Not everything that can be counted, counts. And not everything that counts can be counted.
Albert Einstein

For a long time, elite accounting researchers could find no “empirical evidence” of widespread earnings management. All they had to do was look up from the computers where their heads were buried.

There is an old expression "it's close enough for government work." Lets say a speaker says "it's close enough for accounting work." What word describes the relationship between those two phrases? In other words, the audience knows the original phrase and they know the speaker, in a sense, is modifying the phase to make a point.
Glen Gray

Probably be an accountant. I like to figure out stuff. In accounting, if you miss one number you get the whole thing wrong. You have to be perfect --- I'm a perfectionist.
Giovani Soto (catcher for the Chicago Cubs when asked what he'd like to be if he wasn't in professional baseball), as quoted in an interview with Mary Burns in Sports Illustrated, June 2008
Jensen Comment
If Soto only knew that accountants are second only to economists in terms of inaccuracies. When accountants total up the numbers on a balance sheet the total is always accurate, but the numbers being added up can be off by 1000% or more. Accuracy varies of course. Cash counts are highly accurate. Fixed assets, net of depreciation, are make-pretend within limits. Intangible asset valuations are about as accurate as ground eyesight measurements of floating cloud dimensions on a windy day. Accountants make highly inaccurate estimates of assets, liabilities, and equities. Then accountants change hats and chairs and add these estimates up very accurately and pretend that the total must mean something --- but accountants aren't sure what.

If Soto wants accuracy perhaps he should become a baseball statistician collecting up subjective estimates of the umpires. In the business world, accountants are the statisticians and the umpires. Therein lies the problem. An umpire decides what's a ball/strike, hit/foul, etc. and then leaves it up to baseball statisticians to book the numbers. In the world of business, accountants decide what are current versus deferred revenues, current versus capitalized costs, and additionally make highly subjective estimates about values of such things as forward contracts and interest rate swaps. After making their inaccurate estimates they then put on another hat, change chairs, and record their own estimates to the nearest penny. They're the business world's umpires and statisticians who simply change hats and chairs and wait for the investors to file lawsuits against them.

 

Brief Summary of Accounting Theory

Bob Jensen at Trinity University

Warning 1:  Many of the links were broken when the FASB changed all of its links.  If a link to a FASB site does not work , go to the new FASB link and search for the document.  The FASB home page is at http://www.fasb.org/ 

 

Warning 2:  In February 2008 the FASB for the first time allowed users free access to its "FASB Accounting Standards Codification" database. Access will be free for at least one year, although registration is required for free access. Much, but not all, information in separate booklets and PDF files may now be accessed much more efficiently as hypertext in one database. The document below has not been updated for the Codification Database. Although the database is off to a great start, there is much information in this document and in the FASB standards that cannot be found in the Codification Database. You can read the following at http://asc.fasb.org/asccontent&trid=2273304&nav_type=left_nav

Welcome to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Accounting Standards Codification™ (Codification).

The Codification is the result of a major four-year project involving over 200 people from multiple entities. The Codification structure is significantly different from the structure of existing accounting standards. The Notice to Constituents provides information you should read to obtain a good understanding of the Codification history, content, structure, and future consequences.

FASB's Accounting Standards Codification --- http://asc.fasb.org/home

FASB Master Glossary --- http://asc.fasb.org/glossary&letter=D

**************************

Accounting History in a Nutshell

Islamic and Social Responsibility Accounting

XBRL:  The Next Big Thing

Key Differences Between International (IFRS) and U.S. GAAP (SFAS)

Accounting Research Versus the Accountancy Profession

Learning at Research Schools Versus "Teaching Schools" Versus "Happiness"
With a Side Track into Substance Abuse

Why must all accounting doctoral programs be social
science (particularly econometrics) doctoral programs?

Why accountancy doctoral programs are drying up and
why accountancy is no longer required for admission or
graduation in an accountancy doctoral program

GMAT: Paying for Points

Accounting Journal Lack of Interest in Publishing Replications

Role of Accounting Standards in Efficient Equity Markets

Controversies in Setting Accounting Standards

Should "principles-based" standards replace more detailed requirements for complex
financial contracts such as structured financing contracts and financial instruments derivatives contracts?

Why Let the I.R.S. See What the S.E.C. Doesn't?

Radical Changes in Financial Reporting

Underlying Bases of Balance Sheet Valuation

The Controversy Between OCI versus Current Earnings

Accrual Accounting and Estimation 

Controversy Over  the SEC's Rule 144a

Cookie Jar Accounting and FAS 106

FIN 48 Liability if Transaction Is Later Disallowed by the IRS

Controversy Over FAS 2 on Research and Development (R&D)

Earnings Management, Agency Theory, and Accounting Manipulations 

Goodwill Impairment Issues 

Purchase Versus Pooling: The Never Ending Debate

Off-Balance Sheet Financing (OBSF)

Insurance:  A Scheme for Hiding Debt That Won't Go Away

CDOs: A Scheme for Hiding Debt That Won't Go Away

Pensions and Post-retirement benefits:  Schemes for Hiding Deb

Leases:  A  Scheme for Hiding Debt That Won't Go Away 

Accounting for Executory Contracts Such as
Purchase/Sale Commitments and Loan Commitments

Debt Versus Equity (including shareholder earn-out contracts)

Time versus Money

Intangibles and Contingencies:   Theory Disputes Focus Mainly on the Tip of the Iceberg

Intangibles:  An Accounting Paradox

Intangibles:  Selected References On Accounting for Intangibles

EBR:  Enhanced Business Reporting (including non-financial information)

The Controversy Over Revenue Reporting and HFV 

The Controversy Over Employee Stock Options as Compenation  

Accounting for Options to Buy Real Estate

The Controversy over Accounting for Securitizations and Loan Guarantees  

The Controversy Over Pro Forma Reporting

Triple-Bottom (Social, Environmental) Reporting  

The Sad State of Government Accounting and Accountability

Which is More Value-Relevant: Earnings or Cash Flows?

The Controversy Over Fair Value (Mark-to-Market) Financial Reporting

Online Resources for Business Valuations
See http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

Understanding the Issues 

Issues of Auditor Independence 

Quality of Earnings, Restatements, and Core Earnings

Sale-Leaseback Accounting Controversies
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm#SaleLeasback

Economic Theory of Accounting

Socionomics Theory of Finance and Fraud

Facts Based on Assumptions:  The Power of Postpositive Thinking

Critical Postmodern Theory --- http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/

Mike Kearl's great social theory site

Bob Jensen's threads on GAAP comparisons (with particular stress upon derivative financial
instruments accounting rules) are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/canada.htm
The above site also links to more general GAAP comparison guides between nations.

Implications of Bad Auditing on Capital Markets
and Client's Cost of Captial
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm#IncompetentAudits

Bob Jensen's threads on corporate governance are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#Governance

Great Minds in Management:  The Process of Theory Development --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/GreatMinds.htm

"Cornell Theory Center Aids Social Science Researchers," PR Web, June 19, 2006 --- http://www.prweb.com/releases/2006/6/prweb400160.htm

How Do Scholars Search? --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Searchh.htm#Scholars

Some of the many, many lawsuits settled by auditing firms can be found at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm

FREE access to ANNUAL REPORTS in XBRL --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm#TimelineXBRL
From EDGAR Online --- http://www.tryxbrl.org/

 

 

You can order back issues or relevant links management and accounting books and journals from MAAW --- http://maaw.info/

Free Access to Back Issues of The Accounting Review --- http://maaw.info/TheAccountingReview.htm 

Bob Jensen's threads on special purpose (variable interest) entities are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm

"Visualization of Multidimensional Data" --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/352wpVisual/000DataVisualization.htm 

Bob Jensen's threads on XBRL are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm#XBRLextended 

Accounting for Electronic Commerce, Including Controversies on Business Valuation, ROI, and Revenue Reporting --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce.htm 

Comparisons of International IAS Versus FASB Standards --- http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/pocketiasus.pdf 

Bob Jensen's Enron Quiz (with answers) --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnronQuiz.htm

Tom Selling's blog The Accounting Onion (great on theory and practice) --- http://accountingonion.typepad.com/

"Corporate Reports Now Searchable Via EDGAR," SmartPros, June 16, 2006 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x53502.xml

Investors and analysts can now search the full text of every SEC document filed by companies within the last two years. They'll also be able to retrieve mutual fund filings by fund or share class.

The company filing search engine enables real-time, full-text searches of filings on the entirety of the SEC's EDGAR (Electronic Document, Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval) database of company filings for the last two years. The tool can be found at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm.

SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, a strong proponent of using the Internet to post dynamic financial reports and to serve as a tool for investors and analysts made the announcement in his opening remarks at the SEC's Interactive Data Roundtable in Washington, D.C.

"This new full-text search capability will give investors and analysts instant access to the specific information they want," said Cox.

The new mutual fund search capability was made possible when the SEC recently required that filings contain a unique numerical identifier for each fund and share class. Investors will be able to find relevant filings by searching for the name of their own fund. In the past, searching for information on particular funds and particular share classes within funds was very difficult, because a single prospectus might contain information about many mutual funds and share classes.

The SEC is asking users of this Web site feature to supply feedback, including suggestions for additional functions, so that further improvements to the site can be considered and implemented.

 

Paul Pacter has been working hard to both maintain his international accounting site and to produce a comparison guide between international and Chinese GAAP.  He states the following on May 26, 2005 at http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm 

May 26, 2005:  Deloitte (China) has published a comparison of accounting standards in the People's Republic of China and International Financial Reporting Standards as of March 2005. The comparison is available in both English and Chinese. China has different levels of accounting standards that apply to different classes of entities. The comparison relates to the standards applicable to the largest companies (including all non-financial listed and foreign-invested enterprises) and identifies major accounting recognition and measurement differences. Click to download:

 
 

 


The chronology of events leading up to European adoption if common international accounting standards --- http://www.iasplus.com/restruct/resteuro.htm

Large International Accounting Firm History --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Four_auditors

Tom Selling's blog The Accounting Onion (great on theory and practice) --- http://accountingonion.typepad.com/

This is a Good Summary of Various Forms of Business Risk  --- http://www.erisk.com/portal/Resources/resources_archive.asp 

  1. Enterprise Risk Management

  2. Credit Risk

  3. Market Risk

  4. Operational Risk

  5. Business Risk

  6. Other Types of Risk?

Accounting History in a Nutshell

Confucius is described, by Sima Qian and other sources, as having endured a poverty-stricken and humiliating youth and been forced, upon reaching manhood, to undertake such petty jobs as accounting and caring for livestock.

Early accounting was a knotty issue
South American Indian culture apparently used layers of knotted strings as a complicated ledger.

Two Harvard University researchers believe they have uncovered the meaning of a group of Incan khipus, cryptic assemblages of string and knots that were used by the South American civilization for record-keeping and perhaps even as a written language. Researchers have long known that some knot patterns represented a specific number. Archeologist Gary Urton and mathematician Carrie Brezine report today in the journal Science that computer analysis of 21 khipus showed how individual strings were combined into multilayered collections that were used as a kind of ledger.
Thomas H. Maugh, "Researchers Think They've Got the Incas' Numbers," Los Angeles Times, August 12, 2005 ---
http://www.latimes.com/news/science/la-sci-khipu12aug12,1,6589325.story?coll=la-news-science&ctrack=1&cset=true
Also note http://snipurl.com/incaknots   [64_233_169_104

Jensen Comment:  I'm told that accounting tallies in Africa and other parts of the world preceded written language.  However, tallies alone did not permit aggregations such as accounting for such things as three goats plus sixty apples.   Modern accounting awaited a combination of the Arabic numbering ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arabic_numbers ) and a common valuation scheme for valuing heterogeneous items (e.g., gold equivalents or currency units) such that the values of goats and apples could be aggregated.  It is intriguing that Inca knot patterns were something more than simple tallies since patterns could depict different numbers and aggregations could possibly be achieved with "multilayered collections."


From Texas A&M University
Accounting History Outline --- http://acct.tamu.edu/giroux/history.html


Accounting History (across hundreds of years)
 
A Change Fifty-Years in the Making, by Jennie Mitchell, Project Accounting WED Interconnect --- http://accounting.smwc.edu/historyacc.htm


Serious Accounting Historians May Find Some Things of Use Here
Advanced Papyrological Information System from Columbia University --- http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/projects/digital/apis/

APIS is a collections-based repository hosting information about and images of papyrological materials (e.g. papyri, ostraca, wood tablets, etc) located in collections around the world. It contains physical descriptions and bibliographic information about the papyri and other written materials, as well as digital images and English translations of many of these texts. When possible, links are also provided to the original language texts (e.g. through the Duke Data Bank of Documentary Papyri). The user can move back and forth among text, translation, bibliography, description, and image. With the specially-developed APIS Search System many different types of complex searches can be carried out.

APIS includes both published and unpublished material. Generally, much more detailed information is available about the published texts. Unpublished papyri have often not yet been fully transcribed, and the information available is sometimes very basic. If you need more information about a papyrus, you should contact the appropriate person at the owning institution. (See the list of contacts under Rights & Permissions.)

APIS is still very much a work in progress; current statistics are shown in the sidebar at right. Other statistics are available on the statistics page in the project documentation. Curators of collections interested in becoming part of APIS are invited to communicate with the project director, Traianos Gagos.


More Than a Numbers Game: A Brief History of Accounting
Author: Thomas A. King
ISBN: 0-470-00873-3
Hardcover 242 pages
September 2006

Inspired by a 1998 speech by former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, this book addresses the why of accounting instead of the how, providing practitioners and students with a highly readable history of U.S. corporate accounting. Each chapter explores a controversial accounting topic. Author Thomas King is treasurer of Progressive Insurance.
SmartPros Newsletter, September 25, 2006


More Than a Numbers Game: A Brief History of Accounting
Author: Thomas A. King
ISBN: 0-470-00873-3
Hardcover 242 pages
September 2006

Inspired by a 1998 speech by former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, this book addresses the why of accounting instead of the how, providing practitioners and students with a highly readable history of U.S. corporate accounting. Each chapter explores a controversial accounting topic. Author Thomas King is treasurer of Progressive Insurance.
SmartPros Newsletter, September 25, 2006

Jensen Comment
The Chief Accountant of the SEC under Arthur Levitt was one of my heroes named Lynn Turner.

Let me close by citing Harry S. Truman who said, "I never give them hell; I just tell them the truth and they think its hell!"
Great Speeches About the State of Accountancy

"20th Century Myths," by Lynn Turner when he was still Chief Accountant at the SEC in 1999 --- http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch323.htm

It is interesting to listen to people ask for simple, less complex standards like in "the good old days." But I never hear them ask for business to be like "the good old days," with smokestacks rather than high technology, Glass-Steagall rather than Gramm-Leach, and plain vanilla interest rate deals rather than swaps, collars, and Tigers!! The bottom line is—things have changed. And so have people.

Today, we have enormous pressure on CEO’s and CFO’s. It used to be that CEO’s would be in their positions for an average of more than ten years. Today, the average is 3 to 4 years. And Financial Executive Institute surveys show that the CEO and CFO changes are often linked.

In such an environment, we in the auditing and preparer community have created what I consider to be a two-headed monster. The first head of this monster is what I call the "show me" face. First, it is not uncommon to hear one say, "show me where it says in an accounting book that I can’t do this?" This approach to financial reporting unfortunately necessitates the level of detail currently being developed by the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB"), the Emerging Issues Task Force, and the AICPA’s Accounting Standards Executive Committee. Maybe this isn’t a recent phenomenon. In 1961, Leonard Spacek, then managing partner at Arthur Andersen, explained the motivation for less specificity in accounting standards when he stated that "most industry representatives and public accountants want what they call ‘flexibility’ in accounting principles. That term is never clearly defined; but what is wanted is ‘flexibility’ that permits greater latitude to both industry and accountants to do as they please." But Mr. Spacek was not a defender of those who wanted to "do as they please." He went on to say, "Public accountants are constantly required to make a choice between obtaining or retaining a client and standing firm for accounting principles. Where the choice requires accepting a practice which will produce results that are erroneous by a relatively material amount, we must decline the engagement even though there is precedent for the practice desired by the client."

We create the second head of our monster when we ask for standards that absolutely do not reflect the underlying economics of transactions. I offer two prime examples. Leasing is first. We have accounting literature put out by the FASB with follow-on interpretative guidance by the accounting firms—hundreds of pages of lease accounting guidance that, I will be the first to admit, is complex and difficult to decipher. But it is due principally to people not being willing to call a horse a horse, and a lease what it really is—a financing. The second example is Statement 133 on derivatives. Some people absolutely howl about its complexity. And yet we know that: (1) people were not complying with the intent of the simpler Statements 52 and 80, and (2) despite the fact that we manage risk in business by managing values rather than notional amounts, people want to account only for notional amounts. As a result, we ended up with a compromise position in Statement 133. To its credit, Statement 133 does advance the quality of financial reporting. For that, I commend the FASB. But I believe that we could have possibly achieved more, in a less complex fashion, if people would have agreed to a standard that truly reflects the underlying economics of the transactions in an unbiased and representationally faithful fashion.

I certainly hope that we can find a way to do just that with standards we develop in the future, both in the U.S. and internationally. It will require a change in how we approach standard setting and in how we apply those standards. It will require a mantra based on the fact that transparent, high quality financial reporting is what makes our capital markets the most efficient, liquid, and deep in the world.


In her notes compiled in 1979, Professor Linda Plunkett of the College of Charleston S.C., calls accounting the "oldest profession"; in fact, since prehistoric times families had to account for food and clothing to face the cold seasons. Later, as man began to trade, we established the concept of value and developed a monetary system. Evidence of accounting records can be found in the Babylonian Empire (4500 B.C.), in pharaohs' Egypt and in the Code of Hammurabi (2250 B.C.). Eventually, with the advent of taxation, record keeping became a necessity for governments to sustain social orders.
James deSantis, A BRIEF HISTORY OF ACCOUNTING: FROM PREHISTORY TO THE INFORMATION AGE --- http://www.ftlcomm.com/ensign/historyAcc/ResearchPaperFin.htm 

 


Origins of Double Entry Accounting are Unknown

Recall that double entry bookkeeping supposedly evolved in Italy long before it was put into algebraic form in the book Summa by Luca Pacioli .  As a result the English term "Debit" really has a Latin origin.  

You can read the following at http://www.wikiverse.org/debit

**************
Debit is an accounting and bookkeeping term that comes from the Latin word debere which means "to owe." The opposite of a debit is a credit. Debit is abbreviated Dr while credit is abbreviated Cr.
**************

December 13, 2005 message from Robert Bowers [M.Robert.Bowers@WHARTON.UPENN.EDU]

In the 14th Century, the Phoenicians sent trading ships to Cathay (China) to trade for silk. Problem was, if a ship sank, the merchant prob sank (bankrupt) with it. So the merchants pooled their resources so if a ship sank no one merchant lost everything. Along with this, an Italian Count named Paole (seriously) set up a system of recordkeeping to keep track of the ventures. In this system, he created two registers, a Debit Register (DR), and a Credit Register (CR)

I'll bet 95% of all CPA's don't know that which makes me .... a trivia freak?

December 16, 2005  message from Robert B Walker [walkerrb@ACTRIX.CO.NZ]

Luca Pacioli did not invent double entry book-keeping. The rudiments of double entry book-keeping (DEBK) can be found in Muslim government administration in the 10th Century. (See Book-keeping and Accounting Systems in a tenth Century Muslim Administrative Office by Hamid, Craig & Clark in Accounting, Business & Financial History Vol 3 No 5 1995).

As I understand it Pacioli saw the technique being used by Arab traders and adapted and codified the technique allowing it to spread to Northern Europe where it became a* key component in Western economic dominance in the last 500 years.

This is logical if you think about it. DEBK is the greatest expression of applied algebra – that Arab word betraying the origin of the particular mathematical technique in which the world’s duality is reflected.

RW

* but not the key component as Werner Sombart would have it. But then his reason for wanting that to be was his extreme anti-semitism … but that is another story.

December 13, 2005 reply from Earl Hall [earl@PERSPLAN.COM]

From thefreedictionary.com

DR = Debit [Middle English debite, from Latin dbitum, debt; see debt.]

CR=Credit [French, from Old French, from Old Italian credito, from Latin crditum, loan, from neuter past participle of crdere, to entrust; see kerd- in Indo-European roots.]

Who am I to argue with a free dictionary? The answer is worth what I paid.


Accountancy and the da Vinci Code

April 12, 2007 message from Barry Rice [brice@LOYOLA.EDU

From the April 11 Brisbane Times:

Forgotten magic manual contains original da Vinci code
AFTER lying almost untouched in the vaults of an Italian university for 500 years, a book on the magic arts written by Leonardo da Vinci's best friend and teacher has been translated into English for the first time.

The world's oldest magic text, De viribus quantitatis (On the Powers of Numbers), was penned by Luca Pacioli, a Franciscan monk who shared lodgings with da Vinci.

Continued at http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/articles/2007/04/10/1175971101054.html  .

E. Barry Rice, MBA, CPA
Director, Instructional Services
Emeritus Accounting Professor
Loyola College in Maryland
BRice@Loyola.edu
410-617-2478

www.barryrice.com 

Facebook me! http://www.facebook.com/p/Barry_Rice/20102311


The following is a controversial quotation from http://www.cbs.dk/staff/hkacc/BOOK-ART.doc 

"The power of double-entry bookkeeping has been praised by many notable authors throughout history. In Wilhelm Meister, Goethe states, "What advantage does he derive from the system of bookkeeping by double-entry! It is among the finest inventions of the human mind"... Werner Sombart, a German economic historian, says, "... double-entry bookkeeping is borne of the same spirit as the system of Galileo and Newton" and "Capitalism without double-entry bookkeeping is simply inconceivable. They hold together as form and matter. And one may indeed doubt whether capitalism has procured in double-entry bookkeeping a tool which activates its forces, or whether double-entry bookkeeping has first given rise to capitalism out of its own (rational and systematic) spirit".

If, for a moment, one considers the credibility crisis of practical accounting, it would be quite impossible to dismiss the following paradox: the conflict between the enthusiastic praise of the system's strength on the one hand, and on the other, the many financial failures in the real world. How can such a powerful system, even when applied meticulously, still result in disasters? Although it is hardly necessary to argue more in favour of double-entry book-keeping, I still want to underline the two qualities of the system which I find are valid explanations of the system's very important and world-wide role in financial development for five centuries.

The Logic of Double-Entry Bookkeeping, by Henning Kirkegaard
Department of Financial & Management Accounting 
Copenhagen Business School 
Howitzvej 60

 

Along this same double-entry thread I might mention my mentor at Stanford.
Nobody I know holds the mathematical wonderment of double-entry and historical cost accounting more in awe than Yuji Ijiri.  For example, see Theory of Accounting Measurement, by Yuji Ijiri (Sarasota:  American Accounting Association Studies in Accounting Research No. 10, 1975).  

Dr. Ijirii also extended the concept to triple-entry bookkeeping in (Sarasota:  Triple-Entry Bookkeeping and Income Momentum
American Accounting Association Studies in Accounting Research No. 18, 1982).
http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aaa/market/studar.htm
tm 

Also see the following:

Brush up your Shakespeare:  Medieval manuscripts to hit Internet
Stanford University Libraries, the University of Cambridge and Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, will make hundreds of medieval manuscripts, dating from the sixth through the 16th centuries, accessible on the Internet.
"Medieval manuscripts to hit Internet," Stanford Report, July 13, 2005 ---
http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2005/july13/parker-071305.html

A summary of the medieval times and literature is available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medieval


Brush up your Shakespeare:  Medieval manuscripts to hit Internet
Stanford University Libraries, the University of Cambridge and Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, will make hundreds of medieval manuscripts, dating from the sixth through the 16th centuries, accessible on the Internet.
"Medieval manuscripts to hit Internet," Stanford Report, July 13, 2005 ---
http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2005/july13/parker-071305.html

A summary of the medieval times and literature is available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medieval

May 28, 2005  reply from Barbara Scofield [scofield@GSM.UDALLAS.EDU]

Thank you for the notice about the availability of the medieval manuscripts on the Internet through the project Parker on the Web at Stanford University. Two manuscripts are currently available, and on page 11 of the English translation of Matthew Paris's "English History From 1235 to 1273" I have already found references to accounting (see below).

Accountants are still using the principle "under whatever name it may be called" and entities are still making up new names for inconvenient economic events in the hopes of avoiding full disclosure.

At this Catholic liberal arts university Shakespeare is modern, and the medieval world is revered, so I'm interested in gaining some insight into the medieval worldview.

Barbara W. Scofield, PhD, CPA
Associate Professor of Accounting
University of Dallas
1845 E. Northgate Irving, TX 75062
Braniff 262
scofield@gsm.udallas.edu 

 


Ancient Finance from Harvard Business School

From Jim Mahar's blog on May 17, 2006 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

 
The HBS Working Knowledge site has an interesting article by William Goetzmann on financial instruments back in the time of the Romans and Greeks. For instance on checks:

...bankers' checks written in Greek on papyri appeared in ancient Egypt as far back as 250 B.C. Papyri preserved well in Egypt thanks to its arid climate, but Goetzmann thinks it's safe to say such checks changed hands throughout the Mediterranean world . . . So the whole tradition of bank checks predates the current era and has its roots at least in Hellenistic Greek times," he says.


Going Concern and Accrual Accounting Evolved in the 1500s

Limited liability Corporations (divorced professional management from ownership shares)

Speculation Fever
Fraud and corruption festered and grew with the trading of joint stock, especially after 1600 A.D.  The South Seas Company scandal (reporting stock sales as income and paying dividends out of capital) led to England's Bubble Act in 1720 A.D. that focused on misleading accounting practices that helped managers rip off investors, especially by crediting stock sales to income.

One of the earliest and probably the most famous accounting and investment scandal was the South Sea Bubble in 1720
From the Harvard University Business School
Sunk in Lucre's Sordid Charms: South Sea Bubble Resources in the Kress Collection at Baker Library --- http://www.library.hbs.edu/hc/ssb/

Free online textbooks, cases, and tutorials in accounting, finance, economics, and statistics --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ElectronicLiterature.htm#Textbooks

 

Laissez-Faire Accounting survived endless debates and scandals until the Great Depression in 1933

After 1933, the AICPA and the SEC seriously attempted to generate accounting standards, enforce accounting standards, and provide academic justification for promulgated standards.

History of the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and earlier accounting standard setting in the United States --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AccountingHistory

July 16, 2008 message from Brady, Joseph [bradyj@LERNER.UDEL.EDU]

I recommend the book “More than a numbers game – a brief history of accounting”, by Thomas A. King. Mr. King traces the development of our accounting standards, from the railroad accounting era through Enron. King describes the major accounting controversies in each era. The reader gains an understanding of the differing points of view – academic, management, enforcement, public accountants, internal accountants. King writes clearly and is a good story teller, so the pace of the book is fast.

I used the book in a senior level accounting systems course last semester, covering all 15 chapters in 3 weeks. It would be possible to go somewhat faster by jettisoning some chapters, without loss of continuity. I am sure that all my 80 students learned from the book, and most said they enjoyed learning some of the profession’s history. I liked it because it allowed me to challenge students to think about what the nature of our reporting system and of that system’s limitations. In their four years, our students learn a lot of techniques and rules; the book puts these into context and I liked the book for that reason, too.

Mr. King began his career in public accounting. He is now Treasurer of Progressive Insurance.

Joe Brady
Accounting & MIS
Lerner College of Business & Economics
University of Delaware

 

In 1973 the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) was formed and evolved into the International Accounting Standards Board IASC) in 1981.
A Timeline of development can be found at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds
H
istory of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) ---  http://www.iasb.org/About+Us/About+the+Foundation/History.htm

A more complete commentary on the history of the IASC and IASB by Paul Pacter --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/pacter.htm#001
lso see http://static.managementboek.nl/pdf/9780471726883.pdf

Some of the many, many lawsuits settled by auditing firms can be found at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm

 

Wow Online Accounting History Book (Free)
Thank you David A.R. Forrester for providing a great, full-length, and online book:
An Invitation to Accounting History --- http://accfinweb.account.strath.ac.uk/df/contents.html 
Note especially Section B2 --- "
Rational Administration, Finance And Control Accounting:  the Experience of Cameralism" --- http://accfinweb.account.strath.ac.uk/df/b2.html 

Accounting history lecture worth noting --- http://newman.baruch.cuny.edu/digital/saxe/saxe_1978/baxter_79.htm

The for-free IASC comparison study of IAS 39 versus FAS 133 (by Paul Pacter) at http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm

The non-free FASB comparison study of all standards entitled The IASC-U.S. Comparison Project: A Report on the Similarities and Differences between IASC Standards and U.S. GAAP
SECOND EDITION, (October 1999) at http://stores.yahoo.com/fasbpubs/publications.html 

In 1999 the Joint Working Group of the Banking Associations sharply rebuffed the IAS 39 fair value accounting in two white papers that can be downloaded from http://www.iasc.org.uk/frame/cen3_112.htm.

Also see the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Federation of Accountants Committee (IFAC).

Side by Side: IAS 39 Compared with FASB Standards (FAS 133), by Paul Pacter, as published in Accountancy International Magazine, June 1999 --- http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm 
Also note "Comparisons of International IAS Versus FASB Standards" --- http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/pocketiasus.pdf

October 21, 2005 message from Scott Bonacker [lister@BONACKERS.COM]

I remember a thread or two asking for information on historical figures or accounting heros or something like that. I couldn't come up with the right key words to find it by searching the archives unfortunately.

When I saw this article, I thought this was someone that should be included:


"Mary T. Washington of Chicago stepped bravely beyond race and gender boundaries in 1943, becoming the first black female certified public accountant in the United States. Washington, 99 years old when she died in late July, first opened an accounting practice for African-American clients in her basement while working on her college degree.

Washington lived and led in a world not yet here, creating what her business partner later called an "underground railroad" for aspiring black CPAs.
...."

Read the rest at: 

http://www.sojo.net/index.cfm?action=magazine.article&issue=soj0511&article=051149
 

October 21, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Scott,

Although there are probably various interesting sites such as those you mentioned, there are several sites that are of particular interest with respect to famous accounting practitioners and academics.

The OSU Accounting Hall of Fame
It should be noted that members elected to this Hall of Fame include famous accountants from around the world --- http://fisher.osu.edu/acctmis/hall/ 

U.K. Accounting Hall of Fame
Professors David Otley and Ken Peasnell of the Department of Accounting and Finance are two of the fourteen founding members of the British Accounting Association’s Hall of Fame. The ceremony took place at the British Accounting Association 2004 Annual conference at York in April 2004 --- http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/news/3806/ 

Michigan State Video Archive
I've not yet seen anything about other accounting Hall of Fame sites. Michigan State University has a video archive of famous accountants. These accountants were invited to campus and then taped live. I don't think any of this footage is available online, but it would be a nice thing to do now that digitization hardware is so inexpensive. Don Edwards (U. of Georgia) probably knows more about these videos than anybody else.

A few accountants who became famous in fields other than accounting are listed at http://www.educationwithattitude.com/catch/accounting.asp 

The above site missed my favorite accounting celebrity John Cleese
The Unofficial Monty Python Website --- http://www.educationwithattitude.com/catch/accounting.asp

Note especially The Accountancy Shanty (audio) at http://www.educationwithattitude.com/catch/accounting.asp 

Bob Jensen

October 23, 2005 reply from Tom Sentman [TSentman@MSN.COM]

Here is a historical figure for consideration. While not a CPA, Luca Pacioli is considered to be the father of accounting. Although he did not invent dual-entry accounting, he described the system as we know it today. I always use this question on my tests.

Visit http://acct.tamu.edu/smith/ethics/pacioli.htm  for more.

Cheers,

Tom Sentman


Question
How does accounting for time differ from accounting for money?
Remember those Taylor and Gilbreth time and motion studies in cost accounting.
How has time accounting changed in the workplace (or should change)?

The link below was forwarded by Gregory Morrison at Trinity University

Studies have shown the alarming extent of the problem: office workers are no longer able to stay focused on one specific task for more than about three minutes, which means a great loss of productivity. The misguided notion that time is money actually costs us money.
"Time Out of Mind," by Stefan Klein, The New York Times, March 7, 2008 --- Click Here

In 1784, Benjamin Franklin composed a satire, “Essay on Daylight Saving,” proposing a law that would oblige Parisians to get up an hour earlier in summer. By putting the daylight to better use, he reasoned, they’d save a good deal of money — 96 million livres tournois — that might otherwise go to buying candles. Now this switch to daylight saving time (which occurs early Sunday in the United States) is an annual ritual in Western countries.

Even more influential has been something else Franklin said about time in the same year: time is money. He meant this only as a gentle reminder not to “sit idle” for half the day. He might be dismayed if he could see how literally, and self-destructively, we take his metaphor today. Our society is obsessed as never before with making every single minute count. People even apply the language of banking: We speak of “having” and “saving” and “investing” and “wasting” it.

But the quest to spend time the way we do money is doomed to failure, because the time we experience bears little relation to time as read on a clock. The brain creates its own time, and it is this inner time, not clock time, that guides our actions. In the space of an hour, we can accomplish a great deal — or very little.

Inner time is linked to activity. When we do nothing, and nothing happens around us, we’re unable to track time. In 1962, Michel Siffre, a French geologist, confined himself in a dark cave and discovered that he lost his sense of time. Emerging after what he had calculated were 45 days, he was startled to find that a full 61 days had elapsed.

To measure time, the brain uses circuits that are designed to monitor physical movement. Neuroscientists have observed this phenomenon using computer-assisted functional magnetic resonance imaging tomography. When subjects are asked to indicate the time it takes to view a series of pictures, heightened activity is measured in the centers that control muscular movement, primarily the cerebellum, the basal ganglia and the supplementary motor area. That explains why inner time can run faster or slower depending upon how we move our bodies — as any Tai Chi master knows.

Time seems to expand when our senses are aroused. Peter Tse, a neuropsychologist at Dartmouth, demonstrated this in an experiment in which subjects were shown a sequence of flashing dots on a computer screen. The dots were timed to occur once a second, with five black dots in a row followed by one moving, colored one. Because the colored dot appeared so infrequently, it grabbed subjects’ attention and they perceived it as lasting twice as long as the others did.

Another ingenious bit of research, conducted in Germany, demonstrated that within a brief time frame the brain can shift events forward or backward. Subjects were asked to play a video game that involved steering airplanes, but the joystick was programmed to react only after a brief delay. After playing a while, the players stopped being aware of the time lag. But when the scientists eliminated the delay, the subjects suddenly felt as though they were staring into the future. It was as though the airplanes were moving on their own before the subjects had directed them to do so.

The brain’s inclination to distort time is one reason we so often feel we have too little of it. One in three Americans feels rushed all the time, according to one survey. Even the cleverest use of time-management techniques is powerless to augment the sum of minutes in our life (some 52 million, optimistically assuming a life expectancy of 100 years), so we squeeze as much as we can into each one.

Believing time is money to lose, we perceive our shortage of time as stressful. Thus, our fight-or-flight instinct is engaged, and the regions of the brain we use to calmly and sensibly plan our time get switched off. We become fidgety, erratic and rash.

Tasks take longer. We make mistakes — which take still more time to iron out. Who among us has not been locked out of an apartment or lost a wallet when in a great hurry? The perceived lack of time becomes real: We are not stressed because we have no time, but rather, we have no time because we are stressed.

Studies have shown the alarming extent of the problem: office workers are no longer able to stay focused on one specific task for more than about three minutes, which means a great loss of productivity. The misguided notion that time is money actually costs us money.

And it costs us time. People in industrial nations lose more years from disability and premature death due to stress-related illnesses like heart disease and depression than from other ailments. In scrambling to use time to the hilt, we wind up with less of it.

Continued in article

March 12, 2008 reply from David Albrecht [albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]

For those who don't remember these time and motion studies (about 100 years ago), here is a summary:  http://www.netmba.com/mgmt/scientific/

Pondering your question, I keep coming back to a humorous story I read in Reader's Digest years ago.  A person's car breaks down and a mechanic with a fine reputation is summoned.  The mechanic looks over the engine, pulls out a screwdriver, and in about three seconds tightens a screw.  The mechanic then hands the driver a bill for several hundred dollars.  The driver complains about paying so much for so little of the mechanic's time.  The mechanic replies that the itemization was $0.10 for the act of tightening the screw, and hundreds of dollars for knowing what to tighten.

At this time I refrain from saying much about the Empire Club and it's ability to charge thousands of dollars per hour for the time of its models.  I'm wondering if Governor Spitzer maintained personal financials according to GAAP, would he have reported his time involvement with Empire Club as a contingent liability.

Bob, you're retired and on pension, I'm still employed and getting paid.  The time you spend surfing, writing and sharing on AECM is unrecompensed, but mine is not.  Yet, you provide much more value to AECM than I.

David Albrecht


How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, & Co. Transformed the Intellectual Life of the United States
"French Theory," by Scott McLemee, Inside Higher Ed, April 17, 2008 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2008/04/16/mclemee

Last week, while rushing to finish up a review of Francois Cusset’s French Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, & Co. Transformed the Intellectual Life of the United States (University of Minnesota Press), I heard that Stanley Fish had just published a column about the book for The New York Times. Of course the only sensible thing to do was to ignore this development entirely. The last thing you need when coming to the end of a piece of work is to go off and do some more reading. The inner voice suggesting that is procrastination disguised as conscientiousness. Better, sometimes, to trust your own candlepower — however little wax and wick you may have left.

Once my own cogitations were complete (the piece will run in the next issue of Bookforum), of course, I took a look at the Times Web site. By then, Fish’s column had drawn literally hundreds of comments. This must warm some hearts in Minnesota. Any publicity is good publicity as long as they spell your name right — so this must count as great publicity, especially since French Theory itself won’t actually be available until next month.

But in other ways it is unfortunate. Fish and his interlocutors reduce Cusset’s rich, subtle, and paradox-minded book (now arriving in translation) into one more tale of how tenured pseudoradicalism rose to power in the United States. Of course there is always an audience for that sort of thing. And it is true that Cusset – who teaches intellectual history at the Institute d’Etudes Politiques and at Reid Hall/Columbia University, in Paris – devotes some portions of the book to explaining American controversies to his French readers. But that is only one aspect of the story, and by no means the most interesting or rewarding.

When originally published five years ago, the cover of Cusset’s book bore the slightly strange words French Theory. That the title of a French book was in English is not so much lost in translation as short-circuited by it. The bit of Anglicism is very much to the point: this is a book about the process of cultural transmission, distortion, and return. The group of thinkers bearing the (American) brand name “French Theory” would not be recognized at home as engaged in a shared project, or even forming a cohesive group. Nor were they so central to cultural and political debate there, at least after the mid-1970s, as they were to become for academics in the United States. So the very existence of a phenomenon that could be called “French Theory” has to be explained.

To put it another way: the very category of “French Theory” itself is socially constructed. Explaining how that construction came to pass is Cusset’s project. He looks at the process as it unfolded at various levels of academic culture: via translations and anthologies, in certain disciplines, with particular sponsors, and so on. Along the way, he recounts the American debates over postmodernism, poststructuralism, and whatnot. But those disputes are part of his story, not the point of it. While offering an outsider’s perspective on our interminable culture wars, it is more than just a chronicle of them..

Instead, it would be much more fitting to say that French Theory is an investigation of the workings of what C. Wright Mills called the “cultural apparatus.” This term, as Mills defined it some 50 years ago, subsumes all the institutions and forms of communication through which “learning, entertainment, malarky, and information are produced and distributed ... the medium by which [people] interpret and report what they see.” The academic world is part of this “apparatus,” but the scope of the concept is much broader; it also includes the arts and letters, as well as the media, both mass and niche.

The inspiration for Cusset’s approach comes from the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, rather than Mills, his distant intellectual cousin from Texas. Even so, the book is in some sense more Millsian in spirit than the author himself may realize. Bourdieu preferred to analyze the culture by breaking it up into numerous distinct “fields” – with each scholarly discipline, art form, etc. constituting a separate sub-sector, following more or less its own set of rules. By contrast, Cusset, like Mills, is concerned with how the different parts of American culture intersect and reinforce one another, even while remaining distinct. (I didn’t say any of this in my review, alas. Sometimes the best ideas come as afterthoughts.)

The boilerplate account of how poststructuralism came to the United States usually begins with visit of Lacan, Derrida, and company to Johns Hopkins University for a conference in 1966 – then never really imagines any of their ideas leaving campus. By contrast, French Theory pays attention to how their work connected up with artists, musicians, writers, and sundry denizens of various countercultures. Cusset notes the affinity of “pioneers of the technological revolution” for certain concepts from the pomo toolkit: “Many among them, whether marginal academics or self-taught technicians, read Deleuze and Guattari for their logic of ‘flows’ and their expanded definition of ‘machine,’ and they studied Paul Virilio for his theory of speed and his essays on the self-destruction of technical society, and they even looked at Baudrillard’s work, in spite of his legendary technological incompetence.”

And a particularly sharp-eyed chapter titled “Students and Users” offers an analysis of how adopting a theoretical affiliation can serve as a phase in the psychodrama of late adolescence (a phase of life with no clearly marked termination point, now). To become Deleuzian or Foucauldian, or what have you, is not necessarily a step along the way to the tenure track. It can also serve as “an alternative to the conventional world of career-oriented choices and the pursuit of top grades; it arms the student, affectively and conceptually, against the prospect of alienation that looms at graduation under the cold and abstract notions of professional ambition and the job market....This relationship with knowledge is not unlike Foucault’s definition of curiosity: ‘not the curiosity that seeks to assimilate what it is proper for one to know, but that which enables one to get free of oneself’....”

Much of this will be news, not just to Cusset’s original audience in France, but to readers here as well. There is more to the book than another account of pseudo-subversive relativism and neocon hyperventilation. In other words, French Theory is not just another Fish story. It deserves a hearing — even, and perhaps especially, from people who have already made up their minds about “deconstructionism,” whatever that may be.

You can read more about Michael Foucault at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michel_Foucault

You can read about post-structuralism at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-structuralism

You can read about post-modernism at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Postmodernism

Jensen Comment
It's pretty difficult to trace these French theories to accounting research and scholarship, but the leading accounting professor trying to do so is probably my former doctoral student Ed Arrington who even moved to Europe for a while to carry on his studies in these theories --- http://www.uncg.edu/bae/acc/accfacul.htm#arrington

A Google search turns up some of his publications in this area as they relate to accounting, economics, and business. His publications also branch off into other areas since Ed has wide ranging interests and is an excellent speaker as well as a researcher and writer. His thesis was an application of the Analytic Hierarchy Process in decision modelling, but he's expanded well beyond that since he got his PhD. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic_Hierarchy_Process
For years my interests and publications were in AHP, although in latter years I was mostly critical of Saaty's precious and arbitrary eigenvector mathematical scaling (but I was not critical of Ed's thesis).

 


See Accounting History Publications list 1998 --- http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3933/is_199905/ai_n8843886

A substantial listing of history papers is available from the Institute of Chartered Accountants --- http://www.icaew.co.uk/library/index.cfm?AUB=TB2I_27022

Accounting Historians Journal --- http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aah/

The University of Sydney's Accounting Foundation provides some accounting history publications --- http://www.econ.usyd.edu.au/af /

History of Information Technology in Auditing (EDP Auditing) --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_information_technology_auditing

For additional information on the history of accountancy and the accountancy profession see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accounting


Islamic and Social Responsibility Accounting

Islamic Accounting --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_accounting

The Islamic Accounting Web --- http://www.iiu.edu.my/iaw/

The Differences of Conventional and Islamic Accounting --- Click Here

"Islamic Accounting: Challenges, Opportunities and Terror," AccountingWeb, October 5, 2006 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102651

Recent events, from the start of Ramadan, to the Pope’s controversial remarks about Islam, to the discovery of a new tape by two of the September 11 attackers, to the release of Bob Woodward’s latest book, have once more made Islam a topic of conversation. Beyond the headlines, however, exists a complex religious and social system that affects far more people than just Muslims. Islamic finance, particularly Islamic banking, insurance and accounting, is playing a growing role around the globe, especially in the business world.

Islamic accounting is generally defined as an alternative accounting system which aims to provide users with information enabling them to operate businesses and organizations according to Shariah, or Islamic law. With little doubt, the greatest challenges to Islamic accounting and finance in the United States stem from a lack of knowledge and understanding of Islam and the intricacies of its financial laws and concerns regarding terrorism, combined with the U.S. regulatory framework and guiding principles of American business. The Muslim and Islamic financial markets within the U.S. and around the world, currently represent an enormous opportunity for those willing to overcome these challenges.

Islam & Islamic Financial Laws

“To professional accountants who have been brought-up on the idea of accounting as an ‘objective’, technical and value-free discipline, the idea of attaching a religious adjective to accounting may seem embarrassing, unprofessional and even dangerous,” Dr. Shahul Hameed bin Mohamed Ibrahim says in Islamic Accounting – A Primer.

Both conventional and Islamic accounting provide information and define how that information is measured, valued, recorded and communicated. Conventional accounting provides information about economic events and transactions, measuring resources in terms of assets and liabilities, and communicating that information through financial statements users, typically investors, rely on to make decisions regarding their investments. Islamic accounting, however, identifies socio-economic events and transactions measured in both financial and non-financial terms and the information is used to ensure Islamic organizations of all types adhere to Shariah and achieve the socio-economic objectives promoted by Islam. This is not to say, or imply, Islamic accounting is not concerned with money, rather it is not concerned only with money.

Islamic accounting, in many ways, is more holistic. Shariah prohibits interest-based income or usury and also gambling, so part of what Islamic accounting does is help ensure companies do not harm others while making money and achieve an equitable allocation and distribution of wealth, not just among shareholders of a specific corporation but also among society in general. Of course, as with conventional accounting, this is not always achieved in practice, as an examination of the wide variances in wealth among the populations of Arab nations, particularly those with majority Muslim populations shows.

In addition, because a significant part of operating within Shariah means delivering on Islam’s socio-economic objectives, Islamic organizations have far wider interests and engage in more diverse activities than their non-Islamic counterparts.

Concerns About Terrorism

The diverse activities and interests organizations pursue under Shariah is a cause for concern when applying conventional accounting to Islamic organizations. After all, conventional accounting can be used to disguise unethical and even illegal activities within the very organizations they were intended to provide information about. Imagine how easy it is to overlook or just not identify such information when employing an accounting system not designed for use with the type of organization it is being applied to.

In the past, the issues raised by this mismatch focused on the ability of users beyond the Muslim world to make appropriate decisions regarding investments. Since September 11, 2001, however, the concern has changed from the potential loss of investment to the possibility of supporting terrorism.

This concern is particularly significant for non-profit organizations involved in providing humanitarian relief outside the U.S.. Fortunately, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (DoT) has issued updated Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-based Charities (Guidelines).

“The abuse of charities by terrorist organizations is a serious and urgent matter, and the Guidelines reinforce the need for the U.S. Government and the charitable sector alike, to keep this challenge at the forefront of our complementary efforts,” Pat O’Brien, Assistant Secretary for the Treasury’s Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crime, said in a statement announcing the updated guidelines. The Treasury Department is committed to protecting and enabling legitimate and vital charity worldwide, and will continue to work with the sector to advance our mutual goals.”

The Guidelines urge charities to take a proactive, risk-based approach to protecting against illicit abuse and are intended to be applied by those charities vulnerable to such abuse, in a manner commensurate with the risks they face and the resources with which they work. At the request of the charitable sector, the Guidelines contain extensive anti-terrorist financing guidance, as well as guidance on sound governance and financial practices that helps prevent the exploitation of charities.

Regulatory Issues

The regulatory environment Islamic individuals and organizations are most concerned with, considering the current political climate, are those relating to anti-terrorism and anti-money laundering. Yet the tensions arising from regulatory requirements within the U.S. related to American business practices often prove more difficult to resolve.

It is in trying to balance the expectations of distinct business cultures that the differences between conventional and Islamic accounting are most notable. For instance, depending upon the type of transactions the organizations are engaged in, the roles, responsibilities and rights assigned to each party can be contradictory and even in direct conflict. In some situations, such as transactions involving private equity, venture capital, profit sharing and liquidations, organizations and individuals employing conventional accounting may actually find they prefer Islamic accounting. Other issues, such as those related to taxation, require significant effort to resolve. The inherent flexibility of Shariah is a benefit under these circumstances, since the complexity of the American tax code is highly inflexible.

The number of Muslim consumers, investors and business owners has grown along with the Muslim American population which is currently estimated to be between six and seven million. Although demand for Islamic financial products and services has increased, both the supply and the number of providers remain insufficient. It should also be noted that Islamic orthodoxy, expressed as the desire to implement Shariah as the sole legal foundation of a nation, is actually associated with progressive economic principles, including increasing government for the poor, reducing income inequality and increasing government ownership of industries and industries, especially in the poorer nations of the Muslim world.

“While it is common to associate traditional religious beliefs with conservative political stances on a wide range of issues, this is only partly true,” said Robert V. Robinson, Chancellor’s Professor and chair of Indiana University’s Department of Sociology. “The Islamic orthodox are more conservative on issues having to do with gender, sexuality and the family, but more liberal or left on economic issues.

Islamic Accounting Web --- http://www.iiu.edu.my/iaw/

The Islamic Accounting Website is a project of the Department of Accounting, Kulliyah of Economics and Management Sciences, International Islamic University Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur. This project is under the direction of Dr. Shahul Hameed bin Mohamed Ibrahim, Assistant Professor and the current Head of the Department. The philosophy of the University is to Islamize knowledge to solve the crisis in Muslim thinking brought about by the secularization of knowledge and furthermore contributing as a centre of educational excellence to revive the dynamism of the Muslim Ummah in knowledge, learning and the professions. The Department of Accounting is fully committed to this vision and strives to Islamicise Accounting.

"ISLAMIC ACCOUNTING STANDARDS," by Shadia Rahman --- http://islamic-finance.net/islamic-accounting/acctg5.html

Sharing site of Dr Shahul Hameed Bin Hj Mohamed Ibrahim --- http://islamic-finance.net/islamic-accounting/

articles by the author

 

articles by other scholars

 Forthcoming Articles on Islamic Accounting


Alternative (conventional accounting) rules may, for the individual citizen, mean the difference between employment and unemployment, reliable products and dangerous ones, enriching experiences and oppressive ones, stimulating work environments and dehumanising ones, care and compassion for the old and sick versus intolerance and resentment.
Tony Tinker, 1985

Financial Reporting should provide information that is useful to present and potential investors and creditors and other users in making rational investment, credit and similar decisions ...(through the provision of information that will help them to assess)..... the amount, timing and uncertainty of net cash inflows to the related enterprise
FASB Concept Number 1 of the Conceptual Framework, 1978

"Bear Stearns: SEC Can't Serve Brokerage Clients and Shareholders Simultaneously," by Tom Selling, The Accounting Onion, March 19, 2008 --- http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/03/the-sec-has-bee.html

The SEC has been one of the most prominent and well-respected of federal agencies during most of its history.  Strict adherence to a focused mission on disclosure in regards to the regulation of financial reporting by public companies has been its trademark.

Having said that, however, the SEC has been far from pristine in implementing a disclosure-only policy.  Certain actions could be characterized by some as a form of “merit regulation”—some companies may have been unfairly subject to undue scrutiny, and others may have received an undeserved pass.  The SEC has also used its broad powers to make rules requiring added disclosures in some circumstances, and allowing abbreviated disclosures in others.  For example, the SEC has added disclosure requirements to the offering documents of “blank check” companies, and also provided disclosure accommodations to smaller and foreign companies. 

But, if some were to criticize the SEC for merit regulation, cavils of this sort are on the fringes of SEC activity.  And, most important to the criticisms I'm fixin' to deliver, they all relate to the regulatory activities concerning disclosures by companies to the SEC.  But now, an SEC official -- the chair, no less -- has seen fit to make gratuitous disclosures for certain public companies. 

Here's the situation.  Last Tuesday (March 11, 2008), SEC Chair Christopher Cox made the following statement to reporters:  "We have a good deal of comfort about the capital cushions that these firms [the five largest investment banks, which included Bear Stearns] have been on."
(http://www.cnbc.com/id/23576630)

At the time, Bear's stock was at $60, a five-year low, and just the day before, Bear issued a press release denying rumors of liquidity problems.  The stock tumbled to $30 early Friday, and over the weekend, JP Morgan struck a deal to buy Bear Stearns for a paltry $2 per share. (For reasons I don't want to cover here, the current market price as I write this is around $5 per share.) 

It's a serious thing that investors may have relied on false and misleading information issued by Bear Stearns, but it is quite another for the SEC to have issued information for Bear Stearns.  (I am trying to making a principled statement here, so that fact that investors who relied on that information got taken to the cleaners is notable, though not the sole basis of my critique.)  Heretofore, a company either complies with the disclosure rules, or it doesn’t; the SEC doesn’t make congratulatory announcements for companies it finds to have been exemplary compliers, disclosers, or what have you.  But if you fail to comply, then that’s when the SEC will tell the world about you; there are thousands of examples of the consistent implementation of this policy.

I imagine that Cox would defend himself on the basis that the SEC is in a curious position with respect to companies like Bear Stearns.  One of the many jobs given to the SEC by Congress is to monitor the “capital adequacy” of broker-dealers.  The objective is to provide a form of protection for the assets of clients who have deposited cash and securities with broker-dealers.  Thus, the SEC is serving two masters, having very different interests in Bear Stearns:  clients and shareholders. 

When Cox chose to speak about Bear Stearns last Tuesday, both groups of Bear Stearns stakeholders were listening, and at least some in each group responded with diametrically opposite courses of action:
       • Some clients of Bear may have been calmed, but too many disregarded Cox’s assurances, took their money and ran;

       • Some investors on the verge of selling their shares had a change of mind -- and some may have even bought stock based on his assurances.   

Cox should have known that he was unavoidably sending a signal of encouragement to jittery investors who were trying to decide whether or not to buy, hold, or sell shares of Bear Stearns.  If SEC history is any guide, it was simply not appropriate for him to have done so. Just as a real estate agent cannot claim to represent parties on both sides of a transaction, the SEC cannot claim to be "the investor's advocate" at the same moment they are functioning as the public relations spokesperson for the investee. It would have been far better to have left the public relations role to other government officials.

The question of how much SEC credibility has been lost is difficult for me to judge.  Assuming this were an isolated instance, it would be significant.  But seen as the latest in a series of questionable actions reflecting the SEC's stance on investor protection, the Bear Stearns case is just more confirming evidence of an altered SEC culture.  I am sad to say that the process of restoring credibility to a once peerless agency cannot begin until there is a new chair. 

Bob Jensen's threads on the controversies of accounting standards --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting

 


Jensen Comment
As pointed out above, Islamic accounting is really in the realm of social accounting by whatever name you want to call it. It is primarily concerned with accounting for all constituencies without investors and creditors necessarily being the primary constituencies. Certainly investors and creditors must provide capital. But employees must provide their labor, customers must purchase outputs, suppliers must provide the inputs, and society must provide an environment within which all constituencies are to flourish.
See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Responsibility
Also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AccountAbility_%28Institute_of_Social_and_Ethical_AccountAbility%29

The problem with Islamic accounting is that it has never delved deeply into the details of accounting for complex contracts of structured financing, derivative financial instruments, hedging, collateralized debt, convertible debt, and intangibles accounting. Hence it is not yet a place where one goes for learning about such contracting and theories of accounting for such contracts. It is naive to think such complex contracting should be banned in Islam, because business leaders in Islam must manage risks and hedge just like everybody else.

Also see http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#TripleBottom

 


XBRL:  The Next Big Thing

January 14, 2008 message from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]

Here's a link to a very interesting recent speech by SEC Chairman Chris Cox - http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch011008cc.htm

Among other things he says:
"So to sum up, this is what you need to know from the SEC's standpoint: IFRS is coming. XBRL is coming. And mutual recognition is coming."

From this and many other recent activities at the SEC, FASB, Congress and elsewhere, it appears that both IFRS and XBRL are nearer than some might have imagined.  And educators should be taking these developments into consideration now, or may be left behind.

Denny Beresford

 

SEC releases new XBRL analytical tool
XBRL US, Inc., the nonprofit consortium dedicated to the adoption of XBRL (eXtensible Business Reporting Language), a technology standard for the reporting of financial and business information in the U.S., strongly supports the Securities and Exchange Commission's launch of an online, interactive tool that allows investors to instantly extract, compare, and analyze executive compensation for the largest 500 companies in the United States . . . This tool relies on the power of XBRL for the compensation data and underscores the flexibility and usefulness of "tagged" data. The SEC announcement comes a year after it adopted stricter rules on executive pay disclosure that now require more detail in annual shareholder proxy statements. The new application uses XBRL data created by the SEC and allows investors and researchers to immediately create reports showing salary, bonus, stock awards, option awards, non-equity incentive plan compensation, change in pension value, and other compensation figures for executives at the top 500 companies.
"SEC releases new XBRL analytical tool," AccountingWeb, January 10, 2008 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/item/104442

Bob Jensen's threads on XBRL are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm

Bob Jensen's video demos of XBRL are at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/video/Tutorials/


December 6, 2005 message from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@terry.uga.edu]

National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments. His talk is available at: http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch120505cc.htm 

He had three main messages:

1. Accounting rules need to be simplified. "The accounting scandals that our nation and the world have now mostly weathered were made possible in part by the sheer complexity of the rules." "The sheer accretion of detail has, in time, led to one of the system's weaknesses - its extreme complexity. Convolution is now reducing its usefulness."

2. The concentration of auditing services in the Big 4 "quadropoly" is bad for the securities markets. The SEC will try to do more to encourage the use of medium size and smaller firms that receive good inspection reports from the PCAOB.

3. The SEC will continue to push XBRL. "The interactive data that this initiative will create will lead to vast improvements in the quality, timeliness, and usefulness of information that investors get about the companies they're investing in."

A very interesting talk - one that seems to promise a high level of cooperation with the accounting profession.

Denny

Bob Jensen's threads on XBRL are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm


Two XBRL Videos

XBRL is no longer something we only play with in academe.  It is now available to investors around the world, although it may take a while for some companies to add the XBRL tags to their financial statements.  Some things that are now being done in XBRL such as time graphs and ratio graphs can be done with things other than XBRL.  What XBRL does, however, is make it possible to:

(1) Compare different companies in a Web browser

(2) Perform customized analyses if the XBRL statements are downloaded into Excel

(3) Conduct easy searches that do not yield thousands of unwanted and extraneous hits

Bob Jensen's New Video Tutorial on XBRL (about 30 minutes)
It's the XBRLdemos2005.wmv file at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/video/Tutorials/ 
But first read the following and watch the KOSDAQ video before watching the above video.

Question
What are the two most significant events in the history of accounting, financial reporting, and financial statement analysis? 

Answers
Double Entry Bookkeeping and XBRL

The origins of double entry bookkeeping are unknown.  It goes back over 100 years before Luca Pacioli  made it famous by algebraically describing it in the world's first algebra book called Summa written in 1494.  Pacioli's basic equation A=L+E simply shows how recorded asset values in total equal the double-entry sum of creditor liabilities plus owner equities in those assets.  For over 500 years accounting disputes mainly lie in defining the A, L, and E concepts and measuring them in financial statements.  Pacioli gave us the algebra without the crucial and operational definitions of terms.  Bob Jensen's brief summary of the history of accounting is at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm

XBRL stands for eXtensible Business Reporting Language in XML that can now be interpreted by every Web browser such as Microsoft's Internet Explorer.  In the future, virtually every all academic disciplines such as Chemistry, Physics, and History will probably develop their own taxonomies for XML reporting on the Web.  Hence, we one day may have XCHEM, XPHYS, and XHIST eXtensible reporting languages

Whereas the famous HTML tags on data are not extensible and are more or less fixed in scope and time, XML extensible meta-tags will become the world's most popular way of creating customized "meta-tags" that attach to virtually every piece of Web data and describe attributes of each piece of data.  The history of data tags and meta-tags is briefly outlined at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm
I also highly recommend the XBRL history and news site at XBRL headquarters at http://www.xbrl.org/Home/

XBRL is a taxonomy for XML meta-tags to be placed on virtually every number in a set of financial statements.  For over a decade, efforts have been made by huge companies and accounting firms to develop standardized XBRL tags for key taxonomies in accounting.  These taxonomies may vary as to a particular set of accounting generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) such as International GAAP or US GAAP.  Once a company or user selects which GAAP taxonomy to use, it's financial statements can be "marked up" with XBRL meta-tags that facilitate comparative financial statement analysis.  Users may also take any set of financial statements and add tags for a chosen set of GAAP tags.  For example, see Drag and Tag from Rivet Corporation --- http://www.rivetsoftware.com/
Also see http://www.xbrl.org/eu/CEBS-3/Rivet_Industry Day_Brussels_14 Sept 2005.pdf

Because adding XBRL meta-tags to a given set of financial statements is time consuming, most large companies are in the process of adding these tags to their own financial data so that investors will not have to do their own tagging.  The major stock exchanges of the world are now urging companies to send in their financial reports marked up in XBRL.  Soon they will require all listed companies to submit XBRL-tagged financial statements.

Bob Jensen's Old XBRL Video Tutorial called XBRLdemos.wmf
About four years ago (I can't remember exactly when) I prepared a XBRL tutorial on how to use XBRL in financial statement analysis.  The tutorial itself was actually developed by NASDAQ, Microsoft, and PwC in a NMP partnership.  NASDAQ selected 20 companies and marked up their financial statements in XBRL.  Microsoft wrote a fancy Excel program to analyze those financial statements in Excel.  PwC served up the data on the Web.  This NMP tutorial was intended to have a short life since the plan was eventually to use XBRL directly in Web browsers without having to use Excel.  Indeed, PwC no longer serves up this tutorial.  Bob Jensen probably has the only recorded history of this NMP tutorial on video in the file XBRLdemos.wfm at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/video/Tutorials/

Bob Jensen's New 2005 XBRL Video Tutorial called XBRLdemos2005.wmf
XBRL is now marked up on many financial statements on the Web and can be used for financial statement analysis in Web browsers.  I found a set of such statements for various (Star) companies on the Korean KOSDAQ stock exchange homepage. 

Before looking at my new video, I want you to first view the KOSDAQ Camtasia video at http://www.ubmatrix.com/solutions/WebHelp/KOSDAQDemo.html

After viewing this video, you can then go to my new Camtasia 2005 video XBRLdemos2005.wmv file at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/video/Tutorials/ 

My new video is mainly a tutorial about how I learned to use the XBRL financial statements made available by KOSDAQ for actual use by investors in companies listed on the KOSDAQ stock exchange.

In particular, my new video shows how to perform the following steps at the KOSDAQ site.

First
Watch the http://www.ubmatrix.com/solutions/WebHelp/KOSDAQDemo.html

Second
Watch my XBRLdemos2005.wmv file at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/video/Tutorials/ 

The KOSDAQ homepage is at http://www.ubmatrix.com/home/default.asp
           
Go to http://km.krx.co.kr/
     You do not have to install the Korean language pack
     Note that it may take some time for the upper menu to appear
     Click on the English button in the upper right corner after the menu appears

Third
Go directly to http://english.kosdaq.com/
     Click on the "XBRL Service" on the right side of the screen
     Click on a company's logo (ignore any pop ups to install a language pack)
     If you do not see a graph on the left side of a company's report,
             click on the button/instruction below the graph's border
     After you see a graph,
             click on the various financial statement line items to the right of the graph
            (Your mouse pointer will now be a small bar graph)

Go to the bottom of the page and click on "Ratios"
     If your pointer is still a small graph,
             click on the ratios that you want to see in the graph
    

Go to the bottom of the page and click on "Comparison"
     Options for comparisons are given (they are also demonstrated in my video)
    

Go to the bottom of the page and read about the Excel Analyzer
      See what you can download if you really get interested in the analysis options

 

October 30, 2005 reply from Deborah Johnson [Finance@WeFightFraud.com]

I followed the instructions you plan to give your students for Monday and found a few bugs you might want to know about.

The Demos link at XBRL.org  is not on the home page. They need to know that this site requires them to navigate to "Showcase" to find the Demo.

http://km.krx.co.kr/   selected English and then XBRL Services, then chose the company. The graph is only available if you agree to download and install additional software on your PC. If they do not have administrator rights, this is not going to be an option for your students. (say on college lab and classroom computers).

The company I selected, LG Micron, had an obvious defect in the financial data being presented for this demonstration. XBRL is clearly not going to minimize any human mistakes, and the printed financials will still have to be carefully scrutinized by management and the auditors. Do the math on the Trade Receivables at Net. Demerits for any student who doesn't find the error. If you go to the bottom of the table and select "Get these financials in XBRL" you may get an XML Parsing Error. This is probably a higher version of XMl required, and again the student would need administrator rights to upgrade the software or install patches and plug ins.

Regards,

Deborah Johnson

October 30, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Deborah,

I agree with all your points and thank you for providing some clarifications.  With respect to needing administrative rights to view the graphs (say on college lab computers and on classroom computers), it behooves faculty to ask administrators to install the software that can be downloaded free by clicking below the graph frame for any company in the demo.

If students do not have administrative rights on a college lab or classroom computer, I guess this makes my video tutorial even more valuable since students can see what will happen if they try this on their own computers where they automatically have administrative rights.

Thanks,

Bob


From the Publisher of the AccountingWeb on June 19, 2008

Some friends of ours are currently on vacation in Russia, which got me to thinking, "I wonder what it's like to be an accountant in Russia?" I have no idea. It wasn't all that long ago that International Financial Reporting Standards were adopted by the Russian Finance Ministry, so it's probably been a rather challenging profession as of late! If you have any first-hand knowledge of accounting in the Russian Federation, please e-mail me so we can share it with AccountingWEB readers.

In the meantime, here are some key Russian facts:
Rob Nance
Publisher
AccountingWEB, Inc.

publisher@accountingweb.com

Bob Jensen's reply to Rob Nance

Hi Rob,

A better question is to ask what accounting became in Russia after the breakup of the Soviet Union --- http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/janfeb99/pgs22-25.htm
The system is highly geared to tax reporting and has a long ways to go relative to IFRS.

Accounting in the former Soviet Union was pretty much an exercise in tabulating fiction --- http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=6827120

Accounting was an instrument of the planning and control process that substituted for market-based controls ---
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-6281.1974.tb00002.x?cookieSet=1&journalCode=abac

Russia now has offices of the Big 4 accounting firms and maybe other Western CPA firms as well. One of my former students accepted a transfer to the PwC office in Moscow. It proved to be a fast-track to becoming a partner in PwC. Russian companies are seeking equity investors throughout the world, and to do so they have to add accounting assurances much like the other companies in the global economy seek assurances.

KPMG has a publication comparing IFRS with Russian GAAP --- http://snipurl.com/russiangaap 
Also see http://www.kpmg.ru/index.thtml/en/services/assurance/IFRS/IFRSpublications/

PwC has an IFRS Transition document at http://www.pwc.com/extweb/service.nsf/docid/90828387207B28F78025717B0038B2AD
Results of a 2006 survey are reported at http://snipurl.com/russiangaapsurvey

Deloitte links to a Russian translation of IFRS as well as providing information on transitioning to IFRS in Russia --- http://www.iasplus.com/country/russia.htm

A illustrative Russian set of financial statements can be found at http://www.dixy.ru/en_invest-report/

Hope this helps!

Bob Jensen

 

 


Bob Jensen's threads on GAAP comparisons (with particular stress upon derivative financial instruments accounting rules) are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/canada.htm
The above site also links to more general GAAP comparison guides between nations.

International Standards from the IASB --- Click Here
IASB homepage--- http://www.iasb.org/Home.htm 

U.S. Standards from the FASB (Free Downloads) --- http://www.fasb.org/public/ 
FASB homepage --- http://www.fasb.org/

Management Accounting Standards from the IMA (Free Downloads) --- http://www.imanet.org/publications_statements.asp#C
IMA homepage --- http://www.imanet.org/

Bob Jensen's summary of accounting theory and controversies --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm

"Global Finance Leaders Release Comprehensive Proposals to Strengthen the Financial Industry and Financial Markets," Institute for International Finance, July 17, 2008 --- http://www.iif.com/press/press+75.php

The world’s leading financial services firms today released a far-reaching report 1 detailing best practice reforms for the industry. The report represents the global industry’s response to the turmoil in financial markets that was triggered by the U.S. subprime mortgage market crisis in mid-2007. Today’s 200-page report is published by the Institute of International Finance, the association of leading financial services firms with more than 380 members across the world. The report proposes Principles of Conduct together with Best Practice Recommendations on critical issues such as risk management, compensation policies, valuation of assets, liquidity management, underwriting and the rating of structured products as well as boosting transparency and disclosure

 

Comparison of IFRSs and US GAAP (Educators can provide free copies to students) --- http://www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/0703ifrsusgaap.pdf
Comparisons for other nations --- http://www.iasplus.com/country/compare.htm

From IAS Plus on March 14, 2007 --- http://www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/0703ifrsusgaap.pdf

Deloitte's IFRS Global Office has published a new Comparison of International Financial Reporting Standards and United States GAAP (PDF 208k, 36 pages) as of 28 February 2007. While this comparison is comprehensive, it does not attempt to capture all of the differences that exist or that may be material to a particular entity's financial statements. Our focus is on differences that are commonly found in practice. The significance of the differences enumerated in this pubilcation – and others not included – will vary with respect to individual entities depending on such factors as the nature of the entity's operations, the industry in which it operates, and the accounting policy choices it has made. We are pleased to grant permission for accounting educators and students to make copies for educational purposes.

 

Main News Site for International Accounting Happenings --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm 

KEY GROUPS
EFRAG
Europe
IFAC
IOSCO
US FASB
US SEC
US PCAOB
RESOURCES
Past News by Month
Reference Materials
Statistics Database
IFRS in Europe by 2005
UK Web-based IFRS Updates
Country/Region Use of IFRSs
IAASB Auditing Standards
Public Sector Standards
TOOLS
11-Year Calendar
Currency Converter
Loan Amortisation
News Headlines
Stock Market Indexes
Telephone Codes
Unit Conversions
World Electric Guide
World Phone Guide
World Time Clock
Worldwide Weather
DELOITTE'S IASPLUS WEBSITE
About IASPlus
Terms for Use
Privacy Policy
Abbreviations
IAS Plus Spanish
IAS Plus German
Paul Pacter and Deloitte provide a statistical database (with data about international accounting) at http://www.iasplus.com/stats/stats.htm

 

International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Summary --- http://www.iasplus.com/standard/standard.htm

Use of IFRS varies by nation --- http://www.iasplus.com/country/useias.htm 

If you click on the Search tab and enter something like (IFRS AND China) to compare IFRS with the domestic standards of a given nation --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm


"Bye-bye, GAAP? Not yet SEC’s Cox says international standards still years away for U.S. biz ," by Nicholas Rummell,  Financial Week, January 16, 2008 ---
http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080114/REG/885146278 or Click Here

While the push toward merged accounting standards has gained considerable momentum in recent months, finance chiefs may not need to start boning up on principles-based accounting—yet. In fact, Securities and Exchange Commission chairman Christopher Cox stated last week that U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) aren’t going away anytime soon.

Speaking at an American Institute of Certified Public Accountants conference, Mr. Cox said the Financial Accounting Standards Board will not be replaced for many years. He said that the current push merely aims to converge U.S. accounting standards with international ones. “I worry that people think there is something imminent here,” he said. “U.S. GAAP is deeply entrenched in the United States.”

Mr. Cox stressed that there are too many imperfections in international accounting standards to switch wholesale to IFRS at this point. Additional work must be done—including changing language in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act—before the SEC would be able to recognize the International Accounting Standards Board as the sole accounting regulator.

That’s probably good news for Robert Herz, chairman of FASB. Last month, Mr. Herz cautioned against switching to international standards too swiftly. “We have to get beyond just common accounting standards, we have to get to a common reporting system,” he said. “Standards are a big element of this, but it requires common application of the standards, common disclosures, audit practices, regulatory review, training. We ain’t there yet.”

Nevertheless, some finance executives say the switch to international standards could pay unexpected dividends. “We see this as more of an opportunity if this [convergence] trend continues,” said PepsiCo controller Peter Bridgman. About 30 of the company’s reporting entities are already using IFRS. “We will be able to set up regional accounting centers,” noted Mr. Bridgman, “be able to consolidate training onto one platform, and we can simplify our auditing processes.”

Comments like that may explain, in part, why the SEC has been working to end the need for companies to reconcile their financial reports between the two standards. The commission is now considering a plan that would allow U.S. companies to use IFRS. In November, the regulatory agency voted to allow foreign companies raising capital in U.S. markets to include addendums explaining the differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP.

Another sign of convergence: The International Accounting Standards Board late last week published revised rules on mergers and acquisitions. The new rules basically realign IASB’s standards for M&A with U.S. GAAP. The new standards take effect in July 2009, though companies can adopt them sooner.

During his speech at the AICPA meeting, Mr. Cox noted that the fledgling XBRL reporting format—more widely embraced in Europe—goes hand in hand with the shift to international accounting standards. An internal cost-benefit study by the SEC of a two-year pilot program, in which companies were allowed to voluntarily file using XBRL taxonomies, is expected to be completed by the end of February.

“IFRS is coming,” the SEC chairman said. “XBRL is coming. And mutual recognition [of foreign exchanges and securities regulators] is coming.”


Standard Setting and Securities Markets:  U.S. Versus Europe

November 29, 2007 message from Pacter, Paul (CN - Hong Kong) [paupacter@DELOITTE.COM.HK]

Some similarities to Chair of SEC, but some important differences. SEC has direct regulatory powers over securities markets, entities that offer securities in those markets, broker/dealers in securities, auditors, and others. SEC can impose penalties on those it regulates.

In Europe there is no pan-European securities regulator equivalent to the SEC with direct regulatory powers similar to the SEC's. Rather, there are 27 securities regulators (one from each member state) who have that power. Here's a link to the list:

http://www.cesr-eu.org/index.php?page=members_directory&mac=0&id=

There is a coordinating body of European securities regulators called CESR (the Committee of European Securities Regulators (http://www.cesr-eu.org/) but CESR's role is advisory, not regulatory.

When the European Parliament adopts legislation (such as securitieslegislation) the legislation first has to be transposed (legally adopted) into the national laws of the Member States. Commissioner McCreevy's role is to propose policies and propose legislation to adopt those policies in Europe, oversee implementation of the legislation in the 27 Member States (plus 3 EEA countries), and (through both persuasion and some legal authority) try to ensure consistent and coordinated implementation. The Commissioner also has outreach and liaison responsibilities outside the European Union. Because there is no pan-European counterpart to the SEC Chairman, Commissioner McCreevy generally handles top level policy liaison between the SEC and Europe.

Like the Chair of the SEC, EU Commissioners are political appointees.

Paul Pacter

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting standard setting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting


Question
Will the U.S. adopt all IFRS international standards while the European Union cherry picks which standards it will adopt?

From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on April 27, 2007

"SEC to Mull Letting U.S. Companies Use International Accounting Rules," by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, Page: C3 --- http://snipurl.com/WSJ0425

TOPICS: Accounting, Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Securities and Exchange Commission

SUMMARY: The article describes the SEC's willingness to consider allowing U.S. companies to use USGAAP or International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in their filings. This development stems from the initiative to allow international firms traded on U.S. exchanges to file using IFRS without reconciling to USGAAP-based net income and stockholders' equity as is now required on Form 20F. "SEC Chairman Christopher Cox said the agency remains committed to removing the reconciliation requirement by 2009. Such a move was the subject of an SEC roundtable and is being closely watched by European Union officials." The SEC will accept comments this summer on its proposal to eliminate the reconciliation requirements. If the agency does implement this change, then it will consider allowing U.S. companies the same alternative.

QUESTIONS:
1.) What is a "foreign private issuer" (FPI)? Summarize the SEC's current filing requirements for these entities.

2.) Why is the SEC considering allowing U.S. companies to submit filings under IFRS rather than U.S. GAAP?

3.) Why might the SEC's decision in this matter "spell the demise of USGAAP"?

4.) Define "principles-based standards" and contrast with "rules-based standards." Give an example in either USGAAP or IFRS requirements for each of these items.

5.) "Some experts don't think a move away from U.S. GAAP would necessarily be bad." Who do you think would hold this opinion? Who would disagree? Explain.

6.) Define the term convergence in relation to global standards. Who is working towards this goal?

Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

Jensen Comment
Canada has already decided to adopt the IFRS in place of domestic Canadian standards.

Also see ""Strengthening the Transatlantic Economy," by José Manuel Barroso (European Commission President), April 27, 2007 --- http://www.iasplus.com/europe/0704barroso.pdf

Also don't assume that the European Union automatically adopts each IASB international standard. For example, the EU may not adopt IFRS 8 --- http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ifrs08.htm


"Is IFRS Compatible with U.S.-Style Corporate Governance?" by Tom Selling, The Accounting Onion, December 10, 2007 --- http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2007/12/is-ifrs-compati.html

I just finished reading a brief, highly readable and interesting article by a Columbia Law School professor, John C. Coffee, Jr., entitled A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the U.S. and Europe Differ.*  The purpose of this post is to piggyback on his framework to also provide an explanation for the difference in basic approaches between U.S. GAAP and IFRS; and most importantly, why political pressure to trash U.S. GAAP and adopt IFRS should be resisted. 

How and Why, According to Coffee, U.S. and European Scandals Differ

Coffee's thesis is that corporate governance of majority-owned corporations (predominant in Europe) should be fundamentally different than corporate governance of corporations that lack a controlling shareholder group (predominant in the U.S.). It's not necessarily because there are fewer incentives to rip off other shareholders, but the feasible means to do so will differ.

Scandals in Europe involving majority-owned corporations usually do not feature an accounting manipulation. First, financial reporting is less important to the majority owners because they rarely sell shares; and if they do, they usually receive a control premium that is uncorrelated with recent earnings (and generally larger than control premia in U.S. transactions).  Second, fraud is more easily accomplished by misappropriation of the private benefits of control: authorization of related-party transactions at advantageous prices, below-market tender offers, are prime examples.  Any trading that takes place between minority owners has less to do with recent earnings reports, and more to do with an assessment of how minority shareholders will be treated by controlling interests. 

In dispersed-ownership corporations, managers do not possess private benefits of control.  Moreover, a significant portion of manager's compensation may be in the form of stock options or other forms of equity.  Therefore, stock price can have a significant effect on a manager's compensation, providing them with strong incentives to manipulate accounting earnings.

The Implications for Accounting

Professor Coffee's thesis is that differences in ownership patterns have important implications for the selection of gatekeepers: auditors, analysts, independent directors, etc.  His observations and recommendations are interesting, but I want to advance a related thesis, namely that different ownership patterns call for different types of accounting regimes. 

It stands to reason that accounting should be difficult to manipulate, if it can be used to rip off shareholders.  Thus, the evolution of U.S. GAAP can be seen as a response to the need for specific rules that minimized the role of management judgment because of their strong self-interest in the reported earnings and financial position.  This has occurred in part because U.S. gatekeepers have shown themselves to often lack sufficient resolve or power to prevent management from under-reserving, overvaluing, or just plain ole making up numbers.  U.S. managers effectively control the "independent" directors and auditors; and prior to Regulation FD, analysts bartered glowing assessment in exchange for tidbits inside information.  Without empowered gatekeepers to prevent accounting fraud, we have had to place our hopes on very inflexible accounting rules, and sheriffs like the SEC and private attorneys to catch the cases where management has attempted to surreptitiously cross the bright line.

Thus, it should be self-evident that IFRS-style accounting, replete with gray areas, would be a gift to U.S. managers.  Outright fraud would be replaced by more subtle means of "earnings management," rendering the SEC and private attorneys much less potent. Is it any wonder why U.S. corporations and their auditors are practically begging to have IFRS available to them? 

In short, it would be a grave mistake to adopt IFRS in the U.S. simply because it seems to work well elsewhere.  As corporate ownership patterns in Europe change, it may well be that IFRS may evolve to look more like U.S. GAAP.  Only after that occurs may it make more sense to have a single worldwide financial reporting regime.      

Imagine if Enron Had Applied IFRS

One of the scapegoats of the Enron scandal was "rules-based"  U.S. GAAP. The libel was that Andrew Fastow was a mad genius, capable of walking an accounting tightrope by creating complex special-purpose entities (SPEs).  But, GAAP wasn't the culprit in the Enron scandal. Frustrated Fastow was only able to get the accounting treatment he needed past the auditors by hiding from them side agreements that unwound critical provisions requiring the new investors to have a sufficient amount of capital at risk in the SPEs. 

The enduring legacy of the libel is the erroneous conventional wisdom that GAAP is responsible for Enron; and what's more, Enron et. al. might not have happened if our financial reporting system were more like IFRS.  More likely, if IFRS had been the basis of accounting for Enron instead of GAAP, it might have taken longer to discover the fraud, or to pin the blame for the fraud where it belonged.

Neither GAAP nor IFRS are principles-based, but GAAP certainly has more rules and bright lines.  At least there seems to be some method to the madness, but it would be nice if more of the rules were based on sound principles. 

-------------------------------

*There are two versions of this paper.  The working paper is available at no charge from the Social Sciences Research Network electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract=694581.  The published version is in Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2005).

 

Bob Jensen's threads on the differences between U.S. versus International GAAP are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FASBvsIASB


iGAAP (International GAAP) 2007 Financial Instruments: IAS 32, IAS 39 and IFRS 7 Explained (Third Edition)
Deloitte & Touche LLP (United Kingdom) has developed iGAAP 2007 Financial Instruments: IAS 32, IAS 39 and IFRS 7 Explained (Third Edition), which has been published by CCH. This publication is the authoritative guide for financial instruments accounting under IFRSs. The 2007 edition expands last year's edition with further interpretations, examples, discussions from the IASB and the IFRIC, updates on comparisons of IFRSs with US GAAP for financial instruments, as well as a new chapter on IFRS 7 Financial Instruments Disclosures including illustrative disclosures. iGAAP 2007 Financial Instruments: IAS 32, IAS 39 and IFRS 7 Explained (628 pages, March 2007) can be purchased through CCH Online or by phone at +44 (0) 870 777 2906 or by email: customer.services@cch.co.uk .
IAS Plus, March 24, 2007 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

Bob Jensen's tutorials on IAS 39 (Derivative Financial Instruments) are linked at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm


CPA Examination candidates and accounting faculty should check out the free database at
http://www.cpa-exam.org/cpa/literature.htm

The Trinity University library has a single-user license (with an academic discount) for PwC’s Comperio --- http://www.pwcglobal.com/comperio
The single-user limitation really has not been problematic for us. Our Library guru wrote some front end code that lets any Trinity faculty member or student go directly into Comperio without having to remember a password

Comperio evolved out of a CD-Rom database that Price Waterhouse  sold under the name “Price Waterhouse Researcher.” Updated CDs were sent to us each quarter in the old days before things were as networked on the Web. Now it’s all Comperio on the Web.

Andersen had a competing CD database called Research Manager. That was bought out after Andersen fell, but I think it is now defunct (I could be wrong about this).

Now Comperio is the main commercial database available other than FARs --- http://www.fasb.org/fars/
I think each student can buy this from Wiley, but there have been numerous complaints about it.

PwC's Comperio Accounting Research Manager

Comperio is the most comprehensive on-line library of financial reporting and assurance literature in the world. Over 1,500 financial executives from around the world use Comperio on a daily basis. Comperio content includes AICPA, DIG, EITF, FASB, IAS, ISB and the SEC as well as pronouncements and standards from Australia, Belgium, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

With Comperio, the answers you need are always available - right now, right at your fingertips. There is no software to install - just go to the Comperio website and start researching!

The entire online library can be immediately accessed by browsing a pronouncement or topic directly, or by searching the entire database for key words, topics or terms.

Visit the Comperio product information site at http://www.pwcglobal.com/comperio . You will find the necessary forms to order Comperio today or to request a 30-day free trial.

Andersen's old Accounting Research Manager is now updated and maintained by CCH. The AICPA has accounting research literature in the FARs database.

For national and international accounting rulings and online research, it is best to subscribe for a fee to one of the leading services shown below:

PwC Comperio --- http://www.pwcglobal.com/comperio

CCH Accounting Research Manager --- http://www.accountingresearchmanager.com/ARMMenu.nsf/vwHTML/ARMSplash?OpenDocument

AICPA FARs (marketed by Wiley) --- http://www.fasb.org/fars/

For looking up filings with the SEC, there are two major sources:

EDGAR --- http://www.sec.gov/edgar/quickedgar.htm

PwC EdgarScan --- http://edgarscan.pwcglobal.com/servlets/edgarscan 

It is possible to do comparative company financial analyses using the core earnings databases --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#CoreEarnings

Many IFRS and multiple nation standards and reviews are available from Deloitte's IAS Plus --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

Free International Auditing Standards
All documents issued by IFAC and the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) are now available for immediate download at no charge. Visitors must simply fill out a one-time registration to gain access to the documents. http://www.accountingweb.com/item/96952 


PwC has a new helper comparing U.S. GAAP with international (IFRS) GAAP --- http://www.pwc.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/74d6c09e0a4ee610802569a1003354c8

Download: Similarities and Differences - A comparison of IFRS and US GAAP (2005 update) [PDF file, 469k]

Download: Similarities and Differences - A comparison of IFRS and US GAAP (2004) [PDF file, 314k]

Download: publication order form [PDF file, 212k]

Other publications in the Similarities and Differences series are also available.


Updated in 2005:  Some Key Differences Between IFRs and U.S. GAAP -

Side by Side: IAS 39 Compared with FASB Standards (FAS 133), by Paul Pacter, as published in Accountancy International Magazine, June 1999 --- http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cen8_142.htm 
Also note "Comparisons of International IAS Versus FASB Standards" --- http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/pocketiasus.pdf

I.                    Key Differences Between IAS 39 Versus FAS 133

 

A.                 Some Key Differences That Remain

Definitions of derivatives

  • IAS 39: Does not define “net settlement” as being required to be scoped into IAS 39 as a derivative such as when interest rate swap payments and receipts are not net settled into a single payment.
  • FAS 133: Net settlement is an explicit requirement to be scoped into FAS 133 as a derivative financial instrument.
  • Implications: This is not a major difference since IAS 39 scoped out most of what is not net settled such as Normal Purchases and Normal Sales (NPNS) and other instances where physical delivery transpires in commodities rather than cash settlements. IAS 39 makes other concessions to net settlement such as in deciding whether a "loan obligation" is a derivative

Offsetting amounts due from and owed to two different parties

  • IAS 39: Required if legal right of set-off and intent to settle net.
  • FAS 133: Prohibited.

Multiple embedded derivatives in a single hybrid instrument

  • IAS 39: Sometimes accounted for as separate derivative contracts
  • FAS 133: Always combined into a single hybrid instrument.
  • Implications: FAS 133 does not allow hybrid instruments to be hedged items. This restriction can be overcome in some instances by disaggregating for implementation of IAS 39.

Subsequent reversal of an impairment loss

  • IAS 39: Previous impairment losses may be reversed under some circumstances.
  • FAS 133: Reversal is not allowed for HTM and AFS securities.
  • Implications: The is a less serious difference since Fair Value Options (FVOs) were adopted by both the IASB and FASB. Companies can now avoid HTM and AFS implications by adopting fair values under the FVO hedged instrument.

Derecognition of financial assets

  • IAS 39: It is possible, under restrictive guidelines, to derecognise part of an a financial instrument and no "isolation in bankruptcy" test is required.
  • FAS 133: Derecognise financial instruments when transferor has surrendered control in part or in whole. An isolation bankruptcy test is required.
  • Status: This inconsistency in the two standards will probably be resolved in future amendments.    

Hedging foreign currency risk in a held-to-maturity investment

  • IAS 39: Can qualify for hedge accounting for FX risk but not cash flow or fair value risk.
  • FAS 133: Cannot qualify for hedge accounting.

IAS 39 Hedging foreign currency risk in a firm commitment to acquire a business in a business combination

  • IAS 39: Can qualify for hedge accounting.
  • FAS 133: Cannot qualify for hedge accounting.

Assuming perfect effectiveness of a hedge if critical terms match

  • IAS 39: Hedge effectiveness must always be tested in order to qualify for hedge accounting.
  • FAS 133: The “Shortcut Method” is allowed for interest rate swaps.
  • Implications: This is am important difference that will probably become more political due to pressures from international bankers.

Use of "basis adjustment"

  • IAS 39:
    Fair value hedge: Basis is adjusted when the hedge expires or is dedesignated.
    Cash flow hedge: Basis is adjusted when the hedge expires or is dedesignated.

     
  • FAS 133:
    Fair value hedge: Basis is adjusted when the hedged item is sold or otherwise utilized in operations such as using raw material in production (Para 24)
    Cash flow hedge of a transaction resulting in an asset or liability: OCI or other hedge accounting equity amount remains in equity and is reclassified into earnings when the earnings cycle is completed such as when inventory is sold rather than purchased or when inventory is used in the production process. (Para 376)

 

IAS 39 Macro hedging

  • IAS 39: Allows hedge accounting for portfolios having assets and/or liabilities with different maturity dates.
  • FAS 133: Hedge accounting treatment is prohibited for portfolios that are not homogeneous in virtually all major respects.
  • Implications: This is pure theory pitched against practicality, politics, and how industry hedges portfolios. It is a very sore point for companies having lots and lots of items in portfolios that make it impractical to hedge each item separately.

 

Fair value accounting politics in the revised IAS 39

From Paul Pacter's IAS Plus on July 13, 2005 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

 
The European Commission has published Frequently Asked Questions – IAS 39 Fair Value Option (FVO) (PDF 94k), providing the Commission's views on the following questions:
  • Why did the Commission carve out the full fair value option in the original IAS 39 standard?
  • Do prudential supervisors support IAS 39 FVO as published by the IASB?
  • When will the Commission to adopt the amended standard for the IAS 39 FVO?
  • Will companies be able to apply the amended standard for their 2005 financial statements?
  • Does the amended standard for IAS 39 FVO meet the EU endorsement criteria?
  • What about the relationship between the fair valuation of own liabilities under the amended IAS 39 FVO standard and under Article 42(a) of the Fourth Company Law Directive?
  • Will the Commission now propose amending Article 42(a) of the Fourth Company Directive?
  • What about the remaining IAS 39 carve-out relating to certain hedge accounting provisions?

Bob Jensen's threads and tutorials on FAS 133 and IAS 39 are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

IAS 39 Implementation Guidance

IAS 39 Amendments in 2005 --- http://snipurl.com/IAS39amendments


Convergence of foreign and domestic accounting rules could catch some U.S. companies by surprise
Although many differences remain between U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and international financial reporting standards (IFRS), they are being eliminated faster than anyone, even Herz or Tweedie, could have imagined. In April, FASB and the IASB agreed that all major projects going forward would be conducted jointly. That same month, the Securities and Exchange Commission said that, as soon as 2007, it might allow foreign companies to use IFRS to raise capital in the United States, eliminating the current requirement that they reconcile their statements to U.S. GAAP. The change is all the more remarkable given that the IASB was formed only four years ago, and has rushed to complete 25 new or revamped standards in time for all 25 countries in the European Union to adopt IFRS by this year. By next year, some 100 countries will be using IFRS. "We reckon it will be 150 in five years," marvels Tweedie. "That leaves only 50 out."
Tim Reason, "The Narrowing GAAP:  The convergence of foreign and domestic accounting rules could catch some U.S. companies by surprise," CFO Magazine December 01, 2005 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/5193385/c_5243641?f=magazine_coverstory


Monumental Scholarship (The following book is not online.)
The Early History of Financial Economics 1478-1776
by Geoffrey Poitras (Simon Fraser University) --- http://www.sfu.ca/~poitras/photo_pa.htm 
(Edward Elgar,  Cheltenham, UK, 2000) --- http://www.e-elgar.co.uk/ 

Jack Anderson sent the following message:

A good book on accounting history in the U.S. is

A History of Accountancy in the United States by Gary John Previts and  Barbara Dubis Merino

 

It's available through The Ohio State University Press (see web site

http://www.ohiostatepress.org/cat97/previts.htm )

 

I'm unaware of a good history of international accounting but would like to hear of one.

 

Jack Anderson

 

The FASB's website is at http://www.iasb.org/ 

The future of the FASB and all national standard setters is cloudy due to the globalization of business and increasing needs for international standards.  The primary body for setting international standards was the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) that evolved into the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) having a homepage at http://www.iasc.org.uk/  For a brief review of its history and the history of its standards, I recommend going to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/pacter.htm#003.04.

In 2001, the IASC was restructured into the new and smaller International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).  The majority of the IASB members will be full-time, whereas the members of the IASC were only part-time and did not have daily face-to-face encounters with other Board members or the IASC staff.  The IASB will operate more like the FASB in the U.S.  

In the early years of its existence, the IASC tended to avoid controversial issues and there was nothing to back up its standards (except in the U.S. where lawyers will use almost anything to support litigation brought by investors against corporations).  

Times are changing at the IASC.  It has been restructured and is getting a much greater budget for accounting research.  Most importantly, IASC standards are becoming the standards required by large international stock exchanges (IOSCO).

The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) was established in late 1997 with the mission of developing globally applicable guidelines for reporting on the economic, environmental, and social performance, initially for corporations and eventually for any business, governmental, or non-governmental organisation (NGO). Convened by the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) in partnership with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the GRI incorporates the active participation of corporations, NGOs, accountancy organisations, business associations, and other stakeholders from around the world business plan --- http://www.globalreporting.org/ 

Jagdish Gangolly recommends the following book:
Dollars & scholars, scribes & bribes: The story of accounting by Gary Giroux # Dame Publications, Inc (1996) # ASIN: B0006R6WQS --- http://snipurl.com/Giroux  

Jim McKinney recommends the following book;
It is not a lot more recent but I would consider the US centric text: A History of Accountancy in the United States: The Cultural Significance of Accounting by Previtz & Merino published in 1998. It is available in paperback.

SHARPEN YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE (2005) YEAR'S FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS AND DEVELOPMENTS --- http://accountingeducation.com/index.cfm?page=newsdetails&id=141776

Accounting Research Versus the Accountancy Profession


Perhaps I'm old and tired, but I always think that the chances of finding out what really is going on are so absurdly remote that the only thing to do is to say hang the sense of it and just keep yourself occupied.

Douglas Adams

There are two explanations one can give for this state of affairs here. The first is due to the great English economist Maurice Dobb according to whom the theory of value was replaced in the United States by theory of price. May be, the consequence for us today is that we know the price of everything but perhaps the value of nothing. Economics divorced from politics and philosophy is vacuous. In accounting, we have inherited the vacuousness by ignoring those two enduring areas of inquiry.
Professor Jagdish Gangolly, SUNY Albany

The second is the comment that Joan Robinson made about American Keynsians: that their theories were so flimsy that they had to put math into them. In accounting academia, the shortest path to respectability seems to be to use math (and statistics), whether meaningful or not.
Professor Jagdish Gangolly, SUNY Albany


Rough notes of David Dennis from an informal panel of veteran accounting researchers at the American Accounting Association annual meetings in 2007 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Dennis2007.htm


This citation was forwarded by Don Ramsey
"Why business ignores the business schools," by Michael Skapinker, Financial Times, January 7, 2008

Chief executives, on the other hand, pay little attention to what business schools do or say. As long ago as 1993, Donald Hambrick, then president of the US-based Academy of Management, described the business academics' summer conference as "an incestuous closed loop", at which professors "come to talk with each other". Not much has changed. In the current edition of The Academy of Management Journal.

. . .

They have chosen an auspicious occasion on which to beat themselves up: this year is The Academy of Management Journal's 50th anniversary. A scroll through the most recent issues demonstrates why managers may be giving the Journal a miss. "A multi-level investigation of antecedents and consequences of team member boundary spanning behaviour" is the title of one article.

Why do business academics write like this? The academics themselves offer several reasons. First, to win tenure in a US university, you need to publish in prestigious peer-reviewed journals. Accessibility is not the key to academic advancement.

Similar pressures apply elsewhere. In France and Australia, academics receive bonuses for placing articles in the top academic publications. The UK's Research Assessment Exercise, which evaluates university research and ties funding to the outcome, encourages similarly arcane work.

But even without these incentives, many business school faculty prefer to adorn their work with scholarly tables, statistics and jargon because it makes them feel like real academics. Within the university world, business schools suffer from a long-standing inferiority complex.

The professors offer several remedies. Academic business journals should accept fact-based articles, without demanding that they propound a new theory. Professor Hambrick says that academics in other fields "don't feel the need to sprinkle mentions of theory on every page, like so much aromatic incense or holy water".

Others talk of the need for academics to spend more time talking to managers about the kind of research they would find useful.

As well-meaning as these suggestions are, I suspect the business school academics are missing something. Law, medical and engineering schools are subject to the same academic pressures as business schools - to publish in prestigious peer-reviewed journals and to buttress their work with the expected academic vocabulary.


The schism between academic research and the business world: 
The outside world has little interest in research of the business school professors
If our research findings were important, there would be more demand for replication of findings

"Business Education Under the Microscope:  Amid growing charges of irrelevancy, business schools launch a study of their impact on business,"
Business Week
, December 26, 2007 --- http://www.businessweek.com/bschools/content/dec2007/bs20071223_173004.htm 

The business-school world has been besieged by criticism in the past few months, with prominent professors and writers taking bold swipes at management education. Authors such as management expert Gary Hamel and Harvard Business School Professor Rakesh Khurana have published books this fall expressing skepticism about the direction in which business schools are headed and the purported value of an MBA degree. The December/January issue of the Academy of Management Journal includes a special section in which 10 scholars question the value of business-school research.

B-school deans may soon be able to counter that criticism, following the launch of an ambitious study that seeks to examine the overall impact of business schools on society. A new Impact of Business Schools task force convened by the the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB)—the main organization of business schools—will mull over this question next year, conducting research that will look at management education through a variety of lenses, from examining the link between business schools and economic growth in the U.S. and other countries, to how management ideas stemming from business-school research have affected business practices. Most of the research will be new, though it will build upon the work of past AACSB studies, organizers said.

The committee is being chaired by Robert Sullivan of the University of California at San Diego's Rady School of Management, and includes a number of prominent business-school deans including Robert Dolan of the University of Michigan's Stephen M. Ross School of Business, Linda Livingstone of Pepperdine University's Graziado School of Business & Management, and AACSB Chair Judy Olian, who is also the dean of UCLA's Anderson School of Management. Representatives from Google (GOOG) and the Educational Testing Service will also participate. The committee, which was formed this summer, expects to have the report ready by January, 2009.

BusinessWeek.com reporter Alison Damast recently spoke with Olian about the committee and the potential impact of its findings on the business-school community.

There has been a rising tide of criticism against business schools recently, some of it from within the B-school world. For example, Professor Rakesh Khurana implied in his book From Higher Aims to Hired Hands (BusinessWeek.com, 11/5/07) that management education needs to reinvent itself. Did this have any effect on the AACSB's decision to create the Impact of Business Schools committee?

I think that is probably somewhere in the background, but I certainly don't view that as in any way the primary driver or particularly relevant to what we are thinking about here. What we are looking at is a variety of ways of commenting on what the impact of business schools is. The fact is, it hasn't been documented and as a field we haven't really asked those questions and we need to. I don't think a study like this has ever been done before.

Continued in article

Bob Jensen's threads on the growing irrelevance of academic accounting research are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

The dearth of research findings replications --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#Replication

Bob Jensen's threads on higher education controversies are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm

January 2, 2008 reply from David Albrecht [albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]

Bob,

AACSB chair Judy Olian (dean, UCLA school of biz) is quoted as saying that 39% of Fortune 500 CEOs are graduates of a businesss school.

I am surprised that this is such a low number. Why shouldn't this number be very much higher? Given that corporations are run by professional managers, why wouldn't the college degree that prepares professional managers show up with greater frequency in the profile of the top professional managers?

I don't know how it is possible for this group of deans to design a research study to show the relevance of business school education. Well, I don't know how it would be possible for anyone to design it. Isn't relevance a judgment call?

David Albrecht

January 2, 2008 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi David,

CEOs rise up from many walks of life, especially engineering, economics, law, and the specialties of an industry such as chemistry, medicine, agriculture, etc. CFOs and CAOs are another matter entirely.

As far as research impacts are determined, subjective judgment is certainly a huge factor but there are other indicators. Can executives recall a single article published in The Accounting Review or other leading academic accounting journal upon which academic reputations are built? Can executives name one author who received the AAA Seminal Contributions Award or any other academic award of major academic associations?

One indicator in accounting is practitioner membership in the American Accounting Association. The AAA started out as primarily an association for accounting practitioners and teachers of accounting. For four decades practitioners were heavily involved in the AAA and the longest-running editor of The Accounting Review was a practitioner (Kohler) --- http://snipurl.com/aohkohler 

All this changed with what Jean Heck and I call the "perfect storm" of the 1960s. Since then, practitioner membership steadily declined in the AAA and readership of academic accounting research journals plummeted to virtually zero. Practitioners still send us their money and their recruiters, but leading academic researchers like Joel Demski warn against accounting researchers catching a "vocational virus" and cringe at aiming our research talent toward practical problems of the profession for which we seemingly have no comparative advantage due to our rather useless accountics skills.

You can read much of the history of this schism at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession 

The schism is probably greatest in accounting and the smallest in finance where there practitioners have relied more on research findings and fads in economics and finance journals.

Some universities are more focused on industry than others. Harvard certainly has tried very hard in this regard, but Harvard's case method research just cannot pass the hurdles of the journal referees of our leading accounting research journals.

And even accounting academics are bored with the (yawn) articles appearing in our academic research journals. Ron Dye is probably one of our most esoteric accountics researchers (his degrees are in mathematics and economics even though he's an "accounting professor"). Ron stated the following at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession 

Begin Quote from Ron Dye***************

About the question: by and large, I think it is a mistake for someone interested in pursuing an academic career in accounting not to get a phd in accounting. If you look at the "success" stories, there aren't many: most of the people who make a post-phd transition fail. I think that happens for a couple reasons. 1. I think some of the people that transfer late do it for the money, and aren't really all that interested in accounting. While the $ are nice, it is impossible to think about $ when you are trying to come up with an idea, and anyway, you're unlikely to come up with an idea unless you're really interested in the subject. 2. I think, almost independent of the field, unless you get involved in the field at an early age, for some reason it becomes very hard to develop good intuition for the area - which is a second reason good problems are often not generated by "crossovers."

The bigger thing - not related to the question you raise - but maybe you could add to the discussion is that there are, as far as I can tell, not a lot of new ideas being put forth by anyone in accounting nowadays (with the possible exception of John Dickhaut's neuro stuff). In most fields, the youngsters are supposed to come up with the new problems, techniques, etc., but I see a lot more mimicry than innovation among newly minted phds now.

Anyway, for what it's worth....

Ron
End Quote from Ron Dye****************

_________________

Perhaps the AACSB can make some progress toward bridging the schism. But I leave you with a forthcoming quote in the January 6 edition of Tidbits:

Question "How many professors does it take to change a light bulb?"

Answer "Whadaya mean, "change"?" Bob Zemsky, Chronicle of Higher Education's Chronicle Review, December 2007


"The "Bright Star" of B-School Research: Finance  While other academic fields lie almost fallow — drawing criticism for lack of relevance — examples abound of finance research that makes a difference," by Roy Harris CFO.com, March 27, 2008 --- http://cfo.com/article.cfm/10927537/c_10923636

Our Tuesday article, "Business School for Dummies?" looked at the drive at accrediting group ACCSB to move research in the direction of providing more useful lessons for the business world.

Even as business schools draw fire for producing too little research of real relevance to Corporate America, the area of finance may be the single most notable exception — an area in which theory after theory is used to solve daily business problems.

"Finance is the bright star," says professor Gabriel Hawawini, one member of the AACSB "Impact of Research" task force, which strongly suggested in its recent report pressing for academic studies to do more to fill the needs presented by American business. "If you ask what contributions have been made, you would put finance at the top of the list for models, principles, and theories that are in use today," adds the Hawawini, currently a visiting professor of finance at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School.

Continued in article


Question
What research methodology flaws are shared by studies in political science and accounting science?

"Methodological Confusion:  How indictments of The Israel Lobby (by John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen M. Walt, ISBN-13: 9780374177720) expose political science's flaws" by Daniel W. Drezner, Chronicle of Higher Education's Chronicle Review, February 22, 2008, Page B5 --- http://chronicle.com/weekly/v54/i24/24b00501.htm 

Does the public understand how political science works? Or are political scientists the ones who need re-educating? Those questions have been running through my mind in light of the drubbing that John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt received in the American news media for their 2007 book,  The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007). Pick your periodical — The Economist, Foreign Affairs, The Nation, National Review, The New Republic, The New York Times Book Review, The Washington Post Book World — and you'll find a reviewer trashing the book.

From a political-science perspective, what's interesting about those reviews is that they are largely grounded in methodological critiques — which rarely break into the public sphere. What's disturbing is that the methodologies used in The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy are hardly unique to Mearsheimer and Walt. Are the indictments of their book overblown, or do they expose the methodological flaws of the discipline in general?

The most persistent public criticism of Mearsheimer and Walt has been their failure to empirically buttress their argument with interviews. Writing in the Times Book Review, Leslie H. Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, criticized their "writing on this sensitive topic without doing extensive interviews with the lobbyists and the lobbied." David Brooks, a columnist for The New York Times, recently seconded that notion: "If you try to write about politics without interviewing policy makers, you'll wind up spewing all sorts of nonsense."

That kind of critique has a long pedigree. For decades public officials and commentators have decried the failure of social scientists to engage more deeply with the objects of their studies. Secretary of State Dean Acheson once objected to being treated as a "dependent variable." The New Republic ran a cover story in 1999 with the subhead, "When Did Political Science Forget About Politics?"

To the general reader, such critiques must sound damning. International-relations scholars know full well, however, that innumerable peer-reviewed articles and university-press books utilize the same kind of empirical sources that appear in The Israel Lobby. Most case studies in international relations rely on news-conference transcripts, official documents, newspaper reportage, think-tank analyses, other scholarly works, etc. It is not that political scientists never interview policy makers — they do (and Mearsheimer and Walt aver that they have as well). However, with a few splendid exceptions, interviews are not the bread and butter of most international-relations scholarship. (This kind of fieldwork is much more common in comparative politics.)

Indeed, the claim that political scientists can't write about policy without talking to policy makers borders on the absurd. The first rule about policy makers is that they always have agendas — even in interviews with social scientists. That does not mean that those with power lie. It does mean that they may not be completely candid in outlining motives and constraints. One would expect that to be particularly true about such "a sensitive topic."

Further, most empirical work in political science is concerned with actions, not words. How much aid has the United States disbursed to Israel? How did members of Congress vote on the issue? Without talking to members of Congress, thousands of Congressional scholars study how the legislative branch acts, by analyzing verifiable actions or words — votes, speeches, committee hearings, and testimony. Statistical approaches allow political scientists to test hypotheses through regression analysis. By Brooks's criteria, any political analysis of, say, 19th-century policy decisions would be pointless, since all the relevant players are dead.

Other methodological critiques are more difficult to dismiss. Walter Russell Mead's dissection of The Israel Lobby in Foreign Affairs does not pull any punches. Mead, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote that Mearsheimer and Walt "claim the clarity and authority of rigorous logic, but their methods are loose and rhetorical. This singularly unhappy marriage — between the pretensions of serious political analysis and the standards of the casual op-ed — both undercuts the case they wish to make and gives much of the book a disagreeably disingenuous tone."

Mead enumerates several methodological sins, in particular the imprecise manner in which the "Israel Lobby" is defined in the book. For their part, the book's authors acknowledge that the term is "somewhat misleading," conceding that "the boundaries of the Israel Lobby cannot be identified precisely." It is certainly true that many of the central concepts in international-relations theory — like "power" or "regime" — have disputed definitions. But most political scientists deal with nebulous concepts by explicitly offering their own definition to guide their research. Even if others disagree, at least the definition is transparent. In The Israel Lobby, however, Mearsheimer and Walt essentially rely on a Potter Stewart definition of the lobby: They know it when they see it. That makes it exceedingly difficult for other political scientists to test or falsify their hypotheses.

Many of the reviews of the book highlight two flaws that, disturbingly, are more pervasive in academic political science. The first is the failure to compare the case in question to other cases. For example, Mearsheimer and Walt go to great lengths to outline the "extraordinary material aid and diplomatic support" the United States provides to Israel. What they do not do, however, is systematically compare Israel to similarly situated countries to determine if the U.S.-Israeli relationship really is unique. An alternative, strategic explanation would posit that Israel falls into a small set of countries: longstanding allies bordering one or multiple enduring rivals. The category of states that meet that criteria throughout the time period analyzed by Mearsheimer and Walt is relatively small: Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey. Compared to that smaller set of countries, the U.S. relationship with Israel does not look anomalous. The United States has demonstrated a willingness to expend blood, treasure, or diplomatic capital to ensure the security of all of those countries — despite the wide variance in the strength of each's "lobby."

Continued in article

Daniel W. Drezner is an associate professor of international politics at the Fletcher School at Tufts University.

Jensen Comment
When I read the above review entitled "Metholological Confusiion" I kept thinking of the thousands of empirical and analytical studies by accounting faculty and students that have similar methodology confusions. How many mathematical/empirical database studies relating accounting events (e.g., a new standard) with capital market behavior also conduct formal interviews with investors, analysts, fund managers, etc. Do analytical researchers conduct formal interviews with real-world decision makers before building their mathematical models? The majority of behavioral accounting studies conducted by professors use students as surrogates for real-world decision makers. This methodology is notoriously flawed and could be helped if the researchers had also interviewed real-world players.

And Drezner overlooked another common flaw shared by both political science and accountics research. If the findings are as important as claimed by authors, why aren't other researchers frantically trying to replicate the results? The lack of replication in accounting science (accountics research) is scandalous --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#Replication
Formal and well-crafted interviews with important players (investors, standard setters, CEOs, etc.) constitute possible ways of replicating empirical and analytical findings.

The closest things we have to in-depth contact with real world players in accounting research is research conducted by the standard setters themselves such as the FASB, the IASB, the GASB, etc. Sometimes these are interviews, although more often then not they are comment letters. But accountics researchers wave off such research as anecdotal and seldom even quote the public archives of such interviews and comments. Surveys are frequently published but these tend to be relegated to less prestigious academic research journals and practitioner journals.

Most importantly of all in accountics is that the leading accounting research journals for tenure, promotion, and performance evaluation in academe are devoted to accountics paper. Normative methods, case studies, and interviews are rarely used in studies published in such journals. The following is a quotation from “An Analysis of the Evolution of Research Contributions by The Accounting Review (TAR): 1926-2005,” by Jean L. Heck and Robert E. Jensen, Accounting Historians Journal, Volume 34, No. 2, December 2007, Page 121.

Leading accounting professors lamented TAR’s preference for rigor over relevancy [Zeff, 1978; Lee, 1997; and Williams, 1985 and 2003]. Sundem [1987] provides revealing information about the changed perceptions of authors, almost entirely from academe, who submitted manuscripts for review between June 1982 and May 1986. Among the 1,148 submissions, only 39 used archival (history) methods; 34 of those submissions were rejected. Another 34 submissions used survey methods; 33 of those were rejected. And 100 submissions used traditional normative (deductive) methods with 85 of those being rejected. Except for a small set of 28 manuscripts classified as using “other” methods (mainly descriptive empirical according to Sundem), the remaining larger subset of submitted manuscripts used methods that Sundem [1987, p. 199] classified these as follows:

292          General Empirical

172          Behavioral

135          Analytical modeling

119          Capital Market

  97          Economic modeling

  40          Statistical modeling

  29          Simulation

 

It is clear that by 1982, accounting researchers realized that having mathematical or statistical analysis in TAR submissions made accountics virtually a necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition for acceptance for publication. It became increasingly difficult for a single editor to have expertise in all of the above methods. In the late 1960s, editorial decisions on publication shifted from the TAR editor alone to the TAR editor in conjunction with specialized referees and eventually associate editors [Flesher, 1991, p. 167]. Fleming et al. [2000, p. 45] wrote the following:

The big change was in research methods. Modeling and empirical methods became prominent during 1966-1985, with analytical modeling and general empirical methods leading the way. Although used to a surprising extent, deductive-type methods declined in popularity, especially in the second half of the 1966-1985 period.
 

I think the emphasis highlighted in red above demonstrates that "Methodological Confusion" reigns supreme in accounting science as well as political science.

February 22, 2008 reply from James M. Peters [jpeters@NMHU.EDU]

A couple of years ago, P. Kothari, one of the Editors of JAE and a full professor at MIT, visited the U. of Maryland to present a paper. In my private discussion with him, I asked him to identify what he considered to the the settled findings associated with the last 30 years of capital markets research in accounting. I pointed out that somewhere over half of all accounting research since Ball and Brown fit into this category and I was curious as to what the effort had added to Ball and Brown. That is, what conclusions have been drawn that could be considered settled ground so that researchers could move on to other topics. His response, and I quote, was "I understand your point, Jim." He could not identify one issue that researchers had been able to "put to bed" after all that effort.

Jim Peters
New Mexico Highlands University

February 22, 2008 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

Jim,

P. Kothari's response is to be expected. I have had similar responses from at least two ex-editors of TAR; how appropriate a TLA! But who wants to bell the cats (or call off the naked emperors' bluff)? Accounting academia knows which side of the bread is buttered.

That you needed to flaunt Kothari's resume to legitimise his vacuous response shows the pathetic state of accounting academia.

If accounting academia is not to be reduced to the laughing stock of accounting practice, we better start listening to the problems that practice faces. How else can we understand what we profess to "research"? We accounting academics have been circling our wagons too long as a ploy to keep our wages arbitrarily high.

In as much as we are a profession, any academic on such a committee reduces the whole exercise to a farce.

Jagdish

Bob Jensen's threads on research methods in accounting can be found at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm 


As David Bartholomae observes, “We make a huge mistake if we don’t try to articulate more publicly what it is we value in intellectual work. We do this routinely for our students — so it should not be difficult to find the language we need to speak to parents and legislators.” If we do not try to find that public language but argue instead that we are not accountable to those parents and legislators, we will only confirm what our cynical detractors say about us, that our real aim is to keep the secrets of our intellectual club to ourselves. By asking us to spell out those secrets and measuring our success in opening them to all, outcomes assessment helps make democratic education a reality.
Gerald Graff, "Assessment Changes Everything," Inside Higher Ed, February 21, 2008 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2008/02/21/graff
Gerald Graff is professor of English at the University of Illinois at Chicago and president of the Modern Language Association. This essay is adapted from a paper he delivered in December at the MLA annual meeting, a version of which appears on the MLA’s Web site and is reproduced here with the association’s permission. Among Graff’s books are Professing Literature, Beyond the Culture Wars and Clueless in Academe: How School Obscures the Life of the Mind.

The consensus report, which was approved by the group’s international board of directors, asserts that it is vital when accrediting institutions to assess the “impact” of faculty members’ research on actual practices in the business world.

"Measuring ‘Impact’ of B-School Research," by Andy Guess, Inside Higher Ed, February 21, 2008 ---  http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/02/22/impact

Ask anyone with an M.B.A.: Business school provides an ideal environment to network, learn management principles and gain access to jobs. Professors there use a mix of scholarly expertise and business experience to teach theory and practice, while students prepare for the life of industry: A simple formula that serves the school, the students and the corporations that recruit them.

Yet like any other academic enterprise, business schools expect their faculty to produce peer-reviewed research. The relevance, purpose and merit of that research has been debated almost since the institutions started appearing, and now a new report promises to add to the discussion — and possibly stir more debate. The Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business on Thursday released the final report of its Impact of Research Task Force, the result of feedback from almost 1,000 deans, directors and professors to a preliminary draft circulated in August.

The consensus report, which was approved by the group’s international board of directors, asserts that it is vital when accrediting institutions to assess the “impact” of faculty members’ research on actual practices in the business world. But it does not settle on concrete metrics for impact, leaving that discussion to a future implementation task force, and emphasizes that a “one size fits all” approach will not work in measuring the value of scholars’ work.

The report does offer suggestions for potential measures of impact. For a researcher studying how to improve manufacturing practices, impact could be measured by counting the number of firms adopting the new approach. For a professor who writes a book about finance for a popular audience, one measure could be the number of copies sold or the quality of reviews in newspapers and magazines.

“In the past, there was a tendency I think to look at the [traditional academic] model as kind of the desired situation for all business schools, and what we’re saying here in this report is that there is not a one-size-fits-all model in this business; you should have impact and expectations dependent on the mission of the business school and the university,” said Richard Cosier, the dean of the Krannert School of Management at Purdue University and vice chair and chair-elect of AACSB’s board. “It’s a pretty radical position, if you know this business we’re in.”

That position worried some respondents to the initial draft, who feared an undue emphasis on immediate, visible impact of research on business practices — essentially, clear utilitarian value — over basic research. The final report takes pains to alleviate those concerns, reassuring deans and scholars that it wasn’t minimizing the contributions of theoretical work or requiring that all professors at a particular school demonstrate “impact” for the institution to be accredited.

“Many readers, for instance, inferred that the Task Force believes that ALL intellectual contributions must be relevant to and impact practice to be valued. The position of the Task Force is that intellectual contributions in the form of basic theoretical research can and have been extremely valuable even if not intended to directly impact practice,” the report states.

“It also is important to clarify that the recommendations would not require every faculty member to demonstrate impact from research in order to be academically qualified for AACSB accreditation review. While Recommendation #1 suggests that AACSB examine a school’s portfolio of intellectual contributions based on impact measures, it does not specify minimum requirements for the maintenance of individual academic qualification. In fact, the Task Force reminds us that to demonstrate faculty currency, the current standards allow for a breadth of other scholarly activities, many of which may not result in intellectual contributions.”

Cosier, who was on the task force that produced the report, noted that business schools with different missions might require differing definitions of impact. For example, a traditional Ph.D.-granting institution would focus on peer-reviewed research in academic journals that explores theoretical questions and management concepts. An undergraduate institution more geared toward classroom teaching, on the other hand, might be better served by a definition of impact that evaluated research on pedagogical concerns and learning methods, he suggested.

A further concern, he added, is that there simply aren’t enough Ph.D.-trained junior faculty coming down the pipeline, let alone resources to support them, to justify a single research-oriented model across the board. “Theoretically, I’d say there’s probably not a limit” to the amount of academic business research that could be produced, “but practically there is a limit,” Cosier said.

But some critics have worried that the report could encourage a focus on the immediate impact of research at the expense of theoretical work that could potentially have an unexpected payoff in the future.

Historically, as the report notes, business scholarship was viewed as inferior to that in other fields, but it has gained esteem among colleagues over the past 50 or so years. In that context, the AACSB has pursued a concerted effort to define and promote the role of research in business schools. The report’s concrete recommendations also include an awards program for “high-impact” research and the promotion of links between faculty members and managers who put some of their research to use in practice.

The recommendations still have a ways to go before they become policy, however. An implementation task force is planned to look at how to turn the report into a set of workable policies, with some especially worried about how the “impact” measures would be codified. The idea, Cosier said, was to pilot some of the ideas in limited contexts before rolling them out on a wider basis.

Jensen Comment
It will almost be a joke to watch leading accountics researchers trying of show how their esoteric findings have impacted the practice world when the professors themselves cannot to point to any independent replications of their own work --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#Replication
Is the practice world so naive as to rely upon findings of scientific research that has not been replicated?

Bob Jensen's threads on assessment are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Assess.htm

February 22, 2008 reply from Ed Scribner [escribne@NMSU.EDU]

Bob,

I’d surprised to see much reaction from “accountics” researchers as they are pretty secure, especially since the report takes pains not to antagonize them. Anyway, in the words of Corporal Klinger of the 4077th MASH Unit, “It takes a lot of manure to produce one perfect rose.”

Ed

February 25, 2008 reply from Paul Williams [Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]

On 24 Feb 2008 at 14:18, David Albrecht wrote:
>
> I am struck by a seeming incongruity.
>
> On one hand there is no respect for accounting research in B-schools. On the other
> hand, publishing accounting research in peer-reviewed pubs is a requirement for AQ
> status in B-schools.
>
> More and more I am attracted to Ernest Boyer's description of multiple forms of
> scholarships and multiple outlets of scholarship.
 
Re: this conversation.
Ian Shapiro, professor of Political Science at Yale, has recently published a book "The Flight from Reality in the Human Sciences"  (Princeton U. Press, 2005) that assures that the problem is not confined to accounting (though it is more ludicrous a place for a discipline that is actually a practice).  All of the social sciences have succumbed to rational decision theory and methodological purity to the point that academe now largely deals with understanding human behavior only within a mathematically tractible unreality made real in the academy essentially because of its mathematical tractibility.  Jagdish recent post is insightful (and inciteful to the winners of this game in our academy).  The problem the US academy has defined for itself is not solvable.  Optimal information systems?  Information useful for decision making (without any consideration of the intervening "motives" (potentially infinite in number) that convert assessments into actions)?   
 
As Bob has so frequently reminded us replication is the lifeblood of science, yet we never replicate.  But we couldn't replicate if we wanted to because replication is not the point.  Anyone with a passing familiarity with laboratory sciences knows that a fundamental ethic of those sciences is the laboratory journal.  The purpose of the journal is to provide the precise recipe of the experiments so that other scientists can replicate.  All research in accounting (that is published in the "top" journals, at least) is "laboratory research."  But do capital market or principal/agent researchers maintain a log that decribes in minute detail the innumerable decisions that they made along the way in assembling and manipulating their data (as chemists and biologists are bound to do by virtue of the  research ethics of their disciplines) ?  No way.  From any published article, it is nearly impossible to actually replicate one of their experiments because the article is never sufficient documentation.  But, of course, that isn't the point. Producing politically correct academic reputations is what our enterprise is about. Ideology trumps science every time.  We don't want to know the "truth."  Sadly, this suits the profession just fine.  (It's this dream world that permits such nonsensical statements like trading off relevance for reliability -- how can I know how relevant a datum is unless I know something about its reliability?  Isn't the whole idea of science to increase the relevance of data by increasing their reliability?)

Bob Jensen's threads on the sad state of academic accounting research are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

Also see http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession


Reviving Journalism Schools and Business Schools
For as long as doomsayers have predicted the decline of civic-minded reportage as we know it, reformers have sought to draft a rewrite of the institutions that train many undergraduate and graduate students pursuing a career in journalism. Criticisms of journalism schools have ranged from questioning whether the institutions are necessary in the first place (since many journalists, and most senior ones, don’t have journalism degrees) to debating the merits of teaching practical skills versus theory and whether curriculums should emphasize broad knowledge or specialization in individual fields . . . The sessions were part of an effort to evaluate the function of journalism schools in an age of new media and the public’s declining faith in the fourth estate: the Carnegie-Knight Initiative on the Future of Journalism Education, which in 2005 enlisted top institutions in the country to bolster their curriculums with interdisciplinary studies and expose students to different areas of knowledge, including politics, economics, philosophy and the sciences. The initiative, funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation, also works with journalism schools to incubate selected students working on national reporting projects.
Andy Guess, "Reviving the J-School," Inside Higher Ed, January 10, 2008 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/01/10/jschools

There are an increasing number of scholarly videos on this topic at
BigThink:  YouTube for Scholars (where intellectuals may post their lectures on societal issues) --- http://www.bigthink.com/

Some of you may benefit by analyzing similarities and differences between the above tidbit on J-Schools versus the AACSB effort to examine needs for change in B-Schools.

Key AACSB sites include the following:

 

http://www.aacsb.edu/Resource_Centers/AME/AME report.pdf

http://www.aacsb.edu/publications/metf/metfreportfinal-august02.pdf

http://www.aacsb.edu/publications/dfc/default.asp

http://www.aacsb.edu/wxyz/hp-sdc.asp

http://www.aacsb.edu/publications/ValueReport_lores.pdf

 

From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on January 11, 2008

Talking B-School: Teaching the Gospel of Management
by Ron Alsop
The Wall Street Journal

Jan 08, 2008
Page: B4
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119974268053072925.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
 

TOPICS: Accounting, Internal Controls

SUMMARY: Professor Charles Zech, director of the Center for the study of Church Management and a professor of economics at Villanova University, discusses their new MBA program. The article mentions internal controls needed in church management practices.

CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Familiarity with specific types of MBA programs, general educational issues, and the issues of internal control evident in recent church and clergy scandals can be discussed in an introductory accounting, accounting information systems, or auditing class.

QUESTIONS: 
1.) You may have seen advertisements for MBA programs targeted to golf course or ski resort management. In general, why are different industries targeted in management education?

2.) Why did Villanova University decide to offer an MBA in church management? In what ways will Villanova target the MBA program?

3.) Not all universities may be able to offer this targeted MBA. Why not?

4.) What is transparency in financial reporting? How do examples given in the article indicate insufficient transparency in church management and reporting practices?

5.) What internal control weaknesses are identified in the article? List each weakness and describe a solution for the weakness.

6.) How do properly functioning internal controls support sufficient transparency in financial reporting?

7.) What is the concept of stewardship? How is it discussed in the objectives of financial reporting in both U.S. and international conceptual frameworks of accounting?

8.) How do the comments in the article make it clear that focusing on stewardship better fits church management than does focusing on other objectives and qualitative characteristics identified in the conceptual framework of accounting?
 

Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
 

"Teaching the Gospel of Management Program Aims to Bring Transparency To Church Business Practices," by Ron Alsop, January 8, 2008; Page B4--- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119974268053072925.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac

The reputations of many Roman Catholic parishes have been tarnished in recent years, both by the priest sex-abuse scandals and a growing number of embezzlement cases. That has prompted a burgeoning movement to improve the management and leadership skills of church officials through new programs being offered primarily at Catholic universities. M.B.A. Track columnist Ron Alsop talked recently with Charles Zech, director of the Center for the Study of Church Management and a professor of economics at Villanova University's School of Business in Villanova, Pa., about the launch of its master's degree in church management in May and the need for more sophisticated and more transparent business practices in parishes and religious organizations.

WSJ: Why did Villanova decide to create a master's degree in church management?

Dr. Zech: We find that business managers at both the parish and diocesan level often have social work, theology or education backgrounds and lack management skills. While pastors aren't expected to know all the nitty-gritty of running a small business, they at least need enough training in administration to supervise their business managers. Before starting the degree, we ran some seminars in 2006 and 2007 as a trial balloon to see if folks were interested enough to pay for management education. The seminars proved to be quite popular, drawing people from all over the country, including high-level officials from both Catholic dioceses and religious orders.

How have the sexual-abuse scandals and embezzlement cases put a spotlight on poor management and governance practices?

The Catholic Church has some real managerial problems that were brought to light by the clergy abuse scandals. It became quite obvious that the church isn't very transparent and accountable in its finances. Settlements had been made off the books with abuse victims and priests had been sent off quietly for counseling, to the surprise of many parishioners. Then came a string of embezzlement cases. Our center on church management surveyed chief financial officers of U.S. Catholic dioceses in 2005 and found that 85% had experienced embezzlements in the previous five years. One of our recommendations was that parishes be audited once a year by an independent auditor. There clearly are serious questions about internal financial controls at the parish level, and we are now doing research on parish advisory councils and asking questions about such things as who handles the Sunday collection and who has check-writing authority. Does the same person count the collection, deposit the money and then reconcile the checkbook? Obviously, you're just asking for problems if it's the same person; you can imagine the temptations.

Beyond the need for better financial controls, what other management issues should get more attention from church leaders?

Performance management is definitely an important but neglected area. That's partly because it's a very touchy issue. Who is going to appraise the performance of a priest or a church worker who is also a member of the parish? There's great reluctance on the part of the clergy to be appraiser or appraisee. You have to view the parish as a family business and understand that it's like evaluating members of your family.

How will Villanova's church management degree be different from what other universities have started offering?

Some schools combine standard business classes with courses from theology and other departments. But if you're taking a regular M.B.A. finance class, you're learning about Wall Street and other things that aren't really relevant. What we're doing is creating courses specifically for this degree program, so there are both business and faith-based elements in every class. For example, the law course will deal with civil law relative to church law so students understand the possible conflicts. The accounting course will cover internal financial-control issues for churches. And the human-resource management class will include discussion of volunteers, a big part of the labor force for parishes.

Have you encountered any resistance from church officials?

Yes, some people say a church is not a business. But I point out that we still have to be good stewards of our resources -- our financial and human capital -- to carry out God's work on Earth. When you use management terms with bishops, they often get turned off. But when you use the word stewardship, it has more impact because it's in the Bible. Jesus talked about the importance of our being good stewards who take care of our talents and other gifts.

Is the degree restricted to Catholic clergy and lay managers?

The courses will have a Catholic focus because as a Catholic university, our mission is to try to meet the needs of our community. But the degree is certainly not restricted to Catholics. Every church has similar managerial problems. In fact, we're eager for other Christian denominations to become part of the program and provide some valuable contributions to class discussions. A typical course, however, would not apply to other religions because of the different way Christian churches are organized compared with synagogues and other religious institutions.

Why is the degree being offered primarily online, with only a one-week residency on campus?

Since we view the market for church-management education as national and even global, a distance-learning degree will attract clergy and church workers from any part of the world who can't take off for two years to come to Villanova. In fact, we already have heard from a priest in Ireland and a Presbyterian minister in Cameroon interested in enrolling in the program.

The church management degree costs $23,400. How can clergy and church workers afford it?

We expect the vast majority of students to be supported by a diocese or other religious or social service organizations. We will chop 25% off the price for anyone who can get their organization to pay a third of the tuition. That cuts a student's out-of-pocket costs by about half. We're trying to send the message to religious leaders that this is important and that they should invest in management training.

Bob Jensen's threads on controversies in higher education are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm


"The Theory Fetish: Too Much of a Good Thing? Management journals demand contributions to theory. But slavish devotion to theory inhibits other valuable research," by Donald C. Hambrick, Business Week, January 13, 2008 --- Click Here 

Recently I was at a brown-bag seminar where a pair of faculty colleagues in our business school's department of management sought advice about a preliminary research idea. We all quickly agreed that their research question was fascinating and would be of great interest to both academics and practicing managers. The only problem: The presenters had no theory.

No theory! Everyone knows that the top scholarly journals in management require without exception that manuscripts make contributions to theory. And so we spent the entire session that day going through our collective mental catalogues of theories. Theories that I'd never heard of were proposed. Things got a little frenzied: "Good God, there must be a theory that we can latch onto," someone said.

Losing the Trees for the Forest

Because these researchers are savvy about academic publishing, their project likely will appear some day in a leading journal. But the straightforward beauty of the original research idea will probably be largely lost. In its place will be what we too often see in our journals and what undoubtedly puts non-scholars off: a contorted, misshapen, inelegant product, in which an inherently interesting phenomenon has been subjugated to an ill-fitting theoretical framework.

Many nice things can be said about theory. Theories help us organize our thoughts, generate coherent explanations, and improve our predictions. But they are not ends in themselves, and in academic management we have allowed obsession with theory to compromise the larger goal of understanding. Most important, perhaps, it prevents the reporting of rich detail about interesting phenomena for which no theory yet exists but which, once reported, might stimulate the search for an explanation.

Happily, our sister disciplines in business education—accounting, finance, and marketing—are not afflicted to the extent that those of us in management are. But the breadth and variety of the subjects that fall under the category of management exceed those of the other business school academic departments; a number of MBA-granting institutions, in fact, call themselves schools of management. If management scholars fail to connect with real-life managers or management scholarship is shrugged off by managers as irrelevant—both of which happen with regularity—the credibility of all business academe suffers.

Management's idolization of theory began after two blue-ribbon reports of the late 1950s, from the Carnegie and Ford foundations, levied withering attacks on business schools for their lack of academic sophistication. As a result, in the 1960s and 1970s schools adopted a new commitment to drawing from basic academic disciplines (e.g., economics and psychology), and to analytic rigor, science, and—above all—theory. Since then, however, other fields have relaxed their single-mindedness about theory, while management scholars have not.

Trapped in Inertia?

To confirm this, I recently analyzed the 120 articles published in 2005 by three leading scholarly management journals—the Academy of Management Journal, the Administrative Science Quarterly, and Organization Science. Every one contained some variation of the word "theory." In contrast, only 78% of the 178 articles published in 2005 in the Journal of Marketing, the Journal of Finance, and Accounting Review contained those words. Moreover, they appeared 18 times, on average, in each management article, but only eight times, on average, in each non-management article. Finally, about two-thirds of the articles in the management journals had section headings that trumpeted "theory," compared with one in five headings in the non-management journals.

I must admit to uncertainty about the reason for this continuing fetish; perhaps we in management academe are simply trapped in our own inertia. But at what a cost! To illustrate, let me take a hypothetical case from another field that has nothing to do with management or business.

Continued in article

 

Great Minds in Management:  The Process of Theory Development --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/GreatMinds.htm

"Cornell Theory Center Aids Social Science Researchers," PR Web, June 19, 2006 --- http://www.prweb.com/releases/2006/6/prweb400160.htm

Bob Jensen’s threads on the schism between academic research and the business world --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession


Question
Given the dire shortages of doctoral students in accountancy, should the requirement for doctoral degrees be eliminated in higher education?

Perhaps I'm old and tired, but I always think that the chances of finding out what really is going on are so absurdly remote that the only thing to do is to say hang the sense of it and just keep yourself occupied.
Douglas Adams

There are two explanations one can give for this state of affairs here. The first is due to the great English economist Maurice Dobb according to whom the theory of value was replaced in the United States by theory of price. May be, the consequence for us today is that we know the price of everything but perhaps the value of nothing. Economics divorced from politics and philosophy is vacuous. In accounting, we have inherited the vacuousness by ignoring those two enduring areas of inquiry.
Professor Jagdish Gangolly, SUNY Albany

The second is the comment that Joan Robinson made about American Keynsians: that their theories were so flimsy that they had to put math into them. In accounting academia, the shortest path to respectability seems to be to use math (and statistics), whether meaningful or not.
Professor Jagdish Gangolly, SUNY Albany

There are two sides to nearly every profession (as opposed to a narrow trade). The first one is the clinical side, and the second one is the research side. But this is not to say that the twain do not meet.

I advocate requiring that most (maybe not all) clinical instructors be grounded solidly in research. Requiring a PhD is a traditional way to get groundings in research. Probably more importantly is that doctoral studies are ways to motivate clinically-minded students to attempt to do research on clinical issues and make important contributions to the practicing profession.

I define “research” as a contribution to new knowledge. Among other things a good doctoral program should make scholars more appreciative of good research and critical of bad/superficial research that does not contribute to much of anything that is relevant, including research that should get Senator William Proxmire's  Golden Fleece Awards. Like urban cowboys, our academic accounting researchers are all hat (mathematical/statistical models) with no cows.

The problem with accountancy doctoral programs is that they’ve become narrowly bounded by accountics (especially econometrics and psychometrics) that in the past three decades have made little progress toward helping the clinical side of our profession of accountancy. This makes our doctoral programs very much unlike those in economics, finance, medicine, science, and engineering where many clinical advances in their disciplines have emerged from studies in doctoral programs.

The problem with higher education in accountancy is not that we require doctoral degrees in our major colleges and universities. The problem is that our doctoral programs shut out research methodologies that are perhaps better suited for making research discoveries that really help the clinical side of our profession. Accountics models just do not deal well with missing variables and nonstationarities that must be allowed for on the clinical side of accountancy. Humanities researchers face many of these same issues and have evolved a much broader arsenal of research methodologies that are verboten in accounting doctoral programs --- (See below).

The related problem is that our leading scholars running those doctoral programs have taken a supercilious view of the clinical side of our profession. Or maybe it’s just that these leaders do not want to take the time and trouble to learn the clinical side of the profession. Once again I repeat the oft-quoted referee of an Accounting Horizons rejection of Denny Beresford’s 2005 submission

I quote from http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession

*************
1. The paper provides specific recommendations for things that accounting academics should be doing to make the accounting profession better. However (unless the author believes that academics' time is a free good) this would presumably take academics' time away from what they are currently doing. While following the author's advice might make the accounting profession better, what is being made worse? In other words, suppose I stop reading current academic research and start reading news about current developments in accounting standards. Who is made better off and who is made worse off by this reallocation of my time? Presumably my students are marginally better off, because I can tell them some new stuff in class about current accounting standards, and this might possibly have some limited benefit on their careers. But haven't I made my colleagues in my department worse off if they depend on me for research advice, and haven't I made my university worse off if its academic reputation suffers because I'm no longer considered a leading scholar? Why does making the accounting profession better take precedence over everything else an academic does with their time?
**************

Joel Demski steers us away from the clinical side of the accountancy profession by saying we should avoid that pesky “vocational virus.” (See below).

The (Random House) dictionary defines "academic" as "pertaining to areas of study that are not primarily vocational or applied , as the humanities or pure mathematics." Clearly, the short answer to the question is no, accounting is not an academic discipline.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline?" Accounting Horizons, June 2007, pp. 153-157

 

Statistically there are a few youngsters who came to academia for the joy of learning, who are yet relatively untainted by the vocational virus. I urge you to nurture your taste for learning, to follow your joy. That is the path of scholarship, and it is the only one with any possibility of turning us back toward the academy.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline? American Accounting Association Plenary Session" August 9, 2006 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm

Too many accountancy doctoral programs have immunized themselves against the “vocational virus.” The problem lies not in requiring doctoral degrees in our leading colleges and universities. The problem is that we’ve been neglecting the clinical needs of our profession. Perhaps the real underlying reason is that our clinical problems are so immense that academic accountants quake in fear of having to make contributions to the clinical side of accountancy as opposed to the clinical side of finance, economics, and psychology.

Our problems with doctoral programs in accountancy are shared with other disciplines, notably education and nursing schools.
Bob Jensen's threads on controversies in higher education are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm


Linking Research and Teaching in History: Case Studies --- http://www.hca.heacademy.ac.uk/resources/case_Studies/snas/index.php

Linking Research and Teaching in History For academic historians the link between research and teaching is regarded as an integral part of the provision of a high-quality history education: vital to teachers and students and to the ongoing health of the discipline.

These resources have been compiled as part of a Higher Education Academy project on linking teaching and research in the disciplines. The project's aim is to provide case-studies of existing practice alongside a review essay considering the nature of the research-teaching relationship in each discipline. Whilst the resources are intended in the first instance for new members of academic staff, they will be of interest to anyone who wishes to reflect on the research-teaching nexus in History and the ways in which academic historians have translated this in the context of their teaching.

Our Subject Centre is very keen to build upon this collection of case-studies. We would welcome further contributions so that we can create a resource for our community that reflects the importance of this topic and the wealth of experience that historians have in linking their research and teaching at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels.

Jensen Comment
The above site may be of interest to the accounting academy for a number of reasons:

 


Question
Is accounting an "academic" discipline?

The (Random House) dictionary defines "academic" as "pertaining to areas of study that are not primarily vocational or applied , as the humanities or pure mathematics." Clearly, the short answer to the question is no, accounting is not an academic discipline.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline?" Accounting Horizons, June 2007, pp. 153-157

Statistically there are a few youngsters who came to academia for the joy of learning, who are yet relatively untainted by the vocational virus. I urge you to nurture your taste for learning, to follow your joy. That is the path of scholarship, and it is the only one with any possibility of turning us back toward the academy.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline? American Accounting Association Plenary Session" August 9, 2006 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm

Jensen Comment
Joel's lament is a bit confusing since for the past four decades, virtually all doctoral programs have replaced accounting professional content with mathematics, statistics, econometrics, psychometrics, and sociometrics content to a fault and to a point where very few accountants are interested in applying for accountancy doctoral programs --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

The decline in doctoral program graduates (to less than 100 per year in the United States) combined with the scientific requirements for publication in leading academic accounting research journals resulted in the academy serving the accountancy profession less and less over the past few decades:

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/03MainDocumentMar2007.htm

It would help if Joel would be more explicit about what types of basic "academic" research studies qualify as "accounting research" and why there is virtually none of it being produced according to his paper and his address to the AAA membership in August 2006. In particular, I would like to know what types of academic "accounting" publications set academic accounting apart from mathematical economics and mathematics disciplines such that these basic research contributions can still be called "accounting" research that is not applied (in the sense of his definition of "academic" research as not being applied).

Following Joel's paper is a paper by the same title "is Accounting an Academic Discipline?" by John C. Fellingham, Accounting Horizons, June 2007, pp. 159-163. John features the following quotation from Henry Rand Hatfield in 1924:

I am sure that all of us who teach accounting in the university suffer from the implied contempt of our colleagues, who look upon accounting as an intruder, a Saul among the prophets, a paria whose very presence detracts somewhat from the sanctity of the academic halls.
Henry Rand Hatfield, "An Historical Defense of Bookkeeping," Journal of Accountancy, 1924.

I consider this quotation to be inappropriate in 2007. Professor Hatfield was referring to the teaching of bookkeeping which is no longer the mundane vocational subject matter of college accounting in the past fifty or more years. I consider most of what we now teach in college accountancy to be very appropriate in service to the accountancy profession. You can read more about accounting education in Hatfield's time in the following historic papers:

Allen, C. E. (1927), "The growth of accounting instruction since 1900," The Accounting Review (June): 150-166 ---
http://maaw.info/TheAccountingReview.htm Click on the "Non USF User Link"

Atkins, P. M. (1928), "University instruction in industrial cost accounting," The Accounting Review,"  (December): 345-363 --- http://maaw.info/TheAccountingReview.htm  Click on the "Non USF User Link"

Atkins, P. M. (1929), "University instruction in industrial cost accounting,"  The Accounting Review (March): 23-32 ---
http://maaw.info/TheAccountingReview.htm  Click on the "Non USF User Link"

I guess what I'm really trying to say is that accountancy is a profession like law is a profession, medicine is a profession, architecture is a profession, engineering is a profession, pharmacy is a profession, etc. Why does the academy need to apologize for teaching to the profession of accountancy when in fact the academy is very proud to serve those other highly esteemed professions. I do not see schools of law and schools of medicine apologizing to the world for nobly serving those professions.

Both Demski and Fellingham made emotional appeals for academic accounting researchers to make noteworthy contributions to the "true academic disciplines" as quoted by Fellingham on Page 163. Not only should this be a goal, but in a sense they are arguing that this should be a primary goal far above the goal of serving the accountancy profession. I fail to note similar appeals being made by professors of law and medicine and engineering. These professions do distinguish between clinical versus research publications and teaching, but in general they do not further glorify their research if it cannot conceivably have some relevance to their professions. Indeed, even the most basic chemical and physiological research in medicine still takes place with an eye toward eventual relevance to human health.

I might also note that both law and medicine also publish some academic research that is not based upon esoteric mathematics and statistics. For example, historical and philosophical research methodologies are still allowed in their most prestigious academic law and science journals, which currently is not the case for leading academic accounting research journals.

By way of example, since Joel Demski took charge of the accounting doctoral program at the University of Florida, every applicant to that doctoral program cannot even matriculate into the program before pre-requisites of advanced mathematics are satisfied.

Students are required to demonstrate math competency prior to matriculating the doctoral program. Each student's background will be evaluated individually, and guidance provided on ways a student can ready themselves prior to beginning the doctoral course work. There are opportunities to complete preparatory course work at the University of Florida prior to matriculating our doctoral program. 
University of Florida Accounting Concentration  --- http://www.cba.ufl.edu/fsoa/docs/phd_AccConcentration.pdf

Why does every candidate have to qualify in advanced mathematics rather than allowing substitutes such as advanced philosophy or advanced legal studies?

