investor is to buy and hold an index fund for the long term. Even if
you think you have compelling reasons to believe a particular trade could
beat the market, the odds are still probably against you.
A Hedge Fund Manager's Indictment of Accountants (and the regulators)
The book also shows why good accounting really
matters. It is easy to mock finicky people with green eyeshades who worry about
financial footnotes. But reliable numbers are essential if capital is to be
allocated properly in our economy. Otherwise good projects starve and foolish
ones burn up money.
Fooling Some of the People All of the Time,
by David Einhorn (Wiley, 379 pages)
Reviewed by George Anders, "The Money Kept Vanishing," The Wall Street
Journal, April 23, 2008, Page A15 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120891268398036495.html?mod=todays_us_opinion
Most of David Einhorn's ideas work out brilliantly.
He is a 39-year-old hedge-fund manager in Manhattan who oversees $6 billion.
Bull markets? Bear markets? It hardly matters. His stock portfolio has
averaged 25% annual returns since 1996, when he opened Greenlight Capital.
Now Mr. Einhorn has written a book. But instead of
packaging the real or contrived "secrets" to his success – as cliché would
have it – he has tried to do something less triumphant and far gutsier. In
"Fooling Some of the People All of the Time," he turns the spotlight on a
single, stubborn investment play that never made much money for him but
created six years of headaches.
It is a surprisingly dark story, in which Mr.
Einhorn's usual winning touch vanishes for most of the narrative. As he
struggles to figure out why, he appears naïve at certain times, petulant at
others. But he presses on anyway, confident that vindication will come. It
never really does.
The story starts in 2002, with Mr. Einhorn rightly
proud of his ability to spot companies with shoddy accounting practices. He
sells their shares short, betting on a stock-price collapse. Generally he
wins big within months. Convinced that he has found another juicy target, he
zeroes in on Allied Capital, a business- financing company that seems to
dawdle when it comes to marking down the value of its troubled loans.
Bad call. Allied eventually did take big
write-downs – but only after the overall economy had improved, allowing
Allied to enjoy offsetting gains from other investments. Allied's stock,
rather than sinking from Mr. Einhorn's short-sale price of $26.25 a share,
climbed past $30 over the next few years.
Mr. Einhorn didn't retreat, though. He grew so
irate about the company's accounting that he alerted the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The SEC did little with his complaint; in fact, it
investigated him instead for spreading negative views about Allied.
Mr. Einhorn survived that episode and kept
hammering away. He found evidence that one of Allied's affiliates, Business
Loan Express, was making what appeared to be excessive, poorly documented
loans to operators of shrimp boats and service stations. The deals looked
like fraud to him. He tried to tip off journalists and regulators but was
mostly met with yawns.
Large chunks of "Fooling Some of the People All of
the Time" amount to an angry man's recital of his grievances – and Mr.
Einhorn has some good ones. An SEC lawyer who quizzed him aggressively about
his short-selling methods later went into private practice and registered as
a lobbyist for Allied. Mr. Einhorn, understandably, regards such a career
move as an ethics violation.
Allied also ended up with purloined copies of Mr.
Einhorn's phone records, something he had long suspected. Allied had
originally told him that it had no evidence that his phone records had been
grabbed but later admitted to getting them. He labels the company
"dishonest" at one point and expresses the hope that regulators and auditors
may still "remedy the situation." For its part, Allied calls Mr. Einhorn's
book "a self-serving rehash of the same discredited charges that Mr. Einhorn
has made for the past six years."
Without some broader significance, Einhorn v.
Allied Capital would be small beer in the chronicles of modern-day corporate
showdowns. There is no lurid scandal here involving drugs, bimbos or $6,000
shower curtains. There is no cataclysmic ending. Allied stock has faded to
about $19 in the current credit crunch but hasn't fared worse than many of
its rivals. After a long tug-of-war, Mr. Einhorn's initial short sale has
proved neither disastrous nor especially lucrative.
What gives the book a special value, beyond its
backstage look at the life of an elite trader, is its insight into two
important but usually neglected aspects of the investment business. First,
Mr. Einhorn's carefully documented battles with Allied Capital say a lot
about the temperament needed to be a great investor. Tenacity is vital. So
is patience. And so, too, is an ability to keep a sane perspective.
As Mr. Einhorn's own firm prospered, he could have
jammed far more money into his Allied Capital short position, determined to
prevail by brute force. He didn't. He kept 3% of assets in that position but
invested most of his money in other ideas that worked out better. Such
discipline, we come to realize, is what distinguishes the wisest long-term
investors from obstinate short-timers who veer between triumph and ruin.
The book also shows why good accounting really
matters. It is easy to mock finicky people with green eyeshades who worry
about financial footnotes. But reliable numbers are essential if capital is
to be allocated properly in our economy. Otherwise good projects starve and
foolish ones burn up money.
Mr. Einhorn is a hard-liner, wanting strict
accounting standards that punish missteps quickly. Allied Capital, to judge
by his version of events, liked living in a more lenient world, where there
was plenty of time to patch up problems quietly. Regulators were comfortable
with an easy-credit philosophy, too, to a degree that startled Mr. Einhorn.
In the current financial shakeout, people like Mr.
Einhorn are entitled to say: "I told you so." It's to his credit that,
telling the Allied story, he is often angry but never smug.
Controversies in Setting Accounting Standards
The roaring SEC-FASB (read that Cox-Herz) Train replacing domestic accounting
standards such as U.S. and Canadian GAAP is analogous to letting the United
Nations govern the world. Both the U.N. and the International Accounting
Standards Board have lofty intentions, but multinational politics is a nightmare
to behold
The IASB defines IFRS as a set of International Financial Reporting Standards
--- http://www.iasb.org/Home.htm
The AICPA maintains a helper site for guidance on the replacement of FASB/SEC
standards with IASB international standards ---
http://www.ifrs.com/
The American Accounting Association Commons contains, for AAA members, documents
supplied by accounting firms to help accounting educators make the transition
from domestic accounting standards to international accounting standards ---
https://commons.aaahq.org/signin
Also see
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting
And see
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#FASBvsIASB
Paul Pacter's IASB Update Presentation in Anaheim on August 4, 2008
Slides:
http://www.iasplus.com/resource/0808aaa-ifrs-is-here.pdf (PDF
141k) Resource list :
http://www.iasplus.com/resource/0808aaaifrsresources.pdf (PDF 49k)
Bob Jensen defines IFRS as International Fleecing of
Responsible Standards
International auditing firms are seeking a judgmental (read that softer) set
of standards under lobbying pressure from their large multinational clients.
Bright lines led to $billions of losses in litigation in the U.S. because a
client, with the blessing or incompetence of an auditor, crossed a line such as
the old SPE 3% line that was a huge factor in the demise of Andersen and Enron
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
I’m
presently doing a funded research study comparing FAS 133 with IAS 39. FAS 133
has lots of bright lines and lots of examples, especially
DIG examples, of
how to account for complicated hedges. IAS 39 is like driving down a mountain
road on a moonless night without any headlights, road signs, or guard rails.
With over a thousand variations of financial instrument derivative contracts and
thousands of types hedging strategies, IAS 39 lets clients manage earnings most
any way they like without detailed rules of the road and bright lines that give
them and their auditors guidance.
Eventually IFRS will be all fair value accounting on moonless nights.
Accountability is going into the ditch or over a cliff ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#FairValue
Question
What is similar between IFRS and "A Call for a Warning System on Artificial
Joints?"
Answer
The Accounting Onion, August 18, 2008 ---
http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/08/no-escaping-the.html
Notable Quotations About the SEC's New Proposals for Oil & Gas Accounting
I think I can always tell when the fix is in. First,
big lies are woven into a large dose of truth, so they won't look to be as big
as they are. There are certainly many things in the SEC's proposal to recommend
it, especially along the lines of expanding the types of reserves that would be
disclosed, and updating important definitions. Second, when the justification
for a proposal makes no sense, there can be no debate; you can't tell the
emperor he's naked. The lesson of the Cox's SEC is to never forget about the big
special interests that write big checks to the big politicians that made him
emperor for a day.
Tom Selling, "SEC on Oil and Gas Disclosures: Current Prices Aren't
'Meaningful'?" The Accounting Onion, July 25, 2008 ---
http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/07/oil-and-gas-dis.html
"Last Ditch" Effort (before Bush leaves office) by SEC Chairman to
Force IFRS on the US as a Concession to Industry and Large Accounting Firms
The sad think is that the FASB (under Bob Herz) and the SEC (under
Christopher Cox) applaud the move to UN-style accounting rule making
James D. Cox, a securities law expert at Duke Law
School who returned this week from teaching corporate law in Europe, said the
shift to international rules amounted to “outsourcing safety standards.” “We
would not for a moment tolerate having American auto safety standards set by
China or India,” he said. “Why should we do it for financial safety standards?
There has to be some accountability.”
See below
Charles Wankel (St Johns University) called my attention to this important
article
"Accounting Plan Would Allow Use of Foreign Rules," by Stephen Labaton, The
New York Times, July 5, 2008 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/05/business/05sec.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
Federal officials say they are
preparing to propose a series of regulatory changes to enhance American
competitiveness overseas, attract foreign investment and give American
investors a broader selection of foreign stocks.
But critics say the changes appear to be a
last-ditch push by appointees of President Bush to dilute securities rules
passed after the collapse of Enron and other large companies — measures that
were meant to forestall accounting gimmicks and corrupt practices that led
to those corporate failures.
Legal experts, some regulators and Democratic
lawmakers are concerned that the changes would put American investors at the
mercy of overseas regulators who enforce weaker rules and may treat
investment losses as a low priority.
Foreign regulators are beyond the reach of
Congress, which oversees American securities regulation through confirmation
proceedings, enforcement hearings and approval of the Securities and
Exchange Commission’s budget.
The commission is preparing a timetable that will
permit American companies to shift to the international rules, which are set
by a foreign organization and give companies greater latitude in reporting
earnings. Companies that have used both domestic and overseas rules have, on
average, been able to report revenues and earnings that were 6 percent to 8
percent higher under the international standards, according to accounting
experts.
Though foreign accounting standards are stronger in
some ways than American accounting principles, they are weaker in some
important areas. They enable companies, for example, to provide fewer
details about mortgage-backed securities, derivatives and other financial
instruments at the center of today’s housing crisis and that have troubled
many Wall Street firms, including Bear Stearns.
The shift to international standards could also
wind up eliminating the conflict-of-interest rules, adopted after the
collapse of Arthur Andersen and Enron, that have limited auditors from
performing both accounting work and consulting for the same client.
James D. Cox, a securities law expert at Duke Law
School who returned this week from teaching corporate law in Europe, said
the shift to international rules amounted to “outsourcing safety standards.”
“We would not for a moment tolerate having American
auto safety standards set by China or India,” he said. “Why should we do it
for financial safety standards? There has to be some accountability.”
The S.E.C. also plans to announce details of a
pilot program that would enable foreign brokers to deal directly with
American investors, while continuing to be largely regulated by the foreign
country. The first country in the program will be Australia, although
officials hope to eventually include other countries. In a third move, the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, which works under the supervision
of the S.E.C., is preparing a rule that would allow it to defer to foreign
regulators for inspections of some of the 800 foreign auditors of overseas
companies that sell stock in the United States.
The oversight board was created by the
Sarbanes-Oxley law of 2002 in response to the accounting scandals at Enron
and other large companies. The law requires the board to inspect regularly
all accounting firms that certify the financial results of companies whose
shares are sold in the United States.
Officials say the proposed changes reflect the
decades-long push toward global markets. They say the changes are necessary
to attract capital from abroad and will protect Americans as they
increasingly look to invest overseas. In the decade ending last November,
American holdings of foreign stock increased to $4.3 trillion from $1.2
trillion.
“You are seeing a world now where everything is
mobile,” Ethiopis Tafara, director of international affairs at the S.E.C.,
said in an interview. “You have securities issuers that are mobile. Broker
dealers can provide services from anywhere. Exchanges are mobile, and
electronic trading platforms don’t need a physical location. You have
capital that is mobile, it travels almost anywhere around the world.”
“When you have everything that is mobile, the way
we think about our mandate — investor protection and enforcement — has to
take this into account,” Mr. Tafara said.
Mr. Tafara said that the mutual recognition
agreement with Australia would continue to protect American investors
because the S.E.C. would continue to have the authority to prosecute foreign
companies under antifraud provisions of the law for what he called “lying,
stealing and cheating.” The S.E.C. would continue to investigate accusations
of illegal insider trading, for example, an area where the commission has
been more vigorous than many foreign jurisdictions.
But the S.E.C. would not enforce many
investor-protection laws involving issues ranging from the quiet period
before a stock offering to market manipulation, financial disclosures and
abusive trading tactics. Nor would foreign officials apply a panoply of
American securities rules that are unique in that they are intended to
protect minority shareholders. Instead, the commission would rely on its
Australian counterpart to enforce its securities regulations, which often
involve different standards.
In a speech earlier this year,
Christopher Cox, the agency’s chairman, said that working on the transition
to international accounting standards and reaching enforcement agreements
with foreign countries like the Australians were two of the most important
items on his agenda as his term comes to a close.
Continued in article
The Fairy Tale of 'True and Fair View' and a Modest Proposal for Real
'Core Principles',
The elusiveness of a meaning for 'true and fair' in
an accounting context stems from a lack of meaning for that quintessentially
British phrase in a capital markets context. Financial reporting is about
producing information: is it possible that truth telling could not result in
fair reporting? Answer: no way. Therefore, 'and fair' adds nothing whatsoever;
and besides, everyone learns in Accounting 101 that accrual accounting and
'truth' don't mix anyway. The point is that cunning Tweedie, like Soc Gen and
its auditors, can construe 'true and fair' to mean anything and at any time.
Just like the emperor in the cautionary fairy tale, IFRS wears no clothes; his
royal highness and subjects are deceived by the Tweedie tailor (pun intended) to
disbelieve their eyes, and to behave as if IFRS is adorned with some noble
British bromide.
Tom Selling, "The Fairy Tale of 'True and Fair View' and a Modest Proposal for
Real 'Core Principles'," The Accounting Onion, July 10, 2008 ---
http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/07/the-core-prin-1.html
More on how to lie with statistics
It brings to mind the joke about Bill Gates walking
into a bar and suddenly everyone in the room becomes a millionaire.
Statistically, by averaging the incomes in the room, the statement is true.
Zachary Karabell (see below)
"There Is No 'The Economy'," by Zachary Karabell, The Wall Street Journal,
June 30, 2008; Page A13 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121478256977914431.html?mod=djemEditorialPage
Once upon a time, and for most of the 20th century,
there was. The data that we use today is a product of the nation-state, and
was created in order to give government the tools to gauge the health of the
nation. The Bureau of Labor Statistics, which measures the unemployment rate
and inflation, was created around the turn of the 20th century, and for much
of that century the U.S. was a cohesive unit. It was its own most important
market, its own source of consumption, and its own source of credit.
Big-picture statistics form the basis of almost
every discussion about "the economy." But these statistics are averages
reporting one blended number that is treated as if it applies to all 300
million Americans. It brings to mind the joke about Bill Gates walking into
a bar and suddenly everyone in the room becomes a millionaire.
Statistically, by averaging the incomes in the room, the statement is true.
Macro data and big-picture statistics like GDP
growth, the unemployment rate and consumer spending are all large averages.
The fact that the economy is growing or contracting by 1% or 2% is taken as
a proxy not just for the economic health of the nation, but for the economic
health of the bulk of its citizens. The same goes for consumer spending. If
it goes up or down 2%, that is taken as representative not just of the
statistical fiction called "the American consumer" but as indicative of the
behavior and attitudes of U.S. consumers writ large.
To begin with, someone in the upper-income brackets
is living a different life than those in the lower-income brackets. The top
20% of income earners spend more than the lower 60% combined. The wealthiest
400 people have more than $1 trillion in net worth, which exceeds the
discretionary spending of the entire federal government. These groups are
all American, yet it would be stretching the facts to the breaking point to
assert that they share an economic reality. On the upper end, the soaring
price of food and fuel hardly matter; on the other end, they matter above
all else. The upper end does matter quantitatively, but the group of people
on the lower end is vastly larger and therefore has more resonance in our
public and electoral debate.
Look at housing, widely regarded as a national
calamity. The regional variations depict something different. In Stockton,
Calif., one in 75 households are in foreclosure; in Nebraska, the figure is
one in every 1,459; and the greater Omaha area is thriving. Similar
contrasts could be made between Houston and Tampa, or between Las Vegas and
Manhattan. Home prices have plunged in certain regions such as Miami-Dade,
and stayed stable in others such as San Francisco and Silicon Valley.
Houston, bolstered by soaring oil prices, has a 3.9% unemployment rate; the
rate in Detroit, depressed by a collapsing U.S. auto industry, is 6.9%. The
notion that these disparate areas share a common housing malaise or similar
employment challenges is a fiction.
We hear continual stories of the subprime economy
and its fallout on Main Street and Wall Street. All true. Yet there is also
an iPhone economy and a Blackberry economy. Ten million iPhones were sold
last year at up to $499 a pop, and estimates are for 20 million iPhones sold
this year, many at $199 each. That's billions of dollars worth of iPhones.
Add in the sales of millions of Blackberrys, GPS devices, game consoles and
so on, and you get tens of billions more.
The economy that supports the purchases of these
electronic devices is by and large not the same economy that is seeing
rampant foreclosures. The economy of the central valley of California is not
the same economy of Silicon Valley, any more than the economy of Buffalo is
the same as the economy of greater New York City. Yet in our national
discussion, it is as if those utterly crucial distinctions simply don't
exist. Corn-producing states are doing just fine; car-producing states
aren't.
The notion that the U.S. can be viewed as one
national economy makes increasingly less sense. More than half the profits
of the S&P 500 companies last year came from outside the country, yet in
indirect ways those profits did add to the economic growth in the U.S. None
of that was captured in our economic statistics, because the way we collect
data – sophisticated as it is – has not caught up to the complicated web of
capital flows and reimportation of goods by U.S.-listed entities for sale
here.
These issues are not confined to the U.S. Every
country is responsible for its own national data, and every country is
falling victim to a similar fallacy that its national data represent
something meaningful called "the economy."
In truth, what used to be "the economy" is just one
part of a global chess board, and the data we have is incomplete,
misleading, and simultaneously right and wrong. It is right given what it
measures, and wrong given what most people conclude on the basis of it.
The world is composed of hundreds of economies that
interact with one another in unpredictable and unexpected ways. We cling to
the notion of one economy because it creates an illusion of shared
experiences. As comforting as that illusion is, it will not restore a
simplicity that no longer exists, and clinging to it will not lead to viable
solutions for pressing problems.
So let's welcome this new world and discard
familiar guideposts, inadequate data and outmoded frameworks. That may be
unsettling, but it is a better foundation for wise analysis and sound
solutions than clinging to a myth.
Jensen Comment
Sadly, the same thing is happening with the state of financial reporting of
global companies. The once tough minded FASB (leases, pensions, pooling,
post-retirement benefits, stock options, derivatives, etc.) is caving in to
globalization of accounting standards that is analogous to turning over law
making to the United Nations. The goal is to "welcome this new world and discard
familiar guideposts (read that bright lines in accounting standards), inadequate
data and outmoded frameworks."
Perhaps I'm a luddite, but I do not think IASB's so-called principles-based
standards provide "a better foundation for wise analysis and sound solutions
than clinging to myth." All these principle-based standards are going to do is
make it harder to pin down CEO crooks and incompetent auditors in court.
"Accounting rule-makers putting markets at risk," by Michael Starkie,
Financial Times,.June 12 2008 ---
Click Here
Sir, Whither accounting?
I write this letter in a personal capacity. My
qualifications for expressing these opinions are that I have been chief
accountant at BP for the past 14 years and have been for some years chairman
of the UK's CBI Financial Reporting Panel and a member of the European
Financial Reporting Advisory Group Technical Expert Group.
Recent years have seen major changes in the
topography of accounting standards; acceptance by the European Union
(subject to endorsement) of International Financial Reporting Standards and
by other countries also, and the decline in the influence of US generally
accepted accounting principles as the US capital markets have become
relatively less attractive.
What a wasted opportunity, then, that the current
body of IFRS is so unhelpful for the markets when the accounting world was
given this historic opportunity to create something that should have been
both useful for markets and with the potential to be welcomed globally. I
recall a year or two ago that the heads of leading accounting firms said
that current international financial reporting was broken. But nothing has
been done about this.
And the future looks even bleaker. The
International Accounting Standards Board continues to develop an accounting
model about which users of financial information have grave misgivings.
Probably the most disturbing example is the use of predominantly
mark-to-model exit values in the balance sheet, which cannot be relevant for
a market trying to assess the economic performance and position of companies
that have the intention of continuing to operate as going concerns. In the
interests of brevity I will not list other examples though there are enough
voices of protest being raised by those in the financial world to make it
apparent that all is far from well.
How have things come to this pass? I have
concluded, albeit with regret, that the fundamental problem is the members
of the IASB. Collectively as board members they do not have the experience
and wisdom to produce and maintain accounting standards that are useful for
the capital markets and the wider economy. And some of the board members are
clearly committed to an extreme view of recognition and measurement which
will severely damage the operation of markets and ultimately economies.
Recent appointments to the board are too little and too late to change the
overall thrust.
Continued in article
Andersen's demise didn't solve the broader problem of the cozy collaboration
between auditors and their corporate clients. "This is day-to-day business in
accounting firms and on Wall Street," says former SEC Chief Accountant Lynn
Turner. "There is nothing extraordinary, nothing unusual, with respect to
Enron." Will Congress and the SEC do what's needed to restore trust in the
system?
See "More Enrons Ahead" video in the list of Frontline (from PBS) videos on
accounting and finance regulation and scandals ---
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/regulation/view/
FASB's Accounting Standards Codification ---
http://asc.fasb.org/home
FASB Master Glossary ---
http://asc.fasb.org/glossary&letter=D
The FASB's Derivatives and Hedging Glossary
(in the Accounting Standards
Codification Database) ---
http://asc.fasb.org/subtopic&trid=2229141&nav_type=left_nav
Accounting Educators should pay more attention to the following blog that
seeks out weaknesses in company filings of 10Q (and other reports) with the SEC
10Q Detective blog by David Phillips ---
http://10qdetective.blogspot.com/
Investors often overlook SEC filings, and it is the
job of the 10Q Detective to dig through businesses’ 8-K and 10-Q SEC
filings, looking for financial statement ‘soft spots,' (depreciation
policies, warranty reserves, and restructuring charges, etc.) that may
materially impact Quality of Earnings
Bob Jensen's threads on creative accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/AccountingTricks.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on the roles of listservs and blogs ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ListservRoles.htm
Accounting
Golden Fleece Quotations (read that bull crap)
I want to conclude by explaining what I mean by
"truly believe." I'm just a politician ... whoops, I mean lawyer ... who really
doesn't know much about what all you CFOs have to go through to make your
numbers. Frankly, the details of the differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP
don't concern me much. I just threw in "truly" to impress upon you that I am on
your side -- kind of like "no kidding," or "I swear." In other words, even
though I don’t have a single good answer to any of the questions I have raised
today, don’t worry, because we're going through with this anyway. I truly
believe that If IFRS is good for you, it's good for the SEC; and it must be good
for everyone.
John White, Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance, as
quoted by Tom Selling in The Accounting Onion, June 9, 2008 ---
http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/06/accounting-convergence-decoding-john-whites-speech.html
"Deloitte Puts IFRS in College Classrooms," SmartPros, May 19,
2008 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x61904.xml
Big Four accounting firm Deloitte & Touche has formed a consortium to
accelerate integration of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
into college curricula.
Through the
IFRS University Consortium, Deloitte is
contributing resources to Ohio State and Virginia Tech universities
to assist the schools in developing IFRS curricula. The
contributions to Ohio State and Virginia Tech include drafting
course materials such as classroom guides and case studies and
providing Deloitte professionals as lecturers. The classroom guides
and course materials will be made available to other interested
universities.
The
announcement was made at the Deloitte/Federation of Schools of
Accountancy (FSA) Faculty Consortium meeting in Chicago, a
curriculum development program for accounting educators that is
sponsored annually by the Deloitte Foundation, the not-for-profit
arm of Deloitte LLP.
Participating schools can benefit by having input in the direction,
goals and resources available from the consortium; participation in
periodic webcasts; sharing of best practices used in the classroom;
involvement in the development of materials; and access to the
support and guidance from Deloitte professionals, as well as to
Deloitte IFRS information resources, publications and training
sessions.
There
is no cost for institutions to join the Deloitte IFRS University
Consortium.
Continued in article |
EI's Financial Reporting Blog
Smart Stops on the Web, Journal of Accountancy, March 2008 ---
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/mar2008/smart_stops.htm
FINANCIAL REPORTING PORTAL
www.financialexecutives.org/blog
Find news highlights from the SEC, FASB and the
International Accounting Standards Board on this
financial reporting blog from Financial Executives
International. The site, updated daily, compiles
regulatory news, rulings and statements, comment letters
on standards, and hot topics from the Web’s largest
business and accounting publications and organizations.
Look for continuing coverage of SOX requirements, fair
value reporting and the Alternative Minimum Tax, plus
emerging issues such as the subprime mortgage crisis,
international convergence, and rules for tax return
preparers. |
|
Alternative (conventional accounting) rules may, for
the individual citizen, mean the difference between employment and unemployment,
reliable products and dangerous ones, enriching experiences and oppressive ones,
stimulating work environments and dehumanising ones, care and compassion for the
old and sick versus intolerance and resentment.
Tony Tinker, 1985
Financial Reporting should provide information that
is useful to present and potential investors and creditors and other users in
making rational investment, credit and similar decisions ...(through the
provision of information that will help them to assess)..... the amount, timing
and uncertainty of net cash inflows to the related enterprise
FASB Concept Number 1 of the Conceptual Framework, 1978
"Bear Stearns: SEC Can't Serve
Brokerage Clients and Shareholders Simultaneously," by Tom Selling, The
Accounting Onion, March 19, 2008 ---
http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/03/the-sec-has-bee.html
The
SEC has been one of the most prominent
and well-respected of federal agencies
during most of its history. Strict
adherence to a focused mission on
disclosure in regards to the regulation
of financial reporting by public
companies has been its trademark.
Having said that, however, the SEC has
been far from pristine in implementing a
disclosure-only policy. Certain actions
could be characterized by some as a form
of “merit regulation”—some companies may
have been unfairly subject to undue
scrutiny, and others may have received
an undeserved pass. The SEC has also
used its broad powers to make rules
requiring added disclosures in some
circumstances, and allowing abbreviated
disclosures in others. For example, the
SEC has added disclosure requirements to
the offering documents of “blank check”
companies, and also provided disclosure
accommodations to smaller and foreign
companies.
But, if some were to criticize the SEC
for merit regulation, cavils of this
sort are on the fringes of SEC
activity. And, most important to the
criticisms I'm fixin' to deliver, they
all relate to the regulatory activities
concerning disclosures by
companies to the SEC. But now, an SEC
official -- the chair, no less -- has
seen fit to make gratuitous disclosures
for certain
public companies.
Here's the situation. Last Tuesday
(March 11, 2008), SEC Chair Christopher
Cox made the following statement to
reporters: "We have a good deal of
comfort about the capital cushions that
these firms [the five largest investment
banks, which included Bear Stearns] have
been on." (http://www.cnbc.com/id/23576630)
At the time,
Bear's stock was at $60, a five-year
low, and just the day before, Bear
issued a press release denying rumors of
liquidity problems. The stock tumbled
to $30 early Friday, and over the
weekend, JP Morgan struck a deal to buy
Bear Stearns for a paltry $2 per share.
(For reasons I don't want to cover here,
the current market price as I write this
is around $5 per share.)
It's a serious thing that investors may
have relied on false and misleading
information issued by
Bear Stearns, but it is quite another
for the SEC to have issued information
for Bear
Stearns. (I am trying to making a
principled statement here, so that fact
that investors who relied on that
information got taken to the cleaners is
notable, though not the sole basis of my
critique.) Heretofore, a company either
complies with the disclosure rules, or
it doesn’t; the SEC doesn’t make
congratulatory announcements for
companies it finds to have been
exemplary compliers, disclosers, or what
have you. But if you fail to comply,
then that’s when the SEC will tell the
world about you; there are thousands of
examples of the consistent
implementation of this policy.
I imagine that Cox would defend himself
on the basis that the SEC is in a
curious position with respect to
companies like Bear Stearns. One of the
many jobs given to the SEC by Congress
is to monitor the “capital adequacy” of
broker-dealers. The objective is to
provide a form of protection for the
assets of clients who have deposited
cash and securities with
broker-dealers. Thus, the SEC is
serving two masters, having very
different interests in Bear Stearns:
clients and shareholders.
When Cox chose to speak about Bear
Stearns last Tuesday, both groups of
Bear Stearns stakeholders were
listening, and at least some in each
group responded with diametrically
opposite courses of action:
• Some clients of Bear may have
been calmed, but too many disregarded
Cox’s assurances, took their money and
ran;
•
Some investors on the verge of selling
their shares had a change of mind -- and
some may have even bought stock based on
his assurances.
Cox should have known that he was
unavoidably sending a signal of
encouragement to jittery investors who
were trying to decide whether or not to
buy, hold, or sell shares of Bear
Stearns. If SEC history is any guide,
it was simply not appropriate for him to
have done so. Just as a real estate
agent cannot claim to represent parties
on both sides of a transaction, the SEC
cannot claim to be "the investor's
advocate" at the same moment they are
functioning as the public relations
spokesperson for the investee. It would
have been far better to have left the
public relations role to other
government officials.
The question of how much SEC credibility
has been lost is difficult for me to
judge. Assuming this were an isolated
instance, it would be significant. But
seen as the latest in a series of
questionable actions reflecting the
SEC's stance on investor protection, the
Bear Stearns case is just more
confirming evidence of an altered SEC
culture. I am sad to say that the
process of restoring credibility to a
once peerless agency cannot begin until
there is a new chair.
Bob Jensen's threads on the controversies of accounting standards ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting
Also see
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#TripleBottom
"FASB Issues GAAP Hierarchy," SmartPros, May 12, 2008 ---
http://lyris.smartpros.com/t/985109/6637240/5059/0/
The Financial Accounting Standards Board on
Friday issued FASB Statement No. 162, The Hierarchy of Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles.
The new standard is intended to improve financial
reporting by identifying a consistent framework, or hierarchy, for selecting
accounting principles to be used in preparing financial statements that are
presented in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles
for nongovernmental entities.
Prior to the issuance of Statement 162, GAAP
hierarchy was defined in the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 69, The Meaning of
Present Fairly in Conformity With Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.
SAS 69 has been criticized because it is directed
to the auditor rather than the entity. Statement 162 addresses these issues
by establishing that the GAAP hierarchy should be directed to entities
because it is the entity (not its auditor) that is responsible for selecting
accounting principles for financial statements that are presented in
conformity with GAAP.
Statement 162 is effective 60 days following the
SEC's approval of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Auditing
amendments to AU Section 411, The Meaning of Present Fairly in Conformity
with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. It is only effective for
nongovernmental entities; therefore, the GAAP hierarchy will remain in SAS
69 for state and local governmental entities and federal governmental
entities.
February 5, 2008 message from Robert B Walker
[walkerrb@ACTRIX.CO.NZ]
For those of you who are interested in such things,
there has been a significant change in the wording of IAS32 (para 18b).
Previously, the standard was interpreted to require all managed or mutual
funds to display sums due to unitholders as liabilities. The standard was
not as rigid as was supposed as it used the expression ‘may’ not ‘must’ (see
below). Nonetheless most of the managed funds in my part of the world
(Australia & NZ) rushed, lemming like, headlong into creating that
accounting anomaly, the ’equityless’ entity.
It didn’t seem to matter to them that an entity
without equity is utterly inconsistent with the concepts set out in the
Framework (the IASB version of the conceptual framework) in that the notions
of revenue, expense and income pivot on the existence of equity. Without
equity there can be no income. Without income there can be no complete set
of financial statements as required by IAS1. Notwithstanding this
irregularity, the IASB saw fit to include an example in the Appendices to
IAS32 which specifically provided an example of an ‘equityless’ entity.
Now there is a elaborate variation in the
definitions in IAS32 which carefully carves out entities such as managed
funds and co-operative companies so that a residual, subordinate interest
assumes its rightful place as equity.
But it was never necessary. Consider this little
example. If the reader were to follow this link http://www.mfsgroup.com.au/managed-funds/premium-income-fund/
he or she would see that an announcement had been made, the effect of which
is to suspend redemptions from a fund that has been adversely affected by
the ‘credit crunch’ emanating from America. This fund is named, ironically,
the MFS Premium Income Fund. Perhaps it might be renamed the ‘not quite so
premium repayment of capital invested fund’, but I digress.
If the reader was to follow the links still further
to the financial statements (Annual Report on the right) they would discover
a set of financials drawn up in accordance with IFRS, or at least the
Australian version thereof. The reader would then find that the $880 million
of unitholders’ funds was a liability (see balance sheet page 29). The
reader will also note that it isn’t really classified as such as the
remainder of the requirements in respect to liabilities aren’t met. But
anyway the presentation holds itself out as a liability.
And what was that classification based on? It was
based on this:
‘For example, open-ended mutual funds … may provide
their unitholders … with a right to redeem their interests in the issuer at
any time for cash’ ( emphasis added).
Funny that … what it doesn’t say is ‘at any time
for cash unless the manager doesn’t want to give it to them’.
The truth of the matter is that the unitholders’
funds were never liabilities because the trust deed or some other founding
document or agreement always gave the manager the right to suspend. Yet the
preparers ignored this provision. When I say the preparers I really the mean
the auditors, because, if my experience is anything to go by, the auditors
are leading the charge on this matter and they will not listen to cogent
argument to the contrary. I turned out to be right and they were wrong.
What are the lessons from this?
First, the auditors do not have a monopoly on
wisdom. They need to be challenged when they assert primacy, a primacy which
I understand is asserted initially in London and disseminated across the
rest of the world.
Second, IFRS are very poorly drafted and can clash
with the concepts that purportedly underlie them. Whilst we cannot escape
the depredations anytime soon, Americans should be very concerned. The
Europeans, in a triumphalist tone, now openly say that IFRS will replace the
existing US GAAP (FAS etc.) (see Accountancy Jan 2008 page 114)*. This would
be a travesty. For whilst FAS have their problems they are at least drafted
by people who have a vague idea about accounting.
For those of you in the USA, you should be very
afraid. Maybe not, the byzantine IFRS, in my view, sound the death knell of
standard setting as we know it.
RBW
*PS: the same Accountancy magazine has the
following fascinating little exchange in regard to Northern Rock (or Wreck
as it is sometimes called between the head of assurance at PWC and an
investigating Member of Parliament (a Mr Fallon). This fiasco has cost the
UK Government about $US100 to $US150 billion so far.
‘[Head of Assurance] said that PWC did not advise
on the securitizations [of loans], but was responsible for writing ‘comfort
letters’ that were used in prospectuses aimed at potential investors.
This riled Fallon, who retorted: ‘You have audited
and provided comfort to the biggest banking disaster for 150 years.’
"FASB Governance: Damn the Feedback, Full Speed Ahead to IFRS!," by
Tom Selling, The Accounting Onion, February 26, 2008 ---
http://accountingonion.typepad.com/
The Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF), the body
that governs the FASB, has issued a
press release announcing the results of their one
meeting to consider the feedback on their proposals to change the way the
FASB operates. To reiterate from a prior
post (though somewhat less gentle this time!) the
proposing document was a model of obfuscation. It was clear from the outset
that FAF wasn't at all interested in knowing what anyone else had to say
about reducing the size of the FASB, voting rules, or how the FASB would set
its agenda. Any discussion of past problems, current needs, etc. were vague
(more accurately, not mentioned) in a thinly veiled attempt to frustrate and
limit comments. It certainly frustrated me; I abandoned the effort as soon
as I realized that anything I wrote could, by design, amount to no more than
the equivalent of shooting at a flea with an elephant gun while
blindfolded.
So, predictably -- and despite the clear protests
of Financial Executives International, the CFA Institute and numerous former
board members -- all the proposals passed muster with flying colors. One of
my readers, who shall remain anonymous, wrote to me soon after he heard the
FAF news to tell me that he had spoken to a former FASB project manager
about it, and the only comment he had was "unbelievable."
Would You Trust the Future of U.S. GAAP to
These Guys?
The rat I had been smelling for weeks walked right
into the middle of the room during the
FAF press conference in which its members
rationalized their actions with comments to the effect that requiring new
board members to all have knowledge of "investing" (whatever that means)
will assure that the entire board will give adequate consideration to
investor needs. Right. Guess who will be excluded: someone to replace
Donald Young, the current investor representative, whose term expires this
year; and you can forget about any more academics, lest some pesky dissenter
asks too many uncomfortable questions that could slow down the IFRS
convergence train.
And, what kind of convergence are we going to get
under the new FASB? If facilitating a constructive and stable convergence
with IFRS is the real goal, why is it appropriate for the IASB to have
fourteen members, and now the FASB only five? No good answer.
Why is it appropriate for the IASB to require a super-majority vote of nine
members to adopt a new rule, and the FASB only a simple majority of three --
the FASB chair, who now sets the agenda, plus two handpicked shills? No
good answer. What evidence is there that it will be difficult to find
new board members who are sufficiently knowledgeable of IFRS to hit the
ground running when they are appointed? LOL.
It's obvious to me that the real goal
is not a convergence to benefit U.S. investors; for that would
require careful study, thinking and time. The real goal is
quick-and-dirty convergence -- so that the big audit firms can get on with
the business of charging large fees for the accounting changeovers while at
the same time lowering their long-term audit risk -- and so that their
clients can manage earnings with less fear of interference by the SEC (see
my earlier posts
here and
here for the reasons why this is so, and why it is
harmful to investors).
Speaking of the SEC, What's Their Take?
By the way, FASB's pronouncements are rules for
public companies to follow whilst the SEC so deigns. One would think,
therefore, that the SEC would have taken more than a passing interest in
changes to how the FASB is organized and governed. Yet, I haven't noticed a
peep out of Conrad Hewitt, the SEC's chief accountant. Given his recent
track record, I can't say I'm surprised. All I can say is that I'm glad
that I served in the Office of the Chief Accountant in a different era.
Under the current administration the SEC has become more the captain of the
public company cheerleaders and less the watchdog of investors.
It's a shame.
Bob Jensen's threads on the history of and controversy of accounting
standard setting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting
Question
Are our U.S. standard setters bent transitioning to IFRS (and its loopholes) in
the U.S. like fools rushing in where angels fear to tread?
"IFRS Chaos in France: The Incredible Case of Société Générale," by Tom
Selling, The Accounting Onion, March 7, 2008 ---
http://accountingonion.typepad.com/
IFRS Chaos in France: The Incredible Case of
Société Générale "Breaking
the Rules and Admitting It" is the title of Floyd
Norris's column describing the accounting by Société Générale for the losses
incurred by their rogue trader Jérôme Kerviel; the title is provocative
enough, but it's still not adequate to describe this amazing story. Although
I am reluctant to come off as a prudish American unfairly criticizing suave
and sophisticated French norms, what Société and its auditors have
perpetrated would be regarded here as the accounting equivalent of
pornography.
I don't aim to re-write Norris's excellent column,
who rightly asks what a case like this says about the prospects for IFRS
adoption in the U.S. But, I want to make two additional points. To tee them
up, here's an encapsulation of the sordid tale:
Société Générale chose to lump Kerviel's 2008
trading losses in 2007's income statement, thus netting the losses of the
later year with his gains of the previous year. There is no disputing that
the losses occurred in 2008, yet the company's position is that application
of specific IFRS rules (very simply, marking derivatives to market) would,
for reasons unstated, result in a failure of the financial statements to
present a "true and fair view." You might also be interested to know that
the financial statements of French companies are opined on by not just one
-- but two -- yes, two -- auditors. Even by invoking the "true and fair"
exception, Société Générale must still be in compliance with IFRS as both
E&Y and D&T have concurred. How could both auditors be wrong? C'est
imposible. The first point I want to make is that Société's motives to
commit such transparent and ridiculous shenanigans are not clearly apparent
from publicly available information. My unsubstantiated hunch is that it has
to do with executive compensation. For example, could it be that 2007
bonuses have already been determined on same basis that did not have to
include the trading losses (maybe based on stock price appreciation)?
Moreover, pushing the losses back to 2007 could have bee the best way to
clear the decks for 2008 bonuses, which could be based on reported earnings
-- since the stock price has already tanked.
The second point was made by Lynn Turner, former
SEC Chief Accountant in a recent email. The PCAOB and SEC are considering a
policy of mutual recognition of audit firms whereby the PCAOB would promise
not to inspect foreign auditors opining on financial statements filed with
the SEC. Instead, the U.S. investors would have to settle for the
determination of foreign authorities. Thus, if the French regulators saw
nothing wrong with the actions of local auditors -- even operating under the
imprimaturs of EY or D&T -- then the PCAOB could not say otherwise.
Never mind the black eye the Société debacle gives
IFRS, this sordid case must surely signal the SEC that mutual recognition
would be a step too far; however, I'm not counting on the current SEC
leadership to get the message.
"Loophole Lets Bank Rewrite the Calendar," by Floyd Norris, The New York
Times, March 7. 2008 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/07/business/07norris.html?ref=business
It is not often that a major international bank
admits it is violating well-established accounting rules, but that is what
Société Générale has done in accounting for the fraud that caused the bank
to lose 6.4 billion euros — now worth about $9.7 billion — in January.
In its financial statements for 2007, the French
bank takes the loss in that year, offsetting it against 1.5 billion euros in
profit that it says was earned by a trader, Jérôme Kerviel, who concealed
from management the fact he was making huge bets in financial futures
markets.
In moving the loss from 2008 — when it actually
occurred — to 2007, Société Générale has created a furor in accounting
circles and raised questions about whether international accounting
standards can be consistently applied in the many countries around the world
that are converting to the standards.
While the London-based International Accounting
Standards Board writes the rules, there is no international organization
with the power to enforce them and assure that companies are in compliance.
In its annual report released this week, Société
Générale invoked what is known as the “true and fair” provision of
international accounting standards, which provides that “in the extremely
rare circumstances in which management concludes that compliance” with the
rules “would be so misleading that it would conflict with the objective of
financial statements,” a company can depart from the rules.
In the past, that provision has been rarely used in
Europe, and a similar provision in the United States is almost never
invoked. One European auditor said he had never seen the exemption used in
four decades, and another said the only use he could recall dealt with an
extremely complicated pension arrangement that had not been contemplated
when the rules were written.
Some of the people who wrote the rule took
exception to its use by Société Générale.
“It is inappropriate,” said Anthony T. Cope, a
retired member of both the I.A.S.B. and its American counterpart, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board. “They are manipulating earnings.”
John Smith, a member of the I.A.S.B., said: “There
is nothing true about reporting a loss in 2007 when it clearly occurred in
2008. This raises a question as to just how creative they are in
interpreting accounting rules in other areas.” He said the board should
consider repealing the “true and fair” exemption “if it can be interpreted
in the way they have interpreted it.”
Société Générale said that its two audit firms,
Ernst & Young and Deloitte & Touche, approved of the accounting, as did
French regulators. Calls to the international headquarters of both firms
were not returned, and Société Générale said no financial executives were
available to be interviewed.
In the United States, the Securities and Exchange
Commission has the final say on whether companies are following the nation’s
accounting rules. But there is no similar body for the international rules,
although there are consultative groups organized by a group of European
regulators and by the International Organization of Securities Commissions.
It seems likely that both groups will discuss the Société Générale case, but
they will not be able to act unless French regulators change their minds.
“Investors should be troubled by this in an I.A.S.B.
world,” said Jack Ciesielski, the editor of The Analyst’s Accounting
Observer, an American publication. “While it makes sense to have a ‘fair and
true override’ to allow for the fact that broad principles might not always
make for the best reporting, you need to have good judgment exercised to
make it fair for investors. SocGen and its auditors look like they were
trying more to appease the class of investors or regulators who want to
believe it’s all over when they say it’s over, whether it is or not.”
Not only had the losses not occurred at the end of
2007, they would never have occurred had the activities of Mr. Kerviel been
discovered then. According to a report by a special committee of Société
Générale’s board, Mr. Kerviel had earned profits through the end of 2007,
and entered 2008 with few if any outstanding positions.
But early in January he bet heavily that both the
DAX index of German stocks and the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx index would go up.
Instead they fell sharply. After the bank learned of the positions in
mid-January, it sold them quickly on the days when the stock market was
hitting its lowest levels so far this year.
In its annual report, Société Générale says that
applying two accounting rules — IAS 10, “Events After the Balance Sheet
Date,” and IAS 39, “Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement” —
would have been inconsistent with a fair presentation of its results. But it
does not go into detail as to why it believes that to be the case.
One rule mentioned, IAS 39, has been highly
controversial in France because banks feel it unreasonably restricts their
accounting. The European Commission adopted a “carve out” that allows
European companies to ignore part of the rule, and Société Générale uses
that carve out. The commission ordered the accounting standards board to
meet with banks to find a rule they could accept, but numerous meetings over
the past several years have not produced an agreement.
Investors who read the 2007 annual report can learn
the impact of the decision to invoke the “true and fair” exemption, but
cannot determine how the bank’s profits would have been affected if it had
applied the full IAS 39.
It appears that by pushing the entire affair into
2007, Société Générale hoped both to put the incident behind it and to
perhaps de-emphasize how much was lost in 2008. The net loss of 4.9 billion
euros it has emphasized was computed by offsetting the 2007 profit against
the 2008 loss.
It may have accomplished those objectives, at the
cost of igniting a debate over how well international accounting standards
can be policed in a world with no international regulatory body.
From Jim Mahar's blog on January 25,
2008 ---
Kerviel joins ranks of
master rogue traders:
"In being identified as the lone wolf
behind French investment bank Société
Générale's staggering $7.1-billion loss
Thursday, Jérôme Kerviel joined the
ranks of a rare and elite handful of
rogue traders whose audacious
transactions have single-handedly
brought some of the world's financial
powerhouses to their knees.
This notorious company includes Nick
Leeson, who brought down Britain's
Barings Bank in 1995 by blowing
$1.4-billion, Yasuo Hamanaka, who
squandered $2.6-billion on fraudulent
copper deals for Sumitomo Corp. of Japan
in 1998, John Rusnak, who frittered away
$750-million through unauthorized
currency trading for Allied Irish Bank
in 2002 and Brian Hunter of Calgary, who
oversaw the loss of $6-billion on hedge
fund bets at Amaranth Advisors in 2006.
|
Bob Jensen's threads on "Rotten to the Core" are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
On January 30, 2008 Dr. Andrew D. Bailey, Jr. (former AAA president, SEC
Deputy Chief Accountant, and faculty member at several universities) wrote a
long letter to the U.S. Department of Treasury's Advisory Committee on the
Accounting Profession.
January 30, 2008
Mr. Arthur Levitt, Jr.
Mr. Don Nicolaisen
Advisory Committee on the Accounting Profession
Office of Financial Institutions Policy, Room 1418
Department of the Treasury
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20220
Dear Mr. Levitt and Mr. Nicolaisen:
I am pleased to submit comments about a number of the
issues under consideration by the Treasury Department’s Advisory Committee
on the Auditing Profession. I would be pleased to discuss my views with the
Committee or the Staff.
You can read the letter at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Bailey2008.htm
From the Publisher of the
AccountingWeb on June 19, 2008
Some friends of ours are
currently on vacation in Russia, which got me to thinking, "I wonder what
it's like to be an accountant in Russia?" I have no idea. It wasn't all that
long ago that International Financial Reporting Standards were adopted by
the Russian Finance Ministry, so it's probably been a rather challenging
profession as of late! If you have any first-hand knowledge of accounting in
the Russian Federation, please
e-mail me so we can
share it with AccountingWEB readers.
In the meantime, here are some key Russian facts:
- Population: 142 million
- Largest city (and
capital): Moscow
- Second largest city:
St. Petersburg
- Size: the largest
country in the world by more than 2.5 million square miles
- Ethnic groups:
Russian 79.8%,
Tatar 3.8%,
Ukrainian 2%,
other 14.4%
Rob Nance
Publisher
AccountingWEB, Inc.
publisher@accountingweb.com
Bob Jensen's reply to Rob Nance
Hi Rob,
A better
question is to ask what accounting became in Russia after the breakup of the
Soviet Union ---
http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/janfeb99/pgs22-25.htm
The system is highly geared to tax reporting and has a long ways to go
relative to IFRS.
Accounting
in the former Soviet Union was pretty much an exercise in tabulating fiction
---
http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=6827120
Accounting was an instrument of
the planning and control process that substituted for market-based controls
---
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-6281.1974.tb00002.x?cookieSet=1&journalCode=abac
Russia now has offices of the Big 4 accounting
firms and maybe other Western CPA firms as well. One of my former students
accepted a transfer to the PwC office in Moscow. It proved to be a
fast-track to becoming a partner in PwC. Russian companies are seeking
equity investors throughout the world, and to do so they have to add
accounting assurances much like the other companies in the global economy
seek assurances.
KPMG has a publication comparing IFRS with
Russian GAAP ---
http://snipurl.com/russiangaap
Also see
http://www.kpmg.ru/index.thtml/en/services/assurance/IFRS/IFRSpublications/
PwC has an IFRS Transition document at
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/service.nsf/docid/90828387207B28F78025717B0038B2AD
Results of a 2006 survey are reported at
http://snipurl.com/russiangaapsurvey
Deloitte links to a Russian translation of
IFRS as well as providing information on transitioning to IFRS in Russia ---
http://www.iasplus.com/country/russia.htm
A illustrative Russian set of financial
statements can be found at
http://www.dixy.ru/en_invest-report/
Hope this helps!
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting history,
theory, and controversies ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting firm
scandals and lawsuits ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
Bob Jensen's homepage with links to a lot of
other accounting documents ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/
Bright Lines versus Accounting Principles
More Reasons Why Tom and I Hate Principles-Based Accounting Standards
"Contingent Liabilities: A Troubling Signpost on the Winding Road to a Single
Global Accounting Standard," by Tom Selling, The Accounting Onion, May 26, 2008
---
Click Here
By the logic of others, which I can’t explain,
fuzzy lines in accounting standards have come to be exalted as
“principles-based” and bright lines are disparaged as “rules-based.” One of
my favorite examples (actually a pet peeve) of this phenomenon is the
difference in the accounting for leases between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. The
objective of the financial reporting game is to capture as much of the
economic benefits of an asset as possible, while keeping the contractual
liability for future lease payments off the balance sheet; a win is scored
an “operating lease,” and a loss is scored a “capital lease.” As in tennis,
If the present value of the minimum lease payments turns out to be even a
hair over the 90% line of the leased asset’s fair value, your shot is out
and you lose the point.
The counterpart to FAS 13 in IFRS is IAS 17, a
putative principles-based standard. It’s more a less a carbon copy of FAS 13
in its major provisions, except that bright lines are replaced with fuzzy
lines: if the present value of the minimum lease payments is a “substantial
portion” (whatever that means) of the leased asset’s fair value, you lose
operating lease accounting. If FAS 13 is tennis, then IAS 17 is
tennis-without-lines. Either way, the accounting game has another twist: the
players call the balls landing on their side of the net; and the only job of
the umpire—chosen and compensated by each player—is to opine on the
reasonableness of their player's call. So, one would confidently expect that
the players of tennis-without- lines have a much lower risk of being
overruled by their auditors… whoops, I meant umpires.
Although lease accounting is one example for which
GAAP is bright-lined and IFRS is the fuzzy one, the opposite is sometimes
the case, with accounting for contingencies under FAS 5 or IAS 37 being a
prime exaple. FAS 5 requires recognition of a contingent liability when it
is “probable” that a future event will result in the occurrence of a
liability. What does “probable” mean? According to FAS 5, it means “likely
to occur.” Wow, that sure clears things up. With a recognition threshold as
solid as Jell-o nailed to a tree and boilerplate footnote disclosures to
keep up appearances, there should be little problem persuading one’s
handpicked independent auditor of the “reasonableness” of any in or out
call.
IAS 37 has a similar recognition threshold for a
contingent liability (Note: I am adopting U.S. terminology throughout, even
though "contingent liabilities" are referred to as "provisions" in IAS 37).
But in refreshing contrast to FAS 5, IAS 37 unambiguously nails down the
definition of “probable” to be “more likely than not” —i.e., just a hair
north of 50%. Naively assuming that companies actually comply with the
letter and spirit of IAS 37, then more liabilities should find their way
onto the balance sheet under IFRS than GAAP. And, IAS 37 also has more
principled rules for measuring a liability, once recognized. But, I won’t
get into that here. Just please take my word for it that IAS 37 is to FAS 5
as steak is to chopped liver.
The Global Accounting Race to the Bottom
And so we have the IASB’s ineffable ongoing
six-year project to make a hairball out of IAS 37. If these two standards,
IAS 37 and FAS 5, are to be brought closer together as the ballyhooed
Memorandum of Understanding between IASB and FASB should portend, it would
make much more sense for the FASB to revise FAS 5 to make it more like IAS
37. After all, convergence isn’t supposed to take forever; even if you don’t
think IAS 37 is perfect, there are a lot more serious problems IASB could be
working harder on: leases, pensions, revenue recognition, securitizations,
related party transactions, just to name a few off the top of my head. But,
the stakeholders in IFRS are evidently telling the IASB that they get their
jollies from tennis without lines. And, the IASB, dependent on the big boys
for funding, is listening real close.
Basically, the IASB has concluded that all present
obligations – not just those that are more likely than not to result in an
outflow of assets – should be recognized. It sounds admirably principled and
ambitious, but there’s a catch. In place of the bright-line probability
threshold in IAS 37, there would be the fuzziest line criteria one could
possibly devise: the liability must be capable of “reliable” measurement. We
know that "probable" without further guidance must at least lie between 0
and 1, but what amount of measurement error is within range of “reliable”?
The answer, it seems, would be left to the whim of the issuer followed by
the inevitable wave-your-hands-in-the-air rubber stamp of the auditor.
It’s not as if the IASB doesn’t have history from
which to learn. Where the IASB is trying to go in revising IAS 37, we’ve
already been in the U.S. The result was all too often not a pretty sight as
unrecognized liabilities suddenly slammed into balance sheets like freight
trains. As I discussed in an earlier post, retiree health care liabilities
were kept off balance sheets until they were about to break unionized
industrial companies. Post-retirement benefits were doled out by earlier
generations of management, long departed with their generous termination
benefits, in order to persuade obstreperous unions to return to the assembly
lines. GM and Ford are now on the verge of settling faustian bargains of
their forbearers with huge cash outlays: yet for decades the amount
recognized on the balance sheet was precisely nil. The accounting for these
liabilities had been conveniently ignored, with only boilerplate disclosures
in their stead, out of supposed concern for reliable measurement. Yet,
everyone knew that zero as the answer was as far from correct as Detroit is
from Tokyo – where, as in most developed countries, health care costs of
retirees are the responsibility of government.
Holding the recognition of a liability hostage to
“reliable” measurement is bad accounting. There is just no other way I can
put it. If this is the way the IASB is going to spend its time as we are
supposed to be moving to a single global standard, then let the race to the
bottom begin.
Bob Jensen's threads on lease accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#Leases
Bob Jensen's threads on synthetic leases ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/00overview/speOverview.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on intangibles and contingencies ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes
Question
Why did FTI Consulting switch auditors in 2006?
Answer
Either a reason or an excuse was provided by Ernst & Young when dropping this
go-go client
"FTI Switches from Ernst to KPMG," April 26, 2006 ---
http://www.big4.com/AlumniBlogs/April2006/FTI-Switches-from-Ernst-to-KPMG.htm
Here’s an interesting development of how auditor
independence issues can impact firm-client relationships.
FTI Consulting (NYSE: FCN), a premier provider of
problem-solving consulting and technology services to major corporations,
financial institutions and law firms, recently announced that it had
switched from Ernst and Young to KPMG as its public auditor for 2006.
The reason: Ernst wants to hire FTI as a consulting
vendor, and believes that its independence could be impaired if E&Y
continues to be the auditor for FTI. So both firms reach an agreement that
FTI should no longer have E&Y as an auditor after Q1-2006. According to FTI,
there have been no disagreements with or adverse opinions expressed by E&Y
for 2004 and 2005. FTI then switches to KPMG as an independent auditor.
If we read this correctly, E&Y loses FTI’s audit
fees and has to pay FTI’s consulting fees, so it is getting impacted
financially on two fronts. We take it that they must have really wanted
FTI’s services to go these lengths.
In terms of background…..FTI Consulting was founded
by Daniel W. Luczak and Joseph R. Reynolds in 1982. It was formerly known as
Forensic Technologies International Corporation and subsequently changed its
name to FTI Consulting, Inc. The company is based in Baltimore, Maryland.
From The Wall Street Journal Weekly Accounting Review on May 2, 2008
Is FTI Consulting As Good as It Looks?
by Karen
Richardson
The Wall Street Journal
Apr 28, 2008
Page: C1
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120934061032248377.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
TOPICS: Accounting,
Earn-Outs, Financial
Accounting, Financial Statement Presentation, Financial
Statements, Forgivable Loans
SUMMARY: FTI
Consulting looks like a great place to make money, judging by
its financials. But for investors, looks can be deceiving. The
company is structuring some transactions in creative ways that
result in a favorable appearance on the financial statements.
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: This article shows students how transactions
that are presented on the financial statements in a way that is
not technically wrong can still misrepresent the condition of
the company to the users of the financial statements.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Advanced) What are "earn-outs?" How does FTI
utilize earn-outs? Why does the firm choose to use earn-outs?
2. (Advanced) How does FTI represent the earn-outs on
its financial statements? Is FTI's accounting treatment
considered proper under GAAP? How could the users of the
financial statements misunderstand this transaction as it is
presented on the financial statements?
3. (Advanced) What does one financial manager suggest
must be done to the FTI financial statements to get a true
picture of the earn-out transactions? Do you agree with his
assessment? Why or why not?
4. (Introductory) Do you think that FTI is structuring
the earn-outs to make its financial statements look favorable?
Why or why not? What are the long-term consequences of
presenting the earn-outs in this manner?
5. (Introductory) Could FTI present the earn-outs as
compensation expense? Would that be a violation of GAAP?
6. (Advanced) Why does FTI give forgivable loans? Who
is benefited? How are forgivable loans presented on FTI
financial statements? What are the effects of forgivable loans
on the financial statements?
7. (Advanced) What are the ethical implications of FTI
using these presentations of earn-outs and forgivable loans to
compensate its employees?
SMALL GROUP
ASSIGNMENT:
Search online sources for FTI Consulting financial statements
and other financial information. Can you find information on the
earn-outs? How are the forgivable loans expressed in the
financial statements? Are either of these transactions presented
in the notes to the financial statements? How could investors
discover the facts of these transactions if they had not read
the Wall Street Journal article?
Reviewed By: Linda Christiansen, Indiana University Southeast
|
"Is FTI Consulting As Good as It Looks?" by Karen Richardson, The Wall
Street Journal, April 28, 2008; Page C1 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120934061032248377.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
Judging by its financials, FTI Consulting Inc.
looks like a great place to make money. For investors, looks can be
deceiving.
FTI, which provides legal, financial and
public-relations services, handsomely pays the hundreds of professionals it
has been adding to its ranks through a series of acquisitions. In the first
quarter, FTI bought eight companies and added 445 employees in 49 days.
But FTI's method of paying for its new companies
and rewarding its new executives largely avoids any negative effect on
earnings. As a result, its operating income looks bigger, fueling its
share-price rise and winning praise from analysts and investors. Meanwhile,
its sizable and growing compensation-type payouts and loans go largely
unnoticed by investors.
FTI's shares rose 11 cents to $67.69 in trading
Friday on the New York Stock Exchange. That put them up 9.8% for the year
and more than double where they were at the start of 2007.
FTI, which has a market value of $3.3 billion, is
trading at 27 times estimated 2008 earnings, or a 50% premium on average to
its peers, such as the smaller Huron Consulting Group Inc., according to
Thomson Reuters. Only one analyst rates it a "sell." Others rave about
earnings growth and how the sagging economy will benefit FTI's restructuring
practice, which made up 26% of the company's revenue of $1 billion last
year.
FTI, which will report its first-quarter earnings
next month, declined to comment.
Like other companies that count people as their
main asset, FTI uses "earn-outs" to pay many executives who come with its
acquisitions. Under this model, an acquirer gives its new company an upfront
payment and then gives the company's owners or executives additional
payments over the next few years based on performance targets.
While there isn't anything technically wrong with
these additional payments, they make expenses look smaller and earnings
appear larger than they otherwise would because the earn-outs aren't treated
as compensation expense, which is subtracted from earnings.
Instead, they appear as contingent payments on the
cash-flow statement and intangible assets on the balance sheet, neither of
which drive investor sentiment as much as the earnings numbers on the income
statement.
"I think of earn-outs as a mechanism for inflating
operating income," says Michael Winter, a portfolio manager at hedge-fund
Otter Creek Management, which manages about $160 million in assets and
doesn't own FTI shares. "For a true quality-of-earnings figure, an investor
needs to add those amounts back to earnings as compensation expense."
Earn-outs aren't small change for a company that
has made so many acquisitions and that reported pretax income last year of
$150 million. In the first quarter, FTI paid nearly $43 million in earn-outs
for earlier acquisitions, and it has said it expects to pay $49 million in
earn-outs over the next few years for its latest deals.
Some analysts regard earn-outs as a necessary evil.
"It is important to be cognizant of the financial and accounting
ramifications of earn-outs, but they're an important way for
professionals-based companies to make sure interests are aligned," says
Timothy McHugh, an analyst for William Blair & Co. who has a "buy" rating on
FTI stock.
Another practice employed by FTI, doling out
"forgivable" loans, is far less common in corporate America. In 2006, it
launched an incentive compensation program that involved granting $30
million in cash payments "in the form of unsecured general recourse
forgivable" loans, to senior managing directors and other employees. Last
year FTI paid out $35 million in forgivable loans to about 57 senior
managing directors and others. "The amount of forgivable loans we make could
be significant," FTI said in a recent Securities and Exchange Commission
filing.
FTI typically amortizes the cost of these loans
over five years, meaning a fraction of them have an impact on income in the
current periods. The total costs aren't reflected until FTI fully forgives
the loans. While they are a great incentive to employees, their effect on
earnings is delayed.
"It seems that they really go out of their way to
compensate people very well and avoid affecting the income statement," says
Donn Vickrey, head of research firm Gradient Analytics.
Mr. Vickrey is an earnings-quality analyst who doesn't
formally cover FTI. "It gives them a whole lot of room to make their
earnings number every quarter."
Jensen Comment
Yet another example of why I'm in favor of bright lines.
"Mr. Vickrey is an earnings-quality analyst who doesn't
formally cover FTI. "It gives them a whole lot of room to make their earnings
number every quarter."
Hi David,
You said: "Intelligently applying principles makes
rules unnecessary."
Then why do we have traffic police?
Why do we have internal and external auditors?
How can we make all drivers "intelligent" with always
high levels of ethics? How can we make all intelligent drivers immune from peer
pressure to break the rules?
Principle 1: Don't drive above any speed that is unsafe
in any zone.
Principle 2: Don't drink too much and drive.
Rule 1: 20 mph (non-metric) maximum speed in a school
zone where many students are walking to and from school.
Rule 2: An alcohol blood level in excess of .10 is a punishable offense for
vehicle drivers on any road or street.
The principles are perfect in theory, and the rules are
disputable because a teen driver going 40 mph with a blood alcohol level of .20
may actually be less dangerous than the old lady who can't see well driving 10
mph on her way to a MADD anti-drinking meeting.
But now tell me David:
Does each five-year old child's mother feel safer and
every traffic cop feel more effective with the principles or the rules in school
zones?
You said that GAAP "bright lines" mean that "bright
people" will figure out new ways to cross the bright lines.
But I say that "principles" in place of some rules just
make it easier for unethical dumb crooks and harder for the courts to punish
those crooks ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#Principles-Based
In reality I'm sure you, as my good friend, agree that
there are no optimal solutions on either end of the Principles versus Rules
spectrum. We only differ sometimes as to where to stop making rules in
particular circumstances. What I fear more than you is that all clients of
auditors are not perfectly ethical --- otherwise why require auditors in the
first place?
Perhaps principles will suffice for auditors to
determine whether a lease is an operating lease or how much should be placed in
an allowance for doubtful accounts. But bright lines are needed when clients are
successfully changing auditors to get more friendly applications of
"principles."
I honestly think that what led to Andersen's implosion
is that some of the partners in charge of huge audits like WorldCom and Enron
were caving in to client pressures to cross the lines. It's the violation of
bright lines that eventually brought down Andersen and its sneaky clients. Enron
knowingly lept over the SEC's 3% bright line for SPEs. And FASB set a
fiber-optic line expensing bright line rule that WorldCom knowingly crossed.
Most interesting in all of this is that many accounting
theorists would've supported WorldCom's CFO (Scott) argument that fiber-optic
line lines should've been capitalized and depreciated. But there was a
bright-line rule in place to the contrary, and WorldCom executives were
secretive and sneakily crossed that bright line, out of the sight of their own
internal auditors, for over $1 billion in higher earnings and stock prices.
Breaking the rule in secret benefitted WorldCom executives because the market
thought WorldCom playing by the conservative rules in place.
Often the worst crooks get caught up by bright lines
much like Al Capone (who rarely did his own dirty work) finally got sent to
prison because of bright lines in the tax code. Without the tax code bright
lines. The lofty Big Al might've continued on for more years of organized crime.
I'm thankful we have bright lines in our traffic laws,
accounting rules, and tax codes. You, David, and I just have to argue about
where to paint the lines. I've got a bigger paint bucket and more paint brushes
Question
Were accountants responsible for the dotcom bubble and burst at the turn of
the Century?
Jensen Answer
The article below fails to directly mention where auditors contributed the most
to the 1990's bubble. The auditors were allowing clients to get away with murder
in terms of recognizing revenue that should never have
been recognized. The dotcom companies were not yet making profits but
were full of promise as the bubble filled with hot air. In financial reporting
(especially in
pro forma reporting) dotcom companies shifted the attention from profit
growth to revenue growth. But much of the revenue growth they got away with
reporting was due to bad judgment on the part of their auditors. Corrections
finally began to appear after the EITF belatedly made some bright line decisions
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm
I give auditors F grades when auditing the hot
air balloons of dotcom companies. This shows what can happen when we let
judgment overtake some of the bright line rules in accounting standards.
Auditors were supposed to have "principles" when they had no bright lines to
follow. The auditing firms demonstrated their lack of professional principles in
the 1990s.
"Were accountants responsible for the dotcom
bubble and burst?" AccountingWeb's U.K. Site, March 11, 2008 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=104768
"Were accountants responsible for the dotcom bubble
and burst?" This worrying allegation emerged from a question two weeks ago
at the ICAEW IT Faculty annual lecture.
During a thought-provoking talk on Second Life and
related issues, Clive Holtham mentioned the dotcom bubble, which prompted
the pointed follow-up question from one audience member.
The answer was that they weren't - which accorded
with the general audience reaction. The reason? Accountants, Holtham argued,
had not made the investment and business decisions that fuelled the boom and
led to the bust.
Some would argue that this is exactly why
accountancy, perhaps more than accountants, was responsible. Why weren't
accountants more involved in these decisions? We would surely expect
accountants to have been stressing the need to temper the wild enthusiasm
with a bit of solid business analysis. It's hard to escape the conclusion
that accountants either didn't put forward the right arguments, or were not
sufficiently influential. Accountants either lacked the confidence to
participate forcefully enough in the debate, or were viewed as not knowing
enough about IT.
Either way, it suggests that the main accountancy
bodies had allowed a major change in business to occur without preparing
their members to deal competently and confidently with it. If technology had
been seen as a natural competency of an accountant, accountants might have
been more able to fight their corner over the excesses of the dotcom era.
Anyway, that was years ago. Surely things have
changed. The recent AccountingWEB/National B2B Centre survey on accountants'
involvement in ebusiness was introduced in the following terms: "In spirit
accountants would like to get involved with ebusiness, but the reality of
their current knowledge and workload means that only a small minority are
able to help clients take advantage of new technology opportunities."
It's unfair to blame the accountants themselves.
Their workload is a significant factor. Government has been piling
regulation after regulation upon them and it must be a struggle to keep up
with just what they consider their core skills and knowledge. Ethically, you
would not expect accountants to offer advice in areas in which they do not
consider themselves adequately qualified. Technology is such a vast and
rapidly moving area that it's pretty hard for most full time IT
professionals to keep up, let alone accountants with their myriad other
responsibilities. Yet the need, and opportunity, certainly seems to be
there. Various government initiatives in the past have sought to identify
sources of competent advice to help companies succeed in ebusiness.
Usually, articles about accountants doing more in
the field of IT elicit comments about "leaving it to the IT professionals".
The worry is that accountants may not know enough to be able to do so
confidently and therefore they withdraw from any involvement - this is what
the AccountingWeb/NB2BC survey seems to suggest is happening. This is in
nobody's interest. Businesses may fail to exploit key opportunities,
accountants will lose out on income and probably credibility, and IT
specialists will have fewer clients. A more ebusiness-confident accountancy
profession should be able not only to offer advice itself, but also to
recommend, trust and work with specialists where required.
To achieve this it's vital that the professional
bodies help their members more than they are doing currently. What seems to
be missing is a set of boundaries. What exactly do accountants need to know
about IT and ebusiness in order to be able to confidently and competently
advise their clients? How can you, as an accountant, assess your competence
in this vital area?
It's not as if this is anything new, The
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) has been working on a revised
Education Practice Statement regarding 'Information Technology for
Professional Accountants' for years and in October 2007 released
International Education Practice Statement 2 (IEPS 2) after consultation
with accountancy bodies worldwide. This sets out "IT knowledge and
competency requirements" for the qualification process, but also for
continuing professional development.
So should accountants be more active in advising
on ebusiness? Should they do it themselves or work with specialists? And are
the professional bodies doing enough to help their members in this, and
other IT related, areas? We look forward to hearing the views of
AccountingWEB members so that we can carry this debate forward.
March 12, 2008 reply from Ed Scribner
[escribne@NMSU.EDU]
Interestingly, most of the criticism of accountants
during the dotcom bubble was not for allowing premature revenue recognition
but, to the contrary, for failure to allow recording of internally developed
goodwill. Dotcoms were reporting losses that critics at the time said should
have been profits because of the purported existence of unrecognized
intangible future benefit. (BTW, I always remember Denny’s term for pro
forma reporting—EBS (everything but bad stuff).)
Ed
March 12, 2008 reply from J. S. Gangolly
[gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
Ed,
Let me play the devil's advocate (and here I really
AM the devil). I look forward to your witty repartee.
I think the root cause of the dot-com (and much
else that has happened) is the tax law provision that limited the tax
deductibility of executive compensation to $1 million.
This led to perverse incentives on the part of the
managers to fiddle with the financial statements to maximize the price at
which IPOs could be floated.
As John Coffee has stated in his book Gatekeepers,
"when one pays the CEOs with stock options, one is using a high octane fuel
that creates incentives for short-term financial manipulation and accounting
gamesmanship".
The dot-com bust is an expemplar for the worst in
the American and European corporate governance.
On the one hand, it is an example of American
system of perverse incentives for financial statement manipulation (which is
addressed by SOx and the corporation codes only peripherally) fueled by
non-cash executive compensation. On the other hand, it is an example of a
typical European fraud in the sense of the "insiders'" (primarily the
venture capitalists, greed (which European laws have addressed in the past).
The consequences of non-cash executive
compensation, in my opinion, is the scourge of the American corporate scene,
that is destroying the employee morale, perceived equity of the "system",
the good old-fashioned idea that each pay one's dues to the society, and
ultimately our way of life in the United States. To give just one example,
the following is the data on the CEO compensation as a multiple of average
employee compensation in various countries:
531:1 USA
25:1 UK
21:1 Canada
16:1 France
11.1 Germany
10:1 Japan __________________
Source: Gatekeepers, by John Coffee.
Shouldn't we be surprised that social unrest and
crime in the US is so low? Shouldn't we auditors be paranoid (and not just
sceptical) of the machinations of management?
And one would have to a fool to think that this is
the "equilibrium" market situation, decided by millions of the 'homo
economicus' persuasion in the "market"..
Goodwill is almost a red herring in this equation.
Its recognition would only fuel the perverse incentives of managers.
Financial statements for most firms of the dot-com variety are already a
fiction; goodwill accounting is just one more dose of fictionitis.
Respectfully submitted,
Jagdish S. Gangolly,
Associate Professor (
j.gangolly@albany.edu
)
Chairperson, Department of Accounting & Law, School of
Business
Director, PhD Program in Information Science, College of Computing &
Information
State University of New York at Albany, Albany, NY 12222.
Phone: (518) 442-4949 URL:
http://www.albany.edu/acc/gangolly
March 12, 2008 reply from Bob Jensen
With all due respects to Ed and Jagdish, I
still think that inflated revenue reporting and other creative accounting
ploys led to a bubble of artificially inflated stock prices of dotcom
companies. It was more than the "premature revenue recognition" that Ed
mentions. It was reporting of questionable revenues that would never be
realized in cash. For example dotcomA contracts with dotcomB, dotcomC, ...,
dotcomZ to trade advertising space on Websites and vice versa for all
combinations of contracting dotcom companies. Each company counts the trade
at estimated value as revenue and expense even though there will never be
any cash flows for these advertising trades.
The dotcom companies did not inflate profits
with this move but they dramatically inflated revenues which was all they
cared about since the investing public never expected them to show a profit
early on. You can read about how bad this bartering scam became ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm#Issue02
And auditors let the dotcom companies get away with this scam until EITF
99-17 made auditors finally recognize the errors of their ways.
Other revenue inflation scams and questions
raised in the following issues resolved by by various EITF pronouncements
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm
Revenue Issue: Gross versus Net
Issue 01: Should a company that acts as a distributor or reseller of
products or services record revenues as gross or net?
Examples of Creatively Reporting at Gross:
Priceline.com brokered airline tickets
online and included the full price of the ticket as Priceline.com
revenues. This greatly inflated revenues relative to traditional
ticket brokers and travel agents who only included commissions as
revenue.
eBay.com included the entire price of
auctioned items into its revenue even though it had no ownership or
credit risk for items auctioned online.
Land's End issued discount coupons (e.g.,
20% off the price), recorded sales at the full price, and then
charged the price discount to marketing expense.
Issue 02: Should a company that swaps website advertising with
another company record advertising revenue and expense?
Issue 03: Should discounts or rebates offered to purchasers of
personal computers in combination with Internet service contracts be
treated as a reduction of revenues or as a marketing expense?
Issue 04: Should shipping and handling fees collected from customers
be included in revenues or netted against shipping expense?
Discounts and rebates are traditionally
deducted from gross revenues to arrive at a net revenue figure that
is the basis of revenue reporting. Internet companies, however, did
not always follow this treatment. Discounts and rebates have been
reflected as operating expenses rather than as reductions of
revenue.
Handling fees and pricing rebates
throughout accounting history could not be included in revenues
since the writing of the first accounting textbook. Auditors knew
this very well from the history of accounting, but it took EITF
00-14 in Year 2000 to remind auditors that this bit of history
applied to dotcom companies as well as mainstream clients.
Definition of Software
Issue 07: Should the accounting for products distributed via the
Internet, such as music, follow pronouncements regarding software
development or those of the music industry?
Issue 08: Should the costs of website development be expensed similar
to software developed for internal use in accordance with SOP 98-1?
Revenue Recognition
Issue 9: How should an Internet auction site account for up-front and
back-end fees?
Issue 10: How should arrangements that include the right to use
software stored on another company’s hardware be accounted for?
Issue 11: How should revenues associated with providing access to, or
maintenance of, a website, or publishing information on a website, be
accounted for?
Issue 12: How should advertising revenue contingent upon “hits,”
“viewings,” or “click-throughs” be accounted for?
Issue 13: How should “point” and other loyalty programs be accounted
for?
Prepaid/Intangible Assets vs. Period Costs
Issue 14: How should a company assess the impairment of capitalized
Internet distribution costs?
Issue 15: How should up-front payments made in exchange for certain
advertising services provided over a period of time be accounted for?
Issue 16: How should investments in building up a customer or
membership base be accounted for?
Miscellaneous Issues
Issue 17: Does the accounting by holders for financial instruments
with exercisability terms that are variable-based future events, such an
IPO, fall under the provisions of SFAS 133?
Issue 18: Should Internet operations be treated as a separate
operating segment in accordance with SFAS 131?
Issue 19: Should there be more comparability between Internet
companies in the classification of expenses by category?
Issue 20: How should companies account for on-line coupons?
In nearly every instance dotcom companies
were inflating the promise of their new companies with creative accounting
blessed by their auditors until the EITF and other FASB pronouncements set
some bright lines that auditors had to stand behind. The investing public
was nearly always misled by both the audited financial statements and the
pro forma statements of dotcom companies in the 1990s. Then the bubble
burst, in part, by bright line setting by the EITF and the FASB.
Bob Jensen
Bob Jensen's threads on e-Commerce and
e-Business accounting issues are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/000start.htm
Especially note the revenue recognition
issues at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm
Here’s another example of why I’m dubious of principles-based standards in
accounting and auditing. Nothing should've prevented KPMG from being more
professional on this huge audit. KPMG still amazes me on how it wins awards for
everything from employee relations to minority student support but falls down on
the services for which it gets paid by selling illegal tax shelters
(over a half billion in
fines and legal fees ), performing sloppy audits (e.g., being fired from
the enormous Fannie Mae audit), and now this. There’s a whole lot of good stuff
and bad stuff referenced at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
In an interview Wednesday, Mr. Missal said KPMG
"didn't have the healthy skepticism that you would expect from your outside
independent auditors." One of the accounting errors Mr. Missal identified
involved a decision not to account for a
"growing backlog" of troubled loans New
Century was obligated to repurchase. Senior New
Century executives knew as far back as 2004 that the subprime-mortgage boom was
doomed to go bust, Mr. Missal said. But he said its accounting practices allowed
those dangers to be disguised.
See below
"KPMG Aided New Century Missteps, Report Says," by Peg Brickley and Amir
Efrati, The Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2008; Page A6 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120658573750067861.html?mod=todays_us_page_one
A court-appointed investigator looking into the
collapse of New Century Financial Corp. said in a report that its auditor,
KPMG LLP, devised some of the improper accounting strategies that allowed
the company to hide its financial problems for years.
The investigator, Michael J. Missal, said the
company might be able to recover money for its creditors by suing KPMG for
professional negligence and negligent misrepresentation. He also recommended
the company sue several of its former top executives to recover millions of
dollars in bonuses and other compensation paid to them.
KPMG "contributed to certain of these accounting
and financial reporting deficiencies by enabling them to persist and, in
some instances, precipitating the company's departure from applicable
accounting standards," Mr. Missal said in a 550-page report filed with the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Wilmington, Del., and released Wednesday.
Dan Ginsburg, a spokesman for KPMG, said, "We
strongly disagree with the report's conclusion concerning KPMG. We believe
that an objective review of the facts and circumstances will affirm our
position."
The Justice Department, as part of its
investigation into New Century's collapse, is looking at individuals at KPMG
who audited the company, according to people familiar with the case. But
these individuals are not currently a target of the investigation, according
to a person familiar with the matter. The Justice Department inquiry is
being handled out of the Santa Ana office of the U.S. attorney for
California's central district, based in Los Angeles. A spokesman for KPMG
declined to comment.
A spokesperson for New Century said in a statement:
"The Company is pleased that the Examiner's report is finally completed and
that we can take the next steps of confirming the plan of liquidation,
therefore substantially concluding the bankruptcy process."
In his report, Mr. Missal said that in one
instance, a KPMG partner who led the New Century audit team castigated a
subordinate who had questioned one of the company's accounting practices as
it prepared to file its 2005 annual report with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
According to Mr. Missal, the KPMG partner told the
subordinate in an email: "I am very disappointed we are still discussing
this. As far as I am concerned, we are done. The client thinks we are done.
All we are going to do is p- everybody off."
New Century, based in Irvine, Calif., was once one
of the country's biggest providers of mortgages to people with poor credit
histories. In 2006, it originated nearly $60 billion in subprime mortgages.
It collapsed in April 2007 after its accounting problems came to light,
accelerating the meltdown in the subprime-mortgage market. That meltdown
precipitated the biggest credit crunch in at least a decade.
In his report, Mr. Missal said New Century had "a
brazen obsession with increasing loan originations, without due regard to
the risks associated with that business strategy." Its loan-production
department, he said, was "the dominant force in the company," which trained
mortgage brokers in sessions it referred to as "CloseMore University."
The company had low standards for originating
loans, Mr. Missal said. "The predominant standard for loan quality was
whether the loans New Century originated could be initially sold or
securitized in the secondary market," he said. "The increasingly risky
nature of New Century's loan originations created a ticking time bomb that
detonated in 2007."
New Century owes its creditors more than $1
billion, but it has said in court papers that they are likely to recover no
more than 17 cents of every dollar they are owed. Because the company has
few assets left, much of that funding is likely to come from lawsuits
against parties responsible for the company's collapse.
In an interview Wednesday, Mr. Missal said KPMG
"didn't have the healthy skepticism that you would expect from your outside
independent auditors." One of the accounting errors Mr. Missal identified
involved a decision not to account for a "growing backlog" of troubled loans
New Century was obligated to repurchase.
Senior New Century executives knew as far back as
2004 that the subprime-mortgage boom was doomed to go bust, Mr. Missal said.
But he said its accounting practices allowed those dangers to be disguised.
An independent report commissioned by the Justice
Department concluded that the "improper and imprudent practices" of now-bankrupt
subprime lender New Century Financial were condoned and enabled by the company's
independent auditor, KPMG.
Zac Bissonnette, "KPMG engulfed in subprime accounting scandal," Blogging
Stocks, March 27, 2008
http://bstocksdev.weblogsinc.com/2008/03/27/kpmg-engulfed-in-subprime-accounting-scandal/
"Inquiry Assails Accounting Firm (KPMG) in Lender’s Fall," by Vikas
Bajaj, The New York Times, March 27, 2008 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/27/business/27account.html?_r=2&hp&oref=&oref=slogin
A sweeping five-month investigation into the
collapse of one of the nation’s largest subprime lenders points a finger at
a possible new culprit in the mortgage mess: the accountants.
New Century Financial, whose failure just a year
ago came at the start of the credit crisis, engaged in “significant improper
and imprudent practices” that were condoned and enabled by auditors at the
accounting firm KPMG, according to an independent report commissioned by the
Justice Department.
In its scope and detail, the 580-page report is the
most comprehensive document yet made public about the failings of a mortgage
business. Some of its accusations echo charges that surfaced about the
accounting firm Arthur Andersen after the collapse of Enron in 2001.
E-mail messages uncovered in the investigation
showed that some KPMG auditors raised red flags about the accounting
practices at New Century, but that the KPMG partners overseeing the audits
rejected those concerns because they feared losing a client.
From its headquarters in Irvine, Calif., New
Century ruled as one of the nation’s leading subprime lenders. But its
dominance ended when it was forced into bankruptcy last April because of a
surge in defaults and a loss of confidence among its lenders.
The report lays bare the aggressive business
practices at the heart of the mortgage crisis.
“I would call it incredibly thorough analysis,”
said Zach Gast, an analyst at RiskMetrics who raised concerns about
accounting practices at New Century and other lenders in December 2006.
“This is certainly the most in-depth review we have seen of one of the
mortgage lenders that we have seen go bust.”
A spokeswoman for KPMG, Kathleen Fitzgerald, took
strong exception to the report’s allegations. “We strongly disagree with the
report’s conclusions concerning KPMG,” she said. “We believe an objective
review of the facts and circumstances will affirm our position.”
The report zeros in on how New Century accounted
for losses on troubled loans that it was forced to buy back from investors
like Wall Street banks and hedge funds. Had it not changed its accounting,
the company would have reported a loss rather than a profit in the second
half of 2006.
The report said that investigators “did not find
sufficient evidence to conclude that New Century engaged in earnings
management or manipulation, although its accounting irregularities almost
always resulted in increased earnings.”
Even so, the profits were the basis for significant
executive bonuses and helped persuade Wall Street that the company was in
fine health when in fact its business was coming apart, the report contends.
In bankruptcy court, creditors of New Century say
they are owed $35 billion. The company’s stock peaked at nearly $65.95 in
late 2004; it was trading at a penny on Wednesday.
A spokesman for New Century, which is being managed
by a restructuring firm under the supervision of the bankruptcy court, said
the company was pleased that the report had been published.
The investigation was led by Michael J. Missal, a
lawyer and former investigator in the enforcement division of the Securities
and Exchange Commission who was hired by the United States trustee
overseeing the case in United States Bankruptcy Court in Delaware.
Mr. Missal, who also worked on an investigation of
WorldCom’s accounting misstatements, concluded that KPMG and some former New
Century executives could be legally liable for millions of dollars in
damages because of their conduct.
In the aftermath of the collapse of Enron, Arthur
Andersen was indicted and convicted on obstruction of justices charges. The
conviction was overturned by the Supreme Court in 2005, long after the
company had ceased doing business.
Mr. Missal drew an analogy to Enron and said there
was evidence that KPMG auditors had deferred excessively to New Century.
“I saw e-mails from the engaged partner saying we
are at the risk of being replaced,” Mr. Missal said in a telephone interview
about a KPMG partner working on the audit of New Century. “They acquiesced
overly to the client, which in the post-Enron era seems mind-boggling.”
Ms. Fitzgerald of KPMG countered, “There is
absolutely no evidence to support that contention.”
In one exchange in the report, a KPMG partner who
was leading the New Century audit responded testily to John Klinge, a
specialist at the accounting firm who was pressing him on a contentious
accounting practice used by the company.
“I am very disappointed we are still discussing
this,” the partner, John Donovan, wrote in the spring of 2006. “And as far
as I am concerned we are done. The client thinks we are done.”
KPMG said Wednesday that a national standards
committee had approved the practice in question.
The accounting irregularities became apparent when
a new chief financial officer, Taj S. Bindra, started asking New Century’s
accounting department and KPMG to justify their approach, beginning in
November 2006.
Continued in article
The entire Missal Report is at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/Final_Report_New_Century.pdf
March 27, 2008 reply from J. S. Gangolly
[gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
Bob,
I have been reading Missal's tome. It will be quite
some time before I am done with it. However, I have three comments.
1. Missal's tome is a treasure trove for financial
accounting instructors. It explains most relevant financial accounting much
better than any intermediate accounting text I have seen. In fact I am using
parts of it it in my 'Financial Statement Fraud & Corporate Governance'
class this semester.
2. Bob, I will refrain from ascribing motives or
assigning blame to any one. However, in my humble opinion, the problem may
be systemic and not just limited to one client or one CPA firm. Perhaps we
as academic could help the profession.
I am convinced that we accountants on our own may
not have the competence to do full audits of the financial sector without
the help of actuaries. The actuarial implications of just computing residual
interests by itself is mind-boggling, and that is only one miniscule item.
I have always felt that the intermediate accounting
sequence needs an extreme makeover, and now I am absolutely convinced. We
could cut down on most of the C***p that we fling at our unsuspecting
students (especially in our intermediate accounting classes) and listen to
our profession as to what could really help them.
Perhaps we could do with just one intermediate
class (I am sure my financial accounting colleagues will kill me if they get
to know this; they usually do not like to anything besides regurgitating the
Kieso "tome") and require students to do one finance oriented actuarial
class followed by specialized financial accounting classes? (I am just
floating my trial balloon here).
Our failure as academics in accounting has been
devastating to the auditing/accounting profession.
3. I share your scepticism regarding the so-called
principles-based standards. Accounting principles are of necessity
conflicting, and we totally lack the intellectual capacity, with the kind of
navel-gazing "research" we have been doing for the past thirty years, to
deal with conflicts among principles. We desperately neecd to look at the
way lawyers and judges/justices REASON in order to develop our own faculties
in coping with conflicting principles in arriving at "standards".
Regards,
Jagdish
March 27, 2008 reply from Patricia Doherty
[pdoherty@BU.EDU]
Jagdish, I read your comments with interest. I
think one problem we have in accounting academe (and by the way, I don't
teach Intermediate - I am a Managerial person, quite happily) is that we
are, like many professors in business schools especially, running a trade
school. In our case, we are teaching the students what they "need" to know
to pass the CPA exam. We have had this discussion on this site before - the
exam is well behind current needs and practice, and isn't likely to change
soon. This is what the students want: what do I need to take to pass the
exam. They ask this specific question. Not "what do I need to be a good
accountant" but "what do I need to take to sit for the exam." We research
state-by-state requirements, and make sure they take the right courses.
Courses change in response to the requirements (so that now some Internet
research capability is needed, for example), but it is all geared to the
same end.
And I am not sure that businesses/industry have a
great deal of motivation to see accounting make progress in the direction
you are indicating, because they too are acting out of self interest. The
excitement over "principles based" accounting rules really in many cases
I've read amounts to their thinking that it will back off the auditors, give
the companies more of what they like to call "flexibility" - some of us may
have other words for that.
No?
p
Mann macht und Gott lacht. old Yiddish expression
Bob Jensen's threads on KPMG's woes in other lawsuits are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
I do not forward advertising requests form commercial
vendors unless I feel that my "audience" would appreciate hearing about
particular new products and services. This one is very important to some
accounting researchers.
April 30, 2008 message from Tom Hardy
[thardy@ivesinc.com]
Dear Professor Jensen,
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*Data analysis for these fields restricted to
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2003 to present.
FIN 48 Revisions (All SEC registrants for
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registrants for fiscal year ends after Nov 15th, 2006)
As the leader in Audit Industry Research,
AuditAnalytics.com provides detailed information on over 20,000 publicly
registered companies and over 1,500 accounting firms. Our database enables
you, your students and faculty to quickly search and analyze reported:
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I sincerely believe that you would find our online
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Phone: (508) 476-7007 ext. 228
e-mail: thardy@ivesinc.com
www.auditanalytics.com - Independent
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April 30, 2008 reply from Todd Pullen
[btpull@COMCAST.NET]
Does anyone have a
recommendation on a good site for financial reports?
I have found that some of the
free sites such a Google Finance and Marketwatch are not that accurate or
their data is outdated.
April 30, 2008 reply from Edith Orenstein
[eorenstein@FINANCIALEXECUTIVES.ORG]
I recently had demo of CCH
Accounting Research Manager (ARM) and it seemed to have a pretty good search
capability for recent filings.
April 30, 2008 reply from W. O. Mills, III C.P.A., C.A.,
P.F.S [wom@WOMILLS.COM]
I am not sure of what you might be looking for
exactly...but perhaps Edgars would be of some benefit to you.
http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml
April 30, 2008 reply from David Albrecht
[albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]
I use several. Usually I go directly to a company's
web site.
If I'm simply shopping for something to use in
class I go to
http://www.annualreportservice.com/
April 30, 2008 reply from Bob Jensen
And don't forget to try the wonderful new TryXBRL service (free for now)
and the new Financial Explorer service from the SEC
"TryXBRL.org Launched," SmartPros,
March 28, 2008 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x61325.xml
A new Web site, TryXBRL.com, allows free
access to view and analyze complete XBRL-tagged financial statements for
over 12,000 publicly traded corporations.
After registering on the portal, TryXBRL.org,
corporate finance professionals can educate
themselves about the XBRL tagging process and view their own historical
financial information in XBRL format. Investors and analysts can
experience how XBRL reduces the complexity and costs associated with
analyzing performance data.
The site is a collaboration of EDGAR Online
Inc., a business and financial information provider, and R.R. Donnelley
& Sons Company, a print services company.
"Our goal has been to deliver solutions that
do not require technical expertise or excessive time commitments by
corporations wishing to take part in the SEC Voluntary Program or to
familiarize themselves with XBRL," said Philip Moyer, President and CEO
of EDGAR Online, Inc. "We are providing open access to our vast XBRL
database through a solution that enables corporations to begin filing
XBRL content with the SEC in as little as a few hours."
RR Donnelley and EDGAR Online have
collaborated to deliver XBRL filing solutions to corporations since
2005.
Once again that site is at
http://www.tryxbrl.org/
April 1, 2008 reply from Amy Dunbar
[Amy.Dunbar@BUSINESS.UCONN.EDU]
I just tried the site. Wow. Very powerful. I
confirmed the numbers for one company to make sure I knew what I was
seeing. It pulled the 2007 four quarter numbers for my selected company
and then the 4th qtr numbers for the three peer companies and my
selected company. I'm not sure where that 12,000 publicly traded
corporations is coming from. They must mean filings, not corporations. I
found the following table for March/June 2005 in Appendix F.
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-finalreport.pdf
If you include pink sheet companies, the
data for which are not publicly available (at least to my knowledge),
the total climbs to 13,094. Does anyone have a source for more recent
numbers of publicly traded corporations?
Listing Venue Number of Companies Listed
NYSE 2,553 AMEX 747 NASDAQ National Market 2,580 NASDAQ Capital Market1
593 OTC Bulletin Board 2,955 Total 9,428
The table (I only show part of it) has the
following footnote explanation: Source: Public data includes 13,094
companies from the Center for Research in Securities Prices at the
University of Chicago for NYSE and AMEX companies as of March 31, 2005
and from NASDAQ for NASDAQ and OTC Bulletin Board companies and from
Datastream Advance for Pink Sheets companies as of June 10, 2005. This
table was compiled by members of the staff of the SEC's Office of
Economic Analysis and does not necessarily reflect the views of the
Commission, the Commissioners, or other members of the Commission staff.
Amy Dunbar UConn
Bob Jensen's threads on XBRL are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm
"SEC unveils 'Financial Explorer'
investor tool using XBRL," AccountingWeb, February 20, 2008
---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=104665
Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman
Christopher Cox has announced the launch of the "Financial Explorer" on
the SEC Web site to help investors quickly and easily analyze the
financial results of public companies. Financial Explorer paints the
picture of corporate financial performance with diagrams and charts,
using financial information provided to the SEC as "interactive data" in
eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL).
At the click of a mouse, Financial Explorer
lets investors automatically generate financial ratios,
graphs, and charts depicting important
information from financial statements. Information including earnings,
expenses, cash flows, assets, and liabilities can be analyzed and
compared across competing public companies. The software takes the work
out of manipulating the data by entirely eliminating tasks such as
copying and pasting rows of revenues and expenses into a spreadsheet.
That frees investors to focus on their investments' financial results
through visual representations that make the numbers easier to
understand. Investors can use Financial Explorer by visiting
www.sec.gov/xbrl .
"XBRL is fast becoming the universal
language for the exchange of business information and it is the future
of financial reporting," said Cox. "With Financial Explorer or another
XBRL viewer, investors will be able to quickly make sense of financial
statements. In the near future, potentially millions of people will be
able to analyze and compare financial statements and make
better-informed investment decisions. That's a big benefit to ordinary
investors."
David Blaszkowsky, Director of the SEC's
Office of Interactive Disclosure, encouraged investors to try out the
new software. "Financial Explorer will help investors analyze investment
choices much quicker. I encourage both companies and investors to visit
the SEC Web site, try the software, and get a first-hand glimpse of the
future of financial analysis, especially for the retail investor."
Financial Explorer is open source, meaning
that its source code is free to the public, and technology and financial
experts can update and enhance the software. As interactive data becomes
more commonplace, investors, analysts, and others working in the
financial industry may develop hundreds of Web-based applications that
help investors garner insights about financial results through creative
ways of analyzing and presenting the information.
Continued in
article
Jensen Comment
The Financial Explorer link ---
http://209.234.225.154/viewer/home/
Note the "Take a Tour" option.
Bob Jensen's videos (created before the
SEC created the Financial Explorer) are at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/video/Tutorials/
When I can find some time, I'll create a Financial Explorer update
video.
Bob Jensen's threads on XBRL are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm
More on the Debate Between Rules-Based Versus Principles-Based Standards
"The Accounting Cycle Arbitrary and Capricious Rules: Lease Accounting --
FAS 13 v. IAS 17," by: J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, March 2008 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x61146.xml
One of the main arguments against a rules-based
accounting standards-setting system is that resulting rules are sometimes
arbitrary; correspondingly, proponents of principles-based accounting claim
that resulting standards will not be arbitrary, but rather logical,
consistent, transparent, and informative to financial statement users. Lease
accounting is often presented as an exemplar of this point. Since the IASB
standards are purportedly principles-based, let's compare the FASB rule
against the international accounting rule -- er, principle -- and look at
the differences. FAS 13 versus IAS 17.
IAS 17 classifies leases as finance leases or
operating leases, but this is mere words. Finance leases correspond to the
Financial Accounting Standards Board's capital leases. There are five
criteria for determining whether a lease is a finance lease; they are:
The lease transfers ownership to the lessee; The
lease contains a bargain purchase option to purchase that is expected to be
exercised; The lease is for the major part of the economic life of the
asset; The present value of the minimum lease payments amounts to
substantially all of the fair value of the leased asset; Only the lessee can
use the leased asset. The first four criteria correspond strongly with those
of FASB; the last one is also contained in FAS 13 even though it is not
specifically included as one of the criterion to determine whether a lease
is a capital lease.
Critics are correct inasmuch as FASB included
bright lines in criteria 3 and 4 (the 75 percent and the 90 percent
thresholds), whereas IASB did not. One wonders, however, whether that change
eliminates or enhances arbitrariness in financial reporting. True, FASB
chose thresholds that cannot be defended while IASB does not contain them.
The upshot might be to move the threshold from the standard-setter to the
preparer and the auditor, without the investor's being privy to the debate.
For example, the preparer might have a lease in which the present value of
the minimum lease payments amounts to (say) 95 percent of the fair value of
the asset and argues for operating lease treatment. What power and authority
does an auditor have to challenge that assertion?
Yes, FAS 13 contains bright lines that are
inherently arbitrary, as no economic theory supports the 75 percent or the
90 percent thresholds. But, the lack of bright lines does not solve the
issue at all -- it merely shifts the decision about the threshold from the
standard-setter to the preparer and to the auditor. This adds subjectivity
to the determination of an appropriate cutoff point between what is a
capital or an operating lease. Unfortunately, this reality places the
decision in the hands of the one being evaluated by the investment
community, and the last decade has shown us what happens when we entrust
accounting policy making to managers.
To my way of thinking, the arbitrariness in FAS 13
is significantly less than the arbitrariness inherent in IAS 17. To say it
another way, the transparency of FASB's arbitrariness to the investment
community trumps the opaqueness of IASB's rule.
The present value of the lease is calculated with
the interest rate implicit in the lease, if practicable; otherwise, the
present value is determined with the business enterprise's incremental
borrowing rate. Notice that IASB thereby allows financial engineering by the
managers of the entity. Managers can argue that they do not know and cannot
find out the implicit rate, obtain a lower present value of the leased item,
and then be in a better position to argue that the lease is an operating
lease. IASB's position conceptually is no better than FASB's on this point.
IASB defines assets and liabilities as follow:
An asset is a resource controlled by the entity as
a result of past events and from which future economic benefits are expected
to flow to the entity.
A liability is a present obligation of the entity
arising from past events, the settlement of which is expected to result in
an outflow from the entity of resources embodying economic benefits.
These definitions are not substantially different
from FASB's definitions. Most importantly, notice that if one is truly
principled, he or she must conclude that leased items are assets and lease
obligations are liabilities. There is no room for operating leases if
managers or auditors are adhering to the principles imbedded in the
definitions that IASB gives assets and liabilities.
Both FASB and IASB have ignored their own
conceptual frameworks in FAS 13 and IAS 17. Under both sets of definitions,
leased items are assets and lease obligations are liabilities. The only
logical conclusion for FASB and IASB is to require capitalization of all
leases.
. . .
FAS 13 is one of the most deficient standards ever
issued by FASB. Yet, IAS 17 contains most of the same errors and
shortcomings. Its only improvement -- removal of the bright lines -- is
actually a detriment because it assists managers in their efforts to
obfuscate meaningful communications with investors and creditors. If that's
the best example of principles-based accounting, give me rules any day.
"Will the Alphabet Soup of GAAP Soon Become Consomme?" by Tom Selling,
The Accounting Onion, February 4, 2008 ---
http://accountingonion.typepad.com/
ARB, APB, SFAS,
SOP, EITF, FSP, AIN, FIN, CON, SAB, AAER,
FRP, ASR, S-X. These are all
authoritative sources of GAAP, and I
probably left some out. So, four years
ago, the FASB began work on its project
to simplify the process of finding
answers to accounting questions by
creating a single, authoritative on-line
Codification—with the significant
exception of SEC literature. On January
15th, the FASB launched a one-year
“verification” period, during which the
Codification Research System will be
available online free of charge. To
access the Codification, a user must
first register at
http://asc.fasb.org.
I have by no means done a thorough
review of the Codification software, but
I decided to replicate a research
project I recently performed for a
client as a test of its usability. My
client had a series of questions about
an anticipated sale of part of their
operations, and in particular whether
presentation as discontinued operations
was specified for the current and future
periods. My resulting first impressions
of the Codification as a research tool
are these:
-
Response time is slow. I'm
concerned that as more users access
the codification, performance will
degrade even further.
-
The organization of topics could be
more logical. For example, the FASB
is working toward an asset/liability
approach to recognition and
measurement; so, why are revenues
and expenses discussed separately
from their balance sheet
counterparts? However, I was able
to the place where discontinued
operation guidance resides very
quickly.
-
The ability to place the cursor over
a defined term and read its
definition without clicking is very
convenient. The organization of
each topic in a systematic series of
sections and subsections appears
logical, consistent and potentially
helpful. However, reading off the
computer screen gets old very
quickly, in no small part because
the subsections are too granular to
be reader-friendly. For my task, I
chose to simplify things by using
the command to join all subsections
together -- and then dump everything
to paper along with citations to the
source documents. I suppose that if
you are looking for a particular
sentence or two in answer to a very
narrow question, reading off the
screen and jumping around using
hyperlinks could work fine; but I
wonder if that's more the exception
than the rule. Usually, I need to
be able to scan the entire content
with my eyes before I can hone in on
the words I need.
Overall, the codification project
continues to hold high promise and is
proceeding apace. A logical next step
for the SEC would be to determine how
they can reasonably make accounting
researcher more efficient and definitive
by incorporating their own literature
into the FASB's codification. At
present, the Codification does include
"authoritative" content issued by the
SEC (though not all), as well as
selected SEC staff interpretations.
Under the current regime, GAAP can be
created in an instant practically every
time an enforcement action takes place;
or a commissioner or high ranking staff
member opes their ruby lips to offer
their two cents worth about accounting.
Continued in article
"FASB Launches GAAP Codification System: Free access granted,
feedback requested," SmartPros, January 16, 2008 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x60405.xml
The Financial Accounting
Standards Board on Tuesday launched the one-year verification phase of its
Accounting Standards Codification, a system that reorganizes the thousands
of U.S. GAAP pronouncements into accounting topics using a consistent
structure.
he
Codification organizes U.S. GAAP by 90 topics or issues on a new Web site,
http://asc.fasb.org. FASB expects the new
structure and system will reduce the amount of time and effort required to
solve an accounting research issue, improve usability of the literature
thereby mitigating the risk of noncompliance with standards, and provide
real-time updates as new standards are released. In addition, the system
should become the authoritative source of literature for the completed
XBRL taxonomy.
The structure includes all accounting standards issued by a standard-setter
within levels A through D of the current U.S. GAAP hierarchy, including
FASB, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), Emerging
Issues Task Force (EITF), and related literature. It excludes governmental
accounting standards.
"For a long time,
many users have said that GAAP is confusing," said Barry Melancon, AICPA
president and CEO. "The Codification represents a simplification of the
enormous body of accounting standards. It renders GAAP more understandable
and accessible for research."
During the
one-year verification period,
FASB will make the Codification available through
a new Web-based research system to solicit feedback from constituents to
confirm that the Codification accurately reflects existing GAAP for
nongovernmental entities.
After
receiving feedback, FASB is expected to formally approve the Codification as
the single source of authoritative U.S. GAAP, other than guidance issued by
the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The
Codification will include authoritative content issued by the SEC, as well
as selected SEC staff interpretations.
Upon approval by
FASB, all accounting standards (other than the SEC guidance) used to
populate the Codification will be superseded. At that time, with the
exception of any SEC or grandfathered guidance, all other accounting
literature not included in the Codification will become nonauthoritative.
Users who
register at
http://asc.fasb.org are able to review the
Codification free of charge and provide specific content-related feedback at
the individual paragraph level as well as general system-related feedback.
During the verification period, Codification content will be updated for
changes resulting from constituent feedback and new standards.
FASB provides
a 52-page document on how to use the new tool at:
http://asc.fasb.org/imageRoot/56/2304556.pdf
February 22, 2008 message from Tom Selling
[tom.selling@GROVESITE.COM]
On cost (replacement)
versus (fair) value, Walter Teets and I have written a paper that we
recently submitted to FAJ. The basic thrust is that cost can be
associated with principles-based accounting, and value cannot. That’s
why FAS 157 is rules based and filled with anomalies. You can read the
working paper
here,
or read my blog post that it
was based on
here. Comments,
especially on the working paper, would be much appreciated.
Thomas I. Selling PhD, CPA
602-228-4871 (M)
602-952-9880 x205 (O)
Website:
www.tomselling.com
Weblog:
www.accountingonion.com
Company:
www.grovesite.com
From Jim Mahar's blog on February 5, 2008 ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
How
'cash' at companies became risky - MarketWatch
There is cash and then
there is cash:
How 'cash' at companies became risky - MarketWatch:
"...as strange as this may sound, Bristol-Myers Squibb
was the latest company to do the equivalent of taking a
charge against cash when it announced a $275 million
impairment of debt investments that held such things as
surprise! subprime and home-equity loans.
Companies don't really take charges against cash, of
course, but investments that double as cash might as
well be cash. Auction-rate securities, as these arcane
investments are called, were deemed so safe that they
sat on the balance sheet not far from Treasurys in a
near-cash category called 'marketable securities.'
Until a few years ago, before a change in accounting
rules, Bristol-Myers accounted for auction-rate
securities as actual cash. They are so much like cash
that they yield just a fraction of a percent above cash
and, as Bristol-Myers regulatory filings say, can 'be
liquidated for cash at a short notice.'"
Question
Should "principles-based" standards replace more detailed requirements for
complex financial contracts such as structured financing contracts and financial
instruments derivatives contracts?
From IASPlus, January 15, 2008 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
'Big-6' joint paper on principles-based accounting standards
The six largest global accounting
networks, including Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, have jointly
published a paper on Principles-Based
Accounting Standards. The paper was launched to coincide
with a global public policy symposium in New York, hosted by
the firms. The paper, which sets out six key criteria for
principles based standards, was debated in a panel that
included IASB Chairman Sir David Tweedie and FASB Chairman
Robert Herz at the symposium. The six attributes proposed
for principles based standards are:
- Faithful presentation of
economic reality
- Responsive to users' needs for
clarity and transparency
- Consistency with a clear
Conceptual Framework
- Based on an appropriately
defined scope that addresses a broad area of accounting
- Written in clear, concise, and
plain language
- Allows for the use of
reasonable judgment
Click to
Download the Paper (PDF 607k). In releasing the paper, the
CEOs of the six global accounting networks said:
Over the past
several years, a growing dialogue has developed
about the future of financial reporting and the
public company audit profession. In order to advance
that dialogue, during the past year, we have engaged
in discussions with stakeholders around the world on
a number of issues critical to the longterm strength
and stability of global capital markets.
In these talks,
we have been struck by the breadth of support for
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs)
as a single set of high-quality, accounting
standards that ultimately can be used around the
world. Stakeholders indicated their support for IFRS
in part because it is more principles-based than US
GAAP. There was, however, a lack of consensus on the
key characteristics of principles-based standards.
|
Preliminary decisions by SEC's financial reporting review panel
In June 2007, the US Securities and
Exchange Commission formed the SEC Advisory Committee on
Improvements to Financial Reporting to study the causes of
complexity in the US financial reporting system and to
recommend ways to make financial reports clearer and more
beneficial to investors, reduce costs and unnecessary
burdens for preparers, and better utilize advances in
technology to enhance all aspects of financial reporting.
See our
News Story of 28 June 2007. Last
week, the Advisory Committee held its third meeting and
reached some tentative decisions on changes that it might
propose. The Committee's deliberations were based on a
Draft Decision Memo (PDF 878k)
that sets out the definition and causes of compelxity and
proposals for reducing complexity. The Committee tentatively
agreed to support the following proposals, among others:
- GAAP should be based
on transactions and activities, rather than
industries, and most existing industry-specific
guidance should be eliminated.
- GAAP should provide
for a single method of accounting for a given
transaction or event and should not normally
include accounting policy choices.
- The FASB should be the
source of interpretations of US GAAP, not other
parties.
- The SEC and others
should acknowledge that principles-based
standards may result in a reasonable amount of
diversity in practice, and the SEC's compliance
and enforcement activities should not require
restatements that may not be material to
users/investors, so long as the basic principles
in US GAAP are followed. The SEC should
promulgate guidance on materiality in this
context.
- Prior period financial
statements should only be restated for errors
that are material to those prior periods.
- The SEC and PCAOB
should provide more protections from lawsuits or
SEC enforcement actions for companies and
auditors exercising reasonable professional
judgment.
- The SEC should require
XBRL filings by the 500 largest domestic listed
companies, followed by evaluation and a decision
whether to extend this to all listed companies.
- The SEC should provide
guidance on corporate websites that provide
financial information to investors.
|
The Advisory Committee will meet again in March and plans to
publish its final recommendations in third quarter 2008.
Click to go to the
Advisory Committee's Web Page on the SEC website.
|
|
Jensen Comment
Because of the inconsistencies that will arise with "principles-based"
standards, I'm agin em! But that's like spitting into the wind!
Principles-Based Versus Rules-Based Accounting Standards
"Standing on Principles In a world with more regulation than ever, can the
accounting rulebook be thrown away?" byAlix Nyberg Stuart, CFO Magazine
September 01, 2006 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7852613/c_7873404?f=magazine_featured
As Groucho Marx once said, "Those are my
principles, and if you don't like them...well, I have others."
Groucho would enjoy the heated stalemate over
principles-based accounting. Four years after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
required the Securities and Exchange Commission to explore the feasibility
of developing principles-based accounting standards in lieu of detailed
rules, the move to such standards has gone exactly nowhere. ad
Broadly speaking, principles-based standards would
be consistent, concise, and general, requiring CFOs to apply common sense
rather than bright-lines. Instead of having, say, numerical thresholds to
define when leases must be capitalized, a CFO could use his or her own
judgment as to whether a company's interest was substantial enough to put a
lease on the balance sheet. If anything, though, accounting and auditing
standards have reached new levels of nitpickiness. "In the current
environment, CFOs are second-guessed by auditors, who are then third-guessed
by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [PCAOB], and then fourth-
and fifth-guessed by the SEC and the plaintiffs' bar," says Colleen
Cunningham, president and CEO of Financial Executives International (FEI).
Indeed, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
seems to have taken a principled stand in favor of rule-creation. The Board
continues to issue detailed rules and staff positions. Auditors have amped
up their level of scrutiny, in many cases leading to a tripling of audit
fees since 2002. And there is still scant mercy for anyone who breaks the
rules: the annual number of restatements doubled to more than 1,000 between
2003 and 2005, thanks to pressure from auditors and the SEC. The agency
pursued a record number of enforcement actions in the past three years,
while shareholder lawsuits, many involving accounting practices, continued
apace, claiming a record $7.6 billion in settlements last year and probably
more in 2006.
Yet the dream won't die. On the contrary,
principles are at the heart of FASB's latest thinking about changes to its
basic accounting framework, as reflected in the "preliminary views" the
board issued in July with the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)
as part of its plan to converge U.S. and international standards.
Principles-based accounting has been championed by FASB chairman Robert Herz,
SEC commissioner Paul Atkins, SEC deputy chief accountant Scott Taub, and
PCAOB member Charlie Niemeier in various speeches over the past six months.
And they're not just talking about editing a few lines in the rulebook.
"We need FASB, the SEC, the PCAOB, preparers,
users, auditors, and the legal profession to get together and check their
respective agendas at the door in order to collectively think through the
obstacles," says Herz. "And if it turns out some of the obstacles are
hardwired into our structure, then maybe we need some legal changes as
well," such as safe harbors that would protect executives and auditors from
having their judgments continually challenged. Even the SEC is talking about
loosening up. Most at the agency favor the idea of principles instead of
rules, says Taub, even knowing that "people will interpret them in different
ways and we'll have to deal with it."
Standards Deviation Why lawmakers are so set on
principles and what exactly those principles would look like is all a bit
hazy right now. "Post-Enron, the perception was that people were engineering
around the accounting rules. We looked around the world and saw that England
had principles-based accounting and they didn't have scandals there, so we
decided this was the way to go," recounts CVS Corp. CFO David Rickard, a
Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Committee (FASAC) member.
But Rickard considers the approach "naive." His
firsthand experience with principles-based accounting, as a group controller
for London-based Grand Metropolitan from 1991 to 1997, left him unimpressed.
"We had accounting rules we could drive trucks through," he says.
Would such a change be worth the trouble? A recent
study that compared the accrual quality of Canadian companies reporting
under a relatively principles-based GAAP to that of U.S. companies reporting
by the rules suggests that there may be no effective difference between the
two systems. The authors, Queen's University (Ontario) professors Daniel B.
Thornton and Erin Webster, found some evidence that the Canadian approach
yields better results, but conclude that "stronger U.S. oversight and
greater litigation risk" compensate for any differences.
U.S. GAAP is built on principles; they just happen
to be buried under hundreds of rules. The SEC, in its 2003 report on
principles-based accounting, labeled some standards as being either "rules"
or "principles." (No surprise to CFOs, FAS 133, stock-option accounting, and
lease accounting fall in the former category, while FAS 141 and 142 were
illustrative of the latter.) The difference: principles offer only "a
modicum" of implementation guidance and few scope exceptions or
bright-lines. ad
For FASB, the move to principles-based accounting
is part of a larger effort to organize the existing body of accounting
literature, and to eliminate internal inconsistencies. "Right now, we have a
pretty good conceptual framework, but the standards have often deviated from
the concepts," says Herz. He envisions "a common framework" with the IASB,
where "you take the concepts," such as how assets and liabilities should be
measured, and "from those you draw key principles" for specific areas of
accounting, like pensions and business combinations. In fact, that framework
as it now stands would change corporate accounting's most elemental
principle, that income essentially reflects the difference between revenues
and expenses. Instead, income would depend more on changes in the value of
assets and liabilities (see "Will Fair Value Fly?").
For its part, the SEC has also made clear that it
does not envisage an entirely free-form world. "Clearly, the standard
setters should provide some implementation guidance as a part of a newly
issued standard," its 2003 report states.
The catch is that drawing a line between rules and
principles is easier said than done. Principles need to be coupled with
implementation guidance, which is more of an art than a science, says Ben
Neuhausen, national director of accounting for BDO Seidman. That ambiguity
may explain why finance executives are so divided on support for this
concept. Forty-seven percent of the executives surveyed by CFO say they are
in favor of a shift to principles, another 25 percent are unsure of its
merits, and 17 percent are unfamiliar with the whole idea. Only 10 percent
oppose it outright, largely out of concern that it would be too difficult to
determine which judgments would pass muster.
A Road to Hell? As it stands now, many CFOs fear
that principles-based accounting would quickly lead to court. "The big
concern is that we make a legitimate judgment based on the facts as we
understand them, in the spirit of trying to comply, and that plaintiffs'
attorneys come along later with an expert accountant who says, 'I wouldn't
have done it that way,' and aha! — lawsuit! — several billion dollars,
please," says Rickard.
Massive shareholder lawsuits were a concern for 36
percent of CFOs who oppose ditching rules, according to CFO's survey, and
regulators are sympathetic. "There are institutional and behavioral issues,
and they're much broader than FASB or even the SEC," says Herz, citing "the
focus on short-term earnings, and the whole kabuki dance around quarterly
guidance."
Continued in article
SEC Seeks Stronger GASB
Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher
Cox wants the Governmental Accounting Standards Board to have more clout, he
said Wednesday in a speech at a community town hall meeting in Los Angeles.
SmartPros, July 19, 2007 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x58440.xml
"SEC Advisory Panel Recommends Wholesale Changes in U.S. Accounting,"
by Judith Burns (Dow Jones Newswires), SmartPros, January 14, 2008 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x60389.xml
A Securities and Exchange Commission advisory group
voted Friday to approve recommendations for wholesale changes in U.S.
accounting and financial reporting.
Among the changes unanimously backed by the panel:
base U.S. accounting rules on transactions and activities to avoid special
treatment for various industries, limit corporate financial restatements to
meaningful mistakes, and provide more protections from lawsuits or SEC
enforcement actions for companies and auditors exercising "reasonable"
professional judgment.
Any move away from industry-specific accounting
would be a big change likely to touch off controversy, according to MFS
Investment Management Co. Chairman Robert Pozen, who heads the SEC advisory
panel on improvements to financial reporting. Pozen predicted "all hell's
going to break loose" once the group issues the recommendation, intended to
reduce complexity and make corporate results more comparable from industry
to industry.
Shielding companies and auditors from
second-guessing or lawsuits when they exercise professional judgment is sure
to be controversial as well. The advisory group urged the SEC to issue a
policy statement or a legal "safe harbor" protecting firms and auditors from
enforcement action or legal challenge provided they acted in good faith and
made a "reasoned" evaluation based on relevant information available to them
at the time.
On restatements, the advisory group called for
companies to correct errors when they are discovered and issue restatements
only for material items, an approach that would reduce the number of
restatements.
The group also wants to shed more light during the
so-called "dark period" after a company announces that it has found a
material error but before it issues a restatement of prior financial
results. The advisory panel called for companies to describe the error, the
periods that might be affected and that are under review, and give an
estimated range of the error's size, any impact it might have and what
management plans to do to prevent such errors in the future.
Deloitte Touche Chief Executive James Quigley, who
serves on the panel, called the recommended approach "a giant step forward"
and panel member Scott Evans, a senior vice president for asset management
at TIAA-Cref, a pension fund for teachers, said expanded disclosure "will
definitely help investors."
The group also endorsed a compromise proposal on
data-tagging technology by calling for the 500 largest U.S. public companies
to furnish reports to the SEC using data tags for part of the financial
statements. The tags, akin to bar codes for individual items in a financial
report, make it easy to find and compare corporate results. That, advocates
say, will benefit investors, analysts and regulators.
The SEC advisory panel is slated to meet again in
March and issue a final recommendation this summer.
In
Concepts Statement No. 2, the FASB asserts it should not issue a standard
for the purpose of achieving some particular economic behavior. Among other
things, this statement implies that the board should not set accounting
standards in an attempt to bolster the economy or some industry sector. Ideally,
scorekeeping should not affect how the game is played. But this is an impossible
ideal since changes in rules for keeping score almost always change player
behavior. Hence, accounting standards cannot be ideally neutral. The FASB,
however, actively attempts not to not take political sides on changing behavior
that favors certain political segments of society. In other words, the FASB
still operates on the basis that fairness and transparency in the spirit of
neutrality override politics. However, there is a huge gray zone that, in large
measure, involves how companies, analysts, investors, creditors, and even the
media react to new accounting rules. Sometimes they react in ways that are not
anticipated by the FASB.
Questions
Is there a problem with how GAAP covers one's Fannie?
Would fair value accounting help in this situation?
"Fannie Execs Defend Accounting Change Friday,"
by Marcy Gordon, Yahoo News, November 16, 2007 ---
http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/071116/fannie_mae_accounting.html
Fannie Mae executives on
Friday defended a change in the way the mortgage lender discloses losses on
home loans amid concern from analysts that it could mask the true impact of
the credit crisis on its bottom line.
The chief financial officer and other executives of
the government-sponsored company, which reported a $1.4 billion
third-quarter loss last week, held a conference call with Wall Street
analysts to explain the recent change.
Analysts peppered the executives with questions in
a skeptical tone. The way Fannie discloses its mortgage losses, addressed in
an article published online by Fortune, raises extra concern among analysts
given that Fannie Mae was racked by a $6.3 billion accounting scandal in
2004 that tarnished its reputation and brought government sanctions against
it.
Moreover, the skepticism from Wall Street comes as
Fannie seeks approval from the government to raise the cap of its investment
portfolio.
The chief financial officer, Stephen Swad, said in
the call that some of the $670 million in provisions for credit losses on
soured home loans that Fannie Mae wrote off in the third quarter likely
would be recovered.
"We book what we book under (generally accepted
accounting principles) and we provide this disclosure to help you understand
it," Swad said.
Shares of Fannie Mae fell $4.30, or 10 percent, to
$38.74 on Friday, following a 10 percent drop the day before.
"Fannie Shares Continue Plunge," by Mike Barris,
The Wall Street Journal, November 16, 2007 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119522620923495790.html
Shares of Fannie Mae skidded further Friday, after
falling 10% Thursday amid worries over the way the mortgage giant reports
credit losses and a gloomy outlook for the housing market.
The latest decline in the company's share price
came as Chief Financial Officer Stephen Swad on Friday attempted to
alleviate investor concerns about the company's credit losses.
In morning trading, Fannie shares were at $41.30,
down $1.75, or 4%. The shares had fallen as much as 14% early in the day
before recovering somewhat. Shares of Fannie's counterpart, Freddie Mac,
also fell, down $1.98, or 4.8%, to $39.91.
Thursday's drop came after Fortune magazine's Web
site reported a change in the method Fannie uses to report credit losses.
Last week, the nation's biggest investor in
home-mortgage loans reported that its credit losses in the year's first nine
months equaled 0.04% of the company's $2.8 trillion of mortgages and related
securities owned or guaranteed, up from 0.018% a year earlier. That was in
line with the company's forecast.
But the company changed its method of presenting
the figure, excluding unrealized losses on
certain loans that were marked down to reflect current market conditions.
Including those unrealized losses, the rate for this year's first nine
months was 0.075%, up from 0.023% a year before.
Fannie officials said the change was made to
separate realized losses from ones that haven't been realized and depend on
fluctuating market values for loans. A report from J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.
analyst George Sacco said the new method is similar to that used by Freddie
Mac. Fannie officials noted that both the realized and unrealized losses
were reflected in the earnings reported last week.
Fannie's stock had already been falling for a few
weeks amid worries about how hard Fannie would be hurt by rising mortgage
defaults. At an investment conference Thursday in New York, Wells Fargo &
Co.'s chief executive, John Stumpf, predicted more pain for mortgage lenders
in the year ahead as falling home prices cut the value of collateral, saying
the nationwide decline in housing is the worst since the Great Depression.
Thursday, Fannie shares dropped $4.78, or 10%, to
$43.04.
On Friday, Mr. Swad tried to explain further how
the company was accounting for potential losses.
Last week, Fannie Mae reported roughly $670 million
in credit losses in the third quarter related to certain charge-offs
recorded when delinquent loans were purchased from mortgage-backed
securities trusts. Mr. Swad explained Friday that portions of the credit
losses would likely be recovered.
Though these third quarter losses were charged off,
they are not considered realized losses, Mr. Swad said, because the loans
backing these securities could still be "cured." Mr. Swad said the company
was "required to take a charge when the market estimate is below our
purchase price." The company's experience, he added, "has shown that the
majority of these loans don't result in any realized losses." But he
declined to be more specific about what percentage of the loans would
eventually "cure."
Fannie last week released earnings for the first
three quarters of the year. It reported an additional unrealized loss of
$955 million in the value of private-label securities backed by subprime and
Alt-A mortgages through the end of the third quarter. This was in addition
to $376 million the company had previously accounted as a loss for these
securities this year.
November 16, 2007 reply from Dennis Beresford
[dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]
For the record, there was no "accounting change" as
per this headline. A headline of "Fannie Mae follows GAAP" probably wouldn't
be quite as sexy but it would be 100% accurate. The company's clear
explanation of what it is required to do under GAAP is covered in the
conference call that is available on Fannie Mae's web site for those
accounting aficionados who want to learn more about AICPA Statement of
Position 03-03 that requires companies repurchasing loans to record them at
fair value. So the answer to your question is that fair value accounting
apparently only complicated analysts' understanding in this case.
Denny Beresford
November 17, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Denny,
Your comment sheds a lot of light on this apparent gap between analyst
expectations and GAAP rules in this case. The SEC, FASB, and the IASB are
pushing hard and steady toward fair value accounting with FAS 155, 157, and
159 just being intermediary steps along the way. At least in this case,
however, required fair value accounting is allegedly contributing to the
plunge in Fannie Mae’s share values.
This is another example of the unpredictability of the Neutrality Concept
in standard setting. You point out (see below) that FASB seriously considers
neutrality for every new standard and interpretation with the goal of having
scorekeeping not affect how the game is played, but in athletics and
business it is virtually impossible to change how something is scored
without affecting policies and strategies. For example, when long shots in
basketball commenced to earn three points rather than two points it
fundamentally changed the game of basketball.
Perhaps this is all an example of what you, in 1989,
termed "relevant financial information may bring about damaging
consequences." (see a quote from your article below). It would have been
interesting if the media reporters in 2007 had cited your 1989 article in
this beating Fannie Mae is now taking by adhering to GAAP.
Bob Jensen
"How well does the FASB consider the consequences of its
work?" by Dennis Beresford, All Business, March 1, 1989 ---
http://www.allbusiness.com/accounting/methods-standards/105127-1.html
Neutrality is the quality that distinguishes
technical decision-making from political decision-making. Neutrality is
defined in FASB Concepts Statement 2 as the absence of bias that is intended
to attain a predetermined result. Professor Paul B. W. Miller, who has held
fellowships at both the FASB and the SEC, has written a paper titled:
"Neutrality--The Forgotten Concept in Accounting Standards Setting." It is
an excellent paper, but I take exception to his title. The FASB has not
forgotten neutrality, even though some of its constituents may appear to
have. Neutrality is written into our mission statement as a primary
consideration. And the neutrality concept dominates every Board meeting
discussion, every informal conversation, and every memorandum that is
written at the FASB. As I have indicated, not even those who have a mandate
to consider public policy matters have a firm grasp on the macroeconomic or
the social consequences of their actions. The FASB has no mandate to
consider public policy matters. It has said repeatedly that it is not
qualified to adjudicate such matters and therefore does not seek such a
mandate. Decisions on such matters properly reside in the United States
Congress and with public agencies.
The only mandate the FASB has, or wants, is to
formulate unbiased standards that advance the art of financial reporting for
the benefit of investors, creditors, and all other users of financial
information. This means standards that result in information on which
economic decisions can be based with a reasonable degree of confidence.
A fear of information
Unfortunately, there is sometimes a fear that
reliable, relevant financial information may bring about damaging
consequences. But damaging to whom? Our
democracy is based on free dissemination of reliable information. Yes, at
times that kind of information has had temporarily damaging consequences for
certain parties. But on balance, considering all interests, and the future
as well as the present, society has concluded in favor of freedom of
information. Why should we fear it in financial reporting?
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on standard setting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on Accrual Accounting and
Estimation are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AccrualAccounting
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
Bob Jensen's threads on Fannie Mae's enormous problem
(the largest in history that led to the firing of KPMG from the audit and a
multiple-year effort to restate financial statemetns) with applying FAS 133 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm#FannieMae
Standard Setting and Securities Markets: U.S. Versus Europe
November 29, 2007 message from Pacter, Paul (CN - Hong Kong)
[paupacter@DELOITTE.COM.HK]
Some similarities to Chair of SEC, but some
important differences. SEC has direct regulatory powers over securities
markets, entities that offer securities in those markets, broker/dealers in
securities, auditors, and others. SEC can impose penalties on those it
regulates.
In Europe there is no pan-European securities
regulator equivalent to the SEC with direct regulatory powers similar to the
SEC's. Rather, there are 27 securities regulators (one from each member
state) who have that power. Here's a link to the list:
http://www.cesr-eu.org/index.php?page=members_directory&mac=0&id=
There is a coordinating body of European securities
regulators called CESR (the Committee of European Securities Regulators
(http://www.cesr-eu.org/)
but CESR's role is advisory, not regulatory.
When the European Parliament adopts legislation
(such as securitieslegislation) the legislation first has to be transposed
(legally adopted) into the national laws of the Member States. Commissioner
McCreevy's role is to propose policies and propose legislation to adopt
those policies in Europe, oversee implementation of the legislation in the
27 Member States (plus 3 EEA countries), and (through both persuasion and
some legal authority) try to ensure consistent and coordinated
implementation. The Commissioner also has outreach and liaison
responsibilities outside the European Union. Because there is no
pan-European counterpart to the SEC Chairman, Commissioner McCreevy
generally handles top level policy liaison between the SEC and Europe.
Like the Chair of the SEC, EU Commissioners are
political appointees.
Paul Pacter
Key differences between U.S. and International Standards ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FASBvsIASB
Question
Is a major overhaul of accounting standards on the way?
Hint
There may no longer be the tried and untrusted earnings per share number to
report!
Comment
It would be interesting to see a documentation of the academic research, if any,
that the FASB relied upon to commence this blockbuster initiative. I recommend
that some astute researcher commence to probe into the thinking behind this
proposal.
"Profit as We Know It Could Be Lost With New Accounting
Statements," by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, May 12, 2007; Page
A1 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117893520139500814.html?mod=DAT
Pretty soon the bottom line may not be, well, the
bottom line.
In coming months, accounting-rule makers are
planning to unveil a draft plan to rework financial statements, the bedrock
data that millions of investors use every day when deciding whether to buy
or sell stocks, bonds and other financial instruments. One possible result:
the elimination of what today is known as net income or net profit, the
bottom-line figure showing what is left after expenses have been met and
taxes paid.
It is the item many investors look to as a key
gauge of corporate performance and one measure used to determine executive
compensation. In its place, investors might find a number of profit figures
that correspond to different corporate activities such as business
operations, financing and investing.
Another possible radical change in the works:
assets and liabilities may no longer be separate categories on the balance
sheet, or fall to the left and right side in the classic format taught in
introductory accounting classes.
ACCOUNTING OVERHAUL
Get a glimpse of what new financial statements
could look like, according to an early draft recently provided by the
Financial Accounting Standards Board to one of its advisory groups.The
overhaul could mark one of the most drastic changes to accounting and
financial reporting since the start of the Industrial Revolution in the 19th
century, when companies began publishing financial information as they
sought outside capital. The move is being undertaken by accounting-rule
makers in the U.S. and internationally, and ultimately could affect
companies and investors around the world.
The project is aimed at providing investors with
more telling information and has come about as rule makers work to one day
come up with a common, global set of accounting standards. If adopted, the
changes will likely force every accounting textbook to be rewritten and
anyone who uses accounting -- from clerks to chief executives -- to relearn
how to compile and analyze information that shows what is happening in a
business.
This is likely to come as a shock, even if many
investors and executives acknowledge that net income has flaws. "If there
was no bottom line, I'd want to have a sense of what other indicators I
ought to be looking at to get a sense of the comprehensive health of the
company," says Katrina Presti, a part-time independent health-care
contractor and stay-at-home mom who is part of a 12-woman investment club in
Pueblo, Colo. "Net income might be a false indicator, but what would I look
at if it goes away?"
The effort to redo financial statements reflects
changes in who uses them and for what purposes. Financial statements were
originally crafted with bankers and lenders in mind. Their biggest question:
Is the business solvent and what's left if it fails? Stock investors care
more about a business's current and future profits, so the net-income line
takes on added significance for them.
Indeed, that single profit number, particularly
when it is divided by the number of shares outstanding, provides the most
popular measure of a company's valuation: the price-to-earnings ratio. A
company that trades at $10 a share, and which has net profit of $1 a share,
has a P/E of 10.
But giving that much power to one number has long
been a recipe for fraud and stock-market excesses. Many major accounting
scandals earlier this decade centered on manipulation of net income. The
stock-market bubble of the 1990s was largely based on investors' assumption
that net profit for stocks would grow rapidly for years to come. And the
game of beating a quarterly earnings number became a distraction or worse
for companies' managers and investors. Obviously it isn't known whether the
new format would cut down on attempts to game the numbers, but companies
would have to give a more detailed breakdown of what is going on.
The goal of the accounting-rule makers is to better
reflect how businesses are actually run and divert attention from the one
number. "I know the world likes single bottom-line numbers and all of that,
but complicated businesses are hard to translate into just one number," says
Robert Herz, chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the U.S.
rule-making body that is one of several groups working on the changes.
At the same time, public companies today are more
global than local, and as likely to be involved in services or lines of
business that involve intellectual property such as software rather than the
plants and equipment that defined the manufacturing age. "The income
statement today looks a lot like it did when I started out in this
profession," says William Parrett, the retiring CEO of accounting firm
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, who started as a junior accountant in 1967. "But
the kind of information that goes into it is completely different."
Along the way, figures such as net income have
become muddied. That is in part because more and more of the items used to
calculate net profit are based on management estimates, such as the value of
items that don't trade in active markets and the direction of interest
rates. Also, over the years rule makers agreed to corporate demands to
account for some things, such as day-to-day changes in the value of pension
plans or financial instruments used to protect against changes in interest
rates, in ways that keep them from causing swings in net income.
Rule makers hope reformatting financial statements
will address some of these issues, while giving investors more information
about what is happening in different parts of a business to better assess
its value. The project is being managed jointly by the FASB in the U.S. and
the London-based International Accounting Standards Board, and involves
accounting bodies in Japan, other parts of Asia and individual European
nations.
The entire process of adopting the revised approach
could take a few years to play out, so much could yet change. Plus, once
rule makers adopt the changes, they would have to be ratified by regulatory
authorities, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission in the U.S. and
the European Commission in Europe, before public companies would be required
to follow them.
As a first step, rule makers expect later this year
to publish a document outlining their preliminary views on what new form
financial statements might take. But already they have given hints of what's
in store. In March, the FASB provided draft, new financial statements at the
end of a 32-page handout for members of an advisory group. (See an example.)
Although likely to change, this preview showed an
income statement that has separate segments for the company's operating
business, its financing activities, investing activities and tax payments.
Each area has an income subtotal for that particular segment.
There is also a "total comprehensive income"
category that is wider ranging than net profit as it is known today, and so
wouldn't be directly comparable. That is because this total would likely
include gains and losses now kept in other parts of the financial
statements. These include some currency fluctuations and changes in the
value of financial instruments used to hedge against other items.
Comprehensive income could also eventually include
short-term changes in the value of corporate pension plans, which currently
are smoothed out over a number of years. As a result, comprehensive income
could be a lot more difficult to predict and could be volatile from quarter
to quarter or year to year.
As for the balance sheet, the new version would
group assets and liabilities together according to similar categories of
operating, investing and financing activities, although it does provide a
section for shareholders equity. Currently, a balance sheet is broken down
between assets and liabilities, rather than by operating categories.
Such drastic change isn't likely to happen without
a fight. Efforts to bring now-excluded figures into the income statement
could prompt battles with companies that fear their profit will be subject
to big swings. Companies may also balk at the expense involved.
"The cost of this change could be monumental," says
Gary John Previts, an accounting professor at Case Western Reserve
University in Cleveland. "All the textbooks are going to have to change,
every contract and every bank arrangement will have to change." Investors in
Europe and Asia, meanwhile, have opposed the idea of dropping net profit as
it appears today, David Tweedie, the IASB's chairman, said in an interview
earlier this year.
Analysts in the London office of UBS AG recently
published a report arguing this very point -- that even if net income is a
"simplistic measure," that doesn't mean it isn't a valid "starting point in
valuation" and that "its widespread use is justification enough for its
retention."
Such opposition doesn't surprise many accounting
experts. Net income is "the basis for bonuses and judgments about what a
company's stock is worth," says Stephen A. Zeff, an accounting professor at
Rice University. "I just don't know what the markets would do if companies
stopped reporting a bottom line somewhere." In the U.S., professional
investors and analysts have taken a more nuanced view, perhaps because the
manipulation of numbers was more pronounced in U.S. markets.
That said, net profit has been around for some
time. The income statement in use today, along with the balance sheet,
generally dates to the 1940s when the SEC laid out regulations on financial
disclosure. But many companies have included net profit in one form or
another since the 1800s.
In its fourth annual report, General Electric Co.
provided investors with a consolidated balance sheet and consolidated
profit-and-loss account for the year ended Jan. 31, 1896. The company, whose
board at the time included Thomas Edison, generated "profit of the year" --
what today would be called net income or net profit -- of $1,388,967.46.
For the moment, net profit will probably exist in
some form, although its days are likely numbered. "We've decided in the
interim to keep a net-income subtotal, but that's all up for discussion,"
the FASB's Mr. Herz says.
Accounting Rule Is Eased for Foreign Companies
Federal regulators tentatively agreed Wednesday to ease
an accounting requirement for foreign companies that trade on United States
exchanges. The action by the Securities and Exchange Commission paves the way
for a related change that would allow public companies to choose between
international and United States accounting standards when reporting financial
results. The step taken by the S.E.C. on Wednesday would eliminate a requirement
for foreign companies to reconcile their financial results with United States
standards called generally accepted accounting principles, or GAAP. Foreign
companies, which already adhere to what are called international financial
reporting standards, say the S.E.C. mandate is burdensome and costly. The
change, which awaits formal adoption after a 75-day public comment
period, would apply to 2008 annual reports, which are submitted in early 2009.
Associated Press, "Accounting Rule Is Eased for Foreign Companies," The New
York Times, June 21, 2007 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/21/business/worldbusiness/21sec.html
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on
March 30, 2007
Accounting
Standard Setters--Independent and Tough
by Robert E.
Denham
Mar 26, 2007
Page: A13
Click here to view the
full article on WSJ.com
---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117486496797748456.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
TOPICS: Accounting,
Financial Accounting Standards Board, Governmental Accounting
SUMMARY: Robert E. Denham is Chairman
of the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF), the oversight
organization of trustees for the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) and the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB).
In this editorial page discussion, he responds to concerns
expressed in a March 9, 2007, editorial by former SEC Chairman
Arthur Levitt, Jr. Mr. Denham discusses the benefits of stable
funding that has been achieved for the FASB through
Sarbanes-Oxley requirements and wishes for such a resource for
the GASB. He comments on the fact that the FASB and the GASB
recently have taken "concrete steps to improve user input to the
standard-setting process." He also describes how the Boards have
faced enormous opposition at times from corporations and
Congressional leaders to do things that have in hindsight turned
out to be "the right thing to do. "As they demonstrated in
standing up to corporate and governmental pressure on options
expensing, the trustees act to protect the independence of the
standards setters when they are attacked by special interest
groups seeking to block or reverse the decisions of the boards.
Students may answer questions by referring to the organizations'
web sites at http://www.fasb.org/faf/ http://www.fasb.org/
http://www.gasb.org/
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is the Financial Accounting Foundation? What is its
role in relation to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
and the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB)?
2.) Why is it important that the FASB and GASB operate on an
independent basis? How did implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley
law improve that ability for the FASB?
3.) What challenges do the FASB and GASB face in setting
standards that are controversial? How does independence help in
facing those challenges? Glean all you can from the articles or
from your own knowledge.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode
Island
RELATED ARTICLES:
Standards Deviation
by Arthur Levitt, Jr.
Mar 09, 2007
Page: A15
|
"Accounting Firms Seek Overhaul," by Tad Kopinski, Institutional
Shareholder Services ISS, November 20, 2006 ---
http://blog.issproxy.com/2006/11/accounting_firms_seek_overhaul.html
The six biggest international audit firms have
called for a complete overhaul of corporate financial reporting as
the U.S. and Europe move toward convergence of international audit
standards.
In a Nov. 8 report, the accounting firms
propose to replace static quarterly financial statements with
real-time, Internet-based reporting that encompasses a wider range
of performance measures, including non-financial ones. The report
was signed by the chiefs of PricewaterhouseCoopers International,
Grant Thornton International, Deloitte, KPMG International, BDO
International, and Ernst & Young. The report can be downloaded
here.
"We all believe the current model is
broken," Mike D. Rake, KPMG's chairman, told the Financial Times.
"There are significant shortcomings to U.S. GAAP [Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles] and issues of concern with International
Financial Reporting Standards. We're not in a very happy situation."
Rake noted that quarterly reporting and the
short-term focus on companies' ability to meet Wall Street earnings
expectations helped foster accounting scandals. The firms have been
working on their proposals for more than a year.
The large discrepancy between the "book"
and "market" values of many listed companies is clear evidence that
the content of traditional financial statements is of limited use,
the report said. The audit firms recommend using non-financial
measures that would provide more valuable indications of a company's
future prospects, such as customer satisfaction, product or service
defects, employee turnover, and patent awards.
The report said the following developments
need to occur to ensure capital market stability, efficiency, and
growth:
--Investor needs for information are well
defined and met;
--The roles of the various stakeholders in these markets--financial
statement preparers, regulators, investors, standards setters, and
auditors--are aligned and supported by effective forums for
continuous dialogue;
--The auditing profession is vibrant, sustainable, and provides
sufficient choice for all stakeholders in these markets;
--A new business-reporting model is developed to deliver relevant
and reliable information in a timely way;
--Large, collusive frauds are more and more rare; and
--Information is reported and audited pursuant to globally
consistent standards.
ICGN Expresses Concerns Over
ConvergenceMeanwhile, the
International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) has expressed
concerns about a draft proposal on harmonizing international and
U.S. accounting standards. The ICGN argues that the draft doesn't
pay sufficient attention to shareholder rights and the stewardship
role of boards and investors.
"Convergence must be there to raise
standards," ICGN Executive Director Anne Simpson told the Financial
Times. "Convergence for its own sake is not of value."
The ICGN letter was in response to a
request for comment by the International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB) and its U.S. counterpart, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) on a discussion paper on harmonization objectives. The
IASB and the FASB have been working on harmonizing the two
accounting systems since October 2002 and have set 2008 as the goal
for finalizing the process.
Unlike the current IASB auditing framework,
the discussion paper endorses a model more similar to U.S.
standards, dropping a key shareowner safeguard embedded in
U.K.-style standards, the ICGN noted. Rather than focusing audits on
past transactions, the discussion paper calls for audits to focus on
"decision-usefulness" that can affect company cash flows, the letter
said.
"We are concerned that this emphasis on the
ability to forecast the future does not fully capture the
requirements of stewardship, which is concerned with monitoring past
transactions and events," Mark Anson, the CEO of Hermes Pensions
Management who chairs the ICGN, wrote in the Nov. 2 letter. (A
Hermes affiliate is a part owner of ISS.)
"In many jurisdictions, financial
statements provide significant input into the decisions we make as
shareholders, by providing an account of past transactions and
events and the current financial position of the business," the ICGN
letter noted. "In de-emphasizing things that are particularly
[relevant to shareholders' risks and rights], the standards setters
could achieve the perverse effect of actually increasing the cost of
capital."
The ICGN includes more than 400
institutional and private investors, corporations, and advisers from
38 countries with capital under management in excess of $10
trillion, according to its Web site. The ICGN letter also was signed
by Claude Lamoureux, CEO of the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan.
A copy of the IASB discussion paper, which
was published in July, can be downloaded
here.
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue
Bob Jensen's threads on troubles in the big international accounting firms
are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on proposed reforms are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudProposedReforms.htm
Question
Will the U.S. adopt all IFRS international standards while the European Union
cherry picks which standards it will adopt?
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on
April 27, 2007
"SEC to Mull Letting U.S. Companies Use International Accounting Rules,"
by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, Page: C3 ---
http://snipurl.com/WSJ0425
TOPICS: Accounting, Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards
Board, Securities and Exchange Commission
SUMMARY: The article describes the SEC's willingness to consider allowing
U.S. companies to use USGAAP or International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
in their filings. This development stems from the initiative to allow
international firms traded on U.S. exchanges to file using IFRS without
reconciling to USGAAP-based net income and stockholders' equity as is now
required on Form 20F. "SEC Chairman Christopher Cox said the agency remains
committed to removing the reconciliation requirement by 2009. Such a move was
the subject of an SEC roundtable and is being closely watched by European Union
officials." The SEC will accept comments this summer on its proposal to
eliminate the reconciliation requirements. If the agency does implement this
change, then it will consider allowing U.S. companies the same alternative.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is a "foreign private issuer" (FPI)? Summarize the SEC's current filing
requirements for these entities.
2.) Why is the SEC considering allowing U.S. companies to submit filings
under IFRS rather than U.S. GAAP?
3.) Why might the SEC's decision in this matter "spell the demise of USGAAP"?
4.) Define "principles-based standards" and contrast with "rules-based
standards." Give an example in either USGAAP or IFRS requirements for each of
these items.
5.) "Some experts don't think a move away from U.S. GAAP would necessarily be
bad." Who do you think would hold this opinion? Who would disagree? Explain.
6.) Define the term convergence in relation to global standards. Who is
working towards this goal?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Jensen Comment
Canada has already decided to adopt the IFRS in place of domestic Canadian
standards.
Also see ""Strengthening the Transatlantic Economy," by José
Manuel Barroso (European Commission President), April 27, 2007 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/europe/0704barroso.pdf
Also don't assume that the European Union automatically adopts
each IASB international standard. For example, the EU may not adopt IFRS 8 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ifrs08.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on differences between the international
and U.S. standards are summarized at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FASBvsIASB
Complicated Accounting Rules and Employee Pressures
November 7, 2006 message from Amy Dunbar
[Amy.Dunbar@BUSINESS.UCONN.EDU]
I am teaching a class, Research for Accounting
Professionals, and I have been thinking about how to prepare my students for
the "real world." I am looking for some insight re: the apparent increased
pressure on accountants. For example, some say that the financial reporting
environment is rivaling the tax world for the number of new rules that come
out every year. I counted the number of statements issued since per year and
found that the 1980s was the busiest period, with 1982 being the highest
year with 18 statements. Does anyone know why that was? If the number of
statements isn't increasing, is it the guidance from SEC that has increased,
or is the pressure coming from the SOX environment with its emphasis on
internal controls? Has the internal control guidance stepped up? Or is the
pressure simply the same pressure that all business people are facing from
increased global competition?
1 1973
2 1974
9 1975
2 1976
6 1977
4 1978
10 1979
10 1980
9 1981
18 1982
7 1983
4 1984
6 1985
3 1986
6 1987
4 1988
3 1989
2 1990
2 1991
5 1992
4 1993
2 1994
7 1995
3 1996
4 1997
3 1998
3 1999
3 2000
4 2001
4 2002
3 2003
4 2004
1 2005
5 2006
Amy Dunbar
University of Connecticut
School of Business
Department of Accounting
2100 Hillside Road, Unit 1041 Storrs, CT 06269
November 8, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Amy,
I don’t think you can
compare numbers of FASB/SEC statements with any sort of confidence. How
do you compare FAS 133 (incredibly complex) with FAS 157 (relatively
simple)? The problem is not the number of new standards but the way new
standards merely add to a growing mountain of previous standards that
does not go away --- the mountain just grows higher and higher.
Our students must face
an exceedingly complex world of technology. They must have skills in
pivot tables, client databases, knowledge databases, ERP, and things
that were just not crashing down on our graduates in the 1980s.
I personally think
that a negative externality of technology has been increased risk of
fraud that increases pressures on auditors. For example, technology has
made it lucrative to steal IDs. Now we have huge conspiracies to steal
those IDs, as witnessed by the recent reporting of a gang, including
hotel owners, managers, and employees, that were stealing IDs at
multiple hotels. Internal controls have just not kept pace with the
level of theft risks and temptations, and our graduates are under
pressures to invent newer internal controls in complicated IT systems.
Hacker/Cracker criminals themselves are extremely sophisticated and
skilled. Our networked enemies can be anywhere on the globe.
Pressures are coming
from a wide variety of interacting causes, not the least of which is SOX
which is basically aimed at improving audit quality. What you had back
in the 1980s was auditing sham! Firms like Andersen were removing much
of the detail testing and trench work out of the audits, thereby taking
much of the pressure off of auditors in the field ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm#RiskBasedAuditing
The world’s worst audit in history, WorldCom, brought this sham into the
light.
The audit scandals
(spread rather evenly among firms), litigation losses, the nose dive of
reputation of the CPA profession, and SOX turned much of this around and
now the audit firms are trying to restore the professionalism of their
work with a dramatic increase in funding to do the job. But the
pressures are bound to increase as well if auditors really try to do
professional work.
You have audit firms
being fired (the way KPMG was fired from Fannie Mae and E&Y was fired
from TIAA/CREF). You have clients paying millions upon millions to
restate financial statements because of bad auditing (e.g., Fannie is
spending over $100 million to produce restatements). This is bound to
pressure auditors assigned to do the job right. One of my former
students brought in by PwC to help generate Fannie’s restatements said
that he had to become an expert on valuing derivatives using a Bloomberg
terminal (as part of the restatement effort). How many of our accounting
education programs teach students how to value interest rate swaps on a
Bloomberg terminal?
But mostly I think the
pressure is on our graduates to deal with incredibly tough contracts
that their professors and their supervisors themselves do not
understand. Pressure is put on our green-as-grass new graduates to
understand and explain contract complexity all the way up the food chain
in their firms.
Below is a message
that I received yesterday from a recent graduate who went to work
immediately for AT&T rather than one of the big auditing firms. It helps
explain how our young graduates encounter contracts that do not appear
in our textbooks and how they must have skills and knowledge well beyond
what we taught in the past Century.
Hey again Dr. Jensen,
I have another derivatives
situation! Do you know anything about zero coupon bonds that are
puttable? I guess they are a relatively new transaction type
that banks are trying to push. I guess the theory is that you
sacrifice some additional risk (by allowing the bondholder to
put to you) in return for a lower interest rate than a typical
zero coupon bond. It is my interpretation that written options
don't count for hedge accounting status unless they offset
another derivative instrument (FAS 133, P 396-401). It is also
my interpretation that this is a situation which would create a
difference in the bond value which would be reflected as an
income statement (other income/expense) effect.
However, I think the financial
components of the situation are over my head, and my boss is
trying to tell me that he thinks that all of this transaction
would either run through interest expense or there would be a
huge increase in income in the first period represented (with no
MTM throughout). I don't understand these arguments. Do you have
any idea what he is getting at?
I am really grateful for any help
you can provide, but I am starting to feel bad about emailing
you. I have always assumed that you enjoyed these kind of
discussions, but if you don't please don't feel obligated to
answer. Just let me know - I don't want to disturb your
retirement!
As always, hope things are well.
Thanks again so much.
Andrew |
My response to him is too long to repeat here, but you can read a bit
more about puttable bond accounting at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm
Each new message from a frustrated former student makes me happier that
I’m retired in the high hills. I would not want to be one of these
young men and women today.
Bob Jensen
November 8, 2006 reply from J. S. Gangolly
[gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
Years ago, I suggested one of my doctoral students
(now a colleague) to prepare a graph that shows how the various standards
are related. The result was the graph attached.
Here, we represent each standard as a point,
equidistant from each other, on the circumference of a circle. Then we draw
an arrow from standard A to standard B if standard A amended Standard B. The
result is the attached graph. It looks more like an oval because I had to
compress the image to fit powerpoint slide.
The graph helps us understand the dynamics of
standards, forces us to ask questions as to why standards may be frequently
revised, why interpretation of "the GAAP" as opposed to standards becomes
difficult, and behooves us to ask what needs to be done.
This sort of a graph is used in information
retrieval as well as exploratory data analysis. I teach using this figure in
my statistics course for accountants (and not Accounting "Theory" course).
Those interested in my first class of the semester,
please go to the following link:
http://www.albany.edu/acc/courses/acc522.fall2006/classnotes/acc522sept142006.ppt
Hope I am not too far off the mark.
Regards,
Jagdish
November 8, 2006 reply from Jim Formosa
[Jim.Formosa@NSCC.EDU]
I believe that SOX and the PCOAB shocked the FASB
for a while and I am not sure that the shock has worn off. I remember
reading in several journals that, with the advent of the PCOAB, the FASB
became tentative. Then I believe you have to consider the FASB process which
requires drafting and approvals with the constant threat of legislative
interference at the federal level. Many have questioned the long-term
efficacy of the FASB process itself. I believe in full disclosure and
feedback in the rule making process but it should not take years - expensing
options as only one of several examples.
I have also read that many believe the FASB is fast
becoming a dinosaur that has outlived its usefulness- it will certainly be
interesting.
Jim Formosa, M.S., CPA
Certified Senior WebCT Trainer
Associate Professor of Accounting
Nashville Community College 615-353-3420 FAX 615-356-1213
November 8, 2006 reply from J. S. Gangolly
[gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
1. Codification is a neanderthal concept and a
vestige of the disastrous Napoleonic rule in Europe. It is expensive, does
nothing to resolve whatever ambiguities that might be present (in fact it
might exacerbate them), has high maintenance, and totally ignores all the
developments in information technologies over the past century. In fact, in
my humble opinion, codification is the accounting equivalent of Iraq (I am,
of course, exaggerating here). What is needed is NOT radical reconstitutive
surgery of the body of accounting standards (as in Iraq) by first
disemboweling them, but a philosophical reflection of the way we draft
standards (and how we use them) that is informed by the developments in
information technology.
In my humble opinion, the emerging technologies
surrounding the semantic web initiative of W3C is the way to go, but that
involves considerable research investments.
Years ago I tried a dialogue with some firms (and
also with FASB through some friends) about supporting research in the area,
but my plea fell on deaf ears (except for Arthur Andersen - their Litigation
Support people, who showed considerable interest before they tragically
disbanded).
2. Your second question as to why people still
refer to SASes rather than their codification, I think I can safely rest my
case in 1. above. Codification adds little value at great cost. Codification
is for the lazy people who want their thinking done for them.
If the standards are drafted well, codification is
a trivial task. One can have an algorithm for codification in less than a
semester of a competent doctoral student's time. Drafting the standards well
is another matter, and is a profoundly intellectual activity. We can not do
that without adequate theories of language competence, language use,
reasoning, and theories of textual interpretation (similar to legal
hermeneutics). And having examined the standards as well as EDGAR filings
over the past few years, I can safely say that we in accounting are quite
lacking in each of these.
Regards,
Jagdish
November 8, 2006 reply from J. S. Gangolly
[gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
Bob,
1. That accounting standards standards have become
complex over the years is true. It is also perhaps true that they are
nowadays better drafted compared with the philosophical ramblings in very
early "standards". However, I personally don't think they are anywhere close
to the tax code in complexity (and of course length. For example, section 10
of SFAS 133, a relatively long paragraph for SFASes, is dwarfed by, for
example section 351 of the Tax code, a relatively average paragraph).
I will not resort to midieval torture of the reader
by reproducing the two sections side-by-side. But the elegance of the tax
code and the lack thereof is there plainly to be seen.
One of the problems with drafting in accounting
standards is in the way definitions are stated. In accounting, the
definitions are often given by examples rather than definitions with
exceptions to the definitions. That is not the only problem. There are a
slew of problems that I wrote about in an article titled "Some thoughts on
the Engineering of Financial Accounting Standards" that I wrote a long time
ago (in the second volume on AI in Accounting edited by Miklos Vasarhelyi.
It would be an interesting exercise comparing the
complexities between the two texts after developing appropriate metrics. I
am not sure accounting standards would measure up to the tax code, but I am
no expert in either field. Perhaps some one like Amy who is one in both can
enlighten us.
Jagdish
November 9, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Jagdish,
Codification with enforcement suppresses some types of atrocious
behavior. For example, thousands of CEOs commenced to steal from investors
by backdating stock options until disclosure rules were put in place.
Without codification and enforcement there's anarchy. With excess
codification freedom and creativity is suppressed. It's just very, very
difficult to set the bar optimally because Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
proved it to be impossible ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impossibility_theorem
We are thus doomed to forever debate codes of behavior ad infinitum.
As usual you make good points. However, financial contracting is so
complex that I'm like Amy is with tax accounting. I cannot imagine trying to
account on a subjective judgment basis without codification. Without
codification comparability is virtually impossible with exotic financial
structurings.
It's possible to reduce the problem with simplified rules/laws such as
eliminating 90% of the personal tax code with a new flat tax, eliminating
accrual accounting in favor of cash flow financial reporting, or reporting
on a "fair value" basis for all assets and liabilities. But the social
impacts of a flat tax are contentious. Cash flow reporting is a license for
CEOs to mislead and manipulate investors with cash flow timing
manipulations. Fair value reporting creates more fiction than fact (such as
wild earnings fluctuations of perfect hedges that eliminate cash flow or FX
risk).
Codification sets parameters on major types of behavior. What is "right"
versus "wrong" becomes anarchy if those parameters become subjective
variables. The never-ending debate becomes one of deciding what are the
"major types of behavior" to be codified since it is impractical and
undesirable to set a parameter for every element of behavior. In the case of
financial structuring we keep inventing new "major types." For example, the
interest rate swap was invented in 1984 and quickly became a major way to
raise capital before it even had to be disclosed (FAS 119) and eventually
booked (FAS 133) in Year 2000.
We are thus doomed to forever debate codes of behavior and accounting
standards ad infinitum.
My threads containing earlier arguments on this issue (e.g., Beresford
versus Ketz) are shown below.
Bob Jensen
March 28, 2006 message from Denny Beresford
[DBeresfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]
A House of Representatives subcommittee is going to
have a public hearing on Wednesday that has the objective of discussing
"ways to promote more transparent financial reporting, including current
initiatives by regulators and industry."
See the press release at:
http://financialservices.house.gov/news.asp?FormMode=release&id=777&NewsType=1
for further details.
Denny Beresford
House Committee on Financial Services ---
http://snipurl.com/BakerSub
Baker Subcommittee to Advocate Transparency in
Financial Reporting
The Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital
Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises, chaired by Rep.
Richard H. Baker (LA), will convene for a hearing entitled Fostering
Accuracy and Transparency in Financial Reporting. The hearing will take
place on Wednesday, March 29 at 10 a.m. in room 2128 of the Rayburn
building.
Members of the Subcommittee are expected to discuss
ways to promote more transparent financial reporting, including current
initiatives by regulators and industry.
For the capital markets to operate most
efficiently, information about public companies must be understandable,
accessible, and accurate. Corporate statements are mathematical summaries
meant to convey a company’s condition. The four basic documents which must
be filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are at the
heart of investor disclosure: the income statement, the cash flow statement,
the balance sheet, and the statement of changes in equity.
Among the current initiatives to improve the
clarity and usefulness of public company information is a trend away from
quarterly earnings forecasting, the use of technology to decrease
complexity, and a review of the various accounting standards and how they
interact.
Subcommittee Chairman Baker said, "If U.S. markets
are to remain on top in an increasingly competitive global marketplace, we
need to move away from the complex and cumbersome and explore technological
and other methods of enhancing the clarity, accuracy, and efficiency of our
accounting system. At the same time, we need to look at whether earnings
forecasting and the beat-the-street mentality, which appears to have
contributed to some of the executive malfeasance of the past several years,
truly serves the best interest of investors or the goal of long-term
economic growth."
The corporate scandals several years ago revealed
weaknesses in the financial reporting system. While many companies were
violating financial reporting requirements, regulatory complexity also may
have contributed to some lapses in compliance.
Fraud, general manipulation of statements, and
regulatory complexity all contribute to a reduction in the usefulness of
financial statements and all may obfuscate the picture of companies’
financial health. A number of recent studies have argued against the
practice of predicting future quarterly earnings, concluding that the drive
to “make the numbers” can lead to poor business decisions and the
manipulation of earnings.
Congress, regulators, and the industry subsequently
have assessed financial reporting failures and have reacted with efforts
aimed at strengthening the system, including many provisions of The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
More recent initiatives by regulators to streamline
financial reporting standards and accounting include:
- A Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
review of complex and outdated accounting standards;
- The use of principles-based, rather than
rules-based, accounting;
- FASB’s continued cooperation with the
International Accounting Standards Board on the convergence of
accounting standards; and
- The use of eXtensible Business Reporting
Language, or XBRL, a computer code which tags data in financial
statements. The use of XBRL allows investors to quickly download
financial data onto spreadsheets for analysis.
Public Companies have been filing financial
statements with the SEC since the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
March 28, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Denny,
I know that we disagree on the principles based
standards initiative. My negative position on this is outlined somewhat at
http://snipurl.com/JensenPBS
I just don't think the principles based Ten
Commandments are sufficient to discard all statutes on felony law. I don't
think we can discard all FDA rules on drug testing and replace them with
principles based guidelines for pharmaceutical companies to follow. The same
can be said for environmental protection regulations, child protective
services, and whatever. Sometimes we need detailed rules so we have better
guidance as to what is right and what is wrong in specific and complex
circumstances.
You and I go back to the old days (and we passed the
CPA exam). GAAP was much less complex and could virtually be memorized. We
go back to the days when much was left to "auditor judgment."
But we also go back to the days when CEOs were not
fanatics about hitting analyst forecasts. We go back to days when top-tier
management compensation did not swing heavily an eps number. We go back to
the days when debt was debt and equity was equity. More importantly we go
back to the days when an auditor could actually understand contracts being
written.
In the past CEOs respected auditor decisions and did
not threaten auditors like in so many companies are doing today. Too many
times in recent years we've seen where virtually all big auditing firms have
caved in to pressures from large clients such as the way KPMG caved in on
Fannie Mae and Andersen caved in on various big clients ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm#others
I think that less complex principles based
standards will only increase conflicts between clients and auditors. Neither
will know that rules (albeit complex rules as in the case of derivatives,
leases, VIEs, and pensions) are being broken if there are no detailed rules
to be broken.
I think the absence of detailed rules greatly
increase inconsistencies in "auditor judgment." I think absence of detailed
rules takes away auditor bargaining chips when dealing with clients.
I guess my bottom line conclusion is that the global
world of contracting, risk management, and mezzanine debt is totally unlike
the simpler world back in the old days when we were auditor whippersnappers.
Bob Jensen
Principles-Based Versus Rules-Based Accounting Standards
"Standing on Principles In a world with more regulation than ever, can the
accounting rulebook be thrown away?" byAlix Nyberg Stuart, CFO Magazine
September 01, 2006 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7852613/c_7873404?f=magazine_featured
As Groucho Marx once said, "Those are my
principles, and if you don't like them...well, I have others."
Groucho would enjoy the heated stalemate over
principles-based accounting. Four years after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
required the Securities and Exchange Commission to explore the feasibility
of developing principles-based accounting standards in lieu of detailed
rules, the move to such standards has gone exactly nowhere. ad
Broadly speaking, principles-based standards would
be consistent, concise, and general, requiring CFOs to apply common sense
rather than bright-lines. Instead of having, say, numerical thresholds to
define when leases must be capitalized, a CFO could use his or her own
judgment as to whether a company's interest was substantial enough to put a
lease on the balance sheet. If anything, though, accounting and auditing
standards have reached new levels of nitpickiness. "In the current
environment, CFOs are second-guessed by auditors, who are then third-guessed
by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [PCAOB], and then fourth-
and fifth-guessed by the SEC and the plaintiffs' bar," says Colleen
Cunningham, president and CEO of Financial Executives International (FEI).
Indeed, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
seems to have taken a principled stand in favor of rule-creation. The Board
continues to issue detailed rules and staff positions. Auditors have amped
up their level of scrutiny, in many cases leading to a tripling of audit
fees since 2002. And there is still scant mercy for anyone who breaks the
rules: the annual number of restatements doubled to more than 1,000 between
2003 and 2005, thanks to pressure from auditors and the SEC. The agency
pursued a record number of enforcement actions in the past three years,
while shareholder lawsuits, many involving accounting practices, continued
apace, claiming a record $7.6 billion in settlements last year and probably
more in 2006.
Yet the dream won't die. On the contrary,
principles are at the heart of FASB's latest thinking about changes to its
basic accounting framework, as reflected in the "preliminary views" the
board issued in July with the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)
as part of its plan to converge U.S. and international standards.
Principles-based accounting has been championed by FASB chairman Robert Herz,
SEC commissioner Paul Atkins, SEC deputy chief accountant Scott Taub, and
PCAOB member Charlie Niemeier in various speeches over the past six months.
And they're not just talking about editing a few lines in the rulebook.
"We need FASB, the SEC, the PCAOB, preparers,
users, auditors, and the legal profession to get together and check their
respective agendas at the door in order to collectively think through the
obstacles," says Herz. "And if it turns out some of the obstacles are
hardwired into our structure, then maybe we need some legal changes as
well," such as safe harbors that would protect executives and auditors from
having their judgments continually challenged. Even the SEC is talking about
loosening up. Most at the agency favor the idea of principles instead of
rules, says Taub, even knowing that "people will interpret them in different
ways and we'll have to deal with it."
Standards Deviation Why lawmakers are so set on
principles and what exactly those principles would look like is all a bit
hazy right now. "Post-Enron, the perception was that people were engineering
around the accounting rules. We looked around the world and saw that England
had principles-based accounting and they didn't have scandals there, so we
decided this was the way to go," recounts CVS Corp. CFO David Rickard, a
Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Committee (FASAC) member.
But Rickard considers the approach "naive." His
firsthand experience with principles-based accounting, as a group controller
for London-based Grand Metropolitan from 1991 to 1997, left him unimpressed.
"We had accounting rules we could drive trucks through," he says.
Would such a change be worth the trouble? A recent
study that compared the accrual quality of Canadian companies reporting
under a relatively principles-based GAAP to that of U.S. companies reporting
by the rules suggests that there may be no effective difference between the
two systems. The authors, Queen's University (Ontario) professors Daniel B.
Thornton and Erin Webster, found some evidence that the Canadian approach
yields better results, but conclude that "stronger U.S. oversight and
greater litigation risk" compensate for any differences.
U.S. GAAP is built on principles; they just happen
to be buried under hundreds of rules. The SEC, in its 2003 report on
principles-based accounting, labeled some standards as being either "rules"
or "principles." (No surprise to CFOs, FAS 133, stock-option accounting, and
lease accounting fall in the former category, while FAS 141 and 142 were
illustrative of the latter.) The difference: principles offer only "a
modicum" of implementation guidance and few scope exceptions or
bright-lines. ad
For FASB, the move to principles-based accounting
is part of a larger effort to organize the existing body of accounting
literature, and to eliminate internal inconsistencies. "Right now, we have a
pretty good conceptual framework, but the standards have often deviated from
the concepts," says Herz. He envisions "a common framework" with the IASB,
where "you take the concepts," such as how assets and liabilities should be
measured, and "from those you draw key principles" for specific areas of
accounting, like pensions and business combinations. In fact, that framework
as it now stands would change corporate accounting's most elemental
principle, that income essentially reflects the difference between revenues
and expenses. Instead, income would depend more on changes in the value of
assets and liabilities (see "Will Fair Value Fly?").
For its part, the SEC has also made clear that it
does not envisage an entirely free-form world. "Clearly, the standard
setters should provide some implementation guidance as a part of a newly
issued standard," its 2003 report states.
The catch is that drawing a line between rules and
principles is easier said than done. Principles need to be coupled with
implementation guidance, which is more of an art than a science, says Ben
Neuhausen, national director of accounting for BDO Seidman. That ambiguity
may explain why finance executives are so divided on support for this
concept. Forty-seven percent of the executives surveyed by CFO say they are
in favor of a shift to principles, another 25 percent are unsure of its
merits, and 17 percent are unfamiliar with the whole idea. Only 10 percent
oppose it outright, largely out of concern that it would be too difficult to
determine which judgments would pass muster.
A Road to Hell? As it stands now, many CFOs fear
that principles-based accounting would quickly lead to court. "The big
concern is that we make a legitimate judgment based on the facts as we
understand them, in the spirit of trying to comply, and that plaintiffs'
attorneys come along later with an expert accountant who says, 'I wouldn't
have done it that way,' and aha! — lawsuit! — several billion dollars,
please," says Rickard.
Massive shareholder lawsuits were a concern for 36
percent of CFOs who oppose ditching rules, according to CFO's survey, and
regulators are sympathetic. "There are institutional and behavioral issues,
and they're much broader than FASB or even the SEC," says Herz, citing "the
focus on short-term earnings, and the whole kabuki dance around quarterly
guidance."
Continued in article
"The Accounting Cycle: Herz Encourages Simpler Accounting: Again, Bah,
Humbug!" by: J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, December 2005 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x50933.xml
Robert Herz, chairman of the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, spoke at the AICPA National Conference on Current SEC and
PCAOB Developments* on December 6. Similar to the speech by SEC Chairman
Christopher Cox on the previous day, Mr. Herz directed his comments to the
proposition "that we need to reduce the complexity of our reporting system."
The proposition may be true, but Herz did little to advance the cause in his
speech.
In
particular, Robert Herz merely asserted his beliefs without adding
any logic or any evidence that the reporting system is too complex.
Worse, he touts principles-based accounting as the savior for the
world of financial reporting, but again provides no argumentation to
support his hypothesis. Maybe it’s because there is none. (Read
the full speech.) |
Given that we have two chairmen making some brash
comments about the complexity of accounting, let’s investigate this further.
Is complexity really bad? Is complexity really the major problem with
financial reporting?
Is complexity bad?
Suppose a patient visits his or her general
practitioner about some medical problem. After some initial testing, the
general practitioner refers the patient to a specialist. The patient obtains
a copy of the referral letter, but has difficulty reading it. Should a
government agency intervene, complaining that the letter is "too complex"
and require medical doctors to apply plain English?
I think the answer is obvious -- of course not.
When one doctor writes to another physician, he or she may employ scientific
jargon. They are both trained in biology, chemistry, and medicine. The
complex vocabulary and the complex theories that they utilize actually
improve the communication process. The additional complexity allows a doctor
to make more precise statements about the patient's condition and about
possible solutions to the medical problem. Requiring plain English
statements would create greater ambiguity and distort the communication
process.
Of course, when the doctor talks with the patient,
he or she must use plain English. Because the patient does not have medical
training, the patient will not understand the more precise language and
therefore the communication process will suffer if the physician employs
medical language. As the physician employs the less precise language of
everyday English, the patient will learn more about the medical problem and
possible future tests. Some communication with a less precise language is
better than virtually no communication with a more powerful language
designed for experts.
While the analogy isn't perfect, it fits the
accounting scenario. When business enterprises report on their financial
condition and on their results during the past year (or quarter), they can
more precisely convey their message by applying a more precise accounting
language. This text, however, is meant for those trained in finance and in
accounting. Complexity can actually improve the communication process when
the recipient is a sophisticated user.
Naïve financial statement readers may not
understand the language of accounting, but they are not necessarily hurt by
that situation. Just as general practitioners can revert from a medical
language to everyday language when they speak with patients, financial
analysts and brokers can employ plain English when they speak with clients.
In this manner, the messages contained in an annual (or quarterly) report
become disseminated to a wide audience.
More precise language and better economic theories
will improve the communication between business enterprises and
sophisticated users, even if the reports are complex. Sophisticated users
can then translate the messages into plain English and convey these stories
to naïve users.
Is complexity really the major problem?
When remonstrating the overly complex accounting
rules and when touting principles-based accounting, Chairman Herz points to
"bright lines" as an example of what's wrong with current-day standards. I
agree with him that such bright lines constitute a problem, but the problem
isn’t the complexity introduced by these bright lines. The problem is that
these bright lines are arbitrary and capricious. Instead of relying upon
economic theory, the FASB (and the SEC whenever it enters the skirmish) has
invented these bright lines that have no meaning and no empirical referent.
Consider leases: the FASB created the 90 percent
cutoff point for deciding whether a lessee had to capitalize a lease, but it
never informed us why. If the present value of the future cash commitments
equals 89.9 percent of the property's fair value, then the lease is an
operating lease; but if it equals 90 percent, then the lease is a capital
lease. What economic theory does the FASB rest its decision on? No theory at
all. The board randomly and recklessly introduced this bright line into the
literature.
If the board really wanted to improve financial
reporting, then it would require lessees to capitalize all leases that had
duration greater than one year. You introduce no fictitious bright lines and
ironically, you simplify the accounting! More importantly, the rule would
require corporations to tell it as it is rather than distort the economic
reality of the lease.
Continued in article
Jensen Comment
Although there is a ground swell of support for both principles-based accounting
standards and greatly simplified standards, I'm inclined to be against both
movements. Business contracting, especially risk diffusion and management
contracting, is becoming so complex that I think principles-based
standards and greatly simplified standards are moves in the wrong direction.
Powerful new financial analysis tools in networked communications, meta-tagging
(e.g., XBRL), and database sharing (eventually object-oriented database
elements) will be greatly harmed if complex standards do not accompany complex
contracting. I think Professor Ketz has taken a bold stand in the above
article, and I personally take the same stance. This, of course, puts me
at odds with the current and many former directors of standard setting bodies
(e.g., the FASB and the IASB), including my very good friend Dennis Beresford
who sides with Bob Herz and probably influenced Bob Herz. See
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm
I'm not necessarily arguing in favor of more bright lines. We can
perhaps avoid these bright lines with more details, albeit complex details,
about contracts, hedging strategies, hedging effectiveness, mezzanine debt
contracts, VIEs, etc. Years ago Bill Beaver (in an innovative unpublished
working paper) argued in favor of database reporting to get around some of the
bright lines problems. This is more complex reporting, but we can have
develop the technologies needed to analyze database reporting. What we
cannot do is do away with complex standards to deal with how complex contracts
are reported in the databases. The standards are what makes comparisons
between databases possible.
The analogy relating accounting to medicine is on target. In this era of DNA
advances in medicine, we do not want medical standards to become less complex in
a more complex world of knowledge. We hope the standards become more complex to
match the increased complexity of our understanding. Similarly, we hope the
standards of accounting become more complex to match the increased complexity of
contracts around the world.
"The Accounting Cycle: Herz Encourages Simpler Accounting: Again, Bah,
Humbug!" by: J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, December 2005 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x50933.xml
Robert Herz, chairman of the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, spoke at the AICPA National Conference on Current SEC and
PCAOB Developments* on December 6. Similar to the speech by SEC Chairman
Christopher Cox on the previous day, Mr. Herz directed his comments to the
proposition "that we need to reduce the complexity of our reporting system."
The proposition may be true, but Herz did little to advance the cause in his
speech.
In
particular, Robert Herz merely asserted his beliefs without adding
any logic or any evidence that the reporting system is too complex.
Worse, he touts principles-based accounting as the savior for the
world of financial reporting, but again provides no argumentation to
support his hypothesis. Maybe it’s because there is none. (Read
the full speech.) |
Given that we have two chairmen making some brash
comments about the complexity of accounting, let’s investigate this further.
Is complexity really bad? Is complexity really the major problem with
financial reporting?
Is complexity bad?
Suppose a patient visits his or her general
practitioner about some medical problem. After some initial testing, the
general practitioner refers the patient to a specialist. The patient obtains
a copy of the referral letter, but has difficulty reading it. Should a
government agency intervene, complaining that the letter is "too complex"
and require medical doctors to apply plain English?
I think the answer is obvious -- of course not.
When one doctor writes to another physician, he or she may employ scientific
jargon. They are both trained in biology, chemistry, and medicine. The
complex vocabulary and the complex theories that they utilize actually
improve the communication process. The additional complexity allows a doctor
to make more precise statements about the patient's condition and about
possible solutions to the medical problem. Requiring plain English
statements would create greater ambiguity and distort the communication
process.
Of course, when the doctor talks with the patient,
he or she must use plain English. Because the patient does not have medical
training, the patient will not understand the more precise language and
therefore the communication process will suffer if the physician employs
medical language. As the physician employs the less precise language of
everyday English, the patient will learn more about the medical problem and
possible future tests. Some communication with a less precise language is
better than virtually no communication with a more powerful language
designed for experts.
While the analogy isn't perfect, it fits the
accounting scenario. When business enterprises report on their financial
condition and on their results during the past year (or quarter), they can
more precisely convey their message by applying a more precise accounting
language. This text, however, is meant for those trained in finance and in
accounting. Complexity can actually improve the communication process when
the recipient is a sophisticated user.
Naïve financial statement readers may not
understand the language of accounting, but they are not necessarily hurt by
that situation. Just as general practitioners can revert from a medical
language to everyday language when they speak with patients, financial
analysts and brokers can employ plain English when they speak with clients.
In this manner, the messages contained in an annual (or quarterly) report
become disseminated to a wide audience.
More precise language and better economic theories
will improve the communication between business enterprises and
sophisticated users, even if the reports are complex. Sophisticated users
can then translate the messages into plain English and convey these stories
to naïve users.
Is complexity really the major problem?
When remonstrating the overly complex accounting
rules and when touting principles-based accounting, Chairman Herz points to
"bright lines" as an example of what's wrong with current-day standards. I
agree with him that such bright lines constitute a problem, but the problem
isn’t the complexity introduced by these bright lines. The problem is that
these bright lines are arbitrary and capricious. Instead of relying upon
economic theory, the FASB (and the SEC whenever it enters the skirmish) has
invented these bright lines that have no meaning and no empirical referent.
Consider leases: the FASB created the 90 percent
cutoff point for deciding whether a lessee had to capitalize a lease, but it
never informed us why. If the present value of the future cash commitments
equals 89.9 percent of the property's fair value, then the lease is an
operating lease; but if it equals 90 percent, then the lease is a capital
lease. What economic theory does the FASB rest its decision on? No theory at
all. The board randomly and recklessly introduced this bright line into the
literature.
If the board really wanted to improve financial
reporting, then it would require lessees to capitalize all leases that had
duration greater than one year. You introduce no fictitious bright lines and
ironically, you simplify the accounting! More importantly, the rule would
require corporations to tell it as it is rather than distort the economic
reality of the lease.
Continued in article
Jensen Comment
Although there is a ground swell of support for both principles-based accounting
standards and greatly simplified standards, I'm inclined to be against both
movements. Business contracting, especially risk diffusion and management
contracting, is becoming so complex that I think principles-based
standards and greatly simplified standards are moves in the wrong direction.
Powerful new financial analysis tools in networked communications, meta-tagging
(e.g., XBRL), and database sharing (eventually object-oriented database
elements) will be greatly harmed if complex standards do not accompany complex
contracting. I think Professor Ketz has taken a bold stand in the above
article, and I personally take the same stance. This, of course, puts me
at odds with the current and many former directors of standard setting bodies
(e.g., the FASB and the IASB), including my very good friend Dennis Beresford
who sides with Bob Herz and probably influenced Bob Herz. See
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm
I'm not necessarily arguing in favor of more bright lines. We can
perhaps avoid these bright lines with more details, albeit complex details,
about contracts, hedging strategies, hedging effectiveness, mezzanine debt
contracts, VIEs, etc. Years ago Bill Beaver (in an innovative unpublished
working paper) argued in favor of database reporting to get around some of the
bright lines problems. This is more complex reporting, but we can have
develop the technologies needed to analyze database reporting. What we
cannot do is do away with complex standards to deal with how complex contracts
are reported in the databases. The standards are what makes comparisons
between databases possible.
The analogy relating accounting to medicine is on target. In this era of DNA
advances in medicine, we do not want medical standards to become less complex in
a more complex world of knowledge. We hope the standards become more complex to
match the increased complexity of our understanding. Similarly, we hope the
standards of accounting become more complex to match the increased complexity of
contracts around the world.
"The Accounting Cycle: The Conceptual Framework for Financial
Reporting Op/Ed," by J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, September 2006
---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x54322.xml
The Financial Accounting Standards Board and the
International Accounting Standards Board have joined forces to flesh out a
common conceptual framework. Recently they issued some preliminary views on
the "objectives of financial reporting" and the "qualitative characteristics
of decision-useful financial reporting information" and have asked for
comment.
To obtain "coherent financial reporting," the
boards feel that they need "a framework that is sound, comprehensive, and
internally consistent" (paragraph P3). In P5, they also state their hope for
convergence between U.S. and international accounting standards.
P6 indicates a need to fill in certain gaps, such
as a "robust concept of a reporting entity." I presume that they will
accomplish this task later, as the current document does not develop such a
"robust concept."
Chapter 1 presents the objective for financial
reporting, and the description differs little from what is in Concepts
Statement No. 1. This objective is "to provide information that is useful to
present and potential investors and creditors and others in making
investment, credit, and similar resource allocation decisions." The emphasis
lay with capital providers, as it should. If anything, I would place greater
accent on this aspect, because in the last 10 years, so many managers have
defined the "business world" as including managers and excluding investors
and creditors. To our chagrin, we learned that managers actually believed
this lie, as they pretended that the resources supplied by the investment
community belonged to the management team.
FASB and IASB further explain that these users are
interested in the cash flows of the entity so they can assess the potential
returns and the potential variability of those returns (e.g., in paragraph
OB.23). I wish they had drawn the logical conclusion that financial
reporting ought to exclude income smoothing. Income smoothing leads the user
to assess a smaller variance of earnings than warranted by the underlying
economics; income smoothing biases downward the actual variability of the
earnings and thus the returns.
Later, in the basis of conclusions, the document
addresses the reporting of comprehensive income and its components (see
BC1.28-31). Currently, FASB has four items that enter other comprehensive
income: gains and losses on available-for-sale investments, losses when
incurring additional amounts to recognize a minimum pension liability,
exchange gains and losses from a foreign subsidiary under the all-current
method, and gains and losses from derivatives that hedge cash flows.
The purported reason for this demarcation between
earnings and other comprehensive income rests with the purported low
reliability of measurements of these four items; however, the real reason
for these other comprehensive items seems to be political. For example, FASB
capitulated in Statement No. 115 when a number of managers objected to
reporting gains and losses on available-for-sale securities because that
would create volatility in earnings. (I find it curious how FASB caters to
the whims of managers but claims that the primary rationale for financial
reporting is to serve the investment community.) Because one has a hard time
reconciling other comprehensive income with the needs of investors and
creditors, it would serve the investment community better if the boards
eliminate this notion of comprehensive income.
Two IASB members think that an objective for
financial reporting should encompass the stewardship function (see AV1.1-7).
Stewardship seems to be a subset of economic usefulness, so this objection
is pointless. It behooves these two IASB members to explain the consequences
of adopting a stewardship objective and how these consequences differ from
the usefulness objective before we can entertain their protestation
seriously.
Sections BC1.42 and 43 ask whether management
intent should be a part of the financial reporting process. Given management
intent during the last decade, I think decidedly not. Management intent is
merely a license to massage accounting numbers as managers please.
Fortunately, the Justice Department calls such tactics fraud.
Chapter 2 of this document concerns qualitative
characteristics. For the most part, this presentation is similar to that in
Concepts Statement No. 2, though arranged somewhat differently. Concepts 2
had as its overarching qualitative characteristics relevance and
reliability. This Preliminary Views expounds relevance, faithful
representation, comparability, and understandability as the qualitative
characteristics.
The discussion on faithful representation is
interesting (QC.16-19) inasmuch as they distinguish between accounts that
depict real world phenomena and accounts that are constructs with no real
world referents. They explain that deferred debits and credits do not
possess faithful representation because they are merely the creation of
accountants. I hope that analysis applies to deferred income tax debits and
credits.
Verifiability implies similar measures by different
measurers (QC.23-26). I wish FASB and IASB to include auditability as an
aspect of verifiability; after all, if you cannot audit something, it is
hardly verifiable. Yet, the soon to be released standard on fair value
measurements includes a variety of items that will prove difficult if not
impossible to audit.
Understandability is obvious, though the two boards
feel that users with a "reasonable knowledge of business and economic
activities" can understand financial statements. I no longer agree. Such a
person might employ a profit analysis model or ratio analysis on a set of
financial statements and mis-analyze a firm's condition because he or she
did not make analytical adjustments for off-balance sheet items and other
fanciful tricks by managers. This includes so many of Enron's investors and
creditors. No, to understand financial reporting today, you must be an
expert in accounting and finance.
Benefits-that-justify-costs acts as a constraint on
financial reporting. While this criterion is acceptable, too often the
boards view costs only from the perspective of the preparers. I wish the
boards explicitly acknowledged the fact that not reporting on some things
adds costs to users. When a business enterprise engages in aggressive
accounting, the expert user needs to employ analytical adjustments to
correct this overzealousness. These adjustments consume the investor's
economic resources and thus involve costs to the investment community.
In the basis-for-conclusions section, FASB and IASB
explain that the concept of substance over form is included in the concept
of faithful representation (see paragraphs BC2.17 and 18). While I don't
have a problem with that, I think they should at least emphasize this point
in Chapter 2 rather than bury it in this section. Substance over form is a
critically important doctrine, especially as it relates to business
combinations and leases, so it deserves greater stress.
On balance, the document is well written and
contains a good clarification of the objective of financial reporting and
the qualitative characteristics of decision-useful financial reporting
information. I offer the criticisms above as a hope to strengthen and
improve the Preliminary Views.
My most important comment, however, does not
address any particular aspects within the document itself. Instead, I worry
about the usefulness of this objective and these qualitative characteristics
to FASB and IASB. To enjoy coherent financial reporting, there not only is
need for a sound, comprehensive, and internally consistent framework, we
also must have a board with the political will to utilize the conceptual
framework. FASB ignored its own conceptual framework in its issuance of
standards on:
* Leases (Aren't the financial commitments of the
lessee a liability?) * Pensions (How can the pension intangible asset really
be an asset as it has no real world referent?) * Stock options (Why did the
board not require the expensing of stock options in the 1990s when stock
options clearly involve real costs to the firm?), and * Special purpose
entities (Why did the board wait for the collapse of Enron before dealing
with this issue?).
Clearly, the low power of FASB -- IASB likewise
possesses little power -- explains some of these decisions, but it is
frustrating nonetheless to see the board ignore its own conceptual
framework. Why engage in this deliberation unless FASB is prepared to follow
through?
J. EDWARD KETZ is accounting professor at The Pennsylvania
State University. Dr. Ketz's teaching and research interests focus on
financial accounting, accounting information systems, and accounting ethics.
He is the author of
Hidden Financial Risk, which explores the causes of recent
accounting scandals. He also has edited
Accounting Ethics, a four-volume set that explores ethical
thought in accounting since the Great Depression and across several
countries.
Suggestions for accountancy from the Directors of the SEC and the FASB
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on December
9, 2005
TITLE: SEC's Cox Wants Simpler Rules, More Competition for Accounting
REPORTER: Judith Burns
DATE: Dec 06, 2005
PAGE: C3
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113381176660114298.html
TOPICS: Accounting, Auditing, Auditing Services, Public Accounting,
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Securities and Exchange Commission
SUMMARY: Questions relate to helping students understand the status various
influences on the accounting profession from the AICPA, the SEC, the FASB, and
the legislature via the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Where did SEC Chairman Christopher Cox describe the ways in which he wants
to see change in the accounting and auditing professions? What is the purpose of
that organization? (Hint: you may find out about the organization's mission via
its web site at www.aicpa.org
2.) In accordance with law, how is the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) responsible for accounting and reporting requirements in the United
States? Hint: you may investigate the SEC's mission via its web site at
www.sec.gov
3.) What are the issues associated with complex accounting rules? Who
establishes those rules? In what way are those rules influenced by the SEC?
4.) The SEC has named an interim chairman of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB). How is this speech's topic related to the process of
change in leadership at the PCAOB?
5.) Commissioner Cox indicated his concern over the fact that only 4 public
accounting firms perform audit and accounting work for most of the publicly
traded companies in the U.S. and that regulators may have contributed to that
concentration. How is that the case? What might regulators do to change that
situation?
"SEC's Cox Wants Simpler Rules, More Competition for Accounting," by Judith
Burns, The Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2005; Page C3 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113381176660114298.html
U.S. securities regulators hope to make accounting
rules less complicated while increasing competition in a field now dominated
by just four firms, Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher
Cox said.
Addressing a meeting of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Mr. Cox called for clearer, more
straightforward accounting rules, saying that would benefit investors,
public companies and accountants.
"Plain English is just as important in
accountancy," he said.
Mr. Cox also raised concern about concentration in
the U.S. accounting profession, with the Big Four firms -- Deloitte & Touche
LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers -- handling the vast
majority of public-company audits. He said this "intense concentration"
isn't desirable, adding that regulators need to consider whether their rules
are inhibiting competition in the field.
SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins, who also addressed
the meeting, acknowledged that regulators were surprised by the cost of
internal-control rules that took effect for the largest U.S. companies last
year, and he said he hopes such costs will be lower this year.
The rules stem from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed
by Congress in 2002. They mandate that public companies make an annual
examination of their internal controls related to financial reporting,
subject to review by these companies' outside auditors.
The SEC is "at an early stage" in considering who
should head the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board now that William
McDonough, its former chairman, has stepped down, Mr. Atkins said.
Last week the SEC named oversight board member Bill
Gradison, a member of Congress, as interim oversight board chairman. Mr.
Atkins said Mr. Gradison, an Ohio Republican, could be in the running as a
permanent chair "if he wants to be."
In repeated speeches, Dennis Beresford, former Chairman of the FASB, has
called for simplification of accounting standards and guidelines. For
example see the following reference:
"Can We Go Back to the Good Old Days?" by Dennis R. Beresford, The CPA
Journal ---
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/1204/perspectives/p6.htm
December 6, 2005 message from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@terry.uga.edu]
National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB
Developments. His talk is available at:
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch120505cc.htm
He had three main messages:
1. Accounting rules need to be simplified. "The
accounting scandals that our nation and the world have now mostly weathered
were made possible in part by the sheer complexity of the rules." "The sheer
accretion of detail has, in time, led to one of the system's weaknesses -
its extreme complexity. Convolution is now reducing its usefulness."
2. The concentration of auditing services in the
Big 4 "quadropoly" is bad for the securities markets. The SEC will try to do
more to encourage the use of medium size and smaller firms that receive good
inspection reports from the PCAOB.
3. The SEC will continue to push XBRL. "The
interactive data that this initiative will create will lead to vast
improvements in the quality, timeliness, and usefulness of information that
investors get about the companies they're investing in."
A very interesting talk - one that seems to promise
a high level of cooperation with the accounting profession.
Denny
Bob Jensen's threads on XBRL are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm
Convergence of foreign and domestic accounting rules could catch some U.S.
companies by surprise
Although many differences remain between U.S. generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and international financial reporting
standards (IFRS), they are being eliminated faster than anyone, even Herz or
Tweedie, could have imagined. In April, FASB and the IASB agreed that all major
projects going forward would be conducted jointly. That same month, the
Securities and Exchange Commission said that, as soon as 2007, it might allow
foreign companies to use IFRS to raise capital in the United States, eliminating
the current requirement that they reconcile their statements to U.S. GAAP. The
change is all the more remarkable given that the IASB was formed only four years
ago, and has rushed to complete 25 new or revamped standards in time for all 25
countries in the European Union to adopt IFRS by this year. By next year, some
100 countries will be using IFRS. "We reckon it will be 150 in five years,"
marvels Tweedie. "That leaves only 50 out."
Tim Reason, "The Narrowing GAAP: The convergence of foreign and domestic
accounting rules could catch some U.S. companies by surprise," CFO Magazine
December 01, 2005 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/5193385/c_5243641?f=magazine_coverstory
David Fordham wrote the following after a very long and very interesting
illustration of corporate accounting:
*****************
Seeing businesses in Europe, I'm learning that the European laws are to
accountants what weight lifting is to the Mr. Atlas competition. The really
good European accountants are without peer when it comes to working within
the system to turn a profit under the rules. So this begs the question:
should we more agressively teach accountants how to help their managers?
Would we be more valuable as "trusted partners" to management if we could be
more helpful in this way?
******************
Jensen Comment:
First I would note that in Europe most financing was and still is raised
from banks who work in close partnership with companies. As in Japan, these
banks are almost insiders that can get most any kind of information they want
irrespective of accounting rules.
Until the IASB wanted to crack into the U.S. Stock exchanges, the IAS
standards were pretty much milk toast. If the former IASC (it was IASC in those
days) standards had replaced the FASB standards, U.S. Corporations would have
been ecstatic with IASC off-balance sheet financing opportunities and
opportunities to create hidden reserves and manage earnings. European companies
are notorious for managing earnings with hidden reserves.
Whether the two Davids (Albrecht and Fordham) like it or not, the FASB has
struggled to make management of earnings and the hiding of debt more difficult
in the U.S. The standards are now almost incomprehensible (especially for
derivatives, SPEs, mezzanine financing, re-insurance, etc.) because U.S.
companies countered the FASB standards with ever-increasing exotic financial
contracts.
Before complaining about the complexity of FASB standards, first take a
serious look at the absolute nightmare of complexity of the financial and
insurance contracting. Especially look at the absolutely ridiculous derivative
financial instrument contracts that are intentionally designed to be too complex
for accountants or trust investors to understand ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds
Many exotic contracts are relatively new. We now have over $100 trillion in
interest rate swaps that were not even invented until 1984.
One of my favorite quotations is a 1994 quotation from Denny Beresford while,
as Chairman of the FASB, he was making a presentation in NYC at the annual AAA
meetings. He was at the time being extremely pressured by the SEC to issue what
became FAS 133 in 1998.
The quotation went something like this:
*******************
"The Director of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, tells me the three main problems
for the SEC and FASB are derivatives, derivatives, and derivatives. I had to
ask some experts to tell me what a derivative is, because until now I
thought a derivative was something a person my age takes when prunes don't
quite do the job. John Stewart of Arthur Andersen tells me that there are
over 1,000 kinds of complex derivative contracts . . . "
********************
Once again, David, my main point to you is that accounting standards outside
the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, did not have to be too complex
since most financing was raised from insiders (mostly banks) who had inside
information sources. The countries with the complex standards rely more on
equity investors who only get the information provided to the public by
companies. The FASB has declared that protection of the public investors is its
number one priority (as is also the case with the SEC).
The real problem we are now facing is that corporations no longer take
accounting seriously other than as something to get around. This has led to an
ever-increasing game where the FASB discovers misleading accounting, writes a
new standard or interpretation, and subsequently discovers how corporations are
re-writing contracts to get around the new standard.
Will this vicious cycle ever cease? Not as long as corporate managers
continue to view accounting as an opportunity to creatively paint rosy
portraits.
David Albrecht asked:
"Has anyone a good definition of financial statement transparency?"
Jensen reply:
Here's one paper that discusses the problem of transparency ---http://www.accenture.com/xdoc/en/ideas/outlook/6_2005/pdf/share_value.pdf
The snipped version is
http://snipurl.com/ShareholderValue
October 18, 2005 reply from Bender, Ruth
[r.bender@CRANFIELD.AC.UK]
I just want to point out that the UK, which is in
Europe, doesn't meet Bob's description of mostly bank finance. Our financing
is much like that of the US - mostly equity, and our lenders are kept at
arm's length from the board.
And a lot of our accountants are howling at the way
IFRS change the accounts. It's not that people are trying to hide things by
using lax standards (although, from my experience as an auditor, I know that
this does of course happen). It's the fact that we and others don't
understand accounts any more! I'm doing some research at the moment that
involves interviewing experienced CFOs of large listed companies. Almost all
of them are complaining that the IFRS, being 'market' facing, are making a
nonsense of the numbers, because in most cases there isn't a market, and so
they are having to use poor proxies. It's taking us away from factually
based accounts and into a world of estimates - which in some ways makes
earnings management easier, not harder! That was the gist of the FT article
that David cited.
Incidentally, there is a really interesting paper
about the fundamental differences between US and UK approaches to financial
regulation and standards, that sets out why convergence is going to be a
problem - if it ever happens. The title is "Where economics meets the law:
US reporting systems compared to other markets" and you can download it from
the ICAEW's website at
http://www.icaew.co.uk/members/index.cfm?AUB=TB2I_79757|MNXI_79757
Outline is:
"In particular the paper examines: * the evolution
of the US financial reporting model; * contrasting approaches to accounting
and auditing: 'principles' versus 'prescription'; * shareholder rights and
the governance function of annual financial statements; * investor behaviour
and corporate governance; * accounting convergence with the US or
recognition of the differences.
Divided by common language is the first in the
Beyond the myth of Anglo-American corporate governance series which aims to:
Challenge commonly held assumptions regarding the
perceived similarity of US and UK corporate governance systems; Identify
possible areas for convergence and, where not practical, clarify why
elements of one system may not be appropriate for incorporation into
another; Anticipate developments and set out challenges for future thinking
about the US and UK models and encourage transatlantic dialogue."
Regards
Dr Ruth Bender
Cranfield School of Management UK
Dr. Ijiri was one of my major professors in the doctoral program at
Stanford. I'm naturally drawn to things he writes. He is one of the
long-time advocates of historical cost based accounting. He is in fact
much more dedicated to it than
Bill Paton (but not
Ananias Littleton) where Paton and Littleton are best known advocates of
historical cost accounting. The following is the lead article in the
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, July/August 2005, pp. 255-279.
US accounting standards and their
environment:
A dualistic study of their 75-years of transition
Yuji Ijiri
Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University
Abstract
This article examines the 75-year transition of the US accounting
standards and their environment. It consists of three parts, each having
two themes: Part (1) Past changes: 1. The first market crash and the
second market crash; 2. Facts-based accounting and forecasts-based
accounting, Part (II) Present issues: 3. The reform legislation
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act) and the reform administration; 4. Procedural fairness
and pure fairness, and Part (III) Future trends: 5. Forecast
protection and forecast separation; 6. Principles-based systems and
rules-based systems. These themes are each examined from dualistic
perspectives by contrasting two fundamental concepts or principles. The
article concludes with the strong need to focus on "procedural fairness" in
establishing accounting standards as well as in implementing the reform
legislation and administration, in contrast to "pure fairness" that is
almost impossible to achieve by anyone.
Accounting Rules So Plentiful "It's Nuts"
There are perhaps 2,000 accounting rules and standards
that, when written out, possibly exceed the U.S. tax code in length. Yet, there
are only the Ten Commandments. So Bob Herz, chairman of the rule-setting
Financial Accounting Standards Board, is asked this: How come there are 2,000
rules to prepare a financial statement but only 10 for eternal salvation? "It is
nuts," Herz allows. "But you're not going to get it down to ten commandments
because the transactions are so complicated. . . . And the people on the front
lines, the companies and their auditors, are saying: 'Give me principles, but
tell me exactly what to do; I don't want to be second-guessed.' " Nonetheless,
the FASB (pronounced, by accounting insiders, as "FAZ-bee") is embarking on
efforts to simplify and codify accounting rules while improving them and
integrating them with international standards.
"Accounting Rules So Plentiful 'It's Nuts' ; Standards Board Takes on Tough Job
to Simplify, Codify," SmartPros, June 8, 2005 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x48525.xml
Jensen Comment: Shyam Sunder (Yale University) is the 2005
President-Elect of the American Accounting Association ---
http://aaahq.org/about/Nominees2005.htm
From Jim Mahar's blog on July 18 2005 ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
SSRN-Social Norms versus Standards of
Accounting by Shyam Sunder ---
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=725821
A few highlights from the paper:
"Historically, norms of accounting played
an important role in corporate financial reporting. Starting with
the federal regulation of securities, accounting norms have been
progressively replaced by written standards....[and]enforcement
mechanisms, often supported by implicit or explicit power of the
state to impose punishment. The spate of accounting and auditing
failures of the recent years raise questions about the wisdom of
this transition from norms to standards....It is possible that the
pendulum of standardization in accounting may have swung too far,
and it may be time to allow for a greater role for social norms in
the practice of corporate financial reporting."
"The monopoly rights given to the FASB in
the U.S. (and the International Accounting Standards Board or IASB
in the EU) deprived the economies, and their rule makers, from the
benefits of experimentation with alternative rules and structures so
their consequences could be observed in the field before deciding on
which rules, if any, might be more efficient. Rule makers have
little idea, ex ante, of the important consequences (e.g., the
corporate cost of capital) of the alternatives they consider."
"Given the deliberate and premeditated
nature of financial fraud and misrepresentation (and other white
color crimes), "clarifications of the rules invite and facilitate
evasion"
And my favorite!
"Indeed the U.S. constitution, a document
that covers the entire governance system for the republic, has less
than 5,000 words. The United Kingdom has no written constitution. A
great part of the governance of both countries depends on norms. Do
accountants deal with greater stakes?"
BTW: I like the prescriptions called for as
well, but will allow you to read those (pages 20 to 22 of paper)
Cite: Sunder, Shyam, "Social Norms versus
Standards of Accounting" (May 2005). Yale ICF Working Paper No. 05-14.
http://ssrn.com/abstract=725821
Let me close by citing Harry
S. Truman who said, "I never give them hell; I just tell them the truth and they
think its hell!"
Great Speeches About the State of Accountancy
"20th Century Myths," by Lynn Turner when he was still Chief Accountant at the
SEC in 1999 ---
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch323.htm
It is
interesting to listen to people ask for simple, less complex
standards like in "the good old days." But I never hear them ask for
business to be like "the good old days," with smokestacks rather
than high technology, Glass-Steagall rather than Gramm-Leach, and
plain vanilla interest rate deals rather than swaps, collars, and
Tigers!! The bottom line is—things have changed. And so have people.
Today, we have enormous pressure on CEO’s and
CFO’s. It used to be that CEO’s would be in their positions for an
average of more than ten years. Today, the average is 3 to 4 years.
And Financial Executive Institute surveys show that the CEO and CFO
changes are often linked.
In such an environment, we in the auditing
and preparer community have created what I consider to be a
two-headed monster. The first head of this monster is what I call
the "show me" face. First, it is not uncommon to hear one say, "show
me where it says in an accounting book that I can’t do this?" This
approach to financial reporting unfortunately necessitates the level
of detail currently being developed by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board ("FASB"), the Emerging Issues Task Force, and the
AICPA’s Accounting Standards Executive Committee. Maybe this isn’t a
recent phenomenon. In 1961, Leonard Spacek, then managing partner at
Arthur Andersen, explained the motivation for less specificity in
accounting standards when he stated that "most industry
representatives and public accountants want what they call
‘flexibility’ in accounting principles. That term is never clearly
defined; but what is wanted is ‘flexibility’ that permits greater
latitude to both industry and accountants to do as they please." But
Mr. Spacek was not a defender of those who wanted to "do as they
please." He went on to say, "Public accountants are constantly
required to make a choice between obtaining or retaining a client
and standing firm for accounting principles. Where the choice
requires accepting a practice which will produce results that are
erroneous by a relatively material amount, we must decline the
engagement even though there is precedent for the practice desired
by the client."
We create the second head of our monster
when we ask for standards that absolutely do not reflect the
underlying economics of transactions. I offer two prime examples.
Leasing is first. We have accounting literature put out by the FASB
with follow-on interpretative guidance by the accounting
firms—hundreds of pages of lease accounting guidance that, I will be
the first to admit, is complex and difficult to decipher. But it is
due principally to people not being willing to call a horse a horse,
and a lease what it really is—a financing. The second example is
Statement 133 on derivatives. Some people absolutely howl about its
complexity. And yet we know that: (1) people were not complying with
the intent of the simpler Statements 52 and 80, and (2) despite the
fact that we manage risk in business by managing values rather than
notional amounts, people want to account only for notional amounts.
As a result, we ended up with a compromise position in Statement
133. To its credit, Statement 133 does advance the quality of
financial reporting. For that, I commend the FASB. But I believe
that we could have possibly achieved more, in a less complex
fashion, if people would have agreed to a standard that truly
reflects the underlying economics of the transactions in an unbiased
and representationally faithful fashion.
I certainly hope that we can find a way to
do just that with standards we develop in the future, both in the
U.S. and internationally. It will require a change in how we
approach standard setting and in how we apply those standards. It
will require a mantra based on the fact that transparent, high
quality financial reporting is what makes our capital markets the
most efficient, liquid, and deep in the world. |
Landmark Exposure Draft containing joint proposals to improve and align
accounting for business combinations
"IASB and FASB Publish First Major Exposure Draft Standard," AccountingWeb,
July 11, 2005 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=101084
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB),
based in London, and the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have
announced publication of an Exposure Draft containing joint proposals to
improve and align accounting for business combinations. The proposed
standard would replace IASB’s International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS)
3, Business Combinations and the FASB’s Statement 141, Business
Combinations.
Sir David Tweedie, IASB Chairman and Bob Herz, FASB
Chairman, emphasized the value of a single standard to users and preparers
of financial statements of companies around the world as it improves
comparability of financial information. "Development of a single standard
demonstrates the ability of the IASB and the FASB to work together,” Tweedie
continued.
Continued in article
"Can We Go Back to the Good Old Days?" by Dennis R. Beresford, The
CPA Journal --- http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/1204/perspectives/p6.htm
Recently I visited my pharmacy to pick up eyedrops
for my two golden retrievers. Before he would give me the prescription, the
pharmacist insisted I sign a form on behalf of Murphy and Millie, representing
that they had been apprised of their rights under the new medical privacy
rules. This ludicrous situation is a good illustration of how complicated life
has gotten.
I was still shaking my head later that same day when
I was clicking mindlessly through the 150 or so channels that my local cable
TV service makes available to me. I happened to land on The Andy Griffith
Show, and the few minutes I spent with Andy, Barney, Opie, and Aunt Bea got me
thinking about the Good Old Days. Wouldn’t it be nice, I thought, to go back
to the Good Old Days of the profession in the early 1960s when I graduated
from college?
Back then, accounting was really simple. The
Accounting Principles Board hadn’t issued any standards yet, and FASB didn’t
exist. So we didn’t have 880 pages listing all of the current rules and
guidance on derivative financial instruments, for example. The totality of
authoritative GAAP at that time fit in one softbound booklet about one-third
the size of the new derivatives guidance.
In those Good Old Days, the SEC had been around for
quite a while but it rarely got excited about accounting matters. Neither
mandatory quarterly reporting nor management’s discussion and analysis
(MD&A) had yet come into being, for example. And annual report footnotes
could actually be read in an hour or so.
The country had eight major accounting firms, and
becoming a partner in one was a truly big deal. Lawsuits against accounting
firms were rare, and almost none of them resulted in substantial damages
against the accountants.
In short, accounting seemed more like a true
profession, with good judgment and experience key requirements for success.
Of course, however much we might like to return to
simpler times, it’s easier said than done. And most of us would never give
up the many benefits of progress, such as photocopiers, personal computers,
e-mail, the Internet, and cellphones. But I think that accounting rules may
have become more complicated than necessary.
Let me start with a mea culpa. You may remember the
famous line from the comic strip Pogo: “We have met the enemy, and he is us!”
Well, you may be tempted to rephrase that quote to “We have met the enemy,
and he is … Beresford!”
I plead guilty to having led the development of 40 or
so new accounting standards over my time at FASB. A number of them had
pervasive effects on financial statements, and some have been costly to apply.
I always tried to be as practical as possible, however, although probably few
would say that I was 100% successful in meeting that objective.
In any event, more-recent accounting standards and
proposals seem to be getting increasingly complicated and harder to apply.
Even the best-intentioned accountants have difficulty keeping up with all of
the changes from FASB, the AICPA, the SEC, the EITF, and the IASB. And some
individual standards, such as those on derivatives and variable-interest
entities, are almost impossible for professionals, let alone laypeople, to
decipher.
Furthermore, these days, companies are subject to
what I’ll call quadruple jeopardy. They have to apply GAAP as best they can,
but they are then subject to as many as four levels of possible
second-guessing of their judgments.
First, the external auditors must weigh in. Second,
the SEC will now be reviewing all public companies’ reports at least once
every three years. Third, the PCAOB will be looking at a sample of accounting
firms’ audits, and that could include any given company’s reports.
Finally, the plaintiff’s bar is always looking for opportunities to
challenge accounting judgments and extort settlements. Broad Principles Versus
Detailed Rules
I suspect that all this second-guessing is what leads
many companies and auditors to ask for more-detailed accounting rules. But we
may have reached the point of diminishing returns. In response to the
complexity and sheer volume of many current standards, some have suggested
that accounting standards should be broad principles rather than detailed
rules. FASB and the SEC have expressed support for the general notion of a
principles-based approach to accounting standards. (It’s kind of like apple
pie and motherhood: Who can object to broad principles?) Of course,
implementing such an approach is problematic.
In 2002, FASB issued a proposal on this matter. And
last year the SEC reported to Congress on the same topic. Specific things that
FASB suggested could happen include the following:
Standards should always state very clear objectives.
Standards should have a clearly defined scope and there should be few, if any,
exceptions (e.g., for certain industries). Standards should contain fewer
alternative accounting treatments (e.g., unrealized gains and losses on
marketable securities could all be run through income rather than the various
approaches used at present). FASB also said that a principles-based approach
probably would include less in the way of detailed interpretive and
implementation guidance. Thus, companies and auditors would be expected to
rely more on professional judgment in applying the standards.
The SEC prefers to call this approach “objectives-based”
rather than “principles-based.” SEC Chief Accountant Donald Nicolaisen
recently repeated the SEC’s support for such an approach, agreeing with the
notion of clearly identifying and articulating the objective for each
standard. Although he also suggested that objectives-based standards should
avoid bright-line tests such as lease capitalization rules, he called for “sufficiently
detailed” implementation guidance, including real-world examples.
Although FASB and the SEC may have reached a meeting
of the minds on the overall notion of more general principles, they may
disagree on the key point of how much implementation guidance to provide. FASB
thinks that a principles-based approach should include less implementation
guidance and rely more on judgment, while the SEC thinks that “sufficiently
detailed” guidance is needed, and I suspect that would make it difficult to
significantly reduce complexity in some cases.
In any event, FASB recently said that it may take “several
years or more” for preparers and auditors to adjust to a change to less
detail. Meantime, little has changed with respect to individual standards,
which if anything are becoming even harder to understand and apply.
I’ve heard FASB board members say that FASB
Interpretation (FIN) 46, on variable-interest entities (VIE), is an example of
a principles-based standard. I assume they say this because FIN 46 states an
objective of requiring consolidation when control over a VIE exists. But the
definition of a VIE and the rules for determining when control exists are
extremely difficult to understand.
FASB recently described what it meant by the
operationality of an accounting standard. The first condition was that
standards have to be comprehensible to readers with a reasonable level of
knowledge and sophistication. This doesn’t seem to be the case for FIN 46.
Many auditors and financial executives have told me that only a few
individuals in the country truly know how to apply FIN 46. And those few
individuals often disagree among themselves!
Such complications make it difficult to get decisions
on many accounting matters from an audit engagement team. Decisions on VIEs,
derivatives, and securitization transactions, to name a few, must routinely be
cleared by an accounting firm’s national experts. And with section 404 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) and new concerns about auditor independence,
getting answers is now even harder. For example, in the past, companies would
commonly consult with their auditors on difficult accounting matters. But now
the PCAOB may view this as a control weakness, under the assumption that the
company lacks adequate internal expertise. And if auditors get too involved in
technical decisions before a complex transaction is completed, the SEC or the
PCAOB might decide that the auditors aren’t independent, because they’re
auditing their own decisions.
When things become this complicated, I wonder whether
it’s time for a new approach. Maybe we do need to go back to the Good Old
Days.
Internal Controls
Today, financial executives are probably more
concerned about internal controls than new accounting requirements. For the
first time, all public companies must report on the adequacy of their internal
controls over financial reporting, and outside auditors must express their
opinion on the company’s controls. Many people have questioned whether this
incredibly expensive activity is worth the presumed benefit to investors.
While one might argue that the section 404 rules are a regulatory
overreaction, shareholders should expect good internal controls. And audit
committees, as shareholders’ representatives, must demand those good
controls. So this has been by far the most time-consuming topic at all audit
committee meetings I’ve attended in the past couple of years.
Companies and auditors are spending huge sums this
year to ensure that transactions are properly processed and controlled. Yet
the most perfect system of internal controls and the best audit of them might
not catch an incorrect interpretation of GAAP. A good example of this was
contained in the PCAOB’s August 2004 report on its initial reviews of the
Big Four’s audit practices. The report noted that all four firms had missed
the fact that some clients had misapplied EITF Issue 95-22. As the New York
Times (August 27, 2004) noted, “The fact that all of the top firms had been
misapplying it raised issues of just how well they know the sometimes
complicated rules.”
Responding to a different criticism in that same
PCAOB report, KPMG noted, “Three knowledgeable informed bodies—the firm,
the PCAOB, and the SEC—had reached three different conclusions on proper
accounting, illustrating the complex accounting issues registrants, auditors
and regulators all face.”
Fair Value Accounting
Even those who are very confident about their
understanding of the current accounting rules shouldn’t get complacent: Fair
value accounting is right around the corner, making things even harder. In
fact, it is already required in several recent standards.
To be clear, I’m not opposed in general to fair
value accounting. It makes sense for marketable securities, derivatives, and
probably many other financial instruments. But expanding the fair value
concept to many other assets and liabilities is a challenge.
Consider this sentence from FASB’s recent exposure
draft on fair value measurements: “The Board agreed that, conceptually, the
fair value measurement objective and the approach for applying that objective
should be the same for all assets and liabilities.” In that same document,
FASB said, “Users of financial statements generally have agreed that fair
value information is relevant.”
So the overall objective of moving toward a fair
value accounting model seems clear. Of course, that doesn’t necessarily mean
that we will get there soon. In fact, in the same exposure draft the board
said that it would continue to use a project-by-project approach to decide on
fair value or some other measure. But in reality the board has been adopting a
fair value approach in most recent decisions:
SFAS 142, on goodwill, requires that impairment
losses for certain intangible assets be recognized based upon a decline in the
fair value of the asset. SFAS 143, on asset retirement obligations, requires
that these liabilities be recorded initially at fair value rather than what
the company expects to incur. SFAS 146, on exit or disposal activities, calls
for the fair value of exit liabilities to be recorded, not the amount actually
expected to be paid. FIN 45, on guarantees, says that a fair value must be
recorded even when the company doesn’t expect to have to make good on a
guarantee. A fair value approach is also integral to other pending projects,
including the conditional asset retirement obligation exposure draft. Under
such a standard, a company might have to record a fair value liability even
when it doesn’t expect to incur an obligation. Fair value is also key to
projects on business combination purchase procedures; differentiating between
liabilities and equity; share-based payments (stock options); and the
tremendously important revenue recognition project.
I have three major concerns about such pervasive use
of fair value accounting. First, in many cases determining fair value in any
kind of objective way will be difficult if not impossible. Second, the
resulting accounting will produce answers that won’t benefit users of
financial statements. Third, those answers will be very difficult to explain
to business managers, with the result that accounting will be further
discredited in their minds.
The approach that FASB is using for what I would call
operating liabilities is particularly troubling. Take, for example, a company
that owns and operates a facility that has some asbestos contamination. The
facility is safe and can be operated indefinitely, but if the company wanted
to sell the property it would have to remediate that contamination. The
company has no plans to sell the property. But FASB’s exposure draft on
conditional asset retirement obligations calls for the company to estimate and
record a fair value liability. This would be based on what someone else would
charge now to assume the obligation to clean up the problem at some
unspecified future date. The board admits that it might be difficult to
determine what the fair value would be in this case, and companies could omit
the liability if they simply couldn’t make a reasonable estimate.
Although FASB and the SEC expect most companies to be
able to make a reasonable estimate, in reality I think that will be possible
only rarely. Even more important, does it really make sense to record a
liability when the company might believe that there is only a 5% chance that
it will have to be paid? Consider how this line of reasoning might apply to
litigation. Presently, liabilities are recorded only when it’s probable that
a loss has been incurred and that a reasonable estimate of the loss can be
made. So if a company were sued for $1 billion but there were only a 1% chance
that it would lose, nothing would be recorded. The fair value approach would
seem to call for a liability of $10 million in this case, based on 1% of $1
billion.
One might think this kind of accounting will apply
only in the distant future, but FASB is due to release its proposal on
purchase accounting procedures in the next few months, and I understand that
the proposal will require exactly this kind of accounting.
In addition to the very questionable relevance of
this, I don’t know how anyone would ever be able to reasonably determine the
1% likelihood I assumed. How would an auditor attest to the reliability of
financial statements whose results depend significantly on such assumptions?
And where would an auditor go to obtain objective audit evidence against which
to evaluate such assumptions?
Fair value definitely makes sense in certain
instances, but FASB seems intent on extending the notion beyond the boundaries
of common sense. FASB also seems to have an exaggerated notion of what
companies and auditors are actually capable of doing. Perhaps we should
consider FASB’s faith in the profession to be a compliment. Rather than
feeling complimented, however, I think that this just makes many of us long
for the Good Old Days.
Fair Value Accounting and Revenue Recognition
Currently, asset retirement obligations and exit
costs apply to only a few companies, and even guarantees are not an everyday
issue. All companies, however, have revenues—or at least they hope to have
them. And for the past year or so, FASB has been engaged in a complete
rethinking of revenue recognition. This, of course, was precipitated by the
numerous SEC enforcement cases on improper revenue recognition. Most cases,
however, involved failure to follow existing standards, and most cases also
resulted in premature recognition of revenue.
Now there’s no doubt that the current revenue
accounting rules are overly complicated, with many specific rules depending on
the type of product or service being sold. But FASB’s current thinking would
replace these rules with an asset and liability–oriented approach based on
fair value accounting. This may well make revenue accounting even more
complicated than the detailed rules that we are at least used to working with.
For example, assume product A is being sold to a
customer. It costs $50 to produce product A and the customer has agreed to pay
a nonrefundable $100 in exchange for the company’s promise to deliver this
hot product next month. What should the company record at month-end?
Most accountants would probably think first of the
traditional approach and conclude that the earnings process had not been
completed. Because product A hasn’t been completed and shipped to the
customer, the $100 credit is unearned income. Some aggressive accountants
would probably say that the company should record the sale now because the
$100 is nonrefundable. In that case the company would probably also record a
liability for the $50 cost that will be incurred next month.
FASB has a surprise for both. The board is presently
thinking about whether revenue for what it calls the “selling activity”—the
difference between the $100 received and the assumed fair value of the
obligation to deliver the product—should be recorded now. This assumed fair
value would be the estimated amount that other companies would charge to
produce product A. In other words, it’s the hypothetical amount a company
would have to pay someone else to assume the obligation to produce the
product. The company would have to make this assumption even though it is 100%
sure that it will make the product itself rather than have someone else make
it.
If one could ever determine what other companies
would charge, I suspect that the amount would be higher than the $50 expected
cost, because another company probably would require a risk premium to produce
a product that it isn’t familiar with. It would want to earn a profit as
well. Let’s assume in this case that the fair value could be determined as
$80. If so, the company would record now $20 of revenue and profit for what
FASB calls the selling activity. Next month it would record the $80 remaining
amount of revenue, along with the $50 cost actually incurred. It’s unclear
when the company would record sales commissions, delivery costs, and similar
expenses, but I assume these would have to be allocated somehow.
Given that this project was added to FASB’s agenda
in large part because of premature recognition of revenue in some SEC cases—Enron
recognized income based on the supposed fair value of energy contracts
extending 30 years into the future—it is ironic that the project may well
mandate recognition earlier than most accountants would consider appropriate.
That kind of premature revenue recognition is now generally prohibited, but
other examples could follow, depending on the outcome of this FASB project.
Although the revenue recognition project is still in
an early stage and both my understanding and the board’s positions could
change, FASB seems determined to use some sort of fair value approach to
revenue recognition in many cases. If this happens, we will all be wishing for
the Good Old Days to return.
Is All That EITF Guidance Really Necessary?
In early 2004, FASB’s board members began reviewing
all EITF consensus positions. A majority of board members now have to “not
disagree” with the EITF before those positions become final and binding on
companies. This gives FASB more control over the EITF process, and it should
prevent the task force from developing positions that the board sees as
inconsistent with existing GAAP.
Although I think the task force has done a great deal
of good over its 20-year existence (I was a charter member), I think it’s
time to challenge whether everything that the EITF does is necessary or even
consistent with its original purpose. Too many of the task force’s topics in
recent years can’t really be called “emerging issues.” Rather, the task
force often takes up long-standing issues where it thinks that some
limitations need to be placed on professional judgment.
For example, a couple of years ago the SEC became
concerned about the accounting for certain investments in other companies. For
years we’ve had standards that call for recognition of losses when market
value declines are “other than temporary.” The EITF discussed this matter
at eight meetings over two years and also relied on a separate working group
of accounting experts. Earlier this year, a final consensus position was
issued. It includes a lengthy abstract that tells companies what factors to
consider, including the following matters:
Evidence to support the ability and intent to
continue to hold the investment; The severity of the decline in value; How
long the decline has lasted; and The evidence supporting a market price
recovery. So now we have a “detailed rule” on this matter. Will this
result in more consistency in practice? Will investors and other users of
financial statements receive better information as a result? Is the result
worth the additional effort?
Moreover, after two years of effort on this project,
FASB had to reconsider the whole thing because no one had considered the
effect on debt securities held as available for sale by financial
institutions. So now the board is developing even more specifics to deal with
the unintended consequences of the rule.
Again, I support the EITF, and I believe it has
generally done a great job. The members try to develop practical ways to deal
with current problems. Nonetheless, both the task force and FASB may need to
more carefully challenge whether all of the EITF’s projects are really
needed. If FASB actually issued relatively broad standards, there probably
would be a need for the EITF to provide supplemental guidance on some issues.
But we now seem to have the worst of all worlds, with quite detailed
accounting standards being accompanied by even more detailed EITF guidance.
A Multitude of Challenges
I don’t intend to seem overly critical of FASB and
others who are working to improve financial reporting. It’s a tough job, and
the brickbats always outnumber the bouquets. If I didn’t strongly support
accounting standards setting I wouldn’t have spent 10 Qs years on the inside
of the process. Still, those years at FASB, as well as my time before and
after, have caused me to develop strong views on these issues. And I truly do
believe that standards have gotten just too complicated.
The announced move to broader principles is one I
fully support. That job won’t be easy, but it has to be tried or the sea of
detail will become even deeper in the near future. FASB needs to actually
start doing this and not allow its actions to speak otherwise. And companies,
auditors, and regulators need to support such a move and resist the temptation
to seek answers to every imaginable question. Furthermore, companies and
auditors may have to become more principled before a principles-based approach
will work.
Part of this process could be for the EITF to be more
judicious in what it takes on. Also, I urge FASB to reevaluate its attitude
toward fair value accounting. I believe FASB is moving much faster in this
area than preparers, auditors, and users of financial statements can
accommodate. Furthermore, the SEC and other regulators may not yet be on board
with this new thinking.
In the final analysis, we won’t be able to return
to my so-called Good Old Days. But we have to make sure that what accounting
and accountants can do is meaningful and operational. We never want to look
back and ask, “Remember the Good Old Days, when accounting was important?”
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CPA Journal Editorial Board member Dennis R. Beresford, CPA, was recently
named the 2005 recipient of the Gold Medal for Distinguished Service from the
AICPA. He received the award on October 26, during the fall meeting of the
Institute’s governing council in Orlando. Beresford is the Ernst & Young
Executive Professor of Accounting at the J.M. Tull School of Accounting at the
University of Georgia, Terry College of Business. From 1987 to 1997, he was
chairman of FASB. Prior to joining FASB, he was national director of
accounting standards for Ernst & Young.ecently I visited my pharmacy to
pick up eyedrops for my two golden retrievers. Before he would give me the
prescription, the pharmacist insisted I sign a form on behalf of Murphy and
Millie, representing that they had been apprised of their rights under the new
medical privacy rules. This ludicrous situation is a good illustration of how
complicated life has gotten.
From the FASB in July 2004 "FASB Response to SEC Study on the Adoption
of a Principles-Based Accounting System" --- http://www.fasb.org/response_sec_study_july2004.pdf
Introduction
In July 2003, the staff of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) submitted to
Congress its Study
Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the
Adoption by the United States
Financial Reporting System of a Principles-Based Accounting
System (the Study). The Study
includes the following recommendations to the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB or Board):
1. The FASB should issue
objectives-oriented standards.
2. The FASB should address
deficiencies in the conceptual framework.
3. The FASB should be the only
organization setting authoritative accounting
guidance in the United States.
4. The FASB should continue its
convergence efforts.
5. The FASB should work to redefine
the GAAP hierarchy.
6. The FASB should increase access to
authoritative literature.
7. The FASB should perform a
comprehensive review of its literature to identify
standards that are more rules-based and adopt
a transition plan to change those standards.
The Board welcomes the SEC’s Study and
agrees with the recommendations. Indeed, a number of those recommendations
relate to initiatives the Board had under way at the time the Study was
issued.1 The Board is committed to continuously improving its standard-setting
process. The Board’s specific responses to the recommendations in the Study
are described in the following sections of this paper.
Objectives-Oriented Standards
In the Study, the SEC staff recommends
that "those involved in the standard-setting
process more consistently develop
standards on a principles-based or objectives-oriented
basis" (page 4).
2
According to the
Study (page 4), an objectives-oriented standard would
have the following characteristics:
•
Be
based on an improved and consistently applied conceptual framework;
•
Clearly
state the accounting objective of the standard;
•
Provide
sufficient detail and structure so that the standard can be operationalized
and applied on a consistent basis;1
•
Minimize
exceptions from the standard;
•
Avoid
use of percentage tests ("bright-lines") that allow financial
engineers to achieve technical compliance with
the standard while evading the
intent of the standard.
The “objectives-oriented” approach to setting
standards described above (and expanded
upon in the Study) is similar to the principles-based approach described in the
Board’s
Proposal. After discussing the comments received on its Proposal, the Board
agreed that
its conceptual framework needs to be improved. This is because an internally
consistent
and complete conceptual framework is critical to a standard-setting approach
that places
more emphasis on the underlying principles that are based on that framework.
Pages 8
and 9 of this paper further describe the Board’s activities related to the
conceptual
framework; the following sections address the other characteristics of an
objectivesoriented
approach addressed in the Study.
Format and Content of Standards
The Board agrees with the Study’s
recommendation to improve the format and content of
its standards. In particular, The Board agrees
that the objective and underlying principles of
a standard should be clearly articulated and prominently placed in FASB
standards. In response to comments
received on its Proposal, the Board agreed that although its existing
standards are based on concepts and principles, the understandability of its
standards could be improved by writing its
standards in ways that (a) clearly state the accounting
objective(s), (b) clearly articulate the underlying principles, and (c)
improve the explanation of the rationale
behind those principles and how they relate to the conceptual
framework.
The Board is working on developing a
format for its standards that will encompass the
attributes of an objectives-oriented standard
described in the Study, for example, describing
the underlying objective of the standard in the introductory paragraphs, using
bold type to set
off the principles,3 and
providing a glossary for defined terms.
In addition, the Board is working with a
consultant to identify changes in the organization
and exposition of its standards that will
increase the understandability of those standards. Accounting
standards by their nature will include many specific technical terms; however,
the Board believes it can do a better job simplifying the language used in its
standards to describe how to account for
complex transactions. In addition, the Board will
strive to apply other effective writing techniques to enhance constituents’
understanding of
FASB standards.
When discussing proposed accounting
standards or specific provisions of a standard,
many of the Board’s constituents comment on
whether a standard is "operational." Because
that term can mean different things to different people, the Board decided to
define the term operational
for its purposes. The Board uses the term operational
to mean
the following:
•
A
provision/standard is comprehensible by a reader who has a reasonable level
of knowledge
and sophistication,
•
The
information needed to apply the provision/standard is currently available or
can be created, and
•
The
provision/standard can be applied in the manner in which it was intended.
The Board believes that if its standards are
more understandable, they also will be more operational.
Implementation Guidance
As noted in the Board’s Proposal, an
approach to setting standards that places more emphasis on principles will not
eliminate the need to provide interpretive and implementation guidance for
applying those standards. Thus, the Board agrees that some amount of
implementation guidance is needed in objectives-oriented standards in order
for entities to apply those standards in a consistent manner. The Board uses
the term implementation guidance to refer to all of the guidance necessary to
explain and operationalize the principles (that is, the explanatory text in
the standards section, the definitions in the glossary, and guidance and
examples included in one or more appendices that help an entity apply the
provisions in the standards section). The Board believes that the amount of
necessary guidance will vary depending on the nature and complexity of the
arrangements that are the subject of the standard. The Board believes that
there should be enough guidance such that a principle is understandable,
operational, and capable of being applied consistently in similar situations.
Judgment is required to decide how much guidance is needed to achieve those
objectives, without providing so much guidance that the overall standard
combined with its implementation guidance becomes a collection of detailed
rules. Therefore, the amount and nature of implementation guidance will vary
from standard to standard.
The Board believes that its primary
focus should be providing broadly applicable implementation guidance, not
providing guidance on relatively narrow and less pervasive issues, including,
for example, issues that are specific to certain entities or industries. When
developing that implementation guidance, the Board plans to apply the same
guidelines that underpin objectives-oriented standards. For example, rather
than consisting of a list of rules or bright lines, the implementation
guidance would explain or expand on the principle(s) or objectives in the
standard. 4.
Continued in the report
From the FASB in October 2002 --- http://www.fasb.org/fasac/results2002.pdf
Results of the 2002
Annual FASAC Survey
FASAC's annual survey
on the priorities of the FASB provides valuable perspectives and observations
about the Board's process and direction. The 2002 survey asked Council
members, Board members, and other interested constituents to provide their
views about the FASB's priorities, the financial reporting issues of tomorrow,
principles-based standards, and the FASB's international activities.
Key observations and
conclusions from the responses to the 2002 survey are:
- Council members
most often mentioned revenue recognition as one of the five most important
issues that the Board should address currently. All seven Board members
also included revenue recognition as one of the most important issues for
the Board.
- FASAC members
most often cited valuation issues, such as the implication of using fair
value measurements in financial statements, as one of the issues of
tomorrow that the Board should start thinking about today.
- FASAC members
generally are prepared to accept differences in interpretation of
principles-based standards. They also are prepared to make the judgments
necessary to apply less-detailed standards despite the risk that their
judgment will be questioned. Some noted that for principles-based
standards to become a reality, the SEC is the primary organization that
needs to support the initiative.
- Nearly all
FASAC members agree that the Board's international activities are an
appropriate use of resources. All Board members also believe that those
activities are an appropriate use of resources.
Twenty-two current
Council members, 7 Board members, and 9 other constituents responded to the
survey.
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting
theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting
fraud are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting for
electronic commerce are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce.htm
There is a complete saga of attempts to establish a conceptual framework of
accounting. See
http://www.wku.edu/~halljo/attempts.html
Methods for setting accounting standards all have
advantages and disadvantages. It is not possible to set optimal standards for all
stakeholders. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem applies, which means that what is
optimal for one constituency must be sub-optimal for other constituencies.
Accounting standards are usually expensive to implement, and the benefits of any new
standard must be weighed against its costs to preparers and users of financial statements.
Deductive Accounting Theory (Mathematical
Methods)
- Assumes that optimal accounting standards and
reporting rules can be derived by deduction much in the way that Pythagoras derived the
rule for measuring the hypotenuse of a triangle based upon square root of the summed
squares of the other two sides (assuming one angle is a perfect 90-degree angle). Is
there ever a perfect 90-degree angle in the real world?
- If we assume that we have perfect definitions of
assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses, then derivations of optimal accounting rules
will follow. A+E=R+L+E before closing E and R to E.
- The FASB's Conceptual Framework is based heavily
upon
Inductive Accounting Theory (Scientific Methods)
- Assumes accounting standards are somewhat like evolution of
a species in nature --- survival of the fittest!
- Relies heavily upon controlled experimentation (e.g.,
behavioral accounting research) and statistical testing (e.g., capital markets
"events" studies of the impact of accounting information on market prices and
volume of transactions).
Normative Accounting Theory
- Normative theorists tend to advocate their
opinions on accounting based upon subjective opinion, deductive logic, and inductive
methods. In the final analysis, nearly all standards are based upon normative
theory.
- Generally conclude that some accounting rule is
better or worse than its alternatives.
- Normative theorists tend to rely heavily upon
anecdotal evidence (e.g., examples of fraud) that generally fails to meet tests of
academic rigor. For example, the Wizard reported that Montgomery Ward would
fail. However, the Wizard always reports that every company will fail or lose its
self identity in a pattern of acquisitions and mergers. Eventually, he will always
be correct.
Positive Accounting Theory
- Positive theorists tend to explain why some
accounting practices are more popular than others (e.g., because they increase management
compensation). They tend to support their conclusions with inductive theory and
empirical evidence as opposed to deductive methods.
- Generally avoid advocacy of one accounting rule as
being better or worse than its alternatives.
- Positivists are inspired by anecdotal evidence,
but anecdotal evidence is never permitted without more rigorous and controlled scientific
investigation.
April 2002 Document on SPEs
and Enron from the International Accounting Standards Board (This Document is Free)
WRITTEN EVIDENCE OF SIR DAVID TWEEDIE
CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD TO THE TREASURY COMMITTEE ---
http://www.iasc.org.uk/docs/speeches/020405-dpt.pdf
An excerpt is shown below:
Consolidations
Of the 16 topics on our research
agenda, one warrants special mention here. For several years, there has been an
international debate on the topic of consolidation policy. The failure to consolidate some
entities has been identified as a significant issue in the restatement of Enrons
financial statements. Accountants use the term consolidation policy as shorthand for
the principles that govern the preparation of consolidated financial statements that
include the assets and liabilities of a parent company and its subsidiaries. For an
example of consolidation, consider the simple example known to every accounting student.
Company A operates a branch office in Edinburgh. Company B also operates a branch office
in Edinburgh, but organises the branch as a corporation owned by Company B. Every
accounting student knows that the financial statements of each company should report all
of the assets and liabilities of their respective Edinburgh operations, without regard to
the legal form surrounding those operations.
Of course, real life is seldom as
straightforward as textbook examples. Companies often own less than 100 per cent of a
company that might be included in the consolidated group. Some special purpose entities
(SPEs) may not be organised in traditional corporate form. The challenge for accountants
is to determine which entities should be included in consolidated financial
statements.
There is a broad consensus among
accounting standard-setters that the decision to consolidate should be based on whether
one entity controls another. However, there is much disagreement over how control should
be defined and translated into accounting guidance. In some jurisdictions accounting
standards and practice seem to have gravitated toward a legal or ownership notion of
control, usually based on direct or indirect ownership of over 50 per cent of the
outstanding voting shares. In contrast, both international standards and the standards in
some national jurisdictions are based on a broader notion of control that includes
ownership, but extends to control over financial and operating policies, power to appoint
or remove a majority of the board of directors, and power to cast a majority of votes at
meetings of the board of directors.
A number of commentators,
including many in the USA, have questioned whether the control principle is consistently
applied. The IASB and its partner standard-setters are committed to an ongoing review of
the effectiveness of our standards. If they do not work as well as they should, we want to
find out why and fix the problem. Last summer we asked the UK ASB to help us by
researching the various national standards on consolidation and identifying any
inconsistencies or implementation problems. It has completed the first stage of that
effort and is moving now to more difficult questions.
The particular consolidation
problems posed by SPEs were addressed by the IASBs former Standing Interpretations
Committee in SIC-12. There are some kinds of SPE that pose particular problems for both an
ownership approach and a control-based approach to consolidations. It is not uncommon for
SPEs to have minimal capital, held by a third party, that bears little if any of the risks
and rewards usually associated with share ownership. The activities of some SPEs are
so precisely prescribed in the
documents that establish them that no active exercise of day-to-day control is needed or
allowed. These kinds of SPEs are commonly referred to as running on
auto-pilot. In these cases, control is exercised in a passive way. To discover
who has control it is necessary to look at which party receives the benefits and risks of
the SPE.
SIC-12 sets out four particular
circumstances that may indicate that an SPE should be consolidated:
(a) in substance, the activities
of the SPE are being conducted on behalf of the enterprise according to its specific
business needs so that the enterprise obtains benefits from the SPEs
operation.
(b) in substance, the enterprise
has the decision-making powers to obtain the majority of the benefits of the activities of
the SPE or, by setting up an autopilot mechanism, the enterprise has delegated
these decision-making powers.
(c) in substance, the enterprise
has rights to obtain the majority of the benefits of the SPE and therefore may be exposed
to risks incidental to the activities of the SPE.
(d) in substance, the enterprise
retains the majority of the residual or ownership risks related to the SPE or its assets
in order to obtain benefits from its activities.
The IASB recognises that we may
be able to improve our approach to SPEs. With this in mind, we have already asked our
interpretations committee if there are any ways in which the rules need to be strengthened
or clarified.
Current criticisms and
concerns about financial reporting
There some common threads that
pass through most of the topics on our active and research agendas. Each represents a
broad topic that has occupied the best accounting minds for several years. It is time to
bring many of these issues to a conclusion.
Off balance sheet items
When a manufacturer sells a car
or a dishwasher, the inventory is removed from the balance sheet (a process that
accountants refer to as derecognition) because the manufacturer no longerowns the item.
Similarly, when a company repays a loan, it no longer reports that loan as a liability.
However, the last 20 years have seen a number of attempts by companies to remove assets
and liabilities from balance sheets through transactions that may obscure the economic
substance of the companys financial position. There are four areas that warrant
mention here, each of which has the potential to obscure the extent of a companys
assets and liabilities.
Leasing transactions
A company that owns an asset, say
an aircraft, and finances that asset with debt reports an asset (the aircraft) and a
liability (the debt). Under existing accounting standards in most jurisdictions (including
ASB and IASB standards), a company that operates the same asset under a lease structured
as an operating lease reports neither the asset nor the liability. It is possible to
operate a company, say an airline, without reporting any of the companys principal
assets (aircraft) on the balance sheet. A balance sheet that presents an airline without
any aircraft is clearly not a faithful representation of economic reality.
Our predecessor body, working in
conjunction with our partners in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the USA,
published a research paper that invited comments on accounting for leases. The UK ASB is
continuing work on this topic and we are monitoring its work carefully. As noted above, we
expect to move accounting for leases to our active agenda at some point in the future.
There is a distinct possibility that such a project would lead us to propose that
companies recognise assets and related lease obligations for all leases.
Securitisation transactions
Under existing accounting
standards in many jurisdictions, a company that transfers assets (like loans or
credit-card balances) through a securitisation transaction recognises the transaction as a
sale and removes the amounts from its balance sheet. Some securitisations are
appropriately accounted for as sales, but many continue to expose the transferor to many
of the significant risks and rewards inherent in the transferred assets. In our project on
improvements to IAS 39 (page 5), we plan to propose an approach that will clarify
international standards governing a companys ability to derecognise assets in a
securitisation. Our approach, which will not allow sale treatment when the
seller has a continuing involvement with the assets, will be significantly
different from the one found in the existing standards of most jurisdictions.
Creation of unconsolidated
entities
Under existing accounting
standards in many jurisdictions, a company that transfers assets and liabilities to a
subsidiary company must consolidate that subsidiary in the parent companys financial
statements (see page 6). However, in some cases (often involving the use of an SPE), the
transferor may be able (in some jurisdictions) to escape the requirement to consolidate.
Standards governing the consolidation of SPEs are described on page 7.
Pension obligations
Under existing standards in many
jurisdictions (including existing international standards) a companys obligation to
a defined benefit pension plan is reported on the companys balance sheet. However,
the amount reported is not the current obligation, based on current information and
assumptions, but instead represents the result of a series of devices designed to spread
changes over several years. In contrast, the UK standard (FRS 17) has attracted
significant recent attention because it does not include a smoothing mechanism. The IASB
plans to examine the differences among the various national accounting standards for
pensions (in particular, the smoothing mechanism), as part of our ongoing work on
convergence.
Items not included in the profit
and loss account
Under existing accounting
standards in some jurisdictions, a company that pays for goods and services through the
use of its own shares, options on its shares, or instruments tied to the value of its
shares may not record any cost for those goods and services. The most common form of this
share-based transaction is the employee share option. In 1995, after what it called an
extraordinarily controversial debate, the FASB issued a standard that, in most
cases in the USA, requires disclosure of the effect of employee share options but does not
require recognition in the financial statements. In its Basis for Conclusions, the FASB
observed:
The Board chose a
disclosure-based solution for stock-based employee compensation to bring closure to the
divisive debate on this issuenot because it believes that solution is the best way
to improve financial accounting and reporting.
Most jurisdictions, including the
UK, do not have any standard on accounting for share-based payment, and the use of this
technique is growing outside of the USA. There is a clear need for international
accounting guidance. Last autumn, the IASB reopened the comment period on a discussion
document Accounting for Share-based Payment. This document was initially published by our
predecessor, in concert with standard-setters from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK
and the USA. We have now considered the comments received and have begun active
deliberation of this project. Accounting measurement
Under existing accounting
standards in most jurisdictions, assets and liabilities are reported at amounts based on a
mixture of accounting measurements. Some measurements are based on historical transaction
prices, perhaps adjusted for depreciation, amortisation, or impairment. Others are based
on fair values, using either amounts observed in the marketplace or estimates of fair
value. Accountants refer to this as the mixed attribute model. It is increasingly clear
that a mixed attribute system creates complexity and opportunities for accounting
arbitrage, especially for derivatives and financial instruments. Some have suggested that
financial reporting should move to a system that measures all financial instruments at
fair value.
Our predecessor body participated
in a group of ten accounting standard-setters (the Joint Working Group or JWG) to study
the problem of accounting for financial instruments. The JWG proposal (which recommended a
change to measuring all financial assets and liabilities at fair value) was published at
the end of 2000. Earlier this year the Canadian Accounting Standards Board presented an
analysis of comments on that proposal. The IASB has just begun to consider how this effort
should move forward.
Intangible assets
Under existing accounting
standards in most jurisdictions, the cost of an intangible asset (a patent, copyright, or
the like) purchased from a third party is capitalised as an asset. This is the same as the
accounting for acquired tangible assets (buildings and machines) and financial assets
(loans and accounts receivable). Existing accounting standards extend this approach to
self-constructed tangible assets, so a company that builds its own building capitalises
the costs incurred and reports that as the cost of its self-constructed asset. However, a
company that develops its own patent for a new drug or process is prohibited from
capitalising much (sometimes all) of the costs of creating that intangible asset. Many
have criticised this inconsistency, especially at a time when many view intangible assets
as significant drivers of company performance.
The accounting recognition and
measurement of internally generated intangibles challenges many long-cherished accounting
conventions. Applying the discipline of accounting concepts challenges many of the popular
conceptions of intangible assets and intellectual capital. We have this topic
on our research agenda. We also note the significant work that the FASB has done on this
topic and its recent decision to add a project to develop proposed disclosures about
internally generated intangible assets. We plan to monitor those efforts closely.
Bob Jensen's threads on the Enron/Andersen scandals are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
Bob Jensen's SPE threads are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm
Why Let the I.R.S. See What the S.E.C. Doesn't?
"Why Let the I.R.S. See What the S.E.C. Doesn't?," by Anna Bernasek,
The New York Times, February 5, 2006 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/05/business/yourmoney/05view.html
IMAGINE a company that makes a practice of keeping
two sets of accounts. One version is revealed to the public through periodic
Securities and Exchange Commission filings and public announcements. The
other is never made public and conveys a markedly different picture.
Does it sound scandalous? Actually, it's common
practice.
It isn't as if companies are breaking the law.
Public companies are required by the S.E.C. to keep their books in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, or GAAP, and to
announce their results each quarter. At the same time, companies keep a
separate and confidential set of books according to rules established by the
Internal Revenue Service. These accounts seldom match. After all, companies
typically have an incentive to state the highest possible earnings under
GAAP and the lowest possible under tax rules.
Economists have long understood that profits
reported to the I.R.S. may be a more reliable guide than those reported to
the S.E.C. and scrutinized on Wall Street. The public presentation of
accounts involves the exercise of an accountant's judgment on such topics as
the useful life of assets, the probability of uncertain events and the fair
value of property. Each exercise of judgment, on which reasonable people may
differ, offers a degree of flexibility in the final reporting of results.
In general, tax rules are less lenient. That is
because allowing companies too much leeway in stating how much tax they owe
would make collecting taxes difficult. So when economists analyze corporate
profits, they tend to focus on a measure derived from corporate tax returns.
Unfortunately, the government publishes only aggregate data, so it is
impossible to know what any particular company made, or paid, under I.R.S.
rules.
It doesn't have to be that way. Companies already
have basic tax information at hand that could be released to the public
without imposing significant costs. And some experts say they believe that
the benefits to investors, regulators and the overall tax system could be
substantial.
A study published in 2003 concluded that the
benefits of disclosing additional tax information would outweigh any costs.
It was conducted by David L. Lenter, a lawyer now on the staff of the
Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation; Joel B. Slemrod, an economist at
the University of Michigan; and Douglas A. Shackelford, an accountant at the
University of North Carolina.
In the study, published in the National Tax
Journal, they quickly agreed that corporate tax returns, which can run into
thousands of pages, should not be exposed in their entirety. That could
reveal sensitive information that companies have a legitimate need to keep
private, they said.
But a simple presentation of summary information —
the bottom-line numbers, for example — would have many attractions. Even
better, companies could release a simplified version of a schedule that they
already prepare. The I.R.S. currently requires companies to reconcile the
differences between the numbers on their financial reports and the
corresponding amounts on their tax return, but so far those reconciliations
have not been made public.
Greater disclosure of tax information would allow
investors and analysts to better appreciate the true economic condition of a
company. More transparent tax figures would also give analysts a tool to cut
through the sometimes confusing tax disclosures currently provided under
S.E.C. rules. Even more significantly, investors could track a company's
performance under an accounting system believed to be less susceptible to
manipulation than GAAP. Together, these effects would permit investors to
value securities with greater confidence. Over all, the researchers say they
believe that it would help financial markets function more efficiently.
Another significant benefit could be to improve the
transparency of the tax system to the voting public. Despite all the
information embedded in accounting footnotes, some basic questions go
unanswered. Under current S.E.C. rules, a public company does not have to
reveal precisely what it paid in taxes for a specific year. "Right now the
tax numbers companies release can contain things like taxes on audits 20
years ago," Professor Shackelford said. "What they don't tell us is how much
they paid the government in taxes in 2005, for instance. You can't find that
anywhere."
The study argued that if companies revealed that
figure, it would help clarify how much tax a company was paying relative to
its income and relative to other companies. And that would yield positive
benefits. For instance, the study says, it could put pressure on legislators
to improve the tax system. And it could discourage corporations from
aggressive tax-reduction strategies if they feared public criticism.
THERE is good cause for trying to understand what
is really going on with corporate taxes, company by company. The aggregate
figures suggest a disturbing trend. While companies have reported rising
profits in recent years, corporate tax receipts have been dwindling. In the
late 1990's, corporate tax receipts hovered between 2 percent and 2.2
percent of the country's overall gross domestic product. But from 2000 to
2004, the last year for which figures are available, the ratio of corporate
tax receipts to G.D.P. has dropped, ranging between 1.2 and 2 percent.
Without reliable tax information, we can only guess
at what companies are really up to. During the late 1990's, company profits
based on tax return information — the profit figure most watched by
economists — grew at a much slower rate than reported profits. The
divergence between the two measures implied that either companies were
finding new ways to minimize their tax bills or they were finding new ways
to overstate their accounting earnings. We now know that at least some
companies were indeed bolstering their earnings, through both legal and
illegal maneuvers.
After a brief reconciliation in 2001 and 2002,
reported earnings and taxed earnings are again diverging. While disclosing
some basic tax information won't by itself prevent the kinds of abuses that
multiplied in the 1990's, it is a step in the right direction. And that's
what good public policy is all about.
From The Wall Street Journal Weekly Accounting Review on August 15, 2008
Corporate Tax Reporting Draws GAO Scrutiny
by Jesse
Drucker
The Wall Street Journal
Aug 13, 2008
Page: A2
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Advanced
Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting, Income Tax, Income
Taxes, Tax Avoidance, Tax Havens, Taxation
SUMMARY: In
a recent report filed in response to a request by two senators,
Carl Levin of Michigan and Byron Dorgan of North Dakota, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that "...at least
23% of large U.S. corporations don't pay federal income taxes in
any given year." Large corporations are defined as companies
generating at least $50 million in sales or with $250 million in
total assets. But smaller firms also frequently report no income
tax liability: "in a given year at least 60% of all U.S.
corporations studied ... reported no federal income-tax
liability during the period...1998 to 2005. In the study, the
GAO analyzed samples of Internal Revenue Service data covering
both publicly traded and closely held corporations, including
U.S.-based and foreign corporations operating in the U.S."
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: The article may be used to introduce book/tax
differences, and items generating the differences such as net
operating losses, in either a financial accounting or a
corporate income tax class.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) Research "...has looked at the gap
between the earnings that companies report to their shareholders
and the smaller profits they report to the Internal Revenue
Service." What causes these differences? Where can investigators
find out about the nature of these differences?
2. (Introductory) Summarize the major findings of the
GAO study in your own words. Do the results surprise you?
Specifically explain why.
3. (Advanced) What was the original question asked by
Senators Carl Levin of Michigan and Byron Dorgan of North
Dakota? Be sure to clearly define the items these senators asked
about. Did the study investigate the specific topic of their
concern?
4. (Advanced) What did the GAO find regarding the use
of net operating losses and tax credits in driving the reported
amounts showing no tax liabilities owed? Why this result
unexpected? In your answer, define each of these tax reporting
items. Explain when you expect each of these items to show on a
tax return in terms of economic cycles.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
|
Radical Changes on the Way in Financial
Reporting
Five General Categories of Aggregation
"The Sums of All Parts: Redesigning Financials: As part of radical
changes to the income statement, balance sheet, and cash flow statement, FASB
signs off on a series of new subtotals to be contained in each," byMarie
Leone, CFO Magazine, November 14, 2007 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/10131571?f=rsspage
In another large step towards the most dramatic
overhaul of financial statements in decades, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board Wednesday laid out a series of subtotal figures that
companies would be required to include on their balance sheets, income
statements and cash flow statements.
The new look for financials will break all three
statements into five general categories: business, discontinued operations,
financing, income taxes, and equity (if needed). Each of those groupings
will carry its own total. In addition, the business, financing, and income
tax categories will be segmented into even more narrow sections, each of
which will include a subtotal. For example, the business category will be
broken down into operating assets, operating liabilities and a subtotal; and
investing assets, investing liabilities, and a second subtotal.
(Although FASB will not officially release its
proposal until the second quarter of 2008, it has made public some initial
peeks at the proposed format.)
The addition of totals and subtotals is an
extension of FASB's broader principle on disaggregating financial statement
line items. It is the board's belief that separating line items into their
components gives investors, creditors, analysts and other financial
statement users a better view of a company's financial health. For example,
the new format should make it easier for an investor to see how much cash a
company generates by selling its products versus how much it generates by
selling-off a business unit or through financial investments made by the
corporate treasurer.
FASB staffers say buy- and sell-side analysts
typically scrutinize financial statements by breaking them down into
categories similar to the ones the board is proposing.
In keeping with its promise to strip accounting
standards of complexity, the board also agreed to issue two overarching
principles in its draft document on financial statement presentation. One
principle instructs preparers to keep the category order consistent in each
of the three financial statements. For example, if income tax is the last
category shown in on the balance sheet, then it should also be the final
category on the cash flow and income statement. "We're not going to tell you
what order [to use], just that you should use the same order in all three
statements," noted FASB Chairman Robert Herz during the meeting.
In addition, the board wants companies to "clearly
distinguish" between operating assets and operating liabilities, as well as
short-term assets and liabilities and their long-term counterparts. But the
board is not going to prescribe how that should be done. Regarding the issue
of common sums, "the only requirement will be that totals and subtotals are
segmented by activities," noted board member George Batavick, "the rest will
be principles."
Updating the look and functionality of financial
statements is one of the joint projects that FASB is working on with the
International Accounting Standards Board as the two organizations work to
converge U.S. and global accounting rules. On Thursday, IASB will discuss
the common totals issue and is expected to release its recommendations.
FASB expects the draft proposal to spark a healthy
debate among users and preparers, and staffers are planning for a four- to
six-month comment period to follow its release. One issue that will have to
be thrashed out, for example, is whether discontinued operations should be
relegated to its own category, or run through the income statement or
financing activities.
To avoid any last-minute confusion with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Herz asked the FASB accountants working
on the project to "touch base with the SEC staff just to get their input."
Herz noted that last time the two groups discussed disaggregation
principles, Scott Taub, not James Kroeker, was the SEC's deputy chief
accountant.
Jensen Comment
Now is especially the time for accounting researchers to look into leading edge
alternatives for visualizing data. My threads on that topic are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/352wpVisual/000DataVisualization.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm
No Bottom Line
Question
Is a major overhaul of accounting standards on the way?
Hint
There may no longer be the tried and untrusted earnings per share number to
report!
Comment
It would be interesting to see a documentation of the academic research, if any,
that the FASB relied upon to commence this blockbuster initiative. I recommend
that some astute researcher commence to probe into the thinking behind this
proposal.
"Profit as We Know It Could Be Lost With New Accounting
Statements," by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, May 12, 2007; Page
A1 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117893520139500814.html?mod=DAT
Pretty soon the bottom line may not be, well, the
bottom line.
In coming months, accounting-rule makers are
planning to unveil a draft plan to rework financial statements, the bedrock
data that millions of investors use every day when deciding whether to buy
or sell stocks, bonds and other financial instruments. One possible result:
the elimination of what today is known as net income or net profit, the
bottom-line figure showing what is left after expenses have been met and
taxes paid.
It is the item many investors look to as a key
gauge of corporate performance and one measure used to determine executive
compensation. In its place, investors might find a number of profit figures
that correspond to different corporate activities such as business
operations, financing and investing.
Another possible radical change in the works:
assets and liabilities may no longer be separate categories on the balance
sheet, or fall to the left and right side in the classic format taught in
introductory accounting classes.
ACCOUNTING OVERHAUL
Get a glimpse of what new financial statements
could look like, according to an early draft recently provided by the
Financial Accounting Standards Board to one of its advisory groups. The
overhaul could mark one of the most drastic changes to accounting and
financial reporting since the start of the Industrial Revolution in the 19th
century, when companies began publishing financial information as they
sought outside capital. The move is being undertaken by accounting-rule
makers in the U.S. and internationally, and ultimately could affect
companies and investors around the world.
The project is aimed at providing investors with
more telling information and has come about as rule makers work to one day
come up with a common, global set of accounting standards. If adopted, the
changes will likely force every accounting textbook to be rewritten and
anyone who uses accounting -- from clerks to chief executives -- to relearn
how to compile and analyze information that shows what is happening in a
business.
This is likely to come as a shock, even if many
investors and executives acknowledge that net income has flaws. "If there
was no bottom line, I'd want to have a sense of what other indicators I
ought to be looking at to get a sense of the comprehensive health of the
company," says Katrina Presti, a part-time independent health-care
contractor and stay-at-home mom who is part of a 12-woman investment club in
Pueblo, Colo. "Net income might be a false indicator, but what would I look
at if it goes away?"
The effort to redo financial statements reflects
changes in who uses them and for what purposes. Financial statements were
originally crafted with bankers and lenders in mind. Their biggest question:
Is the business solvent and what's left if it fails? Stock investors care
more about a business's current and future profits, so the net-income line
takes on added significance for them.
Indeed, that single profit number, particularly
when it is divided by the number of shares outstanding, provides the most
popular measure of a company's valuation: the price-to-earnings ratio. A
company that trades at $10 a share, and which has net profit of $1 a share,
has a P/E of 10.
But giving that much power to one number has long
been a recipe for fraud and stock-market excesses. Many major accounting
scandals earlier this decade centered on manipulation of net income. The
stock-market bubble of the 1990s was largely based on investors' assumption
that net profit for stocks would grow rapidly for years to come. And the
game of beating a quarterly earnings number became a distraction or worse
for companies' managers and investors. Obviously it isn't known whether the
new format would cut down on attempts to game the numbers, but companies
would have to give a more detailed breakdown of what is going on.
The goal of the accounting-rule makers is to better
reflect how businesses are actually run and divert attention from the one
number. "I know the world likes single bottom-line numbers and all of that,
but complicated businesses are hard to translate into just one number," says
Robert Herz, chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the U.S.
rule-making body that is one of several groups working on the changes.
At the same time, public companies today are more
global than local, and as likely to be involved in services or lines of
business that involve intellectual property such as software rather than the
plants and equipment that defined the manufacturing age. "The income
statement today looks a lot like it did when I started out in this
profession," says William Parrett, the retiring CEO of accounting firm
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, who started as a junior accountant in 1967. "But
the kind of information that goes into it is completely different."
Along the way, figures such as net income have
become muddied. That is in part because more and more of the items used to
calculate net profit are based on management estimates, such as the value of
items that don't trade in active markets and the direction of interest
rates. Also, over the years rule makers agreed to corporate demands to
account for some things, such as day-to-day changes in the value of pension
plans or financial instruments used to protect against changes in interest
rates, in ways that keep them from causing swings in net income.
Rule makers hope reformatting financial statements
will address some of these issues, while giving investors more information
about what is happening in different parts of a business to better assess
its value. The project is being managed jointly by the FASB in the U.S. and
the London-based International Accounting Standards Board, and involves
accounting bodies in Japan, other parts of Asia and individual European
nations.
The entire process of adopting the revised approach
could take a few years to play out, so much could yet change. Plus, once
rule makers adopt the changes, they would have to be ratified by regulatory
authorities, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission in the U.S. and
the European Commission in Europe, before public companies would be required
to follow them.
As a first step, rule makers expect later this year
to publish a document outlining their preliminary views on what new form
financial statements might take. But already they have given hints of what's
in store. In March, the FASB provided draft, new financial statements at the
end of a 32-page handout for members of an advisory group. (See an example.)
Although likely to change, this preview showed an
income statement that has separate segments for the company's operating
business, its financing activities, investing activities and tax payments.
Each area has an income subtotal for that particular segment.
There is also a "total comprehensive income"
category that is wider ranging than net profit as it is known today, and so
wouldn't be directly comparable. That is because this total would likely
include gains and losses now kept in other parts of the financial
statements. These include some currency fluctuations and changes in the
value of financial instruments used to hedge against other items.
Comprehensive income could also eventually include
short-term changes in the value of corporate pension plans, which currently
are smoothed out over a number of years. As a result, comprehensive income
could be a lot more difficult to predict and could be volatile from quarter
to quarter or year to year.
As for the balance sheet, the new version would
group assets and liabilities together according to similar categories of
operating, investing and financing activities, although it does provide a
section for shareholders equity. Currently, a balance sheet is broken down
between assets and liabilities, rather than by operating categories.
Such drastic change isn't likely to happen without
a fight. Efforts to bring now-excluded figures into the income statement
could prompt battles with companies that fear their profit will be subject
to big swings. Companies may also balk at the expense involved.
"The cost of this change could be monumental," says
Gary John Previts, an accounting professor at Case Western Reserve
University in Cleveland. "All the textbooks are going to have to change,
every contract and every bank arrangement will have to change." Investors in
Europe and Asia, meanwhile, have opposed the idea of dropping net profit as
it appears today, David Tweedie, the IASB's chairman, said in an interview
earlier this year.
Analysts in the London office of UBS AG recently
published a report arguing this very point -- that even if net income is a
"simplistic measure," that doesn't mean it isn't a valid "starting point in
valuation" and that "its widespread use is justification enough for its
retention."
Such opposition doesn't surprise many accounting
experts. Net income is "the basis for bonuses and judgments about what a
company's stock is worth," says Stephen A. Zeff, an accounting professor at
Rice University. "I just don't know what the markets would do if companies
stopped reporting a bottom line somewhere." In the U.S., professional
investors and analysts have taken a more nuanced view, perhaps because the
manipulation of numbers was more pronounced in U.S. markets.
That said, net profit has been around for some
time. The income statement in use today, along with the balance sheet,
generally dates to the 1940s when the SEC laid out regulations on financial
disclosure. But many companies have included net profit in one form or
another since the 1800s.
In its fourth annual report, General Electric Co.
provided investors with a consolidated balance sheet and consolidated
profit-and-loss account for the year ended Jan. 31, 1896. The company, whose
board at the time included Thomas Edison, generated "profit of the year" --
what today would be called net income or net profit -- of $1,388,967.46.
For the moment, net profit will probably exist in
some form, although its days are likely numbered. "We've decided in the
interim to keep a net-income subtotal, but that's all up for discussion,"
the FASB's Mr. Herz says.
Bob Jensen's summary of accounting theory is at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm
Question
What do CFO's think of Robert Herz's (Chairman of the FASB) radical proposed
format for financial statements that have more disaggregated financial
information and no aggregated bottom line?
As we moved to fair value accounting for
derivative financial instruments (FAS 133) and financial instruments (FAS 157
and 159) coupled with the expected new thrust for fair value reporting on the
international scene, we have filled the income statement and the retained
earnings statement with more and more instability due to fluctuating unrealized
gains and losses.
I have reservations about fair value reporting
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
But if we must live with more and more fair
value reporting, the bottom line has to go. But CFOs are reluctant to give up
the bottom line even if it may distort investing decisions and compensation
contracts tied to bottom-line reporting.
Before reading the article below you may want to first read about radical
new changes on the way ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#ChangesOnTheWay
- "A New Vision for
Accounting: Robert Herz and FASB are preparing a
radical new format for financial, CFO Magazine,
by Alix Stuart, February 2008, pp. 49-53 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/10597001/c_10711055?f=home_todayinfinance
Last summer, McCormick & Co. controller Ken Kelly sliced
and diced his financial statements in ways he had never
before imagined. For starters, he split the income
statement for the $2.7 billion international
spice-and-food company into the three categories of the
cash-flow statement: operating, financing, and
investing. He extracted discontinued operations and
income taxes and placed them in separate categories,
instead of peppering them throughout the other results.
He created a new form to distinguish which changes in
income were due to fair value and which to cash. One
traditional ingredient, meanwhile, was conspicuous by
its absence: net income.
Kelly wasn't just indulging a whim. Ahead of a public
release of a draft of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board's new format for financial statements in the
second quarter of 2008, the McCormick controller was
trying out the financial statements of the future, a
radical departure from current conventions. FASB's
so-called financial statement presentation project is
ostensibly concerned only with the form, or the "face,"
of financial statements, but it's quickly becoming clear
that it will change and expand their content as well.
"This is a complete redefinition of the financial
statements as we know them," says John Hepp, a former
FASB project manager and now senior manager at Grant
Thornton.
Some of the major changes under discussion:
reconfiguring the balance sheet and the income statement
to follow the three categories of the cash-flow
statement, requiring companies to report cash flows with
the little-used direct method; and introducing a new
reconciliation schedule that would highlight fair-value
changes. Companies will also likely have to report more
about their segments, possibly down to the same level of
detail as they currently report for the consolidated
statements. Meanwhile, net income is slated to disappear
completely from GAAP financial statements, with no
obvious replacement for such commonly used metrics as
earnings per share.
FASB, working with the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB) and accounting standards boards
in the United Kingdom and Japan, continues to work out
the precise details of the new financial statements. "We
are trying to set the stage for what financial
statements will look like across the globe for decades
to come," says FASB chairman Robert Herz. (Examples of
the proposed new financial statements can be viewed at
FASB's Website.) If the standard-setters stay their
course, CFOs and controllers at every publicly traded
company in the world could be following Kelly's lead as
soon as 2010.
It's too early to predict with confidence which changes
will ultimately stick. But the mock-up exercise has made
Kelly wary. He considers the direct cash-flow statement
and reconciliation schedule among the "worst aspects" of
the forthcoming proposal, and expects they would require
"draconian exercises" from his finance staff, he says.
And he questions what would result from the additional
details: "If all of a sudden your income statement has
125 lines instead of 25, is that presentation more
clarifying, or more confusing?"
Other financial executives share Kelly's skepticism. In
a December CFO survey of more than 200 finance
executives, only 17 percent said the changes would offer
any benefits to their companies or investors (see "Keep
the Bottom Line" at the end of this article). Even some
who endorsed the basic aim of the project and like the
idea of standardizing categories across the three major
financial statements were only cautiously optimistic.
"It may be OK, or it may be excessive." says David
Rickard, CFO of CVS/Caremark. "The devil will be in the
details."
Net Loss From the outset, corporate financial officers
have been ambivalent about FASB's seven year-old
project, which was originally launched to address
concerns that net income was losing relevance amid a
proliferation of pro forma numbers. Back in 2001,
Financial Executives International "strongly opposed"
it, while executives at Philip Morris, Exxon Mobil,
Sears Roebuck, and Microsoft protested to FASB as well.
(Critics then and now point out that FASB will have
little control over pro forma reporting no matter what
it does. Indeed, nearly 60 percent of respondents to
CFO's survey said they would continue to report pro
forma numbers after the new format is introduced.)
Given the project's starting point, it's not surprising
that current drafts of the future income statement omit
net income. Right now that's by default, since income
taxes are recorded in a separate section. But there is a
big push among some board members to make a more
fundamental change to eliminate net income by design,
and promote business income (income from operations) as
the preferred basis for investment metrics.
"If net income stays, it would be a sign that we
failed," says Don Young, a FASB board member. In his
mind, the project is not merely about getting rid of net
income, but rather about capturing all income-related
information in a single line (including such volatile
items as gains and losses on cash-flow hedges,
available-for-sale securities, and foreign-exchange
translations) rather than footnoting them in other
comprehensive income (OCI) as they are now. "All changes
in net assets and liabilities should be included," says
Young. "Why should the income statement be incomplete?"
He predicts that the new subtotals, namely business
income, will present "a much clearer picture of what's
going on."
Board member Thomas Linsmeier agrees. "The rationale for
segregating those items [in OCI] is not necessarily
obvious, other than the fact that management doesn't
want to be held accountable for them in the current
period," he says.
Whether for self-serving or practical reasons, finance
chiefs are rallying behind net income. Nearly 70 percent
of those polled by CFO in December said it should stay.
"I understand their theories that it's not the be-all
and end-all measure that it's put up to be, but it is a
measure everyone is familiar with, and sophisticated
users can adjust from there," says Kelly. Adds Rickard:
"They're treating [net income] as if it's the scourge of
the earth, which to me is silly. I think the logical
conclusion is to make other things available, rather
than hiding the one thing people find most useful."
. . .

Bob Jensen's threads on this
proposed "radical change" in financial reporting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#ChangesOnTheWay
Jensen Comment
As we moved to fair value accounting for derivative
financial instruments (FAS 133) and financial instruments (FAS
157 and 159) coupled with the expected new thrust for fair
value reporting on the international scene, we have filled
the income statement and the retained earnings statement
with more and more instability due to fluctuating unrealized
gains and losses.
I have reservations about
fair value reporting ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
But if we must live with
more and more fair value reporting, the bottom line has to
go. But CFOs are reluctant to give up the bottom line even
if it may distort investing decisions and compensation
contracts tied to bottom-line reporting.
Bob Jensen's threads on the radical new changes on the
way ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#ChangesOnTheWay
Question
Should your paycheck be impacted contractually by FAS 133?
I was contacted by the representative of a
major and highly reputable transportation company union concerning possible
manipulation of FAS 133 accounting (one of the many tools for creative
accounting) for purposes of lowering compensation payments to employees. He
wanted to engage me on a consulting basis to examine a series of financial
statements of the company. It would be great if I could inspire some public
debate on the following issue. The message below follows an earlier message
to XXXXX concerning how hedging ineffectiveness works under FAS 133
accounting rules ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#Ineffectiveness
_________________
Hi XXXXX,
You wrote:
“Does the $502 million hedging ineffectiveness pique your interest?”
My answer is most
definitely yes since it fits into some research that I am doing at the
moment. But the answers cannot be obtained from financial statements.
Financial statements are (1) too aggregated (across multiple derivative
hedging contracts) and (2) snapshots at particular points in time.
Answers lie in tracing each contract individually (or at least a
sampling of individual contracts) from inception to settlement. Results
of effectiveness testing throughout the life of each hedging contract
must be examined (on a sampling basis).
Recall that there were
enormous scandals concerning financial instruments derivatives that led
up to FAS 133 and IAS 39. See
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds
The SEC pressured the FASB to come up with a new standard that would
overcome the problem of so much unbooked financial liability risk due to
derivative financial instruments. FAS 133 and IAS 39 got complicated
when standard setters tried to book the derivative assets and
liabilities on the balance sheet without impacting current earnings for
qualified effective hedges of financial risk.
When the FASB issued
FAS 133, The FASB and the SEC were concerned about unbooked financial
risk of every active derivative contract if the contract was settled on
the interim balance sheet date. When a contract like an option is valued
on a balance sheet date, its premature settlement value that day may
well be deemed ineffective relative to the value of the hedged item. The
reason is that derivative contracts are traded in different markets
(usually more speculative markets) than commodities markets themselves
(where buyers actually use the commodities). But the hedging contracts
deemed ineffective on interim dates may not be ineffective at all across
the long haul. Usually they are perfectly effective on hedging maturity
dates.
Temporal
ineffectiveness more often than not works itself out such that all those
gains and losses due to hedging ineffectiveness on particular interim
dates exactly wash out such there is no ultimate cash flow gain or loss
when the contracts are settled at maturity dates. I attached an Excel
workbook that explains how some commodities hedges work out over time.
The Graphing.xls file can also be downloaded from
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/FAS133OtherExcelFiles/
Note in particular the “Hedges” spreadsheet in that file. These explain
the outcomes at the settlement maturity dates that yield perfect hedges.
But at any date before maturity (not pictured in the graphs), the hedges
may not be perfect if settled prematurely on interim balance sheet
dates.
I illustrate the
accounting for ineffective interim hedges in both the 03forfut.pps and
05options.ppt PowerPoint files at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/JensenPowerPoint/
The hedges may deemed ineffective under FAS 133 at interim balance sheet
dates with gains and losses posted to current earnings. However, over
time the gains and losses perfectly offset such that the hedges are
perfectly effective when they are settled at maturity dates.
The real problem with
FAS 133 is that compensation contracts are generally tied to particular
balance sheet dates where interim hedging contracts may be deemed
ineffective and thereby affect paychecks. But some of those FAS 133
interim gains and losses may in fact never be realized in cash over the
life of the each commodity hedging contract.
What has to happen is
for management to be very up front about how FAS 133 and other
accounting standards may give rise to artificial gains and losses that
are never realized unless the hedging contracts are settled prematurely
on balance sheet dates. Compensation contracts should be hammered out
with that thought in mind rather than blindly basing compensation
contracts on bottom-line earnings that are mixtures of apples, oranges,
toads, and nails due to accounting standards.
Of course management
is caught in a bind because investors follow bottom-line as the main
indicator of performance of a company. The FASB recognizes this problem
and is now trying to work out a new standard that will eliminate
bottom-line reporting. The idea will be to provide information for
analysts to derive alternative bottom-line numbers based upon what they
want included and excluded in that bottom line. XBRL may indeed make
this much easier for investors and analysts ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm
If I were working out
a compensation contract based on accounting numbers, I would probably
exclude FAS 133 unrealized gains and losses.
In any case, back to
your original question. I would love to work with management to track a
sampling of fuel price hedging contracts from beginning to end. I would
like to see what effectiveness tests were run on each reporting date and
how gains and losses offset over the life of each examined contract. But
this type of study cannot be run on aggregated financial statements.
If I can study some of
those individual hedging contracts over time I would be most interested.
It will take your clout with management, however, to get me this data. I
have such high priors on the integrity of your company's management that
I seriously doubt that there is any intentional manipulation going on
witth FAS 133 implementation. Rather I suspect that management is just
trying to adhere as closely as possible with FAS 133 rules. What I would
like to do is help enlighten the world about the bad things FAS 133 can
do with compensation contracts and investment decisions by users of
statements who really do not understand the temporal impacts of FAS 133
on bottom-line earnings.
I fear that my study would, however, be
mostly one of academic interest that I can report to the public. Only an
inside whistleblower could pinpoint hanky-pank within a company, and I
seriously doubt that your company is engaged in disreputable FAS 133
hanky-pank beyond that of possibly not fully explaining to unions how
FAS 133 losses in general may be phantom losses over the long haul.
Bob Jensen
Underlying
Bases of Balance Sheet Valuation
Levels of "Value" of an Entire Company
General
Theory |
Days Inns of
America
(As Reported September 30, 1987) |
Market
Value of the Entire Block of Common Shares at Today's Price Per Share
(Ignoring Blockage Factors) |
Not
Available
Day Inns of America
Was Privately Owned |
Exit
Value of Firm if Sold As a Firm
(Includes synergy factors and unbooked intangibles) |
Not
Available for
Days Inns of America |
Sum of
Exit Values of Booked Assets Minus Liabilities & Pref. Stock
(includes unbooked and unrealized gains and
losses) |
$194,812,000
as Reported by Days Inns |
Book
Value of the Firm as Reported in Financial Statements |
$87,356,000
as Reported |
Book Value of the Firm as
Reported in the Financial Statements After General Price Level
Adjustments |
Not Available
for Days Inns |
Analysts often examine the market to book ratios which is the green value
above divided by the book value. Usually the book value is not adjusted
for general price levels in calculating this ratio, but there is not reason
why it could not be PLA book value. But the green value often widely
misses the mark in measuring the value of the firm as a whole (the blue value
above). The green value is based upon marginal trades of the day that do
not adjust for blockage factors (large purchases that give total ownership or
effective ownership control of the company). Usually it is impossible to
know whether the green value above is higher or lower than the blue
value. In addition to the blockage factor, there is the huge problem
that the stock market prices have transitory movements up and down due to
changing moods of speculators that create short-term bubbles and bursts.
Buyers and sellers of an entire firm are looking at the long term and
generally ignore transitory price fluctuations of daily trades of relatively
small numbers of shares. For example, daily transaction prices on
100,000 shares in a bubble or burst market are hardly indicative of the long
term value of 100 million shares of a corporation.
Beginning in 1979, FAS 33 required large
corporations to provide a supplementary schedule of condensed balance sheets
and income statements comparing annual outcomes under three valuation bases
--- Unadjusted Historical Cost, Price Level Adjusted (PLA) Historical Cost,
and Current Cost Entry Value (adjusted for depreciation and
amortization). Companies complained heavily that users did not obtain
value that justified the cost of implementing FAS 33. Analysts
complained that the FASB allowed such crude estimates that the FAS 33
schedules were virtually useless, especially the Current Cost estimates.
The FASB rescinded FAS 33 when it issued FAS 89 in 1986.
FAS 33 had a significant impact on some
companies. For example the the earnings reported by United States
Steel in the 1981 Annual Report as required under FAS 33 were as follows:
1981 United States Steel Income Before Extraordinary items and
Changes in Acctg. Principles
Historical Cost (Non-PLA
Adjusted) |
Historical Cost (PLA
Adjusted) |
Market Value (Current
Cost) |
$1,077,000,000
Income |
$475,300,000
Income
Plus $164,500,000 PLA gain due to decline in purchasing power of debt |
$446,400,000
Income
Plus $164,500,000 PLA Gain
Less $168,000,000 Current cost increase less effect of increase in the
general price level |
Companies are no longer required to generate
FAS 33-type comparisons. The primary basis of accounting in the U.S. is
unadjusted historical cost with numerous exceptions in particular
instances. For example, price-level adjustments may be required for for
operations in hyperinflation nations. Exit value accounting is required
for firms deemed highly likely to become non-going concerns. Exit value
accounting is required for personal financial statements (whether an
individual or a personal partnership such as two married people).
Economic (discounted cash flow) valuations are required for certain types of
assets and liabilities such as pension liabilities.
Hence in the United States and virtually every
other nation, accounting standards do not require or even allow one single
basis of accounting. Beginning in January 2005, all nations in the
Eurpean Union adopted the IASB's international standards that have moved
closer and closer each year to the FASB/SEC standards of the United States.
New Fair Value Accounting Standards
From IAS Plus on August 28, 2006 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
At its
meeting on 16 August 2006, the US Financial Accounting Standards
Board authorised its staff to prepare a final draft of a Statement
on Fair Value Measurements for vote by written ballot. The FASB
plans to issue the Statement in September 2006. That Statement will
form the basis of the next step of the IASB's project to develop
fair value measurement guidance. The IASB plans to issue a
discussion paper in the fourth quarter of 2006 that would: |
- indicate the IASB's
preliminary views of the provisions of the FASB's Statement on Fair
Value Measurements; and
- identify differences
between the FASB Statement and fair value measurement guidance in
existing IFRSs.
The IASB will invite
respondents to comment on the provisions of the FASB's statement on fair
value measurements and on the IASB's preliminary views about FASB's
Statement. Those comments would be considered in conjunction with the
development of an IASB exposure draft on fair value measurements.
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at various other links:
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms
Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation, and Yield Curves
for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial
Instruments ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm
I recently completed the first draft of a paper on fair value at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
Comments would be helpful.
A Lesson in Simplifying Financial Instrument Reporting
Can a single "fair value" number such as the "fair price" of a used car be a
surrogate for all the risks under the hood?
In a 2008 exposure draft the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)
argues that "fair value is the only measure appropriate for all types of
financial instruments" --- http://snipurl.com/ias39simplification
The argument does not apply to non-financial items that presumably are to be
accounted for based upon more traditional generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP).
The huge problems that I find most disturbing about fair value accounting are
as follows:
- The problem of mixing realized earnings with unrealized ups and downs of
fair values is an age-old problem that is either ignored (as in FAS 159) or
allocated in a confusing way to Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) as in FAS
115/130 and cash flow/FX hedging under FAS 133, or posting to a "Firm
Commitment" equity account that almost nobody understands in FAS 133. IAS 39
buys into the same hedge accounting alternatives but differs (for the
better) in terms of basis adjustment back to realized earnings. Issues with
unrealized value changes of derivatives are mostly newer problems in the
21st Century after FAS 133 and IAS 39 required fair value accounting for
nearly all derivative financial instruments. However, the theoretical
problem of unrealized value changes dates way back to Kenneth McNeal, John
Canning, and DR Scott in history as later extended by Bob Sterling, Edwards
and Bell, and especially Ray Chambers who leaned toward exit value relative
to current (replacement) cost alternatives ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases
- Exit (fair) value, however, is no panacea. "Value in use" generally
differs greatly from exit (liquidation) values. Exit values can be
highly misleading in terms of value of assets in going concerns. Exit value
accounting properly should be relegated to personal estates and
assets/liabilities approaching a liquidation state except possibly for
financial assets where exit values are usually much closer to value in use.
For operating assets it is quite another matter. For example a huge farm
tractor costing $250,000 new may lose almost half its exit value in the
first 500 hours of use because it is then reclassified as a "used tractor"
even though it might have 30,000 or more hours of usage life remaining. One
problem with exit values is that the "new" market is often restricted to
dealers such that buyers of equipment must sell in a "used" market where
products each unique are no longer fungible commodities like they are in
"new" markets. Another problem with exit values is that they're often very
difficult to estimate and appraisals are prone to fraud as witnessed in real
estate appraisals during the Savings and Loan scandals of the 1980s and the
subprime mortgage scandals in the early part of the 21st Century.
- A related problem of exit values is that "transactions costs" are
sometimes enormous. New robotics machines may cost $10 million to buy and
another $10 million to install. If they're to be valued for reporting
purposes in the used robots market, the entire $10 million of installation
cost must be viewed as down the drain and cannot be recovered in exit
values. Investors are misled if all installation costs are expensed
immediately when new robots are installed in going concerns. Can you imagine
what it actually cost to dismantle the London Bridge, transport it to its
new location in Arizona, and reassemble the bridge? What would be the cost
of taking it back to London at fuel prices today? Also the selling costs of
some types of equipment and real estate can be enormous such that exit
values are distorted when estimates of selling costs are netted out for
going concerns. What would it cost for Arizona just to negotiate a sale of
the London Bridge, apart from all other relocation costs, back to investors
in London?
- Exit values are costly to obtain on an annual basis. In 1987, when Cecil
Day's family was considering an IPO, their Days Inns of America company
incurred an enormous expense to have all of their nationwide properties
appraised with the appraisals each being independently reviewed by Landhauer
Associates. Reported appraised values in the 1987 annual report were
$194,812,000 versus book values of $87,356,000. If its reliable such exit
value reporting might be useful information even though it tells little
about value of this real estate in use as Days Inn motels. But obtaining
subsequent real estate appraisals reliably on an annual basis was much too
expensive. Days Inns of America did not, to my knowledge, report exit values
in the ensuing years. Incidentally, the 1987 Days Inn Annual Report is
interesting for some other pedagogical reasons (I still have my prized
copy). In addition to the exit value reporting, the Price Waterhouse
auditing firm also did a PW-signed "Review of Forecasts" which was and still
is allowed by the AICPA but has not been a popular service of CPA firms
since the AICPA, in the 1980s, approved CPA firm reviews of forecasts. Over
the years I had my students contemplate why this proposed CPA firm "review
of forecasts" airplane never really took off. Of course it would've taken
off if the SEC had required such reviews to be signed by CPA firms.
- Reporting of current (replacement) costs and price-level adjustments was
required in FAS 33 beginning in 1979, for very large U.S. companies. The
unrealized changes in current cost, however, were not mixed in with
traditional GAAP financial statements. Instead footnote schedules were
required in FAS 33 where current cost and price-level adjustment data were
summarized. This supplementary information purportedly was ignored by
analysts and the investing public, even though some of the adjustments were
enormous. In 1981 United States Steel, for example, wiped out nearly a
billion dollars of earnings with such adjustments ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases
The FASB ultimately decided that FAS 33 did not meet the cost-benefit test.
The FASB rescinded FAS 33 when it issued FAS 89
in 1986. No companies are now required to report balance sheet and income
statements on a replacement cost basis.
- Renewed interest in fair value (actually
exit value) reporting of financial instruments got new life when something
had to be done about derivative financial instruments exploding in
popularity in the 1980s (when interest rate swaps were invented) that were
not even being disclosed let alone booked. For example, forward contracts
and interest rate swaps were not even being disclosed and were becoming the
off-balance-sheet financing contracts of choice. The history of derivatives
scandals and ensuing accounting standards can be found in a timeline at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
Derivatives financial instruments, unlike other types of financial
instruments, are unique in that they either have zero historical cost (as in
forward, futures, and swap contracts) or only a nominal historical cost (as
in options premiums) relative to enormous risks and potential rewards.
Traditional amortized historical cost is nonsense for derivatives such that
fair value was the only logical choice. For financial instruments in general
such is not the case, and now firms worldwide may choose from the new and
controversial "Fair Value Options" of the FASB and IASB.
- Exit value reporting of financial assets and liabilities is where the
IASB, FASB, and most national accounting standard setters are now leaning
for financial items as opposed to operating items. This is largely because
there is less or a problem between value in use versus value in liquidation
for financial items as opposed to operating items. The financial securities
markets are also better organized with more value information for both
listed and unlisted items in financial markets. For example,
interest-rate-indexed (called underlyings) forward contracts and swaps tend
to be unique private contracts, but valuation is somewhat reliable because
of the depth of yield curve data provided by futures and options trading
markets. Both the the IASB and the FASB now have a Fair Value Option (FVO)
that allows firms to cherry pick what financial assets and liabilities,
aside from derivatives, will be carried at fair value and what items will be
carried at traditional amortized cost. Fair value reporting of financial
items is not required, other than for derivatives, by standard setters
largely for political reasons. Corporations worldwide would actively lobby
to "carve out" fair value reporting requirements just like the banks in
Europe succeeded in legislating carve outs of two parts of IAS 39.
So where to we go from here
(in June 2008 when I'm writing these remarks)?
All financial accountants should pay close attention to the exposure draft "Reducing
Complexity in Reporting Financial Instruments" that for a very limited
time may be downloaded without charge from the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB) ---
http://snipurl.com/ias39simplification [www_iasb_org] . This exposure
draft should be viewed as both an IASB and a FASB document since both standard
setting bodies, along with the standard setting bodies of many other nations,
are working feverishly to simplify the accounting rules for financial
instruments in general and derivative financial instruments in particular. This
exposure draft really represents the current leanings of virtually all
accounting standard setting bodies.
Be warned, however, that proposed alternatives for simplifying complexity are
really trade-offs in complexity since exit value reporting has many
controversies and complexities. Huge and complicated financial risks of
contracts are proposed, in the exposure draft, to be broad-brush simplified with
"fair value accounting." This is a little like relying on the price of a used
car to serve as a single index of all the risks that lie under the hood (the
British say bonnet) of the used car. The analogy to a used car is appropriate
since in many instances a financial instrument is unique, like a particular used
car, and cannot be valued reliably from either active trading markets or
extrapolations of past valuations of the item following events that may
seriously alter the value of an item.
Although the above exposure draft is intended to "reduce
complexity" with fair value accounting for financial instrument reporting, the
exposure draft is very honest in admitting that fair value accounting by
itself cannot eliminate many complexities, especially many complexities in hedge
accounting.
The bottom line in the IASB's exposure draft is that fair
value accounting is no panacea for reducing financial reporting complexity,
especially in reducing much of the complexity of hedge accounting using
derivative financial instruments.
The
exposure draft then launches into, beginning in Paragraph 2.55, alternatives
to simplifying hedge accounting other than to attempting fair value accounting
alternatives that hit the wall when hedging with derivative financial
instruments.
With respect to hedge accounting, the IASB in the exposure
draft seeks your input regarding the following:
Questions for respondents
Question 1
Do current requirements for reporting financial instruments,
derivative instruments and similar items require significant change
to meet the concerns of preparers and their auditors and the
needs of users of financial statements? If not, how should the IASB
respond to assertions that the current requirements are too
complex?
Question 2
(a) Should the IASB consider intermediate
approaches (short of the fair value option) to address
complexity arising from measurement and hedge accounting? Why or
why not? If you believe that the IASB should not make any
intermediate changes, please answer questions 5 and 6, and the
questions set out in Section 3.
(b) Do you agree with the criteria set out in
paragraph 2.2? If not, what criteria would you use and why?
Question 3
Approach 1 is to amend the existing measurement requirements
(without the fair value option). How would you suggest existing
measurement requirements should be amended? How are your suggestions
consistent with the criteria for any proposed intermediate changes
as set out in paragraph 2.2?
Question 4
Approach 2 is to replace the existing measurement requirements
with a fair value measurement principle with some optional
exceptions.
(a) What restrictions would you suggest on the
instruments eligible to be measured at something other than fair
value? How are your suggestions consistent with the criteria set
out in paragraph 2.2?
(b) How should instruments that are not measured
at fair value be measured?
(c) When should impairment losses be recognised
and how should the amount of impairment losses be measured?
(d) Where should unrealised gains and losses be recognised on
instruments measured at fair value? Why? How are your
suggestions consistent with the criteria set out in paragraph
2.2? (e) Should reclassifications be permitted? What types of
reclassifications should be permitted and how should they be
accounted for? How are your suggestions consistent with the
criteria set out in paragraph 2.2?
Question 5
Approach 3 sets out possible simplifications of hedge
accounting.
(a) Should hedge accounting be eliminated? Why
or why not?
(b) Should fair value hedge accounting be
replaced? Approach 3 sets out three possible approaches to
replacing fair value hedge accounting.
(i) Which method(s) should the IASB
consider, and why?
(ii) Are there any other methods not
discussed that should be considered by the IASB? If so, what
are they and how are they consistent with the criteria set
out in paragraph 2.2? If you suggest changing measurement
requirements under approach 1 or approach 2, please ensure
that your comments are consistent with your suggested
approach to changing measurement requirements.
Question 6
Section 2 also discusses how the existing hedge accounting
models might be simplified. At present, there are several
restrictions in the existing hedge accounting models to maintain
discipline over when a hedging relationship can qualify for hedge
accounting and how the application of the hedge accounting models
affects earnings. This section also explains why those restrictions
are required. (
a) What suggestions would you make to the IASB
regarding how the existing hedge accounting models could be
simplified?
(b) Would your suggestions include restrictions that
exist today? If not, why are those restrictions unnecessary?
(c)
Existing hedge accounting requirements could be simplified if
partial hedges were not permitted. Should partial hedges be
permitted and, if so, why? Please also explain why you believe the
benefits of allowing partial hedges justify the complexity.
(d) What
other comments or suggestions do you have with regard to how hedge
accounting might be simplified while maintaining discipline over
when a hedging relationship can qualify for hedge accounting and how
the application of the hedge accounting models affects earnings
Question 7
Do you have any other intermediate approaches for the IASB to
consider other than those set out in Section 2? If so, what are they
and why should the IASB consider them?
|
Having noted all the problems with fair value accounting when
hedging for derivative financial instruments in Section 2 of the exposure draft,
the
exposure draft in Section 3 tries to nevertheless make a case that fair
value accounting is the best of all the bad alternatives for accounting for
financial instruments in general, including derivative financial instruments. No
attempt is made to advocate fair value accounting for non-financial instruments
such as operating assets where value in use versus exit
values present enormous problems for exit (fair value) accounting.
Section 3 is quite good about mentioning the problems of fair value
accounting as well as the reasons the IASB (and the FASB) is leaning in theory
and in practice for requiring fair value accounting of all financial instruments
be they assets or liabilities or both in the case of some compound instruments.
Section 3 is changing the minds of fair value accounting skeptics like me!
Questions for respondents
Question 8
To reduce today’s measurement-related problems, Section 3 suggests
that the long-term solution is to use a single method to measure all
types of financial instruments within the scope of a standard for
financial instruments. Do you believe that using a single method to
measure all types of financial instruments within the scope of a
standard for financial instruments is appropriate? Why or why not?
If you do not believe that all types of financial instruments should
be measured using only one method in the long term, is there another
approach to address measurement-related problems in the long term?
If so, what is it
Question 9
Part A of Section 3 suggests that fair value seems to be the only
measurement attribute that is appropriate for all types of financial
instruments within the scope of a standard for financial
instruments.
(a) Do you believe that fair value is the only
measurement attribute that is appropriate for all types of
financial instruments within the scope of a standard for
financial instruments?
(b) If not, what measurement attribute other
than fair value is appropriate for all types of financial
instruments within the scope of a standard for financial
instruments? Why do you think that measurement attribute is
appropriate for all types of financial instruments within the
scope of a standard for financial instruments? Does that
measurement attribute reduce today’s measurement-related
complexity and provide users with information that is necessary
to assess the cash flow prospects for all types of financial
instruments?
Question 10
Part B of Section 3 sets out concerns about fair value
measurement of financial instruments. Are there any significant
concerns about fair value measurement of financial instruments other
than those identified in Section 3? If so, what are they and why are
they matters for concern?
Question 11
Part C of Section 3 identifies four issues that the IASB needs
to resolve before proposing fair value measurement as a general
requirement for all types of financial instruments within the scope
of a standard for financial instruments.
(a) Are there other issues that you believe the
IASB should address before proposing a general fair value
measurement requirement for financial instruments? If so, what
are they? How should the IASB address them?
(b) Are there any issues identified in part C of
Section 3 that do not have to be resolved before proposing a
general fair value measurement requirement? If so, what are they
and why do they not need to be resolved before proposing fair
value as a general measurement requirement?
Question 12
Do you have any other comments for the IASB on how it could
improveand simplify the accounting for financial instruments?
|
Jensen Warning
Taking some of the statements in the above exposure draft can be misleading when
taken out of context. For example, in Paragraph 3.14 it is stated that:
"If initial cash flows for a particular instrument (eg costs to acquire the
instrument) are not highly correlated with ultimate cash flows, cost-based
measures have little or no value for assessing future cash flow prospects."
Obviously this is nonsense in terms of many bonds payable and other notes
payable, especially those with fixed interest rates. If there is negligible
credit risk, historical cost is a perfect predictor of all cash flows of future
interest and principles of fixed rate notes and bonds. Paragraph 3.14 must be
taken in the context of securities that are not intended to be held to maturity
or notes that have variable interest returns of interest and/or principal.
Jensen Commentary
Without doubt the most complicated, confusing, and hated accounting standards
are those concerning new rules for booking and carrying deivative financial
instruments, particularly FAS 133 in the U.S. and IAS 39 internationally along
with their even more complicating amendments and implementation guidelines. Companies, with the blessings of
international auditing firms, have made many blunders in implementing these
particular standards, and these errors have led to more revisions to previously
published financial statements than any other standards. Probably
the best known revisions are those of Fannie Mae that led to the firing of
KPMG as the external auditor, to over a million correcting journal entries, and
to millions of dollars spent in finding and correcting FAS 133 implementation
errors that took over a year to correct using over 600 accounting and finance
specialists. But virtually every other company that uses derivative financial
instruments to hedge price, interest rate, and credit risk has encountered
numerous and costly troubles trying to get the accounting right under the
complex 133/39 standards.
The FAS 133 and IAS 39 complex standards were necessary to counter a rising
tide of derivative instruments frauds and inadvertent deception in financial
statements that exploded exponentially with newer types of derivatives
speculations and hedging strategies commencing in the 1980s and 1990s. A
timeline of the scandals and revisions of accounting standards can be found at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
For example, interest rate swaps now used for hundreds of trillions of dollars
of interest rate risk hedging were not even invented until the 1980s. Prior to
1994, companies did not even have to disclose their forward contracts and
interest rate or commodity swaps even when the financial risks of those
undisclosed contracts greatly exceeded all the booked liabilities of companies.
FAS 133 beginning in Year 2000 required booking nearly all derivatives contracts
as assets or liabilities and adjusting the carrying values to fair values at
least every three months and on all reporting dates. IAS 39 followed
internationally soon afterwards.
If the preparers of financial statements, along with their auditors, are
confused by the newer accounting rules for derivative financial instruments,
imagine how hopeless it is for users of financial instruments to evaluate
returns and risks after such added complexity appeared in financial statements.
In addition to the confusing booked numbers such as hedge accounting
accumulations in the Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) account, there are
paragraphs full of technical hedging strategy jargon contained in nearly
unreadable, albeit required, footnote disclosures that supplement the booked
numbers in financial statements.
Definitions of derivative financial instruments and other related terms can
be found a
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm
FAS 133 and its key amending standards FAS 138, 149, 155, and 159 plus
implications of 141, 142, 155, 157 and 159 can be downloaded free from
http://www.fasb.org/st/index.shtml
Also note Section 815 of the FASB's new Accounting Standards Codification (ASC)
online database ---
http://asc.fasb.org/home
The derivative financial instrument contracts are usually purchased options (market exchanged), written
options (market exchanged), futures contracts (market exchanged), forward
contracts (privately exchanged) and swaps (portfolios of privately acquired
forward contracts). Most derivatives have zero historical cost except for
options where a relatively small premium is passed from the option purchaser to
the option writer. As speculations, only purchased options have bounded risk
limited to the premium paid. Other derivatives can have unbounded risk unless
risk is bounded by other items (hedged items) by the hedging process.
The Concern is How to Get Hedge Accounting (read that
relief from earnings volatility caused by unrealized changes in derivatives'
fair value)
The FASB originally intended FAS 133 to be a simple standard in which derivative
financial instruments, many of which were previously unbooked and undisclosed,
be booked at cost (usually zero except for options) and than adjusted for often
wildly fluctuating fair value until the options are settled or otherwise
derecognized. The simple intended standard would've simply offset all changes in
fair value of derivatives to current earnings. The theoretical and practical
problem for derivatives used as hedges is that interim earnings, before
derivatives are settled, typically fluctuates for unrealized changes in value
that usually wash out when the derivatives are finally settled. Companies,
particularly banks, objected wildly to such interim earnings fluctuations when
hedges were intended to reduce financial risk. The FASB responded by adding over
1,000 highly technical pages to FAS 133 and its amendments dictating how and
when companies could use special "hedge accounting" to essentially reduce or
eliminate earnings volatility to the extent that the hedges meet "hedge
effectiveness tests."
Not all economic hedges entered into by management qualify for hedge
accounting in cash flow, fair value, or foreign exchange (FX) hedges. Not all
qualifying hedges fully qualify for hedge accounting throughout the life of the
hedge if hedging ineffectiveness arises. Hedging ineffectiveness may arise at
interim points in time for hedges that are assured of being perfect hedges when
settled at maturity. This, in particular, confuses management until it is
explained those "perfect" hedges can be risky if settled before maturity. For
example, a year-long hedging forward contract that locks in a fuel purchase
price of $5 per gallon on ten million gallons on December 31 may shift in value
wildly between January 1 and December 31, On March 31 the forward contract could
be an enormous asset (when spot prices of fuel are soaring) and on June 30 it
could become an enormous liability (with drastically plunging spot prices).
Those "perfect cash flow hedges" at the December 31 maturity may not be perfect
in terms of value and risk changes before maturity. Before Year 2000 and FAS
133, a company might have $100 million in undisclosed forward contract and swap
exposures relative to $10 million in booked debt on the balance sheet. This is
no longer the case due to FAS 133 and IAS 39.
Unbooked Purchase Contracts and Loan Obligations are Particularly
Problematic
Companies often hedge firm commitments and forecasted transactions that are
not yet booked in ledge accounts. In Accounting 101 and again in Accounting 301
courses, instructors repeatedly explain why executory purchase and sales
contracts are not booked. Loan obligations are somewhat similar. For example, a
firm commitment on January 1 for Airline A to buy 10 million gallons of fuel
from Refiner R is not booked as an asset or liability by Airline A. It is also
not booked as deferred revenue (a liability) by Refiner R until the purchase
transaction actually transpires. However, both Airline A and Refiner R may enter
into a derivative contract, such as a forward contract, to hedge this unbooked
firm commitment contract for fair value risk. FAS 133 and IAS 39 require that
the hedging contract be booked and carried at fair value even if the hedged item
(the purchase/sale) contract is unbooked. Without hedge accounting relief,
reported earnings will fluctuate due to value shifts in the booked derivative
contract that are not offset by unbooked value shifts in the purchase/sale
contract (the hedged item). This is why companies fought so hard to build hedge
accounting relief into FAS 133 and IAS 39. Hedge accounting in this fair value
risk situation allows changes in derivative contract value to be offset by
debits or credits to a special equity account called "Firm Commitment"
rather than current earnings, thereby not corrupting earnings per share with
unrealized fluctuations in hedging contract fair values.
The above purchase/sale contract is a firm commitment since the $5 price per
gallon was contracted a year in advance. If the price was instead contracted as
the December 31 spot price, the purchase/sale contract no longer has fair value
risk, but it does have cash flow risk since neither Refiner R nor Airline A know
what will be paid for the 10 million gallons of fuel until December 31. This
change in the contract changes it from a "firm commitment" purchase/sale
contract to a "forecasted transaction" purchase sale contract. Airline A might
hedge such a forecasted transaction even without a written contract to purchase
10 million gallons of fuel from any supplier. Both Airline A and Refiner R may
enter into a derivative contract, such as a forward contract, to hedge this
unbooked forecasted tranaction contract for cash flow risk. FAS 133 and IAS 39
require that the hedging contract be booked and carried at fair value even if
the hedged item (the purchase/sale) contract is unbooked. Without hedge
accounting relief, reported earnings will fluctuate due to value shifts in the
booked derivative contract that are not offset by unbooked value shifts in the
purchase/sale contract (the hedged item). This is why companies fought so hard
to build hedge accounting relief into FAS 133 and IAS 39. Hedge accounting in
this cash flow risk situation allows changes in derivative contract value to be
offset by debits or credits to a special equity account called "Other
Comprehensive Income (OCI)" rather than current earnings, thereby not corrupting
earnings per share with unrealized fluctuations in hedging contract fair values.
Loan obligations may be similar to unbooked purchase/sale contracts if they
do not net settle. For example, suppose a bank is obligated to loan $1 million
at 14% in three months. This firm commitment was signed when the spot rate of
interest was 12%. If interest rates soar, the bank is still obligated to make
the full loan at 14% unless there is a net settlement clause that allows the
bank to instead provide a net settlement in cash in lieu of making the full
loan. If the loan obligation has such a net settlement clause it has to be
booked as a derivative financial instrument under either FAS 133 or IAS 39. If
it does not net settle, then it might remain unbooked if certain other
conditions are met.
Where the FVO Succeeds and Fails to Simplify Hedge Accounting
Both the FASB and the IASB are looking toward fair value accounting (now called
the financial instrument Fair Value Option (FVO) now available in both the U.S.
and International GAAP) to make it unnecessary to go through the complexities of
qualifying for hedge accounting and continually testing for hedge hedging
ineffectiveness that disqualifies some or all the hedge accounting at certain
interim points of time. The FVO works pretty well for booked hedged items such
as booked investments and booked liabilities for which changes in fair value
under the FVO automatically offset changes of value in their hedging
derivatives. It is no longer necessary to seek out special hedge accounting if
the FVO is applied to such hedged items. Since the FVO is not available for
non-financial hedged items such as operating assets (e.g., inventories,
vehicles, factory machines, land, and buildings), the FVO only simplifies hedge
accounting for hedged items that are booked financial assets or liabilities.
But unbooked hedged items create greater problems since the FVO cannot be
applied to a hedged item that is not even booked, e.g., an unbooked loan
obligation. The IASB exposure draft cited above recognizes this problem in the
following quotation from the IASB exposure draft:
22.7
Cash flow hedge accounting is an exception (with no basis in
accounting concepts) that permits management to recognise gains
and losses on hedging instruments in earnings in a period other
than the one in which they occur. Unlike fair value hedge accounting, the
‘mismatch’ that gives rise to the desire for cash flow hedge accounting is
not an accounting anomaly. The economic effect of changes in fair
value of the hedging instrument used as a hedge occurs before the
hedged cash flows occur or are contracted for or committed to. This is
illustrated as follows:
(a) If the hedged cash flows are anticipated to
result from a forecast transaction, there are no assets, liabilities,
gains, losses, or cash flows to account for at the time the gains and
losses on the hedging instrument occur. There is no conceivable change in
financial reporting standards that would result in recognising
gains or losses on future cash flows arising from a forecast
transaction. (
b) The hedged cash flows could also be payments or
receipts on variable rate financial instruments. Variable rate
instruments are designed to protect the holder from changes in the
fair value of the instrument (the cash flows of the instrument vary in
a way that causes the instrument’s fair value to remain
constant or nearly constant). Again, there is no accounting anomaly
that can be eliminated by changing a financial reporting
standard.
2.28
In either case, the hedging entity is
deliberately exposing itself to gains and losses on a hedging instrument in order to
offset changes in cash flows that have not yet occurred. Therefore, those
cash flows cannot affect earnings until they occur (or they may not
affect earnings at all if the cash flows relate to an acquisition of
an asset) 2.29 For these reasons, the desire for cash flow
hedge accounting will not be affected by changing the general measurement
requirement for financial instruments.
2.29
For these reasons, the desire for cash flow hedge accounting will
not be affected by changing the general measurement requirement for
financial instruments. * IAS 39 also permits some firm commitments
to be hedged using cash flow hedge accounting. SFAS 133 does not.
|
Also recall that the FVO only applies to financial assets and liabilities.
Even though it will simplify hedge accounting for booked financial items, it
does nothing to simplify hedge accounting for booked and unbooked non-financial
items. Below is a section of the
exposure draft regarding fair value hedging for items that are not permitted
to be accounted for at fair value such as custom furniture inventory:
A fair value option
2.37
One way of reducing complexity might be to permit fair value hedge
accounting for only those assets and liabilities that are not
permitted to be measured at fair value using a fair value option.
Hence, fair value hedge accounting might still be permitted for
particular financial instruments and many non-financial assets and
liabilities.
2.38
An entity can use a fairvalue option, if available, to address
accounting mismatches. A fair value option need not be complex, and
the results areeasier to understand.
2.39
However, preparers may not view a fair value option as comparable to
fair value hedge accounting. This is because the fair value option
is less flexible than fair value hedge accounting. For example:
(a) Fair value hedge accounting can be started
and stopped at willprovided that thequalification requirements
for hedge accountingare met. However, the fair value option
designation is availableonly at initial recognition and
isirrevocable.
(b) Fair value hedge accounting can be applied
to specific risks or partsof a hedged item. However, the fair
value option must be applied tothe entire asset or liability.
(c) Hedged items under fair value hedge
accounting can be financialinstruments or non-financial items.
However, in general, the fair value option can be applied to
financial instruments only.
2.40
To address these issues, the following changes could be made to the
fair value option:
(a) allowing the fair value option to be applied
to more non-financial assets and liabilities.
(b) allowing the fair value option to be applied
to specific risks or parts of the designated item.
(c) allowing the fair value option to be applied
at any date after initial recognition.
2.41
However, adding flexibility similar to fair value hedge accounting
as described in the previous paragraph could add complexity and
defeat the purpose of making a change.
2.42
For example, allowing the fair value option to be applied to
specific risks or parts of an item may result in problems similar to
those associated with partial hedges, as discussed later in this
section. 2.43 In addition, allowing the fair value option to be
applied at any date after initial recognition would raise another
issue—whether dedesignation of an item should also be permitted. If
dedesignation is permitted, the fair value option would give the
same flexibility to start and stop as fair value hedge accounting
does today (but without the restrictions surrounding hedge
accounting). Giving such flexibility (but without any restrictions)
would not improve comparability or result in more relevant
andunderstandable information for financial statement users.
Recognition outside earnings of gains and losses on
hedging instruments (similar to cash flow hedge accounting)
2.44
Unlike fair value hedge accounting, cash flow hedge accounting does
not result in adjusting the carrying amount of a hedged asset or
liability. Instead, gains and losses on the hedging instrument are
initially recognised in other comprehensive income and subsequently
reclassified into earnings when the hedged cash flows affect
earnings.
2.45
A similar technique might be used for fair value hedge accounting.
Gains and losses on the hedging instrument that arise from an
effective hedge would be recognised in other comprehensive income
and measurement of the hedged item would not be affected.
2.46
That approach would have the following benefits:
(a) The carrying amount of the hedged item would
not be affected.
(b) The measurement attribute of the hedged item
would be the same whether it was hedged or not.
(c) There would be fewer ongoing effects on
earnings. For example, there would be no ongoing effects on
earnings because the effective interest rate of a financial
asset would not need to be recalculated following the
dedesignation of a fair value hedging relationship.
2.47
However, gains and losses on the hedging instrument that are
initially recognised in other comprehensive income would need to be
reclassified to earnings to offset the effect on earnings of the
hedged item. For example, the cumulative gains or losses on an
interest rate swap designated as hedging a fixed rate bond would be
reclassified to earning when the bond was sold or settled, and not
throughout the life of the bond. However, the net swap settlements
would be recognised in earnings as they accrue.
2.48
As noted, using a cash flow hedging technique for fair value
exposures has some benefits. However, many of the restrictions that
exist today would be needed. That might not result in a significant
reduction incomplexity.
Recognition outside earnings of gains and losses on
hedged items
2.49 This suggestion has the following features:
(a) All (or at least many) financial instruments
would be measured at fair value.
(b) Gains and losses on derivatives, instruments
held for trading and instruments designated in their entirety at
initial recognition to be measured at fair value are recognised
in earnings. (c) For financial instruments other than those
described in (b), entities would be
permitted
to recognise all unrealised
gains and losses or unrealised gains and losses attributable to
specified risks in either earnings or other comprehensive
income, subject to one exception. The exception is that
unrealised gains and losses on interestbearing financial
liabilities attributable to changes in the entity’s own credit
risk must be recognised in other comprehensive income. An entity
could also choose to report a specified
percentage of the gains
or losses on these financial instruments in earnings and the
remainder in other comprehensive income.
2.50
The choice described in paragraph 2.49(c) would be made instrument
by instrument at inception (when the instrument is acquired,
incurred, issued or originated) and would be revocable. If an entity
initially chooses to recognise gains and losses on a financial
instrument in other comprehensive income and later changes that
choice, the cumulative net gain or loss on the instrument would be
reclassified to earnings in some systematic way over the remaining
life of the instrument. Alternatively, if an entity initially
chooses to recognise gains and losses on a financial instrument in
earnings and later changes that choice, the fair value of the
instrument on the date of the new choice would determine the
effective interest rate.
2.51
For those instruments described in paragraph 2.49(c) interest on
interestbearing instruments would be separately presented using an
effective interest rate. Movements in the fair value due to changes
in foreign exchange rates of all monetary items described in
paragraph 2.49(c) would also be recognised in earnings in accordance
with IAS 21
The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange
Rates and IAS 39. 2.52 Moreover,
if a derivative is used to hedge the changes in fair value of a
particular financial instrument, the entity could choose to
recognise in earnings future gains and losses on that hedged
instrument. The gains and losses on the hedged instrument and the
hedging instrument would be offset in earnings in a way that is
similar to fair value hedge accounting. Unlike fair value hedge
accounting, this approach would not require an effectiveness test at
inception or later.
2.53
This approach would result in more financial instruments being
measured at fair value. In addition, hedged items would generally be
measured at fair value instead of being adjusted for some fair value
changes but not others.
2.54
However, this approach has the following disadvantages:
(a) It includes few restrictions about the
choice of where to recognise gains and losses. If restrictions
comparable to existing hedge accounting requirements were added,
there would be little or no reduction in complexity
(b) Recognising part of the gains and losses on
a financial instrument in other comprehensive income and part in
earnings (and being able to change that choice) would create
complexity for users trying to understand the financial
statements.
|
The bottom line is that fair value accounting is no panacea for reducing
financial reporting complexity, especially in reducing much of the complexity of
hedge accounting using derivative financial instruments.
The
exposure draft then launches into, beginning in Paragraph 2.55, alternatives
to simplifying hedge accounting other than to attempting fair value accounting
alternatives that hit the wall when hedging with derivative financial
instruments.
Having noted all the problems with fair value accounting when
hedging for derivative financial instruments in Section 2 of the exposure draft,
the exposure draft in Section 3 tries to nevertheless make a case that fair
value accounting is the best of all the bad alternatives for accounting for
financial instruments in general, including derivative financial instruments. No
attempt is made to advocate fair value accounting for non-financial instruments
such as operating assets where value in use versus exit
values present enormous problems for exit (fair value) accounting.
Section 3 in the IASB's
exposure draft is quite good about mentioning the problems of fair value
accounting as well as the reasons the IASB (and the FASB) is leaning in theory
and in practice for requiring fair value accounting of all financial instruments
be they assets or liabilities or both in the case of some compound instruments.
Questions for respondents
Question 8
To reduce today’s measurement-related problems, Section 3 suggests
that the long-term solution is to use a single method to measure all
types of financial instruments within the scope of a standard for
financial instruments. Do you believe that using a single method to
measure all types of financial instruments within the scope of a
standard for financial instruments is appropriate? Why or why not?
If you do not believe that all types of financial instruments should
be measured using only one method in the long term, is there another
approach to address measurement-related problems in the long term?
If so, what is it
Question 9
Part A of Section 3 suggests that fair value seems to be the only
measurement attribute that is appropriate for all types of financial
instruments within the scope of a standard for financial
instruments.
(a) Do you believe that fair value is the only
measurement attribute that is appropriate for all types of
financial instruments within the scope of a standard for
financial instruments?
(b) If not, what measurement attribute other
than fair value is appropriate for all types of financial
instruments within the scope of a standard for financial
instruments? Why do you think that measurement attribute is
appropriate for all types of financial instruments within the
scope of a standard for financial instruments? Does that
measurement attribute reduce today’s measurement-related
complexity and provide users with information that is necessary
to assess the cash flow prospects for all types of financial
instruments?
Question 10
Part B of Section 3 sets out concerns about fair value
measurement of financial instruments. Are there any significant
concerns about fair value measurement of financial instruments other
than those identified in Section 3? If so, what are they and why are
they matters for concern?
Question 11
Part C of Section 3 identifies four issues that the IASB needs
to resolve before proposing fair value measurement as a general
requirement for all types of financial instruments within the scope
of a standard for financial instruments.
(a) Are there other issues that you believe the
IASB should address before proposing a general fair value
measurement requirement for financial instruments? If so, what
are they? How should the IASB address them?
(b) Are there any issues identified in part C of
Section 3 that do not have to be resolved before proposing a
general fair value measurement requirement? If so, what are they
and why do they not need to be resolved before proposing fair
value as a general measurement requirement?
Question 12
Do you have any other comments for the IASB on how it could
improveand simplify the accounting for financial instruments?
|
In Section 3 of the exposure draft, the IASB's arguments for fair value
accounting are very compelling. I applaud this effort. However, some underlying
and unmentioned assumptions disturb me. Implicitly the IASB assumes that "value
in use" and exit (fair) value are perfectly correlated for financial
instruments. This is admittedly not true for non-financial assets such as farm
tractors where the correlation between recently-purchased tractors and value in
use has negligible correlation because of kinks between markets for new versus
used tractors. The additional problem is that new tractors are fungible
commodities whereas used tractors are entirely unique. No two used tractors are
exactly alike in terms of quality and expected life. In addition the markets for
new versus used tractors are entirely different even for pre-owned tractors that
have never been used or were only used for little old farm ladies to get to and
from church.
Now consider the IASB's assumption there's no difference between a customized
derivative financial instrument and a similar instrument traded in exchange
markets. There is in fact a huge unmentioned problem for financial instruments
like customized interest rate swaps for which there is no external market.
Interest rate swaps are generally unique, customized, and cannot be sold by
parties and counterparties without prohibitive transactions costs. The FASB and
the IASB require that they be "marked-to-market" without providing guidance on
how to do so without a market. You can read about how such valuation takes place
in a complicated manner at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm
But is this supposedly "fair valuation" process really reflective of value in
use of interest rate swaps?
Clearly historical cost (zero) is not relevant for a customized $10 million
interest rate swap that XYZ Company acquired in Example 5 of Appendix B in FAS
133 commencing in Paragraph 131. Jensen and Hubbard explain how such a swap is
valued by banks using a Bloomberg database of forward exchange transactions ---
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/133ex05.htm .
The illustrative Excel workbook can be downloaded from
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/133ex05a.xls
But is this "fair value" derived from market transactions really the fair value
of XYZ's unique and customized interest rate swap? Probably not! It might be
better to simply assume that value changes in the swap are perfectly and
negatively correlated with value changes in the hedged item which in this
example are $10 million in corporate variable rate bonds. But in order to assign
a fair value to the interest rate swap an elaborate estimation process is
required to derive the swap value estimates shown (but not explained) in
Paragraph 137 of FAS 133. It is not clear that these fair values clearly reflect
"value in use" of this unique customized swap that most likely cannot be sold or
terminated with the swap's counter party without huge transactions penalties.
This is an example of a financial instrument whose value in use may be entirely
different from its true and totally unknown exit (fair) value.
The way firms must derive fair values for many financial instruments is truly
fanciful for unique financial instruments that are not like any other market
traded instruments and cannot be disposed of without enormous transactions
costs. In the case of Example 5, the values given by the FASB (and never
explained) and flip flop between positive and negative are probably widely
divergent from value in use of this swap by XYZ Company.
The implicit assumption in fair value accounting that value in use is equal
to extrapolated market valuations is not usually true in reality. This does not
make fair value accounting necessarily worse than other alternatives, but it
might unduly complicate hedge accounting. For example, the IASB does not permit
the Shortcut Method for hedge effectiveness testing of interest rate swaps that
is explained for XYZ Company in Paragraph 132 of FAS 133. The FASB allows the
Shortcut Method, but the IASB refuses to allow it, and all sorts of anomalies
might arise in hedge effectiveness testing that can be avoided by the Shortcut
Method.
Advanced Derivatives Accounting Question
On June 27, 2001 the FASB's Derivatives Implementation Group (DIG) issued
Statement FAS 133 Implementation Issue No. G20
Title: "Cash Flow Hedges: Assessing and Measuring the Effectiveness of a
Purchased Option Used in a Cash Flow Hedge Paragraph"
References FAS 133 Paragraphs 28(b), 30, 63, and 140
Date cleared by Board: June 27, 2001 Date posted to website: August 10, 2001
Do you think the
IASB exposure draft is in direct conflict with G20, and if so, why?
Jun3 23, 2008 reply from Dennis Beresford
[dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]
All of you have a wonderful opportunity to express
your views on the subject of relevance vs. reliability to the FASB and IASB.
The exposure draft on "The Objective of Financial Reporting and Qualitative
Characteristics and Constraints of Decision-Useful Financial Reporting
Information" is available at
http://www.fasb.org/draft/ed_conceptual_framework_for_fin_reporting.pdf
Comments are being solicited through September 29.
I commented on the Preliminary Views document that preceded this exposure
draft and probably will comment on this exposure draft too. This document is
a key building block for the future of financial reporting and I urge all of
you to consider participating formally in the debate.
Bob Jensen's tutorials on accounting for derivative financial instruments and
hedging activities are under FAS 133 and IAS 39 are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
For more on fair value accounting, go to
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
Speak to Me Only With Thine Eyes: The Sound of Colors for the Blind
Researchers at the Balearic Islands University in Spain
are developing a device that will allow blind children to distinguish colors by
associating each shade to a specific sound. The project, dubbed COL-diesis, is
based on the synesthesia principle--a confusion of senses where people
involuntarily relate the real information gathered by one sense with a different
sensation. "Only 4 percent of the population are true synesthetes, but everybody
else is influenced by associations between sounds and colors," said Jessica
Rossi, one of the coordinators of the project. For example, people tend to
associate light colors with high-pitched sounds. "We want to give the user a
device that allows [blind children] to chose specific associations of colors and
sounds based on each user's sensitivity," Rossi said. The device will include a
sensor the blind kids will wear on their fingertips to touch the objects they
want to know the colors of, and a bracelet that will transform the color into a
sound. The researchers expect to have their prototype ready by September.
Maria José Viñas, Chronicle of Higher Education, June 23, 2008 ---
http://chronicle.com/wiredcampus/index.php?id=3109&utm_source=wc&utm_medium=en
Jensen Question
Do we need multiple sounds for some colors? For example, there's Wall Street
green, Al Gore's green, vegetable green, freshman green, and seasick green.
Bob Jensen's threads on technology aids for handicapped learners are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/000aaa/thetools.htm#Handicapped
Jensen Comment for Accountants
Proposed (actually now optional) fair value financial statements have so many
shades of accuracy regarding measurements of financial items. Cash counts are
highly accurate along with cash received from sales of financial instruments.
Unrealized earnings on actively traded bonds and stocks are quite accurate
according to FAS 157. Value estimates of interest rate swaps may be inaccurate
but inaccuracy doesn't matter much since these value changes will all wash out
to zero when the swaps mature. Color them blah. Value estimates of most anything highly unique,
like parcels of real estate, are highly subjective and prone to fraud among
appraisal sharks. Color them scarlet!
Our Students
Might Actually Like Color Book Accounting
Could we add information to fair value financial statements by colorizing them
according to degrees of uncertainty and accuracy? And could we add sounds of
uncertainty so that SEC-recommended bracelets could listen to the soothing
waltzes Strauss (read that cash) and the rancorous hard rock-sounding shares in
a REIT. What sounds and colors might you give to FIN 41 items Amy?
Bob Jensen's threads on visualization of multivariate data are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/352wpvisual/000datavisualization.htm
I think the above document is interesting, but I never get any feedback about
it.
There are all sorts of research opportunities in visualization of
multivariate fair value financial performance!
One of the major problems of using financial
statements to value firms is that sometimes the unbooked assets and liabilities
are much larger than some or all of the booked items.
SEC Staff Report on Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements, Special Purpose
Entities, and Related Issues
From IAS Plus, February 16, 2006 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
The US Financial Accounting Standards Board has
submitted its response to the SEC Staff Report on Off-Balance Sheet
Arrangements, Special Purpose Entities, and Related Issues released by
the US Securities and Exchange Commission in June 2005. The SEC report was
prepared pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and was submitted to the
President and several Congressional committees. The SEC staff report
includes an analysis of the filings of issuers as well as an analysis of
pertinent US generally accepted accounting principles and Commission
disclosure rules. The report contains several recommendations for
potentially sweeping changes in current accounting and reporting
requirements for pensions, leases, financial instruments, and consolidation:
- Pensions: The staff recommends
the accounting guidance for defined-benefit pension plans and
other post-retirement benefit plans be reconsidered. The trusts
that administer these plans are currently exempt from
consolidation by the issuers that sponsor them, effectively
resulting in the netting of assets and liabilities in the
balance sheet. In addition, issuers have the option to delay
recognition of certain gains and losses related to the
retirement obligations and the assets used to fund these
obligations.
- Leases: The staff recommends
that the accounting guidance for leases be reconsidered. The
current accounting for leases takes an 'all or nothing' approach
to recognizing leases on the balance sheet. This results in a
clustering of lease arrangements such that their terms approach,
but do not cross, the 'bright lines' in the accounting guidance
that would require a liability to be recognized. As a
consequence, arrangements with similar economic outcomes are
accounted for very differently.
- Financial instruments: The
staff recommends the continued exploration of the feasibility of
reporting all financial instruments at fair value.
- Consolidation: The staff
recommends that the Financial Accounting Standards Board
continue its work on the accounting guidance that determines
whether an issuer would consolidate other entities – including
SPEs – in which the issuer has an ownership or other interest.
- Disclosures: The staff believes
that, in general, certain disclosures in the filings of issuers
could be better organized and integrated.
|
FASB's response discusses a number of
"fundamental structural, institutional, cultural, and behavioral forces"
that it believes cause complexity and impede transparent financial
reporting. FASB provides an update on its activities and projects intended
to address and improve outdated, overly complex accounting standards. These
areas include accounting for leases; accounting for pensions and other post
employment benefits; consolidation policies; accounting for financial
instruments; accounting for intangible assets; and conceptual and disclosure
frameworks. The FASB also identifies several other initiatives aimed at
improving the understandability, consistency, and overall usability of
existing accounting literature, through codification, by attempting to stem
the proliferation of new pronouncements emanating from multiple sources, and
by developing new standards in a 'principles-based' or 'objectives-oriented'
approach. Click to download:
"FASB Responds to SEC Study," AccountingWeb, February 21, 2006
---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=101801
AccountingWEB.com - Feb-21-2006 - The Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) last week responded to the Security and
Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) Off Balance Sheet Report by
identifying forces causing complexity and impeding financial
transparency, as well as providing an update on the FASB’s
activities intended to address complex accounting standards. The
FASB also reaffirmed its commitment to improving the transparency
and usefulness of financial reporting.
“The FASB
remains fiercely committed to protecting the interests of investors
and the capital markets by developing accounting standards that, if
faithfully followed, provided relevant, reliable and useful
financial information,” FASB Chariman Robert Herz said in a prepared
statement. “Along these lines, we remain concerned about the root
causes and the effects that complexity continues to have on our
financial reporting system and believe that concerted and
coordinated action by the SEC, the FASB, and the PCAOB, together
with other parties in the financial reporting system, is critical.”
The FASB
has named several areas as key for overcoming the challenges facing
the financial reporting system including: accounting for leases;
accounting for pensions and other post-employment benefits;
consolidation policies; accounting for financial instruments;
accounting for intangible assets; and conceptual and disclosure
frameworks. Several initiatives have been undertaken to help improve
understandability, consistency, and overall usability of existing
accounting literature, through codification and by attempting to
limit the proliferation of pronouncements from multiple sources and
by developing new standards using a principles-based or
objectives-oriented approach.
The FASB Response to SEC Study on
Arrangements with Off-Balance Sheet Implications, Special Purpose
Entities, and Transparency of Filings by Issuers provides
comments on issues and recommendations included in the Report and
Recommendations Pursuant to Section 401(c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 on Arrangements with Off-Balance Sheet Implications, Special
Purpose Entities, and Transparency of Filings by Issuers
submitted in June 2005 by the staff of the SEC to the President of
the United States, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs and the Committee of Financial Services of the U.S.
House of Representatives. |
Bob Jensen's threads on special purpose (variable interest) entities are
at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm
How a firm reports an asset or
liability in a balance sheet typically is rooted in one of the following
valuation concepts. GAAP in the United States is historical cost by default, but
there are countless instances where departures from historical cost are either
allowed or required under certain standards in certain circumstances.
The Cost Approach for Financial Reporting
From IASPlus on November 21, 2006 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
The International Valuation Standards Committee has
published
Proposed Revisions to International Valuation Guidance Note 8 – The Cost
Approach for Financial Reporting {PDF 193k).
The proposed revisions are the result of requests for clarification and
suggestions of minor improvements to the 2005 version of GN8. Comment
deadline is 31 December 2006. The
IVSC has also released an update of its work
programme:
Historical Cost Accounting: Unadjusted for
General Price-Level Changes
Advantages of Historical Cost
-
Survival Concept ---
Historical cost accounting has met the Darwin survival test for thousands of
years. One of the most noted books advocating historical cost is called
Introduction to Corporate Accounting Standards by William Paton and A.C.
Littleton (Sarasota: American Accounting Association, 1940). Probably no
single book has ever had so much influence or is more widely cited in
accounting literature than this thin book by Paton and Littleton.
Except in hyperinflation nations, unadjusted historical cost is still the
primary basis of accounting, although there are numerous exceptions for
certain types of assets and liabilities. Most notable among these exceptions
are financial instruments assets and liabilities where FAS 115 and FAS 133
spell out highly controversial exceptions.
-
The Matching Concept ---
costs of resources consumed in production should be matched against the
revenues of the products and services of the production function. (Assumes
costs attach throughout the production process in spite of complicating
factors such as joint costs, indirect costs, fungible resources acquired at
different costs, changing price-levels, basket purchases such as products
and their warranties, changing technologies, and other complications).
Profit is the "residuum (as efforts) and revenues (as accomplishments) for
individual enterprises." This difference (profit) reflects the effectiveness
of management. One overriding concept, however, is conservatism that Paton
and Littleton concede must be resorted to as a basis for writing inventories
down to market when historical cost exceeds market. This leads to a
violation of the matching concept, but it is necessary if investors will be
misled into thinking that inventories historical costs are surrogates for
value.
-
The Audit Trail ---
historical costs can be traced to real rather than hypothetical market
transactions. They leave an audit trail that can be followed by auditors.
-
Predictive Value ---
empirical studies post to reasonably good predictive value of past
historical cost earnings on future historical cost earnings. In some cases,
historical cost statements are better predictors of bankruptcy than current
cost statements.
- Accuracy --- Historical
cost measurement is more accurate and, relative to its alternatives, is more
uniform, consistent, and less prone to measurement error.
Nobody I know holds the mathematical wonderment of double entry and
historical cost accounting more in awe than Yuji Ijiri. For example, see
Theory of Accounting Measurement, by Yuji Ijiri (Sarasota: American
Accounting Association Studies in Accounting Research No. 10, 1975) ---
http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aaa/market/studar.htm
Disadvantages of Historical Cost
-
Does not eliminate or solve such
controversial issues as what to include/exclude from balance sheets and does
not overcome complex schemes for off-balance-sheet financing (OBSF). It is
too simplistic for complex contracting. For example, many derivative
financial instruments having current values of millions of dollars (e.g.,
forward contracts and swaps) have zero or negligible historical costs. For
example, a firm may have an interest rate swap obligating it to pay millions
of dollars even though the historical cost of that swap is zero. Investors
might be easily misled by having such huge liabilities remain unbooked.
Historical cost accounting has induced game playing when writing contracts
(leases, employee compensation, etc.) in order to avoid having to book what
are otherwise assets and liabilities under fair value reporting.
-
Historical cost mixes apples and oranges such
as LIFO inventory dipping that may match costs measured in 1950s purchasing
power with inflated dollars in the 21st Century that have much less
purchasing power. Historical cost income in periods of rising prices
overstates earnings and understates how a firm is maintaining its capital
assets. Even historical cost advocates admit that historical cost accounting
is useless in economies subject to hyperinflation.
-
Historical cost accrual accounting assumes a
going concern. Under current U.S. GAAP, historical cost is the basis of
accounting for going concerns. If the firm is not deemed a going concern,
the basis of accounting shifts to exit (liquidation) values. For many firms,
however, it is difficult and/or misleading to make a binary designation of
going versus non-going. Many firms fall into the gray area on a continuum.
Personal financial statements seldom meet the going concern test since they
are generally used in estate and divorce settlements. Hence, exit
(liquidation) value is required instead of historical cost for personal
financial statements.
- Historical cost is
perpetuated by a myth of objectivity when there are countless underlying
subjective estimates of asset economic life, allocation of joint costs,
allocation of indirect costs, bad debt reserves, warranty liabilities,
pension liabilities, etc.
Going Concern Accounting and Bear Stearns
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on April 11,
2008
Officials Say They Sought To Avoid Bear Bailout
by Kara
Scannell and Sudeep Reddy
The Wall Street Journal
Apr 04, 2008
Page: A1
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120722972567886357.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
TOPICS: Accounting,
Banking
SUMMARY: This
article covers the testimony in Congressional hearings for the
weekend events of March 15-16 leading to the Bear Stearns
bailout and acquisition by J.P. Morgan.
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: Understanding the relationship between the
balance sheet equation and the notions of a run on the bank,
going concern and fire sale is made evident in this review. The
economic concept of moral hazard also is covered.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) Summarize the events leading to Bear
Stearns demise and acquisition by J.P. Morgan.
2. (Introductory) What is the assumption of going
concern in accounting? Give an example of how that assumption
influences the accounting for one balance sheet item, then
explain the assumption's overall influence on the balance sheet
equation.
3. (Introductory) What prices for Bear Stearns' stock
were considered in negotiations leading to J.P. Morgan's
acquisition? What evidence is given in the article that these
prices were based on assumptions other than the going concern
assumption?
4. (Advanced) Define the notions of "capital adequacy"
and "liquidity" in banks. For what type of entity are these
levels now regulated? How might that regulation now expand as a
result of the Bear Stearns debacle?
5. (Advanced) Explain the U.S. government's role in the
transaction between J.P. Morgan and Bear Stearns. How does that
role differ from the usual government regulation in financial
markets?
6. (Advanced) Why did Bear Stearns have to negotiate a
finished deal by the end of the weekend of March 15-16? In your
answer, explain the concept of a "run on the bank" and its
relationship to the going concern assumption.
7. (Introductory) What is the economic notion of "moral
hazard?" How did that issue also influence the price that Bear
Stearns was able to negotiate from J.P. Morgan?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
|
"Officials Say They Sought To Avoid Bear Bailout," by Kara Scannell and
Sudeer Reddy, The Wall Street Journal, April 4, 2008; Page A1 --
Click Here
The government sought a low sale price for Bear
Stearns Cos. to send a message that taxpayers wouldn't bail out firms making
risky bets, a top Treasury Department official testified, as regulators
offered Congress the first detailed explanation of the unprecedented rescue.
Representatives of Washington and Wall Street
painted a dire picture of the chaos they believe would have ensued if the
government hadn't orchestrated a rescue of Bear Stearns by J.P. Morgan Chase
& Co. over the hectic weekend of March 15-16.
"This would have been far more, in my opinion,
expensive to taxpayers had Bear Stearns gone bankrupt and added to the
financial crisis we have today," said J.P. Morgan chief executive James
Dimon. "It wouldn't have even been close."
Officials said they were acutely aware of the
moral-hazard problem, and that is why the government insisted that Bear
Stearns shareholders get a low price for their shares. In the original deal,
announced the night of March 16, J.P. Morgan agreed to pay $2 a share. After
Bear Stearns shareholders protested, J.P. Morgan raised its price a week
later to $10 a share -- still a fraction of the level Bear Stearns shares
had traded at before it faced a funding crisis.
"There was a view that the price should not be very
high or should be towards the low end...given the government's involvement,"
Treasury Undersecretary Robert Steel told a congressional committee during a
five-hour hearing Thursday.
"These were exceptionally consequential acts, taken
with extreme reluctance and care because of the substantial consequences it
would have for moral hazard in the financial system," added Timothy Geithner,
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Mr. Steel and other officials told the Senate
Banking Committee that they didn't dictate the precise sale price, but
wanted to see a deal done quickly to avoid a sudden market-shaking crash of
the company.
At the hearing, the first one focusing on the Bear
Stearns rescue, lawmakers questioned top Fed officials, including Chairman
Ben Bernanke, as well as the chief executives of Bear Stearns and J.P.
Morgan. Held in a cavernous room reserved for big gatherings, rather than
the more-intimate regular room, the hearing sometimes had the feel of a
Hollywood red-carpet event as photographers descended on the panelists.
Officials rejected lawmakers' suggestions that they
bailed out Bear Stearns, noting that shareholders took steep losses and many
employees may lose their jobs. But under questioning, Mr. Bernanke agreed
with a lawmaker who suggested the Fed rescued Wall Street more broadly.
"If you want to say we bailed out the market in
general, I guess that's true," he said. "But we felt that was necessary in
the interest of the American economy." He reiterated comments from a day
earlier that the Fed doesn't expect to lose money on its $30 billion loan.
J.P. Morgan has agreed to cover the first $1 billion in losses, if there are
any.
Mr. Dimon said his bank "could not and would not
have assumed the substantial risk" of buying Bear without the Fed's
involvement.
At the hearing, the government and company
officials gave an exhaustive account of the frenetic scramble in the days
preceding the Bear Stearns sale. "We had literally 48 hours to do what
normally takes a month," said Mr. Dimon.
During the week of March 10, market rumors swirled
that Bear Stearns might not be able to stay in business. At the hearing Alan
Schwartz, Bear Stearns's chief executive, said that the firm's balance sheet
was strong -- as good as that of any other financial institution -- but that
Bear Stearns couldn't keep up with the rumors.
By Thursday, March 13, the rumors had become a
"self-fulfilling prophecy" and resulted in a "run on the bank," Mr. Schwartz
said. Bear Stearns reached out to the regulators, who worked throughout the
night. By Friday morning, March 14, the Fed agreed to extend financing to
Bear Stearns through J.P. Morgan. Then the firms and government officials
worked through the weekend to spur Bear Stearns's sale and prevent a
bankruptcy filing.
Along with the sale announcement on March 16, the
Fed announced that it would lend directly to investment banks from its
discount window, a historic reversal of its longtime policy of lending only
to banks. While some have said that Bear Stearns could have avoided a sale
if it had had access to the new lending program, Mr. Geithner said that
wasn't feasible.
"We only allow sound institutions to borrow against
collateral," he said. "I would have been very uncomfortable lending to Bear
given what we knew at that time."
When it became clear that a deal had to happen
before Asian markets opened late Sunday night, Bear Stearns's negotiating
leverage "went out the window," said Mr. Schwartz. Among the parties
examining Bear Stearns's books was a sophisticated buyer who was "prepared
to write a multibillion check to invest in equity," but that would have
required another financial institution to help finance the deal, Mr.
Schwartz said. He didn't identify the potential buyer.
Mr. Dimon testified that he couldn't recall whose
idea it was to bring in the Fed. Treasury's Mr. Steel said it was J.P.
Morgan that suggested the Fed's involvement.
Continued in article
Replacement (Current) Cost Accounting Versus Historical Cost Accounting
"Windfall Profits for Dummies," The Wall Street Journal, May 3,
2008; Page A10 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120977019142563957.html?mod=djemEditorialPage
This is one strange debate the candidates
are having on energy policy. With gas prices close to $4 a gallon, Hillary
Clinton and John McCain say they'll bring relief with a moratorium on the
18.4-cent federal gas tax. Barack Obama opposes that but prefers a
1970s-style windfall profits tax (as does Mrs. Clinton).
Mr. Obama is right to oppose the gas-tax
gimmick, but his idea is even worse. Neither proposal addresses the problem
of energy supply, especially the lack of domestic oil and gas thanks to
decades of Congressional restrictions on U.S. production. Mr. Obama supports
most of those "no drilling" rules, but that hasn't stopped him from
denouncing high gas prices on the campaign trail. He is running TV ads in
North Carolina that show him walking through a gas station and declaring
that he'll slap a tax on the $40 billion in "excess profits" of Exxon Mobil.
The idea is catching on. Last week
Pennsylvania Congressman Paul Kanjorski introduced a windfall profits tax as
part of what he called the "Consumer Reasonable Energy Price Protection Act
of 2008." So now we have Congress threatening to help itself to business
profits even though Washington already takes 35% right off the top with the
corporate income tax.
You may also be wondering how a higher tax
on energy will lower gas prices. Normally, when you tax something, you get
less of it, but Mr. Obama seems to think he can repeal the laws of
economics. We tried this windfall profits scheme in 1980. It backfired. The
Congressional Research Service found in a 1990 analysis that the tax reduced
domestic oil production by 3% to 6% and increased oil imports from OPEC by
8% to 16%. Mr. Obama nonetheless pledges to lessen our dependence on foreign
oil, which he says "costs America $800 million a day." Someone should tell
him that oil imports would soar if his tax plan becomes law. The biggest
beneficiaries would be OPEC oil ministers.
There's another policy contradiction here.
Exxon is now under attack for buying back $2 billion of its own stock rather
than adding to the more than $21 billion it is likely to invest in energy
research and exploration this year. But hold on. If oil companies believe
their earnings from exploring for new oil will be expropriated by government
– and an excise tax on profits is pure expropriation – they will surely
invest less, not more. A profits tax is a sure formula to keep the future
price of gas higher.
Exxon's profits are soaring with the
recent oil price spike, but the energy industry's earnings aren't as
outsized as the politicians seem to think. Thomson Financial calculates that
profits from the oil and natural gas industry over the past year were 8.3%
of investment, while the all-industry average is 7.8%. And this was a boom
year for oil. An analysis by the Cato Institute's Jerry Taylor finds that
between 1970 and 2003 (which includes peak and valley years for earnings)
the oil and gas business was "less profitable than the rest of the U.S.
economy." These are hardly robber barons.
This tiff over gas and oil taxes only
highlights the intellectual policy confusion – or perhaps we should say
cynicism – of our politicians. They want lower prices but don't want more
production to increase supply. They want oil "independence" but they've
declared off limits most of the big sources of domestic oil that could
replace foreign imports. They want Americans to use less oil to reduce
greenhouse gases but they protest higher oil prices that reduce demand. They
want more oil company investment but they want to confiscate the profits
from that investment. And these folks want to be President?
Late this week, a group of Senate
Republicans led by Pete Domenici of New Mexico introduced the "American
Energy Production Act of 2008" to expand oil production off the U.S. coasts
and in Alaska. It has the potential to increase domestic production enough
to keep America running for five years with no foreign imports. With the
world price of oil at $116 a barrel, if not now, when? No word yet if
Senators Clinton and Obama will take time off from denouncing oil profits to
vote for that.
How Will a Windfall Profits Tax Increase Supply?
by Frank J.
Stalzer and David P. McElvain
The Wall Street Journal
May 08, 2008
Page: A14
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120977019142563957.html?mod=djemEditorialPage
TOPICS: Advanced
Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting, Oil and Gas
Accounting, Tax Laws, Taxation
SUMMARY: The
second of these two letters to the editor is written by a 70
year old reader who has worked in the oil and gas industry for
all of his life. Both letters discuss the Obama-proposed
windfall profits tax, but the latter also refers to the fact
that historical cost-based financial statements show higher
income statement profits than would statements prepared under
replacement cost accounting.
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: The article may be used to addressed the
current political debates of the presidential candidates'
proposed policies in either a taxation or an advanced financial
accounting class.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) What are "windfall profits?" What is
a "windfall profits tax?"
2. (Introductory) Why might a windfall profits tax
appeal to voters who are unsophisticated in their understanding
of its potential economic impact?
3. (Advanced) What is "replacement
cost accounting?" In your answer, compare this
measurement method to our current historical cost method.
4. (Advanced) Why might historical cost accounting be
particularly problematic in the oil and gas industry as opposed
to, say, a traditional manufacturing industry?
5. (Advanced) What is the argument put forth by Mr.
McElvain that historical-cost basis financial statements are
contributing to the potential implementation of a windfall
profits tax?
6. (Advanced) "Major oil companies need to administer
their businesses on the basis of true replacement costs, not
historical accounting costs." Is that possible even if the
business must use historical cost accounting in published
financial statements?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
RELATED
ARTICLES:
Windfall Profits for Dummies
by N/A
May 03, 2008
Page: A10
|
Example: Accounting for a Website
August 7, 2006 message from Ganesh M.
Pandit, DBA, CPA, CMA
[profgmp@hotmail.com]
Hi Bob,
How would you answer this question from a
student: "I wonder if a company's Web site is considered a long-lived
asset!"
Ganesh M. Pandit
Adelphi University
August 9, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Ganesh,
Accounting for Website investment is
a classic example of the issue of "matching" versus "value" accounting. From
an income statement perspective, matching requires the matching of current
revenues with the expenses of generating that revenue, including the "using
up" of fixed asset investments. But we don't depreciate investment in the
site value of land because land site value, unlike a building, is not used
up due to usage in generating revenue. Like land site value, a Website's
"value" probably increases in value over time. One might argue that a
Website should not be expensed since a successful Website, like land, is not
used up when generating revenue. However, Websites do require maintenance
fees and improvement outlays over time which makes it somewhat different
than the site investment in land that requires no such added outlays other
than property taxes that are expensed each year.
I don't think current accounting
rules for Websites are appropriate in theory ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm#Issue08
It seems to me that you can partition
your Website development and improvement outlays into various types of
assets and expenses. For example, computers used in development and
maintenance of the Website are accounted for like other computers. Software
is accounted for under software amortization accounting rules. Purchased
goodwill is accounted for like purchased goodwill under new impairment test
rules. Labor costs for Website maintenance versus improvements are more
problematic.
Leased Website items are treated like
leases, although there are some complications if a Website is leased
entirely. For example, such a leased Website is not "used up" like airplanes
that are typically contracted as operating leases. Leased Website space may
be appropriately accounted for as an operating lease. But leasing an entire
Website is more like the capital lease of a land in that the asset does not
get "used up." My hunch is that most firms ignore this controversy and treat
Website leases as operating leases. It is pretty easy to bury custom
development costs into the "rental fee" for leased Website server space,
thereby burying the development costs and deferring them over the contracted
server space rental period. It would seem to me that rental fees for
Websites that are strictly used for advertising are written off as
advertising expenses. Of course many Websites are used for much more than
advertising.
Firms are taking rather rapid
write-offs of purchased Websites such as write-offs over three years. I'm
not certain I agree with this, but firms are "depreciating" these for tax
purposes and you can see them in filed SEC financial statements such as the
one at Briton International (under the Depreciation heading) ---
http://sec.edgar-online.com/2006/01/27/0001127855-06-000047/Section27.asp
It is more common in annual reports
to see the term Website Amortization instead of Website Depreciation. A few
sites amortize on the basis of Website traffic ---
http://www.nexusenergy.com/presentation6.aspx
This makes
no sense to me since traffic does not use up a Website over time.
Bob Jensen
October 5, 2006 reply from Scott Bonacker
[cpas-l@BONACKER.US]
I can't think of anyone that would be more
knowledgeable than David Hardesty, at
http://davidhardesty.com/
His book, published by CCH, is excellent.
Hope this helps ....
Scott Bonacker, CPA
Springfield, Missouri
Bob Jensen's threads on e-Commerce and
e-Business revenue accounting controversies are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm
Example 2 --- Proposition 87 VAT Tax
An interesting accounting problem (or employment
opportunity?) posed by
Proposition 87 on the State of California November 7 ballot in 2006
Proposition 87 would tax every barrel of oil pumped
from an in-state well . . .But just to make sure, the proposition would fund
investigations of oil companies that try to "pass on" the tax increase in the
price. Severin Borenstein, director of University of California Energy Institute
at UC Berkeley, points out that this would lead to "constant investigation that
will yield no more than what past investigations (on why gasoline prices spike)
have yielded, or even less." The oil tax revenues would go to fund "alternative
energy." That approach didn't work for former President Carter, is not working
for President Bush, and won't work in California. Government funding, by
definition, is not subject to a market test. "Alternate energy" will make sense
only when its cost is less than the cost of using oil. The market will handle
this problem as it did over a century ago by replacing the depleting whale-oil
supply with petroleum. Amazingly, over $40 million of the $45.6 million
contributed to the campaign for the tax comes from one man, Hollywood big shot
Stephen Bing.
David Henderson, "'Sinful and Tyrannical'," The Wall Street Journal,
October 14, 2006; Page A7 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116078251442292601.html?mod=todays_us_opinion
Jensen Comment
Proposition 87 is like (well not entirely) a VAT tax. Although I'm not against
value added taxes (VAT), VAT taxes have been fought tooth and nail in U.S.
politics (unlike in Europe). Apart from the VAT economic debates that are well
known, Proposition 87 raises interesting accounting issues because it in effect
introduces cost-plus pricing controls where fuel prices in California would now
be in a sense regulated by California officials. Fuel companies in essence must
justify prices with a full analysis of costs to verify that the $50 per barrel
tax is not being passed on at the pump. In contrast, most VAT taxes are
typically passed on to consumers in other nations (I think)
Proposition 87 runs four square into the enormous and famous
joint costing problem that has generally never been solved by accountants. Joint
costs are always allocated arbitrarily unless laws govern (arbitrarily) such
allocations. Given the complexity of oil refining joint costs, it would seem
that unscrupulous oil refiners could devise ways of burying this new tax (in
fuel prices) in such a manner that it is impossible for state auditors to
detect. In practice, I think it is absurd to think that any type of corporate
taxes cannot be factored into product and service prices unless prices
themselves are to be regulated by the state. Price regulations themselves
generally become either a joke (if industry controls the regulators) or a
disaster (if regulators as central planners ignore the laws of supply and
demand).
Presumably California will not object to this Proposition 87 VAT
tax being passed along to out-of-state customers of oil refiners. It would be
difficult to pass along the tax if out-of-state customers had open access to
world markets. However, some Nevada and Oregon fueling stations may not have any
efficient source, at least in the short-run, of 92-octane gasoline other than
from California refiners.
Proposition 87 might then be viewed as a tax on surrounding
states if 100% of the Proposition 87 VAT tax can be passed on to states
surrounding California. Sounds like a good deal for California if those other
states are willing to be taxed for California schools. Nevada may in fact punch
a whole in the new immigration wall large enough for a gasoline pipe into
Mexico.
In any case, Proposition 87 might be
better termed California's Cost Accountant Employment Relief Act.
It would seem to be a whole lot easier to simply raise the corporate income tax,
which of course is what California voters are being asked to do in another
proposition, Proposition 89. It is totally naive to think that business taxes of
any kind will not be passed along to customers in one way or another. You can
fool some of the people some of the time, but not all the people all of the time
(didn't someone else think of that line first?).
As an aside, there is also Proposition 88 that will impose a $50
flat tax on every parcel of land, which of course is a tax that will be easily
raised in future years. This in reality is a state-wide property tax that will
grow and grow in spite of an older Proposition 13 assurance that property taxes
cannot grow and grow for long-time home owners. What happens in California when
new ballot propositions clash with older ballot propositions already voted in by
the public?
Historical Cost Accounting: Price-Level
Adjusted (PLA) Historical Cost Accounting
The primary basis of accounting in the U.S. is unadjusted historical cost
with numerous exceptions in particular instances. For example, price-level
adjustments may be required for operations in hyperinflation nations. The
international IASB standards require PLA accounting in hyperinflation nations.