I might also add that science and medicine academic journals also still place monumental priorities on replications of research findings. Leading academic accounting research journals will not even publish replications and mostly as a result it is very difficult to find replications of most of the top academic accounting research papers published by so-called leading accounting researchers --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Replication

More of my rants on this can be found in the following links:

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/03MainDocumentMar2007.htm


Question
Are college students good surrogates for real life studies?
The majority of behavioral experiments in accounting have used students as experimental subjects.

"Too Many Studies Use College Students As Their Guinea Pigs," by Carl Bialik, The Wall Street Journal, August 10, 2007; Page B1--- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118670089203393577.html?mod=todays_us_marketplace

Many of the numbers that make news about how we feel, think and behave are derived from studying a narrow population: college students. It's cheap for social scientists to tap into the on-campus research pool -- everyone from psychology majors who must participate in studies for course credit to students who respond to posters promising a few bucks if they sign up.

Consider just three studies that have received press in the past month. In one, muscular men were twice as likely as their less well-built brethren to have had more than three sex partners -- at least according to 99 UCLA undergraduates. Another, an examination of six separate studies that tape-recorded college students' conversations, found that women, despite being stereotyped as relatively chatty, spoke just 3% more words each day than men. And in the third, 40 undergraduates at Washington University in St. Louis were 6% more likely to complete verbal jokes and 14% more likely to complete visual jests than 41 older study participants.

College students are "essentially free," says Brian Nosek, a psychology professor at the University of Virginia. "We walk out of our office, and there they are." The epitome of a convenience sample, they have become the basis for what some critics call the "science of the sophomore."

But psychologists may be getting what they pay for. College students aren't representative by age, wealth, income, educational level or geographic location. "What if you studied 7-year-old kids and made inferences about geriatrics?" asks Robert Peterson, a marketing professor at the University of Texas, Austin. "Everyone would say you can't do that. But you can use these college students."

Prof. Peterson scoured the literature for examples of studies that examined the same psychological relationships in students and nonstudents. In almost half of the 63 relationships he examined, there were major discrepancies between students and nonstudents: The two groups either produced contradictory results, or one showed an effect at least twice as great as the other.

In a follow-up study, not yet published, Prof. Peterson demonstrated that even college students are far from homogeneous. With help from faculty at 58 schools in 31 states, he surveyed undergraduate business students across the country and found that they vary widely from school to school. That means a professor studying the relationship between students' attitudes toward capitalism and business ethics at one school could reach a sharply different conclusion than a professor at another school.

"People have always been aware of this issue," Prof. Peterson says, but many have chosen to ignore it. A 1986 paper by David Sears, a UCLA psychology professor, documented the increased use of college students for research in the prior quarter century and explored the potential biases that might introduce. In the meantime, the use of college students has, if anything, risen, researchers say.

Authors of the recent studies on sex, chattiness and humor acknowledge the limitations of their research pool. But they argue that college students do just fine for purposes of studying basic cognitive processes. Others agree. "If you think all people have the same attitudes as introductory psychology students, that's really problematic," says Tony Bogaert, a psychology professor at Brock University in St. Catharines, Ontario. "But if you're looking at cognitive processes, intro psych students probably work OK."

After all, every study is hampered by possible differences between those who volunteer to participate and those who don't, whether they're college students or a broader group.

In any case, the fault often lies not with the researchers, who are careful not to overstate the impact of their findings, but with the news articles suggesting the numbers apply to all humanity. "Even if you only focus on college students, the results are still generalizable to millions of Americans," says David Frederick, a UCLA psychology graduate student and lead author of the study on muscularity and sex partners.

Prof. Nosek, a critic of the science of the sophomore, responds that college students are still developing their personalities and behavior. "There is no other time outside my life as an undergraduate where I thought it would be a good idea to wear all my clothes inside out," he says, or to "stay up for as many hours in a row as I could just to see what happens."

To widen the pool of people answering questions about, say, all-nighters, Prof. Nosek has submitted a proposal to the National Institutes of Health to fund the creation of an international, online research panel. That would build on studies his laboratory has already administered online at ProjectImplicit.net.

Online research has its own problems, but at least it taps into the hundreds of millions of people who are online globally, rather than just the hundreds of people enrolled in Psych 101.

"The scientific reward structure does not benefit someone who puts in the enormous effort" to create a representative research sample, Prof. Nosek says. "The way to change researchers' data habits is to make it easier to collect data in a more generalizable way."


Question
When should professors add practitioners to their courses?

"Mixing Theory and Practice on Defense Policy," by Andy Guess, Inside Higher Ed, August 8, 2007 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/08/08/defense

In a class about United Nations regulations on the laws of war, the discussion turned inevitably to Star Trek.

When the U.N. authorizes sanctions against a particular nation, said Ilan Berman, the professor, the institution acts much like the Borg — in the show’s universe, a mechanized force of cyborg mercenaries bent on assimilating all of mankind. The analogy was lost on most of the class, but Berman drove the point home for those who didn’t regularly tune in to syndicated science fiction programs in the early 1990s: Each member nation must act as part of the collective.

The lecture, peppered as it was with the occasional pop culture reference, covered a lot of ground, from the U.S. national security strategy to the justifications for nations’ use of force. The students in the class — five were present on a Monday night in July for the elective — come from a range of backgrounds, several of them working full-time, but all in the program with an eye toward defense policy, whether in the government, consulting or think tanks.

In Washington, those are hardly unorthodox goals. Programs in defense or security studies churn out students every year in the nation’s capital, from well-known and respected institutions such as Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, and also outside the Beltway at places like Harvard (Kennedy) and Princeton (Wilson). The students in Berman’s class, tucked in a conference room on the seventh floor of a corporate office building in Fairfax, Va., are part of a relatively new experiment: What if a state school in Springfield, Mo., operated a satellite campus alongside the established players in defense studies?

So far, enrollments have been growing each year since the unit opened shop in 2005 within commuting distance from the city, sandwiched between a rapidly developing apartment complex and an office park. The Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, a part of Missouri State University, caters to students who want to break into Beltway defense circles with a public university price tag and the advantages of a more practical approach. In doing so, it offers a two-year M.S. degree that requires both coursework and internships.

Having access to actual practitioners in the classroom means, in this case, connections to defense and foreign policy officials in the government. As with others like it, the program has had a long revolving-doors tradition, starting from its original incarnation in the early 1970s at the University of Southern California, where it was founded by a former defense official who served on the SALT I delegation, William R. Van Cleave, and partially funded by the free-market Earhart Foundation. But unlike at similar departments elsewhere, Missouri State’s full-time faculty of three and its nine affiliated lecturers tend to come mainly from positions in Republican administrations and conservative-leaning institutions.

Continued in article

Jensen Comment
Some years back Professor Sharon Lightner (UC at San Diego) put together a really interesting online course for students, practitioners, and accounting standard setters in six different countries where the classes met synchronously.
"An Innovative Online International Accounting Course on Six Campuses Around the World" --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/255light.htm


Question
Does faculty research improve student learning in the classrooms where researchers teach?
Put another way, is research more important than scholarship that does not contribute to new knowledge?

Major Issue
If the answer leans toward scholarship over research, it could monumentally change criteria for tenure in many colleges and universities.

AACSB International: the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business, has released for comment a report calling for the accreditation process for business schools to evaluate whether faculty research improves the learning process. The report expresses the concern that accreditors have noted the volume of research, but not whether it is making business schools better from an educational standpoint.
Inside Higher Ed, August 6, 2007 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/08/06/qt

"Controversial Report on Business School Research Released for Comments," AACSB News Release, August 3, 2007 --- http://www.aacsb.edu/Resource_Centers/Research/media_release-8-3-07.pdf

FL (August 3, 2007) ― A report released today evaluates the nature and purposes of business school research and recommends steps to increase its value to students, practicing managers and society. The report, issued by the Impact of Research task force of AACSB International, is released as a draft to solicit comments and feedback from business schools, their faculties and others. The report includes recommendations that could profoundly change the way business schools organize, measure, and communicate about research.

AACSB International, the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business, estimates that each year accredited business schools spend more than $320 million to support faculty research and another half a billion dollars supports research-based doctoral education.

“Research is now reflected in nearly everything business schools do, so we must find better ways to demonstrate the impact of our contributions to advancing management theory, practice and education” says task force chair Joseph A. Alutto, of The Ohio State University. “But quality business schools are not and should not be the same; that’s why the report also proposes accreditation changes to strengthen the alignment of research expectations to individual school missions.”

The task force argues that a business school cannot separate itself from management practice and still serve its function, but it cannot be so focused on practice that it fails to develop rigorous, independent insights that increase our understanding of organizations and management. Accordingly, the task force recommends building stronger interactions between academic researchers and practicing managers on questions of relevance and developing new channels that make quality academic research more accessible to practice.

According to AACSB President and CEO John J. Fernandes, recommendations in this report have the potential to foster a new generation of academic research. “In the end,” he says, “it is a commitment to scholarship that enables business schools to best serve the future needs of business and society through quality management education.”

The Impact of Research task force report draft for comments is available for download on the AACSB website: www.aacsb.edu/research. The website also provides additional resources related to the issue and the opportunity to submit comments on the draft report. The AACSB Committee on Issues in Management Education and Board of Directors will use the feedback to determine the next steps for implementation.

The AACSB International Impact of Research Task Force
Chairs:
Joseph A. Alutto, interim president, and
John W. Berry, Senior Chair in Business, Max M. FisherCollege of Business, The Ohio State University

K. C. Chan, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Richard A. Cosier, Purdue University
Thomas G. Cummings, University of Southern California
Ken Fenoglio, AT&T
Gabriel Hawawini, INSEAD and the University of Pennsylvania
Cynthia H. Milligan, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Myron Roomkin, Case Western Reserve University
Anthony J. Rucci, The Ohio State University

Teaching Excellence Secondary to Research for Promotion, Tenure, and Pay ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm#TeachingVsResearch

Bob Jensen's threads on higher education controversies are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm


My letter to Kate

Now that the 2007 Annual Meetings are ended and it is public information that finance professor Erik Lie (University of Iowa) won the AICPA/AAA Notable Contributions to Accounting Literature Award, I feel compelled to make my letter to Kate written on May 17 public. This year I served on the Part 2 selection committee that chose Erik Lie from the list of candidates submitted to us by the Part 1 Screening Committee. Professor Lie's contribution was truly notable and deserving of this award for 2007.

But I have serious reservations about the Part 1 Screening Committee's choices over the past two decades. I think it's been a rigged game in which the Part 2 Selection Committee has no choice but to choose an esoteric "accountics" article published in an academic research journal.

My letter to Kate is entirely consistent with the long tidbit below received from Paul Williams on August 10, 2007 after the AAA 2007 Annual Meetings in Chicago. Kate was chair of our 2007 Selection Committee but not the 2007 Screening Committee.

You can read my letter to Kate http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2007NotableLiteratureAward.htm

 

An important aspect of this debate is the timing of the fall off of practitioner interest in academic accounting research. Both public and managerial accountants at one time followed very closely the theory and practice research of academic accountants much like lawyers take an interest in law school research, physicians take an interest in medical research, engineers take an interest in engineering school research, etc. We had it made until the 1960s. Then accounting practitioner interest in our research virtually zeroed out in the ensuing decades. We no longer serve our profession, although we try and try to make a contribution to the economics and finance professions. Joel Demski in a plenary speech in Washington DC called serving the accounting profession a “vocational virus” to avoid so that doing research can be “more fun.” As Judy Rayburn pointed out when she was President Elect of the AAA, the citation records indicate that there is little interest by anybody, including finance and economics professor, in our leading accountics research.

I think the telltale turning point was when accountics professors took over the refereeing of articles in the leading accounting research journals in the 1960s and 1970s. Before then practitioners took a keen interest in both our top journals like The Accounting Review and our sessions/debates at AAA annual meetings. Between 1925 and 1965 practitioners published articles in TAR and had more members in the AAA than did colleges. In fact the longest running editor (Kohler) of TAR was a practitioner --- http://fisher.osu.edu/departments/accounting-and-mis/the-accounting-hall-of-fame/membership-in-hall/eric-louis-kohler/  

Now practitioner participation in the AAA is virtually zero except for PR partners and PR staff employees of large firms. How long has it been since a practitioner published/cited a paper in TAR or Accounting Horizons?

It’s very revealing to compare the titles and authors of papers published in TAR between 1925 and 1965 versus those published 1966-2008. Zeff and Granof claim that leading published research was just more interesting before the 1960s.

You can read more about the “Perfect Storm” of the 1960s that ended practitioner interest in leading academic accounting research at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm

The FASB now sees little interest in even keeping an academic on the Board. I’m sure Katherine and Tom did their best, but we did not give them enough good material to bring to the Board.

An Analysis of the Contributions of The Accounting Review Across 80 Years: 1926-2005 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
Co-authored with Jean Heck and forthcoming in the December 2007 edition of the Accounting Historians Journal.

Bob Jensen's threads on the sad state of academic accounting research --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession


David Dennis organized a discussion panel to address the state of academic research in accounting. I could not be at the AAA meetings this year. But Paul Williams was on the panel and sent out the following message to panel members.

Paul Williams (North Carolina State University) Weighs in Once Again on the Sad State of Accounting Research in the Academy. Paul gave me permission to post his email message to the panel members.

August 10, 2007 message from Paul Williams [Paul_Williams@ncsu.edu]

It is a source of constant frustration that there exists reams of "empirical evidence" that the US academy is as we trouble makers say it is.  For folks who claim to worship empirical evidence there is a great reluctance to consider it.  Jacci Rodgers and I have another paper that you didn't include that was published in The Accounting Historians Journal that dealt with authors during the same period of time as our editors' paper. 

We did a comparison of elite school graduates appearances as authors in TAR (The Accounting Review) with their proportion in the population of North American PhDs (a procedure that was biased in that it overstates the proportion of elite graduates who were in the effective population of people of publishing age).  In Table 3 of that paper we report the proportion of appearance by elite grads and their proportion of the total North American PhD population at the beginnning of each TAR editor's term starting with

Trumball, the first editor to have a published editorial board, the first number is proportion of appearances and the second is proportion of PhDs:

Editor
Trumball:         63.6/63.5

Griffin:             71.3/59.6

Hendrickson:    75/53.7

Keller:              61.1/50.3

Decoster:         63/45.2

Zeff:                 51.9/43.1

Sundem:            47.1/38

Kinney:             50.6/34.7

Abdel-khalik:     56.6/33

 

Through Zeff and Sundems' editorships we start to see the effects of the emergence of the many new doctoral programs that were created during the 1970s.  The dilution of elite school dominance proceeded apace through time as the elite became a smaller proportion of the total population.  I had a paper accepted in TAR by both Zeff and Sundem: both experiences were good.  Both Zeff and Sundem were open-minded and quite helpful during the process; the reviews were constructive. 

But this expected demographically induced trend dramatically reversed itself after Sundem's editorship.  Since that time the elite appearances among authors has hovered, Avogadro's number-like around the mid-60 percent mark -- the proportion that prevailed when Trumball was editor.  All of a sudden the virtues of scholarship that Zeff and Sundem were able to recognize in the work of people not trained at elite schools as conventional economists disappeared.  The ideologues took over by default because of TAR's fear of losing so much reputational ground to JAR and JAE.  TAR became a JAR and JAE clone.  It hasn't changed since. 

So why doesn't Bill McCarthy get enough good systems papers? Perhaps it's because we haven't been terribly interested, for nearly 25 years, in training in U.S. PhD programs people who could do quality systems, or sociological, or historical, or legal, or anthropological work in accounting.  As Jagdish Gangolly noted on the AECM, finance types reproduce like mosquitoes, but it is a struggle for anyone interested in some "causal delta" other than neoclassical economics to find a place to study. 

Today, with the exception of a couple of places, you have to go outside the United States.  Why submit a paper to TAR when the editorial process is not one to be trusted?  Those of us who have been in the AAA a long time have heard these promises of "inclusiveness" before.  They were hot air then, they're hot air now unless the TAR editorial process is willing to take a laxative and publish some papers that may not be the best (there are an awful lot of "main-stream" papers published that aren't very good, either). 

TAR has to signal it isn't telling us another fib and that involves more than just passively sitting around waiting for papers to come.  Trust has been lost and you won't get it back by chastising the mistrustful.  Wouldn't it be refreshing to see someone from the editorial board show up at conferences like IPA, APIRA, CPA, . . . etc. to press the flesh and find out what the rest of the world thinks?

It is perhaps not a coincidence that the only two papers ever published in TAR informed by critical literature (papers by Chua and Hines) were ushered through the review process by Sundem.  Nothing of that kind has ever appeared in TAR since. 

Even JAR published a paper by Peter Miller!

David: kudos on your item 8.  As the U.S. has become the O.E.C.D. country with the most skewed distribution of income and wealth and as our great experiment in democracy appears more and more each day to be less and less robust (see Prem Sikka's work on the extensiveness of accounting corruption), we get a scholarly community primarily fixated on individual career enhancement through the engineering of a linear model with an R-squared of seldom double digits explaining yet some other absurdity about why Nozickian justice is the sine qua non of human  existence.  

I have seen literally  thousands of those models over the years and no two have ever born any resemblance to each other. 

What kind of "models" are really only unique representations of themselves?  Thank you for organizing the panel and allowing me to participate. 

Paul

 Paul Williams

paul_williams@ncsu.edu

(919)515-4436


The Financial Accounting Standards Board recently approached Bloomfield about studying how to create financial accounting standards that will assist investors as much as possible, he quickly turned to the virtual world for answers.

"Theory Meets Practice Online: Researchers and academics are looking to online worlds such as Second Life to shed new light on old economic questions," by Francesca Di Meglio, Business Week, July 24, 2007 --- Click Here 

In fact, many economics researchers, including Bloomfield, professor of accounting at Cornell's Johnson Graduate School of Management, are using the virtual environment to test ideas involving staples of economics such as game theory, the effects of regulation, and issues involving money. Since 1989, Bloomfield has been running experiments in the lab in which he creates small game economies to study narrow issues. But when the Financial Accounting Standards Board recently approached Bloomfield about studying how to create financial accounting standards that will assist investors as much as possible, he quickly turned to the virtual world for answers.

"It would be very difficult to look at the complex issues that FASB is trying to address with eight people in a laboratory playing a very simple economic game," he says. "I started looking for how I could create a more realistic economy with more players dealing with a high degree of complexity. It didn't take me long to realize that people in virtual worlds are already doing just that."

. . .

At Indiana University, researcher Edward Castronova has posed the idea of creating multiple virtual economies to study the effects of different regulatory policies. At Indiana, Castronova is director of the Synthethic Worlds Initiative, a research center to study virtual worlds. "The opportunity is to conduct controlled research experiments at the level of all society, something social scientists have never been able to do before," the center's Web site notes (see BusinessWeek.com, 5/1/06, "Virtual World, Virtual Economies").

A virtual stock market is certainly not the only online entity that opens itself up to research. Marketers are already using the virtual world to test campaigns, packaging, and consumer satisfaction. Pepsi (PEP) famously tracks use of its products in There.com. Architects seek reaction to design. Starwood Hotels (HOT) test-marketed its new loft designs in Second Life (see BusinessWeek.com, 8/23/06, "Starwood Hotels Explore Second Life First").

Continued in article

Bob Jensen's threads on tools and tricks of the trade are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/000aaa/thetools.htm


Summarizing Academic Accounting Research for Practitioners

April 14, 2007 message from Ron Huefner [rhuefner@acsu.buffalo.edu]

The Journal of Accountancy (AICPA) has begun a new series of articles to review accounting research papers and explain them to practitioners. The April issue has an article on "Mining Auditing Research."

It summarizes about a dozen research articles, mostly from The Accounting Review, but also including articles from JAR, CAR, AOS, and the European Accounting Review.

The link for this article is: <http://aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/apr2007/boltlee.htm

This may be useful in bringing research findings into classes

Ron


March 2007 Updates on the Sad State of Accounting Research in Academe --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession

Nearly two years ago I sent out an "Appeal" for accounting educators, researchers, and practitioners to actively support what I call The Accounting Review (TAR) Diversity Initiative as initiated by last year's American Accounting Association President Judy Rayburn --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR.htm

In it I noted that a bright ray of hope for changing narrow focus of The Accounting Review (TAR) was the appointment of Bill McCarthy as Associate Editor for purposes of introducing Accounting Information Systems research into TAR.

I now have an expanded paper written in partnership with Jean Heck --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR\03MainDocumentMar2007.htm
The MS Word version is at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR\395wp.doc
This paper is forthcoming in the December 2007 edition of the Accounting Historians Journal

March 27, 2007 message from McCarthy, William [mccarthy@BUS.MSU.EDU]

This thread and other AECM posts regarding information technology research in accounting casts a grim picture for people who wish to do computer science related work aimed at the major accounting academic journals. This has been an "us vs. them" problem for most of my 30 years in AIS research.

While it is indeed true that JAR, JAE, and the other private accounting journals remain in the Stone Age as far as accounting technology issues are concerned, there have been significant steps taken by TAR to open up the main AAA journal to this kind of work. Dan Dhaliwal appointed me as an editor with the express purpose of having a person knowledgeable in information systems and computer science research methods available to the AIS research community for manuscript review and decision-making.

Surprisingly, as I have outlined at both the sectional and national AAA meetings, the problem has not been as much with "them" as it has been with "us," at least in the last 15 months or so. Quite simply, the number of AIS submissions to TAR has been alarmingly low. In Washington last August, I set a target of 12-18 for the AIS community for this academic year, a number I thought was modest and achievable. However, it does not look like we will come close to that at our present rate.

*

As I mentioned in Washington, the submission procedure is this:

*

Do the work and make sure it is rigorous according to accounting, IS, and/or computer science standards,

*

Submit the paper and note or show that it deals with an important accounting issue issue by using AIS, MIS or CS methods, and

*

Ask that the paper be assigned to me as the editor most familiar with IS and CS methods.

If you make a convincing case on these points and if the senior editor thinks it is high quality, then I get it, I assign the referees, and I get to make the consolidated judgment.

Paraphrasing the famous Canadian hockey player Wayne Gretzky, the AIS research and the accounting practice communities will miss on 100% of the good ideas that never get submitted to TAR. If we want change the face of accounting research, the time for action is now. Do the work and submit "that" paper. Additionally, send your name off to me as a possible referee, outlining your particular expertise in either methods or specific technologies.

Bill McCarthy,
Michigan State University

mccarthy@bus.msu.edu 
http://www.msu.edu/user/mccarth4 <https://mercury.bus.msu.edu/exchweb/bin/redir.asp?URL=http://www.msu.edu/user/mccarth4>

March 27, 2007 reply from Paul Williams [Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]

Bill,

What we may be paying as the price for dragging doctoral education in accounting back to the Stone Age about 40 years ago, is the phenomenon you describe. People have become so disenchanted with TAR that they have found other more comfortable venues for pursuing their work. In spite of public declarations about the new openness, we have heard this before only to have it turn out to be disengenuous PR. I think your appeal here might encourage people to trust you once and submit a paper, BUT it better produce some postitive experiences.

Another issue is "rigor." Everything must be RIGOROUS, but most GOOD IDEAS aren't "rigorous". They are typically fraught with error, but they open new vistas and ways of thinking about things. The history of science is filled with tales of earth changing ideas that were not offered in a RIGOROUS way (we know Mendel fudged his data on sweet peas, so did Milliken and Keynes General Theory... was notoriously cobbled together). We have become so fixated on method and our public appearance as rigorous scientists that all accounting scholarship in the U.S. at least follows the same template. Our idea of rigor is, frankly, naïve, based more on appearance than substance. Robert Heilbroner once remarked that "Mathematics brought great rigor to economics.

Unfortunately it also brought mortis." Bill, you now have some power (?). Take some chances. What is the point of an academic discourse confined only to statistical model building where, simultaneously, replication is emphatically discouraged? Empirical rigor means doing it over and over by independent investigators with rigorous controls. We may not even be doing what we currently do "rigorously."

March 27, 2007 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

Methodological hangups, fetish about quantitative rigour, phobia about normative research, all have afflicted most disciplines at one time or the other. We in accounting seem to have them all at the same time.

I remembering sitting on a doctoral committee with folks from psychology, and was frightened to discover my own prejudices after hearing a well known (Skinnerian) psychologist fellow committee member asked me to be a bit more understanding of methodologies used by others.

I have found the accounting crowd reward conformity with received wisdom from the self-anointed sages.

Much of my work has been normative, and therefore considered "unsuitable" for publications in better known accounting journals (statement made by editor of one of the top rated accounting journal). I feel driven out of the field years ago into Operations Research, Information Systems, Computing & Information Sciences.

In none of those fields have the journal editors/ referees used any litmus tests. On the other hand, the referees at an AAA section journal, (about 20 years ago) was bold enough to state that my paper was an insult to the excellent work done by others in the field (the paper was later published in a respected journal in IS with few changes; it was the last paper I submitted to any establishment accounting journals).

Bill's message gives me hope in a way I never imagined. As a test balloon, I will submit TAR one of our papers that I had targeted for a CSI journal.

We need a balance between rigour, relevance, and methodological purity. Above all, we need tolerance for work that differs from our own perspective on each of these. We also need a diversity of approaches to the issues in the papers.

Jagdish

Academics Versus the Profession

The real world is only a special case, and not a very interesting one at that.
--Attributed to C. E. Ferguson and forwarded by Ed Scribner

Imagination is not to be divorced from facts: it is a way of illuminating the facts. It works by eliciting the general principles which apply to the facts, as they exist, and then by an intellectual survey of alternative possibilities which are consistent with these principles. It enables men (sic) to construct an intellectual vision of a new world, and it preserves the zest of life by the suggestion of satisfying purposes.
Alfred North Whitehead in an address to the AACSB in 1927 and quoted in the paper by Bennis and O'Toole cited below.

During the past several decades, many leading B schools have quietly adopted an inappropriate --- and ultimately self-defeating --- model of academic excellence.  Instead of measuring themselves in terms of the competence of their graduates, or by how well their faculties understand important drivers of business performance, they measure themselves almost solely by the rigor of their scientific research. They have adopted a model of science that uses abstract financial and economic analysis, statistical regressions, and laboratory psychology.  Some of the research produced is excellent, but because so little of it is grounded in actual business practices. the focus of graduate business education has become increasingly circumscribed --- and less and less relevant to practitioners ...We are not advocating a return to the days when business schools were glorified trade schools.  In every business, decision making requires amassing and analyzing objective facts, so B schools must continue to teach quantitative skills.  The challenge is to restore balance to the curriculum and the faculty:  We need rigor and relevance.  The dirty little secret at most of today's best business schools is that they chiefly serve the faculty's research interests and career goals, with too little regard for the needs of other stakehollders.
Warren G. Bennis and James O'Toole, "How Business Schools Lost Their Way," Harvard Business Review, May 2005.
The article be downloaded for a fee of $6.00 ($3.70 to educators) --- http://harvardbusinessonline.hbsp.harvard.edu/b02/en/hbr/hbr_home.jhtml


Bob Jensen's threads on higher education controversies are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm


The original Accounting Hall of Fame is maintained by Ohio State University --- http://fisher.osu.edu/departments/accounting-and-mis/hall-of-fame/

The distinguished set of members selected to date are listed at
http://fisher.osu.edu/departments/accounting-and-mis/hall-of-fame/membership-in-hall/  

At the forthcoming American Accounting Association (AAA) annual meetings in Washington DC this year on August 7, two new distinguished scholars will be inducted into the Accounting Hall of Fame.

June 22, 2006 message from Hall of Famer Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@terry.uga.edu]

Bob,

I don't know if you've seen the news yet, but Bob Kaplan and Bob Sterling will be this year's inductees to the Accounting Hall of Fame.

Denny

June 23, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Denny,

Thanks for the update. Both Bob and Bob are more than worthy of this honor. Both accountancy professors have very distinguished teaching and research accomplishments. Although I do not want to detract from those most noteworthy accomplishments, I cannot resist this opportunity to point out that both Bob Sterling and Bob Kaplan are failed critics of the hijacking of the leading academic accounting research journals by the Accountics/Positivist Establishment. However, both of these scholars took vastly different approaches in their efforts to maintain diversity of research methods and topics in the leading research journals.

The Accountics/Positivist Establishment virtually ignored both Sterling and Kaplan!

The following quotations appear in the following two documents:

An "Appeal" for accounting educators, researchers, and practitioners to actively support what I call The Accounting Review (TAR) Diversity Initiative as initiated by American Accounting Association President Judy Rayburn --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR.htm

An Analysis of the Contributions of The Accounting Review Across 80 Years: 1926-2005 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm

 

Accountics is the mathematical science of (accounting) values.
Charles Sprague (1887) as quoted by McMillan (2003, 1)
 

As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality.
Albert Einstein
 

PG. #390 NONAKA
The chapter argues that building the theory of knowledge creation needs to an epistemological and ontological discussion, instead of just relying on a positivist approach, which has been the implicit paradigm of social science. The positivist rationality has become identified with analytical thinking that focuses on generating and testing hypotheses through formal logic. While providing a clear guideline for theory building and empirical examinations, it poses problems for the investigation of complex and dynamic social phenomena, such as knowledge creation. In positivist-based research, knowledge is still often treated as an exogenous variable or distraction against linear economic rationale. The relative lack of alternative conceptualization has meant that management science has slowly been detached from the surrounding societal reality. The understanding of social systems cannot be based entirely on natural scientific facts.
Ikujiro Nonaka as quoted at Great Minds in Management: The Process of Theory Development --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/GreatMinds.htm 



 

Bob Sterling is rooted in economics and philosophy. He, like Tony Tinker, Barbara Marino, and Paul Williams, relied upon his roots in philosophy to attack the positivists from the standpoint of misinterpretation of the writings of Karl Popper --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Popper

 

Sterling wrote the following in "Positive Accounting: An Assessment," Abacus,Volume 26, Issue 2, September 1990:

*********Begin Quote
Positive accounting theory, using the book of the same name by Watts and Zimmerman (1986) as the primary source of information about that theory, is subjected to scrutiny. The two pillars — (a) value-free study of (b) accounting practices — upon which the legitimacy of that theory are said to rest (and the absence of which is said to make other theories illegitimate) are found to be insubstantial. The claim that authorities — economic and scientific — support the type of theory espoused is found to be mistaken. The accomplishments — actual and potential — of positive theory are found to have been nil, and are projected to continue to be nil. Based on these findings, the recommendation is to classify positive accounting theory as a 'cottage industry' at the periphery of accounting thought and reject its attempt to take centre stage by radically redefining the fundamental question of accounting.
*********End Quote

 

I might add that the above critique would've had zero chance of being published in The Accounting Review (TAR) or other leading U.S. accounting research journals. Professor Sterling always wrote with interesting and simple analogies. He stated that if anthropology research was limited to positivism, then the only research would be the study of anthropologists rather than anthropology.

In some ways, Bob Kaplan is the more interesting critic of the hijacking of academic accounting research by the Accountics/Positivist Establishment. This is because Professor Kaplan built his early reputation, while full time at Carnegie-Mellon University, as an accountics expert in mathematical model building. Later, after he took on joint appointments at Carnegie and the Harvard Business School, he became more involved in case method research. Now he's best noted as a case method researcher since moving full time to Harvard.

In 1986 Steve Zeff was President of the AAA. I had the honor of being appointed by Steve as Program Director for the 1986 AAA annual meetings in Times Square in NYC. I persuaded Bob Kaplan and Joel Demski to share a plenary session in debate of the hijacking of the leading academic accounting research journals by the Accountics/Positivist Establishment (although since the early 1900s the term "accountics" was no longer used in accounting in favor of the term "analytics").

Bob Kaplan's 1986 presentation lamented the fact that researchers using the case method could no longer get their research published in TAR or other leading accounting research journals. He also lamented that innovations generally had their seminal roots in discoveries of practitioners rather than researchers publishing in the leading academic accounting research journals. Whereas practitioners once took a keen interest in academic accounting research, this interest waned to almost nothing.

Joel Demski's presentation defended mathematical model building and analysis as the cornerstone of accounting as a a pure "academic discipline." I would not describe Joel as an evangelist of positivism relative to the extremes of Watts and Zimmerman. Joel typically has had less to say about positivism than he has about mathematical model building and economic information theory applied to accountancy. In this regard I would describe Joel as an ardent defender of accountics. Joel admitted in 1986 that it was very difficult to pinpoint discoveries in academe that were noteworthy in the practicing profession. However, he claimed that this was not a leading purpose of academic accounting research.

Joel Demski steers us away from the clinical side of the accountancy profession by saying we should avoid that pesky “vocational virus.” (See below).

The (Random House) dictionary defines "academic" as "pertaining to areas of study that are not primarily vocational or applied , as the humanities or pure mathematics." Clearly, the short answer to the question is no, accounting is not an academic discipline.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline?" Accounting Horizons, June 2007, pp. 153-157

 

Statistically there are a few youngsters who came to academia for the joy of learning, who are yet relatively untainted by the vocational virus. I urge you to nurture your taste for learning, to follow your joy. That is the path of scholarship, and it is the only one with any possibility of turning us back toward the academy.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline? American Accounting Association Plenary Session" August 9, 2006 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm

Too many accountancy doctoral programs have immunized themselves against the “vocational virus.” The problem lies not in requiring doctoral degrees in our leading colleges and universities. The problem is that we’ve been neglecting the clinical needs of our profession. Perhaps the real underlying reason is that our clinical problems are so immense that academic accountants quake in fear of having to make contributions to the clinical side of accountancy as opposed to the clinical side of finance, economics, and psychology.

Our problems with doctoral programs in accountancy are shared with other disciplines, notably education and nursing schools.
Bob Jensen's threads on controversies in higher education are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm

Ohio State University became one of the leading accountics/positivsim research centers. Under the noteworthy leadership of Tom Burns, OSU became one of the first major universities to drop traditional accounting courses from its doctoral programs in favor of sending students outside the College of Business to take graduate courses in mathematics, statistics, econometrics, psychometrics, and sociometrics. In this context, it is a pleasure that leaders at OSU, in conjunction with the outside Accounting Hall of Fame nominating committee members, sees fit this year to honor two ardent critics of the Accountics/Positivist Establishment.

 Hopefully some of you will heed my current "Appeal" for accounting educators, researchers, and practitioners to actively support what I call The Accounting Review (TAR) Diversity Initiative as initiated by American Accounting Association President Judy Rayburn --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR.htm


Question
What is the new concept of phronesis in the context of accounting research?

"Case Study Research in Accounting," by David Cooper and Wane Morgan, Accounting Horizons, Volume 22, No. 2, June 2008, pp. 159-178 --- http://www.atypon-link.com/AAA/doi/abs/10.2308/acch.2008.22.2.159

SYNOPSIS:
We describe case study research and explain its value for developing theory and informing practice. While recognizing the complementary nature of many research methods, we stress the benefits of case studies for understanding situations of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflict. We introduce the concept of phronesis—the analysis of what actions are practical and rational in a specific context— and indicate the value of case studies for developing, and reflecting on, professional knowledge. Examples of case study research in managerial accounting, auditing, and financial accounting illustrate the strengths of case studies for theory development and their potential for generating new knowledge. We conclude by disputing common misconceptions about case study research and suggesting how barriers to case study research may be overcome, which we believe is an important step in making accounting research more relevant.

Jensen Comment

In 1986 Steve Zeff was President of the AAA. I had the honor of being appointed by Steve as Program Director for the 1986 AAA annual meetings in Times Square in NYC. I persuaded Bob Kaplan and Joel Demski to share a plenary session in debate of the hijacking of the leading academic accounting research journals by the Accountics/Positivist Establishment (although since the early 1900s the term "accountics" was no longer used in accounting in favor of the term "analytics").

Bob Kaplan's 1986 presentation lamented the fact that researchers using the case method could no longer get their research published in TAR or other leading accounting research journals. He also lamented that innovations generally had their seminal roots in discoveries of practitioners rather than researchers publishing in the leading academic accounting research journals. Whereas practitioners once took a keen interest in academic accounting research, this interest waned to almost nothing.

Joel Demski's presentation defended mathematical model building and analysis as the cornerstone of accounting as a a pure "academic discipline." I would not describe Joel as an evangelist of positivism relative to the extremes of Watts and Zimmerman. Joel typically has had less to say about positivism than he has about mathematical model building and economic information theory applied to accountancy. In this regard I would describe Joel as an ardent defender of accountics. Joel admitted in 1986 that it was very difficult to pinpoint discoveries in academe that were noteworthy in the practicing profession. However, he claimed that this was not a leading purpose of academic accounting research.

Joel Demski steers us away from the clinical side of the accountancy profession by saying we should avoid that pesky “vocational virus.” (See below).

The (Random House) dictionary defines "academic" as "pertaining to areas of study that are not primarily vocational or applied , as the humanities or pure mathematics." Clearly, the short answer to the question is no, accounting is not an academic discipline.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline?" Accounting Horizons, June 2007, pp. 153-157

I wrote the following on December 1, 2004 at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession

Faculty interest in a professor’s “academic” research may be greater for a number of reasons. Academic research fits into a methodology that other professors like to hear about and critique. Since academic accounting and finance journals are methodology driven, there is potential benefit from being inspired to conduct a follow up study using the same or similar methods. In contrast, practitioners are more apt to look at relevant (big) problems for which there are no research methods accepted by the top journals.

Accounting Research Farmers Are More Interested in Their Tractors Than in Their Harvests

For a long time I’ve argued that top accounting research journals are just not interested in the relevance of their findings (except in the areas of tax and AIS). If the journals were primarily interested in the findings themselves, they would abandon their policies about not publishing replications of published research findings. If accounting researchers were more interested in relevance, they would conduct more replication studies. In countless instances in our top accounting research journals, the findings themselves just aren’t interesting enough to replicate. This is something that I attacked at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/book02q4.htm#Replication

At one point back in the 1980s there was a chance for accounting programs that were becoming “Schools of Accountancy” to become more like law schools and to have their elite professors become more closely aligned with the legal profession. Law schools and top law journals are less concerned about science than they are about case methodology driven by the practice of law. But the elite professors of accounting who already had vested interest in scientific methodology (e.g., positivism) and analytical modeling beat down case methodology. I once heard Bob Kaplan say to an audience that no elite accounting research journal would publish his case research. Science methodologies work great in the natural sciences. They are problematic in the psychology and sociology. They are even more problematic in the professions of accounting, law, journalism/communications, and political “science.”

We often criticize practitioners for ignoring academic research Maybe they are just being smart. I chuckle when I see our heroes in the mathematical theories of economics and finance winning prizes for knocking down theories that were granted earlier prizes (including Nobel prices). The Beta model was the basis for thousands of academic studies, and now the Beta model is a fallen icon. Fama got prizes for showing that capital markets were efficient and then more prizes for showing they were not so “efficient.” In the meantime, investment bankers, stock traders, and mutual funds were just ripping off investors. For a long time, elite accounting researchers could find no “empirical evidence” of widespread earnings management. All they had to do was look up from the computers where their heads were buried.

Few, if any, of the elite “academic” researchers were investigating the dire corruption of the markets themselves that rendered many of the published empirical findings useless.

Academic researchers worship at the feet of Penman and do not even recognize the name of Frank Partnoy or Jim Copeland.

Bob Jensen

 

Apparently Cooper and Morgan in 2008 are trying to infect us with the pesky vocational virus as well as lending value to research with sample sizes of one that Zimmerman and other positivists would not accept as legitimate accounting research from Kaplan or anybody else.

The case study approach does not prescribe what theories should inform the study or which methods should be used for gathering and analyzing data. Based on the problem and research questions being addressed, a variety of methods may be used, including analysis of archival materials, observation, interviews, and quantitative techniques. Case studies focus on bounded and particular organizations, events, or phenomena, and scrutinize the activities and experiences of those involved, as well as the context in which these activities and experiences occur Stake 2000.

The case study research approach is useful where the researcher is investigating:

• complex and dynamic phenomena where many variables including variables that are not quantifiable are involved;

• actual practices, including the details of significant activities that may be ordinary, unusual, or infrequent e.g., changes in accounting regulation; and

• phenomena in which the context is crucial because the context affects the phenomena being studied and where the phenomena may also interact with and influence its context.

(Yin, 1989) notes that case studies are suited to answer “how” and “why” questions. Furthermore, well-done case study research answers how and why so compellingly and vividly that readers understand and remember the findings the study reveals. Practitioners find “how” questions to be particularly important—for example, case studies are valuable in describing the details of how new accounting and auditing innovations are actually done. Providing details helps convert private knowledge for example, the detailed procedures and calculations that are otherwise hidden in the reports or minds of innovators into publicly available knowledge. Unlike the “action research” some espouse (Kaplan ,1998), a theory-oriented case study requires explicitness in the theory underlying the case analysis, and in the contribution to theory development or testing.

Case studies also address “why” questions, illustrating why something was done or came to be, or when and why something works. (Schön, 1983), 50 argues that case studies are valuable to the “entire process of reflection-in-action, which is central to the ‘art’ by which practitioners sometimes deal well with situations of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness and value conflict.” Such case research considers the values, interests, and operations of power involved—who gained, who lost, and why. While researchers may disagree about what should be done, a good case will stimulate reflection and learning about the actions of all involved, including the researcher. Action or constructivist researchers often use cases to describe examples of an accounting intervention, but they too often neglect the theoretical lessons to be learned (Jönsson and Lukka,  2007).

Although any research approach can focus on how or why, non-case approaches typically emphasize different questions. Statistical analyses using large data sets1 have a comparative advantage in answering “how much” questions, such as the average size of CEO compensation or the average difference in compensation for companies with, for example, high versus low ROA. Experiments may be particularly helpful in answering “what” questions such as what type of response individuals might have to a proposed accounting measure or disclosure. Case studies, archival research, and experiments are complementary research approaches. To illustrate the complementary nature of different approaches, consider that as part of an accounting firm’s efforts to improve its audits, it may:

• statistically analyze data on the properties of specific accounts;

• conduct pilot studies experiments before deploying new audit procedures; and

• study the best-practice cases of audits, considering how the client, audit staff, regulators, and partners might vary in their assessments of what is best.

The quality of the accounting firm’s overall analysis and decisions is improved by using all approaches to acquiring and assessing knowledge. Whether used on their own or in conjunction with other research approaches, case studies can contribute insights to practitioners and researchers.

Continued in article

Also see http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession

 


I examined the Vision being promoted, since November 8, 2006, by CEOs of the largest accounting firms --- http://www.globalpublicpolicysymposium.com/CEO_Vision.pdf
It struck me as yet another example of how small the role of academe is in shaping the future of the profession of accountancy. I wonder if the professions of medicine and law would chart the future of their own professions with so little regard for schools of medicine and law. Large firms in accounting actively seek to hire our students and have great public relations with professors. However, when it comes to something as substantive as this it's very difficult to find where leaders of the profession charted this change in course by building upon academic accounting research. There are probably indirect links, but it would be surprising if the writers of this proposed huge change in policy were influenced heavily by published academic research. An exception might be the thrust toward XBRL, but the so-called leading academic accounting journals have paid scant attention to XBRL,

On one hand we could blame the leaders of the profession for avoiding academe in the generation of new vision for the future. On the other hand we could blame the accounting researchers and their top journals for addressing what they can study with scientific models rather than what the profession wants to be studied. My threads on this issue are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession

"Largest Accounting Firms See Coming Revolution in Business Reporting," AccountingWeb, November 27, 2006 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102827

As part of the Global Public Policy Symposium in Paris, held on November 8 and attended by key players concerned with ensuring the quality and reliability of financial reporting worldwide, the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) International, Grant Thornton International, Deloitte, KPMG International and Ernst & Young, published a joint statement of their vision of what the future might hold for financial reporting and the accounting profession.

Entitled “Global Capital Markets and the Global Economy: A Vision from the CEOs of the International Audit Networks,” the document envisions investors having access to real time company financial information through XBRL, financial statements that go beyond reporting past performance to projecting future performance based on information about business intangibles that are not currently measured, and a recommendation that companies choose to supplement regular audits with periodic forensic audits. The report may be viewed at www.globalpublicpolicysymposium.com/

“This essay is about one type of information and its importance to all actors in the global economy; information about the performance of management and companies that make and deliver goods and services, and compete for capital,” the symposium paper says.

In a letter to the Wall Street Journal published on November 8, the day their paper was released, the CEOs wrote that when the basics of current accounting procedures were written, the world’s investors were more a “private club than a global network. Auditors used fountain pens, capital stayed pooled in a few financial centers, and information moved by runner.” The world has changed since then.

In the short term, the letter says, it will be necessary to proceed as rapidly as possible with convergence in international accounting standards, and with overcoming national differences in oversight of auditors and in enforcement.

In the longer term, auditors themselves must evaluate the usefulness to investors of information provided in the current financial statement and footnote format and consider the inclusion of more nonfinancial information.

But, the CEOs say in the Journal letter, “All of these steps should include an emphasis on allowing auditors greater room to exercise judgment. Accountants and auditors are trained professionals who have the ability to apply the spirit of broad principles in deciding how to account for and report financial and other information. . . . Such [future] measures should also include an honest assessment of the “expectations gap,” relating to material fraud and the ability of auditors to uncover it at a reasonable cost.”

The paper looks forward to a world “where users increasingly will want to customize the information they receive” in which “the process for recording and classifying business information will be as important, if not more important, than the static formats in which today’s financial information is reported. Our jobs as auditors, must therefore change to increasing focus on those business processes.”

An “important enabler” of future reporting will be the Global XBRL Initiative, the paper says. XBRL users will be able to view company data in any language, any currency and under different accounting systems and get immediate answers to queries. “In fact the new world is already here for the approximately 40,000 companies that already use XBRL to input their data. . . . China, Spain, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have required companies to use XBRL.”

The paper acknowledges that investors, analysts and others will still want standardized reports to be issued by public companies on a regular basis. But the CEOs say that investors have told them they want more relevant information to be included. “The large discrepancies between the “book” and “market” values of many, if not most, public companies similarly provide strong evidence of the limited usefulness of statements of assets and liabilities that are based on historical costs. A range of intangibles, such as employee creativity and loyalty and relationships with suppliers and customers, can drive a company’s performance, yet the value of these intangibles is not consistently reported."

In short, the CEO’s vision states “the same forces that are reshaping economies at all levels are driving the need to transform what kind of information various stakeholders want from companies, in what form, and at what frequency. In a world of “mass customization,” standard financial statements have less and less meaning and relevance. The future of auditing in such an environment lies in the need to verify that the process by which company-specific information is collected, sorted and reported is reliable and the information presented is relevant for decision making.”

Investors and regulatory bodies may expect auditors to go further than is reasonable to detect fraud and the paper recommends that all companies be subjected to a regular forensic audit, or be subjected to forensic audits on a random basis.

Another option would be introducing more choice regarding the intensity of audits for fraud. For example, since forensic audits are conducted primarily for the benefit of investors, one possibility would be to let shareholders decide on the intensity of the fraud detection effort
they want auditors to perform. Shareholders could be assisted in making this decision by disclosure in the proxy materials of the costs of the different levels of audits, as well as the historical experience of the company with fraud.

The CEO paper calls for both liability reform and scope of service reform.

Considering the “Brave New World” of auditing envisioned in the document and the scope of the questions it raises, “Global Capital Markets and the Global Economy” has received little attention in the financial press, Motley Fool reports. But, while approving the idea of more timely information flows for the investor, Fool says, “enough companies have trouble meeting their reporting obligations as it is. I would prefer to both maintain those reports and supplement them with additional data.”

That financial reporting will evolve and change is inevitable, the International Herald Tribune says, but whether large accounting firms will lead the dialogue is another matter that may be influenced by their “life-threatening litigation risks.”

"Accounting Firms Seek Overhaul," by Tad Kopinski, Institutional Shareholder Services ISS, November 20, 2006 ---
http://blog.issproxy.com/2006/11/accounting_firms_seek_overhaul.html  

Bob Jensen's threads on proposed reforms --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudProposedReforms.htm


Redesigning an MBA Curriculum Toward the Action:  Why Aren't Accountants Headed on the Same Paths?

"Wall Street Warms To Finance Degree With Focus on Math," by Ronald Alsop, The Wall Street Journal,  November 14, 2006; Page B7 --- Click Here

Just a few years ago, the University of California, Berkeley, found its master's degree in financial engineering a hard sell. Wall Street had cut back sharply on hiring, and many recruiters were still fixated on M.B.A. graduates.

"The doors were shut on us at the human-resource level on Wall Street," recalls Linda Kreitzman, executive director of the financial engineering program at Berkeley's Haas School of Business. "I had to go directly to managing directors to get our students placed after we started the program in 2001."

Now, in a turnabout, it's often the banks and hedge funds that are calling on Dr. Kreitzman and offering her graduates six-figure compensation packages. "They have come to realize they really need students with strong skills in financial economics, math and computer modeling for more complex products like mortgage- and asset-backed securities and credit and equity derivatives," she says. This fall, all 58 financial engineering students seeking internships found spots at such companies as Citigroup, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch. Their projects will include credit portfolio valuation, artificial-intelligence trading models and structured fixed-income products.

While the master's in business administration certainly remains in high demand, companies are increasingly interested in other graduate-level credentials, including Ph.D.s and master's degrees in specific business fields. Deutsche Bank, for example, has hired Ph.D. and master-of-finance graduates in Europe for some time and is now recruiting more in the U.S. as well.

"We are continually looking for strong quantitative skills," says Kristina Peters, global head of graduate recruiting. With a master's degree in finance, "there tends to be more applied finance knowledge such as derivatives pricing."

Continued in article

Jensen Comment
The big question is where will auditing firms find accountants that can handle the exotic contracts written by the financial engineers?


The Sad State of English Literature Research

"Student Pressure and Your Average English Department," by Sanford Pinsker, The Irascible Professor, January 2, 2006 --- http://irascibleprofessor.com/comments-01-02-06.htm .

English professors reflect their graduate school training long after they "graduate" as newly minted Ph.D.s. The rub comes in if you happen to have been more deeply trained in literary theory than you were in literature, and you were taught to believe that theoreticians were much more interesting than novelists or poets.

The result is that many English professors of a certain age find it easier to get excited about multiculturalism than about great writers because they have read very few primary works of consequence. Asking these folk about literature reminds me of the Israeli army recruit who was asked if he could swim, "No," he replied, then quickly added "But I know the theory of it." English departments are likely to suffer through this joke for at least the next twenty more years, as professors who got tenure because they were savvy about Derrida and Foucault hang around to shape an English department curriculum that is longer on deserts than it is on meat-and-potatoes.

That's why advanced seminars in multiculturalism, Madonna, or "The Sopranos" are just a heart beat away from making it into the college catalogue. Those who remember an Irish poet named Yeats might remember what he said about things falling apart and the center not holding. That is what is occurring across the land as English department have a hard time resisting whatever fashionable bandwagon squeaks its way down the road.


The Sad State of Academic Accounting Research

February 3, 2006 message from Jagdish S. Gangolly [gangolly@INFOTOC.COM]

The well known mathematician GH Hardy once observed that he would be disappointed if any one found mathematics useful (I think he was referring to "Pure" mathematics), and that mathematics is to be enjoyed to appreciate its intrinsic beauty. Nevertheless, even "Pure" Mathematics Mathgematics is found useful by many. One pertinent example I can give is of non-Euclidean Geometry which has had a profound impact on data visualisation (See, for example, http://iv.slis.indiana.edu/sw/hyptree.html ).

While mathematical propositions are tautological and hence not "verifiable" in a positivist sense, the underlying axiom system can be examined to see if it corresponds to reality. That is how, for example, things work in Physics where replication is an essential and valued activity. In accounting research (especially of the financial accounting kind), replication is not well regarded, and unlike in Physics there is no "competition" to reach the top of the greasy pole or to prove each other wrong. The result is the mutual admiration society that we have reduced ourselves to, with a few citing each other and the rest of the world ignoring us all.

In human science such as ours is, research should be relevant and useful. We have an obligation to be evaluated by the society (all the stakeholders including the professional practice) at large about this. In this, in my opinion, we in academics have failed miserably.

Jagdish

February 4, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Jagdish,

You have pointed to the heart of the mess in modern day academic accounting research. The pure mathematics term "mathgematics" reminds me of the historic term "accountics." After an intense turn-of-the-century debate over whether academic accounting research should become the "mathematical science of values," leading accounting researchers rejected this "accountics" idea. Both the term and the movement died out for the next 60 years.

In the 1960s the concept was born again without the revival of the word "accountics." You aptly and concisely described how accountics has taken over our top-tier journals that, in turn, have turned our doctoral programs into virtually a singular very narrow research skills curriculum.

I was greatly encouraged by Judy Rayburn's Presidential Address on August 10, 2005 and the publishing of her remarks in Accounting Education News, Fall 2005, pp. 1-4.

Accounting research is different from other business disciplines in the area of citations:  Top-tier accounting journals in total have fewer citations than top-tier journals in finance, management, and marketing.  Our journals are not widely cited outside our discipline.  Our top-tier journals as a group project too narrow a view of the breadth and diversity of (what should count as) accounting research.
Rayburn (2005b, Page 4)
 

I might add that Judy's points are mostly echoing Andy Bailey's 1994 Presidential Address in which he claimed the AAA journals were at a "crisis point." The AAA Publications Committees, TAR editors, and TAR referees ignored Andy's appeals to broaden the scope of topics and research methods that allowed in TAR. And after a long conversation with the current editor of TAR on February 2, 2006, I fear that Judy's appeals are also falling on deaf ears. TAR is not going to change in the near future with the exception of adding some AIS papers that Bill McCarthy, as the new AIS Associate Editor, allows to pass through the gates. TAR will expand to five issues per hear in 2006 and six issues per year after that. But accountics constraints will still dominate TAR in years to come.

February 4, 2006 reply from Jagdish S. Gangolly [gangolly@INFOTOC.COM]

Bob,

Mathgematics was an innocent typo on my part. Your response worried me that there might really be such a term, and so I googled it and went through each of those pages. And on each of those pages the problem was a similar typo. While I would love to put my stamp on lexicography, I need to improve my keyboarding skills first. (My Mac keyboard is driving me up the wall.)

Hardy used the term pure mathematics (he wrote a book with the same title that we used as text) in the same sense that Immanuel Kant used it in the "Critique of Pure Reason" -- uncontaminated by facts.

People were always uncomfortable with Euclid's fifth postulate which says that given a straight line and a point not on the line, it is possible to construct a straight line through the point that is parallel to the given line (there are other equivalent ways to state the postulate). For example, if you stand in the middle of railroad tracks in Kansas and look into the horizon along the tracks, it would appear to you that the two parallel tracks meet there, which would "invalidate" the postulate.

Mathematicians before Lobachevsky were trying to prove that the fifth postulate could be proved as a theorem from the first four (which we all know from grade school). Lobachevsky thought out of the box and showed that Euclidean Geometry was a special case of general non-Euclidean Geometries. Lobachevsky was not alone in this discovery. Gauss (German) and Bolyai (Hungarian) mathematicians independently developed the area.

By the way, the tracks seem to meet at the horizon in Kanbsas because earth is spherical. The non-Euclidean Geometry I referred to in the earlier message was spherical Geometry which is the staple of data visualisation in diverse fields as taxonomy, genetics, forestry,...; We can even use it in Accounting, for example, in visualising XBRL taxonomies.

Jagdish


So what is the history of accountics?

TAR Between 1926 and 1955: Ignoring Accountics

Accountics is the mathematical science of values.
Charles Sprague (1887) as quoted by McMillan (2003, 1)


 

Accounting professor Charles Sprague coined the word "accountics" in 1887. The word is not used today in accounting and has some alternative meanings outside our discipline. However, in the early 19th Century, accountics was the centerpiece of some forward thrusting unpublished lectures by Charles Sprague at Columbia University.  McMillan (2003, 11) stated the following:

These claims were not a pragmatic strategy to legitimize the development of sophisticated bookkeeping theories.  Rather, this development of a science was seen as revealing long-hidden realities within the economic environment and the double-entry bookkeeping system itself.  The science of accounts, through systematic mathematical analysis, could discover hidden thrust of the reality of economic value.  The term, “accountics,” captured the imagination of the members of the IA, connoting advances in bookkeeping that all these men were experiencing.

 

By 1900 there was a journal called Accountics according to Forrester (2003).  Both the journal and the term accountics had short lives, but belief that mathematical analysis and empirical research can “discover hidden thrust in the reality of economic value” underlies much of what has been published in TAR over the past three decades. Hence we propose reviving the term “accountics” in the context of research methods and quantitative analysis tools that have become popular in TAR and other leading accounting research journals.

The American Association of University Instructors of Accounting, which in December 1935 became the American Accounting Association, commenced unofficially in 1915, (Zeff 1966, 5).  It was proposed in October 1919 that the Association publish a Quarterly Journal of AccounticsBut this proposed accountics journal never got off the ground while leaders in the Association argued heatedly and fruitlessly about whether accountancy was a science. A quarterly journal called The Accounting Review was subsequently born in 1925 with its first issue being published in March of 1926.  Its accountics-like attributes did not commence in earnest until the 1960s.

Practitioner involvement, in a large measure, was the reason for changing the name of the Association by removing the words “University Instructors.” Practitioners interested in accounting education participated actively in AAA meetings. TAR articles in the first several decades were devoted heavily to education issues and accounting issues in particular industries and trade groups. Research methodologies were mainly normative (without mathematics), case, and archival (history) methods.  Anecdotal evidence and hypothetical illustrations ruled the day. The longest serving editor of TAR was a practitioner who determined what was published in TAR between 1929 and 1943.  In those years the AAA leadership actually mandated that TAR focus on development of accounting principles and to orient the papers to both practitioners and educators, Chatfield (1975, Page 4).

Following World War II, practitioners outnumbered educators in the AAA, (Chatfield 1975, 4). Leading partners from accounting firms took pride in publishing papers and books intended to inspire scholarship among professors and students. Some practitioners, particularly those with scholarly publications, were admitted over the years into the Accounting Hall of Fame formed by The Ohio State University. Accounting educators were generally long on practical experience and short on academic credentials such as doctoral degrees prior to the 1960s.

A major catalyst for change was the Ford Foundation that poured millions of dollars into first the study of collegiate business schools and second the funding of doctoral programs and students in business studies. Gordon and Howell (1959) reported that business faculty in colleges lacked research skills and academic esteem among their humanities and science colleagues. The Ford Foundation thereafter funded doctoral programs and top quality graduate students to pursue doctoral degrees in business and accountancy. This Foundation even funded publication of selected doctoral dissertations to give business discipline doctoral studies more visibility. Great pressures were also brought to bear on academic associations like the AAA to increase the academic standards for publications in journals like TAR.

Competitors to TAR were launched in the early 1960s, including the Journal of Accounting Research (1963), Abacus (1965) and The International Journal of Accounting Education and Research (1965). Clinging to its traditional normative roots and trade-article style would have made TAR appear to be a journal for academic luddites. Actually, many of the new mathematical approaches to theory development were fundamentally normative, but they were couched in the formidable language and rigors of mathematics. Publication of papers in traditional normative theory, history, and systems slowly ground to almost zero in the new age of accountics.

These new spearheads in accountics were not without problems.  It’s humorous and sad to go back and discover how naïve and misleading some of TAR’s bold and high risk thrusts were into quantitative methods.  Statistical models were employed without regard to underlying assumptions of independence, temporal stationarity, multicollinearity, homoscedasticity, missing variables, and departures from the normal distribution.  Mathematical applications were proposed for real-world systems that failed to meet continuity and non-convexity assumptions inherent in such models as linear programming and calculus optimizations.  Proposed applications of finite mathematics and discrete (integer) programming failed because the fastest computers in the world then, and now, could not solve most realistic integer programming problems in less than 100 years.

After financial databases provided a BETA covariance of each security in a portfolio with the market portfolio, a flood of capital market events studies were published by TAR and other leading accounting journals.  In the early years, accounting researchers did not challenge CAPM’s assumptions and limitations, limitations that, in retrospect cast doubt upon many of the findings based upon any single index of market risk, (Fama and French 1992).

Leading accounting professors have lamented as TAR’s preference for rigor over relevancy, (Zeff 1978; Lee 1997; and Williams 1999). Sundem (1987) provides revealing information about the changed perceptions of authors, almost entirely from academe, who submitted manuscripts for review between June 1982 and May 1986. Among the 1,148 submissions, only 39 used archival (history) methods and 34 of those submissions were rejected.  Also 34 used survey methods and 33 of those were rejected.  And 100 used traditional normative (deductive) methods with 85 of those being rejected.  Except for a small set of 28 manuscripts classified as using  “other” methods (mainly descriptive empirical according to Sundem), the remaining larger subset submitted manuscripts used methods that Sundem classified as follows for leading 1982-1986 submissions:

292 General Empirical

119 Capital Market

172 Behavioral

135 Analytical modeling

  97 Economic modeling

  40 Statistical modeling

  29 Simulation

What’s clear is that by 1982 accounting researchers got the message that having mathematical or statistical analysis in TAR publications made accountics virtually a necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition for acceptance for publication. It became increasingly difficult for a single editor to have expertise in all the above methods. In the late 1960s editorial decisions on publication shifted from the TAR editor alone to the TAR editor in conjunction with specialized referees and eventually associate editors, (Flesher 1991, 167). Fleming et al. (2000) wrote the following:

The big change was in research methods.  Modeling and empirical methods became prominent during 1966-1985, with analytical modeling and general empirical methods leading the way.  Although used to a surprising extent, deductive-type methods declined in popularity, especially in the second half of the 1966-1985 period.

Fleming et al. (2000, Page 48) report that education articles in TAR declined from 21% in 1966 to 8% before Issues in Accounting Education began to publish education articles. Garcha, Harwood, and Hermanson (1983) reported on the readership of TAR before any new specialty journals commenced in the AAA. They reported that among their AAA membership respondents, only 41.7% would subscribe if TAR was unbundled in terms of dollar savings from AAA membership dues. TAR apparently was not meeting the membership’s market test. Based heavily upon the written comments of respondents, the authors’ conclusions were, in part, as follows:

The findings of the survey reveal that opinions vary regarding TAR and that emotions run high.  At one extreme some respondents seem to believe that TAR is performing its intended function very well.  Those sharing this view may believe that its mission is to provide a high-quality outlet for those at the cutting-edge of accounting research.  The pay-off for this approach may be recognition by peers, achieving tenure and promotion, and gaining mobility should one care to move.  This group may also believe that trying to affect current practice is futile anyway, so why even try?

 

At the other extreme are those who believe that TAR is not serving its intended purpose.  This group may believe TAR should serve the readership interests of the audiences identified by the Moonitz Committee.  Many in the intended audience cannot write for, cannot read, or are not interested in reading the Main Articles which have been published during approximately the last decade.  As a result there is the suggestion that this group believes that a change in editorial policy is needed.

 

After a study by Abdel-khalik(1976) that revealed complaints about difficulties of following the increased quantitative methods jargon in TAR, editors did introduce abstracts in front of the articles to summarize major findings with less jargon, (Flesher 1991, 169). But the problem was simultaneously exacerbated when TAR stopped publishing commentaries and rebuttals that sometimes aid understanding of complicated research. Science journals are much better about encouraging commentaries and rebuttals.

The saddest and most revealing state of accountics research is the lack of interest of replicating the many findings of TAR's econometric and psychometric methodologies --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Relication

Bob Jensen


Scientific Method in Accounting Has Not Been a Method for Generating New Theories

The following is a quote from the 1993 President’s Message of Gary Sundem, President’s Message. Accounting Education News 21 (3). 3.
 

Although empirical scientific method has made many positive contributions to accounting research, it is not the method that is likely to generate new theories, though it will be useful in testing them. For example, Einstein’s theories were not developed empirically, but they relied on understanding the empirical evidence and they were tested empirically. Both the development and testing of theories should be recognized as acceptable accounting research.

 

Question
What is the trend in the number of doctoral degrees awarded in accountancy in the United States?

Answer
It all depends on who you ask and whether or not the alma maters are AACSB accredited universities
(note that the AACSB accredits bachelors and masters degree programs but not doctoral programs per se).
The data suggest that there are a lot of ABD doctoral students who never complete the final hurdle of writing a dissertation, although this is only my speculation based upon the higher number of graduates that I would expect from the size of the enrollments.

On January 27, 2006, Jean Heck at Villanova sent me the following message:

This data is only for AACSB accredited schools, so the numbers you had for Accounting in the slide are a little bigger. I got these numbers straight from the AACSB data director.
   
     
  Accounting & Finance Historical Data 2000 - 2004
     
Accounting Full Time Enrollment Part Time Enrollment Degrees Conferred
2000 552 36 122
     
2001 585 80 102
     
2002 578 13 97
     
2003 694 12 103
     
2004 631 16 86
     
     
     
Finance      
2000 738 59 159
     
2001 771 109 129
     
2002 807 49 125
     
2003 939 40 136
     
2004 859 48 109

********************
Jensen Comment
Hasselback, J.R. (2006), Accounting Faculty Directory 2006-2007 (Prentice-Hall, Just Prior to Page 1) reports the following doctoral graduates in accounting:

1998–99 122 - 18%
1999–00 095 - 22%
2000–01 108 +14%
2001–02 099 - 08%
2002–03 069 - 30%

 

In Slide 23 of her Presidential Address at the American Accounting Association Annual Meetings in San Francisco on August 10, Judy Rayburn presented the following data regarding doctoral graduates in accounting --- http://aaahq.org/AM2005/menu.htm

145 Accounting Ph.D.s were awarded in 2002-2003, an increase over 2001-2002 estimates.
TABLE 3B
Accounting Ph.D’s Awarded 1998–99 Through 2002–03
Number of Graduates Rate of Growth
1998–99 185 – 3%
1999–00 195 + 5%
2000–01 115 – 41%
2001–02 110 – 4%
2002–03 145 + 32%

Data from the U.S. Department of Education
You can download an Excel spreadsheet of Doctor's degrees conferred by degree-granting institutions, by discipline division: Selected years, 1970-71 to 2002-03 --- http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d04/tables/dt04_252.asp

Part of that spreadsheet is shown below:

Table 252.  Doctor's degrees conferred by degree-granting institutions, by discipline division: 
Selected years, 1970-71 to 2002-03
_ _ _ _ _ _
Discipline division 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03
_ _ _ _ _
Agriculture and natural resources ................. 1,231 1,168 1,127 1,148 1,229
Architecture and related services ....................... 123 129 153 183 152
Area, ethnic, cultural, and gender studies ................................... 187 205 216 212 186
Biological and biomedical sciences ....................................... 5,024 5,180 4,953 4,823 5,003
Business ........................................................... 1,201 1,194 1,180 1,156 1,251
         
Communication, journalism, and related programs .............................................. 347 347 368 374 394
Communications technologies .......................... 5 10 2 9 4
Computer and information sciences ........................... 801 779 768 752 816
Education ............................................... 6,394 6,409 6,284 6,549 6,835
Engineering ........................................... 5,432 5,390 5,542 5,187 5,276
         
Engineering technologies ................................ 29 31 62 58 57
English language and literature/letters ....................... 1,407 1,470 1,330 1,291 1,246
Family and consumer sciences/human sciences ........... 323 327 354 311 372
Foreign languages, literatures, and linguistics ......................... 1,049 1,086 1,078 1,003 1,042
Health professions and related clinical sciences ............................ 1,920 2,053 2,242 2,913 3,328
         
Legal professions and studies ................................... 58 74 286 79 105
Liberal arts and sciences,           
  general studies, and humanities ................................. 78 83 102 113 78
Library science .......................................... 55 68 58 45 62
Mathematics and statistics ........................................ 1,090 1,075 997 923 1,007
Multi/interdisciplinary studies ................................ 754 792 784 765 899
         
Parks, recreation, leisure and fitness studies ................... 137 134 177 151 199
Philosophy and religious studies .................................. 584 598 600 610 662
Physical sciences and science technologies ............................. 4,142 3,963 3,911 3,760 3,858
Psychology ......................................... 4,695 4,731 5,091 4,759 4,831
Public administration and social services ........................ 532 537 574 571 596
         
Security and protective services .................................... 48 52 44 49 72
Social sciences and history ........................................ 3,855 4,095 3,930 3,902 3,850
Theology and religious vocations .................... 1,440 1,630 1,461 1,350 1,321
Transportation and materials moving ..................... 0 0 0 0 0
Visual and performing arts ............................... 1,130 1,127 1,167 1,114 1,293
Not classified by field of study ................... 6 71 63 0 0

 

 


Question
Why is supply of doctoral faculty, and possibly all business faculty, not a sustainable process?

Jensen Answer
See Below


Question
Why do accounting doctoral students have to be more like science students than medical students and law students?

Jensen Answer
With the explosion of demand for accounting faculty, production of only about 100 doctoral graduates from AACSB schools is no longer a sustainable process. Perhaps the time has come to have a Scholarship Track and a Research Track in accounting doctoral studies. One of the real barriers to entry has been the narrow quantitative method and science method curriculum now required in virtually all doctoral programs in accountancy. Many accounting professionals who contemplate returning to college for doctoral degrees are not interested and/or not talented in our present narrow Ph.D. curriculum.

In my opinion this will work only if our most prestigious universities take the lead in lending prestige to Scholarship Track doctoral students in accounting. Case Western is one university that has already taken a small step in this direction. Now lets open this alternative to younger students who have perhaps only had a few years experience in accounting practice,

In the January 30, 2006 edition of New Bookmarks I presented tables of the numbers of doctoral graduates in all disciplines with particular stress on those in accounting, finance, and business in general. As baby boomers from the World War II era commence to retire, the AACSB International predicts a crisis shortage of new faculty to take their place and to meet the growth in popularity of business programs in universities. In August 2002, the AACSB International Management Education Task Force (METF) issued a landmark report, “Management Education at Risk.” The  2002 report on this is available at http://www.aacsb.edu/publications/dfc/default.asp
 

In particular, note the section on Rethinking Doctoral Education quoted below.

Rethinking Doctoral Education

Several issues in doctoral education are in need of rethinking in light of doctoral faculty shortages.  They include vertical orientation, strategies for sourcing doctoral faculty, the relevance of curricula, rewards and promotion, accreditation standards, and leveraging technology.

Vertical Orientation

Doctoral education is built on vertical orientation to disciplines, requiring prospective applicants to choose their field at the point of entry.  Many doctoral programs train students in narrowly defined research agendas, giving them little, if any, exposure to research problems and methodologies outside their discipline.  In parallel, most hiring adheres to traditional departmental tracks, with few instances of cross-departmental appointments because they are inherently challenging to the structure of most business schools.  Among the schools that are exceptions is IMD, in Switzerland, which eliminated departmental and rank distinctions.

Meanwhile, advancement in business knowledge and thinking requires research frameworks that can span functional and industry boundaries.  And businesses continue to call for more cross-functional education in undergraduate and MBA programs.  There is inevitable and healthy tension between training and theory in vertical disciplines, on the one hand, and the evolving issues of the marketplace that tend to defy such neat categorization, on the other.

There is little question that schools need to add to their doctoral curricula research training that encompasses questions and methodologies across vertical boundaries.  Unless some shifts are instituted, the training ground for researchers in business will become less relevant to the knowledge advances the marketplace needs and demands, and to the teaching and learning needs within business schools.

Strategies for Sourcing Doctoral Faculty

To preserve the inimitable scholarship role of business academics, faculty resources need to be better leveraged.  Business schools must address pervasive doctoral shortages creatively by reaching beyond traditional sources for doctoral faculty.  Though not without challenges, the following are among possible alternative sources of doctoral faculty:

Along with tapping new sources for doctoral faculty, such strategies may have the added benefit of increasing the "practice" flavor of curricula.

A concurrent approach to support continued, vibrant scholarship of business research faculty is a productivity-enhancement strategy, rather than a focus on faculty supply.  The reason for suggesting that approaches to enhance productivity are needed is that reduced teaching loads alone do not ensure increased faculty research contributions.  Possible such approaches include faculty development in best research practices; greater flexibility in faculty employment relationships, to facilitate researcher collaboration and mobility across institutions; a multilevel faculty model that fine-tunes faculty assignments to fit their competencies; and differentiated performance accountability and rewards around these assignments.

The quest for sustained research productivity also hinges on our definition of research.  EQUIS, the business school accreditation program offered by the European Foundation for Management Development, has proposed an expanded definition of research to include research, development, and innovation (RDI).  RDI includes activities related to the origination, dissemination, and application of knowledge to practical management.

I have always been one to distinguish scholarship from research. One can be a scholar by mastering some important subset of what is already known. A researcher must attempt to contribute new knowledge to this subset. Every academic discipline has an obligation to conduct research in an effort to keep the knowledge base dynamic and alive. However, this does not necessarily mean that every tenured professor must have been a researcher at some point along the way as long as the criteria for tenure include highly significant scholarship. This tends not to be the model we work with in colleges and universities in modern times. But given the extreme shortages in accounting doctoral students, perhaps the time has come to attract more scholars into our discipline. It will require a huge rethinking of curriculum and thesis requirements, and I do think there should be a thesis requirement that demonstrates advanced scholarship. I also think that the curriculum should cover a variety of disciplines without aspirations to produce Super CPAs to teach accounting. Possibly universities will even generate some doctoral theses other than the present ones that everybody hopes, including the authors, that nobody will read.

Medical schools have used these two tracks for years. Some medical professors are highly skilled clinically and teach medicine without necessarily devoting 80% of their time in research labs. Other medical professors spend more than 80% of their time in research labs. In law, the distinction is less obvious, but I think when push comes to shove there are many law professors who have mastered case law without contributing significantly to what the legal profession would call new knowledge. Other law professors are noted for their contributions to new theory.

Along these lines follows an obligation to teach “professionalization” in an effort to attract doctoral students
Donald E. Hall finishes his series with proposals to change the dissertation process and a call to teach “professionalization.”
"Collegiality and Graduate School Training," by Donald E. Hall, Inside Higher Ed, January 24, 2006 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/workplace/2006/01/24/hall

This emphasis on conversational skills and commitments allows us then to fine tune also our definition of what “professionalization” actually means. Certainly in the venues above — the classroom and in research mentorship — we work to make our students more aware of the norms and best practices of academic professional life. But the graduate programs that are most concerned with meeting their students’ needs attend also to that professionalization process by offering seminars, roundtables, workshops, and other activities to students intent on or just thinking about pursuing an academic career. In all of these it is important to note that aspiring academics are not only entering the conversation represented by their research fields, but also the conversation of a dynamic and multi-faceted profession.

This does mean encouraging literal conversations among graduate students and recent graduates who have taken a wide variety of positions — from high profile academic, to teaching centered, to those in the publishing industry and a wide variety of non-academic fields. I started this essay by noting that when I was a graduate student I had never heard from or about individuals who had taken jobs like the one I eventually took. Certainly I could have sought out those individuals on my own (though I didn’t know them personally, since they were not part of my cohort group), but it is also true that those individuals were not generally recognized as ones to emulate.

One hopes, given the terrible prospects that most new Ph.D.’s face today as they enter the academic job market, that such snobbishness has waned. However, I still would not go so far as to say that we should tell students that “any job” is better than “no job” or that they should simply “take what they can get.” Some individuals would be terribly mismatched with certain positions — weak teachers who live for research should not take positions at teaching universities unless they are willing to re-prioritize and devote their energies to improving their pedagogies. Similarly, I have known superb teachers with poor research habits and skills who have taken wholly inappropriate positions at prestigious universities and then lost those jobs for low research productivity during third year or tenure reviews (unfortunately, they sometimes got their jobs in the first place because they were able to — and were counseled to — market themselves within certain highly sought-after identity political fields but with no recognition of their own individual needs or abilities). A discussion of who will be happy and will succeed where must be part of any broad conversation on the academic profession, whether that conversation takes place in seminars, workshops, or with groups of students about to “go on the market.”

Indeed, it is vital to invite students into conversation on these matters as often and as early as possible. At the beginning of every meeting of every graduate class I teach, I ask if there are any questions on the minds of the students regarding their program, general professional issues or processes, or the often unexplained norms of academic life. Even if students are sometimes too shy to ask what they really want to know in class, their recognition of my willingness to address such issues means they often show up during office hours to ask what they consider an embarrassing question (“how much do assistant professors typically make?” or “what do you say in a cover letter when you send out an article for consideration?”). We have to let students know that we are willing to share information with them in an honest and practical manner. We should be “open texts” for them to read and learn from in their own processes of professional interpretation and skill-building.

I believe it would be useful to build some of the expectations above into the desired outcomes of our graduate programs. In fact, I haven’t heard of any programs that articulate specific goals for professionalization processes, but I think we should be asking what specifically we wish the end product to be of those seminars, workshops, and other conversations about academic life. I would offer that an overarching goal might be to help our students become more supple and skilled participants in the wide variety of conversations that comprise an academic career. By necessity, acquiring this conversational skill means learning the value of being both multi-voiced and open to the perspectives of others.

This bears some explanation. By multi-voiced I am not implying that students should learn to be Machiavellian or duplicitous. Rather, I mean that all of us who are thriving in our careers have learned to speak within a wide variety of contexts and to choose our language carefully depending upon the venue. I would never speak in class as I do in some of my more theoretically dense writings. I would never speak to administrators from other departments as I do to those in my home department who use the same terms and points of reference. And finally I would never speak to the public exactly as I would to a scholarly audience at a conference. Being multi-voiced in this way means being aware of your conversation partners’ needs and placing their need to understand above your own desire to express yourself in intellectually self-serving ways.

And this is, in fact, an important component of being open to the perspectives of others. Yet that openness also means allowing one’s own beliefs, values, and opinions to be challenged and transformed by contact with those of conversation partners. This does not mean being unwilling to defend one’s beliefs (whether on matters of social justice or minute points of interpretation), but it does mean being able to position oneself at least partially outside of oneself in the process of conversational exchange. It certainly means working to understand how the general public perceives the academy (and the debate over tenure, for example). It means trying to see the world through the eyes of a different generation of professors who may not use the same methodologies or theoretical touchstones in their work. It means seeing one’s own sacredly held positions as ones that exist in a landscape of positions, many of which are also sacredly held.

Continued in article


December 11, 2005 message from David Albrecht [albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]

At Bowling Green, much institutional emphasis is being placed on having undergraduates conduct or participate in research. Of course, I'm pretty sure the program is slanted toward the hard sciences. An economics professor here is active in this area. She suggests that I get involved.

I'd love to get involved, there are significant rewards being tossed about.

On what would my undergraduates do research?

Please help me.

David Albrecht

December 12, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi David,

At the college of business level, you might suggest that your college become involved in the highly popular National Conferences on Undergraduate Research (NCUR). This affords students the opportunity to travel a bit and make presentations with other students at the excellent NCUR conferences. It also is an opportunity to promote your college and its faculty. Your social and physical science colleges may already be involved with NCUR --- http://www.ncur.org/ 

As far as research goes, I think it would be great to have students write responses to FASB, GASB, and IASB exposure drafts and other invitations to comment. Undergraduate research is not as esoteric as PhD research and leaves some room for normative methodology.

Along these lines I had an opportunity to view two absolutely absurd referee reports sent to a professor, not me, with respect to a submission. His submission suggested, among other things, that some accounting faculty should spend more time responding to standard setters' invitations to comment on matters that need more applied research. For lack of a better term, I will call this applied research in accounting.

The reports of both referees were highly critical of professors trying to publish applied research in any AAA journals (including Accounting Horizons which they assert is read mostly by academics rather than practitioners). Perhaps they might make an allowance for Issues in Accounting Education, but no mention is made for IAE in these referee reports.

I think the following quotation (listed as the Number 1 criticism) from one of the referee reports pretty much sums up the sad state of academic accounting research today.

I quote:

*************
1. The paper provides specific recommendations for things that accounting academics should be doing to make the accounting profession better. However (unless the author believes that academics' time is a free good) this would presumably take academics' time away from what they are currently doing. While following the author's advice might make the accounting profession better, what is being made worse? In other words, suppose I stop reading current academic research and start reading news about current developments in accounting standards. Who is made better off and who is made worse off by this reallocation of my time? Presumably my students are marginally better off, because I can tell them some new stuff in class about current accounting standards, and this might possibly have some limited benefit on their careers. But haven't I made my colleagues in my department worse off if they depend on me for research advice, and haven't I made my university worse off if its academic reputation suffers because I'm no longer considered a leading scholar? Why does making the accounting profession better take precedence over everything else an academic does with their time?
**************

Both referees imply that studying accounting standards will take our researchers away from what's really important in accounting academe, namely publishing empirical and analytical research on problems that lend themselves to esoteric statistics and mathematics. The irony is that most of the esoteric research published research along those lines is more or less focused on trivial hypotheses of little interest in and of themselves. Certainly our academic friends in economics and finance are not subscribing to our accounting research journals. We, of course, subscribe to their esoteric journals.

Once again I make my case that that academic research hypotheses published in top accounting research journals cannot be of much interest since all top accounting research journals in academe have a policy against publication of replication studies. What value can the findings have of the replication studies are of no interest? See http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Replication

The bottom line is that real scientists, economists, medical researchers, and legal researchers would laugh the above two arrogant AAA journal referees off the face of the planet. I'm certainly glad that medical researchers focus on professional practice problems and insist on replication. I'm certainly glad that biology researchers focus on microbes that are helping or hindering life on earth. I'm certainly glad that legal research is almost entirely focused on real world case law. No respectable academic discipline, other than accounting, divorces itself from the practice of its own profession. I think this is the main reason academic accounting research is held is such low esteem both by practitioners and by other academic disciplines. We've become a sick joke.

What the two idiots, who are typical arrogant referees for AAA journals, are doing, David, is leaving a whole lot of room for Bowling Green's undergraduates to conduct research on the important problems of the academic profession while they themselves go off and play in the sandbox of research that their own top journals conclude is not worth replicating. I suggest to you David that there is ample room for your undergraduates do applied research that may benefit the profession. Just do not expect the arrogant "philosophers" who guard the gates of our academic accounting research journals to allow any of this research pass into the gates of heaven.

I think the two referee reports mentioned above are exactly what the current AAA President (Judy Rayburn) and the Past President (Jane Mutchler) are trying in vain to overcome by changing the refereeing policy of the AAA's leading journals. I'm certain the prejudices of our arrogant ivory tower academics are so ingrained that these two women are fighting losing battles.

I suggest that you, David, conduct a lab experiment in your undergraduate classes. Bring a scale to each class and have the students weigh the last four issues of The Accounting Review. Then have students weigh the last four issues of Accounting Horizons. You must first tear out only the research articles themselves since both journals do publish some items that are not research submissions to the journals. Please publish this comparative study on the AECM. I think the results will speak for themselves about the sad state of applied research in accounting academe.

Imagine the how academe might be shaken up if an AAA Doctoral Consortium were entirely devoted one year to taking up current issues facing the FASB, GASB, and IASB. The very foundations of academe might crumble if we let outsiders into the tightly controlled esoteric program of the Doctoral Consortium and corrupt the research biases of our new doctoral graduates in accountancy.

Send your undergraduate researchers marching forward David. The accounting world will be a better place. The profession is getting very little help from unreplicated research articles that pass through the gates diligently guarded by arrogant and narcisstic AAA journal referees.

Bob Jensen

December 12, 2005 reply from McCarthy, William [mccarthy@BUS.MSU.EDU]

On Monday 12 December 2005, David Fordham wrote on AECM:

...

No matter how good it is, no matter what its form, systems research will not be published in accounting journals given the current editorship and review staff

...

David and other AECM system researchers:

This has been generally true in the past and there are certainly still a host of accounting journals that underestimate the importance of accounting information systems (AIS) research. Additionally, it is still true that almost all accounting academics remain clueless about the different kinds of methodologies that AIS, MIS, and computer science researchers generally use. Thus, accounting systems people (like Dave and I plus many AECM members) are forced to live in an academic world that understands neither “the what” nor “the how” of AIS research and teaching.

However, the American Accounting Association (in general) and The Accounting Review (in particular) are taking steps to narrow this gap in understanding. Dan Dhaliwal, the senior editor of The Accounting Review (TAR) has appointed me – a known maverick in accounting circles and a long-time champion of AIS research and teaching -- as an editor for TAR.

That was the good news; now the bad (sort of) news. Since the announcement in August of a systems champion at the Review, we have seen no changes because systems people are not submitting manuscripts. I know that gearing up takes a while, but in the interim, I think we need to speak less of our underprivileged past status and concentrate more on how we are going to attack the myriad of problems that accounting faces today with systems-informed thinking and systems-informed methods. If you fervently believe that the practice of accounting benefits little from what TAR, JAR, JAE, et al. produce, and you also believe that accounting practice could benefit tremendously from improvements researched and suggested by good AIS people and computer scientists, you need to get busy.

I am going to give a speech on this at the AAA Information Systems Section mid-year meeting on January 7th, 2006, but in the interim, I hope people can use their inter-term break time to get the flow to TAR increased. Let’s get going!!

Bill McCarthy
Michigan State

Dennis Beresford, former Chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board and current Ernst & Young Professor of Accounting at the University of Georgia, had much to recommend on how academic accountants could improve.  His luncheon speech on August 10, 2005 at the AAA Annual Meetings in San Francisco is provided at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/BeresfordAAAspeech2005.htm
I snipped the above URL to
http://snipurl.com/Beresford2005

My apologies for some formatting that was lost when I converted Denny's DOC file into a HTM file.

December 12, 2005 reply from David Albrecht

What is applied research?

I've never been able to figure this one out.

David Albrecht

December 13, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi David,

First let me point out that for over three decades, Denny Beresford has been appealing for more applied research among accounting educators.  Two days ago I requested and received his permission to post his luncheon speech at the annual 2005 AAA meetings in San Francisco.  His somewhat emotional appeal is at  http://snipurl.com/Beresford2005

You can obtain various definitions of applied research by going to
http://www.google.com/advanced_search?hl=en
Type in the following in one of the search boxes:

        Define "Applied Research"

Among the many definitions the one I like is that basic research is "the  systematic, intensive study directed toward the practical application of knowledge and problem solving."
www.unlv.edu/depts/cas/glossary.htm

 The key word in this definition is "practical application."  In the context of the accountancy profession I think of this is as discovery of practical applications that can be put into place by practicing accountants and their firms.  Included here are practical applications for standard setters such as the FASB, GASB, and IASB.

By way of example, I would include virtually all of the applied research papers published by Ira Kawaller on the practical applications of derivative financial instruments and accounting for derivative financial instruments --- http://www.kawaller.com/articles.shtml  

By way of a particular example, I like Ira's applied research on when to use dollar-offset versus regression tests of hedge effectiveness.  Hedge effectiveness testing is required for hedge accounting per Paragraph 62 in FAS 133.  The FASB does not prescribe how such testing should be done in practice.  It only says such testing is required.  Ira makes some practical  suggestions at http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/AFP_Regression.pdf

I contend that most ABC costing research is of an applied nature since most published papers and the seminal discoveries of ABC by the John Deere Company back in the 1940s are intended for practical application.

Lines between basic research and applied research in accounting are really  confusing because it is common to associate quantitative methods and/or historical methodology with basic research.  Basic research should not be confused with tools and methods of research.  Basic research quite simply is a research discovery, new knowledge, that has no perceived application in practice or at best has some hope for possible discovery of practical applications in future applied research.

I suspect that the discovery of the structure of DNA by Watson and Crick is conceived as basic research.  Applied researchers later on found ways to put this to use in practice such as the practice of using DNA evidence in criminal cases. 

I suspect that portfolio theory in the 1959 doctoral dissertation of Harry Markowitz at Princeton would be considered basic research that later led to the CAPM model and Options Pricing Model applied in practice.  The discovery by Markowitz was totally impractical until simplified index models were later discovered when trying to apply Markowitz theory to actual portfolio choices.

The best examples of basic versus applied research discoveries probably come from the discipline of mathematics.  Theoretical mathematicians like to prove things with no thought as to possible relevance to anything in the real world.

 It is much more difficult to find truly basic research discoveries in accountancy.  We should be grateful that we do not have to select Nobel Prize Winners in accountancy.  The Ball and Brown study got the first Seminal Contribution Award from the AAA.  But this is an application of capital market research discovered previously by researchers in finance and economics.  Capital markets studies have mostly applied models developed in finance, econometrics, and statistics.   

What I am saying is that it is possible to apply theory and test hypotheses without intending to have the discoveries be put directly into practice in a profession.  For example an events study such as the discovery by George Foster that the publication of a Barrons' paper by Abe Briloff was highly correlated with a plunge in share prices of McDonalds Corporation tells us something about an association between Briloff's accounting publication and capital market events.  But correlation is not causation.  Foster's study could not really tell us if the accounting issue (dirty pooling) or the mere fact that Briloff said something negative about McDonalds in Barrons actually caused the plunge in share prices.

The bottom line here is that the basic versus applied research distinction in mathematics and science does not carry over well into accounting.  I prefer to make the distinction more along the lines of research not having versus having a direct impact on practicing accountants.  For example, Ira's paper on hedge effectiveness techniques had immediate and direct impact on having firms use dollar-offset testing for retrospective data and regression for prospective data.  Companies actually follow Ira's recommendations when implementing FAS 133 rules. 

So what makes Ira's study different from those of Ball and Brown, Beaver, and Foster?  I guess the distinction lies in the "take home" for practicing accountants and standard setters.  Most capital markets research discoveries do not provide the CPA on the street with something to immediately place into practice or take out of practice.  The Ira Kawaller studies linked above provide CFOs with strategies for hedging and CAOs/CPAs with strategies for implementing FAS 133.

Now the question is:  What is Denny Beresford asking us to provide to the standard setters?  I think what he's asking for is more along the lines of Ira Kawaller's practical-application contributions.  If Ira's studies had been done before FAS 133 was issued, the standard itself in Paragraph 62 might have suggested or even required specific types of hedge effectiveness testing.  Instead Paragraph 62 of FAS 133 offered no suggestions for how to test for effectiveness.  This has led to thousands of variations, often inconsistent, of hedge effectiveness testing in practice.

Both while he was Chairman of the FASB and after he became a professor of accounting at Georgia, Denny Beresford has consistently been appealing for the academy to conduct research that will have more direct benefit in the writing of accounting standards.  This of course entails a considerable effort in learning the issues faced by standard setters on particular complicated issues like the thousands of different types of derivative financial instruments actually used in practice.  Most academic accountants shun learning about such contracts and instead turn to tried and true regression models of data found in existing databases like those provided by Compustat and Audit Analytics.  My conclusion is that this so-called basic research is actually easier than making creative contributions to practicing accountants, i.e. providing them with discoveries that they did not make themselves in practice.  This is so tough that it is why the academy tends to avoid Denny's appeal.

I repeat and lament the sad state of the accountancy academy as reflected in the following quotation from a referee that closed the gate on publishing a paper of a very close friend of mine:

I quote:

*************

1. The paper provides specific recommendations for things that accounting academics should be doing to make the accounting profession better. However (unless the author believes that academics' time is a free good) this would presumably take academics' time away from what they are currently doing. While following the author's advice might make the accounting profession better, what is being made worse? In other words, suppose I stop reading current academic research and start reading news about current developments in accounting standards. Who is made better off and who is made worse off by this reallocation of my time? Presumably my students are marginally better off, because I can tell them some new stuff in class about current accounting standards, and this might possibly have some limited benefit on their careers. But haven't I made my colleagues in my department worse off if they depend on me for research advice, and haven't I made my university worse off if its academic reputation suffers because I'm no longer considered a leading scholar? Why does making the accounting profession better take precedence over everything else an academic does with their time?

**************

My bottom line conclusion is that the referee acting superior above is really scared to death that he or she cannot be creative enough to make a practical suggestion to the FASB that the FASB itself has not already discovered. 

          Bob Jensen

March 18, 2008 reply from Paul Williams [Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]


Steve Zeff has been saying this since his stint as editor of The Accounting Review (TAR); nobody has listened. Zeff famously wrote at least two editorials published in TAR over 30 years ago that lamented the colonization of the accounting academy by the intellectually unwashed. He and Bill Cooper wrote a comment on Kinney's tutorial on how to do accounting research and it was rudely rejected by TAR. It gained a new life only when Tony Tinker published it as part of an issue of Critical Perspectives in Accounting devoted to the problem of dogma in accounting research.

It has only been since less subdued voices have been raised (outright rudeness has been the hallmark of those who transformed accounting into the empirical sub-discipline of a sub-discipline for which empirical work is irrelevant) that any movement has occurred. Judy Rayburn's diversity initiative and her invitation for Anthony Hopwood to give the Presidential address at the D.C. AAA meeting came only after many years of persistent unsubdued pointing out of things that were uncomfortable for the comfortable to confront.

Paul Williams
paul_williams@ncsu.edu 
(919)515-4436
 

January 19, 2006 reply from Paul Williams [williamsp@COMFS1.COM.NCSU.EDU]

This type of review is all too common and is symptomatic of what the accounting academy has become. I recall a panel discussion that was organized for an AAA annual meeting (I believe it was the last time we held it in Washington) to air an issue that Bill Cooper was animated about at that time -- data sharing and the bigger problem of research impropriety. One of the panelists was a scientist from John Hopkins who had just started a research ethics journal. As part of this program editors of many leading accounting journals were invited to give their perspectives on the problem of replication and potential research malfeasance. Of course none thought there was any problem.

One editor (still an editor of one of the most prominent journals)  responding to the scientist's contention that the scholarly enterprise is to ultimately seek knowledge, concurred, but added, (paraphrased, but pretty close) "An alternative hypothesis is that the academic enterprise is a game constructed to identify the cleverest people so we know who to give the money to."

His smirk revealed a great deal about what he believed to be the silly idea that scholarship was about knowledge. The reviewer's reply above is evidence that the hypothesis about an academic game is more believable than one in which the academic enterprise in accounting has understanding anything as its objective. And the profession is certainly culpable. It created professorships and awarded them to the winners of this game. It funded the JAR conferences. It dropped out of the AAA. This may be because the profession has never had any great respect for scholarship, at least not in my lifetime. Medical scholarship is not about creating profit opportunities for doctors; neither is legal scholarship about creating profit opportunities for lawyers. Perhaps this is why we now have, as Ray Chambers opined in his Abacus article in 1999 (just before he passed away) that we had created vast tomes of incoherent rules "...as if for a profession of morons."


The shift from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft.

"Notes from the Underground," by Scott McLemee, Inside Higher Ed, January 18, 2006 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2006/01/18/mclemee

“Knowledge and competence increasingly developed out of the internal dynamics of esoteric disciplines rather than within the context of shared perceptions of public needs,” writes Bender. “This is not to say that professionalized disciplines or the modern service professions that imitated them became socially irresponsible. But their contributions to society began to flow from their own self-definitions rather than from a reciprocal engagement with general public discourse.”

Now, there is a definite note of sadness in Bender’s narrative – as there always tends to be in accounts of the shift from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft. Yet it is also clear that the transformation from civic to disciplinary professionalism was necessary.

“The new disciplines offered relatively precise subject matter and procedures,” Bender concedes, “at a time when both were greatly confused. The new professionalism also promised guarantees of competence — certification — in an era when criteria of intellectual authority were vague and professional performance was unreliable.”

But in the epilogue to Intellect and Public Life, Bender suggests that the process eventually went too far. “The risk now is precisely the opposite,” he writes. “Academe is threatened by the twin dangers of fossilization and scholasticism (of three types: tedium, high tech, and radical chic). The agenda for the next decade, at least as I see it, ought to be the opening up of the disciplines, the ventilating of professional communities that have come to share too much and that have become too self-referential.”

The above quotation does not contain beginning and ending parts of the article


I loved the Marx Brothers Analogy in This One:  It shows what happens when government runs a business

"Is This Any Way to Run a Railroad? You think you've got problems? Amtrak's got an overpaid workforce. Its trains and tracks are falling apart. Worse, the carrier's balance sheet is a flat-out mess," by John Goff, CFO Magazine, November 2005 --- http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/5077873/c_5101083?f=magazine_featured

As Marx Brothers movies go, Go West isn't much. The aging comedy team was running out of ideas, and it shows: the plot is predictable and the gags are stale. Yet there is one memorable scene in the 1940 film. In it, the boys — desperate to keep a steam-powered locomotive chugging along — feed the entire train to itself, car by car, piece by piece, caboose to tender.

Management at the National Railroad Passenger Corp., better known as Amtrak, performed a similar sacrifice in 2001. Four years into an effort to wean itself from federal operating subsidies, the rail carrier was running on empty. Executives had already started diverting funds earmarked for capital projects to help plug operating holes. But even that wasn't enough, and soon, Amtrak's management began cannibalizing the railroad. Recalls Cliff Black, Amtrak's director of media relations: "We mortgaged everything."

Things got so bad that the railroad took out a loan on New York's Pennsylvania Station to cover three months of expenses. It was a move the U.S. Office of Management and Budget called "a financial absurdity equivalent to a family taking out a second mortgage on its home to pay its grocery bills." Eventually, Amtrak conceded it couldn't break even, and Congress continued pumping funds back into the rail operator.

The damage to the balance sheet had been done, however. During the five-year plan, the carrier's debt load nearly tripled, from $1.7 billion to $4.8 billion. Once dubbed the "Glide Path to Profitability," Amtrak's intended march to self-sufficiency is termed something else by current CFO David Smith. "I call it the slippery slope to hell," he says.

Since taking the reins last November, Smith has personally spent considerable time in purgatory — stuck awaiting vital federal funding for the carrier while politicians dither over the future of passenger rail service. "Amtrak's never had full support from any Administration. And it has no ongoing real capital budget," notes James Coston, chairman of Corridor Capital LLC, which specializes in finance and development for intercity and commuter rail systems. "So each year, they go up to Capitol Hill with a tin cup."

And that cup remains far from full. Last February, for example, the White House announced it intended to cut off Amtrak's billion-dollar-plus annual subsidy — which covers about half the railroad's total budget — unless the carrier agreed to a radical restructuring. Both the House and the Senate defied the Administration, calling for subsidies ranging from $1.17 billion to $1.45 billion for 2006 (the carrier generated $1.9 billion in revenues last year against $2.9 billion in costs). But the details have yet to be ironed out, and it's still unclear just how much money Amtrak will get.

Amid the revenue uncertainty, Smith must somehow pay down Amtrak's borrowings, upgrade its information technology and financial skills, and wring concessions from entrenched unions. He is also charged with mapping out long-term capital investments on the railroad's antiquated infrastructure — a tall order when you don't actually know what funds will be available to finance the repairs. And he must do all this under the scrutiny of an Administration whose purported goal, says Amtrak president and CEO David Gunn, is "to destroy Amtrak."

It is, in sum, a nearly impossible to-do list. But judging from his efforts so far, Smith has what it takes to defy long odds: steadiness, belief, and a certain imperviousness to the Coliseum crowd. Some observers say his first year on the job could be used as a case study for grace under fire. Says Coston: "I can't imagine a tougher job than being CFO at Amtrak."

December 5, 2005 reply from Paul Williams

Bob, Come on! This kind of argument is unfair. You sound like the folks at Rochester. Outcomes I like I attribute to market forces and the private sector; outcomes I don't like are the fault of government meddling. I defy anyone to draw a line that demarcates private from public outcomes. The intertwining of government and economics is today the same as it has always been. Abandoning the messy world of political economy for the mathematically elegant imaginary world of mere economics makes for a nice living for a lot of mathematicians. Since my paycheck is drawn on the account of the State of North Carolina I am legally a government employee. NC State's Centennial Campus is living testament to the impossibility, in a meaningful scientific sense (as opposed to a rhetorical sense), of the distinction between pubic and private. All that exists are organizations within a context of constraints and incentives mutually determined by economic, political, and social forces (if force is the right metaphor).

Paul Williams
paul_williams@ncsu.edu  (919)515-4436

December 6, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen

From the KPMG Audit Report on September 30, 2004 --- http://www.amtrak.com/pdf/04financial.pdf The Company (Amtrak) has a history of substantial operating losses and is highly dependent upon substantial Federal government subsidies to sustain its operations. There are currently no Federal government subsidies authorized or appropriated for any period subsequent to the fiscal year ending September 30, 2005 (“fiscal year 2005”). Without such subsidies, Amtrak will not be able to continue to operate in its current form and significant operating changes, restructuring or bankruptcy may occur. Such changes or restructuring would likely result in asset impairments.

************************

I guess I have to agree Paul that the difference between Amtrak and other businesses, like farmers, dependent upon government subsidies is largely semantic (rhetorical). In a sense, Amtrak is less like Fanny Mae since Amtrak's debt is not guaranteed by the Federal government. It is also less like the U.S. Post Office since Amtrak did sell equity (that has nearly been wiped out by huge deficits). Like the Post Office, Amtrak does negotiate directly with the government for appropriations to a particular business. But unlike the Post Office, I think Amtrak can set prices without an act of Congress.

The lines are indeed fuzzy between government enterprises, private enterprises directly subsidized, private enterprises indirectly subsidized, and the theoretical private firms that have no government subsidies. There may not be any such private firms in modern times since nearly every product or service is indirectly subsidized somewhere along the supply chain.

One possible distinction between public and private enterprises is whether the government is obligated to pay creditors off in full if the enterprise fails. I gather that this is the case for NC state universities, the U.S. Post Office, and Fannie Mae (even though Fanny Mae also sells equity shares). Debt guarantees are not assured in the case of Amtrak such that Amtrak is closer to being private in this context. In this context, classifying public versus private enterprises becomes a sliding scale as to what portion of the debt is guaranteed by the government. Pension guarantees cloud this issue since these are a form of insurance that enterprises must buy into to become partly covered.

I'm not certain where your argument bears much fruit if we don't have some distinction between public and private. If subsidies make every enterprise a government enterprise, wouldn't all businesses become government enterprises? It would not be helpful to have no definition of private enterprise since many equity owners and creditors can still fail and do every day in firms where the government does not guarantee repayment of all debt.

One problem of debt guarantees like we have in Fanny Mae and the Post Office is that managers of those companies can be tempted put their companies in extremely high levels of debt risk because creditors are always willing to loan to the hilt if the government guarantees repayment. Then cowboy managers might be tempted to borrow great amounts to pay for highly inefficient operating costs or make extremely high risk investments (as Fannie Mae did with billions invested in losing manufactured housing mortgages).

When I started this thread I mistakenly thought that Amtrak's debt was guaranteed by the government. What amazes me is how Amtrak is still able to borrow money to finance losing operations. Creditors (who are largely in Canada and France) must have faith that the U.S. government will not allow Amtrak to fail in spite of Amtrak's bleak future for ever earning a profit. Apparently the close association of Amtrak and government make it not like Penn Central in the eyes of lenders.

The Timeline of the Recent History of Fannie Mae Scandals 2002-2008 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm#FannieMae
"Fannie Mayhem: A History," The Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2008


A huge corporate finance textbook
From Jim Mahar's Blog on October 17, 2005 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

Vernimmen.com --- http://vernimmen.com/

What a great site!

When I was gone I received a message from the authors of Corporate Finance by Vernimmen, Quiry, Le Fur, and Salvi.

The book, newsletter, and website are all very interesting and useful.

The book is 48 chapters (about 1000 pages) full of corporate finance. I have to agree with the authors "It is a book in which theory and practice are constantly set off against each other...."

I really like it. Especially the emphasis not so much on techniques ("which tend to shift and change over time."

VERY WELL DONE!

Moreover, the authors also put out a monthly newsletter and have a web site that could stand alone as one of the best in the business.

Vernimmen.com --- http://vernimmen.com/

Jensen Comment:
Perhaps intermediate accounting textbooks will one day follow this lead of contrasting theory and practice.


Accentuate the Obvious
Not every scientist can discover the double helix, or the cellular basis of memory, or the fundamental building blocks of matter. But fear not. For those who fall short of these lofty goals, another entry in the "publications" section of the ol' c.v. is within your reach. The proliferation of scientific journals and meetings makes it possible to publish or present papers whose conclusion inspires less "Wow! Who would have guessed?" and more "For this you got a Ph.D.?" In what follows (with thanks to colleagues who passed along their favorites), names have been withheld to protect the silly.
Sharon Begley, "Scientists Research Questions Few Others Would Bother to Ask," The Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2005; Page B1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB111715390781744684,00.html
Jensen Comment:  Although some of the studies Begley cites are well-intended, her article does remind me of some of the more extreme studies that won Senator Proxmire's Golden Fleece Awards --- http://www.taxpayer.net/awards/goldenfleece/about.htm
Also see http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/G/GoldenF1l.asp
Accounting research in top accounting journals seldom is not so much a fleecing as it is a disappointment in drawing "obvious" conclusions that practicing accountants "would not bother to ask."  Behavioral studies focus on what can be studied rather than what is interesting to study.  Studies based on analytical mathematics often start with assumptions that guarantee the outcomes.  And capital markets event studies either "discover" the obvious or are inconclusive.


A Populist Movement in Accounting Research

At the 2005 American Accounting Association meetings in San Francisco, the 2005-2006 President, Judy Rayburn from the University of Minnesota, gave a luncheon speech about the State of the AAA.  The AAA is not in the best of shape and comparisons are made with other academic associations in business studies such as finance and management.

What is especially interesting is the current populist movement going on in the AAA.  It is built upon the argument that the AAA journals and meeting programs became too detached from the accounting profession and problems within the profession.  There is a strong movement rising to change the editorial biases of the AAA’s top journals that have been tightly controlled by positivists demanding great rigor in empirical and analytical studies.  One problem is that such demands for rigor have limited researchers to rather uninteresting problems that derive outcomes of little surprise or interest.  In many respects there is a current populist movement with respect to the entire academic tenure and performance evaluation process.   You can read a bit more about this at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession  

 

August 23, 2005 message from Tracey Sutherland [tracey@AAAHQ.ORG]

Given the lively discussion about Judy Rayburn's luncheon talk in San Francisco, I thought some would be interested in her PowerPoint slides which are posted on the AAA website -- you'll find them at http://aaahq.org/AM2005/menu.htm  . It was great to see many of you at the Annual Meeting -- special thanks to folks for discussing ideas for some of the teaching/learning related sessions developed by the VP for Education -- a session on using games in teaching accounting was an outcome of conversations on AECM.

Best regards, Tracey

Jensen Comment:  Katherine Schipper's Presidential Lecture slides are also available"

Katherine Schipper's Presidential Lecture
(PowerPoint Slides)
Judy Rayburn's President's Talk
(PowerPoint Slides)

I suspect the AAA is holding off on Denny Beresford's speech until it is determined if Accounting Horizons is going to publish his paper.

Cynthia Cooper’s plenary speech on Wednesday is proprietary and will not be published by the AAA. You can, however, find some of her remarks in various places if you run a search on Google. There is a basketball star by that same name, so I suggest you run the search on “Cooper” AND “Worldcom”.

Cooper was one of Time Magazine's 2002 "Persons of the Year" --- http://www.time.com/time/personoftheyear/2002/

Also see http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m4153/is_6_60/ai_111737943

August 23 reply from Ken Crofts [kcrofts@CSU.EDU.AU]

Judy Rayburn’s slides . . . are also interesting, particularly drop in membership of AAA over the years.

Ken


The philosophy of science is a dying discipline
The philosophy of science is a dying discipline in part because it added philosophical terminology and discourse that did not have enough value added to scientists themselves as they got on with the work at hand, particularly social scientists.

Social scientists have moved on from debates over the scientific paradigm. I highly recommend examining how sociologists now proceed without getting all hung up on positivist or anti-positivist dogma --- http://www.trinity.edu/mkearl/methods.html#ms 

I particularly like the following quotation from the above document:

Methodology entails the procedures by which social research, whether  quantitative and qualitative, are conducted and ultimately evaluated--in other words, how one's hypotheses are tested. Getting more specific, researchers' methodologies guide them in defining, collecting, organizing, and interpreting their data. Often the major breakthroughs in our understanding of social processes occur because of the novelty of the data used, the techniques by which it is gathered, or by the model or question directing its acquisition and/or interpretation.  And let's hear it for the findings that don't support the hypotheses at the Journal of Articles in Support of the Null Hypothesis and in the Index of Null Effects and Replication Failures.

Defining one's data: Precisely how does one go about and measure such theoretical concepts as altruistic behavior, esprit de corps, or anomie?  Even such apparent "no brainers" as religiosity, happiness, or social class reveal how methodological adequacy and validity are a function of the clarity of one's theory and its part.  Further, theory tends to be built into our measurement tools.  When, for instance, one measures temperature with a thermometer it is not the temperature per se that one sees but rather a phenomenon (mercury rising within a column) theoretically related to it.

For strategies for data collection see Bill Trochim's Research Methods Tutorials, including material on:

Thinking about using the web for conducting a survey?  Available online is Matthias Schonlau, Ronald D. Fricker, Jr., and Marc N. Elliott's Conducting Research Surveys via E-mail and the Web.

August 22, 2005 reply from Paul Williams at North Carolina State University

To add a bit more to Michael, Ron, and Bob's comments: Even Popper, by the time he died wasn't a Popperian, but an evolutionary epistimologist. Even he had to recognize the implications of the linguistic turn and, particularly, Paul Feyerabend's (a student of Popper) destruction of the pretenses of method. Bob is right that philosophy of science is a dead horse replaced by a sociology and history of science. Even scientists don't follow the scientific method. Underlying every theory are propositions that don't enter into the specific experiment or hypothesis being tested. I am with Ron, and many others, that rigor is not obtained by running experiments within the context of a theory that has absolutely pernicious underlying presuppostions.
Capital market theory and principal/agent theory are such theories.


The pernicious underlying proposition that is both empirically false (as evolutionary biologists and anthropologists have provided ample evidence of the kind you would consider rigorous) and morally repugnant is that of humans' nature. What we in accounting seem never to consider is what ramifications such presuppositions have for the very culture in which we live. As Ed Arrington labeled it, Watts and Zimmerman are merely Hobbes in drag. Hobbesian human nature was constructed to argue for Leviathan -- self- government is beyond the ken of humans engaged in a war of all against all. Certainly a libertarian philosophy is untenable in a Hobbesian world. Solipsistic, vicious self-maximizers. The
project of the Scottish Enlightenment (of which Thomas Jefferson was a diligent student) was to produce a human being who was capable of being free of the rule of Kings or absolute sovereigns.
 

Jagdish provided us a reference to Sumantra Ghoshal's article "Bad Management Theories Are Destroying Good Management Practices." The bad management theories he speaks of are those of agency theory. Why accounting should have been preoccupied for the last 35 years in substance testing a theory of human nature is one of the great mysteries. Principal/agent theory is a bad theory based on its own empirical pretensions. What kind of Rsquares have we produced? Most of human behavior is left unexplained by the theory. And after this last stock market bubble, does anyone seriously believe in capital market efficiency?
 

How good a "scientific" theory do you have when after 40 years of testing you are still back at square one? And if capital markets aren't efficient, what does that do to the 30 years of "information content" studies predicated on the assumption that markets were at least semi-strong efficient? Let me ask this question, of you and everyone else: How much of what you believe do you believe on the basis of the "empirical evidence?" Very little. Indeed, believing you are a Popperian is a belief not based on empirical evidence. No one did an experiment and proved that Popper was
right.


But what makes capital market theory and principal agent theory bad is what it forces me to believe about myself and Michael and Ron and You, which I will not, nor do I have to, accept. To quote from Michael Shermer's The Science of Good and Evil: "Still, something profound happened in the last 100,000 years that made us -- and no other species -- moral animals to a degree unprecedented in nature (p. 31)." Accounting is a human practice.


It's objects are not atoms, or quarks, or stars, or planets. It's objects are also its subjects (the double hermeneutic that our physicists friends don't have to deal with). A human practice that investigates itself as if human capacities are as impoverished as neo-classicists would have us believe they are (both in terms of doing good and evil) might be missing something exceedingly important to it.

 


Kurt Kleiner, "Most scientific papers are probably wrong," New Scientist, August 30, 2005 --- http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7915&feedId=online-news_rss091

Most published scientific research papers are wrong, according to a new analysis. Assuming that the new paper is itself correct, problems with experimental and statistical methods mean that there is less than a 50% chance that the results of any randomly chosen scientific paper are true.

John Ioannidis, an epidemiologist at the University of Ioannina School of Medicine in Greece, says that small sample sizes, poor study design, researcher bias, and selective reporting and other problems combine to make most research findings false. But even large, well-designed studies are not always right, meaning that scientists and the public have to be wary of reported findings.

"We should accept that most research findings will be refuted. Some will be replicated and validated. The replication process is more important than the first discovery," Ioannidis says.

In the paper, Ioannidis does not show that any particular findings are false. Instead, he shows statistically how the many obstacles to getting research findings right combine to make most published research wrong.

Massaged conclusions Traditionally a study is said to be "statistically significant" if the odds are only 1 in 20 that the result could be pure chance. But in a complicated field where there are many potential hypotheses to sift through - such as whether a particular gene influences a particular disease - it is easy to reach false conclusions using this standard. If you test 20 false hypotheses, one of them is likely to show up as true, on average.

Odds get even worse for studies that are too small, studies that find small effects (for example, a drug that works for only 10% of patients), or studies where the protocol and endpoints are poorly defined, allowing researchers to massage their conclusions after the fact.

Surprisingly, Ioannidis says another predictor of false findings is if a field is "hot", with many teams feeling pressure to beat the others to statistically significant findings.

But Solomon Snyder, senior editor at the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, and a neuroscientist at Johns Hopkins Medical School in Baltimore, US, says most working scientists understand the limitations of published research.

"When I read the literature, I'm not reading it to find proof like a textbook. I'm reading to get ideas. So even if something is wrong with the paper, if they have the kernel of a novel idea, that's something to think about," he says.

Journal reference: Public Library of Science Medicine (DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124)

Jensen Comment:  By analogy, this is a black eye against top accounting research journals that refuse to publish replication studies.  It is a special problem for accounting behavior studies where sample sizes and validity are enormous problems.  It may be less of a problem in capital market studies where sample sizes are often huge.  But problems of poor study design and missing variables in models are an enormous in accounting research that tries to be scientific.

Always subject a research conclusion to the so-what test! Even without technical skills you often can question that which your common sense tells you is not correct, although you may have to endure slings and arrows of paranoids in doing so.  Sometimes a child's question is the best kind of question --- http://imagine.gsfc.nasa.gov/docs/ask_astro/answers/011021a.html

Never be overwhelmed by CAPM studies.  The CAPM is such a simplified model (reducing market risk to one index) that most studies based on CAPM are probably correct versus incorrect by sheer chance.  The problem with multiple-index models, in turn, is that there are all sorts of specification problems due missing variables and other things such as the following:

multicollinearity (http://seamonkey.ed.asu.edu/~alex/computer/sas/collinear.html ),

homoscedasticity ( http://davidmlane.com/hyperstat/A121947.html ),

nonstationarity (http://sepwww.stanford.edu/oldsep/matt/sdi/nstat/Fig/paper_html/node1.html)

And there are many other problems that editors often overlook among "members of the club." 

One common problem in our studies that have huge sample sizes is that statistical inference is nonsense.  For example, suppose that we sample 50,000 men and 50,000 women to see if there is a difference in IQ.  Infinitesmal differences may be deemed "statistically significant."  I once had to critique a paper by a renowned researcher in accounting who somehow just did not understand this problem with large samples.

 


Year 2005 American Accounting Association Annual Meeting in San Francisco August 5-10, 2005
The AAA meetings were very good this year except for the first plenary session. Bravo to Tracie, Dee, and their helpers for great logistics. The Hilton did a great job. Bravo to Jane and her helpers for a great program.

I think Katherine's plenary (Tuesday) session on disclosures will be posted by the AAA. Katherine made reference to quite a lot of academic research. She might also make her PowerPoint file available at the FASB.

I hope the AAA will also post Denny's terrific luncheon speech. If not, I think Denny will share it in some way with all of us on the AECM.

A highlight of the meetings for me was the XBRL workshop conducted by Glen, Roger, and Skip. Eric Cohen also participated with a great demo of Rivet Software's Dragon Tag software which finally makes it possible to teach XBRL hands on to students.

Another highlight was the great debate between Katherine Schipper (for fair value accounting) versus more negative positions taken by Ross Watts and Zoe-Vanna Palmrose. All three did a great (actually unforgettable) job on Monday afternoon.

This 2005 AAA meeting set a record with nearly 2,700 registrations plus over 500 registered guests. This topped the previous record which was also set in San Francisco some years ago. Such a registration number is very high considering that there are only about 8,000 worldwide members of the AAA --- http://aaahq.org/about/financials/KeyIndicators8_31_04.PDF

I returned to Trinity University from New Hampshire today. Trinity is still seeking somebody to fill my chair (the Jesse H. Jones Distinguished Professor of Business Chair) after I retire in May 2006. Anyone interested in applying should contact Dan Walz at 210-999-7289 or dwalz@trinity.edu I am very grateful to have had the privilege to fill it for 24 years.

Life is good!

August 13, 2005 reply from Glen Gray [glen.gray@CSUN.EDU]

Gee, thanks for your kind words regarding our XBRL workshop.

For those who want to know more about XBRL, you should:

See XBRL cover story in August 2005 Journal of Accountancy at http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/aug2005/tie.htm 

Visit http://www.xbrl.org  -- includes general and technical information about XBRL

Check out the 5-years of XBRL abstracts at http://bryant2.bryant.edu/~xbrl/index.html 

Review FAQs at http://xbrl.edgar-online.com/x/faqs/  , which cover a broad range of XBRL questions

Visit http://www.xbrlspy.org/  , a blog-like coverage of XBRL 

Check out the free XBRL teaching materials that will be available (Sept 1) at www.eycarat.ku.edu/XBRLClassMaterials

Bob Jensen's threads on XBRL are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm#TimelineXBRL

Bob Jensen's threads on fair value reporting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue

August 15, 2005 reply from McCarthy, William [mccarthy@BUS.MSU.EDU]

I agree that some of the annual meeting sessions mentioned already were quite good this year, but for me, the clear highlight of the convention was the policy speech given by new AAA president Judy Rayburn at the Wednesday luncheon.

Judy made a strong case for expanding the scope and volume of the AAA journal set by using comparisons to publication trends and citation trends in management, marketing, and finance. She also mentioned some specific AAA committee work that was going to assess these matters. Judy finished by coming down to the floor and answering all individual questions on rather difficult matters such as the acceptability of research paradigms from other countries and disciplines, and the effect of expansion on AAA section journals.

Many attendees did not have a ticket to the Wednesday luncheon, but I am sure Judy's slides will be made available to all.

Bill McCarthy
Michigan State

August 15, 2005 reply from Ali Mohammad J. Abdolmohammadi

I agree with Bill. While I found many presentations to be excellent this year, I was particularly impressed with Judy Rayburn's luncheon policy speech on Wednesday. I found the speech to be honest and gutsy. My nonscientific observation of the crowd was that the speech resonated well with the majority. It'll take a lot of hard work to make serious changes to the current publication culture of AAA journals, but it is well worth trying.

Ali Mohammad J. Abdolmohammadi, DBA, CPA
http://web.bentley.edu/empl/a/mabdolmohamm/ 
John E. Rhodes Professor of Accounting
Bentley College
175 Forest Street
Waltham, MA 02452


Fraudulent Conferences that Rip Off Colleges:  Do you really want to participate in these frauds?
I've written about this before, but I want to elaborate.  Academics either unwittingly or willingly sometimes allow themselves to get caught up in fraudulent "conferences."  Spam is on the rise for these frauds.  The degree of fraudulence varies.  At worst, there is no conference and organizers merely charge an exorbitant fee that allows the paper to be "refereed"  and published in a conference proceedings, thereby giving a professor a "publication."  See http://lists.village.virginia.edu/lists_archive/Humanist/v18/0633.html

Even when the conferences meet, they may be fraudulent.  Generally these conferences are held in places where professors like to travel in Europe, South America, Latin America, Las Vegas, Canada, the Virgin Islands, or other nice locations for vacations that accompany a trip to a conference paid for by a professor's employer.  The professor gets credit for a presentation and possibly a publication in the conference proceedings. 

But wait a minute!  Here are some warning signs for a fraudulent conference:

  1. Even though there is a high registration fee, there are no conference-hosted receptions, luncheons, or plenary sessions.  The conference organizer is never called to account for the high registration fee.  The organizer may allude to the cost of meeting rooms in a hotel, but often the meeting rooms are free as long as the organizer can guarantee a minimum number of guests who will pay for rooms in the hotel.
     

  2. All or nearly all submissions are accepted for presentation.
     

  3. The only participants in most presentation audiences are generally other presenters assigned to make a presentation in the same time slot.  There is virtually no non-participating audience.  Hence only a few people are in the room and each of them take turns making a presentation.  Most are looking at their watches and hoping to get out of the room as soon as possible.
     

  4. Presenters present their papers and then disappear for the rest of the conference.  There is virtually no interaction among all conference presenters.
     

  5. The papers presented are often journal rejects that are cycled conference after conference if the professor can find a conference that will accept anything submitted on paper.  Check the dates on the references listed for each paper.  Chances are the papers have few if any references from the current decade.
     

  6. These conferences are almost always held in popular tourist locations and are often scheduled between semesters for the convenience of adding vacation time to the trip.  They are especially popular in the summer.

Bob Jensen's threads on various types of fraud in academe are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm

August 17, 2005 reply from Jagdish Patha

Bob:

I was about to be fleeced by one such conference cheat claiming himself some Dr.----. generally organizes conferences at almost all the exotic locations of US, Cancun, Venice etc. This organizer double blind peer reviewed my submission (almost 35-40 pages) within 52 hours! Asked for per page charges if required to be placed in "proceedings" which happens to be a CD-ROM. This organizer has also got 4-5 journals which can ultimately accommodate any paper written from any angle of any sphere of business. You may get into any journal of your choice which will claim to be "double blind peer reviewed'!

I wish there should be some agency of regulators who can tame them. These people are bogus, there conferences are bogus and often I feel that what will be the face of a person who will come out and claim a paper presented and published in such bogus outlet to be considered suitable for tenure and promotion!

Jagdish Pathak, PhD
Guest Editor- Managerial Auditing Journal (Special Issue)
Associate Professor of Accounting & Systems Accounting & Finance Area
Odette School of Business
University of Windsor 401 Sunset Windsor, N9B 3P4, ON Canada

August 17, 2005 reply from David Albrecht

My answer is at the bottom of the paper, but please read my supporting argument.

Generally speaking I am not in favor of my department funding conference presentations for other faculty. I just don't think much is gained from it, and it is a very expensive CV line. I'd say that a lot of sponsored conferences haven't distinguished themselves from the rip-offs. However, the research-oriented faculty at my school are funded to attend conferences and conference presentations are the name of the game. So like it or not, I have to play the game.

But are quality conferences, such as AAA conferences, a rip-off? Is the phrase quality conference an oxymoron for the AAA? Here's my experience at the recent AAA in San Francisco. Tell me what you think.

I'm really upset with people making presentations, but then refusing by their actions to share their paper with members of the audience. I attended research presentations at eight of the nine time slots in SF, and tried to surf over to a simultaneous session a couple of times. In all of the sessions I attended, only 2 of 30 presenters had copies of the paper to distribute. The responsible presenters (both in education-related sessions) were Freddie Choo and the co-authoring team of Elizabeth Haywood, Dorothy McMullen and Donald Wygal. In the non-education related sessions I attended, there were no available copies of any paper. I then had to approach each presenter afterward and ask for a copy of the paper to be sent to me (seems reasonable that they would be available, as the papers had to be submitted 8-9 months in advance). Not one of the non-education presenters has sent anything to me. This is my usual experience. A few years ago I asked for a copy of a conference paper, and was assured that I would be sent one. Stereotypically, I received an e-mail two years later informing me that the paper was now available in some journal's most recent edition, and I was free to track it down. Of course, I was thanked for my interest in the paper.

Most of the time when someone says that I will sent a copy of the paper, it is an empty promise apparently designed to get rid of me. I hardly ever get one.

If one of the purposes of the AAA is to share research, then why are most of the presenters so proprietary and reluctant to share details? I don't think that much knowledge is shared when a presenter makes a very brief presentation using ineffective public speaking methods and then has no copy of the paper to share.

I've attended three conferences so far this year, two of which I had to pay for myself. In the Ohio AAA regional (BGSU paid for this one) there were no copies available, but Tim Fogarty was very good in sending me a copy of each of his papers presented. I learned so much from actually reading the papers. At a second conference, I think I was the only presenter at the conference to bring copies for attendees. I asked a few people for a copy his/her paper, but I have yet to be sent one. In the third conference, the SF AAA, I haven't received any requested papers from any concurrent session presenter* except for Tom Buttross, and his paper is education-related.

The teaching-related forums put on by the T&C section (the best section of the AAA, IMHO) were good, and it's my guess that about 20% had some write-up or paper to share at the forums. I picked up material there from Torben Thomson, the co-authoring team of Graeme Dean, Sandra Van Der Laan and Cameron Esslemont, the co-authoring team of Patsy Lee, Cheryl Prachyl and Carol Sullivan, the team of Gary Siegel & Gail Kucuiba, the team of Paul Mihalek, Milo Peck and Patricia Poli, the team of Elsie Ameen, Daryl Guffey and Cynthia Jackson, the team of Violet Rogers and Aileen Smith, the team of Michael Garner, Karen Papke-Shields, Ellen Pettingill and Denise Rotondo, and the sole author Christie Johnson. Well, maybe the rate is closer to 10%.

Following the conference, I've received materials from teaching forum participants George Schmelzle, Wendy Tietz, Gail Kucuiba, Yan Bao and Angela Lee. If I've misclassified anyone, I'm sorry.

My point is, the lid seems to be open for people eager to share their teaching ideas, but when it comes to the research-oriented presenters I'm SOL. Ironic, given that the major reason I attended AAA was to get caught up on financial reporting and auditing research ideas. Oh, I got my money's worth from the people mentioned above (as well as Thomas Calderon and Denny Beresford), but I really wish the conference would have been more research-oriented.

So, are AAA conferences rip-offs? Not entirely, but pretty much so. And since I spend my own money to attend them, I'm much less likely to attend one in the future.

David Albrecht

August 17, 2005 reply from Amy Dunbar [Amy.Dunbar@BUSINESS.UCONN.EDU]

David,

Although I agree that a paper should be available to you, I do not agree that the paper should be available in paper form. Rather, the links to the papers should be provided by the author. Requiring the author to haul papers to the conference is unreasonable, imo, but I think the authors should provide a handout with the title of the paper, the abstract, author information, and a link to the paper. As Bob Jensen mentioned in an earlier posting, an author can easily put a file on his/her web server. Personally, I would prefer to see links to the papers on an electronic version of the AAA program, but many argue that such availability could be construed to be a “publication” of the paper. I find this reasoning suspect because no one has a problem with SSRN postings.

I missed this AAA conference for the first time in years, and I really regret not being able to go. I find the meetings very useful, not only for the various sessions, but also from a networking perspective. This year, I heard there were also excellent CPE sessions. Far from being a “rip-off,” the AAA annual meeting is a valuable resource that takes incredible time on the part of the faculty volunteers who organize that meeting with the help of the AAA staff.

Amy Dunbar

UConn

August 18, 2005 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi David,

Although I disagree with the general negativism of your opinions about the AAA annual meetings, I will begin with one item of support.  Years ago when these meetings were held in San Diego, a CD recording company recorded every session (concurrent sessions to panel discussions to luncheons to plenary sessions).  The company had a booth were participants could buy the CD after each session at a rather modest cost  The sad part was that there was almost no demand to buy the CDs, especially the CDs from the research presentation sessions.  The reasons for this are unknown.  My own conclusion is that this is no fault of the AAA.  The problem is accounting research itself.  Most of it is just not very interesting whether or not it is presented at an AAA meeting.

The CD recording company lost a bundle on this venture and since then no effort is made to record AAA meeting sessions other than occasional plenary and luncheon sessions that are captured by the AAA itself on video as part of the projection system for large audiences.

There is a general lack of interest in accounting research.  Amy mentioned the SSRN working paper series --- http://www.ssrn.com/ . The big sellers in SSRN are economics and finance papers.  Demand for accounting research is dismal, especially when you factor out those papers billed as accounting papers that are economics research papers in accounting clothing.  I can't get the ranking system to work this morning, but the last time I looked there was not a single accounting paper in the SSRN listing of top downloads ---
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/topten/topTenResults.cfm?groupingtype=3&groupingId=1

I discuss problems with accounting research at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession
The biggest problem is that our accounting journals themselves do not even judge it worthy to publish research  replications.  If our findings were really of interest our journals would be like science journals that actively seek out replications of findings in science.

Your comments focus on whether the benefit of sending a professor to the AAA meetings justifies the cost.  If we had interactive teleconferencing or Webcasting of sessions available, perhaps you would be correct in terms of the sessions themselves.  But this fails to weigh in the many other benefits of the AAA meetings, benefits that include the following:


I think you're asking too much in benefits from of the AAA meetings.  Such meetings serve many audiences from Glendale Community College to Ivy League research centers.  Such meetings serve many interests from teaching ideas to empirical/analytical research methods to issues of great concern in accountancy and business in the real world (that "other world").   Such meetings serve many audiences from the U.S. to Europe, to India, to Africa, to Russia to Japan to China to Kangaroo and Kiwi lands.

All we can expect from the AAA meetings are peep holes to opportunities, knowledge, and happenings in our corner on the world of teaching and research and professional practice.

Lastly David, I might add that the annual AAA meetings pass the market test.  Thousands of people would not take the time, trouble, and cost to come to these meetings from all over the world if they were not serving an important purpose.  You have every right to protest in an effort to make the meetings better.  However, I’m afraid that you must first demonstrate how to make accounting research itself better.

Bob Jensen

August 18, 2005 reply from Ruth Bender [r.bender@CRANFIELD.AC.UK]

The European Accounting Association has the papers available for download from its website before the conference and for a week after the conference has ended. My experience was that about 90% of what I wanted was available, and a couple of other authors who I emailed for papers were happy to oblige. Likewise, when I was emailed for a paper about a month after the conference, I sent it by return.

The great advantage of having downloads available before the conference was that it meant that the discussion at sessions could be a bit better informed.

Mind you, I do wish you'd stop putting down the 'Fraudulent Conferences'. One of my minor enjoyments on a wet English morning is looking at that conference email and working out which exotic locations I could possibly get Cranfield to pay for me to visit :-)

Regards Ruth

Dr Ruth Bender
Cranfield School of Management


Thursday, April 28, 2005
The Chronicle of Higher Education
Business Schools' Focus on Research Has Ensured Their Irrelevance, Says Scathing Article
By KATHERINE S. MANGAN

Business schools are "institutionalizing their own irrelevance" by focusing on scientific research rather than real-life business practices, according to a blistering critique of M.B.A. programs that will be published today in the May issue of the Harvard Business Review.

The article, "How Business Schools Lost Their Way," was written by Warren G. Bennis and James O'Toole, both prominent professors at the University of Southern California's Marshall School of Business. Mr. Bennis is also the founding chairman of the university's Leadership Institute, and Mr. O'Toole is a research professor at Southern Cal's Center for Effective Organizations.

Mr. Bennis and Mr. O'Toole conclude that business schools are too focused on theory and quantitative approaches, and that, as a result, they are graduating students who lack useful business skills and sound ethical judgment. The authors call on business schools to become more like medical and law schools, which treat their disciplines as professions rather than academic departments, and to expect faculty members to be practicing members of their professions.

"We cannot imagine a professor of surgery who has never seen a patient or a piano teacher who doesn't play the instrument, and yet today's business schools are packed with intelligent, highly skilled faculty with little or no managerial experience," the two professors write. "As a result, they can't identify the most important problems facing executives and don't know how to analyze the indirect and long-term implications of complex business decisions."

While business deans pay lip service to making their courses more relevant, particularly when they are trying to raise money, their institutions continue to promote and award tenure to faculty members with narrow, scientific specialties, the authors contend.

"By allowing the scientific-research model to drive out all others, business schools are institutionalizing their own irrelevance," the authors write.

Most business problems cannot be solved neatly by applying hypothetical models or formulas, they say. "When applied to business -- essentially a human activity in which judgments are made with messy, incomplete, and incoherent data -- statistical and methodological wizardry can blind rather than illuminate."

Not surprisingly, the head of the association that accredits business schools in the United States disagrees with the authors' assessment. John J. Fernandes, president and chief executive officer of AACSB International: the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business, said most business schools today are making an effort to teach broad skills that are directly applicable to real-world business practices.

He pointed out that in 2003, the association updated its accreditation standards to emphasize the teaching of "soft skills" like ethics and communication, and to require that business schools assess how well students are learning a broad range of managerial skills.

"I think the authors are looking at a very limited group of business schools that emphasize research," said Mr. Fernandes. "Most schools have done an excellent job of producing graduates with a broad range of skills who can hit the ground running when they're hired."

Mr. Bennis and Mr. O'Toole are not convinced. They say that business schools, which in the early 20th century had the reputation of being little more than glorified trade schools, have swung too far in the other direction by focusing too heavily on research. The shift began in 1959, they say, when the Ford and Carnegie Foundations issued scathing reports about the state of business-school research.

While the Southern Cal professors say they do not favor a return to the trade-school days, they think business schools, and business professors, have grown too comfortable with an approach that serves their own needs but hurts students.

"This model gives scientific respectability to the research they enjoy doing and eliminates the vocational stigma that business-school professors once bore," the article concludes. "In short, the model advances the careers and satisfies the egos of the professoriate."

The authors point out a few bright spots in their otherwise gloomy assessment of M.B.A. education. The business schools at the University of California at Berkeley and the University of Dallas are among those that emphasize softer, nonquantifiable skills like ethics and communication, they write. In addition, some business schools operate their own businesses, such as the student-run investment fund offered by Cornell University's S.C. Johnson Graduate School of Management.


Learning at Research Schools
Versus "Teaching Schools"
Versus "Happiness"
With a Side Track into Substance Abuse


 

"The Case Against Case Studies:  How Columbia's B-school is teaching MBAs to make decisions based on incomplete data," by Geoff Gloeckler, Business Week, January 24, 2008 --- http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_05/b4069066093267.htm?link_position=link1

Shortly after R. Glenn Hubbard took over as dean of Columbia Business School in 2004, he began hearing rumblings from executives about the quality of MBA graduates. They were undoubtedly smart but often unprepared to handle the most crucial of managerial responsibilities: quickly solving problems with less than perfect information. Among those wanting more from new hires is Henry Kravis, co-founder of the private equity firm Kohlberg Kravis Roberts. "I want to see MBAs who can jump in and make decisions, not jump in and learn to make decisions," he says.

Hubbard made his own executive decision. He devised a new twist on the case study—the teaching format invented by Harvard Business School almost a century ago and used by most B-schools. Hubbard's so-called decision brief offers less information about a situation than the case study, and it doesn't present the solution until students have grappled with the issues on their own. "We want our students to be used to dealing with incomplete data," Hubbard says. "They should be able to make decisions out of uncertainty."

Even Michael J. Roberts, the executive director of the Arthur Rock Center for Entrepreneurship at Harvard and author of more than 100 HBS case studies, acknowledges the potential benefits of Hubbard's approach, which was introduced to Columbia students last fall. "Framing problems and finding the data to analyze those problems is a skill that MBAs need and that the classic case doesn't fully exploit," Roberts says. Hubbard expects such endorsements, as well as those of companies, will encourage other business schools to make room one day for Columbia's decision briefs in their curriculums. Hubbard, at least initially, doesn't plan to sell the decision briefs but to use them to tap into faculty research.

Hubbard isn't giving up on the traditional case study altogether. As part of an initiative called CaseWorks, Columbia will produce cases designed to reflect contemporary issues (which other schools do already), while also creating decision briefs that do away with the Harvard formula (which no one else has done). To help guide the program, Hubbard has turned to two people familiar with the deficits of the old methods: Stephen P. Zeldes, who has been at Columbia for more than a decade and is now chairman of the economics department at the B-school, and former Harvard case writer Elizabeth Gordon.

TOO MUCH INFORMATION The stock case study presents a tidy narrative arc, with a protagonist and a clear story line. One of the more widely used HBS cases focuses on Intel's (INTC) former marketing vice-president, Pamela Pollace, as she decides whether Intel should extend the "Intel Inside" branding campaign to products other than computers. In 24 pages, students are provided with information on Intel and the history of microprocessors, as well as details about market share and segmentation. Pollace's major concern, they learn, is brand dilution; the potential reward is likely worth the risk. In effect, the students are guided along the decision-making process.

If this case were a Columbia decision brief, students might see a video interview in which Pollace describes the challenge. They would also be given a few documents on the background of the campaign itself—the same data a manager at the company would have, but no more. Then, students would discuss possible solutions. Afterward, the group would see a second video of Pollace explaining how she handled the issue before debating whether or not she made the right decision.

So far, Columbia has produced six briefs that take on of-the-moment business challenges: Among them is one that focuses on General Electric's (GE) business-process-outsourcing division in India. Given increased competition, the company needed to consider a bigger investment, as well as the possibility of serving non-GE customers. With just a little more information than that, students are asked to come up with various strategies. "The idea is to try to simulate what it will be like in a real workplace," says Gordon. "There is uncertainty, things aren't predigested, all the information won't be there."

The first field test for the new teaching technique will be this summer, when the MBAs head out to their internships. At Goldman Sachs (GS), which hires more Columbia interns than any other company, the co-head of campus recruiting, Janet Raiffa, hopes to encounter students who are more independent thinkers. As for Kravis, his firm doesn't employ summer interns.

In some ways the pedagogy proposed by Columbia is a shorter and cheaper version of the BAM approach first proposed by Catanach, Croll, and Grinacker. The BAM approach uses a year-long case and students can seek out data in virtually every way they will do it later on while on the job (including paying for data if necessary) --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/265wp.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on Learning at Research Schools Versus "Teaching Schools" Versus "Happiness" With a Side Track into Substance Abuse --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#Happiness 


If you connect students to the real world, will they be happier?
Somehow it's nice to know that accountancy schools are not alone in this dilemma!

"If You Teach Them, They Will Be Happy," by Jennifer Epstein, Inside Higher Ed, June 19, 2007 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/06/19/lawstudents

Law students — and the lawyers they become — are notoriously unhappy, but the interests of their professors could make all the difference in helping them through law school and in preparing them to be good lawyers.
A study published this month in the Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin compared recent classes at two law schools with almost identical average undergraduate grade-point averages and LSAT scores and found that students at the school that encouraged its professors to be good teachers rather than good scholars reported higher levels of well-being and competence, and scored higher on bar exams.

The study, “Understanding the Negative Effects of Legal Education on Law Students: A Longitudinal Test of Self-Determination Theory,” was conducted by Kennon M. Sheldon, a psychology professor at the University of Missouri at Columbia, and Lawrence S. Krieger, a law professor at Florida State University.

Students at both law schools entered with similar statistics: average undergraduate GPAs around 3.4 and LSAT averages near 156. The schools differed significantly, however, in overall ranking. Law School 1 (LS1), with a good reputation and an emphasis on faculty scholarship, ranked in the second tier (as defined by the study) while Law School 2 (LS2), with an emphasis on hiring and training faculty to be good teachers, ranked in the fourth tier.

Twenty-four percent of the Law School 2 graduates who took the bar exam in the summer of 2005 had “high” scores above 150, compared to 14 percent of Law School 1 graduates. Nearly half of Law School 1’s graduates, meanwhile, had “low” scores – below 130 – on the bar exam, compared with 22 percent of Law School 2’s graduates. Though the scoring statistics are representative of each law school overall, rather than just those students who participated in the study, they are “strongly suggestive that the teaching and learning at LS2 may be more effective,” the authors wrote.

Krieger, one of the authors, said in an interview that it was “almost shocking” to see “how significantly the fourth tier students outperformed the second tier law students on the bar.” But, he added, “it makes sense psychologically – the students at the fourth tier school were happier – and it makes sense that they would have learned more from better teachers.”

By the third year of law school, students at Law School 2 reported significantly higher levels of “subjective well-being,” autonomy and competence than students at Law School 1.

But Ann Althouse, a professor at the University of Wisconsin Law School in Madison said that though it is “intuitively right that the school that emphasizes teaching is the one with students who are happier and score better,” those students may not be better off in the long run.

She said that if all a law school expects of its faculty is to teach, then they can “put more time into teaching students to be lawyers, but not necessarily how to think like lawyers.”

In February, Althouse, a blogger on law and current events, was a month-long guest columnist for The New York Times. In one column, she wrote that while “law should connect to the real world … that doesn’t mean we ought to devote our classes to the personal expression of law students.” Rather, she said, law professors should “deny ourselves the comfort of trying to make [law students] happy and teach them what they came to learn: how to think like lawyers.”

Continued in article

June 23, 2007 reply from Dan Stone, Univ. of Kentucky [dstone@UKY.EDU]

Hi all,

Regarding Ken Sheldon & Lawrence Krieger's law school study (actually, they have published two studies on this topic: the one that Bob cites is their second published study.)

Professor Althouse's assertion that the students at the teaching school may not be learning "how to think like lawyers" suggests that she has not read this study carefully. The students at the teaching school were not only happier they also scored HIGHER on the bar exam. Therefore, unless Professor Althouse argues that the bar exam doesn't test critical thinking skills her argument doesn't accord to the data.

So, perhaps one need not be unhappy to be a competent professional? Perhaps at least some professor-induced suffering merely creates unhappiness and doesn't improve the quality of the "product"? Ok, now I am overstepping the data.....

FYI, I saw Ken present this paper a few weeks ago at the self-determination theory conference and was left wondering if similar results hold for professional accountancy programs. I chatted with Ken about this and he is also interested this topic.

Relatedly, there is some evidence that lawyers have higher alcohol and drug use rates than do some other professionals (though I can't recall the cites just now).

Best,

Dan Stone

Reply from Bob Jensen

Thank you Dan for that helpful and somewhat personalized reply. Here are a couple of citations of possible interest with respect to lawyer substance abuse:

Title:  Substance Abuse in Law Schools: A Tool Kit for Law School Administrators
Authors: Orgena Lewis Singleton JD, Alfred "Cal" Baker L.C.D.C., more...
Publication Date: December 2005, American Bar Association
ISBN: 1-59031-628-2
Topics: Law School, Law Students, Lawyer Assistance Programs, Legal Education & Admissions to the Bar
URL:  Click Here
Also see "Torts, Trials and ... Treatments," by Elia Powers, Issues in Higher Ed, January 4, 2007 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/01/04/lawschool

The ABA report argues that the quality of the legal profession is affected by lawyers who “are impaired as a result of abuse of alcohol and drugs.” One of the co-authors who spoke at Wednesday’s meeting in Washington, Cal Baker, is a recent law school graduate and director of a company that provides chemical dependency treatments.

Baker, a recovering alcoholic, said alcohol and drug abuse are the two top problems he sees among law students. (Other panelists said students often report depression and extreme anxiety, as well as substance abuse issues. ) He said he would have been unable to recover from his condition while in school, because nearly all the planned social activities were centered around bar nights.

One of the largest hurdles, Baker said, is convincing students that admitting their drinking problems won’t lead to disciplinary action. Many who have previous alcohol-related citations are concerned about their professional futures.