The SEC issued ASR 190 requiring PLA supplemental reports. This was followed
by the FASB's 1979 FAS 33 short-lived standard. Follow-up studies did not point
to investor enthusiasm over such supplemental reports. Eventually, both ASR 190
and FAS 33 were rescinded, largely from lack of interest on the part of
financial analysts and investors due to relatively low inflation rates in the
United States. However, PLA adjustments are still required for operations in
nations subject to high rates of inflation.
Advantages of PLA Accounting
-
Attempts to perfect historical cost
accounting by converting costs to a common purchasing power unit of
measurement.
-
Has a dramatic impact upon ROI calculations
in many industries even in times of very low inflation.
-
Is essential in periods of hyperinflation.
- Uses a readily
available and reasonably accurate government-generated consumer price index
(usually the CPI for urban households).
Disadvantages of PLA Accounting
-
There is not general agreement regarding what
is the best inflation index to use in the PLA adjustment process. Computing
a price index for such purposes is greatly complicated by constantly
changing technologies, consumer preferences, etc.
-
There is no common index across nations, and
nations differ greatly with respect to the effort made to derive price
indices.
- Empirical studies in
the U.S. have not shown PLA accounting data to have better predictive powers
than historical cost data not adjusted for inflation.
Market Value Accounting:
Entry Value (Current Cost, Replacement Cost)
Accounting
Beginning in 1979, FAS 33 required large corporations to provide a
supplementary schedule of condensed balance sheets and income statements
comparing annual outcomes under three valuation bases --- Unadjusted Historical
Cost, Price Level Adjusted (PLA) Historical Cost, and Current Cost Entry Value
(adjusted for depreciation and amortization). Companies complained heavily that
users did not obtain value that justified the cost of implementing FAS 33.
Analysts complained that the FASB allowed such crude estimates that the FAS 33
schedules were virtually useless, especially the Current Cost estimates. The
FASB rescinded FAS 33 when it issued FAS 89 in 1986.
Current cost accounting by whatever name (e.g., current or replacement cost)
entails the historical cost of balance sheet items with current (replacement)
costs. Depreciation rates can be re-set based upon current costs rather than
historical costs.
Beginning in 1979, FAS 33 required large corporations to provide a
supplementary schedule of condensed balance sheets and income statements
comparing annual outcomes under three valuation bases --- Unadjusted Historical
Cost, PLA-Adjusted historical cost, and Current Cost Entry Value (adjusted for
depreciation and amortization). Companies are no longer required to generate FAS
33-type comparisons. The primary basis of accounting in the U.S. is unadjusted
historical cost with numerous exceptions in particular instances. For example,
price-level adjustments may be required for operations in hyperinflation
nations. Exit value accounting is required for firms deemed highly likely to
become non-going concerns. Exit value accounting is required for personal
financial statements (whether an individual or a personal partnership such as
two married people). Economic (discounted cash flow) valuations are required for
certain types of assets and liabilities such as pension liabilities. Hence in
the United States and virtually every other nation, accounting standards do not
require or even allow one single basis of accounting. Beginning in January 2005,
all nations in the Eurpean Union adopted the IASB's international standards that
have moved closer and closer each year to the FASB/SEC standards of the United
States.
Advantages of Entry Value (Current Cost, Replacement Cost) Accounting
- Conforms to capital
maintenance theory that argues in favor of matching current revenues with
what the current costs are of generating those revenues. For example, if
historical cost depreciation is $100 and current cost depreciation is $120,
current cost theory argues that an excess of $20 may be wrongly classified
as profit and distributed as a dividend. When it comes time to replace the
asset, the firm may have mistakenly eaten its seed corn.
- If the accurate
replacement cost is known and can be matched with current selling prices,
the problems of finding indices for price level adjustments are avoided.
Disadvantages of Entry Value (Current Cost,
Replacement Cost) Accounting
-
Discovery of accurate replacement costs is
virtually impossible in times of changing technologies and newer production
alternatives. For example, some companies are using data processing
hardware and software that no longer can be purchased or would never be
purchased even if it was available due to changes in technology. Some
companies are using buildings that may not be necessary as production
becomes more outsourced and sales move to the Internet. It is possible to
replace used assets with used assets rather than new assets. Must current
costs rely only upon prices of new assets?
-
Discovering current costs is prohibitively
costly if firms have to repeatedly find current replacement prices on
thousands or millions of items.
-
Accurate derivation of replacement cost is
very difficult for items having high variations in quality. For example,
some ten-year old trucks have much higher used prices than other used trucks
of the same type and vintage. Comparisons with new trucks is very difficult
since new trucks have new features, different expected economic lives,
warranties, financing options, and other differences that make comparisons
extremely complex and tedious. In many cases, items are bought in basket
purchases that cover warranties, insurance, buy-back options, maintenance
agreements, etc. Allocating the "cost" to particular components may be quite
arbitrary.
-
Use of "sector" price indices as surrogates
compounds the price-index problem of general price-level adjustments. For
example, if a "transportation" price index is used to estimate replacement
cost, what constitutes a "transportation" price index? Are such indices
available and are they meaningful for the purpose at hand? When FAS 33 was
rescinded in 1986, one of the major reasons was the cost and confusion of
using sector indices as surrogates for actual replacement costs.
- Current costs tend to
give rise to recognition of holding gains and losses not yet realized.
Market Value Accounting: Exit Value
(Liquidation, Fair Value) Accounting
Whereas entry value is what it will cost to replace an item, exit value is
the value of disposing of the item. It can even be negative in some instances
where costs of clean up and disposal make to exit price negative. Exit value accounting is required under GAAP for personal financial
statements (individuals and married couples) and companies that are deemed
likely to become non-going concerns. See "Personal Financial Statements," by
Anthony Mancuso, The CPA Journal, September 1992 ---
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/old/13606731.htm
Some theorists advocate exit value accounting for going concerns as well as
non-going concerns. Both nationally (particularly under FAS 115 and FAS 133) and
internationally (under IAS 32 and 39 for), exit value accounting is presently
required in some instances for financial instrument
assets and liabilities. Both the FASB and the IASB have exposure drafts
advocating fair value accounting for all financial instruments.
FASB's Exposure
Draft for Fair Value Adjustments to all Financial Instruments
On December 14, 1999 the FASB issued Exposure Draft 204-B entitled
Reporting Financial Instruments and Certain Related Assets and
Liabilities at Fair Value.
If an item is viewed as a
financial instrument rather than inventory, the accounting becomes
more complicated under FAS 115. Traders in financial instruments
adjust such instruments to fair value with all changes in value
passing through current earnings. Business firms who are not deemed
to be traders must designate the instrument as either
available-for-sale (AFS) or hold-to-maturity (HTM). A HTM instrument
is maintained at original cost. An AFS financial instrument must be
marked-to-market, but the changes in value pass through OCI rather
than current earnings until the instrument is actually sold or
otherwise expires. Under international standards, the IASB requires
fair value adjustments for most financial instruments. This has led
to strong reaction from businesses around the world, especially
banks. There are now two major working group debates. In 1999 the
Joint Working Group of the Banking Associations sharply rebuffed the
IAS 39 fair value accounting in two white papers that can be
downloaded from
http://www.iasc.org.uk/frame/cen3_112.htm.
·
Financial
Instruments: Issues Relating to Banks
(strongly argues for required fair value adjustments of financial
instruments). The issue date is August 31, 1999.
·
Accounting for
financial Instruments for Banks
(concludes that a modified form of
historical cost is optimal for bank accounting). The issue date is
October 4, 1999. |
Advantages of Exit Value (Liquidation, Fair Value) Accounting
-
In the case of financial assets and
liabilities, historical costs may be meaningless relative to current exit
values. For example, a forward contract or swap generally has zero
historical cost but may be valued at millions at the current time. Failure
to require fair value accounting provides all sorts of misleading earnings
management opportunities to firms. The above references provide strong
arguments in favor of fair value accounting.
-
Exit value does not require arbitrary cost
allocation decisions such as whether to use FIFO or LIFO or what
depreciation rate is best for allocating cost over time.
- In many instances exit
value accounting is easier to compute than entry values. For example, it is
easier to estimate what an old computer will bring in the used computer
market than to estimate what is the cost of "equivalent" computing power is
in the new computer market.
Exit value reporting is not deemed
desirable or practical for going concern businesses for a number of reasons that
I will not go into in great depth here.
Disadvantages of Exit Value (Liquidation, Fair
Value) Accounting
· Operating
assets are bought to use rather than sell. For example, as long as no
consideration is being given to selling or abandoning a manufacturing plant,
recording the fluctuating values of the land and buildings creates a misleading
fluctuation in earnings and balance sheet volatility. Who cares if the value of
the land went up by $1 million in 1994 and down by $2 million in 1998 if the
plant that sits on the land has been in operation for 60 years and no
consideration is being given to leaving this plant?
· Some assets like
software, knowledge databases, and Web servers for e-Commerce cost millions of
dollars to develop for the benefit of future revenue growth and future expense
savings. These assets may have immense value if the entire firm is sold, but
they may have no market as unbundled assets. In fact it may be impossible to
unbundle such assets from the firm as a whole. Examples include the Enterprise
Planning Model SAP system in firms such as Union Carbide. These systems costing
millions of dollars have no exit value in the context of exit value accounting
even though they are designed to benefit the companies for many years into the
future.
· Exit value
accounting records anticipated profits well in advance of transactions. For
example, a large home building company with 200 completed houses in inventory
would record the profits of these homes long before the company even had any
buyers for those homes. Even though exit value accounting is billed as a
conservative approach, there are instances where it is far from conservative.
· Value of a
subsystem of items differs from the sum of the value of its parts. Investors may
be lulled into thinking that the sum of all subsystem net assets valued at
liquidation prices is the value of the system of these net assets. Values may
differ depending upon how the subsystems are diced and sliced in a sale.
· Appraisals of
exit values are both to expensive to obtain for each accounting report date and
are highly subjective and subject to enormous variations of opinion. The U.S.
Savings and Loan scandals of the 1980s demonstrated how reliance upon appraisals
is an invitation for massive frauds. Experiments by some, mostly real estate
companies, to use exit value-based accounting died on the vine, including
well-known attempts decades ago by TRC, Rouse, and Days Inn.
· Exit values are
affected by how something is sold. If quick cash is needed, the best price may
only be half of what the price can be by waiting for the right time and the
right buyer.
· Financial
contracts that for one reason or another are deemed as to be "held-to-maturity"
items may cause misleading increases and decreases in reported values that will
never be realized. A good example is the market value of a fixed-rate bond that
may go up and down with interest rates but will always pay its face value at
maturity no matter what happens to interest rates.
·
Exit value markets are often thin
and inefficient markets.
Economic Value (Discounted Cash Flow, Present
Value) Accounting
There are over 100 instances where present GAAP requires that historical cost
accounting be abandoned in favor of discounted cash flow accounting (e.g., when
valuing pension liabilities and computing fair values of derivative financial
instruments). These apply in situations where future cash inflows and outflows
can be reliably estimated and are attributable to the particular asset or
liability being valued on a discounted cash flow basis.
Advantages of Economic Value (Discounted Cash Flow, Present Value) Accounting
-
Economic value is based upon management's
intended use for the item in question rather than upon some other use such
as disposal (Exit Value) or replacement (Entry Value).
- Economic value conforms
to the economic theory of the firm.
- Real options valuation models in place of present
value models under uncertainty ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/realopt.htm
Disadvantages of Economic Value (Discounted Cash Flow, Present Value)
Accounting
-
How does one allocate a portion of the cash
flows of General Motors to a single welding machine in Tennessee? Or how
does one allocate the portion of the sales price of a single car to the
robot that welded a single hinge on one of the doors? How does one allocate
the price of a bond to the basic obligation, the attached warrants, the call
option in the fine print, and other possible embedded derivatives in the
contract? The problem lies in the arbitrary nature of deciding what system
of assets and liabilities to value as a system rather than individual
components. Then what happens when the system is changed in some way? In
order to see how complex this can become, note the complicated valuation
assumptions in a paper entitled "Implementation of an Option Pricing-Based
Bond Valuation Model for Corporate Debt and Its Components," by M.E. Barth,
W.R. Landsman, and R.J. Rendleman, Jr., Accounting Horizons, December
2000, pp. 455-480.
-
Cash flows are virtually impossible to
estimate except when they are contractually specified. How can Amazon.com
accurately estimate the millions and millions of dollars it has invested in
online software?
-
Even when cash flows can be reliably
estimated, there are endless disputes regarding the appropriate discount
rates.
- Endless disputes arise
as to assumptions underlying economic valuations.
Time versus Money
Question
How does accounting for time differ from accounting for money?
Remember those
Taylor
and
Gilbreth time and motion studies in cost accounting.
How has time accounting changed in the workplace (or should change)?
Studies have shown the alarming extent of the
problem: office workers are no longer able to stay focused on one specific task
for more than about three minutes, which means a great loss of productivity. The
misguided notion that time is money actually costs us money.
"Time Out of Mind," by Stefan Klein, The New York Times, March 7,
2008 ---
Click Here
IN 1784, Benjamin Franklin composed a satire,
“Essay on Daylight Saving,” proposing a law that would oblige Parisians to
get up an hour earlier in summer. By putting the daylight to better use, he
reasoned, they’d save a good deal of money — 96 million livres tournois —
that might otherwise go to buying candles. Now this switch to daylight
saving time (which occurs early Sunday in the United States) is an annual
ritual in Western countries.
Even more influential has been something else
Franklin said about time in the same year: time is money. He meant this only
as a gentle reminder not to “sit idle” for half the day. He might be
dismayed if he could see how literally, and self-destructively, we take his
metaphor today. Our society is obsessed as never before with making every
single minute count. People even apply the language of banking: We speak of
“having” and “saving” and “investing” and “wasting” it.
But the quest to spend time the way we do money is
doomed to failure, because the time we experience bears little relation to
time as read on a clock. The brain creates its own time, and it is this
inner time, not clock time, that guides our actions. In the space of an
hour, we can accomplish a great deal — or very little.
Inner time is linked to activity. When we do
nothing, and nothing happens around us, we’re unable to track time. In 1962,
Michel Siffre, a French geologist, confined himself in a dark cave and
discovered that he lost his sense of time. Emerging after what he had
calculated were 45 days, he was startled to find that a full 61 days had
elapsed.
To measure time, the brain uses circuits that are
designed to monitor physical movement. Neuroscientists have observed this
phenomenon using computer-assisted functional magnetic resonance imaging
tomography. When subjects are asked to indicate the time it takes to view a
series of pictures, heightened activity is measured in the centers that
control muscular movement, primarily the cerebellum, the basal ganglia and
the supplementary motor area. That explains why inner time can run faster or
slower depending upon how we move our bodies — as any Tai Chi master knows.
Time seems to expand when our senses are aroused.
Peter Tse, a neuropsychologist at Dartmouth, demonstrated this in an
experiment in which subjects were shown a sequence of flashing dots on a
computer screen. The dots were timed to occur once a second, with five black
dots in a row followed by one moving, colored one. Because the colored dot
appeared so infrequently, it grabbed subjects’ attention and they perceived
it as lasting twice as long as the others did.
Another ingenious bit of research, conducted in
Germany, demonstrated that within a brief time frame the brain can shift
events forward or backward. Subjects were asked to play a video game that
involved steering airplanes, but the joystick was programmed to react only
after a brief delay. After playing a while, the players stopped being aware
of the time lag. But when the scientists eliminated the delay, the subjects
suddenly felt as though they were staring into the future. It was as though
the airplanes were moving on their own before the subjects had directed them
to do so.
The brain’s inclination to distort time is one
reason we so often feel we have too little of it. One in three Americans
feels rushed all the time, according to one survey. Even the cleverest use
of time-management techniques is powerless to augment the sum of minutes in
our life (some 52 million, optimistically assuming a life expectancy of 100
years), so we squeeze as much as we can into each one.
Believing time is money to lose, we perceive our
shortage of time as stressful. Thus, our fight-or-flight instinct is
engaged, and the regions of the brain we use to calmly and sensibly plan our
time get switched off. We become fidgety, erratic and rash.
Tasks take longer. We make mistakes — which take
still more time to iron out. Who among us has not been locked out of an
apartment or lost a wallet when in a great hurry? The perceived lack of time
becomes real: We are not stressed because we have no time, but rather, we
have no time because we are stressed.
Studies have shown the alarming extent of the
problem: office workers are no longer able to stay focused on one specific
task for more than about three minutes, which means a great loss of
productivity. The misguided notion that time is money actually costs us
money.
And it costs us time. People in industrial nations
lose more years from disability and premature death due to stress-related
illnesses like heart disease and depression than from other ailments. In
scrambling to use time to the hilt, we wind up with less of it.
Continued in article
Theory
Disputes Focus Mainly on the Tip of the Iceberg
(Intangibles and Other Assets and Liabilities Beneath the Surface)
What is important to ship navigators is the giant mass that lies below the
icebergs. If we make an analogy that the financial statements contain only what
appears above the surface, over 99% of the accounting theory disputes have centered on the
top of the icebergs. We endlessly debate how to value what is seen above the surface
and provide investors virtually nothing about the really big stuff beneath the surface.
For example, what difference does it make how Microsoft Corporation values its tangible
assets if 98% of its value lies in intangible assets such as intellectual property, human
resources, market share, and other items of value that accountants do not know how to
value? One can argue that the difference between the capitalized value of
Microsoft's outstanding shares and the reported value of Shareholders' Equity is mostly
due to intangibles that accountants have no idea how to detect and value. If the
goal of accounting is to help investors value a company, it is backwards to value
intangibles from market prices. Our job is to help investors set those prices.
Question
Accountants talk a lot about "intangibles" and accountant inability to usefully
measure intangibles of companies. Economists also talk about intangibles and
economist inability build successful models incorporating intangibles and
externalities that give rise to troublesome omitted variables and
non-convexities in mathematical optimization.
What is the World Bank's definition that gives rise to a claim that "the
average American has access to over $418,000 in intangible wealth, while the
stay-at-home Mexican's intangible wealth is just $34,000?"
"The Secrets of Intangible Wealth: For once the World Bank says
something smart about the real causes of prosperity," by Ronald Bailey,
Reason Magazine, October 5, 2007 ---
http://www.reason.com/news/show/122854.html
A Mexican migrant to the U.S. is five times more
productive than one who stays home. Why is that?
The answer is not the obvious one: This country has more machinery or tools
or natural resources. Instead, according to some remarkable but largely
ignored research—by the World Bank, of all places—it is because the average
American has access to over $418,000 in intangible wealth, while the
stay-at-home Mexican's intangible wealth is just $34,000.
But what is intangible wealth, and how on earth is it measured? And what
does it mean for the world's people—poor and rich? That's where the story
gets even more interesting.
Two years ago the World Bank's environmental economics department set out to
assess the relative contributions of various kinds of capital to economic
development. Its study, "Where is the Wealth of Nations?: Measuring Capital
for the 21st Century," began by defining natural capital as the sum of
nonrenewable resources (including oil, natural gas, coal and mineral
resources), cropland, pasture land, forested areas and protected areas.
Produced, or built, capital is what many of us think of when we think of
capital: the sum of machinery, equipment, and structures (including
infrastructure) and urban land.
But once the value of all these are added up, the economists found something
big was still missing: the vast majority of world's wealth! If one simply
adds up the current value of a country's natural resources and produced, or
built, capital, there's no way that can account for that country's level of
income.
The rest is the result of "intangible" factors—such as the trust among
people in a society, an efficient judicial system, clear property rights and
effective government. All this intangible capital also boosts the
productivity of labor and results in higher total wealth. In fact,
the World Bank finds, "Human capital and the value of institutions (as
measured by rule of law) constitute the largest share of wealth in virtually
all countries."
Once one takes into account all of the world's natural resources and
produced capital, 80% of the wealth of rich countries and 60% of the wealth
of poor countries is of this intangible type. The bottom line: "Rich
countries are largely rich because of the skills of their populations and
the quality of the institutions supporting economic activity."
What the World Bank economists have brilliantly done is quantify the
intangible value of education and social institutions. According to their
regression analyses, for example, the rule of law explains 57 percent of
countries' intangible capital. Education accounts for 36 percent.
The rule-of-law index was devised using several hundred individual variables
measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 25 separate data sources
constructed by 18 different organizations. The latter include civil society
groups (Freedom House), political and business risk-rating agencies
(Economist Intelligence Unit) and think tanks (International Budget Project
Open Budget Index).
Switzerland scores 99.5 out of 100 on the rule-of-law index and the U.S.
hits 91.8. By contrast, Nigeria's score is a pitiful 5.8; Burundi's 4.3; and
Ethiopia's 16.4. The members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development—30 wealthy developed countries—have an average score of 90,
while sub-Saharan Africa's is a dismal 28.
The natural wealth in rich countries like the U.S. is a tiny proportion of
their overall wealth—typically 1 percent to 3 percent—yet they derive more
value from what they have. Cropland, pastures and forests are more valuable
in rich countries because they can be combined with other capital like
machinery and strong property rights to produce more value. Machinery,
buildings, roads and so forth account for 17% of the rich countries' total
wealth.
Overall, the average per capita wealth in the rich Organization for Economic
Cooperation Development (OECD) countries is $440,000, consisting of $10,000
in natural capital, $76,000 in produced capital, and a whopping $354,000 in
intangible capital. (Switzerland has the highest per capita wealth, at
$648,000. The U.S. is fourth at $513,000.)
By comparison, the World Bank study finds that total wealth for the low
income countries averages $7,216 per person. That consists of $2,075 in
natural capital, $1,150 in produced capital and $3,991 in intangible
capital. The countries with the lowest per capita wealth are Ethiopia
($1,965), Nigeria ($2,748), and Burundi ($2,859).
In fact, some countries are so badly run, that they actually have negative
intangible capital. Through rampant corruption and failing school systems,
Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are destroying their
intangible capital and ensuring that their people will be poorer in the
future.
In the U.S., according to the World Bank study, natural capital is $15,000
per person, produced capital is $80,000 and intangible capital is $418,000.
And thus, considering common measure used to compare countries, its annual
purchasing power parity GDP per capita is $43,800. By contrast, oil-rich
Mexico's total natural capital per person is $8,500 ($6,000 due to oil),
produced capital is $19,000 and intangible capita is $34,500—a total of
$62,000 per person. Yet its GDP per capita is $10,700. When a Mexican, or
for that matter, a South Asian or African, walks across our border, they
gain immediate access to intangible capital worth $418,000 per person. Who
wouldn't walk across the border in such circumstances?
The World Bank study bolsters the deep insights of the late development
economist Peter Bauer. In his brilliant 1972 book Dissent on
Development, Bauer wrote: "If all conditions for development other than
capital are present, capital will soon be generated locally or will be
available . . . from abroad. . . . If, however, the conditions for
development are not present, then aid . . . will be necessarily unproductive
and therefore ineffective. Thus, if the mainsprings of development are
present, material progress will occur even without foreign aid. If they are
absent, it will not occur even with aid."
The World Bank's pathbreaking "Where is the Wealth of Nations?" convincingly
demonstrates that the "mainsprings of development" are the rule of law and a
good school system. The big question that its researchers don't answer is:
How can the people of the developing world rid themselves of the kleptocrats
who loot their countries and keep them poor?
Ronald Bailey is Reason's science correspondent. His most recent book,
Liberation Biology: The Scientific and Moral Case for the Biotech Revolution,
is available from Prometheus Books.
Bob Jensen's threads on intangibles from the standpoint of accounting theory
and practice are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes
Intangibles ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intangibles
Externalities ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Externalities
Trivia Question
The fact that open source and free Office Software is getting closer and closer
to quality of MS Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, etc.) software is still not
really threatening Microsoft's worldwide monopoly for its relatively expensive
MS Office software. What is the main intangible that gives MS Office products
such value in world markets?
Jensen's Opinion
I think the main intangible here is the cost of retraining over 90% of the
computer users of the world. Related to this is the difficulty students and
"white-collar workers" will encounter if they do not know how to use MS Office
software when seeking employment. Whereas most of drivers can drive rental cars
of most any manufacturer, computer users who cannot "drive" Excel, Word,
PowerPoint, etc. face tremendous barriers that give rise to the main intangible
asset of Microsoft Corporation. Organizations spent billions in training that
gave rise to billions in intangible assets of Microsoft.
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on August 22, 2008
FASB Seeks to Inform Investors, Not Whack Companies
by Robert
H. Herz
The Wall Street Journal
Aug 18, 2008
Page: A14
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Contingent
Liabilities, Disclosure, Disclosure Requirements, FASB,
Financial Accounting Standards Board
SUMMARY: The
FASB has proposed a change to disclosures associated with
contingent liabilities, including litigation liabilities,
with a document entitled "Disclosure of Certain Loss
Contingencies-an amendment of FASB Statements No. 5 and 141"
and a comment period that ended August 8, 2008. This
proposed Statement would replace and enhance the disclosure
requirements in FASB Statement No. 5, Accounting for
Contingencies, for all outstanding contingencies, both those
recognized on the balance sheet and those contingencies that
would be recognized as liabilities if the criteria for
recognition in paragraph 8 of Statement 5 were met; it as
well applies to contingent liabilities from business
combinations. The proposal would "...(a) expand the
population of loss contingencies that are required to be
disclosed, (b) require disclosure of specific quantitative
and qualitative information about those loss contingencies,
(c) require a tabular reconciliation of recognized loss
contingencies to enhance financial statement transparency,
and (d) provide an exemption from disclosing certain
required information if disclosing that information would be
prejudicial to an entity's position in a dispute." In the
proposal, the FASB states that the project was taken on
because "investors and other users of financial information
have expressed concerns that disclosures about loss
contingencies under the existing guidance ... do not provide
adequate information to assist users of financial statements
in assessing the likelihood, timing, and amount of future
cash flows associated with loss contingencies." Clearly, the
WSJ Opinion page editors disagree with this assessment (see
the related article) and FASB Chairman Bob Herz responds to
their Op-Ed piece.
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: The article is useful for teaching both the
requirements for reporting loss contingencies and the FASB's
due process for new financial reporting standards, including
addressing international convergence efforts.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) Describe the FASB's extensive due
process procedures. What document did the FASB issue? At
what stage of discussion is this proposed financial
reporting change?
2. (Advanced) The WSJ Opinion page editors clearly
dislike the proposed accounting and reporting requirements
for loss contingencies. They cite the fact that "...FASB has
been getting an earful. Senior litigators from 13
companies...have signed a letter to FASB Chairman Robert
Herz, objecting to the plan." Do you find it surprising that
a preponderance of those who write comment letters to the
FASB argue against any particular proposal? Support your
answer.
3. (Introductory) What are the current accounting
and disclosure requirements for loss contingencies? How will
the FASB's proposal change those requirements? Put your
answer into your own words. You may access the FASB document
on its web site at http://www.fasb.org/draft/ed_contingencies.pdf
4. (Advanced) In the related article, the WSJ
Opinion page editors pose the question, "...Why mess with
the current system?...Lawyers, accountants and corporations
are all reasonably comfortable with the way things are." Do
you agree with that assessment? Support your answer.
5. (Advanced) In his response, FASB Chairman Herz
states that "the [FASB] is not proposing that companies
change their current accounting for the cost of ongoing
litigation...[and that] the proposal would not require any
estimates of fair value..." To what statements is Mr. Herz
responding? How might the WSJ Editors have determined that
the notion of "fair value" for a lawsuit is part of the new
requirements?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
RELATED
ARTICLES:
FASB's Lawyer Bonanza
by
Aug 07, 2008
Page: A12
|
"FASB Seeks to Inform Investors, Not Whack Companies," by Robert Herz, The
Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2008; Page A14 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121902212239348497.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
I write in response to your editorial, "FASB's
Lawyer Bonanza" (Review & Outlook, Aug. 7). The Financial Accounting
Standards Board is not proposing that companies change their current
accounting for the cost of ongoing litigation. Rather, our proposal would
require additional disclosure in the footnotes to the financial statements.
It is a proposal, not a "demand," and is subject to our normal extensive
public due process.
Under the proposal, the amount that would be
required to be disclosed is the claim amount, or, if there is no claim
amount, the company's best estimate of its maximum exposure to loss. The
Board attempted to insure the proposal would not require a company to
"[show] its hand to plaintiffs' attorneys" as the editorial says. For
example, the proposal allows companies to aggregate claim amounts, so that
the plaintiffs attorneys would not be able to identify specific cases. We
have also proposed an exemption for certain disclosure situations that would
be clearly prejudicial to the company.
Moreover, the proposed disclosures would not
require any estimates of fair value -- nor does the proposal involve any new
fair value requirements. The words "fair value" are not even contained in
the proposed statement.
It is because of the strong and extensive input
we've received from investors who want greater transparency relating to a
wide range of contingencies -- including litigation -- that we are proposing
these expanded disclosures. The new disclosures are aimed at providing
information earlier to existing and potential investors in order to give
them a greater understanding of the risks companies are facing. We believe
that information would improve their ability to make informed investment
decisions.
Robert H. Herz
Chairman Financial Accounting Standards Board
Norwalk, Conn.
More Reasons Why Tom and I Hate Principles-Based Accounting Standards
"Contingent Liabilities: A Troubling Signpost on the Winding Road to a Single
Global Accounting Standard," by Tom Selling, The Accounting Onion, May 26, 2008
---
Click Here
By the logic of others, which I can’t explain,
fuzzy lines in accounting standards have come to be exalted as
“principles-based” and bright lines are disparaged as “rules-based.” One of
my favorite examples (actually a pet peeve) of this phenomenon is the
difference in the accounting for leases between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. The
objective of the financial reporting game is to capture as much of the
economic benefits of an asset as possible, while keeping the contractual
liability for future lease payments off the balance sheet; a win is scored
an “operating lease,” and a loss is scored a “capital lease.” As in tennis,
If the present value of the minimum lease payments turns out to be even a
hair over the 90% line of the leased asset’s fair value, your shot is out
and you lose the point.
The counterpart to FAS 13 in IFRS is IAS 17, a
putative principles-based standard. It’s more a less a carbon copy of FAS 13
in its major provisions, except that bright lines are replaced with fuzzy
lines: if the present value of the minimum lease payments is a “substantial
portion” (whatever that means) of the leased asset’s fair value, you lose
operating lease accounting. If FAS 13 is tennis, then IAS 17 is
tennis-without-lines. Either way, the accounting game has another twist: the
players call the balls landing on their side of the net; and the only job of
the umpire—chosen and compensated by each player—is to opine on the
reasonableness of their player's call. So, one would confidently expect that
the players of tennis-without- lines have a much lower risk of being
overruled by their auditors… whoops, I meant umpires.
Although lease accounting is one example for which
GAAP is bright-lined and IFRS is the fuzzy one, the opposite is sometimes
the case, with accounting for contingencies under FAS 5 or IAS 37 being a
prime exaple. FAS 5 requires recognition of a contingent liability when it
is “probable” that a future event will result in the occurrence of a
liability. What does “probable” mean? According to FAS 5, it means “likely
to occur.” Wow, that sure clears things up. With a recognition threshold as
solid as Jell-o nailed to a tree and boilerplate footnote disclosures to
keep up appearances, there should be little problem persuading one’s
handpicked independent auditor of the “reasonableness” of any in or out
call.
IAS 37 has a similar recognition threshold for a
contingent liability (Note: I am adopting U.S. terminology throughout, even
though "contingent liabilities" are referred to as "provisions" in IAS 37).
But in refreshing contrast to FAS 5, IAS 37 unambiguously nails down the
definition of “probable” to be “more likely than not” —i.e., just a hair
north of 50%. Naively assuming that companies actually comply with the
letter and spirit of IAS 37, then more liabilities should find their way
onto the balance sheet under IFRS than GAAP. And, IAS 37 also has more
principled rules for measuring a liability, once recognized. But, I won’t
get into that here. Just please take my word for it that IAS 37 is to FAS 5
as steak is to chopped liver.
The Global Accounting Race to the Bottom
And so we have the IASB’s ineffable ongoing
six-year project to make a hairball out of IAS 37. If these two standards,
IAS 37 and FAS 5, are to be brought closer together as the ballyhooed
Memorandum of Understanding between IASB and FASB should portend, it would
make much more sense for the FASB to revise FAS 5 to make it more like IAS
37. After all, convergence isn’t supposed to take forever; even if you don’t
think IAS 37 is perfect, there are a lot more serious problems IASB could be
working harder on: leases, pensions, revenue recognition, securitizations,
related party transactions, just to name a few off the top of my head. But,
the stakeholders in IFRS are evidently telling the IASB that they get their
jollies from tennis without lines. And, the IASB, dependent on the big boys
for funding, is listening real close.
Basically, the IASB has concluded that all present
obligations – not just those that are more likely than not to result in an
outflow of assets – should be recognized. It sounds admirably principled and
ambitious, but there’s a catch. In place of the bright-line probability
threshold in IAS 37, there would be the fuzziest line criteria one could
possibly devise: the liability must be capable of “reliable” measurement. We
know that "probable" without further guidance must at least lie between 0
and 1, but what amount of measurement error is within range of “reliable”?
The answer, it seems, would be left to the whim of the issuer followed by
the inevitable wave-your-hands-in-the-air rubber stamp of the auditor.
It’s not as if the IASB doesn’t have history from
which to learn. Where the IASB is trying to go in revising IAS 37, we’ve
already been in the U.S. The result was all too often not a pretty sight as
unrecognized liabilities suddenly slammed into balance sheets like freight
trains. As I discussed in an earlier post, retiree health care liabilities
were kept off balance sheets until they were about to break unionized
industrial companies. Post-retirement benefits were doled out by earlier
generations of management, long departed with their generous termination
benefits, in order to persuade obstreperous unions to return to the assembly
lines. GM and Ford are now on the verge of settling faustian bargains of
their forbearers with huge cash outlays: yet for decades the amount
recognized on the balance sheet was precisely nil. The accounting for these
liabilities had been conveniently ignored, with only boilerplate disclosures
in their stead, out of supposed concern for reliable measurement. Yet,
everyone knew that zero as the answer was as far from correct as Detroit is
from Tokyo – where, as in most developed countries, health care costs of
retirees are the responsibility of government.
Holding the recognition of a liability hostage to
“reliable” measurement is bad accounting. There is just no other way I can
put it. If this is the way the IASB is going to spend its time as we are
supposed to be moving to a single global standard, then let the race to the
bottom begin.
Bob Jensen's threads on principles-based standards versus rules-based
standards ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#Principles-Based
Bob Jensen's threads on lease accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#Leases
Bob Jensen's threads on synthetic leases ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/00overview/speOverview.htm
A New Type of Intangible Investment (sort of not yet legal in the U.S.)
--- Litigation
How should it be booked and carried in financial statements?
I say "sort of" since this intangible asset might be buried (as Purchased
Goodwill") in acquisition prices when firms are purchased purchased or merged.
The notion of litigation as a separate asset class
is a novel one. It's hard to imagine fund managers one day allotting a bit of
their portfolio to third-party lawsuits, alongside shares, bonds, property and
hedge funds. But some wealthy investors are starting to dabble in lawsuit
investment, bankrolling some or all of the heavy upfront costs in return for a
share of the damages in the event of a win. The London-managed hedge fund MKM
Longboat last month revealed plans to invest $100million (£50.5million) to
finance European lawsuits. Today a new company, Juridica, floats on AIM, having
raised £80million to make litigation bets.
"The law is now an asset class," The London Times, December 21, 2007 ---
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/columnists/article3080766.ece
Jensen Comment
Under U.S. GAAP, intangible assets are generally booked only when purchased and
are not conducive to fair value accounting afterwards. Probably the most serious
problem in both accounting theory and practice is unbooked value (and in many
cases undisclosed) of intangible assets and liabilities. Do the values of human
capital and knowledge capital ring a bell? Does the cost retraining the world's
workforce to use Office software other than Microsoft Office (Word, Excel,
PowerPoint, etc.) ring a bell?
Contingent liabilities (particularly pending lawsuits) are problematic until
the amount of the liability is both reasonably measurable and highly probable.
Until now, contingent litigation assets were not investment assets. Contingent
liabilities were booked as current or past expenses. Now purchased litigation
assets having future value? Horrors!
In the past when a company purchased another company, some of the "goodwill"
value above and beyond the traceable value to net tangible assets could easily
have been the value of future litigation such as when Blackboard acquired WebCT
and WebCT's patents on online education software. Patents and Copyrights may
have value with respect to fending off future competition.
But patents and copyrights may also have value in future litigation regarding
past infringements. Now hedge funds might invest in bringing litigation to
fruition.
Intangible assets and liabilities are, and will forever remain, the largest
problem in accounting theory and practice! In some cases, such as Microsoft
Corporation, booked assets are so miniscule relative to unbooked intangible
assets that the balance sheets are virtually a bad joke.
An enormous problem, besides the fact that current value of intangibles
cannot be counted, current value can change by enormous magnitudes overnight as
new discoveries are made and new legislation is passed, to say nothing of court
decisions. Tangible asset values can also change, but in general they are not as
volatile.
December 25, 2007 reply from Dennis Beresford
[dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]
Bob,
SFAS 141R (available on the FASB web site)
substantially changes the accounting for both contingent assets and
liabilities in connection with business combinations. In fact, 141R coupled
with SFAS 160 on noncontrolling interests makes major changes to both the
accounting for business combinations and the accounting for consolidation
procedures. While the new rules can't be applied until 2009, anyone teaching
advanced accounting or where ever else these topics are covered should throw
out their old lesson plans and be prepared to enter into an entirely new
world of accounting - not for the better in my humble opinion.
By the way, another interesting thing to read on
the FASB web site is the proposal to reduce the size of the FASB and make
some other changes to improve the standard-setting process. We celebrated
our family Christmas a few days ago because of travel plans and I'm working
on my comment letter to the Financial Accounting Foundation today.
Merry Christmas!
Denny
December 25, 2007 reply from Amy Dunbar
[Amy.Dunbar@BUSINESS.UCONN.EDU]
What I found interesting about 141R is the
discussion in the appendices that showed both the FASB and IASB views and
how the Boards reached convergence.
141R also added a couple paragraphs to FIN 48 that
result in goodwill no longer being adjusted if the contingent tax liability
is increased or decreased. Instead the DR is to tax expense, which makes a
lot more sense to me. If I read the statement correctly, the purchased
assets and liabilities are stated at fair value under a recognition, then
measurement principle. Taxes are exempt from those two principles; instead
FAS 109/FIN 48 apply. What I couldn't tell is if the purchaser still has up
to one year (the maximum measurement period) to get the tax contingent
liability right before the DR goes to tax expense. Can anyone help me?
Amy Dunbar
UConn
Jensen Comment
You can download FAS 141(R) from
http://www.fasb.org/st/index.shtml#fas160
"What Good Comes from Goodwill Accounting?" by Tom Selling, The
Accounting Onion, February 18, 2008 ---
http://accountingonion.typepad.com/
In an earlier
post,
I described how SFAS 141R resulted in
some incremental improvements to the
accounting for business combinations.
However, warts remain, and the purposes
of this post is describe the ugliest and
most painful of them all: the accounting
for so-called 'goodwill.'
Here's a simple example to contemplate:
-
Company P determines that Company S
has a value of $1,100, and
negotiates an acquisition for 100%
of its outstanding shares for
$1,000.
-
S has the following assets:
-
Plant and equipment with a fair
value of $200.
-
An assembled workforce with a
fair value of $100.
-
S has no liabilities eligible for
accounting recognition.
-
Company S will be run independently
from Company P; thus, any synergies
created by the acquisition are
negligible.
The root of the problem is literally
that debits (the assets acquired) do not
equal credits (the purchase price).
Business combination accounting is a
collision of fantasy and reality: the
fantasy is that accounting can fully
reflect the economic impact of past
events on an enterprise, and the reality
is that it cannot be so. A balance sheet
produced by even the most principled of
accounting systems imaginable cannot
possibly comprehend the entire set of
economic assets and liabilities. One
example on the asset side would be that
S has been put together in such a way as
to rapidly and inexpensively expand or
contract capacity as market conditions
change. In other words, S holds 'real
options', and the shareholders of S
would want P to pay for them. On the
liability side, not all obligations are
legal, amounts are highly uncertain, and
the probability of payment may be low.
The FASB's solution to the debit and
credit problem is to plug the shortfall
in debits and to weave a fantasy around
it. The plug is euphoniously dubbed
'goodwill' -- to be classified on the
balance sheet as an asset and tested for
impairment at least once each year. In
the above example, the amount reported
as goodwill would be $800 (=$1,000 -
$200).
Whipped Cream on the Balance
Sheet
As described above, the amount reported
as goodwill is, at its best, a
conglomeration of assets offset by
liabilities. Nowhere else in accounting
would there be permitted such a
hodgepodge, and by no other means other
than a narrowly defined 'business
combination' may it -- whatever it
is -- be recognized. But even granting
that offsetting assets with unrelated
liabilities may be permissible, of what
use to investors is the assignment of a
number to something that, by definition,
is beyond description? (Ironically,
even though the value of S's assembled
workforce may be measurable and
significant, separate recognition of
this asset is streng verboten
and kept a dark secret from investors.)
As I have reported in my earlier post,
Walter Schuetze (former SEC Chief
Accountant and FASB member) derisively
characterizes reported goodwill as "the
lump left over." Actually, I think he
was being generous. FAS 141R contains
some significant exceptions to fair
valuation of assets acquired and
liabilities assumed. Thus, the unknown
difference between recorded amounts and
their fair values are shoveled into the
goodwill muddle. As if that weren't
enough, the math of the goodwill
calculation blithely compares apples
with oranges: prices paid with values
received. "Lump", "goodwill" or
whatever name you can think of implies
that the number is associated with
actual attributes, but what we are
dealing with here is nothing more than
just a number--an arbitrary number.
So, dear readers, I hope you are not
disillusioned to realize that 'goodwill'
is invariably anything but. If it must
be recognized at all, let's drop the
obvious pretension and call it what it
is: in this example, "excess of purchase
price over recognized amounts of
identified assets acquired and
liabilities assumed." However, dropping
the pretension is not as easy as it
seems. If a muddle is to be reported as
an asset, it must be subject to an
impairment test; and without a dressy
name that belies the muddle that is
'goodwill', there can be no pretense for
the charade of an impairment test that
is FAS 142.
The Goodwill Impairment Mess
Recognition of goodwill may seem but a
curious anomaly until you get to the
impairment test specified in FAS 142.
It's a real money pit: goodwill has to
be assigned to "reporting units" (a new
concept rife with opportunities for
manipulation); the fair value of each
reporting unit has to be assessed at
least once a year (another opportunity
for manipulation); and the real mayhem
begins if, heaven forbid, you are
required to estimate the "implied fair
value of goodwill" (another new concept
rife with opportunities for
manipulation). The only good that comes
out of goodwill impairment testing are
the jobs created for valuation
consultants, accountants and attorneys.
A Proposed Solution
In olden days, the British permitted a
charge to contributed capital for the
amount that would otherwise have been
recognized as goodwill. While
imperfect, it may well be the only
reasonable solution to the problem; for
as I have shown above, there can be no
perfect solution. If you
can't describe what something is, than
what possible good can come from
purporting to measure it?
By the way, even though business
combinations rules have been somewhat
converged by the issuance of FAS 141R
and a revised IFRS 3, goodwill
impairment remains one of the most
significant differences between IFRS and
U.S. GAAP. The two approaches are
fundamentally at odds, but it should be
said that IFRS's impairment rules are
much less worse. But that's not the
most important point I want to make.
Whatever the merits of the two
approaches, by eliminating goodwill and
the inevitably screwball impairment
tests, standard setters would not only
be improving financial reporting, they
could also say that they have resolved
one of the thorniest convergence
issues.
Tom Selling poses some added Catch 22 issues about goodwill accounting in
"FAS 52: Another Goodwill Charade, and IFRS Convergences To Boot," The
Accounting Onion, February 25, 2008 ---
http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/02/goodwill-at-for.html
Bob Jensen's threads on FAS 141R , contingencies, and intangibles are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes
Some related earlier tidbits:
A New Type of Intangible Investment (sort of not yet legal in the U.S.)
--- Litigation
How should it be booked and carried in financial statements?
I say "sort of" since this intangible asset might be buried (as Purchased
Goodwill") in acquisition prices when firms are purchased purchased or merged.
The notion of litigation as a separate asset class
is a novel one. It's hard to imagine fund managers one day allotting a bit of
their portfolio to third-party lawsuits, alongside shares, bonds, property and
hedge funds. But some wealthy investors are starting to dabble in lawsuit
investment, bankrolling some or all of the heavy upfront costs in return for a
share of the damages in the event of a win. The London-managed hedge fund MKM
Longboat last month revealed plans to invest $100million (£50.5million) to
finance European lawsuits. Today a new company, Juridica, floats on AIM, having
raised £80million to make litigation bets.
"The law is now an asset class," The London Times, December 21, 2007 ---
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/columnists/article3080766.ece
Jensen Comment
Under U.S. GAAP, intangible assets are generally booked only when purchased and
are not conducive to fair value accounting afterwards. Probably the most serious
problem in both accounting theory and practice is unbooked value (and in many
cases undisclosed) of intangible assets and liabilities. Do the values of human
capital and knowledge capital ring a bell? Does the cost retraining the world's
workforce to use Office software other than Microsoft Office (Word, Excel,
PowerPoint, etc.) ring a bell?
Contingent liabilities (particularly pending lawsuits) are problematic until
the amount of the liability is both reasonably measurable and highly probable.
Until now, contingent litigation assets were not investment assets. Contingent
liabilities were booked as current or past expenses. Now purchased litigation
assets having future value? Horrors!
In the past when a company purchased another company, some of the "goodwill"
value above and beyond the traceable value to net tangible assets could easily
have been the value of future litigation such as when Blackboard acquired WebCT
and WebCT's patents on online education software. Patents and Copyrights may
have value with respect to fending off future competition.
But patents and copyrights may also have value in future litigation regarding
past infringements. Now hedge funds might invest in bringing litigation to
fruition.
Intangible assets and liabilities are, and will forever remain, the largest
problem in accounting theory and practice! In some cases, such as Microsoft
Corporation, booked assets are so miniscule relative to unbooked intangible
assets that the balance sheets are virtually a bad joke.
An enormous problem, besides the fact that current value of intangibles
cannot be counted, current value can change by enormous magnitudes overnight as
new discoveries are made and new legislation is passed, to say nothing of court
decisions. Tangible asset values can also change, but in general they are not as
volatile.
December 25, 2007 reply from Dennis Beresford
[dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]
Bob,
SFAS 141R (available on the FASB web site)
substantially changes the accounting for both contingent assets and
liabilities in connection with business combinations. In fact, 141R coupled
with SFAS 160 on noncontrolling interests makes major changes to both the
accounting for business combinations and the accounting for consolidation
procedures. While the new rules can't be applied until 2009, anyone teaching
advanced accounting or where ever else these topics are covered should throw
out their old lesson plans and be prepared to enter into an entirely new
world of accounting - not for the better in my humble opinion.
By the way, another interesting thing to read on
the FASB web site is the proposal to reduce the size of the FASB and make
some other changes to improve the standard-setting process. We celebrated
our family Christmas a few days ago because of travel plans and I'm working
on my comment letter to the Financial Accounting Foundation today.
Merry Christmas!
Denny
December 25, 2007 reply from Amy Dunbar
[Amy.Dunbar@BUSINESS.UCONN.EDU]
What I found interesting about 141R is the
discussion in the appendices that showed both the FASB and IASB views and
how the Boards reached convergence.
141R also added a couple paragraphs to FIN 48 that
result in goodwill no longer being adjusted if the contingent tax liability
is increased or decreased. Instead the DR is to tax expense, which makes a
lot more sense to me. If I read the statement correctly, the purchased
assets and liabilities are stated at fair value under a recognition, then
measurement principle. Taxes are exempt from those two principles; instead
FAS 109/FIN 48 apply. What I couldn't tell is if the purchaser still has up
to one year (the maximum measurement period) to get the tax contingent
liability right before the DR goes to tax expense. Can anyone help me?
Amy Dunbar
UConn
Jensen Comment
You can download FAS 141(R) from
http://www.fasb.org/st/index.shtml#fas160
February 21, 2008 reply from David Fordham, James Madison University
[fordhadr@JMU.EDU]
I'm not up on SFAS 141R, but I have to wonder why
we accountants even bother dibbling around with non-quantifiable amounts
like "utility" and "expectations" and other "value judgments"? We don't
bother with other similar concepts, such as training, collegiality,
preferences, love, aspirations, etc. which also affect the "value of
assets".
I have a rock that I consider very valuable, and a
few other experts who have analyzed it have declared it very valuable (at
least one thinks its more valuable than I do) and the values vary all over
the map, and yet there are others who believe it is worthless, merely an
interesting-looking rock. While I'm willing to part with it for a princely
sum, and several have offered me near that amount, others think we are
foolish. I would be amused to see what happens if I were to list it on my
net worth statement next time I apply for a loan. How valuable is the name
"Exxon"? How valuable is custom software? How valuable is a gold doubloon
retrieved from the Notre-Dame-de-Deliverance, or a lock of wool from Dolly
the sheep?
Instead of "how much", it seems like the question
we *should* be asking is, "Why?"
Aren't these individualized answers? Why do any of
us pretend there is a single right answer, then?
As an aside, a couple of years ago, my wife was
called for jury duty, on a case involving goodwill. A stonemason had decided
to retire and sold his business to his young apprentice. At the time of
sale, the mason had a state-wide reputation, so the transaction involved
considerable goodwill beyond the tools and other tangible assets. Within a
year, the apprentice had gotten lazy, had botched several high-profile jobs,
had alienated customers, and otherwise ruined the company. Several customers
approached the retired mason and asked him to do personal jobs for them,
which he did since there was no non-compete clause in the contract. When the
apprentice tried to sell out to another mason, he wasn't offered but a
fraction of what he'd originally paid. The apprentice sued the mason,
claiming his actions had "impaired the goodwill of the company". The
interesting thing was, the jury was given no definition (none, nada, zip,
zilch) or guidance of what "goodwill" was supposed ! ! to be, only that it
was an asset that could be impaired. There was no explanation of where it
came from, what created it, why it existed, how it could be destroyed, etc.
The jury begged the judge for more guidance, and he claimed he could only
read the lawbooks to them, and the lawbooks contained no definition or other
information which said what goodwill was or how it could be changed. The
jury at first agreed that they could not reach a verdict without more
information, but the judge demanded that they reach one, without any further
guidance. After three days of working "in the dark" with nothing to go on
but opposing lawyers' recognizably-ridiculous claims, they reached a verdict
agreeing that the goodwill had been impaired and the apprentice had been
harmed by the retiree's taking the new jobs. After the trial, when my wife
learned a little bit about it, she was angered that the jury wasn't told so
they could have made a better decision.
The public is under the impression that if
everything goes right, the accounting reports always show the "correct"
number. Why do we continue to deceive them so?
David "Rhetorical Questionmaker" Fordham
February 21, 2008 message from Paul Williams
[Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]
Dilbert recently ran a series of cartoons in which
the pointy-haired boss opines about raising some cash by selling the
Goodwill. When an ex-engineer/cartoonist can so easily see the silliness of
what we try to foist off as "professional expertise", perhaps the public
isn't so deceived as we have deceived ourselves. Makes one nostalgic for the
old days when we argued about "costs" and "market values (entry or exit)".
One might be able to make a case that sufficient evidence is available to
ascertain what something cost or what it could fetch in some broad market.
But fair value?
In the article we are assured that S has an asset
"assembled workforce" worth $100. Just exactly how would one obtain that
$100 cash? On what market do we buy and sell "assembled workforces?" Even if
that were possible (which it isn't, at least not in the US) how long does a
workforce stay assembled? Our NHL franchise is celebrating its 10th
anniversary as the team (assembled workforce) labeled Carolina Hurricanes.
Only one person (Glen Wesley) has been part of that assembled workforce the
entire time. Dozens and dozens of players have come and gone as part of the
"assembled workforce."
In 2002 the team went to the Stanley Cup finals
and, with the team (assembled workforce) intact finished 30th (dead last) in
2003. They did likewise in 2006 and won the Cup and with virtually the same
"assembled workforce" failed to make the playoffs in 2007. The "fair value"
of an assemble workforce seems to be a rather ephemeral thing. To assign a
single number value to it at an arbitrary point in time does seem to an
active that can be nothing other than deceptive.
David raises a most critical issue for a group that
claims some kind of professional expertise. One can entertain the notion
that there could be a coherent "cost" or "market value" accounting, but a
"fair value" accounting? But in the academy we have been speaking for so
long and so matter of factly about earnings expectations and models that
provide those numbers, which are sufficient for scientific precision, that
we have conned ourselves into believing that we actually can provide "fair
values." We abandoned SFAS #33 because "market values" were too difficult to
ascertain with any degree of reliability. But fair values don't have to be
reliable, only relevant to some hypothetical world populated by persons who
don't actually exist (Joe Doodlebugs, e.g.); we can just make them up.
Accountants have been victimized by finance hubris.
There is a significant historical irony in this since the "positivists" (I
can name names but will not do so publicly) dogma was that accounting was
too normative and that concepts like "true and fair" view were
intellectually vacuous because terms like "true" and "fair" were references
to subjective notions. Yet the influence of positive economics on accounting
has produced a system of financial reporting focused on the manufacture of
"fair" values, which in too many cases are the hypothetical products of the
imaginary world of the positive economists. Normative accounting gave us
positive measures. Positive accounting has provided us with normative
measures. A classic example of unintended consequences?
February 21, 2008 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Paul and David,
Actually valuation is at last as easy as it can get. Below is an email
that I received today offering to let me try this little black box in which
I feed in financial statements and out pops the value of the firm. I don't
quite know how the black box deals with intangibles, but maybe there's magic
inside that box.
Actually all valuation experts use magic dust. I protested my land and
home valuations at various times in Maine, Texas, and New Hampshire. In each
case, the appraiser carefully documented square footage, construction
quality, location, view quality, landscape, school district, etc. Good work!
Then each initial appraisal, say V dollars, was multiplied by a mysterious M
coefficient such that my property tax appraisal was T=MV. For example, in
Maine the M was 2.85. When I asked where the 2.85 came from, the appraiser
admitted that he stood in front of my house and used magic dust to set the
value of T. Then he divided T by V to get M. In other words M was truly a
magic dust derivation. I don’t even know why the appraisers bother with
calculating V in the first place. I guess it’s just to make naïve property
owners think the appraiser is earning his fee. In reality, he probably rode
slowly through the neighborhood and calculated T values for each house in
about five minutes or less.
When something similar happened in New Hampshire last year, I carefully
compared in a spreadsheet the difference in the M coefficient between me and
my neighbors having identical views and much newer and bigger homes.
Why was my M coefficient so much larger such that my T real estate
appraisal was so much larger than my neighbors’ T values? My wife called me
the Big M Guy!
I was told by the Sugar Hill Selectmen that the magic dust M coefficients
could not be changed. So I hired a property tax pro who actually got this
issue docketed for court down in the State Capitol of Concord. One day
before the first court hearing, the town’s appraiser sheepishly came to my
home and asked if I would accept a lower magic dust coefficient. We finally
agreed on a revised M coefficient so I guess magic dust can be affected by
new magic the closer you get to your day in court.
Note the magic-dust black box described below in a message from XXXXX. He
doesn’t mention magic dust, but I’m sure its floating around in there just
like snowflakes swirl up when you shake a glass-ball paper weight.
Bob Jensen’s threads on the realities of valuation are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
Bob
February 21, 2008 message from XXXXX
Hi, Bob,
I have been spending time absorbing as much as I
can from the many resources you have about the world of accounting. We have
a server based application that we tout as “our application starts where
accounting software ends.” A bit camp, I agree, but, in truth, that’s what
it does. Input an Income Statement and the
basic P&L info, and we can calculate the value of a business.
Take that and adjust with normalizations to forecast where the business will
be in the future. Then adjust expenses, and apply some basic strategies to
get the profits where you want/hope they should be. Then generate reports,
including monthly line by line budgets to track all the line items as you
move forward. Oh, and calculate Burden rates to guide the pricing of your
product/service to achieve your forecast revenue goals. I have no idea
whether you are at all interested in looking at what we have, but, if so,
let me know and I will be happy to provide you with log in ID and Password.
On a slightly different note…have you ever heard of
K2 Enterprises? If so, can you share any feedback about them with me.
Thanks,
February 22, 2008 reply from Tom Selling
[tom.selling@GROVESITE.COM]
On cost (replacement)
versus (fair) value, Walter Teets and I have written a paper that we
recently submitted to FAJ. The basic thrust is that cost can be
associated with principles-based accounting, and value cannot. That’s
why FAS 157 is rules based and filled with anomalies. You can read the
working paper
here,
or read my blog post that it
was based on
here. Comments,
especially on the working paper, would be much appreciated.
Thomas I. Selling PhD, CPA
602-228-4871 (M)
602-952-9880 x205 (O)
Website:
www.tomselling.com
Weblog:
www.accountingonion.com
Company:
www.grovesite.com
A Sad Time for Corporate Reputations
"Question for Corporate
America: Does Your Reputation Fall into the Liabilities Column on Your Balance
Sheet?" PR Web, June 19, 2006 ---
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2006/6/prweb399939.htm
In a survey conducted among 2,000 participants at
the 2004 Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum, more CEOs said that
corporate reputation, not profitability, was their most important measure of
success. Fortune Magazine calculates that a one-point change on its scale
used to rank its most admired companies translates to a difference of $107
million to a company’s market value.
Lord Levene, Chairman of Lloyd’s of London,
reported in a 2005 speech at the Philadelphia Club that loss of reputation
is now viewed as the second most serious threat to an organization’s
viability. (Business interruption is the first.)An Economist Intelligence
Unit survey ranked reputational risk as the greatest potential threat to an
organization's value. More than 30% of participating CEOs said that
reputational risk represents the greatest potential threat to their
company's market value. Of this same group of CEOs only 11% said that they
had taken any action against the threat.
If these data are not sufficient to jolt companies
into action, there is enough compelling data linking corporate reputation to
corporate performance that should. Fortune Magazine, which has been
publishing the results of its "America’s Most Admired Companies" survey for
20 years, calculates that a change of 1 point on its scale, either
positively or negatively, affects a company's market value by an average of
$107 million. The results of another study published in 2003 in Management
Today, Britain's leading monthly business magazine, demonstrate a clear
correlation between corporate reputation and equity return. Using existing
data from Fortune’s surveys to construct portfolios of the most and least
admired companies, the authors found that for the five years following
Fortune’s publication of the results, the portfolios of the most admired
companies had cumulative returns of 126% while those of the least admired
had cumulative returns of 80%.
"While executives may choose to spend time
analyzing these data and poking holes in research methodologies in order to
dismiss reputation as a strategic priority," says Wallace, "the effort would
simply provide another diversion from addressing the problem head-on. The
fact that corporate America's sullied reputation has lead to such dramatic
legislative change in the form of the Sarbannes-Oxley Act, and that it has
become routine front-page news, is as telling as any data. No company wants
bad press, but it may finally be what convinces American business that, left
unmanaged, a company’s reputation can become a terminal liability."
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on proposed reforms are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudProposedReforms.htm
Say what?
Why bother entering into contracts that are not enforceable?
Do unenforceable contracts create emerging problems in accounting theory and in
practice?
"The Best Way to Construct Unenforceable Contracts," by Erica Plambeck,
Stanford Graduate School of Business Newsletter, April 2007 ---
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/mfg_plambeck_contracts.shtml
Strong relationships are frequently more important
than legally binding contracts when companies outsource key operational
activities.
Researchers say that as more firms form
international relationships—particularly in innovation-intensive industries
such as biopharmaceuticals or high tech—ironclad legal agreements can be
impractical, if not impossible. Overburdened court systems around the world
and the growing complexity of the types of collaborative deals being forged
mean that increasingly firms rely on the threat of loss of future business
rather than the court system to enforce those deals.
“When an innovative product is under development
and a supplier must invest in capacity up front, it can be difficult—if not
impossible—to write a court-enforceable contract that specifies exactly what
will be delivered,” says Erica Plambeck, associate professor of operations,
information, and technology at the Stanford Graduate School of Business.
For example, she says, electronics giant Toshiba is
continually making design changes, frequently substantial ones, throughout
the development process. If Toshiba’s suppliers delayed making capacity
investment for manufacturing a new product until the design was finalized
and a court-enforceable procurement contract could be negotiated, Toshiba
would miss the small windows of opportunity that the consumer electronics
market allows for releasing state-of-the-art products. Therefore, Toshiba
needs suppliers to build capacity early, without a contract. In a one-off
transaction, a supplier would be likely to build far too little capacity,
anticipating that Toshiba would attempt to negotiate a low price for
production once the capacity investment was made. But within the context of
an ongoing, cooperative relationship, Toshiba could offer more generous
compensation, and convince the supplier to expand its capacity—and both
firms’ profits—even without a contract.
Alternatively, she says, there are cases where
assurances about the quality or quantity of output cannot be legally
enforceable. “Frequently, producing a viable product depends on the
collaborative efforts of both parties, and it’s difficult to determine fault
if something goes wrong,” she says. A case in point: A biopharmaceutical
firm could hand over genetically modified cells and the liquid medium in
which to multiply them to a supplier, who then would be responsible for
managing that fermentation process to produce a therapeutic protein. If the
protein yield is unexpectedly low, a court would have difficulty determining
whether the cells and medium were of poor quality or the supplier made
mistakes in managing the fermentation process.
“This kind of complicated business arrangement can
be difficult to specify in a contract in a manner that a court could
enforce,” says Plambeck. “Under such conditions, an ongoing relationship
between partners is critical to cooperation.”
Plambeck has written a series of papers on
so-called relational contracts—agreements enforced by the value of the
ongoing cooperative relationship—research she has conducted with Terry
Taylor, an associate professor in the business school at Columbia
University. Plambeck became interested in relational contracts after
realizing that there was an almost universal assumption in the operations
and supply chain management literature that all contracts were
court-enforced.
“By recognizing that the strength of incentives for
investment in design, capacity, and inventory are limited by the value of
the future business, one obtains qualitatively different managerial insights
and policies for operations and supply chain management,” she says. There is
a rich body of economics research in this area—indeed, it was a Stanford
economics professor, Robert Gibbons (now at MIT) who coined the phrase
“relational contracts.” Plambeck and Taylor build on this existing work by
taking the abstract idea of relational contracts and applying it to dynamic
problems of collaborative product development, capacity, production, and
inventory management.
Plambeck has some high-level recommendations for
managers.
Continued in article
Accounting Theory: The Vexing Problem of
Contingent Liabilities and Environmental Risk
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review
on November 2, 2007
BP Settles Charges, Submits to Watchdogs
by Ann
Davis, Amir Efrati, Matthew Dalton and Guy Chazan
The Wall Street Journal
Oct 26, 2007
Page: A3
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119332810057671536.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
TOPICS: Advanced
Financial Accounting, Contingent Liabilities, Environmental
Cleanup Costs
SUMMARY: "[British
Petroleum] BP PLC put a host of legal threats behind it with
far-reaching federal settlements yesterday [10/24/2007] and
$373 million in fines and restitution...The British energy
firm agreed to plead guilty to environmental crimes and
agreed to a three-year probation connected to a fatal
accident in Texas and an oil spill in Alaska." The article
describes the expected impact on BP PLC's operations; the
questions in this review focus on the company's Form 20-F
contingent liability disclosures, including environmental
and other contingent liabilities.
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: Environmental liabilities and other
contingencies are discussed in this article.
QUESTIONS:
1.) The article states that BP PLC (British Petroleum) "put
a host of legal threats behind it" through a settlement with
U.S. government authorities and fines. Summarize the legal
issues facing the company and the settlement that was
reached.
2.) In general, where can you find information about the
likely financial impact of legal and environmental issues
facing any company? Describe the authoritative literature
requiring disclosure of this information.
3.) BP PLC uses the term "provisions" in their corporate
balance sheet, rather than "contingent liabilities." What is
the meaning of the term "provisions"?
4.) Specifically investigate the extent of the legal and
environmental issues facing BP PLC by examining their annual
report filed on Form 20-F with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, available at:
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/313807/000115697307000346/b848881-20f.htm#p85
How extensive are the liabilities associated with these
issues, as measured on December 31, 2006?
5.) Examine footnote 40 to further investigate these
liabilities. What are the 3 major categories of provisions
for estimated liabilities recorded by BP PLC? How do they
estimate the amounts recorded for these liabilities?
6.) Which category of provisions do you think will be
impacted by the settlement, based on the disclosures in the
December 31, 2006, year end financial statements and the
description of the settlement in the article?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
|
Tom Selling in his Accounting Onion Blog has a really nice piece on
January 24, 2008 entitled "Peeling the Onion on the New Business Combination
Standards: FAS 141R and FAS 160" ---
This post examines the onion skin, if you will, of
the new business combination standards. I'm going to explain the differences
between the so-called 'purchase' method of accounting and the new
'acquisition' method. As is my habit, let's begin with a simple example.
Assume that ParentCo acquires 70% of the
outstanding shares of SubCo for $1,000. Additional facts are as follows:
ParentCo estimates that the fair value of 100% of
SubCo is $1,405: You should note that the fair value of SubCo may not
ordinarily be calculated by extrapolating the purchase price paid to the
remaining shares outstanding (i.e., $1,000/70% = $1,429 is not ordinarily
the fair value). The reason is that a portion of the purchase price contains
a payment for the ability to exercise control. In this case, the control
premium would be $55, calculated as follows: ($1000 - .7($1405))/(1-.7) =
$55
It may be difficult to estimate the control
premium, because it may have to be derived from an estimate of the full fair
value of the acquired company, as above. But the new requirement to do so
has not been controversial. That's because the larger the control premium,
the lower will be goodwill. The book value of SubCo's assets and liabilities
approximate their book value, except for one asset with a remaining useful
life of 10 years. For that asset, the fair value exceeds the book value by
$100.
FINANCIAL REPORTING: MORE SCIENCE, LESS ART
Governments and investors alike now demand more
financial transparency from public companies. And, given the impressive
evolution of technology and business practices, there is no excuse for reporting
that is anything but spot-on. Intangible factors that are not taken into account
when following U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (G.A.A.P.) -- such
as brand value, intellectual capital, growth expectations and forecasts, and
corporate citizenship -- are now being recognized as important drivers of
shareholder value. A new white paper from Accenture explores "Enhanced Business
Reporting" as a means for businesses to gain and communicate a clearer picture
of company goals and performance.
Frank D'Andrea, "FINANCIAL REPORTING: MORE SCIENCE, LESS ART," Double Entries,
September 21, 2005 ---
http://accountingeducation.com/news/news6481.html
The Accenture report is at
http://www.accenture.com/xdoc/en/ideas/outlook/6_2005/pdf/share_value.pdf
Gore and Blood
We see a lot of snide remarks and jokes about Al Gore the conservative media,
and he (like his counterpart George W. Bush) has made some rather dumb remarks
in highly boring speeches. But when teamed up with the former head of Goldman
Sachs Asset Management, Gore and Blood (not the best of last name combinations)
produced a rather good, albeit short, article about some severe accounting
limitations.
I commend The Wall Street Journal for carrying this
piece which I would normally expect to appear in the more liberal media.
"For People and Planet: When will companies start
accounting for environmental costs?" by Al gore and David Blood, The Wall
Street Journal, March 28, 2006 ---
http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110008151
Capitalism and sustainability are deeply and
increasingly interrelated. After all, our economic activity is based on the
use of natural and human resources. Not until we more broadly "price in" the
external costs of investment decisions across all sectors will we have a
sustainable economy and society.
The industrial revolution brought enormous
prosperity, but it also introduced unsustainable business practices. Our
current system for accounting was principally established in the 1930s by
Lord Keynes and the creation of "national accounts" (the backbone of today's
gross domestic product). While this system was precise in its ability to
account for capital goods, it was imprecise in its ability to account for
natural and human resources because it assumed them to be limitless. This,
in part, explains why our current model of economic development is
hard-wired to externalize as many costs as possible.
Externalities are costs created by industry but
paid for by society. For example, pollution is an externality which is
sometimes taxed by government in order to make the entity responsible
"internalize" the full costs of production. Over the past century, companies
have been rewarded financially for maximizing externalities in order to
minimize costs.
Today, the global context for business is clearly
changing. "Capitalism is at a crossroads," says Stuart Hart, professor of
management at Cornell University. We agree, and we think the financial
markets have a significant opportunity to chart the way forward. In fact, we
believe that sustainable development will be the primary driver of
industrial and economic change over the next 50 years. The interests of
shareholders, over time, will be best served by companies that maximize
their financial performance by strategically managing their economic,
social, environmental and ethical performance. This is increasingly true as
we confront the limits of our ecological system to hold up under current
patterns of use. "License to operate" can no longer be taken for granted by
business as challenges such as climate change, HIV/AIDS, water scarcity and
poverty have reached a point where civil society is demanding a response
from business and government. The "polluter pays" principle is just one
example of how companies can be held accountable for the full costs of doing
business. Now, more than ever, factors beyond the scope of Keynes's national
accounts are directly affecting a company's ability to generate revenues,
manage risks, and sustain competitive advantage. There are many examples of
the growing acceptance of this view.
In the corporate sector, companies like General
Electric are designing products to enable their clients to compete in a
carbon-constrained world. Novo Nordisk is taking a holistic view of
combating diabetes not only through treatment but also through prevention.
And Whole Foods and others are addressing the demand for quality food by
sourcing local and organic produce. Importantly, the business response is
about making money for shareholders, not altruism.
In the nongovernmental sector, organizations such
as World Resources Institute, Transparency International, the Coalition for
Environmentally Responsible Economies (Ceres) and AccountAbility are helping
companies explore how best to align corporate responsibility with business
strategy.
Over the past five years we have seen markets begin
to incorporate the external cost of carbon dioxide emissions. This is
happening through pricing mechanisms (price per ton of carbon dioxide) and
government-supported trading platforms such as the European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme in Europe. Even without a regulatory framework in the U.S.,
voluntary markets are emerging, such as the Chicago Climate Exchange and
state-level initiatives such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.
These market mechanisms increasingly enable companies to calculate project
returns and capital expenditures decisions with the price of carbon dioxide
fully integrated.
The investment community has also started to
respond. For example, the Enhanced Analytics Initiative, an international
collaboration between asset owners and managers, encourages investment
research that considers the impact of extrafinancial issues on long-term
company performance. The Equator Principles, designed to help financial
institutions manage environmental and social risk in project financing, have
now been adopted by 40 banks, which arrange over 75% of the world's project
loans. In addition, the rise in shareholder activism and the growing debate
on fiduciary responsibility, governance legislation and reporting
requirements (such as the Global Reporting Initiative and the EU Business
Review) indicate the mainstream incorporation of sustainability concerns.
While we are seeing evidence of leading public companies adopting
sustainable business practices in developed markets, there is still a long
way to go to make sustainability fully integrated and therefore truly
mainstream. A short-term focus still pervades both corporate and investment
communities, which hinders long-term value creation.
As some have said, "We are operating the Earth like
it's a business in liquidation." More mechanisms to incorporate
environmental and social externalities will be needed to enable capital
markets to achieve their intended purpose--to consistently allocate capital
to its highest and best use for the good of the people and the planet.
Mr. Gore, a former vice president of the United States, is chairman of
Generation Investment Management. Mr. Blood, formerly head of Goldman Sachs
Asset Management, is managing partner of Generation Investment Management,
which he co-founded with Mr. Gore.
"Kyoto? No Go. How to combat "global warming" without destroying the
economy," by Pete Du Pont, The Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2006
---
http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/pdupont/?id=110008113
What we teach just won't float?
Quite a few of you out there, like me, are trying to teach analysis of
financial statements and business analysis and valuation from books like Penman
or Palepu,
Healy, and Bernard. The current task of valuing MCI illustrates
how frustrating this can be in the real world and how financial statement
analysis that we teach, along with the revered Residual Income and Free Cash
Flow Models, are often Titanic tasks in rearranging the deck chairs on sinking
models. If you've not attempted valuations with these models I suggest
that you begin with my favorite case study:
"Questrom vs. Federated Department
Stores, Inc.: A Question of Equity Value," May 2001 edition of
Issues in Accounting Education, by University of Alabama faculty members Gary
Taylor, William Sampson, and Benton Gup, pp. 223-256.
In spite of all the sophistication in
models, it is ever so common for intangibles and forecasting problems to sink
the valuation models we teach.
My threads on valuation are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
A question I always ask my students
is: What is the major thing that has to be factored in when valuing
Microsoft Corporation?
The answer I'm looking for is certainly
not product innovation or something similar to that. The answer is also
not customer loyalty, although that probably is a huge factor. The big
factor is the massive cost of retraining the entire working world in something
that replaces MS Office products (Excel, Word, PowerPoint, Outlook, etc.).
It simply costs too much to retrain workers in MS Office substitues even if we
are so sick of security problems in Micosoft's systems. How do you
factor this "customer lock-in" into a Residual Income or FCF
Model? Our models are torpedoed by intangibles in the real world.
MCI's customer base is another torpedo
for valuation models. Here the value seems to lie in a "web of
corporate customers." And nobody seems to be able to value that.
"Valuing MCI in an Industry Awash in Questions," by Matt Richtel, The
New York Times, February 9, 2005 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/09/business/09phone.html
Industry bankers and accountants are trying to answer
just that: What is the value of MCI, a company for which Qwest Communications
has already made a tentative offer of about $6.3 billion, and on which Verizon
Communications has been running the numbers. Conversations between MCI and
Qwest have been suspended since late last week, and Verizon has yet to make a
formal offer, people close to the negotiations say.
Most analysts say MCI's extensive network assets in
this country and Europe may have diminishing value because of the industry's
continued capacity glut. Instead, they say, MCI's
worth lies more in its web of corporate customers.
But as MCI's revenue continues to tumble, the real
trick for the accountants is trying to forecast the future. Can the company meet
its stated goal of achieving profitable growth as a telecommunications company
emphasizing Internet technology before the bottom falls out of its traditional
voice and data business?
Continued in article
What we teach just won't float?
Quite a few of you out there, like me, are trying to teach analysis of
financial statements and business analysis and valuation from books like Penman
or Palepu,
Healy, and Bernard. The current task of valuing Amazon illustrates
how frustrating this can be in the real world and how financial statement
analysis that we teach, along with the revered Residual Income and Free Cash
Flow Models, are often Titanic tasks in rearranging the deck chairs on sinking
models.
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on
February 11, 2005
TITLE: Amazon's Net Is Curtailed by Costs
REPORTER: Mylene Mangalindan
DATE: Feb 03, 2005
PAGE: A3
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110735918865643669,00.html
TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Statement Analysis, Income Taxes,
Managerial Accounting, Net Operating Losses
SUMMARY: Amazon "...had forecast that profit margins would rise in the
fourth quarter, while Wall Street analysts had expected margins to remain
about the same." The company's operating profits fell in the fourth
quarter from 7.9% of revenue to 7%. The company's stock price plunged
"14% in after-hours trading."
QUESTIONS:
1.) "Amazon said net income rose nearly fivefold, to $346.7 million, or
82 cents a share, from $73.2 million, or 17 cents a share a year
earlier." Why then did their stock price drop 14% after this
announcement?
2.) Refer to the related article. How were some analysts' projections borne
out by the earnings Amazon announced?
3.) One analyst discussed in the related article, Ken Smith, disagrees with
the majority of analysts' views as discussed under #2 above. Do you think that
his viewpoint is supported by these results? Explain.
4.) Summarize the assessments made in answers to questions 2 and 3 with the
way in which Amazon's operating profits as a percentage of sales turned out
this quarter.
5.) Amazon's results "included a $244 million gain from tax benefits,
stemming from Amazon's heavy losses earlier in the decade." What does
that statement say about the accounting treatment of the deferred tax benefit
for operating loss carryforwards when those losses were experienced? Be
specific in describing exactly how these tax benefits were accounted for.
6.) Why does Amazon adjust out certain items, including the tax gain
described above, in assessing their earnings? In your answer, specifically
state which items are adjusted out of earnings and why that adjustment might
be made. What is a general term for announcing earnings in this fashion?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
--- RELATED ARTICLES ---
TITLE: Web Sales' Boom Could Leave Amazon Behind
REPORTER: Mylene Mangalindan
ISSUE: Jan 21, 2005
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110627113243532202,00.html
Bob
Jensen's threads on valuation are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on March 10,
2006
TITLE: Troll Call
REPORTER: Bruce Sewell
DATE: Mar 06, 2006
PAGE: A14
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114161297437490081.html
TOPICS: Accounting, Intangible Assets
SUMMARY: The author describes issues on both sides of patent disputes, based
on his experience as general counsel for Intel Corp., and relates them to the
patent infringement suit settlement by RIM.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What have been the events leading up to RIM (the company behind BlackBerry
hand held devices) paying $615 million to NTP? On what basis has that amount
increased over time? You may refer to the related articles to get a sense of
that issue.
2.) What are the accounting issues related to intellectual property? List all
that you can think of. How are these issues related to patent rights and
disputes as described in the article?
3.) How has RIM been accounting for the cost of defending against the patent
infringement suit by NTP? Determine the answer to this question based on
information in the second related article.
4.) What are the author' s proposals for reforming patent infringement law?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
--- RELATED ARTICLES ---
TITLE: BlackBerry maker Agrees to Settle Patent Dispute
REPORTER: Mark Heinzl
PAGE: B4
ISSUE: Mar 17, 2005
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111098088750681042,00.html
TITLE: BlackBerry Case Could Spur Patent-Revision efforts
REPORTER: Mark Heinzl
PAGE: B4
ISSUE: Mar 06, 2006
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114160263279289921.html
"Troll Call," by Bruce Sewell, The Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2006;
Page A14 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114161297437490081.html
RIM, the company that brings BlackBerry service to
four million subscribers, finally caved in to the threat of losing its
business. It paid NTP, a small patent holding company reputedly comprised of
just one inventor and one patent lawyer, $615 million to settle a four-year
patent dispute. For NTP it was like winning the lottery, but for the rest of
us, and for business in particular, it stinks. NTP used the patent system,
and the threat of shutting down BlackBerry service, to play chicken with RIM
and millions of BlackBerry users around the world. Unless the courts or
Congress do something to stop this kind of gamesmanship, we're only going to
see more cases like this.
NTP doesn't have a competitive product. It isn't
even in the business of making products. It's one of a large number of
companies known as patent trolls. Trolls acquire and use patents just to sue
companies that actually make products and generate revenue. A patent without
a product isn't worth much, whereas a patent tied to a revenue stream,
particularly someone else's, is a whole different matter. RIM was the best
thing that ever happened to NTP, because by last Friday the only question
left was how much of RIM's pie NTP could get.
The distressing part of this picture is that RIM's
contribution of complementary technologies, business acumen, product R&D and
marketing is what "enabled" the NTP invention to achieve commercial
relevance. The right question is: What would be a fair royalty for NTP,
given its contribution of the patent and RIM's contribution of everything
else? Unfortunately, that isn't where this case ended up. Because NTP had
the presumptive right to obtain an injunction against RIM and stop it dead
in its tracks, the issue on the table wasn't the value of NTP's patent in
the context of RIM's business; instead, it was the total value of RIM's
business. "Pay me a lot or lose everything" hardly leads to rational
settlements. Is this really what we want from our patent system?
At Intel, I see this problem every day and from
both sides of the fence. Intel owns a considerable portfolio of patents and
we believe strongly that inventors are entitled to fair compensation for
their efforts. But Intel is also a target for patent trolls because we run a
successful business. The fact that success creates leverage for trolls to
extract value above and beyond the true contribution of the patented
invention just doesn't seem quite . . . American.
Things got so lopsided in the world of patent
litigation not on account of the patent statute itself but from case law,
which has become increasingly protective of patent owners and tolerant of
excessive damages arguments by plaintiffs' lawyers. Our patent laws are
supposed to be about proliferation of technology. If there is actual
competition between patent owner and infringer, an injunction may be
appropriate -- it protects the patent owner's right to exclusivity and does
not deprive society of the benefits of the technology. On the other hand, if
the patent owner has not commercialized the invention, blocking others from
using it is a loss for all of us. The right to an injunction also needs to
be tempered by a commonsense look at how much real value the patented
technology adds to the whole commercial product. A fundamental invention
deserves greater value than a relatively minor tweak to work that went
before it. A broad application of the injunction remedy makes all patents
"crucial," whether they are or not.
What I'm suggesting here is not all that radical.
These concepts are already embedded in our patent laws; but unfortunately
they have been buried beneath the wrongheaded notion that all patents should
be treated equally.
There is a glimmer of hope. The Supreme Court will
hear eBay v. MercExchange, in which eBay faces the threat of an injunction
from MercExchange, a patent-holding company without a competitive product in
the online auction space. The eBay case is an opportunity for the highest
court to take the judiciary back to the language of the patent statute and
remind judges that they don't have to grant injunctions in every patent
case. Judges have the right to balance the interests of patent plaintiffs
with those of the defendant, and society at large. It may be with just a
touch of irony that we'll read about the eBay case on our now more costly
BlackBerries.
When do contingencies become liabilities and when should they be booked?
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on August 25,
2005
TITLE: Merck Loss Jolts Drug Giant, Industry: In Landmark Vioxx Case, Jury
Tuned Out Science, Explored Coverup Angle
REPORTER: Heather Won Tesoriero, Ilan Brat, Gary McWilliams, and Barbara
Martinez
DATE: Aug 22, 2005
PAGE: A1
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB112447069284018316,00.html
TOPICS: Contingent Liabilities, Disclosure, Accounting, Disclosure Requirements
SUMMARY: Merck lost its first case defending against a claim of death
stemming from the drug Vioxx. The company faces thousands of lawsuits over Vioxx
following the drug's removal from the market, but many observers had felt the
company had an ironclad defense in this one because the patient's cause of death
was not a risk identified in the drug's clinical trials. The primary article
describes the process of the lawsuit while the related articles post two
viewpoints on investment in the company's stock. (The first of those uses the
term "Stock Dividend" in its title when the author actually is referring to a
cash dividend.) Questions also ask students to examine Merck's most recent
quarterly filing for disclosures about the litigation.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Access Merck's most recent 10-Q filing with the SEC. You may do so through
the on-line version of this article by clicking on Merck & Co. under Companies
in the right hand side of the page, then clicking on SEC Filings under Web
Resources on the left hand side of the page, then choosing the 10-Q filed on
8/8/2005. Find all disclosures related to the recall of Vioxx and summarize the
various financial implications of this drug's withdrawal.
2.) What costs were recorded when the company issued the Vioxx recall?
Prepare summary journal entries based on the information in the financial
statement disclosures.
3.) What information is disclosed about the Ernst case on which the main
article reports? What accounting standard promulgates required accounting for
litigation cases such as these that Merck faces?
4.) Based on their disclosure as of the 8/8/2005 filing date, what do you
think was the company's assessment of the potential outcome of this case?
Support your answer with reference to the accounting standard identified in
answer to question 3 above.
5.) Based on the discussion in the end of the first related article, how are
analysts using the information in Merck's footnote disclosures? What do they
estimate from that information?
6.) Compare the arguments made in the two related articles about the
desirability of holding Merck stock at this point. Which argument do you
believe? Support your answer.
7.) What is incorrect about the use of the term "stock dividend" in the title
of the first related article?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
--- RELATED ARTICLES ---
TITLE: Merck's Stock Dividend May Ease Vioxx Pain
REPORTER: Barbara Martinez
PAGE: C1
ISSUE: Aug 24, 2005
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB112484944952621498,00.html
TITLE: First Vioxx Verdict Casts Doubt on Merck, But Not the Industry
REPORTER: James B.Stewart
PAGE: D2
ISSUE: Aug 24, 2005
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB112483560740621188,00.html
From Paul Pacter's IAS Plus on October 28, 2005 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
We have posted the Deloitte
Letter of Comment on Proposed Amendments to IAS 37 Provisions,
Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets (PDF 47k). On 30 June 2005, the
IASB proposed to amend IAS 37 (and to retitle it Non-financial Liabilities)
and complementary limited amendments to IAS 19 Employee Benefits. The
amendments to IAS 37 would change the conceptual approach to recognising
non-financial liabilities by requiring recognition of all obligations that
meet the definition of a liability in the IASB’s Framework, unless they
cannot be measured reliably. Uncertainty about the amount or timing of
settlement would be reflected in measuring the liability instead of (as is
currently required) affecting whether it is recognised.
Our response states:
With the exception of the proposals for
restructuring provisions, we do not support the ED, which we see as
largely unnecessary. In our view, the majority of the Board's proposals
are premature and pre-judge matters that should be discussed in the
context of the review of the IASB Framework rather than as an amendment
of IAS 37. We think that IAS 37 is operating satisfactorily within the
current operating model and environment. In addition, we do not think
that the Board's choice of a single measurement attribute is
appropriate. As such, we find the majority of the changes proposed in
the ED fail to achieve an improvement in financial reporting.
What lies below the surface of the financial reporting icebergs?
- The giant portion of the bulk of value (or negative value in the case of huge pending
liabilities) lies in intangibles such as intellectual property assets and liabilities,
human resource assets and liabilities (including unions who are militant in negotiating
higher benefits every time the company has some success, items valued at virtually zero on
the balance sheet (including in-process R&D, patents, copyrights, trademarks,
franchise rights, etc.)
The knowledge capital estimates that Lev and
Bothwell came up with during their run last fall of some 90 leading companies (see
accompanying table) were absolutely huge. Microsoft,
for example, boasted a number of $211 billion, while Intel,
General
Electric and Merck
weighed in with $170 billion, $112 billion and $110 billion, respectively. Source:
"The New Math," by Jonathan R. Laing, Barrons Online, November 20, 2000 --- http://equity.stern.nyu.edu/News/news/levbarrons1120.html
Trinity students may go to J:\courses\acct5341\readings\levNov2000.htm
|
- Market share momentum and trend, especially in terms of "rival
assets.". For example, the huge market share of Microsoft Office products makes
it extremely expensive for customers to change. For example, think of the retraining
that would have to take place if Trinity University ordered abandonment of Microsoft
Office products presently used by literally all departments on campus. The American
Airlines Sabre system has the major market share in terms of worldwide databases for
airline ticketing on the major airlines of the world. Lev reports that the SABRE
system accounts for far more market value than all of AMR Corporations other assets.
.In October 1996, AMR Corp. sold 18% of its
computer-reservations system, called SABRE, to the public. It held on to the remaining
82%. That one transaction provides a beautiful way of evaluating tangible and intangible
assets. When I recently checked the market, SABRE constituted 50% of AMR's value. This is
mind-boggling! You have one of the largest airlines in the world, with roughly 700 jets in
its fleet, nearly 100,000 employees, and exclusive and valuable landing rights in the
world's most heavily trafficked airports. On the other hand, you have a
computer-reservation system. It's a good system that's used by a lot of people, but it's
just a computer system nonetheless. And this system is valued as much as the entire
airline. Now, what makes this asset -- the computer system -- so valuable? One big difference is that when you're dealing with tangible assets, your
ability to leverage them -- to get additional business or value out of them -- is limited.
You can't use the same airplane on five different routes at the same time. You can't put
the same crew on five different routes at the same time. And the same goes for the
financial investment that you've made in the airplane.
But there's no limit to the number of people who can use AMR
Corp.'s SABRE system at once: It works as well with 5 million people as it does with 1
million people. The only limit to your ability to leverage a knowledge asset is the size
of the market.
Economists call physical assets "rival assets" --
meaning that users act as rivals for the specific use of an asset. With an airplane,
you've got to decide which route it's going to take. But knowledge assets aren't rivals.
Choosing isn't necessary. You can apply them in more than one place at the same time. In
fact, with many knowledge assets, the more places in which you apply them, the larger the
return. With many knowledge assets, you get what economists call "increasing returns
to scale." That's one key to intangible assets: The larger the network of users, the
greater the benefit to everyone.
Source: "New Math for the New Economy," by Alan M. Webber, Fast Company,
January/February, 2000 --- http://pf.fastcompany.com/online/31/lev.html
Trinity students may go to J:\courses\acct5341\readings\levJan2000.htm
|
- Purchase commitments that are not valued on the balance sheet. Sometimes these are
enormous in terms of contract value. However, long-term purchase commitments can
often be broken for damages amounts far below the contracted values (because the damages
from breach of contract may be very small on very long term contracts).
- OBSF items that firms are still able to scheme through clever contract
terminologies. These include employee compensation that is not booked.
- Contingency claims may be gigantic relative to booked debt. Even if a company has
a good defense against lawsuits, the frequency of lawsuits may drown it in litigation
costs such as the litigation costs of tobacco companies and pharmaceutical producers.
On August 28, 2002, the FASB met with representatives from the Financial
Valuation Group and the Phillips-Hitchner firm to discuss valuation of
intangible assets. See our news item for access to their presentation. More
details in our full news item at http://accountingeducation.com/news/news3225.html
Companies will have to place intangible assets, such as customer lists and
customer back orders, in their financial statements, under proposals released
last week by the International Accounting Standards Board --- http://www.smartpros.com/x36285.xml
Question
What is cookie jar accounting and why is it generally a bad thing in financial
reporting?
Answer
Cookie jar is more formally known as earnings reserve accounting where
management manipulates the timings of earnings and expenses usually to smooth
reported earnings and prevent shocks up and down in the perceived stability of
the company. European companies in the past notoriously put deferred earnings in
"cookie jars" so as to picture themselves as solid by covering bad times with
deferrals out of the cookie jar that mitigate the bad news and vice versa for
good times. The problem with too much in the way of a good time (in terms of
financial reporting) is that accelerated growth rates in one year cannot
generally be maintained every year and it may be a bad thing, in the eyes of
management, to have investors expecting high rates of growth in revenues and
earnings every year.
What's wrong with cookie jar reporting is that it allows management wide
latitude in discretionary reporting that is a major concern to both investors
and standard setters. Accounting reports become obsolete when they mix stale
cookies from the cookie jar with fresh sweets and lemon balls of the current
period.
Also see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cookie_jar_accounting
You can read more about FAS 106 at
http://www.fasb.org/st/index.shtml
Scroll down to FAS 106 on "Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits
Other Than Pensions"
"FAS 106: Will the SEC Allow GM to Have
the Largest Earnings Cookie Jar in History?" by Tom Selling, The Accounting
Onion, March 13, 2008 ---
http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/03/gm-holding-work.html
Note: This post was
published about 12 hours prior to
publication of Justin Hyde's
article on the same topic in the
Detroit Free Press. Justin was the one
who brought the topic to my attention,
and I made the decision to write this
post after a conversation with him. I
thank him for allowing me to go ahead
with publication, even though his own
article would be appearing later.
In an earlier
post, I
expressed my strong suspicion that top
managers at General Motors were
utilizing big bath accounting. By 'big
bath', I mean a violation of GAAP that
permits delayed recognition of
relatively small losses over time, so as
to recognize the whole enchilada in some
later period. For some reason that
others may wish to ponder, managers
prefer the big bang to the accounting
equivalent of death by a thousand cuts.
In GM's case, they appear to have
improperly delayed as much as $11
billion in writedowns of their deferred
tax assets.
Now comes another enormous red flag out
of GM's public disclosures. In fact,
the numbers -- in the neighborhood of
$50 billion -- make the big bath look
like a glass of water. This new one is
of the 'cookie jar' variety: the
improper deferral of a gain so as to
spread its sweet goodness to the benefit
of many subsequent accounting periods.
But, sad to say, this tale has another
annoying twist: if GM doesn't get SEC
approval for the accounting they are
aiming for, they can -- for no other
good reason -- opt out of their
recent milestone agreement with the
United Auto Workers.
How this Opportunity for
Accounting Shenanigans Came to Be
Before I get into
the sordid details of the current
situation, some background information
may help. GM has an 'OPEB' ('Other
Post-Employment Benefit') liability on
its balance sheet that is somewhat north
of $50B. It represents the present
value of estimated future payments to
employees as reimbursement of health
care costs during their retirement
years. In all, the plans cover about
500,000 current and retired employees. I
have read that the expected future
payments add about $1,600 to GM's
per-vehicle cost, which is about eight
times the cost incurred by foreign
competitors (who benefit from more
generous state-sponsored health care
programs). Note 15 to the financial
statements in
GM's 2007 10-K
indicate that they spent in the
neighborhood of $6 billion on retiree
health care costs in that year.
Yuck. How did GM let itself get eaten
alive by an OPEB in the first place?
The story starts with accounting
standards -- or more accurately, the
appalling lack thereof. FAS 106, though
significantly flawed, filled a gap in
GAAP, but it was birthed only in 1990 --
long after the horses galloped through
the open barn door. My recollection
from reading the financial press in the
years just preceding is that corporate
America was already buried under
approximately $1trillion in off-balance
sheet liabilities relating to retiree
health care costs. Why did management
keep them off-balance sheet? Because
they could. Why did managers let the
liabilities get to be so humongous?
Because they were off-balance sheet.
Let me explain. When negotiating with
unions, companies could either grant
wage rate increases that would affect
the bottom line starting at Day 1,
or provide deferred compensation
that would not hit the income statement
for decades. Such was the case with
retiree health care benefits prior to
FAS 106. The "generally accepted"
accounting prior to then was "pay as you
go." In other words, you expensed only
that portion paid out to employees and
their health care providers. Actual
payments (and thus, expenses) at the
outset were low because so few of the
employees to whom benefits were promised
were old enough to begin receiving
them. By the time FAS 106 came to
require accrual of benefits as the
employees earned them, the unionized
rust belt was already awash in unfunded,
gold-plated retiree health care plans.
To make matters worse, health care costs
looked like they might increase faster
than inflation forever.
Back to Now
Late last year, GM and the UAW entered
into a compromise ('Settlement
Agreement') whereby GM gave its
commitment (albeit with an escape clause
I shall address anon) to pre-fund, in
2010, its $50 billion accumulated
retiree health care obligation. In
exchange, GM would be relieved of any
future obligation to make payments,
except for funding annual plan
shortfalls up to a paltry $165 million
per year for the next 20 years. (The
UAW thinks that GM's money should last
them 80 years, but that's another
story.)
$165 million? What's up with that? The
numbers I gave you earlier make it
abundantly clear that it's but a drop in
the bucket compared to the expected plan
costs and the number of employees in the
plan. If we assume that expenditures
are the current amounts paid by GM and
ignore inflation, $165 million amounts
to about 10 days worth of coverage. If
we further assume that there are about 1
million beneficiaries (retirees plus
spouses), that's a safety net of only
$165 per beneficiary. That would be like
a safety net made of thin-sliced swiss
cheese.
As to the real purpose of the $165
million, it's much akin to a fly on a
cow's hindquarter: maybe just enough to
get the 'right' accounting -- or to get
the cow toswish her tail. The 'right'
accounting for GM is "negative plan
amendment" treatment under FAS 106, or
else they're gonna pick up their marbles
and go home.
And just what is negative plan amendment
accounting? It's a cookie jar reserve.
Basically, the accounting treatment of
transactions of this ilk boil down to
three possibilities:
-
Settlement: The
liability would be taken off the
books, and a gain (around $50
billion) would be recorded in 2010
when the settlement occurs. The
GM-UAW agreement looks like a
settlement and quacks like a
settlement, but FAS 106 (para. 90)
defines a settlement as "...a
transaction that (a) is an
irrevocable action, (b) relieves the
employer ... of primary
responsibility ... and (c)
eliminates significant
[emphasis supplied] risks related to
the obligation and the assets used
to effect the settlement."
Thus, the result of settlement
accounting would be no cookie jar:
just a blob of earnings that can't
be used to juice any earnings-based
compensation of top management.
-
Negative plan amendment:
Even though a plan
amendment immediately affects the
calculation of the liability
recorded on the balance sheet, FAS
106 requires that it be deferred and
recognized over the time that
current employees become eligible
for retirement (para. 55). If
that amortization period is, say, 20
years, then negative plan amendment
accounting creates an earnings
cookie jar to be drawn on at the
rate of $2.5 billion per year.
-
Partial Settlement: GM
is insisting that the recognized
liability be written down to about
$1.5 billion, the present value of a
19-year annuity of $165 million per
year. It is conceivable that one
could find that GM is exposed to
more risk than that amount, and
that, therefore, the liability
should be higher.
Section 21 of the
Settlement Agreement (Exhibit 10(m) of
the 10-K), is where stated that GM can
hold up the agreement if they can't get
the liability on their balance sheet
down to $1.5 billion. Both settlement
and negative plan amendment accounting
will do that, and there is some chance
that the Settlement Agreement may
qualify for neither. That's the
scenario under which everybody has to
sit down and renegotiate. However, a
presentation
that GM gave to analysts reveals that
the brass ring is negative plan
amendment accounting. That's where the
measly $165 million comes in; it's
supposed to be just enough to be
considered "significant." They want the
SEC to say that because of it,
settlement accounting is not
appropriate, and that accounting as a
negative plan amendment is the result.
It's a ridiculous charade, well-hidden
by the following 10-K disclosure
appearing under the caption "Risk
Factors":
"We are relying on the
implementation of the Settlement
Agreement to make a significant
reduction in our OPEB liability.
Under certain circumstances,
however, it may not be possible to
implement the Settlement Agreement.
The implementation of the Settlement
Agreement is contingent on our
securing satisfactory accounting
treatment for our obligations to the
covered group for retiree medical
benefits, which we plan to discuss
with the staff of the SEC. If, based
on those discussions, we believe
that the accounting may be some
treatment other than settlement or a
substantive negative plan amendment
that would be reasonably
satisfactory to us, we will attempt
to restructure the Settlement
Agreement with the UAW to obtain
such accounting treatment, but if we
cannot accomplish such a
restructuring the Settlement
Agreement will terminate...."
I have a couple of things to say about
this disclosure:
-
First, the
possibility of not getting the
accounting treatment one wants is
not a risk factor. Risk factors
have to do with the possibility of
real losses; paper losses are just
that -- unless, perhaps, recognizing
a paper loss has an indirect real
effect like tripping a loan
covenant. In fact, the SEC has said
as much quite recently, and I wrote
about it
here.
I admit to not having read the 10-K
completely (I do have a life), but I
can't see that the accounting
treatment has any such indirect
effects. If there were any, that
surely is a substantive
risk factor, and should have been
disclosed.
-
Second, what does Section 21 of the
Settlement Agreement and the risk
factor disclosure say to providers
of capital about the focus of GM's
management on the real business of
running a car company? Exactly
why is a particular accounting
result is so darn important that
they're willing to go back to the
table with the UAW in order to get
it? Everything else equal, you
gotta expect that in a renegotiation
GM will end up giving more to the
UAW; they will get nothing more in
return than a new "economic
substance" to run up the SEC's
flagpole.
When the ball is in the SEC's court,
what will they do with it? It
doesn't appear that anyone at the SEC
has lifted a finger to follow up on GM's
$11 billion big bath deferred tax asset
charge, and I don't expect they will.
My money says the fix is in for this
one, too. The only question is how
Chief Accountant Conrad Hewitt is going
to fall over himself to give GM the
negative plan amendment accounting they
crave, resulting in what may be the
largest legitimized accounting cookie
jar in history.
I've been blogging about financial
reporting for a little over six months
now, and so far I haven't had to overly
tax my brain to find something to write
about once or twice a week. For
whatever reason(s), there are many tales
of wealth destruction that begin with a
bad accounting rule. Vast destruction
of shareholder wealth ensues by the
deliberate actions of managers who
realize they can paper over their
self-serving behavior with rosy
short-term earnings reports. The
cases of retiree health care costs at
company's like GM are particularly
notable because it takes multiple
manager and employee turnovers spanning
decades to merely begin the process of
exterminating the termites eating away
at shareholder wealth and employee job
security.
The GM case is particularly emblematic
of corporate governance run amok because
the older generations of managers
skimmed accounting cream going into
questionable deals with unions when more
discipline was called for; now, the
latest generation is trying to do the
same on the back end. As they go about
their business of re-arranging the deck
chairs, current management seems to be
doing quite well for themselves. It is
even more certain that their scheming
progenitors have retired and shielded
themselves with ironclad contracts,
signed and sealed by board members who
effectively serve at the pleasure of the
CEO. Those managers became rich while
at the same time bequeathing their
legacy of unsustainable labor costs.
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review
on June 1, 2007
Lifting the Veil on Tax Risk
by Jesse Drucker
The Wall Street Journal
May 25, 2007
Page: C1
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118005869184314270.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
TOPICS: Accounting,
Accounting Theory, Advanced Financial Accounting, Disclosure
Requirements, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Financial
Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis, Income Taxes
SUMMARY: FIN
48, entitled Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes--An
Interpretation of FASB Statement No. 109, was issued in June
2006 with an effective date of fiscal years beginning after
December 15, 2006. As stated on the FASB's web site, "This
Interpretation prescribes a recognition threshold and
measurement attribute for the financial statement recognition
and measurement of a tax position taken or expected to be taken
in a tax return. This Interpretation also provides guidance on
derecognition, classification, interest and penalties,
accounting in interim periods, disclosure, and transition." See
the summary of this interpretation at
http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/finsum48.shtml As noted in
this article, "in the past, companies had to reveal little
information about transactions that could face some risk in an
audit by the IRS or other government entities." Further, some
concern about use of deferred tax liability accounts to create
so-called "cookie jar reserves" useful in smoothing income
contributed to development of this interpretation's recognition,
timing and disclosure requirements. The article highlights an
analysis of 361 companies by Credit Suisse Group to identify
those with the largest recorded liabilities as an indicator of
risk of future settlement with the IRS over disputed amounts.
One example given in this article is Merck's $2.3 billion
settlement with the IRS in February 2007 over a Bermuda tax
shelter; another is the same company's current dispute with
Canadian taxing authorities over transfer pricing. Financial
statement analysis procedures to compare the size of the
uncertain tax liability to other financial statement components
and follow up discussions with the companies showing the highest
uncertain tax positions also is described.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Summarize the requirements of Financial Interpretation No.
48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes--An
Interpretation of FASB Statement No. 109 (FIN 48).
2.) In describing the FIN 48 requirements, the author of this
article states that "until now, there was generally no way to
know about" the accounting for reserves for uncertain tax
positions. Why is that the case?
3.) Some firms may develop "FIN 48 opinions" every time a tax
position is taken that could be questioned by the IRS or other
tax governing authority. Why might companies naturally want to
avoid having to document these positions very clearly in their
own records?
4.) Credit Suisse analysts note that the new FIN 48 disclosures
about unrecognized tax benefits provide investors with
information about risks companies are undertaking. Explain how
this information can be used for this purpose.
5.) How are the absolute amounts of unrecognized tax benefits
compared to other financial statement categories to provide a
better frame of reference for analysis? In your answer, propose
a financial statement ratio you feel is useful in assessing the
risk described in answer to question 4, and support your reasons
for calculating this amount.
6.) The amount of reserves recorded by Merck for unrecognized
tax benefits, tops the list from the analysis done by Credit
Suisse and the one done by Professors Blouin, Gleason, Mills and
Sikes. Based only on the descriptions given in the article, how
did the two analyses differ in their measurements? What do you
infer from the fact that Merck is at the top of both lists?
7.) Why are transfer prices among international operations
likely to develop into uncertain tax positions?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
|
March 15, 2008 reply from Peters, James M
[jpeters@NMHU.EDU]
I have always found these discussions highly
superficial because they don't get down to the actual accounting involved.
"Cookie jar" reserves most commonly come from overly pessimistic valuation
judgments that management must make under GAAP. The classics are the
valuation reserves accounts receivable (allowance for doubtful accounts),
inventories (under the lower of cost of market rule), tax assets, and
warrantees. On other side are decisions when to recognize or defer revenues.
However, GAAP has guidelines for all these issues and auditors also have
guidelines they follow. Thus, the idea that managers have unlimited
discretion to put "cookies" in a "jar" is pure fiction. Also, if you want to
complain about "cookie jar reserves," then you should be talking about the
specific GAAP feature that allows them. These "hand waivy" discussions
accomplish nothing and indicate to me that the people writing them have
never actually thought deeply about the sources of these reserves and the
possible "fixes."
Jim Peters
March 15, 2008 reply from Tom Selling
[tom.selling@GROVESITE.COM]
When I wrote my blog post on GM, I made a
distinction in my mind between "cookie jar reserves" and "rainy day
reserves." I realize that this is not the way that Arthur Levitt used the
term in his famous “Numbers Game” speech, but these are mere euphemisms, and
I thought the distinction was useful for the purpose of my post.
As to “unlimited discretion”, I don’t see how that
is a necessary condition for earnings management – it’s more a matter of
degree. As to the auditor’s role, let’s get real here; how much is D&T going
to push back against GM? I was at the SEC, and I actually do know how the
accounting can happen. Just like when ATT needed the SEC to bless their
pooling of interests accounting when they acquired NCR, even though it
couldn’t be shoe-horned into APB 16, D&T will be more than happy to let the
SEC decide whether GM can get the accounting they want.
As to tax and other reasons -- as I stated in my
post, if those were considerations they should have been disclosed in the
10-K as part of the relatively new Item 1A. (See Reg. S-K, Item 503(c)).
Tom Selling
March 15, 2008 reply from J. S. Gangolly
[gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
Bob,
Your main objection to "cookie jar" (I prefer to
call it "piggy bank" accounting) seems to be that one can "manipulate"
income. Unfortunately, accounting period "income" is a fiction created by
accounting and economists.
Don't we, in our personal lives, put away something
for a rainy day and then dip into such "reserves" when the rainy day
arrives? What is wrong with it when the companies do the same thing, so long
as they are required to fund such reserves?
When reserve accounting is permitted, the income
reported is likely to reflect the long term prospects for the company, or a
sort of moving average of incomes over the planning horizon. In my humble
opinion that would be a far more accurate number for "income".
We accountants often think that the world exists to
satisfy our fetish for encapsulating all that happened during an "accounting
period" into one fictional number we call "income".
The deadly combination of the concepts of
"accounting period" and a fictional "income" that we have created will
expose the corporate world to incalculable hazards by way of manipulation of
financial statements.
At the risk of sounding like a broken record, I'll
repeat what I have said many times. In the early days of the SEC there was a
"battle" between the accountants and the attorneys as to the importance of
disclosures as opposed to measurement. We accountants won the battle in
favour of measurement. With all that has happened since the early thirties,
we may have won the battle, but we may be on the brink of losing the war
(fair reporting).
With warm regards,
Jagdish
Reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Jagdish,
I wonder if a company could keep dipping into its cookie jar to report
earnings for years after it's dead and buried. Existing shareholders could
thereby recoup some of their losses long after the company ceased producing
goods and services.
The cookie
jar might be a disaster for income tax reporting because it allows for
interest free deferrals of taxes for many years or at least until the GOP
gets on its feet again.
Or put another way the New England Patriots could've won the 2008 Super
Bowl if their unused reserves in points exceeded the reserves of the NY
Giants. Or John Kerry might be able to win the Democratic Nomination in 2008
if he has enough reserve delegates from Year 2004.
The problem with reserve accounting is that it can distort current
performance with ancient history. To some extent we do that already with
accruals like depreciation, but at least sophisticated investors and
analysts know the rules (standards) that apply to all companies.
Cookie jar accounting is generally associated with customized (for one
company only) secret reserves that allow management to do their own
scorekeeping. If we allow cookie jar accounting with full faith in
management to provide its own customized scores why use accounting scores at
all? Why not just let management tell us that this year performance relative
to last year was 27 points to 24 points. Each company can thereby devise its
own point system and secret rules for assigning points.
Obviously I'm exaggerating, and I do understand your position on this
Jagdish. However, I for one lose all faith in accounting if management
can reserve ancient history points to fudge current performance scores. But
I would like the Patriots to be declared Super Bowl winners on the basis of
accumulated reserve points from prior seasons. They might not even have to
play the game.
Bob Jensen
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm
March 15, 2008 reply from J. S. Gangolly
[gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
Bob and Jim,
I think my thinking on this topic were partially
expressed by Jim.
Reserves are fine so long as they are funded and
are not secret. When reserves are funded and not secretive, they are not in
a cookie jar but in a piggy bank. It is only when they are secretive that
they become cookies.
A good example is a dividend equalisation reserve
or asset replacement reserves, where you appropriate retained earnings and
put the amount in a fund by seggregating the associated assets. I don;t
think they are very popular now.
A short article (http://ezinearticles.com/?Secret-Reserves&id=616062)
describes some examples of secret reserves. In fact they should be the
staples of Auditing courses except that since they do not fit into the
textbook risk models of auditing, are often ignored in classes. For example,
in auditing we always teach that the risk is in overvaluation of assets and
therefore the most important assertion tested is 'existence, and that since
the primary risk in case of liabilities is one of understatement, the most
important assertion to be tested is 'completeness. Textbooks rarely mention
the risk at the other tail, namely, the risk of secret reserves created by
lack of support for the opposite assertions -- completeness for assets and
existence for liabilities.
The only risk of such secret reserves are that they
violate SEC rules and existing GAAP. I do not know of a single company in
history that went under because they had secret reserves.
It is just that they do not fit our fixation with a
single indicator of income which we have failed to define objectively (the
idea of income is incorrigible in the sense of Art Thomas).
The examples are,
1. By under valuation of assets much below their
cost or market value, such as investment, stock in trade, etc.
2. By not writing up the value of an asset, the
price of which has permanently gone up.
3. By creating excessive reserve for bad and
doubtful debts or discount on sundry debtors.
4. By providing, excessive depreciation on fixed
assets.
5. By writing down goodwill to a nominal value.
6. By omitting some of the assets altogether from
balance sheet.
7. By changing capital expenditure to revenue
account and thus showing the value of assets to be less than their actual
value.
8. By overvaluing the liabilities.
9. By the inclusion of fictitious liabilities.
10. By showing contingent liabilities as actual
liabilities.
I think Jim was saying that there are protections
against the above by way of GAAP and GAAS. Jim, let me know if I am right.
Regards to both,
Jagdish
May 16, 2008 reply from
I took a quick look at the "secret reserve' article
and most of them aren't secret at all. You just have to teach analysts and
accountants how to read footnotes. I taught a financial statement analysis
class for years at the U. of Maryland in their MBA program and did just
that. Annectodally, I was repeated told by my students who work as analysts
for major firms that analysts never read footnotes. I guess my basic point
about all these reserves is that most can be detected easily if you know how
to read financial statements and footnotes.
By the way, if you want to cover a classic example,
check out Lucent Technology's use of their tax asset valuation allowance
beginning in 2001. I hope the following table comes out in the e-mail, but
it shows that they incurred a sharp increase in their tax assets in 2001 and
then wrote substantially all of them off in 2002, only one year later. The
numbers are in millions so we are talking billions. The vast majority of
their tax assets were NOL's carryforwards that won't expire for 20 years.
So, do you think they won't make enough taxable income over the next 20
years to recover at least some, if not all, of these NOL's? You can see the
valuation allowance steadily dropping from 2003 on when they started making
money and cashing in the NOL's. The get a boost of nearly $1 billion in
earnings from this, which, for them, was nearly 50% of their net income in
2004 and 2005. Their "hidden reserves" are very obvious by doing this simple
side calculation based on their footnote disclosures.
Income Tax Asset Valuation
2005 2004
2003 2002
2001 2000
1999 1998
1997
Total deferred tax assets
104 19
1,132 747
7,675 3,562
1,848 3,326
3,313
Tax Asset Valuation Allowance
7,298 8,027
9,934 9,989
742
197
179 261
234
Gross Deferred tax assets
7,402 8,046
11,066 10,736
8,417 3,759
2,027 3,587
3,547
Valuation account as % of gross tax assets
98.6% 99.8%
89.8% 93.0%
8.8% 5.2%
8.8% 7.3%
6.6%
Gross tax asset as a % of total assets
45.1% 47.4%
70.2% 60.3%
25.0% 7.7%
5.7% 13.4%
14.9%
Tax asset valuation as a % of revenues
77.3% 88.7%
117.3% 81.1%
3.5% 0.7%
0.6% 1.1%
0.9%
I guess that is my main point. In my opinion,
analysts that complain about hidden researves are just lazy and won't take
the time to really analyze a firm's financial statements, including
footnotes. Of course, managers know that analysts are lazy and so they will
pull this sort of "stuff." Also, it is fair to ask "where were the
auditors?" First, I think auditors are too fixated on increasing assets and
revenues and decreasing liabilities and expenses, which, of course, is the
opposite of setting up reserves. I also teach auditing and have never seen
an auditing text refer to settting up these sorts of reserves as an audit
issue. Second, I do think auditors will never be truly independent as long
as they audit the hand that feeds them and I have publically advocated
nationalizing auditing by having a Federal agency, structured similarly to
the Federal Reserve or GAO whose directors are appointed for 15 years, take
over hiring, monitoring, and firing the auditors and just have the firms pay
for them. However, I get called a communist a lot for that suggestion.
Jim
March 16, 2008 reply from Richard C. Sansing
[Richard.C.Sansing@TUCK.DARTMOUTH.EDU]
--- Jim Peters wrote:
By the way, if you want to cover a classic example,
check out Lucent Technology's use of their tax asset valuation allowance
beginning in 2001. I hope the following table comes out in the e-mail, but
it shows that they incurred a sharp increase in their tax assets in 2001 and
then wrote substantially all of them off in 2002, only one year later. The
numbers are in millions so we are talking billions. The vast majority of
their tax assets were NOL's carryforwards that won't expire for 20 years.
So, do you think they won't make enough taxable income over the next 20
years to recover at least some, if not all, of these NOL's? You can see the
valuation allowance steadily dropping from 2003 on when they started making
money and cashing in the NOL's. The get a boost of nearly $1 billion in
earnings from this, which, for them, was nearly 50% of their net income in
2004 and 2005. Their "hidden reserves" are very obvious by doing this simple
side calculation based on their footnote disclosures.
---
For someone who says "I have always found these
discussions highly superficial because they don't get down to the actual
accounting involved" and "These "hand waivy (sic)" discussions accomplish
nothing and indicate to me that the people writing them have never actually
thought deeply about the sources of these reserves",
your own example seems both superficial and hand
wavy. First, according to
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1006240/000095012306015189/y27905exv13.htm#324
(Or
Click Here )
over $1.7 billion of Lucent's deferred tax asset
arises from credit carryovers and state & foreign loss carryovers, some of
which expire as early as 2007. Second, the provisions that lead to these
carryovers (net operating loss carryovers, foreign tax credit carryovers,
alternative minimum tax considerations, section 382 limitations, etc.)
interact in complicated ways. For all their federal NOL carryovers, for
example, Lucent had a positive current tax expense for federal, state, and
foreign purposes in 2006. This suggests that their ability to use these
carryovers is more constrained than you suggest. Third, the ability to
recover "some" of their NOLs in the future does not mean a firm can avoid
recording a valuation allowance for the full deferred tax asset. Suppose a
firm has a $1 billion deferred tax asset, and believes that 48% of the time
it will use all of it in the future and 52% of the time it will use none of
it in the future. Even though its expected future tax benefit is $480
million, GAAP requires the firm to record a $1 billion valuation allowance
under the "more likely than not" criterion.
I have no opinion as to whether Lucent's valuation
allowance is too high, too low, or just right. Sensible people understand
that strong claims require strong evidence. What evidence--not conjecture,
not speculation, evidence--which requires a detailed understanding of
Lucent's federal, state, and foreign tax situations, and the interactions
among them, as well as expectations about Lucent's performance well into the
future--can you present to support your claims that their valuation
allowance for 2006 or any prior year is inconsistent with GAAP?
Richard C. Sansing
Professor of Accounting
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
100 Tuck Hall Hanover, NH 03755
March 17, 2008 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Jim and Jagdish,
When is a cookie jar reserve secret? I would
contend that manipulation of bad debt reserves is sometimes a secret and
devious practice even though the reserve itself is not secret. A great
example of the secrecy employed is provided in "iMergent Practicing 'Cookie
Jar Accounting'?" November 6, 2006 ---
http://seekingalpha.com/article/19914-imergent-practicing-cookie-jar-accounting
In our
last comments on iMergent, we
promised further discussion of the company’s accounting
vulnerabilities. When a short seller calls “accounting
irregularities” on a company, they might just be accused
of pounding the table on their own position. Yet, when
the company in question is currently the subject of
numerous Attorney General Investigations, a Formal SEC
Investigation, and a business that Forbes Magazine
singled out this month as a
paradigm for dirty companies
on the AMEX, a warning of accounting irregularities begs
to be given additional weight.
Stocklemon believes that
iMergent is guilty of using cookie jar accounting to pad
current earnings. This “voodoo” accounting
employed by iMergent could be the reason why the company
has lost all coverage from major brokerage houses and is
now reports numbers to the public without independent
scrutiny.
Cookie Jar Accounting defined:
Investopedia ,
Investorwords.
First Hand Caught in the Cookie
Jar
In
2005, iMergent confessed a huge restatement of prior
earnings, and rolled up a mass of prior years’
unreported losses. The losses were due to overestimating
collectability of receivables from its installment
contract sales to its typically poor quality credit risk
customers.
Hidden by these massive adjustments were their repeated
acts of “cookie jar” accounting, where they shuttled
dollars in and out of receivables, reserves, and net
profit, as necessary to massage their earnings for the
benefit of shareholders.
As
the stock tanked from 25 to 4 last year, iMergent issued
these multi-year restatements under the cover of late
filing and the absence of a conference call to discuss
them.
For a
“normal” company, a massive confession/restatement like
this one would be an opportunity to “clean house”, to
sweep out the closets, dump out all the bad news and
take a fresh start.
Not
iMergent. They simply used the revision of their entire
accounting policy and all the confusion created by a set
of massive one-time adjustments (which obstruct
investors’ ability to draw meaningful comps to prior
periods) to start a whole new cookie jar.
Most
cookie jar accounting serves to “smooth earnings” and,
although subtle, is banned corporate behavior. But
cookie jars also have a more sinister use – misleading
investors to believe there is a pattern of increasing
earnings when actually the business is stagnant or
declining. With the amount of complaints online and
government regulation along with dissatisfied customers,
it does not take Warren Buffet to figure out this is a
terminal business model.
And
now, the other hand… This strategy only works until the
cookie jar runs out… and the jar at iMergent is running
low.
In a
call with First Albany (before they dropped coverage),
management of iMergent was astoundingly candid about the
company’s reserve policy. They implied that the company
was at times over-reserving against bad debt, which
could, in future periods improve earnings.
SEC files show
the agency was curious
enough about this to inquire further as to its validity.
In
the company's reply to SEC questions, they clarified how
exactly the reserves are figured out and also supplied
statistics for defaults. This Rosetta Stone, posted on
the SEC website not more than 2 weeks ago. The company
explained the issue to the SEC with facts it had never
previously disclosed to investors.
Their
better credits (the "A"s) defaulted at a 26% rate and
the lower quality credits (the "B"s) defaulted at a 53%
rate. The company also stated that they didn't make a
determination of reserves when finance receivables were
perfected (created), rather they would look at the pool
of receivables at quarter-end and then determine what
reserve level was appropriate. The result was that when
the prior reserve was deemed higher than necessary, the
recently added reserves would get a lower reserve
allocated -- which has the direct result of improving
non-GAAP earnings!
Hidden under the massive restatements of June 2005, an
anomaly appears which raises serious questions about
IIG's use of reserves to benefit future earnings. Buried
in the restatement, and not explicitly disclosed, IIG
reserved an astounding 79% of revenues for bad debt
reserves, dropping their new contracts written (from
which the reserve has been deducted) to a historic low
$14.6 million. This made their loss for the quarter even
worse (because of the restatement it was already
gigantic, so nobody noticed).
It
also created a brand new cookie jar to pad future
quarters. Strangely, at the same time, the company,
explaining why their sales conversion rate had dropped,
stated that new policy changes were resulting in
increased credit quality. This is contradictory to a
reserve rate nearly double its historical levels.
Stocklemon believes iMergent’s current results have been
benefiting from the new cookie jar.
As
recently as March 2005 the company stated that the
eventual default rate for finance receivables was 47%,
which begs the question as to why higher reserves were
ever materially above that. The company refuses to
update the overall default rate, as they say it won't
impact GAAP earnings. True enough, but it directly
impacts non-GAAP earnings. Since the September 2005
quarter with a 57.5% reserve ratio, the company has
grown gross receivables by $14.8 million, yet reserves
have only grown by $1.2 million for an 8% suggested
reserve ratio. While the company will suggest that that
is mainly due to losing the lower quality credits (which
we showed may have been artificially created last year)
it suggests very strongly that the company was using
those higher reserves to benefit current earnings.
In
fact, were the ending June 2006 reserve materially
higher, it would have had a dramatic impact on non-GAAP
earnings as demonstrated by this table: Most companies
would report non-GAAP so as to give a clear picture of
profitability without options expenses or goodwill.
iMergent wants you to focus on non- GAAP so you do not
factor in their customer with a 550 FICO Score who may
or may not pay 18% interest on his “software loan”.
Therefore, it is the opinion of Stocklemon that if this
company reserved properly, their NON-GAAP would be 24%
lower than their GAAP earnings.
Receivables still not visible
Imergent’s receivables and reserves
accounting can only be relied upon if the company’s cash
is indeed “unrestricted” and the receivables are real.
Considering
the company
they sold their receivables to:
1) was set up with a Storesonline Website
2) doesn’t seem to have any factoring business
beyond iMergent
3) runs out of a 2000 sq ft house in Incline Village
NV
4) bought the receivables on a “non-recourse” basis,
but still periodically puts bad contracts back to
iMergent for “replacement”
...this transaction fails to dispel the questions
looming over the quality of iMergent’s receivables.
History repeats?
Imergent bears very strong resemblance to
former Stocklemon subject Housevalues.com
(SOLD).
At the heart of
both is an accounting model that systematically leaves
out certain key metrics needed by the investing public
to determine the true health of the company. Add to that
an unending litany of consumer complaints, and you have
the reason for the reporting omissions – an
unsustainable business model – the last thing management
wants to admit.
When
Stocklemon reported on Housevalues.com, the stock was
$15 a share and Avondale and Piper both had lofty price
targets on the stock. Today it is $5.65, trading not far
above its cash.
In
contrast to Housevalues.com, iMergent has no analyst
coverage. There’s no independent scrutiny holding
management to a standard of reporting sufficient to shed
light on their real business operations.
Continued in article
The history
of cookie jar accounting is rooted so deeply in “secret reserves” that I
generally think of secret reserves as part and parcel to cookie jar
accounting as I learned about it. Newer standards have made it more
difficult to hide reserves, especially standards making it more difficult
not to consolidate subsidiary companies.
Some
references on this history of secret reserves include the following:
Financial Statement Analysis in Europe, by J.M. Samuels, R.E. Brayshaw and
J.M. Craner (Chapman & Hall, London, 1995)
These authors discuss how common it was and still is in Europe to manage
earnings with secret reserves, especially in Germany and Switzerland.
The
Applied Theory of Accounts, by Paul-Joseph Esquerre ---
Click Here

Secret
Accounting in New Zealand: P&O and the Union Steam Ship Company,
1917-1936, by Christopher J. Napier ---
Click Here

Proceedings of the Fourth International Congress on
Accounting Author(s) of Review: A. C. Littleton The Accounting Review,
Vol. 9, No. 1 (Mar., 1934), pp. 102-103 ---
Click Here
Bob Jensen
The interaction of moral sentiments and self-interest
"Does the Invisible Hand Need a Helping Hand? A behavioral economist
explores the interaction of moral sentiments and self-interest," by Ronald
Bailey, Reason Magazine, June 24, 2008 ---
http://www.reason.com/news/show/127130.html
Remember how you reacted to your micromanaging boss
in a past job? He was forever looking over your shoulder, constantly
kibitzing and threatening you. In return, you worked as little as you could
get away with. On the other hand, perhaps you've had bosses who inspired
you—pulling all-nighters in order to finish up a project so that you
wouldn't disappoint her. You kept the first job only because you couldn't
get another and because you needed the money; you stayed with the second one
even though you might have earned more somewhere else.
In the June 20 issue of Science, Samuel Bowles,
director of the Behavioral Sciences Program at the Santa Fe Institute, looks
at how market interactions can fail to optimize the rewards of
participants—e.g., the micromanager who gets less than he wants from his
employees. For Bowles, the key is that policies designed for self-interested
citizens may undermine "the moral sentiments." His citation of the "moral
sentiments" obviously references Adam Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments
(1759), in which Smith argued that people have an innate moral sense. This
natural feeling of conscience and sympathy enables human beings to live and
work together in mutually beneficial ways.
To explore the interaction of moral sentiments and
self-interest, Bowles begins with a case where six day care centers in
Haifa, Israel imposed a fine on parents who picked their kids up late. The
fine aimed to encourage parents to be more prompt. Instead, parents reacted
to the fine by coming even later. Why? According to Bowles: "The fine seems
to have undermined the parents' sense of ethical obligation to avoid
inconveniencing the teachers and led them to think of lateness as just
another commodity they could purchase."
Bowles argues that conventional economics assumes
that "policies that appeal to economic self-interest do not affect the
salience of ethical, altruistic, and other social preferences."
Consequently, material interests and ethics generally pull in the same
direction, reinforcing one another. If that is the case, then how can one
explain the experience of the day care centers and the micromanager?
Bowles reviews 41 behavioral economics experiments
to see when and how material and moral incentives diverge. For example,
researchers set up an experiment involving rural Colombians who depend on
commonly held forest resources. In the first experiment, the Colombians were
asked to decide how much to anonymously withdraw from a beneficial common
pool analogous to the forest. After eight rounds of play, the Colombians
withdrew an amount that was halfway between individually self-interested and
group-beneficial levels. Then experimenters allowed them to talk, thus
boosting cooperation. Finally, the experimenters set up a condition
analogous to "government regulation," one where players were fined for
self-interestedly overexploiting the common resource. The result? The
players looked at the fine as a cost and pursued their short-term interests
at the expense of maximizing long-term gains. In this case, players
apparently believed that they had satisfied their moral obligations by
paying the fine.
While this experiment illuminates how bad
institutional designs can yield bad social results, I am puzzled about why
Bowles thinks this experiment is so telling. What would have happened if the
Colombians in the experiment were allocated exclusive rights to a portion of
the common pool resources—e.g., private property? Oddly, Bowles himself
recognizes this solution when he discusses how the incentives of
sharecropping produced suboptimal results. He recommends either giving the
sharecropper ownership or setting a fixed rent.
In fact, Bowles recognizes that markets do not
leave us selfish calculators. He cites the results of a 2002 study that
looked at how members of 15 small-scale societies played various
experimental economics games. In one game, a player split a day's pay with
another player. If the second player didn't like the amount that the first
player offered, he could reject it and both would get nothing.
The findings would warm the hearts of market
proponents. As Bowles notes, "[I]ndividuals from the more market-oriented
societies were also more fair-minded in that they made more generous offers
to their experimental partners and more often chose to receive nothing
rather than accept an unfair offer. A plausible explanation is that this
kind of fair-mindedness is essential to the exchange process and that in
market-oriented societies individuals engaging in mutually beneficial
exchanges with strangers represent models of successful behavior who are
then copied by others." In other words, as people gain more experience with
markets, morals and material incentives pull together.
Interestingly, neuro-economics is also beginning to
delve deeper into how we respond to various institutions. In one experiment
done by Oregon University researchers, MRIs scanned the brains of students
as they chose to give—or were required to give—some portion of $100 to a
food bank. The first was a charitable act and the second analogous to a tax.
In both cases, their reward centers "lit up," but much less so under the tax
condition. As Oregon economist William Harbaugh told the New York Times,
"We're showing that paying taxes does produce a neural reward. But we're
showing that the neural reward is even higher when you have voluntary
giving."
Bowles, with some evident regret, observes, "Before
the advent of economics in the 18th century, it was more common to appeal to
civic virtues." Bowles does recognize that such appeals "are hardly adequate
to avoid market failures." How to resolve these market failures was the
subject of Smith's second great book, The Wealth of Nations (1776), where he
explained: "By pursuing his own interest (the individual) frequently
promotes that of society more effectually than when he really intends to
promote it."
Question
Did Clemson hide a cookie jar in order to increase revenue?
"Lawsuit Says Clemson U. Hid Cash Reserves While Increasing Tuition," by
Charles Huckabee, Chronicle of Higher Education, March 17, 2008 ---
http://chronicle.com/news/article/4147/lawsuit-says-clemson-u-hid-cash-reserves-while-increasing-tuition?utm_source=at&utm_medium=en
A former executive secretary to Clemson
University’s Board of Trustees alleges in a lawsuit that top officials of
the public university hid $80-million in cash reserves from legislators
while requesting more money from the state and increasing tuition, The
State, a newspaper in Columbia, S.C., reported today.
The board’s chairman, Leon J. (Bill) Hendrix Jr.,
denied the allegations in the lawsuit, which was filed by Chalmers Eugene
Troutman III, and described Mr. Troutman as a “disgruntled former employee.”
Mr. Troutman says in the lawsuit that he was fired last August after he
encouraged the trustees to spend down the cash reserves.
The university’s chief public-affairs officer,
Catherine T. Sams, declined to comment on the suit but told the newspaper
that Clemson’s financial practices were open and were audited annually. As
of last June, she said, the university had $79.1-million in unrestricted
funds, adding that “unrestricted does not mean uncommitted.” The money is
available to “cover expenditures and plans that extend beyond the end of a
fiscal year,” she said.
Mr. Troutman is seeking lost pay, actual and
punitive damages, and reinstatement as executive secretary. A hearing on his
lawsuit is scheduled this week before Judge Matthew J. Perry Jr. in the U.S.
District Court in Columbia. Since 2001, in-state tuition at Clemson has
risen from $5,090 to $9,870, the newspaper reported.
Question
Do you really understand the SEC's Rule 144a?
What is it and why do accountants hate it?
And here's the real beauty of it: Companies that issue
stock under Rule 144a can access America's deep pools of capital without
submitting to public-company accounting rules or to the tender mercies of
Sarbanes-Oxley. In exchange, however, they must strictly limit the number of
qualified U.S. investors in their company -- to 500 total for U.S.-based firms
and 300 for foreign-based. They are also barred from offering comparable
securities for sale in the public market. The 144a market is also for the most
part nontransparent, often illiquid and thus in some ways riskier. But
increasingly, this is a trade that institutional investors and companies seeking
capital are willing to make.
"A Capital Idea," The Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2007; Page A18
---
Click Here
That America's public capital markets have lost
some of their allure is no longer much disputed. Eminences as unlikely as
Chuck Schumer and Eliot Spitzer have taken to bemoaning the fact and calling
for some sort of fix, albeit without doing much.
Tort reform -- to reduce jackpot justice in
securities class-action suits -- would certainly help. So would easing the
compliance costs and regulatory burden placed on publicly traded companies
by Sarbanes-Oxley, Regulation FD and the like. (See Robert Grady nearby.)
The good news is that, as usual, private-sector innovation is finding a way
around these government obstacles through the rapid growth of something
known as the Rule 144a market.
First, a little capital-markets background: Most
Americans are familiar with the "public markets," which consist of the New
York Stock Exchange, the Nasdaq and other stock markets. These are open to
investors of every stripe and are where the stocks of most of the world's
best-known companies are traded. Nearly anyone can invest, and these
exchanges are comprehensively regulated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
Less well understood is another, more restricted
market known after SEC Rule 144a that governs participation in it. As on
stock exchanges, this market allows for the buying and selling of the stock
of companies that offer their shares for sale. But participation is strictly
limited. To be what is called a "qualified buyer" in this market, you must
be a financial institution with at least $100 million in investable assets.
If you meet these criteria, you are free to buy stocks of both U.S. and
foreign companies that have never offered their shares to the investing
public.
And here's the real beauty of it: Companies that
issue stock under Rule 144a can access America's deep pools of capital
without submitting to public-company accounting rules or to the tender
mercies of Sarbanes-Oxley. In exchange, however, they must strictly limit
the number of qualified U.S. investors in their company -- to 500 total for
U.S.-based firms and 300 for foreign-based. They are also barred from
offering comparable securities for sale in the public market. The 144a
market is also for the most part nontransparent, often illiquid and thus in
some ways riskier. But increasingly, this is a trade that institutional
investors and companies seeking capital are willing to make.
There are estimated to be about 1,000 companies
whose stocks trade in the 144a market. And last year, for perhaps the first
time, more capital was raised in the U.S. by issuing these so-called
unregistered securities than through IPOs on all the major stock exchanges
combined. Even more telling is that the large institutional investors
eligible to buy these unregistered securities are more than happy to oblige.
There is no selling without buying, and for the 144a market to overtake the
giant stock exchanges, institutional investors who control trillions of
dollars in capital must see better opportunities outside the regulations
built by Congress and the SEC.
In a sign of these times, none other than Nasdaq is
now stepping in to bring some greater order, liquidity and transparency to
the Rule 144a market. Any day now, the SEC is expected to propose giving the
green light to a Nasdaq project called Portal. Portal aims to be a central
clearing house for buyers and sellers of Section 144a securities. You will
still need to be a "qualified institutional buyer" to purchase 144a
securities. And the companies whose stocks change hands on Portal will still
need to meet the limitations on numbers of investors to offer their stock
there.
So Portal will not bring unregistered securities to
the masses -- at least not directly. It is forbidden to do so because the
entire U.S. regulatory system is designed to protect individual investors
from such things. What Portal will do, if it operates as intended, is make
the trading of Rule 144a securities easier and less costly. And this could,
in turn, further increase their attractiveness to issuers and investors
alike. Average investors will at least be able to participate indirectly via
mutual and pension funds, most of which meet the standards for "qualified
institutional buyers."
Given the limitations on eligibility for Rule 144a
assets, they will never replace our public markets. But their growth is one
more sign that investors, far from valuing current regulation, are seeking
ways to avoid its costs and complications. Nasdaq's participation is
especially notable given its stake as an established public exchange. Nasdaq
seems to have concluded that there is a new market opportunity created by
overregulation, so it is following the money.
This leaves our politicians with two choices. They
can move to meddle with and diminish this second securities market -- which
will only drive more business away from U.S. shores. Or they can address the
overregulation that is hurting public markets and prompting both investors
and companies to seek alternatives.
New Accounting Rule Lays Bare A Firm's Liability if
Transaction Is Later Disallowed by the IRS
CPA auditors have always considered their primary role as attesting to
full and fair corporate disclosures to investors and creditors under Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Now it turns out that this extends,
perhaps unexpectedly, to the government as well.
"How Accounting Rule (FIN
48) Led to Probe Disclosure of Tax Savings Firms Regard as Vulnerable Leaves
Senate Panel a Trail," by Jesse Drucker, The Wall Street Journal,
September 11, 2007; Page A5 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118947026768923240.html?mod=todays_us_page_one
The probe, by the Senate's Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations, appears to have been sparked by an accounting rule known
as FIN 48, which took effect in January. The rule for the first time
requires companies to disclose how much they have set aside to pay tax
authorities if certain tax-cutting transactions are successfully challenged
by the government. The disclosures require companies to attach a dollar
figure to tax-savings arrangements they think could be vulnerable.
Although intended to inform investors, the
disclosures also serve as a kind of road map for government authorities,
guiding them to companies that may have taken an aggressive stance on
tax-related arrangements.
The probe, by the Senate's Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations, appears to have been sparked by an accounting rule known
as FIN 48, which took effect in January. The rule for the first time
requires companies to disclose how much they have set aside to pay tax
authorities if certain tax-cutting transactions are successfully challenged
by the government. The disclosures require companies to attach a dollar
figure to tax-savings arrangements they think could be vulnerable.
Although intended to inform investors, the
disclosures also serve as a kind of road map for government authorities,
guiding them to companies that may have taken an aggressive stance on
tax-related arrangements.
The FIN 48 disclosures generally reveal how much a
company has set aside in an accounting reserve called "unrecognized tax
benefits." The reserve represents the portion of the tax benefits realized
on a company's tax return that also hasn't been recognized in its financial
reporting.
In the letters, sent Aug. 23, Senate investigators
seek to obtain more details about the underlying transactions in the FIN 48
disclosures. One letter viewed by The Wall Street Journal asks the companies
to "describe any United States tax position or group of similar tax
positions that represents five percent or more of your total [unrecognized
tax benefit] for the period, including in the description of each whether
the tax position involved foreign entities or jurisdictions."
The subcommittee, led by Sen. Carl Levin (D.,
Mich.), has held numerous hearings on tax shelters, tax avoidance, and the
law firms and accounting firms that set up such structures.
The Senate's inquiry also includes questions about
other tax-cutting arrangements. For tax-cutting transactions on which
companies spent at least $1 million for legal fees or other costs, Senate
investigators are asking companies to identify the amount of the tax
benefit, as well as "the tax professional(s) who planned or designed the
transaction or structure and the law firm(s) that authored the tax opinion
or advice."
Continued in article
"Accounting for Uncertainty (FIN 48)," by Damon M. Fleming and Gerald
E. Whittenburg, Journal of Accountancy, October 2007 --- ---
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/oct2007/uncertainty.htm
FASB Interpretation no. 48 (FIN 48), Accounting for
Uncertainty in Income Taxes, sets the threshold for recognizing the benefits
of tax return positions in financial statements as “more likely than not”
(greater than 50%) to be sustained by a taxing authority. The effect is most
pronounced where the uncertainty arises in the timing, amount or validity of
a deduction.
Thresholds applicable to tax practitioners have
been revised from a “realistic possibility” to “more likely than not” that a
tax position will be sustained, as set forth in the U.S. Troop Readiness,
Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act
of 2007 that was signed into law in May.
A third threshold, that a tax position possesses a
“reasonable basis” in tax law, has been regarded as reflecting 25%
certainty. In addition, taxpayers are subject to penalties if an
understatement of liability is caused by a position that lacks “substantial
authority,” a threshold for which no percentage of certainty has been
established but has been regarded as between the reasonable-basis and
more-likely-than-not standards.
Being familiar with the different thresholds for
the reporting of uncertain tax positions can help CPAs effectively advocate
for their clients’ tax positions and be impartial in financial reporting.
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review
on June 1, 2007
Lifting the Veil on Tax Risk
by Jesse Drucker
The Wall Street Journal
May 25, 2007
Page: C1
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118005869184314270.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
TOPICS: Accounting,
Accounting Theory, Advanced Financial Accounting, Disclosure
Requirements, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Financial
Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis, Income Taxes
SUMMARY: FIN
48, entitled Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes--An
Interpretation of FASB Statement No. 109, was issued in June 2006
with an effective date of fiscal years beginning after December 15,
2006. As stated on the FASB's web site, "This Interpretation
prescribes a recognition threshold and measurement attribute for the
financial statement recognition and measurement of a tax position
taken or expected to be taken in a tax return. This Interpretation
also provides guidance on derecognition, classification, interest
and penalties, accounting in interim periods, disclosure, and
transition." See the summary of this interpretation at
http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/finsum48.shtml As noted in this
article, "in the past, companies had to reveal little information
about transactions that could face some risk in an audit by the IRS
or other government entities." Further, some concern about use of
deferred tax liability accounts to create so-called "cookie jar
reserves" useful in smoothing income contributed to development of
this interpretation's recognition, timing and disclosure
requirements. The article highlights an analysis of 361 companies by
Credit Suisse Group to identify those with the largest recorded
liabilities as an indicator of risk of future settlement with the
IRS over disputed amounts. One example given in this article is
Merck's $2.3 billion settlement with the IRS in February 2007 over a
Bermuda tax shelter; another is the same company's current dispute
with Canadian taxing authorities over transfer pricing. Financial
statement analysis procedures to compare the size of the uncertain
tax liability to other financial statement components and follow up
discussions with the companies showing the highest uncertain tax
positions also is described.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Summarize the requirements of Financial Interpretation No. 48,
Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes--An Interpretation of
FASB Statement No. 109 (FIN 48).
2.) In describing the FIN 48 requirements, the author of this
article states that "until now, there was generally no way to know
about" the accounting for reserves for uncertain tax positions. Why
is that the case?
3.) Some firms may develop "FIN 48 opinions" every time a tax
position is taken that could be questioned by the IRS or other tax
governing authority. Why might companies naturally want to avoid
having to document these positions very clearly in their own
records?
4.) Credit Suisse analysts note that the new FIN 48 disclosures
about unrecognized tax benefits provide investors with information
about risks companies are undertaking. Explain how this information
can be used for this purpose.
5.) How are the absolute amounts of unrecognized tax benefits
compared to other financial statement categories to provide a better
frame of reference for analysis? In your answer, propose a financial
statement ratio you feel is useful in assessing the risk described
in answer to question 4, and support your reasons for calculating
this amount.
6.) The amount of reserves recorded by Merck for unrecognized tax
benefits, tops the list from the analysis done by Credit Suisse and
the one done by Professors Blouin, Gleason, Mills and Sikes. Based
only on the descriptions given in the article, how did the two
analyses differ in their measurements? What do you infer from the
fact that Merck is at the top of both lists?
7.) Why are transfer prices among international operations likely to
develop into uncertain tax positions?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
|
Tutorial: FIN 48 from different perspectives
Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation
No. 48 (FIN 48), Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, is intended to
substantially reduce uncertainty in accounting for income taxes. Its
implementation and infrastructure requirements, however, generate a great deal
of uncertainty. This feature provides an overview of FIN 48, addresses some of
its federal and international tax issues, as well as issues arising at the state
and local level.
AccountingWeb, June 2007 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=103625
"GM Will Book $39 Billion Charge Write-Down of Tax
Credits Indicates That Profits Won't Come in Near Term," by John D. Stoll,
The Wall Street Journal, November 7, 2007; Page A3 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119438884709884385.html?mod=todays_us_page_one
General Motors Corp. will take a $39 billion,
noncash charge to write down deferred-tax credits, a signal that it expects
to continue to struggle financially despite significant restructuring and
cost cutting in the past two years.
The deferred-tax assets stem from losses and could
be used to offset taxes on current or future profits for a certain number of
years.
In after-hours trading, GM fell 2.9% to $35.14.
Before the disclosure, its shares finished at $36.16, up 16 cents, or less
than 1%, in New York Stock Exchange composite trading.
GM, the world's largest auto maker in vehicle
sales, was to report third-quarter financial results today. The company,
which was stung by big losses in 2005 and 2006, said the write-down was
triggered by three main issues: a string of adjusted losses in core North
American operations and Germany over the past three years, weakness at its
GMAC Financial Services unit, and the long duration of tax-deferred assets.
GM had appeared to be making progress in stemming
its losses. Its global automotive operations were profitable in the first
half of the year. It recently signed a labor deal with the United Auto
Workers that allows it to establish an independent trust to absorb its
approximately $50 billion in hourly retiree health-care liabilities. The
move promises to significantly reduce GM's cash health-care expenses and
combine with other labor-cost cuts in creating a more profitable North
American arm.
If it returns to steady profits, GM could remove
the valuation allowance and reclaim some or all of the $39 billion in
deferred credits.
For now, the massive charge promises to devastate
GM's headline financial results for the third quarter, and for the year,
likely leading to the worst annual loss in its 99-year history. Although the
charge is an accounting loss that doesn't involve cash, it is still a
staggering sum. By comparison, the company reported a total of $34 billion
in net income from 1996 to 2004.
GM will partially offset the charge with a gain of
more than $5 billion related to the sale of its Allison Transmission unit.
The charge follows more than $12 billion in losses
since the beginning of 2005. GM has been scrambling to cut the size of its
U.S. operation amid shrinking market share, rising costs and a rapidly
globalizing auto industry. Its restructuring has been complicated by a
slowdown in U.S. demand for automobiles and losses at GMAC.
The lending giant lost $1.6 billion in the third
quarter, the biggest quarterly setback since at least the 1960s. It made
money on auto lending and insurance but was dragged down by a $1.8 billion
setback at ResCap, its residential-mortgage business and a big player in
subprime loans. GM's exposure is limited because it sold 51% of GMAC to
Cerberus Capital Management LP last year. In the past, GMAC delivered
dividends to GM, including more than $9 billion in the decade before the
GMAC sale.
The write-down isn't expected to affect GM's
liquidity position, which stood at $27.2 billion as of June 30. GM has been
selling noncore assets in recent years to pad its bank account. In addition,
GM Chief Financial Officer Frederick "Fritz" Henderson said the write-down
won't preclude it from using loss carry-forwards or other deferred-tax
assets in the future. It is unclear whether GM's plunge deeper into negative
shareholder-equity status will affect it's borrowing capabilities or credit
rating.
The latest disclosure underscores the challenge
Chief Executive Officer Richard Wagoner faces in seeking a full-scale
turnaround as GM hangs on to its No. 1 global-sales ranking over Toyota
Motor Corp. by a thread. Delphi Corp., GM's top supplier, has failed in
attempts to emerge from bankruptcy protection, so GM must wait indefinitely
on cost savings it hopes to gain from a reorganized Delphi. Also, U.S.
automobile demand has withered to the lowest point in a decade, and, as oil
futures continue to escalate, pressure on high-profit trucks and SUVs
remains firm.
Denny Beresford provided a link to another reference ---
Click Here
November 7, 2008 reply from Amy Dunbar
[Amy.Dunbar@BUSINESS.UCONN.EDU]
>So they think it is more likely than not that they
will receive zero tax benefit from their tax loss carryforwards!
Hmmmmm, I doubt that is what GM thinks. As the news
release stated, "In making such judgments, significant weight is given to
evidence that can be objectively verified. A company's current or previous
losses are given more weight than its future outlook, and a recent
three-year historical cumulative loss is considered a significant factor
that is difficult to overcome." FAS 109, P 23 states, "Forming a conclusion
that a valuation allowance is not needed is difficult when there is negative
evidence such as cumulative losses in recent years."
As an aside, the more-likely-than-not standard in
FAS 109 existed before FIN 48 adopted the standard. FIN 48 doesn't talk
about objective evidence wrt the MLTN standard.
FIN 48, 6, states, "An enterprise shall initially
recognize the financial statement effects of a tax position when it is more
likely than not, based on the technical merits, that the position will be
sustained upon examination. As used in this Interpretation, the term more
likely than not means a likelihood of more than 50 percent; the terms
examined and upon examination also include resolution of the related appeals
or litigation processes, if any. The more-likely than- not recognition
threshold is a positive assertion that an enterprise believes it is entitled
to the economic benefits associated with a tax position. The determination
of whether or not a tax position has met the more-likely-than-not
recognition threshold shall consider the facts, circumstances, and
information available at the reporting date.
FIN 48, 7, states, "In assessing the
more-likely-than-not criterion as required by paragraph 6 of this
Interpretation: a. It shall be presumed that the tax position will be
examined by the relevant taxing authority that has full knowledge of all
relevant information. b. Technical merits of a tax position derive from
sources of authorities in the tax law (legislation and statutes, legislative
intent, regulations, rulings, and case law) and their applicability to the
facts and circumstances of the tax position. When the past administrative
practices and precedents of the taxing authority in its dealings with the
enterprise or similar enterprises are widely understood, those practices and
precedents shall be taken into account. c. Each tax position must be
evaluated without consideration of the possibility of offset or aggregation
with other positions."
In an appendix, FIN 48, B46, states, "In
considering the subsequent recognition of tax positions that do not
initially meet the more-likely-than-not recognition threshold and the
subsequent measurement of tax positions, the Board initially considered
whether specific external events should be required to effect a change in
judgment about the recognition of a tax position or the measurement of a
recognized tax position. The Board concluded in the Exposure Draft that a
change in estimate is a judgment that requires evaluation of all available
facts and circumstances, not a specific triggering event. Some respondents
to the Exposure Draft stated that the evidence supporting a change in
judgment should be objectively verifiable and that a triggering event is
normally required to subsequently recognize a tax benefit."
Since this language wasn't put in the standard, I
wonder if one could argue that the two MLTN standards are different. It
would be interesting to be a fly on the wall as some of the debate goes on
about uncertain tax positions.
Amy Dunbar
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on November 9,
2007
GM Will Book $39 Billion Charge
by John
D. Stoll
Nov 07, 2007
Page: A3
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119438884709884385.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
TOPICS: Advanced
Financial Accounting, Income Taxes
SUMMARY: "General
Motors Corp. will take a $39 billion, noncash charge to
write down deferred tax assets, "...a signal that it expects
to continue to struggle financially despite significant
restructuring and cost cutting in the past two years."
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: Use to cover accounting for deferred tax
assets and a related valuation account.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Define the terms deferred tax assets, deferred tax
liabilities, net operating loss carryforwards, and deferred
tax credits.
2.) Which of the above three items has General Motors
recorded for a total of $39 billion? In your answer, comment
on the opening statement in the article that GM will
write-down its "deferred tax credits."
3.) What is a valuation allowance against deferred tax
assets? When must such an allowance be recorded under
generally accepted accounting standards? Use GM's situation
as an example in your answer.
4.) GM states that its $39 billion write down was impacted
by three factors. Explain how each of these factors bears on
the determination of a valuation allowance against deferred
tax assets. Be specific.
5.) The author writes, "If it returns to steady profits, GM
could remove the valuation allowance and reclaim some or all
of the $39 billion in deferred credits," and that the
write-down does not preclude GM from future use of its net
operating loss carryforwards and deferred tax assets.
Explain these statements, including the entries that will be
recorded if the deferred tax assets are used in the future.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
RELATED
ARTICLES:
GM Statement on Noncash Charge
by General Motors, via PRNewswire
Nov 06, 2007
Online Exclusive
|
Controversy Over FAS 2 on Research and Development
(R&D)
Question
Are these just dirty tricks to keep some generic drugs off the market?
Pharmaceutical makers go to great lengths to protect
their exclusive marketing rights to best-selling brand-name drugs. But a pair of
lawsuits and a government antitrust investigation involving a drug made by
Abbott Laboratories could help define how far those companies can legally go to
fend off copycat rivals.
Shirley S. Wang
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on June 6, 2008
TriCor Case May Illuminate Patent Limits
by Shirley S.
Wang
The Wall Street Journal
Jun 02, 2008
Page: B1
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121236509655436509.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
TOPICS: Financial
Accounting, Intangible Assets, Research & Development
SUMMARY: Aboott
Laboratories have been involved in lawsuits and a government
antitrust investigation in relation to its 33-year-old
cholesterol medication TriCor. This drug generated sales of $1.2
billion in 2007 but the patent on the original product--which
was developed in France--has now expired. When Abbott Labs
acquired the TriCor licensing rights in the late 1990s, the
company patented a new way to make the product. The antitrust
suit examines whether Abbot Labs "...violated antitrust laws in
its efforts to prevent an Israeli company from successfully
selling a generic version of the drug." The bases for the
arguments against Abbott Labs are that the company filed "...new
patents on questionable improvements to TriCor...[and] engaged
in a practice known as 'product switching'--retiring an existing
drug and replacing it with a modified version that is marketed
'new and improved,' preventing pharmacists from substituting a
generic for the branded drug when they fill prescriptions for
it." Though not against the law per se, these practices may have
violated antitrust laws if their sole purpose was to extend
Abbott's monopoly on sales of the product.
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: The article clearly illustrates issues in
accounting for R&D and intangible assets and is therefore useful
in intermediate financial accounting and MBA accounting courses.
In addition, an ethical question of the cost impact on medical
patients of these patent rights may be included in class
discussion of this article.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) Summarize accounting in the two areas
of intangible assets and research and development (R&D)
expenditures. How are these two areas related?
2. (Introductory) Examine Abbott Laboratories' most
recent quarterly financial statement filing with the SEC,
available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1800/000110465908029545/a08-11202_110q.htm
or by clicking on the live link to Abbot Laboratories in the
on-line version of the article, then SEC Filings under "Other
Resources" in the left-hand column of the web page, selecting
the 10-Q filing submitted 2008-05-02 and selecting the html
version of the entire document. How large are Abbott Labs
intangible assets and research and development expenditures? In
your answer, specifically consider how you can best answer this
question using some basis for assessment.
3. (Advanced) Refer to your answer to question 2. How
do the accounting practices for intangible assets and R&D
expenditures impact the way in which you assess the size of
these items relative to Abbott Labs operations?
4. (Introductory) "Drug companies typically have three
to ten years of exclusive patent rights remaining when their
products hit the market." Why is this the case? In your answer,
specifically state how these business conditions impact the
required time period over which the cost of patents may be
amortized.
5. (Advanced) Again examine Abbott Labs 10-Q filing
made on May 2, 2008, in particular the footnote disclosure
related to intangible assets. Note 11--Goodwill and Intangible
Assets. What accounting policy is consistent with the
description of patent rights' useful lives discussed in answer
to question 4 above?
6. (Introductory) What steps has Abbott Labs undertaken
to extend the life of its patent on TriCor? Are steps like these
a business necessity or merely a method of generating excessive
profits for pharmaceutical companies? In your answer,
specifically consider ethical issues related to profitability,
continued R&D for new pharmaceutical products, and the cost to
both medical patients and insurance companies of patented,
brand-name products versus generic equivalents.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
|
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on April 23,
2004
TITLE: Brothers of Invention
REPORTER: Timothy Aeppel
DATE: Apr 19, 2004
PAGE: B1,3
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108233054158486127,00.html
TOPICS: Research & Development, Intangible Assets
SUMMARY: Lahart reports on the growing instances of designing variations of
new
patent-protected products in an attempt to skirt the patent laws and offer
virtual clones of those products at lower prices.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is a patent? How does one appropriately account for a patent that has
been granted to a firm? How does a patent differ from other intangible assets?
How is it similar? How does a patent give a firm a competitive advantage? In
the Aeppel article, what happens to this advantage when a design-around is
introduced?
2.) Explain impairment of an intangible asset. How do the "design
arounds"
described in the Aeppel article impair the value of the patent? How do you
account for such an impairment?
3.) What effect is this issue having on research & development (R&D)
expenditures for firms developing new patented products? Are R&D costs
expensed
or capitalized? What about R&D costs that result in the granting of a
patent?
4.) Why are valid patent-holders designing around their own products?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
"Brothers of Invention:
'Design-Arounds' Surge As More Companies Imitate Rivals' Patented
Products," by Timothy Aeppel, The Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2004, Page
B1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108233054158486127,00.html
Nebraska rancher Gerald Gohl had a
bright idea: Create a remote-controlled spotlight, so he wouldn't have to roll
down the window of his pickup truck and stick out a hand-held beacon to look
for his cattle on cold nights.
By 1997, Mr. Gohl held a patent on the
RadioRay, a wireless version of his spotlight that could rotate 360 degrees
and was mounted using suction cups or brackets. Retail price: more than $200.
RadioRay started to catch on with ranchers, boaters, hunters and even police.
Wal-Mart
Stores Inc. liked it, too. Mr. Gohl says a buyer for Wal-Mart's Sam's Club
stores called to discuss carrying the RadioRay as a "wow" item, an
unusual product that might attract lots of attention and sales. Mr. Gohl said
no, worrying that selling to Sam's Club could drive the spotlight's price
lower and poison his relationships with distributors.
Before long, though, Sam's Club was
selling its own wireless, remote-controlled searchlight -- for about $60. It
looked nearly identical to the RadioRay, except for a small, plastic part
restricting the light's rotation to slightly less than 360 degrees. Golight
Inc., Mr. Gohl's McCook, Neb., company, sued Wal-Mart in 2000, alleging patent
infringement. The retailer countered that Mr. Gohl's invention was obvious and
that its light wasn't an exact copy of the RadioRay's design.
The legal battle between Mr. Gohl and
the world's largest retailer -- which Wal-Mart lost in a federal district
court and on appeal and is now considering taking to the Supreme Court --
reflects a growing trend in the high-stakes, persnickety world of patents and
product design. Patent attorneys say that companies increasingly are imitating
rivals' inventions, while trying to make their own versions just different
enough to avoid infringing on a patent. The near-copycat procedure, which
among other things helps companies avoid paying royalties to patent holders,
is called a "design-around."
"The thinking in engineering
offices more and more boils down to, 'Let's see what the patent says and see
if we can get around it and get something as good -- or almost as good --
without violating the patent,' " says Ken Kuffner, a patent attorney
in Houston who represents a U.S. maker of retail-display stands that designed
around the patent on plastic displays it used to buy from another company. He
declines to identify his client.
Design-arounds are nearly as old as the
patent system itself, underscoring the pressure that companies feel to keep
pace with the innovations of competitors. And U.S. courts have repeatedly
concluded that designing around -- and even copying products left unprotected
-- can be good for consumers by lowering prices and encouraging innovation.
The practice appears to be surging as
companies shift more manufacturing outside the U.S. in an effort to drive
costs lower. No one tracks overall design-around numbers, but "there's
really been a spike in this sort of activity in the last few years," says
Jack Barufka, a patent-attorney specializing in design-arounds at Pillsbury
Winthrop LLP in McLean, Va.
Mr. Barufka, a former physicist, has
handled design-arounds on exercise equipment, industrial parts, and factory
machinery. A client recently brought him a household appliance, which he won't
identify, to be dissected part-by-part so that his client can try to make a
similar product at a cheaper price, probably by using foreign suppliers.
"We design around competitor
patents on a regular basis," says James O'Shaughnessy, vice president and
chief intellectual property counsel at Rockwell Automation Inc. in Milwaukee,
a maker of industrial automation equipment. "Anybody who is really paying
attention to the patent system, who respects it, will still nevertheless try
to find ways -- either offshore production or a design-around -- to produce an
equivalent product that doesn't infringe."
Design-arounds are particularly common
in auto parts, semiconductors and other industries with enormous markets that
are attractive to newcomers looking for a way to break in. The practice also
happens in mature industries, where there are few big breakthroughs and
competitors rely on relatively small changes to gain a competitive advantage.
Patented products are attractive targets for an attempted end run because they
command premium prices, making them irresistible amid razor-thin profit
margins and expanding global competition.
Few companies will talk about their
design-around efforts, since the results often look like little more than
clones of someone else's idea. Even companies with patented products that are
designed-around usually keep quiet, sometimes because their own engineers are
looking for ways to make an end run on rivals.
The surge in design-arounds is pushing
research-and-development costs higher, since some companies feel forced to
protect their inventions from being copied by coming up with as many
alternative ways to achieve the same result -- and patenting those, too.
"A patent is basically worthless
if someone else can design around it easily and make a high-performing
component for less," says Morgan Chu, a patent attorney at Irell &
Manella LLP in Los Angeles.
Because successful design-arounds also
force prices lower, they make it harder for companies to recover their
investment in new products. Danfoss
AS, a Danish maker of air conditioning, heating and other industrial
equipment, discovered in the late 1990s that a customer in England had
switched to buying a designed-around part for a Danfoss agricultural machine
at a lower price from an English supplier. Danfoss eventually won back the
customer, but only after agreeing to a price concession, says Georg Nissen,
the Danish company's intellectual property manager, who notes they lowered
their price about 5%.
The main way for companies to fight
design-arounds is in court -- or the threat of it. Dutton-Lainson Co., a
Hastings, Neb., maker of marine, agricultural, and industrial products,
recently discovered that a rival was selling a tool used by ranchers to
tighten the barbed wire on fences that was identical to its own patented tool,
with an ergonomic handle shaped to fit the palm of a hand.
Continued in the article
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on
October 14, 2005
TITLE: In R&D, Brains Beat Spending in Boosting Profit
REPORTER: Gary McWilliams
DATE: Oct 11, 2005
PAGE: A2
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB112898917962665021.html
TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis,
Research & Development
SUMMARY: The article reports on a study by management consultants Booz Allen
Hamilton on firms� levels of R&D spending and related performance metrics.
QUESTIONS:
1.) How must U.S. firms account for Research and Development expenditures?
What is the major reasoning behind the FASB's requirement to treat these costs
in this way? In your answer, reference the authoritative accounting literature
promulgating this treatment and the FASB's supporting reasoning.
2.) How does the U.S. treatment differ from the treatment of R&D costs under
accounting standards in effect in most countries of the world?
3.) Describe the study undertake by Booz Allen Hamilton as reported in the
article. In your answer, define each of the terms for variables used in the
analysis. Why would a management consulting firm undertake such a study?
4.) What were the major findings of the study? How does this finding support
the FASB�s reasoning as described in answer to question 1 above?
5.) As far as you can glean from the description in the article, what are the
potential weaknesses to the study? Do these weaknesses have any bearing on your
opinion about the support that the results give to the current R&D accounting
requirements in the U.S.? Explain.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"In R&D, Brains Beat Spending in Boosting Profit," by Gary McWilliams, The
Wall Street Journal, October 11, 2005, Page A2 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB112898917962665021.html
Booz Allen concluded that once a minimum level of
research and development spending is achieved, better oversight and culture
were more significant factors in determining financial results. The study
calculated the percentage of a company's revenue spent on R&D and compared
it with sales growth, gross profit, operating profit, market capitalization
and total shareholder result.
It found "no statistically significant difference"
when comparing the financial results of middle-of-the-pack companies with
those in the top 10% of their industry, said Barry Jaruzelski, Booz Allen's
vice president of Global Technology Practice. The result was the same when
viewed within 10 industry groups or across all industries evaluated.
"It is the culture, the skills and the process more
than the absolute amount of money available," he said. "It says tremendous
results can be achieved with relatively modest amounts" of spending.
He points to Toyota Motor Corp., which spent 4.1%
of revenue on R&D last year, but consistently has outperformed rivals such
as Ford Motor Co., which spent 4.3% of sales on research and development.
Toyota's success with hybrid, gasoline-electric cars resulted from better
spending, not more spending, Mr. Jaruzelski says.
The study rankles some. Allan C. Eberhart, a
professor of finance at Georgetown University, says the time period examined
is too short to catch companies whose results might have benefited from past
R&D spending. He co-authored a paper that found "economically significant"
increases in R&D spending did benefit operating profits. The paper, which
examined R&D spending at 8,000 companies over a 50-year period, found 1% to
2% increased operating profit at companies that increased R&D spending by 5%
or more in a single year.
Mr. Jaruzelski said less isn't always better. The
study found that companies that ranked among the bottom 10% of R&D spenders
performed worse than average or top spenders. The result suggests there is a
base level of research and development needed to remain healthy but that
spending above a certain level doesn't confer additional benefits.
R&D spending was positively associated with one
performance measure: gross margins. Median gross margins of the top half of
companies measured by R&D to sales spending were 40% higher than those in
the bottom half.
This is a good
slide show!
"The Truth Behind the Earnings
Illusion: The profit picture has never been so distorted. The surprise? Things
aren't as ugly as they look" by Justin Fox, Fortune, July 22, 2002 --- http://www.fortune.com/indexw.jhtml?channel=artcol.jhtml&doc_id=208677
Question:
Where are the major differences between book income and taxable income that favor booked
income reported to the investing public?
Answer according to Justin Fox:
What the heck happened? The most
obvious explanations for the disconnect are disparities in accounting for stock options
and pension funds. When a company's employees exercise stock options, the gains are
treated for tax purposes as an expense to the company but are completely ignored in
reported earnings. And while investment gains made by a company's employee pension fund
are counted in reported earnings, they don't show up in tax profits.
Analysts at Standard & Poor's
are working to remove those two distortions by calculating a new "core earnings"
measure for S&P 500 companies that includes options costs and excludes pension fund
gains. When that exercise is completed in the coming weeks, most of the profit disconnect
may disappear. Then again, maybe not. In struggling to deliver the outsized profits to
which they and their investors had become accustomed in the mid-1990s, a lot more CEOs and
CFOs may have bent the rules than we know about. "There was some cheating around the
edges," says S&P chief economist David Wyss. "It's just not clear how big
the edges are."
While conservative accounting is
now back in vogue, it's impossible to say with certainty that reported earnings have
returned to reality: Comparing the earnings per share of the S&P 500 with the tax
profits of all American corporations, both public and private (which is what the Commerce
Department reports), is too much of an apples and oranges exercise. But over the long run
reported earnings and tax earnings do grow at about the same rate--just over 7% a year
since 1960, according to Prudential Securities chief economist Richard Rippe, Wall
Street's most devoted student of the Commerce Department profit numbers. So the fact that
Commerce says after-tax profits came in at an annualized rate of $615 billion in the first
quarter--a record-setting pace if it holds up for the full year--ought to be at least a
little reassuring to investors. "I do believe the hints of recovery that we're seeing
in tax profits will continue," Rippe says.
That does not mean we're
due for another profit boom. Declining interest rates were the biggest reason profits rose
so fast in the 1990s, says S&P's Wyss. Rates simply don't have that far to fall now.
So even when investors start believing again what companies say about their earnings, they
may still be shocked at how slowly those earnings are growing.
Continued at http://www.fortune.com/indexw.jhtml?channel=artcol.jhtml&doc_id=208677
Reply by Bob Jensen:
For a technical explanation of the stock option accounting alluded to in the above
quotation, go to one of my student examinations at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Exams/5341sp02/exam02/Exam02VersionATeachingNotes.htm
The exam02.xls Excel workbook answers can be downloaded from http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Exams/5341sp02/exam02/
The S&P revised GAAP core earnings model alluded to in the above quotation can be
examined in greater detail at http://www.standardandpoors.com/Forum/MarketAnalysis/coreEarnings/index.html
The pause that refreshes just got a bit more refreshing - Coca-Cola Co. announced
Sunday it will lead the corporate pack by treating future stock option grants as employee
compensation. http://www.accountingweb.com/item/86333
Question:
Where are the major differences between book income and economic income that understate
book income reported to the investing public?
Answer:
This question is too complex to even scratch the surface in a short paragraph. One
of the main bones of contention between the FASB and technology companies is FAS 2 that
requires the expensing of both research and development (R&D) even though it is
virtually certain that a great deal of the outlays for these items will have economic
benefit in future years. The FASB contends that the identification of which
projects, what future periods, and the amount of the estimated benefits per period are too
uncertain and subject to a high degree of accounting manipulation (book cooking) if such
current expenditures are allowed to be capitalized rather than expensed. Other bones
of contention concern expenditures for building up the goodwill, reputation, and training
"assets" of companies. The FASB requires that these be expensed rather
than capitalized except in the case of an acquisition of an entire company at a price that
exceeds the value of tangible assets less current market value of debt. In summary,
many firms have argued for "pro forma" earnings reporting such that companies
can make a case that huge expense reporting required by the FASB and GAAP can be adjusted
for better matching of future revenues with past expenditures.
You can read more about these problems in the
following two documents:
Accounting Theory --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm
State of the Profession of Accountancy --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm
Hard Assets Versus Intangible Assets
Intangible assets are difficult to define because there are so many types and
circumstances. For example some have contractual or statutory lives (e.g.,
copyrights, patents and human resources) whereas others have indefinite lives (e.g.,
goodwill and intellectual capital). Baruch Lev classifies intangibles as follows in
"Accounting for Intangibles: The New Frontier" --- http://www.nyssa.org/abstract/acct_intangibles.html
:
- Spillover knowledge that creates new products and enhances
valuepatents, drugs, chemicals, software, etc. (i.e., Merck, Cisco, Microsoft, IBM).
- Human Resources.
- Brands/Franchises.
- Structural capital, such as processes, and systems of doing
things. This is the fastest-growing group of intangibles.
He does not flesh in these groupings. I flesh in some examples below of unbooked
(unrecorded) intangible assets that may have value far in excess of all the booked assets
of a company.
- Spillover Knowledge
- Millions or billions expensed on R&D having good prospects for future economic
benefit
- Databases (e.g., prospective customer lists , knowledge bases, and AMR
Sabre System)
- Customer relationships including CRM software
- Operational software such as Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) installations and human
resource software
- Financial relationships such as credit reputation and international banking
contacts.
- Production backlog
- Human Resources.
- Highly skilled and experienced executives, staff, and labor (e.g., Steve Jobs, Bill
Gates, Warren Buffet, technicians, pilots, doctors, lawyers, accountants, etc.)
- Employee dedication and loyalty
- Mix of discipline and creative opportunity employment structure
- Brands/Franchises.
- Tradenames and logos
- Patents
- Copyrights
- Protections from many kinds of lawsuits (e.g., road builders are not sued for every
accident on roads they built and out of court settlements affording protections from
future lawsuits)
- Structural Capital, Processes, and Systems
- Machine and worker efficiencies and labor relations
- Risk management system and ethics environment
- Financial and operating leverage
- TQM
- Supply chain management AND marketing systems (the history of Dell Corporation)
- Political power (e.g., defense contractors, agricultural giants, and multinational oil
companies)
- Monopoly power (e.g., Microsoft corporation is worth more because there is so little
competition remaining in PC operating systems and MS Office products like Excel, Word, and
Powerpoint).
Baruch Lev's Value Chain Scorecard
Discovery/Learning
· Research and Development
· IT Development
· Employee Training
· Communities of Practice
· Customer Acquisition Costs
· Technology Purchase
· Reverse Engineering
-Spillovers
· IT Acquisition
· R&D Alliances/Joint Ventures
· Supplier/Customer Integration
Implementation
· Clinical Tests, FDA Approvals
· Beta Tests
· Unique Visitors
· Marketing Alliances
· Brand Support
· Stickiness and Loyalty Traffic Measures
· Work Practices
· Retention
· Hot Skills (Knowledge Workers
Commercialization
· Innovation Revenues
· Market Share/Growth
· Online Revenues
· Revenues from Alliances
· Revenue Growth by Segments
· Productivity Gains
· Online Supply Channels
· Earnings/Cash Flows
· Value Added
· Cash Burn Rate
· Product Pipeline
· Expected Restructuring Impact
· Market Potential/Growth
· Expected Capital Spending
|
The knowledge
capital estimates that Lev and Bothwell came up with during their run last fall of some 90
leading companies (see accompanying table) were absolutely huge. Microsoft,
for example, boasted a number of $211 billion, while Intel,
General
Electric and Merck
weighed in with $170 billion, $112 billion and $110 billion, respectively. Source: "The New Math," by Jonathan R. Laing, Barrons
Online, November 20, 2000 --- http://equity.stern.nyu.edu/News/news/levbarrons1120.html
Trinity students may go to J:\courses\acct5341\readings\levNov2000.htm |
- It is seldom, if ever mentioned, but Microsoft's
overwhelming huge asset is its customer lock-in to the Windows Operating System combined
with the enormous dominance of MS Office (Word, Excel, Outlook, etc) and MS Access.
The cost of shifting most any organization over to some other operating system and suite
software comparable to MS Office is virtually prohibitive. This
is the main asset of Microsoft, but measuring its value and variability is virtually
impossible.
- Intellectual property
- Trademarks, patents, copyrights
- In-process R&D
- Unrecorded goodwill
- Ways of doing business and adapting to technology
changes and shifts in consumer tastes
For example,
my (Baruch Lev's) recent computations show that Microsoft has
knowledge assets worth $211 billion -- by far the most of any company. Intel has knowledge
assets worth $170 billion, and Merck has knowledge assets worth $110 billion. Now, compare
those figures with DuPont's assets. DuPont has more employees than all of those companies
combined. And yet, DuPont's knowledge assets total only $41 billion -- there isn't much
extra profitability there. Source:
"The New Math," by Jonathan R. Laing, Barrons Online, November 20, 2000
--- http://equity.stern.nyu.edu/News/news/levbarrons1120.html
Trinity students may go to J:\courses\acct5341\readings\levNov2000.htm |
University logos of prestigious universities
(Stanford, Columbia, Carnegie-Mellon, Duke, etc.) are worth billions when discounting
their value in distance education of the future--- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/000aaa/0000start.htm
|
Purchase Versus Pooling: The Never Ending
Debate
FAS 141 and the Question of Value By
PricewaterhouseCoopers CFOdirect Network Newsdesk, January 16, 2003 --- http://www.cfodirect.com/cfopublic.nsf/vContentPrint/CA13B226B214A04085256CB000512D34?OpenDocument
Just as early reactions
to FAS 142 seemed to have overlooked the complexities in reviewing and testing
goodwill for impairment, so too have reactions to complying with the Financial
Accounting Standards Board's Statement No. 141 – Business Combinations.
Adopted and issued at the same time as Statement No. 142 in the summer of
2001, the headline news about FAS 141 was the elimination of the Pooling-of-Interest
accounting method in mergers and acquisitions. Going forward from June 30,
2001, all acquisitions are to be accounted for using one method only – Purchase
Accounting.
This change is significant and one particular aspect of it – the
identification and measurement of intangible assets outside of goodwill
– seems to be somewhat under-appreciated.
Stephen C. Gerard, Managing Director at Standard & Poor's Corporate Value
Consulting, says that there is "general conceptual understanding of
Statement 141 by corporate management and finance teams. But the real impact
will not be felt until the next deal is done." And that deal in FAS 141
parlance will be a "purchase" since "poolings" are no
longer recognized.
Consistent M&A Accounting
The FASB, in issuing Statement No. 141, concluded that "virtually all
business combinations are acquisitions and, thus, all business combinations
should be accounted for in the same way that other asset acquisitions are
accounted for – based on the values exchanged."
In defining how business combinations are to be accounted for, FAS 141
supersedes parts of APB Opinion No. 16. That Opinion allowed companies
involved in a merger or acquisition to use either pooling-of-interest
or purchase accounting. The choice hinged on whether the deal met 12 specified
criteria. If so, pooling-of-interest was required.
Over time, "pooling" became the accounting method of choice,
especially in "mega-deal" transactions. That, in the words of the
FASB, resulted in "…similar business combinations being accounted for
using different methods that produced dramatically different financial
statement results."
FAS 141 seeks to level that playing field and improve M&A financial
reporting by:
- Better
reflecting the investment made in an acquired entity based on the values
exchanged.
- Improving the
comparability of reported financial information on an apples-to-apples
basis.
- Providing more
complete financial information about the assets acquired and liabilities
assumed in business combinations.
- Requiring
disclosure of information on the business strategy and reasons for the
acquisition.
When announcing FAS 141, the FASB wrote: "This Statement requires those
(intangible assets) be recognized as assets apart from goodwill if they meet
one of two criteria – the contractual-legal criterion or the separability
criterion."
Unchanged by the new rule are the fundamentals of purchase accounting and the
purchase price allocation methodology for measuring goodwill: that is,
goodwill represents the amount remaining after allocating the purchase price
to the fair market values of the acquired assets, including recognized
intangibles, and assumed liabilities at the date of the acquisition.
"What has changed," says Steve Gerard, "is the rigor companies
must apply in determining what assets to break out of goodwill and separately
recognize and amortize."
Thus, in an unheralded way, FAS 141 introduces a process of identifying and
placing value on intangible assets that could prove to be a new experience for
many in corporate finance, as well as a costly and time-consuming exercise.
Nonetheless, an exercise critical to compliance with the new rule.
Continued at http://www.cfodirect.com/cfopublic.nsf/vContentPrint/CA13B226B214A04085256CB000512D34?OpenDocument
A Little Like Dirty Pooling Accounting
Tyco Undervalues Acquired Assets and Overvalues Acquired Liabilities:
Tyco International Ltd. said Monday it has agreed to
pay the Securities and Exchange Commission $50 million to settle charges related
to allegations of accounting fraud by the high-tech conglomerate's prior
management. The regulatory agency had accused Tyco of inflating operating
earnings, undervaluing acquired assets, overvaluing acquired liabilities and
using improper accounting rules, company spokeswoman Sheri Woodruff said. 'The
accounting practices violated federal securities laws,'' she said.
"Tyco to Pay S.E.C. $50 Million on Accounting Charges," The New York Times,
April 17, 2006 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/business/AP-Tyco-SEC-Fine.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
April 17, 2006 reply from Saeed Roohani
Bob,
Assuming improper accounting practices by Tyco
negatively impacted investors and creditors in the capital markets, why
SEC gets the $50 M? Shouldn't SEC give at least some of it back to the
people potentially hurt by such practices? Or damage to investors should
only come from auditors' pocket?
Saeed Roohani
April 18, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Saeed,
In a case like this it is difficult to identify particular victims
and the extent of the damage of this one small set of accounting
misdeeds in the complex and interactive multivariate world of
information.
The damage is also highly dispersed even if you confine the scope to
just existing shareholders in Tyco at the particular time of the
financial reports.
One has to look at motives. I'm guessing that one motive was to
provide overstated future ROIs from acquisitions in order to justify the
huge compensation packages that the CEO (Kozlowski) and the CFO
(Schwarz) were requesting from Tyco's Board of Directors for superior
acquisition performance. Suppose that they got $125 million extra in
compensation. The amount of damage for to each shareholder for each
share of stock is rather minor since there were so many shares
outstanding.
Also, in spite of the illegal accounting, Kozlowski's acquisitions
were and still are darn profitable for Tyco. I have a close friend (and
neighbor) in New Hampshire, a former NH State Trooper, who became
Koslowski's personal body guard. To this day my friend, Jack, swears
that Kozlowski did a great job for Tyco in spite of possibly "stealing"
some of Tyco's money. Many shareholders wish Kozlowski was still in
command even if he did steal a small portion of the huge amount he made
for Tyco. He had a skill at negotiating some great acquisition deals in
spite of trying to take a bit more credit for the future ROIs than was
justified under purchase accounting instead of virtual pooling
accounting.
I actually think Dennis Kozlowski was simply trying to get a bit
larger commission (than authorized by the Board) for some of his good
acquisition deals.
Would you rather have a smart crook or an unimaginative bean counter
managing your company? (Just kidding)
Bob Jensen
Bob Jensen's threads on the Tyco scandals are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm#PwC
April 18, 2006 message reply Gregg Wilson
Hi Bob Jensen
From Forbes:
<<But Briloff says what's particularly egregious is
the fact that Tyco did not file with the SEC disclosure forms (known as 8K
filings), which would have carried the exhibits setting forth the balance
sheets and income statements of the acquired companies.
"This is an even worse situation than under the old
pooling accounting, " Briloff says, "because under that now vestigial
method, investors and analysts could dig out the historical balance sheet
and income statement for the acquired companies." >>
Ah yes, the good old days, when accountants
understood what mattered.
Gregg
April 18, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Interesting but still does not mean Abe wanted to pool those statements.
Abe fought poolings like a tiger. He never said that accounting information
before an acquisition is totally useless. He did say it could be misleading
when pooled, especially in relation to terms of the acquisition.
Bob Jensen
Purchase Versus Pooling: The Never Ending Debate
March 29, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hope you don't mind another question.
I worked on Wall Street during the other tech mania
(late 60's) which included the conglomerate craze. I know
pooling-of-interest accounting was kind of tarred and feathered in the
ensuing meltdown, but I was never too clear why that was so. I am still
wondering why bogus goodwill is preferable to retaining the financial track
record of the combined companies. Are you aware of what the actual
objections to p-o-i are?
Gregg Wilson
March 29, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Some investors are impressed by high ROI or ROE
numbers. Keeping the denominator low with old historical cost numbers and
the numerator high with future earnings numbers "inflated" ROI and ROE and
made the mergers appear more successful than was actually the case.
There are other problems with "dirty pooling."
One of the best-known articles (from Barrons) was
written by Professor Abe Briloff about "Dirty Pooling at McDonalds."
McDonald's shares plummeted significantly the day that Briloff exposed dirty
pooling by McDonald's ---
http://www.jstor.org/view/00014826/ap010167/01a00060/0
Actually, one of the arguments in favor of purchase
accounting rather than pooling of interests is that in an arm's length
transaction goodwill can actually be measured, unlike the pie-in-the sky
valuations in a hypothetical world.
Bob Jensen
March 29, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Bob Jensen
Well I wasn't able to find a site where I could access Abe's article.
The "old numbers" are worth a lot to this user of financial statements,
and I would much rather have the combined track record of the two companies
than its obliteration. I am not sure why accountants feel that there is a
problem revealing what the past and current combined ROE has been. The
pooling-of-interest doesn't create that number, it only preserves it for
those who want to use it.
If you mean that the value of the exchanged stock is an actual
measurement of goodwill then I would take very serious issue. There is no
economic meaning to that number. Companies negotiate an exchange ratio. The
relative value of the two stocks may matter, but the value of the exchanged
stock has no relevance to the negotiation, so how could it be a measure of
anything economic? All you have to do is look at the real cases of stock
acquisitions that were made during the market boom to see how true that is
and how spurious the numbers became. I always assumed that the amortization
rules were changed because of the charade of company after company being
forced to report pro forma earnings due to the ludicrous mountains of
mythical goodwill.
But even if the goodwill number were determinable why would you want to
use it. The point isn't to have accurate values on the balance sheet. The
point is retaining the historical relationships of the earnings model.
Deferred costs are not assets that you want to value but the merely costs
that are going to be expensed and the historical relationship of those costs
to the resulting earnings is what tells you what the capital efficiency of
the company is. I want that information. Why obliterate it?
Gregg Wilson
March 29, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Generally there are market values of the stocks at the date of the
acquisition. These give some evidence of value at the time of the merger,
although there are blockage factor considerations.
In any case there is a long history of abuses of pooling to mislead
investors. In some cases that was the main purpose such that without being
able to use pooling accounting, acquisitions did not take place. In other
words the main purpose was to deceive.
A summary of FAS 141 is given at
http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/stsum141.shtml
The standard itself discusses a lot of both theory and abuses. In
general, academics fought against pooling. About the only parties in favor
of pooling were the corporations themselves.
Read the standard itself and you will learn a lot.
Bob Jensen
March 30, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Bob Jensen
Well I would call that entire FAS 141 a lot of
sophistries. Apples and oranges indeed. This is a case of trying to make an
apple into an orange and getting a rotten banana.
In the above example, if a company bought another
company for more than its net worth, the excess price paid was attributable
to goodwill and would have to be written off over a period of years. The
problem is that the writing off goodwill creates an expense that lowers
earnings. To get around this, companies use an accounting technique called
pooling of interest. This practice allows the acquiring company to buy other
companies at inflated prices and keep the goodwill charges off the company's
books. This strategy has resulted in merger mania. It enables a corporation
to buy another company at an inflated price using its own highly priced
stock as currency. In honest times, this process would create huge amounts
of goodwill that normally would have to be written off against future
earnings. Today, companies avoid this detriment to their bottom line by
pooling. The Merger Wave
These accounting abuses can be credited to what is
behind the current merger wave on Wall Street. Companies are using their
inflated stock prices to buy other companies. The result of buying more
companies brings in more sales and more profits, which Wall Street loves.
Using the pooling method of accounting, companies can acquire other
companies at high prices without the consequences of depressing future
earnings through the amortization of goodwill.
I was trying to find example of the abuses you were
talking about. I thought this was a terrific one. What fantastic
misinformation!
The thing that's so laughable about these arguments
is that they take investors for fools. In a stock acquisition not a nickel
of cash has been expended, so everyone understands that the purchase
goodwill is just a little paper farce that the accountants make us go
through. The amortization thing doesn't effect the price of the stock
because it has no e ffect whatsoever on the company's actual profitability
or cash flow. Have you read about the efficient market? I was really struck
in this last go around at the willingness of companies to take on billions
of dollars in goodwill that literally dwarfed everything else on their
balance sheets and caused their GAP earnings to be huge losses. They
reported their pro forma earnings and everyone understood that they hadn't
really paid 10 billion dollars for a company that was worth 100 million. I
looked at a couple of the deals and the share exchange ratios were really
very fair relative to the fundamentals (not the share prices). They were
good solid deals, between smallish tech companies that were very profitable
in the capex bubble and so were richly priced as one would expect. So the
accountants caved and changed the rule, and this little pint sized company
took some astounding goodwill writeoff the next year and the stock did
nothing. Did the guy who wrote 141 really think that phony made up good will
is the same thing as actual paid for with cash good will? I always get the
feeling that the companies relented on this one so they could fight their
battles on the ones that really matter. An orange is an orange, and an apple
is an apple.
I think accountants have really misunderstood the
whole abuse issue. I worked on Wall Street during the conglomerate fad and
spent hours analyzing stock acquisitions. There were some accounting abuses
but they were really not about pooling-of-interest. The people that really
got hurt were not the investors so much as the entrepreneurs who sold their
companies. Textron started the whole conglomerate thing and the business
schools wet their pants over the idea and pretty soon you could call
yourself a congolmerate and get a high stock price. I can't tell you how
tired I got of hearing the word "synergy". What was basically happening was
that the companies were making really good deals and getting a lot of value
for the stock they were giving up, partly because of the whole aura of the
thing. When you get a really good share exchange it makes your earnings
higher than they would be otherwise. Of course there is nothing abusive
about this. It's just the reality of doing a good deal. The real earnings
and cash flow are indeed and in fact actually higher per share for the
acquiring company. But of course that meant it took on the qualities of a
self-fullfilling prophecy. Investors were not fools then and they're not
fools now. They understood perfectly what was going on and hopped on for the
ride. It was the entrepreneurs that were selling their companies that were
duped. They were the ones that ended up with most of the stock when the
bubble burst.
I remember going out to talk to Henry Singleton at
Teledyne. What a brilliant man. He was telling me a story about a guy who
was peddling his company and wanted a certain price which he was evaluating
purely in terms of the value of the stock he was going to receive in the
exchange. Henry said that he sent him off to one of the schlock companies
that he knew would "pay" him what he wanted. We had our little moment of
bemusement, because even though it was early in the melt down stage, the guy
was obviously going to come up short. He just wasn't willing to look at what
he was getting a whole bunch of shares in, and he wasn't going to be able to
sell it for a while. So what do you think? Is it the accountants job to
protect that guy from his own greed?
By the way, Henry was playing his own games, and
they weren't really about pooling of interest. He was making literally
hundreds of stock acquisitions most of which were not really growth
companies but good solid little cash cows, and then he would slip in a nice
medium sized cash acquisitions once a quarter to make his "internal growth"
target. He would say that he was doing 15% external growth (the deal value
factor) and 15% internal growth. The thing about pooling was that you could
really see what the year-to-year growth of the combined companies was, so
Henry had to do his fix. Then after the stock tanked with the other
congomerates he was in great shape with all his cash flow so he started
doing debt swaps for the depressed stock. I was really sad when I heard he
had died prematurely. It would have been fun to see what his next move would
have been. The company languished without him.
Anyway I think the whole thing got interpreted as a
pooling-of-interest abuse, but as far as I'm concerned it really didn't have
anything to do with the accounting treatment. It's not the accountants
business to police the markets. In a stock deal the goodwill is all funny
money anyways, so the way I see it we are mucking up the balance sheet for
no good reason. You can amortize til you're blue in the face but it's not
really going to have any affect on anything real. It's not cash and it never
was. But you can pretend.
Gregg Wilson
March 30, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
FASB rules now require writing off goodwill only to the extent it is deemed impaired.
If you want to publish on such issues you have to provide something other
than off the top-of-your-head evidence. Do you have any evidence that
companies tend to buy other companies at inflated prices above what
companies are actually worth in terms of synergy and possibly oligopoly
benefits (such as when AT&T bought Bell South). You need to define "inflated
prices." About the only good examples I found of this on a large scale was
during the S&L bubble of the 1980s and the technology bubble of the 1990s
when almost everything was inflated in value. But at the time, who could've
predicted if and when the bubble would burst? It's always easier to assess
value in hindsight.
In general, it's very hard to define "inflated value" since the worth of
Company B to Company A may be far different than the worth of Company B to
Company C. You can always make an assumption that CEOs acquiring companies
are all stupid and/or crooks, but this assumption is just plain idiotic.
Many acquisitions pay off very nicely such as when Tyco bought most of its
acquisitions. Even crooks like Dennis Koswalski often make good acquisitions
for their companies. Koswalski simply thought he should get a bigger piece
of the action from his good deals.
Of course there are obvious isolated cases such as when Time Warner
bought AOL, but in this case AOL used fraudulent accounting that was not
detected.
I'm a little curious about what you would recommend for a balance sheet
of the merged AB Company when Company A buys Company B having the following
balance sheets:
Company A
Cash $200
Land $100 having a current exit value of $200
Equity ($300)
Company B
Land $10 having a current exit value of $100
Equity ($10)
Company A buys all Company B shares for $120 million in cash and merges
the accounts. Company A and B business operations are all merged such that
maintaining Company B as a subsidiary makes no sense. Employees of Company B
are highly skilled real estate investors who now work for Company AB. The
extra $20 million paid above the land current values of Company B was paid
mainly to acquire the highly skilled employees of Company B.
Company AB
Cash $ 80
Land ?
Equity ($ ?)
Why would a pooling be better than purchase accounting in the above
instance? I think not.
Bob Jensen
March 30, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
I certainly didn't mean to imply that cash
acquisitions should be treated as pooling-of-interest. On the contrary I was
trying to make the point that they are totally different situations, and
can't be treated effectively by the same accounting rule. The cash is the
whole point.
Gregg Wilson
March 30, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
I guess I still don't see a convincing argument why pooling is better for
non-cash deals since you still have the same problem as with cash deals.
That problem is badly out of date historical cost accounts on the books that
are totally meaningless in the acquisition negotiations. If they are totally
meaningless in negotiations, why should historical costs be pooled into the
acquiring firm's book instead of more relevant numbers reflecting the fair
values of the tangible assets at the time of the acquisition?
Of course there are many issues that your raise below, but I don't think
they argue for pooling.
Bob Jensen
March 30, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Bob Jensen
Because historical costs are the historical record
of the company's capital efficiency. As my old accounting teacher pointed
out, the earnings model is a gross approximation at best, but if persued
with consistency and conservativeness it can be a good indicator of the
capital efficiency of the firm and it's ability to generate a stream of
future cash returns. For me the killer argument in that regard is this. The
reality of a company is the stream of cash returns itself, dividends if you
will, and that's what the stock is worth. It makes no difference whether the
company has liberal accounting policies or conservative accounting policies.
If applied consistently then that rate of return on equity will define the
stream of future cash returns. It can be liberal accounting with a low ROE
and high E and a high reinvestment rate, or conservative accounting with a
high ROE and low E and a low reinvestment rate, but the resulting stream of
dividends is the same. The historical deferred costs and historical ROE are
the evidence of value, but they depend on consistent application of some
kind of accounting standards and rules whether they be liberal or
conservative (conservative has its advantages). I would rather have that
evidence than know what the current "fair value" of the assets is. Those
values don't help me determine the value of the stock. Pooling of interest
is terrific, because it recreates that earnings model history for the
combined companies. The historical costs are not meaningless to the
negotiations but rather are the basis for the negotiations, for they are the
evidence that the companies are using to determine the share exchange ratio
that they will accept. A low ROE company will have less to bargain with than
a high ROE company, all else being equal. There are potentials for abuse in
the differing accounting standards of the two entities, but if major changes
in the accounting standards of one of the companies occur, then the
accountants should disclose that material fact.
Gregg Wilson
March 30, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hardly a measure of capital efficiency. I have the 1981 U.S. Steel Annual
Report back when FAS 33 was still in force. U.S. Steel had to report under
both historical cost and current cost bases.
Under historical cost, U.S. Steel reported over $1 billion in net
earnings. On a current cost basis, all earnings disappeared and a net loss
of over $300 million was reported.
I consider the $1 billion net income reported under historical cost to be
a misleading figure of capital efficiency.
I think you should first read the FASB's standard on pooling versus
purchase accounting in detail. Then see if you still prefer pooling. Also
study
http://www.jstor.org/view/00014826/ap010167/01a00060/0
You might want to compare your analysis below with what Fama states at
http://library.dfaus.com/reprints/interview_fama_tanous/
Bob Jensen
March 31, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Gregg,
The law views this in reverse. Equity is a residual claim on assets under
securities laws. But the claim itself has no bearing on the historical
(deferred) cost amount since, in liquidation, the historical cost is
irrelevant. And in negotiating acquisition deals historical cost is
irrelevant. I have trouble imagining acquisitions where it would be relevant
since asset appraisals are essential in acquisitions.
Deferred cost such as book value of buildings and equipment is also
rendered meaningless by entirely arbitrary accumulated depreciation contra
accounts. Your argument does not convince me that pooling is better than
purchase accounting in acquisitions.
Since you feel so strongly about this, I suggest that you expose your
theories to the academic accounting world. Consider subscribing (free) to
the AECM at
http://pacioli.loyola.edu/aecm/ (Don't be mislead by the
technology description of this listserv. It has become the discussion forum
for all matters of accounting theory.)
Then carefully summarize your argument for pooling and see how accounting
professors respond to your arguments.
See if you can convince some accounting professors. You've not yet
convinced me that pooling is better.
Bob Jensen
April 5, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
I have been having an e-mail discussion with Bob
Jensen about accounting of stock acquisitions, and he kindly suggested that
I post my thoughts on the matter in this forum. I am not an academic and I
am here only because, as a user of financial statements, I find purchase
accounting of stock acquisitions puzzling.
(1) To me, the value of the exchanged shares is not
an economically relevant amount and is certainly not a purchase price. The
price of a stock acquisition is the share exchange ratio and what is
negotiated is the equity participation of the two groups of stockholders in
the combined companies. In the latest boom period purchase accounting often
produced extreme purchase prices many times what any cash buyer would have
paid and, when amortization was employed, large losses for the acquiror
which prompted pro forma reporting. If there was any economic reality to the
accounting treatment, why did those managements not lose their jobs? They
didn't "pay" the value of the exchanged shares. On the contrary, the share
exchange ratio that they negotiated was perfectly reasonable and beneficial.
(2) The exchanged stock value as purchase price is
a non-cash paper value which, regardless of the amortization or impairment
treatment, is ignored by this investor and, from what I have seen, investors
in general. It has no relevance to determining the discounted value of the
future cash returns, simply because the acquisition was in fact a
combination of equity interests and not a cash purchase and there was never
an economically relevant cash cost.
(3) Pooling-of-interest is good because it
preserves the historical profitability history of the combined companies and
accurately reflects the merger of equity interests which has in fact taken
place.
(4) There is nothing deceptive or abusive about
pooling accounting. If the ROE is higher it's because that's the right ROE.
It will result in a more accurate, and not a less accurate, projection of
future cash returns.
If company A and company B are very similar
fundamentally and both stocks are selling at 20 and they are negotiating a
share for share exchange and interest rates drop suddenly and both stocks go
to 25, then A isn't going to think oh-my-gosh we are "paying" 25% more for B
and drop out of the negotiations. On the contrary they will take the market
action as validation of the negotiated exchange ratio which is the price.
The stocks could go to 90 and it still wouldn't change anything except the
size of the goodwill on the balance sheet of the combined companies that I
have to back out of my analysis.
Gregg Wilson
April 5, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
--- Gregg Wilson wrote: I have been having an
e-mail discussion with Bob Jensen about accounting of stock acquisitions,
and he kindly suggested that I post my thoughts on the matter in this forum.
(snip) --- end of quote ---
Consider the following two sets of transactions:
1. P Corporation (P is for purchaser) raises $100
by issuing ten new shares to the capital market. It uses the $100 cash to
purchase 100% of the outstanding stock of T (as in Target) Corporation.
2. P issues ten new shares to the stockholders of T
in exchange for 100% of the outstanding stock of T.
Questions:
1. Should the accounting for the assets of T in the
consolidated financial statements of P differ between these two
transactions?
2. The crux of your critique of purchase accounting
seems to your assertion: "To me, the value of the exchanged shares is not an
economically relevant amount and is certainly not a purchase price."
a. Is the $100 cash raised by P in transaction #1
above an economically relevant amount?
b. Is the $100 cash transferred by P to the
shareholders of T in transaction #1 above a purchase price?
Richard C. Sansing
Associate Professor of Business Administration
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
100 Tuck Hall Hanover, NH 03755
April 5, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Richard Sansing
I would say the two transactions are not
equivalent.
In 1. the stockholders of T end out with $100. In
2. the stockholders of T end out with shares of stock in P.
1. is still a cash purchase and
2. is still an exchange of shares.
Say that P has 100 shares outstanding. In 2. what P
and T have negotiated is that in combining the two companies the
shareholders of T will end up with 10 shares in the combined companies and P
will end up with 100. That is obviously based on an assessment that the
value of P is 10 times the value of T based on their relative fundamentals
and ability to produce future cash returns. The price at which P can sell
it's stock to some third party is not relevant.
Gregg Wilson
April 6, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
--- Gregg Wilson wrote:
I would say the two transactions are not
equivalent.
In 1. the stockholders of T end out with $100. In
2. the stockholders of T end out with shares of stock in P.
1. is still a cash purchase and 2. is still an
exchange of shares.
--- end of quote ---
That the former shareholders of T wind up with
different assets in the two settings is not in dispute. Let's try this once
more.
In response to your original post, I posed three
questions. They were:
1. Should the accounting for the assets of T in the
consolidated financial statements of P differ between these two
transactions?
2. a. Is the $100 cash raised by P in transaction
#1 above an economically relevant amount?
b. Is the $100 cash transferred by P to the
shareholders of T in transaction #1 above a purchase price?
You answered none of them. You did remark:
"The price at which P can sell it's stock to some
third party is not relevant."
but I did not pose a question to which that is a
plausible answer. I have stipulated a transaction, that P sells--not could
sell, did sell--ten new shares of P stock in exchange for $100 cash as part
of transaction #1. Question 2a is a simple one. Is the $100 cash that P
received for its stock in the stipulated transaction an economically
relevant amount? If later in the discussion you want to dispute a premise in
an argument I advance, you are of course free to do so. But I have not yet
advanced an argument. I have simply posed some questions.
You have chosen to enter a community in which
abstract reasoning involving hypothetical examples the norm. You can
participate in this community, or not. If you answer the three questions, we
can proceed, because then I think I can understand what it is about the
purchase method of accounting that you find objectionable. But right now I
am unsure how you are thinking about the problem.
Richard C. Sansing
Associate Professor of Business Administration
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
100 Tuck Hall Hanover, NH 03755
April 6, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Richard Sansing
Maybe I should qualify my "Yes" answer. Answers 2
and 3 are yes to the extent they are economically relevant within
transaction set 1. They are not economically relevant to transaction set 2.
Gregg Wilson
April 6, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
---Gregg Wilson wrote:
Answer to all questions is yes.
Maybe I should qualify that. Answers 2 and 3 are
yes to the extent they are economically relevant within transaction set 1.
They are not economically relevant to transaction set 2.
--- end of quote ---
Okay, that helps. Given your answers, I think I can
put forward the case for purchase accounting. Transaction set #1 is recorded
in the following manner.
Sale of new equity for cash:
Cash 100
Stockholder equity 100
Purchase of T's assets for cash:
Assets 100
Cash 100
When the smoke clears, P has recorded assets with a
book value of 100 and stockholder equity of 100.
Purchase accounting takes the view that P's
acquisition of T's assets for stock essentially collapses these two
transactions into one, recording the value of the T assets at the market
price of the P stock. In contrast, if T's assets had a book value of 60,
pooling of interest would record assets of 60 and equity of 60.
The issue is whether this "collapsing" is
appropriate. P and T certainly wind up in the same position under both
transactions. Whether the shareholders of P and T are in the same position
depends on their portfolio choices.
Suppose first that I behave in accordance with the
principles of Capital Markets 101, in which I hold the market portfolio plus
the risk-free asset. Before either transaction #1 or #2, I hold (say) 10 P
shares (out of 100 outstanding) and 1 T share (out of 10 outstanding).
After either transaction, I own 11 P shares (out of
110
outstanding.) If all shareholders behave as I do,
then every party associated with the transaction is in the same position
under both sets of transactions. The burden seems to be on those advocating
the pooling method to explain why the accounting should differ when the
results to every party are the same.
Now suppose instead that shareholders, for whatever
reason, do not behave in this manner, and the two transactions lead to
substantive differences at the shareholder level (but not at the corporate
level). Should differences between the two transactions at the shareholder
level dictate different accounting treatments at the corporate level? Why?
Finally, let's consider the assertions you made in
your original post.
"To me, the value of the exchanged shares is not an
economically relevant amount and is certainly not a purchase price. (snip)
In the latest boom period purchase accounting often produced extreme
purchase prices many times what any cash buyer would have paid..."
When the stock was issued for cash, you considered
the cash price paid economically relevant (my question 2a); and when the
assets were sold for cash, you considered it a purchase price (my question
2b.) Yet when the transaction is collapsed, you
consider the market value of shares an not economically relevant amount and
not a purchase price. So if transaction were arranged as a stock deal, are
you arguing that P would issue more than ten shares to the shareholders of T
in exchange for their T stock? Why?
Richard Sansing
April 7, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Richard Sansing
I was going to followup this morning, and noticed
that you had already responded.
On the details of your case... What I didn't
understand was the equivalence of the subscribers to the P stock, and the T
shareholders. Why would we presume that they are one in the same? The
hypothetical subscribers to the P stock obviously would view the price of P
as economically relevant. But the T shareholders are only interested in the
shares of P that they end up with. From their point of view the collapsible
transaction could be executed at any price and it would still bear the same
result for them. It's a wash with regard to price. That is why I qualified
my response to question 2 by indicating that it was not economically
relevant to transaction 2. The price of P is an economic reality, but not
one which consititutes a purchase price of T.
I wouldn't say that pooling looks to the book value
as a value of the combined companies, any more than book value is the value
of any other company. What pooling does is reflect the merging of the two
historical earnings and financial records of the two companies to reflect
that the nature of the transaction as a merging of equity interests with an
indeterminate "purchase price".
I had never thought about the compensation issue.
I'll get back to you if I can figure something out.
Gregg
April 7, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
---Gregg Wilson wrote:
P and T have negotiated that P should issue ten shares in exchange for T
stock. That is the economic reality. (snip) And there is no economic reason
that we should pick the one that happens to coincide with the actual current
price of P's stock, because that was not an input of determining the
exchange ratio. The problem is that there is no determinant value for a
share exchange acquisition. Using the current P stock price is merely an
arbitrary convention (snip)
--- end of quote ---
The current market price of P is part of the
economic reality, as is the current book value of T. Purchase accounting
looks to the former to record the assets of T on the books of P; pooling
looks to the latter.
Okay, time for a new thought experiment. The CEO of
P corporation receives a salary of $400K plus 1,000 shares of P stock on
July 1. These are shares, not options, and they are not restricted. On July
1, when the shares were delivered to the CEO, the stock had a market value
of $60 per share, a book value of $40 per share, and a par value of $1 per
share. Note that the amount of shares delivered is not a function of the
stock price.
Record the entry for compensation expense for the
year. The accounts are provided below.
Compensation expense
Cash Stockholder's equity
Richard C. Sansing
Associate Professor of Business Administration
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
100 Tuck Hall Hanover, NH 03755
April 6, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Richard Sansing
I was going to follow up this morning, and noticed
that you had already responded.
On the details of your case... What I didn't
understand was the equivalence of the subscribers to the P stock, and the T
shareholders. Why would we presume that they are one in the same? The
hypothetical subscribers to the P stock obviously would view the price of P
as economically relevant. But the T shareholders are only interested in the
shares of P that they end up with. From their point of view the collapsible
transaction could be executed at any price and it would still bear the same
result for them. It's a wash with regard to price. That is why I qualified
my response to question 2 by indicating that it was not economically
relevant to transaction 2. The price of P is an economic reality, but not
one which consititutes a purchase price of T.
I wouldn't say that pooling looks to the book value
as a value of the combined companies, any more than book value is the value
of any other company. What pooling does is reflect the merging of the two
historical earnings and financial records of the two companies to reflect
that the nature of the transaction as a merging of equity interests with an
indeterminate "purchase price".
I had never thought about the compensation issue.
I'll get back to you if I can figure something out.
Gregg
April 7, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
--- Gregg Wilson wrote:
On the details of your case... What I didn't
understand was the equivalence of the subscribers to the P stock, and the T
shareholders. Why would we presume that they are one in the same? The
hypothetical subscribers to the P stock obviously would view the price of P
as economically relevant. But the T shareholders are only interested in the
shares of P that they end up with. From their point of view the collapsible
transaction could be executed at any price and it would still bear the same
result for them. (snip)
I had never thought about the compensation issue.
I'll get back to you if I can figure something out.
--- end of quote ---
The setting in which P and T shareholders are the
same is an interesting special case in which the distinction you regard as
crucial--the difference in what the T shareholders hold after transaction #1
and transaction #2--vanishes. And it is not a unreasonable case to consider,
as it is consistent with finance portfolio theory in which all investors
hold the market portfolio.
Let me restate what I hear you saying to see if I
understand. Investors that receive P stock for cash care about the price of
P stock. Investors that receive P stock in a merger care only about the
number of shares they receive, but do not care about the price of those
shares. Do I have that right?
Your answer to the compensation question will, I
think, help me understand how you are framing these issues.
Richard Sansing
April 7, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Richard Sansing
I am afraid I am not well-versed in the
compensation/option issues though I probably should do better. So without
the benefit of prior knowledge...
I guess if there is a compensation expense, it is
not necessarily one that is determinable. If there were 100,000 shares
outstanding, then from the owners point of view they expect that the
incremental net cash returns produced by the extra efforts of the CEO
motivated by the stock grant can be valued at a minimum of 1/100 of the
value of the company's future cash returns without the CEO's extra effort.
But relative values aren't costs and it's unclear to me whether the owners
care what the current price of the stock is. Maybe not since the grant is
not a function of the stock price. That's as far as I've gotten. I need to
get some other things done. I'll keep thinking on it, but I seem to be
stumped for now.
Gregg Wilson
April 7, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
Hi Gregg Wilson,
I think I am starting to understand your
perspective, but I need a little more input from you. First, here are some
excerpts from your recent contributions to this thread.
---Gregg Wilson wrote: I guess if there is a
compensation expense, it is not necessarily one that is determinable. (Note:
The compensation consisted of $400K cash and 1,000 shares of stock with a
market price of $60 per share--RS)
...it's unclear to me whether the owners care what
the current price of the stock is.
And there is no economic reason that we should pick
the one that happens to coincide with the actual current price of P's stock.
Using the current P stock price is merely an
arbitrary convention.
The price at which P can sell it's stock to some
third party is not relevant.
The price of P is relevant not as an absolute
number, but only in terms of its ratio to the real or imputed price of T.
---end of quotations
In the compensation issue that I posed, I
stipulated that the market value of the stock was $60 per share. Tell me
what that number means to you. At the most fundamental level, why do you
think the price might be $60 instead of $6 or $600? I'm not looking for a
"because that's where the market cleared that day" answer, but something
that gets at the most primitive, fundamental reasons stock prices are what
they are. And when they change, why do they change?
Richard Sansing
April 8, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Richard Sansing
That's easy. I subcribe to the
dividend-discount-model view of stock prices. Stock prices are basically a
function of interest rates and expected sustainable future profitability
(ROE; the best estimator we have (with reinvestment rate) for those future
cash returns).
In fact I use my own DDM to convert stock prices to
expectational ROEs. Such a DDM is a complete model of stock valuation, and
can fully explain stock price levels from the 10-12% ROE low reinvestment
low interest rate period of the late 30s, to the 12-15% ROE high interest
rate period of the 70s, to the 25% cap-weighted ROE and low interest rates
of the capex peak in 2000. Stock prices are extremely volatile because they
are a point-in-time market consensus of the future sustainable profitability
of the company. A decline in profitabliity expectations will typically
produce a price change of two or three times the magnitude, while a change
in discount rate will have a more subdued impact.
Gregg Wilson
April 8, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
--- Gregg Wilson wrote: I subscribe to the
dividend-discount-model view of stock prices. (snip) --- end of quote ---
Understood. The theme that has emerged in this
thread is that you are uncomfortable in situations in which GAAP would use
the current market price of the firm's stock as an input when determining an
accounting entry.
Let's put aside the purchase/pooling dispute to
look at the compensation question. Under the set of facts that I stipulated,
I don't think there is any controversy regarding the appropriate accounting
treatment. It would be:
Compensation expense $460K Cash $400K Equity $60K
A rationale for this treatment is to decompose the
equity transfer into two components. First, suppose the firm sells 1,000
shares of new equity to the CEO at the market price of $60 per share (debit
cash, credit equity); second, suppose the firm pays the CEO a cash salary of
$460K (credit cash, debit compensation expense.) Collapsing these two
transactions into one (transfer of $400K cash plus equity worth $60K in
exchange for services) doesn't change the accounting treatment.
Now change some of the numbers and labels around
and let the firm issue new P equity to T in exchange for all of its equity.
The purchase method uses the value of the P stock issued to record the
assets and liabilities of T.
Which brings us full circle to your original post.
You wrote:
"To me, the value of the exchanged shares is not an
economically relevant amount and is certainly not a purchase price."
I argue that the value of P stock is relevant and
is a purchase price, in both the compensation case and P's acquisition of T.
Richard Sansing
April 9, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Richard Sansing
I trust you are having a pleasant weekend. Before
tackling the compensation case etc, can you tell me how we account for open
market share repurchases.
Gregg Wilson
April 10, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
--- You wrote: Before tackling the compensation
case etc, can you tell me how we account for open market share repurchases.
--- end of quote ---
Credit cash, debit equity; details can vary
depending on whether the repurchase is a major retirement or acquiring the
shares to distribute as part of compensation. If the latter, the debit is to
Treasury Stock.
Richard Sansing
April 11, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Richard Sansing
Well I'm still in the same place. It seems to me
that when a company pays an employee $60,000 in cash they are compensating
them for services rendered in that value. When a company grants stock to an
employee they are diluting the interests of the current equity participants
in the expectation that the employee will be motivated to more than
compensate them by an improved stream of cash returns in the future; the
point of making the employee an equity participant in the first place,
rather than an immediately richer individual. So I don't see the relevance
of the price of the shares to the trans 2 again. Except in this case the use
of the market share price seems even more suspect in the collapsible
transaction, since the company and the CEO could execute the wash
transactions between themselves at any price. Also the dilution is the cost,
so adding an additional phantom non-cash cost seems to me to be a double
counting. It also has the same characteristics as the pooling transaction
where very bizarre results could be possible. If a company had a 50 PE then
a 2% dilution would erase the company's entire earnings for the period while
if the company had a 10 PE a 2% dilution would erase 20% of the earnings.
It's the same 2% dilution.
So is that it Richard? Am I a hopeless dolt? I'm
sorry but I can't get there on the collapsible transaction. Nor do I
understand why the lack of rational result doesn't matter to anyone. I don't
want to go look up the data again, but I know when JDS Uniphase bought E-tek
the share exchange was quite reasonable but the value of the exchanged stock
was in the multi billions and was probably like 500 times the eanrings of E-tek.
So when this pipsqueek company goes to raise billions of dollars at their
current market price, it's not just whether they could sell that much stock,
but rather how they would justify it to the buyers. "Use of Proceeds: we are
going to go out and make a cash acquisition of a company called E-tek and we
are going to pay billions of dollars and 500 times E-teks's earnings and
many many multiples of book value and sales." So what would their real
chances be of getting away with that, and why doesn't that seem like a
phoney number to anyone? Why doesn't it seem funny that the "prices" of
stock purchase acquisitions are basically randomly distributed from the
reasonable to the ludicrous to the sublime? Isn't that evidence that the
price is uneconomic? Is this really the basic justification for the economic
relevance of the purchase number, or is there something more?
Gregg Wilson
April 11, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
--- Gregg Wilson wrote:
It seems to me that when a company pays an employee
$60,000 in cash they are compensating them for services rendered in that
value. When a company grants stock to an employee they are diluting the
interests of the current equity participants in the expectation that the
employee will be motivated to more than compensate them by an improved
stream of cash returns in the future; the point of making the employee an
equity participant in the first place, rather than an immediately richer
individual. (snip) Why doesn't it seem funny that the "prices" of stock
purchase acquisitions are basically randomly distributed from the reasonable
to the ludicrous to the sublime? Isn't that evidence that the price is
uneconomic?
--- end of quote ---
I did not stipulate an assumption that the employee
had to hold the 1,000 shares granted.
The interests of the current stockholders are not
diluted in the specified transaction ($400K cash plus stock worth $60K)
relative to an alternative cash compensation arrangement of equal value
($460K cash.)
You had earlier indicated a belief that stock
prices are best explain by a dividend discount model. Now you suggest that
they are random. If you think they are random, of course, I quite understand
your discomfort using stock price as an input to the accounting system; but
GAAP can use stock price as an input in many transactions, and it is that,
not the purchase method per se, that appears to trouble you.
Anecdotes regarding one firm "over-paying" for
another in a stock deal don't add much to our understanding, and in any case
the issues involving merger premiums and acquisition method may be unrelated
to the financial accounting treatment of the acquisition. There is a large
and growing literature on this topic; see for example:
Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. 2003. Stock market
driven acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics 70 (December): 295-311.
Richard Sansing
April 11, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
--- Gregg Wilson wrote:
<<> The interests of the current stockholders are
not diluted in the specified > transaction ($400K cash plus stock worth
$60K) relative to an > alternative cash compensation arrangement of equal
value ($460K > cash.)>>
I'm confused. Aren't there 1,000 more shares
outstanding?
--- end of quote ---
Yes. Suppose before any compensation is paid, 100K
shares are outstanding and the firm is worth $6,460,000. After we pay $460K
compensation, the firm is worth $6,000,000, or $60 per share.
If instead we compensate the CEO with $400K and
1,000 shares, after compensating the CEO the firm is worth $6,460,000 -
$400,000 =$6,060,000 and 101K shares are outstanding, still with a value of
$60 per share (because $6,060,000/101,000 = $60).
With regard to the rest of the thread, I think we
are going around in circles. Purchase accounting uses the price of P shares
to record the assets of T on P's financial statements. If that price is
meaningful, goodwill is meaningful; if the price is random, goodwill is too.
Richard Sansing
April 11, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Richard Sansing
If I spend $460,000 I certainly hope that my
company isn't worth $460,000 less or I certainly wouldn't spend the money.
Hopefully the present value of the impact of the $460,000 on future net cash
returns will at least exceed the cash expenditure. The same could be said
for the 1,000 shares, although they are not a book cost but merely a
redistribution of equity participation.
But by your logic I should point out that the
company was worth $60.60 per share after the $400,000 total loss
expenditure. Now by issuing 1,000 shares the company is only worth $60.00
per share. Dilution?
Well it has certainly been an interesting
conversation, and I do thank you for your time and interest. I have learned
a great deal. I would agree that we are at an impasse. All my best to you
and yours.
Gregg Wilson
April 11, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Richard Sansing
Sorry for the confusion. I was referring to the
value of the exchanged shares of stock in the purchase acquisitions, the
"price" that purchase accounting puts on the deal which becomes in fact
random because it bears no relationship to the economic basis of the
negotiation.
<<> The interests of the current stockholders are
not diluted in the specified > transaction ($400K cash plus stock worth
$60K) relative to an > alternative cash compensation arrangement of equal
value ($460K > cash.)>>
I'm confused. Aren't there 1,000 more shares
outstanding?
> Anecdotes regarding one firm "over-paying" for
another in a stock > deal don't add much to our understanding,>>
Apparently not, but it should. We should be asking
why any of those managements still have a job. The point is they didn't
overpay. The share exchange ratio in the JDS/E-tek deal was quite reasonable
and resulting in a fair allocation of equity ownership between the two
groups of shareholders. It just had nothing to do with the market value of
the JDS stock that was exchanged. The monstrocity of the goodwill is a tip
off that something is wrong about the treatment, not that the buyer
overpaid.
<<> merger premiums and acquisition method may be
unrelated to the financial > accounting treatment of the acquisition.>>
I think that's right. Management has caught on that
the market doesn't care about the phony goodwill and they just do what's
right for the company. There's always pro forma reporting if the GAAP
reporting gets too messed up.
Gregg Wilson
April 12, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Gregg,
You wrote: "There's always pro forma reporting if
the GAAP reporting gets too messed up." End Quote
I hardly think pro forma does a whole lot for
investors when "GAAP gets messed up." The problem is that you can't compare
pro forma, anything-goes, reports with any benchmarks at all ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#ProForma
Appealing to pro forma reporting only weakens your
case for an already defenseless case for pooling.
Bob Jensen
April 11, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Bob Jensen
I think you misunderstand my point. I am surely not
defending pro forma reporting. I would assume that one reason goodwill
amortization was suspended was that it left companies with no other option.
Management rightly assumes that investors want to know what the company is
actually earning. If goodwill amortization was suspended for some other
reason, what might it have been?
Gregg Wilson
April 13, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Richard Sansing and anyone who would care to
reply.
We have come to an impasse on purchase accounting,
but I did have a question on pooling that I wanted to ask you about.
I am old enough to have been hanging around Wall
Street research departments in my misspent youth, and was there for the
conglomerate craze in the late sixties, and these are the things I remember.
After the Harvard B School did there endorsement of Textron, all you had to
do was call yourself a conglomerate and talk about synergy and you'd have an
immediate following for your stock. Not only that, but you seemed to be able
to make share exchange acquisitions on favorable terms which were accretive
to your earnings, and pretty soon you had a kind of self-fullfilling
prophecy going on. I did some work on Teledyne and even went out to
California and met Henry Singleton. He used to talk about 15% internal
growth, and 15% external growth. The external part was the accretion to
earnings from stock acquisitions. Well we know that the whole thing ended
badly, although Henry was nobody's fool and had been buying little cash-cow
companies all along despite the sales pitch, so he was in far better shape
than some.
Now for years afterwards you keep hearing this idea
that pooling is abusive because companies can use their "high priced" stock
to make acquisitions, especially in periods of market enthusiasm like the
late sixties. I guess what is really being said is that companies stand a
better chance of making accretive acquisitions when times are good and the
stock is selling at a high price, and the whole thing is in danger of
becoming another ponzi scheme like the conglomerate fad all over again,
because the accretion to earnings will then reinforce the high price of the
stock. There is a perception that the price of the stock matters and because
it matters we have to somehow account for that mattering in the accounting
treatment of the acquisition.
My biggest concern with this conclusion is that the
problem is not the accounting treatment. If a company makes a favorable
share exchange acquisition which is accretive to earnings, then that is what
has happened. That is an accurate portrayal of economic reality. There is no
denying that the company made a GOOD DEAL. They ended up with a share of the
combined companies that is quite favorable to their interests. The second
problem is that in many circumstances the value of the exchanged shares is
much less of a factor than we fear. If the acquired company has publically
traded shares, then the price of those shares will be reflecting the current
market expectations as well. There is little motivation on the part of the
seller to consider the deal in terms of the putative purchase value of the
exchanged shares, because they can already cash in at a "high price". It is
the relative values of the two share prices that will be the consideration.
JDS Uniphase negotiates a share exchange acquisition with E-tek. The share
exchange ratio is pretty fair to both companies, and is not really
particularly accretive or advantageous to JDS, despite the fact that the
value of the exchanged shares is in the multi billions of dollars and many
many times what any reasonable cash buyer would pay. E-tek has a "high
price" stock already. They don't need JDS to cash in on the market's current
enthusiasm for net stocks. Would there be anything abusive or deceptive
about accounting for this deal as a pooling-of-interest?
Now I won't deny the fact that the price of the
acquirors stock can influence the deal. Henry himself told me a story about
a seller that came to him and was looking for a certain "price" expressed in
terms of the value of the exchanged shares that he expected to get. The
seller was a private company owned by a single entrepreneur, not untypical
of the sellers at that time. Henry couldn't give him that many shares for
his company because it wouldn't have met his accretion requirments, but he
sent him to another conglomerator who he knew would, because that company's
stock was flying high relative to it's underlying profitability which didn't
compare to Teledyne's. The seller got his deal, but by the time the sellers
shares came out of lockup that company was almost bankrupt. Though we think
of the crash in conglomerate stocks in terms of the poor investors, it was
really the sellers who were the biggest victims of the conglomerate fad,
because they were left holding a much bigger proportion of the bag. And the
investors weren't really investors. They were speculators and knew perfetly
well they were playing a musical chairs game. There are two points (1) the
sellers may consider the deal in terms of the value of the exchanged shares,
particularly if they are non-publically-traded sellers, but they would
probably be well advised to also consider that the shares they receive
represent an equity interest in the combined companies, and (2) whatever the
seller's motivation, the buyer will always be looking at the deal in terms
of their equity share of the combined companies and whether the deal will be
accretive or dilutive to their interests.
When we say that pooling is abusive and deceptive
what are we really talking about? Is it pooling itself, or is it the fear
that rollup companies can make those self-fullfilling accretive acquisitions
because of the desire of sellers to cash in on the market value of that
stock, and that is somehow an evil thing? Is it really our responsibility as
accountants to police the market and try to keep that from happening? Is an
accretive acquistion really deceptive? Didn't the company actually make a
good deal? Whom are we really protecting from whom?
Gregg Wilson
April 13, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
-- end of quote ---
-
-- Gregg Wilson wrote:
Hi Richard Sansing and anyone who would care to
reply.
When we say that pooling is abusive and deceptive
what are we really talking about?
--- end of quote ---
I will pass on continuing this thread, except to
reiterate that your unhappiness with GAAP extends well beyond the purchase
method. If we can't agree that the transfer of $60K of a publicly traded
company's own stock, unrestricted, to an employee in exchanges for services
should be accounted for as an expense of $60K, I doubt we can come to
agreement on accounting for more complicated transactions that involve the
transfer of a company's stock for anything other than cash.
Richard Sansing
April 13, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Richard Sansing
Interesting argument. Sort of a combination of all
or none and falling back on good authority. Well you did better than Bob
Jensen's suggested reading approach, and for that I am grateful. My wife
once opined that we should be happy to have heretics for they help us test
the veracity of our faith. Still I better leave before I get burned at the
stake.
Regards,
Gregg Wilson
April 14, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
GAAP espouses the economic entity assumption. In
what way does transferring stock to an employee represent a cost to the
company? Is there any tangible evidence that the company is worse off? Does
it have less cash, dimmer prospects, damaged intangible assets? It is a cost
to the shareholders. According to GAAP they are distinct from the company.
Regards,
Gregg Wilson
April 15, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Gregg,
Following your logic to its conclusion, firms need not pay employees in
anything other than paper. Why bother giving them assets? Just print stock
certificates and have them toil for 60 years for 100 shares of stock per
week.
This is tantamount to what the Germans did after World War I. Rather than
have the banks create marks, the German government just printed millions of
marks that soon became worth less than the paper they were printed on. It
eventually took a wheel barrow full of marks to buy a slice of bread
(literally).
Suppose a firm pays $120 in cash to an employee and the employee pays $20
in income taxes and invests $40 in the open market for 40 shares of his
employer's common shares. What is different about this if the company pays
him $80 in cash and issues him 40 shares of treasury stock? The employee
ends up in the same situation under either alternative. And he or she owes
$20 in taxes in either case. Stock must often be issued from the treasury of
shares purchased by the company on the open market since new shares have
pre-emptive rights that make it difficult to pay employees in new shares.
If employees instead are given stock options or restricted stock, the
situation is more complicated but the principle is the same. The stock or
the options must be valued and taxes must eventually be paid on the value
received for his or her services.
As far as what is wrong with pooling, I told you before your exchanges
with Professor Sansing that the main problem with pooling is the reason
firms want pooling. They like to keep acquired net assets on the books at
very old and outdated historical costs so that future revenues divided by
outdated book values show high rates of return (ROIs) and make managers who
acquired the old assets look brilliant.
Other abuses are described in the paper by Abe Briloff on "Dirty Pooling"
that I sent to you --- Briloff, AJ 1967. Dirty pooling. The Accounting
Review (July): 489-496 ---
http://www.jstor.org/view/00014826/ap010167/01a00060/0
I hope you will read Abe's paper carefully before continuing this thread.
Bob Jensen
April 15, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
-- end of quote ---
These issues are covered Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 123, which you can find on the FASB website,
http://www.fasb.org .
The excerpt that follows states the general rule.
This Statement requires a public entity to measure
the cost of employee services received in exchange for an award of equity
instruments based on the grant-date fair value of the award.
Richard Sansing
April 15, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Bob Jensen,
Hope all is well with you.
I am not arguing from the employee's point of view.
What I am arguing is that the company can pay the employee cash, but if the
employee is being paid stock it is not the company but the shareholders who
are doing the paying, so it cannot be a cost to the company. The employee is
being paid something that belongs to the shareholders, and does not belong
to the company. The ownership interest is distinct from the company
according to the economic entity assumption.
<<As far as what is wrong with pooling, I told
you before your exchanges with Professor Sansing that the main problem
with pooling is the reason firms want pooling. They like to keep
acquired net assets on the books at very old and outdated historical
costs so that future revenues divided by outdated book values show high
rates of return (ROIs) and make managers who acquired the old assets
look brilliant.>>
I would argue that the costs of the acquired firm
are no more old and outdated than any other company that follows GAAP
accounting procedures. There is no such thing as an "outdated" book value.
The earnings model matches costs and revenues consistently and
conservatively over time and that is what makes the return on equity number
meaningful. Adjusting those costs to some other random value at a random
point in time makes the return on equity number NOT meaningful. The return
on equity of the combined companies under pooling is not an inflated return
on equity that is meant to make the management look brilliant. It is merely
the correct return on equity, and the correct measure of the capital
efficiency of the combined companies. It is the return on equity that should
be used to project future cash returns in order to determine the value of
the company as an ongoing enterprise.
Suppose there are two companies that are both
highly profitable and both have 30% ROEs. Is there something misleading
about a pooling acquisition where the combined ROE of the two companies is
pro forma'ed at a 30% ROE? Is it more meaningul to write up the assets of
the acquired company by some phoney goodwill amount so that the combined
number will now be 15% ROE? Which number is going to produce a more accurate
assessment of the value of the combined companies going forward? For a cash
acquisition there has been an additional economic cash cost and the ROE is
rightfully lower. But there is no such cost, cash or otherwise, when the
equity interests are combined through a share exchange.
Gregg Wilson
April 15, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Sorry Greg,
You show no evidence of countering Abe Briloff’s real contention that
pooling is likely to be “dirty.” It has little to do with stock valuation
since the same “cost” has been incurred for an acquisition irrespective of
whether the bean counters book it as a purchase or a pooling. The pooling
alternative has everything to do with manipulation of accounting numbers to
make managers look like they increased the ROI because of their clever
acquisition even if the acquisition is a bad deal in terms of underlying
economics.
Briloff, AJ 1967. Dirty pooling. The Accounting Review (July):
489-496 ---
http://www.jstor.org/view/00014826/ap010167/01a00060/0
I doubt that you’ve convinced a single professor around the world that
pooling provides better information to investors. Pooling was banned years
ago because of widespread opinion that pooling has a greater potential of
misleading investors than purchase accounting. If the historical cost net
book value of the acquired firm is only half of the current value relevant
to the acquisition price, there is no way that future ROIs under pooling and
purchasing can be the same. You’ve set up a straw man.
Please don’t bring stock dividends into this debate. Stock dividends and
stock splits only confuse the issue. Stock dividends must be distributed to
all shareholders and are merely a means, like stock splits, of lowering
share prices without changing the value of any shareholder’s investment.
Certainly stock dividends cannot be issued selectively to employees and not
outside investors. The main argument for large stock dividends/splits is to
lower share prices to attract smaller investors into buying blocks of shares
without having to pay odd-lot commissions in the market. The only argument
for small stock dividends is to mislead shareholders into thinking they are
getting something when they are not getting anything at all. Studies show
the market is very efficient in adjusting prices to stock dividends and
splits.
Certainly not a single professor around the world has come to your
defense. It’s time to come up with a new argument Gregg. You must counter
Abe’s arguments to convince us otherwise. The only valid argument for
pooling is that markets are perfectly efficient irrespective of bean counter
reporting. That argument holds some water but it is a leaky bucket according
to many studies in recent years. If that argument was really true,
management and shareholders would not care what bean counters do. Managers
are in reality very concerned about bean counting rules. Corporations
actually fought tooth and nail for pooling, but their arguments were not
convincing from the standpoint for shareholder interests.
If ABC Company is contemplating buying anything for $40 cash (wheat,
corn, Microsoft Shares, or ABC treasury shares) and making this part of a
future compensation payment in kind, it’s irrelevant how that $40 is paid to
an employee because the net cost to ABC Company is $40 in cash. As the
proportionate share of ABC Company has not been changed for remaining
shareholders whether the payment is salary cash or in treasury shares (which
need not be purchased if the salary is to be $40 in cash), the cash cost is
the same for the employment services as far as shareholders and the ABC
Company are concerned.
ABC Company might feel that payment in ABC’s treasury shares increases
the employee’s motivation level. The employee, however, may not view the two
alternatives as equivalent since he or she must incur an added transactions
cost to convert most any in-kind item into cash.
Your argument would make a little more sense if ABC Company could issue
new shares instead of paying $40 in cash. But in most states this is not
allowed without shareholder approval due to preemptive anti-dilution
protections for existing shareholders that prevent companies from acting
like the German government in the wake of World War I (when Germany started
printing Deutsch marks that weren’t worth the cost of the paper they were
printed on).
It’s very risky to buy shares of corporations that do not have preemptive
rights. I think you’ve ignored preemptive rights from get go on this thread.
Bob Jensen
April 17, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Bob Jensen
Maybe you could produce an example of how pooling
is "dirty in practice", OTHER THAN the fact that it produces a higher ROI.
Gregg Wilson
April 18, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Gregg,
High ROIs are the main reason pooling becomes dirty. It is “dirty” because
it is intended to deceive the public and distort future performance measures
relative to the underlying economics of the acquisition.
As
to other examples, I think Abe gives you ample illustrations of how
management tries to take credit (“feathers in their cap” on Page 494) for
“something shareholders are paying dearly for.” Also note his Case II where
“A Piddle Makes a Pool.” Briloff, AJ 1967. "Dirty pooling." The
Accounting Review (July): 489-496 ---
http://www.jstor.org/view/00014826/ap010167/01a00060/0
Additional examples have been provided over the years by Abe. The
following is Table 1 from a paper entitled "Briloff and the Capital Markets"
by George Foster, Journal of Accounting Research, Volume 17, Spring
1979 ---
http://www.jstor.org/view/00218456/di008014/00p0266h/0
As George Foster points out, what makes Briloff unique in academe are the
detailed real-world examples he provides. Briloff became so important that
stock prices reacted instantly to his publications, particularly those in
Barron's. George formally studied market reactions to Briloff articles.
Companies Professor Briloff criticized for misleading accounting reports
experienced an average drop in share prices of 8%.
TABLE 1
Articles of Briloff Examined
|
Article |
Journal/Publication Date |
Companies Cited That Are Examined
in This Note |
1. |
"Dirty Pooling" |
Barron's (July 15, 1968) |
Gulf and Wesern: Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV) |
2. |
"All a Fandangle?" |
Barron's (December 2, 1968) |
Leasco Data Processing: Levin-Townsend |
3. |
"Much-Abused Goodwill" |
Barron's (April 28, 1969) |
Levin-Townsend; National General Corp. |
4. |
"Out of Focus" |
Barron's (July 28, 1969) |
Perfect Film & Chemical Corp. |
5. |
"Castles of Sand?"
|
Barron's (February 2, 1970)
|
Amrep Corp.; Canaveral International; Deltona Corp.;
General Development Corp.; Great Southwest Corp.; Great Western
United, Major Realty; Penn Central |
6. |
"Tomorrow's Profits?" |
Barron's (May 11, 1970) |
Telex |
7. |
"Six Flags at Half-Mast?" |
Barron's (January 11, 1971) |
Great Southwest Corp.; Penn Central |
8. |
"Gimme Shelter"
|
Barron's (October 25, 1971)
|
Kaufman & Broad Inc.; U.S. Home Corp.; U.S.
Financial Inc. |
9. |
"SEC Questions Accounting"
|
Commercial and Financial Chronicle (November
2, 1972) |
Penn Central
|
10. |
"$200 Million Question" |
Barron's (December 18, 1972) |
Leasco Corp. |
11. |
"Sunrise, Sunset" |
Barron's (May 14, 1973) |
Kaufman & Broad |
12. |
"Kaufman & Broad--More Questions? |
Commercial and Financial Chronicle (July 12,
1973) |
Kaufman & Broad
|
13. |
"You Deserve a Break..." |
Barron's (July 8, 1974) |
McDonald's |
14. |
"The Bottom Line: What's Going on at I.T.T."
(Interview with Briloff) |
New York Magazine (August 12, 1974)
|
I.T.T.
|
15. |
"Whose Deep Pocket?" |
Barron's (July 19, 1976) |
Reliance Group Inc. |
Not all of the above illustrations are focused on pooling accounting,
but some of them provide real-world examples that you are looking for,
particularly dirty pooling at McDonalds Corporation.
It would would help your case if you followed Briloff’s example by
getting out of hypothetical (nonexistent?) examples and give us some real
world examples from your consulting. I don’t buy into any illustrations that
merely criticize goodwill accounting. What you need to demonstrate how
accounting for goodwill under purchase accounting was more misleading than
pooling accounting for at least one real-world acquisition. I realize,
however, that this may be difficult since the SEC will sue companies who use
pooling accounting illegally these days. Did you ever wonder why the SEC
made pooling illegal?
Perhaps for your clients you have prepared statements contrasting
purchase versus pooling in acquisitions. It would be nice if you could share
those (with names disguised).
Bob Jensen
April 17, 2006 reply from Paul Polinski [pwp3@CASE.EDU]
Gregg:
Please let me use a slightly different example to look at your views in the
purchase/pooling debate, and invite anyone else to contribute or to improve
the example.
Let's say you own and run several bed-and-breakfast
inns. About 20 years ago, you received as a gift an authentic Normal
Rockwell painting, which you put behind a false wall in your house to
protect your investment. You recently brought it back out, and several
reputable appraisers have put its value at $255,000.
You want to invest in an inn, and its lot, that the
current owner is selling. The current owner bought the inn and lot many
years ago for $100,000; the inn's $60,000 gross book value is fully
depreciated, while the lot (as land) is still recorded on current owner's
books at $40,000. You and another party agree to jointly purchase the inn
from the current owner; you exchange your Normal Rockwell painting for 51%
ownership in the inn/lot, and the other party pays $245,000 in cash for his
or her 49% ownership. You and the other party have rights and
responsibilities proportional to your ownership percentages in all aspects
under the joint ownership agreement.
To simplify matters, at my own risk, I'll say
"ignore tax treatments for now."
My questions to you are:
(1) For performance evaluation purposes, when you
and the other party are computing the returns on your respective investments
in this inn, what are your relevant investment amounts?
(2) (I'm wandering out on a limb here, so I'll
invite anyone who wants to improve or correct this to do so...)
Now let's say that all the other facts are the
same, except that:
- The other party pays $122,500 for 49% ownership
of the inn/lot;
- You get 51% ownership in the inn/lot in exchange
for giving the current owner a 50% transferable ownership interest in your
Norman Rockwell.
What are your relevant investment amounts in this
case?
Paul
April 18, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Paul Polinski
So what's the point? Your example is clearly a cash
acquisition. Pooling is appropriate only in the case of a share exchange
acquisition, and I would say pooling should only be used in the case of two
ongoing enterprise. The point is that a share exchange acquisition is a
combining of equity interests and there is no purchase price beyond the
exchange ratio. Say you had two inns and both are ongoing businesses so they
not only have real estate assets but furniture and equipment and supplies
and payables and receivables etc. Lets say they each have book assets of
$40,000 and they decide to combine their two enterprises on a share for
share basis. The owner of each inn ends up with half the equity in the
combined enterprise. Has a new value been placed on the assets by the share
exchange? Would the owners want to restate the assets to some different
value just because they have merged? Or would they prefer to retain the
combined financial statements as they are? Doesn't the meaningfulness of the
earnings model depend on following consistent rules of matching costs and
revenues over a period of time, and wouldn't revaluing those costs merely
represent an obliteration of the earnings model and the information it
imparts? Is not a share exchange acquisition a totally different animal from
a cash purchase, and shouldn't it be recorded in the financial statements in
a way that reflects that economic reality?
Gregg Wilson
April 19, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Sorry Gregg,
You’re too hung up on cash basis accounting. You only think transactions
can be valued if and when they are paid in cash. This is clearly absurd
since there are many purchase transactions that are not cash deals and
require value estimation on the part of both the buyer and the seller. We
use value estimates in countless transactions, and accounting would really
revert to the dark ages if we were forced to trace value of each item back
to some ancient surrogate cash transaction value years ago. Cash accounting
can badly mislead investors about risk, such as when interest rate swaps
were not even disclosed on financial statements until cash flowed. Our
estimates of current values and obligations may be imperfect, but they beat
non-estimation.
With respect to business combinations/acquisitions, GAAP requires that
the accounting come as close as possible to the value estimations upon which
the deal was actually transacted. I don’t know how many times we have to
tell you that the valuation estimation process is not perfect, but trying to
come as close to economic reality at the time of the current transaction is
our goal, not pulling values from transactions from olden times and ancient
history circumstances.
Be careful what you declare on this forum, because some students are also
in the forum and they may believe such declaratives as “Pooling is
appropriate only in the case of a share exchange acquisition.” Pooling is
not only a violation of FASB standards, it is against SEC law. Please do not
encourage students to break the law.
And there are good reasons for bans on pooling. You’ve not been able to
convince a single professor in this forum that pooling is better accounting
for stock trades. You’ve ranted against estimates of value and how these
estimates may become impaired shortly after deals go down, but GAAP says to
do the best job possible in booking the values that were in effect at the
time the deals actually went down. If values become impaired later on, GAAP
says to adjust the values.
You’ve not convinced a single one of us who watched pooling accounting
become dirty time and time again when it was legal. We don’t want to revert
to those days of allowing managers to repeatedly report inflated ROIs on
acquired companies.
I
think Richard Sansing is right. You’re beating a dead horse. Future
communications that only repeat prior rants are becoming time wasters in
this forum.
Forum members interested in our long and tedious exchange on this topic
can go to
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Pooling
Bob Jensen
April 18, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Again Bob Jensen
Let's put it this way. If we want to value the
acquisition at a non-cost current value, then we should use a fair appraisal
like something akin to what a cash buyer would be willing to pay, and not
the phoney share exchange value. Then we could actually have goodwill
numbers that made some sense and would avoid all those embarassing
impairment writedowns a year after the acquisition. I prefer pooling, but if
you insist on revaluing, then use an economic value. The value of the
exchanged shares is not, I repeat, not an economic value.
Gregg
April 20, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Sorry Gregg,
GAAP states that all tangible assets should be valued at what cash
purchasers would pay for them, so we have no argument.
Intangibles such as knowledge capital are more difficult to value, but
the ideal is to value them for what cash purchasers would pay for such
things as a skilled work force, customers, name recognition, etc.
The problem with using a cash price surrogate lies in situations where
there is really valuable synergy that is unique to the acquiring company.
For example, there is probably considerable synergy value (actually
monopoly) value when SBC acquired AT&T that probably made it much more
valuable to SBC than to any other buyer whether the deal would be done in
cash or stock.
Auditors are supposed to attest to the value at the time the acquisition
deal goes down. Not long afterwards it may be found that the best estimate
at the time the deal went down was either in error or it was reasonable at
the time but the value changed afterwards, possible because of the market
impact of the “new” company operating after the acquisition. For example,
when Time Warner acquired AOL it appears that Time Warner and its auditors
gave up way to much value to AOL in the deal, in part due to accounting
fraud in AOL.
Problems of valuation in purchase accounting should not, and cannot under
current law, be used as an excuse to use historical cost values that
typically have far greater deviation from accurate values at the time the
acquisition deal is consummated.
I think you made your points Gregg. Please stop repeating arguments that
you have hammered repeatedly at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Pooling
Bob Jensen
April 20, 2006 message reply Gregg Wilson
Hi Bob Jensen
You have masterfully skirted the issue as usual. Do
you believe that the value of the exchanged shares is either a "fair value"
and/or an "economic value"? If we are attesting to the value at the time of
the deal as the share exchange value then I would say we are attesting
badly. Use whatever fair value you want. The value of the exchanged shares
isn't one.
By the way. AOL purchased Time Warner, not the
other way around. From the 10K:
April 20, 2006 Reply from Bob Jensen
Sorry Gregg
I think you're wasting our time and embarrassing yourself until you can
back your wild claims with convincing research. Your wild speculations
appear to run counter to serious research.
If you are really convinced of evidence to the contrary, please go out
and conduct some rigorous research testing your hypotheses. Please don't
continue making wild claims in an academic forum until you've got some
convincing evidence.
Or as Richard Sansing would say, we seldom accept anecdotal evidence that
can be selectively cherry picked to show most any wild speculation.
If you bothered to do research rather than wildly speculate, you would
find that serious academic research points to the conclusions opposite to
your wild
speculations about revaluations and goodwill write-offs.
First consider the Steven L. Henning, Wayne H. Shaw, and Toby Stock
(2004) study:
This paper investigates criticisms that U.S.
GAAP had given firms too much discretion in determining the amount and
timing of goodwill write-offs. Using 1,576 U.S. and 563 U.K.
acquisitions, we find little evidence that U.S. firms managed the amount
of goodwill write-off or that U.K. firms managed the amount of
revaluations (write-ups of intangible assets). However, our results are
consistent with U.S. firms delaying goodwill write-offs and U.K. firms
timing revaluations strategically to avoid shareholder approval linked
to certain financial ratios.
Steven L. Henning, Wayne H. Shaw, and Toby Stock, "The Amount and Timing
of Goodwill Write-Offs and Revaluations: Evidence from U.S. and U.K.
Firms," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Volume 23,
Number 2, September 2004 Pages: 99 - 121
Also consider the Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2002a) conclusions
below:
We investigate two related questions. What
factors influence firms' use of acquisition accounting method, and are
firms willing to pay higher acquisition premiums to use the
pooling-of-interests accounting method? We analyze a comprehensive
sample of nontaxable corporate stock-for-stock acquisitions from 1990
through 1996. We use a two-stage, instrumental variables estimation
method that explicitly allows for simultaneity in the choice of
accounting method and acquisition premiums. After controlling for
economic differences across pooling and purchase transactions, our
evidence indicates that financial reporting incentives influence how
acquiring firms structure stock-for-stock acquisitions.
In addition, our two-stage analysis indicates that
higher acquisition premiums are associated with the pooling method. In
sum, our evidence suggests that acquiring firms structure acquisitions
and expend significant resources to secure preferential accounting
treatment in stock-for-stock acquisitions.
Benjamin C. Ayers , Craig E. Lefanowicz and John R. Robinson, "Do
Firms Purchase the Pooling Method?" Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 7, Number 1, March 2002 Pages: 5 - 32.
You apparently have evidence to contradict the Ayers, Lefanowicz, and
Robinson (2002a) study. Would you please enlighten us with some convincing
evidence.
Consider the Patrick E. Hopkins, Richard W. Houston, and Michael F.
Peters (2000) research:
We provide evidence that analysts' stock-price
judgments depend on (1) the method of accounting for a business
combination and (2) the number of years that have elapsed since the
business combination. Consistent with business-press reports of
managers' concerns, analysts' stock-price judgments are lowest when a
company applies the purchase method of accounting and ratably amortizes
the acquisition premium. The number of years since the business
combination affects analysts' price estimates only when the company
applies the purchase method and ratably amortizes goodwill—analysts'
price estimates are lower when the business-combination transaction is
further in the past. However, this joint effect of accounting method and
timing is mitigated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board's
proposed income-statement format requiring companies to report separate
line items for after-tax income before goodwill charges and net-of-tax
goodwill charges. When a company uses the purchase method of accounting
and writes off the acquisition premium as in-process research and
development, analysts' stock price judgments are not statistically
different from their judgments when a company applies
pooling-of-interest accounting.
Patrick E. Hopkins, Richard W. Houston, and Michael F. Peters,
"Purchase, Pooling, and Equity Analysts' Valuation Judgments," The
Accounting Review, Vol. 75, 2000, 257-281.
You seem to think that acquisition goodwill is based upon wild
speculation. Research studies discover rather sophisticated valuation
approaches that distinguish core from synergy goodwill components. See
Henning, Lewis, and Shaw, "Valuation of Components of Purchased Goodwill,"
The Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 38, Autumn 2000.
Also consider the Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2002b) study:
Accounting standard setters have become
increasingly concerned with the perceived manipulation of financial
statements afforded by the pooling-of-interests (pooling) method of
accounting for corporate acquisitions. While different restrictions have
been discussed, in September 1999 the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) issued an Exposure Draft to eliminate the pooling method.
This study provides a basis for evaluating restrictions on the pooling
method by analyzing the financial statement effects on pooling
acquisitions made by public corporations over the period 1992 through
1997. Using these acquisitions we (1) quantify the scope of the pooling
problem, (2) estimate the financial statement repercussions of
eliminating the pooling method, and (3) examine the effects of
restricting pooling accounting to business combinations meeting various
merger of equals restrictions.
While our analysis does not address whether
restrictions on the pooling method will influence the nature or level of
acquisition activity, the results indicate that the pooling method
generates enormous amounts of unrecognized assets, across individual
acquisitions, and in aggregate. In addition, our results suggest that
recording and amortizing these assets generate significant balance sheet
and income statement effects that vary with industry. Regarding
restrictions on the pooling method, our analysis indicates that size
restrictions would significantly reduce the number and value of pooling
acquisitions and unrecognized assets generated by these acquisitions.
. . .
Accounting standard setters have become
increasingly concerned with the perceived manipulation of financial
statements and the lack of comparability across firms financial
statements that have resulted from having two acquisition accounting
methods. Consistent with these concerns, the FASB issued an Exposure
Draft in September 1999 to eliminate the pooling-of-interests method.
Using a comprehensive set of pooling acquisitions by public corporations
over the period 1992 through 1997, this study analyzes the financial
statement effects of eliminating or severely restricting the pooling
method of accounting for business combinations. Although we make no
assumptions regarding the effects of pooling restrictions on either
acquisition activity or acquisition price, this study provides a useful
starting point for assessing the effects of different pooling
restrictions. Our evidence suggests that firms avoid recognition of
significant amounts of target firms purchase prices, both in aggregate
and per acquisition, via the pooling method. Further, we document that
these unrecognized assets are significant relative to the bidders book
value and that the quantity and dollar magnitude of pooling acquisitions
have increased dramatically in recent years. With respect to
industry-specific analyses, we find that the financial services industry
accounts for approximately one-third of all pooling acquisitions in
number and value.
The effects on bidder financial-reporting
ratios of precluding use of the pooling method for a typical acquisition
are substantial, though varying widely across industries. Decreases in
return on equity, assuming a ten-year amortization period for
unrecognized assets, range from a 65 percent decline for the hotel and
services industry to a13 percent decline for the financial services
industry.15For earnings per share, the effects are more moderate than
are those on return on equity. Decreases, assuming a ten-year
amortization period, range from a 42 percent decrease for the food,
textile, and chemicals industry to an 8 percent decrease for the
financial services industry. For market-to-book ratios, four industries
(the metal and mining industry; the food, textile, and chemicals
industry; the hotel and other services industry; and the health and
engineering industry) have decreases in bidder market-to-book ratio in
excess of 30 percent, whereas the financial services industry has only a
6 percent decrease. The relatively small effects for the financial
services industry suggests that the industry�s opposition to eliminating
the pooling method may be more driven by the quantity and aggregate
magnitude of pooling acquisitions than per-acquisition effects. Overall,
we find that eliminating the pooling method affects firm profitability
and capitalization ratios in all industries, but there is a wide
dispersion of the magnitude of these effects across industry.
Finally, we document that restricting pooling
treatment via a relative size criterion significantly decreases the
number and value of pooling acquisitions as well as the unrecognized
assets generated by these acquisitions. Nevertheless, we find that a
size restriction, depending on its exact implementation, can
simultaneously allow a number of acquisitions to be accounted for under
the pooling method. Regardless of the type of restriction, the magnitude
of past pooling transactions, both in total dollars and relative to the
individual bidder's financial condition, lends credibility to the
contention that the imposition of pooling restrictions has the potential
to seriously impact firm financial statements and related
financial-reporting ratios. These effects, of course, decrease with a
longer amortization period for unrecognized assets.
Benjamin C. Ayers , Craig E. Lefanowicz and John R. Robinson,
"The Financial Statement Effects of Eliminating the Pooling-of-Interests
Method of Acquisition," Accounting Horizons, Vol 14, March 2000.
There are many, many more such studies. If you are really convinced of
evidence to the contrary, please go out and conduct some rigorous research
testing your hypotheses. Please don't continue this until you've got some
convincing evidence.
Or as Richard Sansing would say, we seldom accept anecdotal evidence that
can be selectively cherry picked to show most any wild conclusion.
Nobody argues that the present system of accounting for acquisitions and
goodwill is perfect. Various alternatives have been proposed in the research
literature. But none to my knowledge support your advocacy of a return to
pooling-of-interests accounting.
Bob Jensen
PS
You are correct about the AOL purchase of Time Warner. I forgot this since
Time Warner runs the household. Later on it was Time Warner that tried to sell AOL (to Google). It's a
little like husband buys wife and later on wife puts husband for sale.
April 18, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson
greggwil@optonline.net
Hi Bob Jensen
I was really trying to go one step at a time, and
establish that the value of the exchanged shares is not an economic value or
a "fair appraisal" of the value of the acquired company. I am certainly not
a researcher, and as you know I do not have access to the fine studies that
you have referenced. I am not even sure what would qualify as evidence of
the point.
I was thinking one could send the following
questionnaire to companies that had made share exchange acquistions....
""""""""""" You recently made a share exchange for
XYZ company. After you determined the value of the target company to you,
[Target value], which of the following do you feel best describes the
decision process by which you arrived at the number of shares to offer the
target company:
(1) [Target value] / [Price of your stock]
(2) [Your shares outstanding] * ([Target value] /
[Your value]) where [Your value] is the value of your own company arrived at
by a similar valuation standard as [Target value].
(3) Some combination of the above, or other
decision process. Please explain________________________________.
""""""""""""""""
If the response came back overwhelmingly (2), then
would that be conclusive evidence that the value of the exchanged shares is
not an economic value or the price paid? I really wouldn't want to go to the
trouble, if the result wouldn't demonstrate what I am trying to demonstrate.
Gregg Wilson
April 23, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Sorry Gregg,
If you want
to communicate with the academy you must play by the academy’s rules. The
number one rule is that a hypothesis must be supported by irrefutable
(normative) arguments or convincing empirical evidence. We do accept idle
speculation but only for purposes of forming interesting hypotheses to be
tested later on.
In my
communications with you regarding pooling-of-interests accounting, I've
always focused on what I will term your Pooling-Preferred Hypothesis or PP
Hypothesis for short. Your hypothesis may be implied from a collection of
your earlier quotations from
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Pooling
Well I would call that entire FAS
141 a lot of sophistries. This is a case of trying to make an apple into
an orange and getting a rotten banana.
Gregg Wilson, March 30, 2006
I certainly didn't mean to
imply that cash acquisitions should be treated as pooling-of-interest.
On the contrary I was trying to make the point that they are totally
different situations, and can't be treated effectively by the same
accounting rule. The cash is the whole
point.
Gregg Wilson, March 30, 2006
Pooling of interest is
terrific, because it recreates that earnings model history for the
combined companies. The historical costs are not meaningless to the
negotiations but rather are the basis for the negotiations, for they are
the evidence that the companies are using to determine the share
exchange ratio that they will accept.
Gregg Wilson, March
30, 2006
Pooling is appropriate
only in the case of a share exchange acquisition, and I would say
pooling should only be used in the case of two ongoing enterprise(s).
Gregg Wilson, March
30, 2006
There's a bit of inconsistency in your quotations,
because in one case you say pooling is "terrific" for combined companies and
in the other quotation you claim pooling should only when the acquired
company carries on by itself. I will state your Pooling-Preferred (PP)
Hypothesis as follows:
Pooling-Preferred (PP) Hypothesis
FAS 141 is based upon sophistry.
Pooling-of--interest accounting is the best accounting approach when a
company is acquired in a stock-for-stock (non-cash) acquisition.
Purchase accounting required under FAS 141 is a
"case of trying to make an apple
into an orange and getting a rotten banana. "
What I've
tried to point out all along is that FAS 141 is not based upon sophistry. It
rests on the foundation of countless normative and empirical studies that
refute your PP Hypothesis.
Your only
support of the PP Hypothesis is another hypothesis that is stated by you
over and over ad nausea for two months as follows:
Exchanged Shares Non-Value (ESNV) Hypothesis
The
value of the exchanged shares is not an economic value or a "fair
appraisal" of the value of the acquired company.
Gregg Wilson,
April 22, 2006
In the academy we cannot accept an
untested hypothesis as a legitimate test of another hypothesis. Even if we
speculate that the ESNV Hypothesis is true, it does not support your PP
Hypothesis because it is totally disconnected to the real reason that
standard setters and the academic academy no longer want pooling accounting.
The "real reason" is that corporations are motivated to want pooling
accounting so they can inflate future ROIs and make most all acquisitions
look like great deals even though some of them are bad deals from an
economic perspective (to say nothing about wanting inflated ROIs to support
larger bonuses and sweetened future compensation plans for executives).
The preponderance of academic research
refutes the PP Hypothesis. One of the highlight studies in fact shows that
managers may enter into worse deals (in the past when it was legal) just to
get pooling accounting.
Some of the Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2002a) conclusions are as
follows:
We investigate two related questions. What
factors influence firms' use of acquisition accounting method, and are
firms willing to pay higher acquisition premiums to use the
pooling-of-interests accounting method? We analyze a comprehensive
sample of nontaxable corporate stock-for-stock acquisitions from 1990
through 1996. We use a two-stage, instrumental variables estimation
method that explicitly allows for simultaneity in the choice of
accounting method and acquisition premiums. After controlling for
economic differences across pooling and purchase transactions, our
evidence indicates that financial reporting incentives influence how
acquiring firms structure stock-for-stock acquisitions.
In addition, our two-stage analysis indicates that
higher acquisition premiums are associated with the pooling method. In
sum, our evidence suggests that acquiring firms structure acquisitions
and expend significant resources to secure preferential accounting
treatment in stock-for-stock acquisitions.
Benjamin C. Ayers , Craig E. Lefanowicz and John R. Robinson, "Do
Firms Purchase the Pooling Method?" Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 7, Number 1, March 2002 Pages: 5 - 32.
In fact the above study suggests that
pooling accounting creates a worse situation that you speculate in your ESNV
Hypothesis. My conclusion is that if we accept your ESNV hypothesis we most
certainly would not want pooling accounting due to the above findings of
Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson.
Your alleged
support of the PP Hypothesis is your
untested ESNV Hypothesis. As
mentioned above, you cannot support a hypothesis with an untested
hypothesis. Certainly the academy to date has not accepted your ESNV
Hypothesis. And even if it did, this hypothesis alone is disconnected to the
academic research pointing to why pooling accounting deceives investors.
Your only support of the ESNV
Hypothesis lies in conclusions drawn based upon your own anecdotal
experiences. Anecdotal experience is not an acceptable means of hypothesis
testing in the academy. Anecdotal evidence can be cherry picked to support
most any wild speculation.
As a result, I recommend the
following"
-
Admit that you do not have
sufficient evidence to support your PP Hypothesis. You must otherwise
refute a mountain of prior academic evidence that runs counter to the PP
Hypothesis.
-
Admit that you do not have
sufficient evidence in the academic world to support your ESNV
hypothesis. Certainly you've not convinced, to my knowledge, any members
of this academic (AECM) forum that virtually all managers are so
ignorant of values when putting together stock-for-stock acquisitions.
-
Stop hawking and repeating
your anecdotal speculations that are already documented on the Web at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Pooling
Come back to us only when you have sufficient academic evidence to
support your hypotheses.
April 22, 2006 reply from Henry Collier
[henrycollier@aapt.net.au]
You have been very gentle with Gregg Wilson … I
would suggest that we send him to Singapore and subject him to the cane that
is so liberally used there to the recalcitrant. He has ‘convinced’ not one
it seems. Many of us ‘old timers’ agree with you … perhaps Wilson just
doesn’t get it … or perhaps it’s his Warhol’s 15 minutes of fame (or infamy
in this case).
One comment that has always struck me as relevant
in business combinations … well perhaps 2 … (1) why would we revalue only
the acquired company’s assets to FMV in the combination and (2) why would we
bother to recognize ‘goodwill’ at all? In the recognition it seems as though
we’ve just ‘paid’ too much for the FMV of the assets … why wouldn’t we just
reduce the ‘retained earnings’ of the combination?
Just my old management accountant’s rant I suppose.
Over the years with my approach to the share markets, I’ve found ‘income
statements’ and ‘balance sheets’ somewhat less than useful … seems to me
that particularly in high risk companies, like pink sheet things being
offered / touted on certain websites and through phishing mails, one can
obtain both historical and pro-forma I/S and B/S, but seldom any real or
projected cash flow information.
With regards from the land down under …
Enjoy retirement, I’ve found it very rewarding …
thanks for all you’ve done for the profession …
Henry Collier
April 23, 2006 reply from
[Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
--
Bob,
---Bob Jensen wrote:
In my communications with you (Gregg Wilson)
regarding pooling-of-interests accounting, I've always focused on what I
will term your Pooling-Preferred Hypothesis or PP Hypothesis for short.
---
My exchanges with Gregg Wilson suggests that his
discomfort with GAAP goes well beyond the pooling vs. purchase debate. He
does not care for the GAAP treatment of simple transactions such as the
transfer of shares to employees in lieu of cash compensation. Why argue
about (relatively) complicated transactions with someone who does not
understand simple ones?
Richard Sansing
Strange as it may seem a losing company may have more value to someone
else than itself
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on April 27,
2006
TITLE: Alcatel Stands to Reap Tax Benefit on Merger
REPORTER: Jesse Drucker and Sara Silver
DATE: Apr 26, 2006
PAGE: C3
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114601908332236130.html
TOPICS: Accounting, International Accounting, Net Operating Losses, Taxation
SUMMARY: "Lucent's operating losses in [the] wake of [the] tech bubble may
allow big deductions" for the merged firm's U.S. operations.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is the purpose of allowing net operating losses (NOLs) to be deducted
against other years' income amounts?
2.) Summarize the U.S. tax law provisions regarding NOLs. Why has Lucent been
unable to use up all of its NOL carryforwards since the tech bubble burst in
2000-2001?
3.) Define the term deferred tax assets. Describe how NOLs fit the definition
you provide. What other types of deferred tax assets do you think that Lucent
has available and wants to take advantage of?
4.) How is it possible that the "federal, state and local deductions" from
the deferred tax assets described in answer to question #3 "will nearly double
the U.S. net income that the combined company [of Alcatel and Lucent
Technologies] will be able to report"?
5.) How does the availability of NOL carryforwards, and the expected timing
of their deductions based on an acquirer's earnings or the recent tax law change
referred to in the article, impact the price an acquirer is willing to pay in a
merger or acquisition transaction?
6.) How did the availability of deferred tax asset deductions drive Alcatel's
choice of its location for its headquarters? What other factors do you think
drive such a choice?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
From The Wall Street Journal Weekly Accounting Review on April 7, 2006
TITLE: Takeover of VNU to Begin with Explanation of Price
REPORTER: Jason Singer
DATE: Apr 03, 2006
PAGE: A2
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114405567166415142.html
TOPICS: Accounting, Mergers and Acquisitions
SUMMARY: The article offers an excellent description of the process
undertaken by VNU's Board of Directors in deciding to put the company "on the
auction block", consider alternative strategies, and finally accept an offer
price.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Describe the transaction agreed to by the Board of VNU NV and its acquirer,
AlpInvest Partners.
2.) What does the current stock price of VNU imply about the takeover
transaction? Why do you think that VNU is distributing the 210 page document
explaining the transaction and the Board's decision process?
3.) Connect to the press release dated March 8 through the on-line version of
the article. Scroll down to the section covering the "background of the offer."
Draw a timeline of the events, using abbreviations that are succinct but
understandable.
4.) What other alternatives did the VNU Board consider rather than selling
the company? Why did they decide against each of these alternatives?
5.) Based on the information in the article and the press releases, do you
think the acquirers will obtain value from the investment they are making?
Support your answer, including refuting possible arguments against your
position.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"Takeover of VNU to Begin With Explanation of Price," by Jason Singer, The
Wall Street Journal, April 3, 2006 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114405567166415142.html
A group of private-equity funds is beginning a $9
billion takeover of Dutch media giant VNU NV with the release of documents
that explain for the first time how VNU's board determined the purchase
price was high enough.
In the four weeks since VNU announced it would
recommend the private-equity group's offer, many shareholders have accused
the company of rushing to sell itself after being forced by investors to
abandon a big acquisition last year.
These critics said that the sale process was
halfhearted and that the agreed-upon price too low. Some have said they
preferred VNU to break itself up and separately sell the pieces.
At least two VNU shareholders, including
mutual-fund giant Fidelity Investments, have said publicly they are unlikely
to support the takeover; many others have said so privately.
VNU shares have traded far below the agreed
per-share offer price of €28.75 ($34.85) since the deal was announced,
suggesting the market expects the takeover bid to fail.
VNU – based in Haarlem, Netherlands, and the
world's largest market-research firm by sales – addresses these concerns in
the 210-page offer document to be sent to shareholders and outlines in
detail the steps it took to ensure the highest value.
Materials include two fairness opinions written by
VNU's financial advisers, one by Credit Suisse Group and the other by NM
Rothschild & Sons, evaluating the offer and concluding the price is
attractive for shareholders.
"This was a fully open auction," said Roger Altman,
chairman of Evercore Partners, another VNU financial adviser. The company's
board fully vetted all options, including a breakup of the business,
restructuring opportunities or proceeding with the status quo, he said.
"None provided a value as high as €28.75 [a share]. None of them."
Mr. Altman said that after being contacted by
private-equity funds interested in buying VNU after its failed attempt last
year to acquire IMS Health Inc., of Fairfield, Conn., VNU auctioned itself,
including seeking other strategic or private-equity bidders.
A second group of private-equity funds explored a
possible bid but dropped out when it concluded it couldn't pay as much as
the first group said it was prepared to offer. Another potential bidder, a
company, withdrew after refusing to sign a confidentiality agreement, VNU's
offer document says.
The initial group, which submitted the only firm
bid, consists of AlpInvest Partners of the Netherlands, and Blackstone
Group, Carlyle Group, Hellman & Friedman, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. and
Thomas H. Lee Partners, all of the U.S. The group formed Valcon Acquisition
BV to make the bid.
Some of the calculations provided in the offer
document suggest the company might be valued higher than the Valcon bid
price in certain circumstances. The Credit Suisse letter indicates the
company could be valued at as much as €29.60 a share based on prices paid
for businesses similar to VNU's in the past. It says a "sum of the parts
breakup analysis" indicates a range of €25.90 to €29.35.
The Rothschild letter also shows certain methods of
valuing the company reaching as high as €35.80 a share. But both advisers
said that when weighed against the many risks in VNU's future, the cash
payment being offered now by the Valcon group is the most attractive option
for shareholders.
COMPANIES
Dow Jon
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4/6 |
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From The Wall Street Journal Weekly Accounting Review on April 7, 2006
TITLE: Sign of the Times: A Deal for GMAC by Investor Group
REPORTER: Dennis K. Berman and Monica Langley
DATE: Apr 04, 2006
PAGE: A1 LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114406446238015171.html
TOPICS: Accounting, Advanced Financial Accounting, Banking, Bankruptcy, Board of
Directors, Financial Accounting, Investments, Mergers and Acquisitions, Spinoffs
SUMMARY: Cerberus Capital Management LP has led the group who will acquire
control of General Motors Acceptance Corp. (GMAC) from GM for $7.4 billion (plus
an additional payment from GMAC to GM of $2.7 billion). GM had expected to
receive offers for GMAC from big banks. Instead, they received offers from
private-equity and hedge funds, like the one from Cerberus. This article follows
up on last week's coverage of this topic; the related article identifies how CEO
Rick Wagoner is working with his Board to extend time for evaluating his own
performance there.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Describe the transaction GM is undertaking to sell control in GMAC.
Specifically, who owns the 51% ownership of GMAC that is being sold? What will
happen to the 49% ownership in GMAC following this transaction? To answer the
question, you may also refer to the GM statement available through the on-line
article link at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114406559238215183.html
2.) Again refer to the GM statement on the GMAC deal. In addition to the
purchase price, what other cash flows will accrue to GM from this transaction?
How do you think these items relate to the fact that GM is selling a 51%
interest in GMAC?
3.) What is the nature of GMAC's business? Specifically describe its
"portfolio of loans and lease receivables."
4.) Why do you think GM expected "...be courted by big banks..." to negotiate
a purchase of GMAC? Why do you think that expectation proved wrong, that other
entities ended up bidding for GMAC? To answer, consider the point made in the
article that even Citigroup, GM's primary bank and a significant player in the
ultimate deal, had decided that it couldn't structure a deal that GM wanted from
big banks.
5.) What are the risks associated with the acquisition of GMAC? In
particular, comment on the risk associated with GM's possible bankruptcy and its
relation to GMAC's business operations.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
--- RELATED ARTICLES ---
TITLE: GM's Wagoner Gains Some Time for Turnaround
REPORTER: Lee Hawkins, Jr., Monica Langley, and Joseph B. White
PAGE: A1
ISSUE: Apr 04, 2006
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114411090537615994.html
OBSF: Off Balance Sheet Financing
Off-Balance-Sheet Financing ---
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/obsf.asp
A form of financing in which large capital
expenditures are kept off of a company's balance sheet through various
classification methods. Companies will often use off-balance-sheet financing
to keep their debt to equity (D/E) and leverage ratios low, especially if
the inclusion of a large expenditure would break negative debt covenants.
Contrast to loans, debt and equity, which do appear
on the balance sheet. Examples of off-balance-sheet financing include joint
ventures, research and development partnerships, and operating leases
(rather than purchases of capital equipment).
Operating leases are one of the most common forms
of off-balance-sheet financing. In these cases, the asset itself is kept on
the lessor's balance sheet, and the lessee reports only the required rental
expense for use of the asset. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in
the U.S. have set numerous rules for companies to follow in determining
whether a lease should be capitalized (included on the balance sheet) or
expensed.
This term came into popular use during the Enron
bankruptcy. Many of the energy traders' problems stemmed from setting up
inappropriate off-balance-sheet entities.
Videos About Off-Balance-Sheet Financing to an Unimaginable
Degree
Truth in Accounting or Lack Thereof in the Federal Government (Former
Congressman Chocola) ---
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NWTCnMioaY0
Part 2 (unfunded liabilities of $55 trillion plus) ---
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Edia5pBJxE
Part 3 (this is a non-partisan problem being ignored in election promises) ---
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lG5WFGEIU0E
Watch the Video of the non-sustainability of the U.S. economy (CBS Sixty
Minutes TV Show Video) ---
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OS2fI2p9iVs
Also see "US Government Immorality Will Lead to Bankruptcy" in the CBS interview
with David Walker ---
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OS2fI2p9iVs
Also at Dirty Little Secret About Universal Health Care (David Walker) ---
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KGpY2hw7ao8
The history of financial reporting is replete
with ploys to keep debt from being disclosed in financial statements. If
standard setters require disclosures, the history of financial reporting is
replete with ploys to keep the disclosed obligations from being booked under the
liabilities section of the balance sheet.
Examples of OBSF ploys in the past and some that still remain as
viable means of keeping debt off the balance sheets.
-
Underfunded Pensions, Post-Retirement
Obligations, and Other Debt
Probably the largest form of OBSF is booked debt that is badly
understated. Particularly problematic is variable debt that is badly
underestimated. For example, a company or a government unit (e.g., city or
county) may be obligated to pay medical bills or insurance premiums for
retired employees and their families. Until FAS 106 companies did not report
these obligations at all. Governmental agencies (not the Federal government)
are just not becoming obligated to report such obligations under GASB 45.
Accounting rules have been so lax that many of these obligations were never
disclosed or disclosed at absurdly low amounts relative to the explosion in
the costs of medical care and medical insurance. Pensions had to be booked,
but the rules allowed companies to greatly understate the amount of the
unfunded debt.
-
Forward contracts, swaps, and some other
derivative financial instruments.
Until FAS 119 in 1995, many derivative contracts did not even have to
disclose many derivative financial instruments contracts, some of which had
enormous obligations. FAS 119 was issued as a stop gap disclosure standard
after some enormous scandals in undisclosed derivative obligations. See
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds
In the Year 2000, FAS 133 kicked in as a complex standard requiring not only
disclosure but booking of derivative financial instruments in balance sheet
accounts and maintenance at fair values at all reporting dates. For
tutorials on this complex standard see
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm
-
Capital leases and leasing subsidiaries
Until FAS 13, leases did not have to be booked. Companies entered into
complex leasing arrangements to avoid showing debt on balance sheet. For
example, Safeway borrowed heavily to build hundreds of grocery stores across
the United States and then transferred the stores and their mortgages to a
leasing subsidiary. The stores were then leased from Safeway's leasing
subsidiary. The leasing subsidiary was not consolidated in Safeway's
financial statements. Hence all the debt on all Safeway stores was hidden on
Safeway balance sheets. Safeway was not unique. This ploy was used by
hundreds of companies to keep millions in debt off balance sheets. FAS 94
put an end to much of this type of OBSF by requiring consolidation of
financing subsidiary corporations ---
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/old/07551314.htm
The Financial Accounting Standards Board has
implemented Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 94, requiring
consolidated financial statements for all majority-owned subsidiaries with
their parent firms, in order to eliminate off balance sheet financing. The
manufacturing sector of the economy is expected to be heavily affected, with
highly leveraged subsidiaries causing an increase in total debt and the debt
to equity ratio after consolidation. The likely effects of SFAS 94 on extant
debt and management contracting agreements include increased operating costs
due to the: negative effects in the securities markets; increased costs
inherent in the recontracting of debt covenant restrictions in light of
likely violations; and the renegotiation of dividend restrictions,
management compensation agreements, and loan agreements.
FAS 13 put an end to much OBSF by setting up bright lines distinguishing
capital leases from operating leases. Capital leases that are essentially a
form of financing capital assets are required to be booked as debt on the
balance sheet ---
http://ez13.com/rules.htm
-
Operating Leases
In theory an operating lease is a lease without any intention of ever owning
the leased asset. For example, a company that rents a store in a shopping
mall signs an operating lease but can never become an owner of that rented
space in the mall. Many offices are rented in office buildings under similar
"operating leases." FAS 13 created some bright line tests of whether a lease
is an operating lease or a capital lease that is simply a means of financing
eventual ownership. The problem is that FAS 13 bright line tests allow many
companies to declare leases operating leases that are really capital leases
in disguise. For example, airline companies typically declare leases on
aircraft to be operating leases that meet the bright line tests in theory
but not in substance. Hence operating leases remain as one of the main ploys
of keeping debt off the balance sheet.
-
Unconsolidated ventures and financing
companies
FAS 94 did not put an end to all OBSF from unconsolidated subsidiares. For
example, the FASB still allows OBSF with Variable Interest Entities (VIEs
that were formerly called SPEs). FIN 46 dictates when OFSF is still allowed
with the key rule that the value of the VIE's assets should exceed the value
of the obligations and the requirement that an independent outside investor
place at least 10% interest in the VIE at risk. See
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm
Securitizations are popular forms of VIEs that keep debt off the
balance sheet. For example, a VIE (formerly called SPE) might be
formed to hold real estate and the issuance of debt carried by the VIE to
finance that real estate. The concept, however, is a bit more subtle as
explained at
http://www.securitization.net/knowledge/transactions/introduction.asp
The Nature of Securitization
Most attempts to define securitization
make the same mistake; they focus on the process of securitization instead
of on the substance, or meaning, of securitization. Hence, the most common
definition of securitization is that it consists of the pooling of assets
and the issuance of securities to finance the carrying of the pooled assets.
Yet, surely, this reveals no more about securitization than seeing one's
image reflected in a mirror reveals about one's inner character. In Lord
Kelvin's terms, it is knowledge of "a meager and unsatisfactory kind."
A better definition of securitization is
that it consists of the use of superior knowledge about the expected
financial behavior of particular assets, as opposed to knowledge about the
expected financial behavior of the originator of the chosen assets, with the
help of structure to more efficiently finance the assets. This definition is
superior because it better explains the need for the most essential aspects
of any securitization any where in the world under any legal system, and it
better defines the place of securitization within several of the broader
financial trends that have occurred at the end of our century.
The first trend has been the break down of
individual, segregated and protected, capital markets into one, increasingly
world-wide, capital market. The result of this trend has been a drive to
find ever more efficient forms of raising capital, particularly in the form
of debt financings. The more efficient forms will, by definition, in capital
markets that are not segregated or protected from other competing markets,
replace the less efficient forms.
Securitization, in the correct
circumstances, is one of the very most efficient forms of financing. This is
because of two additional trends. The first is the increasing importance of
the use of information to create wealth. The second is the increasing
sophistication of computers and their uses. Securitization is made possible
by the combination of these two trends. Computers enable one to store and
retrieve extensive data about the historical behavior of pools of assets.
This historical data in turn enables one to predict, under the right
circumstances, the behavior of pools of such assets subsequently originated
by the applicable originator. Because our knowledge about such behavior may
be so precise and reliable, when structured correctly, a securitization may
entail less risk than a financing of the entity that originated the
securitized assets. Again in Lord Kelvin's terms, our knowledge about the
likely behavior of pools of assets is "measurable" and we "express it in
numbers." It is a superior sort of knowledge from the perspective of the
world of finance. Accordingly, such a securitization may be fairly labeled
to be more efficient and indeed may require less over-all capital than
competing forms of financing.
The preferred definition of securitization
with which this essay began thus reveals why securitization often is
preferable to other forms of financing. It also explains most of the
structural requirements of securitization. For, to take advantage of
superior information of the expected behavior of a pool of assets, the
ability of the investor to rely on those assets for payment must not be
materially impaired by the financial behavior of the related originator or
any of its affiliates. In most legal systems, this is not practicable
without the isolation of those assets legally from the financial fortunes of
the originator. Isolation, in turn, is almost always accomplished by the
legal transfer of the assets to another entity, often a special purpose
entity ("SPE") that has no businesses other than holding, servicing,
financing and liquidating the assets in order to insure that the only
relevant event to the financial success of the investors' investment in the
assets is the behavior of such assets. Finally, almost all of the structural
complexities that securitization entails are required either to create such
isolation or to deal with the indirect effects of the creation of such
isolation. For example, the (i) attempt to cause such transfers to be "true
sales" in order to eliminate the ability of the originator to call on such
assets in its own bankruptcy, (ii) "perfection" of the purchaser's interest
in the transferred assets, (iii) protections built into the form of the SPE,
its administration and its capital structure all in order to render it
"bankruptcy remote", and (iv) limitation on the liabilities that an SPE may
otherwise incur are each attributes of the structure of a securitization
designed to insure that the isolation of the transferred assets is not only
theoretical but also real.
Similarly, attempts to (i) limit taxes on
the income of the SPE or the movement across borders of the interest accrued
by transferred receivables, (ii) comply with the various securities or
investment laws that apply to the securities issued by the various SPEs in
order to finance their purchases of the assets, or (iii) comply with the
bank regulatory restrictions that arise in connection with such transfers,
the creation of SPEs and the other various roles played by banks in
connection with sponsoring such transactions each constitute a reaction to
indirect problems caused by the structuring of the above described transfer
and the SPE to receive the transferred assets.
Synthetic leasing is motivated by the corporate tax code that allows
a company to a transaction to be booked as an OBSF VIE from an accounting
standpoint and as a loan from a tax standpoint. The end results are an
off-balance sheet account of the financing and the tax benefits, such as
depreciation, that accompany the financed asset.
There are many other ploys for hiding debt with unconsolidated "ventures."
One ploy is called a diamond structure. A diamond structure arises
when three or more companies form a financing venture in which all companies
own less than 50% of the venture. The venture can sometimes borrow millions
or billions of dollars because of business contracts between the venture and
its "owners." For example, pipeline ventures may be diamond structured
ventures where three or more major oil companies sign "throughput" contracts
to ship huge amounts of fuel through the venture's pipeline. Since these
major oil companies have very solid financial reputations (e.g., companies
like Exxon and Shell), the venture can borrow billions to build the
pipeline. That huge amount of debt never appears on the financial statements
of the companies who sign the throughput contracts. The throughput contracts
must be disclosed, but these are like purchase contracts that do not have to
be booked in advance.
-
Unconsolidated Suppliers and Customers
Whereas diamond structures are typically VIEs formed by "equity"
holders (the VIE may not actually issue equity shares per se) in the
venture, it is possible that long-term purchase contracts with suppliers or
long-term sales contracts with customers are sufficient for those customers
and suppliers to borrow huge amounts of debt. For example, suppose a paper
company needs an enormous supply of paper pulp. The company could borrow
money and invest in its own timber lands and pulp mills. But that might
entail putting an enormous amount of debt on the paper company's balance
sheet. Instead the company could sign a long-term purchase contract with a
relatively unknown pulp producer. The purchase contract alone might enable
the pulp producer to borrow enough for huge tracts of timberland and pulp
producing mill construction. The debt appears on the pulp producer's books
but never on the paper company's books. The paper company may be indirectly
obligated for an enormous amount of this debt, however, because if the
company should renege on its long-term purchase contracts it will be liable
for damages under the unbooked purchase contract (purchase contracts are not
booked like debt contracts).
Similar arrangements might be made with customers. Instead of borrowing to
finance retail stores, a company might sell franchises that, in turn, can
borrow money to build stores because of the franchise reputation such as a
McDonald's Restaurant franchise. The franchiser (e.g., McDonalds
Corporation) may have huge unbooked obligations for damages if it reneges on
the franchise contract. Sales contracts are not booked like debt is booked.
-
In-Substance Defeasance
In-substance defeasance used to be a ploy to take debt off the balance
sheet. It was invented by Exxon in 1982 as a means of capturing the millions
in a gain on debt (bonds) that had gone up significantly in value due to
rising interest rates. The debt itself was permanently "parked" with an
independent trustee as if it had been cancelled by risk free government
bonds also placed with the trustee in a manner that the risk free assets
would be sufficient to pay off the parked debt at maturity. The defeased
(parked) $515 million in debt was taken off of Exxon's balance sheet and the
$132 million gain of the debt was booked into current earnings ---
http://www.bsu.edu/majb/resource/pdf/vol04num2.pdf
Defeasance was thus looked upon as an alternative to outright extinguishment
of debt until the FASB passed FAS 125 that ended the ability of companies to
use in-substance defeasance to remove debt from the balance sheet. Prior to FAS
125, defeasance became enormously popular as an OBSF ploy.
RBI releases guidelines for Off-Balance Sheet Financing (OBSF) exposures
Draft Guidelines on Prudential Norms
for Off-balance Sheet Exposures of Banks – Capital
Adequacy, Exposure,
Asset Classification and Provisioning
Norms
At present, paragraphs 2.4.3 and 2.4.4
of the ‘Master Circular on Prudential Norms on Capital Adequacy’,
DBOD.No.BP.BC.4/21.01.002/2007-08 dated July 2, 2007, stipulate the
applicable credit conversion factors (CCF) for the foreign exchange and
interest-rate related contracts under Basel-I framework. Likewise, paragraph
5.15.4 of our circular on ‘Guidelines for Implementation of the New Capital
Adequacy Framework’ DBOD.No.BP.BC. 90/20.06.0001/2006-07 dated April 27,
2007, prescribes the CCFs for these contracts under the Basel-II framework.
Further, in terms of paragraph 2.3.2 of the ‘Master Circular on Exposure
Norms’, DBOD.No.Dir.BC.11/ 13.03.000/2007-08 dated July 2, 2007, the banks
have the option of measuring the credit exposure of derivative products
either through the ‘Original Exposure Method’ or ‘Current Exposure Method’.
2. In accordance with the proposal
contained in the paragraph 165 (reproduced in
Annex 1) of the Annual
Policy Statement for the year 2008-09, released on April 29, 2008, it is
proposed to
effect the following modifications to the existing instructions on the
above aspects:
2.1 Credit Exposure – Method of
computing the credit exposure
For the purpose of exposure norms, banks shall compute their credit
exposures, arising on account of the interest rate & foreign exchange
derivative transactions and gold, using the ‘Current Exposure Method’,
as detailed in Annex 2.
2.2 Capital Adequacy –
Computation of the credit equivalent amount
For the purpose of capital adequacy also, all banks, both under
Basel-I as well as under Basel-II
framework, shall use the ‘Current Exposure Method’, as detailed in
Annex 2, to compute the credit
equivalent amount of the interest rate & foreign exchange derivative
transactions and gold.
2.3 Provisioning requirements
for derivative exposures
Credit exposures computed as per the ‘current exposure method’,
arising on account of the interest rate &
foreign exchange derivative transactions, and gold, shall also attract
provisioning requirement as
applicable to the loan assets in the ‘standard’ category, of the
concerned counterparties. All conditions
applicable for treatment of the provisions for standard assets would
also apply to the aforesaid provisions
for derivative and gold exposures.
2.4 Asset Classification of the
receivables under the derivatives transactions
It is reiterated that, in respect of derivative transactions, any
amount receivable by the bank, which
remains unpaid for a period of 90 days from the specified due date for
payment, will be classified as nonperforming
assets as per the ‘Prudential Norms on Income Recognition, Asset
Classification and Provisioning pertaining to the Advances Portfolio’,
contained in our Master Circular DBOD. No. BP.BC.12/ 21.04.048/2007-08
dated July 2, 2007.
2.5 Cash settlement of
derivatives contracts
Any restructuring of the derivatives contracts, including the
foreign exchange contracts, shall be carried out only on cash settlement
basis.
3. The foregoing modifications
will come into effect from the financial year 2008-09. The banks will,
however, have the option of complying with the additional capital and
provisioning requirements, arising from these modifications, in a phased
manner, over a period of four quarters, ending March 31, 2009.
Continued in article
Many executives allegedly misstate
earnings upward and debt downward to collect bonuses, stock options, and stock sales
before restating earnings later on without having to repay their
allegedly ill-gotten gains ---
http://aaahq.org/AM2006/display.cfm?Filename=SubID_0847.pdf&MIMEType=application%2Fpdf
Infectious Greed: How Deceit
and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets (Henry Holt and
Company, 2003, Page 351, ISBN 0-8050-7510-0)
The range of
financial malfeasance and manipulation was fast. Energy companies, such as
Dynegy, El Paso, and Williams, did the same complex financial deals
(particularly using
SPEs) Andy Fastow engineered at Enron. Telecommunication s firms, such
as
Global Crossing and WorldCom,
fell into bankruptcy after it became clear they, too, had been cooking their
books. Financial firms were victims as well as aiders-and-abettors.
PNC Financial, a major bank, settled SEC charges that it abused
off-balance-sheet deals and recklessly overstated its 2001 earnings by more
than half. A rogue trader at
Allfirst Financial, a large Irish bank, lost $750 million in a flurry of
derivatives trading that put Nick Leeson of Barings to shame. And so on, and
so on.
. . .
As with the prior
financial scandals, substantial losses were related to over-the-counter
derivatives. There were prepaid swaps, in which a company received an up-rong
payment resembling a loan from a bank, but did not record its future
obligations to repay the bank as a liability. There were swaps of
Indefeasible Rights of Use, or IRUs, long-term rights to use bandwidth
on a telecommunications company's fiber-optic network, which were similar to
the long-term energy derivatives Enron traded --- and just as ripe for
abuse. And there were more
Soecial Purpose Entities, created by Wall Street banks.
"FSP 140-3: Plugging a Hole in GAAP, or Another Off-Balance Sheet
Financing Gimmick?" by Tom Selling, The Accounting Onion, March 4, 2008 ---
http://accountingonion.typepad.com/
I subscribe to a listserv for professors of
accounting (
http://pacioli.loyola.edu/aecm/ ) to discuss
emerging technologies, pedagogy, and pretty much anything else. One of the
recent topics of discussion on the listserv had to do with the impact of
accounting complexity on preparing students to become auditors. One
participant in the conversation offered up the following quotation from a
masters student's paper on the bogus reinsurance transactions between AIG
and General Re:
"When companies are involved in these complicated
transactions, auditors often don't have the time, training, or knowledge to
spot questionable items. When I audited a financial services company during
my internship, I didn't really understand their business let alone the
documentation that I was reviewing to ensure that controls were operating
properly. So much of the work we conducted was based on mimicking the prior
year's work papers that even after levels of review I believe fraud could
have easily slipped by." [italics supplied]
Coincidentally, FASB Staff Position (FSP) FAS140-3,
Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets and Repurchase Financing
Transactions, has been recently finalized; this student's lament came to my
mind while I was attempting to decipher the new accounting rule.
In order to begin to explain the FSP, you need to
know that FAS 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial
Assets and Extinguishment of Liabilities, contains criteria that restrict
"sale accounting" on transferred financial assets when there is a concurrent
purchase agreement. Consequently, “repurchase agreements” (repos) may be
subject to "loan accounting" instead of sale accounting. The difference in
accounting treatments is as follows: under sale accounting, the asset comes
off the balance sheet and is replaced by the proceeds from sale; under loan
accounting, the asset stays on the balance sheet, so the credit offset to
recognition of the proceeds is to debt. So most significantly, sale
accounting is off-balance sheeting financing, and loan accounting is
on-balance sheet financing.
To the financial engineer attempting to defeat the
best efforts of investors and/or regulators of financial institutions, loan
accounting is a bad thing, and sale accounting is good. So one important for
them is how to fabricate an 'arrangement' that gets under FAS 140's fence to
permit sale accounting. Thus appears to have been invented by a mortgage
REIT a variation on the repo (essentially a round trip for the asset)
whereby the financial instrument now makes one more trip back to the
original transferee. If you're confused, this picture may help:
Continued in article (with exhibits)
Bob Jensen's threads on General Re and AIG are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#MutualFunds
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm
Questions
Are GE's Recent Restatements Part of Jack Welch's Legacy?
In this post-Enron and S-OX 404 environment, would a CEO today would so
openly express such a blatant disregard for reporting to investors?
The WSJ article also mentions that in addition to
the firing of some division managers (perhaps one or more of the same cookie
sharers), the SEC probe lead to the resignation of Phil Ameen, long-time VP and
comptroller -- and prime specimen of the accounting equivalent of a wolf in
sheep's clothing let loose in the barnyard. (Whew, that was a long way to go for
a metaphor!) Believe it or not, Ameen was a member of the FASB's Emerging Issues
Task Force (EITF) during much of the 1990s. He was also an active and
influential FASB lobbyist. Separately, out of one side of this mouth came
exhortations to
simplify accounting, and
out of the other side, to
ditch simple solutions that might have impaired
GE's ability to manage its earnings and reported debt . . .
Tom Selling, The Accounting Onion, February 18, 2008 ---
http://accountingonion.typepad.com/
Shocking Impact of GASB 45
Underfunded Pensions, Post-Retirement
Obligations, and Other Debt
Probably the largest form of OBSF is booked debt that is badly
understated. Particularly problematic is variable debt that is badly
underestimated. For example, a company or a government unit (e.g., city or
county) may be obligated to pay medical bills or insurance premiums for retired
employees and their families. Until FAS 106 companies did not report these
obligations at all. Governmental agencies (not the Federal government) are just
not becoming obligated to report such obligations under GASB 45. Accounting
rules have been so lax that many of these obligations were never disclosed or
disclosed at absurdly low amounts relative to the explosion in the costs of
medical care and medical insurance. Pensions had to be booked, but the rules
allowed companies to greatly understate the amount of the unfunded debt.
"A $2-Trillion Fiscal Hole," by Chris Edwards and Jagadeesh
Gokhale, The Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2006; Page A18 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116062308693690263.html?mod=opinion&ojcontent=otep
State and local governments are
amassing huge obligations in the form of unfunded retirement benefits for
their workers. Aside from underfunded pension plans, governments have also
run up large obligations from their retiree health plans. While a new
Governmental Accounting Standards Board rule will kick in next year and
reveal exactly how large this problem is, we estimate that retiree health
benefits are a $1.4 trillion fiscal time bomb.
The new GASB regulations will require
accrual accounting of state and local retiree health benefits, thus
revealing to taxpayers the true costs of the large bureaucracies that they
fund. We reviewed unfunded health costs across 16 states and 11 local
governments that have made actuarial estimates, and found an average accrued
liability per covered worker of $135,000. Multiplying that by the number of
covered state and local employees in the country yields a total unfunded
obligation of $1.4 trillion -- twice the reported underfunding in state and
local pension plans at $700 billion.
To put these costs in context,
consider the explicit net debt of state and local governments. According to
the Federal Reserve Board, state and local credit market debt has risen
rapidly in recent years, from $313 billion in 2001 to $568 billion in 2005.
But unfunded obligations from state and local pension and retiree health
plans -- about $2 trillion -- are still more than three times this net debt
amount.
The key problem is that the great
majority of state and local governments finance their retiree health
benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis. In coming years that will create pressure
to raise taxes as Baby Boomers age and government employees retire in
droves. New Jersey's accrued unfunded obligations in its retiree health plan
now stand at $20 billion, and the overall costs of its employee health plan
are expected to grow at 18% annually for the next four years.
To compound the problem,
defined-benefit pension and retirement health plans are much more common and
generous in the public sector than the private sector. Out of 15.9 million
state and local workers, about 65% are covered under retirement health
plans, compared to just 24% of workers in large firms in the private sector.
The prospect of funding $2 trillion
of obligations with higher taxes is frightening, especially when you
consider that state politicians would be imposing them on the same income
base as federal politicians trying to finance massive shortfalls in Social
Security and Medicare. Hopefully, most state policy makers appreciate that
hiking taxes in today's highly competitive global economy is a losing
proposition.
The only good options are to cut
benefits and move state and local retirement plans to a pre-funded basis
with personal savings plans. Two states, Alaska and Michigan, have moved to
savings-based (defined-contribution) pension plans for their new employees.
Alaska has also implemented a health-care plan for new state employees,
which includes high-deductible insurance and a Health Savings Account.
Expect to see more states following Alaska's lead.
State and local governments also need
to cut retirement benefits, which were greatly expanded during the 1990s
boom. From a fairness perspective, cutting benefits especially of younger
workers is reasonable given the generosity of state and local plans. Federal
data shows that state and local governments spend an average of $3.91 per
hour worked on employee health benefits, compared to $1.72 in the private
sector.
Underfunded -- or more accurately,
over-promised -- retirement plans for state and local workers have created a
$2 trillion fiscal hole. Every year that policy makers put off the tough
decisions, the hole gets bigger. Hopefully, the new GASB rules will prompt
them to enact the reforms needed to avert job-destroying tax increases on
the next generation.
Mr. Edwards is tax policy director at the Cato
Institute. Mr. Gokhale is a senior fellow at Cato and a former senior
economic adviser to the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
Question
What is the new European accounting ploy (termed the 2007 Accounting Miracle) to
hide debt until the instant it becomes due?
"Italy's Accounting Miracle," by Tito Boeri and Guido Tabellini, The Wall
Street Journal, November 28, 2006 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116466953696233804.html?mod=opinion&ojcontent=otep
The latest murky accounting ploy has received the
European Union's stamp of approval. As of 2007, Italy will be able to reduce
its official budget deficit with the cash proceeds of new liabilities. The
new debt will remain hidden until it comes due. If this is how the EU's
revised Stability and Growth Pact will work, it would be wiser to scrap the
budget rules altogether. At least then national capitals would not be so
tempted to artificially reduce their budget deficits, and citizens would be
better informed about the true state of public finances.
Here's how the new gimmick works. Under current
Italian law, employees must set aside a tax-exempt fraction of their gross
wages, nearly 7%, into a severance scheme called TFR. Instead of creating
personal accounts for their employees, each company collects the money in
one large fund. When an employee leaves the firm, he receives the money he
paid into the fund plus interest, currently about 3%. The TFR is thus debt
that companies owe to their employees. That's why firms list it as
liabilities in their financial statements.
Under the new Italian budget law, though, part of
the contributions to this severance scheme will be collected and held by
Italy's social security administration to finance public expenditures. When
the employee leaves his job or has health problems, the government, rather
than the employer, will disburse his severance payments. The bottom line is
that, by receiving the contributions for this new, implicit debt, the
Italian government expects to reduce its yearly budget deficit by almost
0.5% of GDP. A debt instrument has miraculously become a surplus.
This bookkeeping equivalent of turning water into
wine is possible because EU accounting rules for government finances are
much looser than the rules that the same governments apply to private firms.
The bloc's statistics service, Eurostat, does not consider the future
obligations implicit in public pensions as part of government liabilities.
Hence, the transfer of the TFR to the Italian social security system is
treated like the creation of a new pay-as-you go system.
The Stability Pact's 2005 reform, though,
specifically encourages Brussels to pay special attention to fiscal
sustainability in the long run, and in particular to the future liabilities
implicit in the pension systems. The Commission, however, has paid lip
service to the principle of long-run sustainability, while in practice is
giving its blessing to the Italian accounting miracle. In so doing, it has
shown that the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact will not be enforced.
This creates a dangerous precedent that other
member states might be tempted to follow. Germany, for instance, has a "book
reserve" system similar to the Italian TFR that automatically applies to a
significant portion of its work force. The contributions to the German
system are even more attractive as a potential source of government finance
since, unlike the TFR, they can only be claimed by the workers upon
retirement. Many other Europeans countries have sizable occupational pension
plans. The EU is implicitly saying that the proceeds from nationalizing
these plans can be used to meet its budget deficit targets. Firms in
financial difficulties with occupational pension plans are always tempted to
transfer to the state their pension liabilities, together with the annual
contributions to the fund. Now myopic governments will have an additional
incentive to meet these requests for "state aid." Public revenues increase
immediately, while the debt disappears once it is transferred to the public
sector.
Europe's public finances can ill afford these kinds
of miracles.
Messrs. Boeri and Tabellini are economics professors at Bocconi
University in Milan.
This could make a good case study for an accounting theory course
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on December 8, 2006
TITLE: Making Use of Frequent-Flier Miles Gets Harder
REPORTER: Scott McCartney
DATE: Dec 05, 2006
PAGE: D5
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116528094651740654.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
TOPICS: Accounting, Auditing
SUMMARY: The Department of Transportation (DOT) has undertaken audit
procedures on airlines to review how they are "living up to their 1999 'Customer
Service Commitment.'" This document was written when "airlines were under
pressure from Congress and consumers for lousy service and long delays" in order
to "stave off new legislation regulating their business." The airlines also
report little about the frequent flier mile plans they offer, and particularly
focus only on the financial aspects of these plans in their annual reports and
SEC filings, rather than, say, information about ease of redeeming miles in
which customers may be particularly interested.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What information do airlines provide about frequent flier mileage offerings
and redemptions in their annual reports and SEC filings?
2.) Why is this information important for financial statement users? In your
answer, describe your understanding of the business model and accounting for
frequent flier miles, based on the description in the article.
3.) Why did the Department of Transportation (DOT) undertake a review of
airline practices? What type of audit would you say that the DOT performed?
4.) What audit procedures did the airlines abandon due to financial
exigencies? What was the result of abandoning these audit procedures? In your
answer, describe the incentives provided by the act of undertaking audit
procedures on operational efficiencies and effectiveness.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"Making Use of Frequent-Flier Miles Gets Harder Falling Redemption Rate Is One
of Many Service Issues, Government Report Find," by Scott McCartney, The Wall
Street Journal, December 5, 2006; Page D5 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116528094651740654.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
Which airline is the most accommodating when it
comes to letting consumers cash in frequent-flier mileage awards? It's hard
to know, a new government report says, because airlines disclose so little
information.
One thing is clear: Over the past four years, the
percentage of travelers cashing in frequent-flier award tickets has declined
at four of the five biggest airlines, even though miles accumulated by
consumers have increased.
The Department of Transportation's inspector
general went back and checked how airlines were living up to their 1999
"Customer Service Commitment." Back then, airlines were under pressure from
Congress and consumers for lousy service and long delays, and they promised
reform to stave off new legislation regulating their business.
Seven years later, Inspector General Calvin L.
Scovel III found that under financial pressure, many airlines quit auditing
or quality control checks on their own customer service, leading to service
deterioration. Airlines don't provide enough training for employees who
assist passengers with disabilities, the investigation found, and don't
always follow rules when handling passengers who get bumped from flights.
And as travelers have long complained, government
auditors studying 15 carriers at 17 airports found airline employees often
don't provide timely and accurate information on flight delays and their
causes, and don't give consumers straightforward information about
frequent-flier award redemptions.
"They can do better and must do better, and if they
don't do better, Congress has authority to wield a big stick," said U.S. Rep
John Mica, the outgoing chairman of the House Aviation Subcommittee who
requested the inspector general's customer-service investigation. He said
he's eager to hear the airline industry's response before making final
judgments, but the report card gives airlines only "average to poor grades
in a range of areas that need improvement."
Since airlines are returning to profitability and
aggressively raising fares, there's more attention being paid to
customer-service issues. Delays have increased; baggage handling worsened.
As traffic has rebounded, airlines still under financial pressure because of
high oil prices may not have adequate staff to live up to the promises they
made on customer service.
The report called on the DOT to "strengthen its
oversight and enforcement of air-traveler consumer-protection rules" and
urged airlines to get back on the stick for customer service. The inspector
general also reminded consumers that since airlines incorporated the
customer-service commitment into their "contract of carriage" -- the legal
rules governing tickets -- carriers can be sued for not living up to their
customer-service commitment.
The industry says it is paying attention. The
inspector general's Nov. 21 report "is a good report card for reminding us
where we need to improve," said David Castelveter, a spokesman for the Air
Transport Association, the industry's lobbying group, which coordinated the
"Customer Service Commitment." Airlines will "react accordingly," he said.
One of the stickiest areas is frequent-flier
redemptions because airlines are loath to release detailed information about
their programs, considering it crucial competitive information.
Frequent-flier programs have become big money-makers for airlines since they
sell so many miles in advance to credit-card companies, merchants, charities
and others. That allows them to pocket cash years in advance of a ticket,
then incur very little expense when consumers eventually redeem the miles,
if they ever do.
In 1999, airlines pledged to publish "annual
reports" on frequent-flier redemptions. But at most carriers, the disclosure
didn't change at all. Today, as then, carriers typically bury numbers deep
in filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission and report only the
number of awards issued, the estimated liability they have for the cost of
awards earned but not yet redeemed and the number of awards as a percentage
either of passengers or passenger miles traveled.
The inspector general said the hard-to-find
information has only "marginal value to the consumer for purposes of
determining which frequent-flier program best meets their need."
What you'd really want to know is which airline
makes it easiest to get an award, particularly the cheapest domestic coach
ticket, typically 25,000 miles, which is the most popular award. But
airlines don't disclose how many awards are at the lowest level, and how
many consumers have to pay double miles or so for a premium award of an
"unrestricted" coach ticket.
The award market follows ticket prices and
availability, so recent years have seen an increase in the price people have
to pay to get the awards they want, and less availability of award seats,
particularly at the cheapest level, because some airlines have cut capacity
and demand for travel has been strong. Add in the flood of miles airlines
are issuing, and the value of a frequent-flier mile has declined sharply.
The inspector general's report compares
award-redemption rates at big airlines over the past four years and found a
relatively steady drop at four carriers: UAL Corp.'s United Airlines,
Continental Airlines Inc., AMR Corp.'s American Airlines and Northwest
Airlines Corp. US Airways Group Inc. actually saw higher rates of redemption
in 2005 than in 2002, and Delta Air Lines Inc. was unchanged. Both Delta and
US Airways had higher redemption rates than competitors.
to claim short-trip tickets, adding more seats to
award inventory this fall and offering a new credit card with easier
redemption features. Northwest said its numbers have remained relatively
consistent -- roughly one in every 12 seats is a reward seat.
Other airlines said declining redemption rates
result from factors including an increase in paying customers, fuller planes
and shifts in airline capacity. American says the number of awards it has
issued has remained fairly constant, and while the number of passengers it
carries has climbed, its seat capacity hasn't. In addition, several airlines
said customer preferences like using miles for first-class upgrades or
hoarding miles longer to land big international trips can affect the
redemption rate. "Reward traffic does not spool up and absorb capacity
increases as fast as revenue traffic does," said a Continental spokesman.
Those numbers don't include awards that their
customers redeem on partner airlines, so some of the decline could be
attributable to an increase in consumers' opting to grab award seats on
foreign airlines or other partners, says frequent-flier expert Randy
Petersen. American, for example, does disclose more redemption data on its
Web site and showed that last year, it issued more than 955,000 awards for
travel on its partners, compared with the 2.6 million used on American and
American Eagle flights.
"The data can be misleading," said Mr. Petersen,
founder of InsideFlyer.com. He'd like to see more data, including numbers on
how many customers made requests but couldn't find seats.
But further disclosure is unlikely to happen unless
the government forces it. "Left to their own devices," said Tim Winship,
publisher of FrequentFlier.com, "I see no reason to expect airlines to step
up and disclose more."
Insurance: A Scheme for Hiding Debt That
Won't Go Away
The SEC and Eliot Spitzer have launched probes into sales by insurance
firms of products that help customers burnish results. Industry
executives say companies can reap distinct accounting
benefits by obtaining loans dressed up as insurance products. Under
U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, companies are allowed to use
insurance recoveries to offset losses on their income statements -- often
without disclosing them. To qualify as insurance under the accounting rules,
financial contracts must involve a significant transfer of risk from one party
to another.
"Fresh Probes Target Insurers' Earnings Role," by Theo Francis
and Jonathan Weil, The Wall Street Journal, November 8, 2004, Page C1
--- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB109988032427267296,00.html?mod=home_whats_news_us
The Securities and Exchange
Commission and New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer each have launched
investigations into sales by insurance companies of questionable financial
products that help customers burnish their financial statements, according
to people familiar with the matter.
The SEC's enforcement division is
conducting an industrywide investigation into whether a variety of insurance
companies may have helped customers improperly smooth their earnings by
selling them financial-engineering products that were designed to look like
insurance but in some cases were little more than loans in disguise, people
familiar with the matter say. The agency is focusing on a universe of
products that are intended to achieve desired accounting results for
customers' financial statements, as opposed to traditional insurance, whose
primary goal is transferring risk of losses from a policyholder to the
insurer selling the coverage.
Meanwhile, New York state
investigators are preparing to issue subpoenas as soon as this week to
several large insurance companies. After months of combing through industry
documents in its continuing probe of insurance-broker compensation, Mr.
Spitzer's office has grown increasingly concerned about insurance-industry
products, detailed in The Wall Street Journal last month, that customers can
use to manipulate their income statements and balance sheets.
Although Mr. Spitzer's office and the
SEC began looking into the issue separately, they have discussed sharing
information and resources, according to a person familiar with the probes.
Normally, an insurer is paid a specific amount of
premiums to take on a risk of uncertain size and timing. In the
"insurance" at issue, the risk of loss to the insurer selling the
policy is limited and sometimes even eliminated -- partly because, in these
policies' simplest form, the premiums are so high; other times, the loss
already has occurred.
Industry executives say companies can reap distinct
accounting benefits by obtaining loans dressed up as insurance products.
Under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, companies are allowed
to use insurance recoveries to offset losses on their income statements --
often without disclosing them. To qualify as insurance under the accounting
rules, financial contracts must involve a significant transfer of risk from
one party to another.
Continued in the article
Insurance companies historically have been rancid with white collar
crime and consumer rip offs. Bob Jensen's threads on insurance company
scandals are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudRotten.htm#Insurance
Off-Balance-Sheet Entities: The Good, The Bad And The Ugly - This
article defines some typical off-balance-sheet items and discusses when they
are justified and when they are misleading.
The Good
Off-balance-sheet companies were created to help finance new ventures.
Theoretically, these separate companies were used to transfer the risk
of the new venture from the parent to the separate company. This way,
the parent could finance the new venture without diluting existing
shareholders or adding to the parent's debt burden. These separate legal
entities could be privately held partnerships or publicly traded
spin-offs.
Sometimes the separate companies were created
to pursue a business project that was a part of the parent's main line
of business. For example, oil-drilling companies established
off-balance-sheet subsidiaries as a way to finance oil exploration
projects. These subsidiaries were jointly funded by the parent and
outside investors who were willing to take the exploration risk. The
parent company could have sold shares or borrowed the money directly,
but the accounting and tax laws were designed to allow the project
funding come from investors who were interested in investing in specific
explorations rather than investing in the parent company.
Other times these separate companies were
created to house businesses that were decidedly different from the
parent's line of work (in order to unlock "value"). For example,
Williams Co's, created Williams Communications to pursue the
communications business. Williams Companies spun off Williams
Communications, but the bankers required the parent to guarantee the
debt of Williams Communications. Because Williams Communications was a
new company, this is not an unusual request.
This use of off-balance-sheet entities is good
in that it transfers risk from the parent's shareholders to others that
were willing to take the business risk. Investors in Williams Companies
(an energy resource company) may not have wanted to invest in a
communications company, so management created a separate entity to house
that business. Likewise, oil companies used off-balance-sheet entities
to remove the exploration risk from their business to share it with
others that wanted a bigger piece of the potential return from
exploration.
The Bad
While GAAP and tax laws allow off-balance-sheet entities for valid
reasons noted above, bad things happen when economic reality differs
significantly from the assumptions that were used to justify the
off-balance-sheet entity. Problems also occur when egos get too big.
In Williams's case, the decision to spin off
the communications business was reasonable at the time. The parent had
the infrastructure on which to build a communications network, but it
was an energy company. By spinning off the subsidiary, it was not
forcing its investors to take on the risk of a communications company,
and it was able to take advantage of the market's demand for
communication stocks. At the same time, the need to guarantee the debt
of a new subsidiary is a reasonable request that bankers make in this
type of transaction.
What went "wrong" was that economic reality
differed from the assumptions that were used to justify the spin off.
Dotcom mania resulted in over-capacity, causing problems for all
telecommunications companies. The loan guarantee, which is never
expected to be triggered, is now an issue for the company because of the
recession and the slump in the telecommunications sector.
Enron exemplifies how ego can be the basis for
the misuse of off-balance-sheet items. Here, off-balance-sheet vehicles
appear to have been used to pump up financial results rather than for
legitimate business purposes. What started as a plan to legitimately use
off-balance-sheet vehicles morphed into ways to manufacture earnings as
trades went bad. While one could argue that this is also a case of
economic reality differing from expectations, the way management reacted
to the situation allows us to classify it as an ego thing.
This financial engineering is usually fueled by
the need to reach certain operating targets established by Wall Street
or compensation plans. Once management succumbs to this "Dark Side",
more time is spent on trying to game the system than trying to manage
the core business. It is then only a matter of time before the house of
cards falls.
The Ugly
It gets ugly when the markets start to punish a stock just because it
has an off-balance-sheet item. Granted, it is not always easy to read a
company's SEC filings, let alone dig into the footnotes and figure out
how the off-balance-sheet items might impact results. But the companies
that provide full disclosure will probably be the better investments.
Conclusion The loss of faith in accounting's
ability to provide full disclosure could have a bigger impact on the
stock market than the events of September 11th. The attacks were an
exogenous factor and we bounced back nicely. The loss of confidence in
financial statements is an attack on one of the core elements of
investment decision making. To quote Johnny Cochran, "If the statements
aren't true, what will we do?"
However, the focus on off-balance-sheet
accounting will have two major benefits. First, it will result in new
regulations that will hopefully prevent future Enrons. Some of these
changes will likely be the following:
Prevention of officers of the parent from being
officers of the off-balance-sheet subsidiary
Increasing the percentage ownership by outside
and non-affiliated companies
Enforcing disclosure rules so that investors
can clearly understand the risk (if any) posed by off-balance-sheet
companies Second, market over-reaction creates a buying opportunity.
Markets always overreact, causing panic in the Street. Uncertainty
created by the loss of faith in financial disclosures could even cause
more damage to the market than extreme events like September 11th.
Bob Jensen's threads on VIE's (SPEs) are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm
Uncovering Hidden Debt - Understand how financing through operating
leases, synthetic leases, and securitizations affects companies' image of
performance.
Is the company whose stock you own carrying
more debt than the balance sheet is showing? Most of the information
about debt can be found on the balance sheet--but many debt obligations
are not disclosed there. Here is a review of some off-balance-sheet
transactions and what they mean for investors.
The term "off-balance-sheet" debt has recently
come under the spotlight. The reason, of course, is Enron, which used
underhanded techniques to shift debt off its balance sheet, making the
company's fundamentals look far stronger than they were. That said, not
all off–balance-sheet finance is shady. In fact, it can be a useful tool
that all sorts of companies can use for a variety of legitimate
purposes--such as tapping into extra sources of financing and reducing
liability risk that could hurt earnings.
As an investor, it's your job to understand the
differences between various off-balance-sheet transactions. Has the
company really reduced its risk by shifting the burden of debt to
another company, or has it simply come up with a devious way of
eliminating a liability from its balance sheet?
Operating Leases
A lot of investors don't know that there are two kinds of leases:
capital leases, which show up on the balance sheet, and operating
leases, which do not.
Under accounting rules, a capital lease is
treated like a purchase. Let's say an airline company buying an airplane
sets up a long-term payment lease plan and pays for the airplane over
time. Since the airline will ultimately own the plane, it shows up on
its books as an asset, and the lease obligations show up as liabilities.
If the airline sets up an operating lease, the
leasing group retains ownership of the plane; therefore, the transaction
does not appear on the airline's balance sheet. The lease payments
appear as operating expenses instead. Operating leases, which are
popular in industries that use expensive equipment, are disclosed in the
footnotes of the company's published financial statements.
Consider Federal Express Corp. In its 2004
annual report, the balance sheet shows liabilities totaling $11.1
billion. But dig deeper, and you will notice in the footnotes that
Federal Express discloses $XX worth of non-cancelable operating leases.
So, the company's total debt is clearly much higher than what's listed
on the balance sheet. Since operating leases keep substantial
liabilities away from plain sight, they have the added benefit of
boosting--artificially, critics say--key performance measures such as
return-on-assets and debt-to-capital ratios.
The accounting differences between capital and
operating leases impact the cash flow statement as well as the balance
sheet. Payments for operating leases show up as cash outflows from
operations. Capital lease payments, by contrast, are divided between
operating activities and financing activities. Therefore, firms that use
capital leases will typically report higher cash flows from operations
than those that rely on operating leases.
Synthetic Leases
Building or buying an office building can load up a company's debt on
the balance sheet. A lot of businesses therefore avoid the liability by
using synthetic leases to finance their property: a bank or other third
party purchases the property and rents it to the company. For accounting
purposes, the company is treated like a tenant in a traditional
operating lease. So, neither the building asset nor the lease liability
appears on the firm's balance sheet. However, a synthetic lease, unlike
a traditional lease, gives the company some benefits of ownership,
including the right to deduct interest payments and the depreciation of
the property from its tax bill.
Details about synthetic leases normally appear
in the footnotes of financial statements, where investors can determine
their impact on debt. Synthetic leases can become a big worry for
investors when the footnotes reveal that the company is responsible for
not only making lease payments but also guaranteeing property values. If
property prices fall, those guarantees represent a big source of
liability risk.
Securitizations
Banks and other financial organizations often hold assets--like credit
card receivables--that third parties might be willing to buy. To
distinguish the assets it sells from the ones it keeps, the company
creates a special purpose entity (SPE). The SPE purchases the credit
card receivables from the company with the proceeds from a bond offering
backed by the receivables themselves. The SPE then uses the money
received from cardholders to repay the bond investors. Since much of the
credit risk gets offloaded along with the assets, these liabilities are
taken off the company's balance sheet.
Capital One is just one of many credit card
issuers that securitize loans. In its 2004 first quarter report, the
bank highlights results of its credit card operations on a so-called
managed basis, which includes $38.4 billion worth of off-balance-sheet
securitized loans. The performance of Capital One's entire portfolio,
including the securitized loans, is an important indicator of how well
or poorly the overall business is being run.
Conclusion
Companies argue that off-balance-sheet techniques benefit investors
because they allow management to tap extra sources of financing and
reduce liability risk that could hurt earnings. That's true, but
off-balance-sheet finance also has the power to make companies and their
management teams look better than they are. Although most examples of
off-balance sheet debt are far removed from the shadowy world of Enron's
books, there are nonetheless billions of dollars worth of real financial
liabilities that are not immediately apparent in companies' financial
reports. It's important for investors to get the full story on company
liabilities.
Show and Tell: The Importance of Transparency - Clear and honest
financial statements not only reflect value, they also help ensure it.
Ask investors what kind of financial
information they want companies to publish and you'll probably hear two
words: more and better. Quality financial reports allow for effective,
informative fundamental analysis.
But let's face it, the financial statements of
some firms are designed to hide rather than reveal information.
Investors should steer clear of companies that lack transparency in
their business operations, financial statements or strategies. Companies
with inscrutable financials and complex business structures are riskier
and less valuable investments.
Transparency Is Assurance The word
"transparent" can be used to describe high-quality financial statements.
The term has quickly become a part of business vocabulary. Dictionaries
offer many definitions for the word, but those synonyms relevant to
financial reporting are "easily understood", "very clear", "frank", and
"candid".
Consider two companies with the same market
capitalization, same overall market-risk exposure, and the same
financial leverage. Assume that both also have the same earnings,
earnings growth rate and similar returns on capital. The difference is
that Company A is a single-business company with easy-to-understand
financial statements. Company B, by contrast, has numerous businesses
and subsidiaries with complex financials.
Which one will have more value? Odds are good
the market will value Company A more highly. Because of its complex and
opaque financial statements, Company B's value will be discounted.
The reason is simple: less information means
less certainty for investors. When financial statements are not
transparent, investors can never be sure about a company's real
fundamentals and true risk. For instance, a firm's growth prospects are
related to how it invests. It's difficult if not impossible to evaluate
a company's investment performance if its investments are funneled
through holding companies, making them hidden from view. Lack of
transparency may also obscure the company's level of debt. If a company
hides its debt, investors can't estimate their exposure to bankruptcy
risk.
High-profile cases of financial shenanigans,
such as those at Enron and Tyco, showed everyone that managers employ
fuzzy financials and complex business structures to hide unpleasant
news. Lack of transparency can mean nasty surprises to come.
Blurry Vision The reasons for inaccurate
financial reporting are varied: a small but dangerous minority of
companies actively intends to defraud investors; other companies may
release information that is misleading but technically conforms to legal
standards.
The rise of stock option compensation has
increased the incentives for companies to misreport key information.
Companies have increased their reliance on pro forma earnings and
similar techniques, which can include hypothetical transactions. Then
again, many companies just find it difficult to present financial
information that complies with fuzzy and evolving accounting standards.
Furthermore, some firms are simply more complex
than others. Many operate in multiple businesses that often have little
in common. For example, analyzing General Electric - an enormous
conglomerate with dozens of businesses, from GE Plastics to NBC - is
more challenging than examining the financials of a firm like Amazon.com,
a pure play online retailer.
When firms enter new markets or businesses, the
way they structure these new businesses can result in greater complexity
and less transparency. For instance, a firm that keeps each business
separate will be easier to value than one that squeezes all the
businesses into a single entity. Meanwhile, the increasing use of
derivatives, forward sales, off-balance-sheet financing, complex
contractual arrangements and new tax vehicles can befuddle investors.
The cause of poor transparency, however, is
less important than its effect on a company's ability to give investors
the critical information they need to value their investments. If
investors neither believe nor understand financial statements, the
performance and fundamental value of that company remains either
irrelevant or distorted.
Transparency Pays
Mounting evidence suggests that the market gives a higher value to firms
that are upfront with investors and analysts. Transparency pays,
according to Robert Eccles, author of "Building Public Trust – The Value
Reporting Revolution". Eccles shows that companies with fuller
disclosure win more trust from investors. Relevant and reliable
information means less risk to investors and thus a lower cost of
capital, which naturally translates into higher valuations. The key
finding is that companies that share the key metrics and performance
indicators that investors consider important are more valuable than
those companies that keep information to themselves.
Of course, there are two ways to interpret this
evidence. One is that the market rewards more transparent companies with
higher valuations because the risk of unpleasant surprises is believed
to be lower. The other interpretation is that companies with good
results usually release their earnings earlier. Companies that are doing
well have nothing to hide and are eager to publicize their good
performance as widely as possible. It is in their interest to be
transparent and forthcoming with information, so that the market can
upgrade their fair value.
Further evidence suggests that the tendency
among investors to mark down complexity explains the conglomerate
discount. Relative to single-market or pure play firms, conglomerates
are discounted by as much as 20%. The positive reaction associated with
spin-offs and divestment can be viewed as evidence that the market
rewards transparency.
Naturally, there could be other reasons for the
conglomerate discount. It could be the lack of focus of these companies
and the inefficiencies that follow. Or it could be that the absence of
market prices for the separate businesses makes it harder for investors
to assess value.
It's worth noting that, even if a company's
financial statements are totally transparent, investors may still not
understand them. If biotech specialist Amgen and semiconductor maker
Intel were totally forthcoming about their R&D spending, investors might
still lack the knowledge to properly value these companies.
Conclusion
Investors should seek disclosure and simplicity. The more companies say
about where they are making money and how they are spending their
resources, the more confident investors can be about the companies'
fundamentals.
It's even better when financial reports provide
a line-of-sight view into the company's growth drivers. Transparency
makes analysis easier and thus lowers an investor's risk when investing
in stocks. That way you, the investor, are less likely to face
unpleasant surprises.
FASB Issues FAS 163 "Accounting for Financial Guarantee Insurance
Contracts"---
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas163.pdf
From the AccountingWeb on May 27, 2008 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=105224
Last week The Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) issued FASB Statement No. 163, Accounting for Financial Guarantee
Insurance Contracts. The new standard clarifies how FASB Statement No. 60,
Accounting and Reporting by Insurance Enterprises, applies to financial
guarantee insurance contracts issued by insurance enterprises, including the
recognition and measurement of premium revenue and claim liabilities. It
also requires expanded disclosures about financial guarantee insurance
contracts. The Statement is effective for financial statements issued for
fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2008, and all interim periods
within those fiscal years, except for disclosures about the insurance
enterprise's risk-management activities. Disclosures about the insurance
enterprise's risk-management activities are effective the first period
beginning after issuance of the Statement. "By issuing Statement 163, the
FASB has taken a major step toward ending inconsistencies in practice that
have made it difficult for investors to receive comparable information about
an insurance enterprise's claim liabilities," stated FASB Project Manager
Mark Trench. "Its issuance is particularly timely in light of recent
concerns about the financial health of financial guarantee insurers, and
will help bring about much needed transparency and comparability to
financial statements."
The accounting and disclosure requirements of
Statement 163 are intended to improve the comparability and quality of
information provided to users of financial statements by creating
consistency, for example, in the measurement and recognition of claim
liabilities. Statement 163 requires that an insurance enterprise recognize a
claim liability prior to an event of default (insured event) when there is
evidence that credit deterioration has occurred in an insured financial
obligation. It also requires disclosure about (a) the risk-management
activities used by an insurance enterprise to evaluate credit deterioration
in its insured financial obligations and (b) the insurance enterprise's
surveillance or watch list.
2001
Infectious Greed: How Deceit
and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets (Henry Holt and
Company, 2003, Pages 385 &389, ISBN 0-8050-7510-0)
The second type of
credit derivative --- the
Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) --- posed even greater
dangers to the global economy. In a standard CDO, a financial institution
sold debt (loans or bonds) to a
Special Purpose Entity, which then split the debt into p9ces by issuing
new securities linked to each piece. Some of the pieces were of higher
quality; some were of lower quality. The credit-rating agencies gave
investment-grade ratings to all except the lowest-quality piece. By 2002,
there were more than a half a trillion dollars of CDOs.
. . .
.No one had paid
much attention to the first warning that CDOs threatened the health of the
global economy. In July 2001 --- two months before Jeff Slilling had
resigned from Enron, and long before investors learned about the accounting
problems at Global Crossing and WorldCom --- American Express, the U.S.
financial services conglomerate had calmly announced that it would take an
$825 million pretax charge to write down the value of investments in
high-yield bonds and Collateralized Debt Obligations. It all sounded much
too esoteric to matter to average investors. The media brushed off the
details by focusing on the junk bonds involved in the various deals, and
commentators seem to agree that theese losses were just a minor consequence
of the explosion of financial innovation.
. . .
Then there was the
stunning public admission by the chairman of American Express, Kenneth
Cheault, that his firm "did not comprehend the risk" of these investments.
What?
Question
What are CDOs?
Should they be booked?
Why were they particularly troublesome in the Year 2007?
CDO ---
Click Here
Accounting for CDOs (including journal entries) under
U.S. and Foreign GAAP ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/TheoryOnFirmCommitments.htm
Why were CDOs particularly troublesome in the Year 2007?
The accounting standards are not resolved on whether or not CDOs should be
booked.
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review
on November 30, 2007
Citi's $41 Billion Issue: Should It Put CDOs On the Balance
Sheet?
by David
Reilly
The Wall Street Journal
Nov 26, 2007
Page: C1
Click here to view the
full article on WSJ.com
---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119604238679603556.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
TOPICS: Accounting,
CDO, Collateralized Debt Obligations, Consolidated Financial
Statements, Consolidations, Financial Accounting,
Reconsideration Events
SUMMARY: Does
Citigroup need to bring $41 billion in potentially shaky
securities onto its balance sheet? Opinions are divided,
reflecting a wider debate over how to interpret accounting
rules on off-balance-sheet treatment for some financing
vehicles.
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: This article offers a good basis for
discussion of CDOs, possible consolidation of CDOs, and the
balance sheet presentation of CDOs based on the rules
related to "reconsideration events."
QUESTIONS:
1.) What are CDOs? What are the recent problems connected
with CDOs? What is the cause of these problems? In general,
why are they especially a concern for Citigroup?
2.) What is the specific issue facing Citigroup, as detailed
in the article?
3.) What are the accounting rules regarding consolidation of
CDOs? How do banks avoid having to consolidate?
4.) Why is there controversy over the how the losses should
be booked by the bank? What is the potentially vague part of
the rules?
5.) What position does Citigroup take? What position are
some accounting experts taking? Is either side getting
support from other parties? If so, from whom?
6.) With what position do you agree? How did you reach this
conclusion? Please offer support from your answer.
Reviewed By: Linda Christiansen, Indiana University
Southeast
RELATED
ARTICLES:
Why Citi Struggles to Tally Losses
by Carrick Mollenkamp and David Reilly
Nov 05, 2007
Page: C1
The Nine Lives of CDOs
by
Nov 26, 2007
Page: C10
Goldman Says Citigroup Faces $15 Billion CDO Write-Downs
by Kimberly A. Vlach
Nov 20, 2007
Online Exclusive
|
"Citi's $41 Billion Issue: Should It Put CDOs On the
Balance Sheet?" by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, November 26,
2007; Page C1 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119604238679603556.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
A $41 billion question mark is hanging over
Citigroup Inc.
That is the amount, in a worst-case scenario, of
potentially shaky securities the bank would need to bring onto its balance
sheet. Citi has already taken billions of dollars of such securities onto
its balance sheet and expects to take big write-downs on those holdings.
The fate of the $41 billion rests on the outcome of
a debate going on in accounting circles over what constitutes a
"reconsideration event." Those who say Citi needs to put these securities,
known as collateralized debt obligations, onto its balance sheet argue that
because Citi acted over the summer to backstop some of them, its
relationship with them changed, prompting a reconsideration event.
At the moment, it seems unlikely Citigroup will be
forced to bring the assets onto its books. The bank doesn't believe such a
reconsideration event is in order. A spokeswoman says Citigroup is confident
its "financial statements fully comply with all applicable rules and
regulations."
But the division of opinion reflects debate within
accounting circles over just how to interpret rules that govern
off-balance-sheet treatment for some financing vehicles. That, in turn,
underscores what many consider to be a failure of these rules to ensure that
investors in the companies that create these vehicles are adequately
informed of the risks posed by them.
In recent months, investors have been shocked to
learn that many banks were exposed to big losses because of their
involvement with vehicles that issued commercial paper and purchased risky
assets such as mortgage securities. The troubles facing one kind of
off-balance-sheet entity, known as structured investment vehicles, have even
prompted Citigroup and other major banks to organize a rescue fund.
But CDO vehicles created by Citigroup have proved
to be a more immediate threat. The bank's announcement this month that it
expects to take $8 billion to $11 billion in write-downs in the fourth
quarter largely stems from its exposure to CDO assets. Citigroup was one of
the biggest arrangers of CDOs -- products that pool debt, often mortgage
securities, and then sell slices with varying degrees of risk.
If Citigroup had to include an additional $41
billion in CDO assets on its books, that could potentially spur a further $8
billion in write-downs, above and beyond those already signaled, according
to a report earlier this month by Howard Mason, an analyst at Sanford C.
Bernstein. Such losses could further weaken Citigroup's capital position,
threatening its dividend or forcing the bank to raise money.
The issue for Citigroup is when, and if, it has to
reconsider consolidation of the CDO vehicles it sponsors.
Like other banks, Citigroup structured these
vehicles so they wouldn't be included on its books. The vehicles are created
as corporate zombies that ostensibly aren't owned or controlled by anyone.
In that case, accounting rules say consolidation of such vehicles is
determined by who holds the majority of risks and rewards connected to them.
To deal with that, banks sell off the riskiest
pieces of the vehicles. This ensures they don't shoulder a majority of the
risk and so don't have to consolidate the vehicles. The assessment of who
absorbs the majority of losses is made when the vehicles are created.
Over time, though, rising losses within a vehicle
can lead a sponsor to shoulder more risk, or even a majority of it. That can
also happen if a sponsor takes on additional interests in the vehicle by
buying up the short-term IOUs it issues.
That is what happened to Citigroup. Over the
summer, the bank was forced to buy $25 billion in commercial paper issued by
its CDO vehicles because investors were no longer interested in the paper.
Citigroup already had an $18 billion exposure to these vehicles through
other funding it had provided.
This combined $43 billion exposure means that if
CDO losses climb high enough, the bank could be exposed to more than half
the losses, according to Bernstein's Mr. Mason. That would seem to argue for
Citigroup's consolidating all $84 billion of its CDO assets originally held
in off-balance-sheet vehicles.
But the accounting rules don't say that sponsors of
these vehicles have to reassess on any regular basis the question of who
bears the majority of risk of loss. Such "reconsideration events" occur when
there is a change in the "governing documents or contractual arrangements"
related to these vehicles, the rules say.
Citigroup believes that because it hasn't changed
the documents or contracts related to the vehicles, it shouldn't have to
reconsider its relationship to them, according to people familiar with the
bank's thinking.
But some accounting experts point out that the rule
also says a reconsideration event occurs when an institution acquires
additional interests in the vehicle. "If a bank is being forced to step in
and be a bigger holder of the commercial paper, to me that's pretty black
and white that it's a reconsideration event," says Ed Trott, a retired
member of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the body that wrote the
accounting rule.
An influential accounting-industry group, the
Center for Audit Quality, also seems to lean toward this view. In a paper
issued last month, the center said the purchase of commercial paper is an
example of a change in the contractual arrangements governing these
vehicles. This "may also result in a reconsideration event," the paper said.
But Citigroup believes its purchase of the CDO
vehicles' commercial paper is different, because it had taken on the
obligation to provide such assistance when the vehicles were created. This
means the bank was acting within the contractual arrangements governing the
vehicles, not changing them, according to the people familiar with
Citigroup's thinking.
Some accounting experts agree. "If all that's
happening is one set of [paper holders] is going out and another is coming
in, that's not a reconsideration event," says Stephen Ryan, an accounting
professor at New York University. "I don't think you reconsider moment by
moment; an event is not just bad luck happening."
Question
Securitization entails lending with collateral that, in the subprime crisis, was
highly (and often fraudulently) overstated in value to outside investors in that
collateralized debt. What can be done to save securitization in capital markets?
"Coming Soon ... Securitization with a New,
Improved (and Perhaps Safer) Face, Knowledge@Wharton, April
2, 2008 ---
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm;jsessionid=a83051431af9532a7261?articleid=1933
For generations, the strength of the U.S. housing
market was due, in part, to securitization of mortgages with guarantees from
the government-sponsored companies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Following
the savings and loan debacle of the late 1980s, securitization -- which has
been defined as "pooling and repackaging of cash-flow producing financial
assets into securities that are then sold to investors" -- helped bring
capital back to battered real estate markets.
Today, securitization of subprime real estate loans
is blamed for the global liquidity crisis, but Wharton faculty say
securitization itself is not at fault. Poor underwriting and other
weaknesses in the market for mortgage-backed securities led to the current
problems. Securitization, they say, will remain an important part of the way
real estate is funded, although it is likely to undergo significant change.
"Securitization, in the long run, is a good thing,"
says Wharton finance professor Franklin Allen. "We didn't have much
experience with falling real estate prices in recent years. The mechanisms
weren't designed for that." He explains that economists were concerned about
the incentives and accounting that shaped the private mortgage
securitization market in recent years, but as long as real estate prices
kept rising, the weaknesses in the system did not become clear. Now, after
credit markets seized up and prices have declined sharply, those problems
have been exposed.
Allen believes financial markets will get back into
the business of securitizing mortgage debt, but only after making some major
changes. One new feature of future securitization deals, he says, could be a
requirement that loan originators hold at least part of the loans they write
on their books. Before the current crisis, loans were bundled into complex
tranches that were passed through the financial system and onto buyers with
little ability to assess the real value of the individual assets.
"The way the collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)
and other vehicles are structured will change. They are too complicated,"
says Allen. "I'm sure the industry will figure out how to do it. There will
be a lot of industry-generated reform and the industry will prosper. This is
not, in my view, something that should be regulated."
Privatizing Securitization
According to Wharton finance professor Richard J.
Herring, for decades, mortgage securitization was backed by government
guarantees through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and it worked well. Of
course, these agencies were regulated and bound by less-risky underwriting
standards than those that ultimately prevailed in the subprime market which
was also, potentially, more profitable. Indeed, default rates were so low in
the mortgage-based securities market that banks and other private financial
institutions were eager to take a piece of the residential business.
At first, the transition to private securitization
worked, because investors were willing to rely on three substitutes for the
government guarantees. These included ratings agencies, new business models
and monoline insurance designed to guarantee specialized mortgage-backed
bonds. "Positive experience with private securitization led to an alphabet
soup of innovations that sliced and diced the cash flows from pools of
mortgages in increasingly complex ways," says Herring.
Now, the subprime crisis has undermined confidence
in all three pillars of private securitization. Ratings proved unreliable as
even highly rated tranches experienced sudden, multiple-notch downgrades
that were unknown in corporate bonds. Models developed by the most
sophisticated firms selling mortgage-backed securities, including Bear
Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup and UBS, failed. Monoline insurers, it
turned out, were not adequately capitalized.
"There has been a highly rational flight to
simplicity," says Herring. Over time, he believes, the real estate
securitization market will reemerge as investors regain confidence in the
ratings agencies, new models evolve, and monoline insurers are able to
increase their capital. "But I think that it will be a long time before the
market will be willing to accept the complex, opaque structures that
failed," continues Herring. He adds that recovery will be delayed until
investors are confident that the fall in house prices has reached the
bottom.
Wharton real estate professor Susan M. Wachter
points out that many recent -- and historic -- international financial
problems originated in real estate. The nature of real estate finance and
incentive structures is more to blame than securitization this time around.
"The most recent crisis is coming through the securitization market, but
this isn't the only real estate crisis," Wachter notes, adding that the
fundamental problem in real estate finance is that there is no way to bet
against the industry. Real estate is essentially priced by optimists, and
rising prices themselves justify even higher values as assets are marked to
market, creating new incentives for investors to overpay.
Wachter points to real estate investment trusts
(REITS), publicly traded bundles of real estate assets, as an example of how
securitization can help provide liquidity, but also a chance for
short-sellers to correct against overly optimistic pricing. Research
indicates that REIT prices may not have increased as much as other sectors
of real estate finance because the industry has at least 200 analysts
looking at the underlying assets in each REIT with the ability to point out
faulty pricing to investors. "REITS have performed fluidly relative to the
overall market, and that is a good thing," says Wachter.
Fee-driven Lending
Another problem was that much of the subprime
lending was fee-driven, giving banks incentives to write loans to earn the
fees because they could then pass the risky assets along to securitized
bondholders. And even bank shareholders had no way to limit their real
estate exposure because banks invest in various kinds of economic activity
and not just in real estate. Biased pricing and bubbles also arise because
the supply of real estate is not elastic. By the time the market recognizes
supply has outstripped demand, construction has already begun on many more
projects that will continue to be built out; this tends to exacerbate
oversupply and create downward pressure on prices for years.
In a research paper titled, "Incentives for
Mortgage Lending in Asia," Wachter and her co-authors write: "With [the]
forbearance of regulatory authorities and the intervention of governments,
banks may be bailed out, mitigating the consequences for shareholders.
Nonetheless, the fundamental factor which explains why episodes of bank
under-pricing of risk are likely to occur is the inability of banking
shareholders to identify these episodes promptly and incentivize correct
pricing."
Wharton real estate professor Joseph Gyourko notes
that significant differences exist in the performance of commercial and
residential real estate securities. "Securitized commercial property debt
will come back once the market calms down," he says, adding that there has
been very little default in commercial real estate finance. "You'll be able
to pool mortgages and securitize them, but almost certainly won't be able to
leverage them as much as you did in the past."
The residential side, where there is significant
default, is more problematic. Gyourko believes the residential market will
go back to what it was in the mid-1990s and most borrowers will have to put
down at least 10% of the sales price. "We will get rid of the exotic, highly
leveraged loans," he says. "That will lead to lower homeownership, but it
should. We put a lot of people into homeownership that we shouldn't have."
Wharton emeritus finance professor Jack Guttentag,
who runs a web site called mtgprofessor.com, says the short-term future for
residential real estate is "bleak."
"Secured bondholders have been badly burned. They
discovered to their dismay that all kinds of problems are connected to
mortgage-backed securities, which they hadn't anticipated." Guttentag also
points to the failure of ratings agencies, which are already being revamped.
The methodologies used to determine ratings were flawed, he says. "They used
historic performance over a period that simply wasn't representative."
"CDOs are Doomed"
In the future, ratings agencies will need to
operate on the assumption that a security rated AAA should be able to
withstand a shock as great as the current crisis.
"That will mean that under the best of
circumstances, it will be harder to get a triple-A rating, which will reduce
the profitability of securities," Guttentag says. Some forms of securities
will die. CDOs are doomed, he adds, because the market has seen they are
extremely difficult to value. "In the short term, the prospects are dismal.
The market will recover, but I don't think we'll ever see CDOs again and the
standards will be tougher, so the comeback will be gradual."
Gyourko notes that the crisis is playing out in a
presidential election year, complicating the response. "I think this is the
worst time to have this happen. It's never a good time, but in an election
year, you're more likely to get a bad policy response," he says. According
to Guttentag, while Republican presidential candidate John McCain is taking
a laissez-faire stance, the Democratic presidential candidates have focused
on using the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to refinance loans that
are in default. The idea is similar to what happened during the Great
Depression of the 1930s with another agency called the Home Owners' Loan
Corp. which was created specifically for that purpose.
The problem, says Guttentag, is that FHA is not
designed as a bailout agency. "The FHA's core mission is predicated on it
being a solvent operation, actuarially sound, charging an insurance premium
large enough only to cover losses. How they would reconcile that is not
clear."
Guttentag says attempts may be made to create a
separate bailout agency within the FHA with different accountability. "But
the devil is in the details," he warns, "and the details have to do with
exactly who is going to be helped, what the requirements are, what the
nature of the assistance is going to be, and myriad other factors that have
to be worked out." The Bush administration has taken some steps to ease the
crisis, including encouraging lenders to modify contracts to avoid
foreclosure. A strong case can be made for these measures, Guttentag adds.
"The cost of foreclosure is often greater than the cost of modifying the
contract and keeping the borrower in the house." One downside is that once
some loans are modified for those truly on the brink of foreclosure, other
borrowers who could somehow manage to avoid foreclosure may demand the same
modifications, shortchanging investors.
In testimony before the U.S. House of
Representatives' Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Wachter laid
out a proposal developed with the Center for American Progress to resolve
the current crisis. Under the so-called SAFE loan plan, the U.S. treasury
and the Federal Reserve would run auctions, in which FHA originators, as
well as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and their servicers, would purchase
mortgages from current investors at a discount determined at the auction.
Investors would take a reduction in asset value and
yield in exchange for liquidity and certainty and the auction process would
price pools and bring transparency back to the market. The FHA, Fannie Mae,
and Freddie Mac could then arrange for restructuring of loans.
Meanwhile, Allen notes the Federal Reserve has
taken some dramatic steps with interest rate policy to resolve the current
economic crisis, but that could lead to tension with Europe and Japan over
currency valuations. As the dollar continues to fall, U.S. companies are
increasingly more competitive overseas. "The Fed cut the rate at the
beginning, and that was fine, but now things are getting way out of line,"
he says.
Furthermore, it is not clear that cutting rates is
going to solve the basic problem. As rates continues to drop, foreigners may
begin withdrawing their money from dollar-denominated investments, driving
rates up. "What the Fed is doing is unprecedented," says Allen. "It is
laudable that it is trying to stop a recession, but how many risks should
you take to do that? We're now moving into an area where the Fed is probably
taking too many risks. If inflation picks up and long-term rates go up,
we'll be in a situation where we have to raise short-term rates as we go
into recession, which is not a happy thing to."
Vulture Capital
The private sector has begun to show signs of
willingness to get back into the fray. A number of vulture funds have begun
to form to take advantage of distressed real estate prices. BlackRock and
Highfields Capital Management have announced they will raise $2 billion to
buy delinquent residential mortgages. The companies have hired Sanford
Kurland, the former president of Countrywide Financial, to run the new
venture called Private National Mortgage Acceptance, or PennyMac. "Many
distressed funds will come in to discover prices," says Gyourko.
Wharton real estate professor Peter Linneman offers
an intriguing prescription to bring prices down to the point where the
industry can start to rebuild. He suggests that the government tell banks
that if they want to maintain their federal insurance, they should fire
their CEO by the end of the day, and the government will pay the CEO $10
million in severance. Ousting the former CEOs gives the new bank CEOs an
incentive to write down all the bad assets immediately, so that any
improvement will make them look good going forward. That would speed the
painful process of gradual price declines.
"There's plenty of money out there waiting for
these assets to be written down to bargain prices," says Linneman. In
another quarter or two, the lenders would have new cash and be ready to lend
again. Meanwhile, he says, the government should tell bankers it will keep
interest rates down but raise them after the end of the year. "That says,
'Get your house in order in the next nine months because the subsidy ends at
the end of the year.'" Linneman figures that 1,000 CEOs are accountable for
about 80% of the current lending mess. If the government were to spend $10
billion to restore liquidity to the market in nine months with only 1,000
people losing their jobs, it would be the best investment it could make to
restore the economy. "I'm only half-kidding," he quips.
Linneman also argues that concerns about moral
hazard -- or the tendency to take greater risks because of the presence of a
safety net -- because of a bailout are not valid. Those concerns, he says,
already exist and have been in place since the U.S. government agreed to
insure bank deposits. "The minute you say to somebody, 'No matter what you
do I'll give your people their money back,' you've created moral hazard," he
says. "Now it's only a matter of how often and how much they will have to
spend to settle up. If you go through our history, every eight years to 15
years we have had an episode."
Continued in article
"The Accounting Cycle: FASB Needs to Change Accounting for SPEs,"
by: J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, January 2008 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x60543.xml
The CDO imbroglio that has enveloped the financial
sector created quite a stir in 2007. Mortgage foreclosures have led to
losses for the banks, and investors in CDOs have been surprised by the
degree of their risk exposure. "Super seniors" have not been super or
senior.
Amid this disarray, a simple question has to be
asked: why are the activities and transactions of special purpose entities (SPEs),
legal entities that run collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and similar
financial vehicles, not displayed on the financial reports of corporate
America? These SPEs remain hidden from view and corporate disclosures about
them mist like a Chicago fog.
Recall that Enron's episodes were sprinkled with
many an SPE shenanigan. The old accounting rule said that if the SPE had at
least 3 percent of its total capital from some outside source, then the
business enterprise did not have to consolidate the SPE with its own
affairs. While EITF 90-15 originally applied to certain leasing activities,
business managers quickly applied it to all sorts of SPEs, and the Financial
Accounting Standards Board and the Securities and Exchange Commission
allowed them to do so. The threshold was so low that managers found it easy
to keep SPE debt off the balance sheet and to make few disclosures.
Because of Enron, FASB finally updated the rules to
require consolidation unless outsiders contributed at least 10 percent of
the capital to the SPE and this capital is at risk. Funny, FASB sat on its
collective backside for over a decade before it took action. It seems the
board members are incapable of taking proactive steps in any area.
One of the criticisms was that 3 percent equity
does not really put the equity at risk. While the 10 percent cutoff remains
arbitrary, it clarifies the situation -- until the board muddied this
clarity with some mystical, principles-based goobledy-gook. Many managers
complained because they perceived that billions of dollars would be added to
the corporate balance sheet. Apparently the appeals had some effect, for
FASB modified the final rule. Interpretation No. 46R now states:
9. An equity investment at risk of less than 10
percent of the entity's total assets shall not be considered sufficient to
permit the entity to finance its activities without subordinated financial
support in addition to the equity investment unless the equity investment
can be demonstrated to be sufficient. The demonstration that equity is
sufficient may be based on either qualitative analysis or quantitative
analysis or a combination of both. Qualitative assessments, including but
not limited to the qualitative assessments described in paragraphs 9(a) and
9(b), will in some cases be conclusive in determining that the entity's
equity at risk is sufficient. If, after diligent effort, a reasonable
conclusion about the sufficiency of the entity's equity at risk cannot be
reached based solely on qualitative considerations, the quantitative
analyses implied by paragraph 9(c) should be made. In instances in which
neither a qualitative assessment nor a quantitative assessment, taken alone,
is conclusive, the determination of whether the equity at risk is sufficient
shall be based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative analyses.
a. The entity has demonstrated that it can
finance its activities without additional subordinated financial
support.
b. The entity has at least as much equity invested as other entities
that hold only similar assets of similar quality in similar amounts and
operate with no additional subordinated financial support.
c. The amount of equity invested in the entity exceeds the estimate of
the entity's expected losses based on reasonable quantitative evidence.
Note that the 10 percent threshold can be ignored
under several scenarios using either quantitative or qualitative excuses. As
I said in 2003, this rule or standard is suspect and board members are
spineless. The debt of an SPE is similar to the debt of a subsidiary. If
FASB thinks that SPE debt does not have to be consolidated, it might as well
announce that parent companies no longer have to show the liabilities of
their subsidiaries.
We can forget substance over form. While we are at
it, we might as well toss out decision usefulness and relevance because FASB
really doesn't promote these ideals, despite the rhetoric in the so-called
conceptual framework.
Given the ethical failures of both managers and
auditors, I predicted in Hidden Financial Risk (2003) that many SPEs would
remain unconsolidated. Indeed the majority of SPEs not only remain
unconsolidated, but also the sponsoring organizations provide precious
little disclosures about them. With the help of investment bankers,
corporate managers have been highly creative in finding rhetoric that skirts
principled accounting. When the corporate executives are managers of the
investment banks, well, the creativity is off the charts.
Years ago FASB and the SEC should have required the
consolidation of SPEs. The last six months or so have clearly displayed the
need for improved corporate reporting. This directive applies to the
sponsors of CDOs including Citicorp and Merrill Lynch: they should
consolidate their special purpose vehicles.
How many more debacles in the market place will
occur before FASB and the SEC get it right? When will they have men and
women of courage?
What's Right and What's Wrong With (SPE, SPEs), SPVs, and VIEs? ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm
"The Accounting Cycle: Poor Performance of
Credit Rating Agencies," by J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, December 2007
---
http://lyris.smartpros.com/t/204743/5562870/4383/0/
Soon after Merrill Lynch disclosed its $8.4 billion write-down because of
problems with collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and other financial
instruments relating to subprime mortgages, the credit rating agencies
started downgrading the securities. But, this is like the proverbial soldier
who watches a raging battle from afar; when the war is over, he proceeds to
bayonet the wounded.
Merrill Lynch and other banks got into the CDO
business several years ago. The CDOs received an imprimatur from agencies
such as Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch. Some CDOs were even evaluated
as investment grade securities. The analysts at Moody's, Standard & Poor's,
and Fitch apparently ignored the risks involved in the subprime mortgage
market as well as the risks in real estate prices.
This segment generated lots of money for Merrill
Lynch and the other banks. The CDO business brought in millions and millions
of revenues. This line of business was at least as profitable for the bond
rating agencies, too, as their ratings produced massive amounts of money.
Not surprisingly, problems developed because the
financial institutions were lending funds to marginal borrowers, those with
less-than-stellar credentials for loan applicants. When some of these
riskier borrowers defaulted on their mortgages, the CDOs started losing
value. The credit rating agencies did nothing; presumably, they felt that
the CDOs still had investment grade status.
With the losses by Merrill Lynch out in the open,
everybody knows not only that the CDOs have less fair value, but also that
the credit raters aren't earning their keep. Unfortunately, members of
Congress believe that they should hold investigations on the matter. I say
unfortunate because such a move would be a waste of time, energy, and money.
Recall the downfall of Enron and the high credit
ratings that Enron received from the credit rating agencies. These agencies
did not downgrade Enron's debt until after the 2001 third quarter results
became public and Enron's stock price started its nosedive. When Congress
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, section 702(b) required the SEC to
conduct a study of credit rating agencies to determine why these credit
rating agencies did not act as useful watchdogs and warn the public about
Enron's true situation. It accomplished little at the time; if Congress
holds hearings now, nothing new will be learned. Until policy makers focus
on the institution of credit ratings and follow the cash, they waste their
time with investigations.
Moody's and the other agencies make money by
charging the business entities who are issuing debt. It doesn't take a
genius to see the conflict of interest. The credit agencies lean on the
issuer for more money or risk receiving a poor rating. Payment not only
entitles one to a good rating, but also it gives one the privilege of not
receiving a downgrade unless bad news becomes public.
The SEC barely mentions this institutional feature
in its "Report on the Roles and Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the
Operation of the Securities Markets."
This essay, written in January, 2003, practically
ignores the problem. On page 41, the SEC report states, "The practice of
issuers paying for their own ratings creates the potential for a conflict of
interest." The SEC goes on to review comments by the large rating agencies
themselves on how they manage this potential conflict of interest.
The comments are pathetic. First, the SEC and the
managers at credit rating agencies mangle the English language when they
refuse to identify conflicts of interest for what they are. My dictionary
defines conflict of interest as "the circumstance of a public officeholder,
corporate officer, etc., whose personal interests might benefit from his or
her official actions or influence." The term does not mean that they
actually do benefit, but calls attention to the possibility. Calling such
circumstances "potential conflicts of interests" merely attempts to push
ethics aside. I can understand this behavior by the managers, but I don't
comprehend the words of the SEC staff.
Second, the comments rely heavily on the assertions
of the credit rating agencies themselves. Managers of these agencies claim
there is no problem, and of course the SEC should listen to them and accept
every word as truth. Yeah, right!