Continued in article

I do not know of comparable studies in the accounting profession. I do know that substance abuse is a problem on two levels for accountants, particularly auditors who are away from home a lot of the time. At level one is the professional away from home more than many other professionals. At level two is the family of a professional who is absent from home much of the time.

Some large CPA firms have hot lines where professionals and their family members can seek counseling with complete confidentiality and possible anonymity. These hot lines link directly with medical and family counseling professionals who are outside the firm itself but are paid by the firm. I'm told that an overwhelming proportion of the problems dealt with are substance abuse and troubled family members.

I suspect that these are problems that are not dealt with at all well in our schools of accountancy. One problem is that we want to attract students to this profession and do not like to dwell on the dark side of this profession's troubles. There are substance abuse problems in all professions. It would be interesting to study whether some professions tend to keep substance abuse problems in dark closets more than other professions. For example, perhaps there is more perceived sensitivity among clients/patients who are more afraid of substance abusers in accounting and medicine relative to law. That is only a personal observation and not something that I've studied. My guess is that substance abuse is highest among physicians and highest in terms of keeping their dependencies secret.

A more general site on substance abuse is provided at http://www.ndsn.org/links.html

June 25, 2007 reply from Bill Dent [billdent@tx.rr.com]

Bob—

I don’t know about other states, but the Texas State Board of Public Accountancy acknowledges the problem as evidenced by the following link on their website:

http://www.tsbpa.state.tx.us/pi8.htm 

Bill Dent

WILLIAM C. DENT, CPA (Retired)

Indirectly this relates to the current accounting doctoral program controversies described at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

It also relates to the issues of whether it is best to spoon feed students --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/265wp.htm

June 19, 2007 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

Bob,

In some ways, the situation in accounting is similar to that in law. In others, there is substantial difference.

In law there are essentially two tiers in law schools: those that are quite bar exam oriented, and those that emphasize legal theory and philosophy. The kinds of placements they have are also very different. The students at second sort of schools do clerkships with well known or almost-well known judges, while those at the first sort of schools do not. The students at the second sort of schools get hired by the large well known law firms (for example, on the Wall Street) doing structured finance and M&A work, whereas the first kind often may do work that could be considered menial (uncontested divorces, fixing speeding tickets/DUI, etc.). Of course there are crossovers.

Often, students at the second sort of schools do not practice at all, but have a profound impact on the profession, and there are some who practice only occasionally (Tribe, Dershowitz,...).

I agree with Ann Althouse that the second sort of schools teach students to think like lawyers whereas the first kind teach them to be lawyers.

In accounting, on the other hand, I think we have only one kind of schools (the equivalent of second sort have no professional accounting programs), and they teach students to BE accountants rather) than to think like accountants.

This situation is convenient for many. It is much easier to teach one to be like someone than to teach one to think like some one.

Jagdish

June 23, 2007 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

Dan,

I am not familiar with the Sheldon/Krieger studies, but will read them soon.

However, I interact with law school faculty often, and ask them questions just to find out how we in accounting can learn from them. I also have an abiding interest in the relationship between jurisprudence and accounting, and it is one of the few psychic benefits I have enjoyed being an accounting academic.

The law school market is pretty much a differentiated market. I think the missions of the top tier schools and others are very different, and both conform to their missions well; there are no pretensions as we have among the accounting schools where there is a race to reach the greasy pole no matter what one's comparative advantages are.

It is difficult to find students from non-top schools doing clerkships with supreme court justices, or the top law firms recruiting from such schools.

* The top tier schools emphasise law as an interdisciplinary field rather than a field confined to narrowly defined learning of existing laws.

* The top tier schools emphasise more critical analyses of certain aspects of law such as constitutional law, international law, jurisprudence... and de-emphasise other aspects such as administrative law, criminal procedure,... as the other schools do.

* Many students graduating from top schools do not enter law practice, and even when they do, they enter very different practices where critical thinking, interdisciplinary, and liberal arts type skills predominate. Many enter government and public service. Many also enter the academia. Over my career I have had dozens of friends and colleagues who went to top law schools (Harvard, Stanford, Cambridge, ...), and they have established their presence as scholars even outside their narrow domain. On the other hand, most law academics that I have known from non-top schools, on the other hand, have been in areas such as tax law, business law,..., generally not considerer the intellectual centers of gravity of law.

I do not mean to be an elitist when I make the above observations. In fact, one of my heroes in law, the late Don Berman, a Harvard educated lawyer at Northeastern, specialised in tax law. If I dig deep, I am sure I can find some law academics from non-top schools who were brilliant scholars in areas of law that are considered scholarly. The point I make is that the two types of schools are just different.

About a dozen years ago, I was trying to establish relationships with a local (non-top) law school to introduce our students in accounting to topics such as the relationship between constitutional law and accounting, and the role of jurisprudence in accounting. I got no where, and we were in fact on different wavelengths. On the other hand, more recently we did try to establish relationships for tax students and it has worked out very well. Our graduate tax students take some tax courses at the law school and it has helped them tremendously.

I attend law sort of conferences (usually at the intersection of law and computer science), and almost all participants are from the top tier law schools. Some from other law schools too attend, but usually to meet CPE requirements to keep their licenses current. I also am an avid reader of law literature (specially in constitutional law and jurisprudence) and there too just about every author is from a top tier law school.

There is nothing wrong in this dichotomy. Those from non-top law schools have performed brilliantly in the corporate world, and once in a while they do spectacular jobs for their clients (see OJ Simpson's dream team)Sometimes they also excel as legal scholars

Another difference I find between the alums at the two types of schools is that the contribution to legal literature from the top law schools is disproportionately large. Ronald Dworkin, Lawrence Tribe, and Richard Posner in the US, or Joseph Raz and HLA Hart in Britain,... one has to stretch one's imagination to come up with those from non-top tier law schools who come close.

And there is no cartel in law as we have in accounting. Good scholarship gets recognised no matter where it originates, and gatekeepers are generally powerless; quite unlike in accounting.

There is learning at both kinds of schools, they are just different. Trying to compare them is like comparing apples and oranges, or worse, like comparing apple to an ape.

I'll try to collect my thoughts on what we in accounting can learn from legal education at both levels and post them to AECM one of these days.

Regards,

Jagdish

 

 


Why accountancy doctoral programs are drying up and
why accountancy is no longer required for admission or
graduation in an accountancy doctoral program

 

 



 

The American Accounting Association (AAA) has a new research report on the future supply and demand for accounting faculty. There's a whole lot of depressing colored graphics and white-knuckle handwringing about anticipated shortages of new doctoral graduates and faculty aging, but there's no solution offered --- http://aaahq.org/temp/phd/AccountingFacultyUSCollegesUniv.pdf 

April 2, 2008 message from David Fordham, James Madison University [fordhadr@JMU.EDU]

I've been reading the AAA study on accounting faculty status and trends:

http://aaahq.org/temp/phd/AccountingFacultyUSCollegesUniv.pdf and I have to wonder, will anything be done -- other than the continued hand wringing?

My guess: probably not. I've concluded no one is listening.

It seems to me that the long-term answer (more Ph.D. students and expanded Ph.D. programs) will of necessity exacerbate the short term crisis: shortage of experienced faculty teaching accounting majors. If more of the experienced professors teach Ph.D. students, that means even fewer teaching the undergrad accounting majors.

Of course, deans will point out that having more Ph.D. students means more grad students will be available to teach accounting majors. So more and more accounting classes will be taught by grad students rather than experienced professors. Is this a good thing? My guess: probably not.

And to be more cynical, does it really MATTER whether or not it's a good thing? My guess: ... probably not.

Having raised four children during the era of Winnie-the-Pooh, I can't help but see a parallel here with a character named Eeyore. Poor ol' Eeyore.

I guess you could say we are living in interesting times. *sigh*

The study is worth perusing. (Are our hands sore yet?)

David Fordham
James Madison University

April 3, 2008 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi David,

I suspect that the most popular solution in the future to meet the shortage of doctoral accounting faculty will be an explosion in the use of adjunct accounting faculty at highly varying ranges of compensation. This will bring us full circle back to the late 1950s when the scathing Pierson Carnegie Report [1959] and the Gordon and Howell Ford Foundation Report [1959] reports dramatically changed accounting doctoral education in the United States --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm

There are several remedies to relieve future shortages of accounting faculty to meet expected continued growth of accounting majors in undergraduate and masters programs (most states virtually require a fifth year of advanced study to sit for the CPA examination):

  1. Make it more attractive for aging accounting faculty who are doing a great job with students to continued beyond retirement age. This is not a ideal solution in that it possibly blocks the flow of "fresh blood" and revitalization into accounting departments, but it is more affordable than paying over $200,000 in salary and fringe benefits for a new accounting doctoral graduate. Even at higher salaries there are just not enough new doctoral graduates (less than a hundred per year) to spread around among a thousand or more colleges. One way to make it more attractive is to assign aging faculty who want to live elsewhere (on the beach?)  and teach some distance education courses an opportunity to do so.
     
  2. Make increasing use of good accounting teachers without doctorates to teach full time. Most will be assigned adjunct status, but some colleges may even let them be on a tenure track depending on the uniqueness of their credentials. This is generally a mixed bag for students, because adjunct professors are often poorly paid and forced to moonlight for sometimes more than they are paid from the colleges. Students generally benefit more from full-time teachers. It is also a poor solution in that adjunct faculty are generally second-class employees on a college campus.
     
  3. Lure increasing numbers of accounting faculty with doctorates who are now teaching in foreign countries. One problem is that in these countries their doctoral degrees often are not in accountancy (many foreign countries do not even have accounting doctoral programs). In addition there are problems with luring families to leave their home countries. Plus there are the same problems as those noted below for many foreign student graduates of U.S. accounting doctoral programs.
     
  4. Shorten North American accounting doctoral programs by making them something other than accountics (econometrics, psychometrics, and advanced mathematics) wolves in sheep clothing. Virtually all accounting doctoral programs now take nearly five years beyond a masters degree in large part because candidates with accounting backgrounds must take years of accountics courses or candidates with mathematics, econometrics, and psychometrics backgrounds must take years of undergraduate accounting equivalents.

    The essential problem is social science research methodology is now the only acceptable research methodology in North American accounting doctoral programs. This is an increasingly negative incentive for younger practicing accountants to consider entering accounting doctoral programs. Increasingly the applicants to these programs, especially at our most prestigious universities, are foreign mathematicians who know virtually nothing about accountancy but are seeking the salary, prestige, and citizenship of accounting professors in North America.

    The problem here is that our undergraduate and graduate students often benefit more from taking accounting courses from instructors who have rich backgrounds in five years of accounting courses and some years of accounting practice. Foreign graduates of accounting doctoral programs are often assigned AIS and doctoral research courses to teach since they have such limited backgrounds in financial, tax, auditing, and managerial accounting. There are of course noted exceptions and some of these immigrant professors have become great accounting educators and friends in the United States. But finding tax and auditing accounting doctoral graduates is particularly problematic.

    To meet the demand of thousands of colleges seeking accounting faculty, the supply situation is revealed by Plumlee et al (2006) as quoted at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm

    There were only 29 doctoral students in auditing and 23 in tax out of the 2004 total of 391 accounting doctoral students enrolled in years 1-5 in the United States.


I suspect that the most popular solution in the future to meet the shortage of doctoral accounting faculty will be an explosion in the use of adjunct accounting faculty at highly varying ranges of compensation. This will bring us full circle back to the late 1950s when the scathing Pierson Carnegie Report [1959] and the Gordon and Howell Ford Foundation Report [1959] reports dramatically changed accounting doctoral education in the United States --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
 

You can find out more about the problems with accounting doctoral programs at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

Bob Jensen

April 2, 2008 reply from Paul Williams [Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]

David,
Eeyore analogy was spot on. Oh woe, Oh woe. For many reasons, most of which have been touched upon or beaten to death on this listserv, we have brought this on ourselves. Frankly, I took the report to be wonderful news! As one of those folks over 41 (well over 41), I am becoming more valuable to NC State all of the time. I make less than a new hire and I have so (so, so, so) much more institutional knowledge and experience. I won't have to retire until I can't remember how to find my classroom and there will be no real incentive for the institution to want to get rid of me until then. I suspect that many of those Plumlee predicts will retire, won't. Some of the supply problem will be taken up by faculty working well past the retirement age.

Follow-up message from Paul on April 2, 2008

I was being somewhat facetious with my "delighted because they won't be in a hurry to rush me out the door" comment. I think your observations are correct. We must ask ourselves how it is that attracting students into PhD programs where the pay prospects are considerably lower is easier than in accounting. I am not surprised that bright, imaginative, bold people aren't attracted to doctoral work in accounting -- it is so mind-numbingly boring. It is all about technique, nothing about ideas. You and I are testimony to what was typical of the generation of accounting academics to which we belong. In my doctoral program, few of the students were undergraduate accounting majors. In my program we had people with degrees in engineering, forestry, sociology, education, and history. Now every candidate we interview from a U.S. doctoral program has the same profile: undergraduate accounting major, MAC, a few years of practice experience (perhaps to manager level), then the standardized, universal doctoral education in "applied" (whatever that could be is a mystery) economics. Based on my experience with undergraduate accounting curricula, a B.S. in accounting is about the worst preparation one could have for pursuing a Doctor of Philosophy degree. Supplication to authority seems to be the thread that runs through every accounting course. FASB (ooo!, GASBs (ooo!), SASs (ooo!), PCAOB (ooo!), SEC (ooo!) , BIG 4 (ooo!). I would like to teach a course (which I am not allowed to do) where we take the GAAP hierarchy and every acronym that students are taught to be reverential toward and teach them to be heretics -- a Dead Poets' Society for accounting students. There is nothing sacred about "official pronouncements" and even less sacred are the unexamined presumptions that underlay them. Even at the highest level of education, the PhD. level, accounting has become, in Bourdieu's term, a doxic society, which is anethema to scholarship.

April 2, 2008 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

David and Paul,

I found the study very depressing.

First, it tells us that we are a geriatric profession. Lack of new blood will have disastrous consequences.

Second, the study keeps harping on the shortage of PhDs IN ACCOUNTING. This shortage is contrived. If four years of college and four or five more years of graduate school is all it takes, the way accounting is currently taught generally, a PhD IN ACCOUNTING is irrelevant. AACSB, in my opinion, is ruining what is essentially a professional field by forcing it with trappings of academic respectability.

If accounting is to succeed as an academic field, I would strongly suggest that we get rid of this ridiculous idea that a PhD IN ACCOUNTING is a requirement for college teaching. If AACSB can not relax the requirement by allowing qualified practitioners to teach accounting, it should relax the requirement of PhD in accounting.

There is no reason why a PhD in Economics, Computing, Psychology, Sociology, Engineering, or even classics can not teach accounting with some minimal retooling.

Third, salary inversion is a consequence of foolish policies having to do with the second point (above).

Fourth, inspite of monstrous salary differentials, we are unable to attract doctoral students. It is pathetic that fields with virtually negligible job markets such as anthropology and classics can attract good talent while we are languishing is a sign that our field is intellectually stagnating and unattractive to the bright minds.

Fifth, the exaggerated salaries offered to new entrants may be getting us the wrong type of people; the type of people attracted to money rather than intellectual excitement. As department chair, I have been put in the ridiculous position of recommending a ghigher starting pay to an ABD than we pay to Guggenheim, McArthur, Fulbright fellows, and NSF Young Investigator award winners with publications that our candidates will not equal in several lifetimes.

We have an unsustainable business model for academic accounting. The earlier the universities realise this the better for the education of accountants. But that will not happen; we have a moral hazard problem.

Being a member of the well-over-the-40-hill gang and having been sidelined as one doing off-the-wall non-mainstream research most of my academic life, the work I do outside of mainstream accounting sustains me. The "mainstream" academic accounting "tent" has gotten considerably smaller since I became an accountant late in life, and I found myself an outsider almost right from the beginning. What has been "mainstream" in academic accounting for the past over thirty years was then the proverbial camel sticking its nose into the tent. The people who have been pushed out of the tent are the professionals and the non-mainstream researchers.

This should not be the case. It is not the case with other fields in which I work.

Jagdish


 


"Research on Accounting Should Learn From the Past," by Michael H. Granof and Stephen A. Zeff, Chronicle of Higher Education, March 21, 2008

Starting in the 1960s, academic research on accounting became methodologically supercharged — far more quantitative and analytical than in previous decades. The results, however, have been paradoxical. The new paradigms have greatly increased our understanding of how financial information affects the decisions of investors as well as managers. At the same time, those models have crowded out other forms of investigation. The result is that professors of accounting have contributed little to the establishment of new practices and standards, have failed to perform a needed role as a watchdog of the profession, and have created a disconnect between their teaching and their research.

Before the 1960s, accounting research was primarily descriptive. Researchers described existing standards and practices and suggested ways in which they could be improved. Their findings were taken seriously by standard-setting boards, CPA's, and corporate officers.

A confluence of developments in the 1960s markedly changed the nature of research — and, as a consequence, its impact on practice. First, computers emerged as a means of collecting and analyzing vast amounts of information, especially stock prices and data drawn from corporate financial statements. Second, academic accountants themselves recognized the limitations of their methodologies. Argument, they realized, was no substitute for empirical evidence. Third, owing to criticism that their research was decidedly second rate because it was insufficiently analytical, business faculties sought academic respectability by employing the methods of disciplines like econometrics, psychology, statistics, and mathematics.

In response to those developments, professors of accounting not only established new journals that were restricted to metric-based research, but they limited existing academic publications to that type of inquiry. The most influential of the new journals was the Journal of Accounting Research, first published in 1963 and sponsored by the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business.

Acknowledging the primacy of the journals, business-school chairmen and deans increasingly confined the rewards of publication exclusively to those publications' contributors. That policy was applied initially at the business schools at private colleges that had the strongest M.B.A. programs. Then ambitious business schools at public institutions followed the lead of the private schools, even when the public schools had strong undergraduate and master's programs in accounting with successful traditions of practice-oriented research.

The unintended consequence has been that interesting and researchable questions in accounting are essentially being ignored. By confining the major thrust in research to phenomena that can be mathematically modeled or derived from electronic databases, academic accountants have failed to advance the profession in ways that are expected of them and of which they are capable.

Academic research has unquestionably broadened the views of standards setters as to the role of accounting information and how it affects the decisions of individual investors as well as the capital markets. Nevertheless, it has had scant influence on the standards themselves.

The research is hamstrung by restrictive and sometimes artificial assumptions. For example, researchers may construct mathematical models of optimum compensation contracts between an owner and a manager. But contrary to all that we know about human behavior, the models typically posit each of the parties to the arrangement as a "rational" economic being — one devoid of motivations other than to maximize pecuniary returns.

Moreover, research is limited to the homogenized content of electronic databases, which tell us, for example, the prices at which shares were traded but give no insight into the decision processes of either the buyers or the sellers. The research is thus unable to capture the essence of the human behavior that is of interest to accountants and standard setters.

Further, accounting researchers usually look backward rather than forward. They examine the impact of a standard only after it has been issued. And once a rule-making authority issues a standard, that authority seldom modifies it. Accounting is probably the only profession in which academic journals will publish empirical studies only if they have statistical validity. Medical journals, for example, routinely report on promising new procedures that have not yet withstood rigorous statistical scrutiny.

Floyd Norris, the chief financial correspondent of The New York Times, titled a 2006 speech to the American Accounting Association "Where Is the Next Abe Briloff?" Abe Briloff is a rare academic accountant. He has devoted his career to examining the financial statements of publicly traded companies and censuring firms that he believes have engaged in abusive accounting practices. Most of his work has been published in Barron's and in several books — almost none in academic journals. An accounting gadfly in the mold of Ralph Nader, he has criticized existing accounting practices in a way that has not only embarrassed the miscreants but has caused the rule-making authorities to issue new and more-rigorous standards. As Norris correctly suggested in his talk, if the academic community had produced more Abe Briloffs, there would have been fewer corporate accounting meltdowns.

The narrow focus of today's research has also resulted in a disconnect between research and teaching. Because of the difficulty of conducting publishable research in certain areas — such as taxation, managerial accounting, government accounting, and auditing — Ph.D. candidates avoid choosing them as specialties. Thus, even though those areas are central to any degree program in accounting, there is a shortage of faculty members sufficiently knowledgeable to teach them.

To be sure, some accounting research, particularly that pertaining to the efficiency of capital markets, has found its way into both the classroom and textbooks — but mainly in select M.B.A. programs and the textbooks used in those courses. There is little evidence that the research has had more than a marginal influence on what is taught in mainstream accounting courses.

What needs to be done? First, and most significantly, journal editors, department chairs, business-school deans, and promotion-and-tenure committees need to rethink the criteria for what constitutes appropriate accounting research. That is not to suggest that they should diminish the importance of the currently accepted modes or that they should lower their standards. But they need to expand the set of research methods to encompass those that, in other disciplines, are respected for their scientific standing. The methods include historical and field studies, policy analysis, surveys, and international comparisons when, as with empirical and analytical research, they otherwise meet the tests of sound scholarship.

Second, chairmen, deans, and promotion and merit-review committees must expand the criteria they use in assessing the research component of faculty performance. They must have the courage to establish criteria for what constitutes meritorious research that are consistent with their own institutions' unique characters and comparative advantages, rather than imitating the norms believed to be used in schools ranked higher in magazine and newspaper polls. In this regard, they must acknowledge that accounting departments, unlike other business disciplines such as finance and marketing, are associated with a well-defined and recognized profession. Accounting faculties, therefore, have a special obligation to conduct research that is of interest and relevance to the profession. The current accounting model was designed mainly for the industrial era, when property, plant, and equipment were companies' major assets. Today, intangibles such as brand values and intellectual capital are of overwhelming importance as assets, yet they are largely absent from company balance sheets. Academics must play a role in reforming the accounting model to fit the new postindustrial environment.

Third, Ph.D. programs must ensure that young accounting researchers are conversant with the fundamental issues that have arisen in the accounting discipline and with a broad range of research methodologies. The accounting literature did not begin in the second half of the 1960s. The books and articles written by accounting scholars from the 1920s through the 1960s can help to frame and put into perspective the questions that researchers are now studying.

For example, W.A. Paton and A.C. Littleton's 1940 monograph, An Introduction to Corporate Accounting Standards, profoundly shaped the debates of the day and greatly influenced how accounting was taught at universities. Today, however, many, if not most, accounting academics are ignorant of that literature. What they know of it is mainly from textbooks, which themselves evince little knowledge of the path-breaking work of earlier years. All of that leads to superficiality in teaching and to research without a connection to the past.

We fervently hope that the research pendulum will soon swing back from the narrow lines of inquiry that dominate today's leading journals to a rediscovery of the richness of what accounting research can be. For that to occur, deans and the current generation of academic accountants must give it a push.

Michael H. Granof is a professor of accounting at the McCombs School of Business at the University of Texas at Austin. Stephen A. Zeff is a professor of accounting at the Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Management at Rice University.

March 18, 2008 reply from Paul Williams [Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]


Steve Zeff has been saying this since his stint as editor of The Accounting Review (TAR); nobody has listened. Zeff famously wrote at least two editorials published in TAR over 30 years ago that lamented the colonization of the accounting academy by the intellectually unwashed. He and Bill Cooper wrote a comment on Kinney's tutorial on how to do accounting research and it was rudely rejected by TAR. It gained a new life only when Tony Tinker published it as part of an issue of Critical Perspectives in Accounting devoted to the problem of dogma in accounting research.

It has only been since less subdued voices have been raised (outright rudeness has been the hallmark of those who transformed accounting into the empirical sub-discipline of a sub-discipline for which empirical work is irrelevant) that any movement has occurred. Judy Rayburn's diversity initiative and her invitation for Anthony Hopwood to give the Presidential address at the D.C. AAA meeting came only after many years of persistent unsubdued pointing out of things that were uncomfortable for the comfortable to confront.

Paul Williams
paul_williams@ncsu.edu 
(919)515-4436
 

Bob Jensen's threads on these matters are at the following links:

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#Replication

“An Analysis of the Evolution of Research Contributions by The Accounting Review: 1926-2005,” by Jean Heck and Robert E. Jensen, Accounting Historians Journal, Volume 34, No. 2, December 2007, pp. 109-142.


 

Praxiologies and the Philosophy of Economics, Edited by J. Lee Auspitz et al. --- Click Here

 


 

July 18, 2008 message from Roger Debreceny [roger@DEBRECENY.COM]

 

 American Accounting Association Membership Trends:

Year

Academic

Practitioner

Emeritus

Life

Associate

Total

1998

6,417

1,068

219

102

636

8,442

1999

6,473

965

207

94

610

8,349

2000

6,528

975

207

117

621

8,448

2001

6,643

972

217

130

594

8,556

2002

6,557

897

239

138

688

8,519

2003

6,373

810

238

146

750

8,317

2004

6,026

734

245

151

847

8,003

2005

6,019

676

209

235

918

8,057

2006

5,996

636

198

264

1,001

8,095

2007

5,859

605

213

277

1,155

8,109

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

10 Year change

-9%

-43%

-3%

172%

82%

-4%

Proportions in 1998

76%

13%

3%

1%

8%

100%

Proportions in 2007

72%

7%

3%

3%

14%

100%

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

This table (with the three summary rows I added) shows the 2007 report of AAA KPIs at aaahq.org/about/financials/KeyIndicators8_31_07.pdf .. there are some interesting patterns here. The number of practitioners has gone down by more than 40%. This has been a matter of concern for me for many years. The AAA should be the natural place a well trained, thoughtful accountant should go to for a professional experience that is different than that provided by the AICPA, IIA, ISACA etc. Yet we seem to be able to attract only 600 professional members – a statistical blip. I have spoken to several professionals who are involved with the AAA and  even they seem to think that attracting professionals is a lost cause. I don’t agree and I don’t think we should accept this number. Other similar organizations such as the AEA and ACM have a much higher proportion than we do.

New journals such as the Auditing sections new journal (which is already providing much fodder for my classes and my own professional improvement) is the way forward as is a much more targeted approach to marketing to professionals. I think that the AAA Annual Meeting is without parallel in terms of receiving an update on current events .. especially  if one went only to the panels and keynotes. And at a price that is just a fraction of equivalent events for professional organizations. This is something we should be marketing strongly.

The second interesting issue is the increase in proportion of associate members. This category is (I imagine) mostly students. The category has increased by more than 80% and nearly doubled its share to 14%. But I imagine that this hides considerable churn and losses. If it were not the case, the number of academic and practitioner members would have increased. What are we doing to actively convert Associate into Academic and Practitioner classes, I wonder?

Roger

 

July 18, 2008 reply from Bob Jensen

Thanks for the updates Tracey and Roger!

Not to detract from Tracey’s current optimism, the membership in the AAA has been on a steady decline for the past four decades (Craig Polhemus vs. Joel Demski)--- http://www.cs.trinity.edu/rjensen/001aaa/atlanta01.htm
The professionalism of Tracey and her staff have contributed greatly to preventing a membership disaster in recent years.

In my viewpoint, AAA membership decline is principally caused by the Perfect Storm that hit doctoral programs over the past five decades --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm

We lost over 90% of our practitioner AAA members in the past five decades from a high point where there were more practitioner members in the AAA than academic members. Practitioners that remain today are mostly PR and recruiting specialists from the large firms. I don’t think you will find them sitting in our concurrent sessions at the annual meetings of the AAA. At the same time, however, the large firms have greatly increased their financial support of the AAA and, even more importantly, the private support of our accountancy programs in colleges and universities throughout the world. As far as the AAA is concerned, however, the increased financial support from practitioner donations to the AAA is offset somewhat by the loss of the dues being paid by almost 6,000 practitioners who abandoned the AAA ship.

 

FIGURE 2

Non-Academic Authorship in TAR

 

 

What is really sad is the decline in academic members at a time when accounting professors were becoming the highest paid professors on nearly every college campus that has an accounting education program. The reason quite simply is the decline in enrollments in accounting doctoral programs as they became solely focused on producing accountics social scientists --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

 

FIGURE 3

Numbers of Doctoral Degrees from 2000-2004

 

But the saddest statistic is the longer run decline in the number of accounting doctoral program graduates in the United States. In 1988 there were over 200 graduates from U.S. doctoral programs in accounting. In two decades this is down by over 50%.

Doesn’t anybody else see a correlation between the decline in practitioner membership in the AAA with the decline in accounting doctoral program graduation rates? The overwhelming majority of applicants in history have been drawn from the practicing world of accountants, particularly practitioners from CPA firms. There is a tremendous and growing pool of applicants who have been working as practitioners from 1-5 years. Many would love to become accounting professors but are totally turned off by our social science accounting doctoral programs. They love accounting and hate accountics! They also hate to spend five years of their lives earning a PhD in accounting.

Our accounting doctoral programs were hijacked by mathematicians, economists, and psychologists in search of higher pay in accounting departments.

 Bob Jensen

 

 

 


Question
How long does it take to get an accounting doctorate?

 

Answer
The answer varies with respect to how long it takes to get both the undergraduate degree plus the requisite masters degree (or at least 150 credits required in most states). Assuming the student is full time and on track as an accounting major this makes it about 5.5 years before entering a doctoral program, although some masters programs only require one year for the masters degree for undergraduate accounting majors. To that we must add about four years of doctoral studies. This adds up to 9.5 years of full time study in college give or take a year. To this we must add the typical 1-5 years of experience most doctoral students spend in practice between attainment of a masters degree and eventual matriculation into a doctoral program.

The good news is that, unlike masters of accountancy and MBA programs, virtually all accountancy doctoral programs provide free tuition and rather generous living allowances from start to finish, although some of the time doctoral students must work as teaching and/or research assistants. Often fellowships in the fourth year allow students to devote full time to finishing their doctoral thesis.

Accountancy doctoral programs take at least four years in most cases for former accounting majors because entering students typically must take advanced mathematics, statistics, econometrics, and psychometrics prerequisites for doctoral seminars in accounting --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

Update on the AACSB's Bridge Program for Wannabe Accounting Professors
I'm sure glad the American Medical Association does not have a bridging program where accounting PhDs can become medical doctors by taking only four courses in medicine.

Students who get doctorates in fields other than accounting can typically get a doctoral degree in less than 9.5 years of full-time college. For example, an economics PhD can realistically spend only 7.5 years in college. He or she can then enter a bridge program to become a business, finance, or even an accounting professor under the AACSB's new Bridge Program, but that program may take two or more years part time. There just does not appear to be a short track into accounting tenure track positions. But the added years may be worth it since accounting faculty salaries are extremely high relative to most other academic disciplines. The high salaries, in part, are do to the enormous shortage of accounting doctoral graduates relative to the number of tenure-track openings in major colleges and universities --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

Only four United States Universities currently participate in the AACSB's Bridge program and one European business school whose doctoral programs I have doubts about because of truly absurd faculty-to-student ratios in the doctoral program.

The AACSB's domestic alternatives are as follows http://snipurl.com/aacsbbridge  
Also see http://snipurl.com/aacsbbridge2

When I mentioned the Bridge Program last year on the AECM, Virginia Tech responded by saying they were participating but not for accounting bridges.

The University of Toledo does not offer accounting bridges --- http://www.utoledo.edu/business/aacsbbridge/curriculum.html

Tulane only lists one full professor of accounting in my Hasselback Directory such that I doubt that Tulane is a major player in an accounting Bridge Program (Tulane may be more viable in management, marketing, and finance).

The University of Florida does apparently have an accounting bridge --- http://www.cba.ufl.edu/academics/pdbp/
But this strangely does not appear to be affiliated with the well known Fisher School of Accountancy at the University of Florida.

From what I can tell, Florida is bridging with only four courses. Can four courses alone turn an economics or history professor into an accounting professor?
The Bridge Program says yes! I think the Bridge Program has little to do with it, although a person's prior background such as years of professional work as a CPA may make all the difference in the world along with the type of doctoral degree earned outside accounting.

June 20 message from Saeed Roohani [sroohani@COX.NET]

AACSB Announces May 2008 Bridge Program Graduates, there are many AACSB certified PQ accounting faculty for hire, see

visit AACSB's online database

 Saeed Roohani
Bryant University

June 20, 2008 reply from Bob Jensen

There is a surprisingly high proportion of the 78 candidates who want to teach accounting and auditing given than most of the bridge programs like Virginia Tech opted out of teaching accounting but do bridge business and finance studies. However, 20 bridged candidates who want to teach accounting and auditing will not make a big dent in the market where the number of accounting faculty openings exceeds the new doctoral graduate supply (less than 100 graduates) by over 1,000 openings.

The big question now is whether those bridged candidates can get tenure track positions and make tenure with sufficient research publications in accounting. The leading schools willingly hire adjunct, non-tenure-track, accounting instructors, but they’re pretty snooty when it comes to tenure tracks.

In my opinion the bridge program is absurd. Can four-courses in a typical bridge program is tantamount to a “90-day Wonder Program” for college graduates to become military officers --- http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/90-day_wonder

There were great military officers that emerged from the 90-Day Wonder officers' candidate programs. There will also be great accounting, finance, and business professors that emerge from the AACSB bridging program. However, the programs do not deserve much of the credit, since the criteria for success are the credentials and personal qualities of the persons who entered the program. In accounting there's almost no chance of success unless the candidate was a good accountant before entering the bridge program. There's just too much to accounting that cannot be covered in less than about three years of full-time study in accountancy modules alone. In most states it takes five years of college as an accounting major just to sit for the CPA examination.

I'm sure glad the American Medical Association does not have a bridging program where accounting PhDs can become medical doctors by taking only four courses in medicine.

Bob Jensen


 

"Exploring Ways to Shorten the Ascent to a Ph.D.," by Joseph Berger, The New York Times, October 3, 2007 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/03/education/03education.html

 

Many of us have known this scholar: The hair is well-streaked with gray, the chin has begun to sag, but still our tortured friend slaves away at a masterwork intended to change the course of civilization that everyone else just hopes will finally get a career under way.

We even have a name for this sometimes pitied species — the A.B.D. — All But Dissertation. But in academia these days, that person is less a subject of ridicule than of soul-searching about what can done to shorten the time, sometimes much of a lifetime, it takes for so many graduate students to, well, graduate. The Council of Graduate Schools, representing 480 universities in the United States and Canada, is halfway through a seven-year project to explore ways of speeding up the ordeal.

For those who attempt it, the doctoral dissertation can loom on the horizon like Everest, gleaming invitingly as a challenge but often turning into a masochistic exercise once the ascent is begun. The average student takes 8.2 years to get a Ph.D.; in education, that figure surpasses 13 years. Fifty percent of students drop out along the way, with dissertations the major stumbling block. At commencement, the typical doctoral holder is 33, an age when peers are well along in their professions, and 12 percent of graduates are saddled with more than $50,000 in debt.

These statistics, compiled by the National Science Foundation and other government agencies by studying the 43,354 doctoral recipients of 2005, were even worse a few years ago. Now, universities are setting stricter timelines and demanding that faculty advisers meet regularly with protégés. Most science programs allow students to submit three research papers rather than a single grand work. More universities find ways to ease financial burdens, providing better paid teaching assistantships as well as tuition waivers. And more universities are setting up writing groups so that students feel less alone cobbling together a thesis.

Fighting these trends, and stretching out the process, is the increased competition for jobs and research grants; in fields like English where faculty vacancies are scarce, students realize they must come up with original, significant topics. Nevertheless, education researchers like Barbara E. Lovitts, who has written a new book urging professors to clarify what they expect in dissertations; for example, to point out that professors “view the dissertation as a training exercise” and that students should stop trying for “a degree of perfection that’s unnecessary and unobtainable.”

There are probably few universities that nudge students out the door as rapidly as Princeton, where a humanities student now averages 6.4 years compared with 7.5 in 2003. That is largely because Princeton guarantees financial support for its 330 scholars for five years, including free tuition and stipends that range up to $30,000 a year. That means students need teach no more than two courses during their schooling and can focus on research.

“Princeton since the 1930s has felt that a Ph.D. should be an education, not a career, and has valued a tight program,” said William B. Russel, dean of the graduate school.

And students are grateful. “Every morning I wake up and remind myself the university is paying me to do nothing but write the dissertation,” said Kellam Conover, 26, a classicist who expects to complete his course of study in five years next May when he finishes his dissertation on bribery in Athens. “It’s a tremendous advantage compared to having to work during the day and complete the dissertation part time.”

But fewer than a dozen universities have endowments or sources of financing large enough to afford five-year packages. The rest require students to teach regularly. Compare Princetonians with Brian Gatten, 28, an English scholar at the University of Texas in Austin. He has either been teaching or assisting in two courses every semester for five years.

“Universities need us as cheap labor to teach their undergraduates, and frankly we need to be needed because there isn’t another way for us to fund our education,” he said.

That raises a question that state legislatures and trustees might ponder: Would it be more cost effective to provide financing to speed graduate students into careers rather than having them drag out their apprenticeships?

But money is not the only reason Princeton does well. It has developed a culture where professors keep after students. Students talk of frequent meetings with advisers, not a semiannual review. For example, Ning Wu, 30, a father of two, works in Dr. Russel’s chemical engineering lab and said Dr. Russel comes by every Friday to discuss Mr. Wu’s work on polymer films used in computer chips. He aims to get his Ph.D. next year, his fifth.

While Dr. Russel values “the critical thinking and independent digging students have to do, either in their mind for an original concept or in the archives,” others question the necessity of book-length works. Some universities have established what they call professional doctorates for students who plan careers more as practitioners than scholars. Since the 1970s, Yeshiva University has not only offered a Ph.D. in psychology but also a separate doctor of psychology degree, or Psy.D., for those more interested in clinical work than research; that program requires a more modest research paper.

OTHER institutions are reviving master’s degree programs for, say, aspiring scientists who plan careers in development of products rather than research.

Those who insist on dissertations are aware that they must reduce the loneliness that defeats so many scholars. Gregory Nicholson, completing his sixth and final year at Michigan State, was able to finish a 270-page dissertation on spatial environments in novels like Kerouac’s “On the Road” with relative efficiency because of a writing group where he thrashed out his work with other thesis writers.

Continued in article

 

Bob Jensen's threads on accountancy doctoral programs are at the following three links:

 


This citation was forwarded by Don Ramsey
"Why business ignores the business schools," by Michael Skapinker, Financial Times, January 7, 2008

Chief executives, on the other hand, pay little attention to what business schools do or say. As long ago as 1993, Donald Hambrick, then president of the US-based Academy of Management, described the business academics' summer conference as "an incestuous closed loop", at which professors "come to talk with each other". Not much has changed. In the current edition of The Academy of Management Journal.

. . .

They have chosen an auspicious occasion on which to beat themselves up: this year is The Academy of Management Journal's 50th anniversary. A scroll through the most recent issues demonstrates why managers may be giving the Journal a miss. "A multi-level investigation of antecedents and consequences of team member boundary spanning behaviour" is the title of one article.

Why do business academics write like this? The academics themselves offer several reasons. First, to win tenure in a US university, you need to publish in prestigious peer-reviewed journals. Accessibility is not the key to academic advancement.

Similar pressures apply elsewhere. In France and Australia, academics receive bonuses for placing articles in the top academic publications. The UK's Research Assessment Exercise, which evaluates university research and ties funding to the outcome, encourages similarly arcane work.

But even without these incentives, many business school faculty prefer to adorn their work with scholarly tables, statistics and jargon because it makes them feel like real academics. Within the university world, business schools suffer from a long-standing inferiority complex.

The professors offer several remedies. Academic business journals should accept fact-based articles, without demanding that they propound a new theory. Professor Hambrick says that academics in other fields "don't feel the need to sprinkle mentions of theory on every page, like so much aromatic incense or holy water".

Others talk of the need for academics to spend more time talking to managers about the kind of research they would find useful.

As well-meaning as these suggestions are, I suspect the business school academics are missing something. Law, medical and engineering schools are subject to the same academic pressures as business schools - to publish in prestigious peer-reviewed journals and to buttress their work with the expected academic vocabulary.


The Fall 2007 Edition of Accounting Education News (AEN from the American Accounting Association) --- 
http://aaahq.org/pubs/AEN/2007/Fall2007.pdf

Two important things to note:

In his first President's Message, Gary Previts mentions the Plumlee report on the dire shortage of accountancy doctoral students and provides a link to the AAA's new site providing resources for research and experimentation on "Future Accounting Faculty and Programs Projects" --- http://aaahq.org/temp/phd/index.cfm
Note especially the Accounting PhD Program Info link with a picture) and the PhD Project link (at the bottom):

Welcome to the preliminary posting of a new resource for the community participating in and supporting accounting programs, students, faculty, and by that connection practitioners of accounting. We plan to build this collection of resources for the broad community committed to a vital future for accounting education. This page is an initial step to creating a place where we can come together to gather resources and share data and ideas.
Making A Difference: Careers in Academia
Powerpoint slides created by Nancy Bagranoff and Stephanie Bryant for the 2007 Beta Alpha Psi Annual Meeting. Permission granted for use and adaptation with attribution.
GradSchools.com
Accounting PhD Program Info

New Research Projects by the AAA on the Trends and Characteristics of Accounting Faculty, Students, Curriculum, and Programs

Part I: Future of Accounting Faculty Project (Report December, 2007)
Part II: Future of Accounting Programs Project

Part I will describe today's accounting academic workforce, via demographics, work patterns, productivity, and career progression of accounting faculty, as well as of faculty in selected peer disciplines using data from the national survey of postsecondary faculty (NSOPF) to establish trends, and a set of measures will be combined to benchmark the overall status of accounting against (approximately) 150 fields. This project will provide context and data to identify factors affecting the pipeline and workplace.

Part II will focus on expanding understanding of the characteristics of accounting faculty, students, and accounting programs, and implications of their evolving environment. The need for the Part I project illustrates how essential it is for the discipline and profession of accounting that we establish a more standard and comprehensive process for collecting, analyzing, and reporting data about accounting students, doctoral students, faculty, curriculum, and programs.

More Resources on the Changing Environment for Faculty:

The Reshaping of America's Academic Workforce
David W. Leslie, TIAA-CREF Institute Fellow
The College of William and Mary
TIAA Institute Research Dialogue Series, 2007

Jim Hasselback's* 2007 Analysis of Accounting Faculty Birthdates
*Copyrighted – requests for use to J. R. Hasselback

  • Among U.S. Accounting Academics -- 53.4% are 55 or older

From the Integrated Postsecondary Education System (IPEDS)

  • 34.8% of all full-time faculty in the U.S. are non-tenure-track -- nearly 2 in 5 of all full-time appointments
  • Between 1993 and 2003 the proportion of all new full-time hires into "off-track" appointments increased each year from 50% to nearly 3 in 5 (58.6%)
  • Reported in J. Schuster & M. Finkelstein (Fall, 2006). "On the Brink: Assessing the Status of the American Faculty," Thought & Action 51-62.

Supply and Demand for Accounting PhDs

American Accounting Association PhD Supply/Demand Resource Page
A collection of resources, links, and reports related to the pipeline of future Accounting faculty. Highlights include:

  • Report of the AAA/APLG Committee to Assess the Supply and Demand of Accounting PhDs
  • Link to the Doctoral Education Resource Center of AACSB International (Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business)
  • AICPA's Journal of Accountancy's article "Teaching for the Love of It"

Deloitte Foundation Accounting Doctoral Student Survey

Survey Results (Summer, 2007)
Data collected by survey of attendees of the 2007 AAA/Deloitte J. Michael Cook Doctoral Consortium

The PhD Project and Accounting Doctoral Students Association

The PhD Project is an information clearinghouse created to increase the diversity of business school faculty by attracting African Americans, Hispanic Americans and Native Americans to business doctoral programs and by providing a network of peer support. In just 12 short years, the PhD Project has been the catalyst for a dramatic increase in the number of minority business school faculty—from 294 to 842, with approximately 380 more candidates currently immersed in doctoral studies.

The PhD Project Accounting Doctoral Students Association is a voluntary association offering moral support and encouragement to African-American, Hispanic-American, and Native American Accounting Doctoral Students as their pursue their degrees and take their places in the teaching and research profession, and serve as mentors to new doctoral students.

PhD Project Surveys of Students, Professors, and Deans
Results of a survey among students to understand the impact of minority professors on minority and non-minority students.

Accounting Firms Supporting the AAA and Accounting Programs, Faculty, and Students

Related Organizations Sharing Interest in Accounting Faculty and Programs

 

Professor Dan Deines at Kansas State University has a handful of Outstanding Educator Awards, including one from the AICPA. Beginning on Page 5 of the Fall 2007 edition of AEN, Dan discusses the Taylor Research and Consulting Group study of accounting education commissioned by the AICPA in 2002. The study identifies barriers to students that prevent many top students from majoring in accounting. Dan then describes a pilot program initiated by KSU in reaction to the Taylor Report. I think accounting educators outside KSU may attend some of the pilot program events.

Bob Jensen's threads on the shortage of doctoral students in accountancy are shown below.

 


Questions
Why must all accounting doctoral programs be social science (particularly econometrics) doctoral programs?
What's wrong with humanities research methodologies?
What's wrong about studying accounting in accounting doctoral programs?
Why are we graduating so many new assistant professors of accounting who do not know any accounting?
Hint: Similar problems exist in languages and education school PhD programs


Question
What drastic move is the AACSB International (accrediting body)  taking to deal with the shortage of graduating students from business doctoral programs (including accountancy doctoral programs)?
Hint:
It's called a “Postdoctoral Bridge to Business”

Answer

With many business schools reporting difficulty attracting Ph.D. faculty members, the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business has announced the first participating institutions in new “Postdoctoral Bridge to Business” programs — short-term programs that will train new Ph.D.’s in fields outside business for faculty jobs at business schools. The programs are starting at the Grenoble Ecole de Management, Tulane University, the University of Florida, the University of Toledo and Virginia Tech.
Inside Higher Ed, September 20, 2007 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/09/20/qt

Bob Jensen's threads on alleged reasons why there are such shortages in accountancy doctoral programs can be found at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

A cynic might conclude that this is a correctional option for naive students who earned an economics PhD in an Economics Department rather than lucky students who earned virtual economics PhDs in accountancy doctoral programs.

A realist might term this the "Bridge Over Troubled Waters" that leads to higher salaries for "90-Day Wonders" in business/accounting education --- http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=90+day+wonder

This reminds me of the Harvard math professor (I can't recall which one at the moment) who said:  "Accounting is a fascinating discipline. I think I might take a couple of hours to master it."


Question
The faculty shortage in nursing schools is even more severe than that of accounting schools. Why are there "bridges over troubled waters" in schools of nursing in the same context as the new bridges being built for non-accounting PhDs mentioned above?

Answer with a Question
Would you really want an economics PhD who took a crash course in nursing teaching the nurses who serve you?

Answer with an Answer --- http://nln.allenpress.com/pdfserv/i1536-5026-028-04-0223.pdf
The fact of the matter is that the law of supply and demand works better in schools of accounting than in schools of nursing. In general, accounting educators are among the highest paid faculty on campus. The number of unfilled tenure-track job openings in schools of accounting combined with starting salaries in excess of $130,000 per year are the main reasons that the AACSB International's "
Postdoctoral Bridge to Business" just might work, although I seriously doubt whether any of the bridged students will be able to teach upper division financial accounting, auditing, and tax courses.

The fact is that the law of supply and demand works lousy in nursing schools. In spite of shortages of qualified faculty, nursing educators remain among the lowest paid faculty on campus. A Nursing International's "Postdoctoral Bridge to Nursing" probably would not work, and given my cynacism about 90-0Day Wonders it is some comfort to me that there is no such bridge over troubled waters in nursing schools.

 


Question
What do accounting schools and nursing schools have in common?

"The Nursing Education Dilemma," by Elia Powers, Inside Higher Ed, June 22, 2007 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/06/22/nursing

The market for nursing graduates remains hot, and plenty of students are vying for those open positions. Enrollment in entry-level baccalaureate nursing programs increased by nearly 8 percent in 2006 from the previous year, which marked the sixth straight year of gains. Community College programs are also seeing increases in applications and enrollments.
It’s all positive news for the health care industry, which has suffered from a well-documented nursing shortage since the 1990s, when many hospitals cut their staffs and some colleges cut back their programs.

But for colleges of nursing, the increasing demand to accommodate more students presents a dilemma: Who will teach them?

When it comes to clinical nursing courses, college programs are bound to strict faculty-to-student ratios, set by individual states. One instructor to every 10 or 12 students is a fairly common ratio. So even as administrators and state lawmakers seek more slots for students, there’s a ceiling on expansion unless more faculty are recruited or produced.

That’s not happening quickly. A survey released last year by the American Association of Colleges of Nursing identified at least 637 faculty vacancies at more than 300 nursing schools with baccalaureate or graduate programs — or what amounts to a nearly 8 percent faculty vacancy rate. The majority of the openings are tenure-track positions that require applicants have a doctorate, the survey shows.

Meanwhile, there continues to be a backlog of students. In 2006, more than 38,000 nursing school candidates deemed “qualified” by the AACN were turned away from entry-level baccalaureate programs, while a total of 50,783 nursing school applicants enrolled and registered in courses. When the new students are added to the pool of all students enrolled, total enrollment rises to 133,578.

Nearly three quarters of the colleges that responded to the AACN survey pointed to faculty shortages as a reason for not accepting the applicants. Community colleges are turning away 3.3 “qualified” applicants for every one turned away by four-year institutions, said Roxanne Fulcher, director of health professions policy at the American Association of Community Colleges.

At many nursing schools, wait lists are shrinking after years of growth, officials say, not because slots are opening up, but because students are becoming frustrated that their chances of enrolling are dim.

Continued in article

Question
What do accounting schools and nursing schools have in common?

"The Nursing Education Dilemma," by Elia Powers, Inside Higher Ed, June 22, 2007 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/06/22/nursing

The market for nursing graduates remains hot, and plenty of students are vying for those open positions. Enrollment in entry-level baccalaureate nursing programs increased by nearly 8 percent in 2006 from the previous year, which marked the sixth straight year of gains. Community College programs are also seeing increases in applications and enrollments.
It’s all positive news for the health care industry, which has suffered from a well-documented nursing shortage since the 1990s, when many hospitals cut their staffs and some colleges cut back their programs.

But for colleges of nursing, the increasing demand to accommodate more students presents a dilemma: Who will teach them?

When it comes to clinical nursing courses, college programs are bound to strict faculty-to-student ratios, set by individual states. One instructor to every 10 or 12 students is a fairly common ratio. So even as administrators and state lawmakers seek more slots for students, there’s a ceiling on expansion unless more faculty are recruited or produced.

That’s not happening quickly. A survey released last year by the American Association of Colleges of Nursing identified at least 637 faculty vacancies at more than 300 nursing schools with baccalaureate or graduate programs — or what amounts to a nearly 8 percent faculty vacancy rate. The majority of the openings are tenure-track positions that require applicants have a doctorate, the survey shows.

Meanwhile, there continues to be a backlog of students. In 2006, more than 38,000 nursing school candidates deemed “qualified” by the AACN were turned away from entry-level baccalaureate programs, while a total of 50,783 nursing school applicants enrolled and registered in courses. When the new students are added to the pool of all students enrolled, total enrollment rises to 133,578.

Nearly three quarters of the colleges that responded to the AACN survey pointed to faculty shortages as a reason for not accepting the applicants. Community colleges are turning away 3.3 “qualified” applicants for every one turned away by four-year institutions, said Roxanne Fulcher, director of health professions policy at the American Association of Community Colleges.

At many nursing schools, wait lists are shrinking after years of growth, officials say, not because slots are opening up, but because students are becoming frustrated that their chances of enrolling are dim.

Continued in article

 


Rankings of Universities in Terms of Doctoral Student Placements
The journal PS: Political Science & Politics has just published
an analysis that suggests that there is not a direct relationship between the general reputation of a department and its success at placing new Ph.D.’s; some programs far exceed their reputation when it comes to placing new Ph.D.’s while others lag. The analysis may provide new evidence for the “halo effect” in which many experts worry that general (and sometimes outdated) institutional reputations cloud the judgment of those asked to fill out surveys on departmental quality. And while the analysis was prepared about political science, its authors believe the same approach could be used in other fields in the humanities and social sciences, with the method more problematic in other areas because fewer Ph.D. students aspire to academic careers.
Scott Jaschik, "A Ranking That Would Matter," Inside Higher Ed, August 21, 2007 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/08/21/ranking
 

Jensen Comment
The big problem here is defining what constitutes "a top job" or a "a good job." There are so many elements in job satisfaction, many of which are intangible and cannot be quantified, that I'm suspect of any study that purports to identify top jobs. Obviously prestigious universities have a bias for hiring prestigious university graduates. But this is often due to the reputations of the graduate student's teachers and thesis advisors. And the quality of the dissertation may have a great deal of impact on hiring even if the degree is from No-name University. Also prestigious universities tend to have the highest GMAT applicants, but this is not always the case. Often the highest GMAT applicants are really tremendous graduates.

In disciplines having great shortages of doctoral graduates, especially doctoral graduates in accounting and finance, findings from political science do not necessarily extrapolate.

Be that as it may, the findings of the above study come as no surprise to me. Particularly in accounting, some prestigious universities have taken a nose dive in terms of reputations of faculty supervising dissertations. And students may not have access to the most reputable faculty, especially faculty who are too busy with consulting and world travel. For example, a few years ago I encountered a doctoral student in accounting at the University of Chicago who claimed that it was very difficult to even find a faculty member who would supervise a dissertation. But if he ever graduates from Chicago, he will have the Chicago halo around his head. In fairness, I've not had recent information regarding what is happening with doctoral students in accounting at the University of Chicago. Certainly it is still a very reputable university in terms of its business studies and research programs.

Also there is a problem in accountancy that mathematics-educated accountancy doctoral graduates from prestigious universities may know very little about accountancy and additionally have troubles with the English language. On occasion prestige-university graduates do not get the "top jobs" where accountancy is spoken.

Beyond Research Rankings," by Luis M. Proenza, Inside Higher Ed, May 17, 2007 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2007/05/17/proenza

Controversies in media rankings of colleges are discussed at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/20/education/20colleges.html

Bob Jensen's threads on college rankings controversies are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm#BusinessSchoolRankings

 


All is Not Well in Modern Languages Education
Proposal to integrate languages with literature, history, culture, economics and linguistics
Proposal to use fewer adjuncts who now teach language courses
The MLA created a special committee in 2004 to study the future of language education and its report, being issued today
(May 24, 2007) is in many ways unprecedented for the association in that it is urging departments to reorganize how languages are taught and who does the teaching. In general, the critique of the committee is that the traditional model has started with basic language training (typically taught by those other than tenure-track faculty members) and proceeded to literary study (taught by tenure-track faculty members). The report calls for moving away from this “two tiered” system, integrating language study with literature, and placing much more emphasis on history, culture, economics and linguistics — among other topics — of the societies whose languages are being taught.
Scott Jaschik, Inside Higher Ed, May 24, 2007 --- http://insidehighered.com/news/2007/05/24/mla

Who Teaches First-Year Language Courses?
Rank Doctoral-Granting Departments B.A.-Granting Departments
Tenured or tenure-track professors 7.4% 41.8%
Full-time, non-tenure track 19.6% 21.1%
Part-time instructors 15.7% 34.7%
Graduate students 57.4% 2.4%

 


All is Not Well in Programs for Doctoral Students in Departments/Colleges of Education
The education doctorate, attempting to serve dual purposes—to prepare researchers and to prepare practitioners—is not serving either purpose well. To address what they have termed this "crippling" problem, Carnegie and the Council of Academic Deans in Research Education Institutions (CADREI) have launched the Carnegie Project on the Education Doctorate (CPED), a three-year effort to reclaim the education doctorate and to transform it into the degree of choice for the next generation of school and college leaders. The project is coordinated by David Imig, professor of practice at the University of Maryland. "Today, the Ed.D. is perceived as 'Ph.D.-lite,'" said Carnegie President Lee S. Shulman. "More important than the public relations problem, however, is the real risk that schools of education are becoming impotent in carrying out their primary missions to prepare leading practitioners as well as leading scholars."
"Institutions Enlisted to Reclaim Education Doctorate," The Carnegie Foundation for Advancement in Teaching --- http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/news/sub.asp?key=51&subkey=2266

The EED does not focus enough on research, and the PhD program has become a social science doctoral program without enough education content. Middle ground is being sought.


All is Not Well in Programs for Doctoral Students in Departments/Colleges of Business, Especially in Accounting
The problem is that not enough accounting is taught in what have become social science doctoral programs
See http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

Partly the problem is the same as with PhD programs in colleges of education.
The pool of accounting doctoral program applicants is drying up, especially accounting doctoral program pool that is increasingly trickle-filled with mathematically-educated foreign students who have virtually no background in accounting. Twenty years ago, over 200 accounting doctoral students were being graduated each year in the United States. Now it's less than one hundred graduates per year, many of whom know very little about accounting, especially U.S. accounting. This is particularly problematic for financial accounting, tax, and auditing education requiring knowledge of U.S. standards, regulations, and laws.

Accounting doctoral programs are social science research programs that do not appeal to accountants who are interested in becoming college educators but have no aptitude for or interest in the five or more years of quantitative methods study required for current accounting doctoral programs.

To meet the demand of thousands of colleges seeking accounting faculty, the supply situation is revealed by Plumlee et al (2006) as quoted at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm

There were only 29 doctoral students in auditing and 23 in tax out of the 2004 total of 391 accounting doctoral students enrolled in years 1-5 in the United States.

The answer here it seems to me is to open doctoral programs to wider humanities and legal studies research methodologies and to put accounting back into accounting doctoral programs.

Partly the problem is the same as with “two-tiered” departments of modern languages
The huge shortage of accounting doctoral graduates has bifurcated the teaching of accounting. Increasingly, accounting, tax, systems, and auditing courses are taught by adjunct part-time faculty or full-time adjunct faculty who are not on a tenure track and often are paid much less than tenure-track faculty who teach graduate research courses.

The short run answer here is difficult since there are so few doctoral graduates who know enough accounting to take over for the adjunct faculty. If doctoral programs open up more to accountants, perhaps more adjunct faculty will enter the pool of doctoral program prospects. This might help the long run problem. Meanwhile as former large doctoral programs (e.g., at Illinois, Texas, Florida, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Michigan) shrink more and more, we’re increasingly building two-tier accounting education programs due to increasing demand and shrinking supply of doctoral graduates in accountancy.

We’re becoming more and more like “two-tier” language departments in our large and small colleges.

Practitioners in  education schools generally are K-12 teachers and school administrators. In the case of accounting doctoral programs, our dual mission is to prepare college teachers of accountancy as well as leading scholars. Our accounting doctoral programs are drying up (less than 100 per year now graduating in the United States, many of whom know virtually no accounting) primarily because our doctoral programs have become five years of social science and mathematics concentrations that do not appeal to accountants who might otherwise enter the pool of doctoral program admission candidates.

Note that the above Carnegie study also claims that education doctoral programs are also failing to "prepare researchers." I think the same criticism applies to current accountancy doctoral programs in the United States. We're failing in our own dual purpose accountancy doctoral programs and need a concerted effort to become a "degree of choice" among the accounting professionals who would like to move into academe in a role other than that of a low-status and low-paid adjunct professor.

In the United States, following the Gordon/Howell and Pierson reports, our accounting doctoral programs and leading academic journals bet the farm on the social sciences without taking the due cautions of realizing why the social sciences are called "soft sciences." They're soft because "not everything that can be counted, counts. And not everything that counts can be counted."

Leading academic accounting research journals commenced accepting only esoteric papers with complicated mathematical models and trivial hypotheses of zero interest to accounting practitioners --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm

Accounting doctoral programs made a concerted effort to recruit students with mathematics, economics, and social science backgrounds even though these doctoral candidates knew virtually nothing about accountancy. To compound the felony, the doctoral programs dropped all accounting requirements except for some doctoral seminars on how to mine accounting data archives with econometric and psychometric models and advanced statistical inference testing.

I cannot find the exact quotation in my archives, but some years ago Linda Kidwell complained that her university had recently hired a newly-minted graduate from an accounting doctoral program who did not know any accounting. When assigned to teach accounting courses, this new "accounting" professor was a disaster since she knew nothing about the subjects she was assigned to teach.

In the year following his assignment as President of the American Accounting Association Joel Demski asserted that research focused on the accounting profession will become a "vocational virus" leading us away from the joys of mathematics and the social sciences and the pureness of the scientific academy:

Statistically there are a few youngsters who came to academia for the joy of learning, who are yet relatively untainted by the vocational virus. I urge you to nurture your taste for learning, to follow your joy. That is the path of scholarship, and it is the only one with any possibility of turning us back toward the academy.
Joel Demski, "Is Accounting an Academic Discipline? American Accounting Association Plenary Session" August 9, 2006 --- http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/demski/Is_Accounting_an_Academic_Discipline.pdf

Accounting professors are no longer "leading scholars" if they focus on accounting rather than mathematics and the social sciences --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR.htm

When Professor Beresford attempted to publish his remarks, an Accounting Horizons referee’s report to him contained the following revealing reply about “leading scholars” in accounting research:

1. The paper provides specific recommendations for things that accounting academics should be doing to make the accounting profession better. However (unless the author believes that academics' time is a free good) this would presumably take academics' time away from what they are currently doing. While following the author's advice might make the accounting profession better, what is being made worse? In other words, suppose I stop reading current academic research and start reading news about current developments in accounting standards. Who is made better off and who is made worse off by this reallocation of my time? Presumably my students are marginally better off, because I can tell them some new stuff in class about current accounting standards, and this might possibly have some limited benefit on their careers. But haven't I made my colleagues in my department worse off if they depend on me for research advice, and haven't I made my university worse off if its academic reputation suffers because I'm no longer considered a leading scholar? Why does making the accounting profession better take precedence over everything else an academic does with their time?
As quoted in Jensen (2006a) ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession


Advice to students planning to take standardized tests such as the SAT, GRE, GMAT, LSAT, TOEFL, etc.
See Test Magic at http://www.testmagic.com/
There is a forum here where students interested in doctoral programs in business (e.g., accounting and finance) and economics discuss the ins and outs of doctoral programs.


Question
Does faculty research improve student learning in the classrooms where researchers teach?
Put another way, is research more important than scholarship that does not contribute to new knowledge?

Major Issue
If the answer leans toward scholarship over research, it could monumentally change criteria for tenure in many colleges and universities.

AACSB International: the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business, has released for comment a report calling for the accreditation process for business schools to evaluate whether faculty research improves the learning process. The report expresses the concern that accreditors have noted the volume of research, but not whether it is making business schools better from an educational standpoint.
Inside Higher Ed, August 6, 2007 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/08/06/qt

"Controversial Report on Business School Research Released for Comments," AACSB News Release, August 3, 2007 --- http://www.aacsb.edu/Resource_Centers/Research/media_release-8-3-07.pdf

FL (August 3, 2007) ― A report released today evaluates the nature and purposes of business school research and recommends steps to increase its value to students, practicing managers and society. The report, issued by the Impact of Research task force of AACSB International, is released as a draft to solicit comments and feedback from business schools, their faculties and others. The report includes recommendations that could profoundly change the way business schools organize, measure, and communicate about research.

AACSB International, the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business, estimates that each year accredited business schools spend more than $320 million to support faculty research and another half a billion dollars supports research-based doctoral education.

“Research is now reflected in nearly everything business schools do, so we must find better ways to demonstrate the impact of our contributions to advancing management theory, practice and education” says task force chair Joseph A. Alutto, of The Ohio State University. “But quality business schools are not and should not be the same; that’s why the report also proposes accreditation changes to strengthen the alignment of research expectations to individual school missions.”

The task force argues that a business school cannot separate itself from management practice and still serve its function, but it cannot be so focused on practice that it fails to develop rigorous, independent insights that increase our understanding of organizations and management. Accordingly, the task force recommends building stronger interactions between academic researchers and practicing managers on questions of relevance and developing new channels that make quality academic research more accessible to practice.

According to AACSB President and CEO John J. Fernandes, recommendations in this report have the potential to foster a new generation of academic research. “In the end,” he says, “it is a commitment to scholarship that enables business schools to best serve the future needs of business and society through quality management education.”

The Impact of Research task force report draft for comments is available for download on the AACSB website: www.aacsb.edu/research. The website also provides additional resources related to the issue and the opportunity to submit comments on the draft report. The AACSB Committee on Issues in Management Education and Board of Directors will use the feedback to determine the next steps for implementation.

The AACSB International Impact of Research Task Force
Chairs:
Joseph A. Alutto, interim president, and
John W. Berry, Senior Chair in Business, Max M. FisherCollege of Business, The Ohio State University

K. C. Chan, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Richard A. Cosier, Purdue University
Thomas G. Cummings, University of Southern California
Ken Fenoglio, AT&T
Gabriel Hawawini, INSEAD and the University of Pennsylvania
Cynthia H. Milligan, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Myron Roomkin, Case Western Reserve University
Anthony J. Rucci, The Ohio State University

Teaching Excellence Secondary to Research for Promotion, Tenure, and Pay ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm#TeachingVsResearch

Bob Jensen's threads on higher education controversies are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm


The Parable Of Being In The Wrong Paradigm
May 30, 2007 parable by David Albrecht [albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]

Sorry to revive this thread (need a favor) after it seemed to die 10 days ago. I present this parable with apologies to Ed Scribner, our resident parable teller.

I call this The Parable Of Being In The Wrong Paradigm.

A certain professor is the sad-sack of accounting higher education. It seems as if he's always been a member of an out-of-power paradigm. He started off college as a music major. He then switched to chemistry to Spanish to creative writing to history to political science. After graduation he discovered his degree qualified him to operate the french frier at a fast food joint. Friends, unhappy with his unhappiness, advised him to pursue an MBA degree. Our professor switched to an MA in accounting.

After this graduation he failed to secure an accounting or auditing job with the Big 8-7-6-5-4, probably due to a combination of not being young enough and wearing a colored shirt to his interviews. He wanted a true job, but it was not to be for him. Count him out of the Big 8-7-6-5-4 paradigm, his first experience with the wrong paradigm.

But lo and behold, a small school hired him to teach accounting. He enjoyed it so much that he decided to pursue an accounting doctorate for that academic union card. On the bright side, he learned new ways of thinking, new ways to approach a problem, and mental flexibility (this trait gets him in trouble, though). On the dark side he tried to pass himself off as a quantoid, but he wasn't. Nor was his degree from a powerful elite university. So count him out of the elite accounting school paradigm, and count him out of a top level salary. He is again a member of the wrong paradigm.

He's been a bust as a research/publishing hound, never hitting a top four journal. Some of his pubs were practitioner oriented and out of favor in his department. His last publication was too many years ago. He hit with the Journal of Excellence in College Teaching, but was told by his dean that it wouldn't count because his article wasn't about accounting (and the journal is too lowly ranked anyway). So, count him out of the dominant accounting research paradigm and from getting annual raises from his department. He is again a member of the wrong paradigm.

He was curious fellow, though, and always eager to contribute to making things better. Intrigued by how students learned, he researched it (but never got anything published, of course). He invested the results of the research back into his classrooms and became a popular teacher. As he continued to learn about how students learn, he became more popular. Eventually, students had to line up to get into one of his classes. The department chair responded by putting in a special registration process to keep excess students away from his classes and into other sections. The lucky students in his classes thrived in his learning-centered environment, it seems that they had been hungry to learn for a long time. The traditional paradigm ("tell them and then test them") is alive and well at at his school, though. He had to endure peer-to-peer evaluations of his teaching from professors who had difficulty in helping students learn. One accounting professor, notorious for his long lectures and lethal use of Power Point, came into our professor's classroom on one of his more non-traditional approach days. After a few minutes, the notorious accounting professor angrily steamed out of the classroom, giving our professor the the lowest score ever on a peer evaluation of teaching. It seems our professor didn't cover enough content. So count him out of another dominant accounting professor paradigm, and again a member of the wrong paradigm.

Despite being considered the worst accounting professor (0 for 4) by his department, he received his university's highest award for contributing to student learning.

One day he was asked how it felt not to be a part of the crowd or a dominant accounting paradigm. He replied that not being in a correct paradigm feels like not being invited to a party. He took solace, though from reading posts to AECM. Contributors seemed to be out of at least one power paradigm, just like him. They discussed it aud nauseum, year after year. Eventually he concluded that the more people lament the power of a dominant paradigm, the more things stay the same. It is like the weather--people can talk about it a lot but no one can do anything to change it. Leaving his computer, our professor went back to work, changing the world one student at a time.

David Albrecht


What's wrong about studying accounting in accounting doctoral programs?
May 2, 2007 message from Bob Jensen to the AECM Listserv

I have a former student and very good friend who’s interested in applying for an accounting doctoral program. He’s a good student who became a better student each year of his five year program. He’s somewhat experienced as a tax accountant.

But he’s not especially interested in a doctoral program that is heavy in quantitative methods (dare I say “accountics?”).

I have a couple of suggestions for him. But before I reply to him I would like some other suggestions from the AECM regarding full-time doctoral programs that are heavier on accounting and taxation skills and a bit lighter on the quantitative methods focus of most (all?) respected accounting doctoral programs at the moment.

You may send your suggestions privately to me or share them on the AECM if you choose to do so.

Please let me know if I can forward your suggestions under your name or if I should make your suggestions to him anonymous.

I do recommend this young man for a doctoral program. He’s become very passionate about becoming an accounting educator.

Thanks,

Bob Jensen

May 2, 2007 reply from Michael Haselkorn [MHASELKORN@bentley.edu]

Bob,

He should check out Bentley College’s new PhD program. Feel free to use my name.

Mike Haselkorn

May 2, 2007 reply from Randy Kuhn [jkuhn@bus.ucf.edu]

Bob,

I would definitely recommend your student speak to some of the professors at UCF (Central Florida in Orlando) like Robin Roberts and Steve Sutton. The general approach for the PhD program here is to provide as much exposure as possible to all areas of accounting scholarship and let the student decide what area best suits them. We take five accounting seminars that include a general overview of research (Kuhn, Burrell & Morgan, etc.), behavioral accounting, accounting information systems, financial archival, and sociological. A nice mix overall. Most of us take electives outside the College of Business in psychology, sociology, education, etc. for our minor as well as for the methods requirements. We can choose a more quantitative approach but no one in the last three classes went that route. Of the nine students in the last two classes, seven came from public accounting (six audit, one tax). The program has definitely enlightened all of us to other views of accounting, research, education, and the world in general. We only accept students every other year and I believe there are one or two spots left for the Fall 2007 class. If you think our program might fit your student, then I strongly recommend that he contact Robin ASAP.

Thanks,

Randy

April 6, 2008 message from Steve Sutton [ssutton@BUS.UCF.EDU]

As a quick point of clarification, the UCF doctoral program came up in these earlier discussions as an alternative to the "accountics" type programs common at most U.S. universities. Our Ph.D. degree is definitely a heavy research degree, but our students tend to specialize in audit, tax, systems, managerial and it would be unusual for one of our students to complete an entirely economics-based archival study in their thesis. Our students are heavily encouraged to use the three-paper dissertation model and thus normally exit their Ph.D. program with three papers from the dissertation that are very near to being in a submitable form. These dissertations generally use multiple methodological approaches to study an issue of interest from multiple perspectives. In addition, virtually all students have published one or more academic papers before working on the dissertation. I perceive UCF as a very heavy research oriented PhD program, we just have a much more encompassing view of what constitutes acceptable research methods than many other programs, and strategically our program is structured to primarily focus on Behavioral/Public Policy/IT-related research.

Sorry to jump into the flow on this, but thought we should make sure there wasn't a misperception out there about our program.

Steve G. Sutton
KPMG Professor
Dixon School of Accounting, UCF
URL ---
www.bus.ucf.edu/ssutton/

May 2, 2007 reply from Steve Sutton [ssutton@bus.ucf.edu]

Bob,

I’ve watched this discussion with some interest. I’m always reluctant to speak of our own PhD program in this forum because it can be taken and interpreted the wrong way. Our PhD program has carved a niche out that is different from the ‘glamour’ programs. If we have a student who applies and wishes to do “accountics” type work, we generally steer them towards a more appropriate program.

Our program has basically focused on audit, tax and systems with a focus on behavioral and public policy research. We have what I believe to be some very accomplished and bright scholars working with our students, but our research is primarily behavioral from an individual (psychology-based), organizational (sociology), and societal (critical and radical humanist perspectives) perspective(s). We believe dialogue about the professions, accounting institutions, ethical implications and the philosophy underlying all of those is critical to the role of accounting academics.

That said, a PhD is still a research degree and not a technical degree. We assume that a student that has attained an undergraduate and masters level education in accounting has the technical accounting knowledge. The PhD is about how to look at accounting with a critical thinking mind and question the rules, processes and institutions—and to ask if there is a better way.

We educate our PhD students in the traditional areas as we believe this is critical to be good colleagues and appreciating each other’s research. But we do a lot in non-traditional areas also. You might find the structure of the programming interesting (or you may not): http://www.graduate.ucf.edu/CurrentGradCatalog/content/Degrees/ACAD_PROG_94.cfm#BUPHD-ACCOUNTING 

Hope you’re enjoying retirement in the mountains. This is the time of year I miss New England.

Steve G. Sutton
KPMG Professor
Dixon School of Accounting, UCF

www.bus.ucf.edu/ssutton/ 

May 2, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

Bob,

What are your friend's aspirations? If he could describe his ideal faculty position, including the sort of research (if any) he would like to pursue, what would that be? (He may be uncertain, which is fine.)

Recommending a set of inputs is easier if the desired output is clear.

Richard Sansing

May 2, Reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Richard,

I think (surmising at this point) that he might aspire to teach accounting/tax in a small liberal arts college where publishing in top research journals is not deemed more important than a dedication for teaching accounting and inspiring liberal arts students to pursue a career in accountancy.

In spite of what some of us more familiar with research universities think, there are many such liberal arts and even smaller state-supported colleges that still place the highest emphasis on teaching and youth inspiration.

What I've discovered is that all colleges want evidence of continued scholarship, but some are much more willing to accept publication in what we might call lower-tiered journals.

Then again, this young man showed such increased aptitude for accounting theory. It may be possible that in the course of his doctoral program he gets fired up for higher level research. His father is a good statistician and systems analyst in a top university. His mother is a teacher.

Bob Jensen

May 2, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

Bob,

I would encourage your friend to think about the real option aspect of this decision. He should be very confident of his decision to not pursue a Ph.D. at a research-oriented program before bypassing that option. If he studies at Chicago and makes an informed decision not to pursue "mainstream" academic research, then he will be over-trained for his dream job at the kind of liberal arts college you describe. But he also has the option of pursuing the research route. But if he studies at a place that puts less emphasis on research methods, he has limited his options at the outset.

Richard Sansing

May 2, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Richard,

I used to think that way. Then I had one student named XXXXX who had similar goals to YYYYY, although XXXXX was a much more brilliant math student according to the Mathematics Department at Trinity University. I made a special effort to have XXXXX admitted to an "accountics" doctoral program without having as much as one week of experience in accounting practice. XXXXX did not even intern and went straight from our Trinity University masters program to an accounting doctoral program.

To my utter disappointment XXXXX dropped out after the end of the first semester. He said he was just not interested in getting an econometrics PhD in an accounting doctoral program. He wanted an accounting PhD and discovered that he would have four or five years of econometrics, statistics, and psychometrics.

Honestly Richard, I'm not making this up. XXXXX enrolled in this accounting doctoral program about three years ago if my memory serves me correctly. With his exceptional math skills XXXXX was capable of getting his accounting (ergo econometrics PhD). He just wasn't interested in econometrics before he applied for the doctoral program, when he was in the doctoral program, or when he withdrew from the doctoral program.

I did not do XXXXX or that doctoral program any favors by pushing XXXXX in the way that you would probably have pushed XXXXX. Now when it comes to YYYYY, we have a similar situation except I don't think YYYYY has the exceptional math skills of XXXXX. YYYYY admits that he's more like his mother than his father in this regard.

YYYYY, like XXXXX, really wants to study accountancy rather than econometrics. If XXXXX wanted to be an econometrics PhD, however, he probably would have stuck it out in the accountancy doctoral program because economics PhDs are a dime a dozen relative to accounting econometricians masquerading as accountants.

My point, Richard, is that sometimes "keeping options open" is not the best advice for some types of students, especially accounting students who really do not want to become statisticians, econometricians, psychometricians, and management scientists. We've pretty much taken the study of accountancy out of doctoral programs. Those entering doctoral programs learn very little accounting beyond what they learned before entering the program.

What accountancy doctoral programs lack is imagination. Why can't there be a joint accounting/JD doctoral program in law and accountancy? Why can't there be an accounting/philosophy doctoral program? Why must virtually all accountancy doctoral programs be accounting/ECONOMICS doctoral programs for economists who want higher starting salaries?

That's my $.02.

Bob Jensen

May 2, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

1. Yes, sometimes options expire out of the money. A bad outcome ex post does not imply a bad decision ex ante.

2. Not everything you learn has to be learned in a classroom. I've learned a lot about non-profit organizations over the last ten years without ever taking a class on the subject.If it is (relatively) harder to learn about research methods on your own than it is to learn about institutional detail on your own, a program that focuses on economics and research methods is likely the most efficient way to learn. There is also an economy of scale issue. If I have five doctoral students interested in five different topics, a program that focuses on methods rather than subjects seems like the way to go; each student can learn about the institutional issues that interest them in another way.

Richard Sansing

May 2, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Richard

Plumlee et al. (2006) discovered that there were only 29 doctoral students in auditing and 23 in tax out of the 2004 total of 391 accounting doctoral students enrolled in years 1-5 in the United States.

With the excessive shortage of new PhDs in accounting (especially in auditing, tax, and systems), I think those who get a PhD with accounting skills will have pretty good "options" to become teachers and may even become the highest paid teachers in smaller colleges.

And you have difficulty separating yourself from the fundamental profit maximization economics assumption that plagues virtually all economics models. You assume that all accounting graduates who elect to go into academe want the highest salaries and probably the lowest teaching loads possible. In fact, there are students like XXXXX and YYYYY who truly want the psychic rewards of teaching rather than earn the highest dollar and the lowest teaching load.

What may be my most important point in this exchange with you is that there are many smaller colleges that would rather have dedicated teachers of accounting rather than failed econmetricians belatedly wanting to teach accounting because they were denied tenure in a top university's accounting/econometrics program.

And your latter assumption is that accounting can be self taught. Actually most anything can be self taught, including Egon Balas who became a well known Carnegie-Mellon mathematics professor after having taught himself mathematics during ten years of solitary confinement in a Hungarian prison. But why should an accounting doctoral student have to spend four or five years studying dreaded econometrics when their first love is learning accounting, tax, auditing, or systems?

And you might've been interested in learning accountancy after you earned an economics doctorate. But there are many econometrics professors in accounting departments who do not share your view. Let me once again dredge up the best example of the Accounting Horizon's referee who rejected a paper submitted by Denny Beresford.

When Professor Beresford attempted to publish his paper appealing for accounting researchers to have more interest in the accounting profession, an Accounting Horizons referee’s report to him contained the following revealing reply about “leading scholars” in accounting research:

Begin Quote
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1. The paper provides specific recommendations for things that accounting academics should be doing to make the accounting profession better. However (unless the author believes that academics' time is a free good) this would presumably take academics' time away from what they are currently doing. While following the author's advice might make the accounting profession better, what is being made worse? In other words, suppose I stop reading current academic research and start reading news about current developments in accounting standards. Who is made better off and who is made worse off by this reallocation of my time? Presumably my students are marginally better off, because I can tell them some new stuff in class about current accounting standards, and this might possibly have some limited benefit on their careers. But haven't I made my colleagues in my department worse off if they depend on me for research advice, and haven't I made my university worse off if its academic reputation suffers because I'm no longer considered a leading scholar? Why does making the accounting profession better take precedence over everything else an academic does with their time?
As quoted at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession

*****************
End Quote

 

Particularly relevant in this regard is Dennis Beresford’s address to the AAA membership at the 2005 Annual AAA Meetings in San Francisco


Begin Quote
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In my eight years in teaching I’ve concluded that way too many of us don’t stay relatively up to date on professional issues. Most of us have some experience as an auditor, corporate accountant, or in some similar type of work. That’s great, but things change quickly these days.

Beresford (2005
)
*****************
End Quote

I'm glad that you like accounting and tax. Unfortunately, may of your econometrics friends in accounting academe hate having to teach such courses as intermediate accounting, advanced accounting, auditing, or introductory tax courses. And they interpret accounting theory as minimal accounting and maximal economic theory.

Bob Jensen

May 2, 2007 reply from Randy Kuhn [jkuhn@BUS.UCF.EDU]

When being recruited I recall my PhD coordinator showing me statistics about the number of accounting PhD students graduating each year and the general declining trend, down to around 70-75 per year. The AAA placement center at the national conference last year listed over 300 job postings. What a dilemma and not getting any better given that many of the baby boomers still have yet to retire.

The Plumlee et al. (2006) study paints an even bleaker picture. The general lack of students specializing in non-financial areas should raise a huge red flag. Will our non-financial accounting classes eventually be taught by professors outside their research area and interest? What kind of higher education will that provide? I have been fervently recruiting friends in public accounting. My approach to date has been to drop a bug in their ear during the worst of busy season then keep plugging away. So far, only one success. Many would love to enter academia but the thought of giving up four years of compensation is unpalatable and just not feasible for their families. The barriers to entry are great. Successful recruiting will take a concerted effort by us all.

May 2, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

---Bob Jensen wrote:

And you have difficulty separating yourself from the fundamental profit maximization economics assumption that plagues virtually all economics models. You assume that all accounting graduates who elect to go into academe want the highest salaries and probably the lowest teaching loads possible. In fact, there are students like XXXXX and YYYYY who truly want the psychic rewards of teaching rather than earn the highest dollar and the lowest teaching load.

---

Nonsense. From a purely financial perspective, an academic career for an accoutant is a big negative NPV. But I wouldn't trade careers with anyone.

Richard Sansing

May 3, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Richard,

Negative NPV makes no sense to me for new accounting PhDs. With universities paying over $180,000 (including summer stipends) as starting salaries plus generous amounts of free time for personal consulting fees and textbook writing, I have a difficult time calculating a negative NPV. And consulting opportunities are relatively easy to get in top universities because the elite names of those universities are a draw for faculty opportunities to consult and write books.

Most Harvard, Wharton, MIT, NYU, and Stanford professors that I know make more in consulting and royalties than their paltry salaries over $200,000 per year plus relatively generous travel allowances. The very top universities also provide incidental funding for research ranging from $10,000 to $30,000 each year (plus summer stipends in the range of $40,000 to $60,000).

When you make the NPV calculations you must also factor in the current fringe benefits averaging 30% of starting salaries. This includes health care and TIAA-CREF contributions. The 30% probably does not even count sabbatical leaves, discounts for child care, and entertainment opportunities such as concerts and theatre.

Sure an accounting or finance professor may have cut off chances of winning the CEO lottery, but this is a low-probability career track. Becoming a partner in a large CPA firm can be lucrative, but not necessarily on a present value basis considering the first ten years at relatively low salary (around $50,000-$60,000 per year) and the necessity to buy into (usually by borrowing) the partnership for those lucky few (less than 10% of the staff accountants) who are eventually invited to become partners.

If our recent undergraduates really took the trouble to compare the NPVs, I think newly-minted accounting professors have a comparable or even better outlook if the competing alternatives are weighted by the relatively low probabilities of becoming an executive partner in a large CPA firm. Smaller CPA firms are harder to compare, because they vary to such a huge extent. Some partners of small CPA firms net over a million dollars each year and many others barely scrape out a living in their home offices.

When you couple this with the wonderful lifestyle opportunities and sabbatical leaves, I always thought of myself as having lived in tall cotton for 40 years before I retired. Now I live in grass that's becoming too tall since I've put off mowing.

Bob Jensen

May 3, 2007 reply from Randy Kuhn [jkuhn@BUS.UCF.EDU]

CPA firm salary ranges obviously vary by location, but really not all that much honestly. Here in Orlando, staff auditors fresh out of school or even experienced hires from smaller firms into the new Big 6 are receiving offers of $50 with $2-3k signing bonuses this semester. This is consistent across the more popular disciplines (audit, tax, business advisory). Business advisory (business process & IT audit/consulting) starts to pull ahead at the manager stage and takes 1-2 years less per level for promotion. Whereas audit typically takes 12 years for partner, business advisory can be as quick as 9 years with a greater probability of making partner due to the demand/supply (not many hybrids out there that know financial, business process, and IT). As a 2nd year advisory manager (10 yrs exp) my base was $100k two years ago while the first-year audit senior manager with comparable experience received less than $90k which I think is on the low-end. The month I started the PhD program, one of my friends in a nearby office made audit partner at the age of 34 receiving a bump in salary from $150k to $225k with the promotion. Not sure about his loan though.

May 3, 2007 message from Bob Jensen

Hi Richard (Sansing),

I’m still trying to find a PhD program that extends beyond the blinders of the social science research paradigm. I need to look a little closer at Bentley’s new program. Also there are a few AIS tracks in existing programs, but my guess is that the AIS majors still have to take the econometrics qualifying courses and exams.

Your NPV sidetrack took us off the main issue regarding why our leading academic journals and virtually all of our accounting doctoral programs define accounting research as a social science that requires the requisite skills in advanced statistics, econometrics, psychometrics, sociometrics, etc.

The fact of the matter is that our current doctoral programs are critically unable to meet demand according to the AACSB and Plumlee et al --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/03MainDocumentMar2007.htm
The supply is steadily dwindling with less than 100 graduates per year (and less than 20 a year in auditing, tax, and systems). The demand is at least ten times the supply and probably higher. Accounting education programs will soon be to the point were virtually all of the instructors have no doctorates or have only doctorates in economics, law, education, etc.

The problem as I pointed out in earlier correspondence is a mismatch between accounting graduates who want to study and do research in accounting but have neither the aptitude nor an interest in becoming social scientists (and in particular econometricians studying capital markets). 

Accounting doctoral programs increasingly have ignored other research paradigms outside the social science paradigm. For example, I do not find humanities or legal research paradigm choices being offered in any accounting doctoral program. Philosophy departments, history departments, and law schools give doctorates to students who have few, if any, social science research skills.

Is there any university in the U.S. where a doctoral student can major in accounting history without having to become a social scientist? Is there a doctoral program in the U.S. where a student can major in accounting philosophy? Is there any doctoral program in the U.S. that uses a law school research paradigm?

And lastly, I would like to point out that our leading journals and award selection committees tend to ignore submissions based upon any research paradigm other than a social science research paradigm.

The AICPA and the AAA jointly award a "Notable Contributions to Accounting Literature Award" of $2,500 and a plaque at the AAA's annual meetings. For the past 20 years, these awards have virtually all gone to empirical research using positivist research methodologies.

This year I'm on the Selection Committee for the first time. The fact that the Screening Committee only gave us empirical studies to select from for the 2007 award to be granted in Chicago makes me wonder why only empirical studies are candidates for Selection Committee evaluation.

The criteria for the award are embedded in the following paragraphs at http://aaahq.org/awards/nominat3.htm

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The Screening Committee for the Joint AICPA/AAA Notable Contributions to Accounting Literature Award invites nominations of outstanding articles, books, monographs, or other publications for consideration. Nominations from regular and irregular (e.g., AICPA-sponsored research studies or monographs) publications, as well as from nonaccounting publications, may be submitted as long as the nominated work is relevant to accounting. Both academic and practitioner nominations will be accepted.

Nominated items must have been published within the years 2002 to 2006. Each nomination must be accompanied by a brief supporting statement (no more than 150 words) summarizing reasons for the nomination that are consistent with the award selection criteria. These criteria include: uniqueness and potential magnitude of contribution to accounting education, practice and/or future accounting research; breadth of potential interest; originality and innovative content; clarity and organization of exposition; and soundness and appropriateness of methodology.

End Quote
**************

This important award can go to both research and other scholarly literature contributions in accountancy. The Award's research literature is not restricted to empirical research and positivist methods. What is curious to me is why only this subset of the literature is repeatedly the only winning subset.

What is even more curious this is why even the literature pieces forwarded this year are only esoteric empirical research studies of dubious value to "accounting education and practice." I say of "dubious value" in the sense of highly simplified modeling assumptions and no replication of the findings by other researchers.

Shouldn't the award winning literature item be at least independently replicated if it is an empirical research study? My previous lament over lack of replication in academic accounting research can be found at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Replication

The accountics bias seems to be rearing up repeatedly in this award process for the past two decades. Is it because of narrowness in the nomination process? Have members of the AAA given up nominating literature that is not of an esoteric accountics nature? Is it because only empirical research is deemed notable by the Screening Committees?

For more on the accountics bias in academe, go to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm

Also see the various commentaries at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession

May 3, 2007 reply from Paul Williams [Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]

I agree that the conversation has drifted a bit from the original question, but if Bob's friend has been following this discussion, he might be inclined to think ill of his prospects for doing what he wants. It is largely the case now that U.S. PhD programs are as Jagdish and Bob have characterized them.

There are a few places in the U.S. where Bob's friend might be able to pursue an interest in accounting. Central Florida and South Florida are PhD programs that offer some diversity of faculty talent that provide a doctoral student with flexibility for pursuing whatever interest excites them.

North Texas and Case Western Reserve are other places. There are probably others, but they are fewer and farther between than they were when I went through the experience. If Bob's friend is adventuresome, there are many excellent doctoral opportunities at schools outside the U.S. For example, the University of Alberta has a diverse faculty, which allows the pursuit of interests that would simply not be tolerated in most U.S. doctoral programs.

Then there are schools in the UK and Australia. Adelaide, Wollongong, Cardiff, Strathclyde, Essex, the list goes on. These places afford someone a different experience from many US programs and provide much greater freedom to follow one's intellectual bliss than the stultifying places that are the U.S. "elite."

Paul

May 11, 2007 reply from Sue P. Ravenscroft [ACCT] [sueraven@iastate.edu]
Sue gave me permission to forward a somewhat laundered version of her original message. It confirms what I've been arguing aud nauseum. The number of accounting student doctoral graduates in the U.S. plunged to less than 100 per year to meet an exploding demand for accounting professors. A major cause of the shortage of applicants to doctoral programs is that these econometrics programs do not interest most accountants in the pool of possible applicants to such doctoral programs.  Nearly all available accounting doctoral programs (not just Tier I programs) are no longer accounting programs and have no dedicated accounting courses. They’re literally social science methodology programs with most emphasis on econometrics and no choices for other research methodologies --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm

Dear Bob,

I was just contacted by a wonderful young woman, who graduated from Iowa State University last year. She is bright, personable, hard-working, and interested in going into a PhD program. She is NOT interested in doing a highly quantitative economics-based program, but can handle the math and statistics needed for behavioral research. I feel fortunate in the timing of her inquiry, because I observed the discussion about a young man you know who is looking into doctoral schools, and the subsequent advice from Sansing that he consider only a Tier One school because of the "alleged choices" such schools provide versus the counter-advice of actually getting training to do what one loves.

The young woman has already received the Tier One type advice and was totally taken aback and turned off by it. The assistant professor who gave her that advice told her she should take two years of college level advanced math courses and then apply, because she is definitely bright enough to go to a Tier One school and should not even consider going to a Tier Two type institution. Her goal was to enter a program in fall of 2008. After that set-back she wrote me, and I was far more encouraging.......I told her that I had just seen a rather long (albeit sometimes almost hostile) exchange about the types of programs available and the wisdom of going to the "Tier One" schools even if that wasn't where one's interest or heart lay.....This student is a wise young woman and doesn't want to be trained to do something she doesn't want to do.....

So, I am writing to ask if you have a final listing of schools that might be more open to a variety of research approaches.....If so, could you please write to me (address above or to her). I would be ever so grateful.

Thank you very much.

Best regards,

Sue Ravenscroft

May 15, 2007 reply from Dana Carpenter [dcarpenter@MATCMADISON.EDU]

I have followed the need a favor thread with great interest. I am in my mid 40'sand have taught at community colleges (with a few years at bachelor granting universities) for 20 years following 3 years with KPMG. I have always wanted to get my doctorate for personal actualization and would be interested in teaching at a regional university. I scored 99 percentile on the verbal portion of the GMAT but just average on the Mathematics. Two years ago I was told during an interview with a very prestigous school that with a few semesters of calculus I could probably gain admission to their Ph. D Program. I was also admitted to a Ph. D in management at a different college. I decided against both options. I would definitely be interested in a DBA or some of the teaching oriented or blended accounting Ph. D's that have been discussed. In my situation (with fewer years left in my career) I am really not interested in a professorship at a Top Tier University. For the same reasons I hesitate to give up a job I love and earn no income for 4 or 5 years at a minimum. I would be interested in your response to the Accounting DBA question as well as specific ideas as to programs or perhaps a different field with a concentration in accounting.

Dana Carpenter
(608) 246-6590

May 4, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen

Your experience, Dana, is very typical of the many students at all ages who are turned off by having to study five years of social science research to obtain a tenure track position to be an accounting professor.

To my knowledge, the distinction between a PhD and a DBA from a Tier 1 research university is about as marked as the distinction between ketchup vs. catsup. Both doctoral degrees are intended to instill research skills in students intent on careers in academia. The DBA used to entail a more rounded set of business courses (management, organization behavior, finance, marketing, etc.) but I think most accounting PhD and DBA programs have dropped required courses except for a few research seminars and possibly some social science (especially economics) and statistics courses.

The DBA used to focus more on the "application of theory" as opposed to the "development of new theory" in a PhD program --- http://dr-hy.com/Menu-Bar/mVita/DBA-vs-PHD.html
In my opinion, these distinctions between the two degrees have largely evaporated. The U.S. Department of Education and the National Science Foundation recognize numerous research-oriented doctoral degrees such as the D.B.A. as "equivalent" to the Ph.D. and do not discriminate between them --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doctor_of_Business_Administration
Certainly the distinction between DBA versus PhD in business schools  is not as great as the distinction between EED and PhD in schools of education.

Probably the best known business school that offers DBA and PhD degrees is the Harvard Business School. If you major in a traditional business area (e.g., accounting, marketing, management strategy, information technology) you get a DBA. If you major in business economics, health policy, or organization behavior you get a PhD. The actual distinction between the two designations is not at all clear to me. About the only thing I can tell is that some HBS doctoral students get ketchup on their hamburgers and others get catsup.

Most certainly, having a DBA will not change the criteria for obtaining tenure later in life. I do not know of any serious university that will put higher weightings on teaching performance for DBA faculty versus higher weightings on research for PhD faculty.

Amy Dunbar provided a link to a good listing of international doctoral programs --- http://aaahq.org/ata/_ATAMenu/phd-programs.htm 

Questions raised are how large each program is and what have been the trends in growth or shrinkage. As new doctoral programs came on line, the very large doctoral programs such as those in Illinois, Michigan, Texas, Indiana, and Michigan State greatly reduced doctoral program size in the 1986-2005 period. What used to be large programs shrank greatly in size. Some smaller programs like Rice have gone out of accounting doctoral programs entirely. Some like Minnesota seem to have disappeared without making any official announcements.

A listing of the history of U.S. accounting doctoral programs is provided in your free Prentice-Hall  Hasselback Accounting Faculty Directory (at least in the hard copy version). The Doctoral Program History table is on the page preceding the start of the alphabetized listing of accounting faculty by college. In don't think this table is available in Jim's Online Directory at http://rarc.rutgers.edu/raw/hasselback/

There are some errors in the Hasselback table that are due mainly to failures of some programs to accurately report their own data to Jim. But except for Penn State, I think the recent undercounting is relatively minor.

Jim also provides the totals by year. The last column is generally way off for the most recent year because of reporting time lags. However, the preceding columns are relatively accurate.

In the past twenty years, the most accounting doctoral graduates reported for the U.S. was 207 in 1988. The least was 69 in 2003. It has not been over 100 since 2001.

The depressing Plumlee et al (2006) study is probably more accurate for the year 2004. Further analysis is provided at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm 

Bob Jensen

May 11, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen

A summary listing of non-traditional programs was provided by Paul Williams in the listing of messages at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

The snipped version is http://snipurl.com/1jb1g

One of the subsequent messages that I sent to my Student YYYYY is shown below:

Message from Bob Jensen to YYYYY

I’m particularly happy that you’re now motivated to become an accounting educator. I loved this profession.

First and foremost is your GMAT score that determines almost everything regarding admission to any respectable doctoral program. Consider all your options for having as high a score as possible.

Second you need to honestly evaluate your aptitude for statistics and mathematics. Nearly all accounting doctoral programs are tantamount to econometrics programs these days with great stress on econometrics models of capital markets data.

I don’t know if you followed the recent AECM lively exchange on this topic or not. You can read some of the messages at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

A listing of doctoral programs is provided at
http://aaahq.org/ata/_ATAMenu/phd-programs.htm

I know you are somewhat interested in taxation. In nearly all instances, taxation doctoral students still have to master the econometrics requirements of capital markets research.

If you are looking for the handful of programs that allow you to customize your program and possibly cut back on the econometrics hurdles, I recommend that you look into the following programs, messages about which appear at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

Bentley College (Boston) This is a new program that I don’t yet know much about. Bentley is a very good accounting and finance college, although I would not expect it to be strong for a tax concentration.

Case Western University (Cleveland)
University of Central Florida (Orlando)
University of South Florida (Tampa)
University of North Texas (Denton)

Various programs outside the U.S. (Please scroll down to the informative message from Paul Williams in this regard) --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

If I can be of further help, please let me know.

Bob Jensen

 

May 12, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

--- Sue Ravenscroft wrote (to Bob Jensen, who then posted it here):

I feel fortunate in the timing of her inquiry, because I observed the discussion about a young man you know who is looking into doctoral schools, and the subsequent advice from Sansing that he consider only a Tier One school because of the "alleged choices" such schools provide versus the counter-advice of actually getting training to do what one loves.

---

For those interested in what I actually said, as opposed to how it is characterized above, I repeat it below.

"I would encourage your friend to think about the real option aspect of this decision. He should be very confident of his decision to not pursue a Ph.D. at a research-oriented program before bypassing that option. If he studies at Chicago and makes an informed decision not to pursue "mainstream" academic research, then he will be over-trained for his dream job at the kind of liberal arts college you describe. But he also has the option of pursuing the research route. But if he studies at a place that puts less emphasis on research methods, he has limited his options at the outset."

Later in the same thread, I also said:

"My point was that the decision Bob's friend makes regarding a Ph.D. program will significantly affect the opportunities that he or she faces upon graduation, which will in turn affect subsequent academic opportunties as well. Unless one is very sure about what what one's preferences will be in the future, the course of action that preserves options has a lot to recommend it. Whether one ultimately prefers a career that features both research and teaching, or wants to teach and do no research, it would be nice to have the skill set needed to make have a real choice."

Richard Sansing

May 12, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Richard,

Even better advice would be to avoid accounting altogether if you want to be a top researcher in a Tier 1 accounting research university. Consider the role model examples. Ron Dye (Northwestern Accounting Professor) has his doctorate and undergraduate degrees in mathematics and economics with almost no accounting. Some of our other top accounting researchers have management science, mathematics, econometrics, and psychometric doctorates with very little in the way of accountancy education and/or experience in accounting practice. What accounting they learned is when having to teach a little about it after they became professors.

I'm not trying to be facetious or cynical here. Those of us that majored in accounting for five years had to take a lot more time in college to earn a doctorate in an accounting doctoral program. It is actually quite costly in time and opportunity cost to first become an accountant and then enter one of our present accounting doctoral programs. It is far more efficient to major in economics and then earn an econometrics doctorate from a prestigious Economics Department. Equally great is to earn a doctorate in computer science.

The only risk of not having an accounting background as far as I can tell is the risk of not getting tenure in a Tier 1 accounting university. Without accounting, it is more difficult for tenure rejects to become accounting teachers in Tier 2 and Tier 3 colleges and universities. Those universities typically require more knowledge of accountancy.

Accounting majors realistically face 12 years of full-time undergraduate and graduate studies before graduating with a doctorate in an accounting program. On top of that, accounting doctoral programs prefer that doctoral candidates have 1-5 years of accounting practice experience. This adds up to 13-17 years to graduate from an accounting doctoral program.

An economics major can earn an economics doctorate in seven years of full-time studies before graduating with a doctorate from an Economics Department. If she or he bothers to earn a MBA degree along the way, it may take eight years to complete the doctorate. Under new AACSB rules, doctoral graduates in economics, statistics, mathematics, psychology, etc. are fully qualified to become accounting professors.

I must admit that I reasoned exactly like you, Richard, until I pushed Student XXXXX into a Tier 1 accounting doctoral program that he withdrew from after his first semester in spite of his being a brilliant math student (double major with accounting).This unfortunate outcome made me think more seriously about why the pool for accounting doctoral students is drying up.

Once again consider the Plumlee et al findings:  Plumlee et al. (2006) discovered that there were only 29 doctoral students in auditing and 23 in tax out of the 2004 total of 391 accounting doctoral students enrolled in years 1-5 in the United States. The number of graduates has shrunk to less than 100 per year.

If the Tier 1 accounting doctoral programs (and in fact virtually all accounting doctoral programs) require that all applicants have the advanced mathematics, statistics, and economics, we have in fact added possibly two more years to a five-year accounting program just to enter the accounting doctoral program applicant pool. Alternately, an applicant might be admitted provisionally into an accounting doctoral studies program and take the two years of econometrics preparatory courses in what becomes tantamount to a six or seven year doctoral full-time studies program in graduate school.

My conclusions are as follows.

1. To become an accounting professor in a Tier 1 accounting program it is far more efficient and possibly more effective (toward tenure) to earn social science, mathematics, or statistics doctorate outside accounting in a highly prestigious university. Accounting doctoral programs are actually inefficient alternatives to becoming an accounting professor in a Tier 1 accounting program unless you cannot get into a highly prestigious non-accounting doctoral program.

2. The pool of applicants for accounting doctoral programs is drying up. Accountants with 1-5 years of experience typically want to study accounting if they choose to enter a doctoral program. Since virtually all accounting doctoral programs in the United States are social science (particularly econometrics) programs with few if any accounting courses, these programs do not appeal to accountants. These doctoral programs might appeal to economists and statisticians, but it is far more efficient to earn economics and statistics doctorates from Departments of Economics and Statistics.

Thus I gave the wrong advice to my Student XXXXX who was a brilliant dual major in accounting and mathematics. Instead of recommending a doctoral program in accounting (where he really did not want a forced feeding of econometrics), I should've recommended that he go directly into a prestigious mathematics doctoral program. Then he could ultimately apply to become an accounting professor in a Tier 1 accounting research university after getting his mathematics doctorate.

Since the number of graduates from accounting doctoral programs is less than 100 students per year, Tier 1 research universities are often forced to seek top graduates from non-accounting doctoral programs such as econometrics and management science programs in prestigious universities.

Isn't it sad that for some accounting professors like me, majoring in accounting was wasted time.

Bob Jensen

May 13, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

Bob,

I suspect that Ron Dye would recommend studying under Ron Dye at Kellogg's accounting Ph.D. program! One way to find out-- I'll ask him and post his response.

Some of your analysis seems exaggerated. I came into the doctoral program with a very weak math background. In my three years of coursework, roughly 1/3 of my classes were accounting research seminars and 2/3 were math and economics classes. When you say:

"If the Tier 1 accounting doctoral programs (and in fact virtually all accounting doctoral programs) require that all applicants have the advanced mathematics, statistics, and economics, we have in fact added possibly two more years to a five-year accounting program just to enter the accounting doctoral program applicant pool."

you are double counting. You take those "tools" courses during the five-year accounting doctoral program, not in addition to it.

I think that trying to become an accounting researcher without taking the accounting research seminars and attending the weekly accounting research workshops would be very difficult.

I would ask someone considering an accounting academic career what sort of questions they would like to answer. Much of this thread has framed the questions in negative terms "How do I avoid course X during my doctoral program?" rather than in positive terms "How do I learn how to answer question Y?"

Richard Sansing

May 14, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Richard,

"Three years" is bad advice these days! Your college (Dartmouth) does not have a doctoral program. Let me use as a benchmark what I view as a typical accounting doctoral program in the 21st Century. The University of Florida writes that it takes 4-5 years to complete an accounting PhD for students entering with strong mathematics backgrounds. Students who must additionally take the "mathematics preparatory courses" must anticipate six or seven years of full-time effort.

Apparently your experience (advice?) differs from the advice given by the accounting professor who advised Sue's accounting graduate to take two more years "advanced mathematics" before applying to accounting doctoral programs.

It also differs from my experience trying to place some top accounting graduates in accounting doctoral programs in recent years. Nearly all who were admitted had significantly stronger mathematics credentials than those that were rejected.  Most programs now advise applicants that (even those with math credentials and masters degrees) the accounting doctoral program will take 4-5 years (See the University of Florida statement quoted below).

In fact most universities make a concerted effort to recruit accounting doctoral program candidates who do not have accounting degrees. Virtually every accounting doctoral program has a mathematics matriculation requirement that is now quite formidable (possibly more so for applicants today than for us applicants in the 20th Century). Consider the following statement at the Fisher School of Accounting Website at the University of Florida.

Note in particular the suggested admission alternatives of "economics, engineering, mathematics, operations research, psychology, and statistics." No mention is made of such undergraduate degrees as history, philosophy, or other humanities degrees, and I suspect that unless a humanities graduate is very strong in mathematics, the chances are zero of being admitted to most any U.S. accounting doctoral program even among humanities graduates that are actively recruited by top law schools. By the way, top law schools in particular recruit accounting graduates more aggressively than accounting doctoral programs in my opinion. One of the major reasons for the shrinking pool of applicants to accounting doctoral programs is the now preferred option to go to law school (including some who want to specialize in tax and eventually teach tax at the college level with a JD credential).

Begin Quote
*************

University of Florida Ph.D. in Business Administration - Accounting

Ph.D. Program - Accounting Concentration

This program is open to all applicants who have completed an undergraduate degree. Individuals with a degree in a non-business discipline (e.g., economics, engineering, mathematics, operations research, psychology, statistics) are encouraged to apply.

Program Details (pdf)

Students are required to demonstrate math competency prior to matriculating the doctoral program. Each student's background will be evaluated individually, and guidance provided on ways a student can ready themselves prior to beginning the doctoral course work. There are opportunities to complete preparatory course work at the University of Florida prior to matriculating our doctoral program.

The accounting concentration is designed to be completed in four to five years. The first year of the program is essentially lockstep with doctoral students in economics and finance. Starting in the second year, individual course work is designed by the student in consultation with his or her supervisory committee and the accounting graduate coordinator. Other than the Accounting Seminars (listed below) there are no specific required courses after the first year of the program.

Accounting Seminars:

ACG 7939 Theoretical Constructs in Accounting
ACG 7979 Accounting Readings and Replication
ACG 7885 Empirical Research Methods in Accounting
ACG 7979 Accounting Readings and Research Project
ACG 7887 Research Analysis in Accounting

Ph.D. Co-Major Program with the Department of Statistics

A program of study for a single degree in which a student satisfies co-major requirements in two separate academic disciplines that offer the Ph.D.

 

End Quote
*************

Is there any accounting doctoral program in the United States that encourages humanities graduates to apply? Is there an accounting doctoral program in the entire United States that has a co-major with the Department of Philosophy or the Department of History?

As of today, The University of Florida graduated four accounting PhDs since Year 2000. As far as I can tell, none of them were undergraduate accounting majors. Degrees in engineering, economics, and mathematics most likely hastened completion of their doctoral degrees in accounting at Florida in less than six or seven years. I mention Florida only because Florida is not a unique accounting doctoral program in this regard. I commend Florida for being more honest than some when stating the program requirements.

The bottom line is that I don't think that the doctoral program that you (Richard) entered "with a very weak math background" and completed in three years makes you a relevant role model for today's applicants to doctoral programs. My reading is that today you could not even be admitted to the University of Florida accounting doctoral program unless you completed the "preparatory course work at the University of Florida prior to matriculating our doctoral program." We (you and me) are no longer role models in that regard for applicants to accounting doctoral programs.

In my case I was admitted to the doctoral program but then had to take all those extra undergraduate math, operations research, economics, and statistics courses while in the program. My PhD graduation would've been hastened at Stanford if I had majored in mathematics or statistics instead of accounting as an undergraduate. I perhaps then could've graduated in three years instead of the five full (and delightful) years that I spent in Palo Alto. Now I think it requires six or seven years in Palo Alto for candidates who must take the preparatory undergraduate courses. In my day we did not have all those accounting research seminars at the graduate level.

Bob Jensen

May 13, 2007 reply from

Bob,

You are not confused. And I am not brainwashed. ;-)

My point, as you well know, is that when we do research using archival data we need math skills. Different types of research appear to be rewarded differently, as evidenced by the salary differentials across the schools at a university.

Amy

May 14, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Amy,

You wrote that "when we do research using archival data we need math skills."

To which I respectfully reply as follows:

Not everything that can be counted, counts. And not everything that counts can be counted.
Albert Einstein

I think that you're confining doctoral scholarship to archives that can be counted and overlooking the archives, possibly the most relevant archived information, that cannot be counted.

In the United States, following the Gordon/Howell and Pierson reports, our accounting doctoral programs and leading academic journals bet the farm on the social sciences without taking the due cautions of realizing why the social sciences are called "soft sciences." They're soft because "not everything that can be counted, counts. And not everything that counts can be counted."

It seems to me that history scholars have a much longer history of analyzing archival data than most any other type of scholars, I wonder what the discipline of history would’ve become if every history scholar over the past 1,000 years had to have two years of preparatory “advanced mathematics” before entering a doctoral program in history.

It seems to me that legal scholars have a very long and scholarly history of doing research on archival data, especially court records, I wonder what the discipline of law would’ve become if every legal scholar over the past 1,000 years had to have two years of preparatory “advanced mathematics” before entering a JD program.

Many of our serious professional problems needing research in accounting are closer to law than economics. Particularly vexing are the issues of how to account for complex contracts (e.g., those with derivatives, contingencies, and intangibles) in settings where the contracts are being written to deceive investors and creditors. Must years of advanced mathematics and econometrics necessary conditions for conducting academic research to help the profession with these contracts?

Where would we be in medicine, law, and most other professions if it was dictated on high that all their doctoral programs had to require advanced mathematics? Would they find themselves in the mess we have today in academic accounting in the United States where the pool of potential doctoral candidates is drying up?

Would we find ourselves in the mess of having to rely on adjuncts to teach more of the accounting courses than our tenure-track faculty who bargained for minimal teaching and maximal salaries and benefits so they could conduct econometric and psychometric research with models of dubious relevance to the practicing profession?

Why is it that virtually all of our doctoral programs in accounting are now being shunned by so many accounting professionals who would like to teach accounting, auditing, tax, or AIS but are turned off by having to first take preparatory courses in advanced mathematics and not have the opportunity for studying accounting in accounting doctoral programs?

In academic accounting we’ve almost all been seduced by frustrated economists in the U.S. who found a way to secure a monopoly by putting up barriers to entry that shrinks the supply of accounting doctoral graduates and lifts the salaries of accounting professors to the highest levels in every university. Most of us, especially me, have benefited from these barriers to entry. But in the process, we’ve widened the schism between professors of accounting and the accounting profession and students of accounting.

These barriers to entry to doctoral programs have frustrated practicing accountants to a point where doctoral programs like the one at the University of Florida are in many cases more appealing to non-accountants ("economics, engineering, mathematics, operations research, psychology, and statistics") who can matriculate into the program with their advanced mathematics skills and graduate from the program without every having studied the things we teach our undergraduates and masters students in accounting. In fairness, the current body of eight accounting doctoral students at the University of Florida has three candidates with undergraduate degrees in accounting. Others include a mathematics major, a statistics major, a finance major, a commerce major, and a student who majored in economics. The finance major also earned a masters of accounting degree.

It seems to me that in the United States after the Gordon/Howell and Pierson reports our accounting doctoral programs and leading academic journals bet the farm on the social sciences without heeding the due cautions of realizing why the social sciences are called "soft sciences." They're soft because "not everything that can be counted, counts. And not everything that counts can be counted."

Why is it that only outside the United States various accounting doctoral programs in prestigious universities have seen the light regarding diversity of research methodologies in academic accountancy?

Bob Jensen

May 13, 2007 reply from Richard C. Sansing [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

--- Bob Jensen wrote:

Even better advice would be to avoid accounting altogether if you want to be a top researcher in a Tier 1 accounting research university. Consider the role model examples. Ron Dye (Northwestern Accounting Professor) has his doctorate and undergraduate degrees in mathematics and economics with almost no accounting. Some of our other top accounting researchers have management science, mathematics, econometrics, and psychometric doctorates with very little in the way of accountancy education and/or experience in accounting practice. What accounting they learned is when having to teach a little about it after they became professors.

--- end of quote ---

Here is Ron's response, along with the question that I posed to him.

About the question: by and large, I think it is a mistake for someone interested in pursuing an academic career in accounting not to get a phd in accounting. If you look at the "success" stories, there aren't many: most of the people who make a post-phd transition fail. I think that happens for a couple reasons. 1. I think some of the people that transfer late do it for the money, and aren't really all that interested in accounting. While the $ are nice, it is impossible to think about $ when you are trying to come up with an idea, and anyway, you're unlikely to come up with an idea unless you're really interested in the subject. 2. I think, almost independent of the field, unless you get involved in the field at an early age, for some reason it becomes very hard to develop good intuition for the area - which is a second reason good problems are often not generated by "crossovers."

The bigger thing - not related to the question you raise - but maybe you could add to the discussion is that there are, as far as I can tell, not a lot of new ideas being put forth by anyone in accounting nowadays (with the possible exception of John Dickhaut's neuro stuff). In most fields, the youngsters are supposed to come up with the new problems, techniques, etc., but I see a lot more mimicry than innovation among newly minted phds now.

Anyway, for what it's worth....

Ron

May 14, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Richard,

I thank you for obtaining a reply from Ron Dye. He's one among a number of leading researchers who became an accounting professor without having a background in accounting. He's also one of the finest mathematics researchers in academic accounting.

What is especially interesting to me is Ron's conclusion that essentially our highly touted and highly selective accounting doctoral programs (with the highest-paid graduates in academe) in the United States are pretty much failures if we define research as the creation of new and innovative knowledge. I love his choice of the word  "mimicry" in his following conclusion:

Begin Quote
**********************

The bigger thing - not related to the question you raise - but maybe you could add to the discussion is that there are, as far as I can tell, not a lot of new ideas being put forth by anyone in accounting nowadays (with the possible exception of John Dickhaut's neuro stuff). In most fields, the youngsters are supposed to come up with the new problems, techniques, etc., but I see a lot more mimicry than innovation among newly minted phds now.

**********************
End Quote

I might add that John Dickhaut is nowhere close to being a newly-minted doctoral student. He's an old guy who got his PhD at Ohio State in 1970 before Ohio State transitioned into its present highly mathematical accounting doctoral program. This illustrates how innovative research can come from graduates of accounting doctoral programs that do not (at least way back then) require advanced mathematics.

I suggested that Ron Dye's route to becoming an accounting academic was more efficient in the sense of taking less time (three  years in an economics doctoral program at Carnegie built upon his mathematics undergraduate degree) rather than the route of entering an accounting doctoral program where it now takes 4-5 years built upon a mathematics undergraduate degree or 6-7 years built upon a typical accounting undergraduate degree if the student has to take the two years of preparatory mathematics required by many of our top accounting doctoral programs.

In terms of accountics, I think our econometrics-based accounting doctoral programs are probably better for us than doctoral programs in the economics departments because accounting doctoral students are more likely to conduct research on archival databases that are more of interest in accounting than are the databases of interest to economics departments. The downside is that the econometrics studies published in leading accounting research journals by graduates of accounting doctoral programs have probably reflected mostly "mimicry" lamented by Professor Dye.

In his message Professor Dye does not recommend that his streamlined route to becoming an accounting professor (without an accounting education background) serve as a role model. I tend to agree, although I now have newer doubts. I'm currently evaluating publications submitted for the 2007 AICPA/AAA Notable Contributions to Literature Award. The Award's Screening Committee filtered out all submissions that were not accountics papers. Among those accountics papers submitted to our Selection Committee by the Screening Committee, many of the authors do not have accounting backgrounds and some of the submissions are from such journals as Management Science and the Journal of Financial Economics. My recommendation for the award will actually be a finance professor's paper that made it through the Screening Committee. Sadly we have to go to finance and management science graduates to find our most notable contributions to accounting literature.

This is consistent with Ron's claim that among graduates of accounting doctoral programs "I see a lot more mimicry than innovation among newly minted phds now." Even some of our so-called Seminal Contributions to Accounting Research Award-winning studies mimicked a lot from prior research of economics and finance professors

Thanks to Ron Dye's reply, I'm even more concerned about our doctoral programs in accounting and our leading academic accounting journals --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm

Thanks for the favor Richard!

Bob Jensen

 

May 3, 2007 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

1.
Students consider many factors before deciding to enter an accounting PhD program, some of them random and/or serendipitous (as in my case; my would-be advisor in Operations Research passed away within four months of my stay in the program). But we need to ask why there are no takers inspite of the astronomical salaries we offer, while outstanding candidates are begging to be admitted into Phd programs in disciplines where tenure-track positions are almost non-existent, or where a doctoral degree is only ticket to years of serfdom as Postdocs.

The simple answer is that our field, AS WE PORTRAY IT, is just not exciting to a young inquiring mind. In accounting there is no Fermat's last theorem to be proved (as in mathematics), nor Hilbert's entscheidungsproblem to be solved (as in Computing), nor the mind-body problem (as in philosophy), nor new chemicals to be synthesised (chemistry), grammar of lost languages to be discovered (anthropology), genes to be targeted (medicine)....

A long time ago, Yuji Ijiri tried to convince us that there were fundamental problems in accounting that are equally challenging. How many of us even remember them today, or even have heard of them?

Most of us have sought to use statistics the same way a drunk uses a lamp post -- more for support than for illumination (apologies to Mark Twain).

I personally think that often, these days, people get into a PhD for a wrong reason, and some times live to regret it.

We accounting academics, especially in the so-called research universities, are living a lie, thanks to AACSB. We portray ourselves as scholars and yet rarely interact with the scholarly community on our campuses. We claim to be academics in a professional discipline and yet hardly interact with the profession in a meaningful way. Aren't we like race horses with blinders on and no jockies?

2.
The shortage of PhD students in non-financial areas is also rigged. We make it clear to the students which side of the toast is buttered. We dump on journals in accounting other than those in the financial area which publish the so-called "mainstream" (I prefer the term stale) research. Then we make life difficult at tenure time for those who have not toed the party line. We tolerate third rate pedagogy as long as it releases time for prima donnas to indulge in stale irrelevant research. Then we squabble over what is "real" research, and why what every one else is doing is not that. Is this a recipe for recruiting young inquiring minds into our discipline?

I left the corporate world in the early seventies because I was fascinated with the problems I had to deal with there (mostly in operations) and the promise that Operations Research offered. Today, however, As someone at the front end of the baby boom generation, I sometimes wonder if, were I shopping today for a PhD program, I would leave the corporate world if my success depended on toeing the party line.

Jagdish

May 13, 2007 reply from Roger Debreceny [Roger@DEBRECENY.COM]

Just a plug for the Shidler PhD program. Given the strategic direction of the Shidler College in international management, our PhD program is somewhat different than the usual program. The program is in International Management, with specializations in accounting, marketing, MIS and so on. Details at http://shidler.hawaii.edu/Programs/Graduate/PhDinInternationalManagement/PhDOverview/tabid/382/Default.aspx . We're always looking for high quality candidates,

Roger Debreceny
Shidler College Distinguished Professor of Accounting
School of Accountancy
Shidler College of Business
University of Hawai`i at Mānoa
2404 Maile Way, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA

roger@debreceny.com     rogersd@hawaii.edu 
Office: +1 808 956 8545 Cell: +1 808 393 1352
www.debreceny.com 

May 13, 2007 reply from Dan Stone, Univ. of Kentucky [dstone@UKY.EDU]

Please add the Univ. of Kentucky to the list of doctoral programs that seek students interested in, and support, a variety of research methods and topics. For example, among the 12 doctoral students in residence currently, we have students pursuing research related to:

1. XBRL

2. Accounting issues related to environmental sustainability 3. Knowledge management in professional service firms 4. Applications of self-determination theory to motivating accounting professionals 5. Accounting methods to aid economic development in emerging economies 6. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting

Information about the Univ. of Kentucky doctoral program is available at:

http://gatton.uky.edu/Programs/ACC/DoctoralDegreeInformation.html

We typically admit 2-3 students per year to the program.

Happy Mother's Day!

Dan Stone (dstone@uky.edu)
Director of Graduate Studies
University of Kentucky

June 12, 2007 reply from doctoral student Randy Kuhn [jkuhn@BUS.UCF.EDU]

Later this week, I will be attending the AAA doctoral consortium held in Tahoe each year as a representative of the University of Central.

Later this week, I will be attending the AAA doctoral consortium held in Tahoe each year as a representative of the University of Central Florida. A few minutes ago I received the message below from one of the professors who will be presenting to the doctoral candidates. Apparently, some of the students attending do not feel his non-archival style of research is worth discussing at the consortium and complained to one of the organizers prompting a well-established professor from an elite private institution to essentially justify his place on the agenda BEFORE we even arrive. I find this behavior not only completely rude and disrespectful but just plain anti-academic from many angles. These folks are complaining about one article out of 21. Should I email the organizer complaining that two-thirds of the material on the agenda is from a neo-classical, efficient markets slant in which I have no interest? My head was spinning in circles for hours trying to grapple with the analytical models that ultimately told me what I already intuitively knew. I’m game for new experiences and will embrace the opportunity to learn about others’ research. Isn’t that what academia is supposed to be about? In the back of my mind I kind of hope one of the complainers is my roommate so I can bore him to tears each night discussing how accounting choices exist, are made by people, are quite often not rational, and have mega impacts to society. Ok enough of my diatribe, see the lengthy note to the consortium participants below.

-Randy

June 12, 2007 reply from doctoral student Randy Kuhn [jkuhn@BUS.UCF.EDU]

Boy, did I misconstrue the original email from the professor. I emailed the professor to express my interest in his subject matter and he responded by stating that he did not mean to imply students had complained negatively about his articles. Rather, several students complained about the overwhelming econometrics-based research on the agenda and lack of diversity in the consortium curriculum. Big oopsy on my part! That is a much brighter situation!

June 12, 2007 reply from Sue P. Ravenscroft [sueraven@IASTATE.EDU]

Randy,

Thanks for the update....I am delighted to hear that doctoral students are finally expressing some dissatisfaction at the constrained nature of what is considered "good" research! As we attempt to replace the retiring professoriate, we need to attract more people, which should mean that we become more catholic in our research approaches, rather than more restrictive.

Sue Ravenscroft

June 12, 2007 reply from Paul Williams [Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]

Randy, et al.,

This is encouraging. When I attended the doctoral consortium the only thing that was on the agenda was EMH. The consortium has historically been an avenue for the ideologues (just check out who the faculty at that thing have been over the years). At the one I attended, Sandy Burton was invited for what appeared to be the sole purpose of humiliating him because of his "naïve" beliefs about accounting and security markets (he was invited to be the "normative" that the "positives" aimed to purge from the academy).

The tide may be turning. Given your interests, there are some recent books you might find useful.

Bent Flyvbjerg, "Making Social Science Matter," Cambridge University Press, 2001. Relying on research mainly from cognitive psych and sociology he makes the case that, "Predictive theories and universals cannot be found in the study of human affairs. Concrete, context-dependent knowledge is therefore more valuable than the vain search for predictive theories and universals (p. 73)."

A much better book than The Black Swan is David Orrell's (Oxford U. PhD in mathematics), "The Future of Everything: The Science of Prediction," Thunder's Mouth Press, 2007. Using the phenomena of weather, securities markets, and genetic variablility as examples he argues that complexity makes such phenomena "uncomputable," thus predicting them with mathematical precision is impossible. Those wanting to understand Bob's animus to "accountics" might find this a useful read.

Related, but specific to environmental science is Orrin H. Pilkey and Linda Pilkey-Jarvis, "useless arithmetic: Why Environmental Scientists Can't Predict the Future," Columbia University Press, 2007.

Paul

 

June 13, 2007 reply from Mac Wright [mac.wright@VU.EDU.AU]

Dear Randy, et al.,

Another book which might lend an interesting direction to a discourse on the SEC is Clarke, F., Dean, G., Oliver, K. Corporate Collapse – Accounting, regulatory and ethical failure, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003.

While directed at the Australian regulatory framework, the argument could be applied with equal validity to the SEC.

Kind regards,
Mac Wright
Co-Ordinator Aviation Program
Victoria University
Melbourne Australia

Fabio's Grad School Rulez (not humor) --- http://orgtheory.wordpress.com/grad-skool-rulz/


"Blog Comments and Peer Review Go Head to Head to See Which Makes a Book Better," by Jeffrey Young, Chronicle of Higher Education, January 22, 2008 --- http://chronicle.com/free/2008/01/1322n.htm?utm_source=at&utm_medium=en

What if scholarly books were peer reviewed by anonymous blog comments rather than by traditional, selected peer reviewers?

That's the question being posed by an unusual experiment that begins today. It involves a scholar studying video games, a popular academic blog with the playful name Grand Text Auto, a nonprofit group designing blog tools for scholars, and MIT Press.

The idea took shape when Noah Wardrip-Fruin, an assistant professor of communication at the University of California at San Diego, was talking with his editor at the press about peer reviewers for the book he was finishing, The book, with the not-so-playful title Expressive Processing: Digital Fictions, Computer Games, and Software Studies, examines the importance of using both software design and traditional media-studies methods in the study of video games.

One group of reviewers jumped to his mind: "I immediately thought, you know it's the people on Grand Text Auto." The blog, which takes its moniker from the controversial video game Grand Theft Auto, is run by Mr. Wardrip-Fruin and five colleagues. It offers an academic take on interactive fiction and video games.

Inviting More Critics

The blog is read by many of the same scholars he sees at academic conferences, and also attracts readers from the video-game industry and teenagers who are hard-core video-game players. At its peak, the blog has had more than 200,000 visitors per month, he says.

"This is the community whose response I want, not just the small circle of academics," Mr. Wardrip-Fruin says.

So he called up the folks at the Institute for the Future of the Book, who developed CommentPress, a tool for adding digital margin notes to blogs (The Chronicle, September 28, 2007). Would they help out? He wondered if he could post sections of his book on Grand Text Auto and allow readers, using CommentPress, to add critiques right in the margins.

The idea was to tap the wisdom of his crowd. Visitors to the blog might not read the whole manuscript, as traditional reviewers do, but they might weigh in on a section in which they have some expertise.

The institute, an unusual academic center run by the University of Southern California but based in Brooklyn, N.Y., was game. So was Mr. Wardrip-Fruin's editor at MIT Press, Doug Sery, but with one important caveat. He insisted on running the manuscript through the traditional peer-review process as well. "We are a peer-review press—we're always going to want to have an honest peer review," says Mr. Sery, senior editor for new media and game studies. "The reputation of MIT Press, or any good academic press, is based on a peer-review model."

So the experiment will provide a side-by-side comparison of reviewing—old school versus new blog. Mr. Wardrip-Fruin calls the new method "blog-based peer review."

Each day he will post a new chunk of his draft to the blog, and readers will be invited to comment. That should open the floodgates of input, possibly generating thousands of responses by the time all 300-plus pages of the book are posted. "My plan is to respond to everything that seems substantial," says the author.

The institute is modifying its CommentPress software for the project, with the help of a $10,000 grant from San Diego's Academic Senate, to create a version that bloggers can more easily add to their existing academic blogs.

A Cautious Look Forward

Mr. Wardrip-Fruin's friends have warned him that sorting through all those comments will take over his life, or at least take far more time than he expects. "It's been said to me enough times by people who are not just naysayers that it is in the back of my mind," he acknowledges. Still, the book's review process "will pale in comparison to the work of writing it."

He expects the blog-based review to be more helpful than the traditional peer review because of the variety of voices contributing. "I am dead certain it will make the book better," he says.

Mr. Sery isn't so sure. "I don't know how this general peer review is going to help," the editor says, except maybe to catch small errors that have slipped through the cracks. Traditional peer review involves carefully chosen experts in the same subject area, who can point to big-picture issues as well as nitpick details. He bets that the blog reviews might merely spark flame wars or other unhelpful arguments about minor points. "I'm curious to see what kind of comments we get back," he says.

That probably "depends on what you're writing about," says Clifford A. Lynch, executive director of the Coalition for Networked Information, a group that supports the use of technology in scholarly communication. "If, God help you, you're writing about current religious or political issues, you're going to get a lot of people with agendas who aren't interested in having a rational discussion. Some of them are just psychos."

Even without flame wars, Mr. Sery equates the blog review with the kind of informal sharing of drafts that many academics do with close friends. It's useful, but it's still not formal peer review, he argues. Carefully choosing reviewers "really allows for the expression of their ideas on the book," he says. Scholars can say with authority, for instance, that a book just isn't worth publishing.

Ben Vershbow, editorial director at the Institute for the Future of the Book, concedes that comments on blogs are unlikely to fully replace peer review. But he says academic blogging can play a role in the publishing process.

Continued in article

Jensen Comment
This is one of those experiments that is impossible to extrapolate. Blog comments are totally voluntary and impulsive such that blog comments are going to be highly variable with respect to topics, errors in the original document, and extent of the readership in the blog. Few blog activists are going to give time and attention to reviews that are not going to be widely read.

Peer reviews are likely to be less impulsive since the reviewer generally agrees ahead of time to conduct a review. But they are more variable than blog comments. The reason is that peer reviewers spend less time reviewing manuscripts that are outliers (i.e., those that are so good that there are few recommendations for change or those that are so bad that there's little hope for a future positive recommendation to publish). More time may be spend on manuscripts that need a lot of repair but have high hopes.

The main problem with peer reviews is that there are so few reviewers. Much depends upon which two or three reviewers are assigned to review the manuscript. Three reviewers' garbage may be another three reviewers' treasure. Another problem is that peer reviews are seldom published in the name of the anonymous reviewers. Blog commentators generally do so in their own names and get some reputation enhancement among their blog peers, especially if their are praiseworthy replies on the blog to the blog review. Anonymous reviewers get little incremental reputation enhancement for their unpublished reviews.

Still another problem with peer reviews is that editors and their hand picked reviewers may be a biased subset of a scholarly community. Others in the community may be shut out, which is now a raging problem in academic accountancy --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

Bob Jensen's threads on open sharing are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/000aaa/updateee.htm#OKI

Bob Jensen's threads on oligopoly abuse of scholarly publishing are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm#ScholarlyJournals

Potential Roles of ListServs and Blogs
Getting More Than We Give --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ListServRoles.htm

 


GMAT: Paying for Points
Test-prep services can be a big help as applicants prepare for the B-school admissions exam. Here, a rundown of some well-known players
by Francesca Di Meglio
Business Week, May 22, 2007
http://www.businessweek.com/bschools/content/may2007/bs20070522_855049.htm

If you're thinking of applying to B-school, then you're likely also wondering how to conquer the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT)—and whether a commercial test-preparation service, which can cost upwards of $1,000, is right for you.

Although admissions committees, even at the best-ranked B-schools, will tell you that your GMAT score is only one of many criteria for getting accepted, you still should plan on earning between 600 and a perfect 800, especially if you're gunning for the A-list. (To find the average and median GMAT scores of accepted students in individual programs, scan the BusinessWeek.com B-school profiles.)

. . .

One popular option is consulting a test-prep company that provides everything from group instruction to online courses. Here's an overview of the most popular GMAT test-preparation services in alphabetical order. For more opinions on the various test-prep services from test takers themselves, visit the BusinessWeek.com B-School forums, where this subject comes up a lot. And you can also check out BusinessWeek.com's newly updated GMAT Prep page --- http://www.businessweek.com/bschools/gmat/

Continued in article

Jensen Comment
The above article then goes on to identify the main commercial players in GMAT coaching for a fee, including those with coaching books, coaching CDs, coaching Websites, coaching courses, and one-on-one coaching tutorials with a supposed expert near where you live. The Business Week capsule summaries are rather nice summaries about options, costs, pros and cons of each coaching option.

Kaplan --- http://www.kaptest.com/

Manhattan GMAT --- http://www.manhattangmat.com/gmat-prep-global-home.cfm

Princeton Review --- http://www.princetonreview.com/mba/default.asp

Veritas --- http://www.veritasprep.com/

Business Week fails to mention one of the better sites (Test Magic) , in my viewpoint, for GMAT, SAT, GRE, and other test coaching:

Advice to students planning to take standardized tests such as the SAT, GRE, GMAT, LSAT, TOEFL, etc.
See Test Magic at http://www.testmagic.com/
There is a forum here where students interested in doctoral programs in business (e.g., accounting and finance) and economics discuss the ins and outs of doctoral programs.

Bob Jensen's threads about higher education controversies are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm


 

Lack of Replication in Academic Accounting Research

A scientist in any serious scientific discipline, such as genetics, would be in serious trouble if his fellow scientists were unable to confirm or replicate his claim to have found the gene for fatness. He would gain a reputation as being 'unreliable' and universities would be reluctant to employ him. This self-imposed insistence on rigorous methodology is however missing from contemporary epidemiology; indeed the most striking feature is the insouciance with which epidemiologists announce their findings, as if they do not expect anybody to take them seriously. It would, after all, be a very serious matter if drinking alcohol really did cause breast cancer.
James Le Fanu --- http://www.open2.net/truthwillout/human_genome/article/genome_fanu.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on replication are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Replication


If you're going to attack empirical accounting research, hit it where it has no defenses!

  1. One type of accounting research is "Spade Research" and our leading Sam Spade in recent decades was Abe Briloff when he was at Baruch College in NYC. Abe and his students diligently poured over accounting reports and dug up where companies and/or their auditors violated accounting standards, rules, and professional ethics. He was not at all popular in the accounting profession because he was so good at his work. Zeff and Granof wrote as follows:
        

    Floyd Norris, the chief financial correspondent of The New York Times, titled a 2006 speech to the American Accounting Association "Where Is the Next Abe Briloff?" Abe Briloff is a rare academic accountant. He has devoted his career to examining the financial statements of publicly traded companies and censuring firms that he believes have engaged in abusive accounting practices. Most of his work has been published in Barron's and in several books — almost none in academic journals. An accounting gadfly in the mold of Ralph Nader, he has criticized existing accounting practices in a way that has not only embarrassed the miscreants but has caused the rule-making authorities to issue new and more-rigorous standards. As Norris correctly suggested in his talk, if the academic community had produced more Abe Briloffs, there would have been fewer corporate accounting meltdowns.
    "Research on Accounting Should Learn From the Past," by Michael H. Granof and Stephen A. Zeff, Chronicle of Higher Education, March 21, 2008 

  2. In the 1960s and 1970s leading academic accounting researchers abandoned "Spade" work and loosely organized what might be termed an Accounting Center for Disease Control where spading was replaced with mining of databases using increasingly-sophisticated accountics (mathematical) models. Leading academic accounting research journals virtually stopped publishing anything but accountics research --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR395wp.htm
     
  3. In the past five decades readers of leading academic accounting research journals had to accept on faith that there were no math errors in the analysis. The reason is that no empirical accounting research is ever exactly replicated and verified. In fact the leading academic accounting research journals adopted policies against publishing replications or even commentaries. The Accounting Review (TAR) does technically allow commentaries, but in reality only about one appears each decade.
     
  4. Many of the empirical research studies are rooted in privately collected databases that are never verified for accuracy and freedom from bias.
     
  5. On occasion empirical studies are partly verified with anecdotal evidence. For example the excellent empirical study of Eric Lie in Management Science on backdating of options was partly verified by court decisions, fines, and prison sentences of some backdating executives. However, anecdotal evidence has severe limitations since it can be cherry picked to either validate or repudiate empirical findings at the same time. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Options_backdating
     
  6. Replication is part and parcel to the scientific method. All important findings in the natural sciences are replicated our verified by some rigorous approach that convinces scientists about accuracy and freedom from bias.
     
  7. One of my most popular quotations is that "empirical accounting farmers are more interested in their tractors than in their harvests." When papers are presented at meetings most of the focus is on the horsepower and driving capabilities of the tractors (mathematical models). If the harvests were of importance to the accounting profession, the profession would insist on replication and verification. But the accounting profession mostly shrugs off academic accounting research as sophisticated efforts to prove the obvious. There are few surprises in empirical accounting research.
     
  8. Another sad part about our leading academic accounting research journals is that they have such a poor citation record relative to our academic brethren in finance, marketing, and management. American Accounting Association President Judy Rayburn made citation outdomes the centerpiece of her emotional (and failed) attempt to get leading academic accounting research journals to accept research paradigms other than accountics paradigms --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/395wpTAR/Web/TAR.htm
     
  9. But the saddest part of all is that the Accounting Center for Disease Control literally took over every doctoral program in the United States (slightly excepting Central Florida University) by requiring that all accounting doctoral graduates be econometricians or psychometricians. As a result doctoral programs realistically require five years beyond the masters degree. Accountants who enter these programs must spend years learning mathematics, statistics, econometrics, and psychometrics. Mathematicians who enter these programs must spend years learning accounting. The bottom line is that practicing accountants who would like to become accounting professors are turned off by having to study five years of accountics. Each year the shortage of graduates from accounting doctoral programs in North America becomes increasingly critical/

    The American Accounting Association (AAA) has a new research report on the future supply and demand for accounting faculty. There's a whole lot of depressing colored graphics and white-knuckle handwringing about anticipated shortages of new doctoral graduates and faculty aging, but there's no solution offered --- http://aaahq.org/temp/phd/AccountingFacultyUSCollegesUniv.pdf 
     

  10. Zeff and Granof concluded the following:

    Starting in the 1960s, academic research on accounting became methodologically supercharged — far more quantitative and analytical than in previous decades. The results, however, have been paradoxical. The new paradigms have greatly increased our understanding of how financial information affects the decisions of investors as well as managers. At the same time, those models have crowded out other forms of investigation. The result is that professors of accounting have contributed little to the establishment of new practices and standards, have failed to perform a needed role as a watchdog of the profession, and have created a disconnect between their teaching and their research.

    . . .

    The unintended consequence has been that interesting and researchable questions in accounting are essentially being ignored. By confining the major thrust in research to phenomena that can be mathematically modeled or derived from electronic databases, academic accountants have failed to advance the profession in ways that are expected of them and of which they are capable.

    Academic research has unquestionably broadened the views of standards setters as to the role of accounting information and how it affects the decisions of individual investors as well as the capital markets. Nevertheless, it has had scant influence on the standards themselves.

    The research is hamstrung by restrictive and sometimes artificial assumptions. For example, researchers may construct mathematical models of optimum compensation contracts between an owner and a manager. But contrary to all that we know about human behavior, the models typically posit each of the parties to the arrangement as a "rational" economic being — one devoid of motivations other than to maximize pecuniary returns.

    Moreover, research is limited to the homogenized content of electronic databases, which tell us, for example, the prices at which shares were traded but give no insight into the decision processes of either the buyers or the sellers. The research is thus unable to capture the essence of the human behavior that is of interest to accountants and standard setters.

    Further, accounting researchers usually look backward rather than forward. They examine the impact of a standard only after it has been issued. And once a rule-making authority issues a standard, that authority seldom modifies it. Accounting is probably the only profession in which academic journals will publish empirical studies only if they have statistical validity. Medical journals, for example, routinely report on promising new procedures that have not yet withstood rigorous statistical scrutiny.
    "Research on Accounting Should Learn From the Past," by Michael H. Granof and Stephen A. Zeff, Chronicle of Higher Education, March 21, 2008

 


Natural blondes are going extinct. It's a published fact!
Suppose this study had actually been reported a leading accounting research journal such as The Accounting Review.
Keep in mind that leading accounting research journals do not publish replication studies.
As a result few accounting researchers conduct replication studies since they cannot be published.
The logical deduction becomes that accountants would forever think that natural blondes are going extinct.

From the WSJ Opinion Journal on March 6, 2006

"Media outlets around the world, from CBS, ABC and CNN to the British tabloids" all fell for a hoax--a fake study from the World Health Organization claiming blondes are going extinct.

The Washington Post reported http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30318-2002Oct1.html
(Actually I think the story was removed with some very red faces)

"The decline and fall of the blonde is most likely being caused by bottle blondes, who researchers believe are more attractive to men than true blondes," said CBS "Early Show" co-host Gretchen Carlson.

"There's a study from the World Health Organization--this is for real--that says that blondes are an endangered species," Charlie Gibson said on "Good Morning America," prompting Diane Sawyer to say she's "going the way of the snail darter." . . .

"We've certainly never conducted any research into the subject," WHO spokeswoman Rebecca Harding said yesterday from Geneva. "It's been impossible to find out where it came from. It just seems like it was a hoax."

The health group traced the story to an account Thursday on a German wire service, which in turn was based on a two-year-old article in the German women's magazine Allegra, which cited a WHO anthropologist. Harding could find no record of such a man working for the WHO.

Hey, if you're a journalist, we've got a great human-interest story for you: Did you hear about the blonde who invented the solar flashlight? --- http://www.zelo.com/blonde/no_brains.asp

Now you see how ridiculous the accounting journal policy of not publishing replications becomes. Hopefully this published story in a leading U.S. newspaper (I mean The Washington Post that broke the Watergate scandal) the next time you read the findings in a leading accounting research journal.


Question
What research methodology flaws are shared by studies in political science and accounting science?

"Methodological Confusion:  How indictments of The Israel Lobby (by John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen M. Walt, ISBN-13: 9780374177720) expose political science's flaws" by Daniel W. Drezner, Chronicle of Higher Education's Chronicle Review, February 22, 2008, Page B5 --- http://chronicle.com/weekly/v54/i24/24b00501.htm 

Does the public understand how political science works? Or are political scientists the ones who need re-educating? Those questions have been running through my mind in light of the drubbing that John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt received in the American news media for their 2007 book,  The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007). Pick your periodical — The Economist, Foreign Affairs, The Nation, National Review, The New Republic, The New York Times Book Review, The Washington Post Book World — and you'll find a reviewer trashing the book.

From a political-science perspective, what's interesting about those reviews is that they are largely grounded in methodological critiques — which rarely break into the public sphere. What's disturbing is that the methodologies used in The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy are hardly unique to Mearsheimer and Walt. Are the indictments of their book overblown, or do they expose the methodological flaws of the discipline in general?

The most persistent public criticism of Mearsheimer and Walt has been their failure to empirically buttress their argument with interviews. Writing in the Times Book Review, Leslie H. Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, criticized their "writing on this sensitive topic without doing extensive interviews with the lobbyists and the lobbied." David Brooks, a columnist for The New York Times, recently seconded that notion: "If you try to write about politics without interviewing policy makers, you'll wind up spewing all sorts of nonsense."

That kind of critique has a long pedigree. For decades public officials and commentators have decried the failure of social scientists to engage more deeply with the objects of their studies. Secretary of State Dean Acheson once objected to being treated as a "dependent variable." The New Republic ran a cover story in 1999 with the subhead, "When Did Political Science Forget About Politics?"