Third, on page 42 of the report, the SEC promises
to explore whether these credit rating agencies "should implement procedures
to manage potential conflicts of interest that arise when issuers [pay] for
ratings." Either the SEC did not keep its promise or such actions are
inadequate. Clearly, the credit rating agencies have not responded any
differently to the CDO problem than they did with Enron's circumstances.
Policy makers can reduce the problems by reducing
the very real conflict of interests that perniciously raises its ugly head
from time to time. The solution is to prohibit credit rating agencies to
receive any funds from the issuers. If the ratings have any merit, then
investors will be willing to pay for them.
This essay reflects the opinion of the author and not necessarily the
opinion of The Pennsylvania State University.
Bob Jensen's threads on credit rating industry frauds
are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#CreditRatingAgencies
Accounting for CDOs (including journal entries) under U.S. and Foreign
GAAP ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/TheoryOnFirmCommitments.htm
Pensions and Post-retirement Benefits:
Schemes for Hiding Debt
Horrible (shell game) accounting rules for pension accounting
Over the past three decades, we have allowed a system
of pension accounting to develop that is a shell game, misleading taxpayers and
investors about the true fiscal health of their cities and companies -- and
allowing management to make promises to workers that saddle future generations
with huge costs. The result: According to a recent estimate by Credit Suisse
First Boston, unfunded pension liabilities of companies in the S&P 500 could hit
$218 billion by the end of this year. Others estimate that public pensions --
the benefits promised by state and local governments -- could be in the red
upwards of $700 billion.
Arthur Levitt, Jr., "Pensions Unplugged," The Wall Street Journal,
November 10, 2005; Page A16 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113159015994793200.html?mod=opinion&ojcontent=otep
Question
What do American Airlines pensions have to do with funding of the Iraq war?
Answer
Plenty, but who knows why?
A pension measure tucked into last month’s Iraq war
spending bill is causing some leading members of Congress to complain that
American Airlines got a break worth almost $2 billion without proper scrutiny.
The measure will allow American to greatly reduce its payments into its pension
fund over the next 10 years. At the end of 2006, the fund had assets of $8.5
billion and needed an additional $2.5 billion to cover all its obligations. The
new provision will allow American to recalculate those numbers, so that the
shortfall disappears and the plan looks fully funded. Continental, along with a
small number of regional airlines and a caterer, will also be able to take
advantage of the provision. But American, the nation’s largest airline, is by
far the biggest beneficiary, according to government calculations. Some
lawmakers who would normally be involved in tax and pension measures say they
were shut out of the process.
Mary Williams Walsh, "Pension Relief for Airlines Faulted by Some Legislators,"
The New York Times, June 21, 2007 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/21/business/21pension.html?ref=business
Jensen Question
How should accountants factor in politics in disclosing and reporting pension
obligations, especially for airlines that do not declare bankruptcy?
Changed pension accounting rules are in the wind
This week, the Financial Accounting Standards Board,
which writes the accounting rules for American business, will decide whether to
go ahead with plans to change the way pension accounting is done. The board's
current rule is 20 years old and has drawn fire from retirees and investors for
many of the same reasons that disturb Mr. Zydney, who has made his concerns
about his Lucent pension into something of a crusade. "Right now, the stuff
isn't transparent," Mr. Zydney said. "There's no accuracy. No consistency. And
everybody's trying to play some financial game to make things look better."
Mary Williams Walsh, "A Pension Rule, Sometimes Murky, Is Under Pressure,"
The New York Times, November 8, 2005 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/08/business/08pension.html?pagewanted=1
Off the government balance sheets - out of sight and
out of mind
This may be a helpful video to use when teaching
the new FAS 132(R) and the new FAS 158
"Can You Afford to Retire?" PBS ---
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/retirement/need/
Click the Tab "Watch Online" to view the video (not
free)!
"PBS Frontline: Can You Afford to Retire,"
Financial Page, November 8, 2006 --- Click Here
PBS Frontline has rebroadcast a critical
examination of the nation's retirement system. You can access the
interviews and written material for the program at
PBS Frontline: Can You Afford to Retire.
One can also view the program on-line, from the
referenced link.
The program highlights problems with both the Defined Benefit pension
system (rapidly becoming obsolete) and the rising Contributory Benefit
system, which brings with it a number of problems. The program
considers:
- Low levels of worker participation in these
plans
- Inadequate funding of these plans by workers
- Poor investment results for most employees
- The burden of self managing the plans
The program does not address the problem of high
intermediation costs in the Contributory Pension system, or the
preponderence of substandard investment vehicles (high cost annuities,
load funds, and high cost active funds) in many employer provided plans.
While the program explores the underfunding and closing of Corporate
Defined Benefit plans, it does not touch on underfunding in the
government pension system, nor does it address the fatal flaw of Defined
Benefit plans: the total lack of portability of these plans for the
employee.
FAS 158 improves financial reporting by
requiring an employer to recognize the overfunded or underfunded status of a
defined benefit postretirement plan (other than a multiemployer plan) as an
asset or liability in its statement of financial position and to recognize
changes in that funded status in the year in which the changes occur through
comprehensive income of a business entity or changes in unrestricted net assets
of a not-for-profit organization. This Statement also improves financial
reporting by requiring an employer to measure the funded status of a plan as of
the date of its year-end statement of financial position, with limited
exceptions.
FASB ---
http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/stsum158.shtml
"FASB Proposal Puts Pension
Plans on Balance Sheet," SmartPros, April 3, 2006 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x52449.xml
The Financial Accounting Standards Board issued a
proposal on Friday that would require employers to recognize the overfunded
or underfunded positions of defined benefit postretirement plans, including
pension plans, in their balance sheets. The proposal would also require that
employers measure plan assets and obligations as of the date of their
financial statements.
According to the standards board, the proposed
changes would increase the transparency and completeness of financial
statements for shareholders, creditors, employees, retirees, donors, and
other users.
The exposure draft applies to plan sponsors that
are public and private companies and nongovernmental not-for-profit
organizations. It results from the first phase of a comprehensive project to
reconsider guidance in Statement No. 87, Employers' Accounting for Pensions,
and Statement No. 106, Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits
Other Than Pensions. A second, broader phase will address remaining issues.
FASB expects to collaborate with the International Accounting Standards
Board on that phase.
In a statement released on Friday, FASB said the
current accounting standards do not provide complete information about
postretirement benefit obligations. For example, those standards allow an
employer to recognize an asset or liability in its balance sheet that almost
always differs from its overfunded or underfunded positions. Instead, they
require that information about the current funded status of such plans be
reported in the notes to financial statements. That incomplete reporting
results because existing standards allow delayed recognition of certain
changes in plan assets and obligations that affect the costs of providing
such benefits.
"Many constituents, including our advisory
councils, investors, creditors, and the SEC staff believe that the current
incomplete accounting makes it difficult to assess an employer's financial
position and its ability to carry out the obligations of its plans," said
George Batavick, FASB member. "We agree. Today's proposal, by requiring
sponsoring employers to reflect the current overfunded or underfunded
positions of postretirement benefit plans in the balance sheet, makes the
basic financial statements more complete, useful, and transparent. "
The proposed changes, other than the requirement to
measure plan assets and obligations as of the balance sheet date, would be
effective for fiscal years ending after December 15, 2006. Public companies
would be required to apply the proposed changes to the measurement date for
fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2006 and nonpublic entities,
including not-for-profit organizations, would become subject to that
requirement in fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2007.
FASB is seeking written comments on the proposal by
May 31, 2006. After the comment period, the board will hold a public
roundtable meeting on the proposal on June 27, 2006, in Norwalk,
Connecticut.
So Long Footnoted Liabilities
Pensions and other retiree benefits are graduating to the balance sheet; how far
should a company go to protect its compensation information?; choosing your
auditor wisely may help protect your stock price; and more.
"So Long Footnoted Liabilities," by Rob Garver, CFO Magazine, February
2006, pp. 16-17 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/5435560/c_5461573?f=magazine_alsoinside
Verizon, Ford, and ExxonMobil, pay attention. It
looks as though pensions and other retiree benefits are about to graduate
from the footnotes to the balance sheet. And companies that have previously
been able to hide underfunded retirement programs may have to count them as
liabilities — often multi-billion-dollar liabilities.
In November, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board voted to move toward a proposal that would require companies to report
the difference between the net present value of their pension- and other
retirement-benefit obligations and the amount the company has set aside to
meet those obligations. And although a final decision is a year or more
away, the numbers won't be pretty. (See "Will Washington Really Act?")
Standard & Poor's, in fact, estimates a
retirement-obligations shortfall of some $442 billion in the S&P 500 alone.
Indeed, it is difficult to understate the potential impact of the FASB plan,
which is expected to be only the first phase in a larger effort to overhaul
the accounting treatment of pensions and benefits. "We believe this FASB
project will have a significant impact on stock evaluations, income
statements, and balance sheets, and will become the major issue in financial
accounting over the next five years," S&P wrote in its December report.
The news was welcome to many in the accounting
business who have been concerned that current rules allow companies to hide
retiree obligations in the footnotes. John Hepp, a senior manager with Grant
Thornton LLP, praised the board's decision to move toward a "simplified
approach. We think this will be a big step forward."
But it won't be without pain for many companies
faced with adding a large negative number to their balance sheets, such as
telecom giant Verizon Communications Inc. Standard & Poor's reported in
December that Verizon has underfunded the nonpension portion of its
postretirement benefits by an estimated $22.5 billion. The company is
clearly trying to get a handle on retirement benefits and health-care costs,
announcing that same month that it will freeze the pension benefits of all
managers who currently receive them.
While the company refused to comment, Verizon is
far from alone. Ford and General Motors have underfunded their retirement
obligations by $44.7 billion and $69.0 billion, respectively, and other big
names facing a shortfall include ExxonMobil ($16.4 billion) and AT&T ($14.8
billion).
If any of these companies think the markets will
treat these obligations as a one-time problem, they had better think again,
says S&P equity market analyst Howard Silverblatt. "Moving this onto the
balance sheet is going to wake people up," he says. "The bottom line is that
shareholder equity [in the S&P 500] is going to be decreased by about 9
percent." And as companies begin to explore their legal options for limiting
the financial damage — including paring back benefits even further —
Silverblatt predicts that the issue will become more politicized and remain
in the public eye for years to come.
Pension Fund
Accounting Fraud in San Diego
"San Diego Charges," by Nicole
Gelinas, The Wall Street Journal, November 27, 2006; Page A12 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116459315111633209.html?mod=todays_us_opinion
The SEC has announced that it has resolved its
pension-fund fraud case against San Diego, with the city agreeing not to
commit illegal shenanigans in the future and to hire an "independent
monitor" to help it avoid doing so. Although the SEC went easy on the
residents and taxpayers of San Diego in its settlement, it still has an
opportunity to make an example of the former officials who the SEC
determined committed the fraud. The feds should seize that chance to show
they're serious about policing a sector of the investment world that remains
vulnerable to similar fraud.
San Diego ran into legal trouble with its pension
fund because elected officials wanted to keep its municipal workers happy by
awarding them more generous pension and health-care benefits, but also
wanted to keep taxpayers happy by sticking to a lean budget. The two goals
were mathematically irreconcilable. So San Diego officials, with the
cooperation of the board members of the city employees' retirement system
(the majority of whom were also city officials), intentionally underfunded
the pension plan for years. They used the "savings" to award workers and
retirees more benefits, some retroactive. Because taxpayers couldn't see how
much retirement benefits for public employees eventually would cost them,
they couldn't protest against those high future costs. The fund also
violated sound investment principles by using "surplus" earnings in boom
years to pay extra benefits to retirees, including a "13th check" in some
years. Trustees should have put such "surpluses" aside for years in which
the market was down.
But the alleged escalated in 2002 and 2003, when
city officials brushed aside warnings from outside groups, as well as from
an analyst it had itself commissioned, about the fund's parlous financial
straits. Although figures clearly showed that the pension fund would face a
seven-fold increase in its deficit, to more than $2 billion, over less than
a decade, San Diego didn't disclose what, according to the SEC, it "knew or
was reckless in not knowing" was an inevitability, instead maintaining its
charade. City officials disclosed not a word of the fund's financial
troubles to potential investors or bond analysts as it raised nearly $300
million in new municipal securities during those two years.
The SEC elected to go easy on the city. The feds
won't levy a fine against it, reasoning that it would end up being the
taxpayers who would pay. This argument has merit, since these taxpayers are
already on the hook for the $1.5 billion deficit -- roughly equal to the
city's operating budget -- the pension-fund fraud had concealed. Taxpayers
could face fallout if wronged investors sue the city. But while SEC won't
punish taxpayers, it can't afford to go so easy on the officials it's still
investigating. (The SEC doesn't name the current and former officials under
its scrutiny, but former Mayor Dick Murphy, former city manager Michael
Uberuaga and former auditor Ed Ryan, as well as members of the City Council,
all had degrees of responsibility for and knowledge of the pension fund's
operations.) The SEC must demonstrate that it considers the fraud officials
committed against the city's bondholders to be just as grave as similar
frauds in the private sector.
People who invest in municipal bonds do so because
they feel that such investments are safer than investing in the common
stocks of corporations. That's why cities and states enjoy access to capital
at affordable interest rates. And, for tax reasons, municipal-bond investors
often invest in the bonds of the city in which they reside, so they face
double jeopardy. In the first place, if city officials are committing fraud,
their bonds will turn out not to be as sound (and thus not as valuable) as
they thought they were. The second risk is that they will have to pay higher
taxes, or suffer lower government services, to cover pension-funding
shortfalls in their city's budget if that is the case.
Continued in article
"FASB Improves Employer Pension & Postretirement Plan
Accounting," AccountingWeb, October 4, 2006 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102640
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 158, Employers Accounting
for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans
last week, making it easier for users of financial
information to understand and assess an employer’s financial position and
its ability to fulfill benefit plan obligations. The new standard requires
that employers fully recognize those obligations associated with
single-employer defined benefit pension, retiree healthcare and other
postretirement plans in their financial statements. It amends Statements No.
87, 88, 106 and 132R.“Previous standards
covering these benefits went a long way toward improving financial
reporting. However, the Board at that time acknowledged that future changes
would be needed, and now our constituents share this view,” said George
Batavick, FASB member, in the statement announcing the new standard.
“Accordingly, today’s standard represents a significant improvement in
financial reporting as it provides employees, retirees, investors and other
financial statement users with access to more complete information. This
information will help users make more informed assessments about a company’s
financial position and its ability to carry out the benefit promises made
through these plans.”
The new standard requires an employer to:
- Recognize in its statement of financial
position an asset for a plan’s overfunded status or a liability for a
plan’s underfunded status.
- Measure a plan’s assets and its obligations
that determine its funded status as of the end of the employer’s fiscal
year (with limited exceptions).
- Recognize changes in the funded status of a
defined benefit postretirement plan in the year in which the changes
occur. Those changes will be reported in comprehensive income of
business entity and in changes in net assets of a not-for-profit
organization.
Statement No. 158 applies to plan sponsors that are
public and private companies and nongovernmental not-for-profit
organizations. The requirements recognize the funded status of a benefit
plan and disclosure requirements are effective as of the end of the fiscal
year ending after December 15, 2006, for employers with publicly traded
equity securities and the end of the fiscal year ending after June 15, 2007,
for all other entities. The requirement to measure plan assets and benefit
obligations as of the date of the employer’s fiscal year-end statement of
financial position is effective for fiscal years ending after December 15,
2008.
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas158.pdf Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 158, Employers Accounting for Defined
Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans was developed in direct
response to concerns expressed by many FASB constituents that past standards
of accounting for postretirement benefit plans needed to be revisited to
improve the transparency and usefulness of the information reported about
them. Among the Board’s constituents calling for change were many members of
the investment community, the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory
Council, the User Advisory Council, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and others.
The issuing of Statement No. 158 completes the
first phase of the Board’s comprehensive project to improve the accounting
and reporting for defined benefit pension and other postretirement plans. A
second, broader phase of this project will comprehensively address remaining
issues. The Board expects to collaborate with the International Accounting
Standards Board on that phase.
Like Texas (which has a bill pending to hide pension and health care
liabilities for retired government workers and families)
Connecticut has picked a fight with the independent
board that tells state and local governments how to report their financial
affairs.
Mary Williams Walsh, "Connecticut Takes Up Fight Over Accounting
Rules," The New York Times, June 2, 2007 ---
Click Here
Jensen Comment
Funny thing is Andy Fastow said the same thing about accounting standards and
auditors. If you're going to sell your bonds in the public capital markets, it
seems that hiding debt from bond purchasers is not an especially good idea.
At issue is the immense amount of such debt even when discounted back to a
present value amount.
Bob Jensen's threads on this controversial topic are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Pensions
"Shocks Seen in New Math for Pensions," by Mary Williams Walsh, The
New York Times, March 31, 2006 ---
Click Here
The board that writes accounting rules for American
business is proposing a new method of reporting pension obligations that is
likely to show that many companies have a lot more debt than was obvious
before.
In some cases, particularly at old industrial
companies like automakers, the newly disclosed obligations are likely to be
so large that they will wipe out the net worth of the company.
The panel, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board, said the new method, which it plans to issue today for public
comment, would address a widespread complaint about the current pension
accounting method: that it exposes shareholders and employees to billions of
dollars in risks that they cannot easily see or evaluate. The new accounting
rule would also apply to retirees' health plans and other benefits.
A member of the accounting board, George Batavick,
said, "We took on this project because the current accounting standards just
don't provide complete information about these obligations."
The board is moving ahead with the proposed pension
changes even as Congress remains bogged down on much broader revisions of
the law that governs company pension plans. In fact, Representative John A.
Boehner, Republican of Ohio and the new House majority leader, who has been
a driving force behind pension changes in Congress, said yesterday that he
saw little chance of a finished bill before a deadline for corporate pension
contributions in mid-April.
Congress is trying to tighten the rules that govern
how much money companies are to set aside in advance to pay for benefits.
The accounting board is working with a different set of rules that govern
what companies tell investors about their retirement plans.
The new method proposed by the accounting board
would require companies to take certain pension values they now report deep
in the footnotes of their financial statements and move the information onto
their balance sheets — where all their assets and liabilities are reflected.
The pension values that now appear on corporate balance sheets are almost
universally derided as of little use in understanding the status of a
company's retirement plan.
Mr. Batavick of the accounting board said the new
rule would also require companies to measure their pension funds' values on
the same date they measure all their other corporate obligations. Companies
now have delays as long as three months between the time they calculate
their pension values and when they measure everything else. That can yield
misleading results as market fluctuations change the values.
"Old industrial, old economy companies with heavily
unionized work forces" would be affected most sharply by the new rule, said
Janet Pegg, an accounting analyst with Bear, Stearns. A recent report by Ms.
Pegg and other Bear, Stearns analysts found that the companies with the
biggest balance-sheet changes were likely to include General Motors, Ford,
Verizon, BellSouth and General Electric.
Using information in the footnotes of Ford's 2005
financial statements, Ms. Pegg said that if the new rule were already in
effect, Ford's balance sheet would reflect about $20 billion more in
obligations than it now does. The full recognition of health care promised
to Ford's retirees accounts for most of the difference. Ford now reports a
net worth of $14 billion. That would be wiped out under the new rule. Ford
officials said they had not evaluated the effect of the new accounting rule
and therefore could not comment.
Applying the same method to General Motors' balance
sheet suggests that if the accounting rule had been in effect at the end of
2005, there would be a swing of about $37 billion. At the end of 2005, the
company reported a net worth of $14.6 billion. A G.M. spokesman declined to
comment, noting that the new accounting rule had not yet been issued.
Many complaints about the way obligations are now
reported revolve around the practice of spreading pension figures over many
years. Calculating pensions involves making many assumptions about the
future, and at the end of every year there are differences between the
assumptions and what actually happened. Actuaries keep track of these
differences in a running balance, and incorporate them into pension
calculations slowly.
That practice means that many companies' pension
disclosures do not yet show the full impact of the bear market of 2000-3,
because they are easing the losses onto their books a little at a time. The
new accounting rule will force them to bring the pension values up to date
immediately, and use the adjusted numbers on their balance sheets.
Not all companies would be adversely affected by
the new rule. A small number might even see improvement in their balance
sheets. One appears to be Berkshire Hathaway. Even though its pension fund
has a shortfall of $501 million, adjusting the numbers on its balance sheet
means reducing an even larger shortfall of $528 million that the company
recognized at the end of 2005.
Berkshire Hathaway's pension plan differs from that
of many other companies because it is invested in assets that tend to be
less volatile. Its assumptions about investment returns are also lower, and
it will not have to make a big adjustment for earlier-year losses when the
accounting rule takes effect. Berkshire also looks less indebted than other
companies because it does not have retiree medical plans.
Mr. Batavick said he did not know what kind of
public comments to expect, but hoped to have a final standard completed by
the third quarter of the year. Companies would then be expected to use it
for their 2006 annual reports. The rule will also apply to nonprofit
institutions like universities and museums, as well as privately held
companies.
The rule would not have any effect on corporate
profits, only on the balance sheets. The accounting board plans to make
additional pension accounting changes after this one takes effect. Those are
expected to affect the bottom line and could easily be more contentious.
First They Do
"Bill Requires Reporting Unfunded Federal Liabilities,"
AccountingWeb, April 12, 2006 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102016
With state and local governments scrambling to meet
the Government Accounting Standards Board’s (GASB) amended rules for
reporting on postretirement benefits, and private and public companies
getting ready for compliance with the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s
(FASB) proposed statement on recording pension liabilities, a congressman
from Indiana has introduced legislation that would require the federal
government to meet a similar standard. The Truth in Accounting Act,
sponsored by Rep. Chris Chocola (R-Ind) and co-sponsored by Reps. Jim Cooper
(D-Tenn) and Mark Kirk (R – Ill), would require the federal government to
accurately report the nation’s unfunded long-term liabilities, including
Social Security and Medicare, a debt that amounts to $43 trillion dollars,
during the next 75 years, Chocola says, according to wndu.com.
The U.S. Treasury Department is not currently
required to file an annual report of these debts to Congress, wndu.com says.
“When I was in business, the federal government
required our company to account for long-term liabilities using generally
accepted accounting principles,” Chocola told the South Bend Tribune. “This
bill would require the federal government to follow the same laws they
require every public business in America to follow. If any company accounted
for its business the way the government accounts, the business would be
bankrupt and the executives would be thrown into jail.”
The legislation doesn’t propose solutions for the
burgeoning liabilities, but it takes a crucial first step, according to
Chocola, “by requiring the Treasury Department to begin reporting and
tracking those liabilities according to net present value calculations and
accrual accounting principles,” the Tribune reports.
“In order to solve our problems and prevent an
impending fiscal crisis,” Chocola said, “we have to first identify where and
how large the problem is.”
Chocola clearly sees a looming fiscal crisis.
“Congress is the Levee Commission and the flood is coming,” he told the
Tribune. “This [bill] is intended to sound the warning bell.”
To support his position, according to the Tribune,
Chocola referred to an article written by David Walker, a Clinton appointee
who serves as Comptroller General of the United States and head of the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO). Walker wrote that the government was
on an “unsustainable path”.
Speaking to a British audience last month, Walker
said that the U.S. is headed for a financial crisis unless it changes its
course of racking up huge deficits, Reuters reported. Walker said some
combination of reforming Social Security and Medicare spending,
discretionary spending and possibly changes in tax policy would be required
to get the deficits under control.
“I think it’s going to take 20-plus years before we
are ultimately on a prudent and sustainable path,” Walker said, according to
Reuters, partly because so many American consumers follow the government’s
example. “Too many Americans are spending more than they take in and are
running up debt at record rates.”
Now They Don't
"Bill Requires Reporting Unfunded Federal Liabilities,"
AccountingWeb, April 12, 2006 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102016
With state and local
governments scrambling to meet the Government Accounting Standards Board’s (GASB)
amended rules for reporting on postretirement benefits, and private and public
companies getting ready for compliance with the Financial Accounting Standards
Board’s (FASB) proposed statement on recording pension liabilities, a
congressman from Indiana has introduced legislation that would require the
federal government to meet a similar standard. The Truth in Accounting Act,
sponsored by Rep. Chris Chocola (R-Ind) and co-sponsored by Reps. Jim Cooper (D-Tenn)
and Mark Kirk (R – Ill), would require the federal government to accurately
report the nation’s unfunded long-term liabilities, including Social Security
and Medicare, a debt that amounts to $43 trillion dollars, during the next 75
years, Chocola says, according to wndu.com.
The U.S. Treasury
Department is not currently required to file an annual report of these debts to
Congress, wndu.com says.
“When I was in business,
the federal government required our company to account for long-term liabilities
using generally accepted accounting principles,” Chocola told the South Bend
Tribune. “This bill would require the federal government to follow the same laws
they require every public business in America to follow. If any company
accounted for its business the way the government accounts, the business would
be bankrupt and the executives would be thrown into jail.”
The legislation doesn’t
propose solutions for the burgeoning liabilities, but it takes a crucial first
step, according to Chocola, “by requiring the Treasury Department to begin
reporting and tracking those liabilities according to net present value
calculations and accrual accounting principles,” the Tribune reports.
“In order to solve our
problems and prevent an impending fiscal crisis,” Chocola said, “we have to
first identify where and how large the problem is.”
Chocola clearly sees a
looming fiscal crisis. “Congress is the Levee Commission and the flood is
coming,” he told the Tribune. “This [bill] is intended to sound the warning
bell.”
To support his position,
according to the Tribune, Chocola referred to an article written by David
Walker, a Clinton appointee who serves as Comptroller General of the United
States and head of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Walker wrote
that the government was on an “unsustainable path”.
Speaking to a British
audience last month, Walker said that the U.S. is headed for a financial crisis
unless it changes its course of racking up huge deficits, Reuters reported.
Walker said some combination of reforming Social Security and Medicare spending,
discretionary spending and possibly changes in tax policy would be required to
get the deficits under control.
“I think it’s going to
take 20-plus years before we are ultimately on a prudent and sustainable path,”
Walker said, according to Reuters, partly because so many American consumers
follow the government’s example. “Too many Americans are spending more than they
take in and are running up debt at record rates.”
"The Next Retirement Time Bomb," by Milt Freudenheim and Mary Williams,
The New York Times, December 11, 2005 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/11/business/yourmoney/11retire.html
SINCE 1983, the city of Duluth, Minn., has been
promising free lifetime health care to all of its retired workers, their
spouses and their children up to age 26. No one really knew how much it
would cost. Three years ago, the city decided to find out.
It took an actuary about three months to identify
all the past and current city workers who qualified for the benefits. She
tallied their data by age, sex, previous insurance claims and other factors.
Then she estimated how much it would cost to provide free lifetime care to
such a group.
The total came to about $178 million, or more than
double the city's operating budget. And the bill was growing.
"Then we knew we were looking down the barrel of a
pretty high-caliber weapon," said Gary Meier, Duluth's human resources
manager, who attended the meeting where the actuary presented her findings.
Mayor Herb Bergson was more direct. "We can't pay
for it," he said in a recent interview. "The city isn't going to function
because it's just going to be in the health care business."
Duluth's doleful discovery is about to be repeated
across the country. Thousands of government bodies, including states,
cities, towns, school districts and water authorities, are in for the same
kind of shock in the next year or so. For years, governments have been
promising generous medical benefits to millions of schoolteachers,
firefighters and other employees when they retire, yet experts say that
virtually none of these governments have kept track of the mounting price
tag. The usual practice is to budget for health care a year at a time, and
to leave the rest for the future.
Off the government balance sheets - out of sight
and out of mind - those obligations have been ballooning as health care
costs have spiraled and as the baby-boom generation has approached
retirement. And now the accounting rulemaker for the public sector, the
Governmental Accounting Standards Board, says it is time for every
government to do what Duluth has done: to come to grips with the total value
of its promises, and to report it to their taxpayers and bondholders.
Continued in article
NEWS RELEASE 11/10/05 FASB Adds Comprehensive
Project to Reconsider Accounting for Pensions and Other Postretirement
Benefits
Board Seeks to Improve Transparency and
Usefulness for Investors, Creditors, Employees, Retirees and Other Users
of Financial Information
Norwalk, CT, November 10, 2005—The Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) voted today to add a project to its
agenda to reconsider guidance in Statement No. 87, Employers’ Accounting
for Pensions, and Statement No. 106, Employers’ Accounting for
Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions.
The Board’s objective in undertaking the
project is to improve the reporting of pensions and other postretirement
benefit plans in the financial statements by making information more
useful and transparent for investors, creditors, employees, retirees,
and other users. The agenda addition reflects the Board’s commitment to
ensure that its standards address current accounting issues and changing
business practices.
In making its decision, the Board considered
requests by various constituents, including members of the Financial
Accounting Standards Advisory Council (FASAC), the FASB’s User Advisory
Council (UAC), and the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).
Complex and Comprehensive
“We have heard many different views from our
constituents about how the current accounting model should be
reconsidered to improve transparency and usefulness. The breadth and
complexity of the issues involved and the views on how to address them
are deeply held. While the accounting and reporting issues do not appear
to lend themselves to a simple fix, the Board believes that immediate
improvements are necessary and will look for areas that can be improved
quickly,” said Robert Herz, Chairman of the Financial Accounting
Standards Board.
The accounting and reporting issues involved
touch on many fundamental areas of accounting, including measurement of
assets and liabilities, consolidation, and reporting of financial
performance. They are also impacted by complex funding and tax rules
that, while not directly associated with accounting standards, affect
the economics the accounting seeks to depict.
Comprehensive Approach with Initial
Improvements in 2006
Given these complexities, the Board believes
that a comprehensive project conducted in two phases is the most
effective way to address these issues. The first phase is expected to be
finalized by the end of 2006.
The first phase seeks to address the fact that
under current accounting standards, important information about the
financial status of a company’s plan is reported in the footnotes, but
not in the basic financial statements. Accordingly, this phase seeks to
improve financial reporting by requiring that the funded or unfunded
status of postretirement benefit plans, measured as the difference
between the fair value of plan assets and the benefit obligation - i.e.,
the projected benefit obligation (PBO) for pensions and the accumulated
postretirement benefit obligation (APBO) for other postretirement
benefits - be recognized on the balance sheet.
The second broader phase would comprehensively
address remaining issues, including:
How to best recognize and display in earnings
and other comprehensive income the various elements that affect the cost
of providing postretirement benefits
How to best measure the obligation, in
particular the obligations under plans with lump-sum settlement options
Whether more or different guidance should be
provided regarding measurement assumptions
Whether postretirement benefit trusts should be
consolidated by the plan sponsor
In conducting the project, the FASB will seek
the views of parties currently involved in other, independent reviews of
the pension system including the Department of Labor and the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation. Furthermore, consistent with its effort
toward international convergence of accounting standards, the FASB
expects to work with the International Accounting Standards Board and
other standards setters.
An Ongoing Improvement Effort
The agenda addition represents the latest step
in the FASB’s effort to ensure that standards for pensions and other
postretirement benefits provide credible, comparable, conceptually sound
and usable information to the public.
In 1987, the Board issued Statement 87, which
made significant improvements in the way the costs of defined benefit
plans were measured and disclosed. It is important to note that at that
time, the Board acknowledged that pension accounting was still in a
transitional stage and that future changes might be warranted.
Accordingly, additional enhancements since that
time have included:
Statement No. 106 (1990)—which made similar
significant improvements to those made in Statement No. 87 but for
postretirement benefits other than pensions
Statement No. 132, Employers’ Disclosures about
Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits, (1998)—which revised
employers’ disclosures about pension and other postretirement benefits
to enhance the information disclosed about changes in the benefit
obligation and fair value of plan assets
Statement No. 132R, Employers’ Disclosures
about Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits (Revised 2003)—which
provided expanded disclosures in several areas, including plan assets,
benefit obligations, and cash flows.
"Huge Rise Looms for Health Care in City's Budget," by Mary Williams Walsh
and Milt Freudenheim, The New York
Times, December 26, 2005 ---
http://snipurl.com/NYT122605
But the cost of pensions may look paltry next to
that of another benefit soon to hit New York and most other states and
cities: the health care promised to retired teachers, judges, firefighters,
bus drivers and other former employees, which must be figured under a new
accounting formula.
The city currently provides free health insurance
to its retirees, their spouses and dependent children. The state is almost
as generous, promising to pay, depending on the date of hire, 90 to 100
percent of the cost for individual retirees, and 82 to 86 percent for
retiree families.
Those bills - $911 million this year for city
retirees and $859 million for state retirees out of a total city and state
budget of $156.6 billion - may seem affordable now. But the New York
governments, like most other public agencies across the country, have been
calculating the costs in a way that sharply understates their price tag over
time.
Although governments will not have to come up with
the cash immediately, failure to find a way to finance the yearly total will
eventually hurt their ability to borrow money affordably.
When the numbers are added up under new accounting
rules scheduled to go into effect at the end of 2006, New York City's annual
expense for retiree health care is expected to at least quintuple, experts
say, approaching and maybe surpassing $5 billion, for exactly the same
benefits the retirees get today. The number will grow because the city must
start including the value of all the benefits earned in a given year, even
those that will not be paid until future years.
Some actuaries say the new yearly amount could be
as high as $10 billion. The increases for the state could be equally
startling. Most other states and cities also offer health benefits to
retirees, and will also be affected by the accounting change.
Continued in article
Jensen Comment
FAS 106 (effective December 15, 1992) prohibits keeping post-retirement benefits
such as medical benefits off private sector balance sheets of corporations
---
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas106.pdf . The equivalent for the public
sector is GASB 45, but the new rules do not go into effect until for cities as
large as Duluth and NYC until December 15, 2006 ---
http://www.gasb.org/pub/index.html
Effective Date:
The requirements of this Statement are
effective in three phases based on a government's total annual
revenues in the first fiscal year ending after June 15, 1999:
- Governments that were phase 1
governments for the purpose of implementation of Statement
34—those with annual revenues of $100 million or more—are
required to implement this Statement in financial statements
for periods beginning after December 15, 2006.
- Governments that were phase 2
governments for the purpose of implementation of Statement
34—those with total annual revenues of $10 million or more
but less than $100 million—are required to implement this
Statement in financial statements for periods beginning
after December 15, 2007.
- Governments that were phase 3
governments for the purpose of implementation of Statement
34—those with total annual revenues of less than $10
million—are required to implement this Statement in
financial statements for periods beginning after December
15, 2008.
|
The new GASB 25 implementation dates may trigger defaults and "The Next
Retirement Time Bomb."
January 2, 2006 reply from Mac Wright in Australia
Dear Bob,
In considering the problems faced by these bodies,
one has to remember that the promise of these benefits was held out to the
then potential employees as an inducement to work in the system. Thus
attempts at cutbacks are a form of theft. It is no different that finding
that commercial paer accepted some time back is worthless because the
acceptor has disappeared with his ill gotten gains (Ponzi)!
Perhaps the message to government workers is
"demand cash up front and do not trust any promise of future benefits!"
Kind regards,
Mac Wright
January 2, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Mac,
I think theft is too strong a word. In a sense, all bankruptcies are a
form of theft, but theft is hardly an appropriate word since the victims
(e.g., creditors) often favor declaration of bankruptcy and restructuring in
an attempt to salvage some of the amounts owing them. Also, employees,
creditors, and investors are aware that they are taking on some risks of
default.
The United Auto Workers Union and its membership have overwhelmingly
elected to reduce GM's post-retirement benefits for retirees since over
$1,500 per vehicle sold today for such purposes will end GM and reduce those
benefits to zero. Is this theft? No! Is this bad management? Most certainly!
In my viewpoint all organizations should fully fund post-retirement benefits
of employees on a pay-as-you-go basis?
The problem is more complex for national social security and national
medical plans for citizens (not just government employees). Fully funding
these in advance is probably infeasible for the nation as a whole and/or
will stifle economic growth needed to sustain any types of benefits.
What will happen to Duluth and NYC if the retired employee benefits are
not reduced? Due to exploding medical costs, we can easily imagine taxes
becoming so oppressive that there is a mass exodus from those cities,
especially among yuppies and senior citizens having greater discretion on
where to live. One can easily imagine industry migrations out of high-tax
cities. Texas, Delaware, Florida, and New Hampshire cities look inviting for
a Wall Street move since there would no longer be oppressive NY state income
taxes added to all the extra NYC taxes. It is not too far fetched to imagine
that post-retirement benefits will collapse to almost zero if retirees
themselves do not accept some concessions to save the post-retirement udder
from going completely dry.
What is interesting to me is how an accounting rule change suddenly
awakens city managers (e.g., the Duluth managers) to the fact that they
should actually try to find out how much they owe former city employees and
the dependents of those employees. This is just another example of where an
accounting rule change instigates better financial management. We might call
city management in Duluth and other cities abnormally stupid if it were not
for the history of so many companies that were oblivious to their
post-retirement obligations until FAS 106 was about to be required. A whole
lot of executives and directors had no idea they were in such deep trouble
until being faced with
FAS 106 requirements to report these huge obligations arising from past
promises of bad managers (many of whom are now trying to collect on what
they promised themselves and their kids in the way of medical care).
In fact, it leads us to question conflicts of interest when managers vote
themselves generous post-retirement benefits. When you use the term "theft,"
Mac, you might question who is stealing from whom. Perhaps some of the
retirees slipped these generous benefits in because they thought they could
get away with something that would not be noticed until it became too late.
Dumb managers may have been "dumb like foxes."
Bob Jensen
January 3, 2006 reply from Bill Herrmann
[billherr@ROCKETMAIL.COM]
An alternative to this discussion is the
realization is that the employee who accepts future "guarantee" of benefits
is in fact loaning the value of the expected benefits to the employer so has
a credit risk much the same as if they were sending in cash for bonds or
stock. There is a risk of bankruptcy or insolvency with any asset held by
another party. Anyone with a "guaranteed future benefit" is susceptible to
this risk.
Bill Herrmann
Spoon River College.
Leases: A Scheme for Hiding Debt
Accounting rules still allow companies to classify
lease obligations differently than debt, leaving billions of dollars off
corporate balance sheets and relegating a big slice of corporate financing to
the shadows.
Jonathan Weil, "How Leases Play A Shadowy Role In Accounting" (See
below)
At the FASB (Financial Accounting Standards
Board), Bob Herz says he thinks "lease accounting is probably an area
where people had good intentions way back when, but it evolved into a set of
rules that can result in form-over substance accounting." He
cautions that an overhaul wouldn't be easy: "Any attempts to change
the current accounting in an area where people have built their business
models around it become extremely controversial --- just like you see with
stock options."
Jonathan Weil, "How Leases Play A Shadowy Role In Accounting" (See
below)
By the phrase form over substance, Bob Herz is referring to the four bright
line tests of requiring leases to be booked on the balance sheet. Over
the past two decades corporations have been using these tests to skate on the
edge with leasing contracts that result in hundreds of billions of dollars of
debt being off balance sheets. The leasing industry has built an
enormously profitable business around financing contracts that just fall under
the wire of each bright line test, particularly the 90% rule that was far too
lenient in the first place. One might read Bob's statement that after
the political fight in the U.S. legislature over expensing of stock options,
the FASB is a bit weary and reluctant to take on the leasing industry. I
hope he did not mean this.
FASB Okays Project to Overhaul Lease Accounting
The Financial Accounting Standards Board voted
unanimously to formally add a project to its agenda to "comprehensively
reconsider" the current rules on lease accounting. Critics say those rules,
which haven't gotten a thorough revision in 30 years, make it too easy for
companies to keep their leases of real estate, equipment and other items off
their balance sheets. As such, FASB members said, they're concerned that
financial statements don't fully and clearly portray the impact of leasing
transactions under the current rules. "I think we have received a clear signal
from the investing community that current accounting standards are not providing
them with all the information they want," FASB member Leslie Seidman said before
the vote.
"FASB Okays Project to Overhaul Lease Accounting," SmartPros, July 20,
2006 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x53931.xml
Lessor (Nope) Versus Lessee (Yup) Accounting Rules
From WebCPA, July 31, 2008 ---
http://www.webcpa.com/article.cfm?articleid=28636
The Financial Accounting Standards Board has
decided to defer the development of a new accounting model for lessors,
saying the project will now only address lessee accounting.
FASB also agreed with taking an overall approach to
generally apply the finance lease model in International Accounting Standard
17, "Leases," adapted where necessary for all leases.
The move is the latest in a long-running project
for the board in setting standards for lease accounting. As FASB moves
toward convergence of U.S. generally accepted accounting principles with
International Financial Reporting Standards, it is also trying to make sure
any new standards it approves match up as much as possible with the
international ones.
In the new lessee standards, FASB has decided to
include options to extend or terminate the lease in the measurement of the
right-of-use asset and the lease obligation based on the best estimate of
the expected lease term. The board also agreed that contractual factors,
non-contractual factors and business factors should be considered when
determining the lease term.
The board decided to require lessees to include
contingent rentals in the measurement of the right-of-use asset and the
lease obligation based on their best estimate of expected lease payments.
FASB also decided that both the right-of-use asset
and the lease obligation should be initially measured at the present value
of the best estimate of expected lease payments for all leases. The board
decided to require the best estimate of expected lease payments to be
discounted using the lessee's secured incremental borrowing rate.
FASB members discussed the subsequent measurement
of both the right-of-use asset and the lease obligation, but the board was
not able to reach a decision. The board also discussed whether there should
be criteria to distinguish between leases that are in-substance purchases
and leases that are a right to use an asset, but it was not able to reach a
decision on that matter either.
More Reasons Why Tom and I Hate Principles-Based Accounting Standards
"Contingent Liabilities: A Troubling Signpost on the Winding Road to a Single
Global Accounting Standard," by Tom Selling, The Accounting Onion, May 26, 2008
---
Click Here
By the logic of others, which I can’t explain,
fuzzy lines in accounting standards have come to be exalted as
“principles-based” and bright lines are disparaged as “rules-based.” One of
my favorite examples (actually a pet peeve) of this phenomenon is the
difference in the accounting for leases between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. The
objective of the financial reporting game is to capture as much of the
economic benefits of an asset as possible, while keeping the contractual
liability for future lease payments off the balance sheet; a win is scored
an “operating lease,” and a loss is scored a “capital lease.” As in tennis,
If the present value of the minimum lease payments turns out to be even a
hair over the 90% line of the leased asset’s fair value, your shot is out
and you lose the point.
The counterpart to FAS 13 in IFRS is IAS 17, a
putative principles-based standard. It’s more a less a carbon copy of FAS 13
in its major provisions, except that bright lines are replaced with fuzzy
lines: if the present value of the minimum lease payments is a “substantial
portion” (whatever that means) of the leased asset’s fair value, you lose
operating lease accounting. If FAS 13 is tennis, then IAS 17 is
tennis-without-lines. Either way, the accounting game has another twist: the
players call the balls landing on their side of the net; and the only job of
the umpire—chosen and compensated by each player—is to opine on the
reasonableness of their player's call. So, one would confidently expect that
the players of tennis-without- lines have a much lower risk of being
overruled by their auditors… whoops, I meant umpires.
Although lease accounting is one example for which
GAAP is bright-lined and IFRS is the fuzzy one, the opposite is sometimes
the case, with accounting for contingencies under FAS 5 or IAS 37 being a
prime exaple. FAS 5 requires recognition of a contingent liability when it
is “probable” that a future event will result in the occurrence of a
liability. What does “probable” mean? According to FAS 5, it means “likely
to occur.” Wow, that sure clears things up. With a recognition threshold as
solid as Jell-o nailed to a tree and boilerplate footnote disclosures to
keep up appearances, there should be little problem persuading one’s
handpicked independent auditor of the “reasonableness” of any in or out
call.
IAS 37 has a similar recognition threshold for a
contingent liability (Note: I am adopting U.S. terminology throughout, even
though "contingent liabilities" are referred to as "provisions" in IAS 37).
But in refreshing contrast to FAS 5, IAS 37 unambiguously nails down the
definition of “probable” to be “more likely than not” —i.e., just a hair
north of 50%. Naively assuming that companies actually comply with the
letter and spirit of IAS 37, then more liabilities should find their way
onto the balance sheet under IFRS than GAAP. And, IAS 37 also has more
principled rules for measuring a liability, once recognized. But, I won’t
get into that here. Just please take my word for it that IAS 37 is to FAS 5
as steak is to chopped liver.
The Global Accounting Race to the Bottom
And so we have the IASB’s ineffable ongoing
six-year project to make a hairball out of IAS 37. If these two standards,
IAS 37 and FAS 5, are to be brought closer together as the ballyhooed
Memorandum of Understanding between IASB and FASB should portend, it would
make much more sense for the FASB to revise FAS 5 to make it more like IAS
37. After all, convergence isn’t supposed to take forever; even if you don’t
think IAS 37 is perfect, there are a lot more serious problems IASB could be
working harder on: leases, pensions, revenue recognition, securitizations,
related party transactions, just to name a few off the top of my head. But,
the stakeholders in IFRS are evidently telling the IASB that they get their
jollies from tennis without lines. And, the IASB, dependent on the big boys
for funding, is listening real close.
Basically, the IASB has concluded that all present
obligations – not just those that are more likely than not to result in an
outflow of assets – should be recognized. It sounds admirably principled and
ambitious, but there’s a catch. In place of the bright-line probability
threshold in IAS 37, there would be the fuzziest line criteria one could
possibly devise: the liability must be capable of “reliable” measurement. We
know that "probable" without further guidance must at least lie between 0
and 1, but what amount of measurement error is within range of “reliable”?
The answer, it seems, would be left to the whim of the issuer followed by
the inevitable wave-your-hands-in-the-air rubber stamp of the auditor.
It’s not as if the IASB doesn’t have history from
which to learn. Where the IASB is trying to go in revising IAS 37, we’ve
already been in the U.S. The result was all too often not a pretty sight as
unrecognized liabilities suddenly slammed into balance sheets like freight
trains. As I discussed in an earlier post, retiree health care liabilities
were kept off balance sheets until they were about to break unionized
industrial companies. Post-retirement benefits were doled out by earlier
generations of management, long departed with their generous termination
benefits, in order to persuade obstreperous unions to return to the assembly
lines. GM and Ford are now on the verge of settling faustian bargains of
their forbearers with huge cash outlays: yet for decades the amount
recognized on the balance sheet was precisely nil. The accounting for these
liabilities had been conveniently ignored, with only boilerplate disclosures
in their stead, out of supposed concern for reliable measurement. Yet,
everyone knew that zero as the answer was as far from correct as Detroit is
from Tokyo – where, as in most developed countries, health care costs of
retirees are the responsibility of government.
Holding the recognition of a liability hostage to
“reliable” measurement is bad accounting. There is just no other way I can
put it. If this is the way the IASB is going to spend its time as we are
supposed to be moving to a single global standard, then let the race to the
bottom begin.
Bob Jensen's threads on principles-based standards versus rules-based
standards ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#Principles-Based
Bob Jensen's threads on synthetic leases ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/00overview/speOverview.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on intangibles and contingencies ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes
Question
What's a "cookie-cutter" lease and why does it illustrate why accounting
standards are not neutral?
"FASB Launches Review of Accounting for Leases," AccountingWeb, June
12, 2006 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102240
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has
begun reviewing its guidance on one of the most complex areas of off-balance
sheet reporting, accounting for leases, Chairman Robert Herz told Forbes.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had requested that FASB review
off-balance sheet arrangements, special purpose entities and related issues
in a staff report issued in June 2005. The most prominent topics for review
were pension disclosure and accounting for leases.
Having issued its Exposure Draft to Improve
Accounting of Pensions and other Postretirement Benefits, FASB is now
considering moving lease obligations from the current footnote disclosure to
the balance sheet. But the sheer number of rules and regulations that relate
to leases – hundreds, according to Business Week – offers experts plenty of
opportunities to keep disclosure off the books and presents FASB with an
enormous challenge.
Companies are currently required to record future
lease obligations in a footnote, but actual rent payments are deducted in
quarterly income statements. Approximately 10 percent of leases are already
disclosed on the balance sheet as liabilities because the company can
purchase the equipment at the end of the lease, and therefore the lease is
treated as a loan, or because lease payments add up to 90 percent of the
value of the leased property.
Robert Herz says, according to Business Week, that
“cookie-cutter templates” have been created to design leases so that they
don’t add up to more than 89 percent of the value of the property. And to
add to the complexity, the AP says, if the contract describes a more
temporary rental-type arrangement, it can be treated as an operating lease
and recorded in the footnote.
Leasing footnotes do not reveal the interest
portion of future payments and require the analyst or investor to make
assumptions about the number of years over which the debt needs to be paid,
the AP says, as well as the interest rate the company will be paying. David
Zion, an analyst from Credit Suisse told the AP that many professionals
interpret the footnotes by multiplying a company’s annual rental costs by
eight.
Thomas J. Linsmeier, recently named a member of the
FASB, said that the current rule for accounting for leases needed to be
changed because it sets such specific criteria. “It is a poster child for
bright-line tests,” he said, according to the New York Times.
The SEC requested the review it said in a press
release because “the current accounting for leases takes an “all or nothing”
approach to recognizing leases on the balance sheet. This results in a
clustering of lease arrangements such that their terms approach, but do not
cross, “the bright lines” in the accounting guidance that would require a
liability to be recognized. As a consequence, arrangements with similar
economic outcomes are accounted for very differently.”
Finding a way to define a lease for accounting
purposes presents additional problems. Some accountants argue that since the
lessor does not own the property and cannot sell it, the property should not
be viewed as an asset, Business Week says. Others say that the promise to
pay a rent is equal to any other liability.
Of 200 companies reviewed by SEC staffers in 2005,
77 percent had off-balance-sheet operating leases, totaling about $1.25
trillion, the Wall Street Journal reported.
Among the companies with the biggest lease
obligations are Walgreen Co. with $15.2 billion, CVS Corp with $11.1 billion
and Fedex Corp. with $10.5 billion, the AP reports. Walgreens owns less that
one-fifth of its store locations and leases the rest. Fedex leases
airplanes, land and facilities.
Robert Herz, in an editorial response in Forbes to
Harvey Pitt, former SEC chairman, acknowledged that FASB’s current projects,
including the review of lease accounting, could generate controversy. But he
says that the complexity and volume of standards impedes transparency, and
that the FASB is working jointly with the IASB to develop more principles
based standards.
“Complexity has impeded the overall usefulness of
financial statements and added to the costs of preparing and auditing
financial statements – particularly for small and private enterprises – and
it is also viewed as a contributory factor to the unacceptably high number
of restatements,” Herz writes in Forbes.
Herz does not expect the new rules to be completed
before 2008 or 2009, Business Week says.
Let me close by citing Harry
S. Truman who said, "I never give them hell; I just tell them the truth and they
think its hell!"
Great Speeches About the State of Accountancy
"20th Century Myths," by Lynn Turner when he was still Chief Accountant at the
SEC in 1999 ---
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch323.htm
It is
interesting to listen to people ask for simple, less complex
standards like in "the good old days." But I never hear them ask for
business to be like "the good old days," with smokestacks rather
than high technology, Glass-Steagall rather than Gramm-Leach, and
plain vanilla interest rate deals rather than swaps, collars, and
Tigers!! The bottom line is—things have changed. And so have people.
Today, we have enormous pressure on CEO’s and
CFO’s. It used to be that CEO’s would be in their positions for an
average of more than ten years. Today, the average is 3 to 4 years.
And Financial Executive Institute surveys show that the CEO and CFO
changes are often linked.
In such an environment, we in the auditing
and preparer community have created what I consider to be a
two-headed monster. The first head of this monster is what I call
the "show me" face. First, it is not uncommon to hear one say, "show
me where it says in an accounting book that I can’t do this?" This
approach to financial reporting unfortunately necessitates the level
of detail currently being developed by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board ("FASB"), the Emerging Issues Task Force, and the
AICPA’s Accounting Standards Executive Committee. Maybe this isn’t a
recent phenomenon. In 1961, Leonard Spacek, then managing partner at
Arthur Andersen, explained the motivation for less specificity in
accounting standards when he stated that "most industry
representatives and public accountants want what they call
‘flexibility’ in accounting principles. That term is never clearly
defined; but what is wanted is ‘flexibility’ that permits greater
latitude to both industry and accountants to do as they please." But
Mr. Spacek was not a defender of those who wanted to "do as they
please." He went on to say, "Public accountants are constantly
required to make a choice between obtaining or retaining a client
and standing firm for accounting principles. Where the choice
requires accepting a practice which will produce results that are
erroneous by a relatively material amount, we must decline the
engagement even though there is precedent for the practice desired
by the client."
We create the second head of our monster
when we ask for standards that absolutely do not reflect the
underlying economics of transactions. I offer two prime examples.
Leasing is first. We have accounting literature put out by the FASB
with follow-on interpretative guidance by the accounting
firms—hundreds of pages of lease accounting guidance that, I will be
the first to admit, is complex and difficult to decipher. But it is
due principally to people not being willing to call a horse a horse,
and a lease what it really is—a financing. The second example is
Statement 133 on derivatives. Some people absolutely howl about its
complexity. And yet we know that: (1) people were not complying with
the intent of the simpler Statements 52 and 80, and (2) despite the
fact that we manage risk in business by managing values rather than
notional amounts, people want to account only for notional amounts.
As a result, we ended up with a compromise position in Statement
133. To its credit, Statement 133 does advance the quality of
financial reporting. For that, I commend the FASB. But I believe
that we could have possibly achieved more, in a less complex
fashion, if people would have agreed to a standard that truly
reflects the underlying economics of the transactions in an unbiased
and representationally faithful fashion.
I certainly hope that we can find a way to
do just that with standards we develop in the future, both in the
U.S. and internationally. It will require a change in how we
approach standard setting and in how we apply those standards. It
will require a mantra based on the fact that transparent, high
quality financial reporting is what makes our capital markets the
most efficient, liquid, and deep in the world. |
Bob Jensen's threads on lease accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Leases
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on April 22,
2005
TITLE: Lease Restatements Are Surging
REPORTER: Eiya Gullapalli
DATE: Apr 20, 2005
PAGE: C4
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111396285894611651,00.html
TOPICS: Accounting, Advanced Financial Accounting, Lease Accounting,
Restatement, Sarbanes-Oxley Act
SUMMARY: Last winter, "the Big Four accounting firms...banded together to ask
the Security and Exchange Commission's chief accountant to clarify rules on
lease accounting...Now about 250 companies have announced restatements for lease
accounting issues..."
QUESTIONS:
1.) Why is it curious that so many companies are now restating previous
financial statements due to lease accounting problems? What does the fact that
companies must restate previous results imply about previous accounting for
these lease transactions?
2.) What industries in particular are cited for these issues in the article?
How do you think this industry uses leases?
3.) While one company, Emeritus Corp., disclosed significant impacts on
previously reported income amounts, companies are "...for the most part, not
materially affecting their earnings, analysts say..." Are you surprised by this
fact? What is the most significant impact of capitalizing a lease on a
corporation's financial statements? In your answer, define the terms
operating lease and capitalized lease.
4.) How do points made in the article show that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is
accomplishing its intended effect?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"Lease Restatements Are Surging: Number Increases Daily; Accounting
Experts Say GAAP Violations Are Rife," by Diya Gullapalli, The Wall Street
Journal, April 20, 2005; Page C4 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111396285894611651,00.html
When it comes to bookkeeping snafus, lease
accounting may be the new revenue recognition.
It all started in November, when KPMG LLP told
fast-food chain CKE Restaurants Inc. that it had problems with the way CKE
recognized rent expenses and depreciated buildings. That led CKE to restate
its financials for 2002 as well as some prior years. CKE will also take a
charge in its upcoming annual filing for 2003 through its just-ended 2005
fiscal year.
By winter, the Big Four accounting firms had banded
together to ask the Securities and Exchange Commission's chief accountant to
clarify rules on lease accounting. Retail and restaurant trade groups began
battling rule makers about the merits of issuing such guidance.
Now, about 250 companies have announced
restatements for lease-accounting issues similar to CKE's, and the number
continues to rise daily.
"We'd be shocked if this isn't the biggest category
of restatements we've ever seen," says Jeff Szafran of Huron Consulting
Group LLC, which tracks restatements.
Given that so many publicly traded companies,
especially retailers and restaurant chains, hold leases, it perhaps isn't
surprising that lease restatements are snowballing. Accounting experts say
the restatements also demonstrate that violations of generally accepted
accounting principles still are widespread.
"The whole subject has been a curiosity to me,"
says Jack Ciesielski, editor of the Analyst's Accounting Observer newsletter
in Baltimore. "This was existing GAAP that hasn't changed, but I don't think
we've seen the end of these restatements."
Since many of the companies announcing restatements
so far report on a January-ending fiscal year, Mr. Ciesielski and other
accounting-industry watchers anticipate a slew of additional restatements in
coming weeks as more companies prepare their books.
Corporate-governance advocates say the volume of
lease-problem restatements shows the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is doing its job.
That 2002 law laid down guidelines for ensuring that companies had proper
internal controls, systems to prevent accounting mistakes and improprieties.
Indeed, many of the companies that have had to restate due to lease problems
also have reported weakness in their internal controls.
While Ernst & Young LLP clients Friendly Ice Cream
Corp., Whole Foods Market Inc. and Cingular Wireless, a joint venture
between SBC Communications Inc. and BellSouth Corp., all reported material
weaknesses in internal controls in their latest annual reports due partly to
lease issues, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP client J. Jill Group Inc. says its
lease-driven restatement didn't signal such significant internal-control
problems.
The main rule on lease accounting hasn't changed
much. Issued in 1976, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 13 is,
in fact, one of the oldest rules written by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, which sets guidelines for publicly traded companies. While
some parts of FAS 13 have been reinterpreted since then, auditors for the
most part hadn't raised any concerns about clients' lease accounting --
until now.
"Our industry has been accounting for leases using
the same methodology for 20 years at least and had gotten clean opinions,"
says Carleen Kohut, chief financial officer of the National Retail
Federation.
The changes in lease accounting are "not the result
of the discovery of new facts or information," reads a statement from
Emeritus Corp., an assisted-living company that announced a restatement for
lease accounting within a week of CKE.
Had Emeritus correctly applied lease-accounting
rules in 2003, it could have almost wiped out its profit. In a restated
annual report released in January, the company said lease expenses and other
adjustments lowered earnings to $204,000 for 2003 from the originally
reported $4.5 million -- and such adjustments widened past years' losses
even further.
Emeritus didn't return calls for comment.
Others companies such as home-furnishing store
Bombay Co. announced a lease restatement in March and then withdrew the
decision a week later, demonstrating lingering confusion over the matter.
The SEC's letter released in February clarified
three specific areas of lease accounting, focusing on leasehold improvement
amortization, rent-expense recognition and tenant incentives.
The bright side is that companies coming to grips
with faulty lease accounting are, for the most part, not materially
affecting their earnings, analysts say -- companies such as Emeritus being
an exception. Rather, they say, the change is just a reshuffling of dollars
across various line items.
--- RELATED ARTICLES ---
TITLE: FOOTNOTES: Recent US Earnings Restatements
REPORTER: Dow Jones Newswires
ISSUE: Apr 19, 2005
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,BT_CO_20050419_008924,00.html
A concise summary of the February 7, 2005 letter is provided at
http://www.accountingobserver.com/blog/2005/02/secs-view-on-lease-accounting-do-overs/
The complete February 7, 2005 letter from the SEC's Chief Accountant to
Robert J. Kueppers is located at
http://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/staffletters/cpcaf020705.htm
In recent weeks, a number of public companies
have issued press releases announcing restatements of their
financial statements relating to lease accounting. You requested
that the Office of the Chief Accountant clarify the staff's
interpretation of certain accounting issues and their application
under generally accepted accounting principles relating to operating
leases. Of specific concern is the appropriate accounting for: (1)
the amortization of leasehold improvements by a lessee in an
operating lease with lease renewals, (2) the pattern of recognition
of rent when the lease term in an operating lease contains a period
where there are free or reduced rents (commonly referred to as "rent
holidays"), and (3) incentives related to leasehold improvements
provided by a landlord/lessor to a tenant/lessee in an operating
lease. It should be noted that the Commission has neither reviewed
this letter nor approved the staff's positions expressed herein. In
addition, the staff's positions may be affected or changed by
particular facts or conditions. Finally, this letter does not
purport to express any legal conclusion on the questions presented.
The staff's views on these issues are as
follows:
- Amortization of Leasehold Improvements
- The staff believes that leasehold improvements in an operating
lease should be amortized by the lessee over the shorter of
their economic lives or the lease term, as defined in paragraph
5(f) of FASB Statement 13 ("SFAS 13"), Accounting for Leases, as
amended. The staff believes amortizing leasehold improvements
over a term that includes assumption of lease renewals is
appropriate only when the renewals have been determined to be
"reasonably assured," as that term is contemplated by SFAS 13.
- Rent Holidays - The staff believes
that pursuant to the response in paragraph 2 of FASB Technical
Bulletin 85-3 ("FTB 85-3"), Accounting for Operating Leases with
Scheduled Rent Increases, rent holidays in an operating lease
should be recognized by the lessee on a straight-line basis over
the lease term (including any rent holiday period) unless
another systematic and rational allocation is more
representative of the time pattern in which leased property is
physically employed.
- Landlord/Tenant Incentives - The staff
believes that: (a) leasehold improvements made by a lessee that
are funded by landlord incentives or allowances under an
operating lease should be recorded by the lessee as leasehold
improvement assets and amortized over a term consistent with the
guidance in item 1 above; (b) the incentives should be recorded
as deferred rent and amortized as reductions to lease expense
over the lease term in accordance with paragraph 15 of SFAS 13
and the response to Question 2 of FASB Technical Bulletin 88-1
("FTB 88-1"), Issues Relating to Accounting for Leases, and
therefore, the staff believes it is inappropriate to net the
deferred rent against the leasehold improvements; and (c) a
registrant's statement of cash flows should reflect cash
received from the lessor that is accounted for as a lease
incentive within operating activities and the acquisition of
leasehold improvements for cash within investing activities. The
staff recognizes that evaluating when improvements should be
recorded as assets of the lessor or assets of the lessee may
require significant judgment and factors in making that
evaluation are not the subject of this letter.
To the extent that SEC registrants have
deviated from the lease accounting standards and related
interpretations set forth by the FASB, those registrants, in
consultation with their independent auditors, should assess the
impact of the resulting errors on their financial statements to
determine whether restatement is required. The SEC staff believes
that the positions noted above are based upon existing accounting
literature and registrants who determine their prior accounting to
be in error should state that the restatement results from the
correction of errors or, if restatement was determined by management
to be unnecessary, state that the errors were immaterial to prior
periods.
Registrants should ensure that the
disclosures regarding both operating and capital leases clearly and
concisely address the material terms of and accounting for leases.
Registrants should provide basic descriptive information about
material leases, usual contract terms, and specific provisions in
leases relating to rent increases, rent holidays, contingent rents,
and leasehold incentives. The accounting for leases should be
clearly described in the notes to the financial statements and in
the discussion of critical accounting policies in MD&A if
appropriate. Known likely trends or uncertainties in future rent or
amortization expense that could materially affect operating results
or cash flows should be addressed in MD&A. The disclosures should
address the following:
- Material lease agreements or
arrangements.
- The essential provisions of material
leases, including the original term, renewal periods, reasonably
assured rent escalations, rent holidays, contingent rent, rent
concessions, leasehold improvement incentives, and unusual
provisions or conditions.
- The accounting policies for leases,
including the treatment of each of the above components of lease
agreements.
- The basis on which contingent rental
payments are determined with specificity, not generality.
- The amortization period of material
leasehold improvements made either at the inception of the lease
or during the lease term, and how the amortization period
relates to the initial lease term.
As you know, the SEC staff is continuing to
consider these and related matters and may have further discussions
on lease accounting with registrants and their independent auditors.
We appreciate your inquiry and further
questions about these matters can be directed to Tony Lopez,
Associate Chief Accountant in the Office of the Chief Accountant
(202-942-7104) or Louise Dorsey, Associate Chief Accountant in the
Division of Corporation Finance (202-942-2960). |
From the FASB: PROPOSED FASB STAFF POSITION No. FAS 157-a
"Application of FASB Statement No. 157 to FASB Statement No. 13 and Its Related
Interpretive Accounting Pronouncements That Address Leasing Transactions" ---
http://www.fasb.org/fasb_staff_positions/prop_fsp_fas157-a.pdf
Objective
1. This FASB Staff Position (FSP)
amends FASB Statement No. 157,
Fair Value Measurements, to exclude FASB Statement No. 13,
Accounting for Leases, and its related interpretive accounting
pronouncements that address leasing transactions.
Background
2. The Exposure Draft preceding
Statement 157 proposed a scope exception for Statement 13 and other
accounting pronouncements that require fair value measurements for leasing
transactions. At that time, the Board was concerned that applying the fair
value measurement objective in the Exposure Draft to leasing transactions
could have unintended consequences, requiring reconsideration of aspects of
lease accounting that were beyond the scope of the Exposure Draft.
3. However, respondents to the
Exposure Draft indicated that the fair value measurement objective for
leasing transactions was generally consistent with the fair value
measurement objective proposed by the Exposure Draft. Others in the leasing
industry subsequently affirmed that view. Based on that input, the Board
decided to include lease accounting pronouncements in the scope of Statement
157.
4. Subsequent to the issuance of
Statement 157, which changed in some respects from the Exposure Draft,
constituents have raised issues stemming from the interaction
Proposed FSP on Statement 157 (FSP
FAS 157-a) 1 FSP FAS 157-a
between the fair value measurement objective in Statement 13 and the fair
value measurement objective in Statement 157.
5. Constituents have noted that
paragraph 5(c)(ii) of Statement 13 provides an example of the determination
of fair value (an exit price) through the use of a transaction price (an
entry price). Constituents also have raised issues about the application of
the fair value measurement objective in Statement 157 to estimated residual
values of leased property. These issues, as well as other issues related to
the interaction between Statement 13 and Statement 157, would result in a
change in lease accounting that requires considerations of lease
classification criteria and measurements in leasing transactions that are
beyond the scope of Statement 157 (for example, a change in lease
classification for leases that would otherwise be accounted for as direct
financing leases).
6. The Board acknowledges that the
term
fair value will be left in
Statement 13 although it is defined differently than in Statement 157;
however, the Board believes that lease accounting provisions and the
longstanding valuation practices common within the leasing industry should
not be changed by Statement 157 without a comprehensive reconsideration of
the accounting for leasing transactions. The Board has on its agenda a
project to comprehensively reconsider the guidance in Statement 13 together
with its subsequent amendments and interpretations.
AICPA PROVIDES GUIDANCE ON LEASE ACCOUNTING ---
http://accountingeducation.com/index.cfm?page=newsdetails&id=141809
Bob Jensen's threads on lease accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Leases
Despite a Post-Enron Push, Companies Can Still
Keep Big Debts Off Balance Sheets.
"How Leases Play A Shadowy Role In Accounting," by Jonathan Weil, The
Wall Street Journal, September 22, 2004, Page A1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB109580870299124246,00.html?mod=home%5Fpage%5Fone%5Fus
Despite the post-Enron drive to improve accounting
standards, U.S. companies are still allowed to keep off their balance sheets
billions of dollars of lease obligations that are just as real as financial
commitments originating from bank loans and other borrowings.
The practice spans the entire spectrum of American
business and industry, relegating a key gauge of corporate health to obscure
financial-statement footnotes, and leaving investors and analysts to do the
math themselves. The scale of these off-balance-sheet obligations --
stemming from leases on everything from aircraft to retail stores to factory
equipment -- can be huge:
• US Airways Group Inc., which recently filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, showed only $3.15 billion in
long-term debt on its most recently audited balance sheet, for 2003, and
didn't include the $7.39 billion in operating-lease commitments it had on
its fleet of passenger jets.
• Drugstore chain Walgreen Co. shows no debt on
its balance sheet, but it is responsible for $19.3 billion of
operating-lease payments mainly on stores over the next 25 years.
• For the companies in the Standard &
Poor's 500-stock index, off-balance-sheet operating-lease commitments, as
revealed in the footnotes to their financial statements, total $482
billion.
Debt levels are among the most important measures
of a company's financial health. But the special accounting treatment for
many leases means that a big slice of corporate financing remains in the
shadows. For all the tough laws and regulations set up since Enron Corp.'s
2001 collapse, regulators have left lease accounting largely untouched.
Members of the Financial Accounting Standards Board say they are considering
adding the issue to their agenda next year.
"Leasing is one of the areas of accounting
standards that clearly merits review," says Donald Nicolaisen, the
Securities and Exchange Commission's chief accountant. The current guidance,
he says, depends on rigidly defined categories in which a slight variation
has a major effect and relies too much on "on-off switches for
determining whether a leased asset and the related payment obligations are
reflected on the balance sheet."
A case in point is the "90% test," part
of the FASB's 28-year-old rules for lease accounting. If the present value
of a company's minimum lease payments equals 90% or more of a property's
value, the transaction must be treated as a "capital lease," with
accounting treatment akin to that of debt. If the figure is slightly less,
say 89%, the deal is treated as an "operating lease," subject to
certain other conditions, meaning the lease doesn't count as debt. The lease
commitment appears not in the main body of the financial statements but in
footnotes, often obscurely written and of limited usefulness.
The $482 billion figure for the S&P 500 was
determined through a Wall Street Journal review of the companies' annual
reports. That's equivalent to 8% of the $6.25 trillion reported as debt on
the 500 companies' balance sheets, according to data provided by Reuters
Research. For many companies, off-balance-sheet lease obligations are many
times higher than their reported debt.
Given the choice between leasing and owning real
estate or equipment, many companies pick operating leases. Besides lowering
reported debt, operating leases boost returns on assets and often plump up
earnings through, among other things, lower depreciation expenses.
"It's nonsense," Trevor Harris, an
accounting analyst and managing director at Morgan Stanley, says of the 90%
rule. "What's the difference between 89.9% and 90%, and 85% and 90%, or
even 70% and 90%? It's the wrong starting point. You've purchased the right
to some resources as an asset. The essence of accounting is supposed to be
economic substance over legal form."
This summer, Union Pacific Corp. opened its new
19-story, $260 million headquarters in Omaha, Neb. The railroad operator is
the owner of the city's largest building, the Union Pacific Center, in
virtually every respect except its accounting.
Under an initial operating lease, Union Pacific
guaranteed 89.9% of all construction costs through the building's completion
date. After completing the building, the company signed a new operating
lease, which guarantees 85% of the building's costs. Unlike most operating
leases, both were "synthetic" leases, which allow the company to
take income-tax deductions for interest and depreciation while maintaining
complete operational control. A Union Pacific spokesman declined to comment.
Neither lease has appeared on the balance sheet.
Instead, they have stayed in the footnotes, resulting in lower reported
assets and liabilities. On its balance sheet, Union Pacific shows about $8
billion of debt, while its footnotes show about $3 billion of
operating-lease commitments, including for railroad engines and other
equipment.
The 90% test goes to the crux of investor
complaints that U.S. accounting standards remain driven by arbitrary rules,
around which companies can easily structure transactions to achieve desired
outcomes.
It means different companies entering nearly
identical transactions can account for them in very different ways,
depending on which side of the 90% test they reside. Meanwhile, as with
disclosures showing employee stock-option compensation expenses, most
investors and stock analysts tend to ignore the footnotes disclosing lease
obligations.
Three years ago, Enron's collapse revealed how
easily a company could hide debt. A big part of the energy company's scandal
centered on off-balance-sheet "special purpose entities." These
obscure partnerships could be kept off the books -- with no footnote
disclosures -- if an independent investor owned 3% of an entity's equity.
Responding to public outcry, FASB members eliminated that rule and promised
more "principles-based" standards, which spell out concise
objectives and emphasize economic substance over form, rather than a
"check the box" approach with rigid tests and exceptions that can
be exploited.
The accounting literature on leasing covers
hundreds of pages. The FASB's original 1976 pronouncement, called Financial
Accounting Standard No. 13, does state a broad principle: A lease that
transfers substantially all the benefits and risks of ownership should be
accounted for as such. But in practice, critics say, FAS 13 amounts to all
rules and no principles, making it easy to manipulate its strict exceptions
and criteria as needed. One key rule says a lease is a "capital
lease" if it covers 75% or more of the property's estimated useful
life. One day less, and it can stay off-balance-sheet, subject to other
tests.
Continued in the article
"Group (the IASB) to Alter Rules On Lease Accounting," The
Wall Street Journal, September 23, 2004, Page C4
BRUSSELS -- The International Accounting Standards
Board next week will unveil plans to overhaul the rules on accounting for
leased assets, the board's chairman said yesterday.
Critics long have contended that the rules for
determining whether leases should be included as assets and liabilities on a
company's balance sheet are easy to evade and encourage form-over-substance
accounting. "It's going to be a very big deal," Chairman Sir David
Tweedie told Dow Jones Newswires after testifying to the European
Parliament. International accounting rules on leasing exist already, but
they are useless, Mr. Tweedie said.
Airlines that lease their aircraft, for instance,
rarely include their planes on their balance sheets, he said. "So the
aircraft is just a figment of your imagination," Mr. Tweedie said. The
board will convene a meeting next week to discuss changes to current rules,
he said.
The Wall Street Journal yesterday reported (see
the above article) that the U.S. Financial Accounting
Standards Board is considering adding lease accounting to its agenda of
items for overhaul.
From The Wall Street Journal's The Weekly Review: Accounting on
September 24, 2004
TITLE: Lease Accounting Still Has an Impact
REPORTER: Jonathan Weil
DATE: Sep 22, 2004
PAGE: A1
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB109580870299124246,00.html
TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Financial
Statement Analysis, Lease Accounting, off balance sheet financing
SUMMARY: The on-line version of this article is entitled "How Leases
Play a Shadowy Role in Accounting." The article highlights the typical
practical ways in which entities avoid capitalizing leases; reports on a WSJ
analysis of footnote disclosures to assess levels of off-balance sheet debt;
and comments on the difficulties the FASB may face in trying to amend
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 13.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What accounting standard governs the accounting for lease transactions
under U.S. GAAP? When was that accounting standard written and first put into
effect?
2.) When is the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) considering
working on improvements to the accounting for lease transactions? Why is the
FASB likely to face challenges in any attempt to change accounting for leasing
transactions?
3.) What are the names of the two basic methods of accounting for leases by
lessees under current U.S. standards? Which of these methods is he referring
to when the author writes, "U.S. companies are...allowed to keep off
their balance sheets billions of dollars of lease obligations..."
4.) What are the required disclosures under each of the two methods of
accounting for leases? What are the problems with financial statement users
relying on footnote disclosures as opposed to including a caption and a
numerical amount on the face of the balance sheet?
5.) How do you think the Wall Street Journal identified the amounts of
lease commitments that are kept off of corporate balance sheets? Specifically
identify the steps you think would be required to measure obligations under
operating leases in a way that is comparable to the amounts shown for capital
leases recognized on the face of the balance sheet.
6.) What four tests must be made in determining the accounting for any
lease? Why do you think the author focuses on only one of these tests, the
"90% test"?
7.) What financial ratios are impacted by accounting for leases? List all
that you can identify in the article, and that you can think of, and explain
how they are affected by different accounting treatments for leases.
8.) What is a "special purpose entity"? When are these entities
used in leasing transactions?
9.) What is a "synthetic lease"? When are these leases
constructed?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
This is Auditing 101: Where were the auditors?
"SEC Uncovers Wide-Scale Lease Accounting Errors," AccountingWeb,
March 1, 2005 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=100600
Where were the auditors? That is the question being
asked as more than 60 companies face the prospect of restating their
earnings after apparently incorrectly dealing with their lease accounting,
Dow Jones reported.
Companies in the retail, restaurant and
wireless-tower industries are among those affected in what is being called
the most sweeping bookkeeping correction in such a short time period since
the late 1990s.
Among the companies on the list are Ann Taylor,
Target and Domino's Pizza. You can view a full listing of the affected
companies.
"It's always disturbing when our accounting is
not followed," Don Nicolaisen, chief accountant at the Securities and
Exchange Commission, said last week during an interview. He published a
letter on Feb. 7 urging companies to follow accounting standards that have
been on the books for many years, Dow Jones reported.
Based on the charges and restatement announcements
that have come in the wake of the SEC letter it seems companies have failed
for years to follow what regulators see as cut-and-dried lease-accounting
rules. The SEC has yet to go so far as to accuse companies of wrongdoing,
but it has led people to wonder why auditors hired to keep company books
clean could have missed so many instances of failure to comply with the
rule.
"Where were the auditors?" J. Edward
Ketz, an accounting professor at Pennsylvania State University, said to Dow
Jones. "Where were the people approving these things? This doesn't seem
like something that really requires new discussion. If we have to go back
and revisit every single rule because companies and their professional
advisers aren't going to follow the rules, then I think we're in very
serious trouble in this country."
Tom Fitzgerald, a spokesman for auditing firm KPMG,
declined to comment. Representatives for Deloitte & Touche LLP,
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLC, and Ernst & Young LLP, didn't return several
phone calls, Dow Jones reported.
The crux of the issue is that companies are
supposed to book these "leasehold improvements" as assets on their
balance sheets and then depreciate those assets, incurring an expense on
their income statements, over the duration of the lease. Instead, companies
such as Pep Boys-Manny Moe & Jack had been spreading those expenses out
over the projected useful life of the property, which is usually a longer
time period, Dow Jones reported.
As a result, expenses were deferred and income was
added to the current period. McDonald's Corp. took a charge of $139.1
million, or 8 cents a share, in its fourth quarter to correct a
lease-accounting strategy that it says had been in place for 25 years, Dow
Jones reported, adding that Pep Boys said it would book a charge of 80 cents
a share, or $52 million, for the nine months through Oct. 30, 2004.
Debt Versus Equity
What is debt? What is equity? What is a Trup?
Banks are going to create huge problems for accountants with newer hybrid
instruments
From Jim Mahar's Blog on February 6, 2005 ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
The Financial Times has a very cool article on
financial engineering and the development of securities that combine
debt and equity-like features.
FT.com / Home UK - Banks hope to cash in on
rush into hybrid securities: "Securities that straddle the debt and
equity worlds are not new. They combine features of debt such as regular
interest-like payments and equity-like characteristics such as long or
perpetual maturities and the ability to defer payments."
"About a decade ago, regulated financial
institutions started issuing so-called trust preferred securities, or
Trups, which are functionally similar to preferred stock but can be
structured to achieve extra benefits such as tax deductibility for the
issuing company. Other hybrid structures have also been tried.
But bankers were still searching for what
several called the “holy grail” – an instrument that looked like debt to
its issuer, the tax man and investors, but like equity to credit rating
agencies and regulators.
That goal came closer a year ago when Moody’s,
the credit rating agency, changed its previously conservative policies,
opening the door for it to treat structures with some debt-like features
more like equity."
The link to the Financial Times article ---
http://news.ft.com/cms/s/e22d70f2-9674-11da-a5ba-0000779e2340.html
Spruce up your basic accounting courses with fresh illustrations of
accounting for preferred stock
Especially note the reasons for choosing preferred stock
Lehman Wants To Short-Circuit Short Sellers
by Susanne
Craig
The Wall Street Journal
Apr 01, 2008
Page: C1
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120699998020978159.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
TOPICS: Accounting,
Financial Accounting, Stock Price Effects
SUMMARY: On
Monday, March 31, 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc,
"...announced it plans to $3 billion of preferred shares....'I
think an issue of this size with the investors we have on board
will put the false rumors about our capital position to rest,'
said Lehman Chief Financial Officer Erin Callan."
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: Financial accounting for stock issuances,
particularly preferred stock can be covered with this article,
providing a background to understand reasoning behind these
transactions and the Chief Financial Officer's responsibility to
communicate to outsiders about this transaction.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) What is the difference between
preferred stock and common stock?
2. (Introductory) What is "short selling?" How is it
having an impact on Lehman Brothers, Inc., common stock value?
3. (Advanced) What is the strategic reason for Lehman
Brothers to issue preferred stock? In your answer, comment on
the "capital position" mentioned by Lehman CFO Erin Callan and
the need to communicate the strategy to investors and other
interested parties.
4. (Advanced) Why do you think that Lehman chose to
issue preferred stock rather than, say, a rights offering for
additional shares of common stock?
5. (Advanced) Define the notion of "dilution." How does
the issuance of preferred stock dilute the interests of common
shareholders?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
|
"Lehman Wants To Short-Circuit Short Sellers," by Susanne Craig, The Wall
Street Journal, April 1, 2008; Page C1 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120699998020978159.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. has unveiled its
latest attempt to try to shake the shorts.
On Monday, the firm announced it plans to issue $3
billion of preferred shares, a move that will strengthen its balance sheet
and that it hopes will dispel speculation that it is facing a capital
crunch. The question now: Will it be enough? "I think an issue of this size
with the investors we have on board will put the false rumors about our
capital position to rest," said Lehman Chief Financial Officer Erin Callan.
Not everyone is on board. The Wall Street brokerage
has become a favorite target of short sellers, traders who make money by
betting that a stock's price will fall. The shorts now will likely ask: If
Lehman had enough capital, why did it need to do the new issue, which will
dilute the stakes of existing shareholders by potentially increasing shares
outstanding by about 5%?
Thursday, the stock fell almost 9%. Two weeks ago,
in the wake of the forced sale of Bear Stearns Cos. to J.P. Morgan Chase &
Co., Lehman's stock took another nasty tumble, falling 19% to a 4½-year low.
Some Lehman shareholders blamed the decline on heavy selling by short
sellers, who borrow shares and sell them, hoping to buy them back at a lower
price and lock in a profit.
Monday, Lehman's stock fell 23 cents to $37.64 in 4
p.m. New York Stock Exchange composite trading. But in after-hours trading,
the share price declined $1.12 to $36.52. Lehman maintains that the stock
will rebound once investors learn both the terms of the offering and the
fact that it has been "substantially" presold. Late last night, Lehman said
there was $11 billion in investor demand for its offering.
So far this year, Lehman's stock is down 43%,
compared with 16% for the Dow Jones Wilshire U.S. Financial Services Index
and 23% and 14%, respectively, for rivals Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and
Morgan Stanley. Lehman says that over the past few months it has been trying
to lower the amount of debt it takes on relative to its assets, both by
selling assets and now by raising capital -- so the new offering isn't
necessarily aimed at beating back the short sellers.
Still, as of March 12, there were 46.6 million
shares, 9.1% of Lehman's total float, sold short. That is up from 9.4
million shares at the beginning of the year, according to the NYSE.
Investors also are loading up on Lehman options, another way to bet on a
fall in the firm's stock.
The firm says it has enough cash on hand to weather
the current crisis, $31 billion in cash and cash equivalents and another $65
billion in assets it can easily borrow against. Furthermore, thanks to a
recent change in the rules, it now has access for the first time to Federal
Reserve funds, a move that gives Lehman access to an essentially unlimited
pool of money at the same rate as commercial banks.
Lehman is no stranger to the skeptics. The
brokerage and its chairman, Richard Fuld Jr., fought off rumors about a cash
crunch in 1998 that were triggered by the near-collapse of hedge fund Long
Term Capital Management. At that time, the firm hired a
private-investigation firm to get to the bottom of the speculation circling
the company. Since then, Mr. Fuld has won praise for diversifying Lehman,
long known as a bond house, into lucrative areas like stock trading and
investment banking.
This time around, the firm has publicly spoken out
against the shorts. It has met with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
and top management is actively trying to track down the source of rumors as
they arise.
The main concern: Lehman's still-sizable exposure
to the mortgage market makes it easy for critics to draw comparisons to
Bear. A recent Bank of America report notes that mortgages represent 29% of
total assets at Lehman, roughly in line with Bear, which had one-third of
its assets in mortgages, and much higher than Merrill Lynch & Co. and
Goldman Sachs, both at 12%, and 13% at Morgan Stanley. Ms. Callan estimates
Lehman's total real-estate exposure is closer to 20% and it is a skilled
operator in managing real-estate assets.
"Looking toward the remainder of 2008, Lehman
investors will be nervously waiting to see if the firm, with its balance
sheet loaded with $87 billion of troubled assets which are under pricing
pressure and which can't be easily sold, will be able to navigate the
continuing credit storm and the de-leveraging environment that we
anticipate," wrote Brad Hintz, an analyst at Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. and
a former chief financial officer at Lehman.
Nearly $31 billion of its holdings are
commercial-real-estate loans. Even as it cut way back on making home loans,
Lehman continued to lend to buyers of office buildings and other assets, and
analysts expect it will take a hit on these this year.
A big concern is Lehman's 2007 investment in
Archstone-Smith Trust, which it bought with Tishman Speyer Properties in May
2007, just as the real-estate market was beginning to melt. Lehman bought in
at $60.75 a share. Archstone is now private, but shares of its publicly
traded rivals are down substantially, suggesting Lehman's investment is
underwater.
During a conference call to discuss its
first-quarter earnings, Lehman said it currently holds $2.3 billion of
Archstone's non-investment-grade debt and $2.2 billion of equity, both of
which Ms. Callan said are being carried "materially below par." She said
Lehman is working to sell assets and improve Archstone's financial profile.
Lehman says it has taken write-downs on this investment, but the size of the
haircut isn't known because it doesn't release this data on individual
investments.
Continued in article
Question
What are shareholder "earn-out"contracts"?
(Another example of the increasing complexity of classifying debt versus
equity.)
How did eBay make a $1.43 dollar (or more) mistake?
"Skype CEO steps down and parent company: eBay takes $1.43 billion
charge," MIT's Technology Review, October 1, 2007 ---
http://www.technologyreview.com/Wire/19466/?nlid=575
EBay Inc. announced Monday that the co-founder and
chief executive of its Skype division was stepping down, and that the parent
company would take $1.43 billion in charges for the Internet phone service
division.
Of the charges to be taken in the current quarter,
$900 million will be a write-down in the value of Skype, eBay said. That
charge, for what accountants call impairment, essentially acknowledges that
San Jose-based eBay, one of the world's largest e-commerce companies,
drastically overvalued the $2.6 billion Skype acquisition, which was
completed in October 2005.
EBay also said Monday it paid certain
shareholders $530 million to settle future obligations.
In 2005, eBay wooed Skype investors by offering an
''earn-out agreement'' up to $1.7 billion if Skype hit specific
targets -- including a number of active users and a gross profit -- in 2008
and the first half of 2009. The Skype shareholders holding those agreements
received the $530 million in an early, one-time payout, eBay spokesman Hani
Durzy said.
EBay also announced that Skype CEO Niklas Zennstrom
will become non-executive chairman of Skype's board and likely spend more
time working on independent projects.
Durzy said the resignation of Zennstrom, a Swedish
entrepreneur who started Skype, was not related to the impairment charge or
Skype's performance.
''Niklas left of his own volition,'' Durzy said.
''He is an entrepreneur first and foremost, and he wanted to spend more time
on some of his new projects that he has been working on.''
Skype, which allows customers to place
long-distance calls using their computers, reported second-quarter revenue
of $89.13 million, up 102 percent from a year ago. It was the second
consecutive quarter of profitability for the newest eBay division.
Zennstrom is likely to work on developing Joost, an
Internet TV service he started in 2006 with Skype co-founder Janus Friis,
relying on peer-to-peer technology to distribute TV shows and other videos
over the Web.
Joost had at least 1 million beta testers in July
and will launch at the end of the year, Zennstrom said earlier this summer.
One of the pair's first collaborations was the
peer-to-peer file-sharing network KaZaA, which launched in March 2000 and is
used primarily to swap MP3 music files over the Internet. Zennstrom also
co-founded the peer-to-peer network Altnet and the venture capital firm
Atomico.
Continued in article
From The Wall Street Journal
Accounting Educators' Review on July 16, 2004
TITLE: Possible Accounting Change May Hurt Convertible Bonds
REPORTER: Aaron Lucchetti
DATE: Jul 08, 2004
PAGE: C1
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108923165610057603,00.html
TOPICS: Bonds, Convertible bonds, Earnings per share, Emerging Issues Task
Force, Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board
SUMMARY: The Emerging Issues Task Force is considering changing the
requirements for including in the EPS calculation the potentially dilutive
shares issuable from so-called CoCo bonds. These bonds have an interest-payment
coupon and are contingently convertible, typically depending upon a specified
percentage increase in the stock price.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Describe the terms of CoCo Bonds. What do you think the term "CoCo"
means? How do they differ from typical convertible bonds? Why do investors find
typical convertible bonds attractive? Why do companies find it attractive to
offer typical convertible bonds?
2.) What is the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF)? How can the organization
of that task force help to resolve issues, such as the questions surrounding
CoCo bonds, more rapidly than the issues can be addressed by the FASB itself?
3.) In general, what is the accounting issue being addressed by the EITF?
What is the proposed change in accounting? Does any of this have to do with the
actual accounting for the bonds and their associated interest expense?
4.) Explain in detail the effect of these bonds on companies' earnings per
share (EPS) calculations. Will the amount of companies' net income change under
the proposed EITF resolution of this accounting issue? What will change? Is it
certain that the change in treatment of these bonds will have a dilutive effect
on EPS? Explain.
5.) Why might an EITF ruling require retroactive restatement of earnings by
companies issuing these bonds? How else could any change in treatment of these
bonds be presented in the financial statements?
6.) One investment analyst states that "the new accounting doesn't
change economics, but investors [are] still likely to care." Why is this
the case?
7.) Why does one analyst describe CoCo bonds as a gimmick? Why then would we
"probably be better off without it"?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
Coke: Gone Flat at the Bright Lines of Accounting Rules and Marketing
Ethics
The king of carbonated beverages is still a moneymaker, but its growth has
stalled and the stock has been backsliding since the late '90s. Now it
turns out that the company's glory days were as much a matter of accounting
maneuvers as of marketing magic.
Guizuenta's most ingenious contribution to Coke, the
ingredient that added rocket fuel to the stock price, was a bit of creative
though perfectly legal balance-sheet rejeiggering that in some ways prefigured
the Enron Corp. machinations. Known inside the company as the "49%
solution," it was the brain child of then-Chief Financial Officer M.
Douglas Ivester. It worked like this: Coke spun off its U.S.
bottling operations in late 1986 into a new company known as Coca-Cola
Enterprises Inc., retaining a 49% state for itself. That was enough to
exert de facto control but a hair below the 50% threshold that requires
companies to consolidate results of subsidiaries in their financials. At
a stroke, Coke erased $2.4 billion of debt from its balance sheet.
Dean Foust, "Gone Flat," Business Week, December 20, 2004,
Page 77.
This is a Business Week cover story.
Coca Cola's outside independent auditor is Ernst & Young
There were other problems, some of which did not do the famed Warren
Buffet's reputation any good. See "Fizzy Math and Fishy Marketing
Lawsuit, Probes Prove Damaging to Coke," by Margaret Webb Pressler, Washington
Post, June 20, 2003 --- http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A14384-2003Jun19¬Found=true
Coca Cola's marketing tactics were unethical and unhealthy for kids --- http://www.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ362/hallam/Coke%20Officials%20Beefed%20Up.pdf
Also see "The Ten Habits of Highly Defective Corporations," From The
Nation --- http://www.greenmac.com/World_Events/thetenha.html
Contingent convertible bonds get a tax-treatment
boost from a new IRS revenue ruling. But the window of opportunity may slam shut.
"Cuckoo for Coco Puffs?" Robert Willens, Lehman Brothers, CFO.com,
May 22, 2002
Now the FASB intends to shut the loop-hole. If
the proposed rule (Section 404) goes into effect, companies will have to
record an increase in shares outstanding on the day they issue a Co-Co
(Contingent Convertible Bond that can be converted only at threshold share
prices), thus reducing EPS. And the change would
be retroactive, a step the board generally reserves for particularly egregious
accounting practices, says Dennis Beresord, professor of accounting at the
University of Georgia and FASB's former chief.
"Too Much of a Good Thing," CFO Magazine, September
4, 2004, Page 21.
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on October 29,
2004
TITLE: First Marblehead: Brilliance or Grade Inflation?
REPORTER: Karen Richardson
DATE: Oct 25, 2004
PAGE: C3
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB109866115416054209,00.html
TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Allowance For Doubtful Accounts,
Financial Statement Analysis, Securitization, Valuations
SUMMARY: First Marblehead securitizes student loans and records assets
based on significant estimates. Investors have significantly increased short
selling on the stock because of concern over when the receivables recorded
through securitization will ultimately be collected.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Define the term securitization. What purpose does securitization serve?
2.) What does the author mean by "gain-on-sale" accounting? When
are gains recognized in securitization transactions?
3.) What standard governs the accounting requirements for securitization
transactions? Why does that standard focus on a question of discerning
liabilities from sales? Is that accounting question a point of difficulty in
the case described in this article? Explain.
4.) Why are critics arguing that "it will be at least five years
before any significant cash starts rolling in" on First Marblehead's
assets?
5.) According to what is listed in the article, how many factors must be
estimated to record the assets and revenues under First Marblehead's business
model? How uncertain do you think the company may be in its estimates of these
of these items?
6.) Why will it take time until "the company's massive earnings growth
can be verified"? What evidence will help to evaluate the validity of the
estimates made in First Marblehead's revenue recognition process?
7.) What is the process of short selling? Why is it telling that there has
been a significant increase in the number of short-sellers on First
Marblehead's stock?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
FERF Newsletter, April 20, 2004
Update on SFAS 150
Halsey Bullen, Senior Project Manager at the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), gave an update on SFAS 150.
Private Net last discussed SFAS 150 and FASB Staff
Position (FSP) 150-3 in the February issue: http://www.fei.org/newsletters/privatenet/pnet204.cfm
Bullen said that SFAS 150 was originally designed to
account for "ambiguous" instruments, such as convertible bonds,
puttable stock, Co-Co No-Nos (conditionally convertible, no coupon, no
interest instruments), and variable share forward sales contracts. Mandatorily
redeemable shares of ownership issued by private companies were then included
in the accounting for this class of instruments.
Bullen said that FSP 150-3 allowed private companies
to defer implementation of SFAS 150 until 2005 with respect to shares that
were redeemable on fixed dates for fixed or externally indexed amounts, and
indefinitely for other mandatorily redeemable shares. (We will assume
indefinite deferral for mandatorily redeemable ownership shares issued by
private companies.)
As an update, Bullen said that in Phase 2, the FASB
was considering several alternatives for "bifurcating" the ambiguous
instruments into equity and liability components: * Fundamental components
approach, * Narrow view of equity as common stock, * IASB 32 approach:
bifurcate convertibles and treat any other obligation that might require
transfer of assets as a liability for the full amount, * Minimum obligation
approach, and * Reassessed expected outcomes approach.
Bullen said that the FASB has encountered a number of
challenges in trying to account for these ambiguous instruments, not the least
of which are just basic conceptual definitions of shareholder equity and
liability. For example, should equity be defined as assets minus liabilities,
or should liabilities be first defined as assets minus shareholder equity?
One FEI member asked Bullen, "Where is the
concept of simplicity?" Bullen responded, "Simplicity is as
simplicity does." In other words, if the financial instrument is not
simple, how can its accounting be simple?
Bullen told the participants to expect an exposure
draft in late 2004 or early 2005.
The Controversy Between
OCI versus Current Earnings
In June 1997, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued FAS 130
on "Reporting Comprehensive Income" ---
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/aop_FAS130.pdf
FAS 130 created an equity account called Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) or
Accumulated OCI (AOCI) to serve as a means of keeping various types of
unrealized changes in asset and liability values from mixing in with current
earnings. For example, changes in the value of available-for-sale securities are
required in FAS 115 to be carried at fair value with offsets to changes in fair
value going to some equity account other than Retained Earnings. FAS 130 named
this account to be OCI. FAS 130 also requires a Statement of Comprehensive
Income that summarizes all changes in AOCI balances during each accounting
period.
Later when FAS 133 required carrying of derivatives at fair value, the OCI
account became the required offset to changes in derivative fair values if those
derivatives are cash flow or foreign exchange (FX) hedges. OCI cannot be used
for Fair Value hedges.
Comprehensive income is part of a larger initiative of both the FASB and the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to provide options for and
perhaps eventually require fair value accounting for all financial assets and
liabilities (but not necessarily non-financial items).
"The Accounting Cycle Let's Scrap the Comprehensive Income Statement Op/Ed,"
by: J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, June 2008 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x62289.xml
The statement of comprehensive income, whether
displayed as a separate financial statement or in conjunction with the
income statement or as part of the statement of changes in shareholders'
equity, has served its purpose. It is time to scrap the concept and
incorporate these items where they actually belong -- in the income
statement.
Over the years the Financial Accounting Standards
Board created a problem by allowing a variety of items to bypass the income
statement, a result of te FASB's bias toward the balance sheet. In other
words, FASB focused on reporting assets and liabilities of the business
enterprise, but did not worry too much about the impact on the income
statement. Included within the comprehensive income statement were foreign
currency translation adjustments under the all-current method, holding gains
and losses for investments under the available-for-sale category, gains and
losses on derivatives if they are considered cash flow hedges, and losses if
necessary to establish a minimum pension liability. If these things make
sense to include on the balance sheet, surely their income statement effects
are meaningful as well.
The board sometimes justified this approach by
claiming that these items had less reliability than other events and
transactions included in the income statement. But, this argument loses
water in today's world. Surely if the fair value changes recently booked in
the accounts of financial institutions are reliable, then these other
measurements are equally reliable. This follows because the fair value
changes recently recognized are the result not of changes in market values
but in changes in model estimates.
Consider last year's 10-K for Merrill Lynch. The
firm did not have a particularly good year, as witnessed by its 7.7 billion
dollar loss. If the items in other comprehensive income are incorporated as
well, the loss grows to almost 9 billion dollars.
The foreign currently translation loss, net of
taxes, is a mere 11 million dollar loss. Nonetheless, it is a real economic
loss to shareholders and should be recognized as such.
Merrill Lynch had losses on its investment
securities considered available for sale of 2.5 billion dollars. Again, this
is net of income taxes. As these securities reflect certain real changes of
value, they too would be better displayed on the income statement.
Merrill Lynch also shows deferred net gains of 81
million dollars on its cash flow hedges. Similarly, it would be more
informative to users if they are reported in income.
Finally, Merrill Lynch shows 240 million dollars of
net actuarial gains and prior service costs. They too signify real economic
flows and, therefore, they belong part of earnings.
In 2007 we have reported losses of $7.7 billion
versus comprehensive losses of $8.9 billion. In 2006 the two measures are
the same, revealing an income of $7.5 billion. In 2005, however, the two
measures have some differences as in 2007: net income is $5.1 billion while
comprehensive net income is $4.7 billion.
So why doesn't FASB scrap the comprehensive income
statement? Surely the reliability of these items is as good as the
reliability of the mark-to-model numbers that have recently hit the
financials of corporate America. The more likely real reason for the
comprehensive income concept is that it is a bargaining chip when creating
new accounting policy. FASB gets what it wants, at least to some extent, on
the balance sheet; in return, the compromise allows reporting entities not
to announce lower incomes (or bigger losses) and it allows them to have less
volatility in their annual earnings.
Creditors and investors would be better served with
a more accurate income statement. Let's renounce the reliability argument
and show some political muscle. Scrap the notion of comprehensive income and
strengthen the income statement.
June 22, 2008 reply from David Albrecht
[albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]
My response to Ed is that it is my understanding
that the new financial statements, on which the income statement will
include no bottom line, will include these CI items.
Is my understanding wrong?
MicroSoft has an interesting approach to reporting
Accumulated OCI on the income statement and the statement of changes in SHE:
it merges the two together. I've always thought that by so doing, MS was
casting its vote that the two should be comingled together on the income
statement.
David Albrecht
Bowling Green
June 22, 2008 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi David,
Count me
in as one who sees good things in OCI or something like OCI that
separates realized gains and losses from those that have a 99.9999%
chance never be realized if the company remains a viable going concern.
It’s important to show the unlikely risks on the balance sheet, but I
sure hate to see them be folded into earnings per share. In the case of
hedging, this becomes a penalty for entering into good economic hedges
that are certain to prevent losses. It’s a bad idea to penalize
companies making good hedges with earnings volatility due to those
hedges. That’s what companies pounded into the FASB when FAS 133 was
being contemplated. It’s also the reason that FAS 133 went from 50
paragraphs to 524 paragraphs, because to keep changes in derivative
contract fair values out of earnings the FASB had to invent what we now
call “hedge accounting” (read that relief from unrealized earnings
volatility due to hedging).
For
example, a cash sale is realized. A huge long-term gain in the value of
an investment in Google’s common shares since its IPO stands a good
chance of being realized but of course nothing is certain until the
stock is sold. But changes in the value of an interest rate swap that’s
a cash flow hedge is even more certain to never be realized.
I repeat
that the debits and credits to OCI from changes in the value of an
interest rate swap used as a hedge, most likely will never be realized.
Firstly, the swap is typically customized and unique for which there are
not likely any buyers unless huge incentives are made to get out of the
swap before it matures. Secondly, if the swap is held to maturity it’s
certain that the accumulated OCI debits and credits for changes in value
of the swap will sum up to zero. All debits and credits to OCI for a
cash flow hedge are not important in the grand sum of things for
derivatives held to maturity of the hedge and the hedged item.
The only
reason changes in value of a cash flow hedge are important on the
balance sheet is to signal that there there’s risk/return from an
unlikely premature settlement of a hedging derivative. Investors should
know about these potential risks and returns at interim points in time
since they truly exist in light of premature settlement. The signaling
is on the balance sheet such as when an interest rate swap has a
reported liability of $42,820,000 if the swap is terminated prematurely.
At the
same time, I would certainly hate to see the offsetting unrealized
“loss” of $42,820,000 be mixed in with the realized earnings, because
the probability of even a single dollar of this loss being ultimately
realized is very, very unlikely if the company is truly a going concern.
To
illustrate these points consider the table in Paragraph 137 that depicts
the journal entries of a cash flow hedge using an interest rate swap in
Example 5 of Appendix B of FAS 133. Below I’ve reproduced Paragraph 137
table that also appears in
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/133ex05.htm
it also appears with footnotes that explain the calculations in the
Excel workbook at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/133ex05a.xls
Note
especially how the debits and credits in the OCI column sum to zero.
This was certain at the commencement of the swap. I would certainly hate
to see debits like $42,820, $33,160, $21,850 and credits like ($24,850),
($73,800), ($85,910), and ($1,960) be folded in with realized components
of earnings each quarter.
Note how
the swap has a liability of $42,820 on June 30, 20X2. This is a good
estimate of what XYZ Company would owe if it breached its swap contract
and was faced with a court judgment when sued by swap’s counterparty.
But if XYZ Company does not breach the contract, it is known in advance
that the swap begins and ends with a value of $0. All the changes in
value at interim reset dates are transitory and will wash out unless the
contract is settled prematurely.
Hence we
most certainly need changes in value of interest rate swaps being booked
at fair values. We also need, in my viewpoint, something like OCI that
prevents highly unlikely unrealized gains and losses from having
volatile impacts on other more likely or realized gains and losses. Note
how the Swap and OCI columns sum to zero. This was certain in advance
unless the swap was breached prematurely.
. |
|
|
|
Example 5 of
FAS 133 Appendix B Paragraph 137 |
|
|
|
|
|
Swap |
OCI |
Earnings |
Cash |
LIBOR |
|
Debit (Credit) |
Debit (Credit) |
Debit (Credit) |
Debit (Credit) |
5.56% |
7/1/X1 |
$ -
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Interest accrued |
$ -
|
|
|
|
|
Payment (Receipt) |
(27,250) |
|
|
27,250
|
|
Effect of change in rates |
52,100
|
(52,100) |
|
|
|
Reclassification to earnings |
-
|
27,250
|
(27,250) |
-
|
5.63% |
9/30/X1 |
24,850
|
(24,850) |
(27,250) |
27,250
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Interest accrued |
$ 350
|
(350) |
|
|
|
Payment (Receipt) |
(25,500) |
|
|
25,500
|
|
Effect of change in rates |
74,100
|
(74,100) |
|
|
|
Reclassification to earnings |
-
|
25,500
|
(25,500) |
-
|
5.56% |
12/31/X1 |
73,800
|
(73,800) |
(25,500) |
25,500
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Interest accrued |
$ 1,026
|
(1,026) |
|
|
|
Payment (Receipt) |
(27,250) |
|
|
27,250
|
|
Effect of change in rates |
38,334
|
(38,334) |
|
|
|
Reclassification to earnings |
-
|
27,250
|
(27,250) |
-
|
5.47% |
3/31/X2 |
85,910
|
(85,910) |
(27,250) |
27,250
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Interest accrued |
$ 1,175
|
(1,175) |
|
|
|
Payment (Receipt) |
(29,500) |
|
|
29,500
|
|
Effect of change in rates |
(100,405) |
100,405
|
|
|
|
Reclassification to earnings |
-
|
29,500
|
(29,500) |
-
|
6.75% |
6/30/X2 |
(42,820) |
42,820
|
(29,500) |
29,500
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Interest accrued |
$ (723) |
723
|
|
|
|
Payment (Receipt) |
2,500
|
|
|
(2,500) |
|
Effect of change in rates |
7,883
|
(7,883) |
|
|
|
Reclassification to earnings |
-
|
(2,500) |
2,500
|
-
|
6.86% |
9/30/X2 |
(33,160) |
33,160
|
2,500
|
(2,500) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Interest accrued |
$ (569) |
569
|
|
|
|
Payment (Receipt) |
5,250
|
|
|
(5,250) |
|
Effect of change in rates |
6,629
|
(6,629) |
|
|
|
Reclassification to earnings |
-
|
(5,250) |
5,250
|
-
|
6.97% |
12/31/X2 |
(21,850) |
21,850
|
5,250
|
(5,250) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Interest accrued |
$ (381) |
381
|
|
|
|
Payment (Receipt) |
8,000
|
|
|
(8,000) |
|
Effect of change in rates |
16,191
|
(16,191) |
|
|
|
Reclassification to earnings |
-
|
(8,000) |
8,000
|
-
|
6.57% |
3/31/X3 |
1,960
|
(1,960) |
8,000
|
(8,000) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Interest accrued |
$ 32
|
(32) |
|
|
|
Payment (Receipt) |
(2,000) |
|
|
2,000
|
|
Rounding error |
8
|
(8) |
|
|
|
Reclassification to earnings |
-
|
2,000
|
(2,000) |
-
|
|
6/30/X3 |
-
|
0
|
(2,000) |
2,000
|
PS
The interest accruals in the above table differ from those in Paragraph
137 of FAS 133 because the FASB screwed up the calculations and failed
to correct them even though I did reported these calculation errors in
Example 5 to the FASB years ago. The FASB did compute the interest
accruals correctly for Example 2 in Paragraph 117, so the FASB batted
50% on their interest rate accrual calculations in FAS 133. However,
such accruals are only a minor part of this outstanding illustration.
I think
Example 5 is the most important illustration in all of FAS 133 and IAS
39. If you fully understand the 133ex05a.xls workbook calculations and
the Hubbard and Jensen explanation of how to value the Example 5
interest rate swap, I will give you a Certificate of FAS 133 Merit. Once
again the links to learn from are as follows:
The swap
valuation explanation is at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/133ex05.htm
The hedge accounting is explained in the Excel workbook at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/133ex05a.xls
My
accounting theory students inevitably despised this illustration until
they saw the light.
You would be surprised at how many former students contact me thanking
me for explaining how to value swaps, because nearly all auditors
encounter interest rate swaps on the job and don’t want to be fired from
the audit for the same reasons KPMG was fired by its client named Fannie
Mae.
I can’t
tell you how many questions and compliments I’ve received over the past
few years regarding one of the most frequently hit documents year in and
year out at my Website ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm
That makes me feel good!
June 22, 2008 reply from David Albrecht
[albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]
Bob,
At 06:31 PM 6/22/2008, Bob Jensen wrote:
Hi David,
Count me in as one who sees good things in OCI or something like OCI
that separates realized gains and losses from those that have a 99.9999%
chance never be realized if the company remains a viable going concern.
It’s important to show the unlikely risks on the balance sheet, but I
sure hate to see them be folded into earnings per share. In the case of
hedging, this becomes a penalty for entering into good economic hedges
that are certain to prevent losses. It’s a bad idea to penalize
companies making good hedges with earnings volatility due to those
hedges. That’s what companies pounded into the FASB when FAS 133 was
being contemplated. It’s also the reason that FAS 133 went from 50
paragraphs to 524 paragraphs, because to keep changes in derivative
contract fair values out of earnings the FASB had to invent what we now
call “hedge accounting” (read that relief from unrealized earnings
volatility due to hedging).
Bob,
I just don't think that in the evolution of GAAP/IFRS to fair market
valuation for the balance sheet, that there is any escape for stretching the
income statement all out of any semblance of understandability (eeeehhhhh,
I'm not sure the income statement has every been that understandable) and
doing away with items of Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) and finally being
all-inclusive.
In the context of fair value accounting, I'm pretty sure that realizability
is no longer relevant. I had a pretty interesting discussion in class last
week with some students about a classic pose from financial accounting:
conservatism. That is, accountants are quick to recognize losses/declines
and slow to recognize gains/increases. When combined with realization, it
means that a gain can be recognized when the earnings process is thought to
be complete, but not before. You even refer to realization (BTW,
realization has a very interesting etymology).
But in the rush to fair value accounting, conservatism and realizability
have become as socially acceptable as an old fart of an accountant or a
professor.
Ceteris paribus, I think that balance sheets can be thought of as naturally
hedged. For example, let's take a case where a company has a simple balance
sheet of CA 30, Investments 20, PPE of 50, CL of 25, LTL of 45 and SHE of
30. Such a balance sheet reflects an assumed capital structure of long-term
financing of 60% debt, and might be appropriate for a product/equipment
manufacturer. This balance sheet captures the essence of the company at a
time when neither times are good nor times are bad. Now, let's assume that
the economy slides into the downward part of an economic cycle. Two things
happen simultaneously--the resources/assets lose some current fair value
because of the downturn (perceived prospects have taken an economy-wide
collective hit), and debt financing becomes harder to get and is rationed by
higher interest rates. affecting all matters of debt financing. The fair
value of the assets go down (and there's a loss), the fair value of the
liabilities go down (and there's a gain). The balance sheet stays in
balance and the measure of company profitability (the new income statement)
stays in balance as the gains and losses cancel out. Perfect hedging.
If US GAAP was to have it right, then not only would the financial assets in
the investment category be marked to market, but so would PPE AND all the
liabilities. SHE would tag along. In the above example, CL becomes a
weightier part of the balance sheet right hand side.
A consistent problem with US GAAP is that the rule makers have only gone
part way (marking financial assets to market). Gains and losses can't be
included in the income statement because the income statement is
under-specified. Hence the decades-old need for OCI and its predecessor,
unrealized gains/losses.
Unfortunately, economic downturns don't hit all companies ceteris paribus,
and company-specific prospects can either improve or deteriorate as compared
to the economy as a whole.
Take the case of airlines (pick one, any one). In the current economic
downturn, the assets (gas-guzzling owned and leased assets) have lost value
at a much faster pace relative generic assets in the economy. In the
current world order, the jets are less valuable because of their low fuel
efficiency puts the airline's existence at risk, and the airline's cost of
capital has just gone sky-high because of this increased business risk. As
a result of oil futures and the attendant economic downturn, the airlines
have incurred a real impairment in asset value, and this should be reflected
in the financials, including the current income statement. At least this is
my opinion. On the other side, have an airline just try retiring some of
its long-term debt on the market. With higher interest rate valuations
applied, the debt has a lower market value and the company can realize real
gains if it were to retire the debt. Many airlines have effectively retired
the debt by choosing bankruptcy reorganization. And if they haven't yet
chosen bankruptcy, the threat is always there, hence the rationale for
decreasing the recorded value of liabilities. The gains and losses cancel,
but shouldn't the investor be informed in the financial statements?
Now, in the generic example, I can see some appeal to keeping gains and
losses off the income statement because they aren't ever going to be
realized, but in the airline example, I can see every reason for putting all
gains and losses on the income statement so that investors can see the good
and bad. The bad is that assets have lost value, and the good is that in a
case of financial reorganization, there will be a gain that will cancel out
all asset declines.
Bob, how does one separate the economy wide effects from the industry
effects or even the company effects? There is simply too much commingling.
As a result, why not put everything on the income statement? I think this
is Ed Ketz's basic position. Mine as well. Make the income statement line
a one-size fits all garment.
Unfortunately, there is no place on the income statement (as currently
constituted) or such gains and losses. That is why the FASB has made such a
historical push to revamp it and do away with the bottom line.
Now, one other issue to attend to: your underlying assumption that the
reporting company is a going concern, and as a result gains/losses will
reverse in the next economic upswing and nothing will ever be realized. The
world is a complex environment, and such an assumption as going concern may
no longer be relevant. Ask Bear Stearns. An auctioneer would say that its
going concern went going-going-gone.
In the current financial world, going concern takes on a whole new meaning.
Historically, auditors have never been effective in flagging going-concern
problems. I don't seen anything structural being done to audit markets that
would make auditors more effective in this area.
David Albrecht
June 22, 2008 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi David,
But you and Ed
miss my major point.
There are some
unrealized gains and losses that “may” reverse with economic swings such as
the unrealized gain or loss of that Google stock you bought five years ago.
You and Ed make good points about such items, although I think Section 3 of
the IASB’s exposure draft makes an excellent case on the other side of the
coin in favor of fair value reporting of financial items ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases
And this is
coming from a guy who has been skeptical of fair value accounting all along
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
I’m not so certain anymore as long as we don’t do dumb things with
unrealized gains and losses.
Section 3 of the
IASB exposure draft makes a lot of sense to me --- "Reducing
Complexity in Reporting Financial Instruments" that for a
very limited time may be downloaded without charge from the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) ---
http://snipurl.com/ias39simplification
[www_iasb_org]
The point you
miss is that there are some gains and losses that are certain to reverse
contractually, and they are 99.99999% likely to be perfectly reversed
irrespective of market swings because these contracts in reality are not
likely to be breached or otherwise settled prematurely. A customized and
unique interest rate swap is this type of contract where unrealized gains
and losses are nearly always perfectly reversed at maturity.
We must show the
fair value of the swap at interim points in time because this is what the
courts will declare we owe or are owed in case of a contract breach. But we
should not show changes in these amounts in current earnings because the
likelihood of our breaching this contract is miniscule. OCI is a very good
vehicle for showing the changes in value of a cash flow hedging swap on the
balance sheet without showing the unlikely realization of these amounts on
the balance sheet.
My point with an
interest rate swap is that when the swap matures, the ultimate impact on
realized earnings will be zero no matter how the market swings during the
hedging period. Interim unrealized gains and losses on the swap should not
be posted to current earnings if they are certain to wash out.
Hence my
illustration of Example 5 from FAS 133 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#OCI
I hope you
and Ed will carefully study the IASB’s Section 3 of
http://snipurl.com/ias39simplification
Section 3 is making more of a believer out of me for financial instruments
(but not non-financial instruments).Bob
Jensen
June 23, 2008 reply from Patricia Walters
[patricia@DISCLOSUREANALYTICS.COM]
I am primarily an investor and investor advocate
with respect to financial reporting issues. I have recently returned to
university teaching after 11 years with the CFA Institute. (That gives some
context to my remarks.)
As an investor, I want to see fair value
information in both the balance sheet and the income statement. I understand
this creates volatility and I'm willing to live with it to get a better
understanding of economic reality (if such exists at all in corporate
financial statements.) I also understand that this makes measurement more
difficult. If the measurement is truly "unreliable", rather than simply "not
the number management wants", then IFRS permits companies to make that claim
and avoid, in most instances, reporting that number in the income statement.
If you read any of the commentary that users of the financial statements
(those whose own money or that of their clients) is on the line when they
rely of financial statements to make investment and credit decisions, you
will see that they are by and large in favor of fair value (price)
accounting. The "academic accountants" are not the ones pushing for this.
(As an aside, if banks do not believe the "fair
value" of their loans is a reliable measure then why don't they feel the
same way about the fair value of the underlying real estate.)
I also am a firm believer in Comprehensive Income
and see no reason why this needs to be arbitrarily divided into NI and OCI.
In my view, transactions and events recorded in OCI are those that belong on
the Income Statement but company management managed to negotitate with the
standard-setting to hide them on the balance sheet. Simply, makes the
investor's job more difficult.
On Disclosure vs Reporting in the Financial
Statements: I might agree with the person who said he had no problem with
disclosure of certain information, just don't put it in the financial
statements. Unfortunately, my experience is that managements often do not
take disclosure information as seriously as recognized information. They
just aren't as concerned about measurement reliability. This was emphasized
to me in a presentation on this issue with respect to stock comp that I
attended. The presenter admitted that information in the footnote was relied
on and used by investors but that it just couldn't be moved to the income
statement because it wasn't reliable.
Unfortunately, in my view, the only way to improve
measurement reliability is to require the information to be recognized and
measured in the financial statements. Investors can make sense of this
information.
Regards, Patricia Walters, PhD, CFA
Fordham University
Jun3 23, 2008 reply from Dennis Beresford
[dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]
All of you have a wonderful opportunity to express
your views on the subject of relevance vs. reliability to the FASB and IASB.
The exposure draft on "The Objective of Financial Reporting and Qualitative
Characteristics and Constraints of Decision-Useful Financial Reporting
Information" is available at
http://www.fasb.org/draft/ed_conceptual_framework_for_fin_reporting.pdf
Comments are being solicited through September 29.
I commented on the Preliminary Views document that preceded this exposure
draft and probably will comment on this exposure draft too. This document is
a key building block for the future of financial reporting and I urge all of
you to consider participating formally in the debate.
Denny Beresford
For more on fair value accounting, go to
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
Accrual Accounting and Estimation
Question
What are banks doing creatively to hide their non-performing loans in the 21st
Century?
Smells like old wine in new bottles.
Banks Find New Ways to East Pain of Bad Loans
by David
Enrich
The Wall Street Journal
Jun 19, 2008
Page: C1
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121383327218786693.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
TOPICS: Business
Ethics, Ethics, GAAP
SUMMARY: Banks
are revising internal accounting policies to mask their
troubles. The maneuvers are legal but could deepen suspicion
about the sector.
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: This article illustrates how a company can
change its policies and the resulting impact of those
changes on the company's accounting records. Sometimes those
actions violate GAAP, but in the situations presented in the
article, the changes are perfectly legal. The bad part of
these actions is that those changes can present a very
different picture of the banks' financial condition to the
users of the financial statements.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Advanced) What did these companies change that
resulted in changes to their financial statements?
2. (Advanced) Why are these changes allowed, even
though they cause differences on the financial statements?
3. (Introductory) Do the policy changes result in a
permanent change over time on the financial statements? Why
or why not?
4. (Introductory) What is the regulatory impact of
moving some loans to a new subsidiary? What is the impact on
the financial statements? Why are these different?
5. (Advanced) What are the public relations issues
involved with these kinds of actions? Should the banks be
concerned? Why or why not?
6. (Advanced) What are the ethics of the actions of
the banks in this article? What would be the ethical way to
handle this reporting? If the reporting as stated is
acceptable, should the banks add any additional information
to the notes to the financial statement? If not, why not? If
so, what should be added?
Reviewed By: Linda Christiansen, Indiana University
Southeast
|
"Banks Find New Ways To Ease Pain of Bad Loans," by David Enrich, The Wall
Street Journal, June 19, 2008; Page C1 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121383327218786693.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
In January, Astoria Financial Corp. told investors
that its pile of nonperforming loans had grown to about $106 million as of
the end of last year. Three months later, the thrift holding company said
the number was just $68 million.
How did Astoria do it? By changing its internal
policy on when mortgages are classified on its books as troubled. The Lake
Success, N.Y., company now counts home loans as nonperforming when the
borrower misses at least three payments, instead of two.
Astoria says the change was made partly to make its
disclosures on shaky mortgages more consistent with those of other lenders.
An Astoria spokesman didn't respond to requests for comment. But the shift
shows one of the ways lenders increasingly are trying to make their
real-estate misery look not quite so bad.
From lengthening the time it takes to write off
troubled mortgages, to parking lousy loans in subsidiaries that don't count
toward regulatory capital levels, the creative maneuvers are perfectly
legal.
Yet they could deepen suspicion about financial
stocks, already suffering from dismal investor sentiment as loan
delinquencies balloon and capital levels shrivel with no end in sight.
"Spending all the time gaming the system rather
than addressing the problems doesn't reflect well on the institutions," said
David Fanger, chief credit officer in the financial-institutions group at
Moody's Investors Service, a unit of Moody's Corp. "What this really is
about is buying yourself time. ... At the end of the day, the losses are
likely to not be that different."
Still, as long as the environment continues to
worsen for big and small U.S. banks, more of them are likely to explore such
now-you-see-it, now-you-don't strategies to prop up profits and keep antsy
regulators off their backs, bankers and lawyers say.
At Wells Fargo & Co., the fourth-largest U.S. bank
by stock-market value, investors and analysts are jittery about its $83.6
billion portfolio of home-equity loans, which is showing signs of stress as
real-estate values tumble throughout much of the country.
Until recently, the San Francisco bank had written
off home-equity loans -- essentially taking a charge to earnings in
anticipation of borrowers' defaulting -- once borrowers fell 120 days behind
on payments. But on April 1, the bank started waiting for up to 180 days.
'Out of Character'
Some analysts note that the shift will postpone a
potentially bruising wave of losses, thereby boosting Wells Fargo's
second-quarter results when they are reported next month. "It is kind of out
of character for Wells," says Joe Morford, a banking analyst at RBC Capital
Markets. "They tend to use more conservative standards."
Wells Fargo spokeswoman Julia Tunis says the change
was meant to help borrowers. "The extra time helps avoid having loans
charged off when better solutions might be available for our customers," she
says. In a securities filing, Wells Fargo said that the 180-day charge-off
standard is "consistent with" federal regulatory guidelines.
BankAtlantic Bancorp Inc., which is based in Fort
Lauderdale, Fla., earlier this year transferred about $100 million of
troubled commercial-real-estate loans into a new subsidiary.
That essentially erased the loans from
BankAtlantic's retail-banking unit. Since that unit is federally regulated,
BankAtlantic eventually might have faced regulatory action if it didn't
substantially beef up the unit's capital and reserve levels to cover the bad
loans.
Because the BankAtlantic subsidiary that holds the
bad loans isn't regulated, it doesn't face the same capital requirements.
But the new structure won't insulate the parent company's profits -- or
shareholders -- from losses if borrowers default on the loans, analysts
said.
Alan Levan, BankAtlantic's chief executive,
declined to comment on how much the loan transfer bolstered the regulated
unit's capital levels. "The reason for doing it is to separate some of these
problem loans out of the bank so that they can get special focus in an
isolated subsidiary," he said.
Other lenders have been considering the use of
similar "bad-bank" structures as a way to cleanse their balance sheets of
shaky loans. In April, Peter Raskind, chairman and CEO of National City
Corp., said the Cleveland bank "could imagine...several different variations
of good-bank/bad-bank kinds of structures" to help shed problem assets.
Two banks that investors love to hate, Wachovia
Corp. and Washington Mutual Inc., troubled some analysts by using data from
the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight when they announced
first-quarter results. Other lenders rely on a data source that is more
pessimistic about the housing market.
Charter Switch
Another eyebrow raiser: switching bank charters so
that a lender is scrutinized by a different regulator.
Last week, Colonial BancGroup Inc., Montgomery,
Ala., announced that it changed its Colonial Bank unit from a nationally
chartered bank to a state-chartered bank, effective immediately.
That means the regional bank no longer will be
regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which has become
increasingly critical of banks such as Colonial with heavy concentrations of
loans to finance real-estate construction projects.
Instead, Colonial's primary regulators now are the
Alabama Banking Department, also based in Montgomery, and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corp. The change probably "is meant to distance [Colonial]
from what is perceived as the more aggressive and onerous of the bank
regulators," said Kevin Fitzsimmons, a bank analyst at Sandler O'Neill &
Partners.
Colonial spokeswoman Merrie Tolbert denies that.
Being a state-chartered bank "gives us more flexibility" and will save the
company more than $1 million a year in regulatory fees, she said.
Trabo Reed, Alabama's deputy superintendent of
banking, said his examiners won't give Colonial a free pass. "There's not
going to be a significant amount of difference" between the OCC and state
regulators, he says.
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on May 19, 2006
TITLE: With Special Effects the Star, Hollywood Faces New Reality
REPORTER: Merissa Marr and Kate Kelly
DATE: May 12, 2006
PAGE: A1
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114739949943750995.html
TOPICS: Accounting, Budgeting, Cost-Volume-Profit Analysis, Managerial
Accounting
SUMMARY: Special effects are driving a lot of movies to become box office
hits. However, "in the area of special effects, technology can't deliver the
kind of efficiencies to Hollywood that it generally provides to other
industries...Amid the excitement, studios are beginning to realize that relying
on special effects is financially risky. Such big budget films tend to be
bonanzas or busts."
QUESTIONS:
1.) The author notes that studios are beginning to realize that films utilizing
a lot of special effects might tend to be "bonanzas or busts." In terms of
costs, why is this the case? In your answer, refer to the high level of costs
associated with special effects work.
2.) Why do special effects teams tend to amass significant costs? In your
answer, define the terms "cost management" and "costs of quality" and explain
how these cost concepts, that are typically associated with product
manufacturing, can be applied to movie production.
3.) Define the term "fixed cost." How does this concept relate to the
financial riskiness of movies with significant special effects and resultant
high cost? Also include in your answer a discussion of the formula for breaking
even under cost-volume-profit analysis.
4.) Define the term "variable cost." Cite some examples of variable costs you
expect are incurred by studios such as Sony Pictures, Universal Pictures, and
others.
5.) Now consider firms such as Industrial Light & Magic, "a company set up by
director George Lucas in 1975 to handle the special effects for his 'Star Wars'
movies." Based on the discussion in the article, describe what you think are
these firms' fixed and variable costs.
6.) What manager do you think is responsible for costs of quality and cost
control in producing movies? Suppose you are filling that role. What steps would
you undertake to ensure that your hoped-for blockbuster film will have the
greatest possible chance of financial success?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"Biased Expectations: Can Accounting Tools Lead To, Rather Than
Prevent, Executive Mistakes," Knowledge@Wharton, March 19,
2008
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm;jsessionid=9a30c173f4042b274364?articleid=1922
Accounting techniques like budgeting, sales
projections and financial reporting are supposed to help prevent business
failures by giving managers realistic plans to guide their actions and
feedback on their progress. In other words, they are supposed to leaven
entrepreneurial optimism with green-eye-shaded realism.
At least that's the theory. But when Gavin Cassar,
a Wharton accounting professor, tested this idea, he found something
troubling: Some accounting tools not only fail to help businesspeople, but
may actually lead them astray. In one of his recent studies, forthcoming in
Contemporary Accounting Research, Cassar showed that budgeting didn't help a
group of Australian firms accurately forecast their revenues. In a second
paper,he found that the preparation of financial projections added to
aspiring entrepreneurs' optimism, leading them to overestimate their
subsequent levels of sales and employment.
"It's been shown in many studies that people are
overly optimistic," Cassar says. "What's interesting here is that, when you
use the accounting tools, the optimism is even more extreme. This suggests
that using the tools, which a lot of academics and government agencies say
is good practice, can lead to even bigger mistakes."
He is not suggesting that anyone ignore accounting
activities and techniques. Investors and regulators expect firms to
implement robust accounting systems. And they should, he says, because
financial reports provide a detailed map of a business and its performance.
But Cassar believes that businesspeople -- especially entrepreneurs, who bet
both their reputations and personal wealth on their ventures -- should
understand the limitations of accounting estimates as well as how common
human tendencies, like optimism, can lead to their misinterpretation.
Cassar's first study, titled "Budgets, Financial
Reports and Manager Forecast Accuracy," set out to the test the usefulness
of some basic tools in the accounting kit. It sprang from his work
experience before he attended graduate school, when, as an accountant for a
builder in his native Australia, he watched the company's gradual decline
into bankruptcy. "My first job was as a financial and managerial accountant
for a civil construction firm," he says. "My second, 18 months later, was
working for the [bankruptcy] receiver of that same company."
On review, the firm's accountants had seemed to do
everything right. They had prepared budgets and put systems in place to get
timely performance reports that could then be factored into the company's
future budgets and plans. As two big highway jobs foundered, the losses
showed up promptly in the monthly reports. Even so, company executives
failed to take remedial action. "The project managers said that the losses
would turn around, but they didn't," Cassar says. "On both those jobs, they
went over budgeted costs by 50%. Those two jobs resulted in the demise of
that company."
But it wasn't the accounting systems that were the
problem. It was the users. "No one would take responsibility because the
cost of doing that was losing your job," Cassar says. "The irony is that, in
the end, everyone lost their jobs."
Cassar's study enabled him to assess whether
budgeting and internal reporting have helped other firms more than they did
his former employer. He examined a group of about 4,000 companies, all with
less than 200 employees, surveyed by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Managers of these firms were asked whether they prepared budgets and
internal reports and also were asked to provide revenue forecasts and in
future years were asked to provide subsequent performance. The agency
followed the firms over four years. Thus its data showed how close they came
to meeting their forecasts.
Cassar suspected that doing either budgets or
internal reports -- or, better yet, both -- might improve a company's
forecasts. "The presence in a firm of a budget preparation activity should
result in improved forecast accuracy because the systematic collection of a
broad range of information should allow for a more accurate assessment of
future performance," write Cassar and his co-author, Brian Gibson, an
accounting professor at Australia's University of New England. "However,
budgeting in itself may not improve forecasting accuracy, because budgeting
without internal reporting is a meaningless formal control system."
When Cassar and Gibson crunched the numbers, their
prediction was borne out: The impact of budgeting alone was trivial,
improving forecast accuracy by less than 2%. But internal reporting made a
real difference, improving accuracy by about 8.5%. And used together, the
two techniques improved forecast accuracy even more, by about 12%.
"Collectively these results suggest that internal accounting report
preparation improves forecast accuracy. In addition, although the accuracy
benefits from budget preparation appear limited, the improvement is greater
when both budget preparation and internal account reporting are used,"
Cassar and Gibson write.
What's more, the firms that saw the most
improvement in their forecasts were ones that operated in the most uncertain
environments, as measured by the variability of revenue. Arguably, these
firms most needed the guidance.
Cassar's second study, titled "Are Individuals
Entering Self-Employment Overly-Optimistic? An Empirical Test of Plans and
Projections on Nascent Entrepreneur Expectations," built on the findings of
his first one. Here, he wasn't interested in whether accounting tools merely
helped entrepreneurs; he wanted to know whether they could distort their
thinking.
His curiosity grew partly from his knowledge of the
field of behavioral economics, which marries the insights and methods of
psychology and economics. Behavioralists have documented a number of mental
shortcuts and biases that can lead people to depart from the logic that
traditional economic orthodoxy would suggest. One of the concepts, for
example, introduced by Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman and co-author Dan
Lovallo, is that "an inside view" can distort decision making. A person who
adopts an inside view becomes so focused on formulating his particular plan
that he neglects to consider critical outside information, like other
people's experiences in pursuing the same goal.
"Individuals form an inside view forecast by
focusing on the specifics of the case, the details of the plan that exists
and obstacles to its completion, and by constructing scenarios of future
progress," Cassar summarizes. "In contrast, an outside view is statistical
and comparative in nature and does not involve any attempt to divine the
future at any level of detail."
Doing financial projections for an entrepreneurial
venture, Cassar realized, entails the creation of an inside view. The
entrepreneur builds a storyline of success in her head and then plays it out
in her spreadsheet, showing rising sales year after year. "Humans are good
at storytelling and building causal links," Cassar notes. "They think, 'I'll
go to college, I'll write a business plan, I'll raise some capital and then
I'll go public or sell out to a big competitor.' There's a probability
attached to each of these steps, but they don't think about that. They put
all the links together and evaluate the likelihood of success at a much
higher probability than is realistic."
Consider the approximately 400 aspiring U.S.
entrepreneurs whom Cassar studied. On average, they believed that their
ideas had about an 80% likelihood of becoming viable ventures, though only
half actually ended up becoming businesses. Of the entrepreneurs who
realized their plans, about 62% overestimated their first-year sales, and
about 46% overestimated what their employment would be at the end of year
one. Employment, unlike sales, implies both costs and benefits, perhaps
explaining the lower jobs figure, Cassar notes. As a company grows it needs
more employees, but it also has to pay them.
So far, none of this seems radical. Yes,
entrepreneurs are optimistic. They have to be if they are undertaking the
risks of starting a business. But when Cassar started to sort through the
entrepreneurs' use of common accounting and planning techniques, he
uncovered surprises.
People who did financial projections were the most
likely to overestimate the future sales of their ventures. In other words,
"the same management activities that entrepreneurs rely on to cope with
uncertainty appear to be causing individuals to hold optimistic
expectations," he writes. Interestingly, writing a business plan also led to
optimism about the likelihood of success, but it didn't lead to overly
optimistic expectations because it's also "positively associated with the
likelihood that the nascent activity will become an operating venture," he
adds. Put another way, people who write plans are more likely to start
companies, thereby justifying their optimism.
One group turned out to be more realistic than the
others -- entrepreneurs who had received money from real sales. "This
demonstrates the benefit of actually making sales in improving the
rationality of financial sales expectations," Cassar notes.
Despite his findings, Cassar doesn't believe that
aspiring entrepreneurs should abandon financial projections. For one thing,
investors, particularly venture capitalists, wouldn't allow that; they
expect firms in which they invest to do projections, if only because it
demonstrates a command of the basics of budgets and accounting. For another,
Cassar believes that preparing projections helps entrepreneurs understand
the drivers of profitability in their businesses and the dynamics of their
industries.
But he says that entrepreneurs need to understand
the ways in which accounting tools may subvert their thinking.
"Acknowledging how management practices bias expectations may allow decision
makers to use organizational or decision making controls to reduce this
influence," he writes. "For example, generating reasons why the planned
outcome may not be achieved or consciously relating past experiences to the
forecasting task at hand are approaches individuals can take to reduce
overly optimistic or overconfident forecasts."
Cassar hasn't studied them, but he suspects that
venture capitalists might be better than entrepreneurs at viewing financial
projections with the appropriate skepticism. Because they see hundreds, even
thousands, of business plans a year, they tend to take an outside view.
"Very good VCs are good at picking winners because
they know what the risks are," he says. "A lot of VCs, when they go through
business plans, think, 'What are the drivers of value creation and what's
the scope of their upsides? And what are the fundamental threats that the
entrepreneur isn't focusing on because it's not in his interest to do so?'"
Based on his own experience, Cassar sees "many
benefits from managers and entrepreneurs using accounting techniques."
However, he adds, "it is important to recognize that financial projections
of success are merely projections based on beliefs, which are sometimes
based on overconfident or optimistic assumptions. Using these accounting
tools may actually exacerbate, rather than dampen, these tendencies."
FAS 163 "Accounting for Financial Guarantee Insurance Contracts"---
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas163.pdf
From the AccountingWeb on May 27, 2008 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=105224
Last week The Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) issued FASB Statement No. 163, Accounting for Financial Guarantee
Insurance Contracts. The new standard clarifies how FASB Statement No. 60,
Accounting and Reporting by Insurance Enterprises, applies to financial
guarantee insurance contracts issued by insurance enterprises, including the
recognition and measurement of premium revenue and claim liabilities. It
also requires expanded disclosures about financial guarantee insurance
contracts. The Statement is effective for financial statements issued for
fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2008, and all interim periods
within those fiscal years, except for disclosures about the insurance
enterprise's risk-management activities. Disclosures about the insurance
enterprise's risk-management activities are effective the first period
beginning after issuance of the Statement. "By issuing Statement 163, the
FASB has taken a major step toward ending inconsistencies in practice that
have made it difficult for investors to receive comparable information about
an insurance enterprise's claim liabilities," stated FASB Project Manager
Mark Trench. "Its issuance is particularly timely in light of recent
concerns about the financial health of financial guarantee insurers, and
will help bring about much needed transparency and comparability to
financial statements."
The accounting and disclosure requirements of
Statement 163 are intended to improve the comparability and quality of
information provided to users of financial statements by creating
consistency, for example, in the measurement and recognition of claim
liabilities. Statement 163 requires that an insurance enterprise recognize a
claim liability prior to an event of default (insured event) when there is
evidence that credit deterioration has occurred in an insured financial
obligation. It also requires disclosure about (a) the risk-management
activities used by an insurance enterprise to evaluate credit deterioration
in its insured financial obligations and (b) the insurance enterprise's
surveillance or watch list.
Questions
Is there a problem with how GAAP covers one's Fannie?
Would fair value accounting help in this situation?
"Fannie Execs Defend Accounting Change Friday,"
by Marcy Gordon, Yahoo News, November 16, 2007 ---
http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/071116/fannie_mae_accounting.html
Fannie Mae executives on
Friday defended a change in the way the mortgage lender discloses losses on
home loans amid concern from analysts that it could mask the true impact of
the credit crisis on its bottom line.
The chief financial officer and other executives of
the government-sponsored company, which reported a $1.4 billion
third-quarter loss last week, held a conference call with Wall Street
analysts to explain the recent change.
Analysts peppered the executives with questions in
a skeptical tone. The way Fannie discloses its mortgage losses, addressed in
an article published online by Fortune, raises extra concern among analysts
given that Fannie Mae was racked by a $6.3 billion accounting scandal in
2004 that tarnished its reputation and brought government sanctions against
it.
Moreover, the skepticism from Wall Street comes as
Fannie seeks approval from the government to raise the cap of its investment
portfolio.
The chief financial officer, Stephen Swad, said in
the call that some of the $670 million in provisions for credit losses on
soured home loans that Fannie Mae wrote off in the third quarter likely
would be recovered.
"We book what we book under (generally accepted
accounting principles) and we provide this disclosure to help you understand
it," Swad said.
Shares of Fannie Mae fell $4.30, or 10 percent, to
$38.74 on Friday, following a 10 percent drop the day before.
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
Bob Jensen's threads on Fannie Mae's enormous problem
(the largest in history that led to the firing of KPMG from the audit and a
multiple-year effort to restate financial statemetns) with applying FAS 133 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm#FannieMae
Honda Says Fuel-Cell Cars Face Hurdles
by Yoshio
Takahashi
The Wall Street Journal
Jun 17, 2008
Page: B4
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121364017994578203.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
TOPICS: Cost
Management, Managerial Accounting, Product strategy
SUMMARY: Honda
Motor. Co. "...obtained the world's first certification for
fuel-cell cars in the U.S. in 2002." Its president, Takeo Fukui,
"...said prices have to fall further for fuel-cell cars to reach
the mass market, even as the Japanese car maker unveiled the
latest generation of fuel-cell vehicle."
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: Management accounting and MBA course
instructors may use this article to discuss the impact of fixed
costs on pricing and product development. Most interestingly,
this article identifies interrelationships between lines of two
industries--automobile manufacturing and fueling stations--that
can be used to discuss strategic investments.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) What is the difference between a
fuel-cell automobile and hybrid automobiles?
2. (Introductory) Why is Honda developing these
fuel-cell vehicles if it can't yet mass-market them? What
factors are limiting the ability to mass market the vehicles?
3. (Advanced) Why are fixed production costs higher if
a car maker cannot mass produce the vehicle? In your answer,
define the terms "fixed costs" and "barriers to entry".
4. (Introductory) What variable production costs,
identified in the article, are at issue in this case? What
strategies can be undertaken to reduce those costs?
5. (Advanced) Suppose you are Honda's president. What
strategic choices in investment would you make to advance this
line of Honda's business?
6. (Advanced) Refer to your answer to question 4. What
types of investments might you make? How might a financing
entity be used to help make those strategic investments?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
|
"Honda Says Fuel-Cell Cars Face Hurdles Prices
Have to Fall For Autos to Reach The Mass Market," by Yoshio Takahashi, The
Wall Street Journal, June 17, 2008; Page B4 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121364017994578203.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
TOCHIGI, Japan -- Honda Motor Co. President Takeo
Fukui said prices have to fall further for fuel-cell cars to reach the mass
market, even as the Japanese car maker unveiled the latest generation of
fuel-cell vehicle.
Fuel-cell cars are considered the most promising
pollution-free vehicles, as they are powered through a chemical reaction
between hydrogen and oxygen, and emit only water as a byproduct.
But low-emission cars such as gasoline-electric
hybrids and diesel vehicles are more popular now. A lack of hydrogen service
stations, among other factors, is limiting demand for the cars, and
therefore car makers can't mass produce them, keeping production costs high.
Honda said Monday that it will begin leasing the
third generation of a fuel-cell model called FCX Clarity in the U.S. in
July. The company plans to lease the new zero-emission car in Japan this
autumn.
Mr. Fukui said the new fuel-cell car costs tens of
millions of yen, significantly less than the several hundred million yen it
cost to make previous models. The price would need to fall to below 10
million yen, or about $92,000, for fuel-cell cars to be a mass-market
product, he said.
"I think it wouldn't take 10 years" for his company
to slash the price of its fuel-cell car to this level, he said.
To cut the price, the company especially needs to
reduce the use of expensive precious metals and address the costliness of
the hydrogen fuel tank, he said.
Honda, Japan's second-biggest car maker by sales
volume, aims for combined lease sales of 200 vehicles of the latest
fuel-cell model for the U.S. and Japan within three years. The lease fee is
$600 a month in the U.S. The company hasn't disclosed the fee in Japan.
Honda, which obtained the world's first
certification for fuel-cell cars in the U.S. in 2002, is a leading maker of
such vehicles and has been competing in the development of the advanced car
with rivals such as Toyota Motor Corp. and General Motors Corp.
Question
When should warranty expenses be deducted all at once in a big bath rather than
deferred like bad debt expenses in an Allowance for Future Warranty Expenses
contra account?
First Consider Some Problems of Estimation
Speech by SEC Staff: Critical Accounting and Critical Disclosures
by Robert K. Herdman
Chief Accountant U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Speech Presented to the Financial Executives International —
San Diego Chapter, Annual SEC Update
San Diego, California January 24, 2002
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch537.htm
Product Warranty Example For balance, let me go
through an example of a manufacturer's warranty reserve. Consider a company
that manufactures and sells or leases equipment through a network of
dealerships. The equipment carries a warranty against manufacturer defects
for a specified period and amount of use. Provisions for estimated product
warranty expenses are made at the time of sale.
Significant estimates and assumptions are required
in determining the amount of warranty losses to initially accrue, and how
that amount should be subsequently adjusted. The manufacturer may have a
great deal of actual historical experience upon which to rely for existing
products, and that experience can provide a basis to build its estimate of
potential warranty claims for new models or products.
Necessarily, management must make certain
assumptions to adjust the historical experience to reflect the specific
uncertainties associated with the new model or product. These assumptions
about the expected warranty costs can have a significant impact on current
and future operating results and financial position.
In this example, investors may benefit from a clear
description of such items as the nature of the costs that are included in or
excluded from the liability measurement, how the estimation process differs
for new models/product lines versus existing or established models and
products, and the company's policies for continuously monitoring the
warranty liability to determine its adequacy.
In terms of sensitivity, investors would benefit
from understanding what types of historical events led to differences
between estimated and actual warranty claims or that resulted in a
significant revisions to the accrual. For example, an investor could benefit
from understanding if a new material or technique had recently been
introduced into the manufacturing of the equipment and historically such
changes have resulted in deviations of actual results from those previously
expected. Similarly, if warranty claims tend to exceed estimates, say, if
actual temperatures are higher or lower than assumed, that fact may also be
relevant to investors.
Obviously these examples don't address all of the
possible scenarios. While each company will have differing critical
accounting policies, the key points for everyone are to identify for
investors the 1) types of assumptions that underlie the most significant and
subjective estimates; 2) sensitivity of those estimates to deviations of
actual results from management's assumptions; and 3) circumstances that have
resulted in revised assumptions in the past. There is a great deal of
flexibility in providing this information and some may choose to disclose
ranges of possible outcomes.
Continued in article
Now Roll Ahead to Microsoft's Big Problem With Warranties in Year 2007
Microsoft's Billion Dollar Attempted Fix
Why isn't the need for this surprising from a company that almost always
releases products in need of fixing before they're out of the box?
In the face of staggering customer returns of the
Xbox 360 console, the software maker announces a charge of at least $1.05
billion to address the problem In the quest for supremacy in next-generation
gaming consoles, Microsoft (MSFT) had a big advantage by releasing the Xbox 360
a full year ahead of competing devices from Sony (SNE) and Nintendo (NTDOY). But
hardware failures on the device are forcing Microsoft to cede some of its
hard-won ground.
Cliff Edwards, "Microsoft's Billion-Dollar Fix," Business Week, July 6,
2007 ---
Click Here
Also see
http://www.technologyreview.com/Wire/19021/
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on July 13, 2007
"Microsoft's Videogame Efforts Take a Costly Hit" by Nick Wingfield, The
Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2007, Page: A3
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Accounting, Financial Accounting, Financial Analysis, Reserves
SUMMARY: Microsoft Corp. said it will take a $1.05 billion to $1.15 billion
pretax charge to cover defects related to its Xbox 360 game console. Microsoft
executives declined to discuss the technical problems in detail, but a person
familiar with the matter said the problem related to too much heat being
generated by the components inside the Xbox 360s. An analyst in the
consumer-electronics industry, Richard Doherty, says the magnitude of the charge
Microsoft is taking, which represents nearly $100 for every Xbox 360 shipped to
retailers so far indicates Microsoft is concerned about widespread failures or
that the company is being extremely conservative in taking this estimated
charge. The charge will be taken in the quarter ended June 30, Microsoft's
fiscal year end.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Describe the accounting for warranty expenses. In general, why must
companies report warranty expenses ahead of the time in which defective units
are submitted for repair?
2.) Why must Microsoft record this charge of over $1 billion entirely in one
quarter, the last quarter of the company's fiscal year ended June 30, 2007?
Support your answer with references to authoritative literature.
3.) How are analysts using the disclosures about the warranty charge to
assess Microsoft's expectations for the repairs that will be required and for
the general success of this line of business at Microsoft?
4.) Consider the analyst Richard Doherty's statement that either a high
number of Xbox 360s will fail or the company is being overly conservative in its
warranty estimate. What will happen in the accounting for warranty expense if
the estimate of future repairs is overly conservative?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Misleading Financial Statements:
Bankers Refusing to Recognize and Shed "Zombie Loans"
One worrying lesson for bankers and regulators
everywhere to bear in mind is post-bubble Japan. In the 1990s its leading
bankers not only hung onto their jobs; they also refused to recognise and shed
bad debts, in effect keeping “zombie” loans on their books. That is one reason
why the country's economy stagnated for so long. The quicker bankers are to
recognise their losses, to sell assets that they are hoarding in the vain hope
that prices will recover, and to make markets in such assets for their clients,
the quicker the banking system will get back on its feet.
The Economist, as quoted in Jim Mahar's blog on November 10, 2007 ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
After the Collapse of Loan Markets Banks
are Belatedly Taking Enormous Write Downs
BTW one of the important stories that are coming out is
the fact that this is affecting all tranches of the debt as even AAA rated debt
is being marked down (which is why the rating agencies are concerned). The
San Antonio Express News reminds us that conflicts of interest exist here
too.
Jime Mahar, November 10, 2007 ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
Jensen Comment
The FASB and the IASB are moving ever closer to fair value accounting for
financial instruments. FAS 159 made it an option in FAS 159. One of the main
reasons it's not required is the tremendous lobbying effort of the banking
industry. Although many excuses are given resisting fair value accounting for
financial instruments, I suspect that the main underlying reasons are those
"Zombie" loans that are overvalued at historical costs on current financial
statements.
Daniel Covitz and Paul Harrison of the
Federal Reserve Board found no evidence of credit agency conflicts of interest
problems of credit agencies, but thier study is dated in 2003 and may not apply
to the recent credit bubble and burst ---
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/feds/2003/200368/200368pap.pdf
In September 2007 some U.S. Senators
accused the rating agencies of conflicts of interest
"Senators accuse rating agencies of conflicts of interest in market turmoil,"
Bloomberg News, September 26, 2007 ---
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/09/26/business/credit.php
Also see
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2007/05/rating-agencies-weak-link.html
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
Bob Jensen's Rotten to the Core threads are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on July 9,
2004
TITLE: Accrual Accounting Can Be Costly
REPORTER: Gene Colter
DATE: Jul 02, 2004
PAGE: C3
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108871005216853178,00.html
TOPICS: Earnings Management, Earnings Quality, Financial Accounting, Financial
Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis, Restatement, Revenue Recognition
SUMMARY: The article discusses a research study relating the extent of
accrual accounting estimates to subsequent firm performance and incidence of
shareholder litigation. The study was conducted by Criterion Research Group,
LLC, and the article notes that the research is of interest to insurers that
offer directors and officers policies.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Summarize the research study described in the article. Who performed the
research? What can you understand about the relationships examined in the
project? What was the motivation for the research?
2.) Define the term accrual accounting. Is it accurately compared to cash
basis accounting by the description given in the article? Why must accrual
accounting always involve estimates?
3.) What is the overall impression of accrual accounting that is created in
the article? In your answer, comment on the statement, "Accrual accounting
is common and kosher."
4.) Describe weaknesses of cash basis accounting as compared to the issues
with accrual basis accounting that are presented in the article. Which basis do
you think better presents information that is useful to financial statement
readers? Support your answer; you may cite relevant accounting literature to do
so.
5.) What basis of accounting is being described using the computer network
example in the article? What accounting standards prescribe this treatment? Name
at least one other industry besides computer software sales in which this
accounting treatment is required.
6.) Refer again to question #5 and your answer. What alternative method must
be used in this area if accrual accounting were to be avoided entirely? What are
the disadvantages of this approach?
7.) Why do you think some companies must record more extensive accruals and
estimates than other companies must? Do these factors themselves lead to greater
likelihood of shareholder litigation as is found in the article?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
"Accrual Accounting Can Be Costly," by Gene Colter, The Wall
Street Journal, July 2, 2004, Page C1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108871005216853178,00.html
Firms Booking Aggressively Are More Likely to Be Sued By Shareholders, Study
Says
Book now. Pay later.
Pay the lawyers, maybe. A study to be
released today suggests that companies that are most aggressive when booking
noncash earnings are four times as likely to be sued by shareholders as
less-aggressive peers.
At issue is so-called accrual
accounting, in which companies book revenue when they earn it and expenses
when they incur them rather than when they actually receive the cash or pay
out the expenses. Accrual accounting is common and kosher. Problems arise,
however, when companies miscalculate how much revenue they've really earned in
a given period or how much in related expenses it cost to get that money.
For example, say Company A agrees to
build a computer network for Company B over four years for $4 million, a job
that Company A estimates it'll have to spend $1 million to complete. Company A
works hard and estimates it ended up building half the computer network in the
first year on the job, so it books $2 million of revenue that year. By
accounting rules, it must accrue related costs in the same proportion as
revenues, so it also books $500,000 of expenses in the same first year. But
say it then turns out that Company A's costs to finish the network actually
run to $2 million. Company A has to address that by booking $1.5 million of
expenses in future years. In other words, Company A would end up increasing
earnings in the first year, but at a cost to future earnings.
Getting the numbers wrong isn't a
violation of generally accepted accounting principles (though intentionally
misestimating is). But companies have a lot of leeway, and those that make the
most aggressive assumptions when booking what the green-visor guys call
accruals can end up creating a misleading picture of their financial health in
any given year. When skeptics refer to a company's "revenue recognition
problems," this is often what they're talking about.
The new study, based on six years of
data, was conducted by Criterion Research Group LLC, an independent research
firm in New York that caters primarily to institutional investors. It shows
that companies that fall into what Criterion calls the highest accrual
category are more likely to end up getting sued by shareholders.
The study builds on earlier research by
Criterion that showed companies that use more accruals underperform companies
with fewer accruals. In that report, Criterion screened 3,500 nonfinancial
companies over 40 years and found that those using the most accruals had
poorer forward earnings and stock returns and also had more earnings
restatements and Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement actions.
None of this is to say that companies
that end up in shareholder litigation set out to mislead shareholders. Rather,
says Criterion Chairman Neil Baron, these companies simply run a higher risk
of making mistakes with their books.
"Accruals are estimates," Mr.
Baron says. "If you're a company and a much higher percentage of your
earnings come from accruals or estimates, it's much more likely that you're
going to be wrong more often."
Criterion screened companies involved
in class-action suits from 1996 to 2003 for its new study. In each case it
looked at a company's earnings for the year of the class start date, which is
the year in which the alleged misbehavior began. Criterion then assigned these
companies into one of 10 ranks, with those in the 10th group using the most
accruals and those in 1st using the fewest. There were four times as many
shareholder class-action suits among 10th group companies as there were among
1st group firms.
A number of companies in the two
highest accrual categories recently settled shareholder class actions related
to accounting issues, including Rite
Aid Corp., Waste
Management Inc., MicroStrategy Inc. and Gateway
Inc. Other companies still involved in ongoing shareholder class actions
involving accounting issues also turned up in the aggressive-accruals group.
Companies currently in Criterion's
highest-accrual category include Chiron
Corp., eBay
Inc., General
Motors Corp., Halliburton
Co. and Yahoo
Inc. -- none of which now face shareholder suits related to accounting --
among others.
EBay spokesman Hani Durzy says he
doesn't think his company belongs in the high-accruals gang, noting that the
company's profit-and-loss statement "closely mirrors our cash flow."
He adds: "We are essentially a cash business."
A GM spokesman says, "All of GM's
accounting policies and procedures are in full compliance with U.S. GAAP and
are reviewed by our outside auditor and the audit committee, and we have, to
the best of our knowledge, never had to restate earnings because of an
accounting issue."
An e-mail from Halliburton's
public-relations office notes that Halliburton follows GAAP and adds that
accruals "are universally required by GAAP."
Representatives from Chiron and Yahoo
said the companies had no comment.
A Criterion analyst pointed out that
accruals don't necessarily relate to everyday operations. For example, a
company estimating and booking tax benefits from employee stock options is
also using accruals. Estimates related to pension accounting are also
accruals.
Mr. Baron stresses that the vast
majority of companies that book a lot of accruals are unlikely to face
shareholder suits, restatements or SEC actions. Many may even outperform
low-accrual companies. But he says investors should be "more
scrutinizing" of financial statements from companies that make liberal
use of accruals, because, statistically, they are most likely to run into
these problems.
Sophisticated investors, such as fund
managers, might reckon they can spot bookkeeping alarms before the broad
investing public and get out of a stock before the lawyers start filing
briefs. But it's possible that companies with a lot of accruals can suffer
even without litigation: Mr. Baron says his firm has been contacted by
insurers that offer directors and officers policies, which large companies buy
to protect executives and directors against lawsuits. The insurers are asking
about Criterion's research as they weigh whether to charge D&O customers
higher premiums, he says.
Bob Jensen's threads on revenue accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on January 28,
2005
TITLE: Quirk Could Hurt Mortgage Insurers (Quirk = FAS 60)
REPORTER: Karen Richardson
DATE: Jan 21, 2005
PAGE: C3
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110626962297132172,00.html
TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Insurance
Industry, Loan Loss Allowance, loan guarantees, Contingent Liabilities
SUMMARY: "Millions of people who can't afford to put down 10% or 20%
of a home's price are required by their mortgage lenders to buy policies from
mortgage insurers, which, by agreeing to shoulder some risk of missed loan
payments, can lower the buyer's down payment to as little as 3%."
However, as a result of a "quirk" in establishing Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 60, "Accounting and Reporting by
Insurance Enterprises" in 1982, the FASB allowed an exclusion for
mortgage insurers from requirements to reserve for future losses. This
exclusion may lead to to delayed reporting of costs associated with the
mortgage lending and of exacerbation of losses if default rates increase due
to the type of borrowers taking advantage of this insurance in the hot real
estate market.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is the purpose of mortgage insurance for a home buyer?
2.) How do mortgage insurance providers, and insurance providers in
general, earn profits on their activities? How are insurance rates determined?
In general what costs are deducted against revenues determined from those
insurance rates?
3.) Access Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 60,
"Accounting and Reporting by Insurance Enterprises," via the FASB's
web site, located at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas60.pdf From the discussion in
the summary of the standard, state the general accounting requirements
contained in this statement.
4.) Based on the discussion in the article, what is the exemption allowed
for mortgage insurers from Statement No. 60's requirements? What is the
reasoning for that exemption? What is your opinion about this reason?
5.) Refer again to the FASB Statement No. 60 on the FASB's web site. Locate
the exemption described in question 4 and give its citation.
6.) Given this accounting requirement exemption, what are the concerns with
measuring profit in the mortgage insurance industry in general (regardless of
the issues with the current real estate market)? What is the technique used to
handle that issue in financial reports? In your answer, specifically refer to,
and define, the matching concept in accounting.
7.) How does the potential caliber of the real estate buyers using mortgage
insurance exacerbate the concerns raised in question 6?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
August 7, 2006 message from Ganesh M. Pandit, DBA, CPA,
CMA
[profgmp@hotmail.com]
Hi Bob,
How would you answer this question from a student:
"I wonder if a company's Web site is considered a long-lived asset!"
Ganesh M. Pandit
Adelphi University
August 9, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Ganesh,
Accounting for Website investment is a classic
example of the issue of "matching" versus "value" accounting. From an income
statement perspective, matching requires the matching of current revenues
with the expenses of generating that revenue, including the "using up" of
fixed asset investments. But we don't depreciate investment in the site
value of land because land site value, unlike a building, is not used up due
to usage in generating revenue. Like land site value, a Website's "value"
probably increases in value over time. One might argue that a Website should
not be expensed since a successful Website, like land, is not used up when
generating revenue. However, Websites do require maintenance fees and
improvement outlays over time which makes it somewhat different than the
site investment in land that requires no such added outlays other than
property taxes that are expensed each year.
I don't think current accounting rules for Websites
are appropriate in theory ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm#Issue08
It seems to me that you can partition your Website
development and improvement outlays into various types of assets and
expenses. For example, computers used in development and maintenance of the
Website are accounted for like other computers. Software is accounted for
under software amortization accounting rules. Purchased goodwill is
accounted for like purchased goodwill under new impairment test rules. Labor
costs for Website maintenance versus improvements are more problematic.
Leased Website items are treated like leases,
although there are some complications if a Website is leased entirely. For
example, such a leased Website is not "used up" like airplanes that are
typically contracted as operating leases. Leased Website space may be
appropriately accounted for as an operating lease. But leasing an entire
Website is more like the capital lease of a land in that the asset does not
get "used up." My hunch is that most firms ignore this controversy and treat
Website leases as operating leases. It is pretty easy to bury custom
development costs into the "rental fee" for leased Website server space,
thereby burying the development costs and deferring them over the contracted
server space rental period. It would seem to me that rental fees for
Websites that are strictly used for advertising are written off as
advertising expenses. Of course many Websites are used for much more than
advertising.
Firms are taking rather rapid write-offs of
purchased Websites such as write-offs over three years. I'm not certain I
agree with this, but firms are "depreciating" these for tax purposes and you
can see them in filed SEC financial statements such as the one at Briton
International (under the Depreciation heading) ---
http://sec.edgar-online.com/2006/01/27/0001127855-06-000047/Section27.asp
It is more common in annual reports to see the term
Website Amortization instead of Website Depreciation. A few sites amortize
on the basis of Website traffic ---
http://www.nexusenergy.com/presentation6.aspx
This makes no
sense to me since traffic does not use up a Website over time.
Bob Jensen
Bob Jensen's threads on e-Commerce and e-Business
revenue accounting controversies are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm
Earnings Management and Agency Theory
The Controversy Over Earnings Smoothing and Other Manipulations
Recall when "agency theory" assumed that CEO's had personal incentives to
make accounting transparent without the need for outside regulation
requirements? This is probably still being taught in accounting theory courses
where instructors rely on old textbooks and journal articles.
In the latest twist in the stock options game, some
executives may have changed the so-called exercise date — the date options can
be converted to stock — to avoid paying hundreds of thousands of dollars in
income tax, federal investigators say . . . As those cases have progressed, at
least 46 executives and directors have been ousted from their positions.
Companies have taken charges totaling $5.3 billion to account for the impact of
improper grants, according to Glass Lewis & Company, a research firm that
advises big investors on shareholder issues. And further investigations,
indictments and restatements are expected. Securities regulators are now
focusing on several cases where it appears the exercise dates of the options
were backdated, according to a senior S.E.C. enforcement official, who asked not
to be identified because of the agency’s policy of not commenting on active
cases. Besides raising disclosure and accounting problems, backdating an
exercise date can result in tax fraud.
Eric Dash, "Dodging Taxes Is a New Stock Options Scheme," The New York Times,
October 30, 2006 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/30/business/30option.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
You can read about agency theory at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agency_Theory
You can read the following at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agency_Theory#Incentive-Intensity_Principle
Incentive-Intensity Principle
However, setting incentives as intense as possible
is not necessarily optimal from the point of view of the employer. The
Incentive-Intensity Principle states that the optimal intensity of
incentives depends on four factors: the incremental profits created by
additional effort, the precision with which the desired activities are
assessed, the agent’s risk tolerance, and the agent’s responsiveness to
incentives. According to Prendergast (1999, 8), “the primary constraint on
[performance-related pay] is that [its] provision imposes additional risk on
workers…” A typical result of the early principal-agent literature was that
piece rates tend to 100% (of the compensation package) as the worker becomes
more able to handle risk, as this ensures that workers fully internalize the
consequences of their costly actions. In incentive terms, where we conceive
of workers as self-interested rational individuals who provide costly effort
(in the most general sense of the worker’s input to the firm’s production
function), the more compensation varies with effort, the better the
incentives for the worker to produce.
Monitoring Intensity Principle
The third principle – the Monitoring Intensity
Principle – is complementary to the second, in that situations in which the
optimal intensity of incentives is high correspond to situations in which
the optimal level of monitoring is also high. Thus employers effectively
choose from a “menu” of monitoring/incentive intensities. This is because
monitoring is a costly means of reducing the variance of employee
performance, which makes more difference to profits in the kinds of
situations where it is also optimal to make incentives intense.
Probably the best illustration of earnings management (both legitimate and
fraudulent) is the saga of Enron --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnron.htm#Quotations
Earnings Management Deception
The 1999 bulletin also said that if accounting
practices were intentionally misleading "to impart a sense of increased earnings
power, a form of earnings management, then by definition amounts involved would
be considered material." AIG hinted some errors may have been intentional,
saying that certain transactions "appear to have been structured for the sole or
primary purpose of accomplishing a desired accounting result."
Jonathan Weil, "AIG's Admission Puts the Spotlight On Auditor PWC," The Wall
Street Journal, April 1, 2005 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111231915138095083,00.html?mod=home_whats_news_us
Bob Jensen's threads on the AIG mess are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudRotten.htm#MutualFunds
It's not clear who got the earnings game going (meeting
earnings forecasts by one penny): executives or
investors. But it's past time for it to stop. As the Progressive example shows,
those companies that continue the charade do it by choice.
Gretchen Morgenson, "Pennies That Aren't From Heaven," The
New York Times, November 7, 2004 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/07/business/yourmoney/07watch.html?ex=1100836709&ei=1&en=8f6b67cd8cfe4757
Ask any chief executive officer if he or she practices
the art of earnings management and you will undoubtedly hear an emphatic
"Of course not!" But ask those same executives about their company's
recent results, and you may very well hear a proud "we beat the analysts'
estimate by a penny."
While almost no one wants to admit to managing
company earnings, the fact is, almost everybody does it. How else to explain
the miraculous manner in which so many companies meet or beat, by the
preposterous penny, the consensus earnings estimates of Wall Street
analysts?
After years of such miracles, investors finally
seem to be wising up to the fact that an extra penny of profit is not only
meaningless but may also be evidence of earnings management and, therefore,
bad news. After all, the practice can hide
what's genuinely going on in a company's books.
A study by Thomson Financial examined how many of
the 30 companies in the Dow Jones industrial average missed, met or beat
analysts' consensus earnings estimates during each quarter over the last
five years. It also looked at how the companies' shares responded to the
results.
Over the period, on average, almost half of the
companies - 46.1 percent - met consensus estimates or beat them by a penny.
Pulling off such a feat in an uncertain world
smacks of earnings management. "It is not possible for this percentage
of reporting companies to hit the bull's-eye," said Bill Fleckenstein,
principal at Fleckenstein Capital in Seattle. "Business is too
complicated; there are too many moving parts."
The precision has a purpose, of course: to keep
stock prices aloft. According to Thomson's five-year analysis, companies
whose results came in below analysts' estimates lost 1.08 percent of their
value, on average, the day of the announcement. The loss averaged 1.59
percent over five days.
Executives have lots of levers to pull to make
their numbers. Lowering the company's tax rate is a favorite, as is
recognizing revenues before they actually come in or monkeying with reserves
set aside to cover future liabilities.
If all else fails and a company faces the nightmare
of an earnings miss, its spinmeisters can always begin a whispering campaign
to persuade Wall Street analysts to trim their estimates, making them more
attainable. Their stock might drift downward as a result, but the damage is
not usually as horrific as it is when earnings miss the target unexpectedly.
So it is not surprising that the strategy has
become so widespread and that fewer companies in the Thomson study are
coming in below their target these days. For the first three quarters of
2004, 10.9 percent missed their expected results, down from 11.7 percent in
2003 and 25 percent in 2002.
At the heart of earnings management is - what else?
- executive compensation. The greater the percentage of pay an executive
receives in stock, the bigger the incentive to produce results that propel
share prices.
Continued in the article
Coke: Gone Flat at the Bright Lines of Accounting Rules and Marketing
Ethics
The king of carbonated beverages is still a moneymaker, but its growth has
stalled and the stock has been backsliding since the late '90s. Now it
turns out that the company's glory days were as much a matter of accounting
maneuvers as of marketing magic.
Guizuenta's most ingenious contribution to Coke, the
ingredient that added rocket fuel to the stock price, was a bit of creative
though perfectly legal balance-sheet rejeiggering that in some ways prefigured
the Enron Corp. machinations. Known inside the company as the "49%
solution," it was the brain child of then-Chief Financial Officer M.
Douglas Ivester. It worked like this: Coke spun off its U.S.
bottling operations in late 1986 into a new company known as Coca-Cola
Enterprises Inc., retaining a 49% state for itself. That was enough to
exert de facto control but a hair below the 50% threshold that requires
companies to consolidate results of subsidiaries in their financials. At
a stroke, Coke erased $2.4 billion of debt from its balance sheet.
Dean Foust, "Gone Flat," Business Week, December 20, 2004,
Page 77.
This is a Business Week cover story.
Coca Cola's outside independent auditor is Ernst & Young
There were other problems, some of which did not do the famed Warren
Buffet's reputation any good. See "Fizzy Math and Fishy Marketing
Lawsuit, Probes Prove Damaging to Coke," by Margaret Webb Pressler, Washington
Post, June 20, 2003 --- http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A14384-2003Jun19¬Found=true
Coca Cola's marketing tactics were unethical and unhealthy for kids --- http://www.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ362/hallam/Coke%20Officials%20Beefed%20Up.pdf
Also see "The Ten Habits of Highly Defective Corporations," From The
Nation --- http://www.greenmac.com/World_Events/thetenha.html
Goodwill and Other Asset
Impairment
"MCI Inc. Posts $3.4 Billion Loss For 3rd Quarter," by
Shawn Young, The Wall Street Journal, November 5, 2004, Page B2 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB109956924948864745,00.html?mod=technology_main_whats_news
Results Reflect Write-Off Of $3.5 Billion on Assets; Revenue in 2004
to Drop
Results Reflect Write-Off Of $3.5 Billion on
Assets; Revenue in 2004 to Drop By SHAWN YOUNG Staff Reporter of THE
WALL STREET JOURNAL November 5, 2004; Page B2
MCI Inc. reported a $3.4 billion
third-quarter loss, reflecting a $3.5 billion write-off the phone
giant has said it is taking on assets that have lost value.
The company also cautioned that 2004 revenue
will be slightly below the $21 billion to $22 billion it had projected
early in the year.
"Slightly means slightly," said
Chief Executive Michael Capellas. He noted that the company hadn't
changed its projections since a regulatory setback led MCI and larger
rival AT&T Corp. to virtually abandon marketing of home phone
service to consumers. Both companies are now focused almost
exclusively on business customers.
Despite the revenue decline, MCI projects a
fourth-quarter profit, the result of improving margins, lower costs
and a little stabilization in the price wars that have wracked the
long-distance industry. The profit would be the first for the former
WorldCom Inc. in years. The company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection in 2002 in the wake of a massive accounting fraud. It
emerged under the name MCI in April.
The improving trends that could produce a
fourth-quarter profit were also evident in operating results for the
third quarter, which largely met investor expectations.
Continued in the article
Bob Jensen's threads on the Worldcom and MCI scandals are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnron.htm#WorldCom
"How to Avoid
the Goodwill Asteroid," by Jon D. Markman, TheStreet.com, May 24,
2002 --- http://www.thestreet.com/funds/supermodels/10024147.html
One of the
gravest fears of investors today is being totaled by an
"asteroid" event -- moments when a stock gets pushed to the
edge of extinction by a bolt from the blue, such as a drug application
rejection, a securities probe revelation or a surprise earnings
restatement.
Yet many
shareholders seem blithely unaware that at least one asteroid speeding
toward their companies is entirely foreseeable: the likelihood that
management will have to write down a decent-sized chunk of their net
worth sometime this year and perhaps rather soon.
This
unfortunate prospect is faced, potentially, by companies such as AOL
Time Warner (AOL:NYSE
- news
- commentary
- research
- analysis),
Allied Waste Industries (AW:NYSE
- news
- commentary
- research
- analysis),
Georgia-Pacific (GP:NYSE
- news
- commentary
- research
- analysis)
and Cendant (CD:NYSE
- news
- commentary
- research
- analysis)
that have accumulated a great deal of goodwill on their balance sheets
over the past few years. That's accountant-speak for the amount a
company pays for another company over its book value because of
expectations that some of its intangible assets -- such as patented
technology, a prized brand name or desirable executives -- will prove
valuable in a concrete, earnings-enhancing sort of way.
New
Accounting Rules
Companies carry
goodwill on their balance sheets as if it were an asset as solid as a
piece of machinery, and therefore it is one of many items balanced
against liabilities, such as long-term debt, to measure shareholder
equity or book value. Just as hard assets are depreciated, or
expensed, by a certain amount each year to account for their
diminished value as they age, intangibles have long been amortized by
a certain amount annually to account for their waning value.
The value of
machinery rarely dissipates quickly, but the value of goodwill can
evaporate in a flash if a company determines that it paid too much for
intangible assets -- e.g., if a patent or brand turns out not to be as
defensible as originally believed, or demand for a new technology
falters. As you can imagine, companies typically don't want to admit
they overpaid. But once they do, they must write down the vanished
value so that the "intangibles" lines on their balance
sheets reflect fair-market pricing. If the writedown leaves a
company's assets at a level lower than liabilities, the company is
left with a negative net worth, which, as you would expect, is frowned
upon, and often results in a dramatically lower stock price.
Until last
year, companies tried to avoid recording goodwill after acquisitions
by using a method of accounting called "pooling of
interests." In these stock-for-stock deals, companies were
allowed to record the acquiree's assets at book value even though the
value of the stock it had given up was greater than the amount of real
stuff its shareholders received. The advantage: No need to drag down
earnings each quarter by amortizing, or expensing, goodwill.
The rulebook
changed this year, however, and pooling went the way of the dodo; now
companies are forced to record goodwill on their books. As a
compromise to serial acquirers, who have a powerful lobby, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) decided that companies
would no longer have to amortize goodwill regularly against earnings.
Instead, a new standard -- encompassed in Rule 142 -- requires
companies to test goodwill for "impairment" periodically.
Essentially,
this means that while the diminished value of goodwill won't count
against a company's earnings annually anymore, companies might need to
write down huge gobs of it from time to time when accountants decide
they can't ignore the fact that an acquisition didn't turn out as
planned. It also means that because FASB 142 does not dictate a set of
strictly objective rules for calculating impairment, writedowns will
be somewhat subjective in both timing and amount.
Don't Fall
for These Three Ploys
As a result,
many market skeptics believe that FASB 142, which was intended to
improve earnings transparency, may in some cases actually result in
more egregious earnings manipulation than ever. Donn Vickrey, vice
president at Camelback Research Alliance, a provider of analytical
tools and consulting services for financial information, says he sees
three ways that companies interested in managing their earnings could
end-run shareholders using the new rule.
The big
bath.
In this approach, companies will write off a big portion of the
goodwill on their books, telling investors it is an insignificant
"paper loss" that should have no impact on the firm's share
price. The benefit: Future write-offs would be unnecessary, and the
company's earnings stream could be more effectively smoothed out in
future periods. This approach would work only if it does not put the
company at risk of violating debt covenants that require it to
maintain a certain ratio of assets vs. liabilities.
Cosmetic
earnings boost.
Under FASB 142, many companies will record earnings that appear higher
than last year's because of the elimination of goodwill amortization.
However, the increase will be purely cosmetic, as the company's
underlying cash flow and profitability would remain unchanged.
Investors should thus ensure they are comparing prior periods with the
current period on an apples-to-apples basis by eliminating goodwill
amortization from comparable year-earlier financial statements. The
amount might be buried in footnotes to the balance sheet, though Kellogg
(K:NYSE
- news
- commentary
- research
- analysis)
explains the issue clearly in its latest 10-k in the section devoted
to its acquisition of cookie maker Keebler in March 2001. Kellogg says
it recorded $90.4 million in intangible amortization expense during
2001 and would have recorded $121 million in 2002 had it not adopted
FASB 142 at the start of the year.