To the general reader, such critiques must sound damning. International-relations scholars know full well, however, that innumerable peer-reviewed articles and university-press books utilize the same kind of empirical sources that appear in The Israel Lobby. Most case studies in international relations rely on news-conference transcripts, official documents, newspaper reportage, think-tank analyses, other scholarly works, etc. It is not that political scientists never interview policy makers — they do (and Mearsheimer and Walt aver that they have as well). However, with a few splendid exceptions, interviews are not the bread and butter of most international-relations scholarship. (This kind of fieldwork is much more common in comparative politics.)

Indeed, the claim that political scientists can't write about policy without talking to policy makers borders on the absurd. The first rule about policy makers is that they always have agendas — even in interviews with social scientists. That does not mean that those with power lie. It does mean that they may not be completely candid in outlining motives and constraints. One would expect that to be particularly true about such "a sensitive topic."

Further, most empirical work in political science is concerned with actions, not words. How much aid has the United States disbursed to Israel? How did members of Congress vote on the issue? Without talking to members of Congress, thousands of Congressional scholars study how the legislative branch acts, by analyzing verifiable actions or words — votes, speeches, committee hearings, and testimony. Statistical approaches allow political scientists to test hypotheses through regression analysis. By Brooks's criteria, any political analysis of, say, 19th-century policy decisions would be pointless, since all the relevant players are dead.

Other methodological critiques are more difficult to dismiss. Walter Russell Mead's dissection of The Israel Lobby in Foreign Affairs does not pull any punches. Mead, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote that Mearsheimer and Walt "claim the clarity and authority of rigorous logic, but their methods are loose and rhetorical. This singularly unhappy marriage — between the pretensions of serious political analysis and the standards of the casual op-ed — both undercuts the case they wish to make and gives much of the book a disagreeably disingenuous tone."

Mead enumerates several methodological sins, in particular the imprecise manner in which the "Israel Lobby" is defined in the book. For their part, the book's authors acknowledge that the term is "somewhat misleading," conceding that "the boundaries of the Israel Lobby cannot be identified precisely." It is certainly true that many of the central concepts in international-relations theory — like "power" or "regime" — have disputed definitions. But most political scientists deal with nebulous concepts by explicitly offering their own definition to guide their research. Even if others disagree, at least the definition is transparent. In The Israel Lobby, however, Mearsheimer and Walt essentially rely on a Potter Stewart definition of the lobby: They know it when they see it. That makes it exceedingly difficult for other political scientists to test or falsify their hypotheses.

Many of the reviews of the book highlight two flaws that, disturbingly, are more pervasive in academic political science. The first is the failure to compare the case in question to other cases. For example, Mearsheimer and Walt go to great lengths to outline the "extraordinary material aid and diplomatic support" the United States provides to Israel. What they do not do, however, is systematically compare Israel to similarly situated countries to determine if the U.S.-Israeli relationship really is unique. An alternative, strategic explanation would posit that Israel falls into a small set of countries: longstanding allies bordering one or multiple enduring rivals. The category of states that meet that criteria throughout the time period analyzed by Mearsheimer and Walt is relatively small: Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey. Compared to that smaller set of countries, the U.S. relationship with Israel does not look anomalous. The United States has demonstrated a willingness to expend blood, treasure, or diplomatic capital to ensure the security of all of those countries — despite the wide variance in the strength of each's "lobby."

Continued in article

Daniel W. Drezner is an associate professor of international politics at the Fletcher School at Tufts University.

Jensen Comment
When I read the above review entitled "Metholological Confusiion" I kept thinking of the thousands of empirical and analytical studies by accounting faculty and students that have similar methodology confusions. How many mathematical/empirical database studies relating accounting events (e.g., a new standard) with capital market behavior also conduct formal interviews with investors, analysts, fund managers, etc. Do analytical researchers conduct formal interviews with real-world decision makers before building their mathematical models? The majority of behavioral accounting studies conducted by professors use students as surrogates for real-world decision makers. This methodology is notoriously flawed and could be helped if the researchers had also interviewed real-world players.

And Drezner overlooked another common flaw shared by both political science and accountics research. If the findings are as important as claimed by authors, why aren't other researchers frantically trying to replicate the results? The lack of replication in accounting science (accountics research) is scandalous --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#Replication
Formal and well-crafted interviews with important players (investors, standard setters, CEOs, etc.) constitute possible ways of replicating empirical and analytical findings.

The closest things we have to in-depth contact with real world players in accounting research is research conducted by the standard setters themselves such as the FASB, the IASB, the GASB, etc. Sometimes these are interviews, although more often then not they are comment letters. But accountics researchers wave off such research as anecdotal and seldom even quote the public archives of such interviews and comments. Surveys are frequently published but these tend to be relegated to less prestigious academic research journals and practitioner journals.

Most importantly of all in accountics is that the leading accounting research journals for tenure, promotion, and performance evaluation in academe are devoted to accountics paper. Normative methods, case studies, and interviews are rarely used in studies published in such journals. The following is a quotation from “An Analysis of the Evolution of Research Contributions by The Accounting Review (TAR): 1926-2005,” by Jean L. Heck and Robert E. Jensen, Accounting Historians Journal, Volume 34, No. 2, December 2007, Page 121.

Leading accounting professors lamented TAR’s preference for rigor over relevancy [Zeff, 1978; Lee, 1997; and Williams, 1985 and 2003]. Sundem [1987] provides revealing information about the changed perceptions of authors, almost entirely from academe, who submitted manuscripts for review between June 1982 and May 1986. Among the 1,148 submissions, only 39 used archival (history) methods; 34 of those submissions were rejected. Another 34 submissions used survey methods; 33 of those were rejected. And 100 submissions used traditional normative (deductive) methods with 85 of those being rejected. Except for a small set of 28 manuscripts classified as using “other” methods (mainly descriptive empirical according to Sundem), the remaining larger subset of submitted manuscripts used methods that Sundem [1987, p. 199] classified these as follows:

292          General Empirical

172          Behavioral

135          Analytical modeling

119          Capital Market

  97          Economic modeling

  40          Statistical modeling

  29          Simulation

 

It is clear that by 1982, accounting researchers realized that having mathematical or statistical analysis in TAR submissions made accountics virtually a necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition for acceptance for publication. It became increasingly difficult for a single editor to have expertise in all of the above methods. In the late 1960s, editorial decisions on publication shifted from the TAR editor alone to the TAR editor in conjunction with specialized referees and eventually associate editors [Flesher, 1991, p. 167]. Fleming et al. [2000, p. 45] wrote the following:

The big change was in research methods. Modeling and empirical methods became prominent during 1966-1985, with analytical modeling and general empirical methods leading the way. Although used to a surprising extent, deductive-type methods declined in popularity, especially in the second half of the 1966-1985 period.
 

I think the emphasis highlighted in red above demonstrates that "Methodological Confusion" reigns supreme in accounting science as well as political science.

February 22, 2008 reply from James M. Peters [jpeters@NMHU.EDU]

A couple of years ago, P. Kothari, one of the Editors of JAE and a full professor at MIT, visited the U. of Maryland to present a paper. In my private discussion with him, I asked him to identify what he considered to the the settled findings associated with the last 30 years of capital markets research in accounting. I pointed out that somewhere over half of all accounting research since Ball and Brown fit into this category and I was curious as to what the effort had added to Ball and Brown. That is, what conclusions have been drawn that could be considered settled ground so that researchers could move on to other topics. His response, and I quote, was "I understand your point, Jim." He could not identify one issue that researchers had been able to "put to bed" after all that effort.

Jim Peters
New Mexico Highlands University

February 22, 2008 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

Jim,

P. Kothari's response is to be expected. I have had similar responses from at least two ex-editors of TAR; how appropriate a TLA! But who wants to bell the cats (or call off the naked emperors' bluff)? Accounting academia knows which side of the bread is buttered.

That you needed to flaunt Kothari's resume to legitimise his vacuous response shows the pathetic state of accounting academia.

If accounting academia is not to be reduced to the laughing stock of accounting practice, we better start listening to the problems that practice faces. How else can we understand what we profess to "research"? We accounting academics have been circling our wagons too long as a ploy to keep our wages arbitrarily high.

In as much as we are a profession, any academic on such a committee reduces the whole exercise to a farce.

Jagdish

Bob Jensen's threads on research methods in accounting can be found at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm 


As David Bartholomae observes, “We make a huge mistake if we don’t try to articulate more publicly what it is we value in intellectual work. We do this routinely for our students — so it should not be difficult to find the language we need to speak to parents and legislators.” If we do not try to find that public language but argue instead that we are not accountable to those parents and legislators, we will only confirm what our cynical detractors say about us, that our real aim is to keep the secrets of our intellectual club to ourselves. By asking us to spell out those secrets and measuring our success in opening them to all, outcomes assessment helps make democratic education a reality.
Gerald Graff, "Assessment Changes Everything," Inside Higher Ed, February 21, 2008 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2008/02/21/graff
Gerald Graff is professor of English at the University of Illinois at Chicago and president of the Modern Language Association. This essay is adapted from a paper he delivered in December at the MLA annual meeting, a version of which appears on the MLA’s Web site and is reproduced here with the association’s permission. Among Graff’s books are Professing Literature, Beyond the Culture Wars and Clueless in Academe: How School Obscures the Life of the Mind.

The consensus report, which was approved by the group’s international board of directors, asserts that it is vital when accrediting institutions to assess the “impact” of faculty members’ research on actual practices in the business world.

"Measuring ‘Impact’ of B-School Research," by Andy Guess, Inside Higher Ed, February 21, 2008 ---  http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/02/22/impact

Ask anyone with an M.B.A.: Business school provides an ideal environment to network, learn management principles and gain access to jobs. Professors there use a mix of scholarly expertise and business experience to teach theory and practice, while students prepare for the life of industry: A simple formula that serves the school, the students and the corporations that recruit them.

Yet like any other academic enterprise, business schools expect their faculty to produce peer-reviewed research. The relevance, purpose and merit of that research has been debated almost since the institutions started appearing, and now a new report promises to add to the discussion — and possibly stir more debate. The Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business on Thursday released the final report of its Impact of Research Task Force, the result of feedback from almost 1,000 deans, directors and professors to a preliminary draft circulated in August.

The consensus report, which was approved by the group’s international board of directors, asserts that it is vital when accrediting institutions to assess the “impact” of faculty members’ research on actual practices in the business world. But it does not settle on concrete metrics for impact, leaving that discussion to a future implementation task force, and emphasizes that a “one size fits all” approach will not work in measuring the value of scholars’ work.

The report does offer suggestions for potential measures of impact. For a researcher studying how to improve manufacturing practices, impact could be measured by counting the number of firms adopting the new approach. For a professor who writes a book about finance for a popular audience, one measure could be the number of copies sold or the quality of reviews in newspapers and magazines.

“In the past, there was a tendency I think to look at the [traditional academic] model as kind of the desired situation for all business schools, and what we’re saying here in this report is that there is not a one-size-fits-all model in this business; you should have impact and expectations dependent on the mission of the business school and the university,” said Richard Cosier, the dean of the Krannert School of Management at Purdue University and vice chair and chair-elect of AACSB’s board. “It’s a pretty radical position, if you know this business we’re in.”

That position worried some respondents to the initial draft, who feared an undue emphasis on immediate, visible impact of research on business practices — essentially, clear utilitarian value — over basic research. The final report takes pains to alleviate those concerns, reassuring deans and scholars that it wasn’t minimizing the contributions of theoretical work or requiring that all professors at a particular school demonstrate “impact” for the institution to be accredited.

“Many readers, for instance, inferred that the Task Force believes that ALL intellectual contributions must be relevant to and impact practice to be valued. The position of the Task Force is that intellectual contributions in the form of basic theoretical research can and have been extremely valuable even if not intended to directly impact practice,” the report states.

“It also is important to clarify that the recommendations would not require every faculty member to demonstrate impact from research in order to be academically qualified for AACSB accreditation review. While Recommendation #1 suggests that AACSB examine a school’s portfolio of intellectual contributions based on impact measures, it does not specify minimum requirements for the maintenance of individual academic qualification. In fact, the Task Force reminds us that to demonstrate faculty currency, the current standards allow for a breadth of other scholarly activities, many of which may not result in intellectual contributions.”

Cosier, who was on the task force that produced the report, noted that business schools with different missions might require differing definitions of impact. For example, a traditional Ph.D.-granting institution would focus on peer-reviewed research in academic journals that explores theoretical questions and management concepts. An undergraduate institution more geared toward classroom teaching, on the other hand, might be better served by a definition of impact that evaluated research on pedagogical concerns and learning methods, he suggested.

A further concern, he added, is that there simply aren’t enough Ph.D.-trained junior faculty coming down the pipeline, let alone resources to support them, to justify a single research-oriented model across the board. “Theoretically, I’d say there’s probably not a limit” to the amount of academic business research that could be produced, “but practically there is a limit,” Cosier said.

But some critics have worried that the report could encourage a focus on the immediate impact of research at the expense of theoretical work that could potentially have an unexpected payoff in the future.

Historically, as the report notes, business scholarship was viewed as inferior to that in other fields, but it has gained esteem among colleagues over the past 50 or so years. In that context, the AACSB has pursued a concerted effort to define and promote the role of research in business schools. The report’s concrete recommendations also include an awards program for “high-impact” research and the promotion of links between faculty members and managers who put some of their research to use in practice.

The recommendations still have a ways to go before they become policy, however. An implementation task force is planned to look at how to turn the report into a set of workable policies, with some especially worried about how the “impact” measures would be codified. The idea, Cosier said, was to pilot some of the ideas in limited contexts before rolling them out on a wider basis.

Jensen Comment
It will almost be a joke to watch leading accountics researchers trying of show how their esoteric findings have impacted the practice world when the professors themselves cannot to point to any independent replications of their own work --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#Replication
Is the practice world so naive as to rely upon findings of scientific research that has not been replicated?

Bob Jensen's threads on assessment are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Assess.htm

February 22, 2008 reply from Ed Scribner [escribne@NMSU.EDU]

Bob,

I’d surprised to see much reaction from “accountics” researchers as they are pretty secure, especially since the report takes pains not to antagonize them. Anyway, in the words of Corporal Klinger of the 4077th MASH Unit, “It takes a lot of manure to produce one perfect rose.”

Ed

February 25, 2008 reply from Paul Williams [Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]

On 24 Feb 2008 at 14:18, David Albrecht wrote:
>
> I am struck by a seeming incongruity.
>
> On one hand there is no respect for accounting research in B-schools. On the other
> hand, publishing accounting research in peer-reviewed pubs is a requirement for AQ
> status in B-schools.
>
> More and more I am attracted to Ernest Boyer's description of multiple forms of
> scholarships and multiple outlets of scholarship.
 
Re: this conversation.
Ian Shapiro, professor of Political Science at Yale, has recently published a book "The Flight from Reality in the Human Sciences"  (Princeton U. Press, 2005) that assures that the problem is not confined to accounting (though it is more ludicrous a place for a discipline that is actually a practice).  All of the social sciences have succumbed to rational decision theory and methodological purity to the point that academe now largely deals with understanding human behavior only within a mathematically tractible unreality made real in the academy essentially because of its mathematical tractibility.  Jagdish recent post is insightful (and inciteful to the winners of this game in our academy).  The problem the US academy has defined for itself is not solvable.  Optimal information systems?  Information useful for decision making (without any consideration of the intervening "motives" (potentially infinite in number) that convert assessments into actions)?   
 
As Bob has so frequently reminded us replication is the lifeblood of science, yet we never replicate.  But we couldn't replicate if we wanted to because replication is not the point.  Anyone with a passing familiarity with laboratory sciences knows that a fundamental ethic of those sciences is the laboratory journal.  The purpose of the journal is to provide the precise recipe of the experiments so that other scientists can replicate.  All research in accounting (that is published in the "top" journals, at least) is "laboratory research."  But do capital market or principal/agent researchers maintain a log that decribes in minute detail the innumerable decisions that they made along the way in assembling and manipulating their data (as chemists and biologists are bound to do by virtue of the  research ethics of their disciplines) ?  No way.  From any published article, it is nearly impossible to actually replicate one of their experiments because the article is never sufficient documentation.  But, of course, that isn't the point. Producing politically correct academic reputations is what our enterprise is about. Ideology trumps science every time.  We don't want to know the "truth."  Sadly, this suits the profession just fine.  (It's this dream world that permits such nonsensical statements like trading off relevance for reliability -- how can I know how relevant a datum is unless I know something about its reliability?  Isn't the whole idea of science to increase the relevance of data by increasing their reliability?)

Bob Jensen's threads on the sad state of academic accounting research are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms

Also see http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession


A Fraudulent Paper Published in Nature, a Prestigious Science Journal
Another Case for Better Replication in Research Reporting

"'Grape harvest dates are poor indicators of summer warmth', as well as about scientific publication generally," by Douglas J. Keenan, Informath, November 3, 2006 ---  http://www.informath.org/apprise/a3200.htm 

That is, the authors had developed a method that gave a falsely-high estimate of temperature in 2003 and falsely-low estimates of temperatures in other very warm years. They then used those false estimates to proclaim that 2003 was tremendously warmer than other years.

The above is easy enough to understand. It does not even require any specialist scientific training. So how could the peer reviewers of the paper not have seen it? (Peer reviewers are the scientists who check a paper prior to its publication.) I asked Dr. Chuine what data was sent to Nature, when the paper was submitted to the journal. Dr. Chuine replied, “We never sent data to Nature”.

I have since published a short note that details the above problem (reference below). There are several other problems with the paper of Chuine et al. as well. I have written a brief survey of those (for people with an undergraduate-level background in science). As described in that survey, problems would be obvious to anyone with an appropriate scientific background, even without the data. In other words, the peer reviewers could not have had appropriate background.

What is important here is not the truth or falsity of the assertion of Chuine et al. about Burgundy temperatures. Rather, what is important is that a paper on what is arguably the world's most important scientific topic (global warming) was published in the world's most prestigious scientific journal with essentially no checking of the work prior to publication.

Moreover—and crucially—this lack of checking is not the result of some fluke failures in the publication process. Rather, it is common for researchers to submit papers without supporting data, and it is frequent that peer reviewers do not have the requisite mathematical or statistical skills needed to check the work (medical sciences largely excepted). In other words, the publication of the work of Chuine et al. was due to systemic problems in the scientific publication process.

The systemic nature of the problems indicates that there might be many other scientific papers that, like the paper of Chuine et al., were inappropriately published. Indeed, that is true and I could list numerous examples. The only thing really unusual about the paper of Chuine et al. is that the main problem with it is understandable for people without specialist scientific training. Actually, that is why I decided to publish about it. In many cases of incorrect research the authors will try to hide behind an obfuscating smokescreen of complexity and sophistry. That is not very feasible for Chuine et al. (though the authors did try).

Finally, it is worth noting that Chuine et al. had the data; so they must have known that their conclusions were unfounded. In other words, there is prima facie evidence of scientific fraud. What will happen to the researchers as a result of this? Probably nothing. That is another systemic problem with the scientific publication process.


This is replication doing its job
Purdue University is investigating “extremely serious” concerns about the research of Rusi Taleyarkhan, a professor of nuclear engineering who has published articles saying that he had produced nuclear fusion in a tabletop experiment, The New York Times reported. While the research was published in Science in 2002, the findings have faced increasing skepticism because other scientists have been unable to replicate them. Taleyarkhan did not respond to inquiries from The Times about the investigation.
Inside Higher Ed, March 08, 2006 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/index.php/news/2006/03/08/qt
The New York Times March 9 report is at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/08/science/08fusion.html?_r=1&oref=slogin 
 

Question
What is an "out of sample" test?
Hint: It's related to the concept of "replication" that almost seems to be unheard of in academic accounting research?

From Jim Mahar's Blog on June 29, 2006 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

I am a big fan of so called "out of sample" tests. When researchers find some anomaly within a data set and then others test for the presence in the same data set, we really do not learn much if they find the same thing. But when a new data set is used for the test, we have a much better understanding of the possible anomaly.

In the current JFQA there is just such an article by Richard Grossman and Stephen Shore. Using a data set that goes from 1870 to 1913 for British stocks, the authors find no small firm effect, and only a limited value effect.

In their own words:

 
"Unlike modern CRSP data, stocks that do not pay dividends do not outperform stocks that pay small dividends during this period. But like modern CRSP data, there is a weak relationship between dividend yield and performance for stocks that pay dividends. In sum, the size and reversal anomalies present in modern data are not present in our historical data, while there is some evidence for a value anomaly."
Which makes me wonder how many other things we think we "know" we really don't.

The current version of the paper is not listed on SSRN, but a past version of the paper is available (at least right now) here.

The evidence lies in lack of interest in replication
I wrote the following on December 1, 2004 at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession

Faculty interest in a professor’s “academic” research may be greater for a number of reasons. Academic research fits into a methodology that other professors like to hear about and critique. Since academic accounting and finance journals are methodology driven, there is potential benefit from being inspired to conduct a follow up study using the same or similar methods. In contrast, practitioners are more apt to look at relevant (big) problems for which there are no research methods accepted by the top journals.

Accounting Research Farmers Are More Interested in Their Tractors Than in Their Harvests

For a long time I’ve argued that top accounting research journals are just not interested in the relevance of their findings (except in the areas of tax and AIS). If the journals were primarily interested in the findings themselves, they would abandon their policies about not publishing replications of published research findings. If accounting researchers were more interested in relevance, they would conduct more replication studies. In countless instances in our top accounting research journals, the findings themselves just aren’t interesting enough to replicate. This is something that I attacked at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/book02q4.htm#Replication

At one point back in the 1980s there was a chance for accounting programs that were becoming “Schools of Accountancy” to become more like law schools and to have their elite professors become more closely aligned with the legal profession. Law schools and top law journals are less concerned about science than they are about case methodology driven by the practice of law. But the elite professors of accounting who already had vested interest in scientific methodology (e.g., positivism) and analytical modeling beat down case methodology. I once heard Bob Kaplan say to an audience that no elite accounting research journal would publish his case research. Science methodologies work great in the natural sciences. They are problematic in the psychology and sociology. They are even more problematic in the professions of accounting, law, journalism/communications, and political “science.”

We often criticize practitioners for ignoring academic research Maybe they are just being smart. I chuckle when I see our heroes in the mathematical theories of economics and finance winning prizes for knocking down theories that were granted earlier prizes (including Nobel prices). The Beta model was the basis for thousands of academic studies, and now the Beta model is a fallen icon. Fama got prizes for showing that capital markets were efficient and then more prizes for showing they were not so “efficient.” In the meantime, investment bankers, stock traders, and mutual funds were just ripping off investors. For a long time, elite accounting researchers could find no “empirical evidence” of widespread earnings management. All they had to do was look up from the computers where their heads were buried.

Few, if any, of the elite “academic” researchers were investigating the dire corruption of the markets themselves that rendered many of the published empirical findings useless.

Academic researchers worship at the feet of Penman and do not even recognize the name of Frank Partnoy or Jim Copeland.

Bob Jensen


Question
In science it is somewhat common for published papers to subsequently be withdrawn because the outcomes could not be replicated. In the history of accounting research has any published paper ever been "withdrawn" or “retracted” because the results could not be replicated?

"Columbia researcher retracts more studies," The New York Times via PhysOrg, June 15, 2006 --- http://www.physorg.com/news69601046.html

A Columbia University researcher has reportedly retracted four more scientific papers because the findings could not be replicated.

Chemistry Professor Dalibor Sames earlier this year retracted two other papers and part of a third published in a scientific journal, The New York Times reported Thursday. All of the papers involved carbon-hydrogen bond activation research.

Although Sames is listed as senior author on all of the papers, one of his former graduate students -- Bengu Sezen -- performed most of the experiments, the Times said.

Sames said each experiment has been repeated by at least two independent scientists who have not been able to replicate the results.

Sezen, a doctoral student in another field at the University of Heidelberg in Germany, disputed the retractions, questioning whether other members of Sames's group had tried to exactly repeat her experiments, the newspaper said.

The retraction of one paper, published in the journal Organic Letters in 2003, appeared Thursday, while the three others published in The Journal of the American Chemical Society in 2002 and 2003 are to be formally retracted later this month, the Times said.

Jensen Comment
What's disappointing and inconsistent is that leading universities pushed accounting research into positivist scientific methods but did not require that findings be verified by independent replication. In fact leading academic accounting research journals discourage replication by their absurd policies of not publishing replications of published research outcomes. They also do not publish commentaries that challenge underlying assumptions of purely analytical research. Hence I like to say that academic accounting researchers became more interested in their tractors than their harvests.

My threads on the dearth of replication/debate and some of the reasons top accounting research journals will not publish replications and commentaries are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Relication 

June 17, 2006 reply from Jagdish S. Gangolly [gangolly@INFOTOC.COM]

Bob,

I have not heard of any one in accounting retracting his/her work. It does not surprise me because of what I see to be the philosophical suppositions of most empirical accounting researchers.

In my opinion, most of us in empirical accounting research are, in many ways, stuck with the philosophical suppositions of late 19th and early 20th century positivists of the Vienna school, the most vocal proponent of the ideas whose work I am familiar with is A.J. Ayer. In his view of the world, a synthetic (that is, not an analytical) sentence must be verifiABLE to be considered a scientific statement, and is added to the stock of science when verified.

The physical sciences have passed by this view, and in fact, in my opinion, regard the latter-day positivist Popperian ideas of falsificationism to be the ideal. Here, a sentence is scientific if it is FalsifIABLE. The stock of sentences that are not repeatedly falsified is science in some sense. Therefore, in most physical sciences, when a statement is falsified (by not being replicable) is treated as nonsense rather than science. For example, when the theory about cold fusion in the Utah experiments met failure in repeated attempts to replicate them, the theory was treated as nonsensical and not scientific.

The unfortunate thing is that verification (or falsification) is misinterpreted by most, since I don't think either Ayer or Popper intended their views to form a theory of meaning.

The above approach has had a whole host of severe critics. My shortlist would include C.S. Peirce, William James, Quine (though a verificationist he did not accept logical positivism), Feyerabend, Davidson, and a bunch of others.

We have twisted the meaning of Popperian as well as Logical positivist thought to consider "scientific propositions" as those "veriFIED" or "not falsiFIED". Philosopher of those schools, on the other hand used veriFIABILITY and falsiFIABILITY as criterion to answer the question whether a proposition is scientific or not. We mistake an epistemic community for a theory of meaning. While it might help reaffirm our belief in our epistemic community to do so, it certainly would not provide our community a resilient philosophical foundation. It also would make us more of a theological community.

Regards to all,

Jagdish

 


My 67th birthday April 30, 2005 commentary on how research in business schools has run full circle  since the 1950s.  We've now completed the circle of virtually no science (long on speculation without rigor) to virtually all science (strong on rigor with irrelevant findings) to criticisms that science is not going to solve our problems that are too complex for rigorous scientific methods.

The U.S. led the way in bringing accounting, finance, and other business education and research into respectability in separate schools or colleges the business (so called B-schools) within top universities of the country.  The movement began in the 1960s and followed later in Europe after leading universities like Harvard, Chicago, Columbia, Chicago, Pennsylvania, UC Berkeley and Stanford showed how such schools could become important sources of cash and respectability. 

A major catalyst for change was the Ford Foundation that put a large amount of money into first the study of business schools and second the funding of doctoral programs and students in business studies.  First came the Ford-Foundation's Gordon and Howell Report (Gordon, R.A., & Howell, J.E. (1959). Higher education for business. New York: Columbia University Press) that investigated the state of business higher education in general.  You can read the following at http://siop.org/tip/backissues/tipoct97/HIGHHO~1.HTM

The Gordon and Howell report, published in 1959, examined the state of business education in the United States. This influential report recommended that managerial and organizational issues be studied in business schools using more rigorous scientific methods. Applied psychologists, well equipped to undertake such an endeavor, were highly sought after by business schools. Today, new psychology Ph.D.s continue to land jobs in business schools. However, we believe that this source of academic employment will be less available in the future because psychologists in the business schools have become well established enough to have their own "off-spring," who hold business Ph.D.s. More business school job ads these days contain the requirement that applicants possess degrees in business administration.

Prior to 1960, business education either took place in economics departments of major universities or in business schools that were viewed as parochial training programs by the more "academic" departments in humanities and sciences where most professors held doctoral degrees.  Business schools in that era had professors rooted in practice who had no doctoral degrees and virtually no research skills.  As a result some universities avoided having business schools altogether and others were ashamed of the ones they had. 

The Gordon and Howell Report concluded that doctoral programs were both insufficient and inadequate for business studies.  Inspired by the Gordon and Howell Report, the Ford Foundation poured millions of dollars into universities that would upgrade doctoral programs for business studies.  I was one of the beneficiaries of this initiative.  Stanford University obtained a great deal of this Ford Foundation money and used a goodly share of that money to attract business doctoral students.  My relatively large fellowship to Stanford (which actually turned into a five-year fellowship for me) afforded me the opportunity to get a PhD in accounting.  The same opportunities were taking place for other business students at major universities around the country.

Another initiative of the Gordon and Howell Report was that doctoral studies in business would entail very little study in business.  Instead the focus would be on building research skills.  In most instances, the business doctoral programs generally sent their students to doctoral studies in other departments in the university.  In my own case, I can only recall having one accounting course at Stanford University.  Instead I was sent to the Mathematics, Statistics, Economics, Psychology, and Engineering (for Operations Research) graduate studies.  It was tough, because in most instances we were thrown into courses to compete head-to-head with doctoral students in those disciplines.  I was even sent to the Political Science Department to study (critically) the current research of Herb Simon and his colleagues at Carnegie Mellon.  That experience taught me that traditional social science researchers were highly skeptical of this new thrust in "business" research. 

Another example of the changing times was at Ohio State University when Tom Burns took command of doctoral students.  OSU took the Stanford approach to an extreme to where accounting doctoral students took virtually all courses outside the College of Business.  The entire thrust was one of building research skills that could then be applied to business problems.

The nature of our academic research journals also changed.  Older journals like The Accounting Review (TAR) became more and more biased and often printed articles that were better suited for journals in operations research, economics, and behavioral science.  Accounting research journal relevance to the profession was spiraling down and down.  I benefited from this bias in the 1960s and 1970s because I found it relatively easy to publish quantitative studies that assumed away the real world and allowed us to play in easier and simpler worlds that we could merely assume existed somewhere in the universe if not on earth.  In fairness, I think that our journal editors today demand more earthly grounding for even our most esoteric research studies.  But in the many papers I published in the 1960s and 1970s, I can only recall one that I think made any sort of practical contribution to the profession of accounting (and the world never noticed that paper published in TAR).

I even got a big head and commenced to think it was mundane to even teach accounting.  In my first university I taught mostly mathematical programming to doctoral students.  When I got a chair at a second university, I taught mathematical programming and computer programming (yes FORTRAN and COBOL) to graduate students.  But my roots were in accounting (as a CPA), my PhD was in accounting (well sort of), and I discovered that the real opportunities for an academic were really in accounting.  The reasons for these opportunities are rooted the various professional attractions of top students to major in accounting and the shortage of doctoral faculty across the world in the field of accountancy.  So I came home so to speak, but I've always been frustrated by the difficulty of making my research relevant to the profession.  If you look at my 75+ published research papers, you will find few contributions to the profession itself.  I'm one of the guilty parties that spend most of my life conducting research of interest to me that had little relevance to the accounting profession.

I was one of those accounting research farmers more interested in my tractors than in my harvests.  Most of my research during my entire career devoted to a study of methods and techniques than on professional problems faced by accounting standard setters, auditors, and business managers.  I didn't want to muck around the real world gathering data from real businesses and real accounting firms.  It was easier to live in assumed worlds or, on occasion, to study student behavior rather than have to go outside the campus. 

What has rooted me to the real world in the past two decades is my teaching.  As contracting became exceedingly complex (e.g., derivative financial instruments and complex financial structurings), I became interested in finding ways of teaching about this contracting and in having students contemplate unsolved problems of how to account for an increasingly complex world of contracts.

In accounting research since the 1950s we've now completed the circle of virtually no science (long on speculation without rigor) to virtually all science (strong on rigor with irrelevant findings) to criticisms that science is not going to solve our problems that are too complex for rigorous scientific methods.  We are also facing increasing hostility from students and the profession that our accounting, finance, and business faculties are really teaching in the wrong departments of our universities --- that our faculties prefer to stay out of touch with people in the business world and ignore the many problems faced in the real world of business and financial reporting.  For more on this I refer you to  http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#AcademicsVersusProfession

Things won’t change as long as our "scientists" control our editorial boards, and they won’t give those up without a huge fight. I’m not sure that even Accounting Horizons (AH) is aimed at practice research at the moment. The rigor hurdles to get into AH are great as of late. Did you compare the thicknesses of the recent AH juxtaposed against the latest Accounting Review? Hold one in each of each in your hands.

What will make this year’s AAA plenary sessions interesting will be to have Katherine defending our economic theorists and Denny Beresford saying “we still don’t get it.” Katherine is now a most interesting case since, in later life, she’s bridging the gap back to practice somewhat. Denny’s an interesting case because he came out of practice into academe only to discover that, like Pogo, “the enemy is us.”

I think what is misleading about the recent HBR article is that focusing more on practice will help us solve our “big” problems. If you look at the contributions of the HBR toward solving these problems in the last 25 years, you will find their contributions are superficial and faddish (e.g., balanced score card). The real problem in accounting (and much of business as well), is that our big problems don’t have practical solutions. I summarize a few of those at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm#BadNews 
Note the analogy with “your favorite greens.”

Focusing on practice will help our teaching. We can never say “never” when it comes to research, but I pretty much stand by my claims at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm#BadNews 

So what can we conclude from having traveled the whole circle from virtually no scientific method to virtually all scientific method to new calls to back off of scientific method and grub around in the real world?  What do we conclude from facing up to the fact that research rigor and our most pressing problems don't mix?

My recommendation at the moment is to shift the focus from scientific rigor to cleverness and creativity in dealing with our most serious problems.  We should put less emphasis on scientific rigor applied to trivial problems.  We should put more emphasis on clever and creative approaches to our most serious problems.  For example, rather than seek optimal ways to classify complex financial instruments into traditional debt and equity sections on the balance sheet, perhaps we should look into clever ways to report those instruments in non-traditional ways in this new era of electronic communications and multimedia graphics.  Much of my earlier research was spent in applying what is called cluster analysis to classification and aggregation.  I can envision all sorts of possible ways of extending these rudimentary efforts into our new multimedia world.

Bob Jensen on my 67th birthday on April 30, 2005

 


A December 5, 2002 reply from David Stout about the replications thing --- an AAA journal editor’s inside perspective!  

Note that I think that a big policy weakness is that the policy of accounting research journals to not publish confirming replications (even in abstracted form) is that this policy discourages efforts to perform confirming replications.    

But the most serious problem is that the findings themselves may not be interesting enough for researchers to perform replications whether or not those replications will be published. Are the findings so uninteresting that researchers aren’t really interested in seeking truth?

Bob Jensen

-----Original Message-----
From: David E. Stout [mailto:david.stout@villanova.edu]
Sent:
Thursday, December 05, 2002
To: Jensen, Robert
Subject: Re: Are we really interested in truth?

I read through the material you sent (below)--one thing caught my eye: the issue of REPLICATIONS. This is a subject about which I am passionate. When I assumed the editorship of Issues, I had to appear before the AAA Publications Committee to present/defend a plan for the journal during my (then) forthcoming tenure. One of my plans was to institute a "Replications Section" in the journal. (The sad reality, beyond the excellent points you make, is that the lack of replications has a limiting effect on our ability to establish a knowledge base. In short, there are not many things where, on the basis of empirical research, we can draw firm conclusions.) After listening to my presentation, the chair of the Publications Committee posed the following question: "Why would we want to devote precious journal space to that which we already know?" To say the least, I was shocked--a rather stark reality check you might say. The lack of replications precludes us, in a very real sense, from "knowing." 

I applaud your frank comments regarding the whole issue of replications, and their (proper) place within the conduct of "scientific" investigations. You made my day!


------
David E. Stout
Villanova University

 


December 15, 2004 message from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU

In a recent issue of Golf World, a letter writer was commenting on the need for professional golfers to be more "entertaining."  He went on to say:

"Fans pay top dollar to attend tournaments and to subscribe to cable coverage.  Not many would pay to see an accountant work in his office or watch The Audit Channel."

That's probably a true comment.  On the other hand, wouldn't at least some of us have liked to watch The Audit Channel and see what was being done on Enron, WorldCom, HeathSouth, or some of the other recent interesting situations?

Denny Beresford

December 15, 2004 reply from Bob Jensen

You know better than the rest of us, Denny, that academic accounting researchers won't tune in to watch practitioners on the Audit Channel. They're locked into the SciFi Channel.

Bob Jensen


December 1, 2004 message from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU
Denny is now a professor of accounting at the University of Georgia.  For ten years he was Chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board and is a member of the Accounting Hall of Fame.

I've enjoyed the recent "debate" on AECM relating to the Economist article about the auditing profession.  I'm delighted to see this interest in such professional issues.  But I'm concerned that academic accountants, by and large, aren't nearly enough involved in actually trying to help solve professional issues.  Let me give an illustration, and I'd certainly be interested in reactions.

Last night our Beta Alpha Psi chapter was fortunate to have Jim Copeland as a guest speaker.  Jim retired as the managing partner of Deloitte a couple of years ago and he continues to be a leading voice in the profession through, among other things, his role in chairing a major study by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on the auditing profession.  Jim also serves as a director of three major corporations and on their audit committees.  In short, he is the kind of person that all students and faculty should be interested in meeting and hearing.

Students turned out in fairly large numbers, as did quite a few practitioners who always are there to further their recruiting efforts.  However, only four faculty members attended (out of a group of about 18) and this included our department head and the BAP advisor, both of whom were pretty much obligated to be there. No PhD students attended.  I'm sure that some faculty members had good excuses but most simply weren't sufficiently interested enough to attend.  Perhaps at some other schools more faculty would have been there but my own experience in speaking to about 100 schools over the years would indicate that this lack of interest is pretty common.

On the other hand, this coming Friday a very young professor from another university will present a research workshop and I expect that nearly all faculty members and PhD students will be there.  The paper being discussed is replete with formulas using dubious (in my humble view) proxies for real world economic matters that can't be observed directly.  The basic conclusion of the paper is that companies are more inclined to give stock options rather than cash compensation because options don't have to be charged to expense.  Somehow I thought that this was a conclusion that was pretty clear to most accountants and business people well before now.

I've heard some faculty members say that they feel obligated to attend such workshops even if they aren't particularly interested in the paper being discussed.  They want to show support for the person who is visiting as well as reinforce the importance of these events to the PhD students.  I certainly understand that thinking and tend to share it.  However, for the life of me I can't understand why faculty members don't feel a similar "obligation" to show respect for a person like Jim Copeland, one of the most important people in the accounting profession in recent years and someone who is making a personal sacrifice to visit our school.

My purpose in this brief note is not to belittle the research paper.  But I simply observe that it would be nice if there were a little more balance between interest in professional matters and such high level research among faculty members at research institutions.  As the Economist article noted, and as should be clear to all of us in the age of Sarbanes-Oxley, etc., there are tremendous issues facing the accounting profession.  Rather than simply complaining about things, it seems to me that academics could become more familiar with professionals and the issues they face and then try to work with them to help resolve those issues.

When is the last time that you called an auditor or corporate accountant and asked him or her to have lunch to just kick around some of the tremendously interesting issues of the day?

Denny Beresford

December 1, 2004 reply from Bob Jensen  (The evidence lies in lack of interest in replication)

Hi Denny,

Jim gave a plenary session at the AAA meetings in Orlando. You may have been in the audience. I thought Jim’s presentation was well received by the audience. He handled himself very well in the follow up Q&A session.

I think academics have some preconceived notions about the auditing “establishment.” They may be surprised at some of the positions taken by leaders of that establishment if they took the time to learn about those positions. I summarized some of Jim’s more controversial statements at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/book04q3.htm#090104  
Note that he proposed eliminating the corporate income tax (but he said he hoped none of his former partners were in the audience).

Faculty interest in a professor’s “academic” research may be greater for a number of reasons. Academic research fits into a methodology that other professors like to hear about and critique. Since academic accounting and finance journals are methodology driven, there is potential benefit from being inspired to conduct a follow up study using the same or similar methods. In contrast, practitioners are more apt to look at relevant (big) problems for which there are no research methods accepted by the top journals.

Accounting Research Farmers Are More Interested in Their Tractors Than in Their Harvests

For a long time I’ve argued that top accounting research journals are just not interested in the relevance of their findings (except in the areas of tax and AIS). If the journals were primarily interested in the findings themselves, they would abandon their policies about not publishing replications of published research findings. If accounting researchers were more interested in relevance, they would conduct more replication studies. In countless instances in our top accounting research journals, the findings themselves just aren’t interesting enough to replicate. This is something that I attacked at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/book02q4.htm#Replication

At one point back in the 1980s there was a chance for accounting programs that were becoming “Schools of Accountancy” to become more like law schools and to have their elite professors become more closely aligned with the legal profession. Law schools and top law journals are less concerned about science than they are about case methodology driven by the practice of law. But the elite professors of accounting who already had vested interest in scientific methodology (e.g., positivism) and analytical modeling beat down case methodology. I once heard Bob Kaplan say to an audience that no elite accounting research journal would publish his case research. Science methodologies work great in the natural sciences. They are problematic in the psychology and sociology. They are even more problematic in the professions of accounting, law, journalism/communications, and political “science.”

We often criticize practitioners for ignoring academic research Maybe they are just being smart. I chuckle when I see our heroes in the mathematical theories of economics and finance winning prizes for knocking down theories that were granted earlier prizes (including Nobel prices). The Beta model was the basis for thousands of academic studies, and now the Beta model is a fallen icon. Fama got prizes for showing that capital markets were efficient and then more prizes for showing they were not so “efficient.” In the meantime, investment bankers, stock traders, and mutual funds were just ripping off investors. For a long time, elite accounting researchers could find no “empirical evidence” of widespread earnings management. All they had to do was look up from the computers where their heads were buried.

Few, if any, of the elite “academic” researchers were investigating the dire corruption of the markets themselves that rendered many of the published empirical findings useless.

Academic researchers worship at the feet of Penman and do not even recognize the name of Frank Partnoy or Jim Copeland.

Bob Jensen

As you recall, this thread was initiated when Denny Beresford raised concern about the University of Georgia's accounting faculty lack of interest in listening to an on-campus presentation by the recently retired CEO of Deloitte & Touche (Jim Copeland).  A leading faculty member from another major research university raises much the same concern.  Jane F. Mutchler is the J. W. Holloway/Ernst & Young Professor of Accounting at Georgia State University.  She is also the current President of the American Accounting Association.


"President's Message," Accounting Education News, Fall 2004, Page 3.  This is available online to paid subscribers but cannot be copied due to a terrible policy established by the AAA Publications Committee.  Any typos in the following quotation are my own at 4:30 this morning.

I raise these questions because I worry that we are all too quick to blame all the problems on the practitioners.  But we must remember that we were the ones responsible for the education of the practitioners.  And unless we analyze the issues and the questions I raised, I fear that we won't make any changes ourselves.  So it is important that we examine our approaches to the classes we are teaching and ask ourselves if we are doing all we canto assure that our students are being made aware of the pressures they will face in practice and if we are helping them develop the skills they need to appropriately deal with those pressures.  In my mind these issues need to be dealt with in every class we teach.  It will do no good to simply mandate new stand alone ethics courses where issues are examined in isolation.  

Continued in  Jane’s Message to the Membership of the American Accounting Association

December 5, 2004 reply from Stone, Dan [Dan.Stone@UKY.EDU

I enjoyed Denny's commentary on the interplay between accounting research and practice, and, Jane's AAA President's statement on this issue.

A few thoughts:

1. Yes, accounting research is largely, though not entirely, divorced from accounting practice. This is no coincidence or anomaly. It is by design. Large sample, archival, financial accounting research -- which dominates mainstream academic accounting -- is about the role of accounting information in markets. It is not about understanding the institutions and individuals who produce and disseminate this information, or, the technologies that make its production possible. We could have an accounting scholarship takes seriously issues of accounting practice. The US institutional structures of accounting scholarship currently eliminate this possibility. Change these institutional structures and we change accounting scholarship.

2. There is a particular and peculiar hubris of financial accounting academics to assume that all accounting scholarship is, or should be, about financial accounting. Am I reading this into Denny's argument? Am I reading beyond the text here?

The unity model of accounting scholarship increasingly, which says that all accounting scholarship is or should be about financial accounting, is no coincidence or anomaly. It is by design. The top disseminators of accounting scholarship in the US increasingly publish, and the major producers of accounting scholars increasingly produce scholars who know about, only 1 small sub-area of accounting -- financial, archival accounting. Change the institutional structures of the disseminators and the producers and we change accounting scholarship.

Best,

Dan Stone 
Gatton Endowed Chair 
University of Kentucky 
Lexington, Kentucky

December 6, 2004 reply from Paul Williams [williamsp@COMFS1.COM.NCSU.EDU

To add to Dan's observations. He is correct that until we change the structure of the US academy nothing is going to change re practice. As Sara Reiter and I argued (with evidence) in our AOS piece, accounting in the academy has been transformed from an autonomous, professional discipline into a lab practice for a discipline for which lab practices are incidental to the main activity, i.e, accounting is an empirical sub discipline of a sub discipline of a sub discipline for which empirical work is irrelevant. The purpose of scholarship in accounting is now purely instrumental -- to create politically correct academic reputations. 

The powers that be are not interested in accounting research for its intrinsic value or for improving practice broadly understood, but only as a means to enhance their own careers (to get "hits" in the major journals). The profession is not powerless to assist in changing that structure. For example, KPMG funds (or at least used to) the JAR conferences. Stop doing that!! Why subsidize that which is doing you more harm than good? The profession has abandoned the AAA in droves -- in the mid-60s the AAA had nearly 15,000 members, 2/3 of which were practitioners. Now we are approximately 8,000 of which only about 1/7 are practitioners. If practitioners aren't happy about the academy they are not powerless to engage it. 

Bob sent us an excerpt from Jane Mutchler's presidential address suggesting things that should be done. They already have been. At the Critical Perspectives conference in New York in 2002 there were numerous sessions devoted to how academics have failed in their educational responsibilities (someone credentialed Andy Fastow). Do the firms help fund that conference? Of course not -- too left wing. Accounting Education: An International Journal dedicated an entire issue to accounting education after Enron, as has the European Accounting Review. Have any AAA journals done so? The insularity of the US academy is evident in that Jane doesn't seem aware that there already has been significant activity for at least the last three years, but none of it as visible as that which is promoted by AAA. Let's have genuine debates in Horizons where others besides those vetted for political correctness are permitted to speak to the issues. 

Let me remind you of the Briloff affair -- Abe wrote a piece for Horizons critical of the COSO report. Abe argued that the "problem" was not just small firms with small auditors. Was Abe right? Less than two years after he wrote that article we had Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Andersen's implosion, etc. See the special issue of Critical Perspectives on Accounting, "AAA, Inc." to see first hand how the structure of the academy handles candid discussion of the profession's problems. If people aren't happy with the way the AAA manages the academy, they are not powerless to change it. The structure stays the same because of the apathy of the membership. It only takes 100 signatures to challenge for an AAA office. Since less than 100 people bother to vote (out of 8,000) it wouldn't take much effort for someone with the resources to effect significant changes. Denny could get his colleagues' attention and get them interested in attending his guests' talks by running for president of AAA -- I will gladly sign his petition to be put on the ballot for 2005. That will shake them up! Change won't happen unless enough members of the academy recognize that we have some very real, serious problems that require candid, adult conversation and a willingness to accept responsibility. 

Realize that there are more of us than there are of them (that is the whole idea of the current structure - to keep the number of them very, very small). Change the executive committee, select editors of the AAA journals that aren't committed to the narrow notion of rigor that now predominates and, as Dan says, things will change. There are plenty of qualified, thoughtful people who could manage an academy more dedicated to the practice of accounting (in all its many manifestations besides financial reporting, likely the most insignificant of accounting's functions). It just takes people with the political and financial leverage to put their efforts into altering that intellectually oppressive structure. PFW

December 1, 2004 reply from Jagdish Gangolly [JGangolly@UAMAIL.ALBANY.EDU

I could not agree more. May be most "top" journals suffer a case of "analysis paralysis". In a practical field such as accounting, how do we know what relevant problems are if we have little contact with the real world (and I would not count sporadic consulting as contact).

There are ways in which the academia and industry mingle in a meaningful way. In the areas I am interested in (computationally oriented work in information systems and auditing), for example, I have found a very healthy relationship between the academia and industry, and in fact far more exciting research reported in computing journals during the past three years than in accounting/auditing journals during the past 30. (I can think of work in computational auditing done by folks at Eindhoven and Delloitte & Touche; work on role-based access control at George Mason and Singlesignonnet, work on formal models of accounting systems as discrete dynamical systems done also at Delloitte and Eindhoven, work on interface of formal models of accounting systems and back-end databases done at Promatis and Goethe-Universität Frankfurt & University of Karlsruhe, to name just a few). In fact it has got to a point where I attend AAA meetings only to meet old friends and have a good time, and not for intellectual stimulation. For that, I go to computing meetings.

The reason for the schism between academia and the profession in accounting, in my opinion, is the almost total lack of accountability in academic accounting research. Once the control of "academic" journals have been wrested, research is pursued not even for its own sake, but for the preservation of control and perpetuation of ones genes. We have not had a Kuhnian paradigm shift for close to 40 years in accounting, because we haven't found the need for anomalies. We use "academic" journals the same way that the proverbial Mark Twain's drunk uses a lamp post, more for support than for illumination.

Respectfully submitted,

Jagdish

December 1, 2004 reply from Paul Williams [williamsp@COMFS1.COM.NCSU.EDU

Bob is right that the accounting academy in the US (not so much the rest of the world) is driven mainly by the interests of methidoliters -- those that suffer from a terminal case of what McCloskey described as the poverty of economic modernism. Sara Reiter and I had a study published in AOS last summer that included an analysis of the rhetorical behavior of the JAR conferences through time to see if the discursive practices of the "leading" forum were conducive to progressive critique -- all sciences "advance" via destruction -- received wisdom is constantly under assault. When the JAR conferences started practiioners and scholars from other disciplines like law and sociology were invited to participate. These were the people that asked the most troublesome questions, the ones who provided the most enervating critique. How did the geniuses at JAR deal with the problem of heretics in the temple? They simply stopped inviting practitioners and scholars from other disciplines. The academy in the US is an exceedingly closed society of only true believers. Accounting academics are now more interested in trying to prove that an imaginary world is real, rather than confront a world too messy for the methods (and, it must be noted, moral and political commitments) to which they unshakeably devoted REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SAYS! (As Bob notes, who in their right mind can still say market efficiency without a smirk on their face. The stock exchange, after all, has members. Does anyone know of any group of "members" that writes the rules of the organization to benefit others equally to themselves? Invisible hands, my a..)

But it must be said the profession is not without guilt in all of this. I avoid listening to big shots from the Big 4 myself because they are as predictable as Jerry Falwell. Accountants have a license, which is a privilege granted to them by the public to serve the broad society of which they are citizens. But whenever you hear them speak, all they do is whine about the evils of government regulation, the onerous burden of taxes on the wealthy (I have never heard a partner of a Big 4 firm complain that taxes were too regressive); they simply parrot the shiboleths that underlay the methodologies of academics. No profession has failed as spectacularly as accounting has just done. If medicine performed as poorly as public accounting has just done in fulfilling its public responsibilities, there would be doctor swinging from every tree. Spectacular audit failures, tax evasion schemes for only the wealthiest people on the planet, liability caps, off-shore incorporation, fraud, etc., a profession up to its neck in the corruption that Bob mentioned. But have we heard one word of contrition from this profession? Has it dedicated itself to adopting the skeptical posture toward its "clients" required of anyone who wants to do a thorough audit? Don't think so. All we still hear is the problem ain't us, it all those corrupt politicians, etc. (Who corrupted them?). And PWC has the gall to run ads about a chief courage officer -- do these guys have no shame? If the profession wants to engage with the academy with an open mind and the courage to hear the truth about itself, the courage to really want to become a learned profession (which it isn't now), then maybe we could get somewhere. But for now, both sides are comfortable where they are -- the chasm serves both of their exceedingly narrow interests. 

There are now 7 volumes of Carl's essays. Thanks to Yuji Ijiri's efforts, the AAA published the first 5 volumes as Studies in Accounting Research #22, Essays in Accounting Theory. A sixth volume, edited by Harvey Hendrickson, Carl Thomas Devine Essays in Accounting Theory: A Capstone was published by Garland Publishing in 1999. A seventh volume was being edited by Harvey when he died. I was asked to finish Harvey's work and that volume, Accounting Theory: Essays by Carl Thomas Devine has been published by Routledge, 2004. Carl also had a collection of Readings in Accounting Theory he compiled mainly for his teaching during his stint in Indonesia (I think). Those were mimeographed as well, but, to my knowledge, have never been published. I have copies of those 4 volumes but their condition is not good -- paper is yellowed and brittle. Thoughtful, curious, imaginative, humble, and kind -- we don't see the likes of Carl much anymore. His daughter Beth told me that he even approach his death with the same vibrant intellectual curiousity he brought to everything. 

PFW

December 6, 2004 reply from Ed Scribner [escribne@NMSU.EDU

Seems to me that most folks on this list take a pretty harsh view of the accounting research "establishment" for being closed, methodology-driven, irrelevant to practice, self-serving, and just generally in the wrong paradigm. Yet I see things like the following in the JAR and the AR that appear relevant and "practice-oriented" to me.

--- Journal of Accounting Research, Volume 42: Issue 3 "Auditor Independence, Non-Audit Services, and Restatements: Was the U.S. Government Right?"

Abstract Do fees for non-audit services compromise auditor's independence and result in reduced quality of financial reporting? The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 presumes that some fees do and bans these services for audit clients. Also, some registrants voluntarily restrict their audit firms from providing legally permitted non-audit services. Assuming that restatements of previously issued financial statements reflect low-quality financial reporting, we investigate detailed fees for restating registrants for 1995 to 2000 and for similar nonrestating registrants. We do not find a statistically significant positive association between fees for either financial information systems design and implementation or internal audit services and restatements, but we do find some such association for unspecified non-audit services and restatements. We find a significant negative association between tax services fees and restatements, consistent with net benefits from acquiring tax services from a registrant's audit firm. The significant associations are driven primarily by larger registrants.

---

I also see articles on topics other than financial accounting. Are these just window-dressing?

Journal editors are always saying that they want work that has "policy implications." Yet it seems to me that important questions in accounting tend to be more complicated than, "Does this medication cause nausea in the control group?" Tough questions are tough to address rigorously.

What are some examples of specific questions (susceptible to rigorous research) that academia should be addressing but is not?

Ed "Paton's Advocate" (am I alone?)

P.S. Many years ago a senior faculty member told me the "top" journals were a closed society, and hitting them was a matter of whom you knew. I made some naïve reply to the effect that the top journals reflected the best work--"the cream rises to the top." Next morning I found in my mailbox photocopies of the tables of contents of then-recent JARs, along with the editorial board, with lines drawn connecting names on the board with names of authors, as if it were a "matching question" on an exam.

December 1, 2004 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Paul,

During one of the early JAR conferences that I attended had an assistant professor present a behavioral research study. A noted psychologist, also from the University of Chicago, Sel Becker, was assigned to critique the paper.

Sel got up and announced words to the affect that this garbage wasn't worth discussing.

I'm not condoning the undiplomatic way Sel treated a colleague. But this does support your argument as to why experts from other disciplines were no longer invited to future JAR conferences.

Bob Jensen

December 1, 2004 reply from Roger Collins [rcollins@CARIBOO.BC.CA

Paul makes some excellent points. Sociologists are interesting to listen to because they tend to get folks' backs up (and if they didn't want to do that they probably wouldn't be sociologists in the first place). That's especially the case in accounting where both the profession and the academics are (with notable exceptions) hidebound in their own way.  If you want a new perspective on things, get a sociologist to comment, throw away any half of what's been said and the remainder will still be an interesting pathway to further thought, whichever half you choose.

The scorn that certain academics in other areas show for accounting academics (and indeed, business academics in general) may be justified (sometimes? often?)- but no-one ever built bridges out of scorn. I think that if Sel Becker was really interested in advancing the cause of academic enquiry he would have figured out that whatever was going on was, from his point of view, an immature contribution and taken the time to give his views on the gap between the contribution and the issues he considered important, and identify some "road map" to move from one position to another.

But then, Sel is a "big, important" person. (From what I can gather), instead of taking a little time to build bridges he indulged in a spot of academic tribalism. Trashing a colleagues paper (isn't that something a noted member of the Rochester School was famous for?) is cheap in terms of effort and may generate some petty self-satisfaction; it may even be justified if the presenter is arrogant in turn -but again, arrogance is a destroyer rather than a builder.

On the other hand, the JAR reaction is just as bad if not worse.  Closing one's ears to criticism will only lead to the prettification of the academy; the dogmatists will have won.

Question - is there a way of enticing the various parties out of their bunkers ? If there is, what are the chances that the "generals" of the profession and academia won't use their power to squash the proposals of the "subalterns" ?

Some years ago a University of Alberta prof. had the temerity to suggest that the local oil companies' financial statements weren't all that they should have been. He was promptly jumped on from every direction. Why ? I suspect, because there is a general (not inevitably true) assumption that business schools are the "cash cows" of the university, and other academics tolerate them on that basis. (Nowadays, pharmaceutical research departments seem to be vying for that label). Maybe the only way out is poverty; poor accounting profs will have less to lose and more reason to explore..

Regards - tongue partly in cheek,

Roger Roger Collins 
UCC (soon to be TRU) School of Business.

December 2, 2004 reply from Paul Williams [williamsp@COMFS1.COM.NCSU.EDU

How do we bridge the chasm?

Good question. We won't be able to do that in the US until we change the structure of the AAA. I was on Council when the great debate over Accounting Horizons occurred. Jerry Searfoss, a person who served time on both sides of the chasm, was a vigorous proponent for creating a medium through which academe and practice could communicate. If you peruse the editorial board of the first issues of Horizons, it reflected this eclectic approach to scholarship. What happened to it? Look at Horizons now. Its editorial board looks just like the editorial board at The Accounting Review and its editor is a University of Chicago PhD! The AAA has a particular structure -- an organizational culture that reproduces itself generation after generation. Horizons, as originally conceived by people like Searfoss, Sack, Mautz, etc., posed a threat to the overwhelmingly anal retentive, ideological commitments (the shadow of William Paton still chills the intellectual climate of the US academy) of the organization. Anti-bodies were quickly mobilized and, voila, Horizons looks just like TAR (two years ago a plan to eliminate Horizons and Issues and roll them into one ill-defined journal was proposed). This body will protect itself at all costs (even declining membership, banal research, etc. will not dissuade them from jumping over the cliff). 

The only way to change that is to create a structure that fosters a place where Sel Beckers and Big 4 partners can say what they have to say IN PRINT and be forced to defend it as often as the Dopuchs, Demskis, Watts and Zimmermans, and Schippers of the world (who never have to defend themselves in print). That will only happen when the selection of executive committees, editors, etc. is democratic. As long as the Politburo structure of the AAA exists and the culture of fear and suspicion of ideas remains, nothing will change. Good models for what the journals should look like are the proceedings of conferences like Tinker's Critical Perspectives conference, Lee Parker's APIRA, and the IPA sponsored by Manchester. Those conferences are so much more exhilirating than the AAA meetings. I'm like Jagdish -- I go to AAA to see old friends and work for the Public Interest Section. The "technical" sessions are of little interest. When the AAA gives Seminal Contribution Awards to "contributions" lifted wholesale from the radical Lockean/monetarist wing of economics, how can you take such an organization seriously. This is particularly true when there are genuinely seminal contributions possessed by the discipline itself, e.g., Ijiri's work, Paton's Accounting Theory, Andy Stredry's budget work, Bill Cooper's QM applications, Sterling/Edwards and Bell/Chambers, etc. (the copyrights on these tell you how long it has been since accounting acted like an autonomous discipline!). 

PFW

December 2 reply from Paul Williams (after a request that he elaborate on Bill Paton)

While Carl Devine was still alive, I used to visit him whenever I could. When Jacci Rodgers and I did our work on editorial boards at The Accounting Review I consulted Carl about how the review process worked at TAR since the first time TAR published the members of an editorial board was 1967 (I beleive). According to Carl, Paton edited TAR for many years after its founding via a process that was, shall we say, less than transparent. According to Carl, Paton and Littleton between them virtually hand picked the AAA presidents for years. You can see a pattern of early presidencies -- one president not from one of the elite 15, then two from, then one, etc. This encouraged the illusion that the AAA was open to everyone, but in fact it was pretty tightly controlled. Now there is no attempt whatsoever to create the illusion of an open organization -- every president for the last 30 years (save one or two) is an elite school grad. It was never permitted to veer too far from the nucleus of schools that founded it. 

Everyone should be familiar with Paton's politics -- he was conservative in the extreme (he published a book that was a rather rabid screed on the evils of Fabian socialism). There were competing root metaphors for accounting during the era of Paton, e.g., the institutionalism of DR Scott (whose spin on the role of accounting seems prescient now that we have a few years separating us from him), there was the accounting as fulfilling social needs of Littleton etc. But what clearly has emerged triumphant was the radical free market ideology of Paton. So, even though accounting seems clearly part of the regulatory apparatus and part of the justice system in the US, the language we use to talk about what accountants are for is mainly that of efficent markets, rational economic actors, etc. No wonder Brian West is able to build such a persuasive case that accounting currently has no coherent cognitive foundation, thus, is not a "learned" profession. Accounting enables market functions in a world of economic competitors whose actions are harmoniously coordinated by the magic fingers of invisible hands (a metaphor that Adam Smith didn't set too much stock in -- it was merely an off-hand remark to which he never returned). Carl Devine has a very useful essay in Essays in Accounting theory, volume six, edited by Harvey Hendrickson (Garland) where he provides an insightful analysis of the contributions to theory of those persons of his generation and his generation of mentors (he particularly admired Mattesich.) 

Carl noted that Paton was a very effective rhetorician, so was perhaps more influential than his ideas really merited (like the relative influence of the contemporaries Malthus and Ricardo; Ricardo, the much better writer overshadowed Malthus in their day). Paton influenced a disproportionate number of the next generation of accounting academics; he was, after all, a classicaly trained economist. 

There is, in my view, absolutely no compelling reason why accountants should be the least bit concerned with new classical economic theory, but Paton, because of his influence, set the US academy on a path that brings us to where we are today. It is an interesting thought experiment (ala Trevor Gambling's buddhist accounting) to imagine what we would be doing and talking about if we had taken the institutionalists, or Ijiri's legal imagery more seriously. But, as they say here in NC, "It is what it is." 

PFW

December 2, 2004 reply from Bob Jensen

Bill Paton was all-powerful on the Michigan campus and was considered an economist as well as an accountant.  For a time under his power, a basic course in accounting was in the common core for all majors.  One of the most noted books advocating historical cost is called Introduction to Corporate Accounting Standards by William Paton and A.C. Littleton (Sarasota:  American Accounting Association, 1940).  Probably no single book has ever had so much influence or is more widely cited in accounting literature than this thin book by Paton and Littleton .  See http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases

Later on Paton changed horses and was apologetic about once being such a strong advocate of historical cost.  He subsequently favored fair value accounting, while his co-author clung to historical cost.  However, Paton never became widely known as a valuation theorist compared to the likes of Edwards, Bell , Canning, Chambers, and Sterling .  (In case you did not know this, former FASB Board Member and SEC Chief Accountant Walter Scheutz is also a long-time advocate of fair value accounting.)

You can read about the Hall of Fame’s Bill Paton at
 http://fisher.osu.edu/Departments/Accounting-and-MIS/Hall-of-Fame/Membership-in-Hall/William-A.-Paton 

Bob Jensen

December 2, 2004 reply from Jagdish Gangolly [JGangolly@UAMAIL.ALBANY.EDU

My earlier posts unfortunately may have implied that every onbe I mentioned continued to be a historical cost advocate -- that is not true. Paton changed his mind, as Bob mentioned.

The point I was trying to make there was the approach to theory building in accounting (something that crudely initates the axiomatic approach) that Paton essentially started. However, Paton had a "theory" in the sense of a set of axioms, but no theorems. In other words it was a sort of laundry list of axioms with out a detailed study of their collective implications (this is what struck me most while I was a student, but that might have been my problem since I came to accounting via applied mathematics/statistics). In fact most of the work of Paton & Littleton, Ijiri, Sprouse & Moonitz,... never really followed through their thoughts to their logical conclusions. One reason might have been that they did not really state their axioms in logic. Mattesich, as I understand, went a bit further, but he must have realised that a field like accounting where most sentences are deontic (normative, stated in English sentences in the imperative mood) rather than alethic (descriptive, stated in English sentences in the indicative mood). In normative systems, as even Hans Kelsen has admitted, there is no concept of truth and therefore logical deduction as we know it is not possible.

I think this becomes clear in one of the later books of Mattesich on Instrumental Reasoning (all but ignored by accountants because it is more philosophical, but in my opinion one of his most fascinating works).

I would not put Paul Grady, Carman Blough,... in the same group. For Paul Grady, for example, accounting "principles" were no more than a grab bag of mundane rules.

Leonard Spacek, one of my heroes, on the other hand, tried to emphasize accounting as communication of rights people had to resources UNDER LAW. He also emphasized fairness as an objective.

One reason for this chasm between practice and academia is that almost all practice is normatively based, whereas in the academia in accounting, for the past 40 years we have cared just about only for descriptive work of the naive positivist kind.

I hate peddling my work, but those interested might like to take a look at an old paper of mine (I consider it the best that I ever wrote) where some of these issues are discussed :

Generally Accepted Accounting Principles: Perspectives from Philosophy of Law, J. Gangolly & M. Hussein Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol. 7 (1996), pp. 383-407.

I think we need to realise that we are not the only discipline that has gone astray from the original lofty goals.

Consider economics in the United States. In Britain, at least till the 70s (I haven't kept in touch since then), it was considered important that Economics teaching devoid of political and philosophical discussions was some how deficient; probably the main reason popular Oxford undergraduate major is PPE (Politics, Philosophy, Economics, with Economics taking the third seat). Specially in the US, attempts to make Economics value-free (wertfrei) have, to an extent also succeeded in making it a bit sterile. In his critique of Ludwig von Mises, Murray Rothbard ("Praxeology, Value Judgments, and Public Policy") states:

"The trouble is that most economists burn to make ethical pronouncements and to advocate political policies - to say, in effect, that policy X is "good" and policy Y "bad." Properly, an economist may only make such pronouncements in one of two ways: either (1) to insert his own arbitrary, ad hoc personal value judgments and advocate policy on that basis; or (2) to develop and defend a coherent ethical system and make his pronouncement, not as an economist, but as an ethicist, who also uses the data of economic science."

Or, that Economics is the "value-free handmaiden of ethics".

In accounting too, the positivists have worked hard over the past forty years or so to make it pretentiously value-free (remember disparaging references to non-descriptive work, and Carl Nelson's virtual jihad to rid accounting of "fairness" as an objective?). The result has been that it is perhaps not unfair to speak of "fair" in the audit reports just cheap talk.

Renaissance in accounting will come only when we look as much at Politics and Law as at Economics to inspire research.

Jagdish

December 3, 2004 reply from Paul Williams

For many subscribers this thread may have started to fray; to them I apologize, but I have to chime in to add a contrarian view to Bob's contention that Paton, Edwards and Bell ,etc. were advocates of fair value accounting. Fair value accounting is (in my view) a classic case of eliding into a use of a concept as if it were what we traditionally understood it to be while radically redefining it (see Feyerabend's analysis of Galileo's use of this same ploy). None of the early theorists were proponents of fair value accounting. 

They may have been advocates of replacement cost or opportunity cost, but never of "fair value," which is a purely hypothetical number generated through heroic assumptions about an undivinable future. As Carl Devine famously said, "No one has ever learned anything from the future." All subscribed to the principle that accounting should report only what actually occurred during a period of time -- this was the essence of E&B's argument that accounting data are for evaluating decisions; its value lies in its value as feedback and accounting data, therefore, categorically should not be generated on assumptions about the outcomes resulting from decisions that have already been made. The significant accomplishment of these theorists was to provide a defense of accounting's avoidance of subjective values. i.e., the accounting was in its essence objective (anyone remember Five 

Monographs on Business Income, particularly Sidney Alexander's critique of accounting measures of profit?). Now we accept seemingly without question the radical transformation of accounting affected by FASB to a system of nearly exclusively subjective values, i.e., your guess is as good as mine. In spite of the optimism people seem to express, we have no technology (nor would a believer in rational expectations theory ever expect there to be) that can divine the economic future. Perhaps a renaissance of some of these old ideas is overdo. I believe it was Clarence Darrow who opined that "Contempt for law is brought about by law making itself ridiculous." As writers of LAW (kudos to Jagdish's paper) the FASB seems to make accounting more ridiculous by the day.

 PFW

December 3, 2004 reply from David Fordham

For those who don't know, Paul is an FSU alum, and Bob is a former Seminole, too, although they pre-dated me and may have had some professional interaction with Carl Devine. ...

David Fordham

December 3, 2004 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi David,

I arrived on the faculty at FSU in 1978. Carl was a recluse for all practical purposes. I don' think anybody had contact with him except a very devoted Ed McIntyre. Paul Williams was very close to Ed and may also have had some contact.  (Paul later reminded me that Carl grew interested in discussing newer directions with Ed Arrington.)

I think Carl was still actively writing and to the walls. His labor of love may have been lost if Ed and Paul didn't strive to share Carl's writings with the world. Carl was a classic scholar who'd lived most of his life in libraries.

Carl could've added a great deal to our intellectual growth and historical foundations if he participated in some of our seminars. He was a renaissance scholar.

It would've been interesting to know how Carl's behavior might've changed in the era of email. Scholars who asked him challenging questions might've gotten lengthy replies (Carl was not concise) that he would not provide face-to-face.

Bob Jensen

Decemeber 3, 2004 reply from Mclelland, Malcolm J [mjmclell@INDIANA.EDU

It almost seems there's a consensus on the AECM listserv on all this! Given the widespread interest and existng intellectual wherewithal among AECMs to do it, maybe it's time to start up the "Journal of Neo-Classical Accounting Theory"? Revisiting Edwards, Bell, Sterling, Chambers, Paton, et al. certainly seems worthwhile; especially if it can be fit into or reconciled with the more recent literature in accounting and finance.

Best regards,

Malcolm

Malcolm J. McLelland, Ph.D. 
mjmclell@indiana.edu
  
website: http://www.uic.edu/~mclellan  
research: http://ssrn.com/author=154711 

December 1, 2004 reply from Glen Gray [glen.gray@CSUN.EDU]

Your story does surprise me. A few years ago I convinced Barry Melancon (President) and Louis Matherne (at that time, Director of IT) from the AICPA to come to L.A. and speak at a dinner meeting of the L.A. chapter of the California Society of CPAs. The meeting was at UCLA, not my campus, however, the chapter offered to waive the $35 dinner charge for any CSUN faculty who want to attend. Other than myself, one (out of about 20) other faculty member attended the dinner. I asked some of the faculty members why they did not attend. The most common answer was something like “We know what he (Barry) is going to say—use more computers in your accounting courses.”

December 1, 2004 reply from Richard C. Sansing [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU

Two thoughts in response:

First, I agree with the gist of your sentiment. Hanging around real world accountants can inform both our teaching and research, and most of us underinvest in such activities.

Second, the effect of "citizenship" considerations looks like an easy cost-benefit tradeoff to me. Seminars are attended only by faculty and doctoral students, so one's presence in the room is more noticable for a research seminar than a presentation attended by lots of undergraduates. Furthermore, the personal cost of attending a daytime event is much less than a nightime event. So if one is driven by citizenship considerations, I expect many more faculty to attend the daytime research seminar than the nightime practitioner presentation.

Richard C. Sansing 
Associate Professor of Business Administration 
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth 
 
email: Richard.C.Sansing@dartmouth.edu

December 1, 2004 reply from Chuck Pier [texcap@HOTMAIL.COM]

Dennis,

I think that you have put your finger on, or maybe stumbled onto, one of the major splits in academic accounting today. You happen to be looking at this situation from one of the "research" universities. Most all of us (I use the term "us" to refer to academic accountants) have been associated with a research university. However, many of us have only been there as students during our doctoral studies. These universities place heavy premiums on both their faculties and students for what we call "basic research" that is quite replete with formulas and theories and the like. Faculty are tenured, promoted and financially rewarded to produce cutting edge research that is published in the top journals, and doctoral students are judged on their ability to analyze and conduct similar research.

On the other hand, many of "us" teach in "teaching universities" that place more emphasis on teaching and "professional" research. In other words, research that has a direct application to either the accounting profession or the teaching of accounting. There is usually not a penalty exerted on those who chose to do the more academic research, but there is also not any special rewartds for that research either.

I feel that many of "us" at teaching schools attend the lectures that you describe with a lot more regularity than your experience at your university. For example, at my school we have a weekly meeting during the fall of our Beta Alpha Psi chapter that inculeds a presentation on a topic by one of the firms in our area. These firms include all of the big four, as well as other national, regional, and local firms. The presentations run the gamut from interview techniques for the students to the latest updates on SOX or forensic accounting. As with any sample, some are better than others and many are appropriate to just the students. Despite the uneveness of the presentations I would estimate that at least 80% of our tenure track faculty are at each meeting, with the missing 20% having some other engagement and unable to attend. There is not a single member of our faculty that routinely does not attend. These meetings are not mandatory, but most of us feel that it supports both or students and the presenters, who hire our students to attend.

I am not trying to indite or point fingers at either side of the academic accounting community but it is obvious that we each have separate priorities. I for one chose the institution that I am at for the very reason that we do have a heavy emphasis on the practioneer and the undergraduate student. I know that many would abhor what I do and could not picture themselves here. They, like me have decided what they like and what they are best suited for. I do feel that at times we who are not at the big research schools feel that we are overlooked, but I wouldn't trade my place with anyone else. I think that I am providing a good service and enjoy the opportunities that it presents.

Chuck

December 3, 2004 reply from Robin A Alexander [alexande.robi@UWLAX.EDU

Interesting. I too came from a math background and finally realized there was no accounting theory in the scientific sense. I also came to suspect it was not a system of measurement either because to be so, there has to be something to measure independent of the measuring tool. Rather it seemed to me accounting defined, for instance, income rather than measured it.

Robin Alexander 

December 3, 2004 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Robin,

I think the distinction lies not so much on "independence" of the measuring tool as it does on behavior induced by the measurements themselves, although this may be what you had in mind in your message to us.

Scientists measure the distance to the moon without fear that behavior of either the earth or the moon will be affected by the measurement process. There may some indirect behavioral impacts such as when designing fuel tanks for a rocket to the moon. In natural science, except for quantum mechanics, the measurers cannot re-define the distance to the moon for purposes of being able to design smaller fuel tanks.

In economics, and social science in general, behavior resulting from measurements is often more impacted by the definition of measurement itself. Changed definitions of inflation or a consumer price index might result in wealth transfers between economic sectors. Plus there is the added problem that measurements in the social sciences are generally less precise and stable, e.g., when people change behavior just because they have been "measured" or diagnosed.

Similarly in accounting, changed definitions of what goes into things like revenue, eps, asset values, and debt values may lead to wealth transfers. The Silicon Valley executives certainly believe that lowering eps by booking stock options will affect share prices vis-a-vis merely disclosing the same information in a footnote rather than as a booked expense. Virtually all earnings management efforts on the part of managers hinges on the notion that accounting outcomes affect wealth transfers. In fact if they did not do so, there probably would not be much interest in accounting numbers See "Toting Up Stock Options," by Frederick Rose, Stanford Business, November 2004, pp. 21 --- http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/bmag/sbsm0411/feature_stockoptions.shtml

Early accounting theorists such as Paton, Littleton, Hatfield, Edwards, Bell, Chambers, etc. generally believed there was some kind of optimal set of definitions that could be deduced without scientifically linking possible wealth transfers to particular definitions. And it is doubtful that subsequent events studies in capital market empiricism will ever solve that problem because human behavior itself is too adaptive. Academic researchers are still seeking to link behavior with accounting numbers, but they're often viewed as chasing moving windmills with lances thrust forward.

Auditors are more concerned about being faithful to the definitions. If the definition says book all leases that meet the FAS 13 criteria for a capital lease, then leases that meet those tests should not have been accounted for as operating leases. The audit mission is to do or die, not to question why. The FASB and other standard setters are supposed to question why. But they are often more impacted by the behavior of the preparers than the users. The behavior of preparers trying to circumvent accounting standards seems to have more bearing than the resulting impacts on wealth transfers that defy being built into a conceptual framework. Where science fails accounting in this regard is that the wealth transfer process is just too complicated to model except in the case of blatant fraud that lines the pockets of a villain.

It is not surprising that accounting "theory" has plummeted in terms of books and curricula. Theory debates never seem to go anywhere beyond unsupportable conjectures. I teach a theory course, but it has degenerated to one of studying intangibles and how preparers design complex contracts such as hedging and SPE contracts that challenge students into thinking how these contracts should be accounted for given our existing standards like FAS 133 and FIN 46. One course that I would someday like to teach is to design a new standard (such as a new FAS 133) and then predict how preparers would change behavior and contracting. Unfortunately my students are not interested in wild blue yonder conjectures. The CPA exam is on their minds no matter where I try to fly. They tolerate "theory" only to the point where they are also learning about existing standards. In their minds, any financial accounting course beyond intermediate should simply be an extension of intermediate accounting.

Bob Jensen


"The Accounting Cycle:  The Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting Op/Ed,"  by J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, September 2006 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x54322.xml 

The Financial Accounting Standards Board and the International Accounting Standards Board have joined forces to flesh out a common conceptual framework. Recently they issued some preliminary views on the "objectives of financial reporting" and the "qualitative characteristics of decision-useful financial reporting information" and have asked for comment.

To obtain "coherent financial reporting," the boards feel that they need "a framework that is sound, comprehensive, and internally consistent" (paragraph P3). In P5, they also state their hope for convergence between U.S. and international accounting standards.

P6 indicates a need to fill in certain gaps, such as a "robust concept of a reporting entity." I presume that they will accomplish this task later, as the current document does not develop such a "robust concept."

Chapter 1 presents the objective for financial reporting, and the description differs little from what is in Concepts Statement No. 1. This objective is "to provide information that is useful to present and potential investors and creditors and others in making investment, credit, and similar resource allocation decisions." The emphasis lay with capital providers, as it should. If anything, I would place greater accent on this aspect, because in the last 10 years, so many managers have defined the "business world" as including managers and excluding investors and creditors. To our chagrin, we learned that managers actually believed this lie, as they pretended that the resources supplied by the investment community belonged to the management team.

FASB and IASB further explain that these users are interested in the cash flows of the entity so they can assess the potential returns and the potential variability of those returns (e.g., in paragraph OB.23). I wish they had drawn the logical conclusion that financial reporting ought to exclude income smoothing. Income smoothing leads the user to assess a smaller variance of earnings than warranted by the underlying economics; income smoothing biases downward the actual variability of the earnings and thus the returns.

Later, in the basis of conclusions, the document addresses the reporting of comprehensive income and its components (see BC1.28-31). Currently, FASB has four items that enter other comprehensive income: gains and losses on available-for-sale investments, losses when incurring additional amounts to recognize a minimum pension liability, exchange gains and losses from a foreign subsidiary under the all-current method, and gains and losses from derivatives that hedge cash flows.

The purported reason for this demarcation between earnings and other comprehensive income rests with the purported low reliability of measurements of these four items; however, the real reason for these other comprehensive items seems to be political. For example, FASB capitulated in Statement No. 115 when a number of managers objected to reporting gains and losses on available-for-sale securities because that would create volatility in earnings. (I find it curious how FASB caters to the whims of managers but claims that the primary rationale for financial reporting is to serve the investment community.) Because one has a hard time reconciling other comprehensive income with the needs of investors and creditors, it would serve the investment community better if the boards eliminate this notion of comprehensive income.

Two IASB members think that an objective for financial reporting should encompass the stewardship function (see AV1.1-7). Stewardship seems to be a subset of economic usefulness, so this objection is pointless. It behooves these two IASB members to explain the consequences of adopting a stewardship objective and how these consequences differ from the usefulness objective before we can entertain their protestation seriously.

Sections BC1.42 and 43 ask whether management intent should be a part of the financial reporting process. Given management intent during the last decade, I think decidedly not. Management intent is merely a license to massage accounting numbers as managers please. Fortunately, the Justice Department calls such tactics fraud.

Chapter 2 of this document concerns qualitative characteristics. For the most part, this presentation is similar to that in Concepts Statement No. 2, though arranged somewhat differently. Concepts 2 had as its overarching qualitative characteristics relevance and reliability. This Preliminary Views expounds relevance, faithful representation, comparability, and understandability as the qualitative characteristics.

The discussion on faithful representation is interesting (QC.16-19) inasmuch as they distinguish between accounts that depict real world phenomena and accounts that are constructs with no real world referents. They explain that deferred debits and credits do not possess faithful representation because they are merely the creation of accountants. I hope that analysis applies to deferred income tax debits and credits.

Verifiability implies similar measures by different measurers (QC.23-26). I wish FASB and IASB to include auditability as an aspect of verifiability; after all, if you cannot audit something, it is hardly verifiable. Yet, the soon to be released standard on fair value measurements includes a variety of items that will prove difficult if not impossible to audit.

Understandability is obvious, though the two boards feel that users with a "reasonable knowledge of business and economic activities" can understand financial statements. I no longer agree. Such a person might employ a profit analysis model or ratio analysis on a set of financial statements and mis-analyze a firm's condition because he or she did not make analytical adjustments for off-balance sheet items and other fanciful tricks by managers. This includes so many of Enron's investors and creditors. No, to understand financial reporting today, you must be an expert in accounting and finance.

Benefits-that-justify-costs acts as a constraint on financial reporting. While this criterion is acceptable, too often the boards view costs only from the perspective of the preparers. I wish the boards explicitly acknowledged the fact that not reporting on some things adds costs to users. When a business enterprise engages in aggressive accounting, the expert user needs to employ analytical adjustments to correct this overzealousness. These adjustments consume the investor's economic resources and thus involve costs to the investment community.

In the basis-for-conclusions section, FASB and IASB explain that the concept of substance over form is included in the concept of faithful representation (see paragraphs BC2.17 and 18). While I don't have a problem with that, I think they should at least emphasize this point in Chapter 2 rather than bury it in this section. Substance over form is a critically important doctrine, especially as it relates to business combinations and leases, so it deserves greater stress.

On balance, the document is well written and contains a good clarification of the objective of financial reporting and the qualitative characteristics of decision-useful financial reporting information. I offer the criticisms above as a hope to strengthen and improve the Preliminary Views.

My most important comment, however, does not address any particular aspects within the document itself. Instead, I worry about the usefulness of this objective and these qualitative characteristics to FASB and IASB. To enjoy coherent financial reporting, there not only is need for a sound, comprehensive, and internally consistent framework, we also must have a board with the political will to utilize the conceptual framework. FASB ignored its own conceptual framework in its issuance of standards on:

* Leases (Aren't the financial commitments of the lessee a liability?) * Pensions (How can the pension intangible asset really be an asset as it has no real world referent?) * Stock options (Why did the board not require the expensing of stock options in the 1990s when stock options clearly involve real costs to the firm?), and * Special purpose entities (Why did the board wait for the collapse of Enron before dealing with this issue?).

Clearly, the low power of FASB -- IASB likewise possesses little power -- explains some of these decisions, but it is frustrating nonetheless to see the board ignore its own conceptual framework. Why engage in this deliberation unless FASB is prepared to follow through?

J. EDWARD KETZ is accounting professor at The Pennsylvania State University. Dr. Ketz's teaching and research interests focus on financial accounting, accounting information systems, and accounting ethics. He is the author of Hidden Financial Risk, which explores the causes of recent accounting scandals. He also has edited Accounting Ethics, a four-volume set that explores ethical thought in accounting since the Great Depression and across several countries.


December 7, 2004 message from Carnegie President [carnegiepresident@carnegiefoundation.org

A different way to think about ... Professional Education This month's Carnegie Perspective is written by Carnegie Senior Scholar William Sullivan, whose extensively revised second edition of Work and Integrity was just released by Jossey-Bass. The Perspective is based on the book's argument that in today's environment of unrelenting economic and social pressures, in which professional models of good work come under increasing strain, the professions need their educational centers more than ever as resources and as rallying points for renewal.

Since our goal in Carnegie Perspectives is to contribute to the dialogue on issues and to provide a different way to think and talk about concerns, we have opened up the conversation by creating a forum—Carnegie Conversations—where you can engage publicly with the author and read and respond to what others have to say.

However, if you would prefer that your comments not be read by others, you may still respond to the author of the piece through CarnegiePresident@carnegiefoundation.org .

If you would like to unsubscribe to Carnegie Perspectives, use the same address and merely type unsubscribe in the subject line of your email to us.

We look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Lee S. Shulman President 
The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching

Preparing Professionals as Moral Agents By William Sullivan

Breakdowns in institutional reliability and professional self-policing, as revealed in waves of scandals in business, accounting, journalism, and the law, have spawned a cancerous cynicism on the part of the public that threatens the predictable social environment needed for a healthy society. For professionals to overcome this public distrust, they must embrace a new way of looking at their role to include civic responsibility for themselves and their profession, and a personal commitment to a deeper engagement with society.

The highly publicized unethical behavior that we see today by professionals is still often thought by many—physicians, lawyers, educators, scientists, engineers—as "marginal" matters in their fields, to be overcome in due course by the application of the value-neutral, learned techniques of their profession. But this conventional view fails to recognize that professionals' "problems" arise outside the sterile, neutral and technical and instead lie within human social contexts. These are not simply physical environments or information systems. They are networks of social engagement structured by shared meanings, purposes, and loyalties. Such networks form the distinctive ecology of human life.

For example, a doctor faced with today's lifestyle diseases—obesity, addictions, cancer, strokes—rather than with infectious biological agents, soon realizes that he or she must take into account how individuals, groups, or whole societies lead their lives. Or in education, it is often assumed that schools can improve student achievement by setting clear standards and then devising teaching techniques to reach them. But this approach has been confounded when it encounters students who do not see a relationship between academic performance and their own goals, or when the experience of students and parents has made trusting school authorities appear a dubious bargain.

In order to "solve" the apparently intractable problems of health care, education, public distrust, or developing a humane and sustainable technological order, the strategies of intervention employed by professionals must engage with, and if possible, strengthen, the social networks of meaning and connection in people's lives—or their efforts will continue to misfire or fail. And not only will they be less effective in meeting the needs of society and the individuals who entrust their lives to their care, but they will also find in their midst colleagues who do not uphold the moral tenets of the profession.

The idea of the professional as neutral problem solver, above the fray, which was launched with great expectations a century ago, is now obsolete. A new ideal of a more engaged, civic professionalism must take its place. Such an ideal understands, as a purely technical professionalism does not, that professionals are inescapably moral agents whose work depends upon public trust for its success.

Since professional schools are the portals to professional life, they bear much of the responsibility for the reliable formation in their students of integrity of professional purpose and identity. In addition to enabling students to become competent practitioners, professional schools always must provide ways to induct students into the distinctive habits of mind that define the domain of a lawyer, a physician, nurse, engineer, or teacher. However, the basic knowledge of a professional domain must be revised and recast as conditions change. Today, that means that the definition of basic knowledge must be expanded to include an understanding of the moral and social ecology within which students will practice.

Today's professional schools will not serve their students well unless they foster forms of practice that open possibilities of trust and partnership with those the professions serve. Such a reorientation of professional education means nothing less than a broadening and rebalancing of professional identity. It means an intentional abandonment of the image of the professional as superior and detached problem-solver. It also requires a positive engagement. Professional education must promote the opening of professional life to meet clients and patients as also fellow citizens, persons with whom teachers, physicians, lawyers, nurses, accountants, engineers, and indeed all professionals share a larger, common "practice"—that of citizen, working to contribute particular knowledge and specialized skills toward improving the quality of life, perhaps especially for those most in need.

Professional schools have too often held out to their students a notion of expert knowledge that remains abstracted from context. Since the displacement of apprenticeship on the job by academic training in a university setting, professional schools have tilted the definition of professional competence heavily toward cognitive capacity, while downplaying other crucial aspects of professional maturity. This elective affinity between the academy's penchant for theoretical abstraction and the distanced stance of problem solving has often obscured the key role played by the face-to-face transmission of professional understanding and judgment from teacher to student. This is the core of apprenticeship that must not be allowed to wither from lack of understanding and attention.

A new civic awareness within professional preparation could go a long way toward awakening awareness that the authentic spirit of each professional domain represents more than a body of knowledge or skills. It is a living culture, painfully developed over time, which represents at once the individual practitioner's most prized possession and an asset of great social value. Its future worth, however, will depend in large measure on how well professional culture gets reshaped to answer these new needs of our time

 


"The Practitioner-Professor Link," by Bonita K. Peterson, Christie W. Johnson, Gil W. Crain, and Scott J. Miller, Journal of Accountancy, June 2006 --- http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/jun2005/kramer.htm


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
PERIODIC FEEDBACK FROM PRACTITIONERS to faculty about the strengths and weaknesses of their graduates and their program can help to positively influence the accounting profession.

CPAs ALSO CAN INSPIRE STUDENTS’ education by providing internship opportunities for accounting students, or serving as a guest speaker in class.

MEMBERSHIP ON A UNIVERSITY’S ACCOUNTING advisory council permits a CPA to interact with faculty on a regular basis and directly affect the accounting curriculum.

SERVING AS A “PROFESSOR FOR A DAY” is another way a CPA can promote the profession to accounting students and answer any questions they have.

CPAs CAN SUPPORT STUDENTS’ PROFESSIONAL development by providing advice on proper business attire and tips for preparing resumes, and conducting mock interviews.

CPAs CAN SHARE EXPERIENCES with a professor to cowrite an instructional case study for a journal, which can reach countless students in classrooms across the world.

ORGANIZING OR CONTRIBUTING to an accounting education fund at the university can help fund a variety of educational purposes, such as student scholarships and travel expenses to professional meetings.

PARTICIPATION BY PRACTITIONERS in the education of today’s accounting students is a win-win-win situation for students, CPAs and faculty.

 


Role of Accounting Standards in Efficient Equity Markets

 

Questions
Should you believe these many claims that the equity capital markets are inefficient and that it's worth investing the time and money to beat the market?

Answer
A Dartmouth College finance professor would have us conclude that in recent years the equity markets are a bit like Las Vegas. It's possible to leave Las Vegas more than a million dollars ahead if you take high risks, but the odds are decidedly in favor of the casinos. Similarly, it's possible to beat the stock index funds if you take the risks, but the odds are definitely against beating the index funds.

This we return to the age old paradox. It's rather useless to carefully conduct a financial analysis of audited accounting reports in an effort to gain superior knowledge to take advantage of more naive investors. On the other hand if a sufficiently large number of investors did not make a sufficient number of "sophisticated-knowledge" buys and sells the equity markets might be less efficient. The sophisticated investors (apart from insiders) cannot take advantage of naive investors because there are so many sophisticated investors. Of course insiders can exploit efficient markets, but the SEC spends most of its budget trying to prevent insider trading. If the SEC was not successful in this effort by and large, the equity capital markets would cease to exist.

"Can You Beat the Market? It’s a $100 Billion Question," by Mark Hulbert, The New York Times, March 9, 2008 --- Click Here

The study, “The Cost of Active Investing,” began circulating earlier this year as an academic working paper. Its author is Kenneth R. French, a finance professor at Dartmouth; he is known for his collaboration with Eugene F. Fama, a finance professor at the University of Chicago, in creating the Fama-French model that is widely used to calculate risk-adjusted performance.

In his new study, Professor French tried to make his estimate of investment costs as comprehensive as possible. He took into account the fees and expenses of domestic equity mutual funds (both open- and closed-end, including exchange-traded funds), the investment management costs paid by institutions (both public and private), the fees paid to hedge funds, and the transactions costs paid by all traders (including commissions and bid-asked spreads). If a fund or institution was only partly allocated to the domestic equity market, he counted only that portion in computing its investment costs.

Professor French then deducted what domestic equity investors collectively would have paid if they instead had simply bought and held an index fund benchmarked to the overall stock market, like the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index fund, whose retail version currently has an annual expense ratio of 0.19 percent.

The difference between those amounts, Professor French says, is what investors as a group pay to try to beat the market.

In 2006, the last year for which he has comprehensive data, this total came to $99.2 billion. Assuming that it grew in 2007 at the average rate of the last two decades, the amount for last year was more than $100 billion. Such a total is noteworthy for its sheer size and its growth over the years — in 1980, for example, the comparable total was just $7 billion, according to Professor French.

The growth occurred despite many developments that greatly reduced the cost of trading, like deeply discounted brokerage commissions, a narrowing in bid-asked spreads, and a big reduction in front-end loads, or sales charges, paid to mutual fund companies.

These factors notwithstanding, Professor French found that the portion of stocks’ aggregate market capitalization spent on trying to beat the market has stayed remarkably constant, near 0.67 percent. That means the investment industry has found new revenue sources in direct proportion to the reductions caused by these factors.

What are the investment implications of his findings? One is that a typical investor can increase his annual return by just shifting to an index fund and eliminating the expenses involved in trying to beat the market. Professor French emphasizes that this typical investor is an average of everyone aiming to outperform the market — including the supposedly best and brightest who run hedge funds.

Professor French’s study can also be used to show just how different the investment arena is from a so-called zero-sum game. In such a game, of course, any one individual’s gains must be matched by equal losses by other players, and vice versa. Investing would be a zero-sum game if no costs were associated with trying to beat the market. But with the costs of that effort totaling around $100 billion a year, active investing is a significantly negative-sum game. The very act of playing reduces the size of the pie that is divided among the various players.

Even that, however, underestimates the difficulties of beating an index fund. Professor French notes that while the total cost of trying to beat the market has grown over the years, the percentage of individuals who bear this cost has declined — precisely because of the growing popularity of index funds.

From 1986 to 2006, according to his calculations, the proportion of the aggregate market cap that is invested in index funds more than doubled, to 17.9 percent. As a result, the negative-sum game played by active investors has grown ever more negative.

The bottom line is this: The best course for the average investor is to buy and hold an index fund for the long term. Even if you think you have compelling reasons to believe a particular trade could beat the market, the odds are still probably against you.


A Hedge Fund Manager's Indictment of Accountants (and the regulators)
The book also shows why good accounting really matters. It is easy to mock finicky people with green eyeshades who worry about financial footnotes. But reliable numbers are essential if capital is to be allocated properly in our economy. Otherwise good projects starve and foolish ones burn up money.

Fooling Some of the People All of the Time, by David Einhorn (Wiley, 379 pages)
Reviewed by George Anders, "The Money Kept Vanishing," The Wall Street Journal, April 23, 2008, Page A15 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120891268398036495.html?mod=todays_us_opinion

Most of David Einhorn's ideas work out brilliantly. He is a 39-year-old hedge-fund manager in Manhattan who oversees $6 billion. Bull markets? Bear markets? It hardly matters. His stock portfolio has averaged 25% annual returns since 1996, when he opened Greenlight Capital.

Now Mr. Einhorn has written a book. But instead of packaging the real or contrived "secrets" to his success – as cliché would have it – he has tried to do something less triumphant and far gutsier. In "Fooling Some of the People All of the Time," he turns the spotlight on a single, stubborn investment play that never made much money for him but created six years of headaches.

It is a surprisingly dark story, in which Mr. Einhorn's usual winning touch vanishes for most of the narrative. As he struggles to figure out why, he appears naïve at certain times, petulant at others. But he presses on anyway, confident that vindication will come. It never really does.

The story starts in 2002, with Mr. Einhorn rightly proud of his ability to spot companies with shoddy accounting practices. He sells their shares short, betting on a stock-price collapse. Generally he wins big within months. Convinced that he has found another juicy target, he zeroes in on Allied Capital, a business- financing company that seems to dawdle when it comes to marking down the value of its troubled loans.

Bad call. Allied eventually did take big write-downs – but only after the overall economy had improved, allowing Allied to enjoy offsetting gains from other investments. Allied's stock, rather than sinking from Mr. Einhorn's short-sale price of $26.25 a share, climbed past $30 over the next few years.

Mr. Einhorn didn't retreat, though. He grew so irate about the company's accounting that he alerted the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC did little with his complaint; in fact, it investigated him instead for spreading negative views about Allied.

Mr. Einhorn survived that episode and kept hammering away. He found evidence that one of Allied's affiliates, Business Loan Express, was making what appeared to be excessive, poorly documented loans to operators of shrimp boats and service stations. The deals looked like fraud to him. He tried to tip off journalists and regulators but was mostly met with yawns.

Large chunks of "Fooling Some of the People All of the Time" amount to an angry man's recital of his grievances – and Mr. Einhorn has some good ones. An SEC lawyer who quizzed him aggressively about his short-selling methods later went into private practice and registered as a lobbyist for Allied. Mr. Einhorn, understandably, regards such a career move as an ethics violation.

Allied also ended up with purloined copies of Mr. Einhorn's phone records, something he had long suspected. Allied had originally told him that it had no evidence that his phone records had been grabbed but later admitted to getting them. He labels the company "dishonest" at one point and expresses the hope that regulators and auditors may still "remedy the situation." For its part, Allied calls Mr. Einhorn's book "a self-serving rehash of the same discredited charges that Mr. Einhorn has made for the past six years."

Without some broader significance, Einhorn v. Allied Capital would be small beer in the chronicles of modern-day corporate showdowns. There is no lurid scandal here involving drugs, bimbos or $6,000 shower curtains. There is no cataclysmic ending. Allied stock has faded to about $19 in the current credit crunch but hasn't fared worse than many of its rivals. After a long tug-of-war, Mr. Einhorn's initial short sale has proved neither disastrous nor especially lucrative.

What gives the book a special value, beyond its backstage look at the life of an elite trader, is its insight into two important but usually neglected aspects of the investment business. First, Mr. Einhorn's carefully documented battles with Allied Capital say a lot about the temperament needed to be a great investor. Tenacity is vital. So is patience. And so, too, is an ability to keep a sane perspective.

As Mr. Einhorn's own firm prospered, he could have jammed far more money into his Allied Capital short position, determined to prevail by brute force. He didn't. He kept 3% of assets in that position but invested most of his money in other ideas that worked out better. Such discipline, we come to realize, is what distinguishes the wisest long-term investors from obstinate short-timers who veer between triumph and ruin.

The book also shows why good accounting really matters. It is easy to mock finicky people with green eyeshades who worry about financial footnotes. But reliable numbers are essential if capital is to be allocated properly in our economy. Otherwise good projects starve and foolish ones burn up money.

Mr. Einhorn is a hard-liner, wanting strict accounting standards that punish missteps quickly. Allied Capital, to judge by his version of events, liked living in a more lenient world, where there was plenty of time to patch up problems quietly. Regulators were comfortable with an easy-credit philosophy, too, to a degree that startled Mr. Einhorn.

In the current financial shakeout, people like Mr. Einhorn are entitled to say: "I told you so." It's to his credit that, telling the Allied story, he is often angry but never smug.

 

 


 

 

Controversies in Setting Accounting Standards

 

The roaring SEC-FASB (read that Cox-Herz) Train replacing domestic accounting standards such as U.S. and Canadian GAAP is analogous to letting the United Nations govern the world. Both the U.N. and the International Accounting Standards Board have lofty intentions, but multinational politics is a nightmare to behold

The IASB defines IFRS as a set of International Financial Reporting Standards --- http://www.iasb.org/Home.htm

The AICPA maintains a helper site for guidance on the replacement of FASB/SEC standards with IASB international standards --- http://www.ifrs.com/

The American Accounting Association Commons contains, for AAA members, documents supplied by accounting firms to help accounting educators make the transition from domestic accounting standards to international accounting standards --- https://commons.aaahq.org/signin

Also see http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting
And see http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#FASBvsIASB

Paul Pacter's IASB Update Presentation in Anaheim on August 4, 2008

Slides: http://www.iasplus.com/resource/0808aaa-ifrs-is-here.pdf  (PDF 141k) Resource list : http://www.iasplus.com/resource/0808aaaifrsresources.pdf  (PDF 49k)

 

 

Bob Jensen defines IFRS as International Fleecing of Responsible Standards

International auditing firms are seeking a judgmental (read that softer) set of standards under lobbying pressure from their large multinational clients. Bright lines led to $billions of losses in litigation in the U.S. because a client, with the blessing or incompetence of an auditor, crossed a line such as the old SPE 3% line that was a huge factor in the demise of Andersen and Enron --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm 

I’m presently doing a funded research study comparing FAS 133 with IAS 39. FAS 133 has lots of bright lines and lots of examples, especially DIG examples, of how to account for complicated hedges.  IAS 39 is like driving down a mountain road on a moonless night without any headlights, road signs, or guard rails. With over a thousand variations of financial instrument derivative contracts and thousands of types hedging strategies, IAS 39 lets clients manage earnings most any way they like without detailed rules of the road and bright lines  that give them and their auditors guidance.

Eventually IFRS will be all fair value accounting on moonless nights. Accountability is going into the ditch or over a cliff --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#FairValue


Question
What is similar between IFRS and "A Call for a Warning System on Artificial Joints?"

Answer
The Accounting Onion, August 18, 2008 --- http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/08/no-escaping-the.html


Notable Quotations About the SEC's New Proposals for Oil & Gas Accounting

I think I can always tell when the fix is in. First, big lies are woven into a large dose of truth, so they won't look to be as big as they are. There are certainly many things in the SEC's proposal to recommend it, especially along the lines of expanding the types of reserves that would be disclosed, and updating important definitions. Second, when the justification for a proposal makes no sense, there can be no debate; you can't tell the emperor he's naked. The lesson of the Cox's SEC is to never forget about the big special interests that write big checks to the big politicians that made him emperor for a day.
Tom Selling, "SEC on Oil and Gas Disclosures: Current Prices Aren't 'Meaningful'?" The Accounting Onion, July 25, 2008 --- http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/07/oil-and-gas-dis.html


"Last Ditch" Effort (before Bush leaves office) by SEC Chairman to Force IFRS on the US as a Concession to Industry and Large Accounting Firms
The sad think is that the FASB (under Bob Herz) and the SEC (under Christopher Cox) applaud the move to UN-style accounting rule making

James D. Cox, a securities law expert at Duke Law School who returned this week from teaching corporate law in Europe, said the shift to international rules amounted to “outsourcing safety standards.” “We would not for a moment tolerate having American auto safety standards set by China or India,” he said. “Why should we do it for financial safety standards? There has to be some accountability.”
See below

Charles Wankel (St Johns University) called my attention to this important article

"Accounting Plan Would Allow Use of Foreign Rules," by Stephen Labaton, The New York Times, July 5, 2008 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/05/business/05sec.html?_r=1&oref=slogin

Federal officials say they are preparing to propose a series of regulatory changes to enhance American competitiveness overseas, attract foreign investment and give American investors a broader selection of foreign stocks.

But critics say the changes appear to be a last-ditch push by appointees of President Bush to dilute securities rules passed after the collapse of Enron and other large companies — measures that were meant to forestall accounting gimmicks and corrupt practices that led to those corporate failures.

Legal experts, some regulators and Democratic lawmakers are concerned that the changes would put American investors at the mercy of overseas regulators who enforce weaker rules and may treat investment losses as a low priority.

Foreign regulators are beyond the reach of Congress, which oversees American securities regulation through confirmation proceedings, enforcement hearings and approval of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s budget.

The commission is preparing a timetable that will permit American companies to shift to the international rules, which are set by a foreign organization and give companies greater latitude in reporting earnings. Companies that have used both domestic and overseas rules have, on average, been able to report revenues and earnings that were 6 percent to 8 percent higher under the international standards, according to accounting experts.

Though foreign accounting standards are stronger in some ways than American accounting principles, they are weaker in some important areas. They enable companies, for example, to provide fewer details about mortgage-backed securities, derivatives and other financial instruments at the center of today’s housing crisis and that have troubled many Wall Street firms, including Bear Stearns.

The shift to international standards could also wind up eliminating the conflict-of-interest rules, adopted after the collapse of Arthur Andersen and Enron, that have limited auditors from performing both accounting work and consulting for the same client.

James D. Cox, a securities law expert at Duke Law School who returned this week from teaching corporate law in Europe, said the shift to international rules amounted to “outsourcing safety standards.”

“We would not for a moment tolerate having American auto safety standards set by China or India,” he said. “Why should we do it for financial safety standards? There has to be some accountability.”

The S.E.C. also plans to announce details of a pilot program that would enable foreign brokers to deal directly with American investors, while continuing to be largely regulated by the foreign country. The first country in the program will be Australia, although officials hope to eventually include other countries. In a third move, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, which works under the supervision of the S.E.C., is preparing a rule that would allow it to defer to foreign regulators for inspections of some of the 800 foreign auditors of overseas companies that sell stock in the United States.

The oversight board was created by the Sarbanes-Oxley law of 2002 in response to the accounting scandals at Enron and other large companies. The law requires the board to inspect regularly all accounting firms that certify the financial results of companies whose shares are sold in the United States.

Officials say the proposed changes reflect the decades-long push toward global markets. They say the changes are necessary to attract capital from abroad and will protect Americans as they increasingly look to invest overseas. In the decade ending last November, American holdings of foreign stock increased to $4.3 trillion from $1.2 trillion.

“You are seeing a world now where everything is mobile,” Ethiopis Tafara, director of international affairs at the S.E.C., said in an interview. “You have securities issuers that are mobile. Broker dealers can provide services from anywhere. Exchanges are mobile, and electronic trading platforms don’t need a physical location. You have capital that is mobile, it travels almost anywhere around the world.”

“When you have everything that is mobile, the way we think about our mandate — investor protection and enforcement — has to take this into account,” Mr. Tafara said.

Mr. Tafara said that the mutual recognition agreement with Australia would continue to protect American investors because the S.E.C. would continue to have the authority to prosecute foreign companies under antifraud provisions of the law for what he called “lying, stealing and cheating.” The S.E.C. would continue to investigate accusations of illegal insider trading, for example, an area where the commission has been more vigorous than many foreign jurisdictions.

But the S.E.C. would not enforce many investor-protection laws involving issues ranging from the quiet period before a stock offering to market manipulation, financial disclosures and abusive trading tactics. Nor would foreign officials apply a panoply of American securities rules that are unique in that they are intended to protect minority shareholders. Instead, the commission would rely on its Australian counterpart to enforce its securities regulations, which often involve different standards.

In a speech earlier this year, Christopher Cox, the agency’s chairman, said that working on the transition to international accounting standards and reaching enforcement agreements with foreign countries like the Australians were two of the most important items on his agenda as his term comes to a close.

Continued in article


The Fairy Tale of 'True and Fair View' and a Modest Proposal for Real 'Core Principles',

The elusiveness of a meaning for 'true and fair' in an accounting context stems from a lack of meaning for that quintessentially British phrase in a capital markets context. Financial reporting is about producing information: is it possible that truth telling could not result in fair reporting? Answer: no way. Therefore, 'and fair' adds nothing whatsoever; and besides, everyone learns in Accounting 101 that accrual accounting and 'truth' don't mix anyway. The point is that cunning Tweedie, like Soc Gen and its auditors, can construe 'true and fair' to mean anything and at any time. Just like the emperor in the cautionary fairy tale, IFRS wears no clothes; his royal highness and subjects are deceived by the Tweedie tailor (pun intended) to disbelieve their eyes, and to behave as if IFRS is adorned with some noble British bromide.
Tom Selling, "The Fairy Tale of 'True and Fair View' and a Modest Proposal for Real 'Core Principles'," The Accounting Onion, July 10, 2008 --- http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/07/the-core-prin-1.html


More on how to lie with statistics

It brings to mind the joke about Bill Gates walking into a bar and suddenly everyone in the room becomes a millionaire. Statistically, by averaging the incomes in the room, the statement is true.
Zachary Karabell (see below)

"There Is No 'The Economy'," by Zachary Karabell, The Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2008; Page A13 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121478256977914431.html?mod=djemEditorialPage

Once upon a time, and for most of the 20th century, there was. The data that we use today is a product of the nation-state, and was created in order to give government the tools to gauge the health of the nation. The Bureau of Labor Statistics, which measures the unemployment rate and inflation, was created around the turn of the 20th century, and for much of that century the U.S. was a cohesive unit. It was its own most important market, its own source of consumption, and its own source of credit.

Big-picture statistics form the basis of almost every discussion about "the economy." But these statistics are averages reporting one blended number that is treated as if it applies to all 300 million Americans. It brings to mind the joke about Bill Gates walking into a bar and suddenly everyone in the room becomes a millionaire. Statistically, by averaging the incomes in the room, the statement is true.

Macro data and big-picture statistics like GDP growth, the unemployment rate and consumer spending are all large averages. The fact that the economy is growing or contracting by 1% or 2% is taken as a proxy not just for the economic health of the nation, but for the economic health of the bulk of its citizens. The same goes for consumer spending. If it goes up or down 2%, that is taken as representative not just of the statistical fiction called "the American consumer" but as indicative of the behavior and attitudes of U.S. consumers writ large.

To begin with, someone in the upper-income brackets is living a different life than those in the lower-income brackets. The top 20% of income earners spend more than the lower 60% combined. The wealthiest 400 people have more than $1 trillion in net worth, which exceeds the discretionary spending of the entire federal government. These groups are all American, yet it would be stretching the facts to the breaking point to assert that they share an economic reality. On the upper end, the soaring price of food and fuel hardly matter; on the other end, they matter above all else. The upper end does matter quantitatively, but the group of people on the lower end is vastly larger and therefore has more resonance in our public and electoral debate.

Look at housing, widely regarded as a national calamity. The regional variations depict something different. In Stockton, Calif., one in 75 households are in foreclosure; in Nebraska, the figure is one in every 1,459; and the greater Omaha area is thriving. Similar contrasts could be made between Houston and Tampa, or between Las Vegas and Manhattan. Home prices have plunged in certain regions such as Miami-Dade, and stayed stable in others such as San Francisco and Silicon Valley. Houston, bolstered by soaring oil prices, has a 3.9% unemployment rate; the rate in Detroit, depressed by a collapsing U.S. auto industry, is 6.9%. The notion that these disparate areas share a common housing malaise or similar employment challenges is a fiction.

We hear continual stories of the subprime economy and its fallout on Main Street and Wall Street. All true. Yet there is also an iPhone economy and a Blackberry economy. Ten million iPhones were sold last year at up to $499 a pop, and estimates are for 20 million iPhones sold this year, many at $199 each. That's billions of dollars worth of iPhones. Add in the sales of millions of Blackberrys, GPS devices, game consoles and so on, and you get tens of billions more.

The economy that supports the purchases of these electronic devices is by and large not the same economy that is seeing rampant foreclosures. The economy of the central valley of California is not the same economy of Silicon Valley, any more than the economy of Buffalo is the same as the economy of greater New York City. Yet in our national discussion, it is as if those utterly crucial distinctions simply don't exist. Corn-producing states are doing just fine; car-producing states aren't.

The notion that the U.S. can be viewed as one national economy makes increasingly less sense. More than half the profits of the S&P 500 companies last year came from outside the country, yet in indirect ways those profits did add to the economic growth in the U.S. None of that was captured in our economic statistics, because the way we collect data – sophisticated as it is – has not caught up to the complicated web of capital flows and reimportation of goods by U.S.-listed entities for sale here.

These issues are not confined to the U.S. Every country is responsible for its own national data, and every country is falling victim to a similar fallacy that its national data represent something meaningful called "the economy."

In truth, what used to be "the economy" is just one part of a global chess board, and the data we have is incomplete, misleading, and simultaneously right and wrong. It is right given what it measures, and wrong given what most people conclude on the basis of it.

The world is composed of hundreds of economies that interact with one another in unpredictable and unexpected ways. We cling to the notion of one economy because it creates an illusion of shared experiences. As comforting as that illusion is, it will not restore a simplicity that no longer exists, and clinging to it will not lead to viable solutions for pressing problems.

So let's welcome this new world and discard familiar guideposts, inadequate data and outmoded frameworks. That may be unsettling, but it is a better foundation for wise analysis and sound solutions than clinging to a myth.

Jensen Comment
Sadly, the same thing is happening with the state of financial reporting of global companies. The once tough minded FASB (leases, pensions, pooling, post-retirement benefits, stock options, derivatives, etc.) is caving in to globalization of accounting standards that is analogous to turning over law making to the United Nations. The goal is to "welcome this new world and discard familiar guideposts (read that bright lines in accounting standards), inadequate data and outmoded frameworks."

Perhaps I'm a luddite, but I do not think IASB's so-called principles-based standards provide "a better foundation for wise analysis and sound solutions than clinging to myth." All these principle-based standards are going to do is make it harder to pin down CEO crooks and incompetent auditors in court.


"Accounting rule-makers putting markets at risk," by Michael Starkie, Financial Times,.June 12 2008 --- Click Here

Sir, Whither accounting?

I write this letter in a personal capacity. My qualifications for expressing these opinions are that I have been chief accountant at BP for the past 14 years and have been for some years chairman of the UK's CBI Financial Reporting Panel and a member of the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group Technical Expert Group.

Recent years have seen major changes in the topography of accounting standards; acceptance by the European Union (subject to endorsement) of International Financial Reporting Standards and by other countries also, and the decline in the influence of US generally accepted accounting principles as the US capital markets have become relatively less attractive.

What a wasted opportunity, then, that the current body of IFRS is so unhelpful for the markets when the accounting world was given this historic opportunity to create something that should have been both useful for markets and with the potential to be welcomed globally. I recall a year or two ago that the heads of leading accounting firms said that current international financial reporting was broken. But nothing has been done about this.

And the future looks even bleaker. The International Accounting Standards Board continues to develop an accounting model about which users of financial information have grave misgivings. Probably the most disturbing example is the use of predominantly mark-to-model exit values in the balance sheet, which cannot be relevant for a market trying to assess the economic performance and position of companies that have the intention of continuing to operate as going concerns. In the interests of brevity I will not list other examples though there are enough voices of protest being raised by those in the financial world to make it apparent that all is far from well.

How have things come to this pass? I have concluded, albeit with regret, that the fundamental problem is the members of the IASB. Collectively as board members they do not have the experience and wisdom to produce and maintain accounting standards that are useful for the capital markets and the wider economy. And some of the board members are clearly committed to an extreme view of recognition and measurement which will severely damage the operation of markets and ultimately economies. Recent appointments to the board are too little and too late to change the overall thrust.

Continued in article


Andersen's demise didn't solve the broader problem of the cozy collaboration between auditors and their corporate clients. "This is day-to-day business in accounting firms and on Wall Street," says former SEC Chief Accountant Lynn Turner. "There is nothing extraordinary, nothing unusual, with respect to Enron." Will Congress and the SEC do what's needed to restore trust in the system?
See "More Enrons Ahead" video in the list of Frontline (from PBS) videos on accounting and finance regulation and scandals --- http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/regulation/view/


FASB's Accounting Standards Codification --- http://asc.fasb.org/home

FASB Master Glossary --- http://asc.fasb.org/glossary&letter=D

The FASB's Derivatives and Hedging Glossary (in the Accounting Standards Codification Database) ---
http://asc.fasb.org/subtopic&trid=2229141&nav_type=left_nav

Accounting Educators should pay more attention to the following blog that seeks out weaknesses in company filings of 10Q (and other reports) with the SEC

10Q Detective blog by David Phillips --- http://10qdetective.blogspot.com/

Investors often overlook SEC filings, and it is the job of the 10Q Detective to dig through businesses’ 8-K and 10-Q SEC filings, looking for financial statement ‘soft spots,' (depreciation policies, warranty reserves, and restructuring charges, etc.) that may materially impact Quality of Earnings

Bob Jensen's threads on creative accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/AccountingTricks.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on the roles of listservs and blogs --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ListservRoles.htm


Accounting Golden Fleece Quotations (read that bull crap)

I want to conclude by explaining what I mean by "truly believe." I'm just a politician ... whoops, I mean lawyer ... who really doesn't know much about what all you CFOs have to go through to make your numbers. Frankly, the details of the differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP don't concern me much. I just threw in "truly" to impress upon you that I am on your side -- kind of like "no kidding," or "I swear." In other words, even though I don’t have a single good answer to any of the questions I have raised today, don’t worry, because we're going through with this anyway. I truly believe that If IFRS is good for you, it's good for the SEC; and it must be good for everyone.
John White, Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance, as quoted by Tom Selling in The Accounting Onion, June 9, 2008 --- http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/06/accounting-convergence-decoding-john-whites-speech.html


"Deloitte Puts IFRS in College Classrooms," SmartPros, May 19, 2008 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x61904.xml

Big Four accounting firm Deloitte & Touche has formed a consortium to accelerate integration of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) into college curricula.

Through the IFRS University Consortium, Deloitte is contributing resources to Ohio State and Virginia Tech universities to assist the schools in developing IFRS curricula. The contributions to Ohio State and Virginia Tech include drafting course materials such as classroom guides and case studies and providing Deloitte professionals as lecturers. The classroom guides and course materials will be made available to other interested universities.

The announcement was made at the Deloitte/Federation of Schools of Accountancy (FSA) Faculty Consortium meeting in Chicago, a curriculum development program for accounting educators that is sponsored annually by the Deloitte Foundation, the not-for-profit arm of Deloitte LLP.

Participating schools can benefit by having input in the direction, goals and resources available from the consortium; participation in periodic webcasts; sharing of best practices used in the classroom; involvement in the development of materials; and access to the support and guidance from Deloitte professionals, as well as to Deloitte IFRS information resources, publications and training sessions.

There is no cost for institutions to join the Deloitte IFRS University Consortium.

Continued in article


EI's Financial Reporting Blog
Smart Stops on the Web, Journal of Accountancy, March 2008 --- http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/mar2008/smart_stops.htm

FINANCIAL REPORTING PORTAL
www.financialexecutives.org/blog

Find news highlights from the SEC, FASB and the International Accounting Standards Board on this financial reporting blog from Financial Executives International. The site, updated daily, compiles regulatory news, rulings and statements, comment letters on standards, and hot topics from the Web’s largest business and accounting publications and organizations. Look for continuing coverage of SOX requirements, fair value reporting and the Alternative Minimum Tax, plus emerging issues such as the subprime mortgage crisis, international convergence, and rules for tax return preparers.

Alternative (conventional accounting) rules may, for the individual citizen, mean the difference between employment and unemployment, reliable products and dangerous ones, enriching experiences and oppressive ones, stimulating work environments and dehumanising ones, care and compassion for the old and sick versus intolerance and resentment.
Tony Tinker, 1985

Financial Reporting should provide information that is useful to present and potential investors and creditors and other users in making rational investment, credit and similar decisions ...(through the provision of information that will help them to assess)..... the amount, timing and uncertainty of net cash inflows to the related enterprise
FASB Concept Number 1 of the Conceptual Framework, 1978

"Bear Stearns: SEC Can't Serve Brokerage Clients and Shareholders Simultaneously," by Tom Selling, The Accounting Onion, March 19, 2008 --- http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/03/the-sec-has-bee.html

The SEC has been one of the most prominent and well-respected of federal agencies during most of its history.  Strict adherence to a focused mission on disclosure in regards to the regulation of financial reporting by public companies has been its trademark.

Having said that, however, the SEC has been far from pristine in implementing a disclosure-only policy.  Certain actions could be characterized by some as a form of “merit regulation”—some companies may have been unfairly subject to undue scrutiny, and others may have received an undeserved pass.  The SEC has also used its broad powers to make rules requiring added disclosures in some circumstances, and allowing abbreviated disclosures in others.  For example, the SEC has added disclosure requirements to the offering documents of “blank check” companies, and also provided disclosure accommodations to smaller and foreign companies. 

But, if some were to criticize the SEC for merit regulation, cavils of this sort are on the fringes of SEC activity.  And, most important to the criticisms I'm fixin' to deliver, they all relate to the regulatory activities concerning disclosures by companies to the SEC.  But now, an SEC official -- the chair, no less -- has seen fit to make gratuitous disclosures for certain public companies. 

Here's the situation.  Last Tuesday (March 11, 2008), SEC Chair Christopher Cox made the following statement to reporters:  "We have a good deal of comfort about the capital cushions that these firms [the five largest investment banks, which included Bear Stearns] have been on."
(http://www.cnbc.com/id/23576630)

At the time, Bear's stock was at $60, a five-year low, and just the day before, Bear issued a press release denying rumors of liquidity problems.  The stock tumbled to $30 early Friday, and over the weekend, JP Morgan struck a deal to buy Bear Stearns for a paltry $2 per share. (For reasons I don't want to cover here, the current market price as I write this is around $5 per share.) 

It's a serious thing that investors may have relied on false and misleading information issued by Bear Stearns, but it is quite another for the SEC to have issued information for Bear Stearns.  (I am trying to making a principled statement here, so that fact that investors who relied on that information got taken to the cleaners is notable, though not the sole basis of my critique.)  Heretofore, a company either complies with the disclosure rules, or it doesn’t; the SEC doesn’t make congratulatory announcements for companies it finds to have been exemplary compliers, disclosers, or what have you.  But if you fail to comply, then that’s when the SEC will tell the world about you; there are thousands of examples of the consistent implementation of this policy.

I imagine that Cox would defend himself on the basis that the SEC is in a curious position with respect to companies like Bear Stearns.  One of the many jobs given to the SEC by Congress is to monitor the “capital adequacy” of broker-dealers.  The objective is to provide a form of protection for the assets of clients who have deposited cash and securities with broker-dealers.  Thus, the SEC is serving two masters, having very different interests in Bear Stearns:  clients and shareholders. 

When Cox chose to speak about Bear Stearns last Tuesday, both groups of Bear Stearns stakeholders were listening, and at least some in each group responded with diametrically opposite courses of action:
       • Some clients of Bear may have been calmed, but too many disregarded Cox’s assurances, took their money and ran;

       • Some investors on the verge of selling their shares had a change of mind -- and some may have even bought stock based on his assurances.   

Cox should have known that he was unavoidably sending a signal of encouragement to jittery investors who were trying to decide whether or not to buy, hold, or sell shares of Bear Stearns.  If SEC history is any guide, it was simply not appropriate for him to have done so. Just as a real estate agent cannot claim to represent parties on both sides of a transaction, the SEC cannot claim to be "the investor's advocate" at the same moment they are functioning as the public relations spokesperson for the investee. It would have been far better to have left the public relations role to other government officials.

The question of how much SEC credibility has been lost is difficult for me to judge.  Assuming this were an isolated instance, it would be significant.  But seen as the latest in a series of questionable actions reflecting the SEC's stance on investor protection, the Bear Stearns case is just more confirming evidence of an altered SEC culture.  I am sad to say that the process of restoring credibility to a once peerless agency cannot begin until there is a new chair. 

Bob Jensen's threads on the controversies of accounting standards --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting

Also see http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#TripleBottom


"FASB Issues GAAP Hierarchy," SmartPros, May 12, 2008 --- http://lyris.smartpros.com/t/985109/6637240/5059/0/

 The Financial Accounting Standards Board on Friday issued FASB Statement No. 162, The Hierarchy of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.

The new standard is intended to improve financial reporting by identifying a consistent framework, or hierarchy, for selecting accounting principles to be used in preparing financial statements that are presented in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles for nongovernmental entities.

Prior to the issuance of Statement 162, GAAP hierarchy was defined in the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 69, The Meaning of Present Fairly in Conformity With Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.

SAS 69 has been criticized because it is directed to the auditor rather than the entity. Statement 162 addresses these issues by establishing that the GAAP hierarchy should be directed to entities because it is the entity (not its auditor) that is responsible for selecting accounting principles for financial statements that are presented in conformity with GAAP.

Statement 162 is effective 60 days following the SEC's approval of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Auditing amendments to AU Section 411, The Meaning of Present Fairly in Conformity with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. It is only effective for nongovernmental entities; therefore, the GAAP hierarchy will remain in SAS 69 for state and local governmental entities and federal governmental entities.


February 5, 2008 message from Robert B Walker [walkerrb@ACTRIX.CO.NZ]

For those of you who are interested in such things, there has been a significant change in the wording of IAS32 (para 18b). Previously, the standard was interpreted to require all managed or mutual funds to display sums due to unitholders as liabilities. The standard was not as rigid as was supposed as it used the expression ‘may’ not ‘must’ (see below). Nonetheless most of the managed funds in my part of the world (Australia & NZ) rushed, lemming like, headlong into creating that accounting anomaly, the ’equityless’ entity.

It didn’t seem to matter to them that an entity without equity is utterly inconsistent with the concepts set out in the Framework (the IASB version of the conceptual framework) in that the notions of revenue, expense and income pivot on the existence of equity. Without equity there can be no income. Without income there can be no complete set of financial statements as required by IAS1. Notwithstanding this irregularity, the IASB saw fit to include an example in the Appendices to IAS32 which specifically provided an example of an ‘equityless’ entity.

Now there is a elaborate variation in the definitions in IAS32 which carefully carves out entities such as managed funds and co-operative companies so that a residual, subordinate interest assumes its rightful place as equity.

But it was never necessary. Consider this little example. If the reader were to follow this link http://www.mfsgroup.com.au/managed-funds/premium-income-fund/ he or she would see that an announcement had been made, the effect of which is to suspend redemptions from a fund that has been adversely affected by the ‘credit crunch’ emanating from America. This fund is named, ironically, the MFS Premium Income Fund. Perhaps it might be renamed the ‘not quite so premium repayment of capital invested fund’, but I digress.

If the reader was to follow the links still further to the financial statements (Annual Report on the right) they would discover a set of financials drawn up in accordance with IFRS, or at least the Australian version thereof. The reader would then find that the $880 million of unitholders’ funds was a liability (see balance sheet page 29). The reader will also note that it isn’t really classified as such as the remainder of the requirements in respect to liabilities aren’t met. But anyway the presentation holds itself out as a liability.

And what was that classification based on? It was based on this:

‘For example, open-ended mutual funds … may provide their unitholders … with a right to redeem their interests in the issuer at any time for cash’ ( emphasis added).

Funny that … what it doesn’t say is ‘at any time for cash unless the manager doesn’t want to give it to them’.

The truth of the matter is that the unitholders’ funds were never liabilities because the trust deed or some other founding document or agreement always gave the manager the right to suspend. Yet the preparers ignored this provision. When I say the preparers I really the mean the auditors, because, if my experience is anything to go by, the auditors are leading the charge on this matter and they will not listen to cogent argument to the contrary. I turned out to be right and they were wrong.

What are the lessons from this?

First, the auditors do not have a monopoly on wisdom. They need to be challenged when they assert primacy, a primacy which I understand is asserted initially in London and disseminated across the rest of the world.

Second, IFRS are very poorly drafted and can clash with the concepts that purportedly underlie them. Whilst we cannot escape the depredations anytime soon, Americans should be very concerned. The Europeans, in a triumphalist tone, now openly say that IFRS will replace the existing US GAAP (FAS etc.) (see Accountancy Jan 2008 page 114)*. This would be a travesty. For whilst FAS have their problems they are at least drafted by people who have a vague idea about accounting.

For those of you in the USA, you should be very afraid. Maybe not, the byzantine IFRS, in my view, sound the death knell of standard setting as we know it.

RBW

*PS: the same Accountancy magazine has the following fascinating little exchange in regard to Northern Rock (or Wreck as it is sometimes called between the head of assurance at PWC and an investigating Member of Parliament (a Mr Fallon). This fiasco has cost the UK Government about $US100 to $US150 billion so far.

‘[Head of Assurance] said that PWC did not advise on the securitizations [of loans], but was responsible for writing ‘comfort letters’ that were used in prospectuses aimed at potential investors.

This riled Fallon, who retorted: ‘You have audited and provided comfort to the biggest banking disaster for 150 years.’


"FASB Governance: Damn the Feedback, Full Speed Ahead to IFRS!," by Tom Selling, The Accounting Onion, February 26, 2008 --- http://accountingonion.typepad.com/

The Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF), the body that governs the FASB, has issued a press release announcing the results of their one meeting to consider the feedback on their proposals to change the way the FASB operates.  To reiterate from a prior post (though somewhat less gentle this time!) the proposing document was a model of obfuscation.  It was clear from the outset that FAF wasn't at all interested in knowing what anyone else had to say about reducing the size of the FASB, voting rules, or how the FASB would set its agenda.  Any discussion of past problems, current needs, etc. were vague (more accurately, not mentioned) in a thinly veiled attempt to frustrate and limit comments.  It certainly frustrated me; I abandoned the effort as soon as I realized that anything I wrote could, by design, amount to no more than the equivalent of shooting at a flea with an elephant gun while blindfolded. 

So, predictably -- and despite the clear protests of Financial Executives International, the CFA Institute and numerous former board members -- all the proposals passed muster with flying colors.  One of my readers, who shall remain anonymous, wrote to me soon after he heard the FAF news to tell me that he had spoken to a former FASB project manager about it, and the only comment he had was "unbelievable."   

Would You Trust the Future of U.S. GAAP to These Guys?

The rat I had been smelling for weeks walked right into the middle of the room during the FAF press conference in which its members rationalized their actions with comments to the effect that requiring new board members to all have knowledge of "investing" (whatever that means) will assure that the entire board will give adequate consideration to investor needs.  Right.  Guess who will be excluded: someone to replace Donald Young, the current investor representative, whose term expires this year; and you can forget about any more academics, lest some pesky dissenter asks too many uncomfortable questions that could slow down the IFRS convergence train. 

And, what kind of convergence are we going to get under the new FASB?  If facilitating a constructive and stable convergence with IFRS is the real goal, why is it appropriate for the IASB to have fourteen members, and now the FASB only five?   No good answer.  Why is it appropriate for the IASB to require a super-majority vote of nine members to adopt a new rule, and the FASB only a simple majority of three -- the FASB chair, who now sets the agenda, plus two handpicked shills?  No good answer.  What evidence is there that it will be difficult to find new board members who are sufficiently knowledgeable of IFRS to hit the ground running when they are appointed?  LOL.

It's obvious to me that the real goal is not a convergence to benefit U.S. investors; for that would require careful study, thinking and time.  The real goal is quick-and-dirty convergence -- so that the big audit firms can get on with the business of charging large fees for the accounting changeovers while at the same time lowering their long-term audit risk -- and so that their clients can manage earnings with less fear of interference by the SEC (see my earlier posts here and here for the reasons why this is so, and why it is harmful to investors).

Speaking of the SEC, What's Their Take?

By the way, FASB's pronouncements are rules for public companies to follow whilst the SEC so deigns. One would think, therefore, that the SEC would have taken more than a passing interest in changes to how the FASB is organized and governed.  Yet, I haven't noticed a peep out of Conrad Hewitt, the SEC's chief accountant.  Given his recent track record, I can't say I'm surprised.  All I can say is that I'm glad that I served in the Office of the Chief Accountant in a different era.  Under the current administration the SEC has become more the captain of the public company cheerleaders and less the watchdog of investors. 

It's a shame.   

Bob Jensen's threads on the history of and controversy of accounting standard setting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting


Question
Are our U.S. standard setters bent transitioning to IFRS (and its loopholes) in the U.S. like fools rushing in where angels fear to tread?

"IFRS Chaos in France: The Incredible Case of Société Générale," by Tom Selling, The Accounting Onion, March 7, 2008 ---
http://accountingonion.typepad.com/

IFRS Chaos in France: The Incredible Case of Société Générale "Breaking the Rules and Admitting It" is the title of Floyd Norris's column describing the accounting by Société Générale for the losses incurred by their rogue trader Jérôme Kerviel; the title is provocative enough, but it's still not adequate to describe this amazing story. Although I am reluctant to come off as a prudish American unfairly criticizing suave and sophisticated French norms, what Société and its auditors have perpetrated would be regarded here as the accounting equivalent of pornography.

I don't aim to re-write Norris's excellent column, who rightly asks what a case like this says about the prospects for IFRS adoption in the U.S. But, I want to make two additional points. To tee them up, here's an encapsulation of the sordid tale:

Société Générale chose to lump Kerviel's 2008 trading losses in 2007's income statement, thus netting the losses of the later year with his gains of the previous year. There is no disputing that the losses occurred in 2008, yet the company's position is that application of specific IFRS rules (very simply, marking derivatives to market) would, for reasons unstated, result in a failure of the financial statements to present a "true and fair view." You might also be interested to know that the financial statements of French companies are opined on by not just one -- but two -- yes, two -- auditors. Even by invoking the "true and fair" exception, Société Générale must still be in compliance with IFRS as both E&Y and D&T have concurred. How could both auditors be wrong? C'est imposible. The first point I want to make is that Société's motives to commit such transparent and ridiculous shenanigans are not clearly apparent from publicly available information. My unsubstantiated hunch is that it has to do with executive compensation. For example, could it be that 2007 bonuses have already been determined on same basis that did not have to include the trading losses (maybe based on stock price appreciation)? Moreover, pushing the losses back to 2007 could have bee the best way to clear the decks for 2008 bonuses, which could be based on reported earnings -- since the stock price has already tanked.

The second point was made by Lynn Turner, former SEC Chief Accountant in a recent email. The PCAOB and SEC are considering a policy of mutual recognition of audit firms whereby the PCAOB would promise not to inspect foreign auditors opining on financial statements filed with the SEC. Instead, the U.S. investors would have to settle for the determination of foreign authorities. Thus, if the French regulators saw nothing wrong with the actions of local auditors -- even operating under the imprimaturs of EY or D&T -- then the PCAOB could not say otherwise.

Never mind the black eye the Société debacle gives IFRS, this sordid case must surely signal the SEC that mutual recognition would be a step too far; however, I'm not counting on the current SEC leadership to get the message.

"Loophole Lets Bank Rewrite the Calendar," by Floyd Norris, The New York Times, March 7. 2008 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/07/business/07norris.html?ref=business

It is not often that a major international bank admits it is violating well-established accounting rules, but that is what Société Générale has done in accounting for the fraud that caused the bank to lose 6.4 billion euros — now worth about $9.7 billion — in January.

In its financial statements for 2007, the French bank takes the loss in that year, offsetting it against 1.5 billion euros in profit that it says was earned by a trader, Jérôme Kerviel, who concealed from management the fact he was making huge bets in financial futures markets.

In moving the loss from 2008 — when it actually occurred — to 2007, Société Générale has created a furor in accounting circles and raised questions about whether international accounting standards can be consistently applied in the many countries around the world that are converting to the standards.

While the London-based International Accounting Standards Board writes the rules, there is no international organization with the power to enforce them and assure that companies are in compliance.

In its annual report released this week, Société Générale invoked what is known as the “true and fair” provision of international accounting standards, which provides that “in the extremely rare circumstances in which management concludes that compliance” with the rules “would be so misleading that it would conflict with the objective of financial statements,” a company can depart from the rules.

In the past, that provision has been rarely used in Europe, and a similar provision in the United States is almost never invoked. One European auditor said he had never seen the exemption used in four decades, and another said the only use he could recall dealt with an extremely complicated pension arrangement that had not been contemplated when the rules were written.

Some of the people who wrote the rule took exception to its use by Société Générale.

“It is inappropriate,” said Anthony T. Cope, a retired member of both the I.A.S.B. and its American counterpart, the Financial Accounting Standards Board. “They are manipulating earnings.”

John Smith, a member of the I.A.S.B., said: “There is nothing true about reporting a loss in 2007 when it clearly occurred in 2008. This raises a question as to just how creative they are in interpreting accounting rules in other areas.” He said the board should consider repealing the “true and fair” exemption “if it can be interpreted in the way they have interpreted it.”

Société Générale said that its two audit firms, Ernst & Young and Deloitte & Touche, approved of the accounting, as did French regulators. Calls to the international headquarters of both firms were not returned, and Société Générale said no financial executives were available to be interviewed.

In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission has the final say on whether companies are following the nation’s accounting rules. But there is no similar body for the international rules, although there are consultative groups organized by a group of European regulators and by the International Organization of Securities Commissions. It seems likely that both groups will discuss the Société Générale case, but they will not be able to act unless French regulators change their minds.

“Investors should be troubled by this in an I.A.S.B. world,” said Jack Ciesielski, the editor of The Analyst’s Accounting Observer, an American publication. “While it makes sense to have a ‘fair and true override’ to allow for the fact that broad principles might not always make for the best reporting, you need to have good judgment exercised to make it fair for investors. SocGen and its auditors look like they were trying more to appease the class of investors or regulators who want to believe it’s all over when they say it’s over, whether it is or not.”

Not only had the losses not occurred at the end of 2007, they would never have occurred had the activities of Mr. Kerviel been discovered then. According to a report by a special committee of Société Générale’s board, Mr. Kerviel had earned profits through the end of 2007, and entered 2008 with few if any outstanding positions.

But early in January he bet heavily that both the DAX index of German stocks and the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx index would go up. Instead they fell sharply. After the bank learned of the positions in mid-January, it sold them quickly on the days when the stock market was hitting its lowest levels so far this year.

In its annual report, Société Générale says that applying two accounting rules — IAS 10, “Events After the Balance Sheet Date,” and IAS 39, “Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement” — would have been inconsistent with a fair presentation of its results. But it does not go into detail as to why it believes that to be the case.

One rule mentioned, IAS 39, has been highly controversial in France because banks feel it unreasonably restricts their accounting. The European Commission adopted a “carve out” that allows European companies to ignore part of the rule, and Société Générale uses that carve out. The commission ordered the accounting standards board to meet with banks to find a rule they could accept, but numerous meetings over the past several years have not produced an agreement.

Investors who read the 2007 annual report can learn the impact of the decision to invoke the “true and fair” exemption, but cannot determine how the bank’s profits would have been affected if it had applied the full IAS 39.

It appears that by pushing the entire affair into 2007, Société Générale hoped both to put the incident behind it and to perhaps de-emphasize how much was lost in 2008. The net loss of 4.9 billion euros it has emphasized was computed by offsetting the 2007 profit against the 2008 loss.

It may have accomplished those objectives, at the cost of igniting a debate over how well international accounting standards can be policed in a world with no international regulatory body.

From Jim Mahar's blog on January 25, 2008 ---

Saturday, January 26, 2008

Kerviel joins ranks of master rogue traders:
"In being identified as the lone wolf behind French investment bank Société Générale's staggering $7.1-billion loss Thursday, Jérôme Kerviel joined the ranks of a rare and elite handful of rogue traders whose audacious transactions have single-handedly brought some of the world's financial powerhouses to their knees.

This notorious company includes Nick Leeson, who brought down Britain's Barings Bank in 1995 by blowing $1.4-billion, Yasuo Hamanaka, who squandered $2.6-billion on fraudulent copper deals for Sumitomo Corp. of Japan in 1998, John Rusnak, who frittered away $750-million through unauthorized currency trading for Allied Irish Bank in 2002 and Brian Hunter of Calgary, who oversaw the loss of $6-billion on hedge fund bets at Amaranth Advisors in 2006.

Bob Jensen's threads on "Rotten to the Core" are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm

 


On January 30, 2008 Dr. Andrew D. Bailey, Jr. (former AAA president, SEC Deputy Chief Accountant, and faculty member at several universities) wrote a long letter to the U.S. Department of Treasury's Advisory Committee on the Accounting Profession.

 

January 30, 2008

 Mr. Arthur Levitt,  Jr.  
Mr. Don Nicolaisen  
Advisory Committee on the Accounting Profession  
Office of Financial Institutions Policy, Room 1418  
Department of the Treasury  
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20220
 

 Dear Mr. Levitt and Mr. Nicolaisen:

I am pleased to submit comments about a number of the issues under consideration by the Treasury Department’s Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession. I would be pleased to discuss my views with the Committee or the Staff.

 You can read the letter at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Bailey2008.htm

 


From the Publisher of the AccountingWeb on June 19, 2008

Some friends of ours are currently on vacation in Russia, which got me to thinking, "I wonder what it's like to be an accountant in Russia?" I have no idea. It wasn't all that long ago that International Financial Reporting Standards were adopted by the Russian Finance Ministry, so it's probably been a rather challenging profession as of late! If you have any first-hand knowledge of accounting in the Russian Federation, please e-mail me so we can share it with AccountingWEB readers.

In the meantime, here are some key Russian facts:
Rob Nance
Publisher
AccountingWEB, Inc.

publisher@accountingweb.com

Bob Jensen's reply to Rob Nance

Hi Rob,

A better question is to ask what accounting became in Russia after the breakup of the Soviet Union --- http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/janfeb99/pgs22-25.htm
The system is highly geared to tax reporting and has a long ways to go relative to IFRS.

Accounting in the former Soviet Union was pretty much an exercise in tabulating fiction --- http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=6827120

Accounting was an instrument of the planning and control process that substituted for market-based controls ---
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-6281.1974.tb00002.x?cookieSet=1&journalCode=abac

Russia now has offices of the Big 4 accounting firms and maybe other Western CPA firms as well. One of my former students accepted a transfer to the PwC office in Moscow. It proved to be a fast-track to becoming a partner in PwC. Russian companies are seeking equity investors throughout the world, and to do so they have to add accounting assurances much like the other companies in the global economy seek assurances.

KPMG has a publication comparing IFRS with Russian GAAP --- http://snipurl.com/russiangaap 
Also see http://www.kpmg.ru/index.thtml/en/services/assurance/IFRS/IFRSpublications/

PwC has an IFRS Transition document at http://www.pwc.com/extweb/service.nsf/docid/90828387207B28F78025717B0038B2AD
Results of a 2006 survey are reported at http://snipurl.com/russiangaapsurvey

Deloitte links to a Russian translation of IFRS as well as providing information on transitioning to IFRS in Russia --- http://www.iasplus.com/country/russia.htm

A illustrative Russian set of financial statements can be found at http://www.dixy.ru/en_invest-report/

Hope this helps!

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting history, theory, and controversies --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting firm scandals and lawsuits --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm

Bob Jensen's homepage with links to a lot of other accounting documents --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/

 


Bright Lines versus Accounting Principles

More Reasons Why Tom and I Hate Principles-Based Accounting Standards

"Contingent Liabilities: A Troubling Signpost on the Winding Road to a Single Global Accounting Standard," by Tom Selling, The Accounting Onion, May 26, 2008 --- Click Here

By the logic of others, which I can’t explain, fuzzy lines in accounting standards have come to be exalted as “principles-based” and bright lines are disparaged as “rules-based.” One of my favorite examples (actually a pet peeve) of this phenomenon is the difference in the accounting for leases between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. The objective of the financial reporting game is to capture as much of the economic benefits of an asset as possible, while keeping the contractual liability for future lease payments off the balance sheet; a win is scored an “operating lease,” and a loss is scored a “capital lease.” As in tennis, If the present value of the minimum lease payments turns out to be even a hair over the 90% line of the leased asset’s fair value, your shot is out and you lose the point.

The counterpart to FAS 13 in IFRS is IAS 17, a putative principles-based standard. It’s more a less a carbon copy of FAS 13 in its major provisions, except that bright lines are replaced with fuzzy lines: if the present value of the minimum lease payments is a “substantial portion” (whatever that means) of the leased asset’s fair value, you lose operating lease accounting. If FAS 13 is tennis, then IAS 17 is tennis-without-lines. Either way, the accounting game has another twist: the players call the balls landing on their side of the net; and the only job of the umpire—chosen and compensated by each player—is to opine on the reasonableness of their player's call. So, one would confidently expect that the players of tennis-without- lines have a much lower risk of being overruled by their auditors… whoops, I meant umpires.