Avoid-a-write-off.
Some companies might take advantage of the new rule by avoiding a
goodwill write-off as long as possible to prevent the big charge to
earnings. Since the tests for impairment are subjective, Camelback
believes it will not be hard for firms to avoid write-offs in the
short run -- a strategy that could both help them avoid violations in
debt covenants and potentially provide a boost in executive
compensation formulas.
While any
public company that does acquisitions will find itself facing
decisions about how to account for goodwill impairment, companies with
the greatest absolute levels of goodwill -- as well as ones with the
greatest amount of goodwill relative to their market capitalization --
will be the most vulnerable in the future to having their earnings
blasted by the FASB 142 asteroid.
Continued at http://www.thestreet.com/funds/supermodels/10024147.html
"The Revisions
to IFRS 3: Bad Enough to Abandon Faith in IFRS?"
by Tom Selling, The Accounting Onion, June 16, 2008 ---
http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/06/ifrs-3-fall-short-of-convergence-again.html
In my
previous post, I described how an SEC honcho, while speaking to the
choir at an event sponsored by FEI, espoused his version of
faith-based accounting; though he could not provide a single, solid
reason to explain why the U.S. should adopt IFRS, he has seen the
light and has become a true believer. In contrast, reason-based
accounting permits recitation of a vast litany of blasphemies
against IFRS to make one a serious, if not committed, agnostic.
Today, I write of one of these latest abominations: the latest
revision to IFRS 3 on the accounting for business combinations.
Goodwill
and NCI: IASB Fakes Right and Goes Left
Perhaps
the most significant development in the accounting for business
combinations is that FAS 141(R) now requires the same basis of
measurement for assets acquired and liabilities assumed, regardless
of the percentage of a company acquired (so long as control is
achieved). Therefore, if control is attained without purchasing 100%
of the existing equity interests in the acquiree, non-controlling
interests (NCI) must be measured at full fair value.
As you
may be aware from reading my post "What Good Comes from Goodwill
Accounting?", I am not a big fan of recognizing 'goodwill' under any
circumstance, so I will grant that the justification for the FASB's
approach is not airtight. Nevertheless, it was common knowledge that
the FASB was given to understand that, by sticking its neck out to
make these controversial changes to FAS 141(R), the IASB would
follow suit.
Instead,
the IASB renegged on its promise in the worst way imaginable: they
voted to allow entities a free choicebetween the partial and full
fair value alternatives to goodwill and NCI measurement. What's
more, issuers can make their choice on a transaction-by-transaction
basis -- kind of like going to church one week and synagouge the
next. Not even the most devoted acolyte can spin this any other way
except as a significant step backwards from establishing the IASB as
a credible agent of quality financial reporting and investor
protection.
And,
it's not just me who is outraged. Read the strongly-worded dissents*
of Mary Barth and John Smith, two of the three Americans on the IASB.
As to the third American, Jim Leisenring, I guess I shouldn't be
surprised that he capitulated to the majority. Leisenring was the
most prominent voice in support of FAS 133 (on hedge accounting)
when he was on the FASB; a standard whose middle name is
inconsistency. Be that as it may, one can only imagine where the
IASB will take the interests of U.S. investors when our membership,
and hence our influence, on IFRS inevitably wanes.
Mind
These GAAPs, Too
If the
unprincipled and unconstrained choice of accounting treatments for
goodwill and NCI aren't enough for you to abandon any faith in a
high-quality convergence, consider two more of the numerous
departures from U.S. GAAP; these may be even worse.
First,
the devilish game of managing the timing of contingent liabilities
still thrives in IFRS. FAS 141(R) now requires that any
non-contractual, contingent liability assumed in a business
combination must be recognized at fair value, if the probability of
occurrence is more likely than not. IFRS allows any contingent
liability to be recognized, regardless of likelihood, if it can be
reliably measured.
As I
discussed in a previous post on IASB machinations of contingent
liability accounting, the ubiquitous criterion of "reliable
measurement" is one of those areas of "judgement" in IFRS that help
management make their numbers with little chance of being challenged
by auditors. Here is how this game will be played in a business
combination under IFRS 3(R): if management thinks that goodwill
won't be impaired any time soon, they will recognize contingent
liabilities to the max. The effect is to create an earnings bank of
liability writedowns when unlikely events become, as anticipated,
resolved without the incurrence of an actual liability. And speaking
of inconsistency, IFRS 3(R) provides that all intangible assets are
to be recognized, even if their fair values cannot be measured
reliably. Where is the "principle" for that one?
Second,
FAS 141(R) requires extensive disclosures that are designed to aid
analysts in determining the past and future effect of a business
combination on earnings and financial position. For example, FAS
141(R) requires the following disclosures:
The
amount of revenue and earnings of the acquiree since the date of
acquisition. Revenue and earnings of the combined entity for the
current period as though the acquisition had been consummated as of
the beginning of the period Revenue and earnings of the combined
entity for the previous period, as if the acquisition had been
consummated as of the beginning of the previous period.
Inexplicably, IFRS does not require the third item, above.
Therefore, inferences as to earnings trends of the combined entity
from historical financial statements are defeated.
The
recent activities of the IASB, the high priests of IFRS, confirm
that they are most definitely not the august body to which the
future of U.S. financial accounting standards should be entrusted.
To those who persist in practicing faith-based accounting, put
IFRS's accounting for business combinations in your pipe and smoke
it.
--------------------------
*Unlike statements of the FASB, IFRS publications are not freely
available. Just thought you might want to know why I didn't provide
a link.
Bob
Jensen's threads on goodwill accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#Impairment
IFRS 3 on
Business Combinations
Contents
paragraphs Introduction IN1–IN16 International Financial Reporting
Standard 3 Business Combinations Objective 1 Scope 2–13 Identifying
a business combination 4–9 Business combinations involving entities
under common control 10–13 Method of accounting 14–15 Application of
the purchase method 16–65 Identifying the acquirer 17–23 Cost of a
business combination 24–35 Adjustments to the cost of a business
combination contingent on future events 32–35 Allocating the cost of
a business combination to the assets acquired and liabilities and
contingent liabilities assumed 36–60 Acquiree's identifiable assets
and liabilities 41–44 Acquiree's intangible assets 45–46 Acquiree's
contingent liabilities 47–50 Goodwill 51–55 Excess of acquirer's
interest in the net fair value of acquiree's identifiable assets,
liabilities and contingent liabilities over cost 56–57 Business
combination achieved in stages 58–60 Initial accounting determined
provisionally 61–65 Adjustments after the initial accounting is
complete 63–64 Recognition of deferred tax assets after the initial
accounting is complete 65 Disclosure 66–77 Transitional provisions
and Effective date 78–85 Previously recognised goodwill 79–80
Previously recognised negative goodwill 81 Previously recognised
intangible assets 82 Equity accounted investments 83–84 Limited
retrospective application 85 Withdrawal of Other Pronouncements
86–87 Appendices A Defined terms B Application supplement C
Amendments to other IFRSs Approval of IFRS 3 by the Board Basis for
Conclusions Dissenting opinions on IFRS 3 Illustrative Examples
[Extracted from IFRS 3, Business Combinations. © IASC Foundation.]
From The Wall Street Journal
Accounting Educators' Review on Junly 30, 2004
TITLE: FASB May Bite Into Overseas Profits
REPORTER: Lingling Wei
DATE: Jul 28, 2004
PAGE: C3
LINK: Print Only
TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board,
International Accounting Standards Board
SUMMARY: The FASB has voted 4-3 to instruct the staff to examine
"whether it is practical to require companies to book a liability
for taxes they potentially owe on profits earned and held
overseas."
QUESTIONS:
1.) What was the vote undertaken at the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB)? Did this vote actually establish a new accounting
requirement? Explain, commenting on the FASB's process for establishing
a new accounting standard.
2.) Why did the FASB undertake this step with respect to deferred
taxes? How does it fit in with other work being undertaken in concert
with the International Accounting Standards Board?
3.) FASB member Michael Crooch comments that "there is a fair
amount of opposition to the change" proposed by the FASB. Do you
think such opposition is unusual or common for FASB proposals? Support
your answer.
4.) Define the term "deferred taxes". When must deferred
taxes be recorded? Why do we bother to record them? That is, how does
the process of reporting deferred taxes help to improve reporting in the
balance sheet and income statement?
5.) What taxes currently are recorded on foreign earnings? Why do
companies currently not calculate deferred taxes for profits on foreign
earnings? Why then would any change in this area result in "a major
hit to earnings"?
6.) Why do you think that companies might reconsider repatriating
foreign earnings if they must begin to record deferred taxes on those
amounts? What does your answer imply in regards to the economic
consequences of accounting policies?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
From The
Wall Street Journal
Accounting Educators' Review
on December 13, 2002
TITLE: International Body to Suggest Tighter Merger Accounting
REPORTER: Silvia Ascarelli and Cassell Bryan-Low
DATE: Dec 05, 2002
PAGE: A2
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1039033389416080833.djm,00.html
TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting, Financial
Statement Analysis, Goodwill, International Accounting, International
Accounting Standards Board, Restructuring
SUMMARY: The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is
proposing a new standard for business combination accounting. The
proposal prescribes accounting treatment that is more stringent than
U.S. standards. For example, it disallows recording restructuring
charges at the outset of a business combination; such charges must
simply be recorded as incurred.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Compare and contrast the standard for business combinations proposed
by the IASB to the current U.S. standard. To investigate these
differences directly from the source, access the IASB's web site at
http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp.
2.) Why are U.S. companies expected to be concerned about recording
restructuring charges as they are incurred in the process of
implementing a business combination, rather than when these anticipated
costs are identified at the outset of a business combination? Do these
two accounting treatments result in differing amounts of expense being
recorded for these restructuring charges? Will such U.S. companies be
required to report according to this IAS, assuming it is implemented?
3.) How are the goodwill disclosures proposed in the IAS expected to
help financial statement analysis?
4.) How are European companies expected to be impacted by this
proposed IAS and future proposals currently planned in this area of
accounting for business combinations? Provide your answer by considering
not only the article under this review, but also by again accessing the
IASB's web site referenced above.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
Program professors can search past editions of Educators' Reviews at http://ProfessorJournal.com.
Go to the Educators' Review section and click on "Search the
Database." You can also change your discipline selection or remove
yourself from the mailing list.
|
Some intangible assets are booked and amortized. Accounting guidance in this area
dates back to APB 17. Usually these are contractual or legal rights (patents,
copyrights, etc.) and amortizations and write downs are to be based on the following
provisions in Paragraph 27 of APB 17:
The Board believes that the value of intangible assets at any one
date eventually disappears and that the recorded costs of intangible assets should be
amortized by systematic charges to income over the periods estimated to be benefited.
Factors which should be considered in estimating the useful lives of intangible assets
include:
- Legal, regulatory, or contractual provisions may limit the maximum
useful life.
- Provisions for renewal or extension may alter a specified limit on
useful life.
- Effects of obsolescence, demand, competition, and other economic
factors may reduce a useful life.
- A useful life may parallel the service life expectancies of
individuals or groups of employees.
- Expected actions of competitors and others may restrict present
competitive advantages.
- An apparently unlimited useful life may in fact be indefinite and
benefits cannot be reasonably projected.
- An intangible asset may be a composite of many individual factors
with varying effective lives.
When a company purchases another company, the purchase price may soar way above the
book value of the acquired firm. The reason for the unbooked excess is the
unbooked market values of booked and unbooked assets plus synergy increments less
negative value of unbooked liabilities. Paragraph 39 of FAS 141 requires the partitioning
of the unbooked excess value into (1) separable versus (2) inseparable components of
unbooked excess purchase value. The inseparable portion is then booked as
"goodwill." This portion is then booked as goodwill and is carried forward
as an asset subject to impairment tests of FAS 142. Paragraph
39 of FAS 141 requires an intangible asset to be recognized as an asset apart from
goodwill if it arises from:
· contractual or other legal rights,
regardless of whether those rights are transferable or separable
from the acquired entity or from other rights and obligations; or
· separable,
that is, it is capable of being separated or divided from the acquired entity and sold, transferred, licensed, rented, or exchanged regardless of
whether there is an intent to do so. An intangible
asset is still considered separable if it can be sold transferred,
licensed, rented, or exchanged in combination with a related contract, asset or liability.
Paragraphs 10-28 of FAS 141 provides examples of intangible assets that are considered
"separable" and are not to be confounded in the goodwill account. But the
majority of the unbooked excess value is usually the inseparable goodwill arising from
"knowledge capital" arising from the following components:
Knowledge Capital Components |
- Spillover Knowledge (see above)
- Human Resources (see above)
- Structural Capital (see above)
|
Knowledge capital arises generally from the conservatism concept that guides the FASB
and other standard setters around the world. For example, human resources are not
owned, controlled, bought, and sold like tangible assets. As a result, investment in
training are expensed rather than capitalized. Research and development expenditures
are expensed rather than booked under the highly conservatism rulings in FAS 2. This
includes most R&D in database and software development except when impacted by FAS 86.
Knowledge capital is often the major component of goodwill. But
"goodwill" as defined in FAS 141 and 142 is a hodgepodge of other positive and
negative components that comprise the net excess value difference between the market value
of total owners' equity and the value of the firm as a whole. This is summarized
below:
Goodwill Components |
+ Market value of Owners' Equity ($10 billion)
- Book value of Owners' Equity ($01 billion)
= Market to book difference in value ($09 billion)
- Adjustment of booked items to fair value ($04 billion)
= Goodwill that includes the following components ($5 billion)
- Unbooked synergy value of booked items (+$1 billion)
- Unbooked knowledge capital value (+$04 billion)
- Other unbooked items (-$01 billion)
- Joint effects, including other synergies (+$01 billion)
|
The components of goodwill are not generally additive. For example, a firm has
just been purchased for $10 billion and has a book equity value of $1 billion. The
market to book ratio is therefore 10=$10/$1. Suppose the value of the individual
booked assets and liabilities sums to $5 billion even though the booked value on a
historical cost basis is only $1 billion. However, when combined as a bundle of
booked items, assume there is a combined value of $6 billion, because the value of the
combined booked items is worth more than the $5 billion sum of the parts. For
example, if an airline sells its booked airplanes and airport facilities, these many be
worth more as a bundle than the sum of the values of all the pieces. If there were
no unbooked items, the value of the firm would be $6 billion, thereby, resulting in $1
billion in goodwill arising entirely from synergy of booked items.
However, the value of the equity is $10 billion rather than $6 billion. This
difference is due to the net value of the unbooked asset and liability items and the
synergies they create in combination with one another. For example, if an airline
sells the entire business in addition to its airplanes and airport facilities, there is
added value due to the intellectual capital components such as experienced mechanics,
flight crews, computer systems, and ground crews. There are also negative components
such as unbooked operating lease obligations on airplanes not booked on the balance sheet.
The components of goodwill are not additve in value, but in combination they sum to the
$5 billion in goodwill equal to the market value of the combined equity minus the sum of
the market values of the booked items (without the $1 billion in unbooked synergy
value). When combined with the booked items, the unbooked knowledge capital takes on
more value than $4 billion it can be sold for individually. For example, if American
Airlines sold its entire SABRE reservations system in one sale and the remainder of the
company in another sale, the sum would probably be less than the combined value of the
unbooked SABRE system plus all of the booked items belonging to American Airlines.
This is because there is synergy value between the booked and unbooked items. One of
the synergy items is leverage. Values of booked debt and assets may be more additive
in firms having low debt/equity ratios than in high leverage firms where there investors
adjust added values for higher risk.
If investors seek to extrapolate firm value from balance sheet value, they will
discover that historical costs are useless and that adustments of booked items to fair
value falls way short of total value. The problem is that major components of value
never appear on the balance sheets. The unbooked knowledge capital components of
firm value have become so enormous that it is not uncommon to find market to book values
of equity way in excess of the ten to one ratio illustrated above.
Goodwill cannot be booked in the United States except when there is a combining of two
companies that must now be accounted for as a purchase under FAS 141. Goodwill is
the purchase price less the current fair values of the booked items (not adjusted for
synergy value). No formal attempt is made to report the portion that is knowledge
capital, although management may justify the business combination on some identified
knowledge capital items. For example, if Microsoft purchased PeopleSoft, Bill Gates
would make a public explanation of why the value of PeopleSoft is almost entirely due to
unbooked items relative to booked items in PeopleSoft's balance sheet.
The main reason why goodwill cannot be booked, unless there is a business combination
transaction, is that estimation of the value of the firm on an ongoing basis is too
expensive and subject to enormous measurement error. One common approach is to
multiply the market price per share times the number of shares outstanding. But this
is usually far different from the price buyers are willing to pay for all of the shares
outstanding. This difference arises in part because acquiring control usually is far
more valueable than the sum of the shares at current trading values. This difference
arises in part because current share prices are subject to transient market price
movements of shares of all traded companies, whereas the value of the firm in a business
combination deal is much more stable.
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on April
4, 2002 TITLE: Why High-Fliers Built on Big Ideas, Are Such Fast Fallers
REPORTER: Greg Ip
DATE: Apr 04, 2002
PAGE: A1
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,4287,SB1017872963341079920,00.html
TOPICS: Intangible Assets, Electricity Markets, Goodwill, Managerial Accounting,
Pharmaceutical Industry, Research & Development
SUMMARY: Greg Ip reports on the perils of life-cycle differences based on products and
services that are reliant on intangible rather than tangible assets. That value is created
with either is undeniable, but significantly riskier when that value is supported by
something intangible that may disappear entirely.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is a product life cycle? How many of the 5 basic stages of a product's life can
you name? What has happened to the product life cycle that is heavily dependent on
technological changes? What part does intangible assets have in this change? How could the
$5 billion in assets of a firm sell for $42 million?
2.) What does the author mean when he says "value today is increasingly derived
from intangible assets - intellectual property, innovative technology, financial services
or reputation"? Explain in terms of Alan Greenspan's statement "a firm is
inherently fragile if its value-added emanates more from conceptual as distinct from
physical assets."
3.) The article relates the story of Polaroid, once a pioneer noted for its
technological prowess. Its "technology" asset formed the basis of its early
success. How did technology and innovation finally slay it?
4.) Other industries are exposed to the same sorts of forces, including the
pharmaceutical and fiber-optic industries. How have they fared?
5.) Why have companies tried to cast off hard assets in favor of intangible assets? In
2000, Jeffrey Skilling said, " What's becoming clear is that there's nothing magic
about hard assets. They don't generate cash. What does is a better solution for your
customer. And increasingly that's intellectual, not physical assets, driven." Do you
suppose he's changed his mind?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University |
A common mistake is to assume that "goodwill" is comprised only of unbooked
assets such as knowledge capital. Nothing could be further from the truth in terms
of how goodwill is calculated under FAS 141 rules. Goodwill also includes downward
value adjustments for unbooked risk items such as off-balance sheet financing, pending and
potential litigation losses, pending and possible adverse legislative and taxation
actions, estimated environmental protection expenses, and various industry-specific
liabilities such as unbooked frequent flyer certificate obligations.
From The Wall Street Journal
Accounting Educators' Reviews on June 20, 2002 TITLE: Frequent-Flier Programs Get an Overhaul
REPORTER: Ron Lieber
DATE: Jun 18, 2002
PAGE: D1 LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1024344325710894400.djm,00.html
TOPICS: Frequent-flier programs, Accounting
SUMMARY: Many frequent-flier programs are
offering alternative rewards in exchange for frequent-flier miles. Questions focus on
accounting for frequent-flier programs and redemption of miles.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is a frequent-flier program? List three possible ways to account for
frequent-flier miles awarded to customers in exchange for purchases. Discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of each accounting method.
2.) Why are companies offering alternative
rewards in exchange for frequent-flier miles? How is the redemption of miles reported in
the financial statements? Discuss accounting issues that arise if the miles are redeemed
for awards that are less costly than originally anticipated.
3.) The article states that the 'surge in
unredeemed points is causing bookkeeping headaches.' Why would unredeemed points cause
bookkeeping headaches? Would companies be better off if the points were never redeemed? If
a company created a liability for awarded points, in what circumstances could the
liability be removed from the balance sheet?
4.) Refer to the related article. Describe Jet
Blue's frequent-flier program. How does stipulating a one-year expiration on
frequent-flier points change accounting for a frequent-flier program?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode
Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
--- RELATED ARTICLES ---
TITLE: JetBlue Joins the Fray But With Big Caveat: Miles Expire in a Year
REPORTER: Ron Lieber
PAGE: D1
ISSUE: Jun 18, 2002
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB102434443936545600.djm,00.html |
Liabilities and Equity
of Microsoft Corporation
The off-balance sheet liabilities of Microsoft dwarf the
recorded liabilities.
- The major risk of Microsoft is the ease with which its products can be duplicated elsewhere
such as in China. From a global perspective this gives rise to perhaps billions in
lost revenues and enormous expenditures to protect copyrights.
- There are enormous contingency risks and pending
lawsuits, particularly government lawsuits alleging abuse of monopoly powers and civil
lawsuits from companies claiming unfair marketing practices and copyright infringements.
|
Entrenched Assets and Market Dominance
- Microsoft Windows and MS Office
- AMR Sabre
- Oracle Databases
- AOL
Market-to-Book (ratio of market value of net
assets/book value of net assets) > 6.0
Conservatism is Largely to Blame
- R&D expensed under FASB, but only R expensed
by IAS
- Amazon.com's tremendous investment in systems,
marketing, and distribution software
- AOL's customer acquisition costs
- Distrust of valuations that are highly subjective
and subject to extreme volatility
Institutional Investors and Security Analysts Are
Also At Fault
|
Wages of factory workers are traced directly into finished goods inventories
and are "capitalized" costs rather than expenses. They are
carried in the balance sheet as "tangible assets" until the the
inventory items are sold or perish. Then these costs become
"expenses" in the income statement and are written off to the Retained
Earnings account. Similarly, wages of construction workers on a building
are capitalized into the Buildings asset account rather than expensed in the
income statement. These wages become expensed over time in periodic
depreciation charges. Costs of labor and direct materials that can be traced to
construction of tangible assets thereby become assets and are written off across
future periods. Even indirect labor and material charges may be
capitalized as overhead applied to tangible assets. Tangible assets depict
"touchable" items that can be purchased and sold in established
markets such as commodity markets, real estate markets, and equipment
markets.
Wages and salaries of research workers can be traced to particular
projects. However, under most accounting standards worldwide, research
costs, including all direct material, labor, and overhead costs are
expensed immediately rather than capitalized as assets even though the revenues
from the projects may not commence until many years into the future.
Research projects are typically too unique and too uncertain to be traded in
markets. Accounting standard setters recognize that there are many
"intangible" items having future benefits or losses that are not
booked as assets or liabilities. Outlays for development of intangibles
are expensed rather than capitalized until they can be better matched with the
revenues they generate. Examples in include research for new or improved
products. Intangibles also include contractual items such as copyrights,
advertising, product promotions, and public relations outlays. When
intangibles such as patents and copyrights are purchased, the outlays can be
booked as intangible assets. Costs are then amortized over time.
However, resources devoted to discovery and development of intangibles are
generally not booked as assets. They are expensed when incurred rather
than capitalized. Typical examples of intangible expenses include the
following:
- Research (including development of patent and copyright items)
- Long-term development of patents, products, and copyrights
- Advertising and trademarks
- Employee training and development
- Public relations
When an entire firm is purchased, the difference between the total price and
the current value of all intangibles is typically booked to a
"Goodwill" asset account. When purchased as a lump sum, goodwill
can be carried as an asset until its value is deemed to be
"impaired." However, when developed internally, goodwill is not
booked as an asset. This creates all sorts of problems when comparing
similar companies where one company purchased its goodwill and the other company
developed it internally. In the U.S., goodwill accounting must be treated
under purchase rather than pooling methods that, in turn, result in booking of
"purchased goodwill." FAS 141 spells out the accounting
standards for Goodwill.
One requirement under FAS 141 is that contractual items such as patents and
copyrights that can be separated from goodwill must be valued separately and be
immediately expensed. This is an attempt in FAS 141 to make it easier to
compare a firm that acquires R&D in a business combination with a firm that
develops its own R&D. However, implementation of FAS 141 rules in this
regard becomes very murky.
FAS 142 dictates that firms are no longer required to amortize capitalized
goodwill costs. Instead firms are required to run impairment tests and
expense portions of goodwill that has been deemed "impaired."
FAS 142 does not alter standards for intangibles that are not acquired in a
business combination. Hence, standards such as FAS 2 (R&D), FAS 19
(Oil and Gas), FAS 50 (Recording Industry), and FAS 86 (Computer Software)
remain intact in situations apart from business combinations. Paragraph
39(b) of FAS 142 admits to the following:
In some cases, the cost of generating an intangible asset
internally
cannot be distinguished from the cost of maintaining or
enhancing ... internally generated goodwill.
There is nothing new about the sad state of accounting for
intangibles. In a working paper entitled "The Measurement and
Recognition of Intangible Assets: Then and Now," Claire Eckstein from
Fairleigh Dickinson University quotes the following footnote from 1928:
The Gold Dust Corporation
August 31, 1928
In view of the available surplus, and in the fact that the
corporation carries its most valuable asset, viz, its goodwill at $1, and
also because of the uncertain market value of industrial plants, it was
concluded that it would be entirely approprate for the corporation to
carry its plants in a similar manner as its goodwill, viz, at the nominal
value of $1. |
The FASB admits that accounting for intangibles is in a sad state in terms of
providing relevant information to investors. An agenda project has been
created that is titled "Disclosure of Information about Intangible Assets
not Recognized in Financial Statements." Analysts bemoan the state of
accounting for intangibles. In April 2001, Fortune stated the
following:
In the Fortune 500 there are thousands upon thousands of statistics that
reveal very little
that's meaningful about the corporations they purportedly describe. At
least that's the
verdict of a growing number of forward-thinking market watchdogs, academics,
accountants,
and others. Convinced that accounting gives rotten information about the
value of performance
in modern knowledge-intensive companies, they are proposing changes that would
be
earthshaking to the profession.
Because so much of the problem rests in "knowledge intensive
companies," Baruch Lev and others have come to view unrecognized
intangibles as being synonymous with unrecognized "knowledge capital."
Measuring the Value of Intangibles and Valuation of the Firm
Knowledge Capital Valuation Factors (terminology adapted from Baruch
Lev's writings)
Value Creators
- Scalability
Nonrivalry (e.g., the SABRE airline reservations system)
Increasing Returns (due to initial fixed cost followed by
low marginal cost)
- Network Effects
Positive Feedback ¨(customer discussion boards)
Network Externalities (fast word of mouth)
Industry Standard (Microsoft Windows)
Value Destroyers
- Partial Excludability (training of employees who cannot be indentured servants)
Spillovers
Fuzzy Property Rights
Private vs. Social Returns (training that creates immense
competition other nations)
- Inherent Risk
Sunk Cost
Creative Destruction (Relational database and ERP destruction of
COBOL systems)
Volatility of value due to competition and technological change
Risk Sharing (only a few products emerge as winners amidst a
trail of road kill)
- Non-tradability
Contracting Problems
Negligible Marginal Cost
A few years ago a hardback set of the thirty-two volumes of the
Britannica cost $1,600
In 1992 Microsoft decided to get into the encyclopedia
business
[creating] a CD with some multimedia bells and whistles and a user friendly
front end and sold it to end users for $49.95
Britannica started to see its market
erode
The company's first move was to offer on-line access to libraries at a
subscription rate of $2,000 per year
Britannica continued to lose market share
In
1996 the company offered a CD version for $200
Britannica now sells a CD for $89.99
that has the same content as the thirty-two volume print version that recently sold for
$1,600.
Shapiro
and Varian (1999, pp. 1920)
|
On November 14, 2002 the following links were provided at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/intangibles.html
There are all sorts of models for valuing an entire firm such that estimates of the
value of unbooked items (goodwill) can be derived as the difference between the sum of the
values of booked items and the entire value of the firm. However, derivation of
values of knowledge capital becomes confounded by the synergy effects.
The major problem is all valuation models is that they entail forecasting into the
future based upon extrapolations from past history. This is not always a bad thing
when forecasting in relatively stable industries and economic conditions. The
problem in modern times is that there are very few stable industries and economic
conditions. Equity values and underlying values of intangibles are impacted by
highly unstable shifts in investor confidence in equity markets, manipulations of
accounting reports, terrorism, global crises such as the Asian debt crises, emergence of
China in the world economy, and massive litigation unknowns such as lawsuits regarding
mold in buildings. Forecasting the future from the past is easy in most steady-state
systems. It is subject to enormous error in forecasting in systems that are far from
being in steady states.
The popular models for valuing entire firms include the following:
- Valuation based upon analyst forecasts. These alternatives have
the advantages of being rooted in data outside what is reported under GAAP
in financial statements. Analysts may meet with top management and
consider intangibles. But there are also drawbacks such as the
following:
- The cart is in front of the horse. When the purpose of accounting
data is
to help help investors and analysts set stock prices in securities
markets, the forecasts of users (especially leading
multiples) for valuation entails circular reasoning.
- The recent scandals involving security analysts of virtually all major
investment firms and brokerages makes us tend to doubt the objectivity and
ability of analysts to make forecasts that are not self-serving. See
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#Cleland
- Analyst forecasts tend to be highly subjective. Comparing them may
be like finding the mean between a banana and a lemon.
- Valuation using stock price multiples (usually limited to comparing firms in a
given industry and adjusted for leverage). Multiples can be based upon price
forecasts (leading multiples) or past price trends (trailing multiples). In either
case, the valuations are suspect for the following reasons:
- The cart is in front of the horse. When the purpose of the valuation exercise is
to help help investors set stock prices in securities markets, the use of stock prices (especially leading
multiples) for valuation entails circular reasoning.
- Use of the current prices of small numbers of shares traded is not the same as the
per-share value of all the shares acquired in a single transaction. This difference
arises in part because acquiring control usually i
- s far more valuable than the sum of the
shares at current trading values. This difference arises in part because current
share prices are subject to transient market price movements of shares of all traded
companies, whereas the value of the firm in a business combination deal is much more
stable. For example, Microsoft share prices have declined about 40%
between Year 2000 and Year 2002, but it is not at all clear that the value
of the firm and/or its knowledge capital value has declined so steeply in
the bear market of securities pricing in Year 2002.
- Present value valuation based upon forecasted dividends (usually including a
forecasted dividend growth rate).
The problem with forecasted dividends is that firms have dividend policies that do not
reflect future value. For example, many firms do not pay dividends at all or their
payout ratios are too small to be reflective of firm value. There may be enormous
dividends decades into the future, but these are too uncertain to be realistic for
valuation purposes. Another problem is that forecasted dividend models generally
require the estimation of a "terminal value" of the firm, and this usually
entails grasping for straws.
- Discounted abnormal earnings and returns valuation (including
Edwards-Bell-Ohlson (EBO) and Steward's EVA Models)
Abnormal earnings and returns valuation models generally use forcasted after-tax
operating profits discounted at the firm's current weighted average cost of capital.
There are variations of methods such as the abnormal returns method, the abnormal
earnings method, and the free cash flow method of valuing returns to debt and equity.
One of the nicer summaries of the EBO versus EVA models can be found in
"Measuring Wealth," by Charles Lee, CA Magazine, April 1996, pp.
32-37 --- http://www.cica.ca/cica/camagazine.nsf/e1996-Apr/TOC
The value of the firm depends on its ability to generate "abnormal
earnings" above what can be earned in riskless or near-riskless investment
alternatives. There are immense problems in this valuation approach for the
following reasons:
- Empirical studies both before and after the Enron scandal indicate that earnings
management is systemic and pervasive such that managers can manipulate abnormal earnings
valuations with their earnings management policies (that are generally secret).
- Earnings measures are subject to all the limitations of GAAP including the failure to
expense employee stock options, inclusion of income on pension funds, write-off of R&D
under FAS 2, and the expensing of expenditures for knowledge capital intended to benefit
the future. Actually, this problem is not as serious as it might seem at first blush
since many of the accounting distortions wash themselves out over time if they are do to
timing. However, when the timing is long-term such as in the case of long-term
R&D projects, distortions persist due to discounting. For example, if a firm
deducts $1 billion per year on a research project that may only start to pay off 15 or
more years into the future, the conservatism badly distorts the discounted abnormal
earnings and return valuation methods.
- Abnormal earnings and returns valuation models implicitly assume firms that carry
massive amounts of excess cash, beyond what is needed for year-to-year operations,
distribute the excess cash as dividends to owners. This just is not the case in some
firms like Microsoft that carry huge cash reserves. As a result, abnormal earnings
and returns valuation methods must take this into account since abnormal earnings do not
accrue to free cash reserves.
- Real Options
There are various valuation methods that are less widely used. One of
these is the Real Options approach that shows some promise even though it is
still quite impractical. See http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/realopt.htm
- Market Transaction
On rare occasion, a portion of a company's knowledge capital is sold in market
transactions that give clues about total value. The sale of a portion of the SABRE system
by American Airlines is an excellent example of a clue to the immense value of this
unbooked asset on the balance sheet.. The problem with this is that market price of
a portion of the SABRE system ignores the synergy values of the remaining portion still
owned by AMR.
In the final analysis, the most practical approach to date is to attempt to forecast
the revenues and/or cost savings attributable to major components of intellectual capital.
This is much easier in the case of software and systems such as the SABRE system
than it is in components like human resources where total future benefits are virtually
impossible to drill down to present values at particular points in time.
The valuation of intangibles will probably always be subject to enormous margins of
error and risk.
One way to help financial statement users analyze intangibles would be to
expand upon the interactive spreadsheet/database approach currently used by
Microsoft Corporation for making forecasts. Although this approach is not
currently used by Microsoft for detailed analysis of intangibles, we can
envision how knowledge capital components might be expanded upon in a way that
financial statement users themselves can make assumptions and then analyze the
aggregative impacts of those assumptions. Click on the Following from http://www.microsoft.com/msft/
FY
2003 Microsoft "What-if?" (193 KB) Do your own forecasting for
Microsoft’s FY 2003 income statements based on your assumptions with this
Excel projection tool --- http://www.microsoft.com/msft/download/PivotTables/What_If.xls
Pivot tables might also be useful for slicing and dicing information about
intangibles. Although Microsoft does not employ this specifically for
analysis of intangibles, the approach used at the following link might be
extended for such purposes:
Financial
History PivotTable (122 KB) Allows you to view and analyze historical
Microsoft financial data. For example, you can look at income statement
line items dating back to 1985 --- http://www.microsoft.com/msft/download/PivotTables/historypivot.xls
Click here to view references on intangibles
FAS 141 and the Question of Value By
PricewaterhouseCoopers CFOdirect Network Newsdesk, January 16, 2003 --- http://www.cfodirect.com/cfopublic.nsf/vContentPrint/CA13B226B214A04085256CB000512D34?OpenDocument
Just as early reactions
to FAS 142 seemed to have overlooked the complexities in reviewing and testing
goodwill for impairment, so too have reactions to complying with the Financial
Accounting Standards Board's Statement No. 141 – Business Combinations.
Adopted and issued at the same time as Statement No. 142 in the summer of
2001, the headline news about FAS 141 was the elimination of the Pooling-of-Interest
accounting method in mergers and acquisitions. Going forward from June 30,
2001, all acquisitions are to be accounted for using one method only – Purchase
Accounting.
This change is significant and one particular aspect of it – the
identification and measurement of intangible assets outside of goodwill
– seems to be somewhat under-appreciated.
Stephen C. Gerard, Managing Director at Standard & Poor's Corporate Value
Consulting, says that there is "general conceptual understanding of
Statement 141 by corporate management and finance teams. But the real impact
will not be felt until the next deal is done." And that deal in FAS 141
parlance will be a "purchase" since "poolings" are no
longer recognized.
Consistent M&A Accounting
The FASB, in issuing Statement No. 141, concluded that "virtually all
business combinations are acquisitions and, thus, all business combinations
should be accounted for in the same way that other asset acquisitions are
accounted for – based on the values exchanged."
In defining how business combinations are to be accounted for, FAS 141
supersedes parts of APB Opinion No. 16. That Opinion allowed companies
involved in a merger or acquisition to use either pooling-of-interest
or purchase accounting. The choice hinged on whether the deal met 12 specified
criteria. If so, pooling-of-interest was required.
Over time, "pooling" became the accounting method of choice,
especially in "mega-deal" transactions. That, in the words of the
FASB, resulted in "…similar business combinations being accounted for
using different methods that produced dramatically different financial
statement results."
FAS 141 seeks to level that playing field and improve M&A financial
reporting by:
- Better
reflecting the investment made in an acquired entity based on the values
exchanged.
- Improving the
comparability of reported financial information on an apples-to-apples
basis.
- Providing more
complete financial information about the assets acquired and liabilities
assumed in business combinations.
- Requiring
disclosure of information on the business strategy and reasons for the
acquisition.
When announcing FAS 141, the FASB wrote: "This Statement requires those
(intangible assets) be recognized as assets apart from goodwill if they meet
one of two criteria – the contractual-legal criterion or the separability
criterion."
Unchanged by the new rule are the fundamentals of purchase accounting and the
purchase price allocation methodology for measuring goodwill: that is,
goodwill represents the amount remaining after allocating the purchase price
to the fair market values of the acquired assets, including recognized
intangibles, and assumed liabilities at the date of the acquisition.
"What has changed," says Steve Gerard, "is the rigor companies
must apply in determining what assets to break out of goodwill and separately
recognize and amortize."
Thus, in an unheralded way, FAS 141 introduces a process of identifying and
placing value on intangible assets that could prove to be a new experience for
many in corporate finance, as well as a costly and time-consuming exercise.
Nonetheless, an exercise critical to compliance with the new rule.
Continued at http://www.cfodirect.com/cfopublic.nsf/vContentPrint/CA13B226B214A04085256CB000512D34?OpenDocument
Intangibles: An Accounting Paradox
Transfer Pricing of Intellectual
Property Rights ---
http://www.buildingipvalue.com/05_TI/031_034.htm
An Accounting Paradox
If you are following the accounting saga
following the implosion of Enron and
Andersen, I strongly recommend the Summer
2002, Volume 21, Number 2 of the Journal
of Accounting and Public Policy --- http://www.elsevier.nl/inca/publications/store/5/0/5/7/2/1/
Enron: An Accounting Perspective
- Reforming corporate governance post Enron: Shareholders' Board of
Trustees and the auditor 97 -- 103
A.R. Abdel-khalik
- Enron: what happened and what we can learn from it pp. 105 -- 127
G.J. Benston, A.L. Hartgraves
- Enron et al.--a comment pp.129 -- 130
J.S. Demski
- Where have all of Enron's intangibles gone? pp.131 -- 135
Baruch Lev
- Enron: sad but inevitable pp.137 -- 145
L. Revsine
- Regulatory competition for low cost-of-capital accounting rules pp.147
-- 149
S. Sunder
Regular Paper
- How are loss contingency accruals affected by alternative reporting
criteria and incentives? pp. 151 -- 167
V.B. Hoffman, J.M. Patton
Question:
Where were Enron's intangible assets? In particular, what was its main
intangible asset that has been overlooked in terms of accounting for
intangibles?
|
Answer by Baruch Lev:
Baruch Lev Quote from Page 131 (from the reference above)
On December 31, 2000, Enron's market value was $75.2 billion,
while its book value (balance sheet equity) was $11.5 billion. The
market-to-book gap of almost $64 billion, while not equal to the value of
intangibles (it reflects, among other things, differences between current and
historical-cost values of physical assets), appears to indicate that Enron had
substantial intangibles just half a year before it started its quick slide to
extinction. This naturally raises the questions: Where are Enron's
intangibles now? And even more troubling: Why did not those intangibles--a
hallmark of modern corporations--prevent the firm's implosion? In
intangibles are "so good", as many believe, why is Enron's situation
"so bad"?
Baruch Lev Quite beginning on Page 133 (from the reference above)
So the answer to the question posed at the opening of this
note--where have Enron's intangible gone?--is a simple one: Nowhere. Enron
did not have substantial intangibles, that is, if hype, glib, and earnings
manipulation did not count as intangibles. Which, of course, also answers
the second question--why did not the intangibles prevent Enron's implosion.
Back to Greenspan's comment about the fragility of
intangibles: "A physical asset, whether an office building or an automotive
assembly plant, has the capability of producing goods even if the reputation of
the managers of such facilities falls under a cloud. The rapidity of
Enron's decline is an effective illustration of the vulnerability of a firm
whose market value largely rests on capitalized reputation."
Intangibles are indeed fragile, more on this later, but "true"
intangibles are not totally dependent on managers' reputation. IBMs
management during the 1980s and early 1990s drove the company close to
bankruptcy, and was completely discredited (though not ethically, as
Enron's). But IBMs intangibles--innovation capabilities and outstanding
services personnel--were not seriously harmed. Indeed, under Lou Gerster's
management (commencing in 1993), IBM made an astounding comeback.
Hypothetically, would a tarnished reputation of Microsoft, Pfizer, or DuPont's
management destroy the ability of these similarly innovative companies to
continuously introduce new products and services and maintain dominant
competitive positions? Of course not. Even when companies collapse,
valuable patents, brands, R&D laboratories, trained employees, and unique
information systems will find eager buyers. Once more, Enron imploded, and
its trading activities "acquired" for change not because its
intangibles were tied to management's reputation, but partly, because it did not
have any valuable intangibles--unique factors of production--that could be used
by successor managers to resuscitate the company and create value.
Finally, to the fragility of intangibles. As I elaborate
elsewhere,3 along with the ability of intangible assets to
create value and growth, comes vulnerability, which emanates from the unique
attributes of these factors of production:
Partial excludability (spillover): The inability of
owners of intangible assets to completely appropriate (prevent non-owners from
enjoying) the benefits of the assets. Patents can be "invented
around", and ultimately expire; trained employees often move to
competitors, and unique organizational structures (e.g., just-in-time
production) are imitated by competitors.
Inherently high risk: Certain intangible investments
(e.g., basic research, franchise building for new products) are riskier than
most physical and financial assets. The majority of drugs under
development do not make it to the market, and most of the billions of dollars
spent by the dotcoms in the late 1990s to build franchise (customer base) were
essentially lost.
Nonmarketability: Market in intangibles are in
infancy, and lack transparency (there are lots of patent licensing deals, for
example, but no details released to the public). Consequently, the
valuation of intangible-intensive enterprises is very difficult (no
"comparables"), and their management challenging.
Intangibles are indeed different than tangible assets, and in
some sense more vulnerable, due to their unique attributes. Their unusual
ability to create value and growth comes at a cost, at both the corporate and
macroeconomy level, as stated by Chairman Greenspan: "The difficulty of
valuing firms that deal primarily with concepts and the growing size and
importance of these firms may make our economy more susceptible to this type of
contagion". Indeed, intangible-intensive firms are "growing in
size and importance", a fact that makes the study of the measurement,
management, and reporting of intangible assets so relevant and exciting,
irrespective of Enron the intangibles-challenged sorry affair.
|
Answer by Bob
Jensen
I have to disagree with Professor Lev with respect his
statement: " Enron
did not have substantial intangibles." I think Enron, like
many other large multinational corporations, invested in a type of
intangible asset that has never been mentioned to my knowledge in the
accounting literature. Enron invested enormously in the intangible
asset of political power and favors. There are really two types of
investments of this nature for U.S. based corporations:
- Investments in bribes and political contributions allowed under
U.S. law, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
- Investments in bribes and political contributions not allowed
under U.S. law, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
I contend that large corporate investment in political power is
sometimes the main intangible asset of the company. This varies by
industry, but political favors are essential in agribusiness,
pharmaceuticals, energy, and various other industries subject to
government regulation and subsidies. Enron took this type of
investment to an extreme in both the U.S. and in many foreign
nations. Many of Enron's investments in political favors appear to
violate the FCPA, but the FCPA is so poorly enforced that it seldom
prevents huge bribes and other types of investments in political
intangibles.
I provide you with several examples below.
Two Examples of Enron's Lost Millions in Political
Intangibles
India
and Mozambique: Enron Invests in U.S. Government Threats
to Cut Off Foreign Aid
SHAMELESS:
1995'S 10 WORST
CORPORATIONS
by
Russell Mokhiber and Andrew Wheat
http://www.essential.org/monitor/hyper/mm1295.04.html
The module about Enron in 1995 reads as follows:
Enron's Political Profit Pipeline
In early 1995, the world's biggest natural gas
company began clearing ground 100 miles south of Bombay, India
for a $2.8 billion, gas-fired power plant -- the largest single foreign
investment in India.
Villagers claimed that the power plant was
overpriced and that its effluent would destroy their fisheries and coconut
and mango trees. One villager opposing Enron put it succinctly, "Why
not remove them before they remove us?"
As Pratap Chatterjee reported ["Enron Deal
Blows a Fuse," Multinational Monitor, July/August 1995],
hundreds of villagers stormed the site that was being prepared for Enron's
2,015-megawatt plant in May 1995, injuring numerous construction workers and
three foreign advisers.
After winning Maharashtra state elections, the
conservative nationalistic Bharatiya Janata Party canceled the deal, sending
shock waves through Western businesses with investments in India.
Maharashtra officials said they acted to prevent
the Houston, Texas-based company from making huge profits off "the
backs of India's poor." New Delhi's Hindustan Times
editorialized in June 1995, "It is time the West realized that India is
not a banana republic which has to dance to the tune of
multinationals."
Enron officials are not so sure. Hoping to convert
the cancellation into a temporary setback, the company launched an all-out
campaign to get the deal back on track. In late November 1995, the campaign
was showing signs of success, although progress was taking a toll on the
handsome rate of return that Enron landed in the first deal. In India, Enron
is now being scrutinized by the public, which is demanding contracts
reflecting market rates. But it's a big world.
In November 1995, the company announced that it has
signed a $700 million deal to build a gas pipeline from Mozambique to South
Africa. The pipeline will service Mozambique's Pande gas field, which will
produce an estimated two trillion cubic feet of gas.
The deal, in which Enron beat out South Africa's
state petroleum company Sasol, sparked controversy in Africa following
reports that the Clinton administration, including the U.S. Agency for
International Development, the U.S. Embassy and even National Security
adviser Anthony Lake, lobbied Mozambique on behalf of Enron.
"There were outright threats to withhold
development funds if we didn't sign, and sign soon," John Kachamila,
Mozambique's natural resources minister, told the Houston Chronicle. Enron
spokesperson Diane Bazelides declined to comment on the these allegations,
but said that the U.S. government had been "helpful as it always is
with American companies." Spokesperson Carol Hensley declined to
respond to a hypothetical question about whether or not Enron would approve
of U.S. government threats to cut off aid to a developing nation if the
country did not sign an Enron deal.
Enron has been repeatedly criticized for relying on
political clout rather than low bids to win contracts. Political
heavyweights that Enron has engaged on its behalf include former U.S.
Secretary of State James Baker, former U.S. Commerce Secretary Robert
Mosbacher and retired General Thomas Kelly, U.S. chief of operations in the
1990 Gulf War. Enron's Board includes former Commodities Futures Trading
Commission Chair Wendy Gramm (wife of presidential hopeful Senator Phil
Gramm, R-Texas), former U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary Charles Walker and
John Wakeham, leader of the House of Lords and former U.K. Energy Secretary.
|
|
United States
Deregulation of Energy That Needed a Change in the Law:
Enron's Investment in Wendy Gramm
Forwarded by Dick Haar on February 11, 2002
Senator
Joseph Leiberman
706 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510
RE:
Enron Investigation
Dear
Senator Leiberman,
I
watched your Sunday morning appearance on Face the
Nation with intense interest. Inasmuch as I own a
fair amount of Enron stock in my SEP/IRA, I'm sure
you can understand my curiosity relative to your
investigation.
Knowing
you to be an honorable man, I feel secure that you
will diligently pursue the below listed matters in
an effort to determine what part, if any, these
matters contributed to the collapse of Enron.
1.
Government records reveal the awarding of seats to
Enron executives and Ken Lay on four Energy
Department trade missions and seven Commerce
Department trade trips during the Clinton
administration's eight years.
a.
From January 13, 1995 through June 1996, Clinton
Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and White House Counsel
Mack McLarty assisted Ken Lay in closing a $3
billion dollar power plant deal with India. Four
days before India gave final approval to the deal,
Enron gave $100,000 to the DNC. Any quid pro quo?
b.
Clinton National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake,
threatened to withhold aid to Mozambique if it
didn't approve an Enron pipeline project. Subsequent
to Mr. Lake's threats, Mozambique approved the
project, which resulted in a further $770 million
dollar electric power contract with Enron. Perhaps,
if NSA Advisor Lake had not been so busy
strong-arming for Enron, he might have been focused
on something obliquely related to national security
like, say, Mr. Bin Laden? Could it be that a
different, somewhat related, investigation is
warranted?
c.
In 1999, Clinton Energy Secretary Bill Richardson
traveled to Nigeria and helped arrange a joint,
varied, energy development program which resulted in
$882 million in power contracts for Enron from
Nigeria. Perhaps if Energy Scretary Richardson had
been more focused on domestic energy, we might have
avoided:
i.
The severe loss of nuclear secrets to China and
concurrently ii. developed more domestic sources of
energy.
d.
Subsequent to leaving Clinton White House employ,
Enron hired Mack McLarty (White House Counsel),
Betsy Moler (Deputy Energy Secretary) and Linda
Robertson (Treasury Official). Even a person without
a high school diploma (no disrespect to airline
security screeners) can see that this looks like
Enron paying off political favors with fat-cat
corporate jobs, at the expense of stockholders and
Enron pension employees.
e.
Democratic Mayor Lee P. Brown of Houston (Enron
headquarter city), received $250,000 just before
Enron filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Isn't that an
awful lot of money to throw away right before
bankruptcy?
The
Democratic National Committee was the recipient of
hundreds of thousands of dollars from 1990 through
2000. The above matters appear to be very troubling
and look like, smack of, reek of, political favors
for campaign payoffs. I know you will find out.
2.
Recently, former Clinton Treasury Secretary Robert
Rubin called a top U. S. Treasury official, asking
on Enron's behalf, for government help with credit
agencies. As you well know, Rubin is the chairman of
executive committee at Citigroup, which just
coincidentally, is Enron's largest unsecured
creditor at an estimated $3 billion dollars.
3.
As you well know, Mr. Leiberman, Citigroup is
Senator Tom Daschle's largest contributor ($50,000)
in addition to being your single largest contributor
($112,546). This fact brings to mind some disturbing
questions I feel you must answer.
a.
Have you, any member of your staff, any Senate or
House colleagues, any relatives or any friends of
yours, been asked by Citigroup to intercede on their
behalf, in an effort to recover part or all of
Citigroup's $3 billion, at the expense of Enron's
shareholders, employees and or Enron pensioners?
b.
Did your largest contributor, Citigroup, have
anything to do with the collapse of Enron?
c.
Enron has tens of thousands of employees,
stockholders and pensioners who have lost their life
savings. How will you answer their most obvious
question? Do you represent Citigroup, your largest
contributor, or do you represent the Enron
employees, et al, who stand to lose if Citigroup
recovers any of its $3 billion?
During
Sunday's Face the Nation, both you and Senator
McCain praised Attorney General Ashcroft for
recusing himself from the Justice Department
investigation because he had once received a
contribution from Enron. I know in my heart, that,
being the honest gentleman you are, you will now
recuse yourself because of the glaring conflict of
interest described above. I also know that you will
pass this letter to your successor for his or her
attention.
Very
truly yours,
Robert
Theodore Knalur
|
|
Also see: "Where Was Enron Getting
a Return for Its Political Bribes?" at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#bribes
The extent to which Enron's investments and alleged investments in
current and future political favors actually resulted in political
favors will never be known. Clearly, Enron invested in some
enormous projects such as the $3 billion power plant in India knowing
full well that the investment would be a total loss without Indian
taxpayer subsidies. Industry in India just could not pay the
forward contract gas rates needed to run the plant.
Enron executives intended that purchased political influence would
make it one of the largest and most profitable companies in the
world. In the case of India, the power plant became a total loss,
because the tragedy of the September 11 terror made the U.S. dependent
upon India in its war against the Taliban. Even if the White House
leaders had been inclined to muscle the Indian government to subsidize
power generated from the new Enron plant in India, the September 11
tragedy destroyed Enron's investment in political intangibles and
its hopes to fire up its $3 billion gas-fired power plant in
India. The White House had greater immediate need for India's full
support in the war against the Taliban.
The point here is not whether Enron money spent for political favors
did or did not actually result in favors. The point is that to the
extent that any company or wealthy employees invest heavily for future
political favors, they have invested in an intangible asset and have
taken on the intangible risk of loss of reputation and money if some of
these investments become discovered and publicized in the media.
In fact, discovery and disclosure will set government officials
scurrying to avoid being linked to political payoffs.
Enron is a prime example of a major corporation focused almost
entirely upon turning political favors into revenues, especially in the
areas of energy trading and foreign power plant construction. As
such, these investments are extremely high risk.
It is doubtful that political intangibles will ever be disclosed or
accounted for except in the case of bankruptcy or other media frenzies
like the Enron media frenzies.
Question:
Accountants and auditors face an enormous task of disclosing and
accounting for political intangibles.
Answer:
Because disclosures and accounting of political intangibles will likely
destroy their value. Generally, accounting for assets does not
destroy those assets. This is not the case for many types of
political intangibles that cost millions upon millions of dollars in
corporations.
August 28, 2002 reply from Craig Polhemus
[Joedpo@AOL.COM]
-----Original
Message-----
From: Craig Polhemus [mailto:Joedpo@AOL.COM]
Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2002 1:55
AM
To: AECM@LISTSERV.LOYOLA.EDU
Subject: Re: An Accounting Paradox: When
will accounting for an asset destroy the
asset?
Bob
Jensen writes:
<<Question:
Accountants and auditors face an enormous
task of disclosing and accounting for
political intangibles.
Answer:
Because disclosures and accounting of
political intangibles will likely destroy
their value. Generally, accounting for
assets does not destroy those assets. This
is not the case for many types of
political intangibles that cost millions
upon millions of dollars in
corporations.>>
Interesting.
There are many instances where the reverse
is true -- the marketing value to a
lobbying firm of having made large
contributions to the winning candidates
(of whatever party) is greatest where it
is well known. This applies regardless
whether the contributions came from
individual partners or (at least in those
states where it's legal for state and
local elections) from the firm itself.
Even
on a local level, if you're in a
jurisdiction where judges are elected,
would you prefer to go to a lawyer who
contributed to the successful judge or to
one who did not? I have a friend who asks
this question directly whenever he's
seeking local counsel. And if you're that
lawyer, do you want that contribution to
be secret or as public as possible? Maybe
even exaggerated?
Dita
Beard is a classic example -- her initial
"puffery" [whether truthful,
partially truthful, or entirely false]
about getting the IT&T antitrust case
dropped based on a pledge of IT&T
funding to support moving the 1972
Republican National Convention to Miami
was a marketing aid to her ONLY if she let
it be known, at least to her clients and
potential clients.
Similarly,
Ed Rollins writes of a foreign
"contributor" who apparently
passed a million in cash to a middleman
and thought it made it to the Reagan
re-election campaign. Rollins believes the
middleman (an unnamed Washington lawyer,
by the way) held on to it all but the
"contributor" felt he'd
purchased access, and certainly the
middleman benefited not just financially
but also from the contributor's belief
that the middleman had provided direct
access to the campaign and hence the
Administration.
I
express no opinion on how such things
should be recorded in financial statements
-- I'm just pointing out that publicity
about large political contributions to
successful candidates (whether within or
exceeding legal limits) can be positive
for some businesses, such as lobbying
firms.
Craig
[Craig Polhemus,
Association Vitality International]
August 28, 2002 reply from Bob
Jensen
Great
to hear from you Craig.
I
agree that sometimes the accounting and/or
media disclosure of investments in political
favors may increase the value of those
investments. Or it may have a neutral effect
in some industries like agribusiness and oil
where the public has come to expect that
members of Congress and/or the Senate are
heavily dependent upon those industries for
election to office and maintenance of their
power.
On
the other hand, it is unlikely that
accounting and media disclosure of the Enron
investments in political favors, including
the favors of linking foreign aid payments
to Enron's business deals, would have either
a positive or neutral impact upon the
expected value of those political favors to
Enron.
It
is most certain that accounting and media
disclosure political investments that are
likely to violate the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act would deal a severe blow to
the value of those intangible assets.
Thanks,
Bob Jensen
August 28 reply
from mark-eckman@att.net
I think companies have invested a great deal in
political intangibles outside the arena of government. Consider the
current discussions on the importance of expensing stock option
expensing as an example. Views are strong and vary widely on the issue
but clearly, these positions exist only to gain visibility and increase
political pressure.
On the side that believes CPA stands for 'can't
prove anything' we find the speech to the Stanford Director's College on
June 3, 2002 by T. J. Rodgers, CEO of Cypress. Mr. Rodgers refers to
expensing options as "...the next mistake..." and refers to
"...accounting theology vs. business reality...." He opposes
the Levin- McCain proposal and recounts the story you have on your
website of the 1994 political storm in Silicon Valley when the FASB
proposed expensing options. He believes that the free market will
eliminate any abuse of option accounting. Contrast that with the
opposition represented in the July 24, 2002 letter to CEOs from John
Biggs at TIAA-CREF. Mr. Biggs also derides the profession by labeling
APB 25 as an "...archaic method..." and that its use has the
effect of “…eroding the quality of earnings…” by encouraging
“…the use of one form of compensation.” Mr. Biggs completes his
letter by equating option expensing to management credibility. Both of
these men have made political investments with their comments, drawing
lines in the sand. While the remarks were not made directly to any
political body, and there is no tangible cost involved, this is still
political pressure. It is also interesting both men focus on the
accounting profession as the root cause rather than the value of the
political intangibles that exist only in market capitalization.
Consider how companies build political
intangibles with analysts, institutional shareholders and others. ADP
had an extended string of increased quarterly earnings – over 100
consecutive quarters. The PE multiple for the stock has been high for
some time, due in no small part to the consistency of this trend. ADP
management reminded shareholders with every quarter how long they had
provided shareholders with higher earnings. When that streak recently
ended, the stock dropped like a stone. Closing price moved down from
$41.35 on July 17, 2002 to $31.60 the next day. The volume associated
with that change was almost nine times the July 16 trading volume. How
would anyone explain this event other than a reversal of political
intangibles that did not exist on the financial statements?
Power and politics are always with us. We just
have to be smart enough to know which is for show and which is for $$$.
(By the way, if you have a way to tell them apart, let me know.)
August 28
reply from E. Scribner
[escribne@NMSU.EDU]
Hi,
Bob and Craig!
You've discovered an
accounting
application of
Heisenberg's
uncertainty
principle, which
originated with the
notion that to
"see" an
electron's position
we have to
"illuminate"
it, which causes it
to shift its
position so it's not
"there"
any more. To quote
from the American
Insitutute of Physics
( http://www.aip.org/history/heisenberg/p08b.htm
), "At the
moment the light is
diffracted by the
electron into the
microscope lens, the
electron is thrust
to the right."
When
we
"illuminate"
political
intangibles by
disclosing them,
they are not
"there"
any more.
Ed
Scribner
New Mexico State
University
Las Cruces,
NM, USA -----
August 28, 2002 Reply from Bob
Jensen
Heisenberg's
Theory Song
"My get up and go
got up an went." http://www.eakles.com/get_up_go.html
August 28, 2002 reply from Richard C. Sansing [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
There is an extensive literature on the
economics of information. The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information
by Jack Hirshleifer and John Riley is a good survey. Chapters 6 (The
economics of emergent public information) and 7 (Research and
invention) address the issues of the value of private information and
the effects of disclosure on its value.
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle both
"originated" and (for practical purposes) terminated with
the behavior of electrons and other sub-atomic particles. It applies
to the joint indeterminacy of the position and momentum of electrons.
It is only significant at the atomic level because Planck's constant
is so small.
Richard C. Sansing
Associate Professor of Business Administration
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
email: Richard.C.Sansing@dartmouth.edu
|
Accounting for Options to Buy Real Estate
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on July 14, 2006
TITLE: Land-Value Erosion Seen As a Problem for Builders
REPORTER: by Michael Corkery and Ian McDonald
DATE: Jul 06, 2006
PAGE: C1
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115214204821498941.html
TOPICS: Accounting, Advanced Financial Accounting, Impairment, Investments
SUMMARY: "Land values are becoming a flash point for investors and analysts
who watch the builders sector. Bears say the companies' land might not be worth
what they paid for it, which could lead to painful write-downs. If they are
right, it will be a blow to the already battered sector." Questions relate to
the classification of land on building companies' balance sheets and the
treatment of the write-down of the value of land.
QUESTIONS:
1.) As an example of the type of building company discussed in this article,
view the quarterly financial statements for Toll Brothers in their 10-Q filing
with the SEC dated July 6, 2006. You may go directly through the following link
or may access through the WSJ article on-line by clicking on Toll Brothers on
the right-hand side of the page then SEC filings.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/794170/000112528206003278/p413541-10q.htm
In what account does Toll Brothers classify Land on its balance sheet? Why is
the Land classified this way?
2.) Refer again to the Toll Brothers financial statements. By how much did
Toll Brothers write down the values of land during the 6-month and 3-month
periods ended on April 30, 2006 and 2005? Describe in words, the pattern of
write-downs that you observe and compare it to the discussion given in the
article.
3.) How will adjustments to reflect decline in land values affect reported
income and balance sheets of companies such as Toll Brothers, which hold land as
inventory and a major component of their operations? How might these adjustments
affect the company's stock price? Refer to information in the article in
providing your answer.
4.) Compare and contrast the accounting for land and recent decline in the
market value of land described in question 2 above, to accounting by a company,
such as a manufacturer or service entity, which owns land only in the location
of its principal place of business (that is, as part of property, plant, and
equipment).
5.) Explain why the accounting differs under the two answers given to
questions 2 and 3 above.
6.) What are options? What type of option contracts do builders enter into?
How much has Toll Brothers paid to enter into such contracts?
7.) What is the book value of net assets? How is that measure used by
analysts of companies in the building industry? How might the recent decline in
land values affect the usefulness of book value for analyzing financial
statements?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"Land-Value Erosion Seen As a Problem for Builders," by Michael Corkery and
Ian McDonald, The Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2006; Page C1 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115214204821498941.html
Already reeling from slowing housing sales and
worries about the economy, shares of home builders face another issue: the
value of the land on their books.
Land values are becoming a flash point for
investors and analysts who watch the builders sector. Bears say the
companies' land might not be worth what they paid for it, which could lead
to painful write-downs.
If they are right, it will be a blow to the already
battered sector. After a 28% average fall so far this year, many stocks of
home builders trade close to -- or even at -- their "book value,'' which
makes them tantalizing to bargain hunters. Book value is a company's assets
minus its liabilities and is often seen as a rough approximation of how a
business would be valued if liquidated.
But if some land on builders' books is overvalued,
their shares might also be overvalued.
"People are looking at book value as a possible
floor for the stock prices. The question is 'should that be a floor?' There
could be some risk to that book value from land recently acquired or put
under option contract," says Banc of America Securities analyst Daniel
Oppenheim, whose firm does business with several builders.
The debate is lively because the true extent of the
land risk is tough to quantify. Many builders use options, where they put a
deposit on a parcel to be purchased at a later date. Builders say options
minimize their losses because they let them walk away from overpriced land,
sacrificing typically no more than a 5% to 10% deposit.
So far, the damage has been limited. In its last
quarter, Centex Corp., a large builder based in Dallas, reduced its earnings
by 14 cents a share in connection with walking away from option deposits and
pre-acquisition costs in Washington, D.C., Sacramento, Calif., and San
Diego. Last month, Hovnanian Enterprises Inc., based in Red Bank, N.J., said
it plans to take $5 million in write-offs on land deposits, a small
percentage of its total, and luxury home builder Toll Brothers Inc. in
suburban Philadelphia wrote down roughly $12 million, mainly from land that
it owned in the sluggish Detroit market. Builders say they often adjust
their land values to the market, even in boom times, but some analysts
expect charges to increase.
Write-downs are "starting to happen,'' says Credit
Suisse analyst Ivy Zelman, a longtime bear on the sector whose firm does
business with several builders. "I don't think you can define what [the
scope] is today and capture the risk."
Parcels are valued at their purchase price on
companies' books, so there isn't any way of determining the land's true
market value until they sell houses on it. Older purchases are likely worth
far more than their listed value on balance sheets, but newer land buys are
probably worth less. Many builders say land prices are still fairly static,
but Jeff Barcy, chief executive of Hearthstone, a large land investor based
in San Rafael, Calif., says prices are declining in certain markets.
"We expect the softening to continue for a while,"
Mr. Barcy says. "In the hottest markets you could see a 20% to 30% price
decline."
Ms. Zelman estimates that many companies are
building houses on land that they bought or optioned a few years ago when
land was less expensive. But some analysts say many companies purchased
large amounts of land in 2005, at the height of the boom, and that could
come back to hurt them if the housing market doesn't improve in a year or
so.
Some think these worries are overblown and creating
an opportunity. Bulls acknowledge there may be scattered write-downs, but
say undervalued land on company books likely outweighs any overpriced recent
buys. They add that the sector's worries, from property values to job
growth, are reflected in the stocks' prices. And they say home prices have
to drop significantly to sink land values. Fans of the builder stocks also
point to a flurry of recent share repurchases, indicating that insiders
believe the stocks are cheap. NVR Inc., for example, has reduced its shares
outstanding by more than 20% over the past five years, according to
researcher CapitalIQ.
Shares of the nation's five biggest home builders
trade at about 1.3 times the their book value, compared with two times book
on average over the past five years, according to Chicago researcher
Morningstar Inc. The average U.S. stock trades at more than four times its
book value.
Pulte Homes Inc. and Beazer Homes USA Inc. trade at
about 1.2 times book, while shares of M.D.C. Holdings Inc. trade at 1.1
times and shares of Standard Pacific Corp. trade at about book value.
Home builders always have had a hard time getting
respect on Wall Street, where investors often take a short-term view of the
sector's performance potential. "The adage has been 'buy them at book value
and sell when they get to two times book value,'" says Arthur Oduma, a
senior stock analyst who covers the home builders at Morningstar. "So, that
would tell you it's time to buy."
And some are doing so. Henry Ramallo, a portfolio
manager at Neuberger Berman, a Lehman Brothers company, with $116 billion
under management, says he likes Toll Brothers because it takes the company
about five years, on average, to develop land from the time the builder puts
it under option. By the time Toll is ready to build on the land it optioned
or bought in the past year, the housing market should have improved, Mr.
Ramallo says. His firm has recently bought shares of Toll, which is trading
at about 1.3 times book value.
The Controversy over Accounting for Securitizations
and Loan Guarantees
Accounting for Loan Guarantees
FASB Issues Accounting Guidance to
Improve Disclosure Requirements for Guarantees --- http://www.fasb.org/news/nr112502.shtml
Accounting and Auditing Policy
Committee Credit Reform Task Force --- http://www.fasab.gov/aapc/cdreform/98CR01Recpts.pdf
The new FAS 146 Interpretation 46 deals
with loan guarantees of Variable Interest (Special Purpose) Entities --- at:
http://www.fasb.org/interp46.pdf.
From The Wall Street
Journal Accounting Educators' Review on November 15, 2002
TITLE: H&R Block's Mortgage-Lending
Business Could Be Taxing
REPORTER: Joseph T. Hallinan
DATE: Nov 12, 2002
PAGE: C1
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB103706997739674188.djm,00.html
TOPICS: Accounting, Bad Debts, Cash Flow, Debt, Loan Loss Allowance,
Securitization, Valuations
SUMMARY: H&R Block's pretax income
from mortgage operations grew by 146% during the fiscal year ending April 30,
2002. However, the accounting treatment for the securitization of these
mortgages is being questioned.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Describe the accounting treatment used by H&R Block for the sale of
mortgages. Why is this accounting treatment controversial?
2.) What alternative accounting methods
are available to record H&R Block's sale of mortgages? Discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of each accounting treatment. Which accounting
method is most conservative?
3.) Why do companies, such as H&R
Block, sell mortgages? Why does H&R Block retain the risks of non-payment?
How could the sale be structured to transfer the risks of non-payment to the
purchaser of the mortgages? How would this change the selling price of the
mortgages? Support your answer.
4.) How do economic conditions change
the expected losses that will result from non-payment? How does the credit
worthiness of borrowers change the expected losses that will result from
non-payment? Support your answers.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University
of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
"H&R
Block Faces Issues With Mortgage Business," by Joseph T. Hallinan, The Wall
Street Journal, November 12, 2002, Page C1 ---- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB103706997739674188.djm,00.html
Famous
for its tax-preparation service, H&R
Block Inc. last year prepared 16.9 million individual income-tax returns,
or about 14% of all individual returns filed with the Internal Revenue
Service.
But the
fastest-growing money maker for the Kansas City, Mo., company these days is
its mortgage business, which last year originated nearly $11.5 billion in
loans. The business, which caters to poor credit risks, has been growing much
faster than its U.S. tax business. In the fiscal year ended April 30, Block's
pretax income from mortgage operations grew 146% over the year before. The tax
business, while still the largest in the U.S., grew just 23%.
If
those rates remain unchanged, the mortgage business will this year for the
first time provide most of Block's pretax income. In the most-recent fiscal
year, mortgage operations accounted for 47.3% of Block's pretax income.
As
Block's mortgage business has soared, so has its stock price, topping $53 a
share earlier this year from less than $15 two years ago, though it has
dropped in recent months as investors have fretted about the cost of lawsuits
in federal court in Chicago and state court in Texas on behalf of tax clients
who received refund-anticipation loans. But now, some investors and analysts
are raising questions about the foundation beneath Block's mortgage earnings.
"The game is up if interest rates rise and shut off the refinancing
boom," says Avalon Research Group Inc., of Boca Raton, Fla., which has a
"sell" rating on Block's shares.
On
Monday, the shares were up $1.53, or 4.8%, to $33.63 in 4 p.m. New York Stock
Exchange composite trading -- a partial snapback from a $3.25, or 11%, drop on
Friday in reaction to the litigation in Texas over fees H&R Block
collected from customers in that state.
The
company dismisses concerns about its mortgage results. "We think it's a
great time for our business right now," says Robert Dubrish, president
and CEO of Block's mortgage unit, Option One Mortgage Corp.
Much of
Block's mortgage growth has come because the company uses a fairly common but
controversial accounting treatment that allows it to accelerate revenue, and
thus income. This treatment, known as gain-on-sale accounting, has come back
to haunt other lenders, including Conseco Inc. and AmeriCredit
Corp. At Block, gains from sales of mortgage loans accounted for 62% of
revenue at the mortgage unit last year.
In
essence, under gain-on-sale accounting, lenders post upfront the estimated
profit from a securitization transaction, which is the sale to investors of a
pool of loans. Specifically, the company selling the loans records profit for
the excess of the sales price and the present value of the estimated interest
income that is expected to be received on the loans above the amounts funded
on the loans and the present value of the interest agreed to be paid to the
buyers of the loan-backed securities.
But if
the expected income stream is cut short -- say, because more borrowers
refinance their loans than expected when the profit was calculated -- the
company essentially has to reverse some of the gain, taking a charge.
That is
what happened at Conseco. The Carmel, Ind., mobile-home lender was forced to
take a $350 million charge in 1998 after many of its loans were paid off
early. It stopped using gain-on-sale accounting the following year, saying
that the "clear preference" of investors was traditional loan
accounting. AmeriCredit in Fort Worth, Texas, which lends money to car buyers
with poor credit histories, abandoned the practice in September in the midst
of a meltdown of its stock price.
But
Block says it faces nowhere near the downside faced by AmeriCredit and Conseco,
which it says had different business models. Big Block holders seem to agree.
"Block doesn't have anywhere near the scale of exposure [to gain on sale]
that the other companies had," says Henry Berghoef, co-manager of the
Oakmark Select mutual fund, which owns 7.7 million, or about 4.3%, of Block's
shares.
Another
potential problem for Block is the way it treats what is left after it sells
its loans. The bits and pieces that it keeps are known as residual interests.
Block securitizes most of these residual interests, allowing it to accelerate
a significant portion of the cash flow it expects to receive rather than
taking it over the life of the underlying loans. The fair value of these
interests is calculated by Block considering a number of factors, such as
expected losses on its loans. If Block guesses wrong, it could be forced to
take a charge down the road.
Block
says its assumptions underlying the valuation of these interests are
appropriately conservative. It estimates lifetime losses on its loan pools at
roughly 5%, which it says is one percentage point higher than the 4% turned in
by its worst-performing pool of loans. (Comparable industry figures aren't
available.) So Block says the odds of a write-up are much greater than those
of a write-down and would, in a worst-case scenario that it terms
"remote," probably not exceed $500 million. Block's net income for
the fiscal year ended April 30 was $434.4 million, or $2.31 a share, on
revenue of $3.32 billion.
Block
spokeswoman Linda McDougall says gain-on-sale provides an
"insignificant" part of the company's revenue. She notes that Option
One, Block's mortgage unit, recently increased the value of its residual
interest by $57 million. She also says that the company's underwriting
standards are typical of lenders who deal with borrowers lacking pristine
credit histories.
Bears
contend that Block has limited experience in the mortgage business. It bought
Option One in 1997, and Option One in Irvine, Calif., has itself been in
business only since 1993. So its track record doesn't extend to the last
recession of 1990 to 1991.
On top
of that, Block lends to some of the least creditworthy people, known in the
trade as "subprime" borrowers. There is no commonly accepted
definition of what constitutes a subprime borrower. One shorthand measure is
available from credit-reports firm Fair, Isaac & Co. It produces so-called
FICO scores that range from 300 to 850, with 850 being perfect. Anything less
than 660 is usually considered subprime. Securities and Exchange Commission
documents filed by Block's mortgage unit show its borrowers typically score
around 600. Moreover, according to the filings, hundreds of recent Block
customers, representing about 4% of borrowers, have FICO scores of 500 or
less, or no score at all. A score below 500 would place an applicant among the
bottom 5% of all U.S. consumers scored by Fair Isaac.
Mr.
Dubrish says Block stopped lending to people with FICO scores below 500 some
two years ago and says he is puzzled as to why those with scores below 500
still appear in the company's loan pools.
Block
says its loans typically don't meet the credit standards set by Fannie Mae or
Freddie Mac, which are the lending industry's norms. Block's customers may
qualify for loans even if they have experienced a bankruptcy in the previous
12 months, according to underwriting guidelines it lists in the SEC documents.
In many
cases, according to Block's SEC filings, an applicant's income isn't verified
but is instead taken as stated on the loan application. In other cases, an
applicant with a poor credit rating may receive an upgraded rating, depending
on factors including "pride of ownership." Most Block mortgages are
for single-family detached homes, but Block also makes mobile-home loans,
according to the filings.
"We
are doing a lot to help people own houses who wouldn't have the chance to do
it otherwise," Mr. Dubrish says. "We think we're doing something
that's good for the economy and good for our borrowers."
A key
figure in the mortgage business is the ratio of loan size to value of the
property being mortgaged. Loans with LTV rates above 80% are thought to
present a greater risk of loss. The LTV on many of Block's mortgages is just
under 80%, according to the SEC filings. The value of these properties can be
important if Block is forced to foreclose on the loans and resell the
properties. Nationwide, roughly 4.17% of subprime mortgage loans are in
foreclosure, according to LoanPerformance, a research firm in San Francisco.
As of June 30, only 3.52% of Block's loans, on a dollar basis, were in
foreclosure, even though its foreclosure ratio more than tripled between Dec.
31, 1999, and June 30.
The Controversy Over Pro Forma
Reporting and HFV
Majority of Companies Produce Unreliable Financial Forecast, Potentially
Hurting Share Prices
The KPMG study of 544 global executives found that
78 percent of the companies surveyed reported forecasting errors of more than 5
percent. Although other factors are undoubtedly at play, companies with
unreliable and inaccurate forecasting had a six percent drop on average in share
price over the past three years, according to the survey findings. Similarly,
the survey also found that companies that kept forecast fluctuations below the
five percent mark realized a 46 percent rise in share price over the same
three-year period, compared to a 34 percent increase among the companies that
had more than a five percent margin of error in their forecasts.
SmartPros, December 14, 2007 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x60077.xml
Up Up and Away in My Beautiful Pro Forma
"Creative Accounting Leads to Fuzzy Earns," SmartPros, December 27,
2005 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x51147.xml
Dec. 27, 2005 (Associated Press) — If it weren't
for some pesky accounting rules, telecom-equipment company Ciena Corp. would
have lost a mere 2 cents a share in the fourth quarter. With those
accounting rules, it lost 44 cents a share.
The disparity is "the GAAP Gap" - the difference
between "pro forma" earnings and earnings prepared according to Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles, or GAAP.
GAAP is the nation's accounting standard. Pro forma
earnings, by contrast, are governed by no fixed standard. Companies can toss
out one-time charges, options expenses, goodwill write-downs - anything that
looks bad. One-time windfalls, however, usually manage to stay in.
Merrill Lynch's U.S. Strategist Richard Bernstein
did the math on 1,600 stocks and found total earnings for their third
calendar quarter grew 22 percent on a GAAP basis, but 31 percent on a pro
forma basis.
The gap was greater when the companies were
subdivided by Standard & Poor's quality rankings. S&P grades stocks on their
annual sales and dividend growth and actual earnings over a 10-year period.
A company with very stable growth would rank "A+," while a company in
bankruptcy would be a "D."
"Lower quality companies are dramatically
overstating their growth rates by using pro forma earnings," Bernstein wrote
in a December 19 research report.
Companies with a B- ranking have a GAAP growth rate
of 1 percent, but a pro forma growth rate of 38 percent, according to
Bernstein. B+ companies are more than doubling their growth rate: GAAP
growth is 13 percent, but pro forma growth is 27 percent.
Part of the problem, according to Bernstein, is
that most post-bubble regulations focus on the quality of formal financial
reporting, but "there appears to be no regulation" covering earnings
conference calls and press releases.
"Although the newer regulation is laudable, stocks
trade on press releases and conference calls, and not on the formal
financial statements that are released weeks after the announcement and
call," he wrote. "We think regulation regarding company press releases and
conference calls is sorely needed because of the significant deterioration
in the quality of announced earnings."
He calls for an end to pro forma earnings, saying
they have made U.S. corporate earnings perhaps the most opaque they've been
in his 23 years in the business.
Continued in article
Compilation and Review Standards Change
As opposed to a formal audit, many accountants perform compilation and
review services to generate unaudited financial statements for a client.
There is a new standard for these two services.
According to SSARS, compilations and reviews are
restricted to historical financial statements, even though clients often ask
their accountants to provide financial statement elements and pro forma
financial information. Michael Glynn, technical manager at the AICPA, reports on
newly adopted standards allowing accountants to report on those financial
statement elements or pro forma financial information under SSARS.
"Compilations & Reviews New Standards," SmartPros, October 2005 ---
http://education.smartpros.com/main1/extcoursedetail.asp?PartnerRed=accountingnet&CatalogNumber=APP515
GAAP vs. Non-GAAP Earnings
"Investors Applaud Oracle’s Non-GAAP Earnings," AccountingWeb, July
1. 2005 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=101064
SOX Regulation G, which went into effect in March
2003, defines non-GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) financial
measures and creates disclosure standards for them. According to Strategic
Finance magazine, the guidelines for non-GAAP financial measures stipulate
that they may not:
- Be given prominence over GAAP numbers
- Exclude any charges or liabilities requiring
cash settlement from non-GAAP liquidity measures
- Be inserted into GAAP financial statements or
accompanying notes. It should be noted that the June 29 announcement of
fiscal 2005 Q4 GAAP and non-GAAP earnings, revenues and net income
appears to adhere to all the SOX guidelines. Also, Oracle’s statements
provide more detail than most company reports according to MarketWatch.
“The rapid integration of PeopleSoft into our
business contributed to the strong growth in both applications sales and
profits that we saw in the quarter,” Oracle President Safra Catz said in a
written statement. “The combination of increased organic growth plus a
carefully targeted acquisition strategy have pushed Oracle’s revenue and
profits to record levels.”
"Little Bitty Cisco," by Jesse Eisinger, The Wall Street Journal,
November 6, 2003 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB106806983279057200,00.html?mod=technology%255Ffeatured%255Fstories%255Fhs
The way Wall Street eyes these things, including the
liberal use of the words "pro forma," Cisco had an impressive fiscal
first quarter.
Revenue came in better than expected and grew 5.3%
compared with a year ago, topping expectations of a flat top-line thanks in
part to spending from the federal government (see article). How impressive is
this? Well, the country's economy grew at 7.2%, and business spending on
equipment and software rose 15%. Microsoft had revenue growth of 6%, IBM 8.6%,
and Dell is estimated to come in at 15% growth. So Cisco Systems, one of the
big tech dogs, looks like the runt of that particular litter. Is networking a
growth industry anymore, or is it doomed to be troubled by overcapacity and a
lack of business demand? The next few quarters are crucial.
Earnings per share -- that is, pro forma earnings per
share -- easily surpassed estimates, logging in at 17 cents a share, compared
with the expectation of 15 cents a share and last year's 14 cents.
The company's shareholder equity fell in the quarter
to $27.4 billion from $28 billion a year ago. Cash flow from operations fell
to $973 million from $1.1 billion a year earlier. Cash on hand and investments
fell from $20.7 billion to $19.7 billion, which is still mountainous but lower
year-over-year, nevertheless.
Then there is the gross-margin story. Cisco has had
Himalayan gross margins throughout the slowdown, because it was able to
squeeze suppliers and find efficiencies. But now that revenue is finally
increasing, gross margins fell. Product gross margins came in at 69%, down
from 71% in the fourth quarter. Cisco is selling less profitable products,
including some from its recent acquisition of Linksys. It also has outsourced
much of its production. How much operating leverage does Cisco now have? That
is the reason it sports its high valuation, after all.
Then there is the outlook. Deferred revenue and
backlog were down. Cisco's book-to-bill ratio, a measure that reflects order
momentum, was below one. When book-to-bill is below one, orders are lower than
billings, suggesting a slowdown, not acceleration. True, Cisco put out a
forecast for modestly higher revenue for the second quarter compared with the
first. But some questions should linger.
Question: How does former Enron
CEO Jeff Skilling define HFV?
Home Video Uncovered by the Houston Chronicle, December 19, 2002
Skits for Enron ex-executive funny then, but full of
irony now --- http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/metropolitan/1703624
(The above link includes a "See it Now" link to download
the video itself which played well for me.)
The tape, made for
the January 1997 going-away party for former Enron President Rich Kinder,
features nearly 30 minutes of absurd skits, songs and testimonials by company
executives and prominent Houstonians. The collection is all meant in good fun,
but some of the comments are ironic in the current climate of corporate
scandal.
In one skit, former
administrative executive Peggy Menchaca plays the part of Kinder as he
receives a budget report from then-President Jeff Skilling, who plays himself,
and financial planning executive Tod Lindholm. When the pretend Kinder
expresses doubt that Skilling can pull off 600 percent revenue growth for the
coming year, Skilling reveals how it will be done.
"We're going to
move from mark-to-market accounting to something I call HFV,
or hypothetical future value accounting," Skilling jokes as he reads from
a script. "If we do that, we can add a kazillion dollars to the bottom
line."
Richard Causey, the
former chief accounting officer who was embroiled in many of the business
deals named in the indictments of other Enron executives, makes an unfortunate
joke later on the tape.
"I've been on
the job for a week managing earnings, and it's easier than I thought it would
be," Causey says, referring to a practice that is frowned upon by
securities regulators. "I can't even count fast enough with the earnings
rolling in."
Texas' political
elite also take part in the tribute, with then-Gov. George W. Bush pleading
with Kinder: "Don't leave Texas. You're too good a man."
Former President
George Bush also offers a send-off to Kinder, thanking him for helping his son
reach the Governor's Mansion.
"You have been
fantastic to the Bush family," he says. "I don't think anybody did
more than you did to support George."
"Bubble Redux," by Andrew Bary, Barron's, April 14, 2003,
Page 17.
Amazon's valuation is the most
egregious of the 'Net trio. It trades for 80 times projected "pro
forma" 2003 profit of 32 cents a share. Amazon's pro forma
definition of profit, moreover, is dubious because it excludes re-structuring
charges and, more important, the restricted stock that Amazon now is issuing
to employees in lieu of stock options. Amazon's reported profit this
year under generally accepted accounting principles (which include
restricted-stock costs) could be just 10 cents to 15 cents a share, meaning
that Amazon's true P/E arguably is closer to 200.
Yahoo, meanwhile, now commands
70 times estimated 2003 net of 35 cents a share, and eBay fetches 65 times
projected 2003 net of $1.35 a share.
What's fair value? By our
calculations, Amazon is worth, at best, roughly 90% of its projected 2003
revenue of $4.6 billion. That translates into $10 a share, or $4.1 billion.
This estimate is charitable because the country's two most successful
brick-and-mortar retailers, Wal-Mart Stores and Home Depot, also
trade for about 90% of 2003 sales.
Yahoo ought to trade closer to
15. That's a stiff 43 times projected 2003 earnings and gives the
company credit for its strong balance sheet, featuring over $2 a share in cash
and another $3 a share for its stake in Yahoo Japan, which has become that
country's eBay.
Sure, eBay undoubtedly is the
most successful Internet company and the only one that has lived up to the
growth projections made during the Bubble. As the dominant online
marketplace in the U.S. and Europe, eBay saw its earnings surge to 87 cents a
share last year from three cents in 1998, when it went public at a
split-adjusted $3.00 a share.
Why would eBay be more fairly
valued around 60, its price just several months ago? At 60, eBay would
trade at 44 times projected 2003 profit of $1.35 a share and 22 times an
optimistic 2005 estimate of $2.75. So confident are analysts about
eBay's outlook that they're comfortable valuing the stock on a 2005 earnings
estimate.
Fans of eBay believe its profit
can rise at a 35% annual clip in the next five years, a difficult rate for any
company to maintain, even one, such as eBay, with a "scalable"
business model that allows it to easily accommodate more transactions while
maintaining its enviable gross margins of 80%. If the company earns $5 a
share in 2007--nearly six times last year's profit--it would still trade at 18
times that very optimistic profit level.
Continued in the article.
The New York Yankees today released their 4th Quarter 2001 pro
forma results. Although generally accepted scorekeeping principles (GASP) indicate that
the Yankees lost Games 1 and 2 of the 2001 World Series, their pro forma figures show that
these reported losses were the result of nonrecurring items, specifically extraordinary
pitching performances by Arizona Diamondbacks personnel Kurt Schilling and Randy Johnson.
Games 3 and 4 results, already indicating Yankee wins, were not restated on a pro forma
basis.
Ed Scribner, New Mexico State
Until
recently, pro forma reporting was seen as a useful tool that could help
companies show performance when unusual circumstances might cloud the picture.
Today it finds itself in bad odour.
"Pro forma lingo Does the use of controversial non-GAAP reporting by some
companies confuse or enlighten?," by Michael Lewis, CA Magazine, March 2002
--- http://www.cica.ca/cica/camagazine.nsf/e2002-mar/Features
For fans of JDS
Uniphase Corp., the fibre-optics manufacturer with headquarters in Ottawa and
San Jose, Calif., the report for fiscal 2001 provided the icing on a very
delicious cake: following an uninterrupted series of positive quarterly
earnings results, the corporate giant announced it was set to deliver US$67
million in pro forma profit.
There was only one
fly in the ointment. Like all such calculations, JDS's pro forma numbers were
not prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP),
and as such they excluded goodwill, merger-related and stock-option charges,
and losses on investments. Once those items were added back into the
accounting mix, JDS suddenly showed a staggering US$50.6 billion in red ink -
a US corporate record. Even so, many investors remained loyal, placing their
trust in the boom-market philosophy that views onetime charges as largely
irrelevant. The mantra was simple - operating results rule.
"That was the
view at the time," says Jim Hall, a Calgary portfolio manager with Mawer
Canadian Equity Fund. "It just goes to show how wrong people can
be."
Since then, of
course, the spectacular flameout of Houston's Enron Corp. has done much to
change that point of view (though it's not a pro forma issue). Once the
world's largest energy trader, the company now holds the title for the largest
bankruptcy case in US history. The Chapter 11 filing in December came after
Enron had to restate US$586 million in earnings because of apparent accounting
irregularities. In its submission, the company admitted it had hidden assets
and related debt charges since 1997 in order to inflate consolidated earnings.
Enron's auditor, accounting firm Arthur Andersen LLP, later acknowledged that
it had made "an [honest] error in judgement" regarding Enron's
financial statements.
While the Enron saga
will continue in various courtrooms for many months to come, regulators on
either side of the border have responded to the collapse with uncharacteristic
swiftness. Both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United
States and the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) issued new guidelines
on financial reporting just a few weeks after the Enron bust. In each
instance, investors were reminded to redirect their focus to financial
statements prepared in accordance with GAAP, paying special attention to cash
flow, liquidity and the intrinsic value of acquisitions. At the same time,
issuers were warned to reduce their reliance on pro forma results and to
explain to investors why they were not using GAAP in their reporting.
SEC chairman Harvey
Pitt moved furthest and fastest. In mid-January he announced plans to
establish a private watchdog to discipline accountants and review company
audits. Working with the largest accounting firms and professional
organizations such as the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA), the SEC wants the new body to be able to punish accountants for
incompetence and ethics violations. As Pitt emphasized, "The commission
cannot, and in any event will not, tolerate this pattern of growing
re-statements, audit failures, corporate failures and investor losses."
The sheer scale of
the Enron debacle has brought pro forma accounting under public scrutiny as
never before, and, observers say, will provide a powerful impetus for
financial reporting reform. "This will send a message to companies and
accountants to cut back on some of the games they've been playing," says
former SEC general counsel Harvey Goldschmid.
Meanwhile, the CSA
(the forum for the 13 securities regulators of Canada's provinces and
territories) expressed its concern over the proliferation of non-standard
measures, warning that they improve the appearance of a company's financial
health, gloss over risks and make it exceedingly difficult for investors to
compare issuers.
"Investors
should be cautious when looking at non-GAAP measures," says John Carchrae,
chair of the CSA Chief Accountants Committee, when the guidelines were
released in January. "These measures present only part of the picture and
may selectively omit certain expenses, resulting in a more positive portrayal
of a company's performance."
As a result, Canadian
issuers will now be expected to provide GAAP figures alongside non-standard
earnings measures, explain how pro forma numbers are calculated, and detail
why they exclude certain items required by GAAP. So far, the CSA has provided
guidance rather than rules, but the committee cautions it could take
regulatory action if issuers publish earnings reports deemed to be misleading
to investors.
Carchrae, who is also
chief accountant of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), believes
"moral suasion" is a good place to start. Nonetheless, he adds, the
OSC intends to track press releases, cross-reference them to statutory
earnings filings and supplemental information on websites, and monitor
continuous disclosure to ensure a company meets its requirements under the
securities act.
Although pro forma
reporting finds itself in bad odour, until recently it was regarded as a
useful tool that could help companies show performance when unusual
circumstances might cloud the picture. In cases involving a merger or
acquisition, for example, where a company has made enormous expenditures that
generate significant non-cash expenses on the income statement, pro forma can
be used as a clarifying document, enabling investors to view economic
performance outside of such onetime events. Over the years, however, the pro
forma route has increasingly involved the selective use of press releases,
websites, and other reports to put a favourable spin on earnings, often
leading to a spike in the value of a firm's stock. Like management discussion
and analysis, such communications are not within the ambit of GAAP, falling
somewhere between the cracks of current accounting standards.
"Obviously, this
issue is of concern to everyone who uses financial statements," says Paul
Cherry, chairman of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants'
Accounting Standards Board. "Our worry as standard-setters is whether
these non-GAAP, pro forma items confuse or enlighten."
Regulators and
standard-setters have agonized over this issue ever since the reporting
lexicon began to expand with the rise of the dot-com sector in the late 1990s,
a sector with little in the way of earnings that concentrated on revenue
growth as a more meaningful performance indicator. New measures, such as
"run-through rates" or "burn rates," were deemed welcome
additions to traditional methodology because they helped determine how much
financing a technology company might require during its risky startup phase.
Critics, however,
argued such terms were usurping easily understood language as part of a
corporate scheme to hoodwink unwary investors. Important numbers were hidden
or left out under a deluge of new and ever-more complex terminology. The new
measurements, they warned, fell short of adequate financial disclosure.
An OSC report
published in February 2001 appears to support these claims. According to the
report, Canadian technology companies have not provided investors with
adequate information about how they disclose revenue, a shortcoming that may
require some of them to restate their financial results.
"Initial results
of the review suggest a need for significant improvement in the nature and
extent of disclosure," the report states, adding that the OSC wants more
specific notes on accounting policy attached to financial statements. The
report also observes that revenue is often recognized when goods are shipped,
not when they are sold, despite the fact that the company may be exposed to
returns.
David Wright, a
software analyst at BMO Nesbitt Burns in Toronto, says dealing with how
technology companies record revenue is a perennial issue. The issue has gained
greater prominence with the rise of vendor financing, a practice whereby
companies act as a bank to buyers, lending customers the cash to complete
purchase orders. If the customer is unable to pay for the goods or services
subsequent to signing the sales agreement, the seller's revenue can be
drastically overstated.
But pro forma still
has plenty of advocates - particularly when it comes to earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). Such a measure, it is
often argued, can provide a pure, meaningful and reliable diagnostic tool,
albeit one that should be considered along with figures that accommodate
charges to a balance sheet.
Ron Blunn, head of
investor relations firm Blunn & Co. Inc. in Toronto and chairperson of the
issues committee of the Canadian Investor Relations Institute, says adjusted
earnings can serve a legitimate purpose and are particularly helpful to
analysts and money managers who must gauge the financial well-being of
technology startups.
The debate shows no
signs of burning out anytime soon. On the one hand, the philosophy among
Canadian and US standard-setters in recent years has appeared to favour
removing constraints, rather than imposing them. New rules to apply to
Canadian banks this year, for example, will no longer require the amortization
of goodwill in earnings figures. On the other hand, it has become abundantly
clear that companies will emphasize the reporting method that puts the best
gloss on their operations. And while the use of pro forma accounting has
remained most prevalent among technology companies, the movement to embrace
more and varied language has spread to "old economy" companies such
as Enron, gaining steam as the economy stumbled. Blunn theorizes the
proliferation of nontraditional reporting and the increasing reliance on
supplemental filings simply reflect the state of the North American economy.
Carchrae has a
slightly different diagnosis. When asked why pro forma reporting has
mushroomed in recent years, he points to investors' slavish devotion to
business box scores - that is, a company's ability to meet sales and earnings
expectations as set out by equity analysts. Since companies can be severely
punished for falling short of the Street's consensus forecast, there is
intense pressure, especially in a bear market, to conjure up earnings that
appear to satisfy forecasts.
As a result, pro
forma terminology has blossomed over the Canadian corporate landscape.
Montreal-based telephone utility BCE Inc., for example, coined the term
"cash baseline earnings" to describe its operating performance. Not
to be outdone, Robert McFarlane, chief financial officer of Telus Corp.,
Canada's second-largest telecommunications company, cited a "revenue
revision" and "EBITDA deficiency" to explain the drop in the
Burnaby, BC-based phone service firm's "core baseline earnings" for
its third quarter ended September 30, 2001. (According to company literature,
core baseline earnings refers to common share income before discontinued
operations, amortization of acquired intangible assets net of tax,
restructuring and nonrecurring refinancing costs net of tax, revaluation of
future tax assets and liabilities and goodwill amortization.)
Meanwhile, IBM Corp.
spinoff Celestica Inc. of Toronto neglected to mention the elimination of more
than 8,700 jobs from a global workforce of 30,000, alluding to the cuts in its
fiscal 2001 third-quarter report through references to "realignment"
charges during the period.
Many statements no
longer use the term "profit" at all. And while statutory filings
must present at least one version of earnings that conforms to GAAP, few rules
have been set down by US or Canadian regulators to govern non-GAAP
declarations. Accounting bodies in Canada and around the world are charged
with policing their members and assuring statutory filings include income and
revenue according to GAAP, using supportable interpretations. But pro forma
numbers are typically distributed before a company's statutory filing is made.
"Not to pass the
buck," says Cherry, "but how can we set standards for something
that's not part of GAAP?" Still, Cherry admits the use of non-GAAP
terminology has become so widespread that accounting authorities are being
forced to take notice. "The matter is gaining some prominence," he
says, "because some of the numbers are just so different."
Despite his
reservations, Cherry acknowledges "the critical point is when information
is released to the marketplace," which nowadays is almost always done via
a press release. The duty to regulate such releases, he says, must rest with
securities bodies - an opinion shared by Edmund Jenkins, chair of the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the United States.
Many authorities view
the issue as a matter of education, believing that a high degree of
sophistication must now be expected from the retail investing community.
Others say the spread of non-GAAP reporting methodology, left unchecked, could
distort markets, undermine investor confidence in regulatory regimes and
ultimately impede the flow of investment capital. But pro forma devotees
insist that introducing tough new measures to govern reporting would do little
to protect consumers and encourage retail investment. Instead, new regulations
might work to impede growth and limit available, useful financial information.
Continued at http://www.cica.ca/cica/camagazine.nsf/e2002-mar/Features
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting
Educators's Review on October 18, 2002
TITLE: Motorola's Profit: 'Special'
Again?
REPORTER: Jesse Drucker
DATE: Oct 15, 2002
PAGE: C1
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1034631975931460836.djm,00.html
TOPICS: Special Items, Pro Forma Earnings, Accounting, Earning Announcements,
Earnings Forecasts, Financial Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis, Net Income
SUMMARY: Motorola has announced both
pro forma earnings and net income as determined by generally accepted accounting
principles for 14 consecutive quarters. Ironically, pro forma earnings are
always greater than net income calculated using generally accepted accounting
principles
QUESTIONS:
1.) Distinguish between a special item and an extraordinary item. How are each
reported on the income statement?
2.) Distinguish between pro forma
earnings and GAAP based earnings. What are the advantages and disadvantages of
allowing companies to report multiple earnings numbers? What are the advantages
and disadvantages of not allowing companies to report multiple earnings numbers?
3.) What items were reported as special
by Motorola? Are these items special? Support your answer.
4.) Are you surprised that all the
special items reduced earnings? What is the likelihood that there were positive
nonrecurring items at Motorola? How are positive nonrecurring items reported?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University
of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
"Pro-Forma Earnings Reporting
Persists," by Shaheen Pasha, Washington Post, August 16, 2002 --- http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25384-2002Aug16.html
While many on Wall
Street are calling for an end to pro forma financial reporting given
widespread jitters over corporate clarity, it's clear from second-quarter
reports that the accounting practice is a hard habit to break.
Publicly traded
companies are required to report their results according to generally accepted
accounting principles, or GAAP, under which all types of business expenses are
deducted to arrive at the bottom line of a company's earnings report.
But an
ever-increasing number of companies in recent years has taken to also
reporting earnings on a pro forma – or "as if" – basis under
which they exclude various costs. Companies defend the practice, saying the
inclusion of one-time events don't accurately reflect true performance.
There is no universal
agreement on which expenses should be omitted from pro forma results, but pro
forma figures typically boost results.
Indeed, as the
second-quarter reporting season dwindles down with more than 90 percent of the
Standard & Poor's 500 companies having reported, only Yahoo Inc.,
Compuware Corp. and Xilinx Inc. made the switch to reporting earnings under
GAAP, according to Thomson First Call.
While a number of
S&P 500 companies, including Computer Associates International Inc. and
Corning Inc., made the switch to GAAP in the first quarter, that still brings
the number to 11 companies in total that have given up on pro forma over the
last two quarters.
"It's
disappointing that at this stage we haven't seen more companies make the
switch to GAAP earnings from pro forma," said Chuck Hill, director of
research at Thomson First Call.
Continued at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25384-2002Aug16.html
A new research report from Bear Stearns
identifies the best earnings benchmarks by industry. GAAP earnings are cited as
the best benchmarks for a few industries, but not many. The preferred benchmarks
are generally pro forma earnings or pro forma earnings per share. http://www.accountingweb.com/item/91934
AccountingWEB US - Oct-1-2002 -
A new research report from Bear Stearns identifies
the best earnings benchmarks by industry. GAAP earnings (earnings prepared
according to generally accepted accounting principles) are cited as the best
benchmarks for a few industries, but not many. Most use pro forma earnings or
pro forma earnings per share (EPS).
Examples of the most
useful earnings benchmarks for just a few of the 50+ industries included in
the report:
- Autos: Pro forma
EPS
- Industrial
manufacturing: Pro forma EPS shifting to GAAP EPS
- Trucking:
Continuing EPS
- Lodging: Pro forma
EPS, EBITDA and FFO
- Small &
mid-cap biotechnology: Product-related events, Cash on hand, Cash burn
rate
- Advertising &
marketing services: Pro forma EPS, EBITDA, Free cash flow
- Business/professional
services: Pro forma EPS, Cash EPS, EBITDA, Discounted free cash flow
- Wireless services:
GAAP EPS, EBITDA
EBITDA=Earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.
FFO=funds from operations.
The report also lists
the most common adjustments made to arrive at pro forma earnings and tells
whether securities analysts consider the adjustments valid. Patricia
McConnell, senior managing director at Bear Stearns, explains, "Analysts
rarely accept managements' suggested 'pro forma' adjustments without due
consideration, and sometimes we reject them... We would not recommend using
management's version of pro forma earnings without analysis and adjustment,
but neither would we blindly advise using GAAP earnings without analysis and
adjustment."
From The Wall Street Journal
Accounting Educators' Review on July 27, 2002
TITLE: Merrill Changes Methods Analysts
Use for Estimates
REPORTER: Karen Talley DATE: Jul 24, 2002
PAGE: C5
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,BT_CO_20020724_009399.djm,00.html
TOPICS: Accounting, Earnings Forecasts, Financial Accounting, Financial
Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis
SUMMARY: Merrill Lynch & Co. has
reported that it will begin forecasting both GAAP based earnings estimates in
addition to pro forma earnings measures. To accommodate Merrill Lynch & Co.,
Thomson First Call will collect and report GAAP estimates from other analysts.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Compare and contrast GAAP earnings and pro forma earnings?
2.) Why do analyst forecast pro forma
earnings? Will GAAP earnings forecasts provide more useful information than pro
forma earnings forecasts? Support your answer.
3.) Discuss the advantages and
disadvantages of analysts forecasting both pro forma and GAAP earnings. Should
analysts continue to provide pro forma earnings forecasts? Should analysts also
provide GAAP earnings forecasts? Support your answers.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University
of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
Denny Beresford's Terry Breakfast Lecture
Subtitle: Does Accounting Still Matter in the "New Economy"
Every accounting educator and practitioner should
read Professor Beresford's Lecture at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/beresford01.htm
Readers might also want to go to http://www.npr.org/news/specials/enron/
(Includes an interview with Lynn Turner talking about pro forma reporting.)
Deferred Taxes Related to FAS123 Expense – Accounting and Administrative
Issues on New Trends in Stock Compensation Accounting
PWC Insight on FAS 123 --- http://www.fei.org/download/HRInsight02_21.pdf
A recent PWC HR Insight discusses the applicable rules and answers questions
raised on accounting for income taxes related to FAS 123 expense (for both the
pro forma disclosure and the recognized FAS 123 expense). Per PWC, the rules are
complex and require that the tax benefits arising from stock options and other
types of stock-based compensation be tracked on a grant-by-grant and
country-by-country basis
Corporate America's New
Math: Investors Now Face Two Sets of Numbers In Figuring a Company's Bottom Line
By Justin Gillis
The Washington Post
Sunday, July 22, 2001; Page H01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/archives/front.htm
Cisco Systems Inc., a bellwether
of the "new economy," prepared its books for the first three months of this year
by slicing and dicing its financial results in the old ways mandated by the rules of
Washington regulators and the accounting profession.
Result: a quarterly loss of $2.7
billion.
Cisco did more, though. It sliced
and diced the same underlying numbers in ways preferred by Cisco, offering an alternative
interpretation of its results to the investing public.
Result: a quarterly profit of
$230 million.
That's an unusually large swing
in a company's bottom line, but there's nothing unusual these days about the strategy
Cisco employed. Across corporate America, companies are emphasizing something called
"pro forma" earnings statements. Because there are no rules for how to prepare
such statements, businesses have wide latitude to ignore various expenses in their pro
forma results that have to be included under traditional accounting rules.
Most of the time, the new numbers
make companies look better than they would under standard accounting, and some evidence
suggests investors are using the massaged numbers more and more to decide what value to
attach to stocks. The pro forma results are often strongly emphasized in news releases
announcing a corporation's earnings; sometimes the results computed under traditional
accounting techniques are not disclosed until weeks later, when the companies file the
official results with the Securities and Exchange Commission, as required by law.
Cisco includes its results under
both the pro forma and the traditional accounting methods in its news releases. People
skeptical of the practice of using pro forma results worry that investors are being
deceived. Karen Nelson, assistant professor of accounting at Stanford University, said
some companies were "verging on fraudulent behavior" in their presentation of
financial results.
Companies that use these
techniques say they are trying to help investors by giving them numbers that more
accurately reflect the core operations of their businesses, in part because they exclude
unusual expenses. Cisco's technique "gives readers of financial statements a clearer
picture of the results of Cisco's normal business activities," the company said in a
statement issued in response to questions about its accounting.
Until recently, pro forma results
had a well-understood and limited use. Most companies used pro forma accounting only to
adjust previously reported financial statements so they could be directly compared with
current results. This most frequently happened after a merger, when a company would adjust
past results to reflect what they would have been had the merger been in effect earlier.
Pro forma, Latin for "matter of form," refers to statements "where certain
amounts are hypothetical," according to Barron's Dictionary of Finance and
Investment Terms.
What's changed in recent years is
that many companies now using the technique also apply it to the current quarter. They
include some of the leading names of the Internet age, including Amazon.com Inc., Yahoo
Inc. and JDS Uniphase Corp. These companies have received enthusiastic support from many
Wall Street analysts for their use of pro forma results. The companies' arguments have
also been bolstered by a broader attack on standard accounting launched by some academic
researchers and accountants. They believe the nation's financial reporting system, rooted
in the securities law reforms of the New Deal, is inadequate to modern needs. In testimony
before Congress last year, Michael R. Young, a securities lawyer, called it a
"creaky, sputtering, 1930s-vintage financial reporting system."
The dispute over earnings
statements has grown in intensity during the recent economic slide. To skeptics, more and
more companies appear to be coping with bad news on their financial statements by
redefining the concept of earnings. SEC staffers are worried about the trend and are
weighing a crackdown.
"People are using the pro
forma earnings to present a tilted, biased picture to investors that I don't believe
necessarily reflects the reality of what's going on with the business," said Lynn
Turner, the SEC's chief accountant.
For the rest of the article (and it is a long
article), go to
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/archives/front.htm
The full article is salted with quotes from accounting professors and Bob Elliott (KMPG
and Chairman of the AICPA)
The Future of
Amazon.com: Unlike Enron, Amazon.com seems to thrive without profits. How long
can it last?
"Economy, the Web and E-Commerce:
Amazon.com." An Interview With Jeff Bezos CEO, Amazon.com, The Washington Post,
December 6, 2001 --- http://discuss.washingtonpost.com/zforum/01/washtech_bezos120601.htm
Amazon.com is pinning its hopes on pro forma
reporting to report the company's first profit in history. But wait! Plans by U.S.
regulators to crack down on "pro forma" abuses in accounting may take a toll on
Internet firms, which like the financial reporting technique because it can make losses
seem smaller than they really are.
"When Pro Forma Is Bad Form," by Joanna
Glasner, Wired News, December 6, 2001 --- http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,48877,00.html
As part of efforts to improve the
clarity of information given to investors, the Securities and Exchange Commission warned
this week that it will crack down on companies that use creative accounting methods to
pump up poor earnings results.
In particular, the commission
said it will focus on abuse of a popular form of financial reporting known as "pro
forma" accounting, which allows companies to exclude certain expenses and gains from
their earnings results. The SEC said the method "may not convey a true and accurate
picture of a company's financial well-being."
Experts say the practice is
especially common among Internet firms, which began issuing earnings press releases with
pro forma numbers en masse during the stock market boom of the late 1990s. The list of
new-economy companies using pro forma figures includes such prominent firms as Yahoo
(YHOO), AOL Time Warner (AOL), CNET (CNET) and JDS Uniphase (JDSU).
Unprofitable firms are
particularly avid users of pro forma numbers, said Brett Trueman, professor of accounting
at the University of California at Berkeley's Haas School of Business.
"I can't say for sure why,
but I can take a guess: They're losing big time, and they want to give investors the
impression that the losses are not as great as they appear," he said.
Trueman said savvy investors tend
to know that companies may have self-serving interests in mind when they release pro forma
numbers. Experienced traders often put greater credence in numbers compiled according to
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which firms are required to release
alongside any pro forma numbers.
A mounting concern, however, is
the fact that many companies rely almost solely on pro forma numbers in projections for
future performance.
Perhaps the best-known proponent
of pro forma is the perennially unprofitable Amazon.com, which has a history of guiding
investor expectations using an accounting system that excludes charges for stock
compensation, restructuring or the declining value of past acquisitions.
Invariably, the pro forma numbers
are better than the GAAP ones. In its most recent quarter, for example, Amazon (AMZN)
reported a pro forma loss of $58 million. When measured according to GAAP, Amazon's net
loss nearly tripled to $170 million.
Things are apt to get even
stranger in the last quarter of the year, when Amazon said it plans to deliver its
first-ever pro forma operating profit. By regular accounting standards, the company will
still be losing money.
Those results might not sit too
well with the folks at the SEC, however.
In its statements this week, the
SEC noted that although there's nothing inherently illegal about providing pro forma
numbers, figures should not be presented in a deliberately misleading manner. Regulators
may have been talking directly to Amazon in one paragraph of their warning, which said:
"Investors are likely to be
deceived if a company uses a pro forma presentation to recast a loss as if it were a
profit."
Neither Amazon nor AOL Time
Warner returned phone calls inquiring if they planned to make changes to their pro forma
accounting methods in light of the SEC's recent statements.
According to Trueman, few members
of the financial community would advocate getting rid of pro forma numbers altogether.
Even the SEC said that pro forma
numbers, when used appropriately, can provide investors with a great deal of useful
information that might not be included with GAAP results. When presented correctly, pro
forma numbers can offer insights into the performance of the core business, by excluding
one-time events that can skew quarterly results.
Rather than ditching pro forma,
industry groups like Financial Executives International and the National Investor
Relations Institute say a better plan is to set uniform guidelines for how to present the
numbers. They have issued a set of recommendations, such as making sure companies don't
arbitrarily change what's included in pro forma results from quarter to quarter.
Certainly some consistency would
make it easier for folks who try to track this stuff, said Joe Cooper, research analyst at
First Call, which compiles analyst projections of earnings.
The boom in pro forma reporting
has created quite a bit of extra work for First Call, Cooper said, because it has to
figure out which companies and analysts are using pro forma numbers and how they're using
them.
But the extra work of compiling
pro forma numbers doesn't necessarily result in greater financial transparency for
investors, Cooper said.
"In days past, before it was
abused, it was a way to give an honest apples-to-apples comparison," he said.
"Now, it is being used as a way to continually put their company in a good
light."
See also:
SEC
Fires Warning Shot Over Tech Statements
Earnings Downplay Stock Losses
Change at
the Top for AOL
Where's the Money?, Huh?
There's no biz like E-Biz
The bellwether Internet firm says it will stop
reporting earnings in pro forma, a controversial accounting method popular in the
technology sector --- http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,51721,00.html
"Yahoo Gives Pro Forma the Boot." By
Joanna Glasner, Wired News, April 11, 2002 ---
Following the release of its
first-quarter results on Wednesday, Yahoo (YHOO) said it will stop reporting earnings
using pro forma, a controversial accounting method popular among Internet and technology
firms.
Instead, the company said it
plans to release all results according to generally accepted accounting principles, or
GAAP. Executives said the shift would provide a clearer picture of the Yahoo's financial
performance.
"We do not believe the pro
forma presentation continues to provide a useful purpose," said Sue Decker, Yahoo's
chief financial officer. In the past, the company has used pro forma accounting as a way
to separate one-time expenses -- such as the costs of closing a unit or acquiring another
firm -- from costs stemming from its core business.
Decker attributed the decision in
part to new rules adopted by the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board that take
effect this year. The new rules require companies to report the amount they overpaid for
acquisitions as an upfront charge.
Accounting experts, however, said
the rule change was probably not the only reason for Yahoo to drop pro forma. The
accounting practice, popularized by technology firms in the late 1990s, has come under
fire from regulators in recent months who say some firms have used nonstandard metrics to
mask poor financial performance.
The U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission warned in December that it will crack down on companies that use creative
accounting methods to pump up poor earnings results.
In particular, the commission
said it will focus on abuses of pro forma accounting, which allows companies to exclude
certain expenses and gains from their earnings results. The SEC said the method "may
not convey a true and accurate picture of a company's financial well-being."
Experts say use of pro forma is
especially common among Internet firms. In addition to Yahoo, the list of prominent
Internet and technology firms employing pro forma includes AOL Time Warner (AOL), Cnet
(CNET) and JDS Uniphase (JDSU).
Although pro forma accounting can
be useful in helping to predict a company's future performance, investors have grown
increasingly suspicious of the metric following the bursting of the technology stock
bubble, said Sam Norwood, a partner at Tatum CFO Partners.
"Once the concept of pro
forma became accepted, there were in some cases abuses," Norwood said. "There
was a tendency for management to exclude the negative events and to not necessarily
exclude the positive events.'
Brett Trueman, an accounting
professor at the University of California at Berkeley's Haas School of Business, said he
wouldn't be surprised if other firms follow Yahoo's lead in dropping pro forma.
Continued at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,51721,00.html
Bob Jensen's threads on pro forma reporting can be found at the following site:
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
Triple-Bottom
(Social, Environmental) Reporting
While some in the profession may question the
long-term viability of audit-only accounting firms, proposed guidelines issued recently by
the Global Reporting Initiative may help make the vision more feasible. The GRI's
guidelines for "triple-bottom- line reporting" would broaden financial reporting
into a three- dimensional model for economic, social and environmental reporting. http://www.accountingweb.com/item/78245
While some in the profession may
question the long-term viability of audit-only accounting firms, proposed guidelines
issued recently by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) may help make the vision more
feasible. The GRI's guidelines for "triple-bottom-line reporting" would broaden
financial reporting into a three-dimensional model for economic, social and environmental
reporting. Each dimension of the model would contain information that is valuable to
stakeholders and could be independently verified.
Numbers, Ratios and Explanations
Despite the convenient shorthand
reference to bottom lines, many of the GRI indicators are multi-faceted, consisting of
tables, ratios and qualitative descriptions of policies, procedures, and systems. Below
are examples of indicators within each of the three dimensions:
Economic performance indicators.
Geographic breakdown of key markets, percent of contracts paid in accordance with agreed
terms, and description of the organization's indirect economic impacts.
Environmental performance
indicators. Breakdown of energy sources used, (e.g., for electricity and heat), total
water usage, breakdown of waste by type and destination, list of penalties paid for
non-compliance with environmental laws and regulations, and description of policies and
procedures to minimize adverse environmental impacts.
Social performance indicators.
Total workforce including temporary workers, percentage of employees represented by trade
unions, schedule of average hours of training per year per employee for all major
categories of employee, male/female ratios in upper management positions, and descriptions
of policies and procedures to address such issues as human rights, product information and
labeling, customer privacy, and political lobbying and contributions. The GRI was formed
in 1997 by a partnership of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the
Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES). Several hundred organizations
have participated in working groups to help form the guidelines for triple-bottom-line
reporting. These organizations include corporations, accounting firms, investors, labor
organizations and other stakeholders.
"What Is Environmental Accounting?" AccountingWeb, January 6, 2006
---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=101639
Environmental Management Accounting (EMA) is a
cover title used to describe different aspects of this burgeoning field of
accounting. The focus of EMA is as a management accounting tool used to make
internal business decisions, especially for proactive environmental
management activities. EMA was developed to recognize some limitations of
conventional management accounting approaches to environmental costs,
consequences, and impacts. For example, overhead accounts were the
destination of many environmental costs in the past. Cost allocations were
inaccurate and could not be traced back to processes, products, or process
lines. Wasted raw materials were also inaccurately accounted for during
production.
Each aspect of EMA has a general accounting type
that serves as its foundation, according to the EMA international website.
The following examples indicate the general accounting type followed by the
environmental accounting parallel:
Management Accounting (MA) entails the
identification, collection, estimation, analysis, and use of cost, or
other information used for organizational decision-making. Environmental
Management Accounting (EMA) is Management Accounting with a focus on
materials and energy flow information, with environmental cost
information.
Financial Accounting (FA) comprises the
development and organizational reporting of financial information to
external parties, such as stockholders and bankers. Environmental
Financial Accounting (EFA) builds on Financial Accounting, focusing on
the reporting of environmental liability costs with other significant
environmental costs.
National Accounting (NA) is the development of
economic and other information used to describe national income and
economic health. Environmental National Accounting (ENA) is National
Accounting focusing on the stocks of natural resources, their physical
flows, environmental costs, and externality costs.
EMA is a broad set of approaches and principles
that provide views into the physical flows and costs critical to the
successful completion of environmental management activities and
increasingly, routine management activities, such as product and process
design, capital budgeting, cost control and allocation, and product pricing,
according to the EMA international website.
Continued in article
Sustainability Accounting ---
Click Here
Banks Illustrate the Hypocrisy of Social Responsibility
Accounting
We hang the petty thieves and appoint the great
ones to public office.
Aesop
That
some bankers have ended up in prison is not a matter of scandal, but
what is outrageous is the fact that all the others are free.
Honoré de Balzac |
"Holding back the banks: Predatory banking practices are likely to
continue while political parties are too close to corporations and regulators
lack teeth," by Prem Sikka, The Guardian (in the U.K.), February 15,
2008 ---
http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/prem_sikka_/2008/02/holding_back_the_banks.html
Politicians
and regulators have been slow to wake up to the destructive
impact of banks on the rest of society. Their lust for profits
and financial engineering has brought us the
sub-prime crisis and possibly a
recession. Billions of pounds have been
wiped off the value of people's
savings, pensions and investments.
Despite
this, banks are set to make
record profits (in the U.K.) and their
executives will be collecting bumper salaries and bonuses. These
profits are boosted by
preying on customers in debt, making
exorbitant
charges and failing to pass on the
benefit of cuts in
interest rates. Banks indulge in
insider trading, exploit
charity laws and have sold suspect
payment protection insurance policies.
As usual, the annual financial reports published by banks will
be opaque and will provide no clues to their antisocial
practices.
Some
governments are now also waking up to the involvement of banks
in organised
tax avoidance and evasion. Banks have
long been at the heart of the tax avoidance industry. In 2003,
the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
concluded (pdf) that the development
and sale of potentially abusive and illegal tax shelters have
become a lucrative business for accounting firms, banks,
investment advisory firms and law firms. Banks use clever
avoidance schemes,
transfer pricing schemes and
offshore (pdf) entities, not only to
avoid their
own taxes but also to help their rich
clients do the same.
The role
of banks in enabling
Enron, the disgraced US energy giant,
to avoid taxes worldwide, is well
documented (pdf) by the US Senate
joint committee on taxation. Enron used complex corporate
structures and transactions to avoid taxes in the US and many
other countries. The Senate Committee noted (see pages 10 and
107) that some of the complex schemes were devised by Bankers
Trust, Chase Manhattan and Deutsche Bank, among others. Another
Senate
report (pdf) found that resources were
also provided by the Salomon Smith Barney unit of Citigroup and
JP Morgan Chase & Co.
The
involvement of banks is essential as they can front corporate
structures and have the resources - actually our savings and
pension contributions - to provide finance for the complex
layering of transactions. After examining the scale of tax
evasion schemes by
KPMG, the US Senate committee
concluded (pdf) that complex tax
avoidance schemes could not have been executed without the
active and willing participation of banks. It noted (page 9)
that "major banks, such as Deutsche Bank, HVB, UBS, and NatWest,
provided purported loans for tens of millions of dollars
essential to the orchestrated transactions," and a subsequent
report (pdf) (page111) added "which
the banks knew were tax motivated, involved little or no credit
risk, and facilitated potentially abusive or illegal tax
shelters".
The
Senate report (pdf) noted (page 112)
that Deutsche Bank provided some $10.8bn of credit lines, HVB
Bank $2.5bn and UBS provided several billion Swiss francs, to
operationalise complex avoidance schemes. NatWest was also a key
player and provided about $1bn (see
page 72 [pdf])
of credit lines.
Deutsche
Bank has been the subject of a US
criminal investigation and in 2007 it
reached an out-of-court settlement with several wealthy
investors, who had been sold aggressive US tax shelters.
Some
predatory practices have also been identified in other
countries. In 2004, after a six-year investigation, the
National Irish Bank was fined £42m for
tax evasion. The bank's personnel promoted offshore investment
policies as a secure destination for funds that had not been
declared to the revenue commissioners. A government report found
that almost the entire former senior management at the bank
played some role in tax evasion scams. The external auditors,
KPMG, and the bank's own audit committee were also found to have
played a role in allowing tax evasion.
In the UK,
successive governments have shown little interest in mounting an
investigation into the role of banks in tax avoidance though
some banks have been persuaded to inform authorities of the
offshore accounts held by private
individuals. No questions have been asked about how banks avoid
their taxes and how they lubricate the giant and destructive tax
avoidance industry. When asked "if he will commission research
on the levels of use of offshore tax havens by UK banks and the
economic effects of that use," the chancellor of the exchequer
replied: "There are no plans to
commission research on the levels of use of offshore tax havens
by UK banks and the economic effects of that use."
Continued in article
"Bringing banks to book Financial institutions are not going to voluntarily
embrace honesty and social responsibility - there is little evidence they do so
now," by Prem Sikka, The Guardian, February 27, 2008 ---
http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/prem_sikka_/2008/02/bringing_banks_to_book.html
Anyone visiting the
websites of banks or browsing through their annual reports will
find no shortage of claims of "corporate social responsibility".
Yet their practices rarely come anywhere near their claims.
In
pursuit of higher profits and bumper executive rewards,
banks have inflicted both the credit crunch and sub-prime
crisis on us. Their sub-prime activities may also be steeped
in
fraud and mis-selling of
mortgage securities. They have
developed onshore and offshore structures and practices to
engage in
insider trading,
corruption,
sham tax-avoidance transactions
and
tax evasion. Money laundering is
another money-spinner.
Worldwide
over $2tn are estimated to be
laundered each year. The laundered
amounts fund private armies, terrorism, narcotics, smuggling,
corruption, tax evasion and criminal activity and generally
threaten quality of life. Large amounts of money cannot be
laundered without the involvement of
accountants, lawyers, financial
advisers and banks.
The US is the
world's biggest laundry and European countries are not far
behind. Banks are required to have internal controls and systems
to monitor suspicious transactions and report them to
regulators. As with any form of regulation, corporations enjoy
considerable discretion about what they record and report.
Profits come above everything else.
A
US government report (see page 31)
noted that "the New York branch of ABN AMRO, a banking
institution, did not have anti-money laundering program and had
failed to monitor approximately $3.2 billion - involving
accounts of US shell companies and institutions in Russian and
other former republics of the Soviet Union".
A US
Senate report on the Riggs Bank noted that it had developed
novel strategies for concealing its trade with General Augusto
Pinochet, former Chilean dictator. It noted (page
2) that the bank "disregarded its
anti-money laundering (AML) obligations ... despite frequent
warnings from ... regulators, and allowed or, at times, actively
facilitated suspicious financial activity". The committee
chairman
Senator Carl Levin
stated that "the 'Don't ask,
Don't tell policy' at Riggs allowed the bank to pursue profits
at the expense of proper controls ... Million-dollar cash
deposits, offshore shell corporations, suspicious wire
transfers, alteration of account names - all the classic signs
of money laundering and foreign corruption made their appearance
at Riggs Bank".
The Senate
committee report (see
page 7) stated that:
"Over the past 25 years, multiple financial institutions
operating in the United States, including Riggs Bank,
Citigroup, Banco de Chile-United States, Espirito Santo Bank
in Miami, and others, enabled [former Chilean dictator]
Augusto Pinochet to construct a web of at least 125 US bank
and securities accounts, involving millions of dollars,
which he used to move funds and transact business. In many
cases, these accounts were disguised by using a variant of
the Pinochet name, an alias, the name of an offshore entity,
or the name of a third party willing to serve as a conduit
for Pinochet funds."
The Senate
report stated (page
28) that "In addition to opening
multiple accounts for Mr Pinochet in the United States and
London, Riggs took several actions consistent with helping Mr
Pinochet evade a court order attempting to freeze his bank
accounts and escape notice by law enforcement". Riggs bank's
files and papers (see
page 27) contained "no reference to or
acknowledgment of the ongoing controversies and litigation
associating Mr Pinochet with human rights abuses, corruption,
arms sales, and drug trafficking. It makes no reference to
attachment proceedings that took place the prior year, in which
the Bermuda government froze certain assets belonging to Mr
Pinochet pursuant to a Spanish court order - even though ...
senior Riggs officials obtained a memorandum summarizing those
proceedings from outside legal Counsel."
The bank's
profile did not identify Pinochet by name and at times he is
referred to (see
page 25) as "a retired professional,
who achieved much success in his career and accumulated wealth
during his lifetime for retirement in an orderly way" (p
25) ... with a "High paying position
in Public Sector for many years" (p
25) ... whose source of his
initial wealth was "profits & dividends from several business[es]
family owned" (p
27) ... the source of his current
income is "investment income, rental income, and pension fund
payments from previous posts " (p
27).
Finger is
also pointed at other banks. Barclays France, Société
Marseillaise de Credit, owned by HSBC, and the National Bank of
Pakistan are facing
allegations of money laundering. In
2002,
HSBC was facing a fine by the Spanish
authorities for operating a series of opaque bank accounts for
wealthy businessmen and professional football players.
Regulators in India are investigating an alleged $8bn (£4bn)
money laundering operation involving
UBS.
Nigeria's
corrupt rulers are estimated to have
stolen
around £220bn over four decades and channelled them through
banks in London, New York, Jersey,
Switzerland, Austria, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Germany. The
Swiss authorities repatriated some of the monies stolen by
former dictator
General Sani Abacha.
A report by the Swiss federal banking commission noted (page
7) that there were instances of serious individual failure
or misconduct at some banks. The banks were named as "three
banks in the Credit Suisse Group (Credit Suisse, Bank Hofmann AG
and Bank Leu AG), Crédit Agricole Indosuez (Suisse) SA, UBP
Union Bancaire Privée and MM Warburg Bank (Schweiz) AG".
Continued in article
Jensen Comment
Prem Sikka has written a rather brief but comprehensive summary of many of the
bad things banks have been caught doing and in many cases still getting away
with. Accounting standards have be complicit in many of these frauds, especially
FAS 140 (R) which allowed banks to sell bundles of "securitized" mortgage notes
from SPE's (now called VIEs) using borrowed funds that are kept off balance
sheet in these entities called SPEs/VIEs. The FASB had in mind that responsible
companies (read that banks) would not issue debt in excess of the value of the
collateral (e.g., mortgage properties). But FAS 140 (R) fails to allow for the
fact that collateral values such as real estate values may be expanding in a
huge bubble about to burst and leave the bank customers and possibly the banks
themselves owing more than the values of the securities bundles of notes. Add to
this the frauds that typically take place in valuing collateral in the first
place, and you have FAS 140 (R) allowing companies, notably banks, incurring
huge losses on debt that was never booked due to FAS 140 (R).
FAS 140 (R) needs to be rewritten ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm
However, the banks now control their regulators! We're not about to see the SEC,
FED, and other regulators allow FAS 140 (R) to be drastically revised.
Also banks are complicit in the "dirty secrets" of credit cards and credit
reporting ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm#FICO
Then there are the many illegal temptations which lure in banks such as
profitable money laundering and the various departures from ethics discussed
above by Prem Sikka.
Bob Jensen's "Rotten to the Core" threads are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
Lessons Not Learned from Enron
Bad SPE Accounting Rules are Still Dogging Us
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on October 19,
2007
Call to Brave for $100 Billion Rescue
by David
Reilly
The Wall Street Journal
Oct 16, 2007
Page: C1
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Advanced
Financial Accounting, Securitization
SUMMARY: This
article addresses a proposed bailout plan for $100 billion
of commercial paper to maintain liquidity in credit markets
that have faced turmoil since July 2007, and the fact that
this bailout "...raises two crucial questions: Why didn't
investors see the problems coming? And how could they have
happened in the first place?" The author emphasizes that
post-Enron accounting rules "...were supposed to prevent
companies from burying risks in off-balance sheet vehicles."
He argues that the new rules still allow for some
off-balance sheet entities and that "...the new rules in
some ways made it even harder for investors to figure out
what was going on."
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: The bailout plan is a response to risks and
losses associated with special purpose entities (SPEs) that
qualified for non-consolidation under Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards 140, Accounting for Transfers and
Servicing of financial Assets and Extinguishments of
Liabilities, and Financial Interpretation (FIN) 46(R),
Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Summarize the plan to guarantee liquidity in commercial
paper markets as described in the related article. In your
answer, define the term structured investment vehicles (SIVs).
2.) The author writes that SIVs "...don't get recorded on
banks books...." What does this mean? Present your answer in
terms of treatment of qualifying special purpose entities (SPEs)
under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 140,
Accounting for Transfers and Servicing Financial Assets and
Extinguishments of Liabilities.
3.) The author argues that current accounting standards make
it difficult for investors to figure out what was going on
in markets that now need bailing out. Explain this argument.
In your answer, comment on the quotations from Citigroup's
financial statements as provided in the article.
4.) How might reliance on "principles-based" versus
"rules-based" accounting standards contribute to solving the
reporting dilemmas described in this article?
5.) How might the use of more "principles-based standards"
potentially add more "fuel to the fire" of problems
associated with these special purpose entities?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
RELATED
ARTICLES:
Call to Brave to $100 Billion Rescue: Banks Seek
Investors for Fund to Shore Up Commercial Paper
by Carrick Mollenkamp, Deborah Solomon and Craig Karmin
The Wall Street Journal
Oct 16, 2007
Page: C1
Plan to Save Banks Depends on Cooperation of Investors
by David Reilly
The Wall Street Journal
Oct 15, 2007
Page: C1
|
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm
I have an article today on The Guardian website
with the title "After Northern Rock". The lead line reads "The government's
proposals for preventing another banking crisis are inadequate and will not
work without major surgery". It is available at
http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/prem_sikka_/2008/02/after_northern_rock.html
As many of you will know Northern Rock, a UK bank,
is a casualty of the subprime crisis and has been bailed out by the UK
government, which could possibly cost the UK taxpayer £100 billion. My
article looks at the reform proposals floated by the government to prevent a
repetition. These have been formulated without any investigation of the
problems. Within the space permitted, the article refers to a number of
major flaws, including regulatory, auditing and governance failures, as well
offshore, remuneration and moral hazard issues.
The above may interest you and you may wish to
contribute to the debate by adding comments.
As always there is more on the AABA website
(
http://www.aabaglobal.org <http://www.aabaglobal.org/>
).
Regards
Prem Sikka
Professor of Accounting
University of Essex
Colchester, Essex CO4 3SQ UK
The Sad State of Government Accounting and Accountability
Before reading this module you may want to read about Governmental
Accounting at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governmental_accounting
"Taxpayers distrustful of government financial reporting,"
AccountingWeb, February 22, 2008 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=104680
The federal government is failing to meet the
financial reporting needs of taxpayers, falling short of expectations, and
creating a problem with trust, according to survey findings released by the
Association of Government Accountants (AGA). The survey, Public Attitudes to
Government Accountability and Transparency 2008, measured attitudes and
opinions towards government financial management and accountability to
taxpayers. The survey established an expectations gap between what taxpayers
expect and what they get, finding that the public at large overwhelmingly
believes that government has the obligation to report and explain how it
generates and spends its money, but that that it is failing to meet
expectations in any area included in the survey.
The survey further found that taxpayers consider
governments at the federal, state, and local levels to be significantly
under-delivering in terms of practicing open, honest spending. Across all
levels of government, those surveyed held "being open and honest in spending
practices" vitally important, but felt that government performance was poor
in this area. Those surveyed also considered government performance to be
poor in terms of being "responsible to the public for its spending." This is
compounded by perceived poor performance in providing understandable and
timely financial management information.
The survey shows:
The American public is most dissatisfied with
government financial management information disseminated by the federal
government. Seventy-two percent say that it is extremely or very important
to receive this information from the federal government, but only 5 percent
are extremely or very satisfied with what they receive.
Seventy-three percent of Americans believe that it
is extremely or very important for the federal government to be open and
honest in its spending practices, yet only 5 percent say they are meeting
these expectations.
Seventy-one percent of those who receive financial
management information from the government or believe it is important to
receive it, say they would use the information to influence their vote.
Relmond Van Daniker, Executive Director at AGA,
said, "We commissioned this survey to shed some light on the way the public
perceives those issues relating to government financial accountability and
transparency that are important to our members. Nobody is pretending that
the figures are a shock, but we are glad to have established a benchmark
against which we can track progress in years to come."
He continued, "AGA members working in government at
all levels are in the very forefront of the fight to increase levels of
government accountability and transparency. We believe that the traditional
methods of communicating government financial information -- through reams
of audited financial statements that have little relevance to the taxpayer
-- must be supplemented by government financial reporting that expresses
complex financial details in an understandable form. Our members are
committed to taking these concepts forward."
Justin Greeves, who led the team at Harris
Interactive that fielded the survey for the AGA, said, "The survey results
include some extremely stark, unambiguous findings. Public levels of
dissatisfaction and distrust of government spending practices came through
loud and clear, across every geography, demographic group, and political
ideology. Worthy of special note, perhaps, is a 67 percentage point gap
between what taxpayers expect from government and what they receive. These
are significant findings that I hope government and the public find useful."
This survey was conducted online within the United
States by Harris Interactive on behalf of the Association of Government
Accountants between January 4 and 8, 2008 among 1,652 adults aged 18 or
over. Results were weighted as needed for age, sex, race/ethnicity,
education, region, and household income. Propensity score weighting was also
used to adjust for respondents' propensity to be online. No estimates of
theoretical sampling error can be calculated.
You can read the
Survey Report, including a full methodology and associated
commentary.
"The Government Is Wasting Your Tax Dollars! How Uncle Sam spends nearly
$1 trillion of your money each year,"
by Ryan Grim with Joseph K. Vetter,
Readers Digest, January 2008, pp. 86-99 ---
http://www.rd.com/content/the-government-is-wasting-your-tax-dollars/4/
1. Taxes:
Cheating Shows. The Internal Revenue Service estimates that the annual net
tax gap—the difference between what's owed and what's collected—is $290
billion, more than double the average yearly sum spent on the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan.
About $59 billion of that figure results from the
underreporting and underpayment of employment taxes. Our broken system of
immigration is another concern, with nearly eight million undocumented
workers having a less-than-stellar relationship with the IRS. Getting more
of them on the books could certainly help narrow that tax gap.
Going after the deadbeats would seem like an
obvious move. Unfortunately, the IRS doesn't have the resources to
adequately pursue big offenders and their high-powered tax attorneys. "The
IRS is outgunned," says Walker, "especially when dealing with multinational
corporations with offshore headquarters."
Another group that costs taxpayers billions: hedge
fund and private equity managers. Many of these moguls make vast "incomes"
yet pay taxes on a portion of those earnings at the paltry 15 percent
capital gains rate, instead of the higher income tax rate. By some
estimates, this loophole costs taxpayers more than $2.5 billion a year.
Oil companies are getting a nice deal too. The
country hands them more than $2 billion a year in tax breaks. Says Walker,
"Some of the sweetheart deals that were negotiated for drilling rights on
public lands don't pass the straight-face test, especially given current
crude oil prices." And Big Oil isn't alone. Citizens for Tax Justice
estimates that corporations reap more than $123 billion a year in special
tax breaks. Cut this in half and we could save about $60 billion.
The Tab* Tax Shortfall: $290 billion (uncollected
taxes) + $2.5 billion (undertaxed high rollers) + $60 billion (unwarranted
tax breaks) Starting Tab: $352.5 billion
2. Healthy Fixes.
Medicare and Medicaid, which cover elderly and low-income patients
respectively, eat up a growing portion of the federal budget. Investigations
by Sen. Tom Coburn (R-OK) point to as much as $60 billion a year in fraud,
waste and overpayments between the two programs. And Coburn is likely
underestimating the problem.
The U.S. spends more than $400 per person on health
care administration costs and insurance -- six times more than other
industrialized nations.
That's because a 2003 Dartmouth Medical School
study found that up to 30 percent of the $2 trillion spent in this country
on medical care each year—including what's spent on Medicare and Medicaid—is
wasted. And with the combined tab for those programs rising to some $665
billion this year, cutting costs by a conservative 15 percent could save
taxpayers about $100 billion. Yet, rather than moving to trim fat, the
government continues such questionable practices as paying private insurance
companies that offer Medicare Advantage plans an average of 12 percent more
per patient than traditional Medicare fee-for-service. Congress is trying to
close this loophole, and doing so could save $15 billion per year, on
average, according to the Congressional Budget Office.
Another money-wasting bright idea was to create a
giant class of middlemen: Private bureaucrats who administer the Medicare
drug program are monitored by federal bureaucrats—and the public pays for
both. An October report by the House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform estimated that this setup costs the government $10 billion per year
in unnecessary administrative expenses and higher drug prices.
The Tab* Wasteful Health Spending: $60 billion
(fraud, waste, overpayments) + $100 billion (modest 15 percent cost
reduction) + $15 billion (closing the 12 percent loophole) + $10 billion
(unnecessary Medicare administrative and drug costs) Total $185 billion
Running Tab: $352.5 billion +$185 billion = $537.5 billion
3. Military Mad Money.
You'd think it would be hard to simply lose massive amounts of money, but
given the lack of transparency and accountability, it's no wonder that eight
of the Department of Defense's functions, including weapons procurement,
have been deemed high risk by the GAO. That means there's a high probability
that money—"tens of billions," according to Walker—will go missing or be
otherwise wasted.
The DOD routinely hands out no-bid and cost-plus
contracts, under which contractors get reimbursed for their costs plus a
certain percentage of the contract figure. Such deals don't help hold down
spending in the annual military budget of about $500 billion. That sum is
roughly equal to the combined defense spending of the rest of the world's
countries. It's also comparable, adjusted for inflation, with our largest
Cold War-era defense budget. Maybe that's why billions of dollars are still
being spent on high-cost weapons designed to counter Cold War-era threats,
even though today's enemy is armed with cell phones and IEDs. (And that $500
billion doesn't include the billions to be spent this year in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Those funds demand scrutiny, too, according to Sen. Amy
Klobuchar, D-MN, who says, "One in six federal tax dollars sent to rebuild
Iraq has been wasted.")
Meanwhile, the Pentagon admits it simply can't
account for more than $1 trillion. Little wonder, since the DOD hasn't been
fully audited in years. Hoping to change that, Brian Riedl of the Heritage
Foundation is pushing Congress to add audit provisions to the next defense
budget.
If wasteful spending equaling 10 percent of all
spending were rooted out, that would free up some $50 billion. And if
Congress cut spending on unnecessary weapons and cracked down harder on
fraud, we could save tens of billions more.
The Tab* Wasteful military spending: $100 billion
(waste, fraud, unnecessary weapons) Running Tab: $537.5 billion + $100
billion = $637.5 billion
4. Bad Seeds.
The controversial U.S. farm subsidy program, part of which pays farmers not
to grow crops, has become a giant welfare program for the rich, one that
cost taxpayers nearly $20 billion last year.
Two of the best-known offenders: Kenneth Lay, the
now-deceased Enron CEO, who got $23,326 for conservation land in Missouri
from 1995 to 2005, and mogul Ted Turner, who got $590,823 for farms in four
states during the same period. A Cato Institute study found that in 2005,
two-thirds of the subsidies went to the richest 10 percent of recipients,
many of whom live in New York City. Not only do these "farmers" get money
straight from the government, they also often get local tax breaks, since
their property is zoned as agricultural land. The subsidies raise prices for
consumers, hurt third world farmers who can't compete, and are attacked in
international courts as unfair trade.
The Tab* Wasteful farm subsidies: $20 billion
Running Tab: $637.5 billion + $20 billion = $657.5 billion
5. Capital Waste.
While there's plenty of ongoing annual operating waste, there's also a
special kind of profligacy—call it capital waste—that pops up year after
year. This is shoddy spending on big-ticket items that don't pan out. While
what's being bought changes from year to year, you can be sure there will
always be some costly items that aren't worth what the government pays for
them.
Take this recent example: Since September 11, 2001,
Congress has spent more than $4 billion to upgrade the Coast Guard's fleet.
Today the service has fewer ships than it did before that money was spent,
what 60 Minutes called "a fiasco that has set new standards for
incompetence." Then there's the Future Imagery Architecture spy satellite
program. As The New York Times recently reported, the technology flopped and
the program was killed—but not before costing $4 billion. Or consider the
FBI's infamous Trilogy computer upgrade: Its final stage was scrapped after
a $170 million investment. Or the almost $1 billion the Federal Emergency
Management Agency has wasted on unusable housing. The list goes on.
The Tab* Wasteful Capital Spending: $30 billion
Running Tab: $657.5 billion + $30 billion = $687.5 billion
6. Fraud and Stupidity.
Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-IA) wants the Social Security Administration to
better monitor the veracity of people drawing disability payments from its
$100 billion pot. By one estimate, roughly $1 billion is wasted each year in
overpayments to people who work and earn more than the program's rules
allow.
The federal Food Stamp Program gets ripped off too.
Studies have shown that almost 5 percent, or more than $1 billion, of the
payments made to people in the $30 billion program are in excess of what
they should receive.
One person received $105,000 in excess disability
payments over seven years.
There are plenty of other examples. Senator Coburn
estimates that the feds own unused properties worth $18 billion and pay out
billions more annually to maintain them. Guess it's simpler for bureaucrats
to keep paying for the property than to go to the trouble of selling it.
The Tab* General Fraud and Stupidity: $2 billion
(disability and food stamp overpayment) Running Tab: $687.5 billion + $2
billion = $689.5 billion
7. Pork Sausage.
Congress doled out $29 billion in so-called earmarks—aka funds for
legislators' pet projects—in 2006, according to Citizens Against Government
Waste. That's three times the amount spent in 1999. Congress loves to deride
this kind of spending, but lawmakers won't hesitate to turn around and drop
$500,000 on a ballpark in Billings, Montana.
The most infamous earmark is surely the "bridge to
nowhere"—a span that would have connected Ketchikan, Alaska, to nearby
Gravina Island—at a cost of more than $220 million. After Hurricane Katrina
struck New Orleans, Senator Coburn tried to redirect that money to repair
the city's Twin Span Bridge. He failed when lawmakers on both sides of the
aisle got behind the Alaska pork. (That money is now going to other projects
in Alaska.) Meanwhile, this kind of spending continues at a time when our
country's crumbling infrastructure—the bursting dams, exploding water pipes
and collapsing bridges—could really use some investment. Cutting two-thirds
of the $29 billion would be a good start.
The Tab* Pork Barrel Spending: $20 billion Running
Tab: $689.5 billion + $20 billion = $709.5 billion
8. Welfare Kings.
Corporate welfare is an easy thing for politicians to bark at, but it seems
it's hard to bite the hand that feeds you. How else to explain why corporate
welfare is on the rise? A Cato Institute report found that in 2006,
corporations received $92 billion (including some in the form of those farm
subsidies) to do what they do anyway—research, market and develop products.
The recipients included plenty of names from the Fortune 500, among them
IBM, GE, Xerox, Dow Chemical, Ford Motor Company, DuPont and Johnson &
Johnson.
The Tab* Corporate Welfare: $50 billion Running
Tab: $709.5 billion + $50 billion = $759.5 billion
9. Been There,
Done That. The Rural Electrification Administration, created during the New
Deal, was an example of government at its finest—stepping in to do something
the private sector couldn't. Today, renamed the Rural Utilities Service,
it's an example of a government that doesn't know how to end a program. "We
established an entity to electrify rural America. Mission accomplished. But
the entity's still there," says Walker. "We ought to celebrate success and
get out of the business."
In a 2007 analysis, the Heritage Foundation found
that hundreds of programs overlap to accomplish just a few goals. Ending
programs that have met their goals and eliminating redundant programs could
comfortably save taxpayers $30 billion a year.
The Tab* Obsolete, Redundant Programs: $30 billion
Running Tab: $759.5 billion + $30 billion = $789.5 billion
10. Living on Credit.
Here's the capper: Years of wasteful spending have put us in such a deep
hole, we must squander even more to pay the interest on that debt. In 2007,
the federal government carried a debt of $9 trillion and blew $252 billion
in interest. Yes, we understand the federal government needs to carry a
small debt for the Federal Reserve Bank to operate. But "small" isn't how we
would describe three times the nation's annual budget. We need to stop
paying so much in interest (and we think cutting $194 billion is a good
target). Instead we're digging ourselves deeper: Congress had to raise the
federal debt limit last September from $8.965 trillion to almost $10
trillion or the country would have been at legal risk of default. If that's
not a wake-up call to get spending under control, we don't know what is.
The Tab* Interest on National Debt: $194 billion
Final Tab: $789.5 billion + $194 billion = $983.5 billion
What YOU Can Do Many believe our system is
inherently broken. We think it can be fixed. As citizens and voters, we have
to set a new agenda before the Presidential election. There are three things
we need in order to prevent wasteful spending, according to the GAO's David
Walker:
• Incentives for people to do the right thing.
• Transparency so we can tell if they've done
the right thing.
• Accountability if they do the wrong thing.
Two out of three won't solve our problems.
So how do we make it happen? Demand it of our
elected officials. If they fail to listen, then we turn them out of office.
With its approval rating hovering around 11 percent in some polls, Congress
might just start paying attention.
Start by writing to your Representatives. Talk to
your family, friends and neighbors, and share this article. It's in
everybody's interest.
The Most Criminal Class is Writing the Laws ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#Lawmakers
Question
What do the department store chains WT Grant and Target possibly have in common?
Answer
WT Grant had a huge chain of departments stores across the United States. It
declared bankruptcy in the sharp 1973 recession largely because of a build up of
accounts receivable losses. Now in 2008
Target Corporation is in a somewhat similar bind.
In 1980 Largay and Stickney (Financial Analysts Journal) published a
great comparison of WT Grant's cash flow statements versus income statements. I
used this study for years in some of my accounting courses. It's a classic for
giving students an appreciation of cash flow statements! The study is discussed
and cited (with exhibits) at
http://www.sap-hefte.de/download/dateien/1239/070_leseprobe.pdf
It also shows the limitations of the current ratio in financial analysis and the
problem of inventory buildup when analyzing the reported bottom line net income.
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on March 14,
2008
Is Target Corp.'s Credit Too Generous?
by
Peter Eavis
The Wall Street Journal
Mar 11, 2008
Page: C1
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120519491886425757.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
TOPICS: Allowance
For Doubtful Accounts, Financial Accounting, Financial
Statement Analysis, Loan Loss Allowance
SUMMARY: "'Target
appears to have pursued very aggressive credit growth at the
wrong time," says William Ryan, consumer-credit analyst at
Portales Partners, a New York-based research firm. "Not so."
says Target's chief financial officer, Douglas Scovanner,
"The growth in the credit-card portfolio is absolutely not a
function of a loosening of credit standards or a lowering of
credit quality in our portfolio."
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: This article covers details of financial
statement ratios used to analyze Target Corp.'s credit card
business. It can be used in a financial statement analysis
course or while covering accounting for receivables in a
financial accounting course
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) What types of credit cards has
Target Corp. issued? Why do companies such as Target issue
these cards?
2. (Introductory) In general, what concerns
analysts about Target Corp.'s portfolio of receivables on
credit cards?
3. (Introductory) How can a sufficient allowance
for uncollectible accounts alleviate concerns about
potential problems in a portfolio of loans or receivables?
What evidence is given in the article about the status of
Target's allowance for uncollectible accounts?
4. (Advanced) "...High growth may make it [hard] to
see credit deterioration that already is happening..." What
calculation by analyst William Ryan is described in the
article to better "see" this issue? From where does he
obtain the data used in the calculation? Be specific in your
answer.
5. (Advanced) Refer again to the calculation done
by the analyst Mr. Ryan. How does that calculation resemble
the analysis done for an aging of accounts receivable?
6. (Advanced) What other financial analysis ratio
is used to assess the status of a credit-card loan portfolio
such as Target Corp.'s?
7. (Advanced) If analysts prove correct in their
concern about Target Corp.'s credit-card receivable balance,
what does that say about the profitability reported in this
year? How will it impact next year's results?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
|
"Is Target Corp.'s Credit Too Generous? Retailer's Loans Rose 29% From Year
Earlier As Others' Books Shrink," By Peter Eavis, The Wall Street Journal,
March 11, 2008; Page C1 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120519491886425757.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
Ben Bernanke must love retailer Target Corp.,
because its credit-card business is one of the few operations in the country
that has strongly increased lending in the face of the credit crunch.
Now, though, some analysts are wondering whether
the torrid expansion of the card business in the current tough environment
could lead to higher-than-expected bad loans.
At the end of Target's fiscal fourth quarter, which
ended Feb. 2, the company had $8.62 billion of loans outstanding on its Visa
cards, which can be used at other retailers as well as Target, and its
private-label cards, which are for purchases at Target only.
That total was up 29% from the $6.71 billion a year
earlier -- and the growth rate was even greater than the 25% year-on-year
rise posted in the fiscal third quarter. The card business has been
responsible for a large part of the retailer's overall earnings growth.
Other credit-card lenders' loan books have either
shrunk or grown much more slowly. For instance, Discover Financial Services'
U.S. credit-card business reported a 5% annual increase in loans in its
fiscal fourth quarter, ended Nov. 30. Loans outstanding at Capital One
Financial Corp.'s U.S. card business declined 2.8% in its fourth quarter,
while Citigroup Inc.'s rose 3.6% and J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.'s was up 3%.
Some fear that Target has lent too much at a time
when a slowing economy makes it harder for borrowers to repay. And that it
may be attracting struggling borrowers who can't get as much credit as they
would like from other companies.
"Target appears to have pursued very aggressive
credit growth at the wrong time," says William Ryan, consumer-credit analyst
at Portales Partners, a New York-based research firm.
Not so, says Target's chief financial officer,
Douglas Scovanner. The growth in the credit-card portfolio "is absolutely
not a function of a loosening of credit standards or a lowering of credit
quality in our portfolio," he says.
For several years, critics have been predicting a
blowup in Target's credit business. It never happened. And Mr. Scovanner
notes that the company has yet to report credit losses that exceed company
forecasts. He expects that to remain the case this year and predicts the
company will report credit losses of about 7% of loans this year, up from
5.9% in the last fiscal year. Discover's credit losses were 3.82% of loans
in its latest fiscal year, while Capital One's were 2.88%.
Last year, Target made a choice to significantly
increase its credit-card loans because it identified more borrowers that it
felt comfortable lending to, Mr. Scovanner says. He adds that the loans
likely won't increase at high rates in the near future from their level at
the end of the latest fiscal year.
"Target has a proven track record of managing its
credit business," says Robert Botard, analyst for the AIM Diversified
Dividend Fund, which holds Target shares. "Because of that track record,
it's difficult to bet against them."
But bears think this could be the point at which
Target stumbles, because the high growth in its card portfolio has happened
just as the economy has slowed and lenders have become tight-fisted. And if
problems were to arise in the credit-card operations, they would happen at a
time when the weak economy is slamming retail operations as well.
Target's stock is up 2.5% this year, while the
Standard & Poor's 500 index has slumped 13%. At a price/earnings ratio of
14.4 times expected per-share earnings for 2008, Target shares also trade
above the market's multiple of 12.9 times. Yesterday, at 4 p.m. in New York
Stock Exchange composite trading, Target shares fell 77 cents, or 1.5%, to
$51.23.
Investors often buy retailers to bet on an economic
recovery, but Target may look less attractive to those sorts of buyers if it
is grappling with problems in its credit-card operations. Target's pretax
earnings rose by $128 million in the latest fiscal year. The lion's share of
the increase -- $103 million -- came from the credit-card business.
And Mr. Ryan at Portales expects Target's credit
losses to be considerably higher than the company predicts. Indeed, the high
growth may make it harder to see credit deterioration that already is
happening, he says.
Continued in article
Question
For investors, how informative is accrual accounting vis-a-vis cash flow
reporting?
Hint: It all depends! ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#CashVsAccrualAcctg
Question
For investors, how informative is accrual accounting vis-a-vis cash flow
reporting?
Hint: It all depends!
From the Unknown Professor's Financial Rounds Blog on November 24,
2007 ---
http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/
More on The Accrual Anomaly and Abnormal Returns
Here's another paper on "tradable" patterns in
stock returns. The CXO Advisory Group recently put up a summary of the study
titled "Repairing the Accruals Anomaly" by Hafzalla, Lunholm and Van Winkle.
The paper examines the pattern that stock market performance of firms with
low accruals (i.e. the difference between the firm's earnings and cash
flows) is significantly greater than the performance of their higher accrual
counterparts. It does a pretty good job of examining Sloan's "Accrual
Anomaly" with a few tweaks:
It corrects for the extent to which the firm is
financially healthy, using Piotrowski's "financial health" indicator. It
measures accruals in relation to earnings rather than to assets
Their findings are that the accrual anomaly does a
better job of sorting out investment performance for financially healthy
firms. Their results are pretty strong (note- the following is CXO's
summary):
A hedge strategy that is long (short) firms of high
(low) financial health (ignoring accruals) generates an average
size-adjusted annual return of 9.36% across the entire sample. After
excluding firms with the lowest financial health scores, a hedge strategy
that is long (short) the 10% of firms with the lowest (highest) traditional
accruals generates an average size-adjusted annual return of 13.64%, with
7.98% coming from the long side Using the total sample, a hedge strategy
that is long (short) low-accrual, high financial health (high-accrual, low
financial health) firms produces an average size-adjusted annual return of
22.93%, with a 14.92% from the long side.
Here's a pretty good grapic of size adjusted abnormal returns on the
various portfolios ---
http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/
"Repairing the Accruals Anomaly," by Russell J. Jundholm, Nader
Hafzalla, and Edmund Matthew Van Winkle,
Abstract:
We document how the effectiveness of an accruals-based trading strategy
changes systematically with the financial health of the sample firms or with
the benchmark used to identify an extreme accrual. Our refinements
significantly improve the strategy's annual hedge return, and do so mostly
because they improve the return earned on the long position in low accrual
stocks. These results are important because recent evidence has shown that,
absent these “repairs,” the accrual strategy does not yield a significantly
positive return in the long portion of the hedge portfolio. We also find
that our new measure of accruals is not dependent on the presence or absence
of special items and it identifies misvalued stocks just as well for loss
firms as for gain firms, in contrast to the traditional accruals measure.
Finally, we show that our repairs succeed where the traditional measure of
accruals fails because they more effectively select firms where the
difference between sophisticated and naïve forecasts are the most extreme.
As such, our results are consistent with Sloan's earnings fixation
hypothesis and are inconsistent with some alternative explanations for the
accrual anomaly.
Jensen Comment
Current findings on these relationships may be more difficult to extrapolate as
fair value accounting becomes more prevalent ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
It's elementary Watson! Of course the statement of cash flow matters.
"Why the Statement of Cash Flows Matters," by Scott Rothbortm, TheStreet,
September 21, 2007 ---
Click Here
Jensen Comment
This really is elementary, but it does have some rather nice current
examples.
Perhaps a better topic would be "why accrual accounting still matters."
"Which is More Value-Relevant: Earnings or Cash Flows?" by Ervin L. Black,
Sr., SSRN, May 1998 ---
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=118089
Statements in the financial press and recent
research suggest that controversy exists as to which accounting measure is
more value-relevant: earnings or cash flows. This study examines the
relative value-relevance of earnings and cash flow measures in the context
of the firm life-cycle. Earnings are predicted to be more value-relevant in
mature stages. Cash flows are expected to be more value relevant in stages
characterized by growth and/or uncertainty. In general the hypotheses are
supported using Wald chi-square tests (Biddle, Seow, and Siegel 1995) of the
Edwards, Bell, Ohlson (1995) model. Evidence supports the hypothesis that
earnings are more value-relevant than operating, investing, or financing
cash flows in mature life-cycle stages. However, in the start-up stage
investing cash flows are more value relevant than earnings. In growth and
decline stages, operating cash flows are more value relevant than earnings.
Jensen Comment
The above paper by Professor Black is an illustration of a working paper that
for quite a long time was available free from BYU. Now that it's on SSRN it's no
longer free. SSRN did not necessarily contribute to the open sharing of research
papers.
By the way, even if cash flow statements were hypothetically more relevant in
all instances, accrual accounting statements would still be vital. My DAH reason
is that, if accountants only reported cash flows, it would be
quite simple for managers to distort period-to-period performance by simply
altering the contractual timings of cash in and cash out. This is much more
simple to do for cash payments than for accrual transactions. There would also
be the pesky problem of capital maintenance if depreciation and amortization
gets overlooked. In theory capital maintenance is not overlooked in fair value
accounting since values decline with asset deterioration. However, fair value
accounting is quite another matter entirely ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
The Controversy Over Fair Value
(Mark-to-Market) Financial Reporting
Fair Value Re-measurement Problems in a Nutshell: (1) Covariances and
(2) Hypothetical Transactions and (3) Estimation Cost
It's All Phantasmagoric Accounting in Terms of Value in Use
In an excellent plenary session
presentation in Anaheim on August 5, 2008 Zoe-Vanna Palmrose mentioned how advocates
of fair value accounting for both financial and non-financial assets and
liabilities should heed the cautions of George O. May about how fair value
accounting contributed to the great
stock
market crash of 1929 and
the ensuing
Great Depression.
Afterwards Don Edwards and I lamented that
accounting doctoral students and younger accounting faculty today have little
interest in and knowledge of accounting history and the great accounting
scholars of the past like George O. May ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_O._May
Don mentioned how the works of George
O. May should be revisited in light of the present movement by standard setters
to shift from historical cost allocation accounting to fair value re-measurement
(some say fantasy land or phantasmagoric) accounting ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#FairValue
The point is that if fair value re-measurement is required in the main
financial statements, the impact upon investors and the economy is not
neutral. It may be very real like it was in the Roaring 1920s.
In the 21st Century, accounting standard setters such as the FASB in the U.S. and the IASB
internationally are dead set on replacing traditional historical cost
accounting for both financial (e.g., stocks and bonds) and non-financial
(e.g., patents, goodwill, real estate, vehicles, and equipment) with
fair values. Whereas historical costs are transactions based and
additive across all assets and liabilities, fair value adjustments are
not transactions based, are almost impossible to estimate, and are not
likely to be additive.
If Asset A is purchased for $100 and Asset B is purchased for $200
and have depreciated book values of $50 and $80 on a given date, the
book values may be added to a sum of $130. This is a
basis adjusted cost allocation valuation that has well-known
limitations in terms of information needed for investment and operating
decisions.
If Asset A now has an exit (disposal) value of $20 and Asset B has an
exit value of $90, the exit values can be added to a sum of $110 that
has meaning only if each asset will be liquidated piecemeal. Exit value accounting is required for
personal estates and for companies deemed by auditors to be non-going
concerns that are likely to be liquidated piecemeal after debts are paid
off.
But accounting standard setters are moving toward standards that suggest that neither historical cost valuation nor
exit value re-measurement are acceptable for going concerns such as
viable and growing companies. Historical cost valuation is in reality a
cost allocation process that provides misleading surrogates for "value
in use." Exit values violate rules that re-measured fair values should be
estimated in terms of the "best possible use" of the items in question.
Exit values are generally the "worst possible uses" of the items in a
going concern. For example, a printing press having a book value of $1
million and an exit value of $100,000 are likely to both differ greatly
from "value in use."
The "value in use" theoretically is the present value of all
discounted cash flows attributed to the printing press. But this entails
wild estimates of future cash flows, discount rates, and terminal
salvage values that no two valuation experts are likely to agree upon.
Furthermore, it is generally impossible to isolate the future cash flows of
a printing press from the interactive cash flows of other assets such as
a company's copyrights, patents, human capital, and goodwill.
What standard setters really want is remeasurement of assets and
liabilities in terms of "value in use." Suppose that on a given date the
"value in use" is estimated as $180 for Asset A and $300 for Asset B.
The problem is that we cannot ipso facto add these two values to
$480 for a combined "value in use" of Asset A plus Asset B. Dangling off
in phantasmagoria fantasy land is the covariance of the values in use:
Value in Use of Assets A+B = $180 + $300 + Covariance of Assets A
and B
For example is Asset A is a high speed printing press and Asset B is
a high speed envelope stuffing machine, the covariance term may be very
high when computing value in use in a firm that advertises by mailing
out a thousands of letters per day. Without both machines operating
simultaneously, the value in use of any one machine is greatly reduced.
I once observed high speed printing presses and envelope stuffing
machines in action in Reverend Billy Graham's "factory" in Minneapolis.
Suppose to printing presses and envelope stuffing machines we add other
assets such as the value of the Billy Graham name/logo that might be
termed Asset C. Now we have a more complicated covariance system:
Value in Use of Assets A+B+C = (Values of A+B+C) + (Higher Order
Covariances of A+B+C)
And when hundreds of assets and liabilities
are combined, the two-variate, three-variate, and n-variate higher order
covariances for combined ""value in use" becomes truly phantasmagoric
accounting. Any simplistic surrogate such as those suggested in the FAS
157 framework are absurdly simplistic and misleading as estimates of the
values of Assets A, B, C, D, etc.
Furthermore, if the "value of the firm" is somehow estimated, it is
virtually impossible to disaggregate that value down to "values in use"
of the various component assets and liabilities that are not truly
independent of one another in a going concern. Financial analysts are
interested in operations details and components of value and would be disappointed
if all that a firm reported is a single estimate of its total value
every quarter.
Of course there are exceptions where a given asset or liability is
independent of other assets and liabilities. Covariances in such
instances are zero. For example, passive
investments in financial assets generally can be estimated at exit
values in the spirit of FAS 157. An investment in 1,000 shares of
Microsoft Corporation is independent of ownership of 5,000 shares of
Exxon. A strong case can be made for exit value accounting of
these passive investments. Similarly a strong case can be made for exit value
accounting of such derivative financial instruments as interest rate
swaps and forward contracts since the historical cost in most instances
is zero at the inception of many derivative contracts.
The problem with fair value re-measurement of passive investments in
financial assets lies in the computation of earnings in relation to cash
flows. If the value of 1,000 shares of Microsoft decreases by -$40,000
and the value of 5000 shares of Exxon increases by +$140,000, the
combined change in earnings is $100,000 assuming zero covariance. But if
the Microsoft shares were sold and and the Exxon shares were held, we've
combined a realized loss with an unrealized gain as if they were
equivalents. This gives rise to the "hypothetical
transaction" problem of fair value re-measurements. If the
Exxon shares are held for a very long time, fair value accounting may
give rise to years and years of "fiction" in terms of variations in
value that are never realized. Companies hate earnings volatility caused
by fair value "fictions" that are never realized in cash over decades of
time.
Now consider real estate fair value re-measurement:
Levels of "Value" of an Entire Company
General
Theory |
Days Inns of
America
(As Reported September 30, 1987) |
Market
Value of the Entire Block of Common Shares at Today's Price Per Share
(Ignoring Blockage Factors) |
Not
Available
Day Inns of America
Was Privately Owned |
Exit
Value of Firm if Sold As a Firm
(Includes synergy factors and unbooked intangibles) |
Not
Available for
Days Inns of America |
Sum of
Exit Values of Booked Assets Minus Liabilities & Pref. Stock
(includes unbooked and unrealized gains and
losses) |
$194,812,000
as Reported by Days Inns |
Book
Value of the Firm as Reported in Financial Statements |
$87,356,000
as Reported |
Book Value of the Firm as
Reported in the Financial Statements After General Price Level
Adjustments |
Not Available
for Days Inns |
Neither $87,356,000 book value is the residual historical cost nor
the $194,812,000 is a reliable estimate of "value in use" of the net
assets of Days Inns in 1987. At that time Days Inns was very much a
private and highly successful going concern contemplating an initial
public offering (IPO). FAS 157 excludes $197,812,000 as an estimate of
"value in use" since piecemeal liquidation of the hotels is most likely
the "worst possible use" of these hotels. Their values also have high
covariance valuation components, especially the covariance of the real
estate values with the goodwill value and human capital values of Days
Inns. Furthermore, value in use of these properties will greatly change
if the sign on each hotel is changed from Days Inn to Holiday Inn. The
reason is that phantasmagoric summation of all the first order to n-th
order covariance terms.
Among the various reasons Days Inn never went to the trouble of
having Landhauer Associates or any other real estate appraisal firm
appraise the exit (sales) value of each of its hundreds of hotels is
that the cost of getting these appraisals updated each year is
prohibitive as well as being subject to huge margins of error. Days Inns
went to considerable expense having its exit values appraised this one
time in 1987 for purposes of improving the proceeds of an IPO. Obtaining
these appraisals annually is far too costly for financial reporting
purposes alone. Furthermore it is highly unlikely that these hotels will
ever be sold piecemeal. If they will ever be sold, it is more likely
that all the hotels or large subsets of these properties will be sold in
block, and the block value is much different the the sum of the
appraisals of each property in the set. Value in use differs greatly
from summations of piecemeal exit values
It is useful to supplement historical cost allocation values with
exit value estimates as well as other possible fair value estimates at a
given point in time, but balance sheets summing component values as if
no covariances exist is absurd except in the case of historical cost
book values and passive financial investments and liabilities. Another
problem is that realistic estimates of exit values of such things as the
value of each of over 300 hotels is very costly to obtain on a periodic
basis such as an annual basis.
Not everything that can be counted, counts. And not
everything that counts can be counted.
Albert EinsteinBob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at various other links:
I recently completed the first draft of a paper on fair value at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
Comments would be helpful.
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms
Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation, and Yield Curves
for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial
Instruments ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm
"Among Different Classes of Equity: Valuation models can be
tailored to unique financing structures." by Andrew C. Smith and Jason
C. Laurent, Journal of Accouintancy, March 2008 ---
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/mar2008/allocating_value.htm
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
It is essential for board members, executive officers, CFOs, auditors
and private equity investors to comprehend option-pricing models used to
determine the per-share values of common and preferred shares.
The AICPA Practice Aid, Valuation of
Privately-Held-Company Equity Securities Issued as Compensation,
describes three methods of allocating value between preferred and common
equity, which include:
Current Value Method (“CVM”) Probability
Weighted Expected Return Method (“PWERM”) Option-Pricing Method (“OPM”)
OPM, which is based on the Black-Scholes model,
is a common method for allocating equity value between common and
preferred shares.
Valuation models must be tailored to the
specific facts and circumstances of the equity in the company being
valued.
Bob Jensen's threads on valuation are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
Notable Quotations About the SEC's New Proposals for
Oil & Gas Accounting
I think I can always tell when the fix is in.
First, big lies are woven into a large dose of truth, so they won't look to
be as big as they are. There are certainly many things in the SEC's proposal
to recommend it, especially along the lines of expanding the types of
reserves that would be disclosed, and updating important definitions.
Second, when the justification for a proposal makes no sense, there can be
no debate; you can't tell the emperor he's naked. The lesson of the Cox's
SEC is to never forget about the big special interests that write big checks
to the big politicians that made him emperor for a day.
Tom Selling, "SEC on Oil and Gas Disclosures: Current Prices
Aren't 'Meaningful'?" The Accounting Onion, July 25, 2008 ---
http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/07/oil-and-gas-dis.html
Tom Selling
put together a nice summary of some key issues in fair value accounting at
“The SEC's Fair Value Roundtable” The
Accounting Onion, July 16, 2008 ---
http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/07/the-secs-fair-v.html
On July 9, 2008, in Washington, DC, the SEC
hosted a roundtable "to facilitate an open discussion of the benefits
and potential challenges associated with existing fair value accounting
and auditing standards." The roundtable was webcast and lasted about
four hours. I admit that I literally fell asleep after listening to the
discussion for the better part of three hours, so I missed the end. For
all I know, the grand finale was a fireworks display, but I doubt it –
this time, both literally and figuratively. When the SEC schedules these
roundtable events for 9 a.m. on the east coast, I can't help but wonder
what they are trying to tell those of us located in PAC-10 country (Go
Sun Devils!). Maybe they would really prefer that no one listens.
Anyway, the topics included, among other
things, discussions of the aspects of current standards that could be
improved, and the usefulness of fair value accounting to investors. I'm
going to address three issues that are so basic and important enough
that accounting professors may want to consider using them for a class
discussion.
Issue #1: "Held-to-Maturity" Investments
James Tisch of Loews Corp., when talking about
his company's insurance subsidiaries, teed up this issue by describing a
situation where his company would invest in marketable debt securities
whose valuation might be affected by interest rate changes -- even
though there would be no changes to the borrower's credit risk. Being an
insurance company subject to various regulatory authorities, a rise in
interest rates would supposedly force Loews to declare the investments
in the held- to-maturity-category of marketable debt securities, the
least onerous of three evils (the other two requiring fair value
accounting).
Without the held-to-maturity option, the
carrying amount of the investment would initially decline as interest
rates rose, but could be expected to recover to the amount of the
contractual obligation as the maturity date approached. Tisch's view
seems to be that either fair value accounting would unreasonably record
losses when it is highly probable that the entire investment plus
interest will be recovered, or that constraints imposed by regulators
trump the accounting that is most appropriate from an investor's
viewpoint.
I think that the best way to approach a
question like this is to ask yourself a simple question: did Mr. Tisch's
company suffer a loss because it chose to invest in fixed-rate, as
opposed to variable-rate, debt instruments? Yes it did. While regulators
may find that it obscures their own peculiar needs, there must surely
more straightforward ways to solve the conflict with investor needs than
to muck up the financial statements.
And don't forget that apart from appeasing the
needs of regulators, the held-to-maturity category is chicken salad for
management: as Mr. Tisch implied, his company would manage its reported
financial position by "cherry picking": if interest rates were to
decline instead of rise, those same investments are probably classified
as trading in order to get the asset and earnings bumps.
In short, FAS 115 on marketable securities
could have been a lot simpler if the goals for financial statements
could be (and should be) a lot simpler. As another panelist observed,
one shouldn't need a legal degree to be capable of reading all the
disclosures. I believe the disclosures he was referring to owe their
existence to low-quality solutions cobbled together to meet the needs of
someone else besides investors. The SEC should be telling other
regulators to go and make their own accounting rules if they don't like
the ones that are supposed to protect investors.
Issue #2: Fair Value of Liabilities
Joseph Price, the CFO of Bank of America,
expressed his opposition to applying fair value measurements to
contractual obligations such as litigation (and by the way, one of my
more recent posts discusses the misguided way in which the IASB would
require fair value measurement for some non-contractual obligations).
Mr. Price has no problem with a mixed attribute model of accounting,
which is just another way of saying that he has no problem adding apples
and oranges.
The larger question, however, is whether any
liability should be subject to fair value measurement. In addition to
the claims that gain recognition on liabilities from deterioration of
credit risk would distort earnings, other speakers pointed out that the
character of the gain itself, often incapable of being monetized absent
liquidation, creates problems.
The academic, Kathy Petroni, conceded that it
can be confusing when an operating loss can be more than offset by gains
from writing down the value of one's own debt. However, she is also of
the view that the gain on the debt is representationally faithful; in
other words, the problem is not with the current valuation of the debt,
but with incomplete asset revaluation. This is because not all balance
sheet assets are measured at fair value, and not all economic assets are
even recognized. Tom Linsmeier, of the FASB and also an academic, made
the interesting observation that a write-down to liabilities could be
reasonably interpreted by investors as a signal of the asset losses that
were not recognized.
As you may already have guessed, I am not
sympathetic to stating liabilities at something other than current
values. For one thing, we will never get to the point where all of the
assets of a business are recognized, so we will never get to the point
of measuring all of the components of economic income. Investor's don't
expect financial reporting to account for all of the components of
economic income. (Actually, that's what changes in stock prices do, but
they have the distinct disadvantage of not allowing an analyst to
directly identify the drivers of stock price changes.) What investors do
expect is that the components of economic income that are measured are
measured properly. If the deterioration of a company's credit worthiness
creates an opportunity, amidst the other problems it must be
experiencing, for it to restructure its debt advantageously, doesn't
that opportunity benefit shareholders? Absolutely.
And, by the way, I am not advocating that all
liabilities, regardless of the likelihood that a cash outflow will
occur, be given recognition. And perhaps, some non-contractual
liabilities, due to their nature, should be excluded from recognition.
So the problem of incomplete recognition extends to the liability side
just as much as to the asset side.
As the old saying goes, "perfection is the
enemy of the good". What that means here is that we should not be
distorting liability valuation just because some other element is not
perfectly taken account of.