Although lease accounting is one example for which GAAP is bright-lined and IFRS is the fuzzy one, the opposite is sometimes the case, with accounting for contingencies under FAS 5 or IAS 37 being a prime exaple. FAS 5 requires recognition of a contingent liability when it is “probable” that a future event will result in the occurrence of a liability. What does “probable” mean? According to FAS 5, it means “likely to occur.” Wow, that sure clears things up. With a recognition threshold as solid as Jell-o nailed to a tree and boilerplate footnote disclosures to keep up appearances, there should be little problem persuading one’s handpicked independent auditor of the “reasonableness” of any in or out call.

IAS 37 has a similar recognition threshold for a contingent liability (Note: I am adopting U.S. terminology throughout, even though "contingent liabilities" are referred to as "provisions" in IAS 37). But in refreshing contrast to FAS 5, IAS 37 unambiguously nails down the definition of “probable” to be “more likely than not” —i.e., just a hair north of 50%. Naively assuming that companies actually comply with the letter and spirit of IAS 37, then more liabilities should find their way onto the balance sheet under IFRS than GAAP. And, IAS 37 also has more principled rules for measuring a liability, once recognized. But, I won’t get into that here. Just please take my word for it that IAS 37 is to FAS 5 as steak is to chopped liver.

The Global Accounting Race to the Bottom

And so we have the IASB’s ineffable ongoing six-year project to make a hairball out of IAS 37. If these two standards, IAS 37 and FAS 5, are to be brought closer together as the ballyhooed Memorandum of Understanding between IASB and FASB should portend, it would make much more sense for the FASB to revise FAS 5 to make it more like IAS 37. After all, convergence isn’t supposed to take forever; even if you don’t think IAS 37 is perfect, there are a lot more serious problems IASB could be working harder on: leases, pensions, revenue recognition, securitizations, related party transactions, just to name a few off the top of my head. But, the stakeholders in IFRS are evidently telling the IASB that they get their jollies from tennis without lines. And, the IASB, dependent on the big boys for funding, is listening real close.

Basically, the IASB has concluded that all present obligations – not just those that are more likely than not to result in an outflow of assets – should be recognized. It sounds admirably principled and ambitious, but there’s a catch. In place of the bright-line probability threshold in IAS 37, there would be the fuzziest line criteria one could possibly devise: the liability must be capable of “reliable” measurement. We know that "probable" without further guidance must at least lie between 0 and 1, but what amount of measurement error is within range of “reliable”? The answer, it seems, would be left to the whim of the issuer followed by the inevitable wave-your-hands-in-the-air rubber stamp of the auditor.

It’s not as if the IASB doesn’t have history from which to learn. Where the IASB is trying to go in revising IAS 37, we’ve already been in the U.S. The result was all too often not a pretty sight as unrecognized liabilities suddenly slammed into balance sheets like freight trains. As I discussed in an earlier post, retiree health care liabilities were kept off balance sheets until they were about to break unionized industrial companies. Post-retirement benefits were doled out by earlier generations of management, long departed with their generous termination benefits, in order to persuade obstreperous unions to return to the assembly lines. GM and Ford are now on the verge of settling faustian bargains of their forbearers with huge cash outlays: yet for decades the amount recognized on the balance sheet was precisely nil. The accounting for these liabilities had been conveniently ignored, with only boilerplate disclosures in their stead, out of supposed concern for reliable measurement. Yet, everyone knew that zero as the answer was as far from correct as Detroit is from Tokyo – where, as in most developed countries, health care costs of retirees are the responsibility of government.

Holding the recognition of a liability hostage to “reliable” measurement is bad accounting. There is just no other way I can put it. If this is the way the IASB is going to spend its time as we are supposed to be moving to a single global standard, then let the race to the bottom begin.

Bob Jensen's threads on lease accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#Leases

Bob Jensen's threads on synthetic leases --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/00overview/speOverview.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on intangibles and contingencies --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes


Question
Why did FTI Consulting switch auditors in 2006?

Answer
Either a reason or an excuse was provided by Ernst & Young when dropping this go-go client

"FTI Switches from Ernst to KPMG," April 26, 2006 --- http://www.big4.com/AlumniBlogs/April2006/FTI-Switches-from-Ernst-to-KPMG.htm

Here’s an interesting development of how auditor independence issues can impact firm-client relationships.

FTI Consulting (NYSE: FCN), a premier provider of problem-solving consulting and technology services to major corporations, financial institutions and law firms, recently announced that it had switched from Ernst and Young to KPMG as its public auditor for 2006.

The reason: Ernst wants to hire FTI as a consulting vendor, and believes that its independence could be impaired if E&Y continues to be the auditor for FTI. So both firms reach an agreement that FTI should no longer have E&Y as an auditor after Q1-2006. According to FTI, there have been no disagreements with or adverse opinions expressed by E&Y for 2004 and 2005. FTI then switches to KPMG as an independent auditor.

If we read this correctly, E&Y loses FTI’s audit fees and has to pay FTI’s consulting fees, so it is getting impacted financially on two fronts. We take it that they must have really wanted FTI’s services to go these lengths.

In terms of background…..FTI Consulting was founded by Daniel W. Luczak and Joseph R. Reynolds in 1982. It was formerly known as Forensic Technologies International Corporation and subsequently changed its name to FTI Consulting, Inc. The company is based in Baltimore, Maryland.

 

From The Wall Street Journal Weekly Accounting Review on May 2, 2008

Is FTI Consulting As Good as It Looks?
by Karen Richardson
The Wall Street Journal

Apr 28, 2008
Page: C1
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120934061032248377.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
 

TOPICS: Accounting, Earn-Outs, Financial Accounting, Financial Statement Presentation, Financial Statements, Forgivable Loans

SUMMARY: FTI Consulting looks like a great place to make money, judging by its financials. But for investors, looks can be deceiving. The company is structuring some transactions in creative ways that result in a favorable appearance on the financial statements.

CLASSROOM APPLICATION: This article shows students how transactions that are presented on the financial statements in a way that is not technically wrong can still misrepresent the condition of the company to the users of the financial statements.

QUESTIONS: 
1. (Advanced) What are "earn-outs?" How does FTI utilize earn-outs? Why does the firm choose to use earn-outs?

2. (Advanced) How does FTI represent the earn-outs on its financial statements? Is FTI's accounting treatment considered proper under GAAP? How could the users of the financial statements misunderstand this transaction as it is presented on the financial statements?

3. (Advanced) What does one financial manager suggest must be done to the FTI financial statements to get a true picture of the earn-out transactions? Do you agree with his assessment? Why or why not?

4. (Introductory) Do you think that FTI is structuring the earn-outs to make its financial statements look favorable? Why or why not? What are the long-term consequences of presenting the earn-outs in this manner?

5. (Introductory) Could FTI present the earn-outs as compensation expense? Would that be a violation of GAAP?

6. (Advanced) Why does FTI give forgivable loans? Who is benefited? How are forgivable loans presented on FTI financial statements? What are the effects of forgivable loans on the financial statements?

7. (Advanced) What are the ethical implications of FTI using these presentations of earn-outs and forgivable loans to compensate its employees?
 

SMALL GROUP ASSIGNMENT: 
Search online sources for FTI Consulting financial statements and other financial information. Can you find information on the earn-outs? How are the forgivable loans expressed in the financial statements? Are either of these transactions presented in the notes to the financial statements? How could investors discover the facts of these transactions if they had not read the Wall Street Journal article?

Reviewed By: Linda Christiansen, Indiana University Southeast
 

"Is FTI Consulting As Good as It Looks?" by Karen Richardson, The Wall Street Journal, April 28, 2008; Page C1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120934061032248377.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC

Judging by its financials, FTI Consulting Inc. looks like a great place to make money. For investors, looks can be deceiving.

FTI, which provides legal, financial and public-relations services, handsomely pays the hundreds of professionals it has been adding to its ranks through a series of acquisitions. In the first quarter, FTI bought eight companies and added 445 employees in 49 days.

But FTI's method of paying for its new companies and rewarding its new executives largely avoids any negative effect on earnings. As a result, its operating income looks bigger, fueling its share-price rise and winning praise from analysts and investors. Meanwhile, its sizable and growing compensation-type payouts and loans go largely unnoticed by investors.

FTI's shares rose 11 cents to $67.69 in trading Friday on the New York Stock Exchange. That put them up 9.8% for the year and more than double where they were at the start of 2007.

FTI, which has a market value of $3.3 billion, is trading at 27 times estimated 2008 earnings, or a 50% premium on average to its peers, such as the smaller Huron Consulting Group Inc., according to Thomson Reuters. Only one analyst rates it a "sell." Others rave about earnings growth and how the sagging economy will benefit FTI's restructuring practice, which made up 26% of the company's revenue of $1 billion last year.

FTI, which will report its first-quarter earnings next month, declined to comment.

Like other companies that count people as their main asset, FTI uses "earn-outs" to pay many executives who come with its acquisitions. Under this model, an acquirer gives its new company an upfront payment and then gives the company's owners or executives additional payments over the next few years based on performance targets.

While there isn't anything technically wrong with these additional payments, they make expenses look smaller and earnings appear larger than they otherwise would because the earn-outs aren't treated as compensation expense, which is subtracted from earnings.

Instead, they appear as contingent payments on the cash-flow statement and intangible assets on the balance sheet, neither of which drive investor sentiment as much as the earnings numbers on the income statement.

"I think of earn-outs as a mechanism for inflating operating income," says Michael Winter, a portfolio manager at hedge-fund Otter Creek Management, which manages about $160 million in assets and doesn't own FTI shares. "For a true quality-of-earnings figure, an investor needs to add those amounts back to earnings as compensation expense."

Earn-outs aren't small change for a company that has made so many acquisitions and that reported pretax income last year of $150 million. In the first quarter, FTI paid nearly $43 million in earn-outs for earlier acquisitions, and it has said it expects to pay $49 million in earn-outs over the next few years for its latest deals.

Some analysts regard earn-outs as a necessary evil. "It is important to be cognizant of the financial and accounting ramifications of earn-outs, but they're an important way for professionals-based companies to make sure interests are aligned," says Timothy McHugh, an analyst for William Blair & Co. who has a "buy" rating on FTI stock.

Another practice employed by FTI, doling out "forgivable" loans, is far less common in corporate America. In 2006, it launched an incentive compensation program that involved granting $30 million in cash payments "in the form of unsecured general recourse forgivable" loans, to senior managing directors and other employees. Last year FTI paid out $35 million in forgivable loans to about 57 senior managing directors and others. "The amount of forgivable loans we make could be significant," FTI said in a recent Securities and Exchange Commission filing.

FTI typically amortizes the cost of these loans over five years, meaning a fraction of them have an impact on income in the current periods. The total costs aren't reflected until FTI fully forgives the loans. While they are a great incentive to employees, their effect on earnings is delayed.

"It seems that they really go out of their way to compensate people very well and avoid affecting the income statement," says Donn Vickrey, head of research firm Gradient Analytics. Mr. Vickrey is an earnings-quality analyst who doesn't formally cover FTI. "It gives them a whole lot of room to make their earnings number every quarter."

Jensen Comment
Yet another example of why I'm in favor of bright lines.
"Mr. Vickrey is an earnings-quality analyst who doesn't formally cover FTI. "It gives them a whole lot of room to make their earnings number every quarter."


Hi David,

You said:  "Intelligently applying principles makes rules unnecessary."
Then why do we have traffic police?
Why do we have internal and external auditors?

How can we make all drivers "intelligent" with always high levels of ethics? How can we make all intelligent drivers immune from peer pressure to break the rules?

Principle 1:  Don't drive above any speed that is unsafe in any zone.

Principle 2:  Don't drink too much and drive.

Rule 1:  20 mph (non-metric) maximum speed in a school zone where many students are walking to and from school.

Rule 2:  An alcohol blood level in excess of .10 is a punishable offense for vehicle drivers on any road or street.

The principles are perfect in theory, and the rules are disputable because a teen driver going 40 mph with a blood alcohol level of .20 may actually be less dangerous than the old lady who can't see well driving 10 mph on her way to a MADD anti-drinking meeting.

But now tell me David:

Does each five-year old child's mother feel safer and every traffic cop feel more effective with the principles or the rules in school zones?

You said that GAAP "bright lines" mean that "bright people" will figure out new ways to cross the bright lines.

But I say that "principles" in place of some rules just make it easier for unethical dumb crooks and harder for the courts to punish those crooks --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#Principles-Based

In reality I'm sure you, as my good friend, agree that there are no optimal solutions on either end of the Principles versus Rules spectrum. We only differ sometimes as to where to stop making rules in particular circumstances. What I fear more than you is that all clients of auditors are not perfectly ethical --- otherwise why require auditors in the first place?

Perhaps principles will suffice for auditors to determine whether a lease is an operating lease or how much should be placed in an allowance for doubtful accounts. But bright lines are needed when clients are successfully changing auditors to get more friendly applications of "principles."

I honestly think that what led to Andersen's implosion is that some of the partners in charge of huge audits like WorldCom and Enron were caving in to client pressures to cross the lines. It's the violation of bright lines that eventually brought down Andersen and its sneaky clients. Enron knowingly lept over the SEC's 3% bright line for SPEs. And FASB set a fiber-optic line expensing bright line rule that WorldCom knowingly crossed.

 Most interesting in all of this is that many accounting theorists would've supported WorldCom's CFO (Scott) argument that fiber-optic line lines should've been capitalized and depreciated. But there was a bright-line rule in place to the contrary, and WorldCom executives were secretive and sneakily crossed that bright line, out of the sight of their own internal auditors, for over $1 billion in higher earnings and stock prices. Breaking the rule in secret benefitted WorldCom executives because the market thought WorldCom playing by the conservative rules in place.

Often the worst crooks get caught up by bright lines much like Al Capone (who rarely did his own dirty work) finally got sent to prison because of bright lines in the tax code. Without the tax code bright lines. The lofty Big Al might've continued on for more years of organized crime.

 I'm thankful we have bright lines in our traffic laws, accounting rules, and tax codes. You, David, and I just have to argue about where to paint the lines. I've got a bigger paint bucket and more paint brushes


Question
Were accountants responsible for the dotcom bubble and burst at the turn of the Century?

Jensen Answer
The article below fails to directly mention where auditors contributed the most to the 1990's bubble. The auditors were allowing clients to get away with murder in terms of recognizing revenue that should never have been recognized. The dotcom companies were not yet making profits but were full of promise as the bubble filled with hot air. In financial reporting (especially in pro forma reporting) dotcom companies shifted the attention from profit growth to revenue growth. But much of the revenue growth they got away with reporting was due to bad judgment on the part of their auditors. Corrections finally began to appear after the EITF belatedly made some bright line decisions --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm

I give auditors F grades when auditing the hot air balloons of dotcom companies. This shows what can happen when we let judgment overtake some of the bright line rules in accounting standards. Auditors were supposed to have "principles" when they had no bright lines to follow. The auditing firms demonstrated their lack of professional principles in the 1990s.
 

"Were accountants responsible for the dotcom bubble and burst?" AccountingWeb's U.K. Site, March 11, 2008 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=104768

"Were accountants responsible for the dotcom bubble and burst?" This worrying allegation emerged from a question two weeks ago at the ICAEW IT Faculty annual lecture.

During a thought-provoking talk on Second Life and related issues, Clive Holtham mentioned the dotcom bubble, which prompted the pointed follow-up question from one audience member.

The answer was that they weren't - which accorded with the general audience reaction. The reason? Accountants, Holtham argued, had not made the investment and business decisions that fuelled the boom and led to the bust.

Some would argue that this is exactly why accountancy, perhaps more than accountants, was responsible. Why weren't accountants more involved in these decisions? We would surely expect accountants to have been stressing the need to temper the wild enthusiasm with a bit of solid business analysis. It's hard to escape the conclusion that accountants either didn't put forward the right arguments, or were not sufficiently influential. Accountants either lacked the confidence to participate forcefully enough in the debate, or were viewed as not knowing enough about IT.

Either way, it suggests that the main accountancy bodies had allowed a major change in business to occur without preparing their members to deal competently and confidently with it. If technology had been seen as a natural competency of an accountant, accountants might have been more able to fight their corner over the excesses of the dotcom era.

Anyway, that was years ago. Surely things have changed. The recent AccountingWEB/National B2B Centre survey on accountants' involvement in ebusiness was introduced in the following terms: "In spirit accountants would like to get involved with ebusiness, but the reality of their current knowledge and workload means that only a small minority are able to help clients take advantage of new technology opportunities."

It's unfair to blame the accountants themselves. Their workload is a significant factor. Government has been piling regulation after regulation upon them and it must be a struggle to keep up with just what they consider their core skills and knowledge. Ethically, you would not expect accountants to offer advice in areas in which they do not consider themselves adequately qualified. Technology is such a vast and rapidly moving area that it's pretty hard for most full time IT professionals to keep up, let alone accountants with their myriad other responsibilities. Yet the need, and opportunity, certainly seems to be there. Various government initiatives in the past have sought to identify sources of competent advice to help companies succeed in ebusiness.

Usually, articles about accountants doing more in the field of IT elicit comments about "leaving it to the IT professionals". The worry is that accountants may not know enough to be able to do so confidently and therefore they withdraw from any involvement - this is what the AccountingWeb/NB2BC survey seems to suggest is happening. This is in nobody's interest. Businesses may fail to exploit key opportunities, accountants will lose out on income and probably credibility, and IT specialists will have fewer clients. A more ebusiness-confident accountancy profession should be able not only to offer advice itself, but also to recommend, trust and work with specialists where required.

To achieve this it's vital that the professional bodies help their members more than they are doing currently. What seems to be missing is a set of boundaries. What exactly do accountants need to know about IT and ebusiness in order to be able to confidently and competently advise their clients? How can you, as an accountant, assess your competence in this vital area?

It's not as if this is anything new, The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) has been working on a revised Education Practice Statement regarding 'Information Technology for Professional Accountants' for years and in October 2007 released International Education Practice Statement 2 (IEPS 2) after consultation with accountancy bodies worldwide. This sets out "IT knowledge and competency requirements" for the qualification process, but also for continuing professional development.

So should accountants be more active in advising on ebusiness? Should they do it themselves or work with specialists? And are the professional bodies doing enough to help their members in this, and other IT related, areas? We look forward to hearing the views of AccountingWEB members so that we can carry this debate forward.

March 12, 2008 reply from Ed Scribner [escribne@NMSU.EDU]

Interestingly, most of the criticism of accountants during the dotcom bubble was not for allowing premature revenue recognition but, to the contrary, for failure to allow recording of internally developed goodwill. Dotcoms were reporting losses that critics at the time said should have been profits because of the purported existence of unrecognized intangible future benefit. (BTW, I always remember Denny’s term for pro forma reporting—EBS (everything but bad stuff).)

Ed

March 12, 2008 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

Ed,

Let me play the devil's advocate (and here I really AM the devil). I look forward to your witty repartee.

I think the root cause of the dot-com (and much else that has happened) is the tax law provision that limited the tax deductibility of executive compensation to $1 million.

This led to perverse incentives on the part of the managers to fiddle with the financial statements to maximize the price at which IPOs could be floated.

As John Coffee has stated in his book Gatekeepers, "when one pays the CEOs with stock options, one is using a high octane fuel that creates incentives for short-term financial manipulation and accounting gamesmanship".

The dot-com bust is an expemplar for the worst in the American and European corporate governance.

On the one hand, it is an example of American system of perverse incentives for financial statement manipulation (which is addressed by SOx and the corporation codes only peripherally) fueled by non-cash executive compensation. On the other hand, it is an example of a typical European fraud in the sense of the "insiders'" (primarily the venture capitalists, greed (which European laws have addressed in the past).

The consequences of non-cash executive compensation, in my opinion, is the scourge of the American corporate scene, that is destroying the employee morale, perceived equity of the "system", the good old-fashioned idea that each pay one's dues to the society, and ultimately our way of life in the United States. To give just one example, the following is the data on the CEO compensation as a multiple of average employee compensation in various countries:

531:1 USA
25:1 UK
21:1 Canada
16:1 France
11.1 Germany
10:1 Japan __________________
Source: Gatekeepers, by John Coffee.

Shouldn't we be surprised that social unrest and crime in the US is so low? Shouldn't we auditors be paranoid (and not just sceptical) of the machinations of management?

And one would have to a fool to think that this is the "equilibrium" market situation, decided by millions of the 'homo economicus' persuasion in the "market"..

Goodwill is almost a red herring in this equation. Its recognition would only fuel the perverse incentives of managers. Financial statements for most firms of the dot-com variety are already a fiction; goodwill accounting is just one more dose of fictionitis.

Respectfully submitted,

Jagdish S. Gangolly,
Associate Professor
( j.gangolly@albany.edu )
Chairperson, Department of Accounting & Law, School of Business
Director, PhD Program in Information Science, College of Computing & Information
State University of New York at Albany, Albany, NY 12222.
Phone: (518) 442-4949 URL:
http://www.albany.edu/acc/gangolly

March 12, 2008 reply from Bob Jensen

With all due respects to Ed and Jagdish, I still think that inflated revenue reporting and other creative accounting ploys led to a bubble of artificially inflated stock prices of dotcom companies. It was more than the "premature revenue recognition" that Ed mentions. It was reporting of questionable revenues that would never be realized in cash. For example dotcomA contracts with dotcomB, dotcomC, ..., dotcomZ to trade advertising space on Websites and vice versa for all combinations of contracting dotcom companies. Each company counts the trade at estimated value as revenue and expense even though there will never be any cash flows for these advertising trades.

The dotcom companies did not inflate profits with this move but they dramatically inflated revenues which was all they cared about since the investing public never expected them to show a profit early on. You can read about how bad this bartering scam became --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm#Issue02
And auditors let the dotcom companies get away with this scam until EITF 99-17 made auditors finally recognize the errors of their ways.

Other revenue inflation scams and questions raised in the following issues resolved by by various EITF pronouncements --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm

Revenue Issue: Gross versus Net

Issue 01: Should a company that acts as a distributor or reseller of products or services record revenues as gross or net?
Examples of Creatively Reporting at Gross:

Priceline.com brokered airline tickets online and included the full price of the ticket as Priceline.com revenues. This greatly inflated revenues relative to traditional ticket brokers and travel agents who only included commissions as revenue.

eBay.com included the entire price of auctioned items into its revenue even though it had no ownership or credit risk for items auctioned online.

Land's End issued discount coupons (e.g., 20% off the price), recorded sales at the full price, and then charged the price discount to marketing expense.

Issue 02: Should a company that swaps website advertising with another company record advertising revenue and expense?

Issue 03: Should discounts or rebates offered to purchasers of personal computers in combination with Internet service contracts be treated as a reduction of revenues or as a marketing expense?

Issue 04: Should shipping and handling fees collected from customers be included in revenues or netted against shipping expense?

Discounts and rebates are traditionally deducted from gross revenues to arrive at a net revenue figure that is the basis of revenue reporting. Internet companies, however, did not always follow this treatment. Discounts and rebates have been reflected as operating expenses rather than as reductions of revenue.

Handling fees and pricing rebates throughout accounting history could not be included in revenues since the writing of the first accounting textbook. Auditors knew this very well from the history of accounting, but it took EITF 00-14 in Year 2000 to remind auditors that this bit of history applied to dotcom companies as well as mainstream clients.

Definition of Software

Issue 07: Should the accounting for products distributed via the Internet, such as music, follow pronouncements regarding software development or those of the music industry?

Issue 08: Should the costs of website development be expensed similar to software developed for internal use in accordance with SOP 98-1?

Revenue Recognition

Issue 9: How should an Internet auction site account for up-front and back-end fees?

Issue 10: How should arrangements that include the right to use software stored on another company’s hardware be accounted for?

Issue 11: How should revenues associated with providing access to, or maintenance of, a website, or publishing information on a website, be accounted for?

Issue 12: How should advertising revenue contingent upon “hits,” “viewings,” or “click-throughs” be accounted for?

Issue 13: How should “point” and other loyalty programs be accounted for?

Prepaid/Intangible Assets vs. Period Costs

Issue 14: How should a company assess the impairment of capitalized Internet distribution costs?

Issue 15: How should up-front payments made in exchange for certain advertising services provided over a period of time be accounted for?

Issue 16: How should investments in building up a customer or membership base be accounted for?

Miscellaneous Issues

Issue 17: Does the accounting by holders for financial instruments with exercisability terms that are variable-based future events, such an IPO, fall under the provisions of SFAS 133?

Issue 18: Should Internet operations be treated as a separate operating segment in accordance with SFAS 131?

Issue 19: Should there be more comparability between Internet companies in the classification of expenses by category?

Issue 20: How should companies account for on-line coupons?

In nearly every instance dotcom companies were inflating the promise of their new companies with creative accounting blessed by their auditors until the EITF and other FASB pronouncements set some bright lines that auditors had to stand behind. The investing public was nearly always misled by both the audited financial statements and the pro forma statements of dotcom companies in the 1990s. Then the bubble burst, in part, by bright line setting by the EITF and the FASB.

Bob Jensen

Bob Jensen's threads on e-Commerce and e-Business accounting issues are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/000start.htm

Especially note the revenue recognition issues at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm 


Here’s another example of why I’m dubious of principles-based standards in accounting and auditing. Nothing should've prevented KPMG from being more professional on this huge audit. KPMG still amazes me on how it wins awards for everything from employee relations to minority student support but falls down on the services for which it gets paid by selling illegal tax shelters (over a half billion in fines and legal fees ), performing sloppy audits (e.g., being fired from the enormous Fannie Mae audit), and now this. There’s a whole lot of good stuff and bad stuff referenced at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm

In an interview Wednesday, Mr. Missal said KPMG "didn't have the healthy skepticism that you would expect from your outside independent auditors." One of the accounting errors Mr. Missal identified involved a decision not to account for a "growing backlog" of troubled loans New Century was obligated to repurchase. Senior New Century executives knew as far back as 2004 that the subprime-mortgage boom was doomed to go bust, Mr. Missal said. But he said its accounting practices allowed those dangers to be disguised.
See below

"KPMG Aided New Century Missteps, Report Says," by Peg Brickley and Amir Efrati, The Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2008; Page A6 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120658573750067861.html?mod=todays_us_page_one

A court-appointed investigator looking into the collapse of New Century Financial Corp. said in a report that its auditor, KPMG LLP, devised some of the improper accounting strategies that allowed the company to hide its financial problems for years.

The investigator, Michael J. Missal, said the company might be able to recover money for its creditors by suing KPMG for professional negligence and negligent misrepresentation. He also recommended the company sue several of its former top executives to recover millions of dollars in bonuses and other compensation paid to them.

KPMG "contributed to certain of these accounting and financial reporting deficiencies by enabling them to persist and, in some instances, precipitating the company's departure from applicable accounting standards," Mr. Missal said in a 550-page report filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Wilmington, Del., and released Wednesday.

Dan Ginsburg, a spokesman for KPMG, said, "We strongly disagree with the report's conclusion concerning KPMG. We believe that an objective review of the facts and circumstances will affirm our position."

The Justice Department, as part of its investigation into New Century's collapse, is looking at individuals at KPMG who audited the company, according to people familiar with the case. But these individuals are not currently a target of the investigation, according to a person familiar with the matter. The Justice Department inquiry is being handled out of the Santa Ana office of the U.S. attorney for California's central district, based in Los Angeles. A spokesman for KPMG declined to comment.

A spokesperson for New Century said in a statement: "The Company is pleased that the Examiner's report is finally completed and that we can take the next steps of confirming the plan of liquidation, therefore substantially concluding the bankruptcy process."

In his report, Mr. Missal said that in one instance, a KPMG partner who led the New Century audit team castigated a subordinate who had questioned one of the company's accounting practices as it prepared to file its 2005 annual report with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

According to Mr. Missal, the KPMG partner told the subordinate in an email: "I am very disappointed we are still discussing this. As far as I am concerned, we are done. The client thinks we are done. All we are going to do is p- everybody off."

New Century, based in Irvine, Calif., was once one of the country's biggest providers of mortgages to people with poor credit histories. In 2006, it originated nearly $60 billion in subprime mortgages. It collapsed in April 2007 after its accounting problems came to light, accelerating the meltdown in the subprime-mortgage market. That meltdown precipitated the biggest credit crunch in at least a decade.

In his report, Mr. Missal said New Century had "a brazen obsession with increasing loan originations, without due regard to the risks associated with that business strategy." Its loan-production department, he said, was "the dominant force in the company," which trained mortgage brokers in sessions it referred to as "CloseMore University."

The company had low standards for originating loans, Mr. Missal said. "The predominant standard for loan quality was whether the loans New Century originated could be initially sold or securitized in the secondary market," he said. "The increasingly risky nature of New Century's loan originations created a ticking time bomb that detonated in 2007."

New Century owes its creditors more than $1 billion, but it has said in court papers that they are likely to recover no more than 17 cents of every dollar they are owed. Because the company has few assets left, much of that funding is likely to come from lawsuits against parties responsible for the company's collapse.

In an interview Wednesday, Mr. Missal said KPMG "didn't have the healthy skepticism that you would expect from your outside independent auditors." One of the accounting errors Mr. Missal identified involved a decision not to account for a "growing backlog" of troubled loans New Century was obligated to repurchase.

Senior New Century executives knew as far back as 2004 that the subprime-mortgage boom was doomed to go bust, Mr. Missal said. But he said its accounting practices allowed those dangers to be disguised.

An independent report commissioned by the Justice Department concluded that the "improper and imprudent practices" of now-bankrupt subprime lender New Century Financial were condoned and enabled by the company's independent auditor, KPMG.
Zac Bissonnette, "KPMG engulfed in subprime accounting scandal," Blogging Stocks, March 27, 2008 http://bstocksdev.weblogsinc.com/2008/03/27/kpmg-engulfed-in-subprime-accounting-scandal/

"Inquiry Assails Accounting Firm (KPMG) in Lender’s Fall," by Vikas Bajaj, The New York Times, March 27, 2008 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/27/business/27account.html?_r=2&hp&oref=&oref=slogin

A sweeping five-month investigation into the collapse of one of the nation’s largest subprime lenders points a finger at a possible new culprit in the mortgage mess: the accountants.

New Century Financial, whose failure just a year ago came at the start of the credit crisis, engaged in “significant improper and imprudent practices” that were condoned and enabled by auditors at the accounting firm KPMG, according to an independent report commissioned by the Justice Department.

In its scope and detail, the 580-page report is the most comprehensive document yet made public about the failings of a mortgage business. Some of its accusations echo charges that surfaced about the accounting firm Arthur Andersen after the collapse of Enron in 2001.

E-mail messages uncovered in the investigation showed that some KPMG auditors raised red flags about the accounting practices at New Century, but that the KPMG partners overseeing the audits rejected those concerns because they feared losing a client.

From its headquarters in Irvine, Calif., New Century ruled as one of the nation’s leading subprime lenders. But its dominance ended when it was forced into bankruptcy last April because of a surge in defaults and a loss of confidence among its lenders.

The report lays bare the aggressive business practices at the heart of the mortgage crisis.

“I would call it incredibly thorough analysis,” said Zach Gast, an analyst at RiskMetrics who raised concerns about accounting practices at New Century and other lenders in December 2006. “This is certainly the most in-depth review we have seen of one of the mortgage lenders that we have seen go bust.”

A spokeswoman for KPMG, Kathleen Fitzgerald, took strong exception to the report’s allegations. “We strongly disagree with the report’s conclusions concerning KPMG,” she said. “We believe an objective review of the facts and circumstances will affirm our position.”

The report zeros in on how New Century accounted for losses on troubled loans that it was forced to buy back from investors like Wall Street banks and hedge funds. Had it not changed its accounting, the company would have reported a loss rather than a profit in the second half of 2006.

The report said that investigators “did not find sufficient evidence to conclude that New Century engaged in earnings management or manipulation, although its accounting irregularities almost always resulted in increased earnings.”

Even so, the profits were the basis for significant executive bonuses and helped persuade Wall Street that the company was in fine health when in fact its business was coming apart, the report contends.

In bankruptcy court, creditors of New Century say they are owed $35 billion. The company’s stock peaked at nearly $65.95 in late 2004; it was trading at a penny on Wednesday.

A spokesman for New Century, which is being managed by a restructuring firm under the supervision of the bankruptcy court, said the company was pleased that the report had been published.

The investigation was led by Michael J. Missal, a lawyer and former investigator in the enforcement division of the Securities and Exchange Commission who was hired by the United States trustee overseeing the case in United States Bankruptcy Court in Delaware.

Mr. Missal, who also worked on an investigation of WorldCom’s accounting misstatements, concluded that KPMG and some former New Century executives could be legally liable for millions of dollars in damages because of their conduct.

In the aftermath of the collapse of Enron, Arthur Andersen was indicted and convicted on obstruction of justices charges. The conviction was overturned by the Supreme Court in 2005, long after the company had ceased doing business.

Mr. Missal drew an analogy to Enron and said there was evidence that KPMG auditors had deferred excessively to New Century.

“I saw e-mails from the engaged partner saying we are at the risk of being replaced,” Mr. Missal said in a telephone interview about a KPMG partner working on the audit of New Century. “They acquiesced overly to the client, which in the post-Enron era seems mind-boggling.”

Ms. Fitzgerald of KPMG countered, “There is absolutely no evidence to support that contention.”

In one exchange in the report, a KPMG partner who was leading the New Century audit responded testily to John Klinge, a specialist at the accounting firm who was pressing him on a contentious accounting practice used by the company.

“I am very disappointed we are still discussing this,” the partner, John Donovan, wrote in the spring of 2006. “And as far as I am concerned we are done. The client thinks we are done.”

KPMG said Wednesday that a national standards committee had approved the practice in question.

The accounting irregularities became apparent when a new chief financial officer, Taj S. Bindra, started asking New Century’s accounting department and KPMG to justify their approach, beginning in November 2006.

Continued in article

The entire Missal Report is at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/Final_Report_New_Century.pdf

March 27, 2008 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

Bob,

I have been reading Missal's tome. It will be quite some time before I am done with it. However, I have three comments.

1. Missal's tome is a treasure trove for financial accounting instructors. It explains most relevant financial accounting much better than any intermediate accounting text I have seen. In fact I am using parts of it it in my 'Financial Statement Fraud & Corporate Governance' class this semester.

2. Bob, I will refrain from ascribing motives or assigning blame to any one. However, in my humble opinion, the problem may be systemic and not just limited to one client or one CPA firm. Perhaps we as academic could help the profession.

I am convinced that we accountants on our own may not have the competence to do full audits of the financial sector without the help of actuaries. The actuarial implications of just computing residual interests by itself is mind-boggling, and that is only one miniscule item.

I have always felt that the intermediate accounting sequence needs an extreme makeover, and now I am absolutely convinced. We could cut down on most of the C***p that we fling at our unsuspecting students (especially in our intermediate accounting classes) and listen to our profession as to what could really help them.

Perhaps we could do with just one intermediate class (I am sure my financial accounting colleagues will kill me if they get to know this; they usually do not like to anything besides regurgitating the Kieso "tome") and require students to do one finance oriented actuarial class followed by specialized financial accounting classes? (I am just floating my trial balloon here).

Our failure as academics in accounting has been devastating to the auditing/accounting profession.

3. I share your scepticism regarding the so-called principles-based standards. Accounting principles are of necessity conflicting, and we totally lack the intellectual capacity, with the kind of navel-gazing "research" we have been doing for the past thirty years, to deal with conflicts among principles. We desperately neecd to look at the way lawyers and judges/justices REASON in order to develop our own faculties in coping with conflicting principles in arriving at "standards".

Regards,

Jagdish

March 27, 2008 reply from Patricia Doherty [pdoherty@BU.EDU]

Jagdish, I read your comments with interest. I think one problem we have in accounting academe (and by the way, I don't teach Intermediate - I am a Managerial person, quite happily) is that we are, like many professors in business schools especially, running a trade school. In our case, we are teaching the students what they "need" to know to pass the CPA exam. We have had this discussion on this site before - the exam is well behind current needs and practice, and isn't likely to change soon. This is what the students want: what do I need to take to pass the exam. They ask this specific question. Not "what do I need to be a good accountant" but "what do I need to take to sit for the exam." We research state-by-state requirements, and make sure they take the right courses. Courses change in response to the requirements (so that now some Internet research capability is needed, for example), but it is all geared to the same end.

And I am not sure that businesses/industry have a great deal of motivation to see accounting make progress in the direction you are indicating, because they too are acting out of self interest. The excitement over "principles based" accounting rules really in many cases I've read amounts to their thinking that it will back off the auditors, give the companies more of what they like to call "flexibility" - some of us may have other words for that.

No?

p
Mann macht und Gott lacht. old Yiddish expression

Bob Jensen's threads on KPMG's woes in other lawsuits are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm


I do not forward advertising requests form commercial vendors unless I feel that my "audience" would appreciate hearing about particular new products and services. This one is very important to some accounting researchers.

April 30, 2008 message from Tom Hardy [thardy@ivesinc.com]

Dear Professor Jensen,

I am writing to let you know about two new research modules available with the AuditAnalytics.com SEC research database. Specifically, our Litigation Module now tracks all material federal litigation involving Russell 3000 companies and all federal litigation involving the top 100 audit firms. This module contains over 12,500 cases in the database. It includes all securities class actions and SEC litigation filed since the year 2000.

In the next few months we also will be making available as an add-on our Advanced Restatement Data to include:

Net Income Effect*

Net Effect on Stockholders Equity*

First Announcement Date*

First Magnitude Announcement Date* All related filings to each restatement*

*Data analysis for these fields restricted to NYSE, Nasdaq and AMEX public companies and is currently populated from 2003 to present.

FIN 48 Revisions (All SEC registrants for fiscal years beginning after Dec 15th, 2006) SAB 108 Revisions (All SEC registrants for fiscal year ends after Nov 15th, 2006)

As the leader in Audit Industry Research, AuditAnalytics.com provides detailed information on over 20,000 publicly registered companies and over 1,500 accounting firms. Our database enables you, your students and faculty to quickly search and analyze reported:

- SOX 404 Internal Controls and SOX 302 Disclosure Controls

- Restatements

- Directory and Officer Changes

- Late filers (Form NT)

- Auditor fees, changes, and opinions

- Governance information (Non-historical)

I sincerely believe that you would find our online service to be a valuable resource for your academic research. We are currently offering special academic and educational subscription pricing for the service and I would be happy to discuss this further at your convenience. Please let me know if there is a good time for us to speak and if you would like any additional information or an online demonstration of the AuditAnalytics.com service.

Best Regards,

Tom

PS. Please feel free to ask me about AuditAnalytics.com availability via the WRDS Database http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/

Tom Hardy
IVES Group, Inc.
9 Main Street, Suite 2F
Sutton, MA 01590
Phone: (508) 476-7007 ext. 228
e-mail: thardy@ivesinc.com
www.auditanalytics.com - Independent Research Provider to the Accounting, Insurance, Research and Investment Communities

April 30, 2008 reply from Todd Pullen [btpull@COMCAST.NET]

Does anyone have a recommendation on a good site for financial reports?

I have found that some of the free sites such a Google Finance and Marketwatch are not that accurate or their data is outdated.

April 30, 2008 reply from Edith Orenstein [eorenstein@FINANCIALEXECUTIVES.ORG]

I recently had demo of CCH Accounting Research Manager (ARM) and it seemed to have a pretty good search capability for recent filings.

April 30, 2008 reply from W. O. Mills, III C.P.A., C.A., P.F.S [wom@WOMILLS.COM]

I am not sure of what you might be looking for exactly...but perhaps Edgars would be of some benefit to you.

http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml 

April 30, 2008 reply from David Albrecht [albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]

I use several. Usually I go directly to a company's web site.

If I'm simply shopping for something to use in class I go to
http://www.annualreportservice.com/

April 30, 2008 reply from Bob Jensen

And don't forget to try the wonderful new TryXBRL service (free for now) and the new Financial Explorer service from the SEC

"TryXBRL.org Launched," SmartPros, March 28, 2008 ---  http://accounting.smartpros.com/x61325.xml

A new Web site, TryXBRL.com, allows free access to view and analyze complete XBRL-tagged financial statements for over 12,000 publicly traded corporations.

After registering on the portal, TryXBRL.org, corporate finance professionals can educate themselves about the XBRL tagging process and view their own historical financial information in XBRL format. Investors and analysts can experience how XBRL reduces the complexity and costs associated with analyzing performance data.

The site is a collaboration of EDGAR Online Inc., a business and financial information provider, and R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company, a print services company.

"Our goal has been to deliver solutions that do not require technical expertise or excessive time commitments by corporations wishing to take part in the SEC Voluntary Program or to familiarize themselves with XBRL," said Philip Moyer, President and CEO of EDGAR Online, Inc. "We are providing open access to our vast XBRL database through a solution that enables corporations to begin filing XBRL content with the SEC in as little as a few hours."

RR Donnelley and EDGAR Online have collaborated to deliver XBRL filing solutions to corporations since 2005.

Once again that site is at http://www.tryxbrl.org/

April 1, 2008 reply from Amy Dunbar [Amy.Dunbar@BUSINESS.UCONN.EDU]

I just tried the site. Wow. Very powerful. I confirmed the numbers for one company to make sure I knew what I was seeing. It pulled the 2007 four quarter numbers for my selected company and then the 4th qtr numbers for the three peer companies and my selected company. I'm not sure where that 12,000 publicly traded corporations is coming from. They must mean filings, not corporations. I found the following table for March/June 2005 in Appendix F. http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-finalreport.pdf  If you include pink sheet companies, the data for which are not publicly available (at least to my knowledge), the total climbs to 13,094. Does anyone have a source for more recent numbers of publicly traded corporations?

Listing Venue Number of Companies Listed NYSE 2,553 AMEX 747 NASDAQ National Market 2,580 NASDAQ Capital Market1 593 OTC Bulletin Board 2,955 Total 9,428

The table (I only show part of it) has the following footnote explanation: Source: Public data includes 13,094 companies from the Center for Research in Securities Prices at the University of Chicago for NYSE and AMEX companies as of March 31, 2005 and from NASDAQ for NASDAQ and OTC Bulletin Board companies and from Datastream Advance for Pink Sheets companies as of June 10, 2005. This table was compiled by members of the staff of the SEC's Office of Economic Analysis and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission, the Commissioners, or other members of the Commission staff.

Amy Dunbar UConn

 Bob Jensen's threads on XBRL are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm


"SEC unveils 'Financial Explorer' investor tool using XBRL," AccountingWeb, February 20, 2008 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=104665

Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher Cox has announced the launch of the "Financial Explorer" on the SEC Web site to help investors quickly and easily analyze the financial results of public companies. Financial Explorer paints the picture of corporate financial performance with diagrams and charts, using financial information provided to the SEC as "interactive data" in eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL).

At the click of a mouse, Financial Explorer lets investors automatically generate financial ratios,

graphs, and charts depicting important information from financial statements. Information including earnings, expenses, cash flows, assets, and liabilities can be analyzed and compared across competing public companies. The software takes the work out of manipulating the data by entirely eliminating tasks such as copying and pasting rows of revenues and expenses into a spreadsheet. That frees investors to focus on their investments' financial results through visual representations that make the numbers easier to understand. Investors can use Financial Explorer by visiting www.sec.gov/xbrl .

"XBRL is fast becoming the universal language for the exchange of business information and it is the future of financial reporting," said Cox. "With Financial Explorer or another XBRL viewer, investors will be able to quickly make sense of financial statements. In the near future, potentially millions of people will be able to analyze and compare financial statements and make better-informed investment decisions. That's a big benefit to ordinary investors."

David Blaszkowsky, Director of the SEC's Office of Interactive Disclosure, encouraged investors to try out the new software. "Financial Explorer will help investors analyze investment choices much quicker. I encourage both companies and investors to visit the SEC Web site, try the software, and get a first-hand glimpse of the future of financial analysis, especially for the retail investor."

Financial Explorer is open source, meaning that its source code is free to the public, and technology and financial experts can update and enhance the software. As interactive data becomes more commonplace, investors, analysts, and others working in the financial industry may develop hundreds of Web-based applications that help investors garner insights about financial results through creative ways of analyzing and presenting the information.

Continued in article

Jensen Comment
The Financial Explorer link --- http://209.234.225.154/viewer/home/
Note the "Take a Tour" option.

Bob Jensen's videos (created before the SEC created the Financial Explorer) are at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/video/Tutorials/
When I can find some time, I'll create a Financial Explorer update video.

Bob Jensen's threads on XBRL are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm


 


More on the Debate Between Rules-Based Versus Principles-Based Standards

"The Accounting Cycle Arbitrary and Capricious Rules: Lease Accounting -- FAS 13 v. IAS 17," by: J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, March 2008 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x61146.xml

One of the main arguments against a rules-based accounting standards-setting system is that resulting rules are sometimes arbitrary; correspondingly, proponents of principles-based accounting claim that resulting standards will not be arbitrary, but rather logical, consistent, transparent, and informative to financial statement users. Lease accounting is often presented as an exemplar of this point. Since the IASB standards are purportedly principles-based, let's compare the FASB rule against the international accounting rule -- er, principle -- and look at the differences. FAS 13 versus IAS 17.

IAS 17 classifies leases as finance leases or operating leases, but this is mere words. Finance leases correspond to the Financial Accounting Standards Board's capital leases. There are five criteria for determining whether a lease is a finance lease; they are:

The lease transfers ownership to the lessee; The lease contains a bargain purchase option to purchase that is expected to be exercised; The lease is for the major part of the economic life of the asset; The present value of the minimum lease payments amounts to substantially all of the fair value of the leased asset; Only the lessee can use the leased asset. The first four criteria correspond strongly with those of FASB; the last one is also contained in FAS 13 even though it is not specifically included as one of the criterion to determine whether a lease is a capital lease.

Critics are correct inasmuch as FASB included bright lines in criteria 3 and 4 (the 75 percent and the 90 percent thresholds), whereas IASB did not. One wonders, however, whether that change eliminates or enhances arbitrariness in financial reporting. True, FASB chose thresholds that cannot be defended while IASB does not contain them. The upshot might be to move the threshold from the standard-setter to the preparer and the auditor, without the investor's being privy to the debate. For example, the preparer might have a lease in which the present value of the minimum lease payments amounts to (say) 95 percent of the fair value of the asset and argues for operating lease treatment. What power and authority does an auditor have to challenge that assertion?

Yes, FAS 13 contains bright lines that are inherently arbitrary, as no economic theory supports the 75 percent or the 90 percent thresholds. But, the lack of bright lines does not solve the issue at all -- it merely shifts the decision about the threshold from the standard-setter to the preparer and to the auditor. This adds subjectivity to the determination of an appropriate cutoff point between what is a capital or an operating lease. Unfortunately, this reality places the decision in the hands of the one being evaluated by the investment community, and the last decade has shown us what happens when we entrust accounting policy making to managers.

To my way of thinking, the arbitrariness in FAS 13 is significantly less than the arbitrariness inherent in IAS 17. To say it another way, the transparency of FASB's arbitrariness to the investment community trumps the opaqueness of IASB's rule.

The present value of the lease is calculated with the interest rate implicit in the lease, if practicable; otherwise, the present value is determined with the business enterprise's incremental borrowing rate. Notice that IASB thereby allows financial engineering by the managers of the entity. Managers can argue that they do not know and cannot find out the implicit rate, obtain a lower present value of the leased item, and then be in a better position to argue that the lease is an operating lease. IASB's position conceptually is no better than FASB's on this point.

IASB defines assets and liabilities as follow:

An asset is a resource controlled by the entity as a result of past events and from which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the entity.

A liability is a present obligation of the entity arising from past events, the settlement of which is expected to result in an outflow from the entity of resources embodying economic benefits.

These definitions are not substantially different from FASB's definitions. Most importantly, notice that if one is truly principled, he or she must conclude that leased items are assets and lease obligations are liabilities. There is no room for operating leases if managers or auditors are adhering to the principles imbedded in the definitions that IASB gives assets and liabilities.

Both FASB and IASB have ignored their own conceptual frameworks in FAS 13 and IAS 17. Under both sets of definitions, leased items are assets and lease obligations are liabilities. The only logical conclusion for FASB and IASB is to require capitalization of all leases.

. . .

FAS 13 is one of the most deficient standards ever issued by FASB. Yet, IAS 17 contains most of the same errors and shortcomings. Its only improvement -- removal of the bright lines -- is actually a detriment because it assists managers in their efforts to obfuscate meaningful communications with investors and creditors. If that's the best example of principles-based accounting, give me rules any day.

 


"Will the Alphabet Soup of GAAP Soon Become Consomme?" by Tom Selling, The Accounting Onion, February 4, 2008 --- http://accountingonion.typepad.com/ 

ARB, APB, SFAS, SOP, EITF, FSP, AIN, FIN, CON, SAB, AAER, FRP, ASR, S-X.  These are all authoritative sources of GAAP, and I probably left some out. So, four years ago, the FASB began work on its project to simplify the process of finding answers to accounting questions by creating a single, authoritative on-line Codification—with the significant exception of SEC literature. On January 15th, the FASB launched a one-year “verification” period, during which the Codification Research System will be available online free of charge.  To access the Codification, a user must first register at http://asc.fasb.org

I have by no means done a thorough review of the Codification software, but I decided to replicate a research project I recently performed for a client as a test of its usability.  My client had a series of questions about an anticipated sale of part of their operations, and in particular whether presentation as discontinued operations was specified for the current and future periods.  My resulting first impressions of the Codification as a research tool are these:

  • Response time is slow.  I'm concerned that as more users access the codification, performance will degrade even further.
  • The organization of topics could be more logical.  For example, the FASB is working toward an asset/liability approach to recognition and measurement; so, why are revenues and expenses discussed separately from their balance sheet counterparts?  However, I was able to the place where discontinued operation guidance resides very quickly.
  • The ability to place the cursor over a defined term and read its definition without clicking is very convenient.  The organization of each topic in a systematic series of sections and subsections  appears logical, consistent and potentially helpful.  However, reading off the computer screen gets old very quickly, in no small part because the subsections are too granular to be reader-friendly.   For my task, I chose to simplify things by using the command to join all subsections together -- and then dump everything to paper along with citations to the source documents.  I suppose that if you are looking for a particular sentence or two in answer to a very narrow question, reading off the screen and jumping around using hyperlinks could work fine; but I wonder if that's more the exception than the rule.  Usually, I need to be able to scan the entire content with my eyes before I can hone in on the words I need.

Overall, the codification project continues to hold high promise and is proceeding apace.  A logical next step for the SEC would be to determine how they can reasonably make accounting researcher more efficient and definitive by incorporating their own literature into the FASB's codification. At present, the Codification does include "authoritative" content issued by the SEC (though not all), as well as selected SEC staff interpretations. Under the current regime, GAAP can be created in an instant practically every time an enforcement action takes place; or a commissioner or high ranking staff member opes their ruby lips to offer their two cents worth about accounting.

Continued in article


"FASB Launches GAAP Codification System:  Free access granted, feedback requested," SmartPros, January 16, 2008 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x60405.xml 

The Financial Accounting Standards Board on Tuesday launched the one-year verification phase of its Accounting Standards Codification, a system that reorganizes the thousands of U.S. GAAP pronouncements into accounting topics using a consistent structure.

he Codification organizes U.S. GAAP by 90 topics or issues on a new Web site, http://asc.fasb.org. FASB expects the new structure and system will reduce the amount of time and effort required to solve an accounting research issue, improve usability of the literature thereby mitigating the risk of noncompliance with standards, and provide real-time updates as new standards are released. In addition, the system should become the authoritative source of literature for the completed XBRL taxonomy.

The structure includes all accounting standards issued by a standard-setter within levels A through D of the current U.S. GAAP hierarchy, including FASB, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF), and related literature. It excludes governmental accounting standards.

"For a long time, many users have said that GAAP is confusing," said Barry Melancon, AICPA president and CEO. "The Codification represents a simplification of the enormous body of accounting standards. It renders GAAP more understandable and accessible for research."

During the one-year verification period, FASB will make the Codification available through a new Web-based research system to solicit feedback from constituents to confirm that the Codification accurately reflects existing GAAP for nongovernmental entities.

After receiving feedback, FASB is expected to formally approve the Codification as the single source of authoritative U.S. GAAP, other than guidance issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Codification will include authoritative content issued by the SEC, as well as selected SEC staff interpretations.

Upon approval by FASB, all accounting standards (other than the SEC guidance) used to populate the Codification will be superseded. At that time, with the exception of any SEC or grandfathered guidance, all other accounting literature not included in the Codification will become nonauthoritative.

Users who register at http://asc.fasb.org are able to review the Codification free of charge and provide specific content-related feedback at the individual paragraph level as well as general system-related feedback. During the verification period, Codification content will be updated for changes resulting from constituent feedback and new standards.

FASB provides a 52-page document on how to use the new tool at:
http://asc.fasb.org/imageRoot/56/2304556.pdf

 


February 22, 2008 message from Tom Selling [tom.selling@GROVESITE.COM]

On cost (replacement) versus (fair) value, Walter Teets and I have written a paper that we recently submitted to FAJ.  The basic thrust is that cost can be associated with principles-based accounting, and value cannot.  That’s why FAS 157 is rules based and filled with anomalies.  You can read the working paper here, or read my blog post that it was based on here.  Comments, especially on the working paper, would be much appreciated.

Thomas I. Selling PhD, CPA
602-228-4871 (M)
602-952-9880 x205 (O)

Website: www.tomselling.com 
Weblog: www.accountingonion.com 
Company: www.grovesite.com 


From Jim Mahar's blog on February 5, 2008 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

How 'cash' at companies became risky - MarketWatch

 
There is cash and then there is cash:

How 'cash' at companies became risky - MarketWatch:
"...as strange as this may sound, Bristol-Myers Squibb was the latest company to do the equivalent of taking a charge against cash when it announced a $275 million impairment of debt investments that held such things as surprise! subprime and home-equity loans.

Companies don't really take charges against cash, of course, but investments that double as cash might as well be cash. Auction-rate securities, as these arcane investments are called, were deemed so safe that they sat on the balance sheet not far from Treasurys in a near-cash category called 'marketable securities.'

Until a few years ago, before a change in accounting rules, Bristol-Myers accounted for auction-rate securities as actual cash. They are so much like cash that they yield just a fraction of a percent above cash and, as Bristol-Myers regulatory filings say, can 'be liquidated for cash at a short notice.'"

Question
Should "principles-based" standards replace more detailed requirements for complex financial contracts such as structured financing contracts and financial instruments derivatives contracts?

From IASPlus, January 15, 2008 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

'Big-6' joint paper on principles-based accounting standards


The six largest global accounting networks, including Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, have jointly published a paper on Principles-Based Accounting Standards. The paper was launched to coincide with a global public policy symposium in New York, hosted by the firms. The paper, which sets out six key criteria for principles based standards, was debated in a panel that included IASB Chairman Sir David Tweedie and FASB Chairman Robert Herz at the symposium. The six attributes proposed for principles based standards are:

  1. Faithful presentation of economic reality
  2. Responsive to users' needs for clarity and transparency
  3. Consistency with a clear Conceptual Framework
  4. Based on an appropriately defined scope that addresses a broad area of accounting
  5. Written in clear, concise, and plain language
  6. Allows for the use of reasonable judgment
Click to Download the Paper (PDF 607k). In releasing the paper, the CEOs of the six global accounting networks said:
 

Over the past several years, a growing dialogue has developed about the future of financial reporting and the public company audit profession. In order to advance that dialogue, during the past year, we have engaged in discussions with stakeholders around the world on a number of issues critical to the longterm strength and stability of global capital markets.

In these talks, we have been struck by the breadth of support for International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) as a single set of high-quality, accounting standards that ultimately can be used around the world. Stakeholders indicated their support for IFRS in part because it is more principles-based than US GAAP. There was, however, a lack of consensus on the key characteristics of principles-based standards.

Preliminary decisions by SEC's financial reporting review panel


In June 2007, the US Securities and Exchange Commission formed the SEC Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting to study the causes of complexity in the US financial reporting system and to recommend ways to make financial reports clearer and more beneficial to investors, reduce costs and unnecessary burdens for preparers, and better utilize advances in technology to enhance all aspects of financial reporting. See our News Story of 28 June 2007. Last week, the Advisory Committee held its third meeting and reached some tentative decisions on changes that it might propose. The Committee's deliberations were based on a Draft Decision Memo (PDF 878k) that sets out the definition and causes of compelxity and proposals for reducing complexity. The Committee tentatively agreed to support the following proposals, among others:

  • GAAP should be based on transactions and activities, rather than industries, and most existing industry-specific guidance should be eliminated.
  • GAAP should provide for a single method of accounting for a given transaction or event and should not normally include accounting policy choices.
  • The FASB should be the source of interpretations of US GAAP, not other parties.
  • The SEC and others should acknowledge that principles-based standards may result in a reasonable amount of diversity in practice, and the SEC's compliance and enforcement activities should not require restatements that may not be material to users/investors, so long as the basic principles in US GAAP are followed. The SEC should promulgate guidance on materiality in this context.
  • Prior period financial statements should only be restated for errors that are material to those prior periods.
  • The SEC and PCAOB should provide more protections from lawsuits or SEC enforcement actions for companies and auditors exercising reasonable professional judgment.
  • The SEC should require XBRL filings by the 500 largest domestic listed companies, followed by evaluation and a decision whether to extend this to all listed companies.
  • The SEC should provide guidance on corporate websites that provide financial information to investors.
The Advisory Committee will meet again in March and plans to publish its final recommendations in third quarter 2008. Click to go to the Advisory Committee's Web Page on the SEC website.
 

Jensen Comment
Because of the inconsistencies that will arise with "principles-based" standards, I'm agin em! But that's like spitting into the wind!

Principles-Based Versus Rules-Based Accounting Standards

"Standing on Principles In a world with more regulation than ever, can the accounting rulebook be thrown away?" byAlix Nyberg Stuart, CFO Magazine September 01, 2006 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7852613/c_7873404?f=magazine_featured

As Groucho Marx once said, "Those are my principles, and if you don't like them...well, I have others."

Groucho would enjoy the heated stalemate over principles-based accounting. Four years after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act required the Securities and Exchange Commission to explore the feasibility of developing principles-based accounting standards in lieu of detailed rules, the move to such standards has gone exactly nowhere. ad

Broadly speaking, principles-based standards would be consistent, concise, and general, requiring CFOs to apply common sense rather than bright-lines. Instead of having, say, numerical thresholds to define when leases must be capitalized, a CFO could use his or her own judgment as to whether a company's interest was substantial enough to put a lease on the balance sheet. If anything, though, accounting and auditing standards have reached new levels of nitpickiness. "In the current environment, CFOs are second-guessed by auditors, who are then third-guessed by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [PCAOB], and then fourth- and fifth-guessed by the SEC and the plaintiffs' bar," says Colleen Cunningham, president and CEO of Financial Executives International (FEI).

Indeed, the Financial Accounting Standards Board seems to have taken a principled stand in favor of rule-creation. The Board continues to issue detailed rules and staff positions. Auditors have amped up their level of scrutiny, in many cases leading to a tripling of audit fees since 2002. And there is still scant mercy for anyone who breaks the rules: the annual number of restatements doubled to more than 1,000 between 2003 and 2005, thanks to pressure from auditors and the SEC. The agency pursued a record number of enforcement actions in the past three years, while shareholder lawsuits, many involving accounting practices, continued apace, claiming a record $7.6 billion in settlements last year and probably more in 2006.

Yet the dream won't die. On the contrary, principles are at the heart of FASB's latest thinking about changes to its basic accounting framework, as reflected in the "preliminary views" the board issued in July with the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) as part of its plan to converge U.S. and international standards. Principles-based accounting has been championed by FASB chairman Robert Herz, SEC commissioner Paul Atkins, SEC deputy chief accountant Scott Taub, and PCAOB member Charlie Niemeier in various speeches over the past six months. And they're not just talking about editing a few lines in the rulebook.

"We need FASB, the SEC, the PCAOB, preparers, users, auditors, and the legal profession to get together and check their respective agendas at the door in order to collectively think through the obstacles," says Herz. "And if it turns out some of the obstacles are hardwired into our structure, then maybe we need some legal changes as well," such as safe harbors that would protect executives and auditors from having their judgments continually challenged. Even the SEC is talking about loosening up. Most at the agency favor the idea of principles instead of rules, says Taub, even knowing that "people will interpret them in different ways and we'll have to deal with it."

Standards Deviation Why lawmakers are so set on principles and what exactly those principles would look like is all a bit hazy right now. "Post-Enron, the perception was that people were engineering around the accounting rules. We looked around the world and saw that England had principles-based accounting and they didn't have scandals there, so we decided this was the way to go," recounts CVS Corp. CFO David Rickard, a Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Committee (FASAC) member.

But Rickard considers the approach "naive." His firsthand experience with principles-based accounting, as a group controller for London-based Grand Metropolitan from 1991 to 1997, left him unimpressed. "We had accounting rules we could drive trucks through," he says.

Would such a change be worth the trouble? A recent study that compared the accrual quality of Canadian companies reporting under a relatively principles-based GAAP to that of U.S. companies reporting by the rules suggests that there may be no effective difference between the two systems. The authors, Queen's University (Ontario) professors Daniel B. Thornton and Erin Webster, found some evidence that the Canadian approach yields better results, but conclude that "stronger U.S. oversight and greater litigation risk" compensate for any differences.

U.S. GAAP is built on principles; they just happen to be buried under hundreds of rules. The SEC, in its 2003 report on principles-based accounting, labeled some standards as being either "rules" or "principles." (No surprise to CFOs, FAS 133, stock-option accounting, and lease accounting fall in the former category, while FAS 141 and 142 were illustrative of the latter.) The difference: principles offer only "a modicum" of implementation guidance and few scope exceptions or bright-lines. ad

For FASB, the move to principles-based accounting is part of a larger effort to organize the existing body of accounting literature, and to eliminate internal inconsistencies. "Right now, we have a pretty good conceptual framework, but the standards have often deviated from the concepts," says Herz. He envisions "a common framework" with the IASB, where "you take the concepts," such as how assets and liabilities should be measured, and "from those you draw key principles" for specific areas of accounting, like pensions and business combinations. In fact, that framework as it now stands would change corporate accounting's most elemental principle, that income essentially reflects the difference between revenues and expenses. Instead, income would depend more on changes in the value of assets and liabilities (see "Will Fair Value Fly?").

For its part, the SEC has also made clear that it does not envisage an entirely free-form world. "Clearly, the standard setters should provide some implementation guidance as a part of a newly issued standard," its 2003 report states.

The catch is that drawing a line between rules and principles is easier said than done. Principles need to be coupled with implementation guidance, which is more of an art than a science, says Ben Neuhausen, national director of accounting for BDO Seidman. That ambiguity may explain why finance executives are so divided on support for this concept. Forty-seven percent of the executives surveyed by CFO say they are in favor of a shift to principles, another 25 percent are unsure of its merits, and 17 percent are unfamiliar with the whole idea. Only 10 percent oppose it outright, largely out of concern that it would be too difficult to determine which judgments would pass muster.

A Road to Hell? As it stands now, many CFOs fear that principles-based accounting would quickly lead to court. "The big concern is that we make a legitimate judgment based on the facts as we understand them, in the spirit of trying to comply, and that plaintiffs' attorneys come along later with an expert accountant who says, 'I wouldn't have done it that way,' and aha! — lawsuit! — several billion dollars, please," says Rickard.

Massive shareholder lawsuits were a concern for 36 percent of CFOs who oppose ditching rules, according to CFO's survey, and regulators are sympathetic. "There are institutional and behavioral issues, and they're much broader than FASB or even the SEC," says Herz, citing "the focus on short-term earnings, and the whole kabuki dance around quarterly guidance."

Continued in article


SEC Seeks Stronger GASB
Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher Cox wants the Governmental Accounting Standards Board to have more clout, he said Wednesday in a speech at a community town hall meeting in Los Angeles.
SmartPros, July 19, 2007 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x58440.xml


"SEC Advisory Panel Recommends Wholesale Changes in U.S. Accounting," by Judith Burns (Dow Jones Newswires), SmartPros, January 14, 2008 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x60389.xml 

A Securities and Exchange Commission advisory group voted Friday to approve recommendations for wholesale changes in U.S. accounting and financial reporting.

Among the changes unanimously backed by the panel: base U.S. accounting rules on transactions and activities to avoid special treatment for various industries, limit corporate financial restatements to meaningful mistakes, and provide more protections from lawsuits or SEC enforcement actions for companies and auditors exercising "reasonable" professional judgment.

Any move away from industry-specific accounting would be a big change likely to touch off controversy, according to MFS Investment Management Co. Chairman Robert Pozen, who heads the SEC advisory panel on improvements to financial reporting. Pozen predicted "all hell's going to break loose" once the group issues the recommendation, intended to reduce complexity and make corporate results more comparable from industry to industry.

Shielding companies and auditors from second-guessing or lawsuits when they exercise professional judgment is sure to be controversial as well. The advisory group urged the SEC to issue a policy statement or a legal "safe harbor" protecting firms and auditors from enforcement action or legal challenge provided they acted in good faith and made a "reasoned" evaluation based on relevant information available to them at the time.

On restatements, the advisory group called for companies to correct errors when they are discovered and issue restatements only for material items, an approach that would reduce the number of restatements.

The group also wants to shed more light during the so-called "dark period" after a company announces that it has found a material error but before it issues a restatement of prior financial results. The advisory panel called for companies to describe the error, the periods that might be affected and that are under review, and give an estimated range of the error's size, any impact it might have and what management plans to do to prevent such errors in the future.

Deloitte Touche Chief Executive James Quigley, who serves on the panel, called the recommended approach "a giant step forward" and panel member Scott Evans, a senior vice president for asset management at TIAA-Cref, a pension fund for teachers, said expanded disclosure "will definitely help investors."

The group also endorsed a compromise proposal on data-tagging technology by calling for the 500 largest U.S. public companies to furnish reports to the SEC using data tags for part of the financial statements. The tags, akin to bar codes for individual items in a financial report, make it easy to find and compare corporate results. That, advocates say, will benefit investors, analysts and regulators.

The SEC advisory panel is slated to meet again in March and issue a final recommendation this summer.


In Concepts Statement No. 2, the FASB asserts it should not issue a standard for the purpose of achieving some particular economic behavior. Among other things, this statement implies that the board should not set accounting standards in an attempt to bolster the economy or some industry sector. Ideally, scorekeeping should not affect how the game is played. But this is an impossible ideal since changes in rules for keeping score almost always change player behavior. Hence, accounting standards cannot be ideally neutral. The FASB, however, actively attempts not to not take political sides on changing behavior that favors certain political segments of society. In other words, the FASB still operates on the basis that fairness and transparency in the spirit of neutrality override politics. However, there is a huge gray zone that, in large measure, involves how companies, analysts, investors, creditors, and even the media react to new accounting rules. Sometimes they react in ways that are not anticipated by the FASB.

Questions
Is there a problem with how GAAP covers one's Fannie?
Would fair value accounting help in this situation?

"Fannie Execs Defend Accounting Change Friday," by Marcy Gordon, Yahoo News, November 16, 2007 --- http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/071116/fannie_mae_accounting.html 

Fannie Mae executives on Friday defended a change in the way the mortgage lender discloses losses on home loans amid concern from analysts that it could mask the true impact of the credit crisis on its bottom line.

The chief financial officer and other executives of the government-sponsored company, which reported a $1.4 billion third-quarter loss last week, held a conference call with Wall Street analysts to explain the recent change.

Analysts peppered the executives with questions in a skeptical tone. The way Fannie discloses its mortgage losses, addressed in an article published online by Fortune, raises extra concern among analysts given that Fannie Mae was racked by a $6.3 billion accounting scandal in 2004 that tarnished its reputation and brought government sanctions against it.

Moreover, the skepticism from Wall Street comes as Fannie seeks approval from the government to raise the cap of its investment portfolio.

The chief financial officer, Stephen Swad, said in the call that some of the $670 million in provisions for credit losses on soured home loans that Fannie Mae wrote off in the third quarter likely would be recovered.

"We book what we book under (generally accepted accounting principles) and we provide this disclosure to help you understand it," Swad said.

Shares of Fannie Mae fell $4.30, or 10 percent, to $38.74 on Friday, following a 10 percent drop the day before.

"Fannie Shares Continue Plunge," by Mike Barris,  The Wall Street Journal, November 16, 2007 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119522620923495790.html

Shares of Fannie Mae skidded further Friday, after falling 10% Thursday amid worries over the way the mortgage giant reports credit losses and a gloomy outlook for the housing market.

The latest decline in the company's share price came as Chief Financial Officer Stephen Swad on Friday attempted to alleviate investor concerns about the company's credit losses.

In morning trading, Fannie shares were at $41.30, down $1.75, or 4%. The shares had fallen as much as 14% early in the day before recovering somewhat. Shares of Fannie's counterpart, Freddie Mac, also fell, down $1.98, or 4.8%, to $39.91.

Thursday's drop came after Fortune magazine's Web site reported a change in the method Fannie uses to report credit losses.

Last week, the nation's biggest investor in home-mortgage loans reported that its credit losses in the year's first nine months equaled 0.04% of the company's $2.8 trillion of mortgages and related securities owned or guaranteed, up from 0.018% a year earlier. That was in line with the company's forecast.

But the company changed its method of presenting the figure, excluding unrealized losses on certain loans that were marked down to reflect current market conditions. Including those unrealized losses, the rate for this year's first nine months was 0.075%, up from 0.023% a year before.

Fannie officials said the change was made to separate realized losses from ones that haven't been realized and depend on fluctuating market values for loans. A report from J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. analyst George Sacco said the new method is similar to that used by Freddie Mac. Fannie officials noted that both the realized and unrealized losses were reflected in the earnings reported last week.

Fannie's stock had already been falling for a few weeks amid worries about how hard Fannie would be hurt by rising mortgage defaults. At an investment conference Thursday in New York, Wells Fargo & Co.'s chief executive, John Stumpf, predicted more pain for mortgage lenders in the year ahead as falling home prices cut the value of collateral, saying the nationwide decline in housing is the worst since the Great Depression.

Thursday, Fannie shares dropped $4.78, or 10%, to $43.04.

On Friday, Mr. Swad tried to explain further how the company was accounting for potential losses.

Last week, Fannie Mae reported roughly $670 million in credit losses in the third quarter related to certain charge-offs recorded when delinquent loans were purchased from mortgage-backed securities trusts. Mr. Swad explained Friday that portions of the credit losses would likely be recovered.

Though these third quarter losses were charged off, they are not considered realized losses, Mr. Swad said, because the loans backing these securities could still be "cured." Mr. Swad said the company was "required to take a charge when the market estimate is below our purchase price." The company's experience, he added, "has shown that the majority of these loans don't result in any realized losses." But he declined to be more specific about what percentage of the loans would eventually "cure."

Fannie last week released earnings for the first three quarters of the year. It reported an additional unrealized loss of $955 million in the value of private-label securities backed by subprime and Alt-A mortgages through the end of the third quarter. This was in addition to $376 million the company had previously accounted as a loss for these securities this year.

November 16, 2007 reply from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]

For the record, there was no "accounting change" as per this headline. A headline of "Fannie Mae follows GAAP" probably wouldn't be quite as sexy but it would be 100% accurate. The company's clear explanation of what it is required to do under GAAP is covered in the conference call that is available on Fannie Mae's web site for those accounting aficionados who want to learn more about AICPA Statement of Position 03-03 that requires companies repurchasing loans to record them at fair value. So the answer to your question is that fair value accounting apparently only complicated analysts' understanding in this case.

Denny Beresford

November 17, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Denny,

Your comment sheds a lot of light on this apparent gap between analyst expectations and GAAP rules in this case. The SEC, FASB, and the IASB are pushing hard and steady toward fair value accounting with FAS 155, 157, and 159 just being intermediary steps along the way. At least in this case, however, required fair value accounting is allegedly contributing to the plunge in Fannie Mae’s share values.

This is another example of the unpredictability of the Neutrality Concept in standard setting. You point out (see below) that FASB seriously considers neutrality for every new standard and interpretation with the goal of having scorekeeping not affect how the game is played, but in athletics and business it is virtually impossible to change how something is scored without affecting policies and strategies. For example, when long shots in basketball commenced to earn three points rather than two points it fundamentally changed the game of basketball.

Perhaps this is all an example of what you, in 1989, termed "relevant financial information may bring about damaging consequences." (see a quote from your article below). It would have been interesting if the media reporters in 2007 had cited your 1989 article in this beating Fannie Mae is now taking by adhering to GAAP.

Bob Jensen

"How well does the FASB consider the consequences of its work?" by Dennis Beresford, All Business, March 1, 1989 ---
http://www.allbusiness.com/accounting/methods-standards/105127-1.html

Neutrality is the quality that distinguishes technical decision-making from political decision-making. Neutrality is defined in FASB Concepts Statement 2 as the absence of bias that is intended to attain a predetermined result. Professor Paul B. W. Miller, who has held fellowships at both the FASB and the SEC, has written a paper titled: "Neutrality--The Forgotten Concept in Accounting Standards Setting." It is an excellent paper, but I take exception to his title. The FASB has not forgotten neutrality, even though some of its constituents may appear to have. Neutrality is written into our mission statement as a primary consideration. And the neutrality concept dominates every Board meeting discussion, every informal conversation, and every memorandum that is written at the FASB. As I have indicated, not even those who have a mandate to consider public policy matters have a firm grasp on the macroeconomic or the social consequences of their actions. The FASB has no mandate to consider public policy matters. It has said repeatedly that it is not qualified to adjudicate such matters and therefore does not seek such a mandate. Decisions on such matters properly reside in the United States Congress and with public agencies.

The only mandate the FASB has, or wants, is to formulate unbiased standards that advance the art of financial reporting for the benefit of investors, creditors, and all other users of financial information. This means standards that result in information on which economic decisions can be based with a reasonable degree of confidence.

A fear of information

Unfortunately, there is sometimes a fear that reliable, relevant financial information may bring about damaging consequences. But damaging to whom? Our democracy is based on free dissemination of reliable information. Yes, at times that kind of information has had temporarily damaging consequences for certain parties. But on balance, considering all interests, and the future as well as the present, society has concluded in favor of freedom of information. Why should we fear it in financial reporting?

Continued in article

 

Bob Jensen's threads on standard setting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on Accrual Accounting and Estimation are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#AccrualAccounting

Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue

Bob Jensen's threads on Fannie Mae's enormous problem (the largest in history that led to the firing of KPMG from the audit and a multiple-year effort to restate financial statemetns) with applying FAS 133 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm#FannieMae


Standard Setting and Securities Markets:  U.S. Versus Europe

November 29, 2007 message from Pacter, Paul (CN - Hong Kong) [paupacter@DELOITTE.COM.HK]

Some similarities to Chair of SEC, but some important differences. SEC has direct regulatory powers over securities markets, entities that offer securities in those markets, broker/dealers in securities, auditors, and others. SEC can impose penalties on those it regulates.

In Europe there is no pan-European securities regulator equivalent to the SEC with direct regulatory powers similar to the SEC's. Rather, there are 27 securities regulators (one from each member state) who have that power. Here's a link to the list:

http://www.cesr-eu.org/index.php?page=members_directory&mac=0&id=

There is a coordinating body of European securities regulators called CESR (the Committee of European Securities Regulators (http://www.cesr-eu.org/) but CESR's role is advisory, not regulatory.

When the European Parliament adopts legislation (such as securitieslegislation) the legislation first has to be transposed (legally adopted) into the national laws of the Member States. Commissioner McCreevy's role is to propose policies and propose legislation to adopt those policies in Europe, oversee implementation of the legislation in the 27 Member States (plus 3 EEA countries), and (through both persuasion and some legal authority) try to ensure consistent and coordinated implementation. The Commissioner also has outreach and liaison responsibilities outside the European Union. Because there is no pan-European counterpart to the SEC Chairman, Commissioner McCreevy generally handles top level policy liaison between the SEC and Europe.

Like the Chair of the SEC, EU Commissioners are political appointees.

Paul Pacter

Key differences between U.S. and International Standards --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FASBvsIASB


Question
Is a major overhaul of accounting standards on the way?

Hint
There may no longer be the tried and untrusted earnings per share number to report!
Comment
It would be interesting to see a documentation of the academic research, if any, that the FASB relied upon to commence this blockbuster initiative. I recommend that some astute researcher commence to probe into the thinking behind this proposal.

"Profit as We Know It Could Be Lost With New Accounting Statements," by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, May 12, 2007; Page A1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117893520139500814.html?mod=DAT

Pretty soon the bottom line may not be, well, the bottom line.

In coming months, accounting-rule makers are planning to unveil a draft plan to rework financial statements, the bedrock data that millions of investors use every day when deciding whether to buy or sell stocks, bonds and other financial instruments. One possible result: the elimination of what today is known as net income or net profit, the bottom-line figure showing what is left after expenses have been met and taxes paid.

It is the item many investors look to as a key gauge of corporate performance and one measure used to determine executive compensation. In its place, investors might find a number of profit figures that correspond to different corporate activities such as business operations, financing and investing.

Another possible radical change in the works: assets and liabilities may no longer be separate categories on the balance sheet, or fall to the left and right side in the classic format taught in introductory accounting classes.

ACCOUNTING OVERHAUL

Get a glimpse of what new financial statements could look like, according to an early draft recently provided by the Financial Accounting Standards Board to one of its advisory groups.The overhaul could mark one of the most drastic changes to accounting and financial reporting since the start of the Industrial Revolution in the 19th century, when companies began publishing financial information as they sought outside capital. The move is being undertaken by accounting-rule makers in the U.S. and internationally, and ultimately could affect companies and investors around the world.

The project is aimed at providing investors with more telling information and has come about as rule makers work to one day come up with a common, global set of accounting standards. If adopted, the changes will likely force every accounting textbook to be rewritten and anyone who uses accounting -- from clerks to chief executives -- to relearn how to compile and analyze information that shows what is happening in a business.

This is likely to come as a shock, even if many investors and executives acknowledge that net income has flaws. "If there was no bottom line, I'd want to have a sense of what other indicators I ought to be looking at to get a sense of the comprehensive health of the company," says Katrina Presti, a part-time independent health-care contractor and stay-at-home mom who is part of a 12-woman investment club in Pueblo, Colo. "Net income might be a false indicator, but what would I look at if it goes away?"

The effort to redo financial statements reflects changes in who uses them and for what purposes. Financial statements were originally crafted with bankers and lenders in mind. Their biggest question: Is the business solvent and what's left if it fails? Stock investors care more about a business's current and future profits, so the net-income line takes on added significance for them.

Indeed, that single profit number, particularly when it is divided by the number of shares outstanding, provides the most popular measure of a company's valuation: the price-to-earnings ratio. A company that trades at $10 a share, and which has net profit of $1 a share, has a P/E of 10.

But giving that much power to one number has long been a recipe for fraud and stock-market excesses. Many major accounting scandals earlier this decade centered on manipulation of net income. The stock-market bubble of the 1990s was largely based on investors' assumption that net profit for stocks would grow rapidly for years to come. And the game of beating a quarterly earnings number became a distraction or worse for companies' managers and investors. Obviously it isn't known whether the new format would cut down on attempts to game the numbers, but companies would have to give a more detailed breakdown of what is going on.

The goal of the accounting-rule makers is to better reflect how businesses are actually run and divert attention from the one number. "I know the world likes single bottom-line numbers and all of that, but complicated businesses are hard to translate into just one number," says Robert Herz, chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the U.S. rule-making body that is one of several groups working on the changes.

At the same time, public companies today are more global than local, and as likely to be involved in services or lines of business that involve intellectual property such as software rather than the plants and equipment that defined the manufacturing age. "The income statement today looks a lot like it did when I started out in this profession," says William Parrett, the retiring CEO of accounting firm Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, who started as a junior accountant in 1967. "But the kind of information that goes into it is completely different."

Along the way, figures such as net income have become muddied. That is in part because more and more of the items used to calculate net profit are based on management estimates, such as the value of items that don't trade in active markets and the direction of interest rates. Also, over the years rule makers agreed to corporate demands to account for some things, such as day-to-day changes in the value of pension plans or financial instruments used to protect against changes in interest rates, in ways that keep them from causing swings in net income.

Rule makers hope reformatting financial statements will address some of these issues, while giving investors more information about what is happening in different parts of a business to better assess its value. The project is being managed jointly by the FASB in the U.S. and the London-based International Accounting Standards Board, and involves accounting bodies in Japan, other parts of Asia and individual European nations.

The entire process of adopting the revised approach could take a few years to play out, so much could yet change. Plus, once rule makers adopt the changes, they would have to be ratified by regulatory authorities, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission in the U.S. and the European Commission in Europe, before public companies would be required to follow them.

As a first step, rule makers expect later this year to publish a document outlining their preliminary views on what new form financial statements might take. But already they have given hints of what's in store. In March, the FASB provided draft, new financial statements at the end of a 32-page handout for members of an advisory group. (See an example.)

Although likely to change, this preview showed an income statement that has separate segments for the company's operating business, its financing activities, investing activities and tax payments. Each area has an income subtotal for that particular segment.

There is also a "total comprehensive income" category that is wider ranging than net profit as it is known today, and so wouldn't be directly comparable. That is because this total would likely include gains and losses now kept in other parts of the financial statements. These include some currency fluctuations and changes in the value of financial instruments used to hedge against other items.

Comprehensive income could also eventually include short-term changes in the value of corporate pension plans, which currently are smoothed out over a number of years. As a result, comprehensive income could be a lot more difficult to predict and could be volatile from quarter to quarter or year to year.

As for the balance sheet, the new version would group assets and liabilities together according to similar categories of operating, investing and financing activities, although it does provide a section for shareholders equity. Currently, a balance sheet is broken down between assets and liabilities, rather than by operating categories.

Such drastic change isn't likely to happen without a fight. Efforts to bring now-excluded figures into the income statement could prompt battles with companies that fear their profit will be subject to big swings. Companies may also balk at the expense involved.

"The cost of this change could be monumental," says Gary John Previts, an accounting professor at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland. "All the textbooks are going to have to change, every contract and every bank arrangement will have to change." Investors in Europe and Asia, meanwhile, have opposed the idea of dropping net profit as it appears today, David Tweedie, the IASB's chairman, said in an interview earlier this year.

Analysts in the London office of UBS AG recently published a report arguing this very point -- that even if net income is a "simplistic measure," that doesn't mean it isn't a valid "starting point in valuation" and that "its widespread use is justification enough for its retention."

Such opposition doesn't surprise many accounting experts. Net income is "the basis for bonuses and judgments about what a company's stock is worth," says Stephen A. Zeff, an accounting professor at Rice University. "I just don't know what the markets would do if companies stopped reporting a bottom line somewhere." In the U.S., professional investors and analysts have taken a more nuanced view, perhaps because the manipulation of numbers was more pronounced in U.S. markets.

That said, net profit has been around for some time. The income statement in use today, along with the balance sheet, generally dates to the 1940s when the SEC laid out regulations on financial disclosure. But many companies have included net profit in one form or another since the 1800s.

In its fourth annual report, General Electric Co. provided investors with a consolidated balance sheet and consolidated profit-and-loss account for the year ended Jan. 31, 1896. The company, whose board at the time included Thomas Edison, generated "profit of the year" -- what today would be called net income or net profit -- of $1,388,967.46.

For the moment, net profit will probably exist in some form, although its days are likely numbered. "We've decided in the interim to keep a net-income subtotal, but that's all up for discussion," the FASB's Mr. Herz says.


Accounting Rule Is Eased for Foreign Companies
Federal regulators tentatively agreed Wednesday to ease an accounting requirement for foreign companies that trade on United States exchanges. The action by the Securities and Exchange Commission paves the way for a related change that would allow public companies to choose between international and United States accounting standards when reporting financial results. The step taken by the S.E.C. on Wednesday would eliminate a requirement for foreign companies to reconcile their financial results with United States standards called generally accepted accounting principles, or GAAP. Foreign companies, which already adhere to what are called international financial reporting standards, say the S.E.C. mandate is burdensome and costly. The change, which awaits formal adoption after a 75-day public comment period, would apply to 2008 annual reports, which are submitted in early 2009.
Associated Press, "Accounting Rule Is Eased for Foreign Companies," The New York Times, June 21, 2007 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/21/business/worldbusiness/21sec.html


From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on March 30, 2007

Accounting Standard Setters--Independent and Tough
by Robert E. Denham
Mar 26, 2007
Page: A13
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117486496797748456.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
 

TOPICS: Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Governmental Accounting

SUMMARY: Robert E. Denham is Chairman of the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF), the oversight organization of trustees for the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB). In this editorial page discussion, he responds to concerns expressed in a March 9, 2007, editorial by former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr. Mr. Denham discusses the benefits of stable funding that has been achieved for the FASB through Sarbanes-Oxley requirements and wishes for such a resource for the GASB. He comments on the fact that the FASB and the GASB recently have taken "concrete steps to improve user input to the standard-setting process." He also describes how the Boards have faced enormous opposition at times from corporations and Congressional leaders to do things that have in hindsight turned out to be "the right thing to do. "As they demonstrated in standing up to corporate and governmental pressure on options expensing, the trustees act to protect the independence of the standards setters when they are attacked by special interest groups seeking to block or reverse the decisions of the boards. Students may answer questions by referring to the organizations' web sites at http://www.fasb.org/faf/ http://www.fasb.org/ http://www.gasb.org/

QUESTIONS: 
1.) What is the Financial Accounting Foundation? What is its role in relation to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB)?

2.) Why is it important that the FASB and GASB operate on an independent basis? How did implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley law improve that ability for the FASB?

3.) What challenges do the FASB and GASB face in setting standards that are controversial? How does independence help in facing those challenges? Glean all you can from the articles or from your own knowledge.
 

Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
 

RELATED ARTICLES: 
Standards Deviation
by Arthur Levitt, Jr.
Mar 09, 2007
Page: A15

 


"Accounting Firms Seek Overhaul," by Tad Kopinski, Institutional Shareholder Services ISS, November 20, 2006 ---
http://blog.issproxy.com/2006/11/accounting_firms_seek_overhaul.html

The six biggest international audit firms have called for a complete overhaul of corporate financial reporting as the U.S. and Europe move toward convergence of international audit standards.

In a Nov. 8 report, the accounting firms propose to replace static quarterly financial statements with real-time, Internet-based reporting that encompasses a wider range of performance measures, including non-financial ones. The report was signed by the chiefs of PricewaterhouseCoopers International, Grant Thornton International, Deloitte, KPMG International, BDO International, and Ernst & Young. The report can be downloaded here.

"We all believe the current model is broken," Mike D. Rake, KPMG's chairman, told the Financial Times. "There are significant shortcomings to U.S. GAAP [Generally Accepted Accounting Principles] and issues of concern with International Financial Reporting Standards. We're not in a very happy situation."

Rake noted that quarterly reporting and the short-term focus on companies' ability to meet Wall Street earnings expectations helped foster accounting scandals. The firms have been working on their proposals for more than a year.

The large discrepancy between the "book" and "market" values of many listed companies is clear evidence that the content of traditional financial statements is of limited use, the report said. The audit firms recommend using non-financial measures that would provide more valuable indications of a company's future prospects, such as customer satisfaction, product or service defects, employee turnover, and patent awards.

The report said the following developments need to occur to ensure capital market stability, efficiency, and growth:

--Investor needs for information are well defined and met;
--The roles of the various stakeholders in these markets--financial statement preparers, regulators, investors, standards setters, and auditors--are aligned and supported by effective forums for continuous dialogue;
--The auditing profession is vibrant, sustainable, and provides sufficient choice for all stakeholders in these markets;
--A new business-reporting model is developed to deliver relevant and reliable information in a timely way;
--Large, collusive frauds are more and more rare; and
--Information is reported and audited pursuant to globally consistent standards.
 

ICGN Expresses Concerns Over Convergence

Meanwhile, the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) has expressed concerns about a draft proposal on harmonizing international and U.S. accounting standards. The ICGN argues that the draft doesn't pay sufficient attention to shareholder rights and the stewardship role of boards and investors.

"Convergence must be there to raise standards," ICGN Executive Director Anne Simpson told the Financial Times. "Convergence for its own sake is not of value."

The ICGN letter was in response to a request for comment by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and its U.S. counterpart, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) on a discussion paper on harmonization objectives. The IASB and the FASB have been working on harmonizing the two accounting systems since October 2002 and have set 2008 as the goal for finalizing the process.

Unlike the current IASB auditing framework, the discussion paper endorses a model more similar to U.S. standards, dropping a key shareowner safeguard embedded in U.K.-style standards, the ICGN noted. Rather than focusing audits on past transactions, the discussion paper calls for audits to focus on "decision-usefulness" that can affect company cash flows, the letter said.

"We are concerned that this emphasis on the ability to forecast the future does not fully capture the requirements of stewardship, which is concerned with monitoring past transactions and events," Mark Anson, the CEO of Hermes Pensions Management who chairs the ICGN, wrote in the Nov. 2 letter. (A Hermes affiliate is a part owner of ISS.)

"In many jurisdictions, financial statements provide significant input into the decisions we make as shareholders, by providing an account of past transactions and events and the current financial position of the business," the ICGN letter noted. "In de-emphasizing things that are particularly [relevant to shareholders' risks and rights], the standards setters could achieve the perverse effect of actually increasing the cost of capital."

The ICGN includes more than 400 institutional and private investors, corporations, and advisers from 38 countries with capital under management in excess of $10 trillion, according to its Web site. The ICGN letter also was signed by Claude Lamoureux, CEO of the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan.

A copy of the IASB discussion paper, which was published in July, can be downloaded here.

Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue

Bob Jensen's threads on troubles in the big international accounting firms are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on proposed reforms are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudProposedReforms.htm


Question
Will the U.S. adopt all IFRS international standards while the European Union cherry picks which standards it will adopt?

From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on April 27, 2007

"SEC to Mull Letting U.S. Companies Use International Accounting Rules," by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, Page: C3 --- http://snipurl.com/WSJ0425

TOPICS: Accounting, Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Securities and Exchange Commission

SUMMARY: The article describes the SEC's willingness to consider allowing U.S. companies to use USGAAP or International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in their filings. This development stems from the initiative to allow international firms traded on U.S. exchanges to file using IFRS without reconciling to USGAAP-based net income and stockholders' equity as is now required on Form 20F. "SEC Chairman Christopher Cox said the agency remains committed to removing the reconciliation requirement by 2009. Such a move was the subject of an SEC roundtable and is being closely watched by European Union officials." The SEC will accept comments this summer on its proposal to eliminate the reconciliation requirements. If the agency does implement this change, then it will consider allowing U.S. companies the same alternative.

QUESTIONS:
1.) What is a "foreign private issuer" (FPI)? Summarize the SEC's current filing requirements for these entities.

2.) Why is the SEC considering allowing U.S. companies to submit filings under IFRS rather than U.S. GAAP?

3.) Why might the SEC's decision in this matter "spell the demise of USGAAP"?

4.) Define "principles-based standards" and contrast with "rules-based standards." Give an example in either USGAAP or IFRS requirements for each of these items.

5.) "Some experts don't think a move away from U.S. GAAP would necessarily be bad." Who do you think would hold this opinion? Who would disagree? Explain.

6.) Define the term convergence in relation to global standards. Who is working towards this goal?

Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

Jensen Comment
Canada has already decided to adopt the IFRS in place of domestic Canadian standards.

Also see ""Strengthening the Transatlantic Economy," by José Manuel Barroso (European Commission President), April 27, 2007 --- http://www.iasplus.com/europe/0704barroso.pdf

Also don't assume that the European Union automatically adopts each IASB international standard. For example, the EU may not adopt IFRS 8 --- http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ifrs08.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on differences between the international and U.S. standards are summarized at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FASBvsIASB


Complicated Accounting Rules and Employee Pressures

November 7, 2006 message from Amy Dunbar [Amy.Dunbar@BUSINESS.UCONN.EDU]

I am teaching a class, Research for Accounting Professionals, and I have been thinking about how to prepare my students for the "real world." I am looking for some insight re: the apparent increased pressure on accountants. For example, some say that the financial reporting environment is rivaling the tax world for the number of new rules that come out every year. I counted the number of statements issued since per year and found that the 1980s was the busiest period, with 1982 being the highest year with 18 statements. Does anyone know why that was? If the number of statements isn't increasing, is it the guidance from SEC that has increased, or is the pressure coming from the SOX environment with its emphasis on internal controls? Has the internal control guidance stepped up? Or is the pressure simply the same pressure that all business people are facing from increased global competition?

1 1973
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1 2005
5 2006

Amy Dunbar
University of Connecticut
School of Business
Department of Accounting
2100 Hillside Road, Unit 1041 Storrs, CT 06269

November 8, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Amy,

I don’t think you can compare numbers of FASB/SEC statements with any sort of confidence. How do you compare FAS 133 (incredibly complex) with FAS 157 (relatively simple)? The problem is not the number of new standards but the way new standards merely add to a growing mountain of previous standards that does not go away --- the mountain just grows higher and higher.

Our students must face an exceedingly complex world of technology. They must have skills in pivot tables, client databases, knowledge databases, ERP, and things that were just not crashing down on our graduates in the 1980s.

I personally think that a negative externality of technology has been increased risk of fraud that increases pressures on auditors. For example, technology has made it lucrative to steal IDs. Now we have huge conspiracies to steal those IDs, as witnessed by the recent reporting of a gang, including hotel owners, managers, and employees, that were stealing IDs at multiple hotels. Internal controls have just not kept pace with the level of theft risks and temptations, and our graduates are under pressures to invent newer  internal controls in complicated IT systems. Hacker/Cracker criminals themselves are extremely sophisticated and skilled. Our networked enemies can be anywhere on the globe.

Pressures are coming from a wide variety of interacting causes, not the least of which is SOX which is basically aimed at improving audit quality. What you had back in the 1980s was auditing sham! Firms like Andersen were removing much of the detail testing and trench work out of the audits, thereby taking much of the pressure off of auditors in the field --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm#RiskBasedAuditing
The world’s worst audit in history, WorldCom, brought this sham into the light.

The audit scandals (spread rather evenly among firms), litigation losses, the nose dive of reputation of the CPA profession, and SOX turned much of this around and now the audit firms are trying to restore the professionalism of their work with a dramatic increase in funding to do the job. But the pressures are bound to increase as well if auditors really try to do professional work.

You have audit firms being fired (the way KPMG was fired from Fannie Mae and E&Y was fired from TIAA/CREF). You have clients paying millions upon millions to restate financial statements because of bad auditing (e.g., Fannie is spending over $100 million to produce restatements). This is bound to pressure auditors assigned to do the job right. One of my former students brought in by PwC to help generate Fannie’s restatements said that he had to become an expert on valuing derivatives using a Bloomberg terminal (as part of the restatement effort). How many of our accounting education programs teach students how to value interest rate swaps on a Bloomberg terminal?

But mostly I think the pressure is on our graduates to deal with incredibly tough contracts that their professors and their supervisors themselves do not understand. Pressure is put on our green-as-grass new graduates to understand and explain contract complexity all the way up the food chain in their firms.

Below is a message that I received yesterday from a recent graduate who went to work immediately for AT&T rather than one of the big auditing firms. It helps explain how our young graduates encounter contracts that do not appear in our textbooks and how they must have skills and knowledge well beyond what we taught in the past Century.

 

Hey again Dr. Jensen,

I have another derivatives situation! Do you know anything about zero coupon bonds that are puttable? I guess they are a relatively new transaction type that banks are trying to push. I guess the theory is that you sacrifice some additional risk (by allowing the bondholder to put to you) in return for a lower interest rate than a typical zero coupon bond. It is my interpretation that written options don't count for hedge accounting status unless they offset another derivative instrument (FAS 133, P 396-401). It is also my interpretation that this is a situation which would create a difference in the bond value which would be reflected as an income statement (other income/expense) effect.

However, I think the financial components of the situation are over my head, and my boss is trying to tell me that he thinks that all of this transaction would either run through interest expense or there would be a huge increase in income in the first period represented (with no MTM throughout). I don't understand these arguments. Do you have any idea what he is getting at?

I am really grateful for any help you can provide, but I am starting to feel bad about emailing you. I have always assumed that you enjoyed these kind of discussions, but if you don't please don't feel obligated to answer. Just let me know - I don't want to disturb your retirement!

As always, hope things are well.

Thanks again so much.

Andrew

 My response to him is too long to repeat here, but you can read a bit more about puttable bond accounting at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm

Each new message from a frustrated former student makes me happier that I’m retired in the high hills.  I would not want to be one of these young men and women today.

Bob Jensen

November 8, 2006 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

Years ago, I suggested one of my doctoral students (now a colleague) to prepare a graph that shows how the various standards are related. The result was the graph attached.

Here, we represent each standard as a point, equidistant from each other, on the circumference of a circle. Then we draw an arrow from standard A to standard B if standard A amended Standard B. The result is the attached graph. It looks more like an oval because I had to compress the image to fit powerpoint slide.

The graph helps us understand the dynamics of standards, forces us to ask questions as to why standards may be frequently revised, why interpretation of "the GAAP" as opposed to standards becomes difficult, and behooves us to ask what needs to be done.

This sort of a graph is used in information retrieval as well as exploratory data analysis. I teach using this figure in my statistics course for accountants (and not Accounting "Theory" course).

Those interested in my first class of the semester, please go to the following link:

http://www.albany.edu/acc/courses/acc522.fall2006/classnotes/acc522sept142006.ppt 

Hope I am not too far off the mark.

Regards,

Jagdish

November 8, 2006 reply from Jim Formosa [Jim.Formosa@NSCC.EDU]

I believe that SOX and the PCOAB shocked the FASB for a while and I am not sure that the shock has worn off. I remember reading in several journals that, with the advent of the PCOAB, the FASB became tentative. Then I believe you have to consider the FASB process which requires drafting and approvals with the constant threat of legislative interference at the federal level. Many have questioned the long-term efficacy of the FASB process itself. I believe in full disclosure and feedback in the rule making process but it should not take years - expensing options as only one of several examples.

I have also read that many believe the FASB is fast becoming a dinosaur that has outlived its usefulness- it will certainly be interesting.

Jim Formosa, M.S., CPA
Certified Senior WebCT Trainer
Associate Professor of Accounting
Nashville Community College 615-353-3420 FAX 615-356-1213

November 8, 2006 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

1. Codification is a neanderthal concept and a vestige of the disastrous Napoleonic rule in Europe. It is expensive, does nothing to resolve whatever ambiguities that might be present (in fact it might exacerbate them), has high maintenance, and totally ignores all the developments in information technologies over the past century. In fact, in my humble opinion, codification is the accounting equivalent of Iraq (I am, of course, exaggerating here). What is needed is NOT radical reconstitutive surgery of the body of accounting standards (as in Iraq) by first disemboweling them, but a philosophical reflection of the way we draft standards (and how we use them) that is informed by the developments in information technology.

In my humble opinion, the emerging technologies surrounding the semantic web initiative of W3C is the way to go, but that involves considerable research investments.

Years ago I tried a dialogue with some firms (and also with FASB through some friends) about supporting research in the area, but my plea fell on deaf ears (except for Arthur Andersen - their Litigation Support people, who showed considerable interest before they tragically disbanded).

2. Your second question as to why people still refer to SASes rather than their codification, I think I can safely rest my case in 1. above. Codification adds little value at great cost. Codification is for the lazy people who want their thinking done for them.

If the standards are drafted well, codification is a trivial task. One can have an algorithm for codification in less than a semester of a competent doctoral student's time. Drafting the standards well is another matter, and is a profoundly intellectual activity. We can not do that without adequate theories of language competence, language use, reasoning, and theories of textual interpretation (similar to legal hermeneutics). And having examined the standards as well as EDGAR filings over the past few years, I can safely say that we in accounting are quite lacking in each of these.

Regards,

Jagdish

November 8, 2006 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

Bob,

1. That accounting standards standards have become complex over the years is true. It is also perhaps true that they are nowadays better drafted compared with the philosophical ramblings in very early "standards". However, I personally don't think they are anywhere close to the tax code in complexity (and of course length. For example, section 10 of SFAS 133, a relatively long paragraph for SFASes, is dwarfed by, for example section 351 of the Tax code, a relatively average paragraph).

I will not resort to midieval torture of the reader by reproducing the two sections side-by-side. But the elegance of the tax code and the lack thereof is there plainly to be seen.

One of the problems with drafting in accounting standards is in the way definitions are stated. In accounting, the definitions are often given by examples rather than definitions with exceptions to the definitions. That is not the only problem. There are a slew of problems that I wrote about in an article titled "Some thoughts on the Engineering of Financial Accounting Standards" that I wrote a long time ago (in the second volume on AI in Accounting edited by Miklos Vasarhelyi.

It would be an interesting exercise comparing the complexities between the two texts after developing appropriate metrics. I am not sure accounting standards would measure up to the tax code, but I am no expert in either field. Perhaps some one like Amy who is one in both can enlighten us.

Jagdish

November 9, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

Jagdish,

Codification with enforcement suppresses some types of atrocious behavior. For example, thousands of CEOs commenced to steal from investors by backdating stock options until disclosure rules were put in place.

Without codification and enforcement there's anarchy. With excess codification freedom and creativity is suppressed. It's just very, very difficult to set the bar optimally because Arrow's Impossibility Theorem proved it to be impossible --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impossibility_theorem 

We are thus doomed to forever debate codes of behavior ad infinitum.

As usual you make good points. However, financial contracting is so complex that I'm like Amy is with tax accounting. I cannot imagine trying to account on a subjective judgment basis without codification. Without codification comparability is virtually impossible with exotic financial structurings.

It's possible to reduce the problem with simplified rules/laws such as eliminating 90% of the personal tax code with a new flat tax, eliminating accrual accounting in favor of cash flow financial reporting, or reporting on a "fair value" basis for all assets and liabilities. But the social impacts of a flat tax are contentious. Cash flow reporting is a license for CEOs to mislead and manipulate investors with cash flow timing manipulations. Fair value reporting creates more fiction than fact (such as wild earnings fluctuations of perfect hedges that eliminate cash flow or FX risk).

Codification sets parameters on major types of behavior. What is "right" versus "wrong" becomes anarchy if those parameters become subjective variables. The never-ending debate becomes one of deciding what are the "major types of behavior" to be codified since it is impractical and undesirable to set a parameter for every element of behavior. In the case of financial structuring we keep inventing new "major types." For example, the interest rate swap was invented in 1984 and quickly became a major way to raise capital before it even had to be disclosed (FAS 119) and eventually booked (FAS 133) in Year 2000.

We are thus doomed to forever debate codes of behavior and accounting standards ad infinitum.

My threads containing earlier arguments on this issue (e.g., Beresford versus Ketz) are shown below.

Bob Jensen


March 28, 2006 message from Denny Beresford [DBeresfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]

A House of Representatives subcommittee is going to have a public hearing on Wednesday that has the objective of discussing "ways to promote more transparent financial reporting, including current initiatives by regulators and industry."

See the press release at:
http://financialservices.house.gov/news.asp?FormMode=release&id=777&NewsType=1  for further details.

Denny Beresford

House Committee on Financial Services --- http://snipurl.com/BakerSub

Baker Subcommittee to Advocate Transparency in Financial Reporting

The Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises, chaired by Rep. Richard H. Baker (LA), will convene for a hearing entitled Fostering Accuracy and Transparency in Financial Reporting. The hearing will take place on Wednesday, March 29 at 10 a.m. in room 2128 of the Rayburn building.

Members of the Subcommittee are expected to discuss ways to promote more transparent financial reporting, including current initiatives by regulators and industry.

For the capital markets to operate most efficiently, information about public companies must be understandable, accessible, and accurate. Corporate statements are mathematical summaries meant to convey a company’s condition. The four basic documents which must be filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are at the heart of investor disclosure: the income statement, the cash flow statement, the balance sheet, and the statement of changes in equity.

Among the current initiatives to improve the clarity and usefulness of public company information is a trend away from quarterly earnings forecasting, the use of technology to decrease complexity, and a review of the various accounting standards and how they interact.

Subcommittee Chairman Baker said, "If U.S. markets are to remain on top in an increasingly competitive global marketplace, we need to move away from the complex and cumbersome and explore technological and other methods of enhancing the clarity, accuracy, and efficiency of our accounting system. At the same time, we need to look at whether earnings forecasting and the beat-the-street mentality, which appears to have contributed to some of the executive malfeasance of the past several years, truly serves the best interest of investors or the goal of long-term economic growth."

The corporate scandals several years ago revealed weaknesses in the financial reporting system. While many companies were violating financial reporting requirements, regulatory complexity also may have contributed to some lapses in compliance.

Fraud, general manipulation of statements, and regulatory complexity all contribute to a reduction in the usefulness of financial statements and all may obfuscate the picture of companies’ financial health. A number of recent studies have argued against the practice of predicting future quarterly earnings, concluding that the drive to “make the numbers” can lead to poor business decisions and the manipulation of earnings.

Congress, regulators, and the industry subsequently have assessed financial reporting failures and have reacted with efforts aimed at strengthening the system, including many provisions of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

More recent initiatives by regulators to streamline financial reporting standards and accounting include:

Public Companies have been filing financial statements with the SEC since the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

March 28, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Denny,

 I know that we disagree on the principles based standards initiative. My negative position on this is outlined somewhat at
http://snipurl.com/JensenPBS

I just don't think the principles based Ten Commandments are sufficient to discard all statutes on felony law. I don't think we can discard all FDA rules on drug testing and replace them with principles based guidelines for pharmaceutical companies to follow. The same can be said for environmental protection regulations, child protective services, and whatever. Sometimes we need detailed rules so we have better guidance as to what is right and what is wrong in specific and complex circumstances.

You and I go back to the old days (and we passed the CPA exam). GAAP was much less complex and could virtually be memorized. We go back to the days when much was left to "auditor judgment."

But we also go back to the days when CEOs were not fanatics about hitting analyst forecasts. We go back to days when top-tier management compensation did not swing heavily an eps number. We go back to the days when debt was debt and equity was equity. More importantly we go back to the days when an auditor could actually understand contracts being written.

In the past CEOs respected auditor decisions and did not threaten auditors like in so many companies are doing today. Too many times in recent years we've seen where virtually all big auditing firms have caved in to pressures from large clients such as the way KPMG caved in on Fannie Mae and Andersen caved in on various big clients --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm#others

 I think that less complex principles based standards will only increase conflicts between clients and auditors. Neither will know that rules (albeit complex rules as in the case of derivatives, leases, VIEs, and pensions) are being broken if there are no detailed rules to be broken.

 I think the absence of detailed rules greatly increase inconsistencies in "auditor judgment." I think absence of detailed rules takes away auditor bargaining chips when dealing with clients.

I guess my bottom line conclusion is that the global world of contracting, risk management, and mezzanine debt is totally unlike the simpler world back in the old days when we were auditor whippersnappers.

 Bob Jensen


Principles-Based Versus Rules-Based Accounting Standards

"Standing on Principles In a world with more regulation than ever, can the accounting rulebook be thrown away?" byAlix Nyberg Stuart, CFO Magazine September 01, 2006 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7852613/c_7873404?f=magazine_featured

As Groucho Marx once said, "Those are my principles, and if you don't like them...well, I have others."

Groucho would enjoy the heated stalemate over principles-based accounting. Four years after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act required the Securities and Exchange Commission to explore the feasibility of developing principles-based accounting standards in lieu of detailed rules, the move to such standards has gone exactly nowhere. ad

Broadly speaking, principles-based standards would be consistent, concise, and general, requiring CFOs to apply common sense rather than bright-lines. Instead of having, say, numerical thresholds to define when leases must be capitalized, a CFO could use his or her own judgment as to whether a company's interest was substantial enough to put a lease on the balance sheet. If anything, though, accounting and auditing standards have reached new levels of nitpickiness. "In the current environment, CFOs are second-guessed by auditors, who are then third-guessed by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [PCAOB], and then fourth- and fifth-guessed by the SEC and the plaintiffs' bar," says Colleen Cunningham, president and CEO of Financial Executives International (FEI).

Indeed, the Financial Accounting Standards Board seems to have taken a principled stand in favor of rule-creation. The Board continues to issue detailed rules and staff positions. Auditors have amped up their level of scrutiny, in many cases leading to a tripling of audit fees since 2002. And there is still scant mercy for anyone who breaks the rules: the annual number of restatements doubled to more than 1,000 between 2003 and 2005, thanks to pressure from auditors and the SEC. The agency pursued a record number of enforcement actions in the past three years, while shareholder lawsuits, many involving accounting practices, continued apace, claiming a record $7.6 billion in settlements last year and probably more in 2006.

Yet the dream won't die. On the contrary, principles are at the heart of FASB's latest thinking about changes to its basic accounting framework, as reflected in the "preliminary views" the board issued in July with the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) as part of its plan to converge U.S. and international standards. Principles-based accounting has been championed by FASB chairman Robert Herz, SEC commissioner Paul Atkins, SEC deputy chief accountant Scott Taub, and PCAOB member Charlie Niemeier in various speeches over the past six months. And they're not just talking about editing a few lines in the rulebook.

"We need FASB, the SEC, the PCAOB, preparers, users, auditors, and the legal profession to get together and check their respective agendas at the door in order to collectively think through the obstacles," says Herz. "And if it turns out some of the obstacles are hardwired into our structure, then maybe we need some legal changes as well," such as safe harbors that would protect executives and auditors from having their judgments continually challenged. Even the SEC is talking about loosening up. Most at the agency favor the idea of principles instead of rules, says Taub, even knowing that "people will interpret them in different ways and we'll have to deal with it."

Standards Deviation Why lawmakers are so set on principles and what exactly those principles would look like is all a bit hazy right now. "Post-Enron, the perception was that people were engineering around the accounting rules. We looked around the world and saw that England had principles-based accounting and they didn't have scandals there, so we decided this was the way to go," recounts CVS Corp. CFO David Rickard, a Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Committee (FASAC) member.

But Rickard considers the approach "naive." His firsthand experience with principles-based accounting, as a group controller for London-based Grand Metropolitan from 1991 to 1997, left him unimpressed. "We had accounting rules we could drive trucks through," he says.

Would such a change be worth the trouble? A recent study that compared the accrual quality of Canadian companies reporting under a relatively principles-based GAAP to that of U.S. companies reporting by the rules suggests that there may be no effective difference between the two systems. The authors, Queen's University (Ontario) professors Daniel B. Thornton and Erin Webster, found some evidence that the Canadian approach yields better results, but conclude that "stronger U.S. oversight and greater litigation risk" compensate for any differences.

U.S. GAAP is built on principles; they just happen to be buried under hundreds of rules. The SEC, in its 2003 report on principles-based accounting, labeled some standards as being either "rules" or "principles." (No surprise to CFOs, FAS 133, stock-option accounting, and lease accounting fall in the former category, while FAS 141 and 142 were illustrative of the latter.) The difference: principles offer only "a modicum" of implementation guidance and few scope exceptions or bright-lines. ad

For FASB, the move to principles-based accounting is part of a larger effort to organize the existing body of accounting literature, and to eliminate internal inconsistencies. "Right now, we have a pretty good conceptual framework, but the standards have often deviated from the concepts," says Herz. He envisions "a common framework" with the IASB, where "you take the concepts," such as how assets and liabilities should be measured, and "from those you draw key principles" for specific areas of accounting, like pensions and business combinations. In fact, that framework as it now stands would change corporate accounting's most elemental principle, that income essentially reflects the difference between revenues and expenses. Instead, income would depend more on changes in the value of assets and liabilities (see "Will Fair Value Fly?").

For its part, the SEC has also made clear that it does not envisage an entirely free-form world. "Clearly, the standard setters should provide some implementation guidance as a part of a newly issued standard," its 2003 report states.

The catch is that drawing a line between rules and principles is easier said than done. Principles need to be coupled with implementation guidance, which is more of an art than a science, says Ben Neuhausen, national director of accounting for BDO Seidman. That ambiguity may explain why finance executives are so divided on support for this concept. Forty-seven percent of the executives surveyed by CFO say they are in favor of a shift to principles, another 25 percent are unsure of its merits, and 17 percent are unfamiliar with the whole idea. Only 10 percent oppose it outright, largely out of concern that it would be too difficult to determine which judgments would pass muster.

A Road to Hell? As it stands now, many CFOs fear that principles-based accounting would quickly lead to court. "The big concern is that we make a legitimate judgment based on the facts as we understand them, in the spirit of trying to comply, and that plaintiffs' attorneys come along later with an expert accountant who says, 'I wouldn't have done it that way,' and aha! — lawsuit! — several billion dollars, please," says Rickard.

Massive shareholder lawsuits were a concern for 36 percent of CFOs who oppose ditching rules, according to CFO's survey, and regulators are sympathetic. "There are institutional and behavioral issues, and they're much broader than FASB or even the SEC," says Herz, citing "the focus on short-term earnings, and the whole kabuki dance around quarterly guidance."

Continued in article


"The Accounting Cycle: Herz Encourages Simpler Accounting: Again, Bah, Humbug!" by: J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, December 2005 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x50933.xml

Robert Herz, chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, spoke at the AICPA National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments* on December 6. Similar to the speech by SEC Chairman Christopher Cox on the previous day, Mr. Herz directed his comments to the proposition "that we need to reduce the complexity of our reporting system." The proposition may be true, but Herz did little to advance the cause in his speech.

In particular, Robert Herz merely asserted his beliefs without adding any logic or any evidence that the reporting system is too complex. Worse, he touts principles-based accounting as the savior for the world of financial reporting, but again provides no argumentation to support his hypothesis. Maybe it’s because there is none. (Read the full speech.)

Given that we have two chairmen making some brash comments about the complexity of accounting, let’s investigate this further. Is complexity really bad? Is complexity really the major problem with financial reporting?

Is complexity bad?

Suppose a patient visits his or her general practitioner about some medical problem. After some initial testing, the general practitioner refers the patient to a specialist. The patient obtains a copy of the referral letter, but has difficulty reading it. Should a government agency intervene, complaining that the letter is "too complex" and require medical doctors to apply plain English?

I think the answer is obvious -- of course not. When one doctor writes to another physician, he or she may employ scientific jargon. They are both trained in biology, chemistry, and medicine. The complex vocabulary and the complex theories that they utilize actually improve the communication process. The additional complexity allows a doctor to make more precise statements about the patient's condition and about possible solutions to the medical problem. Requiring plain English statements would create greater ambiguity and distort the communication process.

Of course, when the doctor talks with the patient, he or she must use plain English. Because the patient does not have medical training, the patient will not understand the more precise language and therefore the communication process will suffer if the physician employs medical language. As the physician employs the less precise language of everyday English, the patient will learn more about the medical problem and possible future tests. Some communication with a less precise language is better than virtually no communication with a more powerful language designed for experts.

While the analogy isn't perfect, it fits the accounting scenario. When business enterprises report on their financial condition and on their results during the past year (or quarter), they can more precisely convey their message by applying a more precise accounting language. This text, however, is meant for those trained in finance and in accounting. Complexity can actually improve the communication process when the recipient is a sophisticated user.

Naïve financial statement readers may not understand the language of accounting, but they are not necessarily hurt by that situation. Just as general practitioners can revert from a medical language to everyday language when they speak with patients, financial analysts and brokers can employ plain English when they speak with clients. In this manner, the messages contained in an annual (or quarterly) report become disseminated to a wide audience.

More precise language and better economic theories will improve the communication between business enterprises and sophisticated users, even if the reports are complex. Sophisticated users can then translate the messages into plain English and convey these stories to naïve users.

Is complexity really the major problem?

When remonstrating the overly complex accounting rules and when touting principles-based accounting, Chairman Herz points to "bright lines" as an example of what's wrong with current-day standards. I agree with him that such bright lines constitute a problem, but the problem isn’t the complexity introduced by these bright lines. The problem is that these bright lines are arbitrary and capricious. Instead of relying upon economic theory, the FASB (and the SEC whenever it enters the skirmish) has invented these bright lines that have no meaning and no empirical referent.

Consider leases: the FASB created the 90 percent cutoff point for deciding whether a lessee had to capitalize a lease, but it never informed us why. If the present value of the future cash commitments equals 89.9 percent of the property's fair value, then the lease is an operating lease; but if it equals 90 percent, then the lease is a capital lease. What economic theory does the FASB rest its decision on? No theory at all. The board randomly and recklessly introduced this bright line into the literature.

If the board really wanted to improve financial reporting, then it would require lessees to capitalize all leases that had duration greater than one year. You introduce no fictitious bright lines and ironically, you simplify the accounting! More importantly, the rule would require corporations to tell it as it is rather than distort the economic reality of the lease.

Continued in article

Jensen Comment
Although there is a ground swell of support for both principles-based accounting standards and greatly simplified standards, I'm inclined to be against both movements.  Business contracting, especially risk diffusion and management contracting, is becoming so complex that I think principles-based standards and greatly simplified standards are moves in the wrong direction.  Powerful new financial analysis tools in networked communications, meta-tagging (e.g., XBRL), and database sharing (eventually object-oriented database elements) will be greatly harmed if complex standards do not accompany complex contracting.  I think Professor Ketz has taken a bold stand in the above article, and I personally take the same stance.  This, of course, puts me at odds with the current and many former directors of standard setting bodies (e.g., the FASB and the IASB), including my very good friend Dennis Beresford who sides with Bob Herz and probably influenced Bob Herz.  See http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm

I'm not necessarily arguing in favor of more bright lines.  We can perhaps avoid these bright lines with more details, albeit complex details, about contracts, hedging strategies, hedging effectiveness, mezzanine debt contracts, VIEs, etc.  Years ago Bill Beaver (in an innovative unpublished working paper) argued in favor of database reporting to get around some of the bright lines problems.  This is more complex reporting, but we can have develop the technologies needed to analyze database reporting.  What we cannot do is do away with complex standards to deal with how complex contracts are reported in the databases.  The standards are what makes comparisons between databases possible.

The analogy relating accounting to medicine is on target.  In this era of DNA advances in medicine, we do not want medical standards to become less complex in a more complex world of knowledge.  We hope the standards become more complex to match the increased complexity of our understanding.  Similarly, we hope the standards of accounting become more complex to match the increased complexity of contracts around the world.

 

"The Accounting Cycle: Herz Encourages Simpler Accounting: Again, Bah, Humbug!" by: J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, December 2005 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x50933.xml

Robert Herz, chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, spoke at the AICPA National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments* on December 6. Similar to the speech by SEC Chairman Christopher Cox on the previous day, Mr. Herz directed his comments to the proposition "that we need to reduce the complexity of our reporting system." The proposition may be true, but Herz did little to advance the cause in his speech.

In particular, Robert Herz merely asserted his beliefs without adding any logic or any evidence that the reporting system is too complex. Worse, he touts principles-based accounting as the savior for the world of financial reporting, but again provides no argumentation to support his hypothesis. Maybe it’s because there is none. (Read the full speech.)

Given that we have two chairmen making some brash comments about the complexity of accounting, let’s investigate this further. Is complexity really bad? Is complexity really the major problem with financial reporting?

Is complexity bad?

Suppose a patient visits his or her general practitioner about some medical problem. After some initial testing, the general practitioner refers the patient to a specialist. The patient obtains a copy of the referral letter, but has difficulty reading it. Should a government agency intervene, complaining that the letter is "too complex" and require medical doctors to apply plain English?

I think the answer is obvious -- of course not. When one doctor writes to another physician, he or she may employ scientific jargon. They are both trained in biology, chemistry, and medicine. The complex vocabulary and the complex theories that they utilize actually improve the communication process. The additional complexity allows a doctor to make more precise statements about the patient's condition and about possible solutions to the medical problem. Requiring plain English statements would create greater ambiguity and distort the communication process.

Of course, when the doctor talks with the patient, he or she must use plain English. Because the patient does not have medical training, the patient will not understand the more precise language and therefore the communication process will suffer if the physician employs medical language. As the physician employs the less precise language of everyday English, the patient will learn more about the medical problem and possible future tests. Some communication with a less precise language is better than virtually no communication with a more powerful language designed for experts.

While the analogy isn't perfect, it fits the accounting scenario. When business enterprises report on their financial condition and on their results during the past year (or quarter), they can more precisely convey their message by applying a more precise accounting language. This text, however, is meant for those trained in finance and in accounting. Complexity can actually improve the communication process when the recipient is a sophisticated user.

Naïve financial statement readers may not understand the language of accounting, but they are not necessarily hurt by that situation. Just as general practitioners can revert from a medical language to everyday language when they speak with patients, financial analysts and brokers can employ plain English when they speak with clients. In this manner, the messages contained in an annual (or quarterly) report become disseminated to a wide audience.

More precise language and better economic theories will improve the communication between business enterprises and sophisticated users, even if the reports are complex. Sophisticated users can then translate the messages into plain English and convey these stories to naïve users.

Is complexity really the major problem?

When remonstrating the overly complex accounting rules and when touting principles-based accounting, Chairman Herz points to "bright lines" as an example of what's wrong with current-day standards. I agree with him that such bright lines constitute a problem, but the problem isn’t the complexity introduced by these bright lines. The problem is that these bright lines are arbitrary and capricious. Instead of relying upon economic theory, the FASB (and the SEC whenever it enters the skirmish) has invented these bright lines that have no meaning and no empirical referent.

Consider leases: the FASB created the 90 percent cutoff point for deciding whether a lessee had to capitalize a lease, but it never informed us why. If the present value of the future cash commitments equals 89.9 percent of the property's fair value, then the lease is an operating lease; but if it equals 90 percent, then the lease is a capital lease. What economic theory does the FASB rest its decision on? No theory at all. The board randomly and recklessly introduced this bright line into the literature.

If the board really wanted to improve financial reporting, then it would require lessees to capitalize all leases that had duration greater than one year. You introduce no fictitious bright lines and ironically, you simplify the accounting! More importantly, the rule would require corporations to tell it as it is rather than distort the economic reality of the lease.

Continued in article

Jensen Comment
Although there is a ground swell of support for both principles-based accounting standards and greatly simplified standards, I'm inclined to be against both movements.  Business contracting, especially risk diffusion and management contracting, is becoming so complex that I think principles-based standards and greatly simplified standards are moves in the wrong direction.  Powerful new financial analysis tools in networked communications, meta-tagging (e.g., XBRL), and database sharing (eventually object-oriented database elements) will be greatly harmed if complex standards do not accompany complex contracting.  I think Professor Ketz has taken a bold stand in the above article, and I personally take the same stance.  This, of course, puts me at odds with the current and many former directors of standard setting bodies (e.g., the FASB and the IASB), including my very good friend Dennis Beresford who sides with Bob Herz and probably influenced Bob Herz.  See http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm

I'm not necessarily arguing in favor of more bright lines.  We can perhaps avoid these bright lines with more details, albeit complex details, about contracts, hedging strategies, hedging effectiveness, mezzanine debt contracts, VIEs, etc.  Years ago Bill Beaver (in an innovative unpublished working paper) argued in favor of database reporting to get around some of the bright lines problems.  This is more complex reporting, but we can have develop the technologies needed to analyze database reporting.  What we cannot do is do away with complex standards to deal with how complex contracts are reported in the databases.  The standards are what makes comparisons between databases possible.

The analogy relating accounting to medicine is on target.  In this era of DNA advances in medicine, we do not want medical standards to become less complex in a more complex world of knowledge.  We hope the standards become more complex to match the increased complexity of our understanding.  Similarly, we hope the standards of accounting become more complex to match the increased complexity of contracts around the world.


"The Accounting Cycle:  The Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting Op/Ed,"  by J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, September 2006 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x54322.xml 

The Financial Accounting Standards Board and the International Accounting Standards Board have joined forces to flesh out a common conceptual framework. Recently they issued some preliminary views on the "objectives of financial reporting" and the "qualitative characteristics of decision-useful financial reporting information" and have asked for comment.

To obtain "coherent financial reporting," the boards feel that they need "a framework that is sound, comprehensive, and internally consistent" (paragraph P3). In P5, they also state their hope for convergence between U.S. and international accounting standards.

P6 indicates a need to fill in certain gaps, such as a "robust concept of a reporting entity." I presume that they will accomplish this task later, as the current document does not develop such a "robust concept."

Chapter 1 presents the objective for financial reporting, and the description differs little from what is in Concepts Statement No. 1. This objective is "to provide information that is useful to present and potential investors and creditors and others in making investment, credit, and similar resource allocation decisions." The emphasis lay with capital providers, as it should. If anything, I would place greater accent on this aspect, because in the last 10 years, so many managers have defined the "business world" as including managers and excluding investors and creditors. To our chagrin, we learned that managers actually believed this lie, as they pretended that the resources supplied by the investment community belonged to the management team.

FASB and IASB further explain that these users are interested in the cash flows of the entity so they can assess the potential returns and the potential variability of those returns (e.g., in paragraph OB.23). I wish they had drawn the logical conclusion that financial reporting ought to exclude income smoothing. Income smoothing leads the user to assess a smaller variance of earnings than warranted by the underlying economics; income smoothing biases downward the actual variability of the earnings and thus the returns.

Later, in the basis of conclusions, the document addresses the reporting of comprehensive income and its components (see BC1.28-31). Currently, FASB has four items that enter other comprehensive income: gains and losses on available-for-sale investments, losses when incurring additional amounts to recognize a minimum pension liability, exchange gains and losses from a foreign subsidiary under the all-current method, and gains and losses from derivatives that hedge cash flows.

The purported reason for this demarcation between earnings and other comprehensive income rests with the purported low reliability of measurements of these four items; however, the real reason for these other comprehensive items seems to be political. For example, FASB capitulated in Statement No. 115 when a number of managers objected to reporting gains and losses on available-for-sale securities because that would create volatility in earnings. (I find it curious how FASB caters to the whims of managers but claims that the primary rationale for financial reporting is to serve the investment community.) Because one has a hard time reconciling other comprehensive income with the needs of investors and creditors, it would serve the investment community better if the boards eliminate this notion of comprehensive income.

Two IASB members think that an objective for financial reporting should encompass the stewardship function (see AV1.1-7). Stewardship seems to be a subset of economic usefulness, so this objection is pointless. It behooves these two IASB members to explain the consequences of adopting a stewardship objective and how these consequences differ from the usefulness objective before we can entertain their protestation seriously.

Sections BC1.42 and 43 ask whether management intent should be a part of the financial reporting process. Given management intent during the last decade, I think decidedly not. Management intent is merely a license to massage accounting numbers as managers please. Fortunately, the Justice Department calls such tactics fraud.

Chapter 2 of this document concerns qualitative characteristics. For the most part, this presentation is similar to that in Concepts Statement No. 2, though arranged somewhat differently. Concepts 2 had as its overarching qualitative characteristics relevance and reliability. This Preliminary Views expounds relevance, faithful representation, comparability, and understandability as the qualitative characteristics.

The discussion on faithful representation is interesting (QC.16-19) inasmuch as they distinguish between accounts that depict real world phenomena and accounts that are constructs with no real world referents. They explain that deferred debits and credits do not possess faithful representation because they are merely the creation of accountants. I hope that analysis applies to deferred income tax debits and credits.

Verifiability implies similar measures by different measurers (QC.23-26). I wish FASB and IASB to include auditability as an aspect of verifiability; after all, if you cannot audit something, it is hardly verifiable. Yet, the soon to be released standard on fair value measurements includes a variety of items that will prove difficult if not impossible to audit.

Understandability is obvious, though the two boards feel that users with a "reasonable knowledge of business and economic activities" can understand financial statements. I no longer agree. Such a person might employ a profit analysis model or ratio analysis on a set of financial statements and mis-analyze a firm's condition because he or she did not make analytical adjustments for off-balance sheet items and other fanciful tricks by managers. This includes so many of Enron's investors and creditors. No, to understand financial reporting today, you must be an expert in accounting and finance.

Benefits-that-justify-costs acts as a constraint on financial reporting. While this criterion is acceptable, too often the boards view costs only from the perspective of the preparers. I wish the boards explicitly acknowledged the fact that not reporting on some things adds costs to users. When a business enterprise engages in aggressive accounting, the expert user needs to employ analytical adjustments to correct this overzealousness. These adjustments consume the investor's economic resources and thus involve costs to the investment community.

In the basis-for-conclusions section, FASB and IASB explain that the concept of substance over form is included in the concept of faithful representation (see paragraphs BC2.17 and 18). While I don't have a problem with that, I think they should at least emphasize this point in Chapter 2 rather than bury it in this section. Substance over form is a critically important doctrine, especially as it relates to business combinations and leases, so it deserves greater stress.

On balance, the document is well written and contains a good clarification of the objective of financial reporting and the qualitative characteristics of decision-useful financial reporting information. I offer the criticisms above as a hope to strengthen and improve the Preliminary Views.

My most important comment, however, does not address any particular aspects within the document itself. Instead, I worry about the usefulness of this objective and these qualitative characteristics to FASB and IASB. To enjoy coherent financial reporting, there not only is need for a sound, comprehensive, and internally consistent framework, we also must have a board with the political will to utilize the conceptual framework. FASB ignored its own conceptual framework in its issuance of standards on:

* Leases (Aren't the financial commitments of the lessee a liability?) * Pensions (How can the pension intangible asset really be an asset as it has no real world referent?) * Stock options (Why did the board not require the expensing of stock options in the 1990s when stock options clearly involve real costs to the firm?), and * Special purpose entities (Why did the board wait for the collapse of Enron before dealing with this issue?).

Clearly, the low power of FASB -- IASB likewise possesses little power -- explains some of these decisions, but it is frustrating nonetheless to see the board ignore its own conceptual framework. Why engage in this deliberation unless FASB is prepared to follow through?

J. EDWARD KETZ is accounting professor at The Pennsylvania State University. Dr. Ketz's teaching and research interests focus on financial accounting, accounting information systems, and accounting ethics. He is the author of Hidden Financial Risk, which explores the causes of recent accounting scandals. He also has edited Accounting Ethics, a four-volume set that explores ethical thought in accounting since the Great Depression and across several countries.

 


Suggestions for accountancy from the Directors of the SEC and the FASB

From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on December 9, 2005

TITLE: SEC's Cox Wants Simpler Rules, More Competition for Accounting
REPORTER: Judith Burns
DATE: Dec 06, 2005
PAGE: C3
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113381176660114298.html
TOPICS: Accounting, Auditing, Auditing Services, Public Accounting, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Securities and Exchange Commission

SUMMARY: Questions relate to helping students understand the status various influences on the accounting profession from the AICPA, the SEC, the FASB, and the legislature via the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

QUESTIONS:
1.) Where did SEC Chairman Christopher Cox describe the ways in which he wants to see change in the accounting and auditing professions? What is the purpose of that organization? (Hint: you may find out about the organization's mission via its web site at www.aicpa.org 

2.) In accordance with law, how is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) responsible for accounting and reporting requirements in the United States? Hint: you may investigate the SEC's mission via its web site at www.sec.gov 

3.) What are the issues associated with complex accounting rules? Who establishes those rules? In what way are those rules influenced by the SEC?

4.) The SEC has named an interim chairman of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). How is this speech's topic related to the process of change in leadership at the PCAOB?

5.) Commissioner Cox indicated his concern over the fact that only 4 public accounting firms perform audit and accounting work for most of the publicly traded companies in the U.S. and that regulators may have contributed to that concentration. How is that the case? What might regulators do to change that situation?

"SEC's Cox Wants Simpler Rules, More Competition for Accounting," by Judith Burns, The Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2005; Page C3 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113381176660114298.html

U.S. securities regulators hope to make accounting rules less complicated while increasing competition in a field now dominated by just four firms, Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher Cox said.

Addressing a meeting of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Mr. Cox called for clearer, more straightforward accounting rules, saying that would benefit investors, public companies and accountants.

"Plain English is just as important in accountancy," he said.

Mr. Cox also raised concern about concentration in the U.S. accounting profession, with the Big Four firms -- Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers -- handling the vast majority of public-company audits. He said this "intense concentration" isn't desirable, adding that regulators need to consider whether their rules are inhibiting competition in the field.

SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins, who also addressed the meeting, acknowledged that regulators were surprised by the cost of internal-control rules that took effect for the largest U.S. companies last year, and he said he hopes such costs will be lower this year.

The rules stem from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed by Congress in 2002. They mandate that public companies make an annual examination of their internal controls related to financial reporting, subject to review by these companies' outside auditors.

The SEC is "at an early stage" in considering who should head the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board now that William McDonough, its former chairman, has stepped down, Mr. Atkins said.

Last week the SEC named oversight board member Bill Gradison, a member of Congress, as interim oversight board chairman. Mr. Atkins said Mr. Gradison, an Ohio Republican, could be in the running as a permanent chair "if he wants to be."

In repeated speeches, Dennis Beresford, former Chairman of the FASB, has called for simplification of accounting standards and guidelines.  For example see the following reference:
"Can We Go Back to the Good Old Days?" by Dennis R. Beresford, The CPA Journal --- http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/1204/perspectives/p6.htm 

 

December 6, 2005 message from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@terry.uga.edu]

National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments. His talk is available at: http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch120505cc.htm 

He had three main messages:

1. Accounting rules need to be simplified. "The accounting scandals that our nation and the world have now mostly weathered were made possible in part by the sheer complexity of the rules." "The sheer accretion of detail has, in time, led to one of the system's weaknesses - its extreme complexity. Convolution is now reducing its usefulness."

2. The concentration of auditing services in the Big 4 "quadropoly" is bad for the securities markets. The SEC will try to do more to encourage the use of medium size and smaller firms that receive good inspection reports from the PCAOB.

3. The SEC will continue to push XBRL. "The interactive data that this initiative will create will lead to vast improvements in the quality, timeliness, and usefulness of information that investors get about the companies they're investing in."

A very interesting talk - one that seems to promise a high level of cooperation with the accounting profession.

Denny

Bob Jensen's threads on XBRL are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm


Convergence of foreign and domestic accounting rules could catch some U.S. companies by surprise
Although many differences remain between U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and international financial reporting standards (IFRS), they are being eliminated faster than anyone, even Herz or Tweedie, could have imagined. In April, FASB and the IASB agreed that all major projects going forward would be conducted jointly. That same month, the Securities and Exchange Commission said that, as soon as 2007, it might allow foreign companies to use IFRS to raise capital in the United States, eliminating the current requirement that they reconcile their statements to U.S. GAAP. The change is all the more remarkable given that the IASB was formed only four years ago, and has rushed to complete 25 new or revamped standards in time for all 25 countries in the European Union to adopt IFRS by this year. By next year, some 100 countries will be using IFRS. "We reckon it will be 150 in five years," marvels Tweedie. "That leaves only 50 out."
Tim Reason, "The Narrowing GAAP:  The convergence of foreign and domestic accounting rules could catch some U.S. companies by surprise," CFO Magazine December 01, 2005 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/5193385/c_5243641?f=magazine_coverstory


David Fordham wrote the following after a very long and very interesting illustration of corporate accounting:

*****************
Seeing businesses in Europe, I'm learning that the European laws are to accountants what weight lifting is to the Mr. Atlas competition. The really good European accountants are without peer when it comes to working within the system to turn a profit under the rules. So this begs the question: should we more agressively teach accountants how to help their managers? Would we be more valuable as "trusted partners" to management if we could be more helpful in this way?
******************

Jensen Comment:

First I would note that in Europe most financing was and still is raised from banks who work in close partnership with companies. As in Japan, these banks are almost insiders that can get most any kind of information they want irrespective of accounting rules.

Until the IASB wanted to crack into the U.S. Stock exchanges, the IAS standards were pretty much milk toast. If the former IASC (it was IASC in those days) standards had replaced the FASB standards, U.S. Corporations would have been ecstatic with IASC off-balance sheet financing opportunities and opportunities to create hidden reserves and manage earnings. European companies are notorious for managing earnings with hidden reserves.

Whether the two Davids (Albrecht and Fordham) like it or not, the FASB has struggled to make management of earnings and the hiding of debt more difficult in the U.S. The standards are now almost incomprehensible (especially for derivatives, SPEs, mezzanine financing, re-insurance, etc.) because U.S. companies countered the FASB standards with ever-increasing exotic financial contracts.

Before complaining about the complexity of FASB standards, first take a serious look at the absolute nightmare of complexity of the financial and insurance contracting. Especially look at the absolutely ridiculous derivative financial instrument contracts that are intentionally designed to be too complex for accountants or trust investors to understand --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds 

Many exotic contracts are relatively new. We now have over $100 trillion in interest rate swaps that were not even invented until 1984.

One of my favorite quotations is a 1994 quotation from Denny Beresford while, as Chairman of the FASB, he was making a presentation in NYC at the annual AAA meetings. He was at the time being extremely pressured by the SEC to issue what became FAS 133 in 1998.

The quotation went something like this:

*******************
"The Director of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, tells me the three main problems for the SEC and FASB are derivatives, derivatives, and derivatives. I had to ask some experts to tell me what a derivative is, because until now I thought a derivative was something a person my age takes when prunes don't quite do the job. John Stewart of Arthur Andersen tells me that there are over 1,000 kinds of complex derivative contracts . . . "
********************

Once again, David, my main point to you is that accounting standards outside the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, did not have to be too complex since most financing was raised from insiders (mostly banks) who had inside information sources. The countries with the complex standards rely more on equity investors who only get the information provided to the public by companies. The FASB has declared that protection of the public investors is its number one priority (as is also the case with the SEC).

The real problem we are now facing is that corporations no longer take accounting seriously other than as something to get around. This has led to an ever-increasing game where the FASB discovers misleading accounting, writes a new standard or interpretation, and subsequently discovers how corporations are re-writing contracts to get around the new standard.

Will this vicious cycle ever cease? Not as long as corporate managers continue to view accounting as an opportunity to creatively paint rosy portraits.

David Albrecht asked:
"Has anyone a good definition of financial statement transparency?"

Jensen reply:
Here's one paper that discusses the problem of transparency ---http://www.accenture.com/xdoc/en/ideas/outlook/6_2005/pdf/share_value.pdf
The snipped version is
http://snipurl.com/ShareholderValue

October 18, 2005 reply from Bender, Ruth [r.bender@CRANFIELD.AC.UK]

I just want to point out that the UK, which is in Europe, doesn't meet Bob's description of mostly bank finance. Our financing is much like that of the US - mostly equity, and our lenders are kept at arm's length from the board.

And a lot of our accountants are howling at the way IFRS change the accounts. It's not that people are trying to hide things by using lax standards (although, from my experience as an auditor, I know that this does of course happen). It's the fact that we and others don't understand accounts any more! I'm doing some research at the moment that involves interviewing experienced CFOs of large listed companies. Almost all of them are complaining that the IFRS, being 'market' facing, are making a nonsense of the numbers, because in most cases there isn't a market, and so they are having to use poor proxies. It's taking us away from factually based accounts and into a world of estimates - which in some ways makes earnings management easier, not harder! That was the gist of the FT article that David cited.

Incidentally, there is a really interesting paper about the fundamental differences between US and UK approaches to financial regulation and standards, that sets out why convergence is going to be a problem - if it ever happens. The title is "Where economics meets the law: US reporting systems compared to other markets" and you can download it from the ICAEW's website at
http://www.icaew.co.uk/members/index.cfm?AUB=TB2I_79757|MNXI_79757

Outline is:

"In particular the paper examines: * the evolution of the US financial reporting model; * contrasting approaches to accounting and auditing: 'principles' versus 'prescription'; * shareholder rights and the governance function of annual financial statements; * investor behaviour and corporate governance; * accounting convergence with the US or recognition of the differences.

Divided by common language is the first in the Beyond the myth of Anglo-American corporate governance series which aims to:

Challenge commonly held assumptions regarding the perceived similarity of US and UK corporate governance systems; Identify possible areas for convergence and, where not practical, clarify why elements of one system may not be appropriate for incorporation into another; Anticipate developments and set out challenges for future thinking about the US and UK models and encourage transatlantic dialogue."

Regards

Dr Ruth Bender
Cranfield School of Management UK

 


Dr. Ijiri was one of my major professors in the doctoral program at Stanford.  I'm naturally drawn to things he writes.  He is one of the long-time advocates of historical cost based accounting.  He is in fact much more dedicated to it than Bill Paton (but not Ananias Littleton) where Paton and Littleton are best known advocates of historical cost accounting.  The following is the lead article in the Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, July/August 2005, pp. 255-279.

US accounting standards and their environment:
A dualistic study of their 75-years of transition

Yuji Ijiri
Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University

Abstract
This article examines the 75-year transition of the US accounting standards and their environment.  It consists of three parts, each having two themes: Part (1) Past changes: 1. The first market crash and the second market crash; 2. Facts-based accounting and forecasts-based accounting,  Part (II) Present issues: 3. The reform legislation (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) and the reform administration; 4. Procedural fairness and pure fairness, and Part (III) Future trends: 5. Forecast protection and forecast separation; 6. Principles-based systems and rules-based systems.  These themes are each examined from dualistic perspectives by contrasting two fundamental concepts or principles.  The article concludes with the strong need to focus on "procedural fairness" in establishing accounting standards as well as in implementing the reform legislation and administration, in contrast to "pure fairness" that is almost impossible to achieve by anyone.


Accounting Rules So Plentiful "It's Nuts"
There are perhaps 2,000 accounting rules and standards that, when written out, possibly exceed the U.S. tax code in length. Yet, there are only the Ten Commandments. So Bob Herz, chairman of the rule-setting Financial Accounting Standards Board, is asked this: How come there are 2,000 rules to prepare a financial statement but only 10 for eternal salvation? "It is nuts," Herz allows. "But you're not going to get it down to ten commandments because the transactions are so complicated. . . . And the people on the front lines, the companies and their auditors, are saying: 'Give me principles, but tell me exactly what to do; I don't want to be second-guessed.' " Nonetheless, the FASB (pronounced, by accounting insiders, as "FAZ-bee") is embarking on efforts to simplify and codify accounting rules while improving them and integrating them with international standards.
"Accounting Rules So Plentiful 'It's Nuts' ; Standards Board Takes on Tough Job to Simplify, Codify," SmartPros, June 8, 2005 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x48525.xml


Jensen Comment:  Shyam Sunder (Yale University) is the 2005 President-Elect of the American Accounting Association --- http://aaahq.org/about/Nominees2005.htm

From Jim Mahar's blog on July 18 2005 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

SSRN-Social Norms versus Standards of Accounting by Shyam Sunder --- http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=725821

A few highlights from the paper:

"Historically, norms of accounting played an important role in corporate financial reporting. Starting with the federal regulation of securities, accounting norms have been progressively replaced by written standards....[and]enforcement mechanisms, often supported by implicit or explicit power of the state to impose punishment. The spate of accounting and auditing failures of the recent years raise questions about the wisdom of this transition from norms to standards....It is possible that the pendulum of standardization in accounting may have swung too far, and it may be time to allow for a greater role for social norms in the practice of corporate financial reporting."

"The monopoly rights given to the FASB in the U.S. (and the International Accounting Standards Board or IASB in the EU) deprived the economies, and their rule makers, from the benefits of experimentation with alternative rules and structures so their consequences could be observed in the field before deciding on which rules, if any, might be more efficient. Rule makers have little idea, ex ante, of the important consequences (e.g., the corporate cost of capital) of the alternatives they consider."

"Given the deliberate and premeditated nature of financial fraud and misrepresentation (and other white color crimes), "clarifications of the rules invite and facilitate evasion"

And my favorite!

"Indeed the U.S. constitution, a document that covers the entire governance system for the republic, has less than 5,000 words. The United Kingdom has no written constitution. A great part of the governance of both countries depends on norms. Do accountants deal with greater stakes?"

BTW: I like the prescriptions called for as well, but will allow you to read those (pages 20 to 22 of paper)

Cite: Sunder, Shyam, "Social Norms versus Standards of Accounting" (May 2005). Yale ICF Working Paper No. 05-14. http://ssrn.com/abstract=725821


Let me close by citing Harry S. Truman who said, "I never give them hell; I just tell them the truth and they think its hell!"
Great Speeches About the State of Accountancy

"20th Century Myths," by Lynn Turner when he was still Chief Accountant at the SEC in 1999 --- http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch323.htm

It is interesting to listen to people ask for simple, less complex standards like in "the good old days." But I never hear them ask for business to be like "the good old days," with smokestacks rather than high technology, Glass-Steagall rather than Gramm-Leach, and plain vanilla interest rate deals rather than swaps, collars, and Tigers!! The bottom line is—things have changed. And so have people.

Today, we have enormous pressure on CEO’s and CFO’s. It used to be that CEO’s would be in their positions for an average of more than ten years. Today, the average is 3 to 4 years. And Financial Executive Institute surveys show that the CEO and CFO changes are often linked.

In such an environment, we in the auditing and preparer community have created what I consider to be a two-headed monster. The first head of this monster is what I call the "show me" face. First, it is not uncommon to hear one say, "show me where it says in an accounting book that I can’t do this?" This approach to financial reporting unfortunately necessitates the level of detail currently being developed by the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB"), the Emerging Issues Task Force, and the AICPA’s Accounting Standards Executive Committee. Maybe this isn’t a recent phenomenon. In 1961, Leonard Spacek, then managing partner at Arthur Andersen, explained the motivation for less specificity in accounting standards when he stated that "most industry representatives and public accountants want what they call ‘flexibility’ in accounting principles. That term is never clearly defined; but what is wanted is ‘flexibility’ that permits greater latitude to both industry and accountants to do as they please." But Mr. Spacek was not a defender of those who wanted to "do as they please." He went on to say, "Public accountants are constantly required to make a choice between obtaining or retaining a client and standing firm for accounting principles. Where the choice requires accepting a practice which will produce results that are erroneous by a relatively material amount, we must decline the engagement even though there is precedent for the practice desired by the client."

We create the second head of our monster when we ask for standards that absolutely do not reflect the underlying economics of transactions. I offer two prime examples. Leasing is first. We have accounting literature put out by the FASB with follow-on interpretative guidance by the accounting firms—hundreds of pages of lease accounting guidance that, I will be the first to admit, is complex and difficult to decipher. But it is due principally to people not being willing to call a horse a horse, and a lease what it really is—a financing. The second example is Statement 133 on derivatives. Some people absolutely howl about its complexity. And yet we know that: (1) people were not complying with the intent of the simpler Statements 52 and 80, and (2) despite the fact that we manage risk in business by managing values rather than notional amounts, people want to account only for notional amounts. As a result, we ended up with a compromise position in Statement 133. To its credit, Statement 133 does advance the quality of financial reporting. For that, I commend the FASB. But I believe that we could have possibly achieved more, in a less complex fashion, if people would have agreed to a standard that truly reflects the underlying economics of the transactions in an unbiased and representationally faithful fashion.

I certainly hope that we can find a way to do just that with standards we develop in the future, both in the U.S. and internationally. It will require a change in how we approach standard setting and in how we apply those standards. It will require a mantra based on the fact that transparent, high quality financial reporting is what makes our capital markets the most efficient, liquid, and deep in the world.


Landmark Exposure Draft containing joint proposals to improve and align accounting for business combinations

"IASB and FASB Publish First Major Exposure Draft Standard," AccountingWeb, July 11, 2005 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=101084

The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), based in London, and the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have announced publication of an Exposure Draft containing joint proposals to improve and align accounting for business combinations. The proposed standard would replace IASB’s International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 3, Business Combinations and the FASB’s Statement 141, Business Combinations.

Sir David Tweedie, IASB Chairman and Bob Herz, FASB Chairman, emphasized the value of a single standard to users and preparers of financial statements of companies around the world as it improves comparability of financial information. "Development of a single standard demonstrates the ability of the IASB and the FASB to work together,” Tweedie continued.

Continued in article


"Can We Go Back to the Good Old Days?" by Dennis R. Beresford, The CPA Journal --- http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/1204/perspectives/p6.htm 

Recently I visited my pharmacy to pick up eyedrops for my two golden retrievers. Before he would give me the prescription, the pharmacist insisted I sign a form on behalf of Murphy and Millie, representing that they had been apprised of their rights under the new medical privacy rules. This ludicrous situation is a good illustration of how complicated life has gotten.

I was still shaking my head later that same day when I was clicking mindlessly through the 150 or so channels that my local cable TV service makes available to me. I happened to land on The Andy Griffith Show, and the few minutes I spent with Andy, Barney, Opie, and Aunt Bea got me thinking about the Good Old Days. Wouldn’t it be nice, I thought, to go back to the Good Old Days of the profession in the early 1960s when I graduated from college?

Back then, accounting was really simple. The Accounting Principles Board hadn’t issued any standards yet, and FASB didn’t exist. So we didn’t have 880 pages listing all of the current rules and guidance on derivative financial instruments, for example. The totality of authoritative GAAP at that time fit in one softbound booklet about one-third the size of the new derivatives guidance.

In those Good Old Days, the SEC had been around for quite a while but it rarely got excited about accounting matters. Neither mandatory quarterly reporting nor management’s discussion and analysis (MD&A) had yet come into being, for example. And annual report footnotes could actually be read in an hour or so.

The country had eight major accounting firms, and becoming a partner in one was a truly big deal. Lawsuits against accounting firms were rare, and almost none of them resulted in substantial damages against the accountants.

In short, accounting seemed more like a true profession, with good judgment and experience key requirements for success.

Of course, however much we might like to return to simpler times, it’s easier said than done. And most of us would never give up the many benefits of progress, such as photocopiers, personal computers, e-mail, the Internet, and cellphones. But I think that accounting rules may have become more complicated than necessary.

Let me start with a mea culpa. You may remember the famous line from the comic strip Pogo: “We have met the enemy, and he is us!” Well, you may be tempted to rephrase that quote to “We have met the enemy, and he is … Beresford!”

I plead guilty to having led the development of 40 or so new accounting standards over my time at FASB. A number of them had pervasive effects on financial statements, and some have been costly to apply. I always tried to be as practical as possible, however, although probably few would say that I was 100% successful in meeting that objective.

In any event, more-recent accounting standards and proposals seem to be getting increasingly complicated and harder to apply. Even the best-intentioned accountants have difficulty keeping up with all of the changes from FASB, the AICPA, the SEC, the EITF, and the IASB. And some individual standards, such as those on derivatives and variable-interest entities, are almost impossible for professionals, let alone laypeople, to decipher.

Furthermore, these days, companies are subject to what I’ll call quadruple jeopardy. They have to apply GAAP as best they can, but they are then subject to as many as four levels of possible second-guessing of their judgments.

First, the external auditors must weigh in. Second, the SEC will now be reviewing all public companies’ reports at least once every three years. Third, the PCAOB will be looking at a sample of accounting firms’ audits, and that could include any given company’s reports. Finally, the plaintiff’s bar is always looking for opportunities to challenge accounting judgments and extort settlements. Broad Principles Versus Detailed Rules

I suspect that all this second-guessing is what leads many companies and auditors to ask for more-detailed accounting rules. But we may have reached the point of diminishing returns. In response to the complexity and sheer volume of many current standards, some have suggested that accounting standards should be broad principles rather than detailed rules. FASB and the SEC have expressed support for the general notion of a principles-based approach to accounting standards. (It’s kind of like apple pie and motherhood: Who can object to broad principles?) Of course, implementing such an approach is problematic.

In 2002, FASB issued a proposal on this matter. And last year the SEC reported to Congress on the same topic. Specific things that FASB suggested could happen include the following:

Standards should always state very clear objectives. Standards should have a clearly defined scope and there should be few, if any, exceptions (e.g., for certain industries). Standards should contain fewer alternative accounting treatments (e.g., unrealized gains and losses on marketable securities could all be run through income rather than the various approaches used at present). FASB also said that a principles-based approach probably would include less in the way of detailed interpretive and implementation guidance. Thus, companies and auditors would be expected to rely more on professional judgment in applying the standards.

The SEC prefers to call this approach “objectives-based” rather than “principles-based.” SEC Chief Accountant Donald Nicolaisen recently repeated the SEC’s support for such an approach, agreeing with the notion of clearly identifying and articulating the objective for each standard. Although he also suggested that objectives-based standards should avoid bright-line tests such as lease capitalization rules, he called for “sufficiently detailed” implementation guidance, including real-world examples.

Although FASB and the SEC may have reached a meeting of the minds on the overall notion of more general principles, they may disagree on the key point of how much implementation guidance to provide. FASB thinks that a principles-based approach should include less implementation guidance and rely more on judgment, while the SEC thinks that “sufficiently detailed” guidance is needed, and I suspect that would make it difficult to significantly reduce complexity in some cases.

In any event, FASB recently said that it may take “several years or more” for preparers and auditors to adjust to a change to less detail. Meantime, little has changed with respect to individual standards, which if anything are becoming even harder to understand and apply.

I’ve heard FASB board members say that FASB Interpretation (FIN) 46, on variable-interest entities (VIE), is an example of a principles-based standard. I assume they say this because FIN 46 states an objective of requiring consolidation when control over a VIE exists. But the definition of a VIE and the rules for determining when control exists are extremely difficult to understand.

FASB recently described what it meant by the operationality of an accounting standard. The first condition was that standards have to be comprehensible to readers with a reasonable level of knowledge and sophistication. This doesn’t seem to be the case for FIN 46. Many auditors and financial executives have told me that only a few individuals in the country truly know how to apply FIN 46. And those few individuals often disagree among themselves!

Such complications make it difficult to get decisions on many accounting matters from an audit engagement team. Decisions on VIEs, derivatives, and securitization transactions, to name a few, must routinely be cleared by an accounting firm’s national experts. And with section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) and new concerns about auditor independence, getting answers is now even harder. For example, in the past, companies would commonly consult with their auditors on difficult accounting matters. But now the PCAOB may view this as a control weakness, under the assumption that the company lacks adequate internal expertise. And if auditors get too involved in technical decisions before a complex transaction is completed, the SEC or the PCAOB might decide that the auditors aren’t independent, because they’re auditing their own decisions.

When things become this complicated, I wonder whether it’s time for a new approach. Maybe we do need to go back to the Good Old Days.

Internal Controls

Today, financial executives are probably more concerned about internal controls than new accounting requirements. For the first time, all public companies must report on the adequacy of their internal controls over financial reporting, and outside auditors must express their opinion on the company’s controls. Many people have questioned whether this incredibly expensive activity is worth the presumed benefit to investors. While one might argue that the section 404 rules are a regulatory overreaction, shareholders should expect good internal controls. And audit committees, as shareholders’ representatives, must demand those good controls. So this has been by far the most time-consuming topic at all audit committee meetings I’ve attended in the past couple of years.

Companies and auditors are spending huge sums this year to ensure that transactions are properly processed and controlled. Yet the most perfect system of internal controls and the best audit of them might not catch an incorrect interpretation of GAAP. A good example of this was contained in the PCAOB’s August 2004 report on its initial reviews of the Big Four’s audit practices. The report noted that all four firms had missed the fact that some clients had misapplied EITF Issue 95-22. As the New York Times (August 27, 2004) noted, “The fact that all of the top firms had been misapplying it raised issues of just how well they know the sometimes complicated rules.”

Responding to a different criticism in that same PCAOB report, KPMG noted, “Three knowledgeable informed bodies—the firm, the PCAOB, and the SEC—had reached three different conclusions on proper accounting, illustrating the complex accounting issues registrants, auditors and regulators all face.”

Fair Value Accounting

Even those who are very confident about their understanding of the current accounting rules shouldn’t get complacent: Fair value accounting is right around the corner, making things even harder. In fact, it is already required in several recent standards.

To be clear, I’m not opposed in general to fair value accounting. It makes sense for marketable securities, derivatives, and probably many other financial instruments. But expanding the fair value concept to many other assets and liabilities is a challenge.

Consider this sentence from FASB’s recent exposure draft on fair value measurements: “The Board agreed that, conceptually, the fair value measurement objective and the approach for applying that objective should be the same for all assets and liabilities.” In that same document, FASB said, “Users of financial statements generally have agreed that fair value information is relevant.”

So the overall objective of moving toward a fair value accounting model seems clear. Of course, that doesn’t necessarily mean that we will get there soon. In fact, in the same exposure draft the board said that it would continue to use a project-by-project approach to decide on fair value or some other measure. But in reality the board has been adopting a fair value approach in most recent decisions:

SFAS 142, on goodwill, requires that impairment losses for certain intangible assets be recognized based upon a decline in the fair value of the asset. SFAS 143, on asset retirement obligations, requires that these liabilities be recorded initially at fair value rather than what the company expects to incur. SFAS 146, on exit or disposal activities, calls for the fair value of exit liabilities to be recorded, not the amount actually expected to be paid. FIN 45, on guarantees, says that a fair value must be recorded even when the company doesn’t expect to have to make good on a guarantee. A fair value approach is also integral to other pending projects, including the conditional asset retirement obligation exposure draft. Under such a standard, a company might have to record a fair value liability even when it doesn’t expect to incur an obligation. Fair value is also key to projects on business combination purchase procedures; differentiating between liabilities and equity; share-based payments (stock options); and the tremendously important revenue recognition project.

I have three major concerns about such pervasive use of fair value accounting. First, in many cases determining fair value in any kind of objective way will be difficult if not impossible. Second, the resulting accounting will produce answers that won’t benefit users of financial statements. Third, those answers will be very difficult to explain to business managers, with the result that accounting will be further discredited in their minds.

The approach that FASB is using for what I would call operating liabilities is particularly troubling. Take, for example, a company that owns and operates a facility that has some asbestos contamination. The facility is safe and can be operated indefinitely, but if the company wanted to sell the property it would have to remediate that contamination. The company has no plans to sell the property. But FASB’s exposure draft on conditional asset retirement obligations calls for the company to estimate and record a fair value liability. This would be based on what someone else would charge now to assume the obligation to clean up the problem at some unspecified future date. The board admits that it might be difficult to determine what the fair value would be in this case, and companies could omit the liability if they simply couldn’t make a reasonable estimate.

Although FASB and the SEC expect most companies to be able to make a reasonable estimate, in reality I think that will be possible only rarely. Even more important, does it really make sense to record a liability when the company might believe that there is only a 5% chance that it will have to be paid? Consider how this line of reasoning might apply to litigation. Presently, liabilities are recorded only when it’s probable that a loss has been incurred and that a reasonable estimate of the loss can be made. So if a company were sued for $1 billion but there were only a 1% chance that it would lose, nothing would be recorded. The fair value approach would seem to call for a liability of $10 million in this case, based on 1% of $1 billion.

One might think this kind of accounting will apply only in the distant future, but FASB is due to release its proposal on purchase accounting procedures in the next few months, and I understand that the proposal will require exactly this kind of accounting.

In addition to the very questionable relevance of this, I don’t know how anyone would ever be able to reasonably determine the 1% likelihood I assumed. How would an auditor attest to the reliability of financial statements whose results depend significantly on such assumptions? And where would an auditor go to obtain objective audit evidence against which to evaluate such assumptions?

Fair value definitely makes sense in certain instances, but FASB seems intent on extending the notion beyond the boundaries of common sense. FASB also seems to have an exaggerated notion of what companies and auditors are actually capable of doing. Perhaps we should consider FASB’s faith in the profession to be a compliment. Rather than feeling complimented, however, I think that this just makes many of us long for the Good Old Days.

Fair Value Accounting and Revenue Recognition

Currently, asset retirement obligations and exit costs apply to only a few companies, and even guarantees are not an everyday issue. All companies, however, have revenues—or at least they hope to have them. And for the past year or so, FASB has been engaged in a complete rethinking of revenue recognition. This, of course, was precipitated by the numerous SEC enforcement cases on improper revenue recognition. Most cases, however, involved failure to follow existing standards, and most cases also resulted in premature recognition of revenue.

Now there’s no doubt that the current revenue accounting rules are overly complicated, with many specific rules depending on the type of product or service being sold. But FASB’s current thinking would replace these rules with an asset and liability–oriented approach based on fair value accounting. This may well make revenue accounting even more complicated than the detailed rules that we are at least used to working with.

For example, assume product A is being sold to a customer. It costs $50 to produce product A and the customer has agreed to pay a nonrefundable $100 in exchange for the company’s promise to deliver this hot product next month. What should the company record at month-end?

Most accountants would probably think first of the traditional approach and conclude that the earnings process had not been completed. Because product A hasn’t been completed and shipped to the customer, the $100 credit is unearned income. Some aggressive accountants would probably say that the company should record the sale now because the $100 is nonrefundable. In that case the company would probably also record a liability for the $50 cost that will be incurred next month.

FASB has a surprise for both. The board is presently thinking about whether revenue for what it calls the “selling activity”—the difference between the $100 received and the assumed fair value of the obligation to deliver the product—should be recorded now. This assumed fair value would be the estimated amount that other companies would charge to produce product A. In other words, it’s the hypothetical amount a company would have to pay someone else to assume the obligation to produce the product. The company would have to make this assumption even though it is 100% sure that it will make the product itself rather than have someone else make it.

If one could ever determine what other companies would charge, I suspect that the amount would be higher than the $50 expected cost, because another company probably would require a risk premium to produce a product that it isn’t familiar with. It would want to earn a profit as well. Let’s assume in this case that the fair value could be determined as $80. If so, the company would record now $20 of revenue and profit for what FASB calls the selling activity. Next month it would record the $80 remaining amount of revenue, along with the $50 cost actually incurred. It’s unclear when the company would record sales commissions, delivery costs, and similar expenses, but I assume these would have to be allocated somehow.

Given that this project was added to FASB’s agenda in large part because of premature recognition of revenue in some SEC cases—Enron recognized income based on the supposed fair value of energy contracts extending 30 years into the future—it is ironic that the project may well mandate recognition earlier than most accountants would consider appropriate. That kind of premature revenue recognition is now generally prohibited, but other examples could follow, depending on the outcome of this FASB project.

Although the revenue recognition project is still in an early stage and both my understanding and the board’s positions could change, FASB seems determined to use some sort of fair value approach to revenue recognition in many cases. If this happens, we will all be wishing for the Good Old Days to return.

Is All That EITF Guidance Really Necessary?

In early 2004, FASB’s board members began reviewing all EITF consensus positions. A majority of board members now have to “not disagree” with the EITF before those positions become final and binding on companies. This gives FASB more control over the EITF process, and it should prevent the task force from developing positions that the board sees as inconsistent with existing GAAP.

Although I think the task force has done a great deal of good over its 20-year existence (I was a charter member), I think it’s time to challenge whether everything that the EITF does is necessary or even consistent with its original purpose. Too many of the task force’s topics in recent years can’t really be called “emerging issues.” Rather, the task force often takes up long-standing issues where it thinks that some limitations need to be placed on professional judgment.

For example, a couple of years ago the SEC became concerned about the accounting for certain investments in other companies. For years we’ve had standards that call for recognition of losses when market value declines are “other than temporary.” The EITF discussed this matter at eight meetings over two years and also relied on a separate working group of accounting experts. Earlier this year, a final consensus position was issued. It includes a lengthy abstract that tells companies what factors to consider, including the following matters:

Evidence to support the ability and intent to continue to hold the investment; The severity of the decline in value; How long the decline has lasted; and The evidence supporting a market price recovery. So now we have a “detailed rule” on this matter. Will this result in more consistency in practice? Will investors and other users of financial statements receive better information as a result? Is the result worth the additional effort?

Moreover, after two years of effort on this project, FASB had to reconsider the whole thing because no one had considered the effect on debt securities held as available for sale by financial institutions. So now the board is developing even more specifics to deal with the unintended consequences of the rule.

Again, I support the EITF, and I believe it has generally done a great job. The members try to develop practical ways to deal with current problems. Nonetheless, both the task force and FASB may need to more carefully challenge whether all of the EITF’s projects are really needed. If FASB actually issued relatively broad standards, there probably would be a need for the EITF to provide supplemental guidance on some issues. But we now seem to have the worst of all worlds, with quite detailed accounting standards being accompanied by even more detailed EITF guidance.

A Multitude of Challenges

I don’t intend to seem overly critical of FASB and others who are working to improve financial reporting. It’s a tough job, and the brickbats always outnumber the bouquets. If I didn’t strongly support accounting standards setting I wouldn’t have spent 10 Qs years on the inside of the process. Still, those years at FASB, as well as my time before and after, have caused me to develop strong views on these issues. And I truly do believe that standards have gotten just too complicated.

The announced move to broader principles is one I fully support. That job won’t be easy, but it has to be tried or the sea of detail will become even deeper in the near future. FASB needs to actually start doing this and not allow its actions to speak otherwise. And companies, auditors, and regulators need to support such a move and resist the temptation to seek answers to every imaginable question. Furthermore, companies and auditors may have to become more principled before a principles-based approach will work.

Part of this process could be for the EITF to be more judicious in what it takes on. Also, I urge FASB to reevaluate its attitude toward fair value accounting. I believe FASB is moving much faster in this area than preparers, auditors, and users of financial statements can accommodate. Furthermore, the SEC and other regulators may not yet be on board with this new thinking.

In the final analysis, we won’t be able to return to my so-called Good Old Days. But we have to make sure that what accounting and accountants can do is meaningful and operational. We never want to look back and ask, “Remember the Good Old Days, when accounting was important?”

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CPA Journal Editorial Board member Dennis R. Beresford, CPA, was recently named the 2005 recipient of the Gold Medal for Distinguished Service from the AICPA. He received the award on October 26, during the fall meeting of the Institute’s governing council in Orlando. Beresford is the Ernst & Young Executive Professor of Accounting at the J.M. Tull School of Accounting at the University of Georgia, Terry College of Business. From 1987 to 1997, he was chairman of FASB. Prior to joining FASB, he was national director of accounting standards for Ernst & Young.ecently I visited my pharmacy to pick up eyedrops for my two golden retrievers. Before he would give me the prescription, the pharmacist insisted I sign a form on behalf of Murphy and Millie, representing that they had been apprised of their rights under the new medical privacy rules. This ludicrous situation is a good illustration of how complicated life has gotten.

 


From the FASB in July 2004 "FASB Response to SEC Study on the Adoption of a Principles-Based Accounting System" --- http://www.fasb.org/response_sec_study_july2004.pdf 

Introduction

In July 2003, the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) submitted to Congress its Study Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adoption by the United States Financial Reporting System of a Principles-Based Accounting System (the Study). The Study includes the following recommendations to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB or Board):

1. The FASB should issue objectives-oriented standards.

2. The FASB should address deficiencies in the conceptual framework.

3. The FASB should be the only organization setting authoritative accounting

guidance in the United States.

4. The FASB should continue its convergence efforts.

5. The FASB should work to redefine the GAAP hierarchy.

6. The FASB should increase access to authoritative literature.

7. The FASB should perform a comprehensive review of its literature to identify standards that are more rules-based and adopt a transition plan to change those standards.

The Board welcomes the SEC’s Study and agrees with the recommendations. Indeed, a number of those recommendations relate to initiatives the Board had under way at the time the Study was issued.1 The Board is committed to continuously improving its standard-setting process. The Board’s specific responses to the recommendations in the Study are described in the following sections of this paper.

Objectives-Oriented Standards

In the Study, the SEC staff recommends that "those involved in the standard-setting

process more consistently develop standards on a principles-based or objectives-oriented

basis" (page 4).2 According to the Study (page 4), an objectives-oriented standard would

have the following characteristics:

Be based on an improved and consistently applied conceptual framework;

Clearly state the accounting objective of the standard;

Provide sufficient detail and structure so that the standard can be operationalized and applied on a consistent basis;1

Minimize exceptions from the standard;

Avoid use of percentage tests ("bright-lines") that allow financial engineers to achieve technical compliance with the standard while evading the intent of the standard.

The “objectives-oriented” approach to setting standards described above (and expanded
upon in the Study) is similar to the principles-based approach described in the Board’s
Proposal. After discussing the comments received on its Proposal, the Board agreed that
its conceptual framework needs to be improved. This is because an internally consistent
and complete conceptual framework is critical to a standard-setting approach that places
more emphasis on the underlying principles that are based on that framework. Pages 8
and 9 of this paper further describe the Board’s activities related to the conceptual
framework; the following sections address the other characteristics of an objectivesoriented
approach addressed in the Study.


Format and Content of Standards

The Board agrees with the Study’s recommendation to improve the format and content of its standards. In particular, The Board agrees that the objective and underlying principles  of a standard should be clearly articulated and prominently placed in FASB standards. In response to comments received on its Proposal, the Board agreed that although its existing standards are based on concepts and principles, the understandability of its standards could be improved by writing its standards in ways that (a) clearly state the accounting objective(s), (b) clearly articulate the underlying principles, and (c) improve the explanation of the rationale behind those principles and how they relate to the conceptual framework.

The Board is working on developing a format for its standards that will encompass the attributes of an objectives-oriented standard described in the Study, for example, describing the underlying objective of the standard in the introductory paragraphs, using bold type to set off the principles,3 and providing a glossary for defined terms.

In addition, the Board is working with a consultant to identify changes in the organization and exposition of its standards that will increase the understandability of those standards.  Accounting standards by their nature will include many specific technical terms; however, the Board believes it can do a better job simplifying the language used in its standards to describe how to account for complex transactions. In addition, the Board will strive to apply other effective writing techniques to enhance constituents’ understanding of FASB standards.

When discussing proposed accounting standards or specific provisions of a standard, many of the Board’s constituents comment on whether a standard is "operational."  Because that term can mean different things to different people, the Board decided to define the term operational for its purposes. The Board uses the term operational to mean the following:

A provision/standard is comprehensible by a reader who has a reasonable level of knowledge and sophistication,

The information needed to apply the provision/standard is currently available or can be created, and 

The provision/standard can be applied in the manner in which it was intended. The Board believes that if its standards are more understandable, they also will be more operational.

Implementation Guidance

As noted in the Board’s Proposal, an approach to setting standards that places more emphasis on principles will not eliminate the need to provide interpretive and implementation guidance for applying those standards. Thus, the Board agrees that some amount of implementation guidance is needed in objectives-oriented standards in order for entities to apply those standards in a consistent manner. The Board uses the term implementation guidance to refer to all of the guidance necessary to explain and operationalize the principles (that is, the explanatory text in the standards section, the definitions in the glossary, and guidance and examples included in one or more appendices that help an entity apply the provisions in the standards section). The Board believes that the amount of necessary guidance will vary depending on the nature and complexity of the arrangements that are the subject of the standard. The Board believes that there should be enough guidance such that a principle is understandable, operational, and capable of being applied consistently in similar situations. Judgment is required to decide how much guidance is needed to achieve those objectives, without providing so much guidance that the overall standard combined with its implementation guidance becomes a collection of detailed rules. Therefore, the amount and nature of implementation guidance will vary from standard to standard. 

The Board believes that its primary focus should be providing broadly applicable implementation guidance, not providing guidance on relatively narrow and less pervasive issues, including, for example, issues that are specific to certain entities or industries. When developing that implementation guidance, the Board plans to apply the same guidelines that underpin objectives-oriented standards. For example, rather than consisting of a list of rules or bright lines, the implementation guidance would explain or expand on the principle(s) or objectives in the standard. 4.

Continued in the report

 


From the FASB in October 2002 --- http://www.fasb.org/fasac/results2002.pdf 

Results of the 2002 Annual FASAC Survey

FASAC's annual survey on the priorities of the FASB provides valuable perspectives and observations about the Board's process and direction. The 2002 survey asked Council members, Board members, and other interested constituents to provide their views about the FASB's priorities, the financial reporting issues of tomorrow, principles-based standards, and the FASB's international activities.

Key observations and conclusions from the responses to the 2002 survey are:

Twenty-two current Council members, 7 Board members, and 9 other constituents responded to the survey.

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm 

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting fraud are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm 

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting for electronic commerce are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce.htm 


There is a complete saga of attempts to establish a conceptual framework of accounting.  See 
http://www.wku.edu/~halljo/attempts.html
 

Methods for setting accounting standards all have advantages and disadvantages.  It is not possible to set optimal standards for all stakeholders.  Arrow's Impossibility Theorem applies, which means that what is optimal for one constituency must be sub-optimal for other constituencies.  Accounting standards are usually expensive to implement, and the benefits of any new standard must be weighed against its costs to preparers and users of financial statements.

Deductive Accounting Theory (Mathematical Methods)

Inductive Accounting Theory (Scientific Methods)

Normative Accounting Theory

Positive Accounting Theory


April 2002 Document on SPEs and Enron from the International Accounting Standards Board (This Document is Free)

WRITTEN EVIDENCE OF SIR DAVID TWEEDIE CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD TO THE TREASURY COMMITTEE  --- http://www.iasc.org.uk/docs/speeches/020405-dpt.pdf 

An excerpt is shown below:

Consolidations 

Of the 16 topics on our research agenda, one warrants special mention here. For several years, there has been an international debate on the topic of consolidation policy. The failure to consolidate some entities has been identified as a significant issue in the restatement of Enron’s financial statements. Accountants use the term consolidation policy as shorthand for the principles that govern the preparation of consolidated financial statements that include the assets and liabilities of a parent company and its subsidiaries. For an example of consolidation, consider the simple example known to every accounting student. Company A operates a branch office in Edinburgh. Company B also operates a branch office in Edinburgh, but organises the branch as a corporation owned by Company B. Every accounting student knows that the financial statements of each company should report all of the assets and liabilities of their respective Edinburgh operations, without regard to the legal form surrounding those operations. 

Of course, real life is seldom as straightforward as textbook examples. Companies often own less than 100 per cent of a company that might be included in the consolidated group. Some special purpose entities (SPEs) may not be organised in traditional corporate form. The challenge for accountants is to determine which entities should be included in consolidated financial statements. 

There is a broad consensus among accounting standard-setters that the decision to consolidate should be based on whether one entity controls another. However, there is much disagreement over how control should be defined and translated into accounting guidance. In some jurisdictions accounting standards and practice seem to have gravitated toward a legal or ownership notion of control, usually based on direct or indirect ownership of over 50 per cent of the outstanding voting shares. In contrast, both international standards and the standards in some national jurisdictions are based on a broader notion of control that includes ownership, but extends to control over financial and operating policies, power to appoint or remove a majority of the board of directors, and power to cast a majority of votes at meetings of the board of directors. 

A number of commentators, including many in the USA, have questioned whether the control principle is consistently applied. The IASB and its partner standard-setters are committed to an ongoing review of the effectiveness of our standards. If they do not work as well as they should, we want to find out why and fix the problem. Last summer we asked the UK ASB to help us by researching the various national standards on consolidation and identifying any inconsistencies or implementation problems. It has completed the first stage of that effort and is moving now to more difficult questions. 

The particular consolidation problems posed by SPEs were addressed by the IASB’s former Standing Interpretations Committee in SIC-12. There are some kinds of SPE that pose particular problems for both an ownership approach and a control-based approach to consolidations. It is not uncommon for SPEs to have minimal capital, held by a third party, that bears little if any of the risks and rewards usually associated with share ownership. The activities of some SPEs are

so precisely prescribed in the documents that establish them that no active exercise of day-to-day control is needed or allowed. These kinds of SPEs are commonly referred to as running on ‘auto-pilot’. In these cases, control is exercised in a passive way. To discover who has control it is necessary to look at which party receives the benefits and risks of the SPE. 

SIC-12 sets out four particular circumstances that may indicate that an SPE should be consolidated:

(a) in substance, the activities of the SPE are being conducted on behalf of the enterprise according to its specific business needs so that the enterprise obtains benefits from the SPE’s operation. 

(b) in substance, the enterprise has the decision-making powers to obtain the majority of the benefits of the activities of the SPE or, by setting up an ‘autopilot’ mechanism, the enterprise has delegated these decision-making powers. 

(c) in substance, the enterprise has rights to obtain the majority of the benefits of the SPE and therefore may be exposed to risks incidental to the activities of the SPE. 

(d) in substance, the enterprise retains the majority of the residual or ownership risks related to the SPE or its assets in order to obtain benefits from its activities.

The IASB recognises that we may be able to improve our approach to SPEs. With this in mind, we have already asked our interpretations committee if there are any ways in which the rules need to be strengthened or clarified.

Current criticisms and concerns about financial reporting 

There some common threads that pass through most of the topics on our active and research agendas. Each represents a broad topic that has occupied the best accounting minds for several years. It is time to bring many of these issues to a conclusion. 

Off balance sheet items 

When a manufacturer sells a car or a dishwasher, the inventory is removed from the balance sheet (a process that accountants refer to as derecognition) because the manufacturer no longerowns the item. Similarly, when a company repays a loan, it no longer reports that loan as a liability. However, the last 20 years have seen a number of attempts by companies to remove assets and liabilities from balance sheets through transactions that may obscure the economic substance of the company’s financial position. There are four areas that warrant mention here, each of which has the potential to obscure the extent of a company’s assets and liabilities. 

Leasing transactions

A company that owns an asset, say an aircraft, and finances that asset with debt reports an asset (the aircraft) and a liability (the debt). Under existing accounting standards in most jurisdictions (including ASB and IASB standards), a company that operates the same asset under a lease structured as an operating lease reports neither the asset nor the liability. It is possible to operate a company, say an airline, without reporting any of the company’s principal assets (aircraft) on the balance sheet. A balance sheet that presents an airline without any aircraft is clearly not a faithful representation of economic reality.

Our predecessor body, working in conjunction with our partners in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the USA, published a research paper that invited comments on accounting for leases. The UK ASB is continuing work on this topic and we are monitoring its work carefully. As noted above, we expect to move accounting for leases to our active agenda at some point in the future. There is a distinct possibility that such a project would lead us to propose that companies recognise assets and related lease obligations for all leases.

 Securitisation transactions

Under existing accounting standards in many jurisdictions, a company that transfers assets (like loans or credit-card balances) through a securitisation transaction recognises the transaction as a sale and removes the amounts from its balance sheet. Some securitisations are appropriately accounted for as sales, but many continue to expose the transferor to many of the significant risks and rewards inherent in the transferred assets. In our project on improvements to IAS 39 (page 5), we plan to propose an approach that will clarify international standards governing a company’s ability to derecognise assets in a securitisation. Our approach, which will not allow sale treatment when the ‘seller’ has a continuing involvement with the assets, will be significantly different from the one found in the existing standards of most jurisdictions.

Creation of unconsolidated entities 

Under existing accounting standards in many jurisdictions, a company that transfers assets and liabilities to a subsidiary company must consolidate that subsidiary in the parent company’s financial statements (see page 6). However, in some cases (often involving the use of an SPE), the transferor may be able (in some jurisdictions) to escape the requirement to consolidate. Standards governing the consolidation of SPEs are described on page 7. 

Pension obligations

Under existing standards in many jurisdictions (including existing international standards) a company’s obligation to a defined benefit pension plan is reported on the company’s balance sheet. However, the amount reported is not the current obligation, based on current information and assumptions, but instead represents the result of a series of devices designed to spread changes over several years. In contrast, the UK standard (FRS 17) has attracted significant recent attention because it does not include a smoothing mechanism. The IASB plans to examine the differences among the various national accounting standards for pensions (in particular, the smoothing mechanism), as part of our ongoing work on convergence.

Items not included in the profit and loss account 

Under existing accounting standards in some jurisdictions, a company that pays for goods and services through the use of its own shares, options on its shares, or instruments tied to the value of its shares may not record any cost for those goods and services. The most common form of this share-based transaction is the employee share option. In 1995, after what it called an “extraordinarily controversial” debate, the FASB issued a standard that, in most cases in the USA, requires disclosure of the effect of employee share options but does not require recognition in the financial statements. In its Basis for Conclusions, the FASB observed:

The Board chose a disclosure-based solution for stock-based employee compensation to bring closure to the divisive debate on this issue—not because it believes that solution is the best way to improve financial accounting and reporting.

Most jurisdictions, including the UK, do not have any standard on accounting for share-based payment, and the use of this technique is growing outside of the USA. There is a clear need for international accounting guidance. Last autumn, the IASB reopened the comment period on a discussion document Accounting for Share-based Payment. This document was initially published by our predecessor, in concert with standard-setters from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the USA. We have now considered the comments received and have begun active deliberation of this project. Accounting measurement

Under existing accounting standards in most jurisdictions, assets and liabilities are reported at amounts based on a mixture of accounting measurements. Some measurements are based on historical transaction prices, perhaps adjusted for depreciation, amortisation, or impairment. Others are based on fair values, using either amounts observed in the marketplace or estimates of fair value. Accountants refer to this as the mixed attribute model. It is increasingly clear that a mixed attribute system creates complexity and opportunities for accounting arbitrage, especially for derivatives and financial instruments. Some have suggested that financial reporting should move to a system that measures all financial instruments at fair value.

Our predecessor body participated in a group of ten accounting standard-setters (the Joint Working Group or JWG) to study the problem of accounting for financial instruments. The JWG proposal (which recommended a change to measuring all financial assets and liabilities at fair value) was published at the end of 2000. Earlier this year the Canadian Accounting Standards Board presented an analysis of comments on that proposal. The IASB has just begun to consider how this effort should move forward. 

Intangible assets

Under existing accounting standards in most jurisdictions, the cost of an intangible asset (a patent, copyright, or the like) purchased from a third party is capitalised as an asset. This is the same as the accounting for acquired tangible assets (buildings and machines) and financial assets (loans and accounts receivable). Existing accounting standards extend this approach to self-constructed tangible assets, so a company that builds its own building capitalises the costs incurred and reports that as the cost of its self-constructed asset. However, a company that develops its own patent for a new drug or process is prohibited from capitalising much (sometimes all) of the costs of creating that intangible asset. Many have criticised this inconsistency, especially at a time when many view intangible assets as significant drivers of company performance.

The accounting recognition and measurement of internally generated intangibles challenges many long-cherished accounting conventions. Applying the discipline of accounting concepts challenges many of the popular conceptions of intangible assets and ‘intellectual capital’. We have this topic on our research agenda. We also note the significant work that the FASB has done on this topic and its recent decision to add a project to develop proposed disclosures about internally generated intangible assets. We plan to monitor those efforts closely.

Bob Jensen's threads on the Enron/Andersen scandals are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm 

Bob Jensen's SPE threads are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm 

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm 


Why Let the I.R.S. See What the S.E.C. Doesn't?

"Why Let the I.R.S. See What the S.E.C. Doesn't?," by Anna Bernasek, The New York Times, February 5, 2006 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/05/business/yourmoney/05view.html

IMAGINE a company that makes a practice of keeping two sets of accounts. One version is revealed to the public through periodic Securities and Exchange Commission filings and public announcements. The other is never made public and conveys a markedly different picture.

Does it sound scandalous? Actually, it's common practice.

It isn't as if companies are breaking the law. Public companies are required by the S.E.C. to keep their books in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, or GAAP, and to announce their results each quarter. At the same time, companies keep a separate and confidential set of books according to rules established by the Internal Revenue Service. These accounts seldom match. After all, companies typically have an incentive to state the highest possible earnings under GAAP and the lowest possible under tax rules.

Economists have long understood that profits reported to the I.R.S. may be a more reliable guide than those reported to the S.E.C. and scrutinized on Wall Street. The public presentation of accounts involves the exercise of an accountant's judgment on such topics as the useful life of assets, the probability of uncertain events and the fair value of property. Each exercise of judgment, on which reasonable people may differ, offers a degree of flexibility in the final reporting of results.

In general, tax rules are less lenient. That is because allowing companies too much leeway in stating how much tax they owe would make collecting taxes difficult. So when economists analyze corporate profits, they tend to focus on a measure derived from corporate tax returns. Unfortunately, the government publishes only aggregate data, so it is impossible to know what any particular company made, or paid, under I.R.S. rules.

It doesn't have to be that way. Companies already have basic tax information at hand that could be released to the public without imposing significant costs. And some experts say they believe that the benefits to investors, regulators and the overall tax system could be substantial.

A study published in 2003 concluded that the benefits of disclosing additional tax information would outweigh any costs. It was conducted by David L. Lenter, a lawyer now on the staff of the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation; Joel B. Slemrod, an economist at the University of Michigan; and Douglas A. Shackelford, an accountant at the University of North Carolina.

In the study, published in the National Tax Journal, they quickly agreed that corporate tax returns, which can run into thousands of pages, should not be exposed in their entirety. That could reveal sensitive information that companies have a legitimate need to keep private, they said.

But a simple presentation of summary information — the bottom-line numbers, for example — would have many attractions. Even better, companies could release a simplified version of a schedule that they already prepare. The I.R.S. currently requires companies to reconcile the differences between the numbers on their financial reports and the corresponding amounts on their tax return, but so far those reconciliations have not been made public.

Greater disclosure of tax information would allow investors and analysts to better appreciate the true economic condition of a company. More transparent tax figures would also give analysts a tool to cut through the sometimes confusing tax disclosures currently provided under S.E.C. rules. Even more significantly, investors could track a company's performance under an accounting system believed to be less susceptible to manipulation than GAAP. Together, these effects would permit investors to value securities with greater confidence. Over all, the researchers say they believe that it would help financial markets function more efficiently.

Another significant benefit could be to improve the transparency of the tax system to the voting public. Despite all the information embedded in accounting footnotes, some basic questions go unanswered. Under current S.E.C. rules, a public company does not have to reveal precisely what it paid in taxes for a specific year. "Right now the tax numbers companies release can contain things like taxes on audits 20 years ago," Professor Shackelford said. "What they don't tell us is how much they paid the government in taxes in 2005, for instance. You can't find that anywhere."

The study argued that if companies revealed that figure, it would help clarify how much tax a company was paying relative to its income and relative to other companies. And that would yield positive benefits. For instance, the study says, it could put pressure on legislators to improve the tax system. And it could discourage corporations from aggressive tax-reduction strategies if they feared public criticism.

THERE is good cause for trying to understand what is really going on with corporate taxes, company by company. The aggregate figures suggest a disturbing trend. While companies have reported rising profits in recent years, corporate tax receipts have been dwindling. In the late 1990's, corporate tax receipts hovered between 2 percent and 2.2 percent of the country's overall gross domestic product. But from 2000 to 2004, the last year for which figures are available, the ratio of corporate tax receipts to G.D.P. has dropped, ranging between 1.2 and 2 percent.

Without reliable tax information, we can only guess at what companies are really up to. During the late 1990's, company profits based on tax return information — the profit figure most watched by economists — grew at a much slower rate than reported profits. The divergence between the two measures implied that either companies were finding new ways to minimize their tax bills or they were finding new ways to overstate their accounting earnings. We now know that at least some companies were indeed bolstering their earnings, through both legal and illegal maneuvers.

After a brief reconciliation in 2001 and 2002, reported earnings and taxed earnings are again diverging. While disclosing some basic tax information won't by itself prevent the kinds of abuses that multiplied in the 1990's, it is a step in the right direction. And that's what good public policy is all about.


From The Wall Street Journal Weekly Accounting Review on August 15, 2008

Corporate Tax Reporting Draws GAO Scrutiny
by Jesse Drucker
The Wall Street Journal

Aug 13, 2008
Page: A2
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
 

TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting, Income Tax, Income Taxes, Tax Avoidance, Tax Havens, Taxation

SUMMARY: In a recent report filed in response to a request by two senators, Carl Levin of Michigan and Byron Dorgan of North Dakota, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that "...at least 23% of large U.S. corporations don't pay federal income taxes in any given year." Large corporations are defined as companies generating at least $50 million in sales or with $250 million in total assets. But smaller firms also frequently report no income tax liability: "in a given year at least 60% of all U.S. corporations studied ... reported no federal income-tax liability during the period...1998 to 2005. In the study, the GAO analyzed samples of Internal Revenue Service data covering both publicly traded and closely held corporations, including U.S.-based and foreign corporations operating in the U.S."

CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The article may be used to introduce book/tax differences, and items generating the differences such as net operating losses, in either a financial accounting or a corporate income tax class.

QUESTIONS: 
1. (Introductory) Research "...has looked at the gap between the earnings that companies report to their shareholders and the smaller profits they report to the Internal Revenue Service." What causes these differences? Where can investigators find out about the nature of these differences?

2. (Introductory) Summarize the major findings of the GAO study in your own words. Do the results surprise you? Specifically explain why.

3. (Advanced) What was the original question asked by Senators Carl Levin of Michigan and Byron Dorgan of North Dakota? Be sure to clearly define the items these senators asked about. Did the study investigate the specific topic of their concern?

4. (Advanced) What did the GAO find regarding the use of net operating losses and tax credits in driving the reported amounts showing no tax liabilities owed? Why this result unexpected? In your answer, define each of these tax reporting items. Explain when you expect each of these items to show on a tax return in terms of economic cycles.
 

Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
 

 

 

 


Radical Changes on the Way in Financial Reporting

Five General Categories of Aggregation
"The Sums of All Parts: Redesigning Financials:  As part of radical changes to the income statement, balance sheet, and cash flow statement, FASB signs off on a series of new subtotals to be contained in each," byMarie Leone, CFO Magazine, November 14, 2007 --- http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/10131571?f=rsspage

In another large step towards the most dramatic overhaul of financial statements in decades, the Financial Accounting Standards Board Wednesday laid out a series of subtotal figures that companies would be required to include on their balance sheets, income statements and cash flow statements.

The new look for financials will break all three statements into five general categories: business, discontinued operations, financing, income taxes, and equity (if needed). Each of those groupings will carry its own total. In addition, the business, financing, and income tax categories will be segmented into even more narrow sections, each of which will include a subtotal. For example, the business category will be broken down into operating assets, operating liabilities and a subtotal; and investing assets, investing liabilities, and a second subtotal.

(Although FASB will not officially release its proposal until the second quarter of 2008, it has made public some initial peeks at the proposed format.)

The addition of totals and subtotals is an extension of FASB's broader principle on disaggregating financial statement line items. It is the board's belief that separating line items into their components gives investors, creditors, analysts and other financial statement users a better view of a company's financial health. For example, the new format should make it easier for an investor to see how much cash a company generates by selling its products versus how much it generates by selling-off a business unit or through financial investments made by the corporate treasurer.

FASB staffers say buy- and sell-side analysts typically scrutinize financial statements by breaking them down into categories similar to the ones the board is proposing.

In keeping with its promise to strip accounting standards of complexity, the board also agreed to issue two overarching principles in its draft document on financial statement presentation. One principle instructs preparers to keep the category order consistent in each of the three financial statements. For example, if income tax is the last category shown in on the balance sheet, then it should also be the final category on the cash flow and income statement. "We're not going to tell you what order [to use], just that you should use the same order in all three statements," noted FASB Chairman Robert Herz during the meeting.

In addition, the board wants companies to "clearly distinguish" between operating assets and operating liabilities, as well as short-term assets and liabilities and their long-term counterparts. But the board is not going to prescribe how that should be done. Regarding the issue of common sums, "the only requirement will be that totals and subtotals are segmented by activities," noted board member George Batavick, "the rest will be principles."

Updating the look and functionality of financial statements is one of the joint projects that FASB is working on with the International Accounting Standards Board as the two organizations work to converge U.S. and global accounting rules. On Thursday, IASB will discuss the common totals issue and is expected to release its recommendations.

FASB expects the draft proposal to spark a healthy debate among users and preparers, and staffers are planning for a four- to six-month comment period to follow its release. One issue that will have to be thrashed out, for example, is whether discontinued operations should be relegated to its own category, or run through the income statement or financing activities.

To avoid any last-minute confusion with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Herz asked the FASB accountants working on the project to "touch base with the SEC staff just to get their input." Herz noted that last time the two groups discussed disaggregation principles, Scott Taub, not James Kroeker, was the SEC's deputy chief accountant.

Jensen Comment
Now is especially the time for accounting researchers to look into leading edge alternatives for visualizing data. My threads on that topic are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/352wpVisual/000DataVisualization.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm


No Bottom Line

Question
Is a major overhaul of accounting standards on the way?

Hint
There may no longer be the tried and untrusted earnings per share number to report!
Comment
It would be interesting to see a documentation of the academic research, if any, that the FASB relied upon to commence this blockbuster initiative. I recommend that some astute researcher commence to probe into the thinking behind this proposal.

"Profit as We Know It Could Be Lost With New Accounting Statements," by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, May 12, 2007; Page A1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117893520139500814.html?mod=DAT

Pretty soon the bottom line may not be, well, the bottom line.

In coming months, accounting-rule makers are planning to unveil a draft plan to rework financial statements, the bedrock data that millions of investors use every day when deciding whether to buy or sell stocks, bonds and other financial instruments. One possible result: the elimination of what today is known as net income or net profit, the bottom-line figure showing what is left after expenses have been met and taxes paid.

It is the item many investors look to as a key gauge of corporate performance and one measure used to determine executive compensation. In its place, investors might find a number of profit figures that correspond to different corporate activities such as business operations, financing and investing.

Another possible radical change in the works: assets and liabilities may no longer be separate categories on the balance sheet, or fall to the left and right side in the classic format taught in introductory accounting classes.

ACCOUNTING OVERHAUL

Get a glimpse of what new financial statements could look like, according to an early draft recently provided by the Financial Accounting Standards Board to one of its advisory groups. The overhaul could mark one of the most drastic changes to accounting and financial reporting since the start of the Industrial Revolution in the 19th century, when companies began publishing financial information as they sought outside capital. The move is being undertaken by accounting-rule makers in the U.S. and internationally, and ultimately could affect companies and investors around the world.

The project is aimed at providing investors with more telling information and has come about as rule makers work to one day come up with a common, global set of accounting standards. If adopted, the changes will likely force every accounting textbook to be rewritten and anyone who uses accounting -- from clerks to chief executives -- to relearn how to compile and analyze information that shows what is happening in a business.

This is likely to come as a shock, even if many investors and executives acknowledge that net income has flaws. "If there was no bottom line, I'd want to have a sense of what other indicators I ought to be looking at to get a sense of the comprehensive health of the company," says Katrina Presti, a part-time independent health-care contractor and stay-at-home mom who is part of a 12-woman investment club in Pueblo, Colo. "Net income might be a false indicator, but what would I look at if it goes away?"

The effort to redo financial statements reflects changes in who uses them and for what purposes. Financial statements were originally crafted with bankers and lenders in mind. Their biggest question: Is the business solvent and what's left if it fails? Stock investors care more about a business's current and future profits, so the net-income line takes on added significance for them.

Indeed, that single profit number, particularly when it is divided by the number of shares outstanding, provides the most popular measure of a company's valuation: the price-to-earnings ratio. A company that trades at $10 a share, and which has net profit of $1 a share, has a P/E of 10.

But giving that much power to one number has long been a recipe for fraud and stock-market excesses. Many major accounting scandals earlier this decade centered on manipulation of net income. The stock-market bubble of the 1990s was largely based on investors' assumption that net profit for stocks would grow rapidly for years to come. And the game of beating a quarterly earnings number became a distraction or worse for companies' managers and investors. Obviously it isn't known whether the new format would cut down on attempts to game the numbers, but companies would have to give a more detailed breakdown of what is going on.

The goal of the accounting-rule makers is to better reflect how businesses are actually run and divert attention from the one number. "I know the world likes single bottom-line numbers and all of that, but complicated businesses are hard to translate into just one number," says Robert Herz, chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the U.S. rule-making body that is one of several groups working on the changes.

At the same time, public companies today are more global than local, and as likely to be involved in services or lines of business that involve intellectual property such as software rather than the plants and equipment that defined the manufacturing age. "The income statement today looks a lot like it did when I started out in this profession," says William Parrett, the retiring CEO of accounting firm Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, who started as a junior accountant in 1967. "But the kind of information that goes into it is completely different."

Along the way, figures such as net income have become muddied. That is in part because more and more of the items used to calculate net profit are based on management estimates, such as the value of items that don't trade in active markets and the direction of interest rates. Also, over the years rule makers agreed to corporate demands to account for some things, such as day-to-day changes in the value of pension plans or financial instruments used to protect against changes in interest rates, in ways that keep them from causing swings in net income.

Rule makers hope reformatting financial statements will address some of these issues, while giving investors more information about what is happening in different parts of a business to better assess its value. The project is being managed jointly by the FASB in the U.S. and the London-based International Accounting Standards Board, and involves accounting bodies in Japan, other parts of Asia and individual European nations.

The entire process of adopting the revised approach could take a few years to play out, so much could yet change. Plus, once rule makers adopt the changes, they would have to be ratified by regulatory authorities, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission in the U.S. and the European Commission in Europe, before public companies would be required to follow them.

As a first step, rule makers expect later this year to publish a document outlining their preliminary views on what new form financial statements might take. But already they have given hints of what's in store. In March, the FASB provided draft, new financial statements at the end of a 32-page handout for members of an advisory group. (See an example.)

Although likely to change, this preview showed an income statement that has separate segments for the company's operating business, its financing activities, investing activities and tax payments. Each area has an income subtotal for that particular segment.

There is also a "total comprehensive income" category that is wider ranging than net profit as it is known today, and so wouldn't be directly comparable. That is because this total would likely include gains and losses now kept in other parts of the financial statements. These include some currency fluctuations and changes in the value of financial instruments used to hedge against other items.

Comprehensive income could also eventually include short-term changes in the value of corporate pension plans, which currently are smoothed out over a number of years. As a result, comprehensive income could be a lot more difficult to predict and could be volatile from quarter to quarter or year to year.

As for the balance sheet, the new version would group assets and liabilities together according to similar categories of operating, investing and financing activities, although it does provide a section for shareholders equity. Currently, a balance sheet is broken down between assets and liabilities, rather than by operating categories.

Such drastic change isn't likely to happen without a fight. Efforts to bring now-excluded figures into the income statement could prompt battles with companies that fear their profit will be subject to big swings. Companies may also balk at the expense involved.

"The cost of this change could be monumental," says Gary John Previts, an accounting professor at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland. "All the textbooks are going to have to change, every contract and every bank arrangement will have to change." Investors in Europe and Asia, meanwhile, have opposed the idea of dropping net profit as it appears today, David Tweedie, the IASB's chairman, said in an interview earlier this year.

Analysts in the London office of UBS AG recently published a report arguing this very point -- that even if net income is a "simplistic measure," that doesn't mean it isn't a valid "starting point in valuation" and that "its widespread use is justification enough for its retention."

Such opposition doesn't surprise many accounting experts. Net income is "the basis for bonuses and judgments about what a company's stock is worth," says Stephen A. Zeff, an accounting professor at Rice University. "I just don't know what the markets would do if companies stopped reporting a bottom line somewhere." In the U.S., professional investors and analysts have taken a more nuanced view, perhaps because the manipulation of numbers was more pronounced in U.S. markets.

That said, net profit has been around for some time. The income statement in use today, along with the balance sheet, generally dates to the 1940s when the SEC laid out regulations on financial disclosure. But many companies have included net profit in one form or another since the 1800s.

In its fourth annual report, General Electric Co. provided investors with a consolidated balance sheet and consolidated profit-and-loss account for the year ended Jan. 31, 1896. The company, whose board at the time included Thomas Edison, generated "profit of the year" -- what today would be called net income or net profit -- of $1,388,967.46.

For the moment, net profit will probably exist in some form, although its days are likely numbered. "We've decided in the interim to keep a net-income subtotal, but that's all up for discussion," the FASB's Mr. Herz says.

Bob Jensen's summary of accounting theory is at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm


Question
What do CFO's think of Robert Herz's (Chairman of the FASB) radical proposed  format for financial statements that have more disaggregated financial information and no aggregated bottom line?

As we moved to fair value accounting for derivative financial instruments (FAS 133) and financial instruments (FAS 157 and 159) coupled with the expected new thrust for fair value reporting on the international scene, we have filled the income statement and the retained earnings statement with more and more instability due to fluctuating unrealized gains and losses.

I have reservations about fair value reporting --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue

But if we must live with more and more fair value reporting, the bottom line has to go. But CFOs are reluctant to give up the bottom line even if it may distort investing decisions and compensation contracts tied to bottom-line reporting.

Before reading the article below you may want to first read about radical new changes on the way --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#ChangesOnTheWay

"A New Vision for Accounting:  Robert Herz and FASB are preparing a radical new format for financial, CFO Magazine, by Alix Stuart, February 2008, pp. 49-53 --- http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/10597001/c_10711055?f=home_todayinfinance

Last summer, McCormick & Co. controller Ken Kelly sliced and diced his financial statements in ways he had never before imagined. For starters, he split the income statement for the $2.7 billion international spice-and-food company into the three categories of the cash-flow statement: operating, financing, and investing. He extracted discontinued operations and income taxes and placed them in separate categories, instead of peppering them throughout the other results. He created a new form to distinguish which changes in income were due to fair value and which to cash. One traditional ingredient, meanwhile, was conspicuous by its absence: net income.

Kelly wasn't just indulging a whim. Ahead of a public release of a draft of the Financial Accounting Standards Board's new format for financial statements in the second quarter of 2008, the McCormick controller was trying out the financial statements of the future, a radical departure from current conventions. FASB's so-called financial statement presentation project is ostensibly concerned only with the form, or the "face," of financial statements, but it's quickly becoming clear that it will change and expand their content as well. "This is a complete redefinition of the financial statements as we know them," says John Hepp, a former FASB project manager and now senior manager at Grant Thornton.

Some of the major changes under discussion: reconfiguring the balance sheet and the income statement to follow the three categories of the cash-flow statement, requiring companies to report cash flows with the little-used direct method; and introducing a new reconciliation schedule that would highlight fair-value changes. Companies will also likely have to report more about their segments, possibly down to the same level of detail as they currently report for the consolidated statements. Meanwhile, net income is slated to disappear completely from GAAP financial statements, with no obvious replacement for such commonly used metrics as earnings per share.

FASB, working with the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and accounting standards boards in the United Kingdom and Japan, continues to work out the precise details of the new financial statements. "We are trying to set the stage for what financial statements will look like across the globe for decades to come," says FASB chairman Robert Herz. (Examples of the proposed new financial statements can be viewed at FASB's Website.) If the standard-setters stay their course, CFOs and controllers at every publicly traded company in the world could be following Kelly's lead as soon as 2010.

It's too early to predict with confidence which changes will ultimately stick. But the mock-up exercise has made Kelly wary. He considers the direct cash-flow statement and reconciliation schedule among the "worst aspects" of the forthcoming proposal, and expects they would require "draconian exercises" from his finance staff, he says. And he questions what would result from the additional details: "If all of a sudden your income statement has 125 lines instead of 25, is that presentation more clarifying, or more confusing?"

Other financial executives share Kelly's skepticism. In a December CFO survey of more than 200 finance executives, only 17 percent said the changes would offer any benefits to their companies or investors (see "Keep the Bottom Line" at the end of this article). Even some who endorsed the basic aim of the project and like the idea of standardizing categories across the three major financial statements were only cautiously optimistic. "It may be OK, or it may be excessive." says David Rickard, CFO of CVS/Caremark. "The devil will be in the details."

Net Loss From the outset, corporate financial officers have been ambivalent about FASB's seven year-old project, which was originally launched to address concerns that net income was losing relevance amid a proliferation of pro forma numbers. Back in 2001, Financial Executives International "strongly opposed" it, while executives at Philip Morris, Exxon Mobil, Sears Roebuck, and Microsoft protested to FASB as well.

(Critics then and now point out that FASB will have little control over pro forma reporting no matter what it does. Indeed, nearly 60 percent of respondents to CFO's survey said they would continue to report pro forma numbers after the new format is introduced.)

Given the project's starting point, it's not surprising that current drafts of the future income statement omit net income. Right now that's by default, since income taxes are recorded in a separate section. But there is a big push among some board members to make a more fundamental change to eliminate net income by design, and promote business income (income from operations) as the preferred basis for investment metrics.

"If net income stays, it would be a sign that we failed," says Don Young, a FASB board member. In his mind, the project is not merely about getting rid of net income, but rather about capturing all income-related information in a single line (including such volatile items as gains and losses on cash-flow hedges, available-for-sale securities, and foreign-exchange translations) rather than footnoting them in other comprehensive income (OCI) as they are now. "All changes in net assets and liabilities should be included," says Young. "Why should the income statement be incomplete?" He predicts that the new subtotals, namely business income, will present "a much clearer picture of what's going on."

Board member Thomas Linsmeier agrees. "The rationale for segregating those items [in OCI] is not necessarily obvious, other than the fact that management doesn't want to be held accountable for them in the current period," he says.

Whether for self-serving or practical reasons, finance chiefs are rallying behind net income. Nearly 70 percent of those polled by CFO in December said it should stay. "I understand their theories that it's not the be-all and end-all measure that it's put up to be, but it is a measure everyone is familiar with, and sophisticated users can adjust from there," says Kelly. Adds Rickard: "They're treating [net income] as if it's the scourge of the earth, which to me is silly. I think the logical conclusion is to make other things available, rather than hiding the one thing people find most useful."

. . .

 

Bob Jensen's threads on this proposed "radical change" in financial reporting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#ChangesOnTheWay 

Jensen Comment
As we moved to fair value accounting for derivative financial instruments (FAS 133) and financial instruments (FAS 157 and 159) coupled with the expected new thrust for fair value reporting on the international scene, we have filled the income statement and the retained earnings statement with more and more instability due to fluctuating unrealized gains and losses.

I have reservations about fair value reporting --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue

But if we must live with more and more fair value reporting, the bottom line has to go. But CFOs are reluctant to give up the bottom line even if it may distort investing decisions and compensation contracts tied to bottom-line reporting.

Bob Jensen's threads on the radical new changes on the way --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#ChangesOnTheWay

 


Question
Should your paycheck be impacted contractually by FAS 133?

I was contacted by the representative of a major and highly reputable transportation company union concerning possible manipulation of FAS 133 accounting (one of the many tools for creative accounting) for purposes of lowering compensation payments to employees. He wanted to engage me on a consulting basis to examine a series of financial statements of the company. It would be great if I could inspire some public debate on the following issue. The message below follows an earlier message to XXXXX concerning how hedging ineffectiveness works under FAS 133 accounting rules --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#Ineffectiveness

_________________

Hi XXXXX,

You wrote:
“Does the $502 million hedging ineffectiveness pique your interest?”

My answer is most definitely yes since it fits into some research that I am doing at the moment. But the answers cannot be obtained from financial statements. Financial statements are (1) too aggregated (across multiple derivative hedging contracts) and (2) snapshots at particular points in time. Answers lie in tracing each contract individually (or at least a sampling of individual contracts) from inception to settlement. Results of effectiveness testing throughout the life of each hedging contract must be examined (on a sampling basis).

 

Recall that there were enormous scandals concerning financial instruments derivatives that led up to FAS 133 and IAS 39. See http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds
The SEC pressured the FASB to come up with a new standard that would overcome the problem of so much unbooked financial liability risk due to derivative financial instruments. FAS 133 and IAS 39 got complicated when standard setters tried to book the derivative assets and liabilities on the balance sheet without impacting current earnings for qualified effective hedges of financial risk.

When the FASB issued FAS 133, The FASB and the SEC were concerned about unbooked financial risk of every active derivative contract if the contract was settled on the interim balance sheet date. When a contract like an option is valued on a balance sheet date, its premature settlement value that day may well be deemed ineffective relative to the value of the hedged item. The reason is that derivative contracts are traded in different markets (usually more speculative markets) than commodities markets themselves (where buyers actually use the commodities). But the hedging contracts deemed ineffective on interim dates may not be ineffective at all across the long haul. Usually they are perfectly effective on hedging maturity dates.

Temporal ineffectiveness more often than not works itself out such that all those gains and losses due to hedging ineffectiveness on particular interim dates exactly wash out such there is no ultimate cash flow gain or loss when the contracts are settled at maturity dates. I attached an Excel workbook that explains how some commodities hedges work out over time. The Graphing.xls file can also be downloaded from http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/FAS133OtherExcelFiles/
Note in particular the “Hedges” spreadsheet in that file. These explain the outcomes at the settlement maturity dates that yield perfect hedges. But at any date before maturity (not pictured in the graphs), the hedges may not be perfect if settled prematurely on interim balance sheet dates.

I illustrate the accounting for ineffective interim hedges in both the 03forfut.pps and 05options.ppt PowerPoint files at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/JensenPowerPoint/
The hedges may deemed ineffective under FAS 133 at interim balance sheet dates with gains and losses posted to current earnings. However, over time the gains and losses perfectly offset such that the hedges are perfectly effective when they are settled at maturity dates.

The real problem with FAS 133 is that compensation contracts are generally tied to particular balance sheet dates where interim hedging contracts may be deemed ineffective and thereby affect paychecks. But some of those FAS 133 interim gains and losses may in fact never be realized in cash over the life of the each commodity hedging contract.

What has to happen is for management to be very up front about how FAS 133 and other accounting standards may give rise to artificial gains and losses that are never realized unless the hedging contracts are settled prematurely on balance sheet dates. Compensation contracts should be hammered out with that thought in mind rather than blindly basing compensation contracts on bottom-line earnings that are mixtures of apples, oranges, toads, and nails due to accounting standards.

Of course management is caught in a bind because investors follow bottom-line as the main indicator of performance of a company. The FASB recognizes this problem and is now trying to work out a new standard that will eliminate bottom-line reporting. The idea will be to provide information for analysts to derive alternative bottom-line numbers based upon what they want included and excluded in that bottom line. XBRL may indeed make this much easier for investors and analysts --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm

If I were working out a compensation contract based on accounting numbers, I would probably exclude FAS 133 unrealized gains and losses.

In any case, back to your original question. I would love to work with management to track a sampling of fuel price hedging contracts from beginning to end. I would like to see what effectiveness tests were run on each reporting date and how gains and losses offset over the life of each examined contract. But this type of study cannot be run on aggregated financial statements.

If I can study some of those individual hedging contracts over time I would be most interested. It will take your clout with management, however, to get me this data. I have such high priors on the integrity of your company's management that I seriously doubt that there is any intentional manipulation going on witth FAS 133 implementation. Rather I suspect that management is just trying to adhere as closely as possible with FAS 133 rules. What I would like to do is help enlighten the world about the bad things FAS 133 can do with compensation contracts and investment decisions by users of statements who really do not understand the temporal impacts of FAS 133 on bottom-line earnings.

I fear that my study would, however, be mostly one of academic interest that I can report to the public. Only an inside whistleblower could pinpoint hanky-pank within a company, and I seriously doubt that your company is engaged in disreputable FAS 133 hanky-pank beyond that of possibly not fully explaining to unions how FAS 133 losses in general may be phantom losses over the long haul.

Bob Jensen

 


Underlying Bases of Balance Sheet Valuation

Levels of "Value" of an Entire Company
General Theory Days Inns of America
(As Reported September 30, 1987)
Market Value of the Entire Block of Common Shares at Today's Price Per Share
(Ignoring Blockage Factors)
Not Available 
Day Inns of America
Was Privately Owned
Exit Value of Firm if Sold As a Firm
(Includes synergy factors and unbooked intangibles)
Not Available for
Days Inns of America
Sum of Exit Values of Booked Assets Minus Liabilities & Pref. Stock
(includes unbooked and unrealized gains and losses)
$194,812,000 
as Reported by Days Inns
Book Value of the Firm as Reported in Financial Statements  $87,356,000 as Reported
Book Value of the Firm as Reported in the Financial Statements  After General Price Level Adjustments Not Available for Days Inns

 

Analysts often examine the market to book ratios which is the green value above divided by the book value.  Usually the book value is not adjusted for general price levels in calculating this ratio, but there is not reason why it could not be PLA book value.  But the green value often widely misses the mark in measuring the value of the firm as a whole (the blue value above).  The green value is based upon marginal trades of the day that do not adjust for blockage factors (large purchases that give total ownership or effective ownership control of the company).  Usually it is impossible to know whether the green value above is higher or lower than the blue value.  In addition to the blockage factor, there is the huge problem that the stock market prices have transitory movements up and down due to changing moods of speculators that create short-term bubbles and bursts.  Buyers and sellers of an entire firm are looking at the long term and generally ignore transitory price fluctuations of daily trades of relatively small numbers of shares.  For example, daily transaction prices on 100,000 shares in a bubble or burst market are hardly indicative of the long term value of 100 million shares of a corporation.

Beginning in 1979, FAS 33 required large corporations to provide a supplementary schedule of condensed balance sheets and income statements comparing annual outcomes under three valuation bases --- Unadjusted Historical Cost, Price Level Adjusted (PLA) Historical Cost, and Current Cost Entry Value (adjusted for depreciation and amortization).  Companies complained heavily that users did not obtain value that justified the cost of implementing FAS 33.  Analysts complained that the FASB allowed such crude estimates that the FAS 33 schedules were virtually useless, especially the Current Cost estimates.  The FASB rescinded FAS 33 when it issued FAS 89 in 1986.  

FAS 33 had a significant impact on some companies.  For example the the earnings reported by United States Steel in the 1981 Annual Report as required under FAS 33 were as follows:

1981 United States Steel Income Before Extraordinary items and Changes in Acctg. Principles
Historical Cost (Non-PLA Adjusted) Historical Cost (PLA Adjusted) Market Value (Current Cost)
$1,077,000,000 Income $475,300,000 Income 
Plus $164,500,000 PLA gain due to decline in purchasing power of debt
$446,400,000 Income
Plus $164,500,000 PLA Gain

Less $168,000,000 Current cost increase less effect of increase in the general price level

Companies are no longer required to generate FAS 33-type comparisons.  The primary basis of accounting in the U.S. is unadjusted historical cost with numerous exceptions in particular instances.  For example, price-level adjustments may be required for for operations in hyperinflation nations.  Exit value accounting is required for firms deemed highly likely to become non-going concerns.  Exit value accounting is required for personal financial statements (whether an individual or a personal partnership such as two married people).  Economic (discounted cash flow) valuations are required for certain types of assets and liabilities such as pension liabilities.  

Hence in the United States and virtually every other nation, accounting standards do not require or even allow one single basis of accounting.  Beginning in January 2005, all nations in the Eurpean Union adopted the IASB's international standards that have moved closer and closer each year to the FASB/SEC standards of the United States.

New Fair Value Accounting Standards

From IAS Plus on August 28, 2006 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

At its meeting on 16 August 2006, the US Financial Accounting Standards Board authorised its staff to prepare a final draft of a Statement on Fair Value Measurements for vote by written ballot. The FASB plans to issue the Statement in September 2006. That Statement will form the basis of the next step of the IASB's project to develop fair value measurement guidance. The IASB plans to issue a discussion paper in the fourth quarter of 2006 that would:
 

  • indicate the IASB's preliminary views of the provisions of the FASB's Statement on Fair Value Measurements; and
  • identify differences between the FASB Statement and fair value measurement guidance in existing IFRSs.
The IASB will invite respondents to comment on the provisions of the FASB's statement on fair value measurements and on the IASB's preliminary views about FASB's Statement. Those comments would be considered in conjunction with the development of an IASB exposure draft on fair value measurements.

Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at various other links:

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes 

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms

Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation, and Yield Curves for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm

I recently completed the first draft of a paper on fair value at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
Comments would be helpful.


A Lesson in Simplifying Financial Instrument Reporting
Can a single "fair value" number such as the "fair price" of a used car be a surrogate for all the risks under the hood?

In a 2008 exposure draft the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) argues that "fair value is the only measure appropriate for all types of financial instruments" --- http://snipurl.com/ias39simplification
The argument does not apply to non-financial items that presumably are to be accounted for based upon more traditional generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).

The huge problems that I find most disturbing about fair value accounting are as follows:

 

So where to we go from here
(in June 2008 when I'm writing these remarks)?

All financial accountants should pay close attention to the exposure draft "Reducing Complexity in Reporting Financial Instruments" that for a very limited time may be downloaded without charge from the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) --- http://snipurl.com/ias39simplification  [www_iasb_org] . This exposure draft should be viewed as both an IASB and a FASB document since both standard setting bodies, along with the standard setting bodies of many other nations, are working feverishly to simplify the accounting rules for financial instruments in general and derivative financial instruments in particular. This exposure draft really represents the current leanings of virtually all accounting standard setting bodies.

Be warned, however, that proposed alternatives for simplifying complexity are really trade-offs in complexity since exit value reporting has many controversies and complexities. Huge and complicated financial risks of contracts are proposed, in the exposure draft, to be broad-brush simplified with "fair value accounting." This is a little like relying on the price of a used car to serve as a single index of all the risks that lie under the hood (the British say bonnet) of the used car. The analogy to a used car is appropriate since in many instances a financial instrument is unique, like a particular used car, and cannot be valued reliably from either active trading markets or extrapolations of past valuations of the item following events that may seriously alter the value of an item.

Although the above exposure draft is intended to "reduce complexity" with fair value accounting for financial instrument reporting, the exposure draft is very honest in admitting that fair value accounting by itself cannot eliminate many complexities, especially many complexities in hedge accounting.

 

The bottom line in the IASB's exposure draft is that fair value accounting is no panacea for reducing financial reporting complexity, especially in reducing much of the complexity of hedge accounting using derivative financial instruments.

The exposure draft then launches into, beginning in Paragraph 2.55, alternatives to simplifying hedge accounting other than to attempting fair value accounting alternatives that hit the wall when hedging with derivative financial instruments.

With respect to hedge accounting, the IASB in the exposure draft seeks your input regarding the following:

Questions for respondents

Question 1
Do current requirements for reporting financial instruments, derivative instruments and similar items require significant change to  meet the concerns of preparers and their auditors and the needs of users of financial statements? If not, how should the IASB respond  to assertions that the current requirements are too complex?

Question 2

(a) Should the IASB consider intermediate approaches (short of the fair value option) to address complexity arising from measurement and hedge accounting? Why or why not? If you believe that the IASB should not make any intermediate changes, please answer questions 5 and 6, and the questions set out in Section 3.

(b) Do you agree with the criteria set out in paragraph 2.2? If not, what criteria would you use and why?

Question 3
Approach 1 is to amend the existing measurement requirements (without the fair value option). How would you suggest existing measurement requirements should be amended? How are your suggestions consistent with the criteria for any proposed intermediate changes as set out in paragraph 2.2?

Question 4
Approach 2 is to replace the existing measurement requirements with a fair value measurement principle with some optional exceptions.

(a) What restrictions would you suggest on the instruments eligible to be measured at something other than fair value? How are your suggestions consistent with the criteria set out in paragraph 2.2?

(b) How should instruments that are not measured at fair value be measured?

(c) When should impairment losses be recognised and how should the amount of impairment losses be measured?

(d) Where should unrealised gains and losses be recognised on instruments measured at fair value? Why? How are your suggestions consistent with the criteria set out in paragraph 2.2? (e) Should reclassifications be permitted? What types of reclassifications should be permitted and how should they be accounted for? How are your suggestions consistent with the criteria set out in paragraph 2.2?

Question 5
Approach 3 sets out possible simplifications of hedge accounting.

(a) Should hedge accounting be eliminated? Why or why not?

(b) Should fair value hedge accounting be replaced? Approach 3 sets out three possible approaches to replacing fair value hedge accounting.

(i) Which method(s) should the IASB consider, and why?

(ii) Are there any other methods not discussed that should be considered by the IASB? If so, what are they and how are they consistent with the criteria set out in paragraph 2.2? If you suggest changing measurement requirements under approach 1 or approach 2, please ensure that your comments are consistent with your suggested approach to changing measurement requirements.

Question 6
Section 2 also discusses how the existing hedge accounting models might be simplified. At present, there are several restrictions in the existing hedge accounting models to maintain discipline over when a hedging relationship can qualify for hedge accounting and how the application of the hedge accounting models affects earnings. This section also explains why those restrictions are required. (

a) What suggestions would you make to the IASB regarding how the existing hedge accounting models could be simplified?

(b) Would your suggestions include restrictions that exist today? If not, why are those restrictions unnecessary?

(c) Existing hedge accounting requirements could be simplified if partial hedges were not permitted. Should partial hedges be permitted and, if so, why? Please also explain why you believe the benefits of allowing partial hedges justify the complexity.

(d) What other comments or suggestions do you have with regard to how hedge accounting might be simplified while maintaining discipline over when a hedging relationship can qualify for hedge accounting and how the application of the hedge accounting models affects earnings

Question 7
Do you have any other intermediate approaches for the IASB to consider other than those set out in Section 2? If so, what are they and why should the IASB consider them?

 

 

Having noted all the problems with fair value accounting when hedging for derivative financial instruments in Section 2 of the exposure draft, the exposure draft in Section 3 tries to nevertheless make a case that fair value accounting is the best of all the bad alternatives for accounting for financial instruments in general, including derivative financial instruments. No attempt is made to advocate fair value accounting for non-financial instruments such as operating assets where value in use versus exit values present enormous problems for exit (fair value) accounting.

Section 3 is quite good about mentioning the problems of fair value accounting as well as the reasons the IASB (and the FASB) is leaning in theory and in practice for requiring fair value accounting of all financial instruments be they assets or liabilities or both in the case of some compound instruments. Section 3 is changing the minds of fair value accounting skeptics like me!

 

Questions for respondents

Question 8
To reduce today’s measurement-related problems, Section 3 suggests that the long-term solution is to use a single method to measure all types of financial instruments within the scope of a standard for financial instruments. Do you believe that using a single method to measure all types of financial instruments within the scope of a standard for financial instruments is appropriate? Why or why not? If you do not believe that all types of financial instruments should be measured using only one method in the long term, is there another approach to address measurement-related problems in the long term? If so, what is it

Question 9
Part A of Section 3 suggests that fair value seems to be the only measurement attribute that is appropriate for all types of financial instruments within the scope of a standard for financial instruments.

(a) Do you believe that fair value is the only measurement attribute that is appropriate for all types of financial instruments within the scope of a standard for financial instruments?

(b) If not, what measurement attribute other than fair value is appropriate for all types of financial instruments within the scope of a standard for financial instruments? Why do you think that measurement attribute is appropriate for all types of financial instruments within the scope of a standard for financial instruments? Does that measurement attribute reduce today’s measurement-related complexity and provide users with information that is necessary to assess the cash flow prospects for all types of financial instruments?

Question 10
Part B of Section 3 sets out concerns about fair value measurement of financial instruments. Are there any significant concerns about fair value measurement of financial instruments other than those identified in Section 3? If so, what are they and why are they matters for concern?

Question 11
Part C of Section 3 identifies four issues that the IASB needs to resolve before proposing fair value measurement as a general requirement for all types of financial instruments within the scope of a standard for financial instruments.

(a) Are there other issues that you believe the IASB should address before proposing a general fair value measurement requirement for financial instruments? If so, what are they? How should the IASB address them?

(b) Are there any issues identified in part C of Section 3 that do not have to be resolved before proposing a general fair value measurement requirement? If so, what are they and why do they not need to be resolved before proposing fair value as a general measurement requirement?

Question 12
Do you have any other comments for the IASB on how it could improveand simplify the accounting for financial instruments?

 

 

Jensen Warning
Taking some of the statements in the above exposure draft can be misleading when taken out of context. For example, in Paragraph 3.14 it is stated that:  "If initial cash flows for a particular instrument (eg costs to acquire the instrument) are not highly correlated with ultimate cash flows, cost-based measures have little or no value for assessing future cash flow prospects." Obviously this is nonsense in terms of many bonds payable and other notes payable, especially those with fixed interest rates. If there is negligible credit risk, historical cost is a perfect predictor of all cash flows of future interest and principles of fixed rate notes and bonds. Paragraph 3.14 must be taken in the context of securities that are not intended to be held to maturity or notes that have variable interest returns of interest and/or principal.

Jensen Commentary

Without doubt the most complicated, confusing, and hated accounting standards are those concerning new rules for booking and carrying deivative financial instruments, particularly FAS 133 in the U.S. and IAS 39 internationally along with their even more complicating amendments and implementation guidelines. Companies, with the blessings of international auditing firms, have made many blunders in implementing these particular standards, and these errors have led to more revisions to previously published financial statements than any other standards. Probably the best known revisions are those of Fannie Mae that led to the firing of KPMG as the external auditor, to over a million correcting journal entries, and to millions of dollars spent in finding and correcting FAS 133 implementation errors that took over a year to correct using over 600 accounting and finance specialists. But virtually every other company that uses derivative financial instruments to hedge price, interest rate, and credit risk has encountered numerous and costly troubles trying to get the accounting right under the complex 133/39 standards.

The FAS 133 and IAS 39 complex standards were necessary to counter a rising tide of derivative instruments frauds and inadvertent deception in financial statements that exploded exponentially with newer types of derivatives speculations and hedging strategies commencing in the 1980s and 1990s. A timeline of the scandals and revisions of accounting standards can be found at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
For example, interest rate swaps now used for hundreds of trillions of dollars of interest rate risk hedging were not even invented until the 1980s. Prior to 1994, companies did not even have to disclose their forward contracts and interest rate or commodity swaps even when the financial risks of those undisclosed contracts greatly exceeded all the booked liabilities of companies. FAS 133 beginning in Year 2000 required booking nearly all derivatives contracts as assets or liabilities and adjusting the carrying values to fair values at least every three months and on all reporting dates. IAS 39 followed internationally soon afterwards.

If the preparers of financial statements, along with their auditors, are confused by the newer accounting rules for derivative financial instruments, imagine how hopeless it is for users of financial instruments to evaluate returns and risks after such added complexity appeared in financial statements. In addition to the confusing booked numbers such as hedge accounting accumulations in the Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) account, there are paragraphs full of technical hedging strategy jargon contained in nearly unreadable, albeit required, footnote disclosures that supplement the booked numbers in financial statements.

Definitions of derivative financial instruments and other related terms can be found a http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm
FAS 133 and its key amending standards FAS 138, 149, 155, and 159 plus implications of 141, 142, 155, 157 and 159 can be downloaded free from http://www.fasb.org/st/index.shtml
Also note Section 815 of the FASB's new Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) online database --- http://asc.fasb.org/home

The derivative financial instrument contracts are usually purchased options (market exchanged), written options (market exchanged), futures contracts (market exchanged), forward contracts (privately exchanged) and swaps (portfolios of privately acquired forward contracts). Most derivatives have zero historical cost except for options where a relatively small premium is passed from the option purchaser to the option writer. As speculations, only purchased options have bounded risk limited to the premium paid. Other derivatives can have unbounded risk unless risk is bounded by other items (hedged items) by the hedging process.

The Concern is How to Get Hedge Accounting (read that relief from earnings volatility caused by unrealized changes in derivatives' fair value)
The FASB originally intended FAS 133 to be a simple standard in which derivative financial instruments, many of which were previously unbooked and undisclosed, be booked at cost (usually zero except for options) and than adjusted for often wildly fluctuating fair value until the options are settled or otherwise derecognized. The simple intended standard would've simply offset all changes in fair value of derivatives to current earnings. The theoretical and practical problem for derivatives used as hedges is that interim earnings, before derivatives are settled, typically fluctuates for unrealized changes in value that usually wash out when the derivatives are finally settled. Companies, particularly banks, objected wildly to such interim earnings fluctuations when hedges were intended to reduce financial risk. The FASB responded by adding over 1,000 highly technical pages to FAS 133 and its amendments dictating how and when companies could use special "hedge accounting" to essentially reduce or eliminate earnings volatility to the extent that the hedges meet "hedge effectiveness tests."

Not all economic hedges entered into by management qualify for hedge accounting in cash flow, fair value, or foreign exchange (FX) hedges. Not all qualifying hedges fully qualify for hedge accounting throughout the life of the hedge if hedging ineffectiveness arises. Hedging ineffectiveness may arise at interim points in time for hedges that are assured of being perfect hedges when settled at maturity. This, in particular, confuses management until it is explained those "perfect" hedges can be risky if settled before maturity. For example, a year-long hedging forward contract that locks in a fuel purchase price of $5 per gallon on ten million gallons on December 31 may shift in value wildly between January 1 and December 31, On March 31 the forward contract could be an enormous asset (when spot prices of fuel are soaring) and on June 30 it could become an enormous liability (with drastically plunging spot prices). Those "perfect cash flow hedges" at the December 31 maturity may not be perfect in terms of value and risk changes before maturity. Before Year 2000 and FAS 133, a company might have $100 million in undisclosed forward contract and swap exposures relative to $10 million in booked debt on the balance sheet. This is no longer the case due to FAS 133 and IAS 39.

Unbooked Purchase Contracts and Loan Obligations are Particularly Problematic
Companies often hedge firm commitments and forecasted transactions that are not yet booked in ledge accounts. In Accounting 101 and again in Accounting 301 courses, instructors repeatedly explain why executory purchase and sales contracts are not booked. Loan obligations are somewhat similar. For example, a firm commitment on January 1 for Airline A to buy 10 million gallons of fuel from Refiner R is not booked as an asset or liability by Airline A. It is also not booked as deferred revenue (a liability) by Refiner R until the purchase transaction actually transpires. However, both Airline A and Refiner R may enter into a derivative contract, such as a forward contract, to hedge this unbooked firm commitment contract for fair value risk. FAS 133 and IAS 39 require that the hedging contract be booked and carried at fair value even if the hedged item (the purchase/sale) contract is unbooked. Without hedge accounting relief, reported earnings will fluctuate due to value shifts in the booked derivative contract that are not offset by unbooked value shifts in the purchase/sale contract (the hedged item). This is why companies fought so hard to build hedge accounting relief into FAS 133 and IAS 39. Hedge accounting in this fair value risk situation allows changes in derivative contract value to be offset by debits or credits to a special equity account called "Firm Commitment"  rather than current earnings, thereby not corrupting earnings per share with unrealized fluctuations in hedging contract fair values.

The above purchase/sale contract is a firm commitment since the $5 price per gallon was contracted a year in advance. If the price was instead contracted as the December 31 spot price, the purchase/sale contract no longer has fair value risk, but it does have cash flow risk since neither Refiner R nor Airline A know what will be paid for the 10 million gallons of fuel until December 31. This change in the contract changes it from a "firm commitment" purchase/sale contract to a "forecasted transaction" purchase sale contract. Airline A might hedge such a forecasted transaction even without a written contract to purchase 10 million gallons of fuel from any supplier. Both Airline A and Refiner R may enter into a derivative contract, such as a forward contract, to hedge this unbooked forecasted tranaction contract for cash flow risk. FAS 133 and IAS 39 require that the hedging contract be booked and carried at fair value even if the hedged item (the purchase/sale) contract is unbooked. Without hedge accounting relief, reported earnings will fluctuate due to value shifts in the booked derivative contract that are not offset by unbooked value shifts in the purchase/sale contract (the hedged item). This is why companies fought so hard to build hedge accounting relief into FAS 133 and IAS 39. Hedge accounting in this cash flow risk situation allows changes in derivative contract value to be offset by debits or credits to a special equity account called "Other Comprehensive Income (OCI)" rather than current earnings, thereby not corrupting earnings per share with unrealized fluctuations in hedging contract fair values.

Loan obligations may be similar to unbooked purchase/sale contracts if they do not net settle. For example, suppose a bank is obligated to loan $1 million at 14% in three months. This firm commitment was signed when the spot rate of interest was 12%. If interest rates soar, the bank is still obligated to make the full loan at 14% unless there is a net settlement clause that allows the bank to instead provide a net settlement in cash in lieu of making the full loan. If the loan obligation has such a net settlement clause it has to be booked as a derivative financial instrument under either FAS 133 or IAS 39. If it does not net settle, then it might remain unbooked if certain other conditions are met.

Where the FVO Succeeds and Fails to Simplify Hedge Accounting
Both the FASB and the IASB are looking toward fair value accounting (now called the financial instrument Fair Value Option (FVO) now available in both the U.S. and International GAAP) to make it unnecessary to go through the complexities of qualifying for hedge accounting and continually testing for hedge hedging ineffectiveness that disqualifies some or all the hedge accounting at certain interim points of time. The FVO works pretty well for booked hedged items such as booked investments and booked liabilities for which changes in fair value under the FVO automatically offset changes of value in their hedging derivatives. It is no longer necessary to seek out special hedge accounting if the FVO is applied to such hedged items. Since the FVO is not available for non-financial hedged items such as operating assets (e.g., inventories, vehicles, factory machines, land, and buildings), the FVO only simplifies hedge accounting for hedged items that are booked financial assets or liabilities.

But unbooked hedged items create greater problems since the FVO cannot be applied to a hedged item that is not even booked, e.g., an unbooked loan obligation. The IASB exposure draft cited above recognizes this problem in the following quotation from the IASB exposure draft:

22.7
Cash flow hedge accounting is an exception (with no basis in accounting concepts) that permits management to recognise gains and losses on hedging instruments in earnings in a period other than the one in which they occur. Unlike fair value hedge accounting, the ‘mismatch’ that gives rise to the desire for cash flow hedge accounting is not an accounting anomaly. The economic effect of changes in fair value of the hedging instrument used as a hedge occurs before the hedged cash flows occur or are contracted for or committed to. This is illustrated as follows:

(a) If the hedged cash flows are anticipated to result from a forecast transaction, there are no assets, liabilities, gains, losses, or cash flows to account for at the time the gains and losses on the hedging instrument occur. There is no conceivable change in financial reporting standards that would result in recognising gains or losses on future cash flows arising from a forecast transaction. (
 

b) The hedged cash flows could also be payments or receipts on variable rate financial instruments. Variable rate instruments are  designed to protect the holder from changes in the fair value of the instrument (the cash flows of the instrument vary in a way that causes the instrument’s fair value to remain constant or nearly constant). Again, there is no accounting anomaly that can be eliminated by changing a financial reporting standard.

2.28
In either case, the hedging entity is deliberately exposing itself to gains and losses on a hedging instrument in order to offset changes in cash flows that have not yet occurred. Therefore, those cash flows cannot affect earnings until they occur (or they may not affect earnings at all if the cash flows relate to an acquisition of an asset)  2.29 For these reasons, the desire for cash flow hedge accounting will not be affected by changing the general measurement requirement for financial instruments.

 

2.29
For these reasons, the desire for cash flow hedge accounting will not be affected by changing the general measurement requirement for financial instruments. * IAS 39 also permits some firm commitments to be hedged using cash flow hedge accounting. SFAS 133 does not.

 

 

Also recall that the FVO only applies to financial assets and liabilities. Even though it will simplify hedge accounting for booked financial items, it does nothing to simplify hedge accounting for booked and unbooked non-financial items. Below is a section of the exposure draft regarding fair value hedging for items that are not permitted to be accounted for at fair value such as custom furniture inventory:

 

A fair value option

2.37
One way of reducing complexity might be to permit fair value hedge accounting for only those assets and liabilities that are not permitted to be measured at fair value using a fair value option. Hence, fair value hedge accounting might still be permitted for particular financial instruments and many non-financial assets and liabilities.

2.38
An entity can use a fairvalue option, if available, to address accounting mismatches. A fair value option need not be complex, and the results areeasier to understand.

2.39
However, preparers may not view a fair value option as comparable to fair value hedge accounting. This is because the fair value option is less flexible than fair value hedge accounting. For example:

(a) Fair value hedge accounting can be started and stopped at willprovided that thequalification requirements for hedge accountingare met. However, the fair value option designation is availableonly at initial recognition and isirrevocable.

(b) Fair value hedge accounting can be applied to specific risks or partsof a hedged item. However, the fair value option must be applied tothe entire asset or liability.

(c) Hedged items under fair value hedge accounting can be financialinstruments or non-financial items. However, in general, the fair value option can be applied to financial instruments only.

2.40
To address these issues, the following changes could be made to the fair value option:

(a) allowing the fair value option to be applied to more non-financial assets and liabilities.

(b) allowing the fair value option to be applied to specific risks or parts of the designated item.

(c) allowing the fair value option to be applied at any date after initial recognition.

2.41
However, adding flexibility similar to fair value hedge accounting as described in the previous paragraph could add complexity and defeat the purpose of making a change.

2.42
For example, allowing the fair value option to be applied to specific risks or parts of an item may result in problems similar to those associated with partial hedges, as discussed later in this section. 2.43 In addition, allowing the fair value option to be applied at any date after initial recognition would raise another issue—whether dedesignation of an item should also be permitted. If dedesignation is permitted, the fair value option would give the same flexibility to start and stop as fair value hedge accounting does today (but without the restrictions surrounding hedge accounting). Giving such flexibility (but without any restrictions) would not improve comparability or result in more relevant andunderstandable information for financial statement users.

Recognition outside earnings of gains and losses on hedging instruments (similar to cash flow hedge accounting)

2.44
Unlike fair value hedge accounting, cash flow hedge accounting does not result in adjusting the carrying amount of a hedged asset or liability. Instead, gains and losses on the hedging instrument are initially recognised in other comprehensive income and subsequently reclassified into earnings when the hedged cash flows affect earnings.

2.45
A similar technique might be used for fair value hedge accounting. Gains and losses on the hedging instrument that arise from an effective hedge would be recognised in other comprehensive income and measurement of the hedged item would not be affected.

2.46
That approach would have the following benefits:

(a) The carrying amount of the hedged item would not be affected.

(b) The measurement attribute of the hedged item would be the same whether it was hedged or not.

(c) There would be fewer ongoing effects on earnings. For example, there would be no ongoing effects on earnings because the effective interest rate of a financial asset would not need to be recalculated following the dedesignation of a fair value hedging relationship.

2.47
However, gains and losses on the hedging instrument that are initially recognised in other comprehensive income would need to be reclassified to earnings to offset the effect on earnings of the hedged item. For example, the cumulative gains or losses on an interest rate swap designated as hedging a fixed rate bond would be reclassified to earning when the bond was sold or settled, and not throughout the life of the bond. However, the net swap settlements would be recognised in earnings as they accrue.

2.48
As noted, using a cash flow hedging technique for fair value exposures has some benefits. However, many of the restrictions that exist today would be needed. That might not result in a significant reduction incomplexity.

Recognition outside earnings of gains and losses on hedged items

2.49 This suggestion has the following features:

(a) All (or at least many) financial instruments would be measured at fair value.

(b) Gains and losses on derivatives, instruments held for trading and instruments designated in their entirety at initial recognition to be measured at fair value are recognised in earnings. (c) For financial instruments other than those described in (b), entities would be permitted to recognise all unrealised gains and losses or unrealised gains and losses attributable to specified risks in either earnings or other comprehensive income, subject to one exception. The exception is that unrealised gains and losses on interestbearing financial liabilities attributable to changes in the entity’s own credit risk must be recognised in other comprehensive income. An entity could also choose to report a specified percentage of the gains or losses on these financial instruments in earnings and the remainder in other comprehensive income.

2.50
The choice described in paragraph 2.49(c) would be made instrument by instrument at inception (when the instrument is acquired, incurred, issued or originated) and would be revocable. If an entity initially chooses to recognise gains and losses on a financial instrument in other comprehensive income and later changes that choice, the cumulative net gain or loss on the instrument would be reclassified to earnings in some systematic way over the remaining life of the instrument. Alternatively, if an entity initially chooses to recognise gains and losses on a financial instrument in earnings and later changes that choice, the fair value of the instrument on the date of the new choice would determine the effective interest rate.

2.51
For those instruments described in paragraph 2.49(c) interest on interestbearing instruments would be separately presented using an effective interest rate. Movements in the fair value due to changes in foreign exchange rates of all monetary items described in paragraph 2.49(c) would also be recognised in earnings in accordance with IAS 21
The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates and IAS 39. 2.52 Moreover, if a derivative is used to hedge the changes in fair value of a particular financial instrument, the entity could choose to recognise in earnings future gains and losses on that hedged instrument. The gains and losses on the hedged instrument and the hedging instrument would be offset in earnings in a way that is similar to fair value hedge accounting. Unlike fair value hedge accounting, this approach would not require an effectiveness test at inception or later.

2.53
This approach would result in more financial instruments being measured at fair value. In addition, hedged items would generally be measured at fair value instead of being adjusted for some fair value changes but not others.

2.54
However, this approach has the following disadvantages:

(a) It includes few restrictions about the choice of where to recognise gains and losses. If restrictions comparable to existing hedge accounting requirements were added, there would be little or no reduction in complexity

(b) Recognising part of the gains and losses on a financial instrument in other comprehensive income and part in earnings (and being able to change that choice) would create complexity for users trying to understand the financial statements.

 

 

The bottom line is that fair value accounting is no panacea for reducing financial reporting complexity, especially in reducing much of the complexity of hedge accounting using derivative financial instruments.

The exposure draft then launches into, beginning in Paragraph 2.55, alternatives to simplifying hedge accounting other than to attempting fair value accounting alternatives that hit the wall when hedging with derivative financial instruments.

 

Having noted all the problems with fair value accounting when hedging for derivative financial instruments in Section 2 of the exposure draft, the exposure draft in Section 3 tries to nevertheless make a case that fair value accounting is the best of all the bad alternatives for accounting for financial instruments in general, including derivative financial instruments. No attempt is made to advocate fair value accounting for non-financial instruments such as operating assets where value in use versus exit values present enormous problems for exit (fair value) accounting.

Section 3 in the IASB's exposure draft is quite good about mentioning the problems of fair value accounting as well as the reasons the IASB (and the FASB) is leaning in theory and in practice for requiring fair value accounting of all financial instruments be they assets or liabilities or both in the case of some compound instruments.

 

Questions for respondents

Question 8
To reduce today’s measurement-related problems, Section 3 suggests that the long-term solution is to use a single method to measure all types of financial instruments within the scope of a standard for financial instruments. Do you believe that using a single method to measure all types of financial instruments within the scope of a standard for financial instruments is appropriate? Why or why not? If you do not believe that all types of financial instruments should be measured using only one method in the long term, is there another approach to address measurement-related problems in the long term? If so, what is it

Question 9
Part A of Section 3 suggests that fair value seems to be the only measurement attribute that is appropriate for all types of financial instruments within the scope of a standard for financial instruments.

(a) Do you believe that fair value is the only measurement attribute that is appropriate for all types of financial instruments within the scope of a standard for financial instruments?

(b) If not, what measurement attribute other than fair value is appropriate for all types of financial instruments within the scope of a standard for financial instruments? Why do you think that measurement attribute is appropriate for all types of financial instruments within the scope of a standard for financial instruments? Does that measurement attribute reduce today’s measurement-related complexity and provide users with information that is necessary to assess the cash flow prospects for all types of financial instruments?

Question 10
Part B of Section 3 sets out concerns about fair value measurement of financial instruments. Are there any significant concerns about fair value measurement of financial instruments other than those identified in Section 3? If so, what are they and why are they matters for concern?

Question 11
Part C of Section 3 identifies four issues that the IASB needs to resolve before proposing fair value measurement as a general requirement for all types of financial instruments within the scope of a standard for financial instruments.

(a) Are there other issues that you believe the IASB should address before proposing a general fair value measurement requirement for financial instruments? If so, what are they? How should the IASB address them?

(b) Are there any issues identified in part C of Section 3 that do not have to be resolved before proposing a general fair value measurement requirement? If so, what are they and why do they not need to be resolved before proposing fair value as a general measurement requirement?

Question 12
Do you have any other comments for the IASB on how it could improveand simplify the accounting for financial instruments?

 

 

 

In Section 3 of the exposure draft, the IASB's arguments for fair value accounting are very compelling. I applaud this effort. However, some underlying and unmentioned assumptions disturb me. Implicitly the IASB assumes that "value in use" and exit (fair) value are perfectly correlated for financial instruments. This is admittedly not true for non-financial assets such as farm tractors where the correlation between recently-purchased tractors and value in use has negligible correlation because of kinks between markets for new versus used tractors. The additional problem is that new tractors are fungible commodities whereas used tractors are entirely unique. No two used tractors are exactly alike in terms of quality and expected life. In addition the markets for new versus used tractors are entirely different even for pre-owned tractors that have never been used or were only used for little old farm ladies to get to and from church.

Now consider the IASB's assumption there's no difference between a customized derivative financial instrument and a similar instrument traded in exchange markets. There is in fact a huge unmentioned problem for financial instruments like customized interest rate swaps for which there is no external market. Interest rate swaps are generally unique, customized, and cannot be sold by parties and counterparties without prohibitive transactions costs. The FASB and the IASB require that they be "marked-to-market" without providing guidance on how to do so without a market. You can read about how such valuation takes place in a complicated manner at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm
But is this supposedly "fair valuation" process really reflective of value in use of interest rate swaps?

Clearly historical cost (zero) is not relevant for a customized $10 million interest rate swap that XYZ Company acquired in Example 5 of Appendix B in FAS 133 commencing in Paragraph 131. Jensen and Hubbard explain how such a swap is valued by banks using a Bloomberg database of forward exchange transactions --- http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/133ex05.htm .
The illustrative Excel workbook can be downloaded from http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/133ex05a.xls

But is this "fair value" derived from market transactions really the fair value of XYZ's unique and customized interest rate swap? Probably not! It might be better to simply assume that value changes in the swap are perfectly and negatively correlated with value changes in the hedged item which in this example are $10 million in corporate variable rate bonds. But in order to assign a fair value to the interest rate swap an elaborate estimation process is required to derive the swap value estimates shown (but not explained) in Paragraph 137 of FAS 133. It is not clear that these fair values clearly reflect "value in use" of this unique customized swap that most likely cannot be sold or terminated with the swap's counter party without huge transactions penalties. This is an example of a financial instrument whose value in use may be entirely different from its true and totally unknown exit (fair) value.

The way firms must derive fair values for many financial instruments is truly fanciful for unique financial instruments that are not like any other market traded instruments and cannot be disposed of without enormous transactions costs. In the case of Example 5, the values given by the FASB (and never explained) and flip flop between positive and negative are probably widely divergent from value in use of this swap by XYZ Company.

The implicit assumption in fair value accounting that value in use is equal to extrapolated market valuations is not usually true in reality. This does not make fair value accounting necessarily worse than other alternatives, but it might unduly complicate hedge accounting. For example, the IASB does not permit the Shortcut Method for hedge effectiveness testing of interest rate swaps that is explained for XYZ Company in Paragraph 132 of FAS 133. The FASB allows the Shortcut Method, but the IASB refuses to allow it, and all sorts of anomalies might arise in hedge effectiveness testing that can be avoided by the Shortcut Method.

 

 

Advanced Derivatives Accounting Question
On June 27, 2001 the FASB's Derivatives Implementation Group (DIG) issued Statement FAS 133 Implementation Issue No. G20
Title: "Cash Flow Hedges: Assessing and Measuring the Effectiveness of a Purchased Option Used in a Cash Flow Hedge Paragraph"
References FAS 133 Paragraphs 28(b), 30, 63, and 140
Date cleared by Board: June 27, 2001 Date posted to website: August 10, 2001
Do you think the IASB exposure draft is in direct conflict with G20, and if so, why?

Jun3 23, 2008 reply from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]

All of you have a wonderful opportunity to express your views on the subject of relevance vs. reliability to the FASB and IASB. The exposure draft on "The Objective of Financial Reporting and Qualitative Characteristics and Constraints of Decision-Useful Financial Reporting Information" is available at http://www.fasb.org/draft/ed_conceptual_framework_for_fin_reporting.pdf

Comments are being solicited through September 29. I commented on the Preliminary Views document that preceded this exposure draft and probably will comment on this exposure draft too. This document is a key building block for the future of financial reporting and I urge all of you to consider participating formally in the debate.

 

Bob Jensen's tutorials on accounting for derivative financial instruments and hedging activities are under FAS 133 and IAS 39 are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue  

For more on fair value accounting, go to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue


Speak to Me Only With Thine Eyes:  The Sound of Colors for the Blind
Researchers at the Balearic Islands University in Spain are developing a device that will allow blind children to distinguish colors by associating each shade to a specific sound. The project, dubbed COL-diesis, is based on the synesthesia principle--a confusion of senses where people involuntarily relate the real information gathered by one sense with a different sensation. "Only 4 percent of the population are true synesthetes, but everybody else is influenced by associations between sounds and colors," said Jessica Rossi, one of the coordinators of the project. For example, people tend to associate light colors with high-pitched sounds. "We want to give the user a device that allows [blind children] to chose specific associations of colors and sounds based on each user's sensitivity," Rossi said. The device will include a sensor the blind kids will wear on their fingertips to touch the objects they want to know the colors of, and a bracelet that will transform the color into a sound. The researchers expect to have their prototype ready by September.
Maria José Viñas, Chronicle of Higher Education, June 23, 2008 --- http://chronicle.com/wiredcampus/index.php?id=3109&utm_source=wc&utm_medium=en
 

Jensen Question
Do we need multiple sounds for some colors? For example, there's Wall Street green, Al Gore's green, vegetable green, freshman green, and seasick green.

Bob Jensen's threads on technology aids for handicapped learners are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/000aaa/thetools.htm#Handicapped

Jensen Comment for Accountants
Proposed (actually now optional) fair value financial statements have so many shades of accuracy regarding measurements of financial items. Cash counts are highly accurate along with cash received from sales of financial instruments. Unrealized earnings on actively traded bonds and stocks are quite accurate according to FAS 157. Value estimates of interest rate swaps may be inaccurate but inaccuracy doesn't matter much since these value changes will all wash out to zero when the swaps mature. Color them blah. Value estimates of most anything highly unique, like parcels of real estate, are highly subjective and prone to fraud among appraisal sharks. Color them scarlet!

Our Students Might Actually Like Color Book Accounting
Could we add information to fair value financial statements by colorizing them according to degrees of uncertainty and accuracy? And could we add sounds of uncertainty so that SEC-recommended bracelets could listen to the soothing waltzes Strauss (read that cash) and the rancorous hard rock-sounding shares in a REIT. What sounds and colors might you give to FIN 41 items Amy?

Bob Jensen's threads on visualization of multivariate data are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/352wpvisual/000datavisualization.htm  
I think the above document is interesting, but I never get any feedback about it.
There are all sorts of research opportunities in visualization of multivariate fair value financial performance!


 

One of the major problems of using financial statements to value firms is that sometimes the unbooked assets and liabilities are much larger than some or all of the booked items.

SEC Staff Report on Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements, Special Purpose Entities, and Related Issues

From IAS Plus, February 16, 2006 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

The US Financial Accounting Standards Board has submitted its response to the SEC Staff Report on Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements, Special Purpose Entities, and Related Issues released by the US Securities and Exchange Commission in June 2005. The SEC report was prepared pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and was submitted to the President and several Congressional committees. The SEC staff report includes an analysis of the filings of issuers as well as an analysis of pertinent US generally accepted accounting principles and Commission disclosure rules. The report contains several recommendations for potentially sweeping changes in current accounting and reporting requirements for pensions, leases, financial instruments, and consolidation:

  • Pensions: The staff recommends the accounting guidance for defined-benefit pension plans and other post-retirement benefit plans be reconsidered. The trusts that administer these plans are currently exempt from consolidation by the issuers that sponsor them, effectively resulting in the netting of assets and liabilities in the balance sheet. In addition, issuers have the option to delay recognition of certain gains and losses related to the retirement obligations and the assets used to fund these obligations.

     

  • Leases: The staff recommends that the accounting guidance for leases be reconsidered. The current accounting for leases takes an 'all or nothing' approach to recognizing leases on the balance sheet. This results in a clustering of lease arrangements such that their terms approach, but do not cross, the 'bright lines' in the accounting guidance that would require a liability to be recognized. As a consequence, arrangements with similar economic outcomes are accounted for very differently.

     

  • Financial instruments: The staff recommends the continued exploration of the feasibility of reporting all financial instruments at fair value.

     

  • Consolidation: The staff recommends that the Financial Accounting Standards Board continue its work on the accounting guidance that determines whether an issuer would consolidate other entities – including SPEs – in which the issuer has an ownership or other interest.

     

  • Disclosures: The staff believes that, in general, certain disclosures in the filings of issuers could be better organized and integrated.
FASB's response discusses a number of "fundamental structural, institutional, cultural, and behavioral forces" that it believes cause complexity and impede transparent financial reporting. FASB provides an update on its activities and projects intended to address and improve outdated, overly complex accounting standards. These areas include accounting for leases; accounting for pensions and other post employment benefits; consolidation policies; accounting for financial instruments; accounting for intangible assets; and conceptual and disclosure frameworks. The FASB also identifies several other initiatives aimed at improving the understandability, consistency, and overall usability of existing accounting literature, through codification, by attempting to stem the proliferation of new pronouncements emanating from multiple sources, and by developing new standards in a 'principles-based' or 'objectives-oriented' approach. Click to download:

"FASB Responds to SEC Study," AccountingWeb, February 21, 2006 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=101801

AccountingWEB.com - Feb-21-2006 - The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) last week responded to the Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) Off Balance Sheet Report by identifying forces causing complexity and impeding financial transparency, as well as providing an update on the FASB’s activities intended to address complex accounting standards. The FASB also reaffirmed its commitment to improving the transparency and usefulness of financial reporting.

“The FASB remains fiercely committed to protecting the interests of investors and the capital markets by developing accounting standards that, if faithfully followed, provided relevant, reliable and useful financial information,” FASB Chariman Robert Herz said in a prepared statement. “Along these lines, we remain concerned about the root causes and the effects that complexity continues to have on our financial reporting system and believe that concerted and coordinated action by the SEC, the FASB, and the PCAOB, together with other parties in the financial reporting system, is critical.”

The FASB has named several areas as key for overcoming the challenges facing the financial reporting system including: accounting for leases; accounting for pensions and other post-employment benefits; consolidation policies; accounting for financial instruments; accounting for intangible assets; and conceptual and disclosure frameworks. Several initiatives have been undertaken to help improve understandability, consistency, and overall usability of existing accounting literature, through codification and by attempting to limit the proliferation of pronouncements from multiple sources and by developing new standards using a principles-based or objectives-oriented approach.

The FASB Response to SEC Study on Arrangements with Off-Balance Sheet Implications, Special Purpose Entities, and Transparency of Filings by Issuers provides comments on issues and recommendations included in the Report and Recommendations Pursuant to Section 401(c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on Arrangements with Off-Balance Sheet Implications, Special Purpose Entities, and Transparency of Filings by Issuers submitted in June 2005 by the staff of the SEC to the President of the United States, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs and the Committee of Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives.

Bob Jensen's threads on special purpose (variable interest) entities are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm

How a firm reports an asset or liability in a balance sheet typically is rooted in one of the following valuation concepts. GAAP in the United States is historical cost by default, but there are countless instances where departures from historical cost are either allowed or required under certain standards in certain circumstances.

The Cost Approach for Financial Reporting
From IASPlus on November 21, 2006 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

The International Valuation Standards Committee has published Proposed Revisions to International Valuation Guidance Note 8 – The Cost Approach for Financial Reporting {PDF 193k). The proposed revisions are the result of requests for clarification and suggestions of minor improvements to the 2005 version of GN8. Comment deadline is 31 December 2006. The IVSC has also released an update of its work programme:

Historical Cost Accounting: Unadjusted for General Price-Level Changes

Advantages of Historical Cost

Nobody I know holds the mathematical wonderment of double entry and historical cost accounting more in awe than Yuji Ijiri. For example, see Theory of Accounting Measurement, by Yuji Ijiri (Sarasota: American Accounting Association Studies in Accounting Research No. 10, 1975) --- http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aaa/market/studar.htm 

Disadvantages of Historical Cost


Going Concern Accounting and Bear Stearns

From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on April 11, 2008

Officials Say They Sought To Avoid Bear Bailout
by Kara Scannell and Sudeep Reddy
The Wall Street Journal

Apr 04, 2008
Page: A1
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120722972567886357.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
 

TOPICS: Accounting, Banking

SUMMARY: This article covers the testimony in Congressional hearings for the weekend events of March 15-16 leading to the Bear Stearns bailout and acquisition by J.P. Morgan.

CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Understanding the relationship between the balance sheet equation and the notions of a run on the bank, going concern and fire sale is made evident in this review. The economic concept of moral hazard also is covered.

QUESTIONS: 
1. (Introductory) Summarize the events leading to Bear Stearns demise and acquisition by J.P. Morgan.

2. (Introductory) What is the assumption of going concern in accounting? Give an example of how that assumption influences the accounting for one balance sheet item, then explain the assumption's overall influence on the balance sheet equation.

3. (Introductory) What prices for Bear Stearns' stock were considered in negotiations leading to J.P. Morgan's acquisition? What evidence is given in the article that these prices were based on assumptions other than the going concern assumption?

4. (Advanced) Define the notions of "capital adequacy" and "liquidity" in banks. For what type of entity are these levels now regulated? How might that regulation now expand as a result of the Bear Stearns debacle?

5. (Advanced) Explain the U.S. government's role in the transaction between J.P. Morgan and Bear Stearns. How does that role differ from the usual government regulation in financial markets?

6. (Advanced) Why did Bear Stearns have to negotiate a finished deal by the end of the weekend of March 15-16? In your answer, explain the concept of a "run on the bank" and its relationship to the going concern assumption.

7. (Introductory) What is the economic notion of "moral hazard?" How did that issue also influence the price that Bear Stearns was able to negotiate from J.P. Morgan?
 

Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

"Officials Say They Sought To Avoid Bear Bailout," by Kara Scannell and Sudeer Reddy, The Wall Street Journal, April 4, 2008; Page A1 -- Click Here

The government sought a low sale price for Bear Stearns Cos. to send a message that taxpayers wouldn't bail out firms making risky bets, a top Treasury Department official testified, as regulators offered Congress the first detailed explanation of the unprecedented rescue.

Representatives of Washington and Wall Street painted a dire picture of the chaos they believe would have ensued if the government hadn't orchestrated a rescue of Bear Stearns by J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. over the hectic weekend of March 15-16.

"This would have been far more, in my opinion, expensive to taxpayers had Bear Stearns gone bankrupt and added to the financial crisis we have today," said J.P. Morgan chief executive James Dimon. "It wouldn't have even been close."

Officials said they were acutely aware of the moral-hazard problem, and that is why the government insisted that Bear Stearns shareholders get a low price for their shares. In the original deal, announced the night of March 16, J.P. Morgan agreed to pay $2 a share. After Bear Stearns shareholders protested, J.P. Morgan raised its price a week later to $10 a share -- still a fraction of the level Bear Stearns shares had traded at before it faced a funding crisis.

"There was a view that the price should not be very high or should be towards the low end...given the government's involvement," Treasury Undersecretary Robert Steel told a congressional committee during a five-hour hearing Thursday.

"These were exceptionally consequential acts, taken with extreme reluctance and care because of the substantial consequences it would have for moral hazard in the financial system," added Timothy Geithner, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Mr. Steel and other officials told the Senate Banking Committee that they didn't dictate the precise sale price, but wanted to see a deal done quickly to avoid a sudden market-shaking crash of the company.

At the hearing, the first one focusing on the Bear Stearns rescue, lawmakers questioned top Fed officials, including Chairman Ben Bernanke, as well as the chief executives of Bear Stearns and J.P. Morgan. Held in a cavernous room reserved for big gatherings, rather than the more-intimate regular room, the hearing sometimes had the feel of a Hollywood red-carpet event as photographers descended on the panelists.

Officials rejected lawmakers' suggestions that they bailed out Bear Stearns, noting that shareholders took steep losses and many employees may lose their jobs. But under questioning, Mr. Bernanke agreed with a lawmaker who suggested the Fed rescued Wall Street more broadly.

"If you want to say we bailed out the market in general, I guess that's true," he said. "But we felt that was necessary in the interest of the American economy." He reiterated comments from a day earlier that the Fed doesn't expect to lose money on its $30 billion loan. J.P. Morgan has agreed to cover the first $1 billion in losses, if there are any.

Mr. Dimon said his bank "could not and would not have assumed the substantial risk" of buying Bear without the Fed's involvement.

At the hearing, the government and company officials gave an exhaustive account of the frenetic scramble in the days preceding the Bear Stearns sale. "We had literally 48 hours to do what normally takes a month," said Mr. Dimon.

During the week of March 10, market rumors swirled that Bear Stearns might not be able to stay in business. At the hearing Alan Schwartz, Bear Stearns's chief executive, said that the firm's balance sheet was strong -- as good as that of any other financial institution -- but that Bear Stearns couldn't keep up with the rumors.

By Thursday, March 13, the rumors had become a "self-fulfilling prophecy" and resulted in a "run on the bank," Mr. Schwartz said. Bear Stearns reached out to the regulators, who worked throughout the night. By Friday morning, March 14, the Fed agreed to extend financing to Bear Stearns through J.P. Morgan. Then the firms and government officials worked through the weekend to spur Bear Stearns's sale and prevent a bankruptcy filing.

Along with the sale announcement on March 16, the Fed announced that it would lend directly to investment banks from its discount window, a historic reversal of its longtime policy of lending only to banks. While some have said that Bear Stearns could have avoided a sale if it had had access to the new lending program, Mr. Geithner said that wasn't feasible.

"We only allow sound institutions to borrow against collateral," he said. "I would have been very uncomfortable lending to Bear given what we knew at that time."

When it became clear that a deal had to happen before Asian markets opened late Sunday night, Bear Stearns's negotiating leverage "went out the window," said Mr. Schwartz. Among the parties examining Bear Stearns's books was a sophisticated buyer who was "prepared to write a multibillion check to invest in equity," but that would have required another financial institution to help finance the deal, Mr. Schwartz said. He didn't identify the potential buyer.

Mr. Dimon testified that he couldn't recall whose idea it was to bring in the Fed. Treasury's Mr. Steel said it was J.P. Morgan that suggested the Fed's involvement.

Continued in article


Replacement (Current) Cost Accounting Versus Historical Cost Accounting

"Windfall Profits for Dummies," The Wall Street Journal, May 3, 2008; Page A10 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120977019142563957.html?mod=djemEditorialPage

This is one strange debate the candidates are having on energy policy. With gas prices close to $4 a gallon, Hillary Clinton and John McCain say they'll bring relief with a moratorium on the 18.4-cent federal gas tax. Barack Obama opposes that but prefers a 1970s-style windfall profits tax (as does Mrs. Clinton).

Mr. Obama is right to oppose the gas-tax gimmick, but his idea is even worse. Neither proposal addresses the problem of energy supply, especially the lack of domestic oil and gas thanks to decades of Congressional restrictions on U.S. production. Mr. Obama supports most of those "no drilling" rules, but that hasn't stopped him from denouncing high gas prices on the campaign trail. He is running TV ads in North Carolina that show him walking through a gas station and declaring that he'll slap a tax on the $40 billion in "excess profits" of Exxon Mobil.

The idea is catching on. Last week Pennsylvania Congressman Paul Kanjorski introduced a windfall profits tax as part of what he called the "Consumer Reasonable Energy Price Protection Act of 2008." So now we have Congress threatening to help itself to business profits even though Washington already takes 35% right off the top with the corporate income tax.

You may also be wondering how a higher tax on energy will lower gas prices. Normally, when you tax something, you get less of it, but Mr. Obama seems to think he can repeal the laws of economics. We tried this windfall profits scheme in 1980. It backfired. The Congressional Research Service found in a 1990 analysis that the tax reduced domestic oil production by 3% to 6% and increased oil imports from OPEC by 8% to 16%. Mr. Obama nonetheless pledges to lessen our dependence on foreign oil, which he says "costs America $800 million a day." Someone should tell him that oil imports would soar if his tax plan becomes law. The biggest beneficiaries would be OPEC oil ministers.

There's another policy contradiction here. Exxon is now under attack for buying back $2 billion of its own stock rather than adding to the more than $21 billion it is likely to invest in energy research and exploration this year. But hold on. If oil companies believe their earnings from exploring for new oil will be expropriated by government – and an excise tax on profits is pure expropriation – they will surely invest less, not more. A profits tax is a sure formula to keep the future price of gas higher.

Exxon's profits are soaring with the recent oil price spike, but the energy industry's earnings aren't as outsized as the politicians seem to think. Thomson Financial calculates that profits from the oil and natural gas industry over the past year were 8.3% of investment, while the all-industry average is 7.8%. And this was a boom year for oil. An analysis by the Cato Institute's Jerry Taylor finds that between 1970 and 2003 (which includes peak and valley years for earnings) the oil and gas business was "less profitable than the rest of the U.S. economy." These are hardly robber barons.

This tiff over gas and oil taxes only highlights the intellectual policy confusion – or perhaps we should say cynicism – of our politicians. They want lower prices but don't want more production to increase supply. They want oil "independence" but they've declared off limits most of the big sources of domestic oil that could replace foreign imports. They want Americans to use less oil to reduce greenhouse gases but they protest higher oil prices that reduce demand. They want more oil company investment but they want to confiscate the profits from that investment. And these folks want to be President?

Late this week, a group of Senate Republicans led by Pete Domenici of New Mexico introduced the "American Energy Production Act of 2008" to expand oil production off the U.S. coasts and in Alaska. It has the potential to increase domestic production enough to keep America running for five years with no foreign imports. With the world price of oil at $116 a barrel, if not now, when? No word yet if Senators Clinton and Obama will take time off from denouncing oil profits to vote for that.

How Will a Windfall Profits Tax Increase Supply?
by Frank J. Stalzer and David P. McElvain
The Wall Street Journal

May 08, 2008
Page: A14
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120977019142563957.html?mod=djemEditorialPage
 

TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting, Oil and Gas Accounting, Tax Laws, Taxation

SUMMARY: The second of these two letters to the editor is written by a 70 year old reader who has worked in the oil and gas industry for all of his life. Both letters discuss the Obama-proposed windfall profits tax, but the latter also refers to the fact that historical cost-based financial statements show higher income statement profits than would statements prepared under replacement cost accounting.

CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The article may be used to addressed the current political debates of the presidential candidates' proposed policies in either a taxation or an advanced financial accounting class.

QUESTIONS: 
1. (Introductory) What are "windfall profits?" What is a "windfall profits tax?"

2. (Introductory) Why might a windfall profits tax appeal to voters who are unsophisticated in their understanding of its potential economic impact?

3. (Advanced) What is "replacement cost accounting?" In your answer, compare this measurement method to our current historical cost method.

4. (Advanced) Why might historical cost accounting be particularly problematic in the oil and gas industry as opposed to, say, a traditional manufacturing industry?

5. (Advanced) What is the argument put forth by Mr. McElvain that historical-cost basis financial statements are contributing to the potential implementation of a windfall profits tax?

6. (Advanced) "Major oil companies need to administer their businesses on the basis of true replacement costs, not historical accounting costs." Is that possible even if the business must use historical cost accounting in published financial statements?
 

Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
 

RELATED ARTICLES: 
Windfall Profits for Dummies
by N/A
May 03, 2008
Page: A10
 


Example:  Accounting for a Website

August 7, 2006 message from Ganesh M. Pandit, DBA, CPA, CMA [profgmp@hotmail.com]

Hi Bob,

How would you answer this question from a student: "I wonder if a company's Web site is considered a long-lived asset!"

Ganesh M. Pandit
Adelphi University

August 9, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Ganesh,

Accounting for Website investment is a classic example of the issue of "matching" versus "value" accounting. From an income statement perspective, matching requires the matching of current revenues with the expenses of generating that revenue, including the "using up" of fixed asset investments. But we don't depreciate investment in the site value of land because land site value, unlike a building, is not used up due to usage in generating revenue. Like land site value, a Website's "value" probably increases in value over time. One might argue that a Website should not be expensed since a successful Website, like land, is not used up when generating revenue. However, Websites do require maintenance fees and improvement outlays over time which makes it somewhat different than the site investment in land that requires no such added outlays other than property taxes that are expensed each year.

I don't think current accounting rules for Websites are appropriate in theory --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm#Issue08

It seems to me that you can partition your Website development and improvement outlays into various types of assets and expenses. For example, computers used in development and maintenance of the Website are accounted for like other computers. Software is accounted for under software amortization accounting rules. Purchased goodwill is accounted for like purchased goodwill under new impairment test rules. Labor costs for Website maintenance versus improvements are more problematic.

Leased Website items are treated like leases, although there are some complications if a Website is leased entirely. For example, such a leased Website is not "used up" like airplanes that are typically contracted as operating leases. Leased Website space may be appropriately accounted for as an operating lease. But leasing an entire Website is more like the capital lease of a land in that the asset does not get "used up." My hunch is that most firms ignore this controversy and treat Website leases as operating leases. It is pretty easy to bury custom development costs into the "rental fee" for leased Website server space, thereby burying the development costs and deferring them over the contracted server space rental period. It would seem to me that rental fees for Websites that are strictly used for advertising are written off as advertising expenses. Of course many Websites are used for much more than advertising.

Firms are taking rather rapid write-offs of purchased Websites such as write-offs over three years. I'm not certain I agree with this, but firms are "depreciating" these for tax purposes and you can see them in filed SEC financial statements such as the one at Briton International (under the Depreciation heading) ---
http://sec.edgar-online.com/2006/01/27/0001127855-06-000047/Section27.asp

It is more common in annual reports to see the term Website Amortization instead of Website Depreciation. A few sites amortize on the basis of Website traffic --- http://www.nexusenergy.com/presentation6.aspx
This makes no sense to me since traffic does not use up a Website over time.

Bob Jensen

  • October 5, 2006 reply from Scott Bonacker [cpas-l@BONACKER.US]

    I can't think of anyone that would be more knowledgeable than David Hardesty, at http://davidhardesty.com/ 

    His book, published by CCH, is excellent.

    Hope this helps ....

    Scott Bonacker, CPA
    Springfield, Missouri

  • Bob Jensen's threads on e-Commerce and e-Business revenue accounting controversies are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm

    Example 2 --- Proposition 87 VAT Tax

    An interesting accounting problem (or employment opportunity?) posed by Proposition 87 on the State of California November 7 ballot in 2006

    Proposition 87 would tax every barrel of oil pumped from an in-state well . . .But just to make sure, the proposition would fund investigations of oil companies that try to "pass on" the tax increase in the price. Severin Borenstein, director of University of California Energy Institute at UC Berkeley, points out that this would lead to "constant investigation that will yield no more than what past investigations (on why gasoline prices spike) have yielded, or even less." The oil tax revenues would go to fund "alternative energy." That approach didn't work for former President Carter, is not working for President Bush, and won't work in California. Government funding, by definition, is not subject to a market test. "Alternate energy" will make sense only when its cost is less than the cost of using oil. The market will handle this problem as it did over a century ago by replacing the depleting whale-oil supply with petroleum. Amazingly, over $40 million of the $45.6 million contributed to the campaign for the tax comes from one man, Hollywood big shot Stephen Bing.
    David Henderson, "'Sinful and Tyrannical'," The Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2006; Page A7 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116078251442292601.html?mod=todays_us_opinion

    Jensen Comment
    Proposition 87 is like (well not entirely) a VAT tax. Although I'm not against value added taxes (VAT), VAT taxes have been fought tooth and nail in U.S. politics (unlike in Europe). Apart from the VAT economic debates that are well known, Proposition 87 raises interesting accounting issues because it in effect introduces cost-plus pricing controls where fuel prices in California would now be in a sense regulated by California officials. Fuel companies in essence must justify prices with a full analysis of costs to verify that the $50 per barrel tax is not being passed on at the pump. In contrast, most VAT taxes are typically passed on to consumers in other nations (I think)

    Proposition 87 runs four square into the enormous and famous joint costing problem that has generally never been solved by accountants. Joint costs are always allocated arbitrarily unless laws govern (arbitrarily) such allocations. Given the complexity of oil refining joint costs, it would seem that unscrupulous oil refiners could devise ways of burying this new tax (in fuel prices) in such a manner that it is impossible for state auditors to detect. In practice, I think it is absurd to think that any type of corporate taxes cannot be factored into product and service prices unless prices themselves are to be regulated by the state. Price regulations themselves generally become either a joke (if industry controls the regulators) or a disaster (if regulators as central planners ignore the laws of supply and demand).

    Presumably California will not object to this Proposition 87 VAT tax being passed along to out-of-state customers of oil refiners. It would be difficult to pass along the tax if out-of-state customers had open access to world markets. However, some Nevada and Oregon fueling stations may not have any efficient source, at least in the short-run, of 92-octane gasoline other than from California refiners.

    Proposition 87 might then be viewed as a tax on surrounding states if 100% of the Proposition 87 VAT tax can be passed on to states surrounding California. Sounds like a good deal for California if those other states are willing to be taxed for California schools. Nevada may in fact punch a whole in the new immigration wall large enough for a gasoline pipe into Mexico.

    In any case, Proposition 87 might be better termed California's Cost Accountant Employment Relief Act.
    It would seem to be a whole lot easier to simply raise the corporate income tax, which of course is what California voters are being asked to do in another proposition, Proposition 89. It is totally naive to think that business taxes of any kind will not be passed along to customers in one way or another. You can fool some of the people some of the time, but not all the people all of the time (didn't someone else think of that line first?).

    As an aside, there is also Proposition 88 that will impose a $50 flat tax on every parcel of land, which of course is a tax that will be easily raised in future years. This in reality is a state-wide property tax that will grow and grow in spite of an older Proposition 13 assurance that property taxes cannot grow and grow for long-time home owners. What happens in California when new ballot propositions clash with older ballot propositions already voted in by the public?

     


    Historical Cost Accounting: Price-Level Adjusted (PLA) Historical Cost Accounting

    The primary basis of accounting in the U.S. is unadjusted historical cost with numerous exceptions in particular instances. For example, price-level adjustments may be required for operations in hyperinflation nations. The international IASB standards require PLA accounting in hyperinflation nations.

    The SEC issued ASR 190 requiring PLA supplemental reports. This was followed by the FASB's 1979 FAS 33 short-lived standard. Follow-up studies did not point to investor enthusiasm over such supplemental reports. Eventually, both ASR 190 and FAS 33 were rescinded, largely from lack of interest on the part of financial analysts and investors due to relatively low inflation rates in the United States. However, PLA adjustments are still required for operations in nations subject to high rates of inflation.

    Advantages of PLA Accounting

    Disadvantages of PLA Accounting

    Market Value Accounting: Entry Value (Current Cost, Replacement Cost) Accounting

    Beginning in 1979, FAS 33 required large corporations to provide a supplementary schedule of condensed balance sheets and income statements comparing annual outcomes under three valuation bases --- Unadjusted Historical Cost, Price Level Adjusted (PLA) Historical Cost, and Current Cost Entry Value (adjusted for depreciation and amortization). Companies complained heavily that users did not obtain value that justified the cost of implementing FAS 33. Analysts complained that the FASB allowed such crude estimates that the FAS 33 schedules were virtually useless, especially the Current Cost estimates. The FASB rescinded FAS 33 when it issued FAS 89 in 1986.

    Current cost accounting by whatever name (e.g., current or replacement cost) entails the historical cost of balance sheet items with current (replacement) costs. Depreciation rates can be re-set based upon current costs rather than historical costs. 

    Beginning in 1979, FAS 33 required large corporations to provide a supplementary schedule of condensed balance sheets and income statements comparing annual outcomes under three valuation bases --- Unadjusted Historical Cost, PLA-Adjusted historical cost, and Current Cost Entry Value (adjusted for depreciation and amortization). Companies are no longer required to generate FAS 33-type comparisons. The primary basis of accounting in the U.S. is unadjusted historical cost with numerous exceptions in particular instances. For example, price-level adjustments may be required for operations in hyperinflation nations. Exit value accounting is required for firms deemed highly likely to become non-going concerns. Exit value accounting is required for personal financial statements (whether an individual or a personal partnership such as two married people). Economic (discounted cash flow) valuations are required for certain types of assets and liabilities such as pension liabilities. Hence in the United States and virtually every other nation, accounting standards do not require or even allow one single basis of accounting. Beginning in January 2005, all nations in the Eurpean Union adopted the IASB's international standards that have moved closer and closer each year to the FASB/SEC standards of the United States.

    Advantages of Entry Value (Current Cost, Replacement Cost) Accounting

    Disadvantages of Entry Value (Current Cost, Replacement Cost) Accounting

    Market Value Accounting: Exit Value (Liquidation, Fair Value) Accounting

    Whereas entry value is what it will cost to replace an item, exit value is the value of disposing of the item. It can even be negative in some instances where costs of clean up and disposal make to exit price negative. Exit value accounting is required under GAAP for personal financial statements (individuals and married couples) and companies that are deemed likely to become non-going concerns. See "Personal Financial Statements," by Anthony Mancuso, The CPA Journal, September 1992 --- http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/old/13606731.htm 

    Some theorists advocate exit value accounting for going concerns as well as non-going concerns. Both nationally (particularly under FAS 115 and FAS 133) and internationally (under IAS 32 and 39 for), exit value accounting is presently required in some instances for financial instrument assets and liabilities. Both the FASB and the IASB have exposure drafts advocating fair value accounting for all financial instruments.

    FASB's Exposure Draft for Fair Value Adjustments to all Financial Instruments
    On December 14, 1999 the FASB issued Exposure Draft 204-B entitled Reporting Financial Instruments and Certain Related Assets and Liabilities at Fair Value.

    If an item is viewed as a financial instrument rather than inventory, the accounting becomes more complicated under FAS 115. Traders in financial instruments adjust such instruments to fair value with all changes in value passing through current earnings. Business firms who are not deemed to be traders must designate the instrument as either available-for-sale (AFS) or hold-to-maturity (HTM). A HTM instrument is maintained at original cost. An AFS financial instrument must be marked-to-market, but the changes in value pass through OCI rather than current earnings until the instrument is actually sold or otherwise expires.  Under international standards, the IASB requires fair value adjustments for most financial instruments. This has led to strong reaction from businesses around the world, especially banks. There are now two major working group debates. In 1999 the Joint Working Group of the Banking Associations sharply rebuffed the IAS 39 fair value accounting in two white papers that can be downloaded from http://www.iasc.org.uk/frame/cen3_112.htm.

    ·         Financial Instruments: Issues Relating to Banks (strongly argues for required fair value adjustments of financial instruments). The issue date is August 31, 1999.

    ·         Accounting for financial Instruments for Banks (concludes that a modified form of historical cost is optimal for bank accounting). The issue date is October 4, 1999.

    Advantages of Exit Value (Liquidation, Fair Value) Accounting

    Exit value reporting is not deemed desirable or practical for going concern businesses for a number of reasons that I will not go into in great depth here.

    Disadvantages of Exit Value (Liquidation, Fair Value) Accounting

    ·     Operating assets are bought to use rather than sell. For example, as long as no consideration is being given to selling or abandoning a manufacturing plant, recording the fluctuating values of the land and buildings creates a misleading fluctuation in earnings and balance sheet volatility. Who cares if the value of the land went up by $1 million in 1994 and down by $2 million in 1998 if the plant that sits on the land has been in operation for 60 years and no consideration is being given to leaving this plant?

    ·     Some assets like software, knowledge databases, and Web servers for e-Commerce cost millions of dollars to develop for the benefit of future revenue growth and future expense savings. These assets may have immense value if the entire firm is sold, but they may have no market as unbundled assets. In fact it may be impossible to unbundle such assets from the firm as a whole. Examples include the Enterprise Planning Model SAP system in firms such as Union Carbide. These systems costing millions of dollars have no exit value in the context of exit value accounting even though they are designed to benefit the companies for many years into the future.

    ·     Exit value accounting records anticipated profits well in advance of transactions. For example, a large home building company with 200 completed houses in inventory would record the profits of these homes long before the company even had any buyers for those homes. Even though exit value accounting is billed as a conservative approach, there are instances where it is far from conservative.

    ·     Value of a subsystem of items differs from the sum of the value of its parts. Investors may be lulled into thinking that the sum of all subsystem net assets valued at liquidation prices is the value of the system of these net assets. Values may differ depending upon how the subsystems are diced and sliced in a sale.

    ·     Appraisals of exit values are both to expensive to obtain for each accounting report date and are highly subjective and subject to enormous variations of opinion. The U.S. Savings and Loan scandals of the 1980s demonstrated how reliance upon appraisals is an invitation for massive frauds. Experiments by some, mostly real estate companies, to use exit value-based accounting died on the vine, including well-known attempts decades ago by TRC, Rouse, and Days Inn.

    ·     Exit values are affected by how something is sold. If quick cash is needed, the best price may only be half of what the price can be by waiting for the right time and the right buyer.

    ·     Financial contracts that for one reason or another are deemed as to be "held-to-maturity" items may cause misleading increases and decreases in reported values that will never be realized.  A good example is the market value of a fixed-rate bond that may go up and down with interest rates but will always pay its face value at maturity no matter what happens to interest rates.

    ·         Exit value markets are often thin and inefficient markets.

    Economic Value (Discounted Cash Flow, Present Value) Accounting

    There are over 100 instances where present GAAP requires that historical cost accounting be abandoned in favor of discounted cash flow accounting (e.g., when valuing pension liabilities and computing fair values of derivative financial instruments). These apply in situations where future cash inflows and outflows can be reliably estimated and are attributable to the particular asset or liability being valued on a discounted cash flow basis.

    Advantages of Economic Value (Discounted Cash Flow, Present Value) Accounting

    Disadvantages of Economic Value (Discounted Cash Flow, Present Value) Accounting

     




    Time versus Money

    Question
    How does accounting for time differ from accounting for money?
    Remember those Taylor and Gilbreth time and motion studies in cost accounting.
    How has time accounting changed in the workplace (or should change)?

    Studies have shown the alarming extent of the problem: office workers are no longer able to stay focused on one specific task for more than about three minutes, which means a great loss of productivity. The misguided notion that time is money actually costs us money.
    "Time Out of Mind," by Stefan Klein, The New York Times, March 7, 2008 --- Click Here

    IN 1784, Benjamin Franklin composed a satire, “Essay on Daylight Saving,” proposing a law that would oblige Parisians to get up an hour earlier in summer. By putting the daylight to better use, he reasoned, they’d save a good deal of money — 96 million livres tournois — that might otherwise go to buying candles. Now this switch to daylight saving time (which occurs early Sunday in the United States) is an annual ritual in Western countries.

    Even more influential has been something else Franklin said about time in the same year: time is money. He meant this only as a gentle reminder not to “sit idle” for half the day. He might be dismayed if he could see how literally, and self-destructively, we take his metaphor today. Our society is obsessed as never before with making every single minute count. People even apply the language of banking: We speak of “having” and “saving” and “investing” and “wasting” it.

    But the quest to spend time the way we do money is doomed to failure, because the time we experience bears little relation to time as read on a clock. The brain creates its own time, and it is this inner time, not clock time, that guides our actions. In the space of an hour, we can accomplish a great deal — or very little.

    Inner time is linked to activity. When we do nothing, and nothing happens around us, we’re unable to track time. In 1962, Michel Siffre, a French geologist, confined himself in a dark cave and discovered that he lost his sense of time. Emerging after what he had calculated were 45 days, he was startled to find that a full 61 days had elapsed.

    To measure time, the brain uses circuits that are designed to monitor physical movement. Neuroscientists have observed this phenomenon using computer-assisted functional magnetic resonance imaging tomography. When subjects are asked to indicate the time it takes to view a series of pictures, heightened activity is measured in the centers that control muscular movement, primarily the cerebellum, the basal ganglia and the supplementary motor area. That explains why inner time can run faster or slower depending upon how we move our bodies — as any Tai Chi master knows.

    Time seems to expand when our senses are aroused. Peter Tse, a neuropsychologist at Dartmouth, demonstrated this in an experiment in which subjects were shown a sequence of flashing dots on a computer screen. The dots were timed to occur once a second, with five black dots in a row followed by one moving, colored one. Because the colored dot appeared so infrequently, it grabbed subjects’ attention and they perceived it as lasting twice as long as the others did.

    Another ingenious bit of research, conducted in Germany, demonstrated that within a brief time frame the brain can shift events forward or backward. Subjects were asked to play a video game that involved steering airplanes, but the joystick was programmed to react only after a brief delay. After playing a while, the players stopped being aware of the time lag. But when the scientists eliminated the delay, the subjects suddenly felt as though they were staring into the future. It was as though the airplanes were moving on their own before the subjects had directed them to do so.

    The brain’s inclination to distort time is one reason we so often feel we have too little of it. One in three Americans feels rushed all the time, according to one survey. Even the cleverest use of time-management techniques is powerless to augment the sum of minutes in our life (some 52 million, optimistically assuming a life expectancy of 100 years), so we squeeze as much as we can into each one.

    Believing time is money to lose, we perceive our shortage of time as stressful. Thus, our fight-or-flight instinct is engaged, and the regions of the brain we use to calmly and sensibly plan our time get switched off. We become fidgety, erratic and rash.

    Tasks take longer. We make mistakes — which take still more time to iron out. Who among us has not been locked out of an apartment or lost a wallet when in a great hurry? The perceived lack of time becomes real: We are not stressed because we have no time, but rather, we have no time because we are stressed.

    Studies have shown the alarming extent of the problem: office workers are no longer able to stay focused on one specific task for more than about three minutes, which means a great loss of productivity. The misguided notion that time is money actually costs us money.

    And it costs us time. People in industrial nations lose more years from disability and premature death due to stress-related illnesses like heart disease and depression than from other ailments. In scrambling to use time to the hilt, we wind up with less of it.

    Continued in article




     

     

    Theory Disputes Focus Mainly on the Tip of the Iceberg
    (Intangibles and Other Assets and Liabilities Beneath the Surface)

    The big stuff lies below the surface where it is powerful and invisible.

    Pictures Source:  http://www.geocities.com/Yosemite/Rapids/4233/more.htm 

    What is important to ship navigators is the giant mass that lies below the icebergs.  If we make an analogy that the financial statements contain only what appears above the surface, over 99% of the accounting theory disputes have centered on the top of the icebergs.  We endlessly debate how to value what is seen above the surface and provide investors virtually nothing about the really big stuff beneath the surface.

    For example, what difference does it make how Microsoft Corporation values its tangible assets if 98% of its value lies in intangible assets such as intellectual property, human resources, market share, and other items of value that accountants do not know how to value?  One can argue that the difference between the capitalized value of Microsoft's outstanding shares and the reported value of Shareholders' Equity is mostly due to intangibles that accountants have no idea how to detect and value.  If the goal of accounting is to help investors value a company, it is backwards to value intangibles from market prices.  Our job is to help investors set those prices.


    Question
    Accountants talk a lot about "intangibles" and accountant inability to usefully measure intangibles of companies. Economists also talk about intangibles and economist inability build successful models incorporating intangibles and externalities that give rise to troublesome omitted variables and non-convexities in mathematical optimization.

    What is the World Bank's definition that gives rise to a claim that "the average American has access to over $418,000 in intangible wealth, while the stay-at-home Mexican's intangible wealth is just $34,000?"

    "The Secrets of Intangible Wealth:  For once the World Bank says something smart about the real causes of prosperity," by Ronald Bailey, Reason Magazine, October 5, 2007 --- http://www.reason.com/news/show/122854.html

    A Mexican migrant to the U.S. is five times more productive than one who stays home. Why is that?

    The answer is not the obvious one: This country has more machinery or tools or natural resources. Instead, according to some remarkable but largely ignored research—by the World Bank, of all places—it is because the average American has access to over $418,000 in intangible wealth, while the stay-at-home Mexican's intangible wealth is just $34,000.