Issue #3: Fair Value Accounting for
Non-Financial Assets
There was some discussion and support for
measuring non-financial assets at fair value, but that support may have
been even less enthusiastic than the support for fair value measurement
of financial assets.
Logic dictates that whatever approach to fair
value for financial assets is taken, that same approach should be
applicable to non-financial assets. What's good for the goose is good
for the gander; otherwise, we permanently consign ourselves to adding
apples and oranges. And speaking of which, I have also pointed out here
that some folks who don't care whether they are adding apples and
oranges don't even care how assets and liabilities are measured -- just
so long as they can control what is reported on the (their) income
statement. One of my favorite examples is the historic cost of a tract
of land carried on the balance sheet of a foreign subsidiary: when
multiplied by today's current exchange rate to translate into dollars,
we don't end up with an historic cost in dollars, or a current value in
dollars. We end up with what is essentially a random number. How do you
test impairment of a random number?
Speaking impairment, for those of you who have
had to apply FAS 144 on the impairment of long-lived assets, or FAS 142
on goodwill impairment, or even inventory impairment, you would know
from that unfortunate experience that the impairment model of accounting
is perhaps the biggest source of complexity, if not broken altogether.
Some would argue that it is a reason, in and of itself, to abandon
historic cost accounting and move to some version of current costs.
So, what if we went to fair value accounting
for non-financial assets? That might solve the impairment problem, but
it would raise another big issue, that being gain recognition before the
non-financial assets, usually inventory, were actually sold. In a
nutshell, that's why I think proponents of fair value are hesitant to
extend the concept to non-financial assets -- more than anything, it
exposes the main problem of fair value serving as a core accounting
principle.
The appropriate non-financial asset attribute
to measure is replacement cost (entry prices), and not fair value (exit
prices). To further appreciate this, take for example the issue of
transaction costs to acquire inventory. If FAS 157 were applied to
purchases of raw materials inventory, transaction costs (perhaps a
brokerage fee) would be expensed immediately upon acquisition. We all
know that this makes no sense: we immediately have an expense to report
before we have any chance at all to generate a return on our investment.
(By the way, the same anomaly applies to financial assets, but it has
already been established by FAS 157 that the FASB doesn't seem to care
much about this.)
A replacement cost approach, on the other hand,
would mean that all of the expenditures required to replace the asset
should be part of the carrying amount of the asset. If we ultimately
sell inventory for an amount greater than it would cost us to replace
it, then we have a profit.
Getting back to geese and ganders, if
replacement cost is the appropriate attribute to measure for
non-financial assets, then it must be the appropriate attribute for
financial assets as well.
Oh, Well…
Overall, the roundtable contributed very little
to the fair value debate that hasn't already been expressed and
considered before. Nonetheless, it reinforces two points that may well
conclude that class discussion that was suggesting:
First, I would prefer to have a dialogue at the
SEC instead of in London at IFRS headquarters. Chairman Cox himself
unwittingly pointed this out when he asked one set of panelists whether
they believe current accounting rules contributed in some way to the
economic issues the financial institutions are now dealing with. What if
the answer to his question is "yes"? That, by itself, should settle for
ever the debate about who should be setting accounting standards for the
U. S. capital markets. What if the answer to Cox's question is "we don't
know"? QED.
Second, it would be refreshing if for once, an
issue were settled by simply asking what it is that investors would
want. Why does it seem that policy makers are incapable of doing that?
"FAS 157: Auditors are ready to assign fair value to financial assets,"
AccountingWeb, November 2007 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=104246
When credit markets all but dried up as a
result of the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the late summer, auditors of
investment and commercial banks that elected to adopt Financial
Accounting Standard 157, Fair Value Measurements, earlier than
the effective date of November 15th were called upon to play a key role
in determining the market value of mortgage-backed assets when few were
being traded. Many of these banks had to report huge write-downs in the
third quarter from declining assets values. But auditors of public
companies have made it clear in
three recently published white papers
from their newly formed Center for Audit Quality that despite the
severity of the current market crunch, they intend to apply the fair
value standard consistently, and market problems will not influence
their professional judgment about the quality of valuation models and
assumptions used by banks.
Continued in article
Jensen Comment
The following standards are especially pertinent to fair value
accounting:
FAS 105, 107, 115, 130, 133, 141(R), 142, 155, 157, 159
FAS 157 is mainly a definitional standard. The key standard to date is
FAS 159 that allows companies to cherry pick which contracts are to be
carried at fair value and which are to be carried at amortized historical
cost. To me FAS 159 is a terrible standard that can lead to all sorts of
subjective manipulation, earnings management, and aggregation of apples and
door knobs in summations of assets, liabilities, and earnings components. I
think the FASB viewed FAS 159 as a political expedient way to expand fair
value accounting into financial statements without having to fight the huge
political battle with banks and other corporations who aggressively oppose
required fair value accounting for all financial and derivative financial
instruments.
The FAS 141(R) revision of the business combinations standard FAS 141
makes a giant leap into fair value accounting for intangibles acquired with
business combinations.
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on May 16, 2008
MBIA's Book-Value View
by David
Reilly
The Wall Street Journal
May 13, 2008
Page: C12
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121065046561187725.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
TOPICS: Accounting,
Banking, Fair Value Accounting, Financial Accounting, Financial
Analysis, Financial Reporting, Financial Statement Analysis,
GAAP, Generally accepted accounting principles, Mark-to-Market,
Market-Value Approach
SUMMARY: Mr.
Reilly advises that investors "should stick to figures the
company compiles according to generally accepted accounting
principles" in analyzing MBIA's financial position, particularly
its $8.70 per share book value. MBIA management provides an
alternative book value measure that ignores items with which it
disagrees about the treatment under generally accepted
accounting principles, particularly mark-to-market requirements.
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: Financial accounting, financial statement
analysis, and accounting theory courses all may use this article
to discuss the bias inherent in choosing alternative measures to
GAAP.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) Define the terms book value and book
value per share. Why do these measures, based on financial
statements, differ from market value per share?
2. (Advanced) What is mark-to-market accounting? In
general, for what MBIA balance sheet items do you think the
company must employ this measurement method?
3. (Introductory) " Some investors may...think
mark-to-market accounting is overestimating losses at MBIA and
other financial firms." How does overstating losses lead to
concerns with accurately assessing book value and book value per
share? What arguments support the assessment that losses may be
overestimated?
4. (Advanced) How is MBIA management trying to divert
attention from book value per share according to generally
accepted accounting principles to a measure it says 'provides an
economic basis for investors to reach their own conclusions
about the fair value of the company'? What qualitative
characteristics of accounting information may be violated in the
measures chosen by management?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
|
"MBIA's Book-Value View: Bond Insurer Dons Rosier Glasses; Dot-Bomb
Move?" by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, May 13, 2008; Page C12
---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121065046561187725.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
Back in the dot-bomb days, companies liked to guide
investors to rosy variations of their stated profit. These profit figures
eventually became known as EBBS, or "earnings before bad stuff."
Bond insurer MBIA Inc. is taking a page from that
playbook. In its first-quarter earnings release Monday, MBIA said investors
shouldn't look to its stated book value -- the measure of a company's net
worth based on assets minus liabilities. Instead it prefers a metric it
calls "analytic adjusted book value" that "provides an economic basis for
investors to reach their own conclusions about the fair value of the
company."
A better name for this measure might have been
SEEMM, or "shareholders equity excluding mortgage mess." At its core, this
means avoiding marking assets to market -- that is, adjusting their value
down to what they would sell for today. So MBIA's variation on book value
excludes things like the $3.5 billion mark-to-market loss on derivatives
that drove its $2.4 billion net loss in the first quarter. Rather, it
includes management's expectations of losses, plus gains from future
expected premium payments.
This method leads to book value per share of about
$42. By excluding only the mark-to-market losses, it shows an adjusted book
value of $24 a share.
That looks a lot better than MBIA's stated book
value of $8.70 at the end of March, and its share price Monday of $9.85, up
42 cents, or 4.5%, in 4 p.m. New York Stock Exchange composite trading.
Investors shouldn't forget the lessons of the
Internet-stock bubble; they should stick to figures the company compiles
according to generally accepted accounting principles. On the basis of that
$8.70-a-share figure, the stock, even at its current level, isn't a bargain.
MBIA Chief Financial Officer C. Edward Chaplin
countered that the firm believes accounting rules don't provide a true view
of long-term value. Items valued using market prices are in many cases
"distorting the book value of the company as opposed to providing additional
useful information to investors," he said.
The company is in better position following the
$2.6 billion in capital it has raised in recent months. That has led ratings
firms to maintain its triple-A ratings and calmed investor fears that MBIA
could go under.
Some investors may be tempted to side with the
company because they, too, think mark-to-market accounting is overestimating
losses at MBIA and other financial firms. And the company's book value
likely has improved since the end of March, given improvements in the debt
markets.
MBIA still has a lot of problems. One big one is
the $18 billion in home-equity loans and second-lien mortgages to which it
has exposure. This is one of the hardest-hit, and worsening, areas of the
mortgage markets. Some 55% of these loans were originated by Countrywide
Financial Corp., whose lending practices are under investigation by federal
authorities.
Another worry is the $40 billion in securities it
insures that are backed by commercial mortgages. These haven't gone sour,
but as the economy weakens, many analysts expect them to.
MBIA Chief Executive Jay Brown said on a conference
call he believed the company's various loss estimates were realistic. "We
sell a promise," he said, referring to the company's pledge to make good on
losses it insures against. So investors "are rightly focused on our ability
to fulfill that promise."
They should also be focused on reported numbers,
not made-up ones that conjure memories of the market's last bubble.
HSBC Cheers Investors, but Pitfalls Remain
Monday's earnings numbers make HSBC Holdings PLC
look tempting. Its write-downs were below consensus and growth is coming
from Asia and the Middle East. But after the recent 20% rally in the stock,
the good news is largely priced in and the bank's warning of a further
slowdown in 2009 in the U.S. isn't.
More worrisome is investors, who bid up HSBC shares
3.1% Monday, seem to believe that the bank has seen the worst of write-downs
in the U.S. That is hard to believe since the U.S.-based HSBC Finance unit
is deeply entrenched in states like California, Florida and Arizona, where
house prices are continuing to decline. More than 40% of HSBC Finance
consumer lending's real-estate portfolio is concentrated in states where
delinquency is expected to keep rising.
At the end of March, its portfolio of
adjustable-rate mortgages stood at $17.1 billion. About $2 billion of those
will have their first interest rates reset in 2008 and double that will
reset in 2009. HSBC Finance's portfolio of "stated income loans" -- loans
given out without verifying borrower's income -- is $7.2 billion.
HSBC appears less optimistic than its investors. It
is one of the first global banks to put out a serious warning of potential
2009 pain. If the warning comes true, the United Kingdom bank is preparing
its investors for hurt and investors should pay heed
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
Bob Jensen's threads on alternative valuations ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases
Question
How did fair value accounting turn a $215 million loss into a $195 million
gain for the Radian Group?
Answer
Because the bonds it insured had been falling in value
for a while, the swaps' values had been increasing, leading to charges in
previous quarters. In the first quarter, a big chunk of that was reversed.
That turned a loss into profit. In theory, the logic of the new accounting
approach holds up. But that doesn't change the fact that for investors, the
real-world outcome is perverse.
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on May 23,
2008
When a Loss Is a Gain
by
David Reilly
The Wall Street Journal
May 19, 2008
Page: C12
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121116684762202957.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
TOPICS: Accounting,
Financial Accounting, Mark-to-Market Accounting
SUMMARY: Radian Group managed to post net profit of
$195 million, despite a rough first quarter. The profit
was a controversial byproduct of a new accounting rule
that caused the company to report gains of about $2
billion on some of its liabilities.
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: This situation clearly shows
the ironic results possible as a result of the new
mark-to-market accounting rule. Use this article for a
good critical thinking exercise analyzing the issues
resulting from this rule.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Advanced) How did Radian manage to post a
net profit of $195 million when it had a loss of $215
million?
2. (Introductory) What is the basic accounting
rule when a firm experiences a reduction in the value of
a liability? What is the reasoning behind this basic
rule?
3. (Introductory) What is mark-to-market
accounting? Why was this new rule instituted? What is
the value of the rule?
4. (Advanced) The article states that Radian
"clearly flagged" the impact of its application of the
new rule. What does that mean? Is this required? What
would happen if a company did not clearly flag the
impact?
5. (Advanced) What is the ironic result of this
new rule? Do you think that this result was anticipated
when the rule was drafted? Why or why not? How does this
affect investors?
6. (Advanced) What could happen if Radian's
financial health improves in the future?
Reviewed By: Linda Christiansen, Indiana University
Southeast
|
"When a Loss Is a Gain: New Rule Helped Radian Turn Woes Into a Net
Profit," by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2008; Page
C12 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121116684762202957.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
Like other companies that insure bonds and
mortgages, Radian Group Inc. had a rough first quarter. What a surprise
then that it managed to post net profit of $195 million.
How that happened holds a cautionary tale for
investors. Radian was in the black because its hobbled financial
condition caused it to report gains of about $2 billion on some of its
liabilities.
The profit was a controversial byproduct of a
new accounting rule involving mark-to-market accounting. Without the
benefit of this quirk, Radian's loss would have been about $215 million.
One of the basic rules of accounting says that
a reduction in the value of a liability leads to a gain that usually
boosts profit. Under the new rule, companies have to take into account
the market's view of their own financial health when considering the
market value of some liabilities. In this case, a company's poor health
can lead to a reduction in the liability's value.
Radian hasn't done anything wrong. It properly
applied the new rule and clearly flagged its impact when it reported
earnings last week. Others might not be so forthright, meaning investors
will have to be even more sharp-eyed as the credit crisis plays itself
out.
The irony is that by marking these particular
assets to market as the new rule requires, the weaker a company gets,
the stronger it may look.
"The most bizarre aspect of this is that if I'm
going bankrupt, the market's diminishing perception of my
credit-worthiness fuels my profits," said Damon Silvers, associate
general counsel at the AFL-CIO and a longtime critic of market-value
accounting.
Another twist: If perceptions of Radian's
financial health increase in coming quarters, the company could reverse
the gain. That could lead it to take losses on some of its assets.
Radian Chief Financial Officer C. Robert Quint
doesn't take issue with the overall notion of market-value accounting.
But he said aspects of it, such as these gains, can be troubling. "For
investors to really understand what's going on behind the numbers is
proving more and more difficult," he said.
Other companies, notably big banks and brokers,
have in recent months seen similar gains from declines in the value of
their own debt, which also leads to a reduction of liabilities and a
boost in profit. But the impact is more pronounced at Radian and other
insurers because the gains are coming instead from their core insurance
business, at least when it involves derivatives. Radian and others also
saw an outsized impact because their first-time adoption of the rule led
to a big, all-at-once adjustment.
Here is how it plays out. Say a company holds a
bond and insures against the bond's default by buying a credit-default
swap from an insurer. If the bond falls 10%, the value of the swap would
increase, say, by the same amount. The bond is considered riskier, so
insurance on the bond is more valuable.
In the past, a bondholder would have booked
offsetting gains and losses as the bond fell in value and the insurance
rose in value. But the new accounting rule on measuring market values
says companies also have to consider how much something would fetch if
sold today.
If the market has doubts about the financial
health of the insurer that issued the credit-default swap, that swap
might not fetch the full 10% premium. While the bond it insures is
riskier, the insurer that issued it is riskier, too. Maybe it could be
sold for only a 5% gain. In that case, the initial 10% moves in both the
bond and swap wouldn't cancel each other out and the bondholder would
record a loss of 5%.
For the insurer issuing the swap, though, this
works in reverse. When bonds that Radian insured fell in value, the
increase in the value of the swap, or liability, would be taken as a
charge. The new rule added a wrinkle -- they could no longer assume that
the only driver of the swap's value was the bond it insured. Instead,
the insurers had to figure in the impact of their own perceived
credit-worthiness and how that would affect the swap's value in a sale.
Radian's perceived credit-worthiness plummeted
in the first quarter as billions of dollars of mortgages it insured fell
in value. With Radian's credit-worthiness in question, the value of the
credit-default swaps it issued fell in value. That led to a big decline
in the value it ascribed to swaps.
Because the bonds it insured had been falling
in value for a while, the swaps' values had been increasing, leading to
charges in previous quarters. In the first quarter, a big chunk of that
was reversed. That turned a loss into profit.
In theory, the logic of the new accounting
approach holds up. But that doesn't change the fact that for investors,
the real-world outcome is perverse.
Bob Jensen's threads on interest rate swap valuations are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on FAS 133 and IAS 39 are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
Question
What is the meaning of the new buzz acronym EBITDAGSAC?
"EBITDAGSAC: A Guide to Cash Generation for Bankers," Long or Short
Capital, April 28, 2008 ---
http://longorshortcapital.com/ebitdagsac-a-guide-to-cash-generation-for-bankers.htm
"The Role of Fair Value Accounting in the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown,"
Journal of Accountancy, May 2008 ---
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/may2008/in_my_opinion.htm
As the credit markets froze and stocks gyrated, investors and pundits
naturally looked for someone, or some thing, to blame. Fair value
accounting quickly emerged as an oft-cited problem. But is fair value
really a cause of the crisis, or is it just a scapegoat? And might it
have prevented an even worse calamity? On the following pages, the JofA
presents three views on the debate.
"Both Sides Make Good Points," by
Michael R. Young
How often do we get to have a
raging national debate on an accounting standard? Well, we’re in one
now.
And while the standard at
issue—FASB Statement no. 157, Fair Value Measurements—is fairly new,
the underlying substance of the debate goes back for decades: Is it
best to record assets at their cost or at their fair (meaning
market) value? It is an issue that goes to the very heart of
accountancy and stirs passions like few others in financial
reporting. There are probably two reasons for this. First, each side
of the debate has excellent points to make. Second, each side
genuinely believes what it is saying.
So let’s step back, take a deep
breath, and think about the issue with all of the objectivity we can
muster. The good news is that the events of the last several months
involving subprime-related financial instruments give us an
opportunity to evaluate the extent to which fair value accounting
has, or has not, served the financial community. Indeed, some might
point out that the experience has been all too vivid.
WHAT HAPPENED We’re all familiar
with what happened. This past summer, two Bear Stearns funds ran
into problems, and the result was increasing financial community
uncertainty about the value of mortgage backed financial
instruments, particularly collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). As
investors tried to delve into the details of the value of CDO assets
and the reliability of their cash flows, the extraordinary
complexity of the instruments provided a significant impediment to
insight into the underlying financial data.
As a result, the markets seized.
In other words, everyone got so nervous that active trading in many
instruments all but stopped.
The practical significance of the
market seizure was all too apparent to both owners of the
instruments and newspaper readers. What was largely missed behind
the scenes, though, was the accounting significance under Statement
no. 157, which puts in place a “fair value hierarchy” that
prioritizes the inputs to valuation techniques according to their
objectivity and observability (see also “Refining Fair Value
Measurement,” JofA, Nov. 07, page 30). At the top of the hierarchy
are “Level 1 inputs” which generally involve quoted prices in active
markets. At the bottom are “Level 3 inputs” in which no active
markets exist.
The accounting significance of the
market seizure for subprime financial instruments was that the
approach to valuation for many instruments almost overnight dropped
from Level 1 to Level 3. The problem was that, because many CDOs to
that point had been valued based on Level 1, established models for
valuing the instruments at Level 3 were not in place. Just as all
this was happening, moreover, another well-intended aspect of our
financial reporting system kicked in: the desire to report
fast-breaking financial developments to investors quickly.
To those unfamiliar with the
underlying accounting literature, the result must have looked like
something between pandemonium and chaos. They watched as some of the
most prestigious financial organizations in the world announced
dramatic write downs, followed by equally dramatic write downs
thereafter. Stock market volatility returned with a vengeance.
Financial institutions needed to raise more capital. And many
investors watched with horror as the value of both their homes and
stock portfolios seemed to move in parallel in the wrong direction.
To some, this was all evidence
that fair value accounting is a folly. Making that argument with
particular conviction were those who had no intention of selling the
newly plummeting financial instruments to begin with. Even those
intending to sell suspected that the write-downs were being overdone
and that the resulting volatility was serving no one. According to
one managing director at a risk research firm, “All this volatility
we now have in reporting and disclosure, it’s just absolute
madness.”
IS FAIR VALUE GOOD OR BAD? So what
do we make of fair value accounting based on the subprime
experience?
Foremost is that some of the
challenges in the application of fair value accounting are just as
difficult as some of its opponents said they would be. True, when
subprime instruments were trading in active, observable markets,
valuation did not pose much of a problem. But that changed all too
suddenly when active markets disappeared and valuation shifted to
Level 3. At that point, valuation models needed to be deployed which
might potentially be influenced by such things as the future of
housing prices, the future of interest rates, and how homeowners
could be expected to react to such things.
The difficulties were exacerbated,
moreover, by the suddenness with which active markets disappeared
and the resulting need to put in place models just as pressure was
building to get up-to-date information to investors. It is hardly
surprising, therefore, that in some instances asset values had to be
revised as models were being refined and adjusted.
Imperfect as the valuations may
have been, though, the real-world consequences of the resulting
volatility were all too concrete. Some of the world’s largest
financial institutions, seemingly rock solid just a short time
before, found themselves needing to raise new capital. In the
aftermath of subprime instrument write-downs, one of the most
prestigious institutions even found itself facing a level of
uncertainty that resulted in what was characterized as a “run on the
bank.”
So the subprime experience with
fair value accounting has given the naysayers some genuine
experiences with which to make their case.
Still, the subprime experience
also demonstrates that there are two legitimate sides to this
debate. For the difficulties in financial markets were not purely
the consequences of an accounting system. They were, more
fundamentally, the economic consequences of a market in which a
bubble had burst.
And advocates of fair value can
point to one aspect of fair value accounting—and Statement no. 157
in particular—that is pretty much undeniable. It has given outside
investors real-time insight into market gyrations of the sort that,
under old accounting regimes, only insiders could see. True, trying
to deal with those gyrations can be difficult and the consequences
are not always desirable. But that is just another way of saying
that ignorance is bliss.
For fair value advocates, that may
be their best argument of all. Whatever its faults, fair value
accounting and Statement no. 157 have brought to the surface the
reality of the difficulties surrounding subprime-related financial
instruments. Is the fair value system perfect? No. Is there room for
improvement? Inevitably. But those favoring fair value accounting
may have one ultimate point to make. In bringing transparency to the
aftermath of the housing bubble, it may be that, for all its
imperfections, the accounting system has largely worked.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael R. Young is a partner in
the New York based law firm Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, where he
specializes in accounting irregularities and securities litigation.
He served as a member of the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory
Council to FASB during the development of FASB Statement no. 157.
His e-mail address is myoung@willkie.com.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"The Capital Markets’ Needs Will Be Served:
Fair value accounting limits bubbles rather than creates them," by
Paul B.W. Miller
With regard to the relationship
between financial accounting and the subprime-lending crisis, I
observe that the capital markets’ needs will be served, one way or
another.
Grasping this imperative leads to
new outlooks and behaviors for the better of all. In contrast to
conventional dogma, capital markets cannot be managed through
accounting policy choices and political pressure on standard
setters. Yes, events show that markets can be duped, but not for
long and not very well, and with inevitable disastrous consequences.
With regard to the crisis,
attempts to place blame on accounting standards are not valid.
Rather, other factors created it, primarily actors in the complex
intermediation chain, including:
Borrowers who sought credit beyond
their reach.
Borrowers who sought credit beyond
their reach.
Investment bankers who earned fees
for bundling and selling vaporous bonds without adequately
disclosing risk.
Institutional investors who sought
high returns without understanding the risk and real value.
In addition, housing markets
collapsed, eliminating the backstop provided by collateral. Thus,
claims that accounting standards fomented or worsened this crisis
lack credibility.
The following paragraphs explain
why fair value accounting promotes capital market efficiency.
THE GOAL OF FINANCIAL REPORTING
The goal of financial reporting, and all who act within it, is to
facilitate convergence of securities’ market prices on their
intrinsic values. When that happens, securities prices and capital
costs appropriately reflect real risks and returns. This efficiency
mutually benefits everyone: society, investors, managers and
accountants.
Any other goals, such as
inexpensive reporting, projecting positive images, and reducing
auditors’ risk of recrimination, are misdirected. Because the
markets’ demand for useful information will be satisfied, one way or
another, it makes sense to reorient management strategy and
accounting policy to provide that satisfaction.
THE PERSCRIPTION The key to
converging market and intrinsic values is understanding that more
information, not less, is better. It does no good, and indeed does
harm, to leave markets guessing. Reports must be informative and
truthful, even if they’re not flattering.
To this end, all must grasp that
financial information is favorable if it unveils truth more
completely and faithfully instead of presenting an illusory better
appearance. Covering up bad news isn’t possible, especially over the
long run, and discovered duplicity brings catastrophe.
SUPPLY AND DEMAND To reap full
benefits, management and accountants must meet the markets’ needs.
Instead, past attention was paid primarily to the needs of managers
and accountants and what they wanted to supply with little regard to
the markets’ demands. But progress always follows when demand is
addressed. Toward this end, managers must look beyond preparation
costs and consider the higher capital costs created when reports
aren’t informative.
Above all, they must forgo
misbegotten efforts to coax capital markets to overprice securities,
especially by withholding truth from them. Instead, it’s time to
build bridges to these markets, just as managers have accomplished
with customers, employees and suppliers.
THE CONTENT In this paradigm, the
preferable information concerns fair values of assets and
liabilities. Historical numbers are of no interest because they lack
reliability for assessing future cash flows. That is, information’s
reliability doesn’t come as much from its verifiability (evidenced
by checks and invoices) as from its dependability for rational
decision making. Although a cost is verifiable, it is unreliable
because it is a sample of one that at best reflects past conditions.
Useful information reveals what is now true, not what used to be.
It’s not just me: Sophisticated
users have said this, over and over again. For example, on March 17,
Georgene Palacky of the CFA Institute issued a press release,
saying, “Fair value is the most transparent method of measuring
financial instruments, such as derivatives, and is widely favored by
investors.” This expressed demand should help managers understand
that failing to provide value-based information forces markets to
manufacture their own estimates. In turn, the markets defensively
guess low for assets and high for liabilities. Rather than stable
and higher securities prices, disregarding demand for truthful and
useful information produces more volatile and lower prices that
don’t converge on intrinsic values.
However it arises, a vacuum of
useful public information is always filled by speculative private
information, with an overall increase in uncertainty, cost, risk,
volatility and capital costs. These outcomes are good for no one.
THE STRATEGY Managers bring two
things to capital markets: (1) prospective cash flows and (2)
information. Their work isn’t done if they don’t produce quality in
both. It does no good to present rosy pictures of inferior cash flow
potential because the truth will eventually be known. And it does no
good to have great potential if the financial reports obscure it.
Thus, managers need to unveil the
truth about their situation, which is far different from designing
reports to prop up false images. Even if well-intentioned, such
efforts always fail, usually sooner rather than later.
It’s especially fruitless to mold
standards to generate this propaganda because readers don’t believe
the results. Capital markets choose whether to rely on GAAP
financial statements, so it makes no sense to report anything that
lacks usefulness. For the present situation, then, not reporting
best estimates of fair value frustrates capital markets, creates
more risk, diminishes demand for a company’s securities and drives
prices even lower.
THE ROLE FOR ACCOUNTING REPORTING
Because this crisis wasn’t created by poor accounting, it won’t be
relieved by worse accounting. Rather, the blame lies with
inattention to CDOs’ risks and returns. It was bad management that
led to losses, not bad standards.
In fact, value-based reporting did
exactly what it was supposed to by unveiling risk and its
consequences. It is pointless to condemn FASB for forcing these
messages to be sent. Rather, we should all shut up, pay attention,
and take steps to prevent other disasters.
That involves telling the truth,
cleanly and clearly. It needs to be delivered quickly and
completely, withholding nothing. Further, managers should not wait
for a bureaucratic standard-setting process to tell them what truth
to reveal, any more than carmakers should build their products to
minimum compliance with government safety, mileage and pollution
standards.
I cannot see how defenders of the
status quo can rebut this point from Palacky’s press release: “…only
when fair value is widely practiced will investors be able to
accurately evaluate and price risk.”
THE FUTURE Nothing can prevent
speculative bubbles. However, the sunshine of truth, freely offered
by management with timeliness, will certainly diminish their
frequency and impact.
Any argument that restricting the
flow of useful public information will solve the problem is totally
dysfunctional. The markets’ demand for value-based information will
be served, whether through public or private sources. It might as
well be public.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paul B.W. Miller, CPA, Ph.D., a
professor of accounting at the University of Colorado, served on
both FASB’s staff and the staff of the SEC’s Office of the Chief
Accountant. He is also a member of the JofA’s Editorial Advisory
Board. His e-mail address is pmiller@uccs.edu.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"The Need for Reliability in Accounting: Why
historical cost is more reliable than fair value," by Eugene H. Flegm
In 1976, FASB issued three documents for
discussion: Tentative Conclusions on Objectives of Financial
Statements of Business Enterprises; Scope and Implications of the
Conceptual Framework Project; and Conceptual Framework for Financial
Accounting and Reporting: Elements of Financial Statements and Their
Measurement. These documents started a revolution in financial
reporting that continues today.
As the director of accounting, then assistant
comptroller-chief accountant, and finally as auditor general for
General Motors Corp., I have been involved in the resistance to this
revolution since it began.
Briefly, the proposed conceptual framework would
shift the determination of income from the income statement and its
emphasis on the matching of costs with related revenues to the
determination of income by measuring the “well offness” from period
to period by measuring changes on the two balance sheets on a fair
value basis from the beginning and the ending of the period. The
argument was made that these data are more relevant than the
historic cost in use and not as subjective as the concept of
identifying costs with related revenues. In addition, those in favor
of the change claimed that the fair value data was more relevant
than the historic cost data and thus more valuable to the possible
lenders and investors, ignoring the needs of the actual managers
and, in the case of private companies, the owners.
RELEVANCY REQUIRES RELIABILITY It seems to me that
the recent meltdown in the finance industry as well as the Enron
experience would have made it clear that to be relevant the data
must be reliable.
Enron took advantage of the mark-to-market rule to
create income by just writing up such assets as Mariner Energy Inc.
(see SEC Litigation Release no. 18403).
Charles R. Morris writes in his recently released
book, The Trillion Dollar Meltdown: Easy Money, High Rollers, and
the Great Credit Crash, that “Securitization fostered irresponsible
lending, by seeming to relieve lenders of credit risk, and at the
same time, helped propagate shaky credits throughout the global
financial system.”
There is much talk of the need for “transparency,”
and it now appears we have completely obscured a company’s exposure
to loss! We still do not know the extent of the meltdown!
ASSIGNING BLAME We are still trying to assign
blame—Morris identifies former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan’s easy money policies—and certainly the regulators allowed
the finance industry to get out of control. However, FASB and its
fascination with “values” and mark to market must be a part of the
problem.
Holman W. Jenkins Jr. began his editorial, “Mark
to Meltdown,” (Wall Street Journal, p. A17, March 5, 2008) by
stating, “No task is more thankless than to write about accounting
for a family newspaper, yet it must be shared with the public that
‘mark to market,’ an accounting and regulatory innovation of the
early 1990s, has proved another of Washington’s fabulous failures.”
Merrill Lynch reported a $15 billion loss on
mortgages for 2007. Citicorp had about $12 billion in losses, and
Bear Stearns failed. These huge losses came from mortgages that had
been written up to some fictitious value based on credit ratings
during the preceding years! In addition there is some doubt that
those loss estimates might be too conservative and at some point in
the future a portion of them may be reversed.
THE BASIC PURPOSE OF ACCOUNTING Anyone who has
ever run an accounting operation knows that the basic purpose of
accounting is to provide reliable, transaction-based data by which
one can control the assets and liabilities and measure performance
of both the overall company and its individual employees.
A forecast of an income statement each month as
well as an analysis of the actual results compared to the previous
month’s forecast are a key factor in controlling a company’s
operations. The balance sheet will often be used by the treasury
department to analyze cash flows and the need for financing. I do
not know of a company that compares the values of the beginning and
ending balance sheets to determine the success of its operations.
How did we reach the current state of affairs
where the standard setters no longer consider the stewardship needs
of the manager but focus instead on the potential investor or
creditor and potential values rather than transactional results?
The problem developed because of the conflict
between economics, accounting and finance—and the education of
accountants. All three fields are vital to running a company but
each has its place. In what some of us perceive to be an exercise of
hubris, FASB has attempted to serve the needs of all three fields at
the expense of manager or owner needs for control and performance
measurements.
HOW WE GOT HERE The debate over the need for any
standards began with the 1929 market crash and the subsequent
formation of the SEC. Initially, Congress intended that the chief
accountant of the SEC would establish the necessary standards.
However, Carmen Blough, the first SEC chief accountant, wanted the
American Institute of Accountants (a predecessor to the AICPA) to do
this. In 1937 he succeeded in convincing the SEC to do just that.
The AICPA did this through an ad hoc committee for 22 years but
finally established a more formal committee, the Accounting
Principles Board, which functioned until it was deemed inadequate
and FASB was formed in 1973.
FASB’s first order of business was to establish a
formal “constitution” as outlined by the report of the Trueblood
Committee (Objectives of Financial Statements, AICPA, October 1973).
With the influence of several academics on that committee, the
thrust of the “constitution” was to move to a balance sheet view of
income versus the income view which had arisen in the 1930s.
Although the ultimate goal was never clarified, it was obvious to
some, most notably Robert K. Mautz, who had served as a professor of
accounting at the University of Illinois and partner in the
accounting firm Ernst & Ernst (a predecessor to Ernst & Young) and
finally a member of the Public Oversight Board and the Accounting
Hall of Fame. Mautz realized then that the goal was fair value
accounting and traveled the nation preaching that a revolution was
being proposed. Several companies, notably General Motors and Shell
Oil, led the opposition that continues to this day.
The most recent statement on the matter was FASB’s
2006 publication of a preliminary views (PV) document called
Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting: Objective of Financial
Reporting and Qualitative Characteristics of Decision-Useful
Financial Reporting Information. It is clear that FASB has abandoned
the real daily users who apply traditional accounting to manage
their businesses. The PV document refers to investors and creditors
only. It mentions the need for comparability and consistency but
does not attempt to explain how this would be possible under fair
value accounting since each manager would be required to make his or
her own value judgments, which, of course, would not be comparable
to any other company’s evaluations.
The only reference to the management of a company
states that “…management has the ability to obtain whatever
information it needs.” That is true, but under the PV proposal
management would have to maintain a third set of books to keep track
of valuations. (The two traditional sets would be the operating set
based on actual costs and sales, which would need to be continued to
allow management or owners to judge actual performance of the
company and personnel, while the other set is that used for federal
income tax filings.)
Since there are about 19 million private companies
that do not file with the SEC versus the 17,000 public companies
that do, private companies are in a quandary. The majority of them
file audited financial statements with banks and creditors based on
historical costs and for the most part current GAAP. They are
already running into trouble with several FASB standards that
introduce fair value into GAAP. What GAAP do they use?
Judging by the crash of the financial system and
the tens of billions of dollars in losses booked by investment banks
this year, the answer seems clear: Return to establishing standards
that are based on costs and transactions, that inhibit rather than
encourage manipulation of earnings (such as mark to market, FASB
Statements no. 133 and 157 to name a few), and that result in data
as reliable as it can be under an accrual accounting system.
The analysts and other investors and creditors
will have to do their own estimates of a company’s future success.
However, the success of any company will depend on the quality of
its products and services and the skill of its management, not on a
guess at the “value” of its assets. Writing up assets was a bad
practice in the 1920s and as bad a practice in recent years.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Eugene H. Flegm, CPA, CFE, (now retired) served
for more than 30 years as an accounting executive for General Motors
Corp. He is a frequent contributor to various accounting
publications. His e-mail address is ehflegm@earthlink.net.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jensen Comment
There are many factors that interacted in causing the subprime scandals of
2008. But the one key factor that could have prevented both the Savings &
Loan scandals in the 1980s and the Subprime Mortgage scandals of 2008 is
professionalism in the real estate appraising industry. In both of these
immense scandals real estate appraisers repeatedly provided fair value
estimates above and beyond anything that could be considered a realistic
fair value. There's genuine moral hazard in the relationships between real
estate appraisal firms and real estate brokerage firms who desperately want
buyers to get financing needed to close the deals. Banks also want
desperately to close the deals so they can sell the mortgages to mortgage
buyers like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac quasi-government corporations
designed to buy up mortgages from banks.
These huge scandals provide evidence of the unreliability and
nonstationarity of fair value estimates. The freight train that's hauling in
fair value standards to replace existing standards in the FASB and the IASB
is fraught with peril. There are, of course, many instances where fair value
is the only reasonable choice such as in derivative financial instruments
where historical cost is usually zero or some miniscule premium paid
relative to the huge risks involved. There are other instances such as with
leases and pensions having contractual future cash flows where fair value
estimation is reasonably accurate. But more often than not fair value
estimates are little more than pie in the sky.
As earnings numbers are increasingly impacted by unrealized adjustments
for fair values, many of which wash out to a zero cumulative effect over
time, the more firms are contracting based upon earnings before unrealized
fair value adjustments. Labor unions are increasingly concerned that
companies can manage earnings by such simple devices as implementation of
hedge accounting effectiveness testing. Companies like Southwest Airlines
exclude these unrealized fair value changes in earnings from compensation
contracts with employees in order to ease the fears of employees.
This is the driving force behind the FASB's bold initiative to eliminate
bottom line reporting.
Five General Categories of Aggregation
"The Sums of All Parts: Redesigning Financials: As part of radical
changes to the income statement, balance sheet, and cash flow statement,
FASB signs off on a series of new subtotals to be contained in each,"
byMarie Leone, CFO Magazine, November 14, 2007 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#ChangesOnTheWay
"Profit as We Know It Could Be Lost With New Accounting
Statements," by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, May 12,
2007; Page A1 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#ChangesOnTheWay
"A New Vision for Accounting: Robert Herz and FASB are preparing a
radical new format for financial, CFO Magazine, by Alix Stuart, February
2008, pp. 49-53 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#ChangesOnTheWay
Bob Jensen's threads on alternative valuations ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases
Question
What is liquidity stress testing in the context of FAS 157?
Definition ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#StressTest
There are two categories: Sensitivity Analysis and Scenario Analysis
Ira Kawaller pulished a paper that talks about liquidity stress
testing in conjunction with FAS 157 valuation definitions
"Watching out for FAS 157: Fair Value Measurement," by Ira Kawaller,
Bank Asset/Liability Management, April 2008 ---
http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/BALMWatchingoutforFAS157.pdf
Also at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/FairValue/StressTestKawaller.pdf
Liquidity Risk Measurement Techniques and Stress Tests
In the first article in this
series on the considerations to the formulation of a liquidity stress
testing framework, the background to liquidity risk and liquidity stress
testing was presented (see March 2008 BALM). This second article
in the series investigates various stress-testing categories in order to
gain a better understanding of stress testing and how it could be
applied in liquidity risk measurement. The basic liquidity risk
measurement techniques are explored to establish a framework of
potential analytical techniques to apply in the formulation of a
liquidity stress testing methodology.
Liquidity Stress Testing. The formulation of a
liquidity stress testing framework requires a clear and decisive
understanding of the stress testing technique applied, exactly what is
stress tested, and the type of analyses conducted. This section will
explore the methods of stress testing that can be applied in the
liquidity risk management process. Furthermore, the types of analyses
conducted in measuring liquidity risk and other considerations that
should be incorporated in the stress testing framework will be
discussed.
Categories of Stress Testing.
Generally, stress testing falls in two main categories – sensitivity
tests and scenario tests.
• Sensitivity tests specify financial
parameters that are moved instantaneously by a unitary amount, for
example, a 10 percent decline or a 10 basis point increase. This
approach is a hypothetical perspective to potential future changes in
the risk factor(s). Such sensitivity tests lack historical and economic
content which limits its usefulness for longer-term risk management
decisions. Sensitivity tests can also examine historical movements in a
number of financial parameters. Historical movements in parameters can
be based on worst case movements over a set historical period (e.g., the
worst change in interest rates, equity prices and currencies over the
past 10 years). Alternatively, actual market correlations between
various factors may be analyzed over a set period of time to determine
the movement in factors that would have resulted in the largest loss for
the current portfolio. In sensitivity stress tests, the source of the
shock is not identified and the time horizon for sensitivity tests is
generally shorter, often
instantaneous, unlike scenario tests.
See my glossary at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#StressTest
"SEC Gives Firms More Leeway In Pricing Asset-Backed Issues," by Judith
Burns, The Wall Street Journal, March 31, 2008; Page C7 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120692976040976073.html?mod=todays_us_money_and_investing
Chief financial officers of public companies
received new guidance Friday from the Securities and Exchange Commission,
giving firms more leeway to value asset-backed securities in cases where
market prices or other relevant pricing information cannot be obtained.
Public companies may use "unobservable inputs" to
value asset-backed securities, but only when actual market prices or
relevant observable inputs are not available, according to a letter from SEC
staff accountants that will be sent to financial chiefs of public companies
holding significant amounts of asset-backed securities.
Firms that rely on "unobservable inputs" to value
illiquid asset-backed securities must determine if that would have a
material impact on their financial results, according to the letter. In such
cases, the letter said, corporate results must include written explanations
of how a firm determined the value of its asset-backed assets and
liabilities, as well as how those values might change and what impact that
would have on operations, liquidity and capital. SEC staffers said such
explanations should appear in quarterly and annual results.
Additionally, the SEC said public companies might
need to provide more disclosure on risky, "Level 3" assets and liabilities,
including changes that increased or decreased the amount of assets in that
category. It also said firms might need to detail the nature and type of
assets underlying asset-backed securities, such as riskier subprime home
mortgages or home-equity lines of credit, along with credit ratings on such
securities and changes or potential changes to those ratings.
My threads on fair value accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
My free tutorials on FAS 133 and IAS 39 are linked at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm
My FAS 133 and IAS 39 glossary is at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm
You can find quite a few interesting problems and answers about embedded
derivatives in my exam material at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/ExamMaterial/PracticeQuestions/
"FAS 157: The FASB's Prelude and Fugue on Fair Value of Liabilities," by Tom
Selling, The Accounting Onion, May 4, 2008 ---
http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/05/fas-157-the-fas.html
FAS 157 on fair value measurements was
supposed to provide comprehensive guidance for determining the fair
value of pretty much any asset or liability. Yet, almost two
years after its initial publication, and well after companies have had
to apply the standard to certain accounts,
CFO.com reports
that the FASB is still making up some of its rules on the fly, and
having a tough slog to boot. The problem described in the article has
immediate consequences for derivative financial instruments that are
classified as liabilities, but it could eventually affect the
measurement of many other liability accounts as fair value measurement
becomes more broadly applied:
"At an unusually heated FASB meeting last
week [no minutes published on the FASB's website yet], for instance,
the members debated how companies should estimate the market value
of liabilities when there's no actual market on which to base the
estimate.
During one point in the discussion, which
concerned a proposed guidance by FASB's staff on how to mark
liabilities to market under 157, chairman Robert Herz seemed, to
member Leslie Seidman, to be contemplating an overhaul of the
brand-new standard itself. Matters got so confusing that the board
ordered its staff to go back and summarize the members' positions so
that they could understand what they themselves had said.
At issue was the question of how to measure
the fair value of a liability for "which there is little, if any,
market activity," according to 157. The standard defines fair value
as "the price that would be received ... to transfer a liability in
an orderly transaction between market participants at the
measurement date." The question that FASB struggled with was: How do
you determine the fair value of a liability that can only be
settled, rather than sold?
...Often, for instance, when a company
borrows money, it can't transfer its obligation to another party
without an agreement from the bank. Or a market may not exist for
transferring such liabilities."
It's a mess that the FASB has gotten itself
into for two related reasons. The first is that the problems now being
addressed are significant, and they were known long before FAS 157 was
let out the door. The second is that FAS 157 is fundamentally flawed in
its approach to fair value measurement of liabilities. The solution, as
I am about to describe, seems to me to be surprisingly simple.
This particular flaw in FAS 157 (see my
previous
post on many others) occurs in paragraph 5:
"Fair value is the price that would be
received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability
[italics supplied] in an orderly transaction between market
participants at the measurement date."
For every liability there is a counter party
that holds an asset, and the economic value of the liability must be
equal to the economic value of the asset. These are basic economic
principles, which are not acknowledged in FAS 157. If they
were acknowledged, there would be no need for the phrase "or paid to
transfer a liability." That's because the value of any
liability -- even one that cannot be transferred --must equal
the value of the counter party's asset, which, perforce, can always
be transferred. Even though the evidence directly available to value
the liability may be scant, the asset value might even be quoted in the
newspaper; the non-transferability restriction on the debtor is just one
more valuation parameter from the viewpoint of the creditor.
If you need further convincing that the
solution to the problem of valuing any liability is to value
the counter party's asset, let's consider an even thornier
non-transferable liability that the FASB briefly considered and then
dropped like a hot potato: contingent
environmental liabilities. My understanding of federal environmental
law is that the cleanup liability of a "potentially responsible party"
is joint and several. No other party can assume the liability, so the
only way out from under it is to settle with the government. Although I
am not aware that the government has done this, it is theoretically
possible for the government to transfer its contingent receivable to a
third party. Is the contingent receivable difficult to value? Yes, but
certainly no harder than many of the complex, illiquid derivatives that
are roiling the global economy. (And by the way, I recall seeing the
issue of the fair value of contingent environmental liabilities posted
on the FASB's website during the project phase of FAS 157. The Board
expressed a tentative conclusion, but it soon disappeared mysteriously,
and without explanation. I have searched Board minutes, and have come
up with nothing. If anyone has any further information on this that
they would like to share, please contact me!)
Because my solution to liability valuation is
so simple (attention: CIFiR - SEC Advisory Committee on Improvements to
Financial Reporting) and obvious, I can't help but fear I have
overlooked something. If that is indeed the case, I hope a reader of
this post will take the time to point it out, and I will gladly issue a
mea culpa forthwith. Yet, I derive some measure of comfort
(and optimism) by an entry in the
minutes of an FASB meeting (11/14/07) where
Bob Herz stated that he disagrees with the measurement principles for
liabilities in SFAS 157.
Who knows, maybe Bob and I are thinking along
the same lines? That gives me hope for the future. But, I have to
express my disappointment that liabilities were not dealt with in a
comprehensive way before SFAS 157 was issued. There is much to be said
for getting it right the first time.
Jensen Comment
Tom wrote the following:
For every liability there is a counter
party that holds an asset, and the economic value of the
liability must be equal to the economic value of the asset.
These are basic economic principles, which are not acknowledged in
FAS 157. If they were acknowledged, there would be no
need for the phrase "or paid to transfer a liability." That's
because the value of any liability -- even one that
cannot be transferred --must equal the value of the counter
party's asset, which, perforce, can always be transferred.
Even though the evidence directly available to value the liability
may be scant, the asset value might even be quoted in the newspaper;
the non-transferability restriction on the debtor is just one more
valuation parameter from the viewpoint of the creditor.
For one party the Pacioli equation A=L+E is tautological since E is
the sink hole makes everything balance. But it does it necessarily hold
that A(Bank) = L(Homeowner) for 30 years after Bank loaned Homeowner $1
million in cash in a jumbo 30-year mortgage for a home on June 16, 2006.
In fact it may well be that A(Bank) = L(Homeowner) did not even hold on
the June 16, 2006 since Bank and Homeowner probably had different
opportunity costs of capital. Most likely Bank charged for a risk
premium and holds the asset (the mortgage note) with values that vary
from day-to-day with Homeowner's credit rating and with resale value of
the home itself that is the collateral on the loan.
In conventional mortgages the Bank can transfer the asset (mortgage
note) wholesale to another buyer such as Fannie Mae. But Homeowner
cannot transfer the liability since most conventional mortgages now have
a clause that says the mortgage must be prepaid if Homeowner sells the
house. What Fannie will pay Bank for the asset (mortgage note) wholesale
varies with market conditions in the wholesale market for mortgages.
At some point in time Homeowner can go back to Bank and ask to
refinance the mortgage (which is tantamount to prepaying the original
mortgage), but Homeowner must refinance in the retail market. Bank can
deal in both the wholesale and retail markets for mortgages whereas
Homeowner is confined to the retail market. The two markets are highly
correlated like they are in blue book car markets, but they are not
perfectly correlated. Hence I don't think Tom can assume that Bank's
transferable asset is equal in value to Homeowner's
non-transferrable liability. Homeowner does not have access to all
the buyers and sellers in the wholesale market.
Then there is the other problem that exploded in both the Savings &
Loan crisis of the 1980s and the subprime crisis of 2008. In both
scandals crooked appraisers overstated the lending value of real estate
way beyond realistic selling prices. Suppose Homeowner got the $1
million mortgage on a house that realistically only had a $500,000 value
on June 16, 2006 and has sunk to a fair value of only $200,000 on June
16, 2008. How would FAS 157 be applied to a non-transferrable mortgage
liability? What is the value of L(Homeowner) on June 16, 2008? Is it
necessarily the same as the A(Bank) or A(Fannie) value of the asset held
by the current holder of the mortgage investment?
The fair value of the L(Homeowner) liability to Homeowner is affected
by many factors, one of which is the cost of having a lower credit
rating simply by turning the property over the Bank. Homeowner may have
troubles even getting another loan for several years, and Former
Homeowner may have to pay premium rates to get another loan. But the
value of the collateral (the house now valued at only $200,000) is far
less than the unpaid balance on the loan of nearly $1 million since the(
principal amount owing does not decline much in the first two years of a
30-year mortgage). In this instance I don't think Professor Selling can
assume that L(Homeowner) = A(Bank) on June 16, 2008. In fact I think the
two values are vastly different.
And Bank (or Fannie Mae) is very sad since what they paid out for
homeowners' mortgages is still way in excess of what the combined
collateral is really worth in 2008. Fortunately many homeowners are
still making payments even though their property is now probably worth
less than the discounted cash flows of their remaining mortgage
payments.
The problem with FAS 157 is that it cannot make a silk purse out a
sow's ear when valuing assets and liabilities for which markets are
non-existent, including surrogate markets. There is also a problem of
dynamics of markets. FAS 157 wants reported values of L(Homeowner) and
A(Bank) on June 16, 2008. Homeowner may continue to make payments on a
$1 million 30-year mortgage for property that is now worth only $200,000
because of transactions costs (including adverse credit ratings) today
of walking away from the mortgage and because of hope that this is only
a market bleep before the value rises back up in value to more than $1
million in anticipation of soaring inflation.
There is always the feeling that markets will bounce back. And there
are what the mathematicians call non-convexities caused by transactions
costs that are real but undeterminable when the cost of lowered credit
ratings are factored into transactions costs. For years, accounting
theorists criticized economists for unrealistic assumptions of
rationality and non-convexities in their models. Economic value was
deemed by accountants as unrealistic due to unknown future cash flows,
unknown future market conditions at affect prices and interest rates,
and unknown future legislative actions and taxes. Now FAS 157 and 159
along with IAS 39 on the international scene wants to turn accountants
into economists.
Valuation is an art rather than a science. Accountants and economists
who are teaching free cash flow and residual income valuation models
might as well be teaching astrology to FAS 157 implementers. It all
boils down to attaching precise-looking number tags to cloud movements
that are beyond anybody's control.
Why do bankers resist expanding FAS
159 into required accounting for all financial instruments?
Misleading Financial Statements:
Bankers Refusing to Recognize and Shed "Zombie Loans"
One worrying lesson for bankers and regulators
everywhere to bear in mind is post-bubble Japan. In the 1990s its leading
bankers not only hung onto their jobs; they also refused to recognise and
shed bad debts, in effect keeping “zombie” loans on their books. That is one
reason why the country's economy stagnated for so long. The quicker bankers
are to recognise their losses, to sell assets that they are hoarding in the
vain hope that prices will recover, and to make markets in such assets for
their clients, the quicker the banking system will get back on its feet.
The Economist, as quoted in Jim Mahar's blog on November 10, 2007 ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
After the Collapse of Loan Markets
Banks are Belatedly Taking Enormous Write Downs
BTW one of the important stories that are coming
out is the fact that this is affecting all tranches of the debt as even AAA
rated debt is being marked down (which is why the rating agencies are
concerned). The San Antonio Express News reminds us that conflicts of
interest exist here too.
Jime Mahar, November 10, 2007 ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
Jensen Comment
The FASB and the IASB are moving ever closer to fair value accounting for
financial instruments. FAS 159 made it an option in FAS 159. One of the main
reasons it's not required is the tremendous lobbying effort of the banking
industry. Although many excuses are given resisting fair value accounting
for financial instruments, I suspect that the main underlying reasons are
those "Zombie" loans that are overvalued at historical costs on current
financial statements.
Daniel Covitz and Paul Harrison of the
Federal Reserve Board found no evidence of credit agency conflicts of
interest problems of credit agencies, but thier study is dated in 2003 and
may not apply to the recent credit bubble and burst ---
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/feds/2003/200368/200368pap.pdf
In September 2007 some U.S. Senators
accused the rating agencies of conflicts of interest
"Senators accuse rating agencies of conflicts of interest in market
turmoil," Bloomberg News, September 26, 2007 ---
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/09/26/business/credit.php
Also see
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2007/05/rating-agencies-weak-link.html
Bob Jensen's Rotten to the Core threads are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
Three Articles from the American Bankers Association on Fair Value
Accounting (as of the end of 2007) ---
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/FairValue/AmericanBankersAssn/
Student Rap Video on FAS 159 ---
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hBoZTM8_cVw&feature=related
This link was forwarded by Denny Beresford, I think with his tongue in his
cheek. Denny knows that I consider FAS 159 to be rediculous.
Question
When is the purpose of reclassifying loans as "Held-to-Maturity" for purposes of
stabilizing earnings rather than a true strategy to hold those notes to
maturity, especially when the value of those notes is plunging daily? "Even
analysts think so. "If you thought the accounting for investments in debt and
equity securities was unnecessarily complex, the accounting for loans will make
your head spin,"
"Is Fair-Value Accounting Always Fair?" Matt A. Greenberg, The Wall Street
Journal, March 5, 2008; Page A15 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120468197325912303.html?mod=todays_us_page_one
Is Fair-Value Accounting Always Fair? March 5,
2008; Page A15 Regarding "Wave of Write-Offs Rattles Market" by David
Reilly (page one, March 1): Thirty years ago, no accounting principle
was more accepted than that assets are worth what they cost, absent
proof of a permanent impairment of value. When such impairment was
understood and confirmed, the carrying value was adjusted.
Today, I see the overzealous accounting
profession calling for long-term assets, those which the owners do not
intend to sell, nor have need to sell, being forced to mark such assets
to market on a regular basis. While this may make sense for equities,
where market values tend to reflect economic reality or assets which may
need to be sold in the normal course of operating the business, it makes
no sense for assets intended to be held to maturity. The marking of
long-term complex financial instruments where market values are
temporarily depressed and meaningless for the longer term is terribly
destructive. In many cases, the only market prices available are
distressed sellers or some thin index which is regularly shorted by
investment professionals.
These are not real values, and marking to these
prices causes unnecessary volatility and contractions in capital which
restrict the ability of financial institutions to operate and grow.
Perhaps the accounting profession is trying to overcompensate for its
failures in the Enron fiasco and other similar cases, and to prevent
lawsuits. Fair-value accounting, particularly for long-term complex
instruments that do not trade in liquid markets, is illogical and
destructive and should be re-examined immediately.
Jensen Comment
One problem here is bank's want it both ways. The want to classify
investments and loans as "held-to-maturity" (HTM) so that they can avoid
having to carry them at fair value such as allowed in FAS 115. However,
bands want to classify them as HTM but want to sell them when fair value
hits trigger points. Hence a lot of those "HTM" securities are not HTM after
all.
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on February
29, 2008
Banks Use Quirk as Leverage Over Brokers in Loan Fallout
by
David Reilly
The Wall Street Journal
Feb 27, 2008
Page: C1
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120407667879295385.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
TOPICS: Accounting,
Advanced Financial Accounting, Banking, Fair Value
Accounting, Investment Banking, Investments, Loan Loss
Allowance
SUMMARY: "Leveraged loans for buyouts were
originally made with the idea that banks and brokers
would quickly sell them to investors." That approach
proved impossible when markets froze in August 2007.
"Among banks, Citigroup and J.P. Morgan have the most at
stake, with $43 billion and $26.4 billion in exposures,
respectively....among brokers, Goldman has the biggest
leveraged-loan exposure, at $26 billion, followed by
Lehman Brothers...with $23.8 billion....By reclassifying
(to held-to-maturity) some of the loans they hold, banks
can avoid marking these loans to market, unlike
brokerages which have to price these assets" at current
market value at each balance sheet date. "J.P.
Morgan...Chief Executive James Dimon said during a
January conference call...[that] the bank reclassified
loans...because it believed that at current depressed
prices, some of its leveraged loans 'may be terrific
long-term assets to hold.' That said, the more favorable
accounting treatment doesn't hurt, either."
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Accounting for investments
versus loans is the main topic in the article. The
article refers to market value (fair value) measurement,
lower or cost-or-market and the cost method as applied
to held-to-maturity investments.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Three methods of valuing loans and investments --
fair value, lower of cost or market and cost basis --
are described in the article, without using these terms.
Summarize how each of these methods is described in the
article.
2.) Why do banks and investment brokerage houses face
different requirements in accounting for loans they have
offered in leveraged buyout transactions?
3.) How might a bank face fewer reported losses by using
the cost method of valuing loans than the fair value
method? In your answer, comment on the possibility that
the bank may have to report allowances for
uncollectibility of these loans.
4.) What is the significance of J.P. Morgan Chief
executive James Dimon's statement that "at current
depressed prices, some of its leveraged loans 'may be
terrific long-term assets to hold'?"
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
|
"Banks Use Quirk as Leverage Over Brokers in Loan Fallout," by David
Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, February 27, 2008; Page C1 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120407667879295385.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
When it comes to losses on "leveraged loans" --
a big source of worry for investors in financial firms -- banks may have
an advantage over their brokerage-house rivals in weathering the storm.
Thanks to a quirk in accounting rules, banks
such as J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. don't always have to book losses
immediately on those loans even as brokers like Goldman Sachs Group Inc.
are forced to take hits right away.
Leveraged loans -- used by companies, usually
with low credit ratings, and often to fund buyouts -- were originally
made with the idea that banks and brokers would quickly sell them to
investors. When markets froze in August, institutions found themselves
stuck with billions of these loans that they couldn't unload.
That led to losses last fall as financial firms
were forced in many cases to mark these loans down by about 5%. The
market for these loans is again struggling, and prices are falling
further -- in some cases to about, or even less than, 90 cents on the
dollar -- which will likely lead to another round of losses at financial
firms.
This makes it more likely some banks will look
to shield at least part of their holdings from the swings in market
prices. By reclassifying some of the loans they hold, banks can avoid
marking these loans to market, unlike brokerages, which have to price
these assets at whatever investors say they are worth.
This isn't to say that banks will be able to
entirely sidestep losses stemming from leveraged loans issued to fund
huge corporate buyouts. But any kind of shock absorber would be welcome,
given the depressed market conditions now.
Still, while the accounting peculiarity may
give banks an edge, it could also pose a danger to their investors,
analysts warn. That is because investors could be lulled into
complacency when it comes to the size and scope of the hits that the
banks may face.
Banks and brokers have nearly $200 billion in
leveraged-loan exposure. Given recent falls in market prices of these
loans, that could lead to $10 billion to $14 billion in write-downs,
Oppenheimer analyst Meredith Whitney estimated in a recent note.
Among banks, Citigroup and J.P. Morgan have the
most at stake, with $43 billion and $26.4 billion in exposures,
respectively, as of the end of last year. Among brokers, Goldman has the
biggest leveraged-loan exposure, at $26 billion, followed by Lehman
Brothers Holdings Inc. with $23.8 billion.
The fact that a bank and a broker holding the
same kind of loan could see very different effects highlights what some
analysts feel is a major flaw in the accounting for leveraged loans.
Brokers for years have argued that banks should also be required to
assess the values of all their financial assets using market prices.
The differing approaches also underscore that
even as the use of so-called market values cause some firms to quickly
recognize big losses -- even if there are growing questions about the
reliability of these values in frozen markets -- not every financial
player always has to measure up against this same yardstick.
Seem strange? Even analysts think so. "If you
thought the accounting for investments in debt and equity securities was
unnecessarily complex, the accounting for loans will make your head
spin," Credit Suisse accounting analyst David Zion wrote in a recent
research note looking at issues surrounding loans.
J.P. Morgan, for example, said last month that
it had reclassified about $5 billion of $26 billion in leveraged loans
it holds. J.P. Morgan declined to comment beyond what Chief Executive
James Dimon said during a January conference call. At that time, he said
the bank reclassified the loans this way because it believed that at
current depressed prices, some of its leveraged loans "may be terrific
long-term assets to hold."
That said, the more favorable accounting
treatment doesn't hurt, either. Here is how it works: Companies either
classify loans as being "held for sale" or as investments, sometimes
referred to as "holding to maturity." Loans held for sale are carried at
whichever is lower: the original cost or the current market value. That
is similar to "marking to market prices." Any losses are taken in the
current period.
But the value of loans held for investment
doesn't change with every uptick or downtick in the market. Instead,
such loans are said to be held at their cost, although they are
initially marked to market prices if a firm is reclassifying them from
held for sale.
The big benefit is that holding loans for
investment reduces volatility. Brokers like Goldman, Lehman, Morgan
Stanley or Merrill Lynch & Co., on the other hand, have to mark just
about everything they hold to market prices. So the firms -- which
together have about $91 billion in leveraged-loan exposure, according to
Oppenheimer -- take losses right away.
This isn't to say banks completely avoid losses
on loans held for investment. Mr. Dimon said in the bank's conference
call that while it wouldn't mark the reclassified loans to market
prices, it would "have to build up proper loan-loss reserves against
those, and we would fully disclose that so there's no issue about what
that did to the company."
But in checking to see whether the value of a
held-for-investment loan is impaired, a bank would look to see if there
has been a change in the credit rating of an issuer, if the issuer has
fallen behind in interest payments or if it looks like a delinquency
could be looming.
A bank wouldn't necessarily have to consider
what the loan would fetch if sold in the market today, analysts say.
That view, which reflects market perceptions, is what is causing big
losses at many firms today. So looking only to credit quality could
prove to be advantageous.
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review, March 7,
2008
Wave of Write-Offs Rattles Market
by
David Reilly
The Wall Street Journal
Mar 01, 2008
Page: A1
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120432957846104273.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
TOPICS: Accounting,
Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards
Board, Financial Analysis, Financial Reporting,
Financial Statement Analysis, Standard Setting
SUMMARY: "The massive write-downs that financial
firms are posting have begun to spur a backlash among
some investors and executives, who are blaming
accounting rules for exaggerating the losses and are
seeking new, more forgiving ways to value investments."
The article quotes comments by Ben Bernancke to the
Senate banking committee saying that he doesn't know how
to "fix" this accounting issue and that accountants must
"make the best judgment they can." Also quoted are
comments by FASB Chairman, Bob Herz.
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Use the article to discuss
the various influences on accounting standards setting:
Economic consequences of accounting choices, the
political pressures that can arise, and the desire to
uphold qualitative characteristics in financial
reporting. The related article is a 'Letter to the
Editor' written by a Westport, CT, investment advisor
with approximately $230 million in assets under
management.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Define the concept of "valuation" in accounting, the
historical cost basis, and fair-value accounting.
Provide examples in which each of these bases of
reporting is used in financial statements.
2.) How is fair value accounting potentially
contributing to the effects of losses reported by
financial institutions?
3.) In responding to questions by the Senate banking
committee, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke says he
does not know how to fix accounting issues arising from
reporting on a fair-value basis and that "..accountants
need to make the best judgment they can." What
accountants are responsible for making judgments about
whether to use the historical cost basis or fair-value
basis for accounting valuations?
4.) On what basis do accountants decide which is the
appropriate model for valuation in financial statements?
In your answer, define the conceptual framework in
financial accounting and reporting and it's associated
qualitative characteristics.
5.) What are the economic consequences of accounting
policy choice? List one argument made in the main
article or the related one which exemplifies this
concern with the economic consequences of accounting
policy choice.
6.) FASB Chairman Bob Herz acknowledges "the difficulty
investors and companies are facing" but also argues that
the alternative to fair-value reporting is to pretend
"...that things aren't decreasing in value" and that
company managements at times like these would "... say
they think it's going to recover." Do you think that
historical cost reporting works in this fashion?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
|
"Wave of Write-Offs Rattles Market: Accounting Rules Blasted as Dow
Falls; A $600 Billion Toll?" by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal,
March 1, 2008; Page A1 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120432957846104273.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
The massive write-downs that financial firms
are posting have begun to spur a backlash among some investors and
executives, who are blaming accounting rules for exaggerating the losses
and are seeking new, more forgiving ways to value investments.
The rules -- which last made headlines back in
the Enron era -- require companies to value many of the securities they
hold at whatever price prevails in the market, no matter how sharply
those prices swing.
Some analysts and executives argue this
triggers a domino effect. The market falls, forcing banks to take
write-offs, pushing the market lower, causing more write-offs.
The rules' supporters, however, make a stark
counter-argument: They can help prevent the U.S. from suffering the kind
of malaise that gripped Japan in the 1990s -- as banks there sat on
mountains of dud loans for years without writing them down.
This debate gained new urgency Friday as the
Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 315 points, or 2.5%. Driving stocks
lower was insurance giant American International Group Inc.'s
announcement of an $11.1 billion write-down that led the firm to post a
$5.3 billion loss for the fourth quarter, the biggest loss in the firm's
89-year history.
Also rattling investors was a report by UBS
that said losses among financial institutions could top $600 billion as
the turmoil in global credit markets continues to unfold.
No one, including the chairman of the Federal
Reserve, Ben Bernanke, knows with certainty what would be a better
approach than using market prices for valuing holdings like these. "I
don't know how to fix it," Mr. Bernanke said during testimony Thursday
before the Senate banking committee. "I don't know what to do about it."
Mr. Bernanke added that "I think the
accountants need to make the best judgment they can."
Despite the grim developments, many investors
actually doubt that firms like AIG will suffer the full force of the
losses they are now booking. Instead, these investors argue that the
market has overreacted and will recover once the current panic subsides.
Indeed, Martin Sullivan, AIG's chief executive,
said Friday on the firm's conference call that he doesn't expect the
losses to be permanent. "We are obviously witnessing and living through
extraordinary market conditions," he said. "We are trying, as are many
others, to value very complex instruments."
Tumult also spread further in the normally
staid market for municipal bonds -- debt issued by states and
municipalities -- which is suffering one of its biggest crises in its
history. Several hedge funds were hit with big losses after betting
wrong on the direction of muni-bond prices, and as traders rushed to
sell and exit their positions, portions of the market effectively froze.
On Friday, muni-bond-prices fell for a 13th
straight day, pushing yields significantly higher. (Bond yields move in
the opposite direction as price.)
For hundreds of muni-bond issuers, ranging from
New York's Port Authority to the North Texas Tollway Authority, this
tumult could cause borrowing costs to soar. That's a particular problem
at a time when tax revenues are coming under strain from a slowing
economy.
AIG's argument that its write-downs were
"unrealized" -- in other words, they may never actually result in a true
charge to the company -- echoes points made by a number of other major
financial firms. It's a sore point because companies feel they are being
forced to take big financial hits on holdings that they have no
intention of actually selling at current prices.
The firms argue they are strong enough to
simply keep the holdings in their portfolios until the crisis passes.
Forcing companies to value securities based on what they would fetch if
sold today "is an attempt to apply liquidation accounting to a going
concern," said Charles Thayer of Chartwell Capital, a financial
advisory.
The market-value accounting approach is
"exaggerating" the market turmoil, leading to write-downs that are
"excessive," said Neal Soss, chief economist at Credit Suisse. "Many
people would take the view that price and ultimately value have
disconnected."
Even analysts who are generally supportive of
the market-value approach acknowledge it can make things tougher for
investors in the current environment. It "increases the volatility of
the accounts and it makes comparisons from quarter to quarter
difficult," said Jeremy Perler of RiskMetrics Group, a research and
strategy firm. "It certainly turns the world on end a little bit.
Alternative accounting strategies don't offer
much for markets to cling to. One alternative is to value a security
based on what the buyer originally paid for it. However, that risks
giving investors outdated information.
The use of pricing models that don't pay heed
to market values was discredited after Enron Corp. used them to book
phantom profits earlier this decade.
Enron, for example, would book a profit on a
contract to buy or sell energy years in the future based on its own
expectations of how much the contract would be worth over time. But
Enron never tried to gauge what others in the market might think the
contracts were worth.
As the Fed chairman acknowledged in his recent
Senate testimony, a move away from market values could in fact worsen
current market turmoil. "The risk on other side is that if you do too
much forbearance, or delay mark-to-market, that the suspicion will arise
among investors that you're hiding something," Mr. Bernanke said.
Buyers are already lacking trust and that has
been a reason they have balked at buying securities that were typically
seen as safe havens.
But these market seizures are what have made
market values so contentious. Robert Herz, chairman of the body that
sets the accounting rules governing the use of market values, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board, acknowledged the difficulty
investors and companies are facing.
"But you tell me what a better answer is," he
said. "Is just pretending that things aren't decreasing in value a
better answer? Should you just let everybody say they think it's going
to recover?"
Others who favor the use of market values say
that for all its imperfections, it also imposes discipline on companies.
"It forces you to realistically confront what's happening to you much
quicker, so it plays a useful purpose," said Sen. Jack Reed (D., R.I.),
a member of the Senate banking committee.
Japan stands out as an example of how ignoring
problems can lead to years-long stagnation. "Look at Japan, where they
ignored write-downs at all their financial institutions when loans went
bad," said Jeff Mahoney, general counsel at the Council for
Institutional Investors.
In addition, companies don't always have the
luxury of waiting out a storm until assets recover the long-term value
that executives believe exists. Sometimes market crises force their
hands. Freddie Mac, for instance, sold $45 billion of assets last fall
to help the company meet regulatory capital requirements.
Investors can no longer take a firm's survival
for granted in today's environment. Fed Chairman Bernanke in his
testimony noted that it wouldn't be surprising if there were some bank
failures due to the current market crisis.
February 22, 2008 message from Tom Selling
[tom.selling@GROVESITE.COM]
On cost
(replacement) versus (fair) value, Walter Teets and I have written a
paper that we recently submitted to FAJ. The basic thrust is that
cost can be associated with principles-based accounting, and value
cannot. That’s why FAS 157 is rules based and filled with
anomalies. You can read the working paper
here,
or read my blog post
that it was based on
here. Comments,
especially on the working paper, would be much appreciated.
Thomas I. Selling PhD, CPA
602-228-4871 (M)
602-952-9880 x205 (O)
Website:
www.tomselling.com
Weblog:
www.accountingonion.com
Company:
www.grovesite.com
Question
What do CFO's think of Robert Herz's (Chairman of the FASB) radical proposed
format for financial statements that have more disaggregated financial
information and no aggregated bottom line?
As we moved to fair value accounting for
derivative financial instruments (FAS 133) and financial instruments (FAS
157 and 159) coupled with the expected new thrust for fair value reporting
on the international scene, we have filled the income statement and the
retained earnings statement with more and more instability due to
fluctuating unrealized gains and losses.
I have reservations about fair value
reporting ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
But if we must live with more and more fair
value reporting, the bottom line has to go. But CFOs are reluctant to give
up the bottom line even if it may distort investing decisions and
compensation contracts tied to bottom-line reporting.
Before reading the article below you may want to first read about
radical new changes on the way ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#ChangesOnTheWay
- "A New Vision for
Accounting: Robert Herz and FASB are preparing
a radical new format for financial, CFO Magazine,
by Alix Stuart, February 2008, pp. 49-53 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/10597001/c_10711055?f=home_todayinfinance
Last summer, McCormick & Co. controller Ken Kelly
sliced and diced his financial statements in ways he
had never before imagined. For starters, he split
the income statement for the $2.7 billion
international spice-and-food company into the three
categories of the cash-flow statement: operating,
financing, and investing. He extracted discontinued
operations and income taxes and placed them in
separate categories, instead of peppering them
throughout the other results. He created a new form
to distinguish which changes in income were due to
fair value and which to cash. One traditional
ingredient, meanwhile, was conspicuous by its
absence: net income.
Kelly wasn't just indulging a whim. Ahead of a
public release of a draft of the Financial
Accounting Standards Board's new format for
financial statements in the second quarter of 2008,
the McCormick controller was trying out the
financial statements of the future, a radical
departure from current conventions. FASB's so-called
financial statement presentation project is
ostensibly concerned only with the form, or the
"face," of financial statements, but it's quickly
becoming clear that it will change and expand their
content as well. "This is a complete redefinition of
the financial statements as we know them," says John
Hepp, a former FASB project manager and now senior
manager at Grant Thornton.
Some of the major changes under discussion:
reconfiguring the balance sheet and the income
statement to follow the three categories of the
cash-flow statement, requiring companies to report
cash flows with the little-used direct method; and
introducing a new reconciliation schedule that would
highlight fair-value changes. Companies will also
likely have to report more about their segments,
possibly down to the same level of detail as they
currently report for the consolidated statements.
Meanwhile, net income is slated to disappear
completely from GAAP financial statements, with no
obvious replacement for such commonly used metrics
as earnings per share.
FASB, working with the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB) and accounting standards
boards in the United Kingdom and Japan, continues to
work out the precise details of the new financial
statements. "We are trying to set the stage for what
financial statements will look like across the globe
for decades to come," says FASB chairman Robert Herz.
(Examples of the proposed new financial statements
can be viewed at FASB's Website.) If the
standard-setters stay their course, CFOs and
controllers at every publicly traded company in the
world could be following Kelly's lead as soon as
2010.
It's too early to predict with confidence which
changes will ultimately stick. But the mock-up
exercise has made Kelly wary. He considers the
direct cash-flow statement and reconciliation
schedule among the "worst aspects" of the
forthcoming proposal, and expects they would require
"draconian exercises" from his finance staff, he
says. And he questions what would result from the
additional details: "If all of a sudden your income
statement has 125 lines instead of 25, is that
presentation more clarifying, or more confusing?"
Other financial executives share Kelly's skepticism.
In a December CFO survey of more than 200 finance
executives, only 17 percent said the changes would
offer any benefits to their companies or investors
(see "Keep the Bottom Line" at the end of this
article). Even some who endorsed the basic aim of
the project and like the idea of standardizing
categories across the three major financial
statements were only cautiously optimistic. "It may
be OK, or it may be excessive." says David Rickard,
CFO of CVS/Caremark. "The devil will be in the
details."
Net Loss From the outset, corporate financial
officers have been ambivalent about FASB's seven
year-old project, which was originally launched to
address concerns that net income was losing
relevance amid a proliferation of pro forma numbers.
Back in 2001, Financial Executives International
"strongly opposed" it, while executives at Philip
Morris, Exxon Mobil, Sears Roebuck, and Microsoft
protested to FASB as well.
(Critics then and now point out that FASB will have
little control over pro forma reporting no matter
what it does. Indeed, nearly 60 percent of
respondents to CFO's survey said they would continue
to report pro forma numbers after the new format is
introduced.)
Given the project's starting point, it's not
surprising that current drafts of the future income
statement omit net income. Right now that's by
default, since income taxes are recorded in a
separate section. But there is a big push among some
board members to make a more fundamental change to
eliminate net income by design, and promote business
income (income from operations) as the preferred
basis for investment metrics.
"If net income stays, it would be a sign that we
failed," says Don Young, a FASB board member. In his
mind, the project is not merely about getting rid of
net income, but rather about capturing all
income-related information in a single line
(including such volatile items as gains and losses
on cash-flow hedges, available-for-sale securities,
and foreign-exchange translations) rather than
footnoting them in other comprehensive income (OCI)
as they are now. "All changes in net assets and
liabilities should be included," says Young. "Why
should the income statement be incomplete?" He
predicts that the new subtotals, namely business
income, will present "a much clearer picture of
what's going on."
Board member Thomas Linsmeier agrees. "The rationale
for segregating those items [in OCI] is not
necessarily obvious, other than the fact that
management doesn't want to be held accountable for
them in the current period," he says.
Whether for self-serving or practical reasons,
finance chiefs are rallying behind net income.
Nearly 70 percent of those polled by CFO in December
said it should stay. "I understand their theories
that it's not the be-all and end-all measure that
it's put up to be, but it is a measure everyone is
familiar with, and sophisticated users can adjust
from there," says Kelly. Adds Rickard: "They're
treating [net income] as if it's the scourge of the
earth, which to me is silly. I think the logical
conclusion is to make other things available, rather
than hiding the one thing people find most useful."
. . .

Bob Jensen's threads on
this proposed "radical change" in financial reporting
are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#ChangesOnTheWay
Jensen Comment
As we moved to fair value accounting for derivative
financial instruments (FAS 133) and financial
instruments (FAS 157 and 159) coupled with the expected
new thrust for fair value reporting on the international
scene, we have filled the income statement and the
retained earnings statement with more and more
instability due to fluctuating unrealized gains and
losses.
I have reservations
about fair value reporting ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
But if we must live with
more and more fair value reporting, the bottom line has
to go. But CFOs are reluctant to give up the bottom line
even if it may distort investing decisions and
compensation contracts tied to bottom-line reporting.
Bob Jensen's threads on the radical new changes on
the way ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#ChangesOnTheWay
Question
Should your paycheck be impacted contractually by FAS 133?
I was contacted by the representative of a
major and highly reputable transportation company union concerning
possible manipulation of FAS 133 accounting (one of the many tools for
creative accounting) for purposes of lowering compensation payments to
employees. He wanted to engage me on a consulting basis to examine a
series of financial statements of the company. It would be great if I
could inspire some public debate on the following issue. The message
below follows an earlier message to XXXXX concerning how hedging
ineffectiveness works under FAS 133 accounting rules ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#Ineffectiveness
_________________
Hi XXXXX,
You wrote:
“Does the $502 million hedging ineffectiveness pique your interest?”
My answer is most
definitely yes since it fits into some research that I am doing at
the moment. But the answers cannot be obtained from financial
statements. Financial statements are (1) too aggregated (across
multiple derivative hedging contracts) and (2) snapshots at
particular points in time. Answers lie in tracing each contract
individually (or at least a sampling of individual contracts) from
inception to settlement. Results of effectiveness testing throughout
the life of each hedging contract must be examined (on a sampling
basis).
Recall that there
were enormous scandals concerning financial instruments derivatives
that led up to FAS 133 and IAS 39. See
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds
The SEC pressured the FASB to come up with a new standard that would
overcome the problem of so much unbooked financial liability risk
due to derivative financial instruments. FAS 133 and IAS 39 got
complicated when standard setters tried to book the derivative
assets and liabilities on the balance sheet without impacting
current earnings for qualified effective hedges of financial risk.
When the FASB
issued FAS 133, The FASB and the SEC were concerned about unbooked
financial risk of every active derivative contract if the contract
was settled on the interim balance sheet date. When a contract like
an option is valued on a balance sheet date, its premature
settlement value that day may well be deemed ineffective relative to
the value of the hedged item. The reason is that derivative
contracts are traded in different markets (usually more speculative
markets) than commodities markets themselves (where buyers actually
use the commodities). But the hedging contracts deemed ineffective
on interim dates may not be ineffective at all across the long haul.
Usually they are perfectly effective on hedging maturity dates.
Temporal
ineffectiveness more often than not works itself out such that all
those gains and losses due to hedging ineffectiveness on particular
interim dates exactly wash out such there is no ultimate cash flow
gain or loss when the contracts are settled at maturity dates. I
attached an Excel workbook that explains how some commodities hedges
work out over time. The Graphing.xls file can also be downloaded
from
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/FAS133OtherExcelFiles/
Note in particular the “Hedges” spreadsheet in that file. These
explain the outcomes at the settlement maturity dates that yield
perfect hedges. But at any date before maturity (not pictured in the
graphs), the hedges may not be perfect if settled prematurely on
interim balance sheet dates.
I illustrate the
accounting for ineffective interim hedges in both the 03forfut.pps
and 05options.ppt PowerPoint files at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/JensenPowerPoint/
The hedges may deemed ineffective under FAS 133 at interim balance
sheet dates with gains and losses posted to current earnings.
However, over time the gains and losses perfectly offset such that
the hedges are perfectly effective when they are settled at maturity
dates.
The real problem
with FAS 133 is that compensation contracts are generally tied to
particular balance sheet dates where interim hedging contracts may
be deemed ineffective and thereby affect paychecks. But some of
those FAS 133 interim gains and losses may in fact never be realized
in cash over the life of the each commodity hedging contract.
What has to happen
is for management to be very up front about how FAS 133 and other
accounting standards may give rise to artificial gains and losses
that are never realized unless the hedging contracts are settled
prematurely on balance sheet dates. Compensation contracts should be
hammered out with that thought in mind rather than blindly basing
compensation contracts on bottom-line earnings that are mixtures of
apples, oranges, toads, and nails due to accounting standards.
Of course
management is caught in a bind because investors follow bottom-line
as the main indicator of performance of a company. The FASB
recognizes this problem and is now trying to work out a new standard
that will eliminate bottom-line reporting. The idea will be to
provide information for analysts to derive alternative bottom-line
numbers based upon what they want included and excluded in that
bottom line. XBRL may indeed make this much easier for investors and
analysts ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm
If I were working
out a compensation contract based on accounting numbers, I would
probably exclude FAS 133 unrealized gains and losses.
In any case, back
to your original question. I would love to work with management to
track a sampling of fuel price hedging contracts from beginning to
end. I would like to see what effectiveness tests were run on each
reporting date and how gains and losses offset over the life of each
examined contract. But this type of study cannot be run on
aggregated financial statements.
If I can study
some of those individual hedging contracts over time I would be most
interested. It will take your clout with management, however, to get
me this data. I have such high priors on the integrity of your
company's management that I seriously doubt that there is any
intentional manipulation going on witth FAS 133 implementation.
Rather I suspect that management is just trying to adhere as closely
as possible with FAS 133 rules. What I would like to do is help
enlighten the world about the bad things FAS 133 can do with
compensation contracts and investment decisions by users of
statements who really do not understand the temporal impacts of FAS
133 on bottom-line earnings.
I fear that my study would, however,
be mostly one of academic interest that I can report to the public.
Only an inside whistleblower could pinpoint hanky-pank within a
company, and I seriously doubt that your company is engaged in
disreputable FAS 133 hanky-pank beyond that of possibly not fully
explaining to unions how FAS 133 losses in general may be phantom
losses over the long haul.
Bob Jensen
Questions
How are auditors dealing with fair market value accounting and credit market
issues?
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on October
19, 2007
With New, United Voice, Auditors Stand Ground on How to
Treat Crunch
by
David Reilly
The Wall Street Journal
Oct 17, 2007
Page: C1
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Audit
Quality, Auditing, Auditing Services, Auditor Independence,
Auditor/Client Disagreements, Banking, Fair Value Accounting
SUMMARY: The
article discusses three papers issued by the Center for
Audit Quality on the recent issues in credit markets. The
topics included the use of market prices for hard-to-trade
securities and issues of banks' exposure to losses in
off-balance-sheet entities. Organization of the Center for
Audit Quality is discussed, along with reaction to the
purpose of this entity from Lynn Turner, former Chief
Accountant at the SEC, and an academic researcher at the
University of Tennessee, Joseph Carcello.
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: The article may be used to discuss the
current credit market issues in an auditing class as well as
a financial reporting class.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Based on discussions in the article and on information
at its web site (see http://thecaq.aicpa.org/) discuss the
purpose and organization of the Center for Audit Quality.
2.) What is self-regulation of the auditing profession? When
did auditors lose the ability to self-regulate?
3.) Some reactions described in this article are positive
about the role that is being played by the Center for Audit
Quality, while others are negative. Which view do you hold?
Support your position.
4.) Summarize concerns with the complexity of financial
reporting guidance in the U.S. How might the work from the
Center for Audit Quality contribute to that complexity? How
might its work alleviate the issue of complexity in
reporting standards?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
RELATED
ARTICLES:
Auditors to Street: Use Market Price
by David Reilly and Randall Smith
The
Wall Street Journal
Sep 18, 2007
Page: C2
|
Also see
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/FairValue/
May 17, 2006 message from Peter Walton
I would like to take this opportunity to let
you know about a forthcoming book from Routledge:
The Routledge Companion to Fair Value and
Financial Reporting ---
Click Here
Edited by Peter Walton
May 2007: 246x174: 406pp
Hb: 978-0-415-42356-4: £95.00 $170.00
Jensen Comment
Even though I have a paper published in this book, I will receive no
compensation from sales of the book. And since I'm retired, lines on a
resume no longer matter.
A New Type of Intangible Investment (sort of not yet legal in the U.S.)
--- Litigation
How should it be booked and carried in financial statements?
I say "sort of" since this intangible asset might be buried (as Purchased
Goodwill") in acquisition prices when firms are purchased purchased or merged.
The notion of litigation as a separate asset class
is a novel one. It's hard to imagine fund managers one day allotting a bit of
their portfolio to third-party lawsuits, alongside shares, bonds, property and
hedge funds. But some wealthy investors are starting to dabble in lawsuit
investment, bankrolling some or all of the heavy upfront costs in return for a
share of the damages in the event of a win. The London-managed hedge fund MKM
Longboat last month revealed plans to invest $100million (£50.5million) to
finance European lawsuits. Today a new company, Juridica, floats on AIM, having
raised £80million to make litigation bets.
"The law is now an asset class," The London Times, December 21, 2007 ---
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/columnists/article3080766.ece
Jensen Comment
Under U.S. GAAP, intangible assets are generally booked only when purchased and
are not conducive to fair value accounting afterwards. Probably the most serious
problem in both accounting theory and practice is unbooked value (and in many
cases undisclosed) of intangible assets and liabilities. Do the values of human
capital and knowledge capital ring a bell? Does the cost retraining the world's
workforce to use Office software other than Microsoft Office (Word, Excel,
PowerPoint, etc.) ring a bell?
Contingent liabilities (particularly pending lawsuits) are problematic until
the amount of the liability is both reasonably measurable and highly probable.
Until now, contingent litigation assets were not investment assets. Contingent
liabilities were booked as current or past expenses. Now purchased litigation
assets having future value? Horrors!
In the past when a company purchased another company, some of the "goodwill"
value above and beyond the traceable value to net tangible assets could easily
have been the value of future litigation such as when Blackboard acquired WebCT
and WebCT's patents on online education software. Patents and Copyrights may
have value with respect to fending off future competition.
But patents and copyrights may also have value in future litigation regarding
past infringements. Now hedge funds might invest in bringing litigation to
fruition.
Intangible assets and liabilities are, and will forever remain, the largest
problem in accounting theory and practice! In some cases, such as Microsoft
Corporation, booked assets are so miniscule relative to unbooked intangible
assets that the balance sheets are virtually a bad joke.
An enormous problem, besides the fact that current value of intangibles
cannot be counted, current value can change by enormous magnitudes overnight as
new discoveries are made and new legislation is passed, to say nothing of court
decisions. Tangible asset values can also change, but in general they are not as
volatile.
December 25, 2007 reply from Dennis Beresford
[dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]
Bob,
SFAS 141R (available on the FASB web site)
substantially changes the accounting for both contingent assets and
liabilities in connection with business combinations. In fact, 141R coupled
with SFAS 160 on noncontrolling interests makes major changes to both the
accounting for business combinations and the accounting for consolidation
procedures. While the new rules can't be applied until 2009, anyone teaching
advanced accounting or where ever else these topics are covered should throw
out their old lesson plans and be prepared to enter into an entirely new
world of accounting - not for the better in my humble opinion.
By the way, another interesting thing to read on
the FASB web site is the proposal to reduce the size of the FASB and make
some other changes to improve the standard-setting process. We celebrated
our family Christmas a few days ago because of travel plans and I'm working
on my comment letter to the Financial Accounting Foundation today.
Merry Christmas!
Denny
December 25, 2007 reply from Amy Dunbar
[Amy.Dunbar@BUSINESS.UCONN.EDU]
What I found interesting about 141R is the
discussion in the appendices that showed both the FASB and IASB views and
how the Boards reached convergence.
141R also added a couple paragraphs to FIN 48 that
result in goodwill no longer being adjusted if the contingent tax liability
is increased or decreased. Instead the DR is to tax expense, which makes a
lot more sense to me. If I read the statement correctly, the purchased
assets and liabilities are stated at fair value under a recognition, then
measurement principle. Taxes are exempt from those two principles; instead
FAS 109/FIN 48 apply. What I couldn't tell is if the purchaser still has up
to one year (the maximum measurement period) to get the tax contingent
liability right before the DR goes to tax expense. Can anyone help me?
Amy Dunbar
UConn
From the AccountingWeb on December 27, 2007 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/blogs/eva_lang_blog.html
On December 4, 2007, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board issued FASB Statements No. 141 (revised 2007), Business
Combinations. The new standard requires the acquiring entity in a business
combination to recognize all (and only) the assets acquired and liabilities
assumed in the transaction; establishes the acquisition-date fair value as
the measurement objective for all assets acquired and liabilities assumed;
and requires the acquirer to disclose to investors and other users all of
the information they need to evaluate and understand the nature and
financial effect of the business combination. The revision of 141 is part of
the FASB's push toward "fair value," or mark-to market accounting.
Financial Week (December 10, 2007) reports
that Dennis Beresford, a former FASB chairman now serving on a Securities
and Exchange Commission advisory committee that is studying the U.S.
financial reporting system says “The rules will be difficult to apply and
will require companies and analysts to relearn a lot of things.” The article
goes on to say that the revisions to 141 “essentially extend the fair-value
requirements to new areas. That will increase the valuation work required of
corporate finance departments, and in some cases jack up the volatility of
reported earnings as various assets and liabilities are marked to market.”
Jensen Comment
You can download FAS 141(R) from
http://www.fasb.org/st/index.shtml#fas160
December 31, 2007 reply from Gerald Trites
[gtrites@ZORBA.CA]
Warren Buffett referred to "mark to market" as
"mark to myth", a comment that I think is right on the mark.
Bob Jensen's threads on intangible/contingency asset asset and liability
accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes
Introduction to Fair Value Accounting
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at various other links:
I recently completed the first draft of a paper on fair value at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
Comments would be helpful.
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms
Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation, and Yield Curves
for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm
The "Unknown Professor's Financial Rounds Blog states the following on
September 21, 2007 ---
http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/
And They Say Accounting Doesn't Make Sense
As a person who's trained primarily in finance,
accounting rules sometimes look like they were designed by Monty Python.
Here's the latest installment - your company's credit rating drops, so
the market value of your liabilities fall. As a result, you show a
profit. This is what happened to some Wall Street firms recently. Read
the whole story
here. IMO, the best line in the
article is:
But Moody’s Investors Service said buyers
should beware of gains booked when brokers mark down their own debt
liabilities. “Moody’s does not consider such gains to be
high-quality, core earnings,” it said in a report issued Friday.
Ya think?
This is why we make all our Finance students
take four accounting classes before they graduate. That way, they'll see
these things often enough that they won't break out laughing.
Question
Why am I not laughing? Is it because I taught accounting for 40 years?
Actually the fact that a lowered credit rating can lead to a realized
gain should make sense even to a finance professor. Consider the following
scenario:
- I sell a bond and record a liability for $100,000 that matures in
ten years.
- My credit rating gets lowered the next day.
- I buy back the bond for $90,000 (the market value of the bond
declines because of my lowered credit rating)
- I've made a $10,000 cash profit in one day because of a lowered
credit rating
- I wonder if a finance professor can comprehend that this is a gain.
- I wonder if Moody's can understand that this is a very high quality
earnings since its cash in the bank.
Now what if I don't sell the bond but adopt the fair value accounting
option for financial instruments under FAS 159. I did not realize a cash
profit if I still owe $100,000 when the bond eventually matures. But the
reason I report an unrealized holding gain follows the same logic as if I
bought back the bond today. That's what the "fair value option" under FAS
159 is all about.
If Moody's does not treat unrealized holding gains and losses as
high-quality, core earnings, more power to them.
Finance students who've taken four courses in accounting may not laugh
because they understand why sometimes credit rating gains are high quality
and sometimes low quality will not laugh because they understand why. But
they may not understand why their finance professor is laughing.
Bob Jensen's tutorials on fair value accounting are at the following
two links:
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly
Review on October 5, 2007
Virtuous Losses
by WSJ
Editors; Review & Outlook Page
The Wall Street Journal
Oct 02, 2007
Page: A16
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Accounting,
Accounting Theory, Advanced Financial Accounting, Bonds,
Debt, Impairment
SUMMARY: The editors laud UBS AG and Citigroup "for
their announcements...that they'll soon take big
writedowns for their mortgage bets." They react this way
on the premise that "one question haunting the markets
during the subprime meltdown has been where the
financial bodies are buried." Similar reactions are
evident for UBS and Citigroup shareholders; the
companies' share prices both rose following the
announcements. The editors conclude by offering evidence
that credit markets are stabilizing and state that "by
being forthright now, the banks can aid the process of
bringing buyers back to the debt markets."
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: This article can be used to
cover write-downs due to impairment losses on mortgage
assets as well as to discuss debtholders as users of
financial markets. The situation also could be described
as a "big bath" write-down to clean house now while
times are bad in credit markets in general and, at least
for UBS, while corporate leadership is new.
QUESTIONS:
1.) In the opinion page article, the editors argue that
"marking asset to market is...better for the financial
system as a whole, rather than hiding losses on the
balance sheet and hoping for a rebound." What does this
statement mean? In your answer, define the terms
"historical cost" and "mark to market." Also, address
the notion that a loss could be included in a balance
sheet account.
2.) Refer to the related articles. What are the assets
on which losses were taken at UBS and Citigroup?
3.) Some might argue that the losses being recorded by
Citigroup and UBS AG constitute a "big bath" to pave the
way for improving reported results in the future. How
does a current writedown help to improve reported
results in the future? What current circumstances at
each of these firms and in the general economy might
allow for taking this approach to writedowns?
4.) Refer again to the opinion page article's conclusion
that reporting losses now "can aid the process of
bringing buyers back to the debt markets." Should
financial reporting have a specific outcome, such as
improving numbers of credit market participants, as its
objective? Support your answer.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
|
"The Finer Points of Fair Value," by Thomas A. Ratcliffe, Journal of
Accountancy, December 2007 ---
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/dec2007/fair_value.htm
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY |
To adopt FASB Statement no. 159, companies must comply with the
requirements of Statement no. 157, Fair Value
Measurements.
Companies and their auditors must consider whether the
use of fair value option accounting reflects a “substance over
form” decision by management rather than an effort to gain an
accounting result.
FASB has raised the bar for disclosure required when
the fair value option is in play so that financial statement
users will be able to clearly understand the extent to which the
option is utilized and how changes in fair values are being
reflected in the financial statements.
Companies are encouraged but not required to present
the fair value option disclosures in combination with the fair
value disclosures required in other accounting literature.
The guidance must be implemented on an
instrument-by-instrument basis and is irrevocable. |
From the FASB: PROPOSED FASB STAFF POSITION No. FAS 157-a
"Application of FASB Statement No. 157 to FASB Statement No. 13 and Its Related
Interpretive Accounting Pronouncements That Address Leasing Transactions" ---
http://www.fasb.org/fasb_staff_positions/prop_fsp_fas157-a.pdf
Objective
1. This FASB Staff Position (FSP)
amends FASB Statement No. 157,
Fair Value Measurements, to exclude FASB Statement No. 13,
Accounting for Leases, and its related
interpretive accounting pronouncements that address leasing
transactions.
Background
2. The Exposure Draft preceding
Statement 157 proposed a scope exception for Statement 13 and other
accounting pronouncements that require fair value measurements for
leasing transactions. At that time, the Board was concerned that
applying the fair value measurement objective in the Exposure Draft to
leasing transactions could have unintended consequences, requiring
reconsideration of aspects of lease accounting that were beyond the
scope of the Exposure Draft.
3. However, respondents to the
Exposure Draft indicated that the fair value measurement objective for
leasing transactions was generally consistent with the fair value
measurement objective proposed by the Exposure Draft. Others in the
leasing industry subsequently affirmed that view. Based on that input,
the Board decided to include lease accounting pronouncements in the
scope of Statement 157.
4. Subsequent to the issuance
of Statement 157, which changed in some respects from the Exposure
Draft, constituents have raised issues stemming from the interaction
Proposed FSP on Statement 157 (FSP
FAS 157-a) 1 FSP FAS 157-a
between the fair value measurement objective in Statement 13 and the
fair value measurement objective in Statement 157.
5. Constituents have noted that
paragraph 5(c)(ii) of Statement 13 provides an example of the
determination of fair value (an exit price) through the use of a
transaction price (an entry price). Constituents also have raised issues
about the application of the fair value measurement objective in
Statement 157 to estimated residual values of leased property. These
issues, as well as other issues related to the interaction between
Statement 13 and Statement 157, would result in a change in lease
accounting that requires considerations of lease classification criteria
and measurements in leasing transactions that are beyond the scope of
Statement 157 (for example, a change in lease classification for leases
that would otherwise be accounted for as direct financing leases).
6. The Board acknowledges that
the term
fair value will be
left in Statement 13 although it is defined differently than in
Statement 157; however, the Board believes that lease accounting
provisions and the longstanding valuation practices common within the
leasing industry should not be changed by Statement 157 without a
comprehensive reconsideration of the accounting for leasing
transactions. The Board has on its agenda a project to comprehensively
reconsider the guidance in Statement 13 together with its subsequent
amendments and interpretations.
When do market investors become market makers?
When "quants" become market makers instead of market players, it throws fair
value accounting into a turmoil.
November 23, 2007 message from Amy Dunbar
[Amy.Dunbar@BUSINESS.UCONN.EDU]
The
subprime crisis has captured my attention, and on the chance that others
on this listserv are interested in this area, I am sending this email
about the paper, What Happened to the Quants in August 2007? I assumed
the hedge funds went down because of subprime investments, but it
appears that was just one of many possible causes. I would love to hear
what others think, particularly about the possibility of regulatory
reform (mentioned at the end below) ---
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1015987
The paper has 9011
abstract views and 4447 downloads. Looks like a lot of people are
interested in the hedge fund losses.
The paper is
fascinating. Its objective is to suggest reasons for the hedge fund
losses during the week of Aug 6, 2007. The funds were quantitative,
market-neutral funds. No major losses were reported in other hedge-fund
sectors. The paper compares August 1998 (think LTCM collapse) with
August 2007, and concludes the following:
In
August 1998, default of Russian government debt caused a flight to
quality that ultimately resulted in the demise of LTCM and many
other fixed-income arbitrage funds. This series of events caught
even the most experienced traders by surprise because of the
unrelated nature of Russian government debt and the broadly
diversified portfolios of some of the most successful fixed-income
arbitrage funds. Similarly, the events of August 2007 caught some of
the most experienced quantitative equity market-neutral managers by
surprise. But August 2007 may be far more significant because it
provides the first piece of evidence that problems in one corner of
the financial system - possibly the sub-prime mortgage sector and
related credit markets – can spill over so directly to a completely
unrelated corner: long/short equity strategies. This is precisely
the kind of ”shortcut" described in the theory of mathematical
networks that generates the “small-world phenomenon" of Watts (1999)
in which a small random shock in one part of the network can rapidly
propagate throughout the entire network.
The authors hypothesize an unwind of a large
long/short equity portfolio, most likely a quantitative equity
market-neutral portfolio.
Likely
factors contributing to the magnitude of the losses of this apparent
unwind were: (a) the enormous growth in assets devoted to long/short
equity strategies over the past decade and, more recently, to
various 130/30 and other active-extension strategies; (b) the
systematic decline in the profitability of quantitative equity
market-neutral strategies, due to increasing competition,
technological advances, and institutional and environmental changes
such as decimalization, the decline in retail order flow, and the
decline in equity-market volatility; (c) the increased leverage
needed to maintain the levels of expected returns required by
hedge-fund investors in the face of lower profitability; (d) the
historical liquidity of U.S. equity markets and the general lack of
awareness (at least prior to August 6, 2007) of just how crowded the
long/short equity category had become; and (e) the unknown size and
timing of new sub-prime-mortgage-related problems in credit markets,
which created a climate of fear and panic, heightening the risk
sensitivities of managers and investors across all markets and style
categories.
They also note that
the
timing of these losses - shortly after month-end of a very
challenging month for many hedge-fund strategies - is also
suggestive. The formal process of marking portfolios to market
typically takes several business days after month-end, and August
7-9 may well be the first time managers and investors were forced to
confront the extraordinary credit-related losses they suffered in
July, which may have triggered the initial unwind of their more
liquid investments, e.g., their equity portfolios, during this
period.
Question: FAS 115 requires investment
securities (actually only trading and available-for-sale
securities) to be marked to market, but what is
the driving force behind marking to market on a monthly basis?
Reporting to investors in the fund?
Do
the losses of August 2007 signal a breakdown in the basic economic
relationships that yield attractive risk/reward profiles for such
strategies, or is August 2007 an unavoidable and integral aspect of
those risk/reward profiles? An instructive thought experiment is to
consider a market-neutral portfolio strategy in which U.S. equities
with odd-numbered CUSIP identifiers are held long and those with
even-number CUSIPs are held short. Suppose such a portfolio strategy
is quite popular and a
number
of large hedge funds have implemented it. Now imagine that one of
these large hedge funds decides to liquidate its holdings because of
some liquidity shock. Regardless of this portfolio's typical
expected return during normal times, in the midst of a rapid and
large unwind, all such portfolios will experience losses, with the
magnitudes of those losses directly proportional to the size and
speed of the unwind. Moreover, it is easy to see how such an unwind
can generate losses for other types of portfolios, e.g., long-only
portfolios of securities with prime-number CUSIPs, dedicated
shortsellers that short only those securities with CUSIPs divisible
by 10, etc. If a portfolio is of sufficient size, and it is based on
a sufficiently popular strategy that is broadly implemented, then
unwinding even a small fraction of it can cascade into a major
market dislocation.
. . .
However,
a successful investment strategy should include an assessment of the
risk of ruin, and that risk should be managed appropriately.
Moreover, the magnitude of tail risk should, in principle, be
related to a strategy's expected return given the inevitable
trade-off between risk and reward. Therefore, it is disingenuous to
assert that “a strategy is successful except in the face of
25-standard-deviation events." Given the improbability of such
events, we can only conclude that either the actual distribution of
returns is extraordinarily leptokurtic, or the standard deviation is
time-varying and exhibits occasional spikes.
In
particular, as Montier (2007) observed, risk has become “endogenous"
in certain markets - particularly those that are recently flush with
large inflows of assets - which is one of the reasons that the
largest players can no longer assume that historical estimates of
volatility and price impact are accurate measures of current risk
exposures. Endogeneity is, in fact, an old economic concept
illustrated by the well-known theory of imperfect competition: if an
economic entity, or group of coordinated entities, is so large that
it can unilaterally affect prices by its own actions, then the
standard predictions of microeconomics under perfect competition no
longer hold. Similarly, if a certain portfolio strategy is so
popular that its liquidation can unilaterally affect the risks that
it faces, then the standard tools of basic risk models such as
Value-at-Risk and normal distributions no longer hold. In this
respect, quantitative models may have failed in August 2007 by not
adequately capturing the endogeneity of their risk exposures. Given
the size and interconnectedness of the hedge-fund industry, we may
require more sophisticated analytics to model the feedback implicit
in current market dynamics.
The authors commented several times on the lack
of transparency in the hedge fund market. I found the authors’ comments
on the need for possible regulatory reform interesting.
Given
the role that hedge funds have begun to play in financial markets -
namely, significant providers of liquidity and credit - they now
impose externalities on the economy that are no longer negligible.
In this respect, hedge funds are becoming more like banks. The fact
that the banking industry is so highly regulated is due to the
enormous social externalities banks generate when they succeed, and
when they fail. But unlike banks, hedge funds can decide to withdraw
liquidity at a moment's notice, and while this may be benign if it
occurs rarely and randomly, a coordinated withdrawal of liquidity
among an entire sector of hedge funds could have disastrous
consequences for the viability of the financial system if it occurs
at the wrong time and in the wrong sector.
November 23, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Amy,
Why do bankers resist expanding FAS 159 into required accounting for all
financial instruments?
Misleading Financial Statements:
Bankers Refusing to Recognize and Shed "Zombie Loans"
One worrying lesson for bankers and regulators
everywhere to bear in mind is post-bubble Japan. In the 1990s its leading
bankers not only hung onto their jobs; they also refused to recognise and
shed bad debts, in effect keeping “zombie” loans on their books. That is one
reason why the country's economy stagnated for so long. The quicker bankers
are to recognise their losses, to sell assets that they are hoarding in the
vain hope that prices will recover, and to make markets in such assets for
their clients, the quicker the banking system will get back on its feet.
The Economist, as quoted in Jim Mahar's blog on November 10, 2007 ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
But there are questions in theory about fair value accounting!
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
I personally think the driving forces behind FAS 115 were tendencies of
banks to not recognize those "zombie" investments and adequately disclose
highly likely losses. Firstly I might note that FAS 115 adjusts
available-for-sale (AFS) securities to fair value without impacting earnings
volatility except in the case of securities traders. According to Paragraph
86 of FAS 115, the FASB wanted to require fair value accounting for all
financial securities but got hung up on debt instruments (such as mortgage
debt) that more commonly are not AFS and more difficult to
mark-to-market (i.e. debt is often more difficult to value due to not being
traded with unique covenants and is more likely to be HTM,
held-to-maturity). The FASB justification for FAS 115 can be found in
Paragraphs 39-43, although the elaborations in Paragraphs 86-100 are
enlightening. IFRS requirements are similar, although penalties for
violating HTM classification are somewhat more onerous.
An interesting November 12 video on the “cascade theory” of what might be
termed quantitative models, like lemmings, cascading over a cliff ---
http://www.ft.com/cms/bfba2c48-5588-11dc-b971-0000779fd2ac.html?_i_referralObject=593529134&fromSearch=n
In that sense the comparison of the LTCM disaster in 1998 with the August
2007 downfall seems to hold some water. Although the big losers in both
instances were big and sophisticated investors who’re well aware of the
unique risks of unregulated hedge funds, the externalities affecting Main
Street (read that CREF investors) are very real. The LTCM fiasco could well
have brought down equity markets in all of Wall Street ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#LTCM
One of the hardcopy journals I read cover-to-cover each week is The
Economist on October 25, 2007. The following is one of my favorite
readable papers among the thousands of articles written about this
controversy ---
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10026288
WHEN markets wobbled in August, almost all the
media attention was focused on the credit crunch and the links to
American mortgage loans. But at exactly the same time, another crisis
was occurring at the core of the stockmarket.
This crisis stemmed from the obscure world of
quantitative, or quant-based, finance, which uses computer models to
find attractive stocks and to identify overpriced shares. Suddenly, in
August, the models went wrong.
The incident revealed a problem at the heart of
the financial system. In effect, the quant groups were acting as
marketmakers, trading so often (some are aiming for transaction times in
terms of milliseconds) that they set prices for everyone else. But
unlike traditional marketmakers, quant funds are not obliged to make
markets come rain or shine. And unlike marketmakers, they use a lot of
leverage. This means that instead of providing liquidity in a crisis,
the quants added to instability. There is a lesson there.
In a way, the crisis stemmed from the quants'
success. Many firms, such as the American hedge fund Renaissance
Technologies, had done fantastically well and had been able to charge
hefty fees. But if one firm can hire top mathematicians and use the
latest technology, so can others. An arms race developed, with some
trading faster and faster—even siting their computers closer to the
exchanges in order to cut the time it took orders to travel down the
wires.
And as the computers sifted through the data,
some strategies became overcrowded. A paper* by Amir Khandani and Andrew
Lo of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology back-tested a proxy for
a typical strategy, involving buying the previous day's losing stocks
and selling the winners. Such a strategy would have delivered a daily
return of 1.38% before (substantial) costs in 1995 but the return fell
steadily to 0.15% a day last year.
In the face of declining returns, the authors
reckon, the natural response of managers would have been to increase
leverage. But that, of course, increased their vulnerability when things
went wrong.
Both the MIT academics and a paper by Cliff
Asness of AQR Capital Management, a leading quant group, agree that
August's problems probably began when a diversified, or multi-strategy,
hedge fund experienced losses in the credit markets. The fund sought to
reduce its exposures but its credit positions were impossible to sell.
So it cut its quant positions instead, since that merely involved
selling highly liquid stocks.
However, that selling pressure caused other
quant funds to lose money as their favoured stocks fell in price. Those
that were leveraged were naturally forced to reduce their positions as
well. These waves of selling played havoc with the models. Quant
investors thought they were aware of the risks of their strategy and had
built diversified portfolios to avoid it. But the parts of the portfolio
that were previously uncorrelated suddenly fell in tandem.
In theory, quant funds could have been bold and
borrowed more; after all, the stocks they thought were cheap had become
even cheaper. The traders who took on the positions of Long-Term Capital
Management (LTCM), after the hedge fund failed in 1998, ended up making
money. But the example of LTCM, which went bust before it could be
proved right, argued in favour of a more cautious approach. “We could
have rolled the dice but that would have risked the business,” said one
quant-fund manager. “I don't know of anyone that did so.”
Avoiding that trap simply led quant investors
into another. On August 10th, the stocks that quants had favoured
suddenly rebounded. Those who had cut their positions most could not
benefit from the rally. That category clearly included Goldman Sachs's
Global Alpha hedge fund, which lost a remarkable 23% on the month.
If it were just a few hedge funds, backed by
rich people, losing money, it might not matter. But the funds had become
too important: rather than adding stability, as marketmakers are
supposed to do, they added volatility.
Quants will adjust their models and clients
will become more discerning; AQR's. Mr Asness says his firm will look
harder for “unique” factors, that is, not used by other fund managers.
But regulators should also reflect that markets are less stable than
they assumed. The presence of leveraged traders such as quants at their
heart means conditions can now turn, at the flick of a switch, from
stability to panic.
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
When "quants" become market makers instead of market players, it throws fair
value accounting into a turmoil.
Question
Will “Minsky Moments” become “Minsky Accounting?”
As both the FASB in the U.S. and the IASB international standards boards
march ever onward toward "fair value" accounting by replacing historical
costs with current values (mark-to-market accounting), it will plunge
corporate accountants and their CPA auditors ever deeper into current value
estimation. Financial statements will become increasingly volatile and
fictional with market movements. It is becoming clear that the efficient
markets hypothesis that drives much of the theory behind fair value
accounting is increasingly on shaky ground.
Especially problematic are moments in time like now (2007) when the
bubble burst on
subprime mortgage borrowing and investing that has caused tremors
throughout the world of banking and investing and risk sharing. And once
again, the ghost of long departed John Maynard Keynes seems to have risen
from the grave. There's material for a great
Stephen
King horror novel here.
It is time for accounting standard setters who set such new standards as
FAS 157 and FAS 159 to dust off some old economics books and seriously
consider whether they understand the theoretical underpinnings of new and
pending fair value standards moving closer to show time. You can read more
fair value accounting controversies in my work-in-process PowerPoint file
called 10FairValue.ppt at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/JensenPowerPoint/
Aside from
badly mixing my metaphors here, the fundamental problem is that unrealized
fair values painting rosy financial performance (as the speculative roller
coaster rises with breath taking thrill toward the crest) become unrealized
losses as the roller coaster swoops downward toward “Minsky Moments.” It's a
fundamental problem in fair value accounting because an enormous portion of
reported earnings on the way up become sheer Minsky mincemeat (before
investments are sold and liabilities are not settled) and diabolical garbage
on the way down. In other words in these boom/bust market cycles, financial
statements (certified by independent auditors under new fair value
accounting standards) become increasingly hypothetical fantasy replacing
accustomed facts rooted in transactional accounting.
Fair value standard setters are plunging accounting into the realm of
economic theory that is itself less uncertain than astrology. It's time to
rethink some of that Chicago School economic theory that we've taken for
granted because of all the Nobel Prizes awarded to Chicago School
economists.
Question
Did John
Maynard Keynes rise from the grave?
"In Time of Tumult, Obscure Economist Gains Currency: Mr. Minsky
Long Argued Markets Were Crisis Prone; His 'Moment' Has Arrived," by Justin Lahart, The Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2007; Page A1 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118736585456901047.html?mod=todays_us_page_one
The recent market turmoil is rocking investors
around the globe. But it is raising the stock of one person: a
little-known economist whose views have suddenly become very popular.
Hyman Minsky, who died more than a decade ago, spent much of his
career advancing the idea that financial systems are inherently
susceptible to bouts of speculation that, if they last long enough, end
in crises. At a time when many economists were coming to believe in the
efficiency of markets, Mr. Minsky was considered somewhat of a radical
for his stress on their tendency toward excess and upheaval.
Today, his views are reverberating from New
York to Hong Kong as economists and traders try to understand what's
happening in the markets. The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College,
where Mr. Minsky worked for the last six years of his life, is planning
to reprint two books by the economist -- one on John Maynard Keynes, the
other on unstable economies. The latter book was being offered on the
Internet for thousands of dollars.
Christopher Wood, a widely read Hong Kong-based
analyst for CLSA Group, told his clients that recent cash injections by
central banks designed "to prevent, or at least delay, a 'Minsky
moment,' is evidence of market failure."
Indeed, the Minsky moment has become a
fashionable catch phrase on Wall Street. It refers to the time when
over-indebted investors are forced to sell even their solid investments
to make good on their loans, sparking sharp declines in financial
markets and demand for cash that can force central bankers to lend a
hand.
Mr. Minsky, who died in 1996 at the age of 77,
was a tall man with unruly hair who wore unpressed suits. He approached
the world as "one big research tank," says Diana Minsky, his daughter,
an art history professor at Bard. "Economics was an integrated part of
his life. It wasn't isolated. There wasn't a sense that work was
something he did at the office."
She recalls how, on a trip to a village in
Italy to meet friends, Mr. Minsky ended up interviewing workers at a
glove maker to understand how small-scale capitalism worked in the local
economy.
Although he was born in Chicago, Mr. Minsky
didn't have many fans in the "Chicago School" of economists, who
believed that markets were efficient. A follower of the economist John
Maynard Keynes, he died just before a decade of financial crises in
Asia, Russia, tech stocks, corporate credit and now mortgage debt, began
to lend credence to his ideas.
Following those periods of tumult, more
investors turned to the investment classic "Manias, Panics, and Crashes:
A History of Financial Crises," by
Charles Kindleberger, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology who leaned heavily on Mr. Minsky's work.
Mr. Kindleberger showed that financial crises
unfolded the way that Mr. Minsky said they would. Though a loyal
follower, Mr. Kindleberger described Mr. Minsky as "a man with a
reputation among monetary theorists for being particularly pessimistic,
even lugubrious, in his emphasis on the fragility of the monetary system
and its propensity to disaster."
At its core, the Minsky view was
straightforward: When times are good, investors take on risk; the longer
times stay good, the more risk they take on, until they've taken on too
much. Eventually, they reach a point where the cash generated by their
assets no longer is sufficient to pay off the mountains of debt they
took on to acquire them. Losses on such speculative assets prompt
lenders to call in their loans. "This is likely to lead to a collapse of
asset values," Mr. Minsky wrote.
When investors are forced to sell even their
less-speculative positions to make good on their loans, markets spiral
lower and create a severe demand for cash. At that point, the Minsky
moment has arrived.
"We are in the midst of a Minsky moment,
bordering on a Minsky meltdown," says Paul McCulley, an economist and
fund manager at Pacific Investment Management Co., the world's largest
bond-fund manager, in an email exchange.
The housing market is a case in point, says
Investment Technology Group Inc. economist Robert Barbera, who first met
Mr. Minsky in the late 1980s. When home buyers were expected to have a
down payment of 10% or 20% to qualify for a mortgage, and to provide
income documentation that showed they'd be able to make payments, there
was minimal risk. But as home prices rose, and speculators entered the
market, lenders relaxed their guard and began offering loans with no
money down and little or no documentation.
Once home prices stalled and, in many of the
more-speculative markets, fell, there was a big problem.
"If you're lending to home buyers with 20% down
and house prices fall by 2%, so what?" Mr. Barbera says. If most of a
lender's portfolio is tied up in loans to buyers who "don't put anything
down and house prices fall by 2%, you're bankrupt," he says.
Several money managers are laying claim to
spotting the Minsky moment first. "I featured him about 18 months ago,"
says Jeremy Grantham, chairman of GMO LLC, which manages $150 billion in
assets. He pointed to a note in early 2006 when he wrote that investors
had become too comfortable that financial markets were safe, and
consequently were taking on too much risk, just as Mr. Minsky predicted.
"Guinea pigs of the world unite. We have nothing to lose but our
shirts," he concluded.
It was Mr. McCulley at Pacific Investment,
though, who coined the phrase "Minsky moment" during the Russian debt
crisis in 1998.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's fair value PowerPoint show ---
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/JensenPowerPoint/
August 18, 2007 reply from J. S. Gangolly
[gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
Bob,
I thought we could all enjoy the following Keynes
quotes:
1. "Capitalism is the astounding belief that the
most wickedest of men will do the most wickedest of things for the greatest
good of everyone."
2. How prophetic he was:
"The day is not far off when the economic problem
will take the back seat where it belongs, and the arena of the heart and the
head will be occupied or reoccupied, by our real problems / the problems of
life and of human relations, of creation and behavior and religion."
3. How wonderfully Keynes anticipated stuff in
games played by Bayesian players and stuff in self-fulfilling equilibria
(which yielded three "Nobel" prizes), all without introducing any
mathematics or economic mumbo jumbo:
"Successful investing is anticipating the
anticipations of others."
4. The accountics folks might enjoy the following:
"The difficulty lies not so much in developing new
ideas as in escaping from old ones."
"If economists could manage to get themselves
thought of as humble, competent people on a level with dentists, that would
be splendid."
"When the facts change, I change my mind. What do
you do, sir?"
5. This should thrill tax folks:
"The avoidance of taxes is the only intellectual
pursuit that still carries any reward."
Jagdish
August 20, 2007 reply from Paul Williams
[Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]
Apparently no economist ever dies -- they just
come in and out of fashion. In George Akerlof's presidential address to
the AEA in January 2006 ("The Missing Motivation in Macroeconomics") he
concludes: "This lecture has shown that the early Keynesians got a great
deal of the working of the economic system right in ways that are denied
by the five neutralities (assumptions of the positivists).
As quoted from Keynes earlier, they based their
models on "our knowledge of human nature and from the detailed facts of
experience."" Thus the recent interest in "norms" by Shyam Sunder and
the urgency to provide "econonmic" explanations for "norms." So the very
FIRST plenary speaker at the, Joe Henrich, at the Chicago 2007 AAA
meeting, regaled us with his "evidence" that market integrated societies
produce people who are more trusting and fair- minded because people
from Missouri divide the spoils in a game that no one ever plays in
their real lives more equitably than a hunter- gatherer from New Guinea
for whom the game may have an entirely different meaning than someone
from St.Louis (a synchresis, perhaps).
Given that the integration of societies by
"markets" represents the blink of an eye in evolutionary time (even for
humans) one might consider that perhaps what makes Missourians different
from hunter- gatherers is that they come from a Christian tradition that
predates market integration by a couple thousand years (a tradition of
Christian agape?).
Linguists have long remarked that language is
impossible without trust (how else can I believe that words mean what I
am told they mean or how do I avoid starvation at birth unless I "trust"
my mother? We are born trusting). Yet we get this facile rendering with
regression equations of Adam Smith's argument stood completely on its
head. For Smith markets were a possibility only within a society that
was already integrated (in Smith's case by the kirk's dispositon of a
stern Calvanist morality).
Mike Royko (the columnist for the Chicago
Tribune) once opined that he had finally figured out economic theory, to
wit, "Economics says that almost anything can happen, and it usually
does." The end of history? I bet not.
May 17, 2006 message from Peter Walton
I would like to take this opportunity to
let you know about a forthcoming book from Routledge:
The Routledge Companion to Fair Value and
Financial Reporting ---
Click Here
Edited by Peter Walton
May 2007: 246x174: 406pp
Hb: 978-0-415-42356-4: £95.00 $170.00
Jensen Comment
Even though I have a paper published in this book, I will receive no
compensation from sales of the book. And since I'm retired, lines on a
resume no longer matter.
FASB Statement No. 107
Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial Instruments
(Issue Date 12/91)
[Full Text]
[Summary]
[Status]
This Statement
extends existing fair value disclosure practices for some instruments by
requiring all entities to disclose the fair value of financial instruments,
both assets and liabilities recognized and not recognized in the statement
of financial position, for which it is practicable to estimate fair value.
If estimating fair value is not practicable, this Statement requires
disclosure of descriptive information pertinent to estimating the value of a
financial instrument. Disclosures about fair value are not required for
certain financial instruments listed in paragraph 8.
This Statement is
effective for financial statements issued for fiscal years ending after
December 15, 1992, except for entities with less than $150 million in total
assets in the current statement of financial position. For those entities,
the effective date is for fiscal years ending after December 15, 1995.
FASB Statement No. 115
Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities
(Issue Date 5/93)
[Full Text]
[Summary]
[Status]
This Statement
addresses the accounting and reporting for investments in equity securities
that have readily determinable fair values and for all investments in debt
securities. Those investments are to be classified in three categories and
accounted for as follows:
Debt securities
that the enterprise has the positive intent and ability to hold to maturity
are classified as held-to-maturity securities and reported at amortized
cost.
Debt and equity
securities that are bought and held principally for the purpose of selling
them in the near term are classified as trading securities and reported at
fair value, with unrealized gains and losses included in earnings.
Debt and equity
securities not classified as either held-to-maturity securities or trading
securities are classified as available-for-sale securities and reported at
fair value, with unrealized gains and losses excluded from earnings and
reported in a separate component of shareholders' equity.
This Statement
does not apply to unsecuritized loans. However, after mortgage loans are
converted to mortgage-backed securities, they are subject to its provisions.
This Statement supersedes FASB Statement No. 12, Accounting for Certain
Marketable Securities, and related Interpretations and amends FASB Statement
No. 65, Accounting for Certain Mortgage Banking Activities, to eliminate
mortgage-backed securities from its scope.
This Statement is
effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1993. It is to be
initially applied as of the beginning of an enterprise's fiscal year and
cannot be applied retroactively to prior years' financial statements.
However, an enterprise may elect to initially apply this Statement as of the
end of an earlier fiscal year for which annual financial statements have not
previously been issued.
FASB Statement No. 130
Reporting Comprehensive Income
(Issue Date 6/97)
[Full Text]
[Summary]
[Status]
This Statement
establishes standards for reporting and display of comprehensive income and
its components (revenues, expenses, gains, and losses) in a full set of
general-purpose financial statements. This Statement requires that all items
that are required to be recognized under accounting standards as components
of comprehensive income be reported in a financial statement that is
displayed with the same prominence as other financial statements. This
Statement does not require a specific format for that financial statement
but requires that an enterprise display an amount representing total
comprehensive income for the period in that financial statement.
This Statement
requires that an enterprise (a) classify items of other comprehensive income
by their nature in a financial statement and (b) display the accumulated
balance of other comprehensive income separately from retained earnings and
additional paid-in capital in the equity section of a statement of financial
position.
This Statement is
effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1997.
Reclassification of financial statements for earlier periods provided for
comparative purposes is required.
FASB Statement No. 133 and Amendments in FAS 137, 138, 149, and 155
Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities
(Issue Date 6/98)
[Full Text]
[Summary]
[Status]
This Statement
establishes accounting and reporting standards for derivative instruments,
including certain derivative instruments embedded in other contracts,
(collectively referred to as derivatives) and for hedging activities. It
requires that an entity recognize all derivatives as either assets or
liabilities in the statement of financial position and measure those
instruments at fair value. If certain conditions are met, a derivative may
be specifically designated as (a) a hedge of the exposure to changes in the
fair value of a recognized asset or liability or an unrecognized firm
commitment, (b) a hedge of the exposure to variable cash flows of a
forecasted transaction, or (c) a hedge of the foreign currency exposure of a
net investment in a foreign operation, an unrecognized firm commitment, an
available-for-sale security, or a foreign-currency-denominated forecasted
transaction. The accounting for changes in the fair value of a derivative
(that is, gains and losses) depends on the intended use of the derivative
and the resulting designation.
For a derivative
designated as hedging the exposure to changes in the fair value of a
recognized asset or liability or a firm commitment (referred to as a fair
value hedge), the gain or loss is recognized in earnings in the period of
change together with the offsetting loss or gain on the hedged item
attributable to the risk being hedged. The effect of that accounting is to
reflect in earnings the extent to which the hedge is not effective in
achieving offsetting changes in fair value. For a derivative designated as
hedging the exposure to variable cash flows of a forecasted transaction
(referred to as a cash flow hedge), the effective portion of the
derivative's gain or loss is initially reported as a component of other
comprehensive income (outside earnings) and subsequently reclassified into
earnings when the forecasted transaction affects earnings. The ineffective
portion of the gain or loss is reported in earnings immediately. For a
derivative designated as hedging the foreign currency exposure of a net
investment in a foreign operation, the gain or loss is reported in other
comprehensive income (outside earnings) as part of the cumulative
translation adjustment. The accounting for a fair value hedge described
above applies to a derivative designated as a hedge of the foreign currency
exposure of an unrecognized firm commitment or an available-for-sale
security. Similarly, the accounting for a cash flow hedge described above
applies to a derivative designated as a hedge of the foreign currency
exposure of a foreign-currency-denominated forecasted transaction. For a
derivative not designated as a hedging instrument, the gain or loss is
recognized in earnings in the period of change. Under this Statement, an
entity that elects to apply hedge accounting is required to establish at the
inception of the hedge the method it will use for assessing the
effectiveness of the hedging derivative and the measurement approach for
determining the ineffective aspect of the hedge. Those methods must be
consistent with the entity's approach to managing risk.
This Statement
applies to all entities. A not-for-profit organization should recognize the
change in fair value of all derivatives as a change in net assets in the
period of change. In a fair value hedge, the changes in the fair value of
the hedged item attributable to the risk being hedged also are recognized.
However, because of the format of their statement of financial performance,
not-for-profit organizations are not permitted special hedge accounting for
derivatives used to hedge forecasted transactions. This Statement does not
address how a not-for-profit organization should determine the components of
an operating measure if one is presented.
This Statement
precludes designating a nonderivative financial instrument as a hedge of an
asset, liability, unrecognized firm commitment, or forecasted transaction
except that a nonderivative instrument denominated in a foreign currency may
be designated as a hedge of the foreign currency exposure of an unrecognized
firm commitment denominated in a foreign currency or a net investment in a
foreign operation.
This Statement
amends FASB Statement No. 52, Foreign Currency Translation, to permit
special accounting for a hedge of a foreign currency forecasted transaction
with a derivative. It supersedes FASB Statements No. 80, Accounting for
Futures Contracts, No. 105, Disclosure of Information about Financial
Instruments with Off-Balance-Sheet Risk and Financial Instruments with
Concentrations of Credit Risk, and No. 119, Disclosure about Derivative
Financial Instruments and Fair Value of Financial Instruments. It amends
FASB Statement No. 107, Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial
Instruments, to include in Statement 107 the disclosure provisions about
concentrations of credit risk from Statement 105. This Statement also
nullifies or modifies the consensuses reached in a number of issues
addressed by the Emerging Issues Task Force.
This Statement is
effective for all fiscal quarters of fiscal years beginning after June 15,
1999. Initial application of this Statement should be as of the beginning of
an entity's fiscal quarter; on that date, hedging relationships must be
designated anew and documented pursuant to the provisions of this Statement.
Earlier application of all of the provisions of this Statement is
encouraged, but it is permitted only as of the beginning of any fiscal
quarter that begins after issuance of this Statement. This Statement should
not be applied retroactively to financial statements of prior periods.
Question
How should you account for this one?
Fair value
accounting under FAS 141? Yeah right!
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review, January 18,
2008
Behind Bank of America's Big Gamble
by Valerie
Bauerlein and James R. Hagerty
The Wall Street Journal
Jan 12, 2008
Page: A1
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120005404048583617.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
TOPICS: Advanced Financial
Accounting, Banking, Mergers and Acquisitions
SUMMARY: The article describes
the process of due diligence used by Bank of America and its
ultimate reasoning in deciding to offer to acquire
Countrywide Funding. "Terms of the deal call for Bank of
America, the largest U.S. bank by market value, to give
0.1822 shares of Bank of America for each share of
Countrywide. The deal could be renegotiated if Countrywide
experiences a material change that adversely affects its
business, but Mr. [Kenneth D.] Lewis [CEO of Bank America]
said he does not anticipate that happening....Bank of
America is buying a deeply troubled company, and it faces
the risk that Countrywide's assets could continue
deteriorating. As of Sept. 30, Countrywide's savings bank
held about $79.5 billion of loans as investments.
Three-quarters of those loans were second-lien home-equity
loans...or option adjustable-rate mortgages....Overdue
payments by Countrywide borrowers are surging....
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Introducing
the acquisition process in business combinations, and the
business combination as a solution to the problem of a
struggling bank, is the best use of this article, though
other topics such as the SEC's interest in Countrywide's
loan loss reserves also are discussed.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is "due diligence"? How long did it take Bank of
America to complete its due diligence prior to making an
offer to Countrywide Financial Corp.?
2.) How would Bank of America's analysts model how its
portfolio of loans is likely to perform in the future?
Describe the components of these models.
3.) How do you think the results of analysts' modeling
impact the negotiations between Bank of America and
Countrywide? How do you think they impact the accounting for
the transaction when it is completed later this spring?
4.) How does fact that Countrywide has a book value of
approximately $12 billion, triple the $4 billion price to
Bank of America, provide a "cushion for potential damages,
settlements and other litigation costs involving mortgages
that went bad"?
5.) Why is the SEC concerned with whether Countrywide has
"...set aside enough reserves to cover potential losses on
the loans on its books"? In your answer, define the term
"reserves" as it is used in this quote and give other words
preferred by accountants for this item.
6.) What are the terms of the offer made by Bank of America?
In your answer, be sure to address the issue of a
contingency in the offer.
7.) If the contingency described in the article were to come
to pass, what would be its impact on the accounting for the
business combination?
8.) What other factors besides the performance of
Countrywide's current loan portfolio are likely to impact
the success of the acquisition and the mortgage lending
operations in the future?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University
of Rhode Island
RELATED
ARTICLES:
No 'Fun': Bank of America Pulls Back
by Valerie Bauerlein
Jan 16, 2008
Page: C3
|
Tom Selling in his Accounting Onion Blog has a
really nice piece on January 24, 2008 entitled "Peeling the Onion on the New
Business Combination Standards: FAS 141R and FAS 160" ---
This post examines the onion
skin, if you will, of the new business combination standards. I'm going to
explain the differences between the so-called 'purchase' method of
accounting and the new 'acquisition' method. As is my habit, let's begin
with a simple example.
Assume that ParentCo
acquires 70% of the outstanding shares of SubCo for $1,000. Additional facts
are as follows:
ParentCo estimates that the
fair value of 100% of SubCo is $1,405: You should note that the fair value
of SubCo may not ordinarily be calculated by extrapolating the purchase
price paid to the remaining shares outstanding (i.e., $1,000/70% = $1,429 is
not ordinarily the fair value). The reason is that a portion of the purchase
price contains a payment for the ability to exercise control. In this case,
the control premium would be $55, calculated as follows: ($1000 -
.7($1405))/(1-.7) = $55
It may be difficult to
estimate the control premium, because it may have to be derived from an
estimate of the full fair value of the acquired company, as above. But the
new requirement to do so has not been controversial. That's because the
larger the control premium, the lower will be goodwill. The book value of
SubCo's assets and liabilities approximate their book value, except for one
asset with a remaining useful life of 10 years. For that asset, the fair
value exceeds the book value by $100.
Tom then launches into a great analysis of
this illustration.
Bob Jensen's threads on intangibles and contingency issues on accountancy
are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
FASB Statement No. 142
Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets
(Issue Date 6/01)
[Full Text]
[Summary]
[Status]
This
Statement changes the subsequent accounting for goodwill and
other intangible assets in the following significant
respects:
-
Acquiring entities usually integrate acquired entities
into their operations, and thus the acquirers'
expectations of benefits from the resulting synergies
usually are reflected in the premium that they pay to
acquire those entities. However, the transaction-based
approach to accounting for goodwill under Opinion 17
treated the acquired entity as if it remained a
stand-alone entity rather than being integrated with the
acquiring entity; as a result, the portion of the
premium related to expected synergies (goodwill) was not
accounted for appropriately. This Statement adopts a
more aggregate view of goodwill and bases the accounting
for goodwill on the units of the combined entity into
which an acquired entity is integrated (those units are
referred to as reporting units).
-
Opinion 17 presumed that goodwill and all other
intangible assets were wasting assets (that is, finite
lived), and thus the amounts assigned to them should be
amortized in determining net income; Opinion 17 also
mandated an arbitrary ceiling of 40 years for that
amortization. This Statement does not presume that those
assets are wasting assets. Instead, goodwill and
intangible assets that have indefinite useful lives will
not be amortized but rather will be tested at least
annually for impairment. Intangible assets that have
finite useful lives will continue to be amortized over
their useful lives, but without the constraint of an
arbitrary ceiling.
-
Previous standards provided little guidance about how to
determine and measure goodwill impairment; as a result,
the accounting for goodwill impairments was not
consistent and not comparable and yielded information of
questionable usefulness. This Statement provides
specific guidance for testing goodwill for impairment.
Goodwill will be tested for impairment at least annually
using a two-step process that begins with an estimation
of the fair value of a reporting unit. The first step is
a screen for potential impairment, and the second step
measures the amount of impairment, if any. However, if
certain criteria are met, the requirement to test
goodwill for impairment annually can be satisfied
without a remeasurement of the fair value of a reporting
unit.
- In
addition, this Statement provides specific guidance on
testing intangible assets that will not be amortized for
impairment and thus removes those intangible assets from
the scope of other impairment guidance. Intangible
assets that are not amortized will be tested for
impairment at least annually by comparing the fair
values of those assets with their recorded amounts.
-
This Statement requires disclosure of information about
goodwill and other intangible assets in the years
subsequent to their acquisition that was not previously
required. Required disclosures include information about
the changes in the carrying amount of goodwill from
period to period (in the aggregate and by reportable
segment), the carrying amount of intangible assets by
major intangible asset class for those assets subject to
amortization and for those not subject to amortization,
and the estimated intangible asset amortization expense
for the next five years.
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FASB Statement No. 155
Accounting for Certain Hybrid Financial Instruments—an amendment of FASB
Statements No. 133 and 140
(Issue Date 02/06)
[Full Text]
[Summary]
[Status]
This Statement
amends FASB Statements No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and
Hedging Activities, and No. 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of
Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities. This Statement resolves
issues addressed in Statement 133 Implementation Issue No. D1, “Application
of Statement 133 to Beneficial Interests in Securitized Financial Assets.”
This Statement:
Permits fair
value remeasurement for any hybrid financial instrument that contains an
embedded derivative that otherwise would require bifurcation
Clarifies which
interest-only strips and principal-only strips are not subject to the
requirements of Statement 133
Establishes a
requirement to evaluate interests in securitized financial assets to
identify interests that are freestanding derivatives or that are hybrid
financial instruments that contain an embedded derivative requiring
bifurcation
Clarifies that
concentrations of credit risk in the form of subordination are not embedded
derivatives
Amends Statement
140 to eliminate the prohibition on a qualifying special-purpose entity from
holding a derivative financial instrument that pertains to a beneficial
interest other than another derivative financial instrument.
Reasons for
Issuing This Statement
In January 2004,
the Board added this project to its agenda to address what had been
characterized as a temporary exemption from the application of the
bifurcation requirements of Statement 133 to beneficial interests in
securitized financial assets.
Prior to the
effective date of Statement 133, the FASB received inquiries on the
application of the exception in paragraph 14 of Statement 133 to beneficial
interests in securitized financial assets. In response to the inquiries,
Implementation Issue D1 indicated that, pending issuance of further
guidance, entities may continue to apply the guidance related to accounting
for beneficial interests in paragraphs 14 and 362 of Statement 140. Those
paragraphs indicate that any security that can be contractually prepaid or
otherwise settled in such a way that the holder of the security would not
recover substantially all of its recorded investment should be subsequently
measured like investments in debt securities classified as
available-for-sale or trading under FASB Statement No. 115, Accounting for
Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, and may not be classified
as held-to-maturity. Further, Implementation Issue D1 indicated that holders
of beneficial interests in securitized financial assets that are not subject
to paragraphs 14 and 362 of Statement 140 are not required to apply
Statement 133 to those beneficial interests until further guidance is
issued.
How the Changes
in This Statement Improve Financial Reporting
This Statement
improves financial reporting by eliminating the exemption from applying
Statement 133 to interests in securitized financial assets so that similar
instruments are accounted for similarly regardless of the form of the
instruments. This Statement also improves financial reporting by allowing a
preparer to elect fair value measurement at acquisition, at issuance, or
when a previously recognized financial instrument is subject to a
remeasurement (new basis) event, on an instrument-by-instrument basis, in
cases in which a derivative would otherwise have to be bifurcated. Providing
a fair value measurement election also results in more financial instruments
being measured at what the Board regards as the most relevant attribute for
financial instruments, fair value.
Effective Date
and Transition
This Statement
is effective for all financial instruments acquired or issued after the
beginning of an entity’s first fiscal year that begins after September 15,
2006. The fair value election provided for in paragraph 4(c) of this
Statement may also be applied upon adoption of this Statement for hybrid
financial instruments that had been bifurcated under paragraph 12 of
Statement 133 prior to the adoption of this Statement. Earlier adoption is
permitted as of the beginning of an entity’s fiscal year, provided the
entity has not yet issued financial statements, including financial
statements for any interim period for that fiscal year. Provisions of this
Statement may be applied to instruments that an entity holds at the date of
adoption on an instrument-by-instrument basis.
At adoption, any
difference between the total carrying amount of the individual components of
the existing bifurcated hybrid financial instrument and the fair value of
the combined hybrid financial instrument should be recognized as a
cumulative-effect adjustment to beginning retained earnings. The
cumulative-effect adjustment should be disclosed gross (that is, aggregating
gain positions separate from loss positions) determined on an
instrument-by-instrument basis. Prior periods should not be restated.
FASB Statement No. 157
Fair Value Measurements
(Issue Date 09/06)
[Full Text]
[Summary]
[Status]
This Statement
defines fair value, establishes a framework for measuring fair value in
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), and expands disclosures
about fair value measurements. This Statement applies under other accounting
pronouncements that require or permit fair value measurements, the Board
having previously concluded in those accounting pronouncements that fair
value is the relevant measurement attribute. Accordingly, this Statement
does not require any new fair value measurements. However, for some
entities, the application of this Statement will change current practice.
Reason for
Issuing This Statement
Prior to this
Statement, there were different definitions of fair value and limited
guidance for applying those definitions in GAAP. Moreover, that guidance was
dispersed among the many accounting pronouncements that require fair value
measurements. Differences in that guidance created inconsistencies that
added to the complexity in applying GAAP. In developing this Statement, the
Board considered the need for increased consistency and comparability in
fair value measurements and for expanded disclosures about fair value
measurements.
Differences
between This Statement and Current Practice
The changes to
current practice resulting from the application of this Statement relate to
the definition of fair value, the methods used to measure fair value, and
the expanded disclosures about fair value measurements.
The definition of
fair value retains the exchange price notion in earlier definitions of fair
value. This Statement clarifies that the exchange price is the price in an
orderly transaction between market participants to sell the asset or
transfer the liability in the market in which the reporting entity would
transact for the asset or liability, that is, the principal or most
advantageous market for the asset or liability. The transaction to sell the
asset or transfer the liability is a hypothetical transaction at the
measurement date, considered from the perspective of a market participant
that holds the asset or owes the liability. Therefore, the definition
focuses on the price that would be received to sell the asset or paid to
transfer the liability (an exit price), not the price that would be paid to
acquire the asset or received to assume the liability (an entry price).
This Statement
emphasizes that fair value is a market-based measurement, not an
entity-specific measurement. Therefore, a fair value measurement should be
determined based on the assumptions that market participants would use in
pricing the asset or liability. As a basis for considering market
participant assumptions in fair value measurements, this Statement
establishes a fair value hierarchy that distinguishes between (1) market
participant assumptions developed based on market data obtained from sources
independent of the reporting entity (observable inputs) and (2) the
reporting entity’s own assumptions about market participant assumptions
developed based on the best information available in the circumstances
(unobservable inputs). The notion of unobservable inputs is intended to
allow for situations in which there is little, if any, market activity for
the asset or liability at the measurement date. In those situations, the
reporting entity need not undertake all possible efforts to obtain
information about market participant assumptions. However, the reporting
entity must not ignore information about market participant assumptions that
is reasonably available without undue cost and effort.
This Statement
clarifies that market participant assumptions include assumptions about
risk, for example, the risk inherent in a particular valuation technique
used to measure fair value (such as a pricing model) and/or the risk
inherent in the inputs to the valuation technique. A fair value measurement
should include an adjustment for risk if market participants would include
one in pricing the related asset or liability, even if the adjustment is
difficult to determine. Therefore, a measurement (for example, a
“mark-to-model” measurement) that does not include an adjustment for risk
would not represent a fair value measurement if market participants would
include one in pricing the related asset or liability.
This Statement
clarifies that market participant assumptions also include assumptions about
the effect of a restriction on the sale or use of an asset. A fair value
measurement for a restricted asset should consider the effect of the
restriction if market participants would consider the effect of the
restriction in pricing the asset. That guidance applies for stock with
restrictions on sale that terminate within one year that is measured at fair
value under FASB Statements No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in
Debt and Equity Securities, and No. 124, Accounting for Certain Investments
Held by Not-for-Profit Organizations.
This Statement
clarifies that a fair value measurement for a liability reflects its
nonperformance risk (the risk that the obligation will not be fulfilled).
Because nonperformance risk includes the reporting entity’s credit risk, the
reporting entity should consider the effect of its credit risk (credit
standing) on the fair value of the liability in all periods in which the
liability is measured at fair value under other accounting pronouncements,
including FASB Statement No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and
Hedging Activities.
This Statement
affirms the requirement of other FASB Statements that the fair value of a
position in a financial instrument (including a block) that trades in an
active market should be measured as the product of the quoted price for the
individual instrument times the quantity held (within Level 1 of the fair
value hierarchy). The quoted price should not be adjusted because of the
size of the position relative to trading volume (blockage factor). This
Statement extends that requirement to broker-dealers and investment
companies within the scope of the AICPA Audit and Accounting Guides for
those industries.
This Statement
expands disclosures about the use of fair value to measure assets and
liabilities in interim and annual periods subsequent to initial recognition.
The disclosures focus on the inputs used to measure fair value and for
recurring fair value measurements using significant unobservable inputs
(within Level 3 of the fair value hierarchy), the effect of the measurements
on earnings (or changes in net assets) for the period. This Statement
encourages entities to combine the fair value information disclosed under
this Statement with the fair value information disclosed under other
accounting pronouncements, including FASB Statement No. 107, Disclosures
about Fair Value of Financial Instruments, where practicable.
The guidance in
this Statement applies for derivatives and other financial instruments
measured at fair value under Statement 133 at initial recognition and in all
subsequent periods. Therefore, this Statement nullifies the guidance in
footnote 3 of EITF Issue No. 02-3, “Issues Involved in Accounting for
Derivative Contracts Held for Trading Purposes and Contracts Involved in
Energy Trading and Risk Management Activities.” This Statement also amends
Statement 133 to remove the similar guidance to that in Issue 02-3, which
was added by FASB Statement No. 155, Accounting for Certain Hybrid Financial
Instruments.
How the
Conclusions in This Statement Relate to the FASB’s Conceptual Framework
The framework for
measuring fair value considers the concepts in FASB Concepts Statement No.
2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information. Concepts Statement
2 emphasizes that providing comparable information enables users of
financial statements to identify similarities in and differences between two
sets of economic events.
The definition of
fair value considers the concepts relating to assets and liabilities in FASB
Concepts Statement No. 6, Elements of Financial Statements, in the context
of market participants. A fair value measurement reflects current market
participant assumptions about the future inflows associated with an asset
(future economic benefits) and the future outflows associated with a
liability (future sacrifices of economic benefits).
This Statement
incorporates aspects of the guidance in FASB Concepts Statement No. 7, Using
Cash Flow Information and Present Value in Accounting Measurements, as
clarified and/or reconsidered in this Statement. This Statement does not
revise Concepts Statement 7. The Board will consider the need to revise
Concepts Statement 7 in its conceptual framework project.
The expanded
disclosures about the use of fair value to measure assets and liabilities
should provide users of financial statements (present and potential
investors, creditors, and others) with information that is useful in making
investment, credit, and similar decisions—the first objective of financial
reporting in FASB Concepts Statement No. 1, Objectives of Financial
Reporting by Business Enterprises.
FASB Statement No. 159
The Fair Value Option
for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities—Including an
amendment of FASB Statement No. 115
(Issue Date 02/07)
[Full Text]
[Summary]
[Status]
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Why Is the FASB
Issuing This Statement?
This Statement
permits entities to choose to measure many financial instruments and certain
other items at fair value. The objective is to improve financial reporting
by providing entities with the opportunity to mitigate volatility in
reported earnings caused by measuring related assets and liabilities
differently without having to apply complex hedge accounting provisions.
This Statement is expected to expand the use of fair value measurement,
which is consistent with the Board’s long-term measurement objectives for
accounting for financial instruments.
What Is the Scope
of This Statement—Which Entities Does It Apply to and What Does It Affect?
This Statement
applies to all entities, including not-for-profit organizations. Most of the
provisions of this Statement apply only to entities that elect the fair
value option. However, the amendment to FASB Statement No. 115, Accounting
for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, applies to all
entities with available-for-sale and trading securities. Some requirements
apply differently to entities that do not report net income.
The following are
eligible items for the measurement option established by this Statement:
Recognized
financial assets and financial liabilities except:
An investment in
a subsidiary that the entity is required to consolidate
An interest in a
variable interest entity that the entity is required to consolidate
Employers’ and
plans’ obligations (or assets representing net overfunded positions) for
pension benefits, other postretirement benefits (including health care and
life insurance benefits), postemployment benefits, employee stock option and
stock purchase plans, and other forms of deferred compensation arrangements,
as defined in FASB Statements No. 35, Accounting and Reporting by Defined
Benefit Pension Plans, No. 87, Employers’ Accounting for Pensions, No. 106,
Employers’ Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions, No.
112, Employers’ Accounting for Postemployment Benefits, No. 123 (revised
December 2004), Share-Based Payment, No. 43, Accounting for Compensated
Absences, No. 146, Accounting for Costs Associated with Exit or Disposal
Activities, and No. 158, Employers’ Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension
and Other Postretirement Plans, and APB Opinion No. 12, Omnibus Opinion—1967
Financial assets
and financial liabilities recognized under leases as defined in FASB
Statement No. 13, Accounting for Leases (This exception does not apply to a
guarantee of a third-party lease obligation or a contingent obligation
arising from a cancelled lease.)
Deposit
liabilities, withdrawable on demand, of banks, savings and loan
associations, credit unions, and other similar depository institutions
Financial
instruments that are, in whole or in part, classified by the issuer as a
component of shareholder’s equity (including “temporary equity”). An example
is a convertible debt security with a noncontingent beneficial conversion
feature.
Firm commitments
that would otherwise not be recognized at inception and that involve only
financial instruments
Nonfinancial
insurance contracts and warranties that the insurer can settle by paying a
third party to provide those goods or services
Host financial
instruments resulting from separation of an embedded nonfinancial derivative
instrument from a nonfinancial hybrid instrument.
How Will This
Statement Change Current Accounting Practices?
The fair value
option established by this Statement permits all entities to choose to
measure eligible items at fair value at specified election dates. A business
entity shall report unrealized gains and losses on items for which the fair
value option has been elected in earnings (or another performance indicator
if the business entity does not report earnings) at each subsequent
reporting date. A not-for-profit organization shall report unrealized gains
and losses in its statement of activities or similar statement.
The fair value
option:
May be applied
instrument by instrument, with a few exceptions, such as investments
otherwise accounted for by the equity method
Is irrevocable
(unless a new election date occurs)
Is applied only
to entire instruments and not to portions of instruments.
How Does This
Statement Contribute to International Convergence?
The fair value
option in this Statement is similar, but not identical, to the fair value
option in IAS 39, Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement. The
international fair value option is subject to certain qualifying criteria
not included in this standard, and it applies to a slightly different set of
instruments.
What Is the
Effective Date of This Statement?
This Statement is
effective as of the beginning of an entity’s first fiscal year that begins
after November 15, 2007. Early adoption is permitted as of the beginning of
a fiscal year that begins on or before November 15, 2007, provided the
entity also elects to apply the provisions of FASB Statement No. 157, Fair
Value Measurements.
No entity is
permitted to apply this Statement retrospectively to fiscal years preceding
the effective date unless the entity chooses early adoption. The choice to
adopt early should be made after issuance of this Statement but within 120
days of the beginning of the fiscal year of adoption, provided the entity
has not yet issued financial statements, including required notes to those
financial statements, for any interim period of the fiscal year of adoption.
This Statement permits
application to eligible items existing at the effective date (or early
adoption date).
Many other U.S. and International Standards directly or indirectly impact
on fair value accounting! In particular international IAS 32 and IAS 39
require fair value accounting in many circumstances.
Introduction to Valuation
Damodaran Online: A Great Sharing Site from a Finance Professor at New York
University and Textbook Writer ---
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/%7Eadamodar/
This site has great sections on corporate finance, investments,
valuation, spreadsheets, research, etc. For example, take a look at the
helpers on valuation ---
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/%7Eadamodar/
You can pick the valuation approach that you would like to go to, to
see illustrations, solutions and other supporting material.
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Discounted Cashflow Valuation |
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Relative Valuation |
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Option Pricing Approaches to Valuation |
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Acquisition Valuation |
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EVA, CFROI and other Value Enhancement Strategies |
Or you can pick the material that you are interested in.
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Spreadsheets |
Overheads |
Datasets |
References |
Problems & Solutions |
Derivations and Discussion |
Valuation Examples |
PowerPoint presentations |
Jim Mahar's finance sharing site (especially note his great blog link)
---
http://financeprofessor.com/
Financial Rounds from an anonymous finance professor ---
http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value controversies in accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue
Bob Jensen's finance and investment helpers are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Bookbob1.htm
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on September 22, 2006
TITLE: FASB to Issue Retooled Rule for Valuing Corporate Assets
REPORTER: David Reilly
DATE: Sep 15, 2006
PAGE: C3
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115828639109763950.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
TOPICS: Accounting, Advanced Financial Accounting, Fair Value Accounting
SUMMARY: On 9/15/2006, the FASB issued Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 157, Fair Value Measurements. The standard "...provides
enhanced guidance for using fair value to measure assets and liabilities.
The standard also responds to investors' requests for expanded information
about the extent to which companies measure assets and liabilities at fair
value, the information used to measure fair value, and the effect of fair
value measurements on earnings." (Source: FASB News Release available on
their web site at http://www.fasb.org/news/nr091506.shtml) This new standard
must be used as guidance whenever reporting entities use fair value to
measure value assets and liabilities as a required or acceptable method of
applying GAAP.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is the purpose of issuing Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 157? In your answer, describe how this standard should help to
alleviate discrepancies in practice. To help answer this question, you may
access the FASB's own news release about the standard, available at http://www.fasb.org/news/nr091506.shtml
or the new standard itself, available on the FASB's web site.
2.) From your own knowledge, cite an example in which fair value is used
to measure an asset or liability in corporate balance sheets. Why is fair
value an appropriate measure for including these assets and liabilities in
corporate balance sheets?
3.) What is the major difficulty with using fair values for financial
reporting that is cited in the article?
4.) Define the term "historical cost." Name two flaws with the use of
historical costs, one cited in the article and one based on your own
knowledge. Be sure to explain the flaw clearly.
5.) How does this standard help to alleviate the issue described in
answer to question 3? Again, you may access the FASB's web site, and the
news release in particle, to answer this question.
6.) The article closes with a statement that "The FASB hopes to counter
some of [the issues cited in the article] by expanding disclosures required
for all balance sheet items measure at fair value..." What could be the
possible problem with that requirement?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"FASB to Issue Retooled Rule For Valuing Corporate Assets New Method
Repeals Limits Spurred by Enron Scandal; Critics Worry About Abuses," by
David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, September 15, 2006; Page
C3 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115828639109763950.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
Accounting rule makers have wrapped up an
overhaul of a tricky but important method of valuing corporate assets,
despite some critics' warning that the change could reopen the door to
abuses like those seen at Enron Corp.
The overhaul, contained in an accounting
standard that could be issued as early as today, will repeal a ban put
in place after Enron collapsed into bankruptcy court in late 2001 amid
an array of accounting irregularities. The ban prohibited companies
immediately booking gains or losses from complex financial instruments
whose real value may not be known for years.
The Financial Accounting Standards Board's new
rule will require companies to base "fair" values for certain items on
what they would fetch from a sale in an open market to a third party. In
the past, firms often would use internal models to determine the value
of instruments that didn't have a readily available price.
FASB prohibited that practice after Enron used
overly optimistic models to value multiyear power contracts in a bid to
pad earnings. The ban was meant to give the board time to come up with a
new approach to determining fair values.
The accounting rule makers say the new standard
will give companies, auditors and investors much needed, and more
nuanced, guidance on how to measure market values. Companies will have
to think, "it's not my own estimate of what something is worth to me,
but what the market would demand for this," said Leslie Seidman, an FASB
member. While clarifying how to come up with appropriate values for some
instruments, the new standard doesn't expand the use of what is known as
fair-value accounting.
Critics say the new rule reopens the door to
manipulation and possibly fraud by unscrupulous managers. Requiring
market values for instruments where there isn't a ready price in a
market can be "a license for management to invent the financial
statements to be whatever they want them to be," Damon Silvers,
associate general counsel for the AFL-CIO, said at a meeting of an FASB
advisory group this spring.
Jousting over the standard reflects a deep rift
within accounting circles. For decades, accounting values were mostly
based on historical cost, or what a company paid for a particular asset.
In recent years, accounting rules have moved toward the use of market
values, known as fair-value accounting. In some ways this reflects the
shift in the U.S. from a manufacturing to a service economy, where
intangible assets are more important than the plant and equipment that
previously defined a company's financial strength.
Starting in the mid-1980s, companies also began
using ever-more-complicated financial instruments such as futures,
options and swaps to manage interest-rate, currency and other risks.
Such contracts often can't be measured based on their cost. This spurred
the use of market values, thought to be more realistic. But these values
can be tough to determine because many complex financial instruments are
tailor-made and don't trade on open markets in the same way as stocks.
Of course, valuations based on historical cost
also have flaws. The savings-and-loan crisis of the late 1980s, for
example, was prompted in part by thrifts carrying loans on their balance
sheets at historical cost, even though the loans had plummeted in value.
Robert Herz, the FASB's chairman, acknowledges
the difficulty in coming up with a market, or fair, value for many
instruments. In discussions, he often asks how a company could
reasonably be expected to come up with a fair value for a 30-year swap
agreement on the Thai currency, the baht, which is a bet on the future
value of that currency against another.
The answer, according to Mr. Herz and the FASB,
is to base the value on what a willing third-party would pay in the
market and possibly include a discount to reflect the uncertainty
inherent in the approach.
In an interview earlier this year, Mr. Herz
said this valuation approach would reduce the likelihood of a recurrence
of problems such as those seen at Enron. "The problem wasn't that Enron
was using fair values, it was that they were using 'unfair' values," he
said.
Still, "the bottom line is that fair-value
accounting is a great thing so long as you have market values," said J.
Edward Ketz, an associate accounting professor at Pennsylvania State
University, who is working on a book about the FASB's new standard. "If
you don't, you get into some messy areas."
The FASB hopes to counter some of these issues
by expanding disclosures required for all balance-sheet items measured
at fair value, the board's Ms. Seidman said.
October 15, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
The original 157 Exposure Draft proposed a Fair Value Option (FVO)
that would have allowed carrying of virtually any financial asset or
liability at fair value rather than just limiting fair value accounting
to selected items that are now required to be carried at fair value
rather than historical cost. Business firms, and especially banks,
generally are against fair value accounting (due to reporting
instabilities that arise from fair value adjustments prior to contract
settlements). The FASB backed off of the FVO when it issued FAS 157,
thereby relegating FAS 157 to a standard that clarifies definitions of
fair value in various circumstances. Hence FAS 157 is largely semantic
and does not change the present fair value accounting rules.
I asked Paul Pacter (at Deloitte in Hong Kong where he's still very
active in helping to set IFRS and FASB standards) for an update on the
FVO Project (commenced in 2004) that failed to impact the new FAS 157
standard. His reply is below.
October 31 reply from Paul Pacter (CN - Hong Kong)
[paupacter@deloitte.com.hk]
Hi Bob,
Yes, FASB's FV Option (FVO) t is very much
active -- an ED on phase 1 was issued in January, and a final FAS is
expected before year end.
- Phase 1 addresses creating an FVO for
financial assets and financial liabilities.
- Phase 2 addresses creating an FVO for
selected nonfinancial items.
Thus phase 2 would go beyond IFRSs, though
several IFRSs have FV options for individual types of assets. IAS 16 and
IAS 38 allow it for PP&E and intangibles -- though the credit is to
surplus, not P&L, no recycling, subsequent depreciation of revalued
amounts. IAS 40 gives a FV option for investment property -- FV through
P&L. IAS 41 isn't an option, it's a requirement for FV through P&L for
agricultural assets.
Phase 2 would commence in 2007.
Re possible amendment to FAS 157, I don't think
FASB plans to do that, though I suppose there might be some
consequential amendment. But I don't think the FVO will change the
definition of fair value that's in FAS 157.
Here's FASB's web page: http://www.fasb.org/project/fv_option.shtml
Warm regards,
Paul
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at various other links:
I recently completed the first draft of a paper on fair value at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
Comments would be helpful.
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms
Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation, and Yield
Curves for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial
Instruments ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm
Robert Walker's First Blog Entry is About Fair Value Accounting,
October 27, 2006 ---
http://www.robertbwalkerca.blogspot.com/
Introduction
I have decided to begin a commentary which expresses my views on accounting.
As I begin to do this I envisage the source of my commentary to comprise
three different sorts of writing in which I may engage:
§ Simple notes directly to the ‘blog’ such as this.
§ Formal submissions I may make to various bodies including the IASB.
§ Letters or reports I may write for one reason or another that I think
might have some general readership.
The expression of my views will stray from the subject matter of accounting
per se to deal with matters of enormous significance to me such as corporate
or public administration. Such expressions will not be too substantial a
digression from the core subject matter because I believe that the
foundation of good ‘corporate governance’, to use a vogue term, is
accounting.
Source of my ideas on accounting
I would have to confess that the foundation upon which I base my philosophy
of accounting is derivative, as much of human knowledge is of course. It is
not for nothing that Newtown said that if he can see so far it is because he
stands on the shoulders of giants. In my case, that ‘giant’ is Yuiji Ijiri.
As I begin a detailed exposition of my views I shall return to the lessons I
learned many years ago from Theory of Accounting Measurement, a neglected
work that will still be read in 1,000 years or so long as humankind survives
whichever is the shorter. As the depredations of the standard setting craze
are visited upon us with ever increasing complexity, the message delivered
by Ijiri will be heeded more an more.
The basic structure of accounting
Without wishing to be too philosophical about it, I need to begin by
outlining what I mean by accounting. Accounting, in my mind, comprises three
inter-related parts. These are:
§ Book-keeping.
§ Accounting.
§ Financial reporting.
Book-keeping is the process of recording financial data elements in the
underlying books of account. These financial data elements represent, or
purport to represent, real world events. The heart of book-keeping is the
double entry process. For instance at the most basic level a movement in
cash will result in the surrender or receipt of an asset, the incurring or
settlement of a liability and so on.
I have no complete and coherent theory of the limits of book-keeping.
Clearly cash movement (change of ownership) or the movement of commodity is
the proper subject matter of book-keeping. Whether all forms of contract
should be similarly treated is not clear to me. I am inclined to say yes.
That is to adopt Ijiri’s theory of commitment accounting, but I can foresee
that this leads me to conclusions that I may find unpalatable later on.
Incidentally I say this because an epiphany I had, based on the notion of
commitment accounting, some years ago is beginning to unravel.
Book-keeping goes beyond recording to encompass control. That is the process
by which the integrity of the centre piece of book-keeping – the general
ledger expressing double entry – is ensured. I will not concern myself with
such processes though this is not to say that they are unimportant.
Accounting is the process by which sense is made of what is a raw record
expressed in the general ledger. It is the process of distillation and
summation that enables the accountant to gain on overview of what has
happened to the entity the subject of the accounting. Accounting
fundamentally assumes that the accountant is periodically capable of saying
something useful about the real world using his or her special form of
notation.
Financial reporting is the process by which data is assembled into a
comprehensive view of the world in accordance with a body of rules. It
differs, in the ideal, from accounting in a number of ways. Most benignly it
differs, for instance, by including ancillary information for the benefit of
a reader beyond the mere abstraction from the general ledger. Again in the
ideal there is an inter-relationship between the three levels in the
accounting hierarchy. That is, the rules of financial reporting will, to
some degree shape the order and format of the basic, book-keeping level so
that the process of distillation and summation follows naturally to the
final level of reporting without dramatic alteration.
Perhaps what concerns me is that the sentiment expressed above can be seen,
without much effort, to be only ideal and that in reality it does not arise.
In short the golden strand that links the detailed recording of real world
phenonmena to its final summation is broken.
An example
I was asked recently by a student of accounting to explain IAS 41, the IASB
standard on agriculture. As I don’t deal in primary production at all, I had
not thought about this subject for years.
IAS 41 admonishes the accountant to apply ‘fair value’ accounting. Fair
value accounting is the process by which current sale prices, or their
proxies, are substituted for the past cost of any given item.
For instance, you may have a mature vineyard. The vineyard comprises land,
the vine and its fruit, the plant necessary to sustain the vine (support
structures, irrigation channels etc.). Subsumed within the vine are the
materials necessary for it to grow and start producing fruit. This will
include the immature plant, the chemical supplements necessary to nurture
and protect it, and the labour necessary to apply it.
The book-keeping process will faithfully record all of these components.
Suppose for example the plant, fertliser and labour cost $1000. In the books
will be recorded:
Dr Vineyard $1000
Cr Cash $1000
At the end of the accounting period, the accountant will summarise this is a
balance statement. He or she will then obtain, in some way, the current
selling price of the vine. Presumably this will be the future cash stream of
selling the fruit, suitably discounted. Assume that this is $1200.
The accountant will then make the following incremental adjustment:
Dr Vineyard $200
Cr Equity $200
Looked like this there is a connection between the original book-keeping and
the periodic adjustment at the end of the accounting period. This is an
illusion. The incremental entry disguises what is really happening. It is as
follows:
Dr Equity $1000
Cr Vineyard $1000
And
Dr Vineyard $1200
Cr Equity $1200
Considered from the long perspective, the original book-keeping has been
discarded and a substitute value put in its place. This is the truth of the
matter. The subject matter of the first phase of accounting was a set of
events arising in a bank and in the entity undertaking accounting. The
subject matter of the second phase is a set of future sales to a party who
does not yet exist.
From a perspective of solvency determination, a vital element of corporate
governance, the view produced by the first phase is next to useless.
However, the disquiet I had in my mind which I had suppressed until
recently, relates to the shattering of the linkages between the three levels
of accounting in the final reporting process. This disquiet has returned as
I contemplate the apparently unstoppable momentum of the standard setting
process.
October 28, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Robert,
I hope you add many more entries to your blog.
The problem with "original book-keeping" is that it provides
no answer how to account for risk of many modern day contracts that were not
imagined when "original book-keeping" evolved in a simple world of
transactions. For example, historical costs of forward contracts and swaps
are zero and yet these contracts may have risks that may outweigh all the
recorded debt under "original book-keeping." Once we opened the door to fair
value accounting to better account for risk, however, we opened the door to
misleading the public that booked fair value adjustments can be aggregated
much like we sum the current balances of assets and liabilities on the
balance sheet. Such aggregations are generally nonsense.
I don't know if you saw my recent hockey analogy or not. It
goes as follows:
Goal Tenders versus Movers and Shakers
Skate to where the puck is going, not to where it is.
Wayne Gretsky (as quoted for many years by Jerry Trites at
http://www.zorba.ca/ )
Jensen Comment
This may be true for most hockey players and other movers and shakers, but for
goal tenders the eyes should be focused on where the puck is at every moment ---
not where it's going. The question is whether an accountant is a goal tender
(stewardship responsibilities) or a mover and shaker (part of the managerial
decision making team). This is also the essence of the debate of historical
accounting versus pro forma accounting.
Graduate student Derek Panchuk and professor Joan
Vickers, who discovered the Quiet Eye phenomenon, have just completed the most
comprehensive, on-ice hockey study to determine where elite goalies focus their
eyes in order to make a save. Simply put, they found that goalies should keep
their eyes on the puck. In an article to be published in the journal Human
Movement Science, Panchuk and Vickers discovered that the best goaltenders rest
their gaze directly on the puck and shooter's stick almost a full second before
the shot is released. When they do that they make the save over 75 per cent of
the time.
"Keep your eyes on the puck," PhysOrg, October 26, 2006 ---
http://physorg.com/news81068530.html
I have written a more serious piece about both theoretical
and practical problems of fair value accounting. I should emphasize that
this was written after the FASB Exposure Draft proposing fair value
accounting as an option for all financial instruments and the culminating
FAS 157 that is mainly definitional and removed the option to apply fair
value accounting to all financial instruments even though it is still
required in many instances by earlier FASB standards.
My thoughts on this are at the following two links:
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue
Bob Jensen
October 30, 2006 reply from Robert B Walker
[walkerrb@ACTRIX.CO.NZ]
Bob
Thanks for the support. I have answered you in my
second installment (
www.robertbwalkerca.blogspot.com ).
I shall continue to write if for no other reason
than for myself. I have had it in mind to write a book. I shall begin doing
so this way.
Robert
October 30, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
I have difficulty envisioning forward contracts as “executory contracts.”
These appear to be to be executed contracts that are terminated when the
cash finally flows.
Fair value appears to be the only way to book forward contracts if they
are to be booked at all, although fair value on the date they are signed is
usually zero.
Once you are in the fair value realm, you have all the aggregation
problems, blockage problems, etc. that are mentioned at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
I guess what I’d especially like you to address is the problem of
aggregation in a balance sheet or income statement based upon heterogeneous
measurements.
Bob Jensen
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at various other links:
I recently completed the first draft of a paper on fair value at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
Comments would be helpful.
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms
Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation, and Yield Curves
for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial
Instruments ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm
Fair value is the
estimated best disposal (exit, liquidation) value in any sale other than a
forced sale. It is defined as follows in Paragraph 540 on Page 243 of
FAS 133:
The amount at which an asset
(liability) could be bought (incurred) or sold (settled) in a current
transaction between willing parties, that is, other than in a forced or
liquidation sale. Quoted market prices in active markets are the best
evidence of fair value and should be used as the basis for the measurement,
if available. If a quoted market price is available, the fair value is the
product of the number of trading units times that market price. If a quoted
market price is not available, the estimate of fair value should be based on
the best information available in the circumstances. The estimate of fair
value should consider prices for similar assets or similar liabilities and
the results of valuation techniques to the extent available in the
circumstances. Examples of valuation techniques include the present value of
estimated expected future cash flows using discount rates commensurate with
the risks involved, option- pricing models, matrix pricing, option-adjusted
spread models, and fundamental analysis. Valuation techniques for
measuring assets and liabilities should be consistent with the objective of
measuring fair value. Those techniques should incorporate assumptions that
market participants would use in their estimates of values, future revenues,
and future expenses, including assumptions about interest rates, default,
prepayment, and volatility. In measuring forward contracts, such as foreign
currency forward contracts, at fair value by discounting estimated future
cash flows, an entity should base the estimate of future cash flows on the
changes in the forward rate (rather than the spot rate). In measuring
financial liabilities and nonfinancial derivatives that are liabilities at
fair value by discounting estimated future cash flows (or equivalent
outflows of other assets), an objective is to use discount rates at which
those liabilities could be settled in an arm's-length transaction.
This is
old news, but it does provide some questions for students to ponder.
The main problem of fair value adjustment is that many ((most?) of the
adjustments cause enormous fluctuations in earnings, assets, and liabilities
that are washed out over time and never realized. The
main advantage is that interim impacts that “might be” realized are
booked. It’s a war between
“might be” versus “might never.” The
war has been waging for over a century with respect to booked assets and two
decades with respect to unbooked derivative instruments, contingencies, and
intangibles.
CFA analysts' group favors full fair value reporting
The CFA Centre for Financial Market Integrity – a
part of the CFA Institute – has published a new financial reporting model
that, they believe, would greatly enhance the ability of financial analysts
and investors to evaluate companies in making investment decisions. The
Comprehensive Business Reporting Model proposes 12 principles to ensure that
financial statements are relevant, clear, accurate, understandable, and
comprehensive (See below).
"Analysts' group favours full fair value reporting," IAS Plus,
October 31, 2005 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
CFA Institute Centre for Financial Market
Integrity
Comprehensive Business Reporting Model –
Principles
|
-
1. The company must be viewed from the
perspective of a current investor in the
company's common equity.
-
2. Fair value information is the only
information relevant for financial decision
making.
-
3. Recognition and disclosure must be
determined by the relevance of the
information to investment decision making
and not based upon measurement reliability
alone.
-
4. All economic transactions and events
should be completely and accurately
recognized as they occur in the financial
statements.
-
5. Investors' wealth assessments must
determine the materiality threshold.
-
6. Financial reporting must be neutral.
-
7. All changes in net assets must be
recorded in a single financial statement,
the Statement of Changes in Net Assets
Available to Common Shareowners.
-
8. The Statement of Changes in Net Assets
Available to Common Shareowners should
include timely recognition of all changes in
fair values of assets and liabilities.
-
9. The Cash Flow Statement provides
information essential to the analysis of a
company and should be prepared using the
direct method only.
-
10. Changes affecting each of the financial
statements must be reported and explained on
a disaggregated basis.
-
11. Individual line items should be reported
based upon the nature of the items rather
than the function for which they are used.
-
12. Disclosures must provide all the
additional information investors require to
understand the items recognized in the
financial statements, their measurement
properties, and risk exposures.
|
|
|
Standards of Value: Theory and Applications
Standards of Value covers the underlying assumption
in many of the prominent standards of value, including Fair Market Value,
investment value, and fair value. It discusses the specific purposes of the
valuation, including divorce, shareholders' oppression, financial reporting, and
how these standards are applied.
Standards of Value: Theory and Applications, by Jay E. Fishman,
Shannon P. Pratt, William J. Morrison Wiley: ISBN: 0-471-69483-5 Hardcover
368 pages November 2006 US $95.00) ---
http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-0471694835.html
"Will Fair Value Fly? Fair-value accounting could change the very basis of
corporate finance,"
by Ronald Fink, CFO Magazine September 01, 2006 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7851757/c_7873404?f=magazine_featured
Much has changed in financial reporting since
Andrew Fastow and Scott Sullivan, the finance chiefs of Enron and
WorldCom, respectively, brought disgrace upon themselves, their
employers, and, to a degree, their profession. Regulators and investors
have pressed companies to be more open and forthcoming about their
results — and companies have responded. According to a new CFO magazine
survey, 82 percent of public-company finance executives disclose more
information in their financial statements today then they did three
years ago. But that positive finding won't quell calls for further
accounting reform.
The U.S. reporting system "faces a number of
important and difficult challenges," Robert Herz, chairman of the
Financial Accounting Standards Board, told the annual conference of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in Washington, D.C.,
last December. Chief among those, said Herz, is "the need to reduce
complexity and improve the transparency and overall usefulness" of
information reported to investors. ad
Critics contend that generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP) remain seriously flawed, even as companies
have beefed up internal controls to comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
"We've done very little but play defense for the last five to six
years," charges J. Michael Cook, chairman and CEO emeritus of Deloitte &
Touche LLP. "It's time to play offense."
Cook, a respected elder statesman in the
accounting community, goes so far as to pronounce financial statements
almost completely irrelevant to financial analysis as currently
conducted. "The analyst community does workarounds based on numbers that
have very little to do with the financial statements," says Cook. "Net
income is a virtually useless number."
How can financial statements become more
relevant and useful? Many reformers, including Herz, believe that
fair-value accounting must be part of the answer. In this approach,
which FASB increasingly favors, assets and liabilities are marked to
market rather than recorded on balance sheets at historical cost.
Fair-value accounting, say its advocates, would give users of financial
statements a far clearer picture of the economic state of a company.
"I know what an asset is. I can see one, I can
touch one, or I can see representations of one. I also know what
liabilities are," says Thomas Linsmeier, a Michigan State University
accounting professor who joined FASB in June. On the other hand, "I
believe that revenues, expenses, gains, and losses are accounting
constructs," he adds. "I can't say that I see a revenue going down the
street. And so for me to have an accounting model that captures economic
reality, I think the starting point has to be assets and liabilities."