    But what is intangible wealth, and how on earth is it measured? And what does it mean for the world's people—poor and rich? That's where the story gets even more interesting.

    Two years ago the World Bank's environmental economics department set out to assess the relative contributions of various kinds of capital to economic development. Its study, "Where is the Wealth of Nations?: Measuring Capital for the 21st Century," began by defining natural capital as the sum of nonrenewable resources (including oil, natural gas, coal and mineral resources), cropland, pasture land, forested areas and protected areas. Produced, or built, capital is what many of us think of when we think of capital: the sum of machinery, equipment, and structures (including infrastructure) and urban land.

    But once the value of all these are added up, the economists found something big was still missing: the vast majority of world's wealth! If one simply adds up the current value of a country's natural resources and produced, or built, capital, there's no way that can account for that country's level of income.

    The rest is the result of "intangible" factors—such as the trust among people in a society, an efficient judicial system, clear property rights and effective government. All this intangible capital also boosts the productivity of labor and results in higher total wealth. In fact, the World Bank finds, "Human capital and the value of institutions (as measured by rule of law) constitute the largest share of wealth in virtually all countries."

    Once one takes into account all of the world's natural resources and produced capital, 80% of the wealth of rich countries and 60% of the wealth of poor countries is of this intangible type. The bottom line: "Rich countries are largely rich because of the skills of their populations and the quality of the institutions supporting economic activity."

    What the World Bank economists have brilliantly done is quantify the intangible value of education and social institutions. According to their regression analyses, for example, the rule of law explains 57 percent of countries' intangible capital. Education accounts for 36 percent.

    The rule-of-law index was devised using several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 25 separate data sources constructed by 18 different organizations. The latter include civil society groups (Freedom House), political and business risk-rating agencies (Economist Intelligence Unit) and think tanks (International Budget Project Open Budget Index).

    Switzerland scores 99.5 out of 100 on the rule-of-law index and the U.S. hits 91.8. By contrast, Nigeria's score is a pitiful 5.8; Burundi's 4.3; and Ethiopia's 16.4. The members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development—30 wealthy developed countries—have an average score of 90, while sub-Saharan Africa's is a dismal 28.

    The natural wealth in rich countries like the U.S. is a tiny proportion of their overall wealth—typically 1 percent to 3 percent—yet they derive more value from what they have. Cropland, pastures and forests are more valuable in rich countries because they can be combined with other capital like machinery and strong property rights to produce more value. Machinery, buildings, roads and so forth account for 17% of the rich countries' total wealth.

    Overall, the average per capita wealth in the rich Organization for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD) countries is $440,000, consisting of $10,000 in natural capital, $76,000 in produced capital, and a whopping $354,000 in intangible capital. (Switzerland has the highest per capita wealth, at $648,000. The U.S. is fourth at $513,000.)

    By comparison, the World Bank study finds that total wealth for the low income countries averages $7,216 per person. That consists of $2,075 in natural capital, $1,150 in produced capital and $3,991 in intangible capital. The countries with the lowest per capita wealth are Ethiopia ($1,965), Nigeria ($2,748), and Burundi ($2,859).

    In fact, some countries are so badly run, that they actually have negative intangible capital. Through rampant corruption and failing school systems, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are destroying their intangible capital and ensuring that their people will be poorer in the future.

    In the U.S., according to the World Bank study, natural capital is $15,000 per person, produced capital is $80,000 and intangible capital is $418,000. And thus, considering common measure used to compare countries, its annual purchasing power parity GDP per capita is $43,800. By contrast, oil-rich Mexico's total natural capital per person is $8,500 ($6,000 due to oil), produced capital is $19,000 and intangible capita is $34,500—a total of $62,000 per person. Yet its GDP per capita is $10,700. When a Mexican, or for that matter, a South Asian or African, walks across our border, they gain immediate access to intangible capital worth $418,000 per person. Who wouldn't walk across the border in such circumstances?

    The World Bank study bolsters the deep insights of the late development economist Peter Bauer. In his brilliant 1972 book Dissent on Development, Bauer wrote: "If all conditions for development other than capital are present, capital will soon be generated locally or will be available . . . from abroad. . . . If, however, the conditions for development are not present, then aid . . . will be necessarily unproductive and therefore ineffective. Thus, if the mainsprings of development are present, material progress will occur even without foreign aid. If they are absent, it will not occur even with aid."

    The World Bank's pathbreaking "Where is the Wealth of Nations?" convincingly demonstrates that the "mainsprings of development" are the rule of law and a good school system. The big question that its researchers don't answer is: How can the people of the developing world rid themselves of the kleptocrats who loot their countries and keep them poor
    ?

    Ronald Bailey is Reason's science correspondent. His most recent book, Liberation Biology: The Scientific and Moral Case for the Biotech Revolution, is available from Prometheus Books.

    Bob Jensen's threads on intangibles from the standpoint of accounting theory and practice are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes

    Intangibles --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intangibles

    Externalities --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Externalities

    Trivia Question
    The fact that open source and free Office Software is getting closer and closer to quality of MS Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, etc.) software is still not really threatening Microsoft's worldwide monopoly for its relatively expensive MS Office software. What is the main intangible that gives MS Office products such value in world markets?

    Jensen's Opinion
    I think the main intangible here is the cost of retraining over 90% of the computer users of the world. Related to this is the difficulty students and "white-collar workers" will encounter if they do not know how to use MS Office software when seeking employment. Whereas most of drivers can drive rental cars of most any manufacturer,  computer users who cannot "drive" Excel, Word, PowerPoint, etc. face tremendous barriers that give rise to the main intangible asset of Microsoft Corporation. Organizations spent billions in training that gave rise to billions in intangible assets of Microsoft.


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on August 22, 2008

    FASB Seeks to Inform Investors, Not Whack Companies
    by Robert H. Herz
    The Wall Street Journal

    Aug 18, 2008
    Page: A14
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
     

    TOPICS: Contingent Liabilities, Disclosure, Disclosure Requirements, FASB, Financial Accounting Standards Board

    SUMMARY: The FASB has proposed a change to disclosures associated with contingent liabilities, including litigation liabilities, with a document entitled "Disclosure of Certain Loss Contingencies-an amendment of FASB Statements No. 5 and 141" and a comment period that ended August 8, 2008. This proposed Statement would replace and enhance the disclosure requirements in FASB Statement No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies, for all outstanding contingencies, both those recognized on the balance sheet and those contingencies that would be recognized as liabilities if the criteria for recognition in paragraph 8 of Statement 5 were met; it as well applies to contingent liabilities from business combinations. The proposal would "...(a) expand the population of loss contingencies that are required to be disclosed, (b) require disclosure of specific quantitative and qualitative information about those loss contingencies, (c) require a tabular reconciliation of recognized loss contingencies to enhance financial statement transparency, and (d) provide an exemption from disclosing certain required information if disclosing that information would be prejudicial to an entity's position in a dispute." In the proposal, the FASB states that the project was taken on because "investors and other users of financial information have expressed concerns that disclosures about loss contingencies under the existing guidance ... do not provide adequate information to assist users of financial statements in assessing the likelihood, timing, and amount of future cash flows associated with loss contingencies." Clearly, the WSJ Opinion page editors disagree with this assessment (see the related article) and FASB Chairman Bob Herz responds to their Op-Ed piece.

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The article is useful for teaching both the requirements for reporting loss contingencies and the FASB's due process for new financial reporting standards, including addressing international convergence efforts.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1. (Introductory) Describe the FASB's extensive due process procedures. What document did the FASB issue? At what stage of discussion is this proposed financial reporting change?

    2. (Advanced) The WSJ Opinion page editors clearly dislike the proposed accounting and reporting requirements for loss contingencies. They cite the fact that "...FASB has been getting an earful. Senior litigators from 13 companies...have signed a letter to FASB Chairman Robert Herz, objecting to the plan." Do you find it surprising that a preponderance of those who write comment letters to the FASB argue against any particular proposal? Support your answer.

    3. (Introductory) What are the current accounting and disclosure requirements for loss contingencies? How will the FASB's proposal change those requirements? Put your answer into your own words. You may access the FASB document on its web site at http://www.fasb.org/draft/ed_contingencies.pdf

    4. (Advanced) In the related article, the WSJ Opinion page editors pose the question, "...Why mess with the current system?...Lawyers, accountants and corporations are all reasonably comfortable with the way things are." Do you agree with that assessment? Support your answer.

    5. (Advanced) In his response, FASB Chairman Herz states that "the [FASB] is not proposing that companies change their current accounting for the cost of ongoing litigation...[and that] the proposal would not require any estimates of fair value..." To what statements is Mr. Herz responding? How might the WSJ Editors have determined that the notion of "fair value" for a lawsuit is part of the new requirements?
     

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
     

    RELATED ARTICLES: 
    FASB's Lawyer Bonanza
    by
    Aug 07, 2008
    Page: A12
     

     

    "FASB Seeks to Inform Investors, Not Whack Companies," by Robert Herz, The Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2008; Page A14 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121902212239348497.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC

    I write in response to your editorial, "FASB's Lawyer Bonanza" (Review & Outlook, Aug. 7). The Financial Accounting Standards Board is not proposing that companies change their current accounting for the cost of ongoing litigation. Rather, our proposal would require additional disclosure in the footnotes to the financial statements. It is a proposal, not a "demand," and is subject to our normal extensive public due process.

    Under the proposal, the amount that would be required to be disclosed is the claim amount, or, if there is no claim amount, the company's best estimate of its maximum exposure to loss. The Board attempted to insure the proposal would not require a company to "[show] its hand to plaintiffs' attorneys" as the editorial says. For example, the proposal allows companies to aggregate claim amounts, so that the plaintiffs attorneys would not be able to identify specific cases. We have also proposed an exemption for certain disclosure situations that would be clearly prejudicial to the company.

    Moreover, the proposed disclosures would not require any estimates of fair value -- nor does the proposal involve any new fair value requirements. The words "fair value" are not even contained in the proposed statement.

    It is because of the strong and extensive input we've received from investors who want greater transparency relating to a wide range of contingencies -- including litigation -- that we are proposing these expanded disclosures. The new disclosures are aimed at providing information earlier to existing and potential investors in order to give them a greater understanding of the risks companies are facing. We believe that information would improve their ability to make informed investment decisions.

    Robert H. Herz
    Chairman Financial Accounting Standards Board
    Norwalk, Conn
    .

     


    More Reasons Why Tom and I Hate Principles-Based Accounting Standards

    "Contingent Liabilities: A Troubling Signpost on the Winding Road to a Single Global Accounting Standard," by Tom Selling, The Accounting Onion, May 26, 2008 --- Click Here

    By the logic of others, which I can’t explain, fuzzy lines in accounting standards have come to be exalted as “principles-based” and bright lines are disparaged as “rules-based.” One of my favorite examples (actually a pet peeve) of this phenomenon is the difference in the accounting for leases between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. The objective of the financial reporting game is to capture as much of the economic benefits of an asset as possible, while keeping the contractual liability for future lease payments off the balance sheet; a win is scored an “operating lease,” and a loss is scored a “capital lease.” As in tennis, If the present value of the minimum lease payments turns out to be even a hair over the 90% line of the leased asset’s fair value, your shot is out and you lose the point.

    The counterpart to FAS 13 in IFRS is IAS 17, a putative principles-based standard. It’s more a less a carbon copy of FAS 13 in its major provisions, except that bright lines are replaced with fuzzy lines: if the present value of the minimum lease payments is a “substantial portion” (whatever that means) of the leased asset’s fair value, you lose operating lease accounting. If FAS 13 is tennis, then IAS 17 is tennis-without-lines. Either way, the accounting game has another twist: the players call the balls landing on their side of the net; and the only job of the umpire—chosen and compensated by each player—is to opine on the reasonableness of their player's call. So, one would confidently expect that the players of tennis-without- lines have a much lower risk of being overruled by their auditors… whoops, I meant umpires.

    Although lease accounting is one example for which GAAP is bright-lined and IFRS is the fuzzy one, the opposite is sometimes the case, with accounting for contingencies under FAS 5 or IAS 37 being a prime exaple. FAS 5 requires recognition of a contingent liability when it is “probable” that a future event will result in the occurrence of a liability. What does “probable” mean? According to FAS 5, it means “likely to occur.” Wow, that sure clears things up. With a recognition threshold as solid as Jell-o nailed to a tree and boilerplate footnote disclosures to keep up appearances, there should be little problem persuading one’s handpicked independent auditor of the “reasonableness” of any in or out call.

    IAS 37 has a similar recognition threshold for a contingent liability (Note: I am adopting U.S. terminology throughout, even though "contingent liabilities" are referred to as "provisions" in IAS 37). But in refreshing contrast to FAS 5, IAS 37 unambiguously nails down the definition of “probable” to be “more likely than not” —i.e., just a hair north of 50%. Naively assuming that companies actually comply with the letter and spirit of IAS 37, then more liabilities should find their way onto the balance sheet under IFRS than GAAP. And, IAS 37 also has more principled rules for measuring a liability, once recognized. But, I won’t get into that here. Just please take my word for it that IAS 37 is to FAS 5 as steak is to chopped liver.

    The Global Accounting Race to the Bottom

    And so we have the IASB’s ineffable ongoing six-year project to make a hairball out of IAS 37. If these two standards, IAS 37 and FAS 5, are to be brought closer together as the ballyhooed Memorandum of Understanding between IASB and FASB should portend, it would make much more sense for the FASB to revise FAS 5 to make it more like IAS 37. After all, convergence isn’t supposed to take forever; even if you don’t think IAS 37 is perfect, there are a lot more serious problems IASB could be working harder on: leases, pensions, revenue recognition, securitizations, related party transactions, just to name a few off the top of my head. But, the stakeholders in IFRS are evidently telling the IASB that they get their jollies from tennis without lines. And, the IASB, dependent on the big boys for funding, is listening real close.

    Basically, the IASB has concluded that all present obligations – not just those that are more likely than not to result in an outflow of assets – should be recognized. It sounds admirably principled and ambitious, but there’s a catch. In place of the bright-line probability threshold in IAS 37, there would be the fuzziest line criteria one could possibly devise: the liability must be capable of “reliable” measurement. We know that "probable" without further guidance must at least lie between 0 and 1, but what amount of measurement error is within range of “reliable”? The answer, it seems, would be left to the whim of the issuer followed by the inevitable wave-your-hands-in-the-air rubber stamp of the auditor.

    It’s not as if the IASB doesn’t have history from which to learn. Where the IASB is trying to go in revising IAS 37, we’ve already been in the U.S. The result was all too often not a pretty sight as unrecognized liabilities suddenly slammed into balance sheets like freight trains. As I discussed in an earlier post, retiree health care liabilities were kept off balance sheets until they were about to break unionized industrial companies. Post-retirement benefits were doled out by earlier generations of management, long departed with their generous termination benefits, in order to persuade obstreperous unions to return to the assembly lines. GM and Ford are now on the verge of settling faustian bargains of their forbearers with huge cash outlays: yet for decades the amount recognized on the balance sheet was precisely nil. The accounting for these liabilities had been conveniently ignored, with only boilerplate disclosures in their stead, out of supposed concern for reliable measurement. Yet, everyone knew that zero as the answer was as far from correct as Detroit is from Tokyo – where, as in most developed countries, health care costs of retirees are the responsibility of government.

    Holding the recognition of a liability hostage to “reliable” measurement is bad accounting. There is just no other way I can put it. If this is the way the IASB is going to spend its time as we are supposed to be moving to a single global standard, then let the race to the bottom begin.

    Bob Jensen's threads on principles-based standards versus rules-based standards --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#Principles-Based

    Bob Jensen's threads on lease accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#Leases

    Bob Jensen's threads on synthetic leases --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/00overview/speOverview.htm


    A New Type of Intangible Investment (sort of not yet legal in the U.S.) --- Litigation
    How should it be booked and carried in financial statements?
    I say "sort of" since this intangible asset might be buried (as Purchased Goodwill") in acquisition prices when firms are purchased purchased or merged.

    The notion of litigation as a separate asset class is a novel one. It's hard to imagine fund managers one day allotting a bit of their portfolio to third-party lawsuits, alongside shares, bonds, property and hedge funds. But some wealthy investors are starting to dabble in lawsuit investment, bankrolling some or all of the heavy upfront costs in return for a share of the damages in the event of a win. The London-managed hedge fund MKM Longboat last month revealed plans to invest $100million (£50.5million) to finance European lawsuits. Today a new company, Juridica, floats on AIM, having raised £80million to make litigation bets.
    "The law is now an asset class," The London Times, December 21, 2007 --- http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/columnists/article3080766.ece

    Jensen Comment
    Under U.S. GAAP, intangible assets are generally booked only when purchased and are not conducive to fair value accounting afterwards. Probably the most serious problem in both accounting theory and practice is unbooked value (and in many cases undisclosed) of intangible assets and liabilities. Do the values of human capital and knowledge capital ring a bell? Does the cost retraining the world's workforce to use Office software other than Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, etc.) ring a bell?

    Contingent liabilities (particularly pending lawsuits) are problematic until the amount of the liability is both reasonably measurable and highly probable. Until now, contingent litigation assets were not investment assets. Contingent liabilities were booked as current or past expenses. Now purchased litigation assets having future value? Horrors!

    In the past when a company purchased another company, some of the "goodwill" value above and beyond the traceable value to net tangible assets could easily have been the value of future litigation such as when Blackboard acquired WebCT and WebCT's patents on online education software. Patents and Copyrights may have value with respect to fending off future competition.

    But patents and copyrights may also have value in future litigation regarding past infringements. Now hedge funds might invest in bringing litigation to fruition.

    Intangible assets and liabilities are, and will forever remain, the largest problem in accounting theory and practice! In some cases, such as Microsoft Corporation, booked assets are so miniscule relative to unbooked intangible assets that the balance sheets are virtually a bad joke.

    An enormous problem, besides the fact that current value of intangibles cannot be counted, current value can change by enormous magnitudes overnight as new discoveries are made and new legislation is passed, to say nothing of court decisions. Tangible asset values can also change, but in general they are not as volatile.

    December 25, 2007 reply from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]

    Bob,

    SFAS 141R (available on the FASB web site) substantially changes the accounting for both contingent assets and liabilities in connection with business combinations. In fact, 141R coupled with SFAS 160 on noncontrolling interests makes major changes to both the accounting for business combinations and the accounting for consolidation procedures. While the new rules can't be applied until 2009, anyone teaching advanced accounting or where ever else these topics are covered should throw out their old lesson plans and be prepared to enter into an entirely new world of accounting - not for the better in my humble opinion.

    By the way, another interesting thing to read on the FASB web site is the proposal to reduce the size of the FASB and make some other changes to improve the standard-setting process. We celebrated our family Christmas a few days ago because of travel plans and I'm working on my comment letter to the Financial Accounting Foundation today.

    Merry Christmas!

    Denny

    December 25, 2007 reply from Amy Dunbar [Amy.Dunbar@BUSINESS.UCONN.EDU]

    What I found interesting about 141R is the discussion in the appendices that showed both the FASB and IASB views and how the Boards reached convergence.

    141R also added a couple paragraphs to FIN 48 that result in goodwill no longer being adjusted if the contingent tax liability is increased or decreased. Instead the DR is to tax expense, which makes a lot more sense to me. If I read the statement correctly, the purchased assets and liabilities are stated at fair value under a recognition, then measurement principle. Taxes are exempt from those two principles; instead FAS 109/FIN 48 apply. What I couldn't tell is if the purchaser still has up to one year (the maximum measurement period) to get the tax contingent liability right before the DR goes to tax expense. Can anyone help me?

    Amy Dunbar
    UConn

    Jensen Comment
    You can download FAS 141(R) from http://www.fasb.org/st/index.shtml#fas160 


    "What Good Comes from Goodwill Accounting?" by Tom Selling, The Accounting Onion, February 18, 2008 --- http://accountingonion.typepad.com/

    In an earlier post, I described how SFAS 141R resulted in some incremental improvements to the accounting for business combinations.  However, warts remain, and the purposes of this post is describe the ugliest and most painful of them all: the accounting for so-called 'goodwill.'

    Here's a simple example to contemplate:

    • Company P determines that Company S has a value of $1,100, and negotiates an acquisition for 100% of its outstanding shares for $1,000.
    • S has the following assets:
      • Plant and equipment with a fair value of $200.
      • An assembled workforce with a fair value of $100.
    • S has no liabilities eligible for accounting recognition.
    • Company S will be run independently from Company P; thus, any synergies created by the acquisition are negligible. 

    The root of the problem is literally that debits (the assets acquired) do not equal credits (the purchase price).  Business combination accounting is a collision of fantasy and reality: the fantasy is that accounting can fully reflect the economic impact of past events on an enterprise, and the reality is that it cannot be so. A balance sheet produced by even the most principled of accounting systems imaginable cannot possibly comprehend the entire set of economic assets and liabilities.  One example on the asset side would be that S has been put together in such a way as to rapidly and inexpensively expand or contract capacity as market conditions change.  In other words, S holds 'real options', and the shareholders of S would want P to pay for them. On the liability side, not all obligations are legal, amounts are highly uncertain, and the probability of payment may be low. 

    The FASB's solution to the debit and credit problem is to plug the shortfall in debits and to weave a fantasy around it.  The plug is euphoniously dubbed 'goodwill' -- to be classified on the balance sheet as an asset and tested for impairment at least once each year. In the above example, the amount reported as goodwill would be $800 (=$1,000 - $200). 

    Whipped Cream on the Balance Sheet   

    As described above, the amount reported as goodwill is, at its best, a conglomeration of assets offset by liabilities.  Nowhere else in accounting would there be permitted such a hodgepodge, and by no other means other than a narrowly defined 'business combination' may it -- whatever it is -- be recognized.  But even granting that offsetting assets with unrelated liabilities may be permissible, of what use to investors is the assignment of a number to something that, by definition, is beyond description?  (Ironically, even though the value of S's assembled workforce may be measurable and significant, separate recognition of this asset is streng verboten and kept a dark secret from investors.) 

    As I have reported in my earlier post, Walter Schuetze (former SEC Chief Accountant and FASB member) derisively characterizes reported goodwill as "the lump left over." Actually, I think he was being generous.  FAS 141R contains some significant exceptions to fair valuation of assets acquired and liabilities assumed.  Thus, the unknown difference between recorded amounts and their fair values are  shoveled into the goodwill muddle.  As if that weren't enough, the math of the goodwill calculation blithely compares apples with oranges: prices paid with values received.  "Lump", "goodwill" or whatever name you can think of implies that the number is associated with actual attributes, but what we are dealing with here is nothing more than just a number--an arbitrary number.

    So, dear readers, I hope you are not disillusioned to realize that 'goodwill' is invariably anything but.  If it must be recognized at all, let's drop the obvious pretension and call it what it is: in this example, "excess of purchase price over recognized amounts of identified assets acquired and liabilities assumed."  However, dropping the pretension is not as easy as it seems.  If a muddle is to be reported as an asset, it must be subject to an impairment test; and without a dressy name that belies the muddle that is 'goodwill', there can be no pretense for the charade of an impairment test that is FAS 142. 

    The Goodwill Impairment Mess

    Recognition of goodwill may seem but a curious anomaly until you get to the impairment test specified in FAS 142.  It's a real money pit:  goodwill has to be assigned to "reporting units" (a new concept rife with opportunities for manipulation); the fair value of each reporting unit has to be assessed at least once a year (another opportunity for manipulation); and the real mayhem begins if, heaven forbid, you are required to estimate the "implied fair value of goodwill" (another new concept rife with opportunities for manipulation).  The only good that comes out of goodwill impairment testing are the jobs created for valuation consultants, accountants and attorneys. 

    A Proposed Solution

    In olden days, the British permitted a charge to contributed capital for the amount that would otherwise have been recognized as goodwill.  While imperfect, it may well be the only reasonable solution to the problem; for as I have shown above, there can be no perfect solution.  If you can't describe what something is, than what possible good can come from purporting to measure it?

    By the way, even though business combinations rules have been somewhat converged by the issuance of FAS 141R and a revised IFRS 3, goodwill impairment remains one of the most significant differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. The two approaches are fundamentally at odds, but it should be said that IFRS's impairment rules are much less worse.  But that's not the most important point I want to make.  Whatever the merits of the two approaches, by eliminating goodwill and the inevitably screwball impairment tests, standard setters would not only be improving financial reporting, they could also say that they have resolved one of the thorniest convergence issues.   

    Tom Selling poses some added Catch 22 issues about goodwill accounting in
    "FAS 52: Another Goodwill Charade, and IFRS Convergences To Boot," The Accounting Onion, February 25, 2008 --- http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/02/goodwill-at-for.html

    Bob Jensen's threads on FAS 141R , contingencies, and intangibles are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes

    Some related earlier tidbits:

    A New Type of Intangible Investment (sort of not yet legal in the U.S.) --- Litigation
    How should it be booked and carried in financial statements?
    I say "sort of" since this intangible asset might be buried (as Purchased Goodwill") in acquisition prices when firms are purchased purchased or merged.

    The notion of litigation as a separate asset class is a novel one. It's hard to imagine fund managers one day allotting a bit of their portfolio to third-party lawsuits, alongside shares, bonds, property and hedge funds. But some wealthy investors are starting to dabble in lawsuit investment, bankrolling some or all of the heavy upfront costs in return for a share of the damages in the event of a win. The London-managed hedge fund MKM Longboat last month revealed plans to invest $100million (£50.5million) to finance European lawsuits. Today a new company, Juridica, floats on AIM, having raised £80million to make litigation bets.
    "The law is now an asset class," The London Times, December 21, 2007 --- http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/columnists/article3080766.ece

    Jensen Comment
    Under U.S. GAAP, intangible assets are generally booked only when purchased and are not conducive to fair value accounting afterwards. Probably the most serious problem in both accounting theory and practice is unbooked value (and in many cases undisclosed) of intangible assets and liabilities. Do the values of human capital and knowledge capital ring a bell? Does the cost retraining the world's workforce to use Office software other than Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, etc.) ring a bell?

    Contingent liabilities (particularly pending lawsuits) are problematic until the amount of the liability is both reasonably measurable and highly probable. Until now, contingent litigation assets were not investment assets. Contingent liabilities were booked as current or past expenses. Now purchased litigation assets having future value? Horrors!

    In the past when a company purchased another company, some of the "goodwill" value above and beyond the traceable value to net tangible assets could easily have been the value of future litigation such as when Blackboard acquired WebCT and WebCT's patents on online education software. Patents and Copyrights may have value with respect to fending off future competition.

    But patents and copyrights may also have value in future litigation regarding past infringements. Now hedge funds might invest in bringing litigation to fruition.

    Intangible assets and liabilities are, and will forever remain, the largest problem in accounting theory and practice! In some cases, such as Microsoft Corporation, booked assets are so miniscule relative to unbooked intangible assets that the balance sheets are virtually a bad joke.

    An enormous problem, besides the fact that current value of intangibles cannot be counted, current value can change by enormous magnitudes overnight as new discoveries are made and new legislation is passed, to say nothing of court decisions. Tangible asset values can also change, but in general they are not as volatile.

    December 25, 2007 reply from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]

    Bob,

    SFAS 141R (available on the FASB web site) substantially changes the accounting for both contingent assets and liabilities in connection with business combinations. In fact, 141R coupled with SFAS 160 on noncontrolling interests makes major changes to both the accounting for business combinations and the accounting for consolidation procedures. While the new rules can't be applied until 2009, anyone teaching advanced accounting or where ever else these topics are covered should throw out their old lesson plans and be prepared to enter into an entirely new world of accounting - not for the better in my humble opinion.

    By the way, another interesting thing to read on the FASB web site is the proposal to reduce the size of the FASB and make some other changes to improve the standard-setting process. We celebrated our family Christmas a few days ago because of travel plans and I'm working on my comment letter to the Financial Accounting Foundation today.

    Merry Christmas!

    Denny

    December 25, 2007 reply from Amy Dunbar [Amy.Dunbar@BUSINESS.UCONN.EDU]

    What I found interesting about 141R is the discussion in the appendices that showed both the FASB and IASB views and how the Boards reached convergence.

    141R also added a couple paragraphs to FIN 48 that result in goodwill no longer being adjusted if the contingent tax liability is increased or decreased. Instead the DR is to tax expense, which makes a lot more sense to me. If I read the statement correctly, the purchased assets and liabilities are stated at fair value under a recognition, then measurement principle. Taxes are exempt from those two principles; instead FAS 109/FIN 48 apply. What I couldn't tell is if the purchaser still has up to one year (the maximum measurement period) to get the tax contingent liability right before the DR goes to tax expense. Can anyone help me?

    Amy Dunbar
    UConn

    Jensen Comment
    You can download FAS 141(R) from http://www.fasb.org/st/index.shtml#fas160 

    February 21, 2008 reply from David Fordham, James Madison University [fordhadr@JMU.EDU]

    I'm not up on SFAS 141R, but I have to wonder why we accountants even bother dibbling around with non-quantifiable amounts like "utility" and "expectations" and other "value judgments"? We don't bother with other similar concepts, such as training, collegiality, preferences, love, aspirations, etc. which also affect the "value of assets".

    I have a rock that I consider very valuable, and a few other experts who have analyzed it have declared it very valuable (at least one thinks its more valuable than I do) and the values vary all over the map, and yet there are others who believe it is worthless, merely an interesting-looking rock. While I'm willing to part with it for a princely sum, and several have offered me near that amount, others think we are foolish. I would be amused to see what happens if I were to list it on my net worth statement next time I apply for a loan. How valuable is the name "Exxon"? How valuable is custom software? How valuable is a gold doubloon retrieved from the Notre-Dame-de-Deliverance, or a lock of wool from Dolly the sheep?

    Instead of "how much", it seems like the question we *should* be asking is, "Why?"

    Aren't these individualized answers? Why do any of us pretend there is a single right answer, then?

    As an aside, a couple of years ago, my wife was called for jury duty, on a case involving goodwill. A stonemason had decided to retire and sold his business to his young apprentice. At the time of sale, the mason had a state-wide reputation, so the transaction involved considerable goodwill beyond the tools and other tangible assets. Within a year, the apprentice had gotten lazy, had botched several high-profile jobs, had alienated customers, and otherwise ruined the company. Several customers approached the retired mason and asked him to do personal jobs for them, which he did since there was no non-compete clause in the contract. When the apprentice tried to sell out to another mason, he wasn't offered but a fraction of what he'd originally paid. The apprentice sued the mason, claiming his actions had "impaired the goodwill of the company". The interesting thing was, the jury was given no definition (none, nada, zip, zilch) or guidance of what "goodwill" was supposed ! ! to be, only that it was an asset that could be impaired. There was no explanation of where it came from, what created it, why it existed, how it could be destroyed, etc. The jury begged the judge for more guidance, and he claimed he could only read the lawbooks to them, and the lawbooks contained no definition or other information which said what goodwill was or how it could be changed. The jury at first agreed that they could not reach a verdict without more information, but the judge demanded that they reach one, without any further guidance. After three days of working "in the dark" with nothing to go on but opposing lawyers' recognizably-ridiculous claims, they reached a verdict agreeing that the goodwill had been impaired and the apprentice had been harmed by the retiree's taking the new jobs. After the trial, when my wife learned a little bit about it, she was angered that the jury wasn't told so they could have made a better decision.

    The public is under the impression that if everything goes right, the accounting reports always show the "correct" number. Why do we continue to deceive them so?

    David "Rhetorical Questionmaker" Fordham

    February 21, 2008 message from Paul Williams [Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]

    Dilbert recently ran a series of cartoons in which the pointy-haired boss opines about raising some cash by selling the Goodwill. When an ex-engineer/cartoonist can so easily see the silliness of what we try to foist off as "professional expertise", perhaps the public isn't so deceived as we have deceived ourselves. Makes one nostalgic for the old days when we argued about "costs" and "market values (entry or exit)". One might be able to make a case that sufficient evidence is available to ascertain what something cost or what it could fetch in some broad market. But fair value?

    In the article we are assured that S has an asset "assembled workforce" worth $100. Just exactly how would one obtain that $100 cash? On what market do we buy and sell "assembled workforces?" Even if that were possible (which it isn't, at least not in the US) how long does a workforce stay assembled? Our NHL franchise is celebrating its 10th anniversary as the team (assembled workforce) labeled Carolina Hurricanes. Only one person (Glen Wesley) has been part of that assembled workforce the entire time. Dozens and dozens of players have come and gone as part of the "assembled workforce."

    In 2002 the team went to the Stanley Cup finals and, with the team (assembled workforce) intact finished 30th (dead last) in 2003. They did likewise in 2006 and won the Cup and with virtually the same "assembled workforce" failed to make the playoffs in 2007. The "fair value" of an assemble workforce seems to be a rather ephemeral thing. To assign a single number value to it at an arbitrary point in time does seem to an active that can be nothing other than deceptive.

    David raises a most critical issue for a group that claims some kind of professional expertise. One can entertain the notion that there could be a coherent "cost" or "market value" accounting, but a "fair value" accounting? But in the academy we have been speaking for so long and so matter of factly about earnings expectations and models that provide those numbers, which are sufficient for scientific precision, that we have conned ourselves into believing that we actually can provide "fair values." We abandoned SFAS #33 because "market values" were too difficult to ascertain with any degree of reliability. But fair values don't have to be reliable, only relevant to some hypothetical world populated by persons who don't actually exist (Joe Doodlebugs, e.g.); we can just make them up.

    Accountants have been victimized by finance hubris. There is a significant historical irony in this since the "positivists" (I can name names but will not do so publicly) dogma was that accounting was too normative and that concepts like "true and fair" view were intellectually vacuous because terms like "true" and "fair" were references to subjective notions. Yet the influence of positive economics on accounting has produced a system of financial reporting focused on the manufacture of "fair" values, which in too many cases are the hypothetical products of the imaginary world of the positive economists. Normative accounting gave us positive measures. Positive accounting has provided us with normative measures. A classic example of unintended consequences?

    February 21, 2008 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Paul and David,

    Actually valuation is at last as easy as it can get. Below is an email that I received today offering to let me try this little black box in which I feed in financial statements and out pops the value of the firm. I don't quite know how the black box deals with intangibles, but maybe there's magic inside that box.

    Actually all valuation experts use magic dust. I protested my land and home valuations at various times in Maine, Texas, and New Hampshire. In each case, the appraiser carefully documented square footage, construction quality, location, view quality, landscape, school district, etc. Good work! Then each initial appraisal, say V dollars, was multiplied by a mysterious M coefficient such that my property tax appraisal was T=MV. For example, in Maine the M was 2.85. When I asked where the 2.85 came from, the appraiser admitted that he stood in front of my house and used magic dust to set the value of T. Then he divided T by V to get M. In other words M was truly a magic dust derivation. I don’t even know why the appraisers bother with calculating V in the first place. I guess it’s just to make naïve property owners think the appraiser is earning his fee. In reality, he probably rode slowly through the neighborhood and calculated T values for each house in about five minutes or less.

    When something similar happened in New Hampshire last year, I carefully compared in a spreadsheet the difference in the M coefficient between me and my neighbors having identical views and much newer and bigger homes.

    Why was my M coefficient so much larger such that my T real estate appraisal was so much larger than my neighbors’ T values? My wife called me the Big M Guy!

    I was told by the Sugar Hill Selectmen that the magic dust M coefficients could not be changed. So I hired a property tax pro who actually got this issue docketed for court down in the State Capitol of Concord. One day before the first court hearing, the town’s appraiser sheepishly came to my home and asked if I would accept a lower magic dust coefficient. We finally agreed on a revised M coefficient so I guess magic dust can be affected by new magic the closer you get to your day in court.

    Note the magic-dust black box described below in a message from XXXXX. He doesn’t mention magic dust, but I’m sure its floating around in there just like snowflakes swirl up when you shake a glass-ball paper weight.

    Bob Jensen’s threads on the realities of valuation are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

    Bob

    February 21, 2008 message from XXXXX

    Hi, Bob,

    I have been spending time absorbing as much as I can from the many resources you have about the world of accounting. We have a server based application that we tout as “our application starts where accounting software ends.” A bit camp, I agree, but, in truth, that’s what it does. Input an Income Statement and the basic P&L info, and we can calculate the value of a business. Take that and adjust with normalizations to forecast where the business will be in the future. Then adjust expenses, and apply some basic strategies to get the profits where you want/hope they should be. Then generate reports, including monthly line by line budgets to track all the line items as you move forward. Oh, and calculate Burden rates to guide the pricing of your product/service to achieve your forecast revenue goals. I have no idea whether you are at all interested in looking at what we have, but, if so, let me know and I will be happy to provide you with log in ID and Password.

    On a slightly different note…have you ever heard of K2 Enterprises? If so, can you share any feedback about them with me.

    Thanks,

    February 22, 2008 reply from Tom Selling [tom.selling@GROVESITE.COM]

    On cost (replacement) versus (fair) value, Walter Teets and I have written a paper that we recently submitted to FAJ.  The basic thrust is that cost can be associated with principles-based accounting, and value cannot.  That’s why FAS 157 is rules based and filled with anomalies.  You can read the working paper here, or read my blog post that it was based on here.  Comments, especially on the working paper, would be much appreciated.

    Thomas I. Selling PhD, CPA
    602-228-4871 (M)
    602-952-9880 x205 (O)

    Website: www.tomselling.com 
    Weblog: www.accountingonion.com 
    Company: www.grovesite.com 

     


    A Sad Time for Corporate Reputations

    "Question for Corporate America: Does Your Reputation Fall into the Liabilities Column on Your Balance Sheet?" PR Web, June 19, 2006 --- http://www.prweb.com/releases/2006/6/prweb399939.htm

    In a survey conducted among 2,000 participants at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum, more CEOs said that corporate reputation, not profitability, was their most important measure of success. Fortune Magazine calculates that a one-point change on its scale used to rank its most admired companies translates to a difference of $107 million to a company’s market value.

    Lord Levene, Chairman of Lloyd’s of London, reported in a 2005 speech at the Philadelphia Club that loss of reputation is now viewed as the second most serious threat to an organization’s viability. (Business interruption is the first.)An Economist Intelligence Unit survey ranked reputational risk as the greatest potential threat to an organization's value. More than 30% of participating CEOs said that reputational risk represents the greatest potential threat to their company's market value. Of this same group of CEOs only 11% said that they had taken any action against the threat.

    If these data are not sufficient to jolt companies into action, there is enough compelling data linking corporate reputation to corporate performance that should. Fortune Magazine, which has been publishing the results of its "America’s Most Admired Companies" survey for 20 years, calculates that a change of 1 point on its scale, either positively or negatively, affects a company's market value by an average of $107 million. The results of another study published in 2003 in Management Today, Britain's leading monthly business magazine, demonstrate a clear correlation between corporate reputation and equity return. Using existing data from Fortune’s surveys to construct portfolios of the most and least admired companies, the authors found that for the five years following Fortune’s publication of the results, the portfolios of the most admired companies had cumulative returns of 126% while those of the least admired had cumulative returns of 80%.

    "While executives may choose to spend time analyzing these data and poking holes in research methodologies in order to dismiss reputation as a strategic priority," says Wallace, "the effort would simply provide another diversion from addressing the problem head-on. The fact that corporate America's sullied reputation has lead to such dramatic legislative change in the form of the Sarbannes-Oxley Act, and that it has become routine front-page news, is as telling as any data. No company wants bad press, but it may finally be what convinces American business that, left unmanaged, a company’s reputation can become a terminal liability."

    Continued in article

    Bob Jensen's threads on proposed reforms are at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudProposedReforms.htm
     


    Say what?
    Why bother entering into contracts that are not enforceable?
    Do unenforceable contracts create emerging problems in accounting theory and in practice?
    "The Best Way to Construct Unenforceable Contracts," by Erica Plambeck, Stanford Graduate School of Business Newsletter, April 2007 --- http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/mfg_plambeck_contracts.shtml

    Strong relationships are frequently more important than legally binding contracts when companies outsource key operational activities.

    Researchers say that as more firms form international relationships—particularly in innovation-intensive industries such as biopharmaceuticals or high tech—ironclad legal agreements can be impractical, if not impossible. Overburdened court systems around the world and the growing complexity of the types of collaborative deals being forged mean that increasingly firms rely on the threat of loss of future business rather than the court system to enforce those deals.

    “When an innovative product is under development and a supplier must invest in capacity up front, it can be difficult—if not impossible—to write a court-enforceable contract that specifies exactly what will be delivered,” says Erica Plambeck, associate professor of operations, information, and technology at the Stanford Graduate School of Business.

    For example, she says, electronics giant Toshiba is continually making design changes, frequently substantial ones, throughout the development process. If Toshiba’s suppliers delayed making capacity investment for manufacturing a new product until the design was finalized and a court-enforceable procurement contract could be negotiated, Toshiba would miss the small windows of opportunity that the consumer electronics market allows for releasing state-of-the-art products. Therefore, Toshiba needs suppliers to build capacity early, without a contract. In a one-off transaction, a supplier would be likely to build far too little capacity, anticipating that Toshiba would attempt to negotiate a low price for production once the capacity investment was made. But within the context of an ongoing, cooperative relationship, Toshiba could offer more generous compensation, and convince the supplier to expand its capacity—and both firms’ profits—even without a contract.

    Alternatively, she says, there are cases where assurances about the quality or quantity of output cannot be legally enforceable. “Frequently, producing a viable product depends on the collaborative efforts of both parties, and it’s difficult to determine fault if something goes wrong,” she says. A case in point: A biopharmaceutical firm could hand over genetically modified cells and the liquid medium in which to multiply them to a supplier, who then would be responsible for managing that fermentation process to produce a therapeutic protein. If the protein yield is unexpectedly low, a court would have difficulty determining whether the cells and medium were of poor quality or the supplier made mistakes in managing the fermentation process.

    “This kind of complicated business arrangement can be difficult to specify in a contract in a manner that a court could enforce,” says Plambeck. “Under such conditions, an ongoing relationship between partners is critical to cooperation.”

    Plambeck has written a series of papers on so-called relational contracts—agreements enforced by the value of the ongoing cooperative relationship—research she has conducted with Terry Taylor, an associate professor in the business school at Columbia University. Plambeck became interested in relational contracts after realizing that there was an almost universal assumption in the operations and supply chain management literature that all contracts were court-enforced.

    “By recognizing that the strength of incentives for investment in design, capacity, and inventory are limited by the value of the future business, one obtains qualitatively different managerial insights and policies for operations and supply chain management,” she says. There is a rich body of economics research in this area—indeed, it was a Stanford economics professor, Robert Gibbons (now at MIT) who coined the phrase “relational contracts.” Plambeck and Taylor build on this existing work by taking the abstract idea of relational contracts and applying it to dynamic problems of collaborative product development, capacity, production, and inventory management.

    Plambeck has some high-level recommendations for managers.

    Continued in article


    Accounting Theory:  The Vexing Problem of Contingent Liabilities and Environmental Risk

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on November 2, 2007

    BP Settles Charges, Submits to Watchdogs
    by Ann Davis, Amir Efrati, Matthew Dalton and Guy Chazan
    The Wall Street Journal

    Oct 26, 2007
    Page: A3
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119332810057671536.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
     

    TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Contingent Liabilities, Environmental Cleanup Costs

    SUMMARY: "[British Petroleum] BP PLC put a host of legal threats behind it with far-reaching federal settlements yesterday [10/24/2007] and $373 million in fines and restitution...The British energy firm agreed to plead guilty to environmental crimes and agreed to a three-year probation connected to a fatal accident in Texas and an oil spill in Alaska." The article describes the expected impact on BP PLC's operations; the questions in this review focus on the company's Form 20-F contingent liability disclosures, including environmental and other contingent liabilities.

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Environmental liabilities and other contingencies are discussed in this article.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) The article states that BP PLC (British Petroleum) "put a host of legal threats behind it" through a settlement with U.S. government authorities and fines. Summarize the legal issues facing the company and the settlement that was reached.

    2.) In general, where can you find information about the likely financial impact of legal and environmental issues facing any company? Describe the authoritative literature requiring disclosure of this information.

    3.) BP PLC uses the term "provisions" in their corporate balance sheet, rather than "contingent liabilities." What is the meaning of the term "provisions"?

    4.) Specifically investigate the extent of the legal and environmental issues facing BP PLC by examining their annual report filed on Form 20-F with the Securities and Exchange Commission, available at: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/313807/000115697307000346/b848881-20f.htm#p85 
    How extensive are the liabilities associated with these issues, as measured on December 31, 2006?

    5.) Examine footnote 40 to further investigate these liabilities. What are the 3 major categories of provisions for estimated liabilities recorded by BP PLC? How do they estimate the amounts recorded for these liabilities?

    6.) Which category of provisions do you think will be impacted by the settlement, based on the disclosures in the December 31, 2006, year end financial statements and the description of the settlement in the article?
     

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
     

    Tom Selling in his Accounting Onion Blog has a really nice piece on January 24, 2008 entitled "Peeling the Onion on the New Business Combination Standards: FAS 141R and FAS 160" ---

    This post examines the onion skin, if you will, of the new business combination standards. I'm going to explain the differences between the so-called 'purchase' method of accounting and the new 'acquisition' method. As is my habit, let's begin with a simple example.

    Assume that ParentCo acquires 70% of the outstanding shares of SubCo for $1,000. Additional facts are as follows:

    ParentCo estimates that the fair value of 100% of SubCo is $1,405: You should note that the fair value of SubCo may not ordinarily be calculated by extrapolating the purchase price paid to the remaining shares outstanding (i.e., $1,000/70% = $1,429 is not ordinarily the fair value). The reason is that a portion of the purchase price contains a payment for the ability to exercise control. In this case, the control premium would be $55, calculated as follows: ($1000 - .7($1405))/(1-.7) = $55

    It may be difficult to estimate the control premium, because it may have to be derived from an estimate of the full fair value of the acquired company, as above. But the new requirement to do so has not been controversial. That's because the larger the control premium, the lower will be goodwill. The book value of SubCo's assets and liabilities approximate their book value, except for one asset with a remaining useful life of 10 years. For that asset, the fair value exceeds the book value by $100.


    FINANCIAL REPORTING: MORE SCIENCE, LESS ART
    Governments and investors alike now demand more financial transparency from public companies. And, given the impressive evolution of technology and business practices, there is no excuse for reporting that is anything but spot-on. Intangible factors that are not taken into account when following U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (G.A.A.P.) -- such as brand value, intellectual capital, growth expectations and forecasts, and corporate citizenship -- are now being recognized as important drivers of shareholder value. A new white paper from Accenture explores "Enhanced Business Reporting" as a means for businesses to gain and communicate a clearer picture of company goals and performance.
    Frank D'Andrea, "FINANCIAL REPORTING: MORE SCIENCE, LESS ART," Double Entries, September 21, 2005 --- http://accountingeducation.com/news/news6481.html

    The Accenture report is at http://www.accenture.com/xdoc/en/ideas/outlook/6_2005/pdf/share_value.pdf


    Gore and Blood
    We see a lot of snide remarks and jokes about Al Gore the conservative media, and he (like his counterpart George W. Bush) has made some rather dumb remarks in highly boring speeches. But when teamed up with the former head of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, Gore and Blood (not the best of last name combinations) produced a rather good, albeit short, article about some severe accounting limitations.

    I commend The Wall Street Journal for carrying this piece which I would normally expect to appear in the more liberal media.

    "For People and Planet:  When will companies start accounting for environmental costs?" by Al gore and David Blood, The Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2006 --- http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110008151 

    Capitalism and sustainability are deeply and increasingly interrelated. After all, our economic activity is based on the use of natural and human resources. Not until we more broadly "price in" the external costs of investment decisions across all sectors will we have a sustainable economy and society.

    The industrial revolution brought enormous prosperity, but it also introduced unsustainable business practices. Our current system for accounting was principally established in the 1930s by Lord Keynes and the creation of "national accounts" (the backbone of today's gross domestic product). While this system was precise in its ability to account for capital goods, it was imprecise in its ability to account for natural and human resources because it assumed them to be limitless. This, in part, explains why our current model of economic development is hard-wired to externalize as many costs as possible.

    Externalities are costs created by industry but paid for by society. For example, pollution is an externality which is sometimes taxed by government in order to make the entity responsible "internalize" the full costs of production. Over the past century, companies have been rewarded financially for maximizing externalities in order to minimize costs.

    Today, the global context for business is clearly changing. "Capitalism is at a crossroads," says Stuart Hart, professor of management at Cornell University. We agree, and we think the financial markets have a significant opportunity to chart the way forward. In fact, we believe that sustainable development will be the primary driver of industrial and economic change over the next 50 years. The interests of shareholders, over time, will be best served by companies that maximize their financial performance by strategically managing their economic, social, environmental and ethical performance. This is increasingly true as we confront the limits of our ecological system to hold up under current patterns of use. "License to operate" can no longer be taken for granted by business as challenges such as climate change, HIV/AIDS, water scarcity and poverty have reached a point where civil society is demanding a response from business and government. The "polluter pays" principle is just one example of how companies can be held accountable for the full costs of doing business. Now, more than ever, factors beyond the scope of Keynes's national accounts are directly affecting a company's ability to generate revenues, manage risks, and sustain competitive advantage. There are many examples of the growing acceptance of this view.

    In the corporate sector, companies like General Electric are designing products to enable their clients to compete in a carbon-constrained world. Novo Nordisk is taking a holistic view of combating diabetes not only through treatment but also through prevention. And Whole Foods and others are addressing the demand for quality food by sourcing local and organic produce. Importantly, the business response is about making money for shareholders, not altruism.

    In the nongovernmental sector, organizations such as World Resources Institute, Transparency International, the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (Ceres) and AccountAbility are helping companies explore how best to align corporate responsibility with business strategy.

    Over the past five years we have seen markets begin to incorporate the external cost of carbon dioxide emissions. This is happening through pricing mechanisms (price per ton of carbon dioxide) and government-supported trading platforms such as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme in Europe. Even without a regulatory framework in the U.S., voluntary markets are emerging, such as the Chicago Climate Exchange and state-level initiatives such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. These market mechanisms increasingly enable companies to calculate project returns and capital expenditures decisions with the price of carbon dioxide fully integrated.

    The investment community has also started to respond. For example, the Enhanced Analytics Initiative, an international collaboration between asset owners and managers, encourages investment research that considers the impact of extrafinancial issues on long-term company performance. The Equator Principles, designed to help financial institutions manage environmental and social risk in project financing, have now been adopted by 40 banks, which arrange over 75% of the world's project loans. In addition, the rise in shareholder activism and the growing debate on fiduciary responsibility, governance legislation and reporting requirements (such as the Global Reporting Initiative and the EU Business Review) indicate the mainstream incorporation of sustainability concerns. While we are seeing evidence of leading public companies adopting sustainable business practices in developed markets, there is still a long way to go to make sustainability fully integrated and therefore truly mainstream. A short-term focus still pervades both corporate and investment communities, which hinders long-term value creation.

    As some have said, "We are operating the Earth like it's a business in liquidation." More mechanisms to incorporate environmental and social externalities will be needed to enable capital markets to achieve their intended purpose--to consistently allocate capital to its highest and best use for the good of the people and the planet.

    Mr. Gore, a former vice president of the United States, is chairman of Generation Investment Management. Mr. Blood, formerly head of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, is managing partner of Generation Investment Management, which he co-founded with Mr. Gore.

    "Kyoto? No Go. How to combat "global warming" without destroying the economy," by Pete Du Pont, The Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2006 --- http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/pdupont/?id=110008113 


    What we teach just won't float?

    Quite a few of you out there, like me, are trying to teach analysis of financial statements and business analysis and valuation from books like Penman or Palepu, Healy, and Bernard.   The current task of valuing MCI illustrates how frustrating this can be in the real world and how financial statement analysis that we teach, along with the revered Residual Income and Free Cash Flow Models, are often Titanic tasks in rearranging the deck chairs on sinking models.  If you've not attempted valuations with these models I suggest that you begin with my favorite case study:

    "Questrom vs. Federated Department Stores, Inc.:  A Question of Equity Value," May 2001 edition of Issues in Accounting Education, by University of Alabama faculty members Gary Taylor, William Sampson, and Benton Gup, pp. 223-256.

    In spite of all the sophistication in models, it is ever so common for intangibles and forecasting problems to sink the valuation models we teach.  
    My threads on valuation are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm 

    A question I always ask my students is:  What is the major thing that has to be factored in when valuing Microsoft Corporation?

    The answer I'm looking for is certainly not product innovation or something similar to that.  The answer is also not customer loyalty, although that probably is a huge factor.  The big factor is the massive cost of retraining the entire working world in something that replaces MS Office products (Excel, Word, PowerPoint, Outlook, etc.).  It simply costs too much to retrain workers in MS Office substitues even if we are so sick of security problems in Micosoft's systems.   How do you factor this "customer lock-in" into a Residual Income or FCF Model?  Our models are torpedoed by intangibles in the real world.

    MCI's customer base is another torpedo for valuation models.  Here the value seems to lie in a "web of corporate customers."  And nobody seems to be able to value that.

    "Valuing MCI in an Industry Awash in Questions," by Matt Richtel, The New York Times, February 9, 2005 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/09/business/09phone.html

    Industry bankers and accountants are trying to answer just that: What is the value of MCI, a company for which Qwest Communications has already made a tentative offer of about $6.3 billion, and on which Verizon Communications has been running the numbers. Conversations between MCI and Qwest have been suspended since late last week, and Verizon has yet to make a formal offer, people close to the negotiations say.

    Most analysts say MCI's extensive network assets in this country and Europe may have diminishing value because of the industry's continued capacity glut. Instead, they say, MCI's worth lies more in its web of corporate customers.

    But as MCI's revenue continues to tumble, the real trick for the accountants is trying to forecast the future. Can the company meet its stated goal of achieving profitable growth as a telecommunications company emphasizing Internet technology before the bottom falls out of its traditional voice and data business?

    Continued in article


    What we teach just won't float?

    Quite a few of you out there, like me, are trying to teach analysis of financial statements and business analysis and valuation from books like Penman or Palepu, Healy, and Bernard.   The current task of valuing Amazon illustrates how frustrating this can be in the real world and how financial statement analysis that we teach, along with the revered Residual Income and Free Cash Flow Models, are often Titanic tasks in rearranging the deck chairs on sinking models.  

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on February 11, 2005

    TITLE: Amazon's Net Is Curtailed by Costs 
    REPORTER: Mylene Mangalindan 
    DATE: Feb 03, 2005 
    PAGE: A3 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110735918865643669,00.html  
    TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Statement Analysis, Income Taxes, Managerial Accounting, Net Operating Losses

    SUMMARY: Amazon "...had forecast that profit margins would rise in the fourth quarter, while Wall Street analysts had expected margins to remain about the same." The company's operating profits fell in the fourth quarter from 7.9% of revenue to 7%. The company's stock price plunged "14% in after-hours trading."

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) "Amazon said net income rose nearly fivefold, to $346.7 million, or 82 cents a share, from $73.2 million, or 17 cents a share a year earlier." Why then did their stock price drop 14% after this announcement?

    2.) Refer to the related article. How were some analysts' projections borne out by the earnings Amazon announced?

    3.) One analyst discussed in the related article, Ken Smith, disagrees with the majority of analysts' views as discussed under #2 above. Do you think that his viewpoint is supported by these results? Explain.

    4.) Summarize the assessments made in answers to questions 2 and 3 with the way in which Amazon's operating profits as a percentage of sales turned out this quarter.

    5.) Amazon's results "included a $244 million gain from tax benefits, stemming from Amazon's heavy losses earlier in the decade." What does that statement say about the accounting treatment of the deferred tax benefit for operating loss carryforwards when those losses were experienced? Be specific in describing exactly how these tax benefits were accounted for.

    6.) Why does Amazon adjust out certain items, including the tax gain described above, in assessing their earnings? In your answer, specifically state which items are adjusted out of earnings and why that adjustment might be made. What is a general term for announcing earnings in this fashion?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    --- RELATED ARTICLES --- 
    TITLE: Web Sales' Boom Could Leave Amazon Behind 
    REPORTER: Mylene Mangalindan 
    ISSUE: Jan 21, 2005 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110627113243532202,00.html 

    Bob Jensen's  threads on valuation are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm 


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on March 10, 2006

    TITLE: Troll Call
    REPORTER: Bruce Sewell
    DATE: Mar 06, 2006
    PAGE: A14
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114161297437490081.html 
    TOPICS: Accounting, Intangible Assets

    SUMMARY: The author describes issues on both sides of patent disputes, based on his experience as general counsel for Intel Corp., and relates them to the patent infringement suit settlement by RIM.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) What have been the events leading up to RIM (the company behind BlackBerry hand held devices) paying $615 million to NTP? On what basis has that amount increased over time? You may refer to the related articles to get a sense of that issue.

    2.) What are the accounting issues related to intellectual property? List all that you can think of. How are these issues related to patent rights and disputes as described in the article?

    3.) How has RIM been accounting for the cost of defending against the patent infringement suit by NTP? Determine the answer to this question based on information in the second related article.

    4.) What are the author' s proposals for reforming patent infringement law?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    --- RELATED ARTICLES ---
    TITLE: BlackBerry maker Agrees to Settle Patent Dispute
    REPORTER: Mark Heinzl
    PAGE: B4
    ISSUE: Mar 17, 2005
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111098088750681042,00.html 

    TITLE: BlackBerry Case Could Spur Patent-Revision efforts
    REPORTER: Mark Heinzl
    PAGE: B4
    ISSUE: Mar 06, 2006
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114160263279289921.html

    "Troll Call," by Bruce Sewell, The Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2006; Page A14 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114161297437490081.html

    RIM, the company that brings BlackBerry service to four million subscribers, finally caved in to the threat of losing its business. It paid NTP, a small patent holding company reputedly comprised of just one inventor and one patent lawyer, $615 million to settle a four-year patent dispute. For NTP it was like winning the lottery, but for the rest of us, and for business in particular, it stinks. NTP used the patent system, and the threat of shutting down BlackBerry service, to play chicken with RIM and millions of BlackBerry users around the world. Unless the courts or Congress do something to stop this kind of gamesmanship, we're only going to see more cases like this.

    NTP doesn't have a competitive product. It isn't even in the business of making products. It's one of a large number of companies known as patent trolls. Trolls acquire and use patents just to sue companies that actually make products and generate revenue. A patent without a product isn't worth much, whereas a patent tied to a revenue stream, particularly someone else's, is a whole different matter. RIM was the best thing that ever happened to NTP, because by last Friday the only question left was how much of RIM's pie NTP could get.

    The distressing part of this picture is that RIM's contribution of complementary technologies, business acumen, product R&D and marketing is what "enabled" the NTP invention to achieve commercial relevance. The right question is: What would be a fair royalty for NTP, given its contribution of the patent and RIM's contribution of everything else? Unfortunately, that isn't where this case ended up. Because NTP had the presumptive right to obtain an injunction against RIM and stop it dead in its tracks, the issue on the table wasn't the value of NTP's patent in the context of RIM's business; instead, it was the total value of RIM's business. "Pay me a lot or lose everything" hardly leads to rational settlements. Is this really what we want from our patent system?

    At Intel, I see this problem every day and from both sides of the fence. Intel owns a considerable portfolio of patents and we believe strongly that inventors are entitled to fair compensation for their efforts. But Intel is also a target for patent trolls because we run a successful business. The fact that success creates leverage for trolls to extract value above and beyond the true contribution of the patented invention just doesn't seem quite . . . American.

    Things got so lopsided in the world of patent litigation not on account of the patent statute itself but from case law, which has become increasingly protective of patent owners and tolerant of excessive damages arguments by plaintiffs' lawyers. Our patent laws are supposed to be about proliferation of technology. If there is actual competition between patent owner and infringer, an injunction may be appropriate -- it protects the patent owner's right to exclusivity and does not deprive society of the benefits of the technology. On the other hand, if the patent owner has not commercialized the invention, blocking others from using it is a loss for all of us. The right to an injunction also needs to be tempered by a commonsense look at how much real value the patented technology adds to the whole commercial product. A fundamental invention deserves greater value than a relatively minor tweak to work that went before it. A broad application of the injunction remedy makes all patents "crucial," whether they are or not.

    What I'm suggesting here is not all that radical. These concepts are already embedded in our patent laws; but unfortunately they have been buried beneath the wrongheaded notion that all patents should be treated equally.

    There is a glimmer of hope. The Supreme Court will hear eBay v. MercExchange, in which eBay faces the threat of an injunction from MercExchange, a patent-holding company without a competitive product in the online auction space. The eBay case is an opportunity for the highest court to take the judiciary back to the language of the patent statute and remind judges that they don't have to grant injunctions in every patent case. Judges have the right to balance the interests of patent plaintiffs with those of the defendant, and society at large. It may be with just a touch of irony that we'll read about the eBay case on our now more costly BlackBerries.


    When do contingencies become liabilities and when should they be booked?

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on August 25, 2005

    TITLE: Merck Loss Jolts Drug Giant, Industry: In Landmark Vioxx Case, Jury Tuned Out Science, Explored Coverup Angle
    REPORTER: Heather Won Tesoriero, Ilan Brat, Gary McWilliams, and Barbara Martinez
    DATE: Aug 22, 2005
    PAGE: A1
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB112447069284018316,00.html
    TOPICS: Contingent Liabilities, Disclosure, Accounting, Disclosure Requirements

    SUMMARY: Merck lost its first case defending against a claim of death stemming from the drug Vioxx. The company faces thousands of lawsuits over Vioxx following the drug's removal from the market, but many observers had felt the company had an ironclad defense in this one because the patient's cause of death was not a risk identified in the drug's clinical trials. The primary article describes the process of the lawsuit while the related articles post two viewpoints on investment in the company's stock. (The first of those uses the term "Stock Dividend" in its title when the author actually is referring to a cash dividend.) Questions also ask students to examine Merck's most recent quarterly filing for disclosures about the litigation.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) Access Merck's most recent 10-Q filing with the SEC. You may do so through the on-line version of this article by clicking on Merck & Co. under Companies in the right hand side of the page, then clicking on SEC Filings under Web Resources on the left hand side of the page, then choosing the 10-Q filed on 8/8/2005. Find all disclosures related to the recall of Vioxx and summarize the various financial implications of this drug's withdrawal.

    2.) What costs were recorded when the company issued the Vioxx recall? Prepare summary journal entries based on the information in the financial statement disclosures.

    3.) What information is disclosed about the Ernst case on which the main article reports? What accounting standard promulgates required accounting for litigation cases such as these that Merck faces?

    4.) Based on their disclosure as of the 8/8/2005 filing date, what do you think was the company's assessment of the potential outcome of this case? Support your answer with reference to the accounting standard identified in answer to question 3 above.

    5.) Based on the discussion in the end of the first related article, how are analysts using the information in Merck's footnote disclosures? What do they estimate from that information?

    6.) Compare the arguments made in the two related articles about the desirability of holding Merck stock at this point. Which argument do you believe? Support your answer.

    7.) What is incorrect about the use of the term "stock dividend" in the title of the first related article?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    --- RELATED ARTICLES ---
    TITLE: Merck's Stock Dividend May Ease Vioxx Pain
    REPORTER: Barbara Martinez
    PAGE: C1
    ISSUE: Aug 24, 2005
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB112484944952621498,00.html 

    TITLE: First Vioxx Verdict Casts Doubt on Merck, But Not the Industry
    REPORTER: James B.Stewart
    PAGE: D2
    ISSUE: Aug 24, 2005
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB112483560740621188,00.html

     


    From Paul Pacter's IAS Plus on October 28, 2005 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

    We have posted the Deloitte Letter of Comment on Proposed Amendments to IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets (PDF 47k). On 30 June 2005, the IASB proposed to amend IAS 37 (and to retitle it Non-financial Liabilities) and complementary limited amendments to IAS 19 Employee Benefits. The amendments to IAS 37 would change the conceptual approach to recognising non-financial liabilities by requiring recognition of all obligations that meet the definition of a liability in the IASB’s Framework, unless they cannot be measured reliably. Uncertainty about the amount or timing of settlement would be reflected in measuring the liability instead of (as is currently required) affecting whether it is recognised.

    Our response states:

    With the exception of the proposals for restructuring provisions, we do not support the ED, which we see as largely unnecessary. In our view, the majority of the Board's proposals are premature and pre-judge matters that should be discussed in the context of the review of the IASB Framework rather than as an amendment of IAS 37. We think that IAS 37 is operating satisfactorily within the current operating model and environment. In addition, we do not think that the Board's choice of a single measurement attribute is appropriate. As such, we find the majority of the changes proposed in the ED fail to achieve an improvement in financial reporting.

     


    What lies below the surface of the financial reporting icebergs?  

    The knowledge capital estimates that Lev and Bothwell came up with during their run last fall of some 90 leading companies (see accompanying table) were absolutely huge. Microsoft, for example, boasted a number of $211 billion, while Intel, General Electric and Merck weighed in with $170 billion, $112 billion and $110 billion, respectively.

    Source: "The New Math," by Jonathan R. Laing, Barrons Online, November 20, 2000 --- http://equity.stern.nyu.edu/News/news/levbarrons1120.html
    Trinity students may go to J:\courses\acct5341\readings\levNov2000.htm

    .In October 1996, AMR Corp. sold 18% of its computer-reservations system, called SABRE, to the public. It held on to the remaining 82%. That one transaction provides a beautiful way of evaluating tangible and intangible assets. When I recently checked the market, SABRE constituted 50% of AMR's value. This is mind-boggling! You have one of the largest airlines in the world, with roughly 700 jets in its fleet, nearly 100,000 employees, and exclusive and valuable landing rights in the world's most heavily trafficked airports. On the other hand, you have a computer-reservation system. It's a good system that's used by a lot of people, but it's just a computer system nonetheless. And this system is valued as much as the entire airline. Now, what makes this asset -- the computer system -- so valuable?

    One big difference is that when you're dealing with tangible assets, your ability to leverage them -- to get additional business or value out of them -- is limited. You can't use the same airplane on five different routes at the same time. You can't put the same crew on five different routes at the same time. And the same goes for the financial investment that you've made in the airplane.

    But there's no limit to the number of people who can use AMR Corp.'s SABRE system at once: It works as well with 5 million people as it does with 1 million people. The only limit to your ability to leverage a knowledge asset is the size of the market.

    Economists call physical assets "rival assets" -- meaning that users act as rivals for the specific use of an asset. With an airplane, you've got to decide which route it's going to take. But knowledge assets aren't rivals. Choosing isn't necessary. You can apply them in more than one place at the same time. In fact, with many knowledge assets, the more places in which you apply them, the larger the return. With many knowledge assets, you get what economists call "increasing returns to scale." That's one key to intangible assets: The larger the network of users, the greater the benefit to everyone.

    Source: "New Math for the New Economy," by Alan M. Webber, Fast Company, January/February, 2000 --- http://pf.fastcompany.com/online/31/lev.html
    Trinity students may go to J:\courses\acct5341\readings\levJan2000.htm

    On August 28, 2002, the FASB met with representatives from the Financial Valuation Group and the Phillips-Hitchner firm to discuss valuation of intangible assets. See our news item for access to their presentation. More details in our full news item at http://accountingeducation.com/news/news3225.html 


    Companies will have to place intangible assets, such as customer lists and customer back orders, in their financial statements, under proposals released last week by the International Accounting Standards Board --- http://www.smartpros.com/x36285.xml 


    Question
    What is cookie jar accounting and why is it generally a bad thing in financial reporting?

    Answer
    Cookie jar is more formally known as earnings reserve accounting where management manipulates the timings of earnings and expenses usually to smooth reported earnings and prevent shocks up and down in the perceived stability of the company. European companies in the past notoriously put deferred earnings in "cookie jars" so as to picture themselves as solid by covering bad times with deferrals out of the cookie jar that mitigate the bad news and vice versa for good times. The problem with too much in the way of a good time (in terms of financial reporting) is that accelerated growth rates in one year cannot generally be maintained every year and it may be a bad thing, in the eyes of management, to have investors expecting high rates of growth in revenues and earnings every year.

    What's wrong with cookie jar reporting is that it allows management wide latitude in discretionary reporting that is a major concern to both investors and standard setters. Accounting reports become obsolete when they mix stale cookies from the cookie jar with fresh sweets and lemon balls of the current period.

    Also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cookie_jar_accounting

    You can read more about FAS 106 at http://www.fasb.org/st/index.shtml
    Scroll down to FAS 106 on "Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions"
     

    "FAS 106: Will the SEC Allow GM to Have the Largest Earnings Cookie Jar in History?" by Tom Selling, The Accounting Onion, March 13, 2008 --- http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/03/gm-holding-work.html

     


    Note: This post was published about 12 hours prior to publication of Justin Hyde's article on the same topic in the Detroit Free Press.  Justin was the one who brought the topic to my attention, and I made the decision to write this post after a conversation with him.  I thank him for allowing me to go ahead with publication, even though his own article would be appearing later.


    In an earlier post, I expressed my strong suspicion that top managers at General Motors were utilizing big bath accounting.  By 'big bath', I mean a violation of GAAP that permits delayed recognition of relatively small losses over time, so as to recognize the whole enchilada in some later period.  For some reason that others may wish to ponder, managers prefer the big bang to the accounting equivalent of death by a thousand cuts.  In GM's case, they appear to have improperly delayed as much as $11 billion in writedowns of their deferred tax assets.

    Now comes another enormous red flag out of GM's public disclosures.  In fact, the numbers -- in the neighborhood of $50 billion -- make the big bath look like a glass of water.  This new one is of the 'cookie jar' variety: the improper deferral of a gain so as to spread its sweet goodness to the benefit of many subsequent accounting periods.  But, sad to say, this tale has another annoying twist: if GM doesn't get SEC approval for the accounting they are aiming for, they can -- for no other good reason -- opt out of their recent milestone agreement with the United Auto Workers.   

    How this Opportunity for Accounting Shenanigans Came to Be

    Before I get into the sordid details of the current situation, some background information may help.  GM has an 'OPEB' ('Other Post-Employment Benefit') liability on its balance sheet that is somewhat north of $50B.  It represents the present value of estimated future payments to employees as reimbursement of health care costs during their retirement years. In all, the plans cover about 500,000 current and retired employees. I have read that the expected future payments add about $1,600 to GM's per-vehicle cost, which is about eight times the cost incurred by foreign competitors (who benefit from more generous state-sponsored health care programs).  Note 15 to the financial statements in GM's 2007 10-K indicate that they spent in the neighborhood of $6 billion on retiree health care costs in that year.

    Yuck. How did GM let itself get eaten alive by an OPEB in the first place?  The story starts with accounting standards -- or more accurately, the appalling lack thereof.  FAS 106, though significantly flawed, filled a gap in GAAP, but it was birthed only in 1990 -- long after the horses galloped through the open barn door.  My recollection from reading the financial press in the years just preceding is that corporate America was already buried under approximately $1trillion in off-balance sheet liabilities relating to retiree health care costs.  Why did management keep them off-balance sheet?  Because they could.  Why did managers let the liabilities get to be so humongous?  Because they were off-balance sheet.   

    Let me explain.  When negotiating with unions, companies could either grant wage rate increases that would affect the bottom line starting at Day 1, or provide deferred compensation that would not hit the income statement for decades.  Such was the case with retiree health care benefits prior to FAS 106.  The "generally accepted" accounting prior to then was "pay as you go."  In other words, you expensed only that portion paid out to employees and their health care providers.  Actual payments (and thus, expenses) at the outset were low because so few of the employees to whom benefits were promised were old enough to begin receiving them.  By the time FAS 106 came to require accrual of benefits as the employees earned them, the unionized rust belt was already awash in unfunded, gold-plated retiree health care plans.  To make matters worse, health care costs looked like they might increase faster than inflation forever.

    Back to Now

    Late last year, GM and the UAW entered into a compromise ('Settlement Agreement') whereby GM gave its commitment (albeit with an escape clause I shall address anon) to pre-fund, in 2010, its $50 billion accumulated retiree health care obligation.  In exchange, GM would be relieved of any future obligation to make payments, except for funding annual plan shortfalls up to a paltry $165 million per year for the next 20 years.  (The UAW thinks that GM's money should last them 80 years, but that's another story.) 

    $165 million? What's up with that?  The numbers I gave you earlier make it abundantly clear that it's but a drop in the bucket compared to the expected plan costs and the number of employees in the plan.  If we assume that expenditures are the current amounts paid by GM and ignore inflation, $165 million amounts to about 10 days worth of coverage. If we further assume that there are about 1 million beneficiaries (retirees plus spouses), that's a safety net of only $165 per beneficiary. That would be like a safety net made of thin-sliced swiss cheese. 

    As to the real purpose of the $165 million, it's much akin to a fly on a cow's hindquarter: maybe just enough to get the 'right' accounting -- or to get the cow toswish her tail.  The 'right' accounting for GM is "negative plan amendment" treatment under FAS 106, or else they're gonna pick up their marbles and go home. 

    And just what is negative plan amendment accounting?  It's a cookie jar reserve.  Basically, the accounting treatment of transactions of this ilk boil down to three possibilities:

    • Settlement: The liability would be taken off the books, and a gain (around $50 billion) would be recorded in 2010 when the settlement occurs.   The GM-UAW agreement looks like a settlement and quacks like a settlement, but FAS 106 (para. 90) defines a settlement as "...a transaction that (a) is an irrevocable action, (b) relieves the employer ... of primary responsibility ... and (c) eliminates significant [emphasis supplied] risks related to the obligation and the assets used to effect the settlement."  Thus, the result of settlement accounting would be no cookie jar: just a blob of earnings that can't be used to juice any earnings-based compensation of top management.
    • Negative plan amendment:  Even though a plan amendment immediately affects the calculation of the liability recorded on the balance sheet, FAS 106 requires that it be deferred and recognized over the time that current employees become eligible for retirement (para. 55).  If that amortization period is, say, 20 years, then negative plan amendment accounting creates an earnings cookie jar to be drawn on at the rate of $2.5 billion per year.
    • Partial Settlement: GM is insisting that the recognized liability be written down to about $1.5 billion, the present value of a 19-year annuity of $165 million per year.  It is conceivable that one could find that GM is exposed to more risk than that amount, and that, therefore, the liability should be higher. 

    Section 21 of the Settlement Agreement (Exhibit 10(m) of the 10-K), is where stated that GM can hold up the agreement if they can't get the liability on their balance sheet down to $1.5 billion.  Both settlement and negative plan amendment accounting will do that, and there is some chance that the Settlement Agreement may qualify for neither.  That's the scenario under which everybody has to sit down and renegotiate.   However, a presentation that GM gave to analysts reveals that the brass ring is negative plan amendment accounting.  That's where the measly $165 million comes in; it's supposed to be just enough to be considered "significant." They want the SEC to say that because of it, settlement accounting is not appropriate, and that accounting as a negative plan amendment is the result.  It's a ridiculous charade, well-hidden by the following 10-K disclosure appearing under the caption "Risk Factors":

    "We are relying on the implementation of the Settlement Agreement to make a significant reduction in our OPEB liability. Under certain circumstances, however, it may not be possible to implement the Settlement Agreement. The implementation of the Settlement Agreement is contingent on our securing satisfactory accounting treatment for our obligations to the covered group for retiree medical benefits, which we plan to discuss with the staff of the SEC. If, based on those discussions, we believe that the accounting may be some treatment other than settlement or a substantive negative plan amendment that would be reasonably satisfactory to us, we will attempt to restructure the Settlement Agreement with the UAW to obtain such accounting treatment, but if we cannot accomplish such a restructuring the Settlement Agreement will terminate...."

    I have a couple of things to say about this disclosure:

    • First, the possibility of not getting the accounting treatment one wants is not a risk factor.  Risk factors have to do with the possibility of real losses; paper losses are just that -- unless, perhaps, recognizing a paper loss has an indirect real effect like tripping a loan covenant.  In fact, the SEC has said as much quite recently, and I wrote about it here.  I admit to not having read the 10-K completely (I do have a life), but I can't see that the accounting treatment has any such indirect effects.  If there were any, that surely is a substantive risk factor, and should have been disclosed. 
    • Second, what does Section 21 of the Settlement Agreement and the risk factor disclosure say to providers of capital about the focus of GM's management on the real business of running a car company?  Exactly why is a particular accounting result is so darn important that they're willing to go back to the table with the UAW in order to get it?  Everything else equal, you gotta expect that in a renegotiation GM will end up giving more to the UAW; they will get nothing more in return than a new "economic substance" to run up the SEC's flagpole.

    When the ball is in the SEC's court, what will they do with it?  It doesn't appear that anyone at the SEC has lifted a finger to follow up on GM's $11 billion big bath deferred tax asset charge, and I don't expect they will.  My money says the fix is in for this one, too.  The only question is how Chief Accountant Conrad Hewitt is going to fall over himself to give GM the negative plan amendment accounting they crave, resulting in what may be the largest legitimized accounting cookie jar in history. 

    I've been blogging about financial reporting for a little over six months now, and so far I haven't had to overly tax my brain to find something to write about once or twice a week.  For whatever reason(s), there are many tales of wealth destruction that begin with a bad accounting rule.  Vast destruction of shareholder wealth ensues by the deliberate actions of managers who realize they can paper over their self-serving behavior with rosy short-term earnings reports.    The cases of retiree health care costs at company's like GM are particularly notable because it takes multiple manager and employee turnovers spanning decades to merely begin the process of exterminating the termites eating away at shareholder wealth and employee job security. 

    The GM case is particularly emblematic of corporate governance run amok because the older generations of managers skimmed accounting cream going into questionable deals with unions when more discipline was called for; now, the latest generation is trying to do the same on the back end.  As they go about their business of re-arranging the deck chairs, current management seems to be doing quite well for themselves.  It is even more certain that their scheming progenitors have retired and shielded themselves with ironclad contracts, signed and sealed by board members who effectively serve at the pleasure of the CEO.  Those managers became rich while at the same time bequeathing their legacy of unsustainable labor costs.

  • From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on June 1, 2007

    Lifting the Veil on Tax Risk
    by Jesse Drucker
    The Wall Street Journal
    May 25, 2007
    Page: C1
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
    ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118005869184314270.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
     

    TOPICS: Accounting, Accounting Theory, Advanced Financial Accounting, Disclosure Requirements, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Financial Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis, Income Taxes

    SUMMARY: FIN 48, entitled Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes--An Interpretation of FASB Statement No. 109, was issued in June 2006 with an effective date of fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2006. As stated on the FASB's web site, "This Interpretation prescribes a recognition threshold and measurement attribute for the financial statement recognition and measurement of a tax position taken or expected to be taken in a tax return. This Interpretation also provides guidance on derecognition, classification, interest and penalties, accounting in interim periods, disclosure, and transition." See the summary of this interpretation at http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/finsum48.shtml  As noted in this article, "in the past, companies had to reveal little information about transactions that could face some risk in an audit by the IRS or other government entities." Further, some concern about use of deferred tax liability accounts to create so-called "cookie jar reserves" useful in smoothing income contributed to development of this interpretation's recognition, timing and disclosure requirements. The article highlights an analysis of 361 companies by Credit Suisse Group to identify those with the largest recorded liabilities as an indicator of risk of future settlement with the IRS over disputed amounts. One example given in this article is Merck's $2.3 billion settlement with the IRS in February 2007 over a Bermuda tax shelter; another is the same company's current dispute with Canadian taxing authorities over transfer pricing. Financial statement analysis procedures to compare the size of the uncertain tax liability to other financial statement components and follow up discussions with the companies showing the highest uncertain tax positions also is described.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) Summarize the requirements of Financial Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes--An Interpretation of FASB Statement No. 109 (FIN 48).

    2.) In describing the FIN 48 requirements, the author of this article states that "until now, there was generally no way to know about" the accounting for reserves for uncertain tax positions. Why is that the case?

    3.) Some firms may develop "FIN 48 opinions" every time a tax position is taken that could be questioned by the IRS or other tax governing authority. Why might companies naturally want to avoid having to document these positions very clearly in their own records?

    4.) Credit Suisse analysts note that the new FIN 48 disclosures about unrecognized tax benefits provide investors with information about risks companies are undertaking. Explain how this information can be used for this purpose.

    5.) How are the absolute amounts of unrecognized tax benefits compared to other financial statement categories to provide a better frame of reference for analysis? In your answer, propose a financial statement ratio you feel is useful in assessing the risk described in answer to question 4, and support your reasons for calculating this amount.

    6.) The amount of reserves recorded by Merck for unrecognized tax benefits, tops the list from the analysis done by Credit Suisse and the one done by Professors Blouin, Gleason, Mills and Sikes. Based only on the descriptions given in the article, how did the two analyses differ in their measurements? What do you infer from the fact that Merck is at the top of both lists?

    7.) Why are transfer prices among international operations likely to develop into uncertain tax positions?
     

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
     

  • March 15, 2008 reply from Peters, James M [jpeters@NMHU.EDU]

    I have always found these discussions highly superficial because they don't get down to the actual accounting involved. "Cookie jar" reserves most commonly come from overly pessimistic valuation judgments that management must make under GAAP. The classics are the valuation reserves accounts receivable (allowance for doubtful accounts), inventories (under the lower of cost of market rule), tax assets, and warrantees. On other side are decisions when to recognize or defer revenues. However, GAAP has guidelines for all these issues and auditors also have guidelines they follow. Thus, the idea that managers have unlimited discretion to put "cookies" in a "jar" is pure fiction. Also, if you want to complain about "cookie jar reserves," then you should be talking about the specific GAAP feature that allows them. These "hand waivy" discussions accomplish nothing and indicate to me that the people writing them have never actually thought deeply about the sources of these reserves and the possible "fixes."

    Jim Peters

    March 15, 2008 reply from Tom Selling [tom.selling@GROVESITE.COM]

    When I wrote my blog post on GM, I made a distinction in my mind between "cookie jar reserves" and "rainy day reserves." I realize that this is not the way that Arthur Levitt used the term in his famous “Numbers Game” speech, but these are mere euphemisms, and I thought the distinction was useful for the purpose of my post.

    As to “unlimited discretion”, I don’t see how that is a necessary condition for earnings management – it’s more a matter of degree. As to the auditor’s role, let’s get real here; how much is D&T going to push back against GM? I was at the SEC, and I actually do know how the accounting can happen. Just like when ATT needed the SEC to bless their pooling of interests accounting when they acquired NCR, even though it couldn’t be shoe-horned into APB 16, D&T will be more than happy to let the SEC decide whether GM can get the accounting they want.

    As to tax and other reasons -- as I stated in my post, if those were considerations they should have been disclosed in the 10-K as part of the relatively new Item 1A. (See Reg. S-K, Item 503(c)).

    Tom Selling

    March 15, 2008 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

    Bob,

    Your main objection to "cookie jar" (I prefer to call it "piggy bank" accounting) seems to be that one can "manipulate" income. Unfortunately, accounting period "income" is a fiction created by accounting and economists.

    Don't we, in our personal lives, put away something for a rainy day and then dip into such "reserves" when the rainy day arrives? What is wrong with it when the companies do the same thing, so long as they are required to fund such reserves?

    When reserve accounting is permitted, the income reported is likely to reflect the long term prospects for the company, or a sort of moving average of incomes over the planning horizon. In my humble opinion that would be a far more accurate number for "income".

    We accountants often think that the world exists to satisfy our fetish for encapsulating all that happened during an "accounting period" into one fictional number we call "income".

    The deadly combination of the concepts of "accounting period" and a fictional "income" that we have created will expose the corporate world to incalculable hazards by way of manipulation of financial statements.

    At the risk of sounding like a broken record, I'll repeat what I have said many times. In the early days of the SEC there was a "battle" between the accountants and the attorneys as to the importance of disclosures as opposed to measurement. We accountants won the battle in favour of measurement. With all that has happened since the early thirties, we may have won the battle, but we may be on the brink of losing the war (fair reporting).

    With warm regards,

    Jagdish

    Reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Jagdish,

    I wonder if a company could keep dipping into its cookie jar to report earnings for years after it's dead and buried. Existing shareholders could thereby recoup some of their losses long after the company ceased producing goods and services.

    The cookie jar might be a disaster for income tax reporting because it allows for interest free deferrals of taxes for many years or at least until the GOP gets on its feet again.

    Or put another way the New England Patriots could've won the 2008 Super Bowl if their unused reserves in points exceeded the reserves of the NY Giants. Or John Kerry might be able to win the Democratic Nomination in 2008 if he has enough reserve delegates from Year 2004.

    The problem with reserve accounting is that it can distort current performance with ancient history. To some extent we do that already with accruals like depreciation, but at least sophisticated investors and analysts know the rules (standards) that apply to all companies. Cookie jar accounting is generally associated with customized (for one company only) secret reserves that allow management to do their own scorekeeping. If we allow cookie jar accounting with full faith in management to provide its own customized scores why use accounting scores at all? Why not just let management tell us that this year performance relative to last year was 27 points to 24 points. Each company can thereby devise its own point system and secret rules for assigning points.

    Obviously I'm exaggerating, and I do understand your position on this Jagdish.  However, I for one lose all faith in accounting if management can reserve ancient history points to fudge current performance scores. But I would like the Patriots to be declared Super Bowl winners on the basis of accumulated reserve points from prior seasons. They might not even have to play the game.

    Bob Jensen

    Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm

    March 15, 2008 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU

    Bob and Jim,

    I think my thinking on this topic were partially expressed by Jim.

    Reserves are fine so long as they are funded and are not secret. When reserves are funded and not secretive, they are not in a cookie jar but in a piggy bank. It is only when they are secretive that they become cookies.

    A good example is a dividend equalisation reserve or asset replacement reserves, where you appropriate retained earnings and put the amount in a fund by seggregating the associated assets. I don;t think they are very popular now.

    A short article (http://ezinearticles.com/?Secret-Reserves&id=616062) describes some examples of secret reserves. In fact they should be the staples of Auditing courses except that since they do not fit into the textbook risk models of auditing, are often ignored in classes. For example, in auditing we always teach that the risk is in overvaluation of assets and therefore the most important assertion tested is 'existence, and that since the primary risk in case of liabilities is one of understatement, the most important assertion to be tested is 'completeness. Textbooks rarely mention the risk at the other tail, namely, the risk of secret reserves created by lack of support for the opposite assertions -- completeness for assets and existence for liabilities.

    The only risk of such secret reserves are that they violate SEC rules and existing GAAP. I do not know of a single company in history that went under because they had secret reserves.

    It is just that they do not fit our fixation with a single indicator of income which we have failed to define objectively (the idea of income is incorrigible in the sense of Art Thomas).

    The examples are,

    1. By under valuation of assets much below their cost or market value, such as investment, stock in trade, etc.

    2. By not writing up the value of an asset, the price of which has permanently gone up.

    3. By creating excessive reserve for bad and doubtful debts or discount on sundry debtors.

    4. By providing, excessive depreciation on fixed assets.

    5. By writing down goodwill to a nominal value.

    6. By omitting some of the assets altogether from balance sheet.

    7. By changing capital expenditure to revenue account and thus showing the value of assets to be less than their actual value.

    8. By overvaluing the liabilities.

    9. By the inclusion of fictitious liabilities.

    10. By showing contingent liabilities as actual liabilities.

    I think Jim was saying that there are protections against the above by way of GAAP and GAAS. Jim, let me know if I am right.

    Regards to both,

    Jagdish

    May 16, 2008 reply from

    I took a quick look at the "secret reserve' article and most of them aren't secret at all. You just have to teach analysts and accountants how to read footnotes. I taught a financial statement analysis class for years at the U. of Maryland in their MBA program and did just that. Annectodally, I was repeated told by my students who work as analysts for major firms that analysts never read footnotes. I guess my basic point about all these reserves is that most can be detected easily if you know how to read financial statements and footnotes.

    By the way, if you want to cover a classic example, check out Lucent Technology's use of their tax asset valuation allowance beginning in 2001. I hope the following table comes out in the e-mail, but it shows that they incurred a sharp increase in their tax assets in 2001 and then wrote substantially all of them off in 2002, only one year later. The numbers are in millions so we are talking billions. The vast majority of their tax assets were NOL's carryforwards that won't expire for 20 years. So, do you think they won't make enough taxable income over the next 20 years to recover at least some, if not all, of these NOL's? You can see the valuation allowance steadily dropping from 2003 on when they started making money and cashing in the NOL's. The get a boost of nearly $1 billion in earnings from this, which, for them, was nearly 50% of their net income in 2004 and 2005. Their "hidden reserves" are very obvious by doing this simple side calculation based on their footnote disclosures.

    Income Tax Asset Valuation                             2005      2004          2003          2002          2001           2000           1999          1998            1997

    Total deferred tax assets                                      104          19         1,132            747         7,675          3,562          1,848         3,326           3,313

    Tax Asset Valuation Allowance                       7,298     8,027         9,934        9,989            742             197              179           261              234

    Gross Deferred tax assets                                  7,402     8,046       11,066      10,736         8,417          3,759           2,027        3,587            3,547

    Valuation account as % of gross tax assets    98.6%    99.8%        89.8%       93.0%        8.8%         5.2%           8.8%         7.3%             6.6%

    Gross tax asset as a % of total assets              45.1%      47.4%       70.2%       60.3%       25.0%       7.7%            5.7%      13.4%           14.9%

    Tax asset valuation as a % of revenues          77.3%       88.7%     117.3%      81.1%        3.5%        0.7%            0.6%        1.1%             0.9%

    I guess that is my main point. In my opinion, analysts that complain about hidden researves are just lazy and won't take the time to really analyze a firm's financial statements, including footnotes. Of course, managers know that analysts are lazy and so they will pull this sort of "stuff." Also, it is fair to ask "where were the auditors?" First, I think auditors are too fixated on increasing assets and revenues and decreasing liabilities and expenses, which, of course, is the opposite of setting up reserves. I also teach auditing and have never seen an auditing text refer to settting up these sorts of reserves as an audit issue. Second, I do think auditors will never be truly independent as long as they audit the hand that feeds them and I have publically advocated nationalizing auditing by having a Federal agency, structured similarly to the Federal Reserve or GAO whose directors are appointed for 15 years, take over hiring, monitoring, and firing the auditors and just have the firms pay for them. However, I get called a communist a lot for that suggestion.

    Jim

    March 16, 2008 reply from Richard C. Sansing [Richard.C.Sansing@TUCK.DARTMOUTH.EDU]

    --- Jim Peters wrote:

    By the way, if you want to cover a classic example, check out Lucent Technology's use of their tax asset valuation allowance beginning in 2001. I hope the following table comes out in the e-mail, but it shows that they incurred a sharp increase in their tax assets in 2001 and then wrote substantially all of them off in 2002, only one year later. The numbers are in millions so we are talking billions. The vast majority of their tax assets were NOL's carryforwards that won't expire for 20 years. So, do you think they won't make enough taxable income over the next 20 years to recover at least some, if not all, of these NOL's? You can see the valuation allowance steadily dropping from 2003 on when they started making money and cashing in the NOL's. The get a boost of nearly $1 billion in earnings from this, which, for them, was nearly 50% of their net income in 2004 and 2005. Their "hidden reserves" are very obvious by doing this simple side calculation based on their footnote disclosures.

    ---

    For someone who says "I have always found these discussions highly superficial because they don't get down to the actual accounting involved" and "These "hand waivy (sic)" discussions accomplish nothing and indicate to me that the people writing them have never actually thought deeply about the sources of these reserves",

    your own example seems both superficial and hand wavy. First, according to
    http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1006240/000095012306015189/y27905exv13.htm#324
    (Or Click Here )

    over $1.7 billion of Lucent's deferred tax asset arises from credit carryovers and state & foreign loss carryovers, some of which expire as early as 2007. Second, the provisions that lead to these carryovers (net operating loss carryovers, foreign tax credit carryovers, alternative minimum tax considerations, section 382 limitations, etc.) interact in complicated ways. For all their federal NOL carryovers, for example, Lucent had a positive current tax expense for federal, state, and foreign purposes in 2006. This suggests that their ability to use these carryovers is more constrained than you suggest. Third, the ability to recover "some" of their NOLs in the future does not mean a firm can avoid recording a valuation allowance for the full deferred tax asset. Suppose a firm has a $1 billion deferred tax asset, and believes that 48% of the time it will use all of it in the future and 52% of the time it will use none of it in the future. Even though its expected future tax benefit is $480 million, GAAP requires the firm to record a $1 billion valuation allowance under the "more likely than not" criterion.

    I have no opinion as to whether Lucent's valuation allowance is too high, too low, or just right. Sensible people understand that strong claims require strong evidence. What evidence--not conjecture, not speculation, evidence--which requires a detailed understanding of Lucent's federal, state, and foreign tax situations, and the interactions among them, as well as expectations about Lucent's performance well into the future--can you present to support your claims that their valuation allowance for 2006 or any prior year is inconsistent with GAAP?

    Richard C. Sansing
    Professor of Accounting
    Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
    100 Tuck Hall Hanover, NH 03755

    March 17, 2008 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Jim and Jagdish,

    When is a cookie jar reserve secret? I would contend that manipulation of bad debt reserves is sometimes a secret and devious practice even though the reserve itself is not secret. A great example of the secrecy employed is provided in "iMergent Practicing 'Cookie Jar Accounting'?" November 6, 2006 ---
    http://seekingalpha.com/article/19914-imergent-practicing-cookie-jar-accounting

    In our last comments on iMergent, we promised further discussion of the company’s accounting vulnerabilities. When a short seller calls “accounting irregularities” on a company, they might just be accused of pounding the table on their own position. Yet, when the company in question is currently the subject of numerous Attorney General Investigations, a Formal SEC Investigation, and a business that Forbes Magazine singled out this month as a paradigm for dirty companies on the AMEX, a warning of accounting irregularities begs to be given additional weight.

    Stocklemon believes that iMergent is guilty of using cookie jar accounting to pad current earnings. This “voodoo” accounting employed by iMergent could be the reason why the company has lost all coverage from major brokerage houses and is now reports numbers to the public without independent scrutiny.

    Cookie Jar Accounting defined: Investopedia , Investorwords.

    First Hand Caught in the Cookie Jar

    In 2005, iMergent confessed a huge restatement of prior earnings, and rolled up a mass of prior years’ unreported losses. The losses were due to overestimating collectability of receivables from its installment contract sales to its typically poor quality credit risk customers.

    Hidden by these massive adjustments were their repeated acts of “cookie jar” accounting, where they shuttled dollars in and out of receivables, reserves, and net profit, as necessary to massage their earnings for the benefit of shareholders.

    As the stock tanked from 25 to 4 last year, iMergent issued these multi-year restatements under the cover of late filing and the absence of a conference call to discuss them.

    For a “normal” company, a massive confession/restatement like this one would be an opportunity to “clean house”, to sweep out the closets, dump out all the bad news and take a fresh start.

    Not iMergent. They simply used the revision of their entire accounting policy and all the confusion created by a set of massive one-time adjustments (which obstruct investors’ ability to draw meaningful comps to prior periods) to start a whole new cookie jar.

    Most cookie jar accounting serves to “smooth earnings” and, although subtle, is banned corporate behavior. But cookie jars also have a more sinister use – misleading investors to believe there is a pattern of increasing earnings when actually the business is stagnant or declining. With the amount of complaints online and government regulation along with dissatisfied customers, it does not take Warren Buffet to figure out this is a terminal business model.

    And now, the other hand… This strategy only works until the cookie jar runs out… and the jar at iMergent is running low.

    In a call with First Albany (before they dropped coverage), management of iMergent was astoundingly candid about the company’s reserve policy. They implied that the company was at times over-reserving against bad debt, which could, in future periods improve earnings. SEC files show the agency was curious enough about this to inquire further as to its validity.

    In the company's reply to SEC questions, they clarified how exactly the reserves are figured out and also supplied statistics for defaults. This Rosetta Stone, posted on the SEC website not more than 2 weeks ago. The company explained the issue to the SEC with facts it had never previously disclosed to investors.

    Their better credits (the "A"s) defaulted at a 26% rate and the lower quality credits (the "B"s) defaulted at a 53% rate. The company also stated that they didn't make a determination of reserves when finance receivables were perfected (created), rather they would look at the pool of receivables at quarter-end and then determine what reserve level was appropriate. The result was that when the prior reserve was deemed higher than necessary, the recently added reserves would get a lower reserve allocated -- which has the direct result of improving non-GAAP earnings!

    Hidden under the massive restatements of June 2005, an anomaly appears which raises serious questions about IIG's use of reserves to benefit future earnings. Buried in the restatement, and not explicitly disclosed, IIG reserved an astounding 79% of revenues for bad debt reserves, dropping their new contracts written (from which the reserve has been deducted) to a historic low $14.6 million. This made their loss for the quarter even worse (because of the restatement it was already gigantic, so nobody noticed).

    It also created a brand new cookie jar to pad future quarters. Strangely, at the same time, the company, explaining why their sales conversion rate had dropped, stated that new policy changes were resulting in increased credit quality. This is contradictory to a reserve rate nearly double its historical levels. Stocklemon believes iMergent’s current results have been benefiting from the new cookie jar.

    As recently as March 2005 the company stated that the eventual default rate for finance receivables was 47%, which begs the question as to why higher reserves were ever materially above that. The company refuses to update the overall default rate, as they say it won't impact GAAP earnings. True enough, but it directly impacts non-GAAP earnings. Since the September 2005 quarter with a 57.5% reserve ratio, the company has grown gross receivables by $14.8 million, yet reserves have only grown by $1.2 million for an 8% suggested reserve ratio. While the company will suggest that that is mainly due to losing the lower quality credits (which we showed may have been artificially created last year) it suggests very strongly that the company was using those higher reserves to benefit current earnings.

    In fact, were the ending June 2006 reserve materially higher, it would have had a dramatic impact on non-GAAP earnings as demonstrated by this table: Most companies would report non-GAAP so as to give a clear picture of profitability without options expenses or goodwill. iMergent wants you to focus on non- GAAP so you do not factor in their customer with a 550 FICO Score who may or may not pay 18% interest on his “software loan”.

    imergent

    Therefore, it is the opinion of Stocklemon that if this company reserved properly, their NON-GAAP would be 24% lower than their GAAP earnings.

    Receivables still not visible

    Imergent’s receivables and reserves accounting can only be relied upon if the company’s cash is indeed “unrestricted” and the receivables are real. Considering the company they sold their receivables to:

    1) was set up with a Storesonline Website

    2) doesn’t seem to have any factoring business beyond iMergent

    3) runs out of a 2000 sq ft house in Incline Village NV

    4) bought the receivables on a “non-recourse” basis, but still periodically puts bad contracts back to iMergent for “replacement”
     

    ...this transaction fails to dispel the questions looming over the quality of iMergent’s receivables.

    History repeats?

    Imergent bears very strong resemblance to former Stocklemon subject Housevalues.com (SOLD). At the heart of both is an accounting model that systematically leaves out certain key metrics needed by the investing public to determine the true health of the company. Add to that an unending litany of consumer complaints, and you have the reason for the reporting omissions – an unsustainable business model – the last thing management wants to admit.

    When Stocklemon reported on Housevalues.com, the stock was $15 a share and Avondale and Piper both had lofty price targets on the stock. Today it is $5.65, trading not far above its cash.

    In contrast to Housevalues.com, iMergent has no analyst coverage. There’s no independent scrutiny holding management to a standard of reporting sufficient to shed light on their real business operations.

    Continued in article

    The history of cookie jar accounting is rooted so deeply in “secret reserves” that I generally think of secret reserves as part and parcel to cookie jar accounting as I learned about it. Newer standards have made it more difficult to hide reserves, especially standards making it more difficult not to consolidate subsidiary companies.

    Some references on this history of secret reserves include the following:

     Financial Statement Analysis in Europe, by J.M. Samuels, R.E. Brayshaw and J.M. Craner (Chapman & Hall, London, 1995)
    These authors discuss how common it was and still is in Europe to manage earnings with secret reserves, especially in Germany and Switzerland.

    The Applied Theory of Accounts, by Paul-Joseph Esquerre --- Click Here

     

    Secret Accounting in New Zealand:  P&O and the Union Steam Ship Company, 1917-1936, by Christopher  J. Napier --- Click Here

    Proceedings of the Fourth International Congress on Accounting Author(s) of Review: A. C. Littleton The Accounting Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Mar., 1934), pp. 102-103 --- Click Here

    Bob Jensen


    The interaction of moral sentiments and self-interest

    "Does the Invisible Hand Need a Helping Hand? A behavioral economist explores the interaction of moral sentiments and self-interest," by Ronald Bailey, Reason Magazine, June 24, 2008  --- http://www.reason.com/news/show/127130.html

    Remember how you reacted to your micromanaging boss in a past job? He was forever looking over your shoulder, constantly kibitzing and threatening you. In return, you worked as little as you could get away with. On the other hand, perhaps you've had bosses who inspired you—pulling all-nighters in order to finish up a project so that you wouldn't disappoint her. You kept the first job only because you couldn't get another and because you needed the money; you stayed with the second one even though you might have earned more somewhere else.

    In the June 20 issue of Science, Samuel Bowles, director of the Behavioral Sciences Program at the Santa Fe Institute, looks at how market interactions can fail to optimize the rewards of participants—e.g., the micromanager who gets less than he wants from his employees. For Bowles, the key is that policies designed for self-interested citizens may undermine "the moral sentiments." His citation of the "moral sentiments" obviously references Adam Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), in which Smith argued that people have an innate moral sense. This natural feeling of conscience and sympathy enables human beings to live and work together in mutually beneficial ways.

    To explore the interaction of moral sentiments and self-interest, Bowles begins with a case where six day care centers in Haifa, Israel imposed a fine on parents who picked their kids up late. The fine aimed to encourage parents to be more prompt. Instead, parents reacted to the fine by coming even later. Why? According to Bowles: "The fine seems to have undermined the parents' sense of ethical obligation to avoid inconveniencing the teachers and led them to think of lateness as just another commodity they could purchase."

    Bowles argues that conventional economics assumes that "policies that appeal to economic self-interest do not affect the salience of ethical, altruistic, and other social preferences." Consequently, material interests and ethics generally pull in the same direction, reinforcing one another. If that is the case, then how can one explain the experience of the day care centers and the micromanager?

    Bowles reviews 41 behavioral economics experiments to see when and how material and moral incentives diverge. For example, researchers set up an experiment involving rural Colombians who depend on commonly held forest resources. In the first experiment, the Colombians were asked to decide how much to anonymously withdraw from a beneficial common pool analogous to the forest. After eight rounds of play, the Colombians withdrew an amount that was halfway between individually self-interested and group-beneficial levels. Then experimenters allowed them to talk, thus boosting cooperation. Finally, the experimenters set up a condition analogous to "government regulation," one where players were fined for self-interestedly overexploiting the common resource. The result? The players looked at the fine as a cost and pursued their short-term interests at the expense of maximizing long-term gains. In this case, players apparently believed that they had satisfied their moral obligations by paying the fine.

    While this experiment illuminates how bad institutional designs can yield bad social results, I am puzzled about why Bowles thinks this experiment is so telling. What would have happened if the Colombians in the experiment were allocated exclusive rights to a portion of the common pool resources—e.g., private property? Oddly, Bowles himself recognizes this solution when he discusses how the incentives of sharecropping produced suboptimal results. He recommends either giving the sharecropper ownership or setting a fixed rent.

    In fact, Bowles recognizes that markets do not leave us selfish calculators. He cites the results of a 2002 study that looked at how members of 15 small-scale societies played various experimental economics games. In one game, a player split a day's pay with another player. If the second player didn't like the amount that the first player offered, he could reject it and both would get nothing.

    The findings would warm the hearts of market proponents. As Bowles notes, "[I]ndividuals from the more market-oriented societies were also more fair-minded in that they made more generous offers to their experimental partners and more often chose to receive nothing rather than accept an unfair offer. A plausible explanation is that this kind of fair-mindedness is essential to the exchange process and that in market-oriented societies individuals engaging in mutually beneficial exchanges with strangers represent models of successful behavior who are then copied by others." In other words, as people gain more experience with markets, morals and material incentives pull together.

    Interestingly, neuro-economics is also beginning to delve deeper into how we respond to various institutions. In one experiment done by Oregon University researchers, MRIs scanned the brains of students as they chose to give—or were required to give—some portion of $100 to a food bank. The first was a charitable act and the second analogous to a tax. In both cases, their reward centers "lit up," but much less so under the tax condition. As Oregon economist William Harbaugh told the New York Times, "We're showing that paying taxes does produce a neural reward. But we're showing that the neural reward is even higher when you have voluntary giving."

    Bowles, with some evident regret, observes, "Before the advent of economics in the 18th century, it was more common to appeal to civic virtues." Bowles does recognize that such appeals "are hardly adequate to avoid market failures." How to resolve these market failures was the subject of Smith's second great book, The Wealth of Nations (1776), where he explained: "By pursuing his own interest (the individual) frequently promotes that of society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it."

     


    Question
    Did Clemson hide a cookie jar in order to increase revenue?

    "Lawsuit Says Clemson U. Hid Cash Reserves While Increasing Tuition," by Charles Huckabee, Chronicle of Higher Education, March 17, 2008 --- http://chronicle.com/news/article/4147/lawsuit-says-clemson-u-hid-cash-reserves-while-increasing-tuition?utm_source=at&utm_medium=en 

    A former executive secretary to Clemson University’s Board of Trustees alleges in a lawsuit that top officials of the public university hid $80-million in cash reserves from legislators while requesting more money from the state and increasing tuition, The State, a newspaper in Columbia, S.C., reported today.

    The board’s chairman, Leon J. (Bill) Hendrix Jr., denied the allegations in the lawsuit, which was filed by Chalmers Eugene Troutman III, and described Mr. Troutman as a “disgruntled former employee.” Mr. Troutman says in the lawsuit that he was fired last August after he encouraged the trustees to spend down the cash reserves.

    The university’s chief public-affairs officer, Catherine T. Sams, declined to comment on the suit but told the newspaper that Clemson’s financial practices were open and were audited annually. As of last June, she said, the university had $79.1-million in unrestricted funds, adding that “unrestricted does not mean uncommitted.” The money is available to “cover expenditures and plans that extend beyond the end of a fiscal year,” she said.

    Mr. Troutman is seeking lost pay, actual and punitive damages, and reinstatement as executive secretary. A hearing on his lawsuit is scheduled this week before Judge Matthew J. Perry Jr. in the U.S. District Court in Columbia. Since 2001, in-state tuition at Clemson has risen from $5,090 to $9,870, the newspaper reported.

     


    Question
    Do you really understand the SEC's Rule 144a?
    What is it and why do accountants hate it?

    And here's the real beauty of it: Companies that issue stock under Rule 144a can access America's deep pools of capital without submitting to public-company accounting rules or to the tender mercies of Sarbanes-Oxley. In exchange, however, they must strictly limit the number of qualified U.S. investors in their company -- to 500 total for U.S.-based firms and 300 for foreign-based. They are also barred from offering comparable securities for sale in the public market. The 144a market is also for the most part nontransparent, often illiquid and thus in some ways riskier. But increasingly, this is a trade that institutional investors and companies seeking capital are willing to make.
    "A Capital Idea," The Wall Street Journal,  April 26, 2007; Page A18 --- Click Here
  •  

    That America's public capital markets have lost some of their allure is no longer much disputed. Eminences as unlikely as Chuck Schumer and Eliot Spitzer have taken to bemoaning the fact and calling for some sort of fix, albeit without doing much.

    Tort reform -- to reduce jackpot justice in securities class-action suits -- would certainly help. So would easing the compliance costs and regulatory burden placed on publicly traded companies by Sarbanes-Oxley, Regulation FD and the like. (See Robert Grady nearby.) The good news is that, as usual, private-sector innovation is finding a way around these government obstacles through the rapid growth of something known as the Rule 144a market.

    First, a little capital-markets background: Most Americans are familiar with the "public markets," which consist of the New York Stock Exchange, the Nasdaq and other stock markets. These are open to investors of every stripe and are where the stocks of most of the world's best-known companies are traded. Nearly anyone can invest, and these exchanges are comprehensively regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

    Less well understood is another, more restricted market known after SEC Rule 144a that governs participation in it. As on stock exchanges, this market allows for the buying and selling of the stock of companies that offer their shares for sale. But participation is strictly limited. To be what is called a "qualified buyer" in this market, you must be a financial institution with at least $100 million in investable assets. If you meet these criteria, you are free to buy stocks of both U.S. and foreign companies that have never offered their shares to the investing public.

    And here's the real beauty of it: Companies that issue stock under Rule 144a can access America's deep pools of capital without submitting to public-company accounting rules or to the tender mercies of Sarbanes-Oxley. In exchange, however, they must strictly limit the number of qualified U.S. investors in their company -- to 500 total for U.S.-based firms and 300 for foreign-based. They are also barred from offering comparable securities for sale in the public market. The 144a market is also for the most part nontransparent, often illiquid and thus in some ways riskier. But increasingly, this is a trade that institutional investors and companies seeking capital are willing to make.

    There are estimated to be about 1,000 companies whose stocks trade in the 144a market. And last year, for perhaps the first time, more capital was raised in the U.S. by issuing these so-called unregistered securities than through IPOs on all the major stock exchanges combined. Even more telling is that the large institutional investors eligible to buy these unregistered securities are more than happy to oblige. There is no selling without buying, and for the 144a market to overtake the giant stock exchanges, institutional investors who control trillions of dollars in capital must see better opportunities outside the regulations built by Congress and the SEC.

    In a sign of these times, none other than Nasdaq is now stepping in to bring some greater order, liquidity and transparency to the Rule 144a market. Any day now, the SEC is expected to propose giving the green light to a Nasdaq project called Portal. Portal aims to be a central clearing house for buyers and sellers of Section 144a securities. You will still need to be a "qualified institutional buyer" to purchase 144a securities. And the companies whose stocks change hands on Portal will still need to meet the limitations on numbers of investors to offer their stock there.

    So Portal will not bring unregistered securities to the masses -- at least not directly. It is forbidden to do so because the entire U.S. regulatory system is designed to protect individual investors from such things. What Portal will do, if it operates as intended, is make the trading of Rule 144a securities easier and less costly. And this could, in turn, further increase their attractiveness to issuers and investors alike. Average investors will at least be able to participate indirectly via mutual and pension funds, most of which meet the standards for "qualified institutional buyers."

    Given the limitations on eligibility for Rule 144a assets, they will never replace our public markets. But their growth is one more sign that investors, far from valuing current regulation, are seeking ways to avoid its costs and complications. Nasdaq's participation is especially notable given its stake as an established public exchange. Nasdaq seems to have concluded that there is a new market opportunity created by overregulation, so it is following the money.

    This leaves our politicians with two choices. They can move to meddle with and diminish this second securities market -- which will only drive more business away from U.S. shores. Or they can address the overregulation that is hurting public markets and prompting both investors and companies to seek alternatives.


  • New Accounting Rule Lays Bare A Firm's Liability if Transaction Is Later Disallowed by the IRS

    CPA auditors have always considered their primary role as attesting to full and fair corporate disclosures to investors and creditors under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Now it turns out that this extends, perhaps unexpectedly, to the government as well.

    "How Accounting Rule (FIN 48) Led to Probe Disclosure of Tax Savings Firms Regard as Vulnerable Leaves Senate Panel a Trail," by Jesse Drucker, The Wall Street Journal, September 11, 2007; Page A5 ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118947026768923240.html?mod=todays_us_page_one

    The probe, by the Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, appears to have been sparked by an accounting rule known as FIN 48, which took effect in January. The rule for the first time requires companies to disclose how much they have set aside to pay tax authorities if certain tax-cutting transactions are successfully challenged by the government. The disclosures require companies to attach a dollar figure to tax-savings arrangements they think could be vulnerable.

    Although intended to inform investors, the disclosures also serve as a kind of road map for government authorities, guiding them to companies that may have taken an aggressive stance on tax-related arrangements.

    The probe, by the Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, appears to have been sparked by an accounting rule known as FIN 48, which took effect in January. The rule for the first time requires companies to disclose how much they have set aside to pay tax authorities if certain tax-cutting transactions are successfully challenged by the government. The disclosures require companies to attach a dollar figure to tax-savings arrangements they think could be vulnerable.

    Although intended to inform investors, the disclosures also serve as a kind of road map for government authorities, guiding them to companies that may have taken an aggressive stance on tax-related arrangements.

    The FIN 48 disclosures generally reveal how much a company has set aside in an accounting reserve called "unrecognized tax benefits." The reserve represents the portion of the tax benefits realized on a company's tax return that also hasn't been recognized in its financial reporting.

    In the letters, sent Aug. 23, Senate investigators seek to obtain more details about the underlying transactions in the FIN 48 disclosures. One letter viewed by The Wall Street Journal asks the companies to "describe any United States tax position or group of similar tax positions that represents five percent or more of your total [unrecognized tax benefit] for the period, including in the description of each whether the tax position involved foreign entities or jurisdictions."

    The subcommittee, led by Sen. Carl Levin (D., Mich.), has held numerous hearings on tax shelters, tax avoidance, and the law firms and accounting firms that set up such structures.

    The Senate's inquiry also includes questions about other tax-cutting arrangements. For tax-cutting transactions on which companies spent at least $1 million for legal fees or other costs, Senate investigators are asking companies to identify the amount of the tax benefit, as well as "the tax professional(s) who planned or designed the transaction or structure and the law firm(s) that authored the tax opinion or advice."

    Continued in article


    "Accounting for Uncertainty (FIN 48)," by Damon M. Fleming and Gerald E. Whittenburg, Journal of Accountancy, October 2007 --- --- http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/oct2007/uncertainty.htm

    FASB Interpretation no. 48 (FIN 48), Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, sets the threshold for recognizing the benefits of tax return positions in financial statements as “more likely than not” (greater than 50%) to be sustained by a taxing authority. The effect is most pronounced where the uncertainty arises in the timing, amount or validity of a deduction.

    Thresholds applicable to tax practitioners have been revised from a “realistic possibility” to “more likely than not” that a tax position will be sustained, as set forth in the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007 that was signed into law in May.

    A third threshold, that a tax position possesses a “reasonable basis” in tax law, has been regarded as reflecting 25% certainty. In addition, taxpayers are subject to penalties if an understatement of liability is caused by a position that lacks “substantial authority,” a threshold for which no percentage of certainty has been established but has been regarded as between the reasonable-basis and more-likely-than-not standards.

    Being familiar with the different thresholds for the reporting of uncertain tax positions can help CPAs effectively advocate for their clients’ tax positions and be impartial in financial reporting.


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on June 1, 2007

    Lifting the Veil on Tax Risk
    by Jesse Drucker
    The Wall Street Journal
    May 25, 2007
    Page: C1
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
    ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118005869184314270.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
     

    TOPICS: Accounting, Accounting Theory, Advanced Financial Accounting, Disclosure Requirements, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Financial Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis, Income Taxes

    SUMMARY: FIN 48, entitled Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes--An Interpretation of FASB Statement No. 109, was issued in June 2006 with an effective date of fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2006. As stated on the FASB's web site, "This Interpretation prescribes a recognition threshold and measurement attribute for the financial statement recognition and measurement of a tax position taken or expected to be taken in a tax return. This Interpretation also provides guidance on derecognition, classification, interest and penalties, accounting in interim periods, disclosure, and transition." See the summary of this interpretation at http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/finsum48.shtml  As noted in this article, "in the past, companies had to reveal little information about transactions that could face some risk in an audit by the IRS or other government entities." Further, some concern about use of deferred tax liability accounts to create so-called "cookie jar reserves" useful in smoothing income contributed to development of this interpretation's recognition, timing and disclosure requirements. The article highlights an analysis of 361 companies by Credit Suisse Group to identify those with the largest recorded liabilities as an indicator of risk of future settlement with the IRS over disputed amounts. One example given in this article is Merck's $2.3 billion settlement with the IRS in February 2007 over a Bermuda tax shelter; another is the same company's current dispute with Canadian taxing authorities over transfer pricing. Financial statement analysis procedures to compare the size of the uncertain tax liability to other financial statement components and follow up discussions with the companies showing the highest uncertain tax positions also is described.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) Summarize the requirements of Financial Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes--An Interpretation of FASB Statement No. 109 (FIN 48).

    2.) In describing the FIN 48 requirements, the author of this article states that "until now, there was generally no way to know about" the accounting for reserves for uncertain tax positions. Why is that the case?

    3.) Some firms may develop "FIN 48 opinions" every time a tax position is taken that could be questioned by the IRS or other tax governing authority. Why might companies naturally want to avoid having to document these positions very clearly in their own records?

    4.) Credit Suisse analysts note that the new FIN 48 disclosures about unrecognized tax benefits provide investors with information about risks companies are undertaking. Explain how this information can be used for this purpose.

    5.) How are the absolute amounts of unrecognized tax benefits compared to other financial statement categories to provide a better frame of reference for analysis? In your answer, propose a financial statement ratio you feel is useful in assessing the risk described in answer to question 4, and support your reasons for calculating this amount.

    6.) The amount of reserves recorded by Merck for unrecognized tax benefits, tops the list from the analysis done by Credit Suisse and the one done by Professors Blouin, Gleason, Mills and Sikes. Based only on the descriptions given in the article, how did the two analyses differ in their measurements? What do you infer from the fact that Merck is at the top of both lists?

    7.) Why are transfer prices among international operations likely to develop into uncertain tax positions?
     

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
     

     

    Tutorial:  FIN 48 from different perspectives
    Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48), Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, is intended to substantially reduce uncertainty in accounting for income taxes. Its implementation and infrastructure requirements, however, generate a great deal of uncertainty. This feature provides an overview of FIN 48, addresses some of its federal and international tax issues, as well as issues arising at the state and local level.
    AccountingWeb, June 2007 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=103625


    "GM Will Book $39 Billion Charge Write-Down of Tax Credits Indicates That Profits Won't Come in Near Term," by John D. Stoll, The Wall Street Journal, November 7, 2007; Page A3 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119438884709884385.html?mod=todays_us_page_one

    General Motors Corp. will take a $39 billion, noncash charge to write down deferred-tax credits, a signal that it expects to continue to struggle financially despite significant restructuring and cost cutting in the past two years.

    The deferred-tax assets stem from losses and could be used to offset taxes on current or future profits for a certain number of years.

    In after-hours trading, GM fell 2.9% to $35.14. Before the disclosure, its shares finished at $36.16, up 16 cents, or less than 1%, in New York Stock Exchange composite trading.

    GM, the world's largest auto maker in vehicle sales, was to report third-quarter financial results today. The company, which was stung by big losses in 2005 and 2006, said the write-down was triggered by three main issues: a string of adjusted losses in core North American operations and Germany over the past three years, weakness at its GMAC Financial Services unit, and the long duration of tax-deferred assets.

    GM had appeared to be making progress in stemming its losses. Its global automotive operations were profitable in the first half of the year. It recently signed a labor deal with the United Auto Workers that allows it to establish an independent trust to absorb its approximately $50 billion in hourly retiree health-care liabilities. The move promises to significantly reduce GM's cash health-care expenses and combine with other labor-cost cuts in creating a more profitable North American arm.

    If it returns to steady profits, GM could remove the valuation allowance and reclaim some or all of the $39 billion in deferred credits.

    For now, the massive charge promises to devastate GM's headline financial results for the third quarter, and for the year, likely leading to the worst annual loss in its 99-year history. Although the charge is an accounting loss that doesn't involve cash, it is still a staggering sum. By comparison, the company reported a total of $34 billion in net income from 1996 to 2004.

    GM will partially offset the charge with a gain of more than $5 billion related to the sale of its Allison Transmission unit.

    The charge follows more than $12 billion in losses since the beginning of 2005. GM has been scrambling to cut the size of its U.S. operation amid shrinking market share, rising costs and a rapidly globalizing auto industry. Its restructuring has been complicated by a slowdown in U.S. demand for automobiles and losses at GMAC.

    The lending giant lost $1.6 billion in the third quarter, the biggest quarterly setback since at least the 1960s. It made money on auto lending and insurance but was dragged down by a $1.8 billion setback at ResCap, its residential-mortgage business and a big player in subprime loans. GM's exposure is limited because it sold 51% of GMAC to Cerberus Capital Management LP last year. In the past, GMAC delivered dividends to GM, including more than $9 billion in the decade before the GMAC sale.

    The write-down isn't expected to affect GM's liquidity position, which stood at $27.2 billion as of June 30. GM has been selling noncore assets in recent years to pad its bank account. In addition, GM Chief Financial Officer Frederick "Fritz" Henderson said the write-down won't preclude it from using loss carry-forwards or other deferred-tax assets in the future. It is unclear whether GM's plunge deeper into negative shareholder-equity status will affect it's borrowing capabilities or credit rating.

    The latest disclosure underscores the challenge Chief Executive Officer Richard Wagoner faces in seeking a full-scale turnaround as GM hangs on to its No. 1 global-sales ranking over Toyota Motor Corp. by a thread. Delphi Corp., GM's top supplier, has failed in attempts to emerge from bankruptcy protection, so GM must wait indefinitely on cost savings it hopes to gain from a reorganized Delphi. Also, U.S. automobile demand has withered to the lowest point in a decade, and, as oil futures continue to escalate, pressure on high-profit trucks and SUVs remains firm.

     

    Denny Beresford provided a link to another reference --- Click Here

    November 7, 2008 reply from Amy Dunbar [Amy.Dunbar@BUSINESS.UCONN.EDU]

    >So they think it is more likely than not that they will receive zero tax benefit from their tax loss carryforwards! 

    Hmmmmm, I doubt that is what GM thinks. As the news release stated, "In making such judgments, significant weight is given to evidence that can be objectively verified. A company's current or previous losses are given more weight than its future outlook, and a recent three-year historical cumulative loss is considered a significant factor that is difficult to overcome." FAS 109, P 23 states, "Forming a conclusion that a valuation allowance is not needed is difficult when there is negative evidence such as cumulative losses in recent years."

    As an aside, the more-likely-than-not standard in FAS 109 existed before FIN 48 adopted the standard. FIN 48 doesn't talk about objective evidence wrt the MLTN standard.

    FIN 48, 6, states, "An enterprise shall initially recognize the financial statement effects of a tax position when it is more likely than not, based on the technical merits, that the position will be sustained upon examination. As used in this Interpretation, the term more likely than not means a likelihood of more than 50 percent; the terms examined and upon examination also include resolution of the related appeals or litigation processes, if any. The more-likely than- not recognition threshold is a positive assertion that an enterprise believes it is entitled to the economic benefits associated with a tax position. The determination of whether or not a tax position has met the more-likely-than-not recognition threshold shall consider the facts, circumstances, and information available at the reporting date.

    FIN 48, 7, states, "In assessing the more-likely-than-not criterion as required by paragraph 6 of this Interpretation: a. It shall be presumed that the tax position will be examined by the relevant taxing authority that has full knowledge of all relevant information. b. Technical merits of a tax position derive from sources of authorities in the tax law (legislation and statutes, legislative intent, regulations, rulings, and case law) and their applicability to the facts and circumstances of the tax position. When the past administrative practices and precedents of the taxing authority in its dealings with the enterprise or similar enterprises are widely understood, those practices and precedents shall be taken into account. c. Each tax position must be evaluated without consideration of the possibility of offset or aggregation with other positions."

    In an appendix, FIN 48, B46, states, "In considering the subsequent recognition of tax positions that do not initially meet the more-likely-than-not recognition threshold and the subsequent measurement of tax positions, the Board initially considered whether specific external events should be required to effect a change in judgment about the recognition of a tax position or the measurement of a recognized tax position. The Board concluded in the Exposure Draft that a change in estimate is a judgment that requires evaluation of all available facts and circumstances, not a specific triggering event. Some respondents to the Exposure Draft stated that the evidence supporting a change in judgment should be objectively verifiable and that a triggering event is normally required to subsequently recognize a tax benefit."

    Since this language wasn't put in the standard, I wonder if one could argue that the two MLTN standards are different. It would be interesting to be a fly on the wall as some of the debate goes on about uncertain tax positions.

    Amy Dunbar

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on November 9, 2007

    GM Will Book $39 Billion Charge
    by John D. Stoll
    Nov 07, 2007
    Page: A3
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119438884709884385.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac

     

    TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Income Taxes

    SUMMARY: "General Motors Corp. will take a $39 billion, noncash charge to write down deferred tax assets, "...a signal that it expects to continue to struggle financially despite significant restructuring and cost cutting in the past two years."

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Use to cover accounting for deferred tax assets and a related valuation account.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) Define the terms deferred tax assets, deferred tax liabilities, net operating loss carryforwards, and deferred tax credits.

    2.) Which of the above three items has General Motors recorded for a total of $39 billion? In your answer, comment on the opening statement in the article that GM will write-down its "deferred tax credits."

    3.) What is a valuation allowance against deferred tax assets? When must such an allowance be recorded under generally accepted accounting standards? Use GM's situation as an example in your answer.

    4.) GM states that its $39 billion write down was impacted by three factors. Explain how each of these factors bears on the determination of a valuation allowance against deferred tax assets. Be specific.

    5.) The author writes, "If it returns to steady profits, GM could remove the valuation allowance and reclaim some or all of the $39 billion in deferred credits," and that the write-down does not preclude GM from future use of its net operating loss carryforwards and deferred tax assets. Explain these statements, including the entries that will be recorded if the deferred tax assets are used in the future.
     

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
     

    RELATED ARTICLES: 
    GM Statement on Noncash Charge
    by General Motors, via PRNewswire
    Nov 06, 2007
    Online Exclusive
     

     


    Controversy Over FAS 2 on Research and Development (R&D)

    Question
    Are these just dirty tricks to keep some generic drugs off the market?

    Pharmaceutical makers go to great lengths to protect their exclusive marketing rights to best-selling brand-name drugs. But a pair of lawsuits and a government antitrust investigation involving a drug made by Abbott Laboratories could help define how far those companies can legally go to fend off copycat rivals.
    Shirley S. Wang

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on June 6, 2008

    TriCor Case May Illuminate Patent Limits
    by Shirley S. Wang
    The Wall Street Journal

    Jun 02, 2008
    Page: B1
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121236509655436509.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
     

    TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Intangible Assets, Research & Development

    SUMMARY: Aboott Laboratories have been involved in lawsuits and a government antitrust investigation in relation to its 33-year-old cholesterol medication TriCor. This drug generated sales of $1.2 billion in 2007 but the patent on the original product--which was developed in France--has now expired. When Abbott Labs acquired the TriCor licensing rights in the late 1990s, the company patented a new way to make the product. The antitrust suit examines whether Abbot Labs "...violated antitrust laws in its efforts to prevent an Israeli company from successfully selling a generic version of the drug." The bases for the arguments against Abbott Labs are that the company filed "...new patents on questionable improvements to TriCor...[and] engaged in a practice known as 'product switching'--retiring an existing drug and replacing it with a modified version that is marketed 'new and improved,' preventing pharmacists from substituting a generic for the branded drug when they fill prescriptions for it." Though not against the law per se, these practices may have violated antitrust laws if their sole purpose was to extend Abbott's monopoly on sales of the product.

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The article clearly illustrates issues in accounting for R&D and intangible assets and is therefore useful in intermediate financial accounting and MBA accounting courses. In addition, an ethical question of the cost impact on medical patients of these patent rights may be included in class discussion of this article.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1. (Introductory) Summarize accounting in the two areas of intangible assets and research and development (R&D) expenditures. How are these two areas related?

    2. (Introductory) Examine Abbott Laboratories' most recent quarterly financial statement filing with the SEC, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1800/000110465908029545/a08-11202_110q.htm  or by clicking on the live link to Abbot Laboratories in the on-line version of the article, then SEC Filings under "Other Resources" in the left-hand column of the web page, selecting the 10-Q filing submitted 2008-05-02 and selecting the html version of the entire document. How large are Abbott Labs intangible assets and research and development expenditures? In your answer, specifically consider how you can best answer this question using some basis for assessment.

    3. (Advanced) Refer to your answer to question 2. How do the accounting practices for intangible assets and R&D expenditures impact the way in which you assess the size of these items relative to Abbott Labs operations?

    4. (Introductory) "Drug companies typically have three to ten years of exclusive patent rights remaining when their products hit the market." Why is this the case? In your answer, specifically state how these business conditions impact the required time period over which the cost of patents may be amortized.

    5. (Advanced) Again examine Abbott Labs 10-Q filing made on May 2, 2008, in particular the footnote disclosure related to intangible assets. Note 11--Goodwill and Intangible Assets. What accounting policy is consistent with the description of patent rights' useful lives discussed in answer to question 4 above?

    6. (Introductory) What steps has Abbott Labs undertaken to extend the life of its patent on TriCor? Are steps like these a business necessity or merely a method of generating excessive profits for pharmaceutical companies? In your answer, specifically consider ethical issues related to profitability, continued R&D for new pharmaceutical products, and the cost to both medical patients and insurance companies of patented, brand-name products versus generic equivalents.
     

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
     

     


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on April 23, 2004

    TITLE: Brothers of Invention
    REPORTER: Timothy Aeppel
    DATE: Apr 19, 2004
    PAGE: B1,3
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108233054158486127,00.html 
    TOPICS: Research & Development, Intangible Assets

    SUMMARY: Lahart reports on the growing instances of designing variations of new
    patent-protected products in an attempt to skirt the patent laws and offer
    virtual clones of those products at lower prices.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) What is a patent? How does one appropriately account for a patent that has
    been granted to a firm? How does a patent differ from other intangible assets?
    How is it similar? How does a patent give a firm a competitive advantage? In
    the Aeppel article, what happens to this advantage when a design-around is
    introduced?

    2.) Explain impairment of an intangible asset. How do the "design arounds"
    described in the Aeppel article impair the value of the patent? How do you
    account for such an impairment?

    3.) What effect is this issue having on research & development (R&D)
    expenditures for firms developing new patented products? Are R&D costs expensed
    or capitalized? What about R&D costs that result in the granting of a patent?

    4.) Why are valid patent-holders designing around their own products?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

    "Brothers of Invention:  'Design-Arounds' Surge As More Companies Imitate Rivals' Patented Products," by Timothy Aeppel, The Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2004, Page B1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108233054158486127,00.html 

    Nebraska rancher Gerald Gohl had a bright idea: Create a remote-controlled spotlight, so he wouldn't have to roll down the window of his pickup truck and stick out a hand-held beacon to look for his cattle on cold nights.

    By 1997, Mr. Gohl held a patent on the RadioRay, a wireless version of his spotlight that could rotate 360 degrees and was mounted using suction cups or brackets. Retail price: more than $200. RadioRay started to catch on with ranchers, boaters, hunters and even police.

    Wal-Mart Stores Inc. liked it, too. Mr. Gohl says a buyer for Wal-Mart's Sam's Club stores called to discuss carrying the RadioRay as a "wow" item, an unusual product that might attract lots of attention and sales. Mr. Gohl said no, worrying that selling to Sam's Club could drive the spotlight's price lower and poison his relationships with distributors.

    Before long, though, Sam's Club was selling its own wireless, remote-controlled searchlight -- for about $60. It looked nearly identical to the RadioRay, except for a small, plastic part restricting the light's rotation to slightly less than 360 degrees. Golight Inc., Mr. Gohl's McCook, Neb., company, sued Wal-Mart in 2000, alleging patent infringement. The retailer countered that Mr. Gohl's invention was obvious and that its light wasn't an exact copy of the RadioRay's design.

    The legal battle between Mr. Gohl and the world's largest retailer -- which Wal-Mart lost in a federal district court and on appeal and is now considering taking to the Supreme Court -- reflects a growing trend in the high-stakes, persnickety world of patents and product design. Patent attorneys say that companies increasingly are imitating rivals' inventions, while trying to make their own versions just different enough to avoid infringing on a patent. The near-copycat procedure, which among other things helps companies avoid paying royalties to patent holders, is called a "design-around."

    "The thinking in engineering offices more and more boils down to, 'Let's see what the patent says and see if we can get around it and get something as good -- or almost as good -- without violating the patent,' " says Ken Kuffner, a patent attorney in Houston who represents a U.S. maker of retail-display stands that designed around the patent on plastic displays it used to buy from another company. He declines to identify his client.

    Design-arounds are nearly as old as the patent system itself, underscoring the pressure that companies feel to keep pace with the innovations of competitors. And U.S. courts have repeatedly concluded that designing around -- and even copying products left unprotected -- can be good for consumers by lowering prices and encouraging innovation.

    The practice appears to be surging as companies shift more manufacturing outside the U.S. in an effort to drive costs lower. No one tracks overall design-around numbers, but "there's really been a spike in this sort of activity in the last few years," says Jack Barufka, a patent-attorney specializing in design-arounds at Pillsbury Winthrop LLP in McLean, Va.

    Mr. Barufka, a former physicist, has handled design-arounds on exercise equipment, industrial parts, and factory machinery. A client recently brought him a household appliance, which he won't identify, to be dissected part-by-part so that his client can try to make a similar product at a cheaper price, probably by using foreign suppliers.

    "We design around competitor patents on a regular basis," says James O'Shaughnessy, vice president and chief intellectual property counsel at Rockwell Automation Inc. in Milwaukee, a maker of industrial automation equipment. "Anybody who is really paying attention to the patent system, who respects it, will still nevertheless try to find ways -- either offshore production or a design-around -- to produce an equivalent product that doesn't infringe."

    Design-arounds are particularly common in auto parts, semiconductors and other industries with enormous markets that are attractive to newcomers looking for a way to break in. The practice also happens in mature industries, where there are few big breakthroughs and competitors rely on relatively small changes to gain a competitive advantage. Patented products are attractive targets for an attempted end run because they command premium prices, making them irresistible amid razor-thin profit margins and expanding global competition.

    Few companies will talk about their design-around efforts, since the results often look like little more than clones of someone else's idea. Even companies with patented products that are designed-around usually keep quiet, sometimes because their own engineers are looking for ways to make an end run on rivals.

    The surge in design-arounds is pushing research-and-development costs higher, since some companies feel forced to protect their inventions from being copied by coming up with as many alternative ways to achieve the same result -- and patenting those, too.

    "A patent is basically worthless if someone else can design around it easily and make a high-performing component for less," says Morgan Chu, a patent attorney at Irell & Manella LLP in Los Angeles.

    Because successful design-arounds also force prices lower, they make it harder for companies to recover their investment in new products. Danfoss AS, a Danish maker of air conditioning, heating and other industrial equipment, discovered in the late 1990s that a customer in England had switched to buying a designed-around part for a Danfoss agricultural machine at a lower price from an English supplier. Danfoss eventually won back the customer, but only after agreeing to a price concession, says Georg Nissen, the Danish company's intellectual property manager, who notes they lowered their price about 5%.

    The main way for companies to fight design-arounds is in court -- or the threat of it. Dutton-Lainson Co., a Hastings, Neb., maker of marine, agricultural, and industrial products, recently discovered that a rival was selling a tool used by ranchers to tighten the barbed wire on fences that was identical to its own patented tool, with an ergonomic handle shaped to fit the palm of a hand.

    Continued in the article

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on October 14, 2005

    TITLE: In R&D, Brains Beat Spending in Boosting Profit
    REPORTER: Gary McWilliams
    DATE: Oct 11, 2005
    PAGE: A2
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB112898917962665021.html 
    TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis, Research & Development

    SUMMARY: The article reports on a study by management consultants Booz Allen Hamilton on firms� levels of R&D spending and related performance metrics.

    QUESTIONS:

    1.) How must U.S. firms account for Research and Development expenditures? What is the major reasoning behind the FASB's requirement to treat these costs in this way? In your answer, reference the authoritative accounting literature promulgating this treatment and the FASB's supporting reasoning.

    2.) How does the U.S. treatment differ from the treatment of R&D costs under accounting standards in effect in most countries of the world?

    3.) Describe the study undertake by Booz Allen Hamilton as reported in the article. In your answer, define each of the terms for variables used in the analysis. Why would a management consulting firm undertake such a study?

    4.) What were the major findings of the study? How does this finding support the FASB�s reasoning as described in answer to question 1 above?

    5.) As far as you can glean from the description in the article, what are the potential weaknesses to the study? Do these weaknesses have any bearing on your opinion about the support that the results give to the current R&D accounting requirements in the U.S.? Explain.

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    "In R&D, Brains Beat Spending in Boosting Profit," by Gary McWilliams, The Wall Street Journal, October 11, 2005, Page A2 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB112898917962665021.html 

    Booz Allen concluded that once a minimum level of research and development spending is achieved, better oversight and culture were more significant factors in determining financial results. The study calculated the percentage of a company's revenue spent on R&D and compared it with sales growth, gross profit, operating profit, market capitalization and total shareholder result.

    It found "no statistically significant difference" when comparing the financial results of middle-of-the-pack companies with those in the top 10% of their industry, said Barry Jaruzelski, Booz Allen's vice president of Global Technology Practice. The result was the same when viewed within 10 industry groups or across all industries evaluated.

    "It is the culture, the skills and the process more than the absolute amount of money available," he said. "It says tremendous results can be achieved with relatively modest amounts" of spending.

    He points to Toyota Motor Corp., which spent 4.1% of revenue on R&D last year, but consistently has outperformed rivals such as Ford Motor Co., which spent 4.3% of sales on research and development. Toyota's success with hybrid, gasoline-electric cars resulted from better spending, not more spending, Mr. Jaruzelski says.

    The study rankles some. Allan C. Eberhart, a professor of finance at Georgetown University, says the time period examined is too short to catch companies whose results might have benefited from past R&D spending. He co-authored a paper that found "economically significant" increases in R&D spending did benefit operating profits. The paper, which examined R&D spending at 8,000 companies over a 50-year period, found 1% to 2% increased operating profit at companies that increased R&D spending by 5% or more in a single year.

    Mr. Jaruzelski said less isn't always better. The study found that companies that ranked among the bottom 10% of R&D spenders performed worse than average or top spenders. The result suggests there is a base level of research and development needed to remain healthy but that spending above a certain level doesn't confer additional benefits.

    R&D spending was positively associated with one performance measure: gross margins. Median gross margins of the top half of companies measured by R&D to sales spending were 40% higher than those in the bottom half.

     

     


    This is a good slide show!
    "The Truth Behind the Earnings Illusion:  The profit picture has never been so distorted. The surprise? Things aren't as ugly as they look" by Justin Fox, Fortune, July 22, 2002 --- http://www.fortune.com/indexw.jhtml?channel=artcol.jhtml&doc_id=208677 

    Question:  
    Where are the major differences between book income and taxable income that favor booked income reported to the investing public?

    Answer according to Justin Fox:

    What the heck happened? The most obvious explanations for the disconnect are disparities in accounting for stock options and pension funds. When a company's employees exercise stock options, the gains are treated for tax purposes as an expense to the company but are completely ignored in reported earnings. And while investment gains made by a company's employee pension fund are counted in reported earnings, they don't show up in tax profits.

    Analysts at Standard & Poor's are working to remove those two distortions by calculating a new "core earnings" measure for S&P 500 companies that includes options costs and excludes pension fund gains. When that exercise is completed in the coming weeks, most of the profit disconnect may disappear. Then again, maybe not. In struggling to deliver the outsized profits to which they and their investors had become accustomed in the mid-1990s, a lot more CEOs and CFOs may have bent the rules than we know about. "There was some cheating around the edges," says S&P chief economist David Wyss. "It's just not clear how big the edges are."

    While conservative accounting is now back in vogue, it's impossible to say with certainty that reported earnings have returned to reality: Comparing the earnings per share of the S&P 500 with the tax profits of all American corporations, both public and private (which is what the Commerce Department reports), is too much of an apples and oranges exercise. But over the long run reported earnings and tax earnings do grow at about the same rate--just over 7% a year since 1960, according to Prudential Securities chief economist Richard Rippe, Wall Street's most devoted student of the Commerce Department profit numbers. So the fact that Commerce says after-tax profits came in at an annualized rate of $615 billion in the first quarter--a record-setting pace if it holds up for the full year--ought to be at least a little reassuring to investors. "I do believe the hints of recovery that we're seeing in tax profits will continue," Rippe says.

    That does not mean we're due for another profit boom. Declining interest rates were the biggest reason profits rose so fast in the 1990s, says S&P's Wyss. Rates simply don't have that far to fall now. So even when investors start believing again what companies say about their earnings, they may still be shocked at how slowly those earnings are growing.

    Continued at http://www.fortune.com/indexw.jhtml?channel=artcol.jhtml&doc_id=208677 

    Reply by Bob Jensen:

    For a technical explanation of the stock option accounting alluded to in the above quotation, go to one of my student examinations at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Exams/5341sp02/exam02/Exam02VersionATeachingNotes.htm 

    The exam02.xls Excel workbook answers can be downloaded from http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Exams/5341sp02/exam02/ 

    The S&P revised GAAP core earnings model alluded to in the above quotation can be examined in greater detail at http://www.standardandpoors.com/Forum/MarketAnalysis/coreEarnings/index.html 

    The pause that refreshes just got a bit more refreshing - Coca-Cola Co. announced Sunday it will lead the corporate pack by treating future stock option grants as employee compensation. http://www.accountingweb.com/item/86333

    Question:
    Where are the major differences between book income and economic income that understate book income reported to the investing public?

    Answer:
    This question is too complex to even scratch the surface in a short paragraph.  One of the main bones of contention between the FASB and technology companies is FAS 2 that requires the expensing of both research and development (R&D)  even though it is virtually certain that a great deal of the outlays for these items will have economic benefit in future years.  The FASB contends that the identification of which projects, what future periods, and the amount of the estimated benefits per period are too uncertain and subject to a high degree of accounting manipulation (book cooking) if such current expenditures are allowed to be capitalized rather than expensed.  Other bones of contention concern expenditures for building up the goodwill, reputation, and training "assets" of companies.  The FASB requires that these be expensed rather than capitalized except in the case of an acquisition of an entire company at a price that exceeds the value of tangible assets less current market value of debt.  In summary, many firms have argued for "pro forma" earnings reporting such that companies can make a case that huge expense reporting required by the FASB and GAAP can be adjusted for better matching of future revenues with past expenditures.

    You can read more about these problems in the following two documents:

    Accounting Theory --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm 

    State of the Profession of Accountancy --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm 

    Hard Assets Versus Intangible Assets

    Intangible assets are difficult to define because there are so many types and circumstances.  For example some have contractual or statutory lives (e.g., copyrights, patents and human resources) whereas others have indefinite lives (e.g., goodwill and intellectual capital).  Baruch Lev classifies intangibles as follows in "Accounting for Intangibles:  The New Frontier" --- http://www.nyssa.org/abstract/acct_intangibles.html :

    He does not flesh in these groupings.  I flesh in some examples below of unbooked (unrecorded) intangible assets that may have value far in excess of all the booked assets of a company.

    Baruch Lev's Value Chain Scorecard
     

    Discovery/Learning

    • Internal Renewal

    · Research and Development
    · IT Development
    · Employee Training
    · Communities of Practice
    · Customer Acquisition Costs

    • Acquired Knowledge

    · Technology Purchase
    · Reverse Engineering
    -Spillovers
    · IT Acquisition

    • Networking

    · R&D Alliances/Joint Ventures
    · Supplier/Customer Integration

    Implementation

    • Intellectual Property

      · Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights
      · Cross-licensing
      · Patent/Know-how Royalties

    • Technological Feasibility

    · Clinical Tests, FDA Approvals
    · Beta Tests
    · Unique Visitors

    • Customers

    · Marketing Alliances
    · Brand Support
    · Stickiness and Loyalty Traffic Measures

    • Employees

    · Work Practices
    · Retention
    · Hot Skills (Knowledge Workers

    Commercialization

    • Top Line

    · Innovation Revenues
    · Market Share/Growth
    · Online Revenues
    · Revenues from Alliances
    · Revenue Growth by Segments

    • Bottom Line

    · Productivity Gains
    · Online Supply Channels
    · Earnings/Cash Flows
    · Value Added
    · Cash Burn Rate

    • Growth Options

    · Product Pipeline
    · Expected Restructuring Impact
    · Market Potential/Growth
    · Expected Capital Spending

     

    The knowledge capital estimates that Lev and Bothwell came up with during their run last fall of some 90 leading companies (see accompanying table) were absolutely huge. Microsoft, for example, boasted a number of $211 billion, while Intel, General Electric and Merck weighed in with $170 billion, $112 billion and $110 billion, respectively.