More than any other regulatory change, fair
value promises to end the practice of earnings management. That's
because a company's earnings would depend more on what happens on its
balance sheet than on its income statement (see "The End of Earnings
Management?" at the end of this article).
But switching from historical cost would
require enormous effort from overworked finance departments. Valuing
assets in the absence of active markets could be overly subjective,
making financial statements less reliable. Linsmeier's confidence
notwithstanding, disputes could arise over the very definition of
certain assets and liabilities. And using fair value could even distort
a company's approach to deal-making and capital structure.
A Familiar Concept Fair value is by no means
unfamiliar to corporate-finance executives, as current accounting rules
for such items as derivatives (FAS 133 and 155), securitizations (FAS
156), and employee stock option grants (FAS 123R) use it to varying
degrees when recording assets and liabilities. So does a proposal issued
last January for another rule, this one for accounting for all financial
instruments. FASB's more recent proposals to include pensions and leases
on balance sheets also embrace fair-value measurement (see "Be Careful
What You Wish For" at the end of this article).
While both Herz and Linsmeier are careful to
note that they don't necessarily favor the application of fair value to
assets and liabilities that lack a ready market, they clearly advocate
its application where there's sufficient reason to believe the
valuations are reliable. Corporate accounting, Herz says, is the only
major reporting system that doesn't use fair value as its basis, and he
points to the Federal Reserve's use of it in tracking the U.S. economy
as sufficient reason for companies to adopt it.
The corporate world, however, must grapple with
its own complexities. For one, fair value could make it even more
difficult to realize value from acquisitions. Take the question of
contingent considerations, wherein the amount that acquirers pay for
assets ultimately depends on their return. Under current GAAP, the
balance-sheet value of assets that are transferred through such earnouts
may reflect only the amount exchanged at the time the deal is completed,
because the acquirer has considerable leeway in treating subsequent
payments as expenses.
Under fair value, the acquirer would also
include on its balance sheet the present value of those contingent
payments based on their likelihood of materializing. Since the money may
never materialize, some finance executives contend those estimates could
be unreliable and misleading. "I disagree with [this application of fair
value] on principle," James Barge, senior vice president and controller
for Time Warner, said during a conference on financial reporting last
May. ad
Barge cites the acquisition of intangible
assets that a company does not intend to use as a further example of
fair value's potentially worrisome effects. Under current GAAP, their
value is included in goodwill and subject to annual impairment testing
for possible write-off. But if, as FASB is contemplating, the value of
those assets would be recorded on the balance sheet along with that of
the associated tangible assets that were acquired, Barge worries that an
immediate write-off would then be required — even though it would not
reflect the acquiring company's economics.
Fair value's defenders say such concerns are
misplaced. The possibility that a contingent consideration won't
materialize, for starters, is already reflected in an acquirer's bid,
says Patricia McConnell, a Bear Stearns senior managing director who
chairs the corporate-disclosure policy council of the CFA Institute, a
group for financial analysts. "It's in the price," she says.
As for intangibles that are acquired and then
extinguished, the analyst says a write-off would not in fact be required
under fair value if the transaction strengthens the acquirer's market
position. That position would presumably be reflected in the value of
the assets associated with those intangibles as recorded on the balance
sheet under fair-value treatment.
"It may be in buying a brand to gain
monopolistic position that you don't have an expense," McConnell
explains, "but rather you have the extinguishment of one asset and the
creation of another." Yet McConnell, among others, admits that
accounting for intangibles is an area that would need improvement even
if FASB adopted fair value.
Deceptive Debt? Another area of concern
involves capital structure, with Barge suggesting that fair value may
make it more difficult to finance growth with debt. He contends that
marking a company's debt to market could make a company look more highly
exposed to interest-rate risk than it really is, noting during the May
conference that Time Warner's debt was totally hedged.
Barge also cited as problematic the
hypothetical case of a company whose creditworthiness is downgraded by
the rating agencies. By marking down the debt's value on its balance
sheet, the company would realize more income, a scenario Barge called
"nonsensical." He warned of a host of such effects arising under fair
value when a company changes its capital structure.
Proponents find at least some of the complaints
about fair value and corporate debt to be misplaced. Herz notes fair
value would require the company to mark the hedge as well as the debt to
market, so that if a company is hedging interest-rate risk effectively,
its balance sheet should accurately reflect its lack of any exposure.
What's more, fair value could also improve
balance sheets in some cases. When, for instance, a company owns an
interest in another whose results it need not consolidate, the equity
holder's proportion of the other company's assets and liabilities is
currently carried at historical cost. If, however, the other company's
assets have gained value and were marked to market, the equity holder's
own leverage might decrease.
A real-life case in point: If the chemical
company Valhi marked to market its 39 percent stake in Titanium Metals,
Valhi's own ratio of long-term debt to equity would fall from 90 percent
(at the end of 2005) to 56 percent, according to Jack T. Ciesielski,
publisher of The Analyst's Accounting Observer newsletter. ad
Still, even some fair-value proponents share
Barge's concern about credit downgrades. As Ciesielski, a member of
FASB's Emerging Issues Task Force, wrote last April in a report on the
board's proposal for the use of fair value for financial instruments, it
is "awfully counterintuitive" for a company to show rising earnings when
its debt-repayment capacity is declining.
Herz and other fair-value proponents disagree,
noting that the income accrues to the benefit of the shareholders, not
to bondholders. "It's not at all counterintuitive," asserts Rebecca
McEnally, director for capital-markets policy of the CFA Institute
Centre for Financial Market Integrity, citing the fact that the item is
classified under GAAP as "income from forgiveness of indebtedness." But
Ciesielski says investors are unlikely to understand that, and that fair
value, in this case at least, may not produce useful results.
Resolving the Issues Even some of FASB's
critics agree, however, that the current system needs improvement, and
that fair value can help provide it. "Fair value in general is more
relevant than historical cost and can lead to reduced complexity and
greater transparency," Barge admits, though he has noted that the use of
fair value may also lead to "soft" results that "you can't audit."
For much the same reason, Colleen Cunningham,
president and CEO of Financial Executives International (FEI), expressed
concern in testimony before Congress last March that "overly theoretical
and complex standards can result in financial reporting of questionable
accuracy and can create a significant cost burden, with little benefit
to investors." In an interview, she explains that her biggest concern is
that FASB is pushing ahead with fair-value-based rules without
sufficient input from preparers. "Let's resolve the issues" before
proceeding, she insists.
Herz concedes that numerous issues surrounding
fair value need to be addressed. But important users of financial
statements are pressing him to move forward on fair value without delay.
As a comment letter that the CFA Institute sent to FASB put it: "All
financial decision-making should be based on fair value, the only
relevant measurement for assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses."
Meanwhile, Herz isn't waiting for the
conceptual framework to be completed before enacting new rules that
embrace fair value. "In the end, we're not going to get everybody
agreeing," Herz says. "So we have to make decisions" despite lingering
disagreement.
Ironically, one fair-value-based proposal that
FASB issued recently may have created an artful means of defusing
opposition. The Board's proposal for financial instruments gives
preparers of financial reports the choice of using historical cost or
fair value in recording the instruments on their balance sheets. That
worries some people, who say giving companies a choice of methods will
make it harder to compare their results, even when they're in the same
industry.
Continued in article
"Guidance on fair value measurements under FAS 123(R)," IAS Plus, May 8,
2006 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
Deloitte & Touche (USA) has updated its book of
guidance on FASB Statement No. 123(R) Share-Based Payment:
A Roadmap to Applying the Fair Value Guidance to Share-Based Payment
Awards (PDF 2220k). This second edition
reflects all authoritative guidance on FAS 123(R) issued as of 28 April
2006. It includes over 60 new questions and answers, particularly in the
areas of earnings per share, income tax accounting, and liability
classification. Our interpretations incorporate the views in SEC Staff
Accounting Bulletin Topic 14 "Share-Based Payment" (SAB 107), as well as
subsequent clarifications of EITF Topic No. D-98 "Classification and
Measurement of Redeemable Securities" (dealing with mezzanine equity
treatment). The publication contains other resource materials, including
a GAAP accounting and disclosure checklist. Note that while FAS 123 is
similar to
IFRS 2 Share-based Payment, there are some
measurement differences that are
Described Here.
Bob Jensen's threads on employee stock options are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/sfas123/jensen01.htm
Fair Value Accounting Book Review (Meeting the New FASB Requirements)
From SmartPros on May 1, 2006
Fair Value for Financial Reporting by Alfred King
highlights the accounting and auditing requirements for fair value
information and offers a detailed explanation of how the FASB is going
to change "fair value," from determining the fair value of intangible
assets to
selecting and working with an appraiser ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x35458.xml
Fair Value for Financial Reporting: Meeting the New FASB Requirements
by Alfred M. King
ISBN: 0-471-77184-8
Hardcover 352 pages April 2006
Click to
Download the Comprehensive Business Reporting Model from the CFA
Institute website.
Click here for
Press Release (PDF 26k).
As you
can see below, the war is not over yet. In
fact it has intensified between corporations (especially banks) versus
standard setters versus members of the academy.
From The Wall
Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on April 2, 2004
TITLE: As IASB
Unveils New Rules, Dispute With EU Continues
REPORTER: David Reilly
DATE: Mar 31, 2004
PAGE: A2 LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108067939682469331,00.html
TOPICS: Generally accepted accounting principles, Fair Value Accounting,
Insider trading, International Accounting, International Accounting
Standards Board
SUMMARY: Despite
controversy with the European Union (EU), the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB) is expected to release a final set of international
accounting standards. Questions focus on the role of the IASB, controversy
with the EU, and harmonization of the accounting standards.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is the role of the IASB? What authority does the IASB have to
enforce standards?
2.) List three
reasons that a country would choose to follow IASB accounting standards. Why
has the U.S. not adopted IASB accounting standards?
3.) Discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of harmonization of accounting standards
throughout the world. Why is it important the IASB reach a resolution with
the EU over the disputed accounting standards?
4.) What is fair
value accounting? Why would fair value accounting make financial statements
more volatile? Is increased volatility a valid argument for not adopting
fair value accounting? Does GAAP in the United States require fair value
accounting? Support your answers.
There are a number of software vendors of FAS 133 valuation
software.
One of the major companies is Financial CAD --- http://www.financialcad.com/
FinancialCAD provides software and services that
support the valuation and risk management of financial securities and
derivatives that is essential for banks, corporate treasuries and asset
management firms. FinancialCAD’s industry standard financial analytics are
a key component in FinancialCAD solutions that are used by over 25,000
professionals in 60 countries.
See software.
Fair value accounting politics in the revised
IAS 39
From Paul Pacter's IAS Plus on July 13, 2005
---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
Also see
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/IASBFairValueFAQ.pdf
-
Why did the Commission
carve out the full fair
value option in the
original IAS 39
standard?
-
Do
prudential supervisors
support IAS 39 FVO as
published by the IASB?
-
When will the Commission
to adopt the amended
standard for the IAS 39
FVO?
-
Will companies be able
to apply the amended
standard for their 2005
financial statements?
-
Does the amended
standard for IAS 39 FVO
meet the EU endorsement
criteria?
-
What about the
relationship between the
fair valuation of own
liabilities under the
amended IAS 39 FVO
standard and under
Article 42(a) of the
Fourth Company Law
Directive?
-
Will the Commission now
propose amending Article
42(a) of the Fourth
Company Directive?
-
What about the remaining
IAS 39 carve-out
relating to certain
|
|
On June 23, 2005, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
issued an Exposure Draft (ED) entitled "Fair Value Measurements." The
original ED can be downloaded free at
http://www.fasb.org/draft/ed_fair_value_measurements.pdf
"Response to the FASB's Exposure Draft on Fair Value Measurements," AAA
Financial Standards Committee, Accounting Horizons, September 2005, pp. 187-195
---
http://aaahq.org/pubs/electpubs.htm
RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC ISSUES
The FASB invited comment on all matters related to
the ED, but specifically requested comments on 14 listed issues. The
Committee's comments are limited to those issues for which empirical
research provides some insights, or those sections of the ED that are
conceptually inconsistent or unclear. The Committee has previously
commented on other fair-value-related documents issued by the FASB and other
standard-setting bodies. This letter reiterates comments expressed in those
letters to the extent they are germane to the measurement issues contained
in the ED. However, to better understand our perspective on reporting fair
value information in the financial statements and related notes, we refer
readers to those comment letters (i.e., AAA FASC 1998, 2000).
Issue 1: Definition of Fair Value
The Committee believes that the ED contains some
conceptual inconsistencies between the definition and application of the
fair value measurement attribute. The ED proposes a definition of fair
value that is relatively independent of the entity-specific use of the
assets held or settlement of the liabilities owed. In contrast, the
proposed standard and related implementation guidance includes measurement
that is, at times, directly determined by the entity-specific use of the
asset or settlement of the liability in question.
Some of the inconsistencies with respect to fair
value measurement might be attributable to the attempt to apply general,
high-level fair value guidance to the idiosyncratic attributes of specific
accounts and transactions. In some cases, application to specific accounts
and transactions requires deviation from an entity-independent notion of
fair value to one that includes consideration of the specific types and uses
of assets held or liabilities owed by companies. For example, as we note in
our discussion of Issue 6 (below), one of the examples in the ED suggests
that the fair value of a machine should include an adjustment of quoted
market prices (based on comparable machines) for installation costs.
However, such an adjustment is dependent on the individual circumstances of
the company that purchases the equipment. That is, installation costs are
included in the fair value of an asset only when the firm intends to use
that asset for income producing activities. Alternatively, if the firm
intends to sell the asset, then installation costs are ignored.
Some members of the Committee, however, do not
perceive an inconsistency between the definition and application of the fair
value measurement attribute. These members view the definition of fair
value and the context within which it is applied (i.e., the valuation
premise) to be distinct, albeit related, attributes. Although the
definition of fair value can be entity-independent, the valuation premise
(e.g., value-in-use or value-in-exchange) cannot. Further, these members
argue that ignoring the valuation premise in determining fair value could
lead to unsatisfactory outcomes. For example, if installation costs are
ignored regardless of the valuation premise, then immediately after
purchasing an asset for use in income-producing activities, firms would
suffer impairment losses equal to the installation costs incurred to prepare
the assets for use.
The Committee raises the example of machinery
installation costs to illustrate the confusion we experienced trying to
reconcile the high-level (seemingly entity-independent) definition of fair
value with the contextually determined application standards. We note that
the Introduction of the Ed suggests that the intent of the proposed guidance
in the ED is to establish fair value measures that would be referenced in
other authoritative accounting to establish fair value measures that would
be referenced in other authoritative accounting pronouncements. Presumably,
these other pronouncements would also establish reasonable deviations from
the entity-independent notion of fair value. The Committee believes the
most effective general purpose fair value measurement standard would adopt a
general notion of fair value that is consistent across the definition of
fair value, the accounting standard, and the implementation guidance. To
the extent the Board generally believes that fair value is an
entity-specific concept, the high-level definition should reflect this as
well.
Issues 4 and 5: Valuation Premise and Fair Value
Hierarchy
Related to our previous comments, some members of
the Committee perceive a contradiction between the definition of fair value
in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the ED and the valuation premise described in
paragraph 13. The definition of fair value provided in paragraph 5 suggests
a pure value-in-exchange perspective where fair value is determined by the
market price that would occur between willing parties. In contrast, the
valuation premise described in paragraph 13 suggests that the fair value
estimate can follow either a value-in-use perspective or a value-in-exchange
perspective.
Moreover, the fair value hierarchy described in the
ED gives the highest priority to fair value measurements based on market
inputs regardless of the valuation premise. Some members of the Committee
believe that quoted market prices are not necessarily an appropriate measure
of fair value when a value-in-use premise is being considered. This is
especially true when a quoted price for an identical asset in an active
reference market (i.e., a Level 1 estimate) exists, but is significantly
different from a value-in-use estimate computed by taking the present value
of the firm-specific future cash flows expected to be generated by the asset
(i.e., a Level 3 estimate). In such instances, following the fair value
hierarchy might lead to a fair value estimate more in character with a
value-in-exchange premise than a value-in-use premise.
In summary, the Committee believes that: (1)
integrating the two valuation premises (i.e., value-in-use and
value-in-exchange) into the definition of fair value itself and (2)
elaborating on the differences between the two premises would help ensure
more consistent application of the standard.
Issue 6: Reference Market
Some members of the Committee are confused by the
guidance related to determining the appropriate reference market. With
respect to the Level 1 reference market, the ED states that when multiple
active markets exist, the most advantageous market should be used. The most
advantageous market is determined by comparing prices across multiple
markets net of transactions costs. However, the ED requires that
transactions costs be ignored subsequently in determining the fair value
measurement. In our view, ignoring transactions costs is problematic
because we believe such costs are an ordinary and predictable part of
executing a transaction.
In Example 5 (paragraph B9 (b) of the ED) where two
markets, A and B, are considered, the price in Market B ($35) is more
advantageous than the price in Market A ($25), ignoring transaction costs.
However, the fair value estimate is determined using the price in Market A
because the transactions cost in Market B ($20) is much higher than in
Market A ($5). The guidance is less clear if we modify the example by
reducing the transaction costs for Market B to $15. In this instance,
neither market is advantageous in a "net" sense, but Market B would yield
the highest fair value estimate (ignoring transactions costs), which
provides managers an opportunity to pick the most desirable figure based on
their reporting objectives.
Omitting transactions costs from the fair value
estimate in Example 5 contrasts sharply with Example 3 (Appendix B,
paragraph B7 (a)) where the value-in-use fair value estimate of a machine is
determined by adjusting the quoted market price of a comparable machine by
installation costs. Installation costs are ignored only if the firm intends
to dispose of the asset (Appendix B, paragraph B7 (b)). Thus, managerial
intent plays an integral role in determining whether fair value is computed
with or without installation costs, but the same does not hold for
transaction costs. Since transaction costs are not relevant unless
management intends to dispose of the asset, the Committee agrees that
ignoring transaction costs is justified when a value-in-use premise is
appropriate, but the Committee questions the appropriateness of ignoring
transaction costs when a value-in-exchange premise is adopted.
Issue 7: Pricing in Active Dealer Markets
The ED requires that the fair value of financial
instruments traded in active dealer markets where bid and asked prices are
readily available be estimated using bid prices for assets and asked prices
for liabilities. Some Committee members believe that this requirement is
inconsistent with the general concept of fair value and seems to be biased
toward valuing assets and liabilities at value-in-exchange instead of
value-in-use. Limiting our discussion to the asset case, if a buyer
establishes a long position through a dealer, the buyer must pay the asked
price. By purchasing the asset at the asked price, the buyer clearly
expects to earn an acceptable rate of return on the investment in the asset
(at the higher price). Moreover, if after purchasing the asset, the buyer
immediately applies the ED's proposed fair value measurement guidance (i.e.,
bid price valuation), the buyer would incur a loss on the asset equal to the
bid-ask spread.
In general, the bid price seems relevant only if
the holder wishes to liquidate his/her position. Although the Committee is
not largely in favor of managerial intent-based fair value measures, we are
uncomfortable with a bias toward a value-in-exchange premise for assets
in-use. If the Board decides to retain bid-based (ask-based) accounting for
dealer traded assets (liabilities) in the final standard, then we propose
that the final standard more clearly describe the conceptual basis for
liquidation basis asset and liability valuation.
Issue 9: Level 3 Estimates
Level 3 estimates require considerable judgment in
terms of both the selection and application of valuation techniques. As a
result, estimates using different valuation techniques with different
assumptions will likely yield widely varying fair value estimates. Examples
7 and 8 in Appendix B of the ED illustrate the wide variance in fair value
estimates obtained with different valuation techniques. The ED allows
considerable latitude in both the valuation technique and inputs used. Due
to their incentives, managers might use the flexibility afforded by the
proposed standard to produce biased and unreliable estimates. The
measurement guidance proposed in the ED is similar to the unstructured and
imprecise category of standards analyzed by Nelson et al. (2002). They
find that managers are more likely to attempt (and auditors are less likely
to question) earnings management under such standards compared to more
precise standards.
The income approach to determining a Level 3 fair
value estimate encompasses a basket of valuation techniques including two
different present value techniques--the discount rate adjustment technique
and the expected present value technique.4 The ED conjectures
that these two techniques should produce the same fair values (see
paragraphs A12, A13 and FN 17). But, from an application perspective, this
conjecture is not consistent with empirical results from studies of human
judgment and decision making.5 In particular, psychology
research repeatedly shows that people are very poor intuitive statisticians
(e.g., people consistently make axiomatic violations when estimating
probabilistic outcomes). In light of these findings, statements such as
"the estimated fair values should be the same" provide preparers, auditors,
and users with an unfounded (and descriptively false) belief that the
techniques suggested in the ED will produce the same fair value estimates.
Some members of the Committee believe that the ED
should explicitly caution preparers, auditors, and users by stating that
individuals consistently make these judgment errors. Further, these
Committee members recommend that the ED require companies (when practicable)
to (1) independently use the discount rate adjustment and expected
present value techniques if they decide to use a present value approach to
determine fair value and (2) reconcile the results of the two techniques in
a meaningful fashion and document the reconciliation so it can be audited
for reasonableness. Moreover, the application of the present value
techniques should be independent of suggested or existing fair value figures
when practicable (e.g., the fair value amount recorded in the previous
year's financial statements), because psychology research finds that
preconceived targets and legacy amounts unduly influence current judgments
and decisions (e.g., through "anchoring" and insufficient adjustment).
Although the disclosures required under paragraph
25 of the ED provide some information regarding the potential reliability of
a Level 3 estimate, they do not provide alternative benchmark models that
the firm may have considered in determining those fair value estimates.
Hence, the Committee also recommends that the FASB consider requiring firms
to disclose (1) fair value estimates under alternative valuation techniques,
and (2) sensitivity of fair value estimates to the specific assumptions and
inputs used.
Issue 11: Fair Value Disclosures
As mentioned previously, the Committee believes
that the proposed fair value measurement disclosures are not complete. The
Committee believes that when a firm uses alternative valuation methods to
determine fair value, information regarding the alternative techniques and
inputs employed should be provided. Furthermore, users of financial
statements would get a better understanding of the reliability of fair value
estimates if the financial statements provide detailed disclosures related
to (1) fair value estimates produced by alternative valuation techniques and
reasons for selecting a preferred estimate, and (2) information about the
sensitivity of fair value estimates to changes in assumptions and inputs.
The Committee also notes that the ED requires the
expanded set of reliability related disclosures only for fair value
estimates reported in the balance sheet (paragraph 25). A complete set of
financial statements also includes many fair value estimates reported in the
notes to the financial statements. Some members of the Committee believe
that financial statement users would also benefit from receiving the
reliability related disclosures for fair values disclosed in the footnotes.
Moreover, application of the fair value hierarchy has implications for the
reliability of the unrealized gains and losses reported in net (or
comprehensive) income. Accordingly, some members recommend that firms be
required to disclose a breakdown of unrealized gains or losses based on how
the related fair value amounts were determined (i.e., quoted prices of
identical items, quoted prices of similar items, valuation models with
significant market inputs, or valuation models with significant entity
inputs.)
CONCLUSION
The Committee supports the formulation of a single
standard that provides guidance on fair value measurement. We believe that
such a standard would improve the consistency of fair value measurement
across the many standards that require fair value reporting and disclosure.
In this comment letter, we identify some potential inconsistencies between
fair value definitions and fair value determination, and suggest ways to
improve disclosures so that users of financial statements can better
appreciate the reliability (or lack thereof) of fair value estimates.
Although the Committee recognizes that the ED is
intended to provide fair value measurement guidance, we wish to caution
against promulgating pronouncements that completely eliminate historical
cost information from the financial statements. Evidence reported in
Dietrich et al. (2000) suggests that historical cost information is
incrementally informative even after fair value information is included in
regression analyses.
4
FASB Concept Statement No. 7, Using Cash Flow Information and Present
Value in Accounting Measurements, describes these techniques, albeit
using different terminology. In that Concepts Statement, traditional
present value refers to the discount rate adjustment technique, while
expected cash flow approach refers to the expected present value technique.
5
Probability-related judgments and decisions are among the oldest branches of
psychology and decision-science research. Two excellent resources that
catalogue the problems that individuals have with probability judgments and
statistical reasoning are Baron (2000) and Goldstein and Hogarth (1997).
What are the
advantages and disadvantages of requiring fair value accounting for all
financial instruments as well as derivative financial instruments?
Advantages:
- Eliminate
arbitrary FAS 115 classifications that can be used by management to
manipulate earnings (which is what Freddie Mac did in 2001 and 1002.
- Reduce problems
of applying FAS 133 in hedge accounting where hedge accounting is now
allowed only when the hedged item is maintained at historical cost.
- Provide a
better snap shot of values and risks at each point in time.
For example, banks now resist fair value accounting because they do
not want to show how investment securities have dropped in value.
Disdvantages:
- Combines fact
and fiction in the sense that unrealized gains and losses due to fair
value adjustments are combined with “real” gains and losses from cash
transactions. Many, if not
most, of the unrealized gains and losses will never be realized in cash.
These are transitory fluctuations that move up and down with
transitory markets. For
example, the value of a $1,000 fixed-rate bond moves up and down with
interest rates when at expiration it will return the $1,000 no matter how
interest rates fluctuated over the life of the bond.
- Sometimes
difficult to value, especially OTC securities.
- Creates
enormous swings in reported earnings and balance sheet values.
- Generally
fair value is the estimated exit (liquidation) value of an asset or
liability. For assets, this is often much less than the entry
(acquisition) value for a variety of reasons such as higher transactions
costs of entry value, installation costs (e.g., for machines), and different
markets (e.g., paying dealer prices for acquisition and blue book for
disposal). For example, suppose Company A purchases a computer for $2
million that it can only dispose of for $1 million a week after the purchase
and installation. Fair value accounting requires expensing half of the
computer in the first week even though the computer itself may be utilized
for years to come. This violates the matching principle of matching
expenses with revenues, which is one of the reasons why fair value
proponents generally do not recommend fair value accounting for operating
assets.
"Derivatives
and hedging: An Analyst's Response to US FAS 133," by Frank Will, Corporate
Finance Magazine, June 2002, http://www.corporatefinancemag.com/pdf/122341.pdf
However,
FAS 133 still needs further clarification and improvement as the example of
Fannie Mae shows. Analysts focus more on the economic value of a
company and less on unrealised gains and losses. Much of the FAS 133
volatility in earnings and in equity does not consistently reflect the
economic situation. This makes it difficult to interpret the figures.
Therefore, analysts welcome the decision of some companies voluntarily to
disclose a separate set of figures excluding the effect of FAS 133.
For
more on Frank Will's analysis of FAS 133, Fair Value Accounting, and Fannie
Mae, go to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm
Bob
Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm
You can read more about fair value at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms
Forwarded on May 11, 2003 by Patrick E Charles
[charlesp@CWDOM.DM]
Mark-to-market rule
should be written off
Richard A. Werner
Special to The Daily Yomiuri
Yomiuri
Since 1996,
comprehensive accounting reforms have been gradually introduced in Japan.
Since fiscal 2000, the valuation of investment securities owned by firms has
been based on their market value at book-closing. Since fiscal 2001,
securities held on a long-term basis also have been subjected to the
mark-to-market rule. Now, the Liberal Democratic Party is calling for the
suspension of the newly introduced rule to mark investments to market, as well
as for a delay in the introduction of a new rule that requires fixed assets to
be valued at their market value.
The proponents of
so-called global standards are up in arms at this latest intervention by the
LDP. If marking assets to market is delayed, they argue, the nation will lag
behind in the globalization of accounting standards. Moreover, they argue that
corporate accounts must be as transparent as possible, and therefore should be
marked to market as often and as radically as possible. On the other hand,
opponents of the mark-to-market rule argue that the recent slump in the stock
market, which has reached a 21-year low, can at least partly be blamed on the
new accounting rules.
What are we to make
of this debate? Let us consider the facts. Most leading industrialized
countries, such as Britain, France and Germany, so far have not introduced
mark-to-market rules. Indeed, the vast majority of countries currently do not
use them.
Nevertheless, there
is enormous political pressure to utilize mark-to-market accounting, and many
countries plan to introduce the standard in 2005 or thereafter.
Japan decided to
adopt the new standard ahead of everyone else, based on the advice given by a
few accountants--an industry that benefits from the revision of accounting
standards as any rule change guarantees years of demand for their consulting
services.
However, so far there
has not been a broad public debate about the overall benefits and
disadvantages of the new standard. The LDP has raised the important point that
such accounting changes might have unintended negative consequences for the
macroeconomy.
Let us first reflect
on the microeconomic rationale supporting mark-to-market rules. They are said
to render company accounts more transparent by calculating corporate balance
sheets using the values that markets happen to indicate on the day of book-
closing. Since book-closing occurs only once, twice or, at best, four times a
year, any sudden or temporary move of markets on these days--easily possible
in these times of extraordinary market volatility--will distort accounts
rather than rendering them more transparent.
Second, it is not
clear that marking assets to market reflects the way companies look at their
assets. While they know that market values are highly volatile, there is one
piece of information about corporate assets that have an undisputed meaning
for
firms: the price at
which they were actually bought.
The purchase price
matters as it reflects actual transactions and economic activity. Marking to
market, on the other hand, means valuing assets at values at which they were
never transacted. The company has neither paid nor received this theoretical
money in exchange for the assets. This market value is hence a purely
fictitious value. Instead of increasing transparency, we end up increasing the
part of the accounts that is fiction.
While the history of
marking to market is brief, we do have some track record from the United
States, which introduced mark-to-market accounting in the 1990s.
Did the introduction
increase accounting transparency? The U.S. Financial Accounting Standards
Board last November concluded that the new rule of marking to market allowed
Enron Energy Services Inc. to book profits from long-term energy contracts
immediately rather than when the money was actually received.
This enabled Enron
executives to create the illusion of a profitable business unit despite the
fact that the truth was far from it. Thanks to mark-to-market accounting,
Enron's retail division managed to hide significant losses and book billions
of dollars in profits based on inflated predictions of future energy prices.
Enron's executives received millions of dollars in bonuses when the energy
contracts were signed.
The U.S. Financial
Accounting Standards Board task force recognized the problems and has hence
recommended the mark-to-market accounting rule be scrapped. Since this year,
U.S. energy companies will only be able to report profits as income actually
is received.
Marking to market
thus creates the illusion that theoretical market values can actually be
realized. We must not forget that market values are merely the values derived
on the basis of a certain number of transactions during the day in case.
Strictly speaking, it
is a false assumption to extend the same values to any number of assets that
were not actually transacted at that value on that day.
When a certain number
of the 225 stocks constituting the Nikkei Stock Average are traded at a
certain price, this does not say anything about the price that all stocks that
have been issued by these 225 companies would have traded on that day.
As market
participants know well, the volume of transactions is an important indicator
of how representative stock prices can be considered during any given day. If
the index falls 1 percent on little volume, this is quickly discounted by many
observers as it means that only a tiny fraction of shares were actually
traded. If the market falls 1 percent on record volume, then this may be a
better proxy of the majority of stock prices on that day.
The values at which
U.S. corporations were marked to market at the end of December 1999, at the
peak of a speculative bubble, did little to increase transparency. If all
companies had indeed sold their assets on that day, surely this would have
severely depressed asset prices.
Consider this: If
your neighbor decides to sell his house for half price, how would you feel if
the bank that gave you a mortgage argued that, according to the mark-to-
market rule, it now also must halve the value of your house--and, as a result,
they regret to inform you that you are bankrupt.
We discussed the case
of traded securities. But in many cases a market for the assets on a company's
books does not actually exist. In this case, accountants use so-called net
present value calculations to estimate a theoretical value. This means even
greater fiction because the theoretical value depends crucially on assumptions
made about interest rates, economic growth, asset markets and so on.
Given the dismal
track record of forecasters in this area, it is astonishing to find that
serious accountants wish corporate accounts to be based on them.
There are significant
macroeconomic costs involved with mark-to-market accounting. As all companies
will soon be forced to recalculate their balance sheets more frequently, the
state of financial markets on the calculation day will determine whether they
are still "sound," or in accounting terms, "bankrupt."
While book value accounting tends to reduce volatility in markets to some
extent, the new rule can only increase it. The implications are especially
far-reaching in the banking sector since banks are not ordinary businesses,
but fulfill the public function of creating and providing the money supply on
which economic growth depends.
U.S. experts warned
years ago that the introduction of marking to market could create a credit
crunch. As banks will be forced to set aside larger loan-loss reserves to
cover loans that may have declined in value on the day of marking, bank
earnings could be reduced. Banks might thus shy away from making loans to
small or midsize firms under the new rules, where a risk premium exists and
hence the likelihood of marking losses is larger. As a result, banks would
have a disincentive to lend to small firms. Yet, for all we know, the small
firm loans may yet be repaid in full.
If banks buy a
10-year Japanese government bond with the intention to hold it until maturity,
and the economy recovers, thus pushing down bond prices significantly, the
market value of the government bonds will decline. Banks would thus be forced
to book substantial losses on their bond holdings despite the fact that, by
holding until maturity, they would never actually have suffered any losses.
Japanese banks currently have vast holdings of government bonds. The change in
accounting rules likely will increase problems in the banking sector. As banks
reduce lending, economic growth will fall, thereby depressing asset prices,
after which accountants will quickly try to mark down everyone's books.
Of course, in good
times, the opposite may occur, as we saw in the case of Enron. During upturns,
marking to market may boost accounting figures beyond the actual state of
reality. This also will boost banks' accounts (similar to the Bank for
International Settlements rules announced in 1988), thus encouraging excessive
lending. This in turn will fuel an economic boom, which will further raise the
accounting values of assets.
Thus does it make
sense to mark everything to fictitious market values? We can conclude that
marking to market has enough problems on the micro level to negate any
potential benefits. On the macro level, the disadvantages will be far larger
as asset price volatility will rise, business cycles will be exacerbated and
economic activity will be destabilized.
The world economy has
done well for several centuries without this new rule. There is no evidence
that it will improve anything. To the contrary, it is likely to prove harmful.
The LDP must be lauded for its attempt to stop the introduction of these new
accounting rules.
Werner is an
assistant professor of economics at Sophia University and chief economist at
Tokyo-based investment adviser Profit Research Center Ltd.
Measuring the Business Value of Stakeholder
Relationships all about social capital and how high-trust relationships affect the
bottom line. Plus a new measurement tool for benchmarking the quality of stakeholder
relationships --- www.cim.sfu.ca/newsletter
Trust, shared values and strong
relationships aren't typical financial indicators but perhaps they should be. A joint
study by CIM and the Schulich School of Business is examining the link between high trust
stakeholder relationships and business value creation. The study is sponsored by the
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA).
The research team is looking at
how social capital can be applied to business. The aim of this project is to better
understand corporate social capital, measure the quality of relationships, and provide the
business community with ways to improve those relationships and in turn improve their
bottom line.
Because stakeholder relationships
all have common features, direct comparisons of the quality of relationships can be made
across diverse stakeholder groups, companies and industries.
Social capital is the stock
of active connections among people; the trust, mutual understanding, and shared values and
behaviors that bind the members of human networks and communities and make cooperative
action possible (Cohen and Prusak, 2000).
So far the research suggests that
trust, a cooperative spirit and shared understanding between a company and its
stakeholders creates greater coherence of action, better knowledge sharing, lower
transaction costs, lower turnover rates and organizational stability. In the bigger
picture, social capital appears to minimize shareholder risk, promote innovation, enhance
reputation and deepen brand loyalty.
Preliminary results show that
high levels of social capital in a relationship can build upon themselves. For example, as
a company builds reputation among its peers for fair dealing and reliability in keeping
promises, that reputation itself becomes a prized asset useful for sustaining its current
alliances and forming future ones.
The first phase of the
research is now complete and the study moves into its second phase involving detailed case
studies with six companies that have earned a competitive business advantage through their
stakeholder relationships. Click here for a full report
Bob Jensen's discussion of valuation and
aggregation issues can be found at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm
That scenario isn't as farfetched as you might
think. It's called a prediction market, based on the notion that a marketplace
is a better organizer of insight and predictor of the future than individuals
are. Once confined to research universities, the idea of markets working
within companies has started to seep out into some of the nation's largest
corporations. Companies from Microsoft to Eli Lilly and Hewlett-Packard are
bringing the market inside, with workers trading futures contracts on such
"commodities" as sales, product success and supplier behavior. The
concept: a work force contains vast amounts of untapped, useful information
that a market can unlock. "Markets are likely to revolutionize corporate
forecasting and decision making," says Robin Hanson, an economist at
George Mason University, in Virginia, who has researched and developed
markets. "Strategic decisions, such as mergers, product introductions,
regional expansions and changing CEOs, could be effectively delegated to
people far down the corporate hierarchy, people not selected by or even known
to top management."
Barbara Kiviat (See below)
"The End Of Management? by Barbara Kiviat, Time Magazine, July
12, 2004, pp. 88-92 --- http://www.time.com/time/insidebiz/printout/0,8816,1101040712-660965,00.html
The end of management just might look something
like this. You show up for work, boot up your computer and log onto your
company's Intranet to make a few trades before getting down to work. You see
how your stocks did the day before and then execute a few new orders. You
think your company should step up production next month, and you trade on
that thought. You sell stock for the production of 20,000 units and buy
stock that represents an order for 30,000 instead. All around you, as
co-workers arrive at their cubicles, they too flick on their computers and
trade.
Together, you are buyers and sellers of your
company's future. Through your trades, you determine what is going to happen
and then decide how your company should respond. With employees in the
trading pits betting on the future, who needs the manager in the corner
office?
That scenario isn't as farfetched as you might
think. It's called a prediction market, based on the notion that a
marketplace is a better organizer of insight and predictor of the future
than individuals are. Once confined to research universities, the idea of
markets working within companies has started to seep out into some of the
nation's largest corporations. Companies from Microsoft to Eli Lilly and
Hewlett-Packard are bringing the market inside, with workers trading futures
contracts on such "commodities" as sales, product success and
supplier behavior. The concept: a work force contains vast amounts of
untapped, useful information that a market can unlock. "Markets are
likely to revolutionize corporate forecasting and decision making,"
says Robin Hanson, an economist at George Mason University, in Virginia, who
has researched and developed markets. "Strategic decisions, such as
mergers, product introductions, regional expansions and changing CEOs, could
be effectively delegated to people far down the corporate hierarchy, people
not selected by or even known to top management."
To understand the hype, take a look at
Hewlett-Packard's experience with forecasting monthly sales. A few years
back, HP commissioned Charles Plott, an economist from the California
Institute of Technology, to set up a software trading platform. A few dozen
employees, mostly product and finance managers, were each given about $50 in
a trading account to bet on what they thought computer sales would be at the
end of the month. If a salesman thought the company would sell between, say,
$201 million and $210 million worth, he could buy a security — like a
futures contract — for that prediction, signaling to the rest of the
market that someone thought that was a probable scenario. If his opinion
changed, he could buy again or sell.
When trading stopped, the scenario behind the
highest-priced stock was the one the market deemed most likely. The traders
got to keep their profits and won an additional dollar for every share of
"stock" they owned that turned out to be the right sales range.
Result: while HP's official forecast, which was generated by a marketing
manager, was off 13%, the stock market was off only 6%. In further trials,
the market beat official forecasts 75% of the time.
Intrigued by that success, HP's business-services
division ran a pilot last year with 14 managers worldwide, trying to
determine the group's monthly sales and profit. The market was so successful
(in one case, improving the prediction 50%) that it has since been
integrated into the division's regular forecasts. Another division is
running a pilot to see if a market would be better at predicting the costs
of certain components with volatile prices. And two other HP divisions hope
to be using markets to answer similar questions by the end of the year.
"You could do zillions of things with this," says Bernardo
Huberman, director of the HP group that designs and coordinates the markets.
"The idea of being able to forecast something allows you to prepare,
plan and make decisions. It's potentially huge savings."
Eli Lilly, one of the largest pharmaceutical
companies in the world, which routinely places multimillion-dollar bets on
drug candidates that face overwhelming odds of failure, wanted to see if it
could get a better idea of which compounds would succeed. So last year Lilly
ran an experiment in which about 50 employees involved in drug development
— chemists, biologists, project managers — traded six mock drug
candidates through an internal market. "We wanted to look at the way
scattered bits of information are processed in the course of drug
development," says Alpheus Bingham, vice president for Lilly Research
Laboratories strategy. The market brought together all the information, from
toxicology reports to clinical results, and correctly predicted the three
most successful drugs.
What's more, the market data revealed shades of
opinion that never would have shown up if the traders were, say, responding
to a poll. A willingness to pay $70 for a particular drug showed greater
confidence than a bid at $60, a spread that wouldn't show if you simply
asked, Will this drug succeed? "When we start trading stock, and I try
buying your stock cheaper and cheaper, it forces us to a way of agreeing
that never really occurs in any other kind of conversation," says
Bingham. "That is the power of the market."
The current enthusiasm can be traced in part, oddly
enough, to last summer's high-profile flop of a market that was supposed to
help predict future terrorist attacks. A public backlash killed that
Pentagon project a few months before its debut, but not before the media
broadcast the notion that useful information embedded within a group of
people could be drawn out and organized via a marketplace. Says George
Mason's Hanson, who helped design the market: "People noticed."
Another predictive market, the Iowa Electronic Markets at the University of
Iowa, has been around since 1988. That bourse has accepted up to $500 from
anyone wanting to wager on election results. Players buy and sell outcomes:
Is Kerry a win or Bush a shoo-in? This is the same information that news
organizations and pollsters chase in the run-up to election night. Yet Iowa
outperforms them 75% of the time.
Inspired by such results, researchers at Microsoft
started running trials of predictive markets in February, finding the system
inexpensive to set up. Now they're shopping around for the market's first
real use. An early candidate: predicting how long it will take software
testers to adopt a new piece of technology. Todd Proebsting, who is
spearheading the initiative, explains, "If the market says they're
going to be behind schedule, executives can ask, What does the market know
that we don't know?" Another option: predicting how many patches, or
corrections, will be issued in the first six months of using a new piece of
software. "The pilots worked great, but we had little to compare it
to," he says. "You can reason that this would do a good job. But
what you really want to show is that this works better than the
alternative."
Ultimately, "you may someday see someone in a
desk job or a manufacturing job doing day trading, knowing that's part of
the job," says Thomas Malone, a management professor at M.I.T. who has
written about markets. "I'm very optimistic about the long-term
prospects."
But no market is perfect. Economists are still
unsure of the human factor: how to get people to play and do their best. In
the stock market or even the Iowa prediction market, people put up their own
money and trade to make more. That incentive ensures that people trade on
their best information. But a company that asks employees to risk their own
money raises ethical questions, so most corporate markets use play money to
trade and small bonuses or prizes for good traders. "Though this may
look like God's gift to business, there are problems with it," says
Plott, who ran the first HP experiments. Tokyo-based Dentsu, one of the
world's largest advertising firms, is still grappling with incentives for an
ad forecasting market it will launch later this year with the help of News
Futures, a U.S. consultancy.
And even if companies can figure out how to make
their internal markets totally efficient, there are plenty of reasons that
corporate America isn't about to jump wholesale onto the markets bandwagon.
For one thing, markets, based on individuals and individual interests, could
threaten the kind of team spirit that many corporations have struggled to
cultivate. Established hierarchies could be threatened too. After all, a
market implies that the current data crunching and decision-making process
may not be as good as a gamelike system that often includes lower-level
employees. In a sense, an internal market's success suggests that if upper
managers would just give up control, things would run better. Lilly, which
is considering using a market to forecast actual drug success, is still
grappling with the potential ramifications. "We already have a rigorous
process," says Lilly's Bingham. "So what do you do if you use a
market and get different data?" Throw it out? Or say that the market
was smarter, impugning the tried-and-true system?
There could be risks to individual workers in an
internal trading system as well. If you lose money in the market, does that
mean you're not knowledgeable about something you should be? "You have
to get people used to the idea of being accountable in a very different
way," says Mary Murphy-Hoye, senior principal engineer at Intel, which
has been experimenting with internal markets. "I can now tell if
planners are any good, because they're making money or they're not making
money."
Continued in article
Robert Walker's First Blog Entry is About Fair Value Accounting,
October 27, 2006 ---
http://www.robertbwalkerca.blogspot.com/
Introduction
I have decided to begin a commentary which expresses my views on
accounting. As I begin to do this I envisage the source of my
commentary to comprise three different sorts of writing in which
I may engage:
§ Simple notes directly to the ‘blog’ such as this.
§ Formal submissions I may make to various bodies including the
IASB.
§ Letters or reports I may write for one reason or another that
I think might have some general readership.
The expression of my views will stray from the subject matter of
accounting per se to deal with matters of enormous significance
to me such as corporate or public administration. Such
expressions will not be too substantial a digression from the
core subject matter because I believe that the foundation of
good ‘corporate governance’, to use a vogue term, is accounting.
Source of my ideas on accounting
I would have to confess that the foundation upon which I base my
philosophy of accounting is derivative, as much of human
knowledge is of course. It is not for nothing that Newtown said
that if he can see so far it is because he stands on the
shoulders of giants. In my case, that ‘giant’ is Yuiji Ijiri. As
I begin a detailed exposition of my views I shall return to the
lessons I learned many years ago from Theory of Accounting
Measurement, a neglected work that will still be read in 1,000
years or so long as humankind survives whichever is the shorter.
As the depredations of the standard setting craze are visited
upon us with ever increasing complexity, the message delivered
by Ijiri will be heeded more an more.
The basic structure of accounting
Without wishing to be too philosophical about it, I need to
begin by outlining what I mean by accounting. Accounting, in my
mind, comprises three inter-related parts. These are:
§ Book-keeping.
§ Accounting.
§ Financial reporting.
Book-keeping is the process of recording financial data elements
in the underlying books of account. These financial data
elements represent, or purport to represent, real world events.
The heart of book-keeping is the double entry process. For
instance at the most basic level a movement in cash will result
in the surrender or receipt of an asset, the incurring or
settlement of a liability and so on.
I have no complete and coherent theory of the limits of
book-keeping. Clearly cash movement (change of ownership) or the
movement of commodity is the proper subject matter of
book-keeping. Whether all forms of contract should be similarly
treated is not clear to me. I am inclined to say yes. That is to
adopt Ijiri’s theory of commitment accounting, but I can foresee
that this leads me to conclusions that I may find unpalatable
later on. Incidentally I say this because an epiphany I had,
based on the notion of commitment accounting, some years ago is
beginning to unravel.
Book-keeping goes beyond recording to encompass control. That is
the process by which the integrity of the centre piece of
book-keeping – the general ledger expressing double entry – is
ensured. I will not concern myself with such processes though
this is not to say that they are unimportant.
Accounting is the process by which sense is made of what is a
raw record expressed in the general ledger. It is the process of
distillation and summation that enables the accountant to gain
on overview of what has happened to the entity the subject of
the accounting. Accounting fundamentally assumes that the
accountant is periodically capable of saying something useful
about the real world using his or her special form of notation.
Financial reporting is the process by which data is assembled
into a comprehensive view of the world in accordance with a body
of rules. It differs, in the ideal, from accounting in a number
of ways. Most benignly it differs, for instance, by including
ancillary information for the benefit of a reader beyond the
mere abstraction from the general ledger. Again in the ideal
there is an inter-relationship between the three levels in the
accounting hierarchy. That is, the rules of financial reporting
will, to some degree shape the order and format of the basic,
book-keeping level so that the process of distillation and
summation follows naturally to the final level of reporting
without dramatic alteration.
Perhaps what concerns me is that the sentiment expressed above
can be seen, without much effort, to be only ideal and that in
reality it does not arise. In short the golden strand that links
the detailed recording of real world phenonmena to its final
summation is broken.
An example
I was asked recently by a student of accounting to explain IAS
41, the IASB standard on agriculture. As I don’t deal in primary
production at all, I had not thought about this subject for
years.
IAS 41 admonishes the accountant to apply ‘fair value’
accounting. Fair value accounting is the process by which
current sale prices, or their proxies, are substituted for the
past cost of any given item.
For instance, you may have a mature vineyard. The vineyard
comprises land, the vine and its fruit, the plant necessary to
sustain the vine (support structures, irrigation channels etc.).
Subsumed within the vine are the materials necessary for it to
grow and start producing fruit. This will include the immature
plant, the chemical supplements necessary to nurture and protect
it, and the labour necessary to apply it.
The book-keeping process will faithfully record all of these
components. Suppose for example the plant, fertliser and labour
cost $1000. In the books will be recorded:
Dr Vineyard $1000
Cr Cash $1000
At the end of the accounting period, the accountant will
summarise this is a balance statement. He or she will then
obtain, in some way, the current selling price of the vine.
Presumably this will be the future cash stream of selling the
fruit, suitably discounted. Assume that this is $1200.
The accountant will then make the following incremental
adjustment:
Dr Vineyard $200
Cr Equity $200
Looked like this there is a connection between the original
book-keeping and the periodic adjustment at the end of the
accounting period. This is an illusion. The incremental entry
disguises what is really happening. It is as follows:
Dr Equity $1000
Cr Vineyard $1000
And
Dr Vineyard $1200
Cr Equity $1200
Considered from the long perspective, the original book-keeping
has been discarded and a substitute value put in its place. This
is the truth of the matter. The subject matter of the first
phase of accounting was a set of events arising in a bank and in
the entity undertaking accounting. The subject matter of the
second phase is a set of future sales to a party who does not
yet exist.
From a perspective of solvency determination, a vital element of
corporate governance, the view produced by the first phase is
next to useless. However, the disquiet I had in my mind which I
had suppressed until recently, relates to the shattering of the
linkages between the three levels of accounting in the final
reporting process. This disquiet has returned as I contemplate
the apparently unstoppable momentum of the standard setting
process.
October 28, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Robert,
I hope you add many more entries to your blog.
The problem with "original book-keeping" is that it
provides no answers about how to account for risk of many modern day
contracts that were not imagined when "original book-keeping" evolved in
a simple world of transactions. For example, historical costs of forward
contracts and swaps are zero and yet these contracts may have risks that
may outweigh all the recorded debt under "original book-keeping." Once
we opened the door to fair value accounting to better account for risk,
however, we opened the door to misleading the public that booked fair
value adjustments can be aggregated much like we sum the current
balances of assets and liabilities on the balance sheet. Such
aggregations are generally nonsense.
I don't know if you saw my recent hockey analogy or not.
It goes as follows:
Goal Tenders versus Movers and Shakers
Skate to where the puck is going, not to where it is.
Wayne Gretsky (as quoted for many years by Jerry Trites at
http://www.zorba.ca/ )
Jensen Comment
This may be true for most hockey players and other movers and shakers, but for
goal tenders the eyes should be focused on where the puck is at every moment ---
not where it's going. The question is whether an accountant is a goal tender
(stewardship responsibilities) or a mover and shaker (part of the managerial
decision making team). This is also the essence of the debate of historical
accounting versus pro forma accounting.
Graduate student Derek Panchuk and professor Joan
Vickers, who discovered the Quiet Eye phenomenon, have just completed the most
comprehensive, on-ice hockey study to determine where elite goalies focus their
eyes in order to make a save. Simply put, they found that goalies should keep
their eyes on the puck. In an article to be published in the journal Human
Movement Science, Panchuk and Vickers discovered that the best goaltenders rest
their gaze directly on the puck and shooter's stick almost a full second before
the shot is released. When they do that they make the save over 75 per cent of
the time.
"Keep your eyes on the puck," PhysOrg, October 26, 2006 ---
http://physorg.com/news81068530.html
I have written a more serious piece about both
theoretical and practical problems of fair value accounting. I should
emphasize that this was written after the FASB Exposure Draft proposing
fair value accounting as an option for all financial instruments and the
culminating FAS 157 that is mainly definitional and removed the option
to apply fair value accounting to all financial instruments even though
it is still required in many instances by earlier FASB standards.
My thoughts on this are at the following link:
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
Bob Jensen
E-COMMERCE AND AUDITING FAIR VALUES SUBJECTS OF NEW INTERNATIONAL GUIDANCE
The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) invites comments on two new
exposure drafts (EDs): Auditing Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures and
Electronic Commerce: Using the Internet or Other Public Networks - Effect on the
Audit of Financial Statements. Comments on both EDs, developed by IFAC's
International Auditing Practices Committee (IAPC), are due by January 15, 2002.
See http://accountingeducation.com/news/news2213.html
The IFAC link is at http://www.ifac.org/Guidance/EXD-Download.tmpl?PubID=1003772692151
The purpose of this International Standard on Auditing (ISA) is to establish
standards and provide guidance on auditing fair value measurements and
disclosures contained in financial statements. In particular, this ISA addresses
audit considerations relating to the valuation, measurement, presentation and
disclosure for material assets, liabilities and specific components of equity
presented or disclosed at fair value in financial statements. Fair value
measurements of assets, liabilities and components of equity may arise from both
the initial recording of transactions and later changes in value.
The FASB's Statement No.
148
FAS 148 improves disclosures for
stock-based compensation and provides alternative transition methods for
companies that switch to the fair value method of accounting for stock options
--- http://www.fasb.org/news/nr123102.shtml
The transition guidance and annual disclosure provisions of Statement 148 are
effective for fiscal years ending after December 15, 2002, with earlier
application permitted in certain circumstances. . Fair
value accounting is still optional (until the FASB finally makes up its mind on
stock options.)
FASB Amends
Transition Guidance for Stock Options and Provides Improved Disclosures
Norwalk, CT,
December 31, 2002—The
FASB has published Statement No. 148, Accounting for Stock-Based
Compensation—Transition and Disclosure, which amends FASB Statement No.
123, Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation. In response to a growing
number of companies announcing plans to record expenses for the fair value of
stock options, Statement 148 provides alternative methods of transition for a
voluntary change to the fair value based method of accounting for stock-based
employee compensation. In addition, Statement 148 amends the disclosure
requirements of Statement 123 to require more prominent and more frequent
disclosures in financial statements about the effects of stock-based
compensation.
Under the provisions
of Statement 123, companies that adopted the preferable, fair value based
method were required to apply that method prospectively for new stock option
awards. This contributed to a “ramp-up” effect on stock-based compensation
expense in the first few years following adoption, which caused concern for
companies and investors because of the lack of consistency in reported
results. To address that concern, Statement 148 provides two additional
methods of transition that reflect an entity’s full complement of
stock-based compensation expense immediately upon adoption, thereby
eliminating the ramp-up effect.
Statement 148 also
improves the clarity and prominence of disclosures about the pro forma effects
of using the fair value based method of accounting for stock-based
compensation for all companies—regardless of the accounting method used—by
requiring that the data be presented more prominently and in a more
user-friendly format in the footnotes to the financial statements. In
addition, the Statement improves the timeliness of those disclosures by
requiring that this information be included in interim as well as annual
financial statements. In the past, companies were required to make pro forma
disclosures only in annual financial statements.
The transition
guidance and annual disclosure provisions of Statement 148 are effective for
fiscal years ending after December 15, 2002, with earlier application
permitted in certain circumstances. The interim disclosure provisions are
effective for financial reports containing financial statements for interim
periods beginning after December 15, 2002.
As previously
reported, the FASB has solicited comments from its constituents relating to
the accounting for stock-based compensation, including valuation of stock
options, as part of its recently issued Invitation to Comment, Accounting
for Stock-Based Compensation: A Comparison of FASB Statement No. 123,
Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation, and Its Related Interpretations,
and IASB Proposed IFRS, Share-based Payment. That Invitation to Comment
explains the similarities of and differences between the proposed guidance on
accounting for stock-based compensation included in the International
Accounting Standards Board’s (IASB’s) recently issued exposure draft and
the FASB’s guidance under Statement 123.
After considering the
responses to the Invitation to Comment, the Board plans to make a decision in
the latter part of the first quarter of 2003 about whether it should undertake
a more comprehensive reconsideration of the accounting for stock options. As
part of that process, the Board may revisit its 1995 decision permitting
companies to disclose the pro forma effects of the fair value based method
rather than requiring all companies to recognize the fair value of employee
stock options as an expense in the income statement. Under the provisions of
Statement 123 that remain unaffected by Statement 148, companies may either
recognize expenses on a fair value based method in the income statement or
disclose the pro forma effects of that method in the footnotes to the
financial statements.
Copies of Statement 148 may be
obtained by contacting the FASB’s Order Department at 800-748-0659 or by
placing an order at the FASB’s website at www.fasb.org
.
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting
Educators' Reviews on June 20, 2002
TITLE: And, Now the Question is: Where's the Next Enron?
REPORTER: Cassell Bryan-Low and Ken Brown
DATE: Jun 18, 2002 PAGE: C1 LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1024356537931110920.djm,00.html
TOPICS: off balance sheet financing, Related-party transactions, loan guarantees,
Accounting, Fair Value Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Regulation,
Securities and Exchange Commission
SUMMARY: In the wake of the Enron accounting debacle, investors are concerned that
another Enron-like situation could occur. The article describes steps taken to improve the
quality of financial reporting.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Why is it important that investors and other financial statement users have
confidence in financial reporting?
2.) What is a related-party transaction? What accounting issues are associated with
related-party transactions? What changes in disclosing and accounting for related party
transactions are proposed? Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed changes.
3.) What is off-balance sheet financing? How was Enron able to avoid reporting
liabilities on its balance sheet? What changes concerning special-purpose entities are
proposed? Will the proposed changes prevent future Enron-like situations? Support your
answer.
4.) When are companies required to report loan guarantees as liabilities? What changes
are proposed? Do you agree with the proposed changes? Support your answer.
5.) What is mark to market accounting? How did mark to market accounting contribute to
the Enron debacle? Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of proposed changes related to
mark to market accounting.
6.) What are pro forma earnings? How can pro forma earnings be used to mislead
investors? What changes in the presentation of pro forma earnings are proposed? Will the
proposed changes protect investors?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
Controversies over revenue reporting are discussed at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm
From the Free Wall Street Journal Educators'
Reviews for December 6, 2001
TITLE: Audits of Arthur Andersen Become Further Focus of Investigation
SEC REPORTER: Jonathan Weil
DATE: Nov 30, 2001 PAGE: A3 LINK:
http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1007059096430725120.djm
TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Auditing
SUMMARY: This article focuses on the issues facing Arthur Andersen now that their work
on the Enron audit has become the subject of an SEC investigation. The on-line version of
the article provides three questions that are attributed to "some accounting
professors." The questions in this review expand on those three provided in the
article.
QUESTIONS:
1.) The first question the SEC might ask of Enron's auditors is "were financial
statement disclosures regarding Enron's transactions too opaque to understand?" Are
financial statement disclosures required to be understandable? To whom? Who is responsible
for ensuring a certain level of understandability?
2.) Another question that the SEC could consider is whether Andersen auditors were
aware that certain off-balance-sheet partnerships should have been consolidated into
Enron's balance sheet, as they were in the company's recent restatement. How could the
auditors have been "unaware" that certain entities should have been
consolidated? What is the SEC's concern with whether or not the auditors were aware of the
need for consolidation?
3.) A third question that the SEC could ask is, "Did Andersen auditors knowingly
sign off on some 'immaterial' accounting violations, ignoring that they collectively
distorted Enron's results?" Again, what is the SEC's concern with whether Andersen
was aware of the collective impact of the accounting errors? Should Andersen have been
aware of the collective amount of impact of these errors? What steps would you suggest in
order to assess this issue?
4.) The article finishes with a discussion of expected Congressional hearings into
Enron's accounting practices and into the accounting and auditing standards setting
process in general. What concern is there that the FASB "has been working on a
project for more than a decade to tighten the rules governing when companies must
consolidate certain off-balance sheet 'special purpose entities'"?
5.) In general, how stringent are accounting and auditing requirements in the U.S.
relative to other countries' standards? Are accounting standards in other countries set in
the same way as in the U.S.? If not, who establishes standards? What incentives would the
U.S. Congress have to establish a law-based system if they become convinced that our
private sector standards setting practices are inadequate? Are you concerned about having
accounting and reporting standards established by law?
6.) The article describes revenue recognition practices at Enron that were based on
"noncash unrealized gains." What standard allows, even requires, this practice?
Why does the author state, "to date, the accounting standards board has given energy
traders almost boundless latitude to value their energy contracts as they see fit"?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
CPA2Biz Unveils Business Valuation Resource Center --- http://www.smartpros.com/x31976.xml
The BV Center will include resources and information from the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and industry experts on various
factors affecting the value of a business or a transaction, such as mergers and
acquisitions; economic damages due to a patent infringement or breaches of contract;
bankruptcy or a reorganization; or fraud due to anti-trust actions or embezzlement. The BV
Center will provide a comprehensive combination of solutions that meet the professional
needs of CPAs practicing business valuation, including those who have achieved the AICPA's
Accredited in Business Valuation credential. The BV Center will also provide networking
communities for BV practitioners as well as a public forum for discussion of business
valuation trends, developments and issues.
"Tremendous growth in the BV discipline, coupled with a
dynamic group of factors affecting business valuation, means that CPAs need a consistent,
timely and relevant vehicle through which BV-related information can be disseminated to
them," said Erik Asgeirsson, Vice President of Product Management at CPA2Biz.
"The BV Center on CPA2Biz will provide them with AICPA books, practice aids,
newsletters and software, along with industry expert literature and complementary
third-party products and solutions. Because the issues associated with valuation impact
CPAs in both public and private sectors -- auditors, tax practitioners, personal financial
planners as well as BV specialists -- the BV Center will have a powerful horizontal impact
on the profession."
"I think that CPAs who practice in business valuation ought
to go to the BV Center for information and tools that are timely, relevant and easy to
obtain," said Thomas Hilton, CPA/ABV, Chairman of the AICPA Business Valuation
Subcommittee. "The BV Center is a source CPAs can use to offer their clients a higher
level of service, as well as to connect with other CPAs who provide valuation
services."
The CPA2Biz Website is at www.cpa2biz.com/
Selected References
on Accounting for Intangibles
(most of which were published after the above paper
was written)
BARUCH LEV'S NEW BOOK Brookings Institution Press
has just issued Baruch's new book, Intangibles: Management, Measurement and Reporting.
Regardless of the "dot com" collapse, this subject continues to be high on the
corporate executive's agenda. Baruch foresees increasing attention being paid to
intangibles by both managers and investors. He feels there is an urgent need to improve
both the management reporting and external disclosure about intellectual capital. He
proposes that we seriously consider revamping our accounting model and significantly
broaden the recognition of intangible assets on the balance sheet. The book can be ordered
at https://www.brookings.edu/press/books/intangibles_book.htm
Professor Lev's free documents on this topic can
be downloaded from http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/newnew.html
SSRN's Top 10
Downloads
(The abstracts are free, but the downloads themselves are not free,.
However, your library may provide you with free SSRN downloads if it
subscribes to SSRN)
One
approach to finding the “top” papers is to download the Social Science
Research Network (SSRN) Top 10 downloads in various categories --- http://papers.ssrn.com/toptens/tt_ntwk_all.html
This database is limited to the selected papers included in the database.
For
accounting, SSRN’s Top 10 papers are at http://papers.ssrn.com/toptens/tt_ntwk_204_home.html#ARN
The average number of downloads of this top accounting research network
paper is 227 per month. In contrast the top economics network
research paper has an average of 2,375 downloads per month.
Downloads in other disciplines depend heavily upon the number of graduate
students and practitioners in that discipline.
The
top ten downloads from the accounting network are as follows (note that
some authors like Mike Jensen are not accountants or accounting
educators):
|
16010 |
A
Comparison of Dividend, Cash Flow, and Earnings Approaches to
Equity Valuation
THEODORE SOUGIANNIS
and STEPHEN H. PENMAN
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
and Columbia School of Business
Date posted to database:March 31, 1997
|
10201 |
Value
Based Management: Economic Value Added or Cash Value Added?
FREDRIK WEISSENRIEDER
Anelda AB
Date posted to database:April 5, 1999
|
8041 |
Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure
Michael C. Jensen, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL
CLAIMS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS, Harvard University Press, Dec.
2000, and The Journal Of Financial Economics, 1976.
MICHAEL C. JENSEN
and WILLIAM H. MECKLING
The Monitor Company and Deceased, University of Rochester Simon School
Date posted to database:July 19, 1998
|
7607 |
Evidence
on EVA®
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 12, No. 2, Summer
1999
GARY C. BIDDLE,
ROBERT M. BOWEN
and JAMES S. WALLACE
Hong Kong University of Science & Technology,
University of Washington and University of California at Irvine
Date posted to database:September 20, 1999
|
5194 |
A
Generalized Earnings Model of Stock Valuation
ANDREW ANG
and JUN LIU
Columbia Business School and University of California, Los Angeles
Date posted to database:July 18, 1998
|
5046 |
Which
is More Value-Relevant: Earnings or Cash Flows?
ERVIN L. BLACK
Brigham Young University
Date posted to database:September 2, 1998
|
4927 |
Combining
Earnings and Book Value in Equity Valuation
STEPHEN H. PENMAN
Columbia School of Business
Date posted to database:November 5, 1997
|
4254 |
Separation
of Ownership and Control
Michael C. Jensen, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY,
Harvard University Press, 1998, and Journal of Law and
Economics, Vol. 26, June 1983
EUGENE F. FAMA
and MICHAEL C. JENSEN
University of Chicago and The Monitor Company
Date posted to database:November 29, 1998
|
3843 |
Value
Creation and its Measurement: A Critical Look at EVA
IGNACIO VELEZ-PAREJA
Politecnico Grancolombiano
Date posted to database:May 19, 1999
|
3771 |
Ratio
Analysis and Equity Valuation
DORON NISSIM
and STEPHEN H. PENMAN
Columbia Business School and Columbia School of Business
Date posted to database:May 11, 1999
|
Other Links on Accounting for
Intangibles
"ACCOUNTING FOR INTANGIBLES: THE GREAT
DIVIDE BETWEEN OBSCURITY IN INNOVATION ACTIVITIES AND THE BALANCE SHEET," by Anne
Wyatt, The Singapore Economic Review, Vol. 46, No. 1 pp. 83-117 --- http://www.worldscinet.com/ser/46/sample/S0217590801000243.html
"Accounting for Intangibles: The New
Frontier" by Baruch Lev (January 11, 2001) --- http://www.nyssa.org/abstract/acct_intangibles.html
FAS 141 and 142 Summary (October 22, 2001) --- http://www.aasb.com.au/workprog/board_papers/public/docs/Agenda_paper_9-1_Accounting_for_Intangibles.pdf
New Rules Summary by Paul Evans (February 24,
2002) --- http://bloodstone.atkinson.yorku.ca/domino/Html/users/pevans/pewwwdl.nsf/98615e08bc387dd385256709007822b0/ddc242fb07932d4f85256b6a00494e9c?OpenDocument
ACCOUNTING FOR INTANGIBLES: A LITERATURE REVIEW, Journal
of Accounting Literature, Vol. 19, 2000
by Leandro Cañibano Autonomous University of Madrid Manuel García-Ayuso University of
Seville Paloma Sánchez Autonomous University of Madrid --- http://www.finansanalytiker.no/innhold/aktiv_presinv/Conf050901/Jal.pdf
"ACCOUNTING FOR INTANGIBLES AT
THE ACCOUNTING COURT," by Jan-Erik Gröjer and Ulf Johanson --- http://www.vn.fi/ktm/1/aineeton/seminar/johanback.htm
NYU Intangibles Research Project --- http://www.stern.nyu.edu/ross/ProjectInt/about/
"Alan Kay talks with Baruch Lev," (June
19, 2001) --- http://www.kmadvantage.com/docs/Leadership/Baruch%20Lev%20on%20Intangible%20Assets.pdf
International Accounting Standard No. 38 --- http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp?s=1020299&sc={2954EE08-82A0-4BC0-8AC0-1DE567F35613}&sd=928976660&n=982
IAS 38: Intangible Assets
|
IAS 38, Intangible Assets,
was approved by the IASB Board in July 1998 and became operative for annual financial
statements covering periods beginning on or after 1 July 1999.
IAS 38 supersedes:
- IAS 4, Depreciation Accounting,
with respect to the amortisation (depreciation) of intangible assets; and
- IAS 9, Research and Development
Costs.
In 1998, IAS
39: Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, amended a paragraph of IAS 38
to replace the reference to IAS 25, Accounting for Investments, by reference to IAS 39.
One SIC Interpretation relates to IAS 38:
Summary of IAS 38
IAS 38 applies to all intangible
assets that are not specifically dealt with in other International Accounting Standards.
It applies, among other things, to expenditures on:
- advertising,
- training,
- start-up, and
- research and development (R&D)
activities.
IAS 38 supersedes IAS 9, Research
and Development Costs. IAS 38 does not apply to financial assets, insurance contracts,
mineral rights and the exploration for and extraction of minerals and similar
non-regenerative resources. Investments in, and awareness of the importance of, intangible
assets have increased significantly in the last two decades.
The main features of IAS 38 are:
- an intangible asset should be
recognised initially, at cost, in the financial statements, if, and only if:
(a) the asset meets the
definition of an intangible asset. Particularly, there should be an identifiable asset
that is controlled and clearly distinguishable from an enterprise's goodwill;
(b) it is probable that the
future economic benefits that are attributable to the asset will flow to the enterprise;
and
(c) the cost of the asset can be
measured reliably.
This requirement applies whether
an intangible asset is acquired externally or generated internally. IAS 38 also includes
additional recognition criteria for internally generated intangible assets;
- if an intangible item does not
meet both the definition, and the criteria for the recognition, of an intangible asset,
IAS 38 requires the expenditure on this item to be recognised as an expense when it is
incurred. An enterprise is not permitted to include this expenditure in the cost of an
intangible asset at a later date;
- it follows from the recognition
criteria that all expenditure on research should be recognised as an expense. The same
treatment applies to start-up costs, training costs and advertising costs. IAS 38 also
specifically prohibits the recognition as assets of internally generated goodwill, brands,
mastheads, publishing titles, customer lists and items similar in substance. However, some
development expenditure may result in the recognition of an intangible asset (for example,
some internally developed computer software);
- in the case of a business
combination that is an acquisition, IAS 38 builds on IAS
22: Business Combinations, to emphasise that if an intangible item does not meet both
the definition and the criteria for the recognition for an intangible asset, the
expenditure for this item (included in the cost of acquisition) should form part of the
amount attributed to goodwill at the date of acquisition. This means that, among other
things, unlike current practices in certain countries, purchased R&D-in-process should
not be recognised as an expense immediately at the date of acquisition but it should be
recognised as part of the goodwill recognised at the date of acquisition and amortised
under IAS 22, unless it meets the criteria for separate recognition as an intangible
asset;
- after initial recognition in the
financial statements, an intangible asset should be measured under one of the following
two treatments:
(a) benchmark
treatment: historical cost less any amortisation and impairment losses; or
(b) allowed alternative
treatment: revalued amount (based on fair value) less any subsequent amortisation and
impairment losses. The main difference from the treatment for revaluations of property,
plant and equipment under IAS 16 is that revaluations for intangible assets are permitted
only if fair value can be determined by reference to an active market. Active markets are
expected to be rare for intangible assets;
- intangible assets should be
amortised over the best estimate of their useful life. IAS 38 does not permit an
enterprise to assign an infinite useful life to an intangible asset. It includes a
rebuttable presumption that the useful life of an intangible asset will not exceed 20
years from the date when the asset is available for use. IAS 38 acknowledges that, in rare
cases, there may be persuasive evidence that the useful life of an intangible asset will
exceed 20 years. In these cases, an enterprise should amortise the intangible asset over
the best estimate of its useful life and:
(a) test the intangible asset for impairment at least annually in
accordance with IAS
36: Impairment of Assets; and
(b) disclose the reasons why the
presumption that the useful life of an intangible asset will not exceed 20 years is
rebutted and also the factor(s) that played a significant role in determining the useful
life of the asset;
- required disclosures on intangible
assets will enable users to understand, among other things, the types of intangible assets
that are recognised in the financial statements and the movements in their carrying amount
(book value) during the year. IAS 38 also requires disclosure of the amount of research
and development expenditure recognised as an expense during the year; and
- IAS 38 is operative for annual
accounting periods beginning on or after 1 July 1999. IAS 38 includes transitional
provisions that clarify when the Standard should be applied retrospectively and when it
should be applied prospectively.
To avoid creating opportunities
for accounting arbitrage in an acquisition by recognising an intangible asset that is
similar in nature to goodwill (such as brands and mastheads) as goodwill rather than an
intangible asset (or vice versa), the amortisation requirements for goodwill in IAS
22: Business Combinations are consistent with those of IAS 38.
|
FASB REPORT - BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL REPORTING,
CHALLENGES FROM THE NEW ECONOMY NO. 219-A April 2001 Author: Wayne S. Upton, Jr. Source:
Financial Accounting Standards Board --- http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/fasb/new_economy.html
Upton's book challenges Lev's contention that the existing standards are enormously
inadequate for the "New Economy."
The Garten SEC Report: A press release and an
executive summary are available at http://www.mba.yale.edu
The Garten SEC Report supports Lev's contention that the existing standards are enormously
inadequate for the "New Economy."
(You can request a copy of the full report using an email address provided at the above
URL)
Trinity University students may access this
report at J:\courses\acct5341\readings\sec\garten.doc
FEI BUSINESS COMBINATIONS VIDEO PROGRAM http://www.fei.org/confsem/bizcombo2k2/agenda.cfm
American Accounting Association (AAA) members may view a replay of a day-long webcast
on accounting for business combinations and intangible valuations (SFAS 141 and 142) at
half the price that will be charged to other non-FEI members ($149 versus $299). The FEI
hopes to use funds generated from AAA members to help the FEI assume sponsorship of a
Corporate Accounting Policy Seminar.
The webcast encompassed five presentations by experts with question-and-answer periods:
(1) Overview of SFAS 141/142, by G. Michael Crooch, FASB Board Member; (2) Recognition and
Measurement of Intangibles, by Tony Aarron of E&Y Valuation Services and Steve Gerard
of Standard and Poors's, (3) Impact on Doing Deals: Structure, Pricing and Process, by
Raymond Beier of PWC and Elmer Huh, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, (4) Testing for Goodwill
Impairment, by Mitch Danaher of GE, and (5) Transition Issues and Financial Statement
Disclosures, by Julie A. Erhardt of Arthur Andersen's Professional Standards Group.
As an example (Digital Island Inc.) of the impact of FAS 142 on impairment testing for
goodwill, please print the following document: http://www.edgar-online.com/brand/businessweek/glimpse/glimpse.pl?symbol=ISLD
Amortization of intangible assets. Amortization expense increased
to $153.7 million for the nine months ended June 30, 2001 from $106.4 million for the nine
months ended June 30, 2000. This increase was primarily due to a full period
of amortization of the goodwill and intangibles related to the
acquisitions of Sandpiper, Live On Line and SoftAware, which were completed in December
1999, January 2000 and September 2000, respectively. This increase was offset by a
decrease in the current quarter's amortization as a direct result of a $1.0 billion
impairment charge on goodwill and intangible assets in the quarter ended March 31, 2001.
Amortization of intangible assets is expected to decrease in future periods due to this
impairment charge.
Impairment of Goodwill and Intangible Assets. Impairment of
goodwill and intangible assets was recorded in the amount of $1,039.2 million. The
impairment charge was based on management performing an impairment assessment of the
goodwill and identifiable intangible assets recorded upon the acquisitions of Sandpiper,
Live On Line and SoftAware, which were completed during the year ended September 30, 2000.
The assessment was performed primarily due to the significant decline in stock price since
the date the shares issued in each acquisition were valued. As a result of this review,
management recorded the impairment charge to reduce goodwill and acquisition-related
intangible assets. The charge was determined as the excess of the carrying value of the
assets over the related estimated discounted cash flows.
Forwarded by Storhaug [storhaug@BTIGATE.COM]
To follow up on this list's earlier brief discussion on FASB 141
& 142, below is a bookmark to a site "CFO.COM" which has an excellent
compendium of articles and links, all of which help you evaluate these new FASB's.
http://www.cfo.com/fasbguide
"The Goodwill Games How to Tackle FASB's New Merger Rules," by Craig
Schneider, CFO.com --- http://www.cfo.com/fasbguide
The thrill of victory and the agony of
defeat. Chances are senior financial executives will experience a similar range of
emotions while wrestling with the Financial Accounting Standards Board's new rules for
business combinations, goodwill, and intangibles. Use CFO.com's special report for tips on
tackling the impairment test, avoiding Securities & Exchange Commission inquiries,
finding valuation experts, and much more. While accounting is not yet an Olympic sport,
with the right training, you'll take home the gold. We welcome your questions and
comments. E-mail craigschneider@cfo.com. |
Take Your First Steps
|

|
How to
Survive the SEC's Second Guessing
New rules for recording goodwill and intangibles may inadvertently produce more
restatements.
Cramming
for the Final
Get up to speed on the latest accounting rule changes for treating goodwill and
intangibles.
Pool's
Closed
FASB's new merger-accounting rules have already won some fans among deal makers.
(CFO Magazine)
Intangibles
Revealed
Once you identify them, how much will the fair value assessments cost?
Four
Ways to Say Goodbye to Goodwill Amortization
Expert tips for tackling the impairment test.
|
Congratulations to Baruch Lev from NYU --- http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/main.html
Baruch's picture adorns the cover of Financial
Executive, March/April 2002 --- http://www.fei.org/magazine/marapr-2002.cfm
The cover story entitled "Rethinking
Accounting: Intangibles at a Crossroads: What Next?" on pp. 34-39 --- http://www.fei.org/magazine/articles/3-4-2002_CoverStory.cfm
The concluding passage is quoted below:
The Inertness and
Commoditization of Intangibles
Intangibles are inert - by
themselves, they neither create value nor generate growth. In fact, without efficient
support and enhancement systems, the value of intangibles dissipates much quicker than
that of physical assets. Some examples of inertness: uHighly qualified scientists at
Merck, Pfizer, or Ely Lilly (human capital intangibles) are unlikely to generate
consistently winning products without innovative processes for drug research, such as the
"scientific method," based on the biochemical roots of the target diseases,
according to Rebecca Henderson, a specialist on scientific drug research, in Industrial
and Corporate Change. Even exceptional scientists using the traditional "random
search" methods for drug development will hit on winners only randomly, writes
Henderson.
uA large patent portfolio at
DuPont or Dow Chemical (intellectual property) is by itself of little value without a
comprehensive decision support system that periodically inventories all patents, slates
them by intended use (internal or collaborative development, licensing out or abandonment)
and systematically searches and analyzes the patent universe to determine whether the
company's technology is state-of-the-art and competitive.
uA rich customer database
(customer intangibles) at Amazon.com or Circuit City will not generate value without
efficient, user-friendly distribution channels and highly trained and motivated sales
forces.
Worse than just inert,
intangibles are very susceptible to value dissipation (quick amortization) - much more so
than other assets. Patents that are not constantly defended against infringement will
quickly lose value due to "invention around" them. Highly trained employees will
defect to competitors without adequate compensation systems and attractive workplace
conditions. Valuable brands may quickly deteriorate to mere "names" when the
firm - such as a Xerox, Yahoo! or Polaroid - loses its competitive advantage. The absence
of active markets for most intangibles (with certain patents and trademark exceptions)
strips them of value on a stand-alone basis.
Witness the billions of dollars
of intangibles (R&D, customer capital, trained employees) lost at all the defunct
dot-coms, or at Enron, or at AOL Time Warner Co., which in January 2002 announced a
whopping write-off of $40-60 billion - mostly from intangibles.
Intangibles are not only inert,
they are also, by and large, commodities in the current economy, meaning that most
business enterprises have equal access to them. Baxter and Johnson & Johnson, along
with the major biotech companies, have similar access to the best and brightest of
pharmaceutical researchers (human capital); every retailer can acquire the
state-of-the-art supply chains and distribution channel technologies capable of creating
supplier and customer-related intangibles (such as mining customer information); most
companies can license-in patents or acquire R&D capabilities via corporate
acquisitions; and brands are frequently traded. The sad reality about commodities is that
they fail to create considerable value. Since competitors have equal access to such
assets, at best, they return the cost of capital (zero value added).
The inertness and commoditization
of most intangibles have important implications for the intangibles movement. They imply
that corporate value creation depends critically on the organizational infrastructure of
the enterprise - on the business processes and systems that transform "lifeless
things," tangible and intangible, to bundles of assets generating cash flows and
conferring competitive positions. Such organizational infrastructure, when operating
effectively, is the major intangible of the firm. It is, by definition, noncommoditized,
since it has to fit the specific mission, culture, and environment of the enterprise.
Thus, by its idiosyncratic nature, organizational infrastructure is the major intangible
of the enterprise.
Focusing the Intangibles
Efforts
Following Phase I of the
intangibles work, which was primarily directed at documentation and awareness-creation,
it's now time to focus on organizational infrastructure, the intangible that counts most
and about which we know least. It's the engine for creating value from other assets. Like
breaking the genetic code, an understanding of the "enterprise code" - the
organizational blueprints, processes and recipes - will enable us to address fundamental
questions of concern to managers and investors, such as those raised above in relation to
H-P/Compaq and Enron.
Organizational Infrastructure By
Example: A company's organizational infrastructure is an amalgam of systems, processes and
business practices (its operating procedures, recipes) aimed at streamlining operations
toward achieving the company's objectives. Following is a concrete example of a business
process, part of the organizational infrastructure, which was substantially modified and
thereby created considerable value. This was adopted from "Turnaround," Business
2.0, January 2002.
Nissan Motor Co. Ltd., Japan's
third-largest automaker and a perennial loser and debt-ridden producer of lackluster cars,
received in March 1999 a new major shareholder, Renault, and a new CEO, Carlos Ghosn, both
imported from France. Ghosn moved quickly to transform Nissan into a viable competitor,
and indeed, in the fiscal year ending March 2001, the company reported a profit of $2.7
billion, the largest in its 68-year history.
How was this miracle performed?
Primarily by cost-cutting, achieved by a drastic change in the procurement process. Here
briefly, is the old process: Nissan's buyers were locked into ordering from keiretsu
partners, suppliers in which Nissan owned stock. The guaranteed stream of Nissan orders
insulated those suppliers from competition. Suppliers can't specialize and can't sell
excess capacity elsewhere. Each supplier was assigned a shukotan, Nissan-speak for a
relationship manager. It was the shukotan who would negotiate price discounts - but favors
got in the way.
Here, in brief, is the new
procurement process, as drastically changed by Ghosn: Ghosn gave Itaru Koeda, the
purchasing chief, authority to place orders without regard to keiretsu relationships -
and, more important, insisted that he use it. Then, a Renault executive and Koeda dumped
the shukotan system, instead assigning buyers responsibility by model and part. They
formed a sourcing committee to review vendor price quotes on a global basis. "This is
the best change in our process," Koeda says. "Suppliers are specializing in what
they do best, making them more efficient."
The results? An 18 percent drop
in purchasing costs, which was the major contributor to Nissan's transformation from a
loss to a profit. Ghosn's next major set of tasks: To change the car design process in
order to enhance the top line, sales; to rid Nissan of the myriad design committees and
hierarchies that stifle and slow innovation; and to institute an efficient, effective
innovative process.
Baruch's cover story is accompanied by
"Fixing Financial Reporting: Financial Statement Overhaul," by
Robert A Howell, pp. 40-42 --- http://www.fei.org/magazine/articles/3-4-2002_Howell_CoverStory.cfm
Financial
reporting is broken and has to be fixed - and fast! If it isn't, we will continue to see
more cases such as Xerox, Lucent, Cisco Systems, Yahoo! and Enron. Xerox's market value is
down 90 percent, or $40 billion, in the past two years. In the same period other market
losses include; Lucent, down more than $200 billion; Cisco Systems, off more than $400
billion; Yahoo!, more than $100 billion; and Enron, down more than $60 billion in the
largest bankruptcy of all time.
Some argue that
these are extreme examples of "irrational exubuerance." Some in the accounting
profession say that such cases represent a small percentage of the aggregate number of
statements audited - some 15,000 public company registrants. Perhaps. But a financial
reporting framework that permits these companies to suggest that they are doing well, and,
by implication, to justify market valuations which, subsequently, cost investors trillions
in the aggregate, is unconscionable.
Financial
reporting, especially in the U. S., with its very public capital markets, has reached the
point where "accrual-based" earnings are almost meaningless. Reported earnings
are driven as much by "earnings expectations" as they are by real business
performance. Balance sheets fail to reflect the major drivers of future value creation -
the research and product, process and software development that fuel high technology
companies, and the brand value of leading consumer product companies. And, cash flow
statements are such a hodge-podge of operating, investing and financing activities that
they obfuscate, rather than illuminate, business cash flow performance.
The FASB, in its
Concept No. 1, states, "financial reporting should provide information that is useful
to present and potential investors and creditors and other users in making rational
investment, credit and similar decisions." This is simply not so.
The primary
financial statements - income statement, balance sheet and cash flow statement - which
derive their foundation from an industrial age model, need major redesign if they are to
serve as the starting point for meaningful financial analysis, interpretation and
decision-making in today's knowledge-based and value-driven economy. Without significant
redesign, ad hoc definitions such as pro forma earnings, returns and cash flows will
continue to proliferate. So will significant reporting "surprises!"
Starting
Point: Market Value Creation
The objective of a business is to increase real shareholder value - what Warren E. Buffett
would call the "intrinsic value" of the firm. It's a very basic idea: Investors
get "returns" from dividends and realized market appreciation. Both investments
and returns are measured in cash terms, so individuals and investors invest cash in
securities with the objective of realizing returns that meet or exceed their criteria. If
their judgments are too high, and that later becomes clear, the market value of the firm
will drop. If judgments are too low and cash flows turn out to be stronger, market values
increase.
From a managerial
viewpoint, the objective of increasing shareholder (market) value really means increasing
the net present value (NPV) of the future stream of cash flows. Note, "cash
flows," not "profits." Cash is real; profits are anything, within reason,
that management wants them to be. If revenues are recognized early - or overstated - and
expenses are deferred or, in some cases, accelerated to "clear the decks" for
future periods, resulting earnings may show a nice trend, but do not really reflect
economic performance.
There are only
three ways management may increase the real market, or "intrinsic," value of a
firm. First, increase the amount of cash flows expected at any point in time. Second,
accelerate cash flows; given the time value of money, cash received earlier has a higher
present value. Third, if a firm is able to lower the discount rate that it applies to its
cash flows - which it frequently can - it can raise its NPV.
Given that cash
flows drive market value, financial statements should put much more emphasis on cash
flows. The statement of cash flows now prescribed by the accounting community and
presented by management is not easily related to value creation. Derived from the income
statement and balance sheet, it's effectively a reconciliation statement for the change in
the balance of the cash account. A major overhaul of the cash flow statement would
directly relate to market valuations.
Cash
Earnings and Free Cash Flows
Managers and investors should focus on "cash earnings" and the reinvestments
that are made into the business in the form of "working capital" and "fixed
and other (including intangible) investments." The net amount of these cash flows
represent the business's "free cash flows."
With negative
cash flows - frequently the case for young startups and high-growth companies - a business
must raise more capital in the form of debt or equity. The sooner it gets its free cash
flows positive, the sooner it'll begin to create value for shareholders. Positive free
cash flows provide resources to pay interest and pay down debt, to return cash to
shareholders (through stock repurchases or dividends) or to invest in new business areas.
The traditional
cash flow statement purportedly distinguishes between operating, investing and financing
cash flows, and has as its "bottom line" the change in cash and cash
equivalents. In fact, the operating cash flows include the results of selling activities,
investing in working capital and interest expense, a financing activity. Investing cash
flows include capital expenditures, acquisitions, disposals of assets and the purchase and
sale of financial assets. Financing cash flows consist of what's left over.
Indeed, the
bottom-line change in cash is not a useful number, other than to demonstrate that it may
be reconciled with the change in the cash account. If one wants a positive change in cash,
simply borrow more. These free cash flows ultimately drive market value, and should be the
focus of managers and investors alike.
Replacing
Income With Cash Earnings
The traditional "profit and loss," or "income," statement needs
modification in three ways, two of which are touched on above, along with a name-change,
to "Operating Statement." That would suggest a representation of the business'
current operations, without the emphasis on accrual-based profits.
Interest expense
(income) should be eliminated from the statement, as it represents a financing cost rather
than an operating cost. A number of companies do this internally to determine "net
operating profit after taxes" (NOPAT). Also, NOPAT needs to be adjusted for the
various non-cash items, such as depreciation, amortization, gains and losses on the sale
of assets, tax-timing differences and restructuring charges - which affect income but not
cash flows. The resultant "cash earnings" better represents the current economic
performance of a business than accrual income and, very importantly, is much less
susceptible to manipulation.
A third
adjustment is the order in which the classes of expenses are displayed. Traditional income
statements report cost of goods sold or product costs first, frequently focus on product
gross margins, and then deduct, as a group, other expenses such as technical, selling and
administrative expenses. This order made sense in the industrial age when product costs
dominated. It does not for many of today's high-tech or consumer product companies. It
would be more useful for companies to report expenses in an order that reflects the flow
of the business activities. One logical order that builds on the concept of a business'
value chain, is to categorize costs into development costs, product (service) conversion
costs, sales and customer support costs and administrative costs.
Reinvesting
in the Business
For most companies - especially those with significant investments that are being
depreciated or amortized - cash earnings will be significantly higher than NOPAT.
Unfortunately, cash earnings are not free cash flows because most businesses have to
reinvest in working capital, property, plant and equipment and intangible assets, just to
sustain - let alone increase - their productive capabilities.
As a business
grows in sales volume, assuming that it offers credit to its customers who pay with the
same frequency, accounts receivable will increase proportionately. As sales volumes
increase, so, too, will product costs, inventories and accounts payable balances. Working
capital - principally receivables, inventories, and payables - will tend to increase
proportionately with sales growth, and will require cash to finance it. The degree to
which it grows is a function of receivables terms and collection practices, inventory
management and payables practices.
Companies such as
Dell Computer Corp. collect payments up front, turn inventories in a few days and pay
their vendors when due. The net effect is that as Dell grows it actually throws off cash,
rather than requiring it to support increases in working capital. Most companies are not
as efficient; the amount of cash needed to support increases in working capital can be as
much as 20-25 percent of any sales increase. The degree to which working capital increases
as sales increase is an important performance metric. Lower is better, which absolutely
flies in the face of such traditional measures of liquidity as "working capital"
and "quick" ratios, for which higher has been considered better.
Balance sheets
ought to reflect investments that represent future value. What drives value for many
businesses in today's knowledge-based economy - pharmaceuticals, high technology, software
and brand-driven consumer product companies - is the investments in R&D, product,
process and software development, brand equity and the continued training and development
of the work force. Yet, based on generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)
accounting, these "investments" in the future are not reflected on balance
sheets, but, rather, expensed in the period in which they are incurred.
A frequent
argument for "expensing" is the unclear nature of the investments' future value.
Apparently, investors believe otherwise, evidenced by the ratio of market values to book
values having exploded in the past 25 years. In 1978, the average book-to-market ratio was
around 80 percent; today it is around 25 percent. In the early 1970s, when accounting
policies were established for R&D, product lines were narrower and life cycles longer,
resulting in R&D being a much less significant element of cost. Expensing was less
relevant. Now, with intangible assets having become so central and significant, expensing
- rather than capitalizing and amortizing them over time - results in an absolute
breakdown of the principle of "matching," which is at the heart of accrual
accounting. The world of business has changed; accounting practices must also change.
Financial
Statement Overhaul
Financial statements need marked overhaul to be useful for analysis and decision-making in
today's knowledge-driven and shareholder value-creation environment. The proposed changes
fall into three categories:
First - Move to a
much more explicit shareholder (market) value creation and cash orientation, and away from
accrual accounting profits and return on investment calculations predicated on today's
accounting policies. Start with a shareholder perspective for cash flows, then reconstruct
the statement of cash flows to clearly provide the free cash flows that the business'
operations are generating. Cash earnings and reinvestments in the business comprise free
cash flows.
Second - Expand
the definition of investments to include intangibles, which should be capitalized as
assets and amortized according to some thoughtful rules. This will better reflect
investments that have potential future value.
Third - Change
the title to "operating statement" and other "housekeeping" of
financial statements, to include categorizing costs in a more logical "value
chain" sequence and aggregating all financial transactions, such as interest and the
purchase and sale of securities, as financing activities.
Value creation is
ultimately measured in the marketplace, so it stands to reason that if a firm's market
value increases consistently, over time, and can be supported by improvements in its cash
generation performance, real value is being created. For this to happen, the place to
start is by fixing the financial statements.
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm
The Shareholder Action On-Line Handbook (1993) (history, finance, investing,
law)--- http://www.ethics.fsnet.co.uk/0home.htm
These Web pages are the on-line version of The Shareholder
Action Handbook, first published in paperback 1993 by New Consumer. The Handbook aims to
give practical advice to individuals about how they may use shares to make companies more
accountable. The need for such a guide is now stronger than ever. Public concern in
Britain about the accountability of company directors has risen to the extent that the
subject makes regular appearances in debates in the House of Commons. While there are many
obstacles to taking shareholder action, shareholders can do much to alter the course of
corporate behaviour. Indeed, since the original version of the guide appeared there have
been a number of successful shareholder action campaigns. However, there is considerable
need both for new legislation to make it easier for shareholders to hold companies to
account, and for the large institutional shareholders who own much of global industry to
take their responsibilities as shareholders rather more seriously.
Online Resources for Business
Valuations
Go to
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
Understanding the Issues
From The Wall Street Journal's Accounting Educator Reviews on January 22, 2002
TITLE: Deciphering the Black Box
REPORTER: Steve Liesman
DATE: Jan 23, 2002 PAGE: C1 LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011739030177303200.djm
TOPICS: Accounting, Accounting Theory, Creative Accounting, Disclosure, Disclosure
Requirements, Earnings Management, Financial Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis,
Fraudulent Financial Reporting, Regulation, Securities and Exchange Commission
SUMMARY: The article discusses several factors that have led to financial reporting
that is complex and difficult to understand. Related articles provide specific examples of
complicated and questionable financial reporting practices.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What economic factors have led to the complexity of financial reporting? Have
accounting standard setters kept pace with the changing economic conditions? Support your
answer.
2.) What determines a company's cost of capital? What is the relation between the
quantity and quality of financial information disclosed by a company and its cost of
capital? Why are companies reluctant to disclose financial information?
3.) Explain the difference between earnings management and fraudulent financial
reporting? Is either earnings management or fraudulent financial reporting illegal? Is
either unethical? Could earnings management ever improve the usefulness of financial
reporting? Explain.
4.) Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of allowing discretion in financial
reporting.
5.) Refer to related articles. Briefly discuss the major accounting or economic
situation that has caused complexity in the financial reporting of each of these
companies. What can be done to make the financial reporting more useful?
SMALL GROUP ASSIGNMENT: How much discretion should Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles allow in financial reporting? Support your position.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
--- RELATED ARTICLES ---
TITLE: GE: Some Seek More Light on the Finances
REPORTER: Rachel Emma Silverman and Ken Brown
PAGE: C1 ISSUE: Jan 23, 2002
LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011744147673133760.djm
TITLE: AIG: A Complex Industry, A Very Complex Company
REPORTER: Christopher Oster and Ken Brown
PAGE: C16 ISSUE: Jan 23, 2002
LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011740010747146240.djm
TITLE: Williams: Enron's Game, But Played with Caution
REPORTER: Chip Cummins
PAGE: C16 ISSUE: Jan 23, 2002
LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011739185631601680.djm
TITLE: IBM: 'Other Income' Can Mean Other Opinions
REPORTER: William Bulkeley
PAGE: C16 ISSUE: Jan 23, 2002
LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011744634389346680.djm
TITLE: Coca-Cola: Real Thing Can Be Hard to Measure
REPORTER: Betsy McKay
PAGE: C16 ISSUE: Jan 23, 2002
LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011739618177530480.djm
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting and securities fraud are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on June 11,
2004
TITLE: Outside Audit: Goodyear and the Butterfly Effect
REPORTER: Timothy Aeppel
DATE: Jun 04, 2004
PAGE: C3
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108629544631828261,00.html
TOPICS: Accounting Changes and Error Corrections, Pension Accounting,
Restatement
SUMMARY: Goodyear Tire & Rubber has announced the amount of its
restatement from problems identified in 2003. The company as well has announced
further restatements due to changes in the discount rate it uses for pension
liability calculations.
QUESTIONS:
1.) For what reason is Goodyear Tire & Rubber restating earnings for the
last five years?
2.) What accounting standards require restatements of past financial results?
Under what circumstances are restatements required? What other types of
accounting changes are possible? How are these categories of accounting changes
presented in the financial statements?
3.) In general, what adjustment is Goodyear Tire & Rubber making to its
accounting for defined benefit pension plans?
4.) Discuss the details of the change in accounting for the defined benefit
pension plan. Specifically, define the discount rate in question and state how
it is used in pension accounting.
5.) Had the company not uncovered the issues identified under question #1, do
you think they would be making the changes identified in questions #3 and #4?
Why or why not?
6.) Do you think that changes in the discount rate used in pension accounting
are made by other companies? When do you think companies might change this rate?
In general, what type of accounting treatment would you recommend for such a
change? Support your answer.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
"Outside Audit: Goodyear And the Butterfly Effect: A Valuation
Rate Is Shaved By Half a Point and Presto, $100.1 Million Goes Poof," by
Timothy Aeppel, The Wall Street Journal, June 4, 2004, Page C3 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108629544631828261,00.html
There's a costly oddity tucked into Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co.'s recent earnings restatement.
As part of a larger revision reaching
back five years, the U.S.'s largest tire maker changed the interest-rate
assumptions associated with its domestic retirement plans. The upshot: By
slicing half a point off a rate used to value the company's obligations to its
pension fund and other post-retirement benefit plans, Goodyear also lopped off
a total of $100.1 million in earnings over that period.
This may be the first time a major
company has restated earnings for this reason, although it was just one of
several accounting issues the Akron, Ohio, tire maker addressed in its
restatement announced May 19. Goodyear has identified a series of accounting
irregularities over the past year and is the target of a continuing
investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
"I have a feeling that while they
were scrubbing, they decided to scrub everything," says Jack Ciesielski,
publisher of Analyst's Accounting Observer.
Keith Price, a Goodyear spokesman, says
the change doesn't mean Goodyear sought to inflate earnings in the past by
using an inappropriately high discount rate. Most of the reduction in earnings
was the result of Goodyear having to record additional tax expenses, he notes.
Mr. Price says Goodyear decided to change its methodology for calculating the
rate it uses going forward and, since a broader restatement was already under
way, chose to extend the new approach into the past as well.
The root of Goodyear's problem appears
to be that it used an uncommon way of calculating the so-called discount rate
it assumes for its traditional pension plan. A discount rate is simply an
interest rate companies use to convert future values into their present-day
terms. Companies calculate the pension-fund discount rate at the end of every
year in order to project cash outflows in their retirement plans. The number
changes from year to year. But it also tends to get buried in financial
footnotes and overlooked.
The higher the discount rate, the less
the current value of a company's future obligations to its retirees under its
plans. So, in Goodyear's case, the older, higher discount rate lowered the
company's projected benefit payments -- which also had the effect of raising
its pretax income.
Goodyear's old method of setting the
rate was to use a six-month average of corporate-bond rates. That's unusual,
though not a violation of generally accepted accounting principles, says Mr.
Ciesielski.
The more common and accurate approach
is to pick a discount rate based on rates at a point in time near to when the
calculations are being done. That provides a better snapshot of reality,
especially in an era when rates are falling, as they have in recent years.
Sure enough, Goodyear's old methodology
resulted in discount rates that were higher than those used by most other
companies during the period in question. For instance, in its restatement,
Goodyear cut the rate it used in 2001 to 7.5% from 8%. But a study by Credit
Suisse First Boston notes that the median discount rate used by S&P-500
component companies that year was a far lower 7.25%. In fact, the study found
only seven companies used rates of 8% or higher in 2001.
Goodyear's numbers are now more in line
with other companies' and shouldn't require further adjustment, say analysts.
But like many old-line companies with a relatively large cadre of older
workers and retirees, Goodyear is expected to face pension problems for years
to come, since its plans are underfunded by about $2.8 billion.
While Goodyear's pension concerns are
not unique, Mr. Ciesielski says it is unlikely other companies will rush to
restate earnings to reflect a new discount-rate assumption. Besides, coming up
with the rate is still far from an exact science.
David Zion, CSFB's accounting analyst,
says even companies that use identical methodologies can arrive at sharply
different discount rates. Those with fiscal years ending in June would have
different rates than those with years ending in December, for example. And
multinational companies face another complication: "The discount rate for
a Japanese pension plan will be different than the discount rate in
Turkey," Mr. Zion points out.
In its restatement, Goodyear decreased
overall pretax income by $18.9 million for the past five years as a result of
its reassessment of the discount rate. And since Goodyear's pension plan is
underfunded, the cut in the discount rate also magnified that negative
condition. As a result, Goodyear had to add $160.9 million in liabilities to
its balance sheet. The new liabilities forced Goodyear to record $81.2 million
in additional tax expenses for 2002.
This restatement comes at a time
Goodyear's accounting is still under heavy scrutiny. The company launched an
internal probe last year after it said it found problems in internal billing
and the implementation of a new computer system. It later said it had
identified serious misdeeds by top managers in Europe and cases in which U.S.
plants understated workers' compensation liabilities.
Hi Robert,
I added your document to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/WalkerToFarrington.htm
I would not say that we are so much timid as we are squashed by lobbying
pressures from industry.
Bob Jensen
Bob
I wish to ask you a favour again. I have written the
attached as a submission to a review of the New Zealand Financial Reporting
Act 1993. It is currently under review due to the imminent adoption of the
IASB's standards. It has thrown New Zealand's application of differential
reporting into confusion. My submission deals with the way in which accounting
must be the pivot upon which creditor protection functions. What I would hope
Americans find interesting is the degree to which we have played out your laws
- the corporate solvency test and GAAP - in a way you are too timid to do.
The Government's discussion document to which the
submission is a response is on this link:
http://www.med.govt.nz/buslt/bus_pol/bus_law/corporate-governance/financial-reporting/part-one/media/minister-20040315.html
The letter is self-contained aside from the specific
commentary at the end. Could you find space for it on your web-site?
Robert B Walker
Stock Option Valuation Research Database
From Syllabus News on December 13, 2002
Wharton School Offers Stock Data Via the Web
The University of Pennsylvania's Wharton business
school is offering financial analysts access to historical information on
stock options over the Internet. The data, supplied by research firm
OptionMetrics's Ivy database, covers information on all U.S. listed index and
equity options from January1996. The Ivy database adds to the 1.5 terabyte
storehouse of financial information from a range of providers now available
through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). The university said that by
making data from the Center for Research in Security Prices, Standard &
Poor's COMPUSTAT, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the New York
Stock Exchange, and other data vendors accessible from a simple Web-based
interface, WRDS hopes to become the preferred source among university scholars
for data covering global financial markets.
Note from Jensen: the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) home page
is at http://www.wharton.upenn.edu/research/wrds.html
Wharton Research Data Services, a revolutionary
Internet-based research data service developed and marketed by the Wharton
School, has become the standard for large-scale academic data research,
providing instant web access to financial and business datasets for almost all
top-tier business schools (including 23 of the top 25 schools as ranked by
Business Week magazine).
Subscribers to Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS)
gain instant access to the broadest array of business and economic data now
available from a single source on the Web. From anywhere and at any time, WRDS
functions as an application service provider (ASP) to deliver information
drawn from 1.2 terabytes of comprehensive financial, accounting, management,
marketing, banking and insurance data.
Launched in July 1997, the unique data service's
client list of over 60 institutions now includes Stanford University, Harvard
University, Columbia University, Yale University, Northwestern University,
London Business School, INSEAD, University of Chicago, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology and dozens of other institutions. Subscribers to WRDS need only
PCs or even less-expensive Web terminals to endow their units with
supercomputer capabilities and tap a massive, constantly updated source of
data. Users click on the WRDS database and interactively select data to
extract. The requested information is instantly returned to the web browser,
ready to be pasted into a spreadsheet or any other application for analysis.
To learn more about WRDS or to get licensing
information, contact: Nicole Carvalho, Marketing Director Wharton Research
Data Services 400 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall 3620 Locust Walk Philadelphia,
PA 19104-6302
1-877-GET-WRDS (1-877-438-9737)
Knowledge@Wharton is a free source of research reports and other materials in
accounting, finance, and business research --- http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
Forwarded by Robert B Walker [walkerrb@ACTRIX.CO.NZ]
FASB Understanding the Issues: Vol 4 Series 1 ---
I refer to the monograph on credit standing & liability
measurement written by Crooch & Upton. --- http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/fasb/statusreport_articles/vol4_series1.html
The article seems to suggest you wish to have feedback on this
and other matters. Accordingly, I send my thoughts on this matter.
I would begin by observing that I think Concepts Statement 7 is
inconsistent with the earlier 1996 study from which it was derived. I found that study
utterly persuasive so I do not now find CS-7 persuasive. In moments of cynicism, I think
that Mr Uptons apparent epiphany is related more to the politics of accountancy than
to its conceptual purity.
By this I mean that the measurement of liabilities at risk free
interest rate rather than at a rate reflecting credit standing would be so anathema to the
generality of accountants that it is futile to suggest it. Indeed the Crooch & Upton
begin by stating a basic premise of axiomatic significance to their case no gain or
loss should arise when engaging in simple borrowing. The idea that no sooner one entered a
loan agreement than a loss would arise (because it would invariably be a loss) would have
most accountants in a state of high dudgeon.
The issue then is one of gain or loss. But then that is only if
you perceive the world from an income orientation perspective. I dont, primarily
because of the influence of the conceptual framework. This is reinforced by my work as a
liquidator of companies. I see the world purely from a balance sheet perspective and one
subject to realisable value at that. In other words, I see the utility of accounting only
in terms of solvency determination with all that entails in regard to the going concern
assumption.
Unlike the United States, in the jurisdiction in which I live
accounting has been rendered central to creditor protection in our corporate law. Central
to this law, in turn, is the conceptual framework (at least in my view and to test the
hypothesis I have a case before the courts now). I am then caused considerable misgiving
as the final consequence of FASBs view is the effective emasculation of our law
built, essentially, on American conceptual development.
The ultimate consequence of what FASB propose is that as a
company slides toward insolvency its liability value declines, the value of its net worth
increases. Presumably as it has no credit standing at all because it is insolvent, it has
no liabilities. This may be practically true when the creditors miss out but in my
jurisdiction at least it is not legally true because those responsible for the creditors
loss are held accountable, the impediments of the legal system notwithstanding.
I note that Crooch & Upton make reference in a footnote to
the theory of Robert Merton in which it is implied that the residual assets are able to be
put to satisfy the claims of creditors. That may be true in an
economists fantasy but it is not true in law, a rather more important arena.
I say perceiving a decline in the value of a liability is
considerably more counter-intuitive than the problem of accelerating the recognition of
cost of debt. This is a mere triviality by comparison. After all the same amount of charge
is recognised over time. The advantage of accelerating loss is that it causes an entity to
be more inhibited in its distribution policy as it has less equity to draw upon. That is
to the advantage of creditors.
It seems to me that there needs to be an objective value at which
to determine the value of a liability, this being central to the ability to liquidate. Mr
Upton in his 1996 study demonstrates that such a value will represent the price the debtor
has to pay to have the liability taken away. That price will be determined by the seller
providing sufficient resources to the buyer to ensure that the buyer will avoid any risk.
The resources would need to be enough to acquire a risk free asset with the same maturity
profile as the liability.
The effect of perceiving the price of a liability in
this way is to necessitate that it is discounted at a risk free rate.
I note that the only way to make CS-7 coherent is to assume that
such transfers of assets are always made between parties of the same credit standing. This
pertains to one of the major practical difficulties of reflecting credit standing in
accounting measurement that is knowing what it is. It may be easily determined in
the publicly listed world in which Crooch & Upton inhabit. It is not in the small,
closely held corporate world in which I operate. For accounting to have long term validity
it must be applicable in all circumstances.
I think it fair to note that there is another dimension to this
that tends to undermine what I believe. I have a theoretical notion that the world upon
consolidation nets to nil. That is to say, my financial asset and your financial liability
must have the same value in our respective records. Call this a principle of reciprocity.
Theoretically, so far as I understand it a lender will discount
the face value of a zero discount bond at the risk free rate after having adjusted for the
probability of receiving nothing at all. The effect of doing that is, at the inception of
an advance, to carry the value of the asset at the cash value paid at that time. If the
application of the principle of reciprocity was applied when the liability was revalued in
the books of the debtor, the creditor would take up a gain that denied any risk existed.
I find this inconvenient as it causes me to abandon a notion in
which I fundamentally believe. I will just have to suffer cognitive dissonance, wont
I? But then one should not underestimate the psychology that underlies accounting,
particularly in the face of the paradoxes it is capable of generating.
Also see other articles on related topics at http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/fasb/statusreport_articles/
Pro-Forma Earnings (Electronic Commerce,
e-Commerce, eCommerce) From the Wall Street Journal's Accounting
Educators' Reviews, October 4, 2001
Educators interested in receiving these excellent reviews (on a variety of topics in
addition to accounting) must firs subscribe to the electronic version of the WSJ and then
go to http://209.25.240.94/educators_reviews/index.cfm
Sample from the October 4 Edition:
TITLE: Sales Slump Could Derail Amazon's Profit Pledge
REPORTER: Nick Wingfield
DATE: Oct 01, 2001
PAGE: B1
LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1001881764244171560.djm
TOPICS: Accounting, Creative Accounting, Earnings Management, Financial Analysis, Net
Income, Net Profit
SUMMARY: Earlier this year Amazon promised analysts that it will report first-ever
operating pro forma operating profit. However, Amazon is not commenting on whether it
still expects to report a fourth-quarter profit this year. Questions focus on profit
measures and accounting decisions that may enable Amazon to show a profit.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What expenses are excluded from pro forma operating profits? Why are these expenses
excluded? Are these expenses excluded from financial statements prepared in accordance
with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles?
2.) List three likely consequences of Amazon not reporting a pro forma operating profit
in the fourth quarter. Do you think that Amazon feels pressure to report a pro forma
operating profit? Why do analysts believe that reporting a fourth quarter profit is
important for Amazon?
3.) List three accounting choices that Amazon could make to increase the likelihood of
reporting a pro forma operating profit. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of making
accounting choices that will allow Amazon to report a pro forma operating profit.
SMALL GROUP ASSIGNMENT: Assume that you are the accounting department for Amazon and
preliminary analysis suggest that Amazon will not report a pro forma operating profit for
the fourth quarter. The CEO has asked you to make sure that the company meets its
financial reporting objectives. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of making
adjustments to the financial statements. What adjustments, if any, would you make? Why?
Reviewed
By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island Reviewed
By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University Reviewed
By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
Bob
Jensen's threads on accounting theory can be found at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm
Bob
Jensen's threads on real options for valuing intangibles are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/realopt.htm
|
Baruch Lev has a very good site on accounting for intangibles at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/intangibles.html
Also note Wayne Upton's Special Report for the FASB at http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/fasb/new_economy.html
E-COMMERCE AND AUDITING FAIR VALUES SUBJECTS OF NEW INTERNATIONAL GUIDANCE The
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) invites comments on two new exposure drafts
(EDs): Auditing Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures and Electronic Commerce: Using the
Internet or Other Public Networks - Effect on the Audit of Financial Statements. Comments
on both EDs, developed by IFAC's International Auditing Practices Committee (IAPC), are
due by January 15, 2002. See http://accountingeducation.com/news/news2213.html
The IFAC link is at http://www.ifac.org/Guidance/EXD-Download.tmpl?PubID=1003772692151
The purpose of this International Standard on Auditing (ISA) is to establish standards
and provide guidance on auditing fair value measurements and disclosures contained in
financial statements. In particular, this ISA addresses audit considerations relating to
the valuation, measurement, presentation and disclosure for material assets, liabilities
and specific components of equity presented or disclosed at fair value in financial
statements. Fair value measurements of assets, liabilities and components of equity may
arise from both the initial recording of transactions and later changes in value.
External Auditing Combined With Consulting and
Other Assurance Services: Audit Independence?
TITLE:
"Auditor Independence and Earnings Quality"R
AUTHORS:
Richard M. Frankel MIT Sloan School of Business 50 Memorial Drive, E52.325g Cambridge, MA
02459-1261 (617) 253-7084 frankel@mit.edu
Marilyn F. Johnson Michigan State University Eli Broad Graduate School of Management N270
Business College Complex East Lansing, MI 48824-1122 (517) 432-0152 john1614@msu.edu
Karen K. Nelson Stanford University Graduate School of Business Stanford, CA 94305-5015
(650) 723-0106 knelson@gsb.stanford.edu
DATE: August 2001
LINK: http://gobi.stanford.edu/ResearchPapers/Library/RP1696.pdf
Stanford University Study Shows Consulting Does Affect Auditor Independence --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=54733
Academics have found that the provision of consulting services to
audit clients can have a serious effect on a firm's perceived independence.
And the new SEC rules designed to counter audit independence
violations could increase the pressure to provide non-audit services to clients to an
increasingly competitive market.
The study (pdf format),
by the Stanford Graduate School of Business, showed that forecast earnings were more
likely to be exceeded when the auditor was paid more for its consultancy services.
This suggests that earnings management was an important factor
for audit firms that earn large consulting fees. And such firms worked at companies that
would offer little surprise to the market, given that investors react negatively when the
auditor also generates a high non-audit fee from its client.
The study used data collected from over 4,000 proxies filed
between February 5, 2001 and June 15, 2001.
It concluded: "We find a significant negative market
reaction to proxy statements filed by firms with the least independent auditors. Our
evidence also indicates an inverse relation between auditor independence and earnings
management.
"Firms with the least independent auditors are more likely
to just meet or beat three earnings benchmarks analysts' expectations, prior year
earnings, and zero earnings and to report large discretionary accruals. Taken
together, our results suggest that the provision of non-audit services impairs
independence and reduces the quality of earnings."
New SEC rules mean that auditors have to disclose their non-audit
fees in reports. This could have an interesting effect, the study warned: "The
disclosure of fee data could increase the competitiveness of the audit market by reducing
the cost to firms of making price comparisons and negotiating fees.
"In addition, firms may reduce the purchase of non-audit
services from their auditor to avoid the appearance of independence problems."
A Lancaster
University study in February this year found that larger auditors are less likely to
compromise their independence than smaller ones when providing non-audit services to their
clients.
And our sister site, AccountingWEB-UK, reports that research
by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW) showed that,
despite the prevalence of traditional standards of audit independence, the principal fear
for an audit partner was the loss of the client.
|
External Auditing Combined With Consulting and
Other Assurance Services: The Enron Scandal
.
One of the most prominent CPAs in the world sent me the following message and sent the
WSJ link:
Bob, More on Enron.
It's interesting that this matter of performing internal audits didn't come up in the
testimony Joe Beradino of Andersen presented to the House Committee a couple of days ago
"Arthur Andersen's 'Double Duty' Work Raises Questions About Its
Independence," by Jonathan Weil, The Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2001 --- http://interactive.wsj.com/fr/emailthis/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1008289729306300000.djm
In addition to acting as Enron
Corp.'s outside auditor, Arthur Andersen LLP also performed internal-auditing services for
Enron, raising further questions about the Big Five accounting firm's independence and the
degree to which it may have been auditing its own work.
That Andersen performed
"double duty" work for the Houston-based energy concern likely will trigger
greater regulatory scrutiny of Andersen's role as Enron's independent auditor than would
ordinarily be the case after an audit failure, accounting and securities-law specialists
say.
It also potentially could expose
Andersen to greater liability for damages in shareholder lawsuits, depending on whether
the internal auditors employed by Andersen missed key warning signs that they should have
caught. Once valued at more than $77 billion, Enron is now in proceedings under Chapter 11
of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
Internal-audit departments, among
other things, are used to ensure that a company's control systems are adequate and
working, while outside independent auditors are hired to opine on the accuracy of a
company's financial statements. Every sizable company relies on outside auditors to check
whether its internal auditors are working effectively to prevent fraud, accounting
irregularities and waste. But when a company hires its outside auditor to monitor internal
auditors working for the same firm, critics say it creates an unavoidable conflict of
interest for the firm.
Still, such arrangements have
become more common over the past decade. In response, the Securities and Exchange
Commission last year passed new rules, which take effect in August 2002, restricting the
amount of internal-audit work that outside auditors can perform for their clients, though
not banning it outright.
"It certainly runs totally
contrary to my concept of independence," says Alan Bromberg, a securities-law
professor at Southern Methodist University in Dallas. "I see it as a double duty,
double responsibility and, therefore, double potential liability."
Andersen officials say their
firm's independence wasn't impaired by the size or nature of the fees paid by Enron -- $52
million last year. An Enron spokesman said, "The company believed and continues to
believe that Arthur Andersen's role as Enron's internal auditor would not compromise
Andersen's role as independent auditor for Enron."
Andersen spokesman David Tabolt
said Enron outsourced its internal-audit department to Andersen around 1994 or 1995. He
said Enron began conducting some of its own internal-audit functions in recent years.
Enron, Andersen's second-largest U.S. client, paid $25 million for audit fees in 2000,
according to Enron's proxy last year. Mr. Tabolt said that figure includes both internal
and external audit fees, a point not explained in the proxy, though he declined to specify
how much Andersen was paid for each. Additionally, Enron paid Andersen a further $27
million for other services, including tax and consulting work.
Following audit failures, outside
auditors frequently claim that their clients withheld crucial information from them. In
testimony Wednesday before a joint hearing of two House Financial Services subcommittees,
which are investigating Enron's collapse, Andersen's chief executive, Joseph Berardino,
made the same claim about Enron. However, given that Andersen also was Enron's internal
auditor, "it's going to be tough for Andersen to take that traditional tack that
'management pulled the wool over our eyes,' " says Douglas Carmichael, an accounting
professor at Baruch College in New York.
Mr. Tabolt, the Andersen
spokesman, said it is too early to make judgments about Andersen's work. "None of us
knows yet exactly what happened here," he said. "When we know the facts we'll
all be able to make informed judgments. But until then, much of this is speculation."
Though it hasn't received public
attention recently, Andersen's double-duty work for Enron wasn't a secret. A March 1996
Wall Street Journal article, for instance, noted that a growing number of companies,
including Enron, had outsourced their internal-audit departments to their outside
auditors, a development that had prompted criticism from regulators and others. At other
times, Mr. Tabolt said, Andersen and Enron officials had discussed their arrangement
publicly.
Accounting firms say the
double-duty arrangements let them become more familiar with clients' control procedures
and that such arrangements are ethically permissible, as long as outside auditors don't
make management decisions in handling the internal audits. Under the new SEC rules taking
effect next year, an outside auditor impairs its independence if it performs more than 40%
of a client's internal-audit work. The SEC said the restriction won't apply to clients
with assets of $200 million or less. Previously, the SEC had imposed no such percentage
limitation.
The Gottesdiener Law Firm, the Washington, D.C. 401(k) and
pension class action law firm prosecuting the most comprehensive of the 401(k) cases
pending against Enron Corporation and related defendants, added new allegations to its
case today, charging Arthur Andersen of Chicago with
knowingly participating in Enron's fraud on employees.
Lawsuit Seeks to Hold Andersen Accountable for Defrauding Enron Investors, Employees
--- http://www.smartpros.com/x31970.xml |
Bob Jensen's threads on the Enron scandal are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
Quality of Earnings,
Restatements, and Core Earnings
Question
What are the primary alleged causes for the rapid increase in revisions to
financial statements in the past few years?
June 14, 2006 message from Denny Beresford
[DBeresfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]
An official in Washington DC sent me a note today
saying that he is " interested in understanding the cause for the increased
number of restatements. Can you recommend any good articles or research that
explains the root causes, trends, etc?
Can anyone suggest some good references to pass
along?
Denny Beresford
June 14, 2006 reply from Ganesh M. Pandit, DBA, CPA, CMA
[profgmp@HOTMAIL.COM]
Perhaps this might help...Financial Restatements:
Causes, Consequences, and Corrections By Erik Linn, CPA, and Kori Diehl,
CPA, published in the September 2005 issue of Strategic Finance,
Vol.87, Iss. 3; pg. 34, 6 pgs.
Ganesh M. Pandit Adelphi University
June 15, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen
Evidence seems to be mounting that Section 404 of SOX is working in
uncovering significant errors in past financial statements. This is to be
expected in the early phases of 404 implementation. But the revisions should
subside after 404 is properly rolling. Companies like Kodak found huge internal
control weaknesses that led to reporting errors.
One of the most popular annual study if restatements is free from the
Huron Consulting Group.
Free from the Huron Consulting Group (Registration Required) ---
http://www.huronconsultinggroup.com/
"Restatements Should Subside as 404, Lease Issues Subside" ---
http://www.huronconsultinggroup.com/uploadedFiles/CW-Restatements-021406.pdf
"2004 Annual Review of Financial Reporting Matters - Summary" ---
Click Here
(I could not yet find the 2005 update, which is understandable since
2005 annual reports were just recently published.)
There also is an interesting 1999 paper entitled "Accounting Defects,
Financial Statement Credibility, and Equity Valuation" by W. Bruce Johnson
and D. Shores ---
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/acct/papers/workingpapers/99-01.pdf
Bob Jensen
Core Earnings
Bob Jensen's Overview --- Go to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/CoreEarnings.htm
"Beyond The Balance Sheet Earnings Quality," by Kurt
Badanhausen, Jack Gage, Cecily Hall, Michael K. Ozanian, Forbes, January 28,
2005 --- http://www.forbes.com/home/business/2005/01/26/bbsearnings.html
It's not how much money a company is making that
counts, it's how it makes its money. The earnings quality scores from
RateFinancials aim to evaluate how closely reported earnings reflect the
cash that the companies' businesses are generating and how well their
balance sheets reflect their true economic position. Companies in the
winners table have the best earnings quality (they are generating a lot of
sustainable cash from their operations), while companies in the losers table
have been boosting their reported earnings with such tricks as unexpensed
stock options, low tax rates, asset sales, off-balance-sheet financing and
deferred maintenance of the pension fund.
Krispy kreme doughnuts is the latest illustration
of the fact that stunning earnings growth can mask a lot of trouble. Not
long ago the doughnut maker was a glamour stock with a 60% earnings-per-share
growth rate and a multiple to match-70 times trailing earnings. Now the
stock is at $9.61, down 72% from May, when the company first issued an
earnings warning. Turns out Krispy Kreme may have leavened profits in the
way it accounted for the purchase of franchised stores and by failing to
book adequate reserves for doubtful accounts. So claims a shareholder
lawsuit against the company. Krispy Kreme would not comment on the
suit.
Investors are not auditors, they don't have
subpoena power, and they can't know about such disasters in advance. But
sometimes they can get hints that the quality of a company's earnings is a
little shaky. In Krispy's case an indication that it was straining to
deliver its growth story came three years ago in its use of synthetic leases
to finance expansion. Forbes described these leases in a Feb. 18, 2002 story
that did not please the company. Another straw in the wind: weak free cash
flow from operations. You get that number by taking the "cash flow from
operations" reported on the "consolidated statement of cash
flows," then subtracting capital expenditures. Solid earners usually
throw off lots of positive free cash flow. At Krispy the figure was
negative.
Is there a Krispy Kreme lurking in your
portfolio? For this, the fifth installment in our Beyond the Balance Sheet
series, we asked the experts at RateFinancials of New York City ( www.ratefinancials.com
) to look into earnings quality among the companies included in the S&P
500 Index. The tables at right display the outfits that RateFinancials puts
at the top and at the bottom of the quality scale. The ratings are to a
degree subjective and, not surprisingly, some of the companies at the bottom
take exception. General Motors feels that RateFinancials understates its
cash flow. But at minimum RateFinancials' work warns investors to look
closely at the financial statements of the suspect companies.
A lot of factors went into the ratings produced by
cofounders Victor Germack and Harold Paumgarten, research director Allan
Young and ten analysts. A company that expenses stock options is probably
not straining to meet earnings forecasts, so it gets a plus. Overoptimistic
assumptions about future earnings on a pension fund artificially prop up
earnings and thus rate a minus. A low tax rate is a potential indicator of
trouble: Maybe the low profit reported to the Internal Revenue Service is
all too true and the high profit reported to shareholders an exaggeration.
Other factors relate to discontinued operations (booking a one-time gain
from selling a business is bad), corporate governance (companies get black
marks for having poison pills), inventory (if it piles up faster than sales,
then business may be weakening) and free cash flow (a declining number is
bad).
Continued in this section of Forbes
Included in Standard &
Poor's definition of Core Earnings are
- employee stock options grant expenses,
- restructuring charges from on-going
operations,
- write-downs of depreciable or amortizable
operating assets,
- pensions costs
- purchased research and development.
Excluded from this definition
are
- impairment of goodwill charges,
- gains or losses from asset sales, pension
gains,
- unrealized gains or losses from hedging
activities, merger and acquisition related fees
- litigation settlements
The Quality of Earnings
Controversy in Accounting Theory
From The Wall Street
Journal Weekly Accounting Review on April 13, 2007
These Days, Detective Skills
Are Key to Gauging a Stock
by Herb Greenberg
The Wall Street Journal
Page: B3
Click here to view the
full article on WSJ.com
---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117590470676662738.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
TOPICS: Accounting,
Disclosure, Disclosure Requirements, Earnings Quality,
Financial Accounting, Sarbanes-Oxley Act
SUMMARY: "When Circuit City Stores
Inc. reported an unexpected fiscal fourth-quarter loss this
past week, with its stock in the doldrums, Victor Germack
felt vindicated. Last summer, when quite a few analysts were
upgrading their ratings on the electronics retailer's stock,
his research firm, RateFinancials, published a report
blasting Circuit City for "very poor quality of earnings"
and "poor accounting policies, footnotes and management
discussion and analysis."" The concerns arose from a
"preponderance of year-end lease terminations and the
disproportional influence [on earnings from] the sales of
extended warranties..." Circuit City's spokesman, Bill
Cimino, cites other factors, such as a rapid decline in the
price of flat-panel television sets, that impacted the
results.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is the "quality" of a company's earnings?
2.) What factors raised questions in some analysts' minds
about the quality of Circuit City's earnings? List all that
you find in the main article and in the related one, and
explain the impact of the issue on the notion of "quality of
earnings" or "quality of financial reporting."
3.) Why did this question of quality of earnings not arise
the minds of other analysts besides those of RateFinancials
Inc.?
4.) How does the corporate spokesperson address the question
of the quality of Circuit City's earnings? How does his
answer benefit Circuit City in its dealings with financial
markets?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of
Rhode Island
RELATED ARTICLES:
Circuit City
Highlights Doubts About Analysts
by Steven D. Jones
Sep 08, 2006
Online Exclusive
|
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators'
Review on May 27, 2004
TITLE: J.C. Penney Profit Hurt by Eckerd
REPORTER: Kortney Stringer
DATE: May 19, 2004
PAGE: B4
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108488326393314408,00.html
TOPICS: Accounting, Earnings Quality, Financial Accounting, Financial Analysis,
Financial Statement Analysis, Income from Continuing Operations, Net Income,
Operating Income
SUMMARY: Despite an earnings increase, J.C. Penney reported a 33% decline in
net income. Questions focus on the components and usefulness of the income
statement.
QUESTIONS:
1.) Describe the primary purpose(s) of the income statement. Distinguish between
the single-step and multi-step format for the income statement. Which type of
statement is more common? Support your answer.
2.) Explain the components of gross margin, operating income, income from
continuing operations, net income, and comprehensive income. What is
persistence? Which income statement total is likely to have the greatest
persistence? Which income statement total is likely to have the least
persistence?
3.) Where are results from discontinued operations reported on the income
statement? Why are results from discontinued operations separated from income
from continuing operations?
4.) What impact does the loss from the sale of Eckerd have on J.C. Penney's
expected future net income? What impact does results from continuing operations
have on expected future net income?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
From The Wall Street Journal
Accounting Educators' Review on May 23, 2002
TITLE: SEC Broadens Investigation Into
Revenue-Boosting Tricks; Fearing Bogus Numbers Are Widespread, Agency Probes
Lucent and Others
REPORTER: Susan Pulliam and Rebecca Blumenstein
DATE: May 16, 2002
PAGE: A1
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1021510491566948760.djm,00.html
TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Statement Analysis
SUMMARY: "Securities and Exchange
Commission officials, concerned about an explosion of transactions that falsely
created the impression of booming business across many industries, are
conducting a sweeping investigation into a host of practices that pump up
revenue."
QUESTIONS:
1.) "Probing revenue promises to be a much broader inquiry than the earlier
investigations of Enron and other companies accused of using accounting tricks
to boost their profits." What is the difference between inflating profits
vs. revenues?
2.) What are the ways in which
accounting information is used (both in general and in ways specifically cited
in this article)? What are the concerns about using accounting information that
has been manipulated to increase revenues? To increase profits?
3.) Describe the specific techniques
that may be used to inflate revenues that are enumerated in this article and the
related one. Why would a practice of inflating revenues be of particular concern
during the ".com boom"?
4.) "[L90 Inc.] L90 lopped $8.3
million, or just over 10%, off revenue previously reported for 2000 and 2001,
while booking the $250,000 [net difference in the amount of wire transfers that
had been used in one of these transactions] as 'other income' rather than
revenue." What is the difference between revenues and other income? Where
might these items be found in a multi-step income statement? In a single-step
income statement?
5.) What are "vendor
allowances"? How might these allowances be used to inflate revenues?
Consider the case of Lucent Technologies described in the article. Might their
techniques also have been used to boost profits?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University
of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
--- RELATED ARTICLES ---
TITLE: CMS Energy Admits Questionable Trades Inflated Its Volume
REPORTER: Chip Cummins and Jonathan Friedland
PAGE: A1
ISSUE: May 16, 2002
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1021494984503313400.djm,00.html
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on May 27,
2004
TITLE: SEC Gets Tough With Settlement in Lucent Case
REPORTER: Deborah Solomon and Dennis K. Berman
DATE: May 17, 2004
PAGE: A1
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108474447102812763,00.html
TOPICS: Criminal Procedure, Financial Accounting, Legal Liability, Revenue
Recognition, Securities and Exchange Commission, Accounting
SUMMARY: After a lengthy investigation into the accounting practices of
Lucent Technologies Inc., the Securities and Exchange Commission is expected to
file civil charges and impose a $25 million fine against the company. Questions
focus on the role of the SEC in financial reporting.
QUESTIONS:
1.) What is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)? When was the SEC
established? Why was the SEC established? Does the SEC have the responsibility
of establishing financial reporting guidelines?
2.) What role does the SEC currently play in the financial reporting process?
What power does the SEC have to sanction companies that violate financial
reporting guidelines?
3.) What is the difference between a civil and a criminal charge? What is the
difference between a class-action suit by investors and a civil charge by the
SEC?
4.) What personal liability do individuals have for improper accounting? Why
does the SEC object to companies indemnifying individuals for consequences
associated with improper accounting?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University
Bob Jensen's threads on revenue accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm
Standard & Poor's News Release on May 14,
2002 --- http://www.standardandpoors.com/PressRoom/index.html
Standard & Poor's To
Change System For Evaluating Corporate Earnings
Widely-Supported "Core
Earnings" Approach to be Applied to Earnings Analyses and Forecasts for US Indices,
Company Data and Equity Research
New York, May 14, 2002 --
Standard & Poor's today published a set of new definitions it will use for equity
analysis to evaluate corporate operating earnings of publicly held companies in the United
States. Release of "Measures of Corporate Earnings" completes a process Standard
& Poor's began in August 2001 when the firm began discussions with securities and
accounting analysts, portfolio managers, academic research groups and others to build a
consensus for changes that will reduce investor frustration and confusion over growing
differences in the reporting of corporate earnings. The text of "Measures of
Corporate Earnings" may be found at www.standardandpoors.com/PressRoom/index.html.
At the center of Standard &
Poor's effort to return transparency and consistency to corporate reporting is a focus on
what it refers to as Core Earnings, or the after-tax earnings generated from a
corporation's principal business or businesses. Since Standard & Poor's believes that
there is a general understanding of what is included in As Reported Earnings, its
definition of Core Earnings begins with As Reported and then makes a series of
adjustments. As Reported Earnings are earnings as defined by Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) which excludes two items - discontinued operations and extraordinary
items, both as defined by GAAP.
Included in Standard & Poor's
definition of Core Earnings are employee stock options grant expenses, restructuring
charges from on-going operations, write-downs of depreciable or amortizable operating
assets, pensions costs and purchased research and development. Excluded from this
definition are impairment of goodwill charges, gains or losses from asset sales, pension
gains, unrealized gains or losses from hedging activities, merger and acquisition related
fees and litigation settlements.
"For over 140 years,
Standard & Poor's has stood for the investor's right to know. Central to that
objective is a clear, consistent, definition of a company's financial position," said
Leo O'Neill, president of Standard & Poor's. "The increased use of so-called pro
forma earnings and other measures to report corporate performance has generated
controversy and confusion and has not served investor interests. Standard & Poor's
Core Earnings definition will help build consensus and restore investor trust and
confidence in the data used to make investment decisions."
"A number of recent high
profile bankruptcies have renewed investors' concerns about the reliability of corporate
reporting," said David M. Blitzer, Standard & Poor's chief investment strategist.
"From the work we have just completed, our hope is to generate additional public
discussion on earnings measures. Once there are more generally accepted definitions, it
will be much easier for analysts and investors to evaluate varying investment opinions and
recommendations and form their own views of which companies are the most attractive."
Beginning shortly, Standard &
Poor's will include the components of its definition for Core Earnings in its COMPUSTAT
database for the U.S., the leading source for corporate financial data. In addition, Core
Earnings will be calculated and reported for Standard & Poor's U.S. equity indices,
including the S&P 500. Finally, Standard & Poor's own equity research team, which
provides opinions on over 1100 stocks, will adopt Core Earnings in its analyses.
"Core Earnings is an
excellent analytical tool for the individual and professional investor alike," said
Kenneth Shea, managing director for global equity research at Standard & Poor's.
"It allows investors to better evaluate and compare the underlying earnings power of
the companies they are examining. In addition, it enhances an investor's ability to
construct and maintain investment portfolios that will adhere to a pre-determined set of
investment objectives. With Core Earnings, Standard & Poor's equity analysts will be
able to provide our clients with even more insightful forecasts and buy, hold and sell
recommendations."
From the outset, Standard &
Poor's has sought to achieve agreement surrounding broad earnings measures that address a
company's potential for profitability. In addition to emphasizing this approach in its
equity analysis, Standard & Poor's will also make Core Earnings a part of its credit
ratings analysis. The accuracy of earnings and earnings trends has always been a component
of credit analysis and Core Earnings adds value to this process. Earnings are also a major
element in cash flow analysis and are therefore a part of Standard & Poor's debt
rating methodology.
Standard & Poor's, a division
of The McGraw-Hill Companies (NYSE:MHP), provides independent financial information,
analytical services, and credit ratings to the world's financial markets. Among the
company's many products are the S&P Global 1200, the premier global equity performance
benchmark, the S&P 500, the premier U.S. portfolio index, and credit ratings on more
than 220,000 securities and funds worldwide. With more than 5,000 employees located in 18
countries, Standard & Poor's is an integral part of the global financial
infrastructure. For more information, visit www.standardandpoors.com.
S&P Main Core Earnings Site (including a Flash Presentation) --- http://snipurl.com/SPCoreEarnings
S&P PowerPoint Show on Core Earnings
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/corePowerpoint.ppt
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/corePowerpoint.htm
Other Related Core Earnings Files
Bob Jensen's Overview --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/CoreEarnings.htm
Updates, including FAS 133 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/CoreEarningsMisc.pdf
Pensions and Pension Interest --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/CoreEarningsPensions.pdf
Question:
What ten companies have the most "inflated" measures of profit?
Answer:
"Shining A New Light on Earnings, BusinessWeek Editorial, June 21,
2002 --- http://www.standardandpoors.com/Forum/MarketAnalysis/coreEarnings/Articles/062102_coredata.html
How much does a company
truly make? It's hard to tell these days. To boost the performance of their
stocks, companies have come up with a slew of self-defined "pro
forma" numbers that put their financials in a favorable light. Now
ratings agency Standard & Poor's has devised a truer measure known as Core
Earnings.
The Goal: to provide a
standardized definition of the profits produced by a company's ongiong
operations. Of the three main changes from more traditional measures of
profits two reduce earmings: Income from pension funds is excluded and the
cost of stock options are deducted as an expense. The other big change boosts
earnings by adding back in the charges taken to adjust for overpriced
acquisitions. Here are the top 10 losers and winners under Core Earnings:

Enhanced Business Reporting
I attended the following CPE Workshop at the AAA Meetings in Orlando
CPE Session 3: Saturday, August 7, 1:00 PM – 4:00 PM
Value Measurement and Reporting—Moving toward Measuring and Reporting Value
Creation Activities and Opportunities
Presenters: William J. L. Swirsky, Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants
Paul Herring, AICPA Director Business Reporting Assurance and Advisory
Service
Description/Objectives:
Content – Presentations and dialogue about measuring the activities and
opportunities that drive an entity’s value and, once measured, reporting
these value creation prospects, in financial or nonfinancial terms, in
addition to current financial information. The session will include
information about research by the Value Measurement and Reporting
Collaborative (VMRC) that will provide the foundation for the development of a
framework of market-driven principles that characterize value measurement and
reporting on a global basis.
Objectives – To continue the dialogue on more
transparent, consistent, and reliable reporting of an entity’s value; to
provide participants with information about the research being undertaken by
VMRC; to talk about disclosure; and to solicit feedback from the attendees
about where they see gaps in the current practices on value measurement and
reporting.
Plan – To (1) provide context for value measurement
and reporting; (2) describe research to date; and (3) describe reporting
initiatives.
The above workshop focused mainly upon the early stages of the Value
Measurement and Reporting Collaborative that evolved into the Enhanced
Business Reporting (EBR) Consortium) for providing more structure,
uniformity, and measurement of non-financial information reported to managers
and other stakeholders --- http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/cpaltr/nov2002/supps/edu1.htm
This initiative that began in 2002 with hope that a collaboration between the
AICPA, the Canadian CICA, leading consulting firms, and others could initiate a
new business reporting model as follows:
The Value Measurement and Reporting Collaborative, in
which the AICPA is a participant, will play a crucial role in the new business
reporting model. VMRC is a global effort of the accounting profession, along
with corporate directors, businesses, business associations and organizations,
institutional investors, investment analysts, software companies and
academics. The key purpose of the collaborative is to help boards of directors
and senior management make better strategic decisions using value measurement
and reporting. It is anticipated that the current financial reporting model
would, over time, migrate to this new model and would be used to communicate a
more complete picture to stakeholders.
Also see Grant Thornton's summary in 2004
Grant Thornton in the US has posted a new
publication of Directors Monthly, which focuses on "Business Reporting: New
Initiative Will Guide Voluntary Enhancements." The publication discusses
how non-financial information offers a better picture of corporate financial
health.
Double Entries, September 9, 2004 --- http://accountingeducation.com/news/news5395.html
For years researchers and businesses have been attempting to find a better
way to report on business performance beyond the traditional financial reporting
effort. Bob Jensen even wrote a 1976 book called Phantasmagoric
Accounting --- See Volume 14 at http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aaa/market/studar.htm
Studies of reporting on non-financial business performance over the past 50
years have generally been disappointing. Numbers attached to such things
as cost of pollution and value of human capital were generally derived from
overly-simplified models that really did not deal with externalities,
interaction effects, non-stationarity, and important missing variables.
There is an immense need, especially by managers and lawmakers, for better
business reporting that will help making tradeoffs between stakeholders.
At the Orlando workshop mentioned above, we heard a great deal about the need
for a new business reporting model. But when the presenters got down to
what had been accomplished to date, I felt like the presentations lacked
scholarship, especially in terms of the history of research on this topic over
the past 50 years. What was presented as "new" really had been
hashed over many times in the past. I left the Enhanced Business Reporting
Consortium workshop feeling that this initiative is long on hype and short on
hope.
But I do not want to give the impression that the EBR initiative is not
important. Little is gained by the traditional accounting research
tradition, especially in academe, of ignoring huge and seemingly intractable
problems that seem to defy all known research methodologies. High on the
list of intractable problems are problems of measuring intangibles and
human/environmental performance. If nothing else, the Value Measurement
and Reporting Collaborative will help to keep researchers focused on the bigger
problems rather than less relevant minutiae. At a minimum some progress
may be made toward standardization of non-financial reporting.
You can track the progress of the Enhanced Business Reporting
Consortium at http://www.ebrconsortium.org/
Economic Theory of
Accounting
Financial Statements Are Still Valuable Tools for Predicting Bankruptcy
Despite growing public skepticism over how useful
financial statements are in providing information to investors, researchers at
Stanford’s Graduate School of Business have found that the value of financial
ratios for predicting bankruptcy has not declined significantly over time.
Professors Maureen McNichols and William Beaver and graduate student Jung-Wu Rhie have reexamined the usefulness for predicting bankruptcy of financial
ratios such as return on assets (net income divided by total assets), cash flow
to total liabilities (earnings before interest, depreciation, and taxes divided
by both short- and long-term debt), and leverage (total liabilities to total
assets). The study explored how three forces have influenced this predictive
value over the past 40 years.
"Financial Statements Are Still Valuable Tools for Predicting Bankruptcy,"
Stanford Graduate School of Business Newsletter, November 2005 ---
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/acctg_mcnichols-beaver_bankruptcy.shtml
"Financial Statements Still Significant
In Predicting Bankruptcy," AccountingWeb, May 17, 2006 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102159
Researchers have
found that financial ratios are still valuable tools in predicting
bankruptcy. The significance of financial ratios found in statements was
explored in a study examining their predictive value over the last four
decades, according to the Stanford Graduate School of Business (GSB).
The GSB reported
that the premise of the study was motivated by regulatory organizations,
such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the Securities and
Exchange Commission, seeking to increase the usefulness of information found
in financial statements.
The study,
completed by Professors Maureen McNichols and William Beaver, with graduate
student Jung-Wu Rhie, reexamined the use of financial ratios such as cash
flow to total liabilities (earnings before interest, depreciation, and taxes
divided by short-term debt plus long-term debt), return on assets (net
income divided by total assets), leverage (total liabilities compared to
total assets), according to the GSB.
McNichols is the
Marriner S. Eccles Professor of Public and Private Management at the GSB.
Beaver is the Joan E. Horngren Professor of Accounting there.
McNichols told the
GSB, “One prediction is that if standard-setters are successful at
incorporating additional information about fair values into financial
statements, then we might expect their predictive ability for bankruptcy to
increase.”
On the other hand,
traditional accounting standards may capture only a portion of current
companies’ scope of activities. Also, financial statements may be seen as
more “managed” than from other times in the past, according to the GSB.
“If we look back in
the 1960s, intangible assets -– as represented by investments in brands,
research and development and technology -– were much less pervasive than
they are today. These kinds of transactions are not well captured by our
current accounting model,” Professor McNichols told the GSB. Concerning the
“management” of financial statements, McNichols said, “Certainly, there is
much more documentation of earnings management today than we’ve seen
historically.”
McNichols went on
to say that any shift in the economic activities of companies might also
offset any improvements in standards and informativeness of financial
statements made by regulatory standard-setters, according to the GSB.
In
study results released in March 2005, financial
statements were found to be highly significant in predicting bankruptcy over
the two periods of the study, according to the GSB. Period 1 was 1962 to
1993 and Period 2 was 1994 to 2002. There was a decline in predictive
ability from Period 1 to Period 2, although it was not statistically
significant. Companies’ “hazard rate”, reflecting their risk of going
bankrupt and using the three ratios, predicted higher risk in the year
before bankruptcy, as well as other years before their insolvency. Beaver
said, “In fact, we see differences in the ratios of bankrupt and nonbankrupt
firms up to five years prior to bankruptcy.”
The researchers
then shifted their predictors toward more market-based values. These were
cumulative stock returns over a year; the market capitalization of the firm
(or common stock price per share, times the common shares outstanding); and
the variability of stock returns. The use of these values was very
predictive as well, according to the GSB.
Predictability
actually increased over time. Ninety-two percent of bankrupt companies were
in the highest three deciles of Period 1 hazard rates and 93 percent for
Period 2. The slight rise was attributed to market prices reflecting broader
information, in addition to the information found in financial statements.
The GSB reported that the incremental significance of non-financial
statement information is reflected in the resulting difference between the
two time periods.
The researchers
then merged the financial-ratio and market-based models into a hybrid model.
Their results improved, coming up with a 96 percent chance of predicting
bankruptcy for Period 1 and 93 percent over Period 2. This seems to show
that market prices may compensate for even slight decreases in the
predictivity of financial ratios. These results further indicate that the
market draws upon additional information not available in financial ratios.
McNichols told the
GSB, “But it’s comforting to know that the behavior of the combined model,
over time, is so stable.” The stability of their combined model suggests
that bankruptcy can be predicted reliably in capital markets and this
ability has not been eroded by changes in reporting.
Dr. Edward
Altman, Ph.D., developed his
Z-score formula for predicting bankruptcy in 1968,
according to Value Based Management. It consists of three different models,
each for specific business organizations, including public manufacturers,
private manufacturers and private general firms.
The American
Bankruptcy Institute collects and publishes metrics on bankruptcies. Review
their
listing of annual business and non-business
filings by state (2000-2005) breaks down total bankruptcies into business
and non-business numbers, as well as consumer bankruptcies as a percentage
of the non-business metrics.
October 30, 2002 message from JerryFeltham [gerald.feltham@commerce.ubc.ca]
Peter Christensen and
I are pleased to announce that the first of two volumes on the fundamentals of
the economic analysis of accounting has been published by Kluwer. This two
volume series is based on two analytical Ph.D. seminars I have taught for
several years, and is designed to provide efficient coverage of key
information economic models and results that are pertinent to accounting
research.
The first volume is
entitled: Economics of
Accounting: Volume I - Information in Markets.
The attached file
provides the table of contents of this volume, plus the preface - which gives
a brief overview of the two volumes. The second volume is
Economics of
Accounting: Volume II - Performance Evaluation.
We expect to complete
it in the next few months.
The two volumes can
be used to provide the foundation for Ph.D. courses on information economic
research in accounting. Furthermore, it is our hope that analytical
researchers, as well as empiricists and experimentalists who use information
economic analysis to motivate their hypotheses, will find our book to be a
useful reference.
We plan to maintain a
website for the book. It will primarily be used to provide some problems Peter
and I have developed in teaching courses based on the two books. In addition,
the website will include any errata. The website address is:
http://people.commerce.ubc.ca/faculty/feltham/economicsofaccounting.html
Also attached is a
flyer from our publisher Kluwer. It announces a 25% discount in the price if
the book is purchased prior to December 31.
The publisher has
also informed us that: "If students buy the book through your university
bookstore (6 or more copies) they will receive an adoption price of $79.95
US."
Information regarding
discounts on this book for course use and bulk purchases can be obtained by
sending an e-mail message to kluwer@wkap.com
(their customer service department).
Jerry Feltham
Faculty of Commerce
University of British Columbia
2053 Main Mall
Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Z2
Tel. 604-822-8397 Fax 604-822-9470 jerry.feltham@commerce.ubc.ca
A One-Hour Video on What it Means to
Be Predictably Irrational (July 25, 2008) ---
http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/
The video is also at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VZv--sm9XXU
This is quite interesting!
From the Financial Rounds Blog on
January 25, 2008 ---
http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/
"Dan Ariely (Duke University) -
Predictably Irrational
Here's a
video of Dan Ariely (author of "Predictably
Irrational") in his recent talk for the Google Authors program. Ariely
has written a fascinating book about some of the cognitive and behavioral
biases that most of us exhibit. If you listen carefully, you'll find that he
even gives a hint about how to increase your student evaluations ---
http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/
Summary of what it means to be
"predictably irrational" ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Predictably_Irrational
New York Times Book Review
"Emonomics," by David Berreby, The New York Times, March 16, 2008
---
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/books/review/Berreby-t.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
For years, the
ideology of free markets bestrode the world, bending politics as well as
economics to its core assumption: market forces produce the best solution to
any problem. But these days, even Bill Gates says capitalism’s work is
“unsatisfactory” for one-third of humanity, and not even Hillary Clinton
supports Bill Clinton’s 1990s trade pacts.
Another sign that
times are changing is “Predictably Irrational,” a book that both exemplifies
and explains this shift in the cultural winds. Here, Dan Ariely, an
economist at M.I.T., tells us that “life with fewer market norms and more
social norms would be more satisfying, creative, fulfilling and fun.” By the
way, the conference where he had this insight wasn’t sponsored by the
Federal Reserve, where he is a researcher. It came to him at Burning Man,
the annual anarchist conclave where clothes are optional and money is
banned. Ariely calls it “the most accepting, social and caring place I had
ever been.”
Obviously, this sly
and lucid book is not about your grandfather’s dismal science. Ariely’s
trade is behavioral economics, which is the study, by experiments, of what
people actually do when they buy, sell, change jobs, marry and make other
real-life decisions.
To see how arousal
alters sexual attitudes, for example, Ariely and his colleagues asked young
men to answer a questionnaire — then asked them to answer it again, only
this time while indulging in Internet pornography on a laptop wrapped in
Saran Wrap. (In that state, their answers to questions about sexual tastes,,
violence and condom use were far less respectable.) To study the power of
suggestion, Ariely’s team zapped volunteers with a little painful
electricity, then offered fake pain pills costing either 10 cents or $2.50
(all reduced the pain, but the more expensive ones had a far greater
effect). To see how social situations affect honesty, they created tests
that made it easy to cheat, then looked at what happened if they reminded
people right before the test of a moral rule. (It turned out that being
reminded of any moral code — the Ten Commandments, the non-existent “M.I.T.
honor system” — caused cheating to plummet.)
These sorts of
rigorous but goofy-sounding experiments lend themselves to a genial,
gee-whiz style, with which Ariely moves comfortably from the lab to broad
social questions to his own life (why did he buy that Audi instead of a
sensible minivan?). He is good-tempered company — if he mentions you in this
book, you are going to be called “brilliant,” “fantastic” or “delightful” —
and crystal clear about all he describes. But “Predictably Irrational” is a
far more revolutionary book than its unthreatening manner lets on. It’s a
concise summary of why today’s social science increasingly treats the
markets-know-best model as a fairy tale.
At the heart of the
market approach to understanding people is a set of assumptions. First, you
are a coherent and unitary self. Second, you can be sure of what this self
of yours wants and needs, and can predict what it will do. Third, you get
some information about yourself from your body — objective facts about
hunger, thirst, pain and pleasure that help guide your decisions. Standard
economics, as Ariely writes, assumes that all of us, equipped with this sort
of self, “know all the pertinent information about our decisions” and “we
can calculate the value of the different options we face.” We are, for
important decisions, rational, and that’s what makes markets so effective at
finding value and allocating work. To borrow from H. L. Mencken, the market
approach presumes that “the common people know what they want, and deserve
to get it good and hard.”
What the past few
decades of work in psychology, sociology and economics has shown, as Ariely
describes, is that all three of these assumptions are false. Yes, you have a
rational self, but it’s not your only one, nor is it often in charge. A more
accurate picture is that there are a bunch of different versions of you, who
come to the fore under different conditions. We aren’t cool calculators of
self-interest who sometimes go crazy; we’re crazies who are, under special
circumstances, sometimes rational.
Ariely is not out
to overthrow rationality. Instead, he and his fellow social scientists want
to replace the “rational economic man” model with one that more accurately
describes the real laws that drive human choices. In a chapter on
“relativity,” for example, Ariely writes that evaluating two houses side by
side yields different results than evaluating three — A, B and a somewhat
less appealing version of A. The subpar A makes it easier to decide that A
is better — not only better than the similar one, but better than B. The
lesser version of A should have no effect on your rating of the other two
buildings, but it does. Similarly, he describes the “zero price effect,”
which marketers exploit to convince us to buy something we don’t really want
or need in order to collect a “free” gift. “FREE! gives us such an emotional
charge that we perceive what is being offered as immensely more valuable
than it really is,” Ariely writes. None of this is rational, but it is
predictable.
What the reasoning
self should do, he says, is set up guardrails to manage things during those
many, many moments when reason is not in charge. (Though one might ask why
the reasoning self should always be in charge, an assumption Ariely doesn’t
examine too closely.)
For example,
Ariely writes, we know our irrational self falls easily into wanting stuff
we can’t afford and don’t need. So he proposes a credit card that encourages
planning and self-control. After $50 is spent on chocolate this month — pfft,
declined! He has in fact suggested this to a major bank. Of course, he knew
that his idea would cut into the $17 billion a year that American banks make
on consumer credit-card interest, but what the heck: money isn’t everything.
An Experiment With Toilet Paper and
Other Messages ---
http://www.predictablyirrational.com/
Other videos on being Predictably
Irrational
Great Minds in Management: The
Process of Theory Development ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/GreatMinds.htm
Question
What's "institutional structure?"
What's the theory entwined in the works of the three 2007 recipients of the
Nobel Prize in Economics?
Hint:
Nobel Prizes ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nobel_Prize
Nobel Prizes in Economics tend to go to mathematicians and/or conservative market theorists.
Nobel Peace Prices tend to reflect liberal political biases, perhaps even
not-so-hidden Nobel agendas.
Nobel Prizes for accounting and mathematics are nonexistent, probably since both
disciplines are built upon assumptions rather than reality. Actually this is
also true for economics, although somehow an exception was made for this branch
of astrology.
"A Market Nobel," by Peter Boettke, The Wall Street Journal,
October 16, 2007; Page A21 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119249811353060179.html?mod=todays_us_opinion
Yesterday Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin and Roger
Myerson won the Nobel Prize in Economic Science for their pioneering work in
the field of "mechanism design." Strangely, some have used this occasion to
disparage free-market economics. But the truth is the deserving recipients
owe a direct debt to free-market thinkers who came before them.
Mechanism design is an area of economic research
that focuses on how institutional structures can be manipulated by changing
the rules of the game in order to produce socially optimal results. The best
intentions for the public good will go astray if the institutional
arrangements are not consistent with the self-interest of decision makers.
Mr. Myerson's work on how to design auctions to
elicit information about the value of the good being auctioned -- and how to
maximize the revenue extracted from the auction -- has informed numerous
privatizations of publicly owned assets over the past quarter-century. Mr.
Maskin also contributed to auction theory, and applied the idea of mechanism
design to assess political institutions such as voting systems.
Mechanism design theory was established to try to
address the main challenge posed by Ludwig von Mises and F.A. Hayek. It all
starts with Mr. Hurwicz's response to Hayek's famous paper, "The Use of
Knowledge in Society." In the 1930s and '40s, Hayek was embroiled in the
"socialist calculation debate." Mises, Hayek's mentor in Vienna, had raised
the challenge in his book "Socialism," and before that in an article, that
without having the means of production in private hands, the economic system
will not create the incentives or the information to properly decide between
the alternative uses of scarce resources. Without the production process of
the market economy, socially desirable outcomes will be impossible to
achieve.
In the mid-1930s, Hayek published Mises's essay in
English in his book, "Collectivist Economic Planning." From there the
discussion moved to the U.K. and the U.S. Hayek summarized the fundamental
challenge that advocates of socialism needed to come to grips with. Hayek's
argument, a refinement of Mises, basically stated that the economic problem
society faced was not how to allocate given resources, but rather how to
mobilize and utilize the knowledge dispersed throughout the economy.
Hayek argued that mathematical modeling, which
relied on a set of given assumptions, had obscured the fundamental problem.
These questions were not being probed since they were assumed away in the
mathematical models of market socialism presented by Oskar Lange and, later,
Abba Lerner. Milton Friedman, when he reviewed Lerner's "Economics of
Control," stated that it was as if economic analysis of policy was being
conducted in a vacuum. Lange actually argued that questions of bureaucratic
incentives did not belong in economics and were best left to other
disciplines such as psychology and sociology.
Leonid Hurwicz, in his classic papers "On the
Concept and Possibility of Informational Decentralization" (1969), "On
Informationally Decentralized Systems" (1972), and "The Design of Mechanisms
for Resource Allocation" (1973), embraced Hayek's challenge. He developed
mechanism-design theory to test the logic of the Mises-Hayek contention that
socialism could not possibly mobilize the dispersed knowledge in society in
a way that would permit rational economic calculation for the alternative
uses of scarce resources. Mises and Hayek argued that replacing the
invisible hand of the market with the guided one of government would not
work. Mr. Hurwicz wanted to see if they were right, and under what
conditions one could say they were wrong.
Those efforts are at the foundation of the field
that was honored by the Nobel Prize committee. To function properly, any
economic system must, as Hayek pointed out, structure incentives so that the
dispersed and sometimes conflicting knowledge in society is mobilized to
realize the gains from exchange and innovation.
Last year Mr. Myerson acknowledged his own debt to
Mr. Hurwicz -- and thus Hayek -- in "Fundamental Theory of Institutions: A
Lecture in Honor of Leo Hurwicz." The incentive-compatibility issue has
highlighted the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection (perverse
behavior due to incentives caused by rules that are supposed protect us and
selection problems due to imperfect information). Mr. Hurwicz helped repair
a mid-20th century neglect of institutions in economic analysis.
While we celebrate the brilliance of Messrs.
Hurwicz, Maskin and Myerson, we should also remember that Hayek's challenge
provided their inspiration. Hayek concluded that the private-property rights
that come with the rule of law, freedom of contract, and freedom of
association is still the one mechanism design that mobilizes and utilizes
the dispersed information in an economy. Furthermore, it does so in a way
that tends to capture the gains from trade and innovation so that wealth is
continually created and humanity is made better off.
Mr. Boettke is a professor of economics at George Mason University and
the Mercatus Center.
October 17, 2007 reply from Paul
Williams [Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]
Bob, et al.
As I think I have
mentioned before there is no Nobel Prize in economics. Alfred Nobel
established his trust fund because of guilt over inventing dynamite. He
awarded prizes only to those branches of intellectual endeavor that he
believed had the potential to bring "goodness" to human kind and end wars
forever (chemistry, physics, medicine, literature, and peace (essentially
noble political acts because peace is largely about politics perhaps
explaining why right- wingers don't tend to win the Peace Prize).
In 1964 the Nobel
Committee agreed to include within the prizes The Bank of Sweden Prize in
Economic Science in Honor of Alfred Nobel, funded not by the Nobel Trust,
but by financial interests. This was a political move to bring legitimacy to
economic "science" whose scientific prescriptions for policy always manage
somehow to benefit financial interests.
Apparently we have
now "scientific" proof that labor is our punishment for the Fall from Grace.
Science my a uh foot.
October 17, 2007 reply from J. S.
Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]
Paul and Bob,
The controversies
involving the economics prize include:
1. Theoretical v.
Practical: Kantorovich, the Russian mathematician is supposed to have
expressed disbelief at receiving one of the earliest economics Nobels
(1975), since he had done virtually no work in economics except for laying
the groundwork for what later became linear programming. But that was just a
footnote in his life's work.
The same can be
said of the work of Reinhard Selten, John Nash, and to an extent Janos
Kornai. Later, a number of other theoreticians were also awarded the
economics Nobel, leading to grumbling among the applied/ empirical crowd.
Probably the series of Nobel's awarded to Milton Friedman and others later
were a reaction to this criticism.
2. Left-wing v.
Right-wing: In general, more Nobels have been awarded to quite-a-bit
right-of-center economists, and hell has broken loose when one has been
awarded to some one even an iota left-of-center. An example was Amartya Sen,
who single-handedly revived the fascinating fields of economics of poverty
and development.
Milton Friedman was
awarded the prize in 1976 right after the controversy surrounding the 1975
award to Kantorovich.
I think economics
Nobel's have generally tarnished the reputation of Nobels in general, but
one feels good when some one like John Nash gets it. I was thrilled that
Leonid Hurwicz got it this year, though I am not sure about Maskin and
Myerson. With the latter two, it is way down hill from Selten, Nash,
Harsanyi, Aumannn, Kantorovich, Arrow, Debreu, ...
So far as I know,
one "accountant" has won the economics Nobel. It is Richard Stone, who
worked in the area of national income accounting.
Incidentally, I
stumbled upon a fascinating book titled "Against Mechanism: Protecting
Economics from Science" By Philip Mirowski
One quote from the
book:
"Contrary to
popular misconceptions, I shall claim that economics needs protection
from science, and especially from scientists such as Richard Feynman, or
any other physicist who thinks he knows just what is needed for
economists to clean up their act. Economics needs protection from the
scientists in its midst, the Paul Samuelsons and the Tjalling Koopmans
and all the others who took their training in the physical sciences and
parlayed it into easy victories among their less technically inclined
colleagues. And worst of all, economics needs protection from itself.
For years, economics has enjoyed an impression of superiority over all
the other "social sciences" in rigor, precision, and technical
expertise. The reason it has been able to assume this mantle is that
economics has consistently striven to be the nearest thing to social
physics in the constellation of human knowledge."
Jagdish
Socionomic Theory of
Finance and Fraud
Socionomics and the
Enron Scandal
Right after
my posting of the 1952 cartoon, B. C. emailed me
the following video that is a documentary on Socionomics and even
has Finance Professor John Nofsinger in it speaking about Enron and
other scandals!
What is socionomics?
From
Socionomics.org:
"Socionomics
is a new theory of social causality that offers fresh insights into
collective human behavior. Over twenty years of empirical research
demonstrates that social actions are not causal to changes in social
mood, but rather changes in social mood motivate changes in social
action."
For instance, rather than suggesting that a rising
economy (or stock market) makes people happy, this takes the related,
but reversed, view that the economy improves because people are happy.
While I do not want to argue the theory (for or against), Nofsinger
makes an interesting point by saying that Enron and other scandals may
have come when they did (after the tech bubble burst etc), not because
of the scandals being worse, but because people were upset and hence
"looking for trouble."
Sort of a chicken or the egg argument that has many finance and economic
implications (not least of which might be a predictable component in
stock markets--for instance this builds upon the Elliot Wave Theory that
was mentioned via Fibonacci sequences in the DaVinci Code.).
Here is the description from video:
"
The Enron and Martha Stewart scandals made headlines at about the
same time. It wasn't just coincidence. This four minute clip about
socionomics from History's
Hidden Engine explains why some scandals make news when they do,
while others go unnoticed."
I have to
admit it is a thought provoking idea and it does fit some scenarios, but
I am not yet willing to buy into it, although
I may buy the book.
Bob Jensen's theory threads are linked
at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm
Facts Based on Assumptions:
The Power of Postpositive Thinking
Everyone is
entitled to their own opinion, but not their own facts.
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan --- FactCheck.org ---
http://www.factcheck.org/
Then again, maybe we're all entitled
to our own facts!
"The Power of Postpositive Thinking,"
Scott McLemee, Inside Higher Ed, August 2, 2006 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2006/08/02/mclemee
In particular, a
dominant trend in critical theory was the rejection of the concept of
objectivity as something that rests on a more or less naive epistemology: a
simple belief that “facts” exist in some pristine state untouched by
“theory.” To avoid being naive, the dutiful student learned to insist that,
after all, all facts come to us embedded in various assumptions about the
world. Hence (ta da!) “objectivity” exists only within an agreed-upon
framework. It is relative to that framework. So it isn’t really
objective....
What Mohanty found
in his readings of the philosophy of science were much less naïve, and more
robust, conceptions of objectivity than the straw men being thrashed by
young Foucauldians at the time. We are not all prisoners of our paradigms.
Some theoretical frameworks permit the discovery of new facts and the
testing of interpretations or hypotheses. Others do not. In short,
objectivity is a possibility and a goal — not just in the natural sciences,
but for social inquiry and humanistic research as well.
Mohanty’s major
theoretical statement on PPR arrived in 1997 with Literary Theory and the
Claims of History: Postmodernism, Objectivity, Multicultural Politics
(Cornell University Press). Because poststructurally inspired notions of
cultural relativism are usually understood to be left wing in intention,
there is often a tendency to assume that hard-edged notions of objectivity
must have conservative implications. But Mohanty’s work went very much
against the current.
“Since the lowest
common principle of evaluation is all that I can invoke,” wrote Mohanty,
complaining about certain strains of multicultural relativism, “I cannot —
and consequently need not — think about how your space impinges on mine or
how my history is defined together with yours. If that is the case, I may
have started by declaring a pious political wish, but I end up denying that
I need to take you seriously.”
PPR did
not require throwing out the multicultural baby with the relativist
bathwater, however. It meant developing ways to think about cultural
identity and its discontents. A number of Mohanty’s students and scholarly
colleagues have pursued the implications of postpositive identity politics.
I’ve written elsewhere
about Moya, an associate professor of English at Stanford University who has
played an important role in developing PPR ideas about identity. And one
academic critic has written
an interesting review essay
on early postpositive scholarship — highly recommended for anyone with a
hankering for more cultural theory right about now.
Not everybody with
a sophisticated epistemological critique manages to turn it into a
functioning think tank — which is what started to happen when people in the
postpositive circle started organizing the first Future of Minority Studies
meetings at Cornell and Stanford in 2000. Others followed at the University
of Michigan and at the University of Wisconsin in Madison. Two years ago FMS
applied for a grant from Mellon Foundation, receiving $350,000 to create a
series of programs for graduate students and junior faculty from minority
backgrounds.
The FMS Summer
Institute, first held in 2005, is a two-week seminar with about a dozen
participants — most of them ABD or just starting their first tenure-track
jobs. The institute is followed by a much larger colloquium (the part I got
to attend last week). As schools of thought in the humanities go, the
postpositivists are remarkably light on the in-group jargon. Someone
emerging from the Institute does not, it seems, need a translator to be
understood by the uninitated. Nor was there a dominant theme at the various
panels I heard.
Rather, the
distinctive quality of FMS discourse seems to derive from a certain very
clear, but largely unstated, assumption: It can be useful for scholars
concerned with issues particular to one group to listen to the research
being done on problems pertaining to other groups.
That sounds pretty
simple. But there is rather more behind it than the belief that we should
all just try to get along. Diversity (of background, of experience, of
disciplinary formation) is not something that exists alongside or in
addition to whatever happens in the “real world.” It is an inescapable and
enabling condition of life in a more or less democratic society. And anyone
who wants it to become more democratic, rather than less, has an interest in
learning to understand both its inequities and how other people are affected
by them.
A case in point
might be the findings discussed by Claude Steele, a professor of psychology
at Stanford, in a panel on Friday. His paper reviewed some of the research
on “identity contingencies,” meaning “things you have to deal with because
of your social identity.” One such contingency is what he called “stereotype
threat” — a situation in which an individual becomes aware of the risk that
what you are doing will confirm some established negative quality associated
with your group. And in keeping with the threat, there is a tendency to
become vigilant and defensive.
Steele did not just
have a string of concepts to put up on PowerPoint. He had research findings
on how stereotype threat can affect education. The most striking involved
results from a puzzle-solving test given to groups of white and black
students. When the test was described as a game, the scores for the black
students were excellent — conspicuously higher, in fact, than the scores of
white students. But in experiments where the very same puzzle was described
as an intelligence test, the results were reversed. The black kids scores
dropped by about half, while the graph for their white peers spiked.
The only variable?
How the puzzle was framed — with distracting thoughts about African-American
performance on IQ tests creating “stereotype threat” in a way that
game-playing did not.
Steele also cited
an experiment in which white engineering students were given a mathematics
test. Just beforehand, some groups were told that Asian students usually did
really well on this particular test. Others were simply handed the test
without comment. Students who heard about their Asian competitors tended to
get much lower scores than the control group.
Extrapolate from
the social psychologist’s experiments with the effect of a few
innocent-sounding remarks — and imagine the cumulative effect of more overt
forms of domination. The picture is one of a culture that is profoundly
wasteful, even destructive, of the best abilities of many of its members.
“It’s not easy for
minority folks to discuss these things,” Satya Mohanty told me on the final
day of the colloquium. “But I don’t think we can afford to wait until it
becomes comfortable to start thinking about them. Our future depends on it.
By ‘our’ I mean everyone’s future. How we enrich and deepen our democratic
society and institutions depends on the answers we come up with now.”
Portions of the Colloquium will
be made available online. For updates, and more information on the Future of
Minority Studies project, check the
FMS Web site.
A version of the keynote speech
from this year’s Colloquium, “Multiculturalism, Universalism, and the 21st
Century Academy,” by Nancy Cantor, chancellor and president of Syracuse
University, will appear soon at Inside Higher Ed.
Earlier this year, Oxford
University Press published a major new work on postpositivist theory,
Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self,by Linda Martin Alcoff,
a professor of philosophy at Syracuse University. Several essays from the
book are available at
the author’s Web
site.
Mike Kearl's great social theory site ---
http://www.trinity.edu/~mkearl/
Some sites to stimulate the sociological
imagination ---
http://www.trinity.edu/~mkearl/theory.html#imag
According to Karl Popper (Logik
der Forschung, 1935: p.26), Theory is "the net which we throw out in order
to catch the world--to rationalize, explain, and dominate it." Through
history, sociological theory arose out of attempts to make sense of times of
dramatic social change. As Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills observed in
Character and Social Structure (Harbinger Books, 1964:xiii), "Problems of
the nature of human nature are raised most urgently when the life-routines
of a society are disturbed, when men are alienated from their social roles
in such a way as to open themselves up for new insight." Consider the
historical contexts spawning the theoretical insights below:
Neither the life of an
individual nor the history of a society can be understood without
understanding both. Yet men do not usually define the troubles they endure
in terms of historical change and institutional contradiction. ... The
sociological imagination enables its possessor to understand the larger
historical scene in terms of its meaning for the inner life and the external
career of a variety of individuals. ... The first fruit of this
imagination--and the first lesson of the social science that embodies it--is
the idea that the individual can understand his own experience and gauge his
own fate only by locating himself within this period, that he can know his
own chances in life only by becoming aware of those of all individuals in
his circumstances. ...We have come to know that every individual lives, from
one generation to the next, in some society; that he lives out a biography,
and that he lives it out within some historical sequence (The Sociological
Imagination, 1959:3-10).
Judge a man by his
questions rather than by his answers. --Voltaire (1694-1778)
A definition is no
proof. --William Pinkney, American diplomat (1764-1822)
A theory is more
impressive the greater the simplicity of its premises, the more different
the kinds of things it relates and the more extended its range of
applicability. --
Albert Einstein, 1949
-
SocioSite: Noted Sociological Theorists and Samplings of their Works
Alan Liu's Voice of the
Shuttle: Great collection of synopses and primary works of the great
theorists
Society for Social Research Page: Classical Sociological Theory. Good
site for excerpts from the classics, courtesy of the University of
Chicago.
Serdar Kaya's
The
Sociology Professor, a portal of social theories and theorists
Sociolog: many
phenomenological links
Larry Ridener's Dead Sociologists Index: Biographies of and excerpts
from those who carved the discipline
SociologyCafe's
"Social Thinkers, Sociologists, and Online Texts" and
Theory Outline
PRAXIS: The
Insurgent Sociology Web Site at University of California, Riverside
Ed Stephan's "A Sociology Timeline from 1600"
Carl Cuneo's Course on Theories of Inequality
Marxist Internet
Archive
Marxism/ Leninism
Marxism Made Simple
Marx
and Engels' Writings
Engels' The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State
Antonio Gramsci
site from Queens College
Habermas links
collected by Antti Kauppinen
Durkheimian links
Durkheim
Homepage
Weberian links
Mannheim Centre for European Social Research
Charles Horton Cooley's Social Organization: A Study of the Larger
Mind
George
Herbert Mead Repository at Brock University
All Things Simmelian--Georg Simmel Homepage
Erving Goffman
Game Theory
Society--mathematically modeling "strategic interaction in
competitive and cooperative environments"
Thorsten Veblen's The Theory of the Leisure Class
Foucault Homepage
Jean Baudrillard speaks
Anthony
Giddens
Howard S.
Becker's Home Page--replete with recent papers, biographical updates
and web recommendations
Amitai Etzioni's Articles in Professional Journals and Books
"Contemporary Philosophy, Critical Theory and Postmodern Thought" from
the University of Denver
Norbert Elias site from University of Sydney
FreudNet: The
A.A. Brill Library
An evolving site to
keep an eye on is
Jim Spickard's Social Theory Pages, with historical backgrounds and
intellectual biographies of the key players
Need a dictionary for
those works of critical theorists and postmodernists?
Try the Red Feather Dictionary of Critical Social Science
Gene Shackman's
Social, Economic
and Political Change--featuring links to theory, data and research
about large scale long term political, economic and social systems
change at the national and international level
World-Systems Archive
The Research
Committee on Sociocybernetics (of the Intl. Sociological Association)
Want to see what theories
sociologists are currently cooking up? Below is a sampling of sociological
journals.
-
Electronic Journal
of Sociology Home Page
-
Sociological Research Online
-
Journal of World-Systems Research
-
Journal of
Mundane Behavior (first issue February 2000)
-
Annual
Review of Sociology--with 12-years of searchable abstracts
-
Sociological Abstracts
Home Page
-
The Canadian Journal of Sociology
-
Tables of Contents for all issues of Postmodern Culture
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