    Source: "The New Math," by Jonathan R. Laing, Barrons Online, November 20, 2000 --- http://equity.stern.nyu.edu/News/news/levbarrons1120.html
    Trinity students may go to J:\courses\acct5341\readings\levNov2000.htm

    • It is seldom, if ever mentioned, but Microsoft's overwhelming huge asset is its customer lock-in to the Windows Operating System combined with the enormous dominance of MS Office (Word, Excel, Outlook, etc) and MS Access.  The cost of shifting most any organization over to some other operating system and suite software comparable to MS Office is virtually prohibitive.  This is the main asset of Microsoft, but measuring its value and variability is virtually impossible.
      • Intellectual property
      • Trademarks, patents, copyrights
      • In-process R&D
      • Unrecorded goodwill
      • Ways of doing business and adapting to technology changes and shifts in consumer tastes
    For example, my (Baruch Lev's) recent computations show that Microsoft has knowledge assets worth $211 billion -- by far the most of any company. Intel has knowledge assets worth $170 billion, and Merck has knowledge assets worth $110 billion. Now, compare those figures with DuPont's assets. DuPont has more employees than all of those companies combined. And yet, DuPont's knowledge assets total only $41 billion -- there isn't much extra profitability there.

    Source: "The New Math," by Jonathan R. Laing, Barrons Online, November 20, 2000 --- http://equity.stern.nyu.edu/News/news/levbarrons1120.html
    Trinity students may go to J:\courses\acct5341\readings\levNov2000.htm

     

    University logos of prestigious universities (Stanford, Columbia, Carnegie-Mellon, Duke, etc.) are worth billions when discounting their value in distance education of the future--- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/000aaa/0000start.htm 

     

     


    Purchase Versus Pooling:  The Never Ending Debate

    FAS 141 and the Question of Value By PricewaterhouseCoopers CFOdirect Network Newsdesk, January 16, 2003 --- http://www.cfodirect.com/cfopublic.nsf/vContentPrint/CA13B226B214A04085256CB000512D34?OpenDocument 

    Just as early reactions to FAS 142 seemed to have overlooked the complexities in reviewing and testing goodwill for impairment, so too have reactions to complying with the Financial Accounting Standards Board's Statement No. 141 – Business Combinations.

    Adopted and issued at the same time as Statement No. 142 in the summer of 2001, the headline news about FAS 141 was the elimination of the Pooling-of-Interest accounting method in mergers and acquisitions. Going forward from June 30, 2001, all acquisitions are to be accounted for using one method only – Purchase Accounting.

    This change is significant and one particular aspect of it – the identification and measurement of intangible assets outside of goodwill – seems to be somewhat under-appreciated.

    Stephen C. Gerard, Managing Director at Standard & Poor's Corporate Value Consulting, says that there is "general conceptual understanding of Statement 141 by corporate management and finance teams. But the real impact will not be felt until the next deal is done." And that deal in FAS 141 parlance will be a "purchase" since "poolings" are no longer recognized.

    Consistent M&A Accounting

    The FASB, in issuing Statement No. 141, concluded that "virtually all business combinations are acquisitions and, thus, all business combinations should be accounted for in the same way that other asset acquisitions are accounted for – based on the values exchanged."

    In defining how business combinations are to be accounted for, FAS 141 supersedes parts of APB Opinion No. 16. That Opinion allowed companies involved in a merger or acquisition to use either pooling-of-interest or purchase accounting. The choice hinged on whether the deal met 12 specified criteria. If so, pooling-of-interest was required.

    Over time, "pooling" became the accounting method of choice, especially in "mega-deal" transactions. That, in the words of the FASB, resulted in "…similar business combinations being accounted for using different methods that produced dramatically different financial statement results."

    FAS 141 seeks to level that playing field and improve M&A financial reporting by:
      • Better reflecting the investment made in an acquired entity based on the values exchanged.
      • Improving the comparability of reported financial information on an apples-to-apples basis.
      • Providing more complete financial information about the assets acquired and liabilities assumed in business combinations.
      • Requiring disclosure of information on the business strategy and reasons for the acquisition.

    When announcing FAS 141, the FASB wrote: "This Statement requires those (intangible assets) be recognized as assets apart from goodwill if they meet one of two criteria – the contractual-legal criterion or the separability criterion."

    Unchanged by the new rule are the fundamentals of purchase accounting and the purchase price allocation methodology for measuring goodwill: that is, goodwill represents the amount remaining after allocating the purchase price to the fair market values of the acquired assets, including recognized intangibles, and assumed liabilities at the date of the acquisition.

    "What has changed," says Steve Gerard, "is the rigor companies must apply in determining what assets to break out of goodwill and separately recognize and amortize."

    Thus, in an unheralded way, FAS 141 introduces a process of identifying and placing value on intangible assets that could prove to be a new experience for many in corporate finance, as well as a costly and time-consuming exercise. Nonetheless, an exercise critical to compliance with the new rule.

    Continued at  http://www.cfodirect.com/cfopublic.nsf/vContentPrint/CA13B226B214A04085256CB000512D34?OpenDocument  

     


    A Little Like Dirty Pooling Accounting
    Tyco Undervalues Acquired Assets and Overvalues Acquired Liabilities: 

    Tyco International Ltd. said Monday it has agreed to pay the Securities and Exchange Commission $50 million to settle charges related to allegations of accounting fraud by the high-tech conglomerate's prior management. The regulatory agency had accused Tyco of inflating operating earnings, undervaluing acquired assets, overvaluing acquired liabilities and using improper accounting rules, company spokeswoman Sheri Woodruff said. 'The accounting practices violated federal securities laws,'' she said.
    "Tyco to Pay S.E.C. $50 Million on Accounting Charges," The New York Times, April 17, 2006 --- http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/business/AP-Tyco-SEC-Fine.html?_r=1&oref=slogin

    April 17, 2006 reply from Saeed Roohani

    Bob,

    Assuming improper accounting practices by Tyco negatively impacted investors and creditors in the capital markets, why SEC gets the $50 M? Shouldn't SEC give at least some of it back to the people potentially hurt by such practices? Or damage to investors should only come from auditors' pocket?

    Saeed Roohani

    April 18, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Saeed,

    In a case like this it is difficult to identify particular victims and the extent of the damage of this one small set of accounting misdeeds in the complex and interactive multivariate world of information.

    The damage is also highly dispersed even if you confine the scope to just existing shareholders in Tyco at the particular time of the financial reports.

    One has to look at motives. I'm guessing that one motive was to provide overstated future ROIs from acquisitions in order to justify the huge compensation packages that the CEO (Kozlowski) and the CFO (Schwarz) were requesting from Tyco's Board of Directors for superior acquisition performance. Suppose that they got $125 million extra in compensation. The amount of damage for to each shareholder for each share of stock is rather minor since there were so many shares outstanding.

    Also, in spite of the illegal accounting, Kozlowski's acquisitions were and still are darn profitable for Tyco. I have a close friend (and neighbor) in New Hampshire, a former NH State Trooper, who became Koslowski's personal body guard. To this day my friend, Jack, swears that Kozlowski did a great job for Tyco in spite of possibly "stealing" some of Tyco's money. Many shareholders wish Kozlowski was still in command even if he did steal a small portion of the huge amount he made for Tyco. He had a skill at negotiating some great acquisition deals in spite of trying to take a bit more credit for the future ROIs than was justified under purchase accounting instead of virtual pooling accounting.

    I actually think Dennis Kozlowski was simply trying to get a bit larger commission (than authorized by the Board) for some of his good acquisition deals.

    Would you rather have a smart crook or an unimaginative bean counter managing your company? (Just kidding)

    Bob Jensen

    Bob Jensen's threads on the Tyco scandals are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm#PwC

    April 18, 2006 message reply Gregg Wilson

    Hi Bob Jensen

    From Forbes:

    <<But Briloff says what's particularly egregious is the fact that Tyco did not file with the SEC disclosure forms (known as 8K filings), which would have carried the exhibits setting forth the balance sheets and income statements of the acquired companies.

    "This is an even worse situation than under the old pooling accounting, " Briloff says, "because under that now vestigial method, investors and analysts could dig out the historical balance sheet and income statement for the acquired companies." >>

    Ah yes, the good old days, when accountants understood what mattered.

    Gregg

    April 18, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Interesting but still does not mean Abe wanted to pool those statements. Abe fought poolings like a tiger. He never said that accounting information before an acquisition is totally useless. He did say it could be misleading when pooled, especially in relation to terms of the acquisition.

    Bob Jensen


    Purchase Versus Pooling:  The Never Ending Debate

    March 29, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hope you don't mind another question.

    I worked on Wall Street during the other tech mania (late 60's) which included the conglomerate craze. I know pooling-of-interest accounting was kind of tarred and feathered in the ensuing meltdown, but I was never too clear why that was so. I am still wondering why bogus goodwill is preferable to retaining the financial track record of the combined companies. Are you aware of what the actual objections to p-o-i are?

    Gregg Wilson

    March 29, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Some investors are impressed by high ROI or ROE numbers. Keeping the denominator low with old historical cost numbers and the numerator high with future earnings numbers "inflated" ROI and ROE and made the mergers appear more successful than was actually the case.

    There are other problems with "dirty pooling."

    One of the best-known articles (from Barrons) was written by Professor Abe Briloff about "Dirty Pooling at McDonalds." McDonald's shares plummeted significantly the day that Briloff exposed dirty pooling by McDonald's  --- http://www.jstor.org/view/00014826/ap010167/01a00060/0 

    Actually, one of the arguments in favor of purchase accounting rather than pooling of interests is that in an arm's length transaction goodwill can actually be measured, unlike the pie-in-the sky valuations in a hypothetical world.

    Bob Jensen

    March 29, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Bob Jensen

    Well I wasn't able to find a site where I could access Abe's article.

    The "old numbers" are worth a lot to this user of financial statements, and I would much rather have the combined track record of the two companies than its obliteration. I am not sure why accountants feel that there is a problem revealing what the past and current combined ROE has been. The pooling-of-interest doesn't create that number, it only preserves it for those who want to use it.

    If you mean that the value of the exchanged stock is an actual measurement of goodwill then I would take very serious issue. There is no economic meaning to that number. Companies negotiate an exchange ratio. The relative value of the two stocks may matter, but the value of the exchanged stock has no relevance to the negotiation, so how could it be a measure of anything economic? All you have to do is look at the real cases of stock acquisitions that were made during the market boom to see how true that is and how spurious the numbers became. I always assumed that the amortization rules were changed because of the charade of company after company being forced to report pro forma earnings due to the ludicrous mountains of mythical goodwill.

    But even if the goodwill number were determinable why would you want to use it. The point isn't to have accurate values on the balance sheet. The point is retaining the historical relationships of the earnings model. Deferred costs are not assets that you want to value but the merely costs that are going to be expensed and the historical relationship of those costs to the resulting earnings is what tells you what the capital efficiency of the company is. I want that information. Why obliterate it?

    Gregg Wilson

    March 29, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Generally there are market values of the stocks at the date of the acquisition. These give some evidence of value at the time of the merger, although there are blockage factor considerations.

    In any case there is a long history of abuses of pooling to mislead investors. In some cases that was the main purpose such that without being able to use pooling accounting, acquisitions did not take place. In other words the main purpose was to deceive.

    A summary of FAS 141 is given at http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/stsum141.shtml 

    The standard itself discusses a lot of both theory and abuses. In general, academics fought against pooling. About the only parties in favor of pooling were the corporations themselves.

    Read the standard itself and you will learn a lot.

    Bob Jensen

    March 30, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Bob Jensen

    Well I would call that entire FAS 141 a lot of sophistries. Apples and oranges indeed. This is a case of trying to make an apple into an orange and getting a rotten banana.

    In the above example, if a company bought another company for more than its net worth, the excess price paid was attributable to goodwill and would have to be written off over a period of years. The problem is that the writing off goodwill creates an expense that lowers earnings. To get around this, companies use an accounting technique called pooling of interest. This practice allows the acquiring company to buy other companies at inflated prices and keep the goodwill charges off the company's books. This strategy has resulted in merger mania. It enables a corporation to buy another company at an inflated price using its own highly priced stock as currency. In honest times, this process would create huge amounts of goodwill that normally would have to be written off against future earnings. Today, companies avoid this detriment to their bottom line by pooling. The Merger Wave

    These accounting abuses can be credited to what is behind the current merger wave on Wall Street. Companies are using their inflated stock prices to buy other companies. The result of buying more companies brings in more sales and more profits, which Wall Street loves. Using the pooling method of accounting, companies can acquire other companies at high prices without the consequences of depressing future earnings through the amortization of goodwill.

    I was trying to find example of the abuses you were talking about. I thought this was a terrific one. What fantastic misinformation!

    The thing that's so laughable about these arguments is that they take investors for fools. In a stock acquisition not a nickel of cash has been expended, so everyone understands that the purchase goodwill is just a little paper farce that the accountants make us go through. The amortization thing doesn't effect the price of the stock because it has no e ffect whatsoever on the company's actual profitability or cash flow. Have you read about the efficient market? I was really struck in this last go around at the willingness of companies to take on billions of dollars in goodwill that literally dwarfed everything else on their balance sheets and caused their GAP earnings to be huge losses. They reported their pro forma earnings and everyone understood that they hadn't really paid 10 billion dollars for a company that was worth 100 million. I looked at a couple of the deals and the share exchange ratios were really very fair relative to the fundamentals (not the share prices). They were good solid deals, between smallish tech companies that were very profitable in the capex bubble and so were richly priced as one would expect. So the accountants caved and changed the rule, and this little pint sized company took some astounding goodwill writeoff the next year and the stock did nothing. Did the guy who wrote 141 really think that phony made up good will is the same thing as actual paid for with cash good will? I always get the feeling that the companies relented on this one so they could fight their battles on the ones that really matter. An orange is an orange, and an apple is an apple.

    I think accountants have really misunderstood the whole abuse issue. I worked on Wall Street during the conglomerate fad and spent hours analyzing stock acquisitions. There were some accounting abuses but they were really not about pooling-of-interest. The people that really got hurt were not the investors so much as the entrepreneurs who sold their companies. Textron started the whole conglomerate thing and the business schools wet their pants over the idea and pretty soon you could call yourself a congolmerate and get a high stock price. I can't tell you how tired I got of hearing the word "synergy". What was basically happening was that the companies were making really good deals and getting a lot of value for the stock they were giving up, partly because of the whole aura of the thing. When you get a really good share exchange it makes your earnings higher than they would be otherwise. Of course there is nothing abusive about this. It's just the reality of doing a good deal. The real earnings and cash flow are indeed and in fact actually higher per share for the acquiring company. But of course that meant it took on the qualities of a self-fullfilling prophecy. Investors were not fools then and they're not fools now. They understood perfectly what was going on and hopped on for the ride. It was the entrepreneurs that were selling their companies that were duped. They were the ones that ended up with most of the stock when the bubble burst.

    I remember going out to talk to Henry Singleton at Teledyne. What a brilliant man. He was telling me a story about a guy who was peddling his company and wanted a certain price which he was evaluating purely in terms of the value of the stock he was going to receive in the exchange. Henry said that he sent him off to one of the schlock companies that he knew would "pay" him what he wanted. We had our little moment of bemusement, because even though it was early in the melt down stage, the guy was obviously going to come up short. He just wasn't willing to look at what he was getting a whole bunch of shares in, and he wasn't going to be able to sell it for a while. So what do you think? Is it the accountants job to protect that guy from his own greed?

    By the way, Henry was playing his own games, and they weren't really about pooling of interest. He was making literally hundreds of stock acquisitions most of which were not really growth companies but good solid little cash cows, and then he would slip in a nice medium sized cash acquisitions once a quarter to make his "internal growth" target. He would say that he was doing 15% external growth (the deal value factor) and 15% internal growth. The thing about pooling was that you could really see what the year-to-year growth of the combined companies was, so Henry had to do his fix. Then after the stock tanked with the other congomerates he was in great shape with all his cash flow so he started doing debt swaps for the depressed stock. I was really sad when I heard he had died prematurely. It would have been fun to see what his next move would have been. The company languished without him.

    Anyway I think the whole thing got interpreted as a pooling-of-interest abuse, but as far as I'm concerned it really didn't have anything to do with the accounting treatment. It's not the accountants business to police the markets. In a stock deal the goodwill is all funny money anyways, so the way I see it we are mucking up the balance sheet for no good reason. You can amortize til you're blue in the face but it's not really going to have any affect on anything real. It's not cash and it never was. But you can pretend.

    Gregg Wilson

    March 30, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    FASB rules now require writing off goodwill only to the extent it is deemed impaired.

    If you want to publish on such issues you have to provide something other than off the top-of-your-head evidence. Do you have any evidence that companies tend to buy other companies at inflated prices above what companies are actually worth in terms of synergy and possibly oligopoly benefits (such as when AT&T bought Bell South). You need to define "inflated prices." About the only good examples I found of this on a large scale was during the S&L bubble of the 1980s and the technology bubble of the 1990s when almost everything was inflated in value. But at the time, who could've predicted if and when the bubble would burst? It's always easier to assess value in hindsight.

    In general, it's very hard to define "inflated value" since the worth of Company B to Company A may be far different than the worth of Company B to Company C. You can always make an assumption that CEOs acquiring companies are all stupid and/or crooks, but this assumption is just plain idiotic. Many acquisitions pay off very nicely such as when Tyco bought most of its acquisitions. Even crooks like Dennis Koswalski often make good acquisitions for their companies. Koswalski simply thought he should get a bigger piece of the action from his good deals.

    Of course there are obvious isolated cases such as when Time Warner bought AOL, but in this case AOL used fraudulent accounting that was not detected.

    I'm a little curious about what you would recommend for a balance sheet of the merged AB Company when Company A buys Company B having the following balance sheets:

    Company A
    Cash    $200
    Land    $100 having a current exit value of $200
    Equity ($300)

    Company B
    Land     $10 having a current exit value of $100
    Equity  ($10)

    Company A buys all Company B shares for $120 million in cash and merges the accounts. Company A and B business operations are all merged such that maintaining Company B as a subsidiary makes no sense. Employees of Company B are highly skilled real estate investors who now work for Company AB. The extra $20 million paid above the land current values of Company B was paid mainly to acquire the highly skilled employees of Company B.

    Company AB
    Cash     $ 80
    Land          ?
    Equity   ($ ?)

    Why would a pooling be better than purchase accounting in the above instance? I think not.

    Bob Jensen

    March 30, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    I certainly didn't mean to imply that cash acquisitions should be treated as pooling-of-interest. On the contrary I was trying to make the point that they are totally different situations, and can't be treated effectively by the same accounting rule. The cash is the whole point.

    Gregg Wilson

    March 30, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    I guess I still don't see a convincing argument why pooling is better for non-cash deals since you still have the same problem as with cash deals. That problem is badly out of date historical cost accounts on the books that are totally meaningless in the acquisition negotiations. If they are totally meaningless in negotiations, why should historical costs be pooled into the acquiring firm's book instead of more relevant numbers reflecting the fair values of the tangible assets at the time of the acquisition?

    Of course there are many issues that your raise below, but I don't think they argue for pooling.

    Bob Jensen

    March 30, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Bob Jensen

    Because historical costs are the historical record of the company's capital efficiency. As my old accounting teacher pointed out, the earnings model is a gross approximation at best, but if persued with consistency and conservativeness it can be a good indicator of the capital efficiency of the firm and it's ability to generate a stream of future cash returns. For me the killer argument in that regard is this. The reality of a company is the stream of cash returns itself, dividends if you will, and that's what the stock is worth. It makes no difference whether the company has liberal accounting policies or conservative accounting policies. If applied consistently then that rate of return on equity will define the stream of future cash returns. It can be liberal accounting with a low ROE and high E and a high reinvestment rate, or conservative accounting with a high ROE and low E and a low reinvestment rate, but the resulting stream of dividends is the same. The historical deferred costs and historical ROE are the evidence of value, but they depend on consistent application of some kind of accounting standards and rules whether they be liberal or conservative (conservative has its advantages). I would rather have that evidence than know what the current "fair value" of the assets is. Those values don't help me determine the value of the stock. Pooling of interest is terrific, because it recreates that earnings model history for the combined companies. The historical costs are not meaningless to the negotiations but rather are the basis for the negotiations, for they are the evidence that the companies are using to determine the share exchange ratio that they will accept. A low ROE company will have less to bargain with than a high ROE company, all else being equal. There are potentials for abuse in the differing accounting standards of the two entities, but if major changes in the accounting standards of one of the companies occur, then the accountants should disclose that material fact.

    Gregg Wilson

    March 30, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hardly a measure of capital efficiency. I have the 1981 U.S. Steel Annual Report back when FAS 33 was still in force. U.S. Steel had to report under both historical cost and current cost bases.

    Under historical cost, U.S. Steel reported over $1 billion in net earnings. On a current cost basis, all earnings disappeared and a net loss of over $300 million was reported.

    I consider the $1 billion net income reported under historical cost to be a misleading figure of capital efficiency.

    I think you should first read the FASB's standard on pooling versus purchase accounting in detail. Then see if you still prefer pooling. Also study http://www.jstor.org/view/00014826/ap010167/01a00060/0 

    You might want to compare your analysis below with what Fama states at http://library.dfaus.com/reprints/interview_fama_tanous/ 

    Bob Jensen

    March 31, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Gregg,

    The law views this in reverse. Equity is a residual claim on assets under securities laws. But the claim itself has no bearing on the historical (deferred) cost amount since, in liquidation, the historical cost is irrelevant. And in negotiating acquisition deals historical cost is irrelevant. I have trouble imagining acquisitions where it would be relevant since asset appraisals are essential in acquisitions.

    Deferred cost such as book value of buildings and equipment is also rendered meaningless by entirely arbitrary accumulated depreciation contra accounts. Your argument does not convince me that pooling is better than purchase accounting in acquisitions.

    Since you feel so strongly about this, I suggest that you expose your theories to the academic accounting world. Consider subscribing (free) to the AECM at http://pacioli.loyola.edu/aecm/  (Don't be mislead by the technology description of this listserv. It has become the discussion forum for all matters of accounting theory.)

    Then carefully summarize your argument for pooling and see how accounting professors respond to your arguments.

    See if you can convince some accounting professors. You've not yet convinced me that pooling is better.

    Bob Jensen

    April 5, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    I have been having an e-mail discussion with Bob Jensen about accounting of stock acquisitions, and he kindly suggested that I post my thoughts on the matter in this forum. I am not an academic and I am here only because, as a user of financial statements, I find purchase accounting of stock acquisitions puzzling.

    (1) To me, the value of the exchanged shares is not an economically relevant amount and is certainly not a purchase price. The price of a stock acquisition is the share exchange ratio and what is negotiated is the equity participation of the two groups of stockholders in the combined companies. In the latest boom period purchase accounting often produced extreme purchase prices many times what any cash buyer would have paid and, when amortization was employed, large losses for the acquiror which prompted pro forma reporting. If there was any economic reality to the accounting treatment, why did those managements not lose their jobs? They didn't "pay" the value of the exchanged shares. On the contrary, the share exchange ratio that they negotiated was perfectly reasonable and beneficial.

    (2) The exchanged stock value as purchase price is a non-cash paper value which, regardless of the amortization or impairment treatment, is ignored by this investor and, from what I have seen, investors in general. It has no relevance to determining the discounted value of the future cash returns, simply because the acquisition was in fact a combination of equity interests and not a cash purchase and there was never an economically relevant cash cost.

    (3) Pooling-of-interest is good because it preserves the historical profitability history of the combined companies and accurately reflects the merger of equity interests which has in fact taken place.

    (4) There is nothing deceptive or abusive about pooling accounting. If the ROE is higher it's because that's the right ROE. It will result in a more accurate, and not a less accurate, projection of future cash returns.

    If company A and company B are very similar fundamentally and both stocks are selling at 20 and they are negotiating a share for share exchange and interest rates drop suddenly and both stocks go to 25, then A isn't going to think oh-my-gosh we are "paying" 25% more for B and drop out of the negotiations. On the contrary they will take the market action as validation of the negotiated exchange ratio which is the price. The stocks could go to 90 and it still wouldn't change anything except the size of the goodwill on the balance sheet of the combined companies that I have to back out of my analysis.

    Gregg Wilson

    April 5, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

    --- Gregg Wilson wrote: I have been having an e-mail discussion with Bob Jensen about accounting of stock acquisitions, and he kindly suggested that I post my thoughts on the matter in this forum.

    (snip) --- end of quote ---

    Consider the following two sets of transactions:

    1. P Corporation (P is for purchaser) raises $100 by issuing ten new shares to the capital market. It uses the $100 cash to purchase 100% of the outstanding stock of T (as in Target) Corporation.

    2. P issues ten new shares to the stockholders of T in exchange for 100% of the outstanding stock of T.

    Questions:

    1. Should the accounting for the assets of T in the consolidated financial statements of P differ between these two transactions?

    2. The crux of your critique of purchase accounting seems to your assertion: "To me, the value of the exchanged shares is not an economically relevant amount and is certainly not a purchase price."

    a. Is the $100 cash raised by P in transaction #1 above an economically relevant amount?

    b. Is the $100 cash transferred by P to the shareholders of T in transaction #1 above a purchase price?

    Richard C. Sansing
    Associate Professor of Business Administration
    Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
    100 Tuck Hall Hanover, NH 03755

    April 5, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Richard Sansing

    I would say the two transactions are not equivalent.

    In 1. the stockholders of T end out with $100. In 2. the stockholders of T end out with shares of stock in P.

    1. is still a cash purchase and
    2. is still an exchange of shares.

    Say that P has 100 shares outstanding. In 2. what P and T have negotiated is that in combining the two companies the shareholders of T will end up with 10 shares in the combined companies and P will end up with 100. That is obviously based on an assessment that the value of P is 10 times the value of T based on their relative fundamentals and ability to produce future cash returns. The price at which P can sell it's stock to some third party is not relevant.

    Gregg Wilson

    April 6, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

    --- Gregg Wilson wrote:

    I would say the two transactions are not equivalent.

    In 1. the stockholders of T end out with $100. In 2. the stockholders of T end out with shares of stock in P.

    1. is still a cash purchase and 2. is still an exchange of shares.

    --- end of quote ---

    That the former shareholders of T wind up with different assets in the two settings is not in dispute. Let's try this once more.

    In response to your original post, I posed three questions. They were:

    1. Should the accounting for the assets of T in the consolidated financial statements of P differ between these two transactions?

    2. a. Is the $100 cash raised by P in transaction #1 above an economically relevant amount?

    b. Is the $100 cash transferred by P to the shareholders of T in transaction #1 above a purchase price?

    You answered none of them. You did remark:

    "The price at which P can sell it's stock to some third party is not relevant."

    but I did not pose a question to which that is a plausible answer. I have stipulated a transaction, that P sells--not could sell, did sell--ten new shares of P stock in exchange for $100 cash as part of transaction #1. Question 2a is a simple one. Is the $100 cash that P received for its stock in the stipulated transaction an economically relevant amount? If later in the discussion you want to dispute a premise in an argument I advance, you are of course free to do so. But I have not yet advanced an argument. I have simply posed some questions.

    You have chosen to enter a community in which abstract reasoning involving hypothetical examples the norm. You can participate in this community, or not. If you answer the three questions, we can proceed, because then I think I can understand what it is about the purchase method of accounting that you find objectionable. But right now I am unsure how you are thinking about the problem.

    Richard C. Sansing
    Associate Professor of Business Administration
    Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
    100 Tuck Hall Hanover, NH 03755

    April 6, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Richard Sansing

    Maybe I should qualify my "Yes" answer. Answers 2 and 3 are yes to the extent they are economically relevant within transaction set 1. They are not economically relevant to transaction set 2.

    Gregg Wilson

    April 6, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

    ---Gregg Wilson wrote:

    Answer to all questions is yes.

    Maybe I should qualify that. Answers 2 and 3 are yes to the extent they are economically relevant within transaction set 1. They are not economically relevant to transaction set 2.

    --- end of quote ---

    Okay, that helps. Given your answers, I think I can put forward the case for purchase accounting. Transaction set #1 is recorded in the following manner.

    Sale of new equity for cash:

    Cash 100
         Stockholder equity 100

    Purchase of T's assets for cash:

    Assets 100
         Cash 100

    When the smoke clears, P has recorded assets with a book value of 100 and stockholder equity of 100.

    Purchase accounting takes the view that P's acquisition of T's assets for stock essentially collapses these two transactions into one, recording the value of the T assets at the market price of the P stock. In contrast, if T's assets had a book value of 60, pooling of interest would record assets of 60 and equity of 60.

    The issue is whether this "collapsing" is appropriate. P and T certainly wind up in the same position under both transactions. Whether the shareholders of P and T are in the same position depends on their portfolio choices.

    Suppose first that I behave in accordance with the principles of Capital Markets 101, in which I hold the market portfolio plus the risk-free asset. Before either transaction #1 or #2, I hold (say) 10 P shares (out of 100 outstanding) and 1 T share (out of 10 outstanding).

    After either transaction, I own 11 P shares (out of 110

    outstanding.) If all shareholders behave as I do, then every party associated with the transaction is in the same position under both sets of transactions. The burden seems to be on those advocating the pooling method to explain why the accounting should differ when the results to every party are the same.

    Now suppose instead that shareholders, for whatever reason, do not behave in this manner, and the two transactions lead to substantive differences at the shareholder level (but not at the corporate level). Should differences between the two transactions at the shareholder level dictate different accounting treatments at the corporate level? Why?

    Finally, let's consider the assertions you made in your original post.

    "To me, the value of the exchanged shares is not an economically relevant amount and is certainly not a purchase price. (snip) In the latest boom period purchase accounting often produced extreme purchase prices many times what any cash buyer would have paid..."

    When the stock was issued for cash, you considered the cash price paid economically relevant (my question 2a); and when the assets were sold for cash, you considered it a purchase price (my question

    2b.) Yet when the transaction is collapsed, you consider the market value of shares an not economically relevant amount and not a purchase price. So if transaction were arranged as a stock deal, are you arguing that P would issue more than ten shares to the shareholders of T in exchange for their T stock? Why?

    Richard Sansing

    April 7, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Richard Sansing

    I was going to followup this morning, and noticed that you had already responded.

    On the details of your case... What I didn't understand was the equivalence of the subscribers to the P stock, and the T shareholders. Why would we presume that they are one in the same? The hypothetical subscribers to the P stock obviously would view the price of P as economically relevant. But the T shareholders are only interested in the shares of P that they end up with. From their point of view the collapsible transaction could be executed at any price and it would still bear the same result for them. It's a wash with regard to price. That is why I qualified my response to question 2 by indicating that it was not economically relevant to transaction 2. The price of P is an economic reality, but not one which consititutes a purchase price of T.

    I wouldn't say that pooling looks to the book value as a value of the combined companies, any more than book value is the value of any other company. What pooling does is reflect the merging of the two historical earnings and financial records of the two companies to reflect that the nature of the transaction as a merging of equity interests with an indeterminate "purchase price".

    I had never thought about the compensation issue. I'll get back to you if I can figure something out.

    Gregg

    April 7, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

    ---Gregg Wilson wrote:
    P and T have negotiated that P should issue ten shares in exchange for T stock. That is the economic reality. (snip) And there is no economic reason that we should pick the one that happens to coincide with the actual current price of P's stock, because that was not an input of determining the exchange ratio. The problem is that there is no determinant value for a share exchange acquisition. Using the current P stock price is merely an arbitrary convention (snip)
    --- end of quote ---

    The current market price of P is part of the economic reality, as is the current book value of T. Purchase accounting looks to the former to record the assets of T on the books of P; pooling looks to the latter.

    Okay, time for a new thought experiment. The CEO of P corporation receives a salary of $400K plus 1,000 shares of P stock on July 1. These are shares, not options, and they are not restricted. On July 1, when the shares were delivered to the CEO, the stock had a market value of $60 per share, a book value of $40 per share, and a par value of $1 per share. Note that the amount of shares delivered is not a function of the stock price.

    Record the entry for compensation expense for the year. The accounts are provided below.

    Compensation expense
         Cash Stockholder's equity

    Richard C. Sansing
    Associate Professor of Business Administration
    Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
    100 Tuck Hall Hanover, NH 03755

    April 6, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Richard Sansing

    I was going to follow up this morning, and noticed that you had already responded.

    On the details of your case... What I didn't understand was the equivalence of the subscribers to the P stock, and the T shareholders. Why would we presume that they are one in the same? The hypothetical subscribers to the P stock obviously would view the price of P as economically relevant. But the T shareholders are only interested in the shares of P that they end up with. From their point of view the collapsible transaction could be executed at any price and it would still bear the same result for them. It's a wash with regard to price. That is why I qualified my response to question 2 by indicating that it was not economically relevant to transaction 2. The price of P is an economic reality, but not one which consititutes a purchase price of T.

    I wouldn't say that pooling looks to the book value as a value of the combined companies, any more than book value is the value of any other company. What pooling does is reflect the merging of the two historical earnings and financial records of the two companies to reflect that the nature of the transaction as a merging of equity interests with an indeterminate "purchase price".

    I had never thought about the compensation issue. I'll get back to you if I can figure something out.

    Gregg

    April 7, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

    --- Gregg Wilson wrote:

    On the details of your case... What I didn't understand was the equivalence of the subscribers to the P stock, and the T shareholders. Why would we presume that they are one in the same? The hypothetical subscribers to the P stock obviously would view the price of P as economically relevant. But the T shareholders are only interested in the shares of P that they end up with. From their point of view the collapsible transaction could be executed at any price and it would still bear the same result for them. (snip)

    I had never thought about the compensation issue. I'll get back to you if I can figure something out.

    --- end of quote ---

    The setting in which P and T shareholders are the same is an interesting special case in which the distinction you regard as crucial--the difference in what the T shareholders hold after transaction #1 and transaction #2--vanishes. And it is not a unreasonable case to consider, as it is consistent with finance portfolio theory in which all investors hold the market portfolio.

    Let me restate what I hear you saying to see if I understand. Investors that receive P stock for cash care about the price of P stock. Investors that receive P stock in a merger care only about the number of shares they receive, but do not care about the price of those shares. Do I have that right?

    Your answer to the compensation question will, I think, help me understand how you are framing these issues.

    Richard Sansing

    April 7, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Richard Sansing

    I am afraid I am not well-versed in the compensation/option issues though I probably should do better. So without the benefit of prior knowledge...

    I guess if there is a compensation expense, it is not necessarily one that is determinable. If there were 100,000 shares outstanding, then from the owners point of view they expect that the incremental net cash returns produced by the extra efforts of the CEO motivated by the stock grant can be valued at a minimum of 1/100 of the value of the company's future cash returns without the CEO's extra effort. But relative values aren't costs and it's unclear to me whether the owners care what the current price of the stock is. Maybe not since the grant is not a function of the stock price. That's as far as I've gotten. I need to get some other things done. I'll keep thinking on it, but I seem to be stumped for now.

    Gregg Wilson

    April 7, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

    Hi Gregg Wilson,

    I think I am starting to understand your perspective, but I need a little more input from you. First, here are some excerpts from your recent contributions to this thread.

    ---Gregg Wilson wrote: I guess if there is a compensation expense, it is not necessarily one that is determinable. (Note: The compensation consisted of $400K cash and 1,000 shares of stock with a market price of $60 per share--RS)

    ...it's unclear to me whether the owners care what the current price of the stock is.

    And there is no economic reason that we should pick the one that happens to coincide with the actual current price of P's stock.

    Using the current P stock price is merely an arbitrary convention.

    The price at which P can sell it's stock to some third party is not relevant.

    The price of P is relevant not as an absolute number, but only in terms of its ratio to the real or imputed price of T.

    ---end of quotations

    In the compensation issue that I posed, I stipulated that the market value of the stock was $60 per share. Tell me what that number means to you. At the most fundamental level, why do you think the price might be $60 instead of $6 or $600? I'm not looking for a "because that's where the market cleared that day" answer, but something that gets at the most primitive, fundamental reasons stock prices are what they are. And when they change, why do they change?

    Richard Sansing

    April 8, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Richard Sansing

    That's easy. I subcribe to the dividend-discount-model view of stock prices. Stock prices are basically a function of interest rates and expected sustainable future profitability (ROE; the best estimator we have (with reinvestment rate) for those future cash returns).

    In fact I use my own DDM to convert stock prices to expectational ROEs. Such a DDM is a complete model of stock valuation, and can fully explain stock price levels from the 10-12% ROE low reinvestment low interest rate period of the late 30s, to the 12-15% ROE high interest rate period of the 70s, to the 25% cap-weighted ROE and low interest rates of the capex peak in 2000. Stock prices are extremely volatile because they are a point-in-time market consensus of the future sustainable profitability of the company. A decline in profitabliity expectations will typically produce a price change of two or three times the magnitude, while a change in discount rate will have a more subdued impact.

    Gregg Wilson

    April 8, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

    --- Gregg Wilson wrote: I subscribe to the dividend-discount-model view of stock prices. (snip) --- end of quote ---

    Understood. The theme that has emerged in this thread is that you are uncomfortable in situations in which GAAP would use the current market price of the firm's stock as an input when determining an accounting entry.

    Let's put aside the purchase/pooling dispute to look at the compensation question. Under the set of facts that I stipulated, I don't think there is any controversy regarding the appropriate accounting treatment. It would be:

    Compensation expense $460K Cash $400K Equity $60K

    A rationale for this treatment is to decompose the equity transfer into two components. First, suppose the firm sells 1,000 shares of new equity to the CEO at the market price of $60 per share (debit cash, credit equity); second, suppose the firm pays the CEO a cash salary of $460K (credit cash, debit compensation expense.) Collapsing these two transactions into one (transfer of $400K cash plus equity worth $60K in exchange for services) doesn't change the accounting treatment.

    Now change some of the numbers and labels around and let the firm issue new P equity to T in exchange for all of its equity. The purchase method uses the value of the P stock issued to record the assets and liabilities of T.

    Which brings us full circle to your original post. You wrote:

    "To me, the value of the exchanged shares is not an economically relevant amount and is certainly not a purchase price."

    I argue that the value of P stock is relevant and is a purchase price, in both the compensation case and P's acquisition of T.

    Richard Sansing

    April 9, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Richard Sansing

    I trust you are having a pleasant weekend. Before tackling the compensation case etc, can you tell me how we account for open market share repurchases.

    Gregg Wilson

    April 10, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

    --- You wrote: Before tackling the compensation case etc, can you tell me how we account for open market share repurchases. --- end of quote ---

    Credit cash, debit equity; details can vary depending on whether the repurchase is a major retirement or acquiring the shares to distribute as part of compensation. If the latter, the debit is to Treasury Stock.

    Richard Sansing

    April 11, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Richard Sansing

    Well I'm still in the same place. It seems to me that when a company pays an employee $60,000 in cash they are compensating them for services rendered in that value. When a company grants stock to an employee they are diluting the interests of the current equity participants in the expectation that the employee will be motivated to more than compensate them by an improved stream of cash returns in the future; the point of making the employee an equity participant in the first place, rather than an immediately richer individual. So I don't see the relevance of the price of the shares to the trans 2 again. Except in this case the use of the market share price seems even more suspect in the collapsible transaction, since the company and the CEO could execute the wash transactions between themselves at any price. Also the dilution is the cost, so adding an additional phantom non-cash cost seems to me to be a double counting. It also has the same characteristics as the pooling transaction where very bizarre results could be possible. If a company had a 50 PE then a 2% dilution would erase the company's entire earnings for the period while if the company had a 10 PE a 2% dilution would erase 20% of the earnings. It's the same 2% dilution.

    So is that it Richard? Am I a hopeless dolt? I'm sorry but I can't get there on the collapsible transaction. Nor do I understand why the lack of rational result doesn't matter to anyone. I don't want to go look up the data again, but I know when JDS Uniphase bought E-tek the share exchange was quite reasonable but the value of the exchanged stock was in the multi billions and was probably like 500 times the eanrings of E-tek. So when this pipsqueek company goes to raise billions of dollars at their current market price, it's not just whether they could sell that much stock, but rather how they would justify it to the buyers. "Use of Proceeds: we are going to go out and make a cash acquisition of a company called E-tek and we are going to pay billions of dollars and 500 times E-teks's earnings and many many multiples of book value and sales." So what would their real chances be of getting away with that, and why doesn't that seem like a phoney number to anyone? Why doesn't it seem funny that the "prices" of stock purchase acquisitions are basically randomly distributed from the reasonable to the ludicrous to the sublime? Isn't that evidence that the price is uneconomic? Is this really the basic justification for the economic relevance of the purchase number, or is there something more?

    Gregg Wilson

    April 11, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

    --- Gregg Wilson wrote:

    It seems to me that when a company pays an employee $60,000 in cash they are compensating them for services rendered in that value. When a company grants stock to an employee they are diluting the interests of the current equity participants in the expectation that the employee will be motivated to more than compensate them by an improved stream of cash returns in the future; the point of making the employee an equity participant in the first place, rather than an immediately richer individual. (snip) Why doesn't it seem funny that the "prices" of stock purchase acquisitions are basically randomly distributed from the reasonable to the ludicrous to the sublime? Isn't that evidence that the price is uneconomic?

    --- end of quote ---

    I did not stipulate an assumption that the employee had to hold the 1,000 shares granted.

    The interests of the current stockholders are not diluted in the specified transaction ($400K cash plus stock worth $60K) relative to an alternative cash compensation arrangement of equal value ($460K cash.)

    You had earlier indicated a belief that stock prices are best explain by a dividend discount model. Now you suggest that they are random. If you think they are random, of course, I quite understand your discomfort using stock price as an input to the accounting system; but GAAP can use stock price as an input in many transactions, and it is that, not the purchase method per se, that appears to trouble you.

    Anecdotes regarding one firm "over-paying" for another in a stock deal don't add much to our understanding, and in any case the issues involving merger premiums and acquisition method may be unrelated to the financial accounting treatment of the acquisition. There is a large and growing literature on this topic; see for example:

    Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. 2003. Stock market driven acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics 70 (December): 295-311.

    Richard Sansing

    April 11, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]

    --- Gregg Wilson wrote:

    <<> The interests of the current stockholders are not diluted in the specified > transaction ($400K cash plus stock worth $60K) relative to an > alternative cash compensation arrangement of equal value ($460K > cash.)>>

    I'm confused. Aren't there 1,000 more shares outstanding?

    --- end of quote ---

    Yes. Suppose before any compensation is paid, 100K shares are outstanding and the firm is worth $6,460,000. After we pay $460K compensation, the firm is worth $6,000,000, or $60 per share.

    If instead we compensate the CEO with $400K and 1,000 shares, after compensating the CEO the firm is worth $6,460,000 - $400,000 =$6,060,000 and 101K shares are outstanding, still with a value of $60 per share (because $6,060,000/101,000 = $60).

    With regard to the rest of the thread, I think we are going around in circles. Purchase accounting uses the price of P shares to record the assets of T on P's financial statements. If that price is meaningful, goodwill is meaningful; if the price is random, goodwill is too.

    Richard Sansing

    April 11, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Richard Sansing

    If I spend $460,000 I certainly hope that my company isn't worth $460,000 less or I certainly wouldn't spend the money. Hopefully the present value of the impact of the $460,000 on future net cash returns will at least exceed the cash expenditure. The same could be said for the 1,000 shares, although they are not a book cost but merely a redistribution of equity participation.

    But by your logic I should point out that the company was worth $60.60 per share after the $400,000 total loss expenditure. Now by issuing 1,000 shares the company is only worth $60.00 per share. Dilution?

    Well it has certainly been an interesting conversation, and I do thank you for your time and interest. I have learned a great deal. I would agree that we are at an impasse. All my best to you and yours.

    Gregg Wilson

    April 11, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Richard Sansing

    Sorry for the confusion. I was referring to the value of the exchanged shares of stock in the purchase acquisitions, the "price" that purchase accounting puts on the deal which becomes in fact random because it bears no relationship to the economic basis of the negotiation.

    <<> The interests of the current stockholders are not diluted in the specified > transaction ($400K cash plus stock worth $60K) relative to an > alternative cash compensation arrangement of equal value ($460K > cash.)>>

    I'm confused. Aren't there 1,000 more shares outstanding?

    > Anecdotes regarding one firm "over-paying" for another in a stock > deal don't add much to our understanding,>>

    Apparently not, but it should. We should be asking why any of those managements still have a job. The point is they didn't overpay. The share exchange ratio in the JDS/E-tek deal was quite reasonable and resulting in a fair allocation of equity ownership between the two groups of shareholders. It just had nothing to do with the market value of the JDS stock that was exchanged. The monstrocity of the goodwill is a tip off that something is wrong about the treatment, not that the buyer overpaid.

    <<> merger premiums and acquisition method may be unrelated to the financial > accounting treatment of the acquisition.>>

    I think that's right. Management has caught on that the market doesn't care about the phony goodwill and they just do what's right for the company. There's always pro forma reporting if the GAAP reporting gets too messed up.

    Gregg Wilson

    April 12, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Gregg,

    You wrote: "There's always pro forma reporting if the GAAP reporting gets too messed up." End Quote

    I hardly think pro forma does a whole lot for investors when "GAAP gets messed up." The problem is that you can't compare pro forma, anything-goes, reports with any benchmarks at all --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#ProForma

    Appealing to pro forma reporting only weakens your case for an already defenseless case for pooling.

    Bob Jensen

    April 11, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Bob Jensen

    I think you misunderstand my point. I am surely not defending pro forma reporting. I would assume that one reason goodwill amortization was suspended was that it left companies with no other option. Management rightly assumes that investors want to know what the company is actually earning. If goodwill amortization was suspended for some other reason, what might it have been?

    Gregg Wilson

    April 13, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Richard Sansing and anyone who would care to reply.

    We have come to an impasse on purchase accounting, but I did have a question on pooling that I wanted to ask you about.

    I am old enough to have been hanging around Wall Street research departments in my misspent youth, and was there for the conglomerate craze in the late sixties, and these are the things I remember. After the Harvard B School did there endorsement of Textron, all you had to do was call yourself a conglomerate and talk about synergy and you'd have an immediate following for your stock. Not only that, but you seemed to be able to make share exchange acquisitions on favorable terms which were accretive to your earnings, and pretty soon you had a kind of self-fullfilling prophecy going on. I did some work on Teledyne and even went out to California and met Henry Singleton. He used to talk about 15% internal growth, and 15% external growth. The external part was the accretion to earnings from stock acquisitions. Well we know that the whole thing ended badly, although Henry was nobody's fool and had been buying little cash-cow companies all along despite the sales pitch, so he was in far better shape than some.

    Now for years afterwards you keep hearing this idea that pooling is abusive because companies can use their "high priced" stock to make acquisitions, especially in periods of market enthusiasm like the late sixties. I guess what is really being said is that companies stand a better chance of making accretive acquisitions when times are good and the stock is selling at a high price, and the whole thing is in danger of becoming another ponzi scheme like the conglomerate fad all over again, because the accretion to earnings will then reinforce the high price of the stock. There is a perception that the price of the stock matters and because it matters we have to somehow account for that mattering in the accounting treatment of the acquisition.

    My biggest concern with this conclusion is that the problem is not the accounting treatment. If a company makes a favorable share exchange acquisition which is accretive to earnings, then that is what has happened. That is an accurate portrayal of economic reality. There is no denying that the company made a GOOD DEAL. They ended up with a share of the combined companies that is quite favorable to their interests. The second problem is that in many circumstances the value of the exchanged shares is much less of a factor than we fear. If the acquired company has publically traded shares, then the price of those shares will be reflecting the current market expectations as well. There is little motivation on the part of the seller to consider the deal in terms of the putative purchase value of the exchanged shares, because they can already cash in at a "high price". It is the relative values of the two share prices that will be the consideration. JDS Uniphase negotiates a share exchange acquisition with E-tek. The share exchange ratio is pretty fair to both companies, and is not really particularly accretive or advantageous to JDS, despite the fact that the value of the exchanged shares is in the multi billions of dollars and many many times what any reasonable cash buyer would pay. E-tek has a "high price" stock already. They don't need JDS to cash in on the market's current enthusiasm for net stocks. Would there be anything abusive or deceptive about accounting for this deal as a pooling-of-interest?

    Now I won't deny the fact that the price of the acquirors stock can influence the deal. Henry himself told me a story about a seller that came to him and was looking for a certain "price" expressed in terms of the value of the exchanged shares that he expected to get. The seller was a private company owned by a single entrepreneur, not untypical of the sellers at that time. Henry couldn't give him that many shares for his company because it wouldn't have met his accretion requirments, but he sent him to another conglomerator who he knew would, because that company's stock was flying high relative to it's underlying profitability which didn't compare to Teledyne's. The seller got his deal, but by the time the sellers shares came out of lockup that company was almost bankrupt. Though we think of the crash in conglomerate stocks in terms of the poor investors, it was really the sellers who were the biggest victims of the conglomerate fad, because they were left holding a much bigger proportion of the bag. And the investors weren't really investors. They were speculators and knew perfetly well they were playing a musical chairs game. There are two points (1) the sellers may consider the deal in terms of the value of the exchanged shares, particularly if they are non-publically-traded sellers, but they would probably be well advised to also consider that the shares they receive represent an equity interest in the combined companies, and (2) whatever the seller's motivation, the buyer will always be looking at the deal in terms of their equity share of the combined companies and whether the deal will be accretive or dilutive to their interests.

    When we say that pooling is abusive and deceptive what are we really talking about? Is it pooling itself, or is it the fear that rollup companies can make those self-fullfilling accretive acquisitions because of the desire of sellers to cash in on the market value of that stock, and that is somehow an evil thing? Is it really our responsibility as accountants to police the market and try to keep that from happening? Is an accretive acquistion really deceptive? Didn't the company actually make a good deal? Whom are we really protecting from whom?

    Gregg Wilson

    April 13, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU] -- end of quote ---

    --- Gregg Wilson wrote:

    Hi Richard Sansing and anyone who would care to reply.

    When we say that pooling is abusive and deceptive what are we really talking about?

    --- end of quote ---

    I will pass on continuing this thread, except to reiterate that your unhappiness with GAAP extends well beyond the purchase method. If we can't agree that the transfer of $60K of a publicly traded company's own stock, unrestricted, to an employee in exchanges for services should be accounted for as an expense of $60K, I doubt we can come to agreement on accounting for more complicated transactions that involve the transfer of a company's stock for anything other than cash.

    Richard Sansing

    April 13, 2006 reply from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Richard Sansing

    Interesting argument. Sort of a combination of all or none and falling back on good authority. Well you did better than Bob Jensen's suggested reading approach, and for that I am grateful. My wife once opined that we should be happy to have heretics for they help us test the veracity of our faith. Still I better leave before I get burned at the stake.

    Regards,
    Gregg Wilson

    April 14, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    GAAP espouses the economic entity assumption. In what way does transferring stock to an employee represent a cost to the company? Is there any tangible evidence that the company is worse off? Does it have less cash, dimmer prospects, damaged intangible assets? It is a cost to the shareholders. According to GAAP they are distinct from the company.

    Regards,
    Gregg Wilson

    April 15, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Gregg,

    Following your logic to its conclusion, firms need not pay employees in anything other than paper. Why bother giving them assets? Just print stock certificates and have them toil for 60 years for 100 shares of stock per week.

    This is tantamount to what the Germans did after World War I. Rather than have the banks create marks, the German government just printed millions of marks that soon became worth less than the paper they were printed on. It eventually took a wheel barrow full of marks to buy a slice of bread (literally).

    Suppose a firm pays $120 in cash to an employee and the employee pays $20 in income taxes and invests $40 in the open market for 40 shares of his employer's common shares. What is different about this if the company pays him $80 in cash and issues him 40 shares of treasury stock? The employee ends up in the same situation under either alternative. And he or she owes $20 in taxes in either case. Stock must often be issued from the treasury of shares purchased by the company on the open market since new shares have pre-emptive rights that make it difficult to pay employees in new shares.

    If employees instead are given stock options or restricted stock, the situation is more complicated but the principle is the same. The stock or the options must be valued and taxes must eventually be paid on the value received for his or her services.

    As far as what is wrong with pooling, I told you before your exchanges with Professor Sansing that the main problem with pooling is the reason firms want pooling. They like to keep acquired net assets on the books at very old and outdated historical costs so that future revenues divided by outdated book values show high rates of return (ROIs) and make managers who acquired the old assets look brilliant.

    Other abuses are described in the paper by Abe Briloff on "Dirty Pooling" that I sent to you --- Briloff, AJ 1967. Dirty pooling. The Accounting Review (July): 489-496 --- http://www.jstor.org/view/00014826/ap010167/01a00060/0 

    I hope you will read Abe's paper carefully before continuing this thread.

    Bob Jensen

    April 15, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU] -- end of quote ---

    These issues are covered Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123, which you can find on the FASB website, http://www.fasb.org .

    The excerpt that follows states the general rule.

    This Statement requires a public entity to measure the cost of employee services received in exchange for an award of equity instruments based on the grant-date fair value of the award.

    Richard Sansing

    April 15, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Bob Jensen,
    Hope all is well with you.

    I am not arguing from the employee's point of view. What I am arguing is that the company can pay the employee cash, but if the employee is being paid stock it is not the company but the shareholders who are doing the paying, so it cannot be a cost to the company. The employee is being paid something that belongs to the shareholders, and does not belong to the company. The ownership interest is distinct from the company according to the economic entity assumption.

    <<As far as what is wrong with pooling, I told you before your exchanges with Professor Sansing that the main problem with pooling is the reason firms want pooling. They like to keep acquired net assets on the books at very old and outdated historical costs so that future revenues divided by outdated book values show high rates of return (ROIs) and make managers who acquired the old assets look brilliant.>>

    I would argue that the costs of the acquired firm are no more old and outdated than any other company that follows GAAP accounting procedures. There is no such thing as an "outdated" book value. The earnings model matches costs and revenues consistently and conservatively over time and that is what makes the return on equity number meaningful. Adjusting those costs to some other random value at a random point in time makes the return on equity number NOT meaningful. The return on equity of the combined companies under pooling is not an inflated return on equity that is meant to make the management look brilliant. It is merely the correct return on equity, and the correct measure of the capital efficiency of the combined companies. It is the return on equity that should be used to project future cash returns in order to determine the value of the company as an ongoing enterprise.

    Suppose there are two companies that are both highly profitable and both have 30% ROEs. Is there something misleading about a pooling acquisition where the combined ROE of the two companies is pro forma'ed at a 30% ROE? Is it more meaningul to write up the assets of the acquired company by some phoney goodwill amount so that the combined number will now be 15% ROE? Which number is going to produce a more accurate assessment of the value of the combined companies going forward? For a cash acquisition there has been an additional economic cash cost and the ROE is rightfully lower. But there is no such cost, cash or otherwise, when the equity interests are combined through a share exchange.

    Gregg Wilson

    April 15, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Sorry Greg,

    You show no evidence of countering Abe Briloff’s real contention that pooling is likely to be “dirty.” It has little to do with stock valuation since the same “cost” has been incurred for an acquisition irrespective of whether the bean counters book it as a purchase or a pooling. The pooling alternative has everything to do with manipulation of accounting numbers to make managers look like they increased the ROI because of their clever acquisition even if the acquisition is a bad deal in terms of underlying economics.
    Briloff, AJ 1967. Dirty pooling. The Accounting Review (July): 489-496 --- http://www.jstor.org/view/00014826/ap010167/01a00060/0 

    I doubt that you’ve convinced a single professor around the world that pooling provides better information to investors. Pooling was banned years ago because of widespread opinion that pooling has a greater potential of misleading investors than purchase accounting. If the historical cost net book value of the acquired firm is only half of the current value relevant to the acquisition price, there is no way that future ROIs under pooling and purchasing can be the same. You’ve set up a straw man.

    Please don’t bring stock dividends into this debate. Stock dividends and stock splits only confuse the issue. Stock dividends must be distributed to all shareholders and are merely a means, like stock splits, of lowering share prices without changing the value of any shareholder’s investment. Certainly stock dividends cannot be issued selectively to employees and not outside investors. The main argument for large stock dividends/splits is to lower share prices to attract smaller investors into buying blocks of shares without having to pay odd-lot commissions in the market. The only argument for small stock dividends is to mislead shareholders into thinking they are getting something when they are not getting anything at all. Studies show the market is very efficient in adjusting prices to stock dividends and splits.

    Certainly not a single professor around the world has come to your defense. It’s time to come up with a new argument Gregg. You must counter Abe’s arguments to convince us otherwise. The only valid argument for pooling is that markets are perfectly efficient irrespective of bean counter reporting. That argument holds some water but it is a leaky bucket according to many studies in recent years. If that argument was really true, management and shareholders would not care what bean counters do. Managers are in reality very concerned about bean counting rules. Corporations actually fought tooth and nail for pooling, but their arguments were not convincing from the standpoint for shareholder interests.

    If ABC Company is contemplating buying anything for $40 cash (wheat, corn, Microsoft Shares, or ABC treasury shares) and making this part of a future compensation payment in kind, it’s irrelevant how that $40 is paid to an employee because the net cost to ABC Company is $40 in cash. As the proportionate share of ABC Company has not been changed for remaining shareholders whether the payment is salary cash or in treasury shares (which need not be purchased if the salary is to be $40 in cash), the cash cost is the same for the employment services as far as shareholders and the ABC Company are concerned.

    ABC Company might feel that payment in ABC’s treasury shares increases the employee’s motivation level. The employee, however, may not view the two alternatives as equivalent since he or she must incur an added transactions cost to convert most any in-kind item into cash.

    Your argument would make a little more sense if ABC Company could issue new shares instead of paying $40 in cash. But in most states this is not allowed without shareholder approval due to preemptive anti-dilution protections for existing shareholders that prevent companies from acting like the German government in the wake of World War I (when Germany started printing Deutsch marks that weren’t worth the cost of the paper they were printed on).

    It’s very risky to buy shares of corporations that do not have preemptive rights. I think you’ve ignored preemptive rights from get go on this thread.

    Bob Jensen

    April 17, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Bob Jensen

    Maybe you could produce an example of how pooling is "dirty in practice", OTHER THAN the fact that it produces a higher ROI.

    Gregg Wilson

    April 18, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Gregg,

    High ROIs are the main reason pooling becomes dirty. It is “dirty” because it is intended to deceive the public and distort future performance measures relative to the underlying economics of the acquisition.

     As to other examples, I think Abe gives you ample illustrations of how management tries to take credit (“feathers in their cap” on Page 494) for “something shareholders are paying dearly for.” Also note his Case II where “A Piddle Makes a Pool.” Briloff, AJ 1967. "Dirty pooling." The Accounting Review (July): 489-496 --- http://www.jstor.org/view/00014826/ap010167/01a00060/0 

    Additional examples have been provided over the years by Abe. The following is Table 1 from a paper entitled "Briloff and the Capital Markets" by George Foster, Journal of Accounting Research, Volume 17, Spring 1979 --- http://www.jstor.org/view/00218456/di008014/00p0266h/0
     

    As George Foster points out, what makes Briloff unique in academe are the detailed real-world examples he provides. Briloff became so important that stock prices reacted instantly to his publications, particularly those in Barron's. George formally studied market reactions to Briloff articles.

    Companies Professor Briloff criticized for misleading accounting reports experienced an average drop in share prices of 8%.

    TABLE 1
    Articles of Briloff Examined
      Article Journal/Publication Date Companies Cited That Are Examined in This Note
    1.  "Dirty Pooling" Barron's (July 15, 1968) Gulf and Wesern: Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV)
    2.  "All a Fandangle?" Barron's (December 2, 1968) Leasco Data Processing: Levin-Townsend
    3.  "Much-Abused Goodwill" Barron's (April 28, 1969) Levin-Townsend; National General Corp.
    4.  "Out of Focus" Barron's (July 28, 1969) Perfect Film & Chemical Corp.
    5. "Castles of Sand?"


     
    Barron's (February 2, 1970)


     
    Amrep Corp.; Canaveral International; Deltona Corp.; General Development Corp.; Great Southwest Corp.; Great Western United, Major Realty; Penn Central
    6. "Tomorrow's Profits?" Barron's (May 11, 1970) Telex
    7. "Six Flags at Half-Mast?" Barron's (January 11, 1971) Great Southwest Corp.; Penn Central
    8. "Gimme Shelter"
     
    Barron's (October 25, 1971)
     
    Kaufman & Broad Inc.; U.S. Home Corp.; U.S. Financial Inc.
    9. "SEC Questions Accounting"
     
    Commercial and Financial Chronicle (November 2, 1972) Penn Central
     
    10. "$200 Million Question" Barron's (December 18, 1972) Leasco Corp.
    11. "Sunrise, Sunset" Barron's (May 14, 1973) Kaufman & Broad
    12. "Kaufman & Broad--More Questions? Commercial and Financial Chronicle (July 12, 1973) Kaufman & Broad
     
    13. "You Deserve a Break..." Barron's (July 8, 1974) McDonald's
    14. "The Bottom Line: What's Going on at I.T.T." (Interview with Briloff) New York Magazine (August 12, 1974)

     
    I.T.T.

     
    15. "Whose Deep Pocket?" Barron's (July 19, 1976) Reliance Group Inc.

     Not all of the above illustrations are focused on pooling accounting, but some of them provide real-world examples that you are looking for, particularly dirty pooling at McDonalds Corporation.

     It would would help your case if you followed Briloff’s example by getting out of hypothetical (nonexistent?) examples and give us some real world examples from your consulting. I don’t buy into any illustrations that merely criticize goodwill accounting. What you need to demonstrate how accounting for goodwill under purchase accounting was more misleading than pooling accounting for at least one real-world acquisition. I realize, however, that this may be difficult since the SEC will sue companies who use pooling accounting illegally these days. Did you ever wonder why the SEC made pooling illegal?

    Perhaps for your clients you have prepared statements contrasting purchase versus pooling in acquisitions. It would be nice if you could share those (with names disguised).

    Bob Jensen

    April 17, 2006 reply from Paul Polinski [pwp3@CASE.EDU]

    Gregg:
    Please let me use a slightly different example to look at your views in the purchase/pooling debate, and invite anyone else to contribute or to improve the example.

    Let's say you own and run several bed-and-breakfast inns. About 20 years ago, you received as a gift an authentic Normal Rockwell painting, which you put behind a false wall in your house to protect your investment. You recently brought it back out, and several reputable appraisers have put its value at $255,000.

    You want to invest in an inn, and its lot, that the current owner is selling. The current owner bought the inn and lot many years ago for $100,000; the inn's $60,000 gross book value is fully depreciated, while the lot (as land) is still recorded on current owner's books at $40,000. You and another party agree to jointly purchase the inn from the current owner; you exchange your Normal Rockwell painting for 51% ownership in the inn/lot, and the other party pays $245,000 in cash for his or her 49% ownership. You and the other party have rights and responsibilities proportional to your ownership percentages in all aspects under the joint ownership agreement.

    To simplify matters, at my own risk, I'll say "ignore tax treatments for now."

    My questions to you are:

    (1) For performance evaluation purposes, when you and the other party are computing the returns on your respective investments in this inn, what are your relevant investment amounts?

    (2) (I'm wandering out on a limb here, so I'll invite anyone who wants to improve or correct this to do so...)

    Now let's say that all the other facts are the same, except that:

    - The other party pays $122,500 for 49% ownership of the inn/lot;

    - You get 51% ownership in the inn/lot in exchange for giving the current owner a 50% transferable ownership interest in your Norman Rockwell.

    What are your relevant investment amounts in this case?

    Paul

    April 18, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Paul Polinski

    So what's the point? Your example is clearly a cash acquisition. Pooling is appropriate only in the case of a share exchange acquisition, and I would say pooling should only be used in the case of two ongoing enterprise. The point is that a share exchange acquisition is a combining of equity interests and there is no purchase price beyond the exchange ratio. Say you had two inns and both are ongoing businesses so they not only have real estate assets but furniture and equipment and supplies and payables and receivables etc. Lets say they each have book assets of $40,000 and they decide to combine their two enterprises on a share for share basis. The owner of each inn ends up with half the equity in the combined enterprise. Has a new value been placed on the assets by the share exchange? Would the owners want to restate the assets to some different value just because they have merged? Or would they prefer to retain the combined financial statements as they are? Doesn't the meaningfulness of the earnings model depend on following consistent rules of matching costs and revenues over a period of time, and wouldn't revaluing those costs merely represent an obliteration of the earnings model and the information it imparts? Is not a share exchange acquisition a totally different animal from a cash purchase, and shouldn't it be recorded in the financial statements in a way that reflects that economic reality?

    Gregg Wilson

    April 19, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Sorry Gregg,

    You’re too hung up on cash basis accounting. You only think transactions can be valued if and when they are paid in cash. This is clearly absurd since there are many purchase transactions that are not cash deals and require value estimation on the part of both the buyer and the seller. We use value estimates in countless transactions, and accounting would really revert to the dark ages if we were forced to trace value of each item back to some ancient surrogate cash transaction value years ago. Cash accounting can badly mislead investors about risk, such as when interest rate swaps were not even disclosed on financial statements until cash flowed. Our estimates of current values and obligations may be imperfect, but they beat non-estimation.

    With respect to business combinations/acquisitions, GAAP requires that the accounting come as close as possible to the value estimations upon which the deal was actually transacted. I don’t know how many times we have to tell you that the valuation estimation process is not perfect, but trying to come as close to economic reality at the time of the current transaction is our goal, not pulling values from transactions from olden times and ancient history circumstances.

    Be careful what you declare on this forum, because some students are also in the forum and they may believe such declaratives as “Pooling is appropriate only in the case of a share exchange acquisition.” Pooling is not only a violation of FASB standards, it is against SEC law. Please do not encourage students to break the law.

    And there are good reasons for bans on pooling. You’ve not been able to convince a single professor in this forum that pooling is better accounting for stock trades. You’ve ranted against estimates of value and how these estimates may become impaired shortly after deals go down, but GAAP says to do the best job possible in booking the values that were in effect at the time the deals actually went down. If values become impaired later on, GAAP says to adjust the values.

    You’ve not convinced a single one of us who watched pooling accounting become dirty time and time again when it was legal. We don’t want to revert to those days of allowing managers to repeatedly report inflated ROIs on acquired companies.

    I think Richard Sansing is right. You’re beating a dead horse. Future communications that only repeat prior rants are becoming time wasters in this forum.

    Forum members interested in our long and tedious exchange on this topic can go to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Pooling 

    Bob Jensen

    April 18, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Again Bob Jensen

    Let's put it this way. If we want to value the acquisition at a non-cost current value, then we should use a fair appraisal like something akin to what a cash buyer would be willing to pay, and not the phoney share exchange value. Then we could actually have goodwill numbers that made some sense and would avoid all those embarassing impairment writedowns a year after the acquisition. I prefer pooling, but if you insist on revaluing, then use an economic value. The value of the exchanged shares is not, I repeat, not an economic value.

    Gregg

    April 20, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Sorry Gregg,

    GAAP states that all tangible assets should be valued at what cash purchasers would pay for them, so we have no argument.

    Intangibles such as knowledge capital are more difficult to value, but the ideal is to value them for what cash purchasers would pay for such things as a skilled work force, customers, name recognition, etc.

    The problem with using a cash price surrogate lies in situations where there is really valuable synergy that is unique to the acquiring company. For example, there is probably considerable synergy value (actually monopoly) value when SBC acquired AT&T that probably made it much more valuable to SBC than to any other buyer whether the deal would be done in cash or stock.

    Auditors are supposed to attest to the value at the time the acquisition deal goes down. Not long afterwards it may be found that the best estimate at the time the deal went down was either in error or it was reasonable at the time but the value changed afterwards, possible because of the market impact of the “new” company operating after the acquisition. For example, when Time Warner acquired AOL it appears that Time Warner and its auditors gave up way to much value to AOL in the deal, in part due to accounting fraud in AOL.

    Problems of valuation in purchase accounting should not, and cannot under current law, be used as an excuse to use historical cost values that typically have far greater deviation from accurate values at the time the acquisition deal is consummated.

    I think you made your points Gregg. Please stop repeating arguments that you have hammered repeatedly at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Pooling 

    Bob Jensen

    April 20, 2006 message reply Gregg Wilson

    Hi Bob Jensen

    You have masterfully skirted the issue as usual. Do you believe that the value of the exchanged shares is either a "fair value" and/or an "economic value"? If we are attesting to the value at the time of the deal as the share exchange value then I would say we are attesting badly. Use whatever fair value you want. The value of the exchanged shares isn't one.

    By the way. AOL purchased Time Warner, not the other way around. From the 10K:

    April 20, 2006 Reply from Bob Jensen

    Sorry Gregg

    I think you're wasting our time and embarrassing yourself until you can back your wild claims with convincing research. Your wild speculations appear to run counter to serious research.

    If you are really convinced of evidence to the contrary, please go out and conduct some rigorous research testing your hypotheses. Please don't continue making wild claims in an academic forum until you've got some convincing evidence.

    Or as Richard Sansing would say, we seldom accept anecdotal evidence that can be selectively cherry picked to show most any wild speculation.

    If you bothered to do research rather than wildly speculate, you would find that serious academic research points to the conclusions opposite to your wild speculations about revaluations and goodwill write-offs.


    First consider the Steven L. Henning, Wayne H. Shaw, and Toby Stock (2004) study:

    This paper investigates criticisms that U.S. GAAP had given firms too much discretion in determining the amount and timing of goodwill write-offs. Using 1,576 U.S. and 563 U.K. acquisitions, we find little evidence that U.S. firms managed the amount of goodwill write-off or that U.K. firms managed the amount of revaluations (write-ups of intangible assets). However, our results are consistent with U.S. firms delaying goodwill write-offs and U.K. firms timing revaluations strategically to avoid shareholder approval linked to certain financial ratios.
    Steven L. Henning, Wayne H. Shaw, and Toby Stock, "The Amount and Timing of Goodwill Write-Offs and Revaluations: Evidence from U.S. and U.K. Firms," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Volume 23, Number 2, September 2004 Pages: 99 - 121


    Also consider the Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2002a) conclusions below:

    We investigate two related questions. What factors influence firms' use of acquisition accounting method, and are firms willing to pay higher acquisition premiums to use the pooling-of-interests accounting method? We analyze a comprehensive sample of nontaxable corporate stock-for-stock acquisitions from 1990 through 1996. We use a two-stage, instrumental variables estimation method that explicitly allows for simultaneity in the choice of accounting method and acquisition premiums. After controlling for economic differences across pooling and purchase transactions, our evidence indicates that financial reporting incentives influence how acquiring firms structure stock-for-stock acquisitions. In addition, our two-stage analysis indicates that higher acquisition premiums are associated with the pooling method. In sum, our evidence suggests that acquiring firms structure acquisitions and expend significant resources to secure preferential accounting treatment in stock-for-stock acquisitions.
    Benjamin C. Ayers , Craig E. Lefanowicz and John R. Robinson, "Do Firms Purchase the Pooling Method?" Review of Accounting Studies Volume 7, Number 1, March 2002 Pages: 5 - 32.

    You apparently have evidence to contradict the Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2002a) study. Would you please enlighten us with some convincing evidence.


    Consider the Patrick E. Hopkins, Richard W. Houston, and Michael F. Peters (2000) research:

    We provide evidence that analysts' stock-price judgments depend on (1) the method of accounting for a business combination and (2) the number of years that have elapsed since the business combination. Consistent with business-press reports of managers' concerns, analysts' stock-price judgments are lowest when a company applies the purchase method of accounting and ratably amortizes the acquisition premium. The number of years since the business combination affects analysts' price estimates only when the company applies the purchase method and ratably amortizes goodwill—analysts' price estimates are lower when the business-combination transaction is further in the past. However, this joint effect of accounting method and timing is mitigated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board's proposed income-statement format requiring companies to report separate line items for after-tax income before goodwill charges and net-of-tax goodwill charges. When a company uses the purchase method of accounting and writes off the acquisition premium as in-process research and development, analysts' stock price judgments are not statistically different from their judgments when a company applies pooling-of-interest accounting.
    Patrick E. Hopkins, Richard W. Houston, and Michael F. Peters, "Purchase, Pooling, and Equity Analysts' Valuation Judgments," The Accounting Review, Vol. 75, 2000, 257-281.


    You seem to think that acquisition goodwill is based upon wild speculation. Research studies discover rather sophisticated valuation approaches that distinguish core from synergy goodwill components. See Henning, Lewis, and Shaw, "Valuation of Components of Purchased Goodwill," The Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 38, Autumn 2000.


    Also consider the Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2002b) study: 

    Accounting standard setters have become increasingly concerned with the perceived manipulation of financial statements afforded by the pooling-of-interests (pooling) method of accounting for corporate acquisitions. While different restrictions have been discussed, in September 1999 the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued an Exposure Draft to eliminate the pooling method. This study provides a basis for evaluating restrictions on the pooling method by analyzing the financial statement effects on pooling acquisitions made by public corporations over the period 1992 through 1997. Using these acquisitions we (1) quantify the scope of the pooling problem, (2) estimate the financial statement repercussions of eliminating the pooling method, and (3) examine the effects of restricting pooling accounting to business combinations meeting various merger of equals restrictions.

    While our analysis does not address whether restrictions on the pooling method will influence the nature or level of acquisition activity, the results indicate that the pooling method generates enormous amounts of unrecognized assets, across individual acquisitions, and in aggregate. In addition, our results suggest that recording and amortizing these assets generate significant balance sheet and income statement effects that vary with industry. Regarding restrictions on the pooling method, our analysis indicates that size restrictions would significantly reduce the number and value of pooling acquisitions and unrecognized assets generated by these acquisitions.

    . . .

    Accounting standard setters have become increasingly concerned with the perceived manipulation of financial statements and the lack of comparability across firms financial statements that have resulted from having two acquisition accounting methods. Consistent with these concerns, the FASB issued an Exposure Draft in September 1999 to eliminate the pooling-of-interests method. Using a comprehensive set of pooling acquisitions by public corporations over the period 1992 through 1997, this study analyzes the financial statement effects of eliminating or severely restricting the pooling method of accounting for business combinations. Although we make no assumptions regarding the effects of pooling restrictions on either acquisition activity or acquisition price, this study provides a useful starting point for assessing the effects of different pooling restrictions. Our evidence suggests that firms avoid recognition of significant amounts of target firms purchase prices, both in aggregate and per acquisition, via the pooling method. Further, we document that these unrecognized assets are significant relative to the bidders book value and that the quantity and dollar magnitude of pooling acquisitions have increased dramatically in recent years. With respect to industry-specific analyses, we find that the financial services industry accounts for approximately one-third of all pooling acquisitions in number and value.

    The effects on bidder financial-reporting ratios of precluding use of the pooling method for a typical acquisition are substantial, though varying widely across industries. Decreases in return on equity, assuming a ten-year amortization period for unrecognized assets, range from a 65 percent decline for the hotel and services industry to a13 percent decline for the financial services industry.15For earnings per share, the effects are more moderate than are those on return on equity. Decreases, assuming a ten-year amortization period, range from a 42 percent decrease for the food, textile, and chemicals industry to an 8 percent decrease for the financial services industry. For market-to-book ratios, four industries (the metal and mining industry; the food, textile, and chemicals industry; the hotel and other services industry; and the health and engineering industry) have decreases in bidder market-to-book ratio in excess of 30 percent, whereas the financial services industry has only a 6 percent decrease. The relatively small effects for the financial services industry suggests that the industry�s opposition to eliminating the pooling method may be more driven by the quantity and aggregate magnitude of pooling acquisitions than per-acquisition effects. Overall, we find that eliminating the pooling method affects firm profitability and capitalization ratios in all industries, but there is a wide dispersion of the magnitude of these effects across industry.

    Finally, we document that restricting pooling treatment via a relative size criterion significantly decreases the number and value of pooling acquisitions as well as the unrecognized assets generated by these acquisitions. Nevertheless, we find that a size restriction, depending on its exact implementation, can simultaneously allow a number of acquisitions to be accounted for under the pooling method. Regardless of the type of restriction, the magnitude of past pooling transactions, both in total dollars and relative to the individual bidder's financial condition, lends credibility to the contention that the imposition of pooling restrictions has the potential to seriously impact firm financial statements and related financial-reporting ratios. These effects, of course, decrease with a longer amortization period for unrecognized assets.
    Benjamin C. Ayers , Craig E. Lefanowicz and John R. Robinson, "The Financial Statement Effects of Eliminating the Pooling-of-Interests Method of Acquisition," Accounting Horizons, Vol 14, March 2000.


    There are many, many more such studies. If you are really convinced of evidence to the contrary, please go out and conduct some rigorous research testing your hypotheses. Please don't continue this until you've got some convincing evidence.

    Or as Richard Sansing would say, we seldom accept anecdotal evidence that can be selectively cherry picked to show most any wild conclusion.

    Nobody argues that the present system of accounting for acquisitions and goodwill is perfect. Various alternatives have been proposed in the research literature. But none to my knowledge support your advocacy of a return to pooling-of-interests accounting.

    Bob Jensen

    PS
    You are correct about the AOL purchase of Time Warner. I forgot this since Time Warner runs the household. Later on it was Time Warner that tried to sell AOL (to Google). It's a little like husband buys wife and later on wife puts husband for sale.

    April 18, 2006 message from Gregg Wilson greggwil@optonline.net

    Hi Bob Jensen

    I was really trying to go one step at a time, and establish that the value of the exchanged shares is not an economic value or a "fair appraisal" of the value of the acquired company. I am certainly not a researcher, and as you know I do not have access to the fine studies that you have referenced. I am not even sure what would qualify as evidence of the point.

    I was thinking one could send the following questionnaire to companies that had made share exchange acquistions....

    """"""""""" You recently made a share exchange for XYZ company. After you determined the value of the target company to you, [Target value], which of the following do you feel best describes the decision process by which you arrived at the number of shares to offer the target company:

    (1) [Target value] / [Price of your stock]

    (2) [Your shares outstanding] * ([Target value] / [Your value]) where [Your value] is the value of your own company arrived at by a similar valuation standard as [Target value].

    (3) Some combination of the above, or other decision process. Please explain________________________________.

    """"""""""""""""

    If the response came back overwhelmingly (2), then would that be conclusive evidence that the value of the exchanged shares is not an economic value or the price paid? I really wouldn't want to go to the trouble, if the result wouldn't demonstrate what I am trying to demonstrate.

    Gregg Wilson

    April 23, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Sorry Gregg,

    If you want to communicate with the academy you must play by the academy’s rules. The number one rule is that a hypothesis must be supported by irrefutable (normative) arguments or convincing empirical evidence. We do accept idle speculation but only for purposes of forming interesting hypotheses to be tested later on.

    In my communications with you regarding pooling-of-interests accounting, I've always focused on what I will term your Pooling-Preferred Hypothesis or PP Hypothesis for short. Your hypothesis may be implied from a collection of your earlier quotations from http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Pooling

    Well I would call that entire FAS 141 a lot of sophistries. This is a case of trying to make an apple into an orange and getting a rotten banana.
    Gregg Wilson, March 30, 2006

    I certainly didn't mean to imply that cash acquisitions should be treated as pooling-of-interest. On the contrary I was trying to make the point that they are totally different situations, and can't be treated effectively by the same accounting rule. The cash is the whole point.
    Gregg Wilson, March 30, 2006

    Pooling of interest is terrific, because it recreates that earnings model history for the combined companies. The historical costs are not meaningless to the negotiations but rather are the basis for the negotiations, for they are the evidence that the companies are using to determine the share exchange ratio that they will accept.
    Gregg Wilson, March 30, 2006

    Pooling is appropriate only in the case of a share exchange acquisition, and I would say pooling should only be used in the case of two ongoing enterprise(s).
    Gregg Wilson, March 30, 2006

    There's a bit of inconsistency in your quotations, because in one case you say pooling is "terrific" for combined companies and in the other quotation you claim pooling should only when the acquired company carries on by itself. I will state your Pooling-Preferred (PP) Hypothesis as follows:

    Pooling-Preferred (PP) Hypothesis
    FAS 141 is based upon sophistry. Pooling-of--interest accounting is the best accounting approach when a company is acquired in a stock-for-stock (non-cash) acquisition. Purchase accounting required under FAS 141 is a "case of trying to make an apple into an orange and getting a rotten banana. "

    What I've tried to point out all along is that FAS 141 is not based upon sophistry. It rests on the foundation of countless normative and empirical studies that refute your PP Hypothesis.

    Your only support of the PP Hypothesis is another hypothesis that is stated by you over and over ad nausea for two months as follows:

    Exchanged Shares Non-Value (ESNV) Hypothesis
    T
    he value of the exchanged shares is not an economic value or a "fair appraisal" of the value of the acquired company. 
    Gregg Wilson, April 22, 2006

    In the academy we cannot accept an untested hypothesis as a legitimate test of another hypothesis. Even if we speculate that the ESNV Hypothesis is true, it does not support your PP Hypothesis because it is totally disconnected to the real reason that standard setters and the academic academy no longer want pooling accounting. The "real reason" is that corporations are motivated to want pooling accounting so they can inflate future ROIs and make most all acquisitions look like great deals even though some of them are bad deals from an economic perspective (to say nothing about wanting inflated ROIs to support larger bonuses and sweetened future compensation plans for executives).

    The preponderance of academic research refutes the PP Hypothesis. One of the highlight studies in fact shows that managers may enter into worse deals (in the past when it was legal) just to get pooling accounting.

    Some of the Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2002a) conclusions are as follows:

    We investigate two related questions. What factors influence firms' use of acquisition accounting method, and are firms willing to pay higher acquisition premiums to use the pooling-of-interests accounting method? We analyze a comprehensive sample of nontaxable corporate stock-for-stock acquisitions from 1990 through 1996. We use a two-stage, instrumental variables estimation method that explicitly allows for simultaneity in the choice of accounting method and acquisition premiums. After controlling for economic differences across pooling and purchase transactions, our evidence indicates that financial reporting incentives influence how acquiring firms structure stock-for-stock acquisitions. In addition, our two-stage analysis indicates that higher acquisition premiums are associated with the pooling method. In sum, our evidence suggests that acquiring firms structure acquisitions and expend significant resources to secure preferential accounting treatment in stock-for-stock acquisitions.
    Benjamin C. Ayers , Craig E. Lefanowicz and John R. Robinson, "Do Firms Purchase the Pooling Method?" Review of Accounting Studies Volume 7, Number 1, March 2002 Pages: 5 - 32.

    In fact the above study suggests that pooling accounting creates a worse situation that you speculate in your ESNV Hypothesis. My conclusion is that if we accept your ESNV hypothesis we most certainly would not want pooling accounting due to the above findings of Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson.

    Your alleged support of the PP Hypothesis is your untested ESNV Hypothesis. As mentioned above, you cannot support a hypothesis with an untested hypothesis. Certainly the academy to date has not accepted your ESNV Hypothesis. And even if it did, this hypothesis alone is disconnected to the academic research pointing to why pooling accounting deceives investors.

    Your only support of the ESNV Hypothesis lies in conclusions drawn based upon your own anecdotal experiences. Anecdotal experience is not an acceptable means of hypothesis testing in the academy. Anecdotal evidence can be cherry picked to support most any wild speculation.

    As a result, I recommend the following"

    1. Admit that you do not have sufficient evidence to support your PP Hypothesis. You must otherwise refute a mountain of prior academic evidence that runs counter to the PP Hypothesis.

       

    2. Admit that you do not have sufficient evidence in the academic world to support your ESNV hypothesis. Certainly you've not convinced, to my knowledge, any members of this academic (AECM) forum that virtually all managers are so ignorant of values when putting together stock-for-stock acquisitions.

       

    3. Stop hawking and repeating your anecdotal speculations that are already documented on the Web at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Pooling
      Come back to us only when you have sufficient academic evidence to support your hypotheses.


    April 22, 2006 reply from Henry Collier [henrycollier@aapt.net.au]

    You have been very gentle with Gregg Wilson … I would suggest that we send him to Singapore and subject him to the cane that is so liberally used there to the recalcitrant. He has ‘convinced’ not one it seems. Many of us ‘old timers’ agree with you … perhaps Wilson just doesn’t get it … or perhaps it’s his Warhol’s 15 minutes of fame (or infamy in this case).

    One comment that has always struck me as relevant in business combinations … well perhaps 2 … (1) why would we revalue only the acquired company’s assets to FMV in the combination and (2) why would we bother to recognize ‘goodwill’ at all? In the recognition it seems as though we’ve just ‘paid’ too much for the FMV of the assets … why wouldn’t we just reduce the ‘retained earnings’ of the combination?

    Just my old management accountant’s rant I suppose. Over the years with my approach to the share markets, I’ve found ‘income statements’ and ‘balance sheets’ somewhat less than useful … seems to me that particularly in high risk companies, like pink sheet things being offered / touted on certain websites and through phishing mails, one can obtain both historical and pro-forma I/S and B/S, but seldom any real or projected cash flow information.

    With regards from the land down under …

    Enjoy retirement, I’ve found it very rewarding … thanks for all you’ve done for the profession …

    Henry Collier

    April 23, 2006 reply from  [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU] --

    Bob,

    ---Bob Jensen wrote:

    In my communications with you (Gregg Wilson) regarding pooling-of-interests accounting, I've always focused on what I will term your Pooling-Preferred Hypothesis or PP Hypothesis for short.

    ---

    My exchanges with Gregg Wilson suggests that his discomfort with GAAP goes well beyond the pooling vs. purchase debate. He does not care for the GAAP treatment of simple transactions such as the transfer of shares to employees in lieu of cash compensation. Why argue about (relatively) complicated transactions with someone who does not understand simple ones?

    Richard Sansing

     


    Strange as it may seem a losing company may have more value to someone else than itself

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on April 27, 2006

    TITLE: Alcatel Stands to Reap Tax Benefit on Merger
    REPORTER: Jesse Drucker and Sara Silver
    DATE: Apr 26, 2006
    PAGE: C3
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114601908332236130.html 
    TOPICS: Accounting, International Accounting, Net Operating Losses, Taxation

    SUMMARY: "Lucent's operating losses in [the] wake of [the] tech bubble may allow big deductions" for the merged firm's U.S. operations.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) What is the purpose of allowing net operating losses (NOLs) to be deducted against other years' income amounts?

    2.) Summarize the U.S. tax law provisions regarding NOLs. Why has Lucent been unable to use up all of its NOL carryforwards since the tech bubble burst in 2000-2001?

    3.) Define the term deferred tax assets. Describe how NOLs fit the definition you provide. What other types of deferred tax assets do you think that Lucent has available and wants to take advantage of?

    4.) How is it possible that the "federal, state and local deductions" from the deferred tax assets described in answer to question #3 "will nearly double the U.S. net income that the combined company [of Alcatel and Lucent Technologies] will be able to report"?

    5.) How does the availability of NOL carryforwards, and the expected timing of their deductions based on an acquirer's earnings or the recent tax law change referred to in the article, impact the price an acquirer is willing to pay in a merger or acquisition transaction?

    6.) How did the availability of deferred tax asset deductions drive Alcatel's choice of its location for its headquarters? What other factors do you think drive such a choice?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

     


    From The Wall Street Journal Weekly Accounting Review on April 7, 2006

    TITLE: Takeover of VNU to Begin with Explanation of Price
    REPORTER: Jason Singer
    DATE: Apr 03, 2006
    PAGE: A2
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114405567166415142.html 
    TOPICS: Accounting, Mergers and Acquisitions

    SUMMARY: The article offers an excellent description of the process undertaken by VNU's Board of Directors in deciding to put the company "on the auction block", consider alternative strategies, and finally accept an offer price.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) Describe the transaction agreed to by the Board of VNU NV and its acquirer, AlpInvest Partners.

    2.) What does the current stock price of VNU imply about the takeover transaction? Why do you think that VNU is distributing the 210 page document explaining the transaction and the Board's decision process?

    3.) Connect to the press release dated March 8 through the on-line version of the article. Scroll down to the section covering the "background of the offer." Draw a timeline of the events, using abbreviations that are succinct but understandable.

    4.) What other alternatives did the VNU Board consider rather than selling the company? Why did they decide against each of these alternatives?

    5.) Based on the information in the article and the press releases, do you think the acquirers will obtain value from the investment they are making? Support your answer, including refuting possible arguments against your position.

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    "Takeover of VNU to Begin With Explanation of Price," by Jason Singer, The Wall Street Journal, April 3, 2006 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114405567166415142.html 

    A group of private-equity funds is beginning a $9 billion takeover of Dutch media giant VNU NV with the release of documents that explain for the first time how VNU's board determined the purchase price was high enough.

    In the four weeks since VNU announced it would recommend the private-equity group's offer, many shareholders have accused the company of rushing to sell itself after being forced by investors to abandon a big acquisition last year.

    These critics said that the sale process was halfhearted and that the agreed-upon price too low. Some have said they preferred VNU to break itself up and separately sell the pieces.

    At least two VNU shareholders, including mutual-fund giant Fidelity Investments, have said publicly they are unlikely to support the takeover; many others have said so privately.

    VNU shares have traded far below the agreed per-share offer price of €28.75 ($34.85) since the deal was announced, suggesting the market expects the takeover bid to fail.

    VNU – based in Haarlem, Netherlands, and the world's largest market-research firm by sales – addresses these concerns in the 210-page offer document to be sent to shareholders and outlines in detail the steps it took to ensure the highest value.

    Materials include two fairness opinions written by VNU's financial advisers, one by Credit Suisse Group and the other by NM Rothschild & Sons, evaluating the offer and concluding the price is attractive for shareholders.

    "This was a fully open auction," said Roger Altman, chairman of Evercore Partners, another VNU financial adviser. The company's board fully vetted all options, including a breakup of the business, restructuring opportunities or proceeding with the status quo, he said. "None provided a value as high as €28.75 [a share]. None of them."

    Mr. Altman said that after being contacted by private-equity funds interested in buying VNU after its failed attempt last year to acquire IMS Health Inc., of Fairfield, Conn., VNU auctioned itself, including seeking other strategic or private-equity bidders.

    A second group of private-equity funds explored a possible bid but dropped out when it concluded it couldn't pay as much as the first group said it was prepared to offer. Another potential bidder, a company, withdrew after refusing to sign a confidentiality agreement, VNU's offer document says.

    The initial group, which submitted the only firm bid, consists of AlpInvest Partners of the Netherlands, and Blackstone Group, Carlyle Group, Hellman & Friedman, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. and Thomas H. Lee Partners, all of the U.S. The group formed Valcon Acquisition BV to make the bid.

    Some of the calculations provided in the offer document suggest the company might be valued higher than the Valcon bid price in certain circumstances. The Credit Suisse letter indicates the company could be valued at as much as €29.60 a share based on prices paid for businesses similar to VNU's in the past. It says a "sum of the parts breakup analysis" indicates a range of €25.90 to €29.35.

    The Rothschild letter also shows certain methods of valuing the company reaching as high as €35.80 a share. But both advisers said that when weighed against the many risks in VNU's future, the cash payment being offered now by the Valcon group is the most attractive option for shareholders.

    COMPANIES
    Dow Jon
    VNU N.V. (38987.AE)
      PRICE
    CHANGE
     
    27.49
    0.06
    8:25a.m.

     
     
    Cadbury Schweppes PLC ADS (CSG)
      PRICE
    CHANGE
     
    40.10
    0.07
    4/6

     
     
    IMS Health Inc. (RX)
      PRICE
    CHANGE
     
    25.99
    0.02
    4/6

     

    From The Wall Street Journal Weekly Accounting Review on April 7, 2006

    TITLE: Sign of the Times: A Deal for GMAC by Investor Group
    REPORTER: Dennis K. Berman and Monica Langley
    DATE: Apr 04, 2006
    PAGE: A1 LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114406446238015171.html 
    TOPICS: Accounting, Advanced Financial Accounting, Banking, Bankruptcy, Board of Directors, Financial Accounting, Investments, Mergers and Acquisitions, Spinoffs

    SUMMARY: Cerberus Capital Management LP has led the group who will acquire control of General Motors Acceptance Corp. (GMAC) from GM for $7.4 billion (plus an additional payment from GMAC to GM of $2.7 billion). GM had expected to receive offers for GMAC from big banks. Instead, they received offers from private-equity and hedge funds, like the one from Cerberus. This article follows up on last week's coverage of this topic; the related article identifies how CEO Rick Wagoner is working with his Board to extend time for evaluating his own performance there.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) Describe the transaction GM is undertaking to sell control in GMAC. Specifically, who owns the 51% ownership of GMAC that is being sold? What will happen to the 49% ownership in GMAC following this transaction? To answer the question, you may also refer to the GM statement available through the on-line article link at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114406559238215183.html 

    2.) Again refer to the GM statement on the GMAC deal. In addition to the purchase price, what other cash flows will accrue to GM from this transaction? How do you think these items relate to the fact that GM is selling a 51% interest in GMAC?

    3.) What is the nature of GMAC's business? Specifically describe its "portfolio of loans and lease receivables."

    4.) Why do you think GM expected "...be courted by big banks..." to negotiate a purchase of GMAC? Why do you think that expectation proved wrong, that other entities ended up bidding for GMAC? To answer, consider the point made in the article that even Citigroup, GM's primary bank and a significant player in the ultimate deal, had decided that it couldn't structure a deal that GM wanted from big banks.

    5.) What are the risks associated with the acquisition of GMAC? In particular, comment on the risk associated with GM's possible bankruptcy and its relation to GMAC's business operations.

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    --- RELATED ARTICLES ---
    TITLE: GM's Wagoner Gains Some Time for Turnaround
    REPORTER: Lee Hawkins, Jr., Monica Langley, and Joseph B. White
    PAGE: A1
    ISSUE: Apr 04, 2006
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114411090537615994.html




    OBSF:  Off Balance Sheet Financing

     

    Off-Balance-Sheet Financing --- http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/obsf.asp

    A form of financing in which large capital expenditures are kept off of a company's balance sheet through various classification methods. Companies will often use off-balance-sheet financing to keep their debt to equity (D/E) and leverage ratios low, especially if the inclusion of a large expenditure would break negative debt covenants.

    Contrast to loans, debt and equity, which do appear on the balance sheet. Examples of off-balance-sheet financing include joint ventures, research and development partnerships, and operating leases (rather than purchases of capital equipment).

    Operating leases are one of the most common forms of off-balance-sheet financing. In these cases, the asset itself is kept on the lessor's balance sheet, and the lessee reports only the required rental expense for use of the asset. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in the U.S. have set numerous rules for companies to follow in determining whether a lease should be capitalized (included on the balance sheet) or expensed.

    This term came into popular use during the Enron bankruptcy. Many of the energy traders' problems stemmed from setting up inappropriate off-balance-sheet entities.


    Videos About Off-Balance-Sheet Financing to an Unimaginable Degree

    Truth in Accounting or Lack Thereof in the Federal Government (Former Congressman Chocola) --- http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NWTCnMioaY0 
    Part 2 (unfunded liabilities of $55 trillion plus) --- http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Edia5pBJxE
    Part 3 (this is a non-partisan problem being ignored in election promises) --- http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lG5WFGEIU0E

    Watch the Video of the non-sustainability of the U.S. economy (CBS Sixty Minutes TV Show Video) ---
    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OS2fI2p9iVs 
    Also see "US Government Immorality Will Lead to Bankruptcy" in the CBS interview with David Walker --- http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OS2fI2p9iVs
    Also at Dirty Little Secret About Universal Health Care (David Walker) --- http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KGpY2hw7ao8


    The history of financial reporting is replete with ploys to keep debt from being disclosed in financial statements. If standard setters require disclosures, the history of financial reporting is replete with ploys to keep the disclosed obligations from being booked under the liabilities section of the balance sheet.

    Examples of OBSF ploys in the past and some that still remain as viable means of keeping debt off the balance sheets.


    RBI releases guidelines for Off-Balance Sheet Financing (OBSF) exposures

    Draft Guidelines on Prudential Norms for Off-balance Sheet Exposures of Banks – Capital

    Adequacy, Exposure,

    Asset Classification and Provisioning Norms

    At present, paragraphs 2.4.3 and 2.4.4 of the ‘Master Circular on Prudential Norms on Capital Adequacy’, DBOD.No.BP.BC.4/21.01.002/2007-08 dated July 2, 2007, stipulate the applicable credit conversion factors (CCF) for the foreign exchange and interest-rate related contracts under Basel-I framework. Likewise, paragraph 5.15.4 of our circular on ‘Guidelines for Implementation of the New Capital Adequacy Framework’ DBOD.No.BP.BC. 90/20.06.0001/2006-07 dated April 27, 2007, prescribes the CCFs for these contracts under the Basel-II framework. Further, in terms of paragraph 2.3.2 of the ‘Master Circular on Exposure Norms’, DBOD.No.Dir.BC.11/ 13.03.000/2007-08 dated July 2, 2007, the banks have the option of measuring the credit exposure of derivative products either through the ‘Original Exposure Method’ or ‘Current Exposure Method’.

    2. In accordance with the proposal contained in the paragraph 165 (reproduced in Annex 1) of the Annual Policy Statement for the year 2008-09, released on April 29, 2008, it is proposed to effect the following modifications to the existing instructions on the above aspects:

    2.1 Credit Exposure – Method of computing the credit exposure
    For the purpose of exposure norms, banks shall compute their credit exposures, arising on account of the interest rate & foreign exchange derivative transactions and gold, using the ‘Current Exposure Method’, as detailed in Annex 2.

    2.2 Capital Adequacy – Computation of the credit equivalent amount
    For the purpose of capital adequacy also, all banks, both under Basel-I as well as under Basel-II
    framework, shall use the ‘Current Exposure Method’, as detailed in Annex 2, to compute the credit
    equivalent amount of the interest rate & foreign exchange derivative transactions and gold.

    2.3 Provisioning requirements for derivative exposures
    Credit exposures computed as per the ‘current exposure method’, arising on account of the interest rate &
    foreign exchange derivative transactions, and gold, shall also attract provisioning requirement as
    applicable to the loan assets in the ‘standard’ category, of the concerned counterparties. All conditions
    applicable for treatment of the provisions for standard assets would also apply to the aforesaid provisions
    for derivative and gold exposures.

    2.4 Asset Classification of the receivables under the derivatives transactions
    It is reiterated that, in respect of derivative transactions, any amount receivable by the bank, which
    remains unpaid for a period of 90 days from the specified due date for payment, will be classified as nonperforming
    assets as per the ‘Prudential Norms on Income Recognition, Asset Classification and Provisioning pertaining to the Advances Portfolio’, contained in our Master Circular DBOD. No. BP.BC.12/ 21.04.048/2007-08 dated July 2, 2007.

    2.5 Cash settlement of derivatives contracts
    Any restructuring of the derivatives contracts, including the foreign exchange contracts, shall be carried out only on cash settlement basis.

    3. The foregoing modifications will come into effect from the financial year 2008-09. The banks will, however, have the option of complying with the additional capital and provisioning requirements, arising from these modifications, in a phased manner, over a period of four quarters, ending March 31, 2009.

    Continued in article


    Many executives allegedly misstate earnings upward and debt downward to collect bonuses, stock options, and stock sales before restating earnings later on without having to repay their allegedly ill-gotten gains --- http://aaahq.org/AM2006/display.cfm?Filename=SubID_0847.pdf&MIMEType=application%2Fpdf

    Infectious Greed:  How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets  (Henry Holt and Company, 2003, Page 351, ISBN 0-8050-7510-0)

    The range of financial malfeasance and manipulation was fast. Energy companies, such as Dynegy, El Paso, and Williams, did the same complex financial deals (particularly using SPEs) Andy Fastow engineered at Enron. Telecommunication s firms, such as Global Crossing and WorldCom, fell into bankruptcy after it became clear they, too, had been cooking their books. Financial firms were victims as well as aiders-and-abettors. PNC Financial, a major bank, settled SEC charges that it abused off-balance-sheet deals and recklessly overstated its 2001 earnings by more than half. A rogue trader at Allfirst Financial, a large Irish bank, lost $750 million in a flurry of derivatives trading that put Nick Leeson of Barings to shame. And so on, and so on.

    . . .

    As with the prior financial scandals, substantial losses were related to over-the-counter derivatives. There were prepaid swaps, in which a company received an up-rong payment resembling a loan from a bank, but did not record its future obligations to repay the bank as a liability. There were swaps of Indefeasible Rights of Use, or IRUs, long-term rights to use bandwidth on a telecommunications company's fiber-optic network, which were similar to the long-term energy derivatives Enron traded --- and just as ripe for abuse. And there were more Soecial Purpose Entities, created by Wall Street banks.


    "FSP 140-3: Plugging a Hole in GAAP, or Another Off-Balance Sheet Financing Gimmick?" by Tom Selling, The Accounting Onion, March 4, 2008 --- http://accountingonion.typepad.com/

     I subscribe to a listserv for professors of accounting ( http://pacioli.loyola.edu/aecm/ ) to discuss emerging technologies, pedagogy, and pretty much anything else. One of the recent topics of discussion on the listserv had to do with the impact of accounting complexity on preparing students to become auditors. One participant in the conversation offered up the following quotation from a masters student's paper on the bogus reinsurance transactions between AIG and General Re:

    "When companies are involved in these complicated transactions, auditors often don't have the time, training, or knowledge to spot questionable items. When I audited a financial services company during my internship, I didn't really understand their business let alone the documentation that I was reviewing to ensure that controls were operating properly. So much of the work we conducted was based on mimicking the prior year's work papers that even after levels of review I believe fraud could have easily slipped by." [italics supplied]

    Coincidentally, FASB Staff Position (FSP) FAS140-3, Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets and Repurchase Financing Transactions, has been recently finalized; this student's lament came to my mind while I was attempting to decipher the new accounting rule.

    In order to begin to explain the FSP, you need to know that FAS 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishment of Liabilities, contains criteria that restrict "sale accounting" on transferred financial assets when there is a concurrent purchase agreement. Consequently, “repurchase agreements” (repos) may be subject to "loan accounting" instead of sale accounting. The difference in accounting treatments is as follows: under sale accounting, the asset comes off the balance sheet and is replaced by the proceeds from sale; under loan accounting, the asset stays on the balance sheet, so the credit offset to recognition of the proceeds is to debt. So most significantly, sale accounting is off-balance sheeting financing, and loan accounting is on-balance sheet financing.

    To the financial engineer attempting to defeat the best efforts of investors and/or regulators of financial institutions, loan accounting is a bad thing, and sale accounting is good. So one important for them is how to fabricate an 'arrangement' that gets under FAS 140's fence to permit sale accounting. Thus appears to have been invented by a mortgage REIT a variation on the repo (essentially a round trip for the asset) whereby the financial instrument now makes one more trip back to the original transferee. If you're confused, this picture may help:

    Continued in article (with exhibits)

    Bob Jensen's threads on General Re and AIG are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#MutualFunds

    Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm


    Questions
    Are GE's Recent Restatements Part of Jack Welch's Legacy?

    In this post-Enron and S-OX 404 environment, would a CEO today would so openly express such a blatant disregard for reporting to investors?

    The WSJ article also mentions that in addition to the firing of some division managers (perhaps one or more of the same cookie sharers), the SEC probe lead to the resignation of Phil Ameen, long-time VP and comptroller -- and prime specimen of the accounting equivalent of a wolf in sheep's clothing let loose in the barnyard. (Whew, that was a long way to go for a metaphor!) Believe it or not, Ameen was a member of the FASB's Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) during much of the 1990s.  He was also an active and influential FASB lobbyist.  Separately, out of one side of this mouth came exhortations to simplify accounting, and out of the other side, to ditch simple solutions that might have impaired GE's ability to manage its earnings and reported debt . . .
    Tom Selling, The Accounting Onion, February 18, 2008 --- http://accountingonion.typepad.com/


    Shocking Impact of GASB 45

    Underfunded Pensions, Post-Retirement Obligations, and Other Debt
    Probably the largest form of OBSF is booked debt that is badly understated. Particularly problematic is variable debt that is badly underestimated. For example, a company or a government unit (e.g., city or county) may be obligated to pay medical bills or insurance premiums for retired employees and their families. Until FAS 106 companies did not report these obligations at all. Governmental agencies (not the Federal government) are just not becoming obligated to report such obligations under GASB 45. Accounting rules have been so lax that many of these obligations were never disclosed or disclosed at absurdly low amounts relative to the explosion in the costs of medical care and medical insurance. Pensions had to be booked, but the rules allowed companies to greatly understate the amount of the unfunded debt.

    "A $2-Trillion Fiscal Hole," by Chris Edwards and Jagadeesh Gokhale, The Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2006; Page A18 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116062308693690263.html?mod=opinion&ojcontent=otep

    State and local governments are amassing huge obligations in the form of unfunded retirement benefits for their workers. Aside from underfunded pension plans, governments have also run up large obligations from their retiree health plans. While a new Governmental Accounting Standards Board rule will kick in next year and reveal exactly how large this problem is, we estimate that retiree health benefits are a $1.4 trillion fiscal time bomb.

    The new GASB regulations will require accrual accounting of state and local retiree health benefits, thus revealing to taxpayers the true costs of the large bureaucracies that they fund. We reviewed unfunded health costs across 16 states and 11 local governments that have made actuarial estimates, and found an average accrued liability per covered worker of $135,000. Multiplying that by the number of covered state and local employees in the country yields a total unfunded obligation of $1.4 trillion -- twice the reported underfunding in state and local pension plans at $700 billion.

    To put these costs in context, consider the explicit net debt of state and local governments. According to the Federal Reserve Board, state and local credit market debt has risen rapidly in recent years, from $313 billion in 2001 to $568 billion in 2005. But unfunded obligations from state and local pension and retiree health plans -- about $2 trillion -- are still more than three times this net debt amount.

    The key problem is that the great majority of state and local governments finance their retiree health benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis. In coming years that will create pressure to raise taxes as Baby Boomers age and government employees retire in droves. New Jersey's accrued unfunded obligations in its retiree health plan now stand at $20 billion, and the overall costs of its employee health plan are expected to grow at 18% annually for the next four years.

    To compound the problem, defined-benefit pension and retirement health plans are much more common and generous in the public sector than the private sector. Out of 15.9 million state and local workers, about 65% are covered under retirement health plans, compared to just 24% of workers in large firms in the private sector.

    The prospect of funding $2 trillion of obligations with higher taxes is frightening, especially when you consider that state politicians would be imposing them on the same income base as federal politicians trying to finance massive shortfalls in Social Security and Medicare. Hopefully, most state policy makers appreciate that hiking taxes in today's highly competitive global economy is a losing proposition.

    The only good options are to cut benefits and move state and local retirement plans to a pre-funded basis with personal savings plans. Two states, Alaska and Michigan, have moved to savings-based (defined-contribution) pension plans for their new employees. Alaska has also implemented a health-care plan for new state employees, which includes high-deductible insurance and a Health Savings Account. Expect to see more states following Alaska's lead.

    State and local governments also need to cut retirement benefits, which were greatly expanded during the 1990s boom. From a fairness perspective, cutting benefits especially of younger workers is reasonable given the generosity of state and local plans. Federal data shows that state and local governments spend an average of $3.91 per hour worked on employee health benefits, compared to $1.72 in the private sector.

    Underfunded -- or more accurately, over-promised -- retirement plans for state and local workers have created a $2 trillion fiscal hole. Every year that policy makers put off the tough decisions, the hole gets bigger. Hopefully, the new GASB rules will prompt them to enact the reforms needed to avert job-destroying tax increases on the next generation.

    Mr. Edwards is tax policy director at the Cato Institute. Mr. Gokhale is a senior fellow at Cato and a former senior economic adviser to the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.


    Question
    What is the new European accounting ploy (termed the 2007 Accounting Miracle) to hide debt until the instant it becomes due?

     

     

    "Italy's Accounting Miracle," by Tito Boeri and Guido Tabellini, The Wall Street Journal, November 28, 2006 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116466953696233804.html?mod=opinion&ojcontent=otep

     

    The latest murky accounting ploy has received the European Union's stamp of approval. As of 2007, Italy will be able to reduce its official budget deficit with the cash proceeds of new liabilities. The new debt will remain hidden until it comes due. If this is how the EU's revised Stability and Growth Pact will work, it would be wiser to scrap the budget rules altogether. At least then national capitals would not be so tempted to artificially reduce their budget deficits, and citizens would be better informed about the true state of public finances.

    Here's how the new gimmick works. Under current Italian law, employees must set aside a tax-exempt fraction of their gross wages, nearly 7%, into a severance scheme called TFR. Instead of creating personal accounts for their employees, each company collects the money in one large fund. When an employee leaves the firm, he receives the money he paid into the fund plus interest, currently about 3%. The TFR is thus debt that companies owe to their employees. That's why firms list it as liabilities in their financial statements.

    Under the new Italian budget law, though, part of the contributions to this severance scheme will be collected and held by Italy's social security administration to finance public expenditures. When the employee leaves his job or has health problems, the government, rather than the employer, will disburse his severance payments. The bottom line is that, by receiving the contributions for this new, implicit debt, the Italian government expects to reduce its yearly budget deficit by almost 0.5% of GDP. A debt instrument has miraculously become a surplus.

    This bookkeeping equivalent of turning water into wine is possible because EU accounting rules for government finances are much looser than the rules that the same governments apply to private firms. The bloc's statistics service, Eurostat, does not consider the future obligations implicit in public pensions as part of government liabilities. Hence, the transfer of the TFR to the Italian social security system is treated like the creation of a new pay-as-you go system.

    The Stability Pact's 2005 reform, though, specifically encourages Brussels to pay special attention to fiscal sustainability in the long run, and in particular to the future liabilities implicit in the pension systems. The Commission, however, has paid lip service to the principle of long-run sustainability, while in practice is giving its blessing to the Italian accounting miracle. In so doing, it has shown that the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact will not be enforced.

    This creates a dangerous precedent that other member states might be tempted to follow. Germany, for instance, has a "book reserve" system similar to the Italian TFR that automatically applies to a significant portion of its work force. The contributions to the German system are even more attractive as a potential source of government finance since, unlike the TFR, they can only be claimed by the workers upon retirement. Many other Europeans countries have sizable occupational pension plans. The EU is implicitly saying that the proceeds from nationalizing these plans can be used to meet its budget deficit targets. Firms in financial difficulties with occupational pension plans are always tempted to transfer to the state their pension liabilities, together with the annual contributions to the fund. Now myopic governments will have an additional incentive to meet these requests for "state aid." Public revenues increase immediately, while the debt disappears once it is transferred to the public sector.

    Europe's public finances can ill afford these kinds of miracles.

    Messrs. Boeri and Tabellini are economics professors at Bocconi University in Milan.


    This could make a good case study for an accounting theory course

     

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on December 8, 2006

     

    TITLE: Making Use of Frequent-Flier Miles Gets Harder
    REPORTER: Scott McCartney
    DATE: Dec 05, 2006
    PAGE: D5
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116528094651740654.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac 
    TOPICS: Accounting, Auditing

    SUMMARY: The Department of Transportation (DOT) has undertaken audit procedures on airlines to review how they are "living up to their 1999 'Customer Service Commitment.'" This document was written when "airlines were under pressure from Congress and consumers for lousy service and long delays" in order to "stave off new legislation regulating their business." The airlines also report little about the frequent flier mile plans they offer, and particularly focus only on the financial aspects of these plans in their annual reports and SEC filings, rather than, say, information about ease of redeeming miles in which customers may be particularly interested.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) What information do airlines provide about frequent flier mileage offerings and redemptions in their annual reports and SEC filings?

    2.) Why is this information important for financial statement users? In your answer, describe your understanding of the business model and accounting for frequent flier miles, based on the description in the article.

    3.) Why did the Department of Transportation (DOT) undertake a review of airline practices? What type of audit would you say that the DOT performed?

    4.) What audit procedures did the airlines abandon due to financial exigencies? What was the result of abandoning these audit procedures? In your answer, describe the incentives provided by the act of undertaking audit procedures on operational efficiencies and effectiveness.

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    "Making Use of Frequent-Flier Miles Gets Harder Falling Redemption Rate Is One of Many Service Issues, Government Report Find," by Scott McCartney, The Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2006; Page D5 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116528094651740654.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac

     

     

  • Which airline is the most accommodating when it comes to letting consumers cash in frequent-flier mileage awards? It's hard to know, a new government report says, because airlines disclose so little information.

    One thing is clear: Over the past four years, the percentage of travelers cashing in frequent-flier award tickets has declined at four of the five biggest airlines, even though miles accumulated by consumers have increased.

    The Department of Transportation's inspector general went back and checked how airlines were living up to their 1999 "Customer Service Commitment." Back then, airlines were under pressure from Congress and consumers for lousy service and long delays, and they promised reform to stave off new legislation regulating their business.

    Seven years later, Inspector General Calvin L. Scovel III found that under financial pressure, many airlines quit auditing or quality control checks on their own customer service, leading to service deterioration. Airlines don't provide enough training for employees who assist passengers with disabilities, the investigation found, and don't always follow rules when handling passengers who get bumped from flights.

    And as travelers have long complained, government auditors studying 15 carriers at 17 airports found airline employees often don't provide timely and accurate information on flight delays and their causes, and don't give consumers straightforward information about frequent-flier award redemptions.

    "They can do better and must do better, and if they don't do better, Congress has authority to wield a big stick," said U.S. Rep John Mica, the outgoing chairman of the House Aviation Subcommittee who requested the inspector general's customer-service investigation. He said he's eager to hear the airline industry's response before making final judgments, but the report card gives airlines only "average to poor grades in a range of areas that need improvement."

    Since airlines are returning to profitability and aggressively raising fares, there's more attention being paid to customer-service issues. Delays have increased; baggage handling worsened. As traffic has rebounded, airlines still under financial pressure because of high oil prices may not have adequate staff to live up to the promises they made on customer service.

    The report called on the DOT to "strengthen its oversight and enforcement of air-traveler consumer-protection rules" and urged airlines to get back on the stick for customer service. The inspector general also reminded consumers that since airlines incorporated the customer-service commitment into their "contract of carriage" -- the legal rules governing tickets -- carriers can be sued for not living up to their customer-service commitment.

    The industry says it is paying attention. The inspector general's Nov. 21 report "is a good report card for reminding us where we need to improve," said David Castelveter, a spokesman for the Air Transport Association, the industry's lobbying group, which coordinated the "Customer Service Commitment." Airlines will "react accordingly," he said.

    One of the stickiest areas is frequent-flier redemptions because airlines are loath to release detailed information about their programs, considering it crucial competitive information. Frequent-flier programs have become big money-makers for airlines since they sell so many miles in advance to credit-card companies, merchants, charities and others. That allows them to pocket cash years in advance of a ticket, then incur very little expense when consumers eventually redeem the miles, if they ever do.

    In 1999, airlines pledged to publish "annual reports" on frequent-flier redemptions. But at most carriers, the disclosure didn't change at all. Today, as then, carriers typically bury numbers deep in filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission and report only the number of awards issued, the estimated liability they have for the cost of awards earned but not yet redeemed and the number of awards as a percentage either of passengers or passenger miles traveled.

    The inspector general said the hard-to-find information has only "marginal value to the consumer for purposes of determining which frequent-flier program best meets their need."

    What you'd really want to know is which airline makes it easiest to get an award, particularly the cheapest domestic coach ticket, typically 25,000 miles, which is the most popular award. But airlines don't disclose how many awards are at the lowest level, and how many consumers have to pay double miles or so for a premium award of an "unrestricted" coach ticket.

    The award market follows ticket prices and availability, so recent years have seen an increase in the price people have to pay to get the awards they want, and less availability of award seats, particularly at the cheapest level, because some airlines have cut capacity and demand for travel has been strong. Add in the flood of miles airlines are issuing, and the value of a frequent-flier mile has declined sharply.

    The inspector general's report compares award-redemption rates at big airlines over the past four years and found a relatively steady drop at four carriers: UAL Corp.'s United Airlines, Continental Airlines Inc., AMR Corp.'s American Airlines and Northwest Airlines Corp. US Airways Group Inc. actually saw higher rates of redemption in 2005 than in 2002, and Delta Air Lines Inc. was unchanged. Both Delta and US Airways had higher redemption rates than competitors.

    to claim short-trip tickets, adding more seats to award inventory this fall and offering a new credit card with easier redemption features. Northwest said its numbers have remained relatively consistent -- roughly one in every 12 seats is a reward seat.

    Other airlines said declining redemption rates result from factors including an increase in paying customers, fuller planes and shifts in airline capacity. American says the number of awards it has issued has remained fairly constant, and while the number of passengers it carries has climbed, its seat capacity hasn't. In addition, several airlines said customer preferences like using miles for first-class upgrades or hoarding miles longer to land big international trips can affect the redemption rate. "Reward traffic does not spool up and absorb capacity increases as fast as revenue traffic does," said a Continental spokesman.

    Those numbers don't include awards that their customers redeem on partner airlines, so some of the decline could be attributable to an increase in consumers' opting to grab award seats on foreign airlines or other partners, says frequent-flier expert Randy Petersen. American, for example, does disclose more redemption data on its Web site and showed that last year, it issued more than 955,000 awards for travel on its partners, compared with the 2.6 million used on American and American Eagle flights.

    "The data can be misleading," said Mr. Petersen, founder of InsideFlyer.com. He'd like to see more data, including numbers on how many customers made requests but couldn't find seats.

    But further disclosure is unlikely to happen unless the government forces it. "Left to their own devices," said Tim Winship, publisher of FrequentFlier.com, "I see no reason to expect airlines to step up and disclose more."


  •  

    Insurance:  A Scheme for Hiding Debt That Won't Go Away

    The SEC and Eliot Spitzer have launched probes into sales by insurance firms of products that help customers burnish results.  Industry executives say companies can reap distinct accounting benefits by obtaining loans dressed up as insurance products. Under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, companies are allowed to use insurance recoveries to offset losses on their income statements -- often without disclosing them. To qualify as insurance under the accounting rules, financial contracts must involve a significant transfer of risk from one party to another.

    "Fresh Probes Target Insurers' Earnings Role," by Theo Francis and Jonathan Weil, The Wall Street Journal, November 8, 2004, Page C1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB109988032427267296,00.html?mod=home_whats_news_us 

    The Securities and Exchange Commission and New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer each have launched investigations into sales by insurance companies of questionable financial products that help customers burnish their financial statements, according to people familiar with the matter.

    The SEC's enforcement division is conducting an industrywide investigation into whether a variety of insurance companies may have helped customers improperly smooth their earnings by selling them financial-engineering products that were designed to look like insurance but in some cases were little more than loans in disguise, people familiar with the matter say. The agency is focusing on a universe of products that are intended to achieve desired accounting results for customers' financial statements, as opposed to traditional insurance, whose primary goal is transferring risk of losses from a policyholder to the insurer selling the coverage.

    Meanwhile, New York state investigators are preparing to issue subpoenas as soon as this week to several large insurance companies. After months of combing through industry documents in its continuing probe of insurance-broker compensation, Mr. Spitzer's office has grown increasingly concerned about insurance-industry products, detailed in The Wall Street Journal last month, that customers can use to manipulate their income statements and balance sheets.

    Although Mr. Spitzer's office and the SEC began looking into the issue separately, they have discussed sharing information and resources, according to a person familiar with the probes.

    Normally, an insurer is paid a specific amount of premiums to take on a risk of uncertain size and timing. In the "insurance" at issue, the risk of loss to the insurer selling the policy is limited and sometimes even eliminated -- partly because, in these policies' simplest form, the premiums are so high; other times, the loss already has occurred.

    Industry executives say companies can reap distinct accounting benefits by obtaining loans dressed up as insurance products. Under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, companies are allowed to use insurance recoveries to offset losses on their income statements -- often without disclosing them. To qualify as insurance under the accounting rules, financial contracts must involve a significant transfer of risk from one party to another.

    Continued in the article

    Insurance companies historically have been rancid with white collar crime and consumer rip offs.  Bob Jensen's threads on insurance company scandals are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudRotten.htm#Insurance



    Off-Balance-Sheet Entities: The Good, The Bad And The Ugly - This article defines some typical off-balance-sheet items and discusses when they are justified and when they are misleading.

    The Good
    Off-balance-sheet companies were created to help finance new ventures. Theoretically, these separate companies were used to transfer the risk of the new venture from the parent to the separate company. This way, the parent could finance the new venture without diluting existing shareholders or adding to the parent's debt burden. These separate legal entities could be privately held partnerships or publicly traded spin-offs.

    Sometimes the separate companies were created to pursue a business project that was a part of the parent's main line of business. For example, oil-drilling companies established off-balance-sheet subsidiaries as a way to finance oil exploration projects. These subsidiaries were jointly funded by the parent and outside investors who were willing to take the exploration risk. The parent company could have sold shares or borrowed the money directly, but the accounting and tax laws were designed to allow the project funding come from investors who were interested in investing in specific explorations rather than investing in the parent company.

    Other times these separate companies were created to house businesses that were decidedly different from the parent's line of work (in order to unlock "value"). For example, Williams Co's, created Williams Communications to pursue the communications business. Williams Companies spun off Williams Communications, but the bankers required the parent to guarantee the debt of Williams Communications. Because Williams Communications was a new company, this is not an unusual request.

    This use of off-balance-sheet entities is good in that it transfers risk from the parent's shareholders to others that were willing to take the business risk. Investors in Williams Companies (an energy resource company) may not have wanted to invest in a communications company, so management created a separate entity to house that business. Likewise, oil companies used off-balance-sheet entities to remove the exploration risk from their business to share it with others that wanted a bigger piece of the potential return from exploration.

    The Bad
    While GAAP and tax laws allow off-balance-sheet entities for valid reasons noted above, bad things happen when economic reality differs significantly from the assumptions that were used to justify the off-balance-sheet entity. Problems also occur when egos get too big.

    In Williams's case, the decision to spin off the communications business was reasonable at the time. The parent had the infrastructure on which to build a communications network, but it was an energy company. By spinning off the subsidiary, it was not forcing its investors to take on the risk of a communications company, and it was able to take advantage of the market's demand for communication stocks. At the same time, the need to guarantee the debt of a new subsidiary is a reasonable request that bankers make in this type of transaction.

    What went "wrong" was that economic reality differed from the assumptions that were used to justify the spin off. Dotcom mania resulted in over-capacity, causing problems for all telecommunications companies. The loan guarantee, which is never expected to be triggered, is now an issue for the company because of the recession and the slump in the telecommunications sector.

    Enron exemplifies how ego can be the basis for the misuse of off-balance-sheet items. Here, off-balance-sheet vehicles appear to have been used to pump up financial results rather than for legitimate business purposes. What started as a plan to legitimately use off-balance-sheet vehicles morphed into ways to manufacture earnings as trades went bad. While one could argue that this is also a case of economic reality differing from expectations, the way management reacted to the situation allows us to classify it as an ego thing.

    This financial engineering is usually fueled by the need to reach certain operating targets established by Wall Street or compensation plans. Once management succumbs to this "Dark Side", more time is spent on trying to game the system than trying to manage the core business. It is then only a matter of time before the house of cards falls.

    The Ugly
    It gets ugly when the markets start to punish a stock just because it has an off-balance-sheet item. Granted, it is not always easy to read a company's SEC filings, let alone dig into the footnotes and figure out how the off-balance-sheet items might impact results. But the companies that provide full disclosure will probably be the better investments.

    Conclusion The loss of faith in accounting's ability to provide full disclosure could have a bigger impact on the stock market than the events of September 11th. The attacks were an exogenous factor and we bounced back nicely. The loss of confidence in financial statements is an attack on one of the core elements of investment decision making. To quote Johnny Cochran, "If the statements aren't true, what will we do?"

    However, the focus on off-balance-sheet accounting will have two major benefits. First, it will result in new regulations that will hopefully prevent future Enrons. Some of these changes will likely be the following:

    Prevention of officers of the parent from being officers of the off-balance-sheet subsidiary

    Increasing the percentage ownership by outside and non-affiliated companies

    Enforcing disclosure rules so that investors can clearly understand the risk (if any) posed by off-balance-sheet companies Second, market over-reaction creates a buying opportunity. Markets always overreact, causing panic in the Street. Uncertainty created by the loss of faith in financial disclosures could even cause more damage to the market than extreme events like September 11th.

    Bob Jensen's threads on VIE's (SPEs) are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm



    Uncovering Hidden Debt - Understand how financing through operating leases, synthetic leases, and securitizations affects companies' image of performance.

    Is the company whose stock you own carrying more debt than the balance sheet is showing? Most of the information about debt can be found on the balance sheet--but many debt obligations are not disclosed there. Here is a review of some off-balance-sheet transactions and what they mean for investors.

    The term "off-balance-sheet" debt has recently come under the spotlight. The reason, of course, is Enron, which used underhanded techniques to shift debt off its balance sheet, making the company's fundamentals look far stronger than they were. That said, not all off–balance-sheet finance is shady. In fact, it can be a useful tool that all sorts of companies can use for a variety of legitimate purposes--such as tapping into extra sources of financing and reducing liability risk that could hurt earnings.

    As an investor, it's your job to understand the differences between various off-balance-sheet transactions. Has the company really reduced its risk by shifting the burden of debt to another company, or has it simply come up with a devious way of eliminating a liability from its balance sheet?

    Operating Leases
    A lot of investors don't know that there are two kinds of leases: capital leases, which show up on the balance sheet, and operating leases, which do not.

    Under accounting rules, a capital lease is treated like a purchase. Let's say an airline company buying an airplane sets up a long-term payment lease plan and pays for the airplane over time. Since the airline will ultimately own the plane, it shows up on its books as an asset, and the lease obligations show up as liabilities.

    If the airline sets up an operating lease, the leasing group retains ownership of the plane; therefore, the transaction does not appear on the airline's balance sheet. The lease payments appear as operating expenses instead. Operating leases, which are popular in industries that use expensive equipment, are disclosed in the footnotes of the company's published financial statements.

    Consider Federal Express Corp. In its 2004 annual report, the balance sheet shows liabilities totaling $11.1 billion. But dig deeper, and you will notice in the footnotes that Federal Express discloses $XX worth of non-cancelable operating leases. So, the company's total debt is clearly much higher than what's listed on the balance sheet. Since operating leases keep substantial liabilities away from plain sight, they have the added benefit of boosting--artificially, critics say--key performance measures such as return-on-assets and debt-to-capital ratios.

    The accounting differences between capital and operating leases impact the cash flow statement as well as the balance sheet. Payments for operating leases show up as cash outflows from operations. Capital lease payments, by contrast, are divided between operating activities and financing activities. Therefore, firms that use capital leases will typically report higher cash flows from operations than those that rely on operating leases.

    Synthetic Leases
    Building or buying an office building can load up a company's debt on the balance sheet. A lot of businesses therefore avoid the liability by using synthetic leases to finance their property: a bank or other third party purchases the property and rents it to the company. For accounting purposes, the company is treated like a tenant in a traditional operating lease. So, neither the building asset nor the lease liability appears on the firm's balance sheet. However, a synthetic lease, unlike a traditional lease, gives the company some benefits of ownership, including the right to deduct interest payments and the depreciation of the property from its tax bill.

    Details about synthetic leases normally appear in the footnotes of financial statements, where investors can determine their impact on debt. Synthetic leases can become a big worry for investors when the footnotes reveal that the company is responsible for not only making lease payments but also guaranteeing property values. If property prices fall, those guarantees represent a big source of liability risk.

    Securitizations
    Banks and other financial organizations often hold assets--like credit card receivables--that third parties might be willing to buy. To distinguish the assets it sells from the ones it keeps, the company creates a special purpose entity (SPE). The SPE purchases the credit card receivables from the company with the proceeds from a bond offering backed by the receivables themselves. The SPE then uses the money received from cardholders to repay the bond investors. Since much of the credit risk gets offloaded along with the assets, these liabilities are taken off the company's balance sheet.

    Capital One is just one of many credit card issuers that securitize loans. In its 2004 first quarter report, the bank highlights results of its credit card operations on a so-called managed basis, which includes $38.4 billion worth of off-balance-sheet securitized loans. The performance of Capital One's entire portfolio, including the securitized loans, is an important indicator of how well or poorly the overall business is being run.

    Conclusion
    Companies argue that off-balance-sheet techniques benefit investors because they allow management to tap extra sources of financing and reduce liability risk that could hurt earnings. That's true, but off-balance-sheet finance also has the power to make companies and their management teams look better than they are. Although most examples of off-balance sheet debt are far removed from the shadowy world of Enron's books, there are nonetheless billions of dollars worth of real financial liabilities that are not immediately apparent in companies' financial reports. It's important for investors to get the full story on company liabilities.



    Show and Tell: The Importance of Transparency  - Clear and honest financial statements not only reflect value, they also help ensure it.

    Ask investors what kind of financial information they want companies to publish and you'll probably hear two words: more and better. Quality financial reports allow for effective, informative fundamental analysis.

    But let's face it, the financial statements of some firms are designed to hide rather than reveal information. Investors should steer clear of companies that lack transparency in their business operations, financial statements or strategies. Companies with inscrutable financials and complex business structures are riskier and less valuable investments.

    Transparency Is Assurance The word "transparent" can be used to describe high-quality financial statements. The term has quickly become a part of business vocabulary. Dictionaries offer many definitions for the word, but those synonyms relevant to financial reporting are "easily understood", "very clear", "frank", and "candid".

    Consider two companies with the same market capitalization, same overall market-risk exposure, and the same financial leverage. Assume that both also have the same earnings, earnings growth rate and similar returns on capital. The difference is that Company A is a single-business company with easy-to-understand financial statements. Company B, by contrast, has numerous businesses and subsidiaries with complex financials.

    Which one will have more value? Odds are good the market will value Company A more highly. Because of its complex and opaque financial statements, Company B's value will be discounted.

    The reason is simple: less information means less certainty for investors. When financial statements are not transparent, investors can never be sure about a company's real fundamentals and true risk. For instance, a firm's growth prospects are related to how it invests. It's difficult if not impossible to evaluate a company's investment performance if its investments are funneled through holding companies, making them hidden from view. Lack of transparency may also obscure the company's level of debt. If a company hides its debt, investors can't estimate their exposure to bankruptcy risk.

    High-profile cases of financial shenanigans, such as those at Enron and Tyco, showed everyone that managers employ fuzzy financials and complex business structures to hide unpleasant news. Lack of transparency can mean nasty surprises to come.

    Blurry Vision The reasons for inaccurate financial reporting are varied: a small but dangerous minority of companies actively intends to defraud investors; other companies may release information that is misleading but technically conforms to legal standards.

    The rise of stock option compensation has increased the incentives for companies to misreport key information. Companies have increased their reliance on pro forma earnings and similar techniques, which can include hypothetical transactions. Then again, many companies just find it difficult to present financial information that complies with fuzzy and evolving accounting standards.

    Furthermore, some firms are simply more complex than others. Many operate in multiple businesses that often have little in common. For example, analyzing General Electric - an enormous conglomerate with dozens of businesses, from GE Plastics to NBC - is more challenging than examining the financials of a firm like Amazon.com, a pure play online retailer.

    When firms enter new markets or businesses, the way they structure these new businesses can result in greater complexity and less transparency. For instance, a firm that keeps each business separate will be easier to value than one that squeezes all the businesses into a single entity. Meanwhile, the increasing use of derivatives, forward sales, off-balance-sheet financing, complex contractual arrangements and new tax vehicles can befuddle investors.

    The cause of poor transparency, however, is less important than its effect on a company's ability to give investors the critical information they need to value their investments. If investors neither believe nor understand financial statements, the performance and fundamental value of that company remains either irrelevant or distorted.

    Transparency Pays
    Mounting evidence suggests that the market gives a higher value to firms that are upfront with investors and analysts. Transparency pays, according to Robert Eccles, author of "Building Public Trust – The Value Reporting Revolution". Eccles shows that companies with fuller disclosure win more trust from investors. Relevant and reliable information means less risk to investors and thus a lower cost of capital, which naturally translates into higher valuations. The key finding is that companies that share the key metrics and performance indicators that investors consider important are more valuable than those companies that keep information to themselves.

    Of course, there are two ways to interpret this evidence. One is that the market rewards more transparent companies with higher valuations because the risk of unpleasant surprises is believed to be lower. The other interpretation is that companies with good results usually release their earnings earlier. Companies that are doing well have nothing to hide and are eager to publicize their good performance as widely as possible. It is in their interest to be transparent and forthcoming with information, so that the market can upgrade their fair value.

    Further evidence suggests that the tendency among investors to mark down complexity explains the conglomerate discount. Relative to single-market or pure play firms, conglomerates are discounted by as much as 20%. The positive reaction associated with spin-offs and divestment can be viewed as evidence that the market rewards transparency.

    Naturally, there could be other reasons for the conglomerate discount. It could be the lack of focus of these companies and the inefficiencies that follow. Or it could be that the absence of market prices for the separate businesses makes it harder for investors to assess value.

    It's worth noting that, even if a company's financial statements are totally transparent, investors may still not understand them. If biotech specialist Amgen and semiconductor maker Intel were totally forthcoming about their R&D spending, investors might still lack the knowledge to properly value these companies.

    Conclusion
    Investors should seek disclosure and simplicity. The more companies say about where they are making money and how they are spending their resources, the more confident investors can be about the companies' fundamentals.

    It's even better when financial reports provide a line-of-sight view into the company's growth drivers. Transparency makes analysis easier and thus lowers an investor's risk when investing in stocks. That way you, the investor, are less likely to face unpleasant surprises.


    FASB Issues FAS 163 "Accounting for Financial Guarantee Insurance Contracts"--- http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas163.pdf

    From the AccountingWeb on May 27, 2008 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=105224

    Last week The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued FASB Statement No. 163, Accounting for Financial Guarantee Insurance Contracts. The new standard clarifies how FASB Statement No. 60, Accounting and Reporting by Insurance Enterprises, applies to financial guarantee insurance contracts issued by insurance enterprises, including the recognition and measurement of premium revenue and claim liabilities. It also requires expanded disclosures about financial guarantee insurance contracts. The Statement is effective for financial statements issued for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2008, and all interim periods within those fiscal years, except for disclosures about the insurance enterprise's risk-management activities. Disclosures about the insurance enterprise's risk-management activities are effective the first period beginning after issuance of the Statement. "By issuing Statement 163, the FASB has taken a major step toward ending inconsistencies in practice that have made it difficult for investors to receive comparable information about an insurance enterprise's claim liabilities," stated FASB Project Manager Mark Trench. "Its issuance is particularly timely in light of recent concerns about the financial health of financial guarantee insurers, and will help bring about much needed transparency and comparability to financial statements."

    The accounting and disclosure requirements of Statement 163 are intended to improve the comparability and quality of information provided to users of financial statements by creating consistency, for example, in the measurement and recognition of claim liabilities. Statement 163 requires that an insurance enterprise recognize a claim liability prior to an event of default (insured event) when there is evidence that credit deterioration has occurred in an insured financial obligation. It also requires disclosure about (a) the risk-management activities used by an insurance enterprise to evaluate credit deterioration in its insured financial obligations and (b) the insurance enterprise's surveillance or watch list.




    2001
    Infectious Greed:  How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets
      (Henry Holt and Company, 2003, Pages 385 &389, ISBN 0-8050-7510-0)

    The second type of credit derivative --- the Collateralized Debt Obligation  (CDO) --- posed even greater dangers to the global economy. In a standard CDO, a financial institution sold debt (loans or bonds) to a Special Purpose Entity, which then split the debt into p9ces by issuing new securities linked to each piece. Some of the pieces were of higher quality; some were of lower quality. The credit-rating agencies gave investment-grade ratings to all except the lowest-quality piece. By 2002, there were more than a half a trillion dollars of CDOs.

    . . .

    .No one had paid much attention to the first warning that CDOs threatened the health of the global economy. In July 2001 --- two months before Jeff Slilling had resigned from Enron, and long before investors learned about the accounting problems at Global Crossing and WorldCom --- American Express, the U.S. financial services conglomerate had calmly announced that it would take an $825 million pretax charge to write down the value of investments in high-yield bonds and Collateralized Debt Obligations. It all sounded much too esoteric to matter to average investors. The media brushed off the details by focusing on the junk bonds involved in the various deals, and commentators seem to agree that theese losses were just a minor consequence of the explosion of financial innovation.

    . . .

    Then there was the stunning public admission by the chairman of American Express, Kenneth Cheault, that his firm "did not comprehend the risk" of these investments.  What?

     

     

    Question
    What are CDOs?
    Should they be booked?
    Why were they particularly troublesome in the Year 2007?

    CDO --- Click Here

    Accounting for CDOs (including journal entries) under U.S. and Foreign GAAP --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/TheoryOnFirmCommitments.htm

    Why were CDOs particularly troublesome in the Year 2007?
    The accounting standards are not resolved on whether or not CDOs should be booked.
    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on November 30, 2007

    Citi's $41 Billion Issue: Should It Put CDOs On the Balance Sheet?
    by David Reilly
    The Wall Street Journal
    Nov 26, 2007
    Page: C1
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
    ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119604238679603556.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac

     

    TOPICS: Accounting, CDO, Collateralized Debt Obligations, Consolidated Financial Statements, Consolidations, Financial Accounting, Reconsideration Events

    SUMMARY: Does Citigroup need to bring $41 billion in potentially shaky securities onto its balance sheet? Opinions are divided, reflecting a wider debate over how to interpret accounting rules on off-balance-sheet treatment for some financing vehicles.

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: This article offers a good basis for discussion of CDOs, possible consolidation of CDOs, and the balance sheet presentation of CDOs based on the rules related to "reconsideration events."

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) What are CDOs? What are the recent problems connected with CDOs? What is the cause of these problems? In general, why are they especially a concern for Citigroup?

    2.) What is the specific issue facing Citigroup, as detailed in the article?

    3.) What are the accounting rules regarding consolidation of CDOs? How do banks avoid having to consolidate?

    4.) Why is there controversy over the how the losses should be booked by the bank? What is the potentially vague part of the rules?

    5.) What position does Citigroup take? What position are some accounting experts taking? Is either side getting support from other parties? If so, from whom?

    6.) With what position do you agree? How did you reach this conclusion? Please offer support from your answer.
     

    Reviewed By: Linda Christiansen, Indiana University Southeast
     

    RELATED ARTICLES: 
    Why Citi Struggles to Tally Losses
    by Carrick Mollenkamp and David Reilly
    Nov 05, 2007
    Page: C1

    The Nine Lives of CDOs
    by
    Nov 26, 2007
    Page: C10

    Goldman Says Citigroup Faces $15 Billion CDO Write-Downs
    by Kimberly A. Vlach
    Nov 20, 2007
    Online Exclusive
     

    "Citi's $41 Billion Issue: Should It Put CDOs On the Balance Sheet?" by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, November 26, 2007; Page C1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119604238679603556.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac

    A $41 billion question mark is hanging over Citigroup Inc.

    That is the amount, in a worst-case scenario, of potentially shaky securities the bank would need to bring onto its balance sheet. Citi has already taken billions of dollars of such securities onto its balance sheet and expects to take big write-downs on those holdings.

    The fate of the $41 billion rests on the outcome of a debate going on in accounting circles over what constitutes a "reconsideration event." Those who say Citi needs to put these securities, known as collateralized debt obligations, onto its balance sheet argue that because Citi acted over the summer to backstop some of them, its relationship with them changed, prompting a reconsideration event.

    At the moment, it seems unlikely Citigroup will be forced to bring the assets onto its books. The bank doesn't believe such a reconsideration event is in order. A spokeswoman says Citigroup is confident its "financial statements fully comply with all applicable rules and regulations."

    But the division of opinion reflects debate within accounting circles over just how to interpret rules that govern off-balance-sheet treatment for some financing vehicles. That, in turn, underscores what many consider to be a failure of these rules to ensure that investors in the companies that create these vehicles are adequately informed of the risks posed by them.

    In recent months, investors have been shocked to learn that many banks were exposed to big losses because of their involvement with vehicles that issued commercial paper and purchased risky assets such as mortgage securities. The troubles facing one kind of off-balance-sheet entity, known as structured investment vehicles, have even prompted Citigroup and other major banks to organize a rescue fund.

    But CDO vehicles created by Citigroup have proved to be a more immediate threat. The bank's announcement this month that it expects to take $8 billion to $11 billion in write-downs in the fourth quarter largely stems from its exposure to CDO assets. Citigroup was one of the biggest arrangers of CDOs -- products that pool debt, often mortgage securities, and then sell slices with varying degrees of risk.

    If Citigroup had to include an additional $41 billion in CDO assets on its books, that could potentially spur a further $8 billion in write-downs, above and beyond those already signaled, according to a report earlier this month by Howard Mason, an analyst at Sanford C. Bernstein. Such losses could further weaken Citigroup's capital position, threatening its dividend or forcing the bank to raise money.

    The issue for Citigroup is when, and if, it has to reconsider consolidation of the CDO vehicles it sponsors.

    Like other banks, Citigroup structured these vehicles so they wouldn't be included on its books. The vehicles are created as corporate zombies that ostensibly aren't owned or controlled by anyone. In that case, accounting rules say consolidation of such vehicles is determined by who holds the majority of risks and rewards connected to them.

    To deal with that, banks sell off the riskiest pieces of the vehicles. This ensures they don't shoulder a majority of the risk and so don't have to consolidate the vehicles. The assessment of who absorbs the majority of losses is made when the vehicles are created.

    Over time, though, rising losses within a vehicle can lead a sponsor to shoulder more risk, or even a majority of it. That can also happen if a sponsor takes on additional interests in the vehicle by buying up the short-term IOUs it issues.

    That is what happened to Citigroup. Over the summer, the bank was forced to buy $25 billion in commercial paper issued by its CDO vehicles because investors were no longer interested in the paper. Citigroup already had an $18 billion exposure to these vehicles through other funding it had provided.

    This combined $43 billion exposure means that if CDO losses climb high enough, the bank could be exposed to more than half the losses, according to Bernstein's Mr. Mason. That would seem to argue for Citigroup's consolidating all $84 billion of its CDO assets originally held in off-balance-sheet vehicles.

    But the accounting rules don't say that sponsors of these vehicles have to reassess on any regular basis the question of who bears the majority of risk of loss. Such "reconsideration events" occur when there is a change in the "governing documents or contractual arrangements" related to these vehicles, the rules say.

    Citigroup believes that because it hasn't changed the documents or contracts related to the vehicles, it shouldn't have to reconsider its relationship to them, according to people familiar with the bank's thinking.

    But some accounting experts point out that the rule also says a reconsideration event occurs when an institution acquires additional interests in the vehicle. "If a bank is being forced to step in and be a bigger holder of the commercial paper, to me that's pretty black and white that it's a reconsideration event," says Ed Trott, a retired member of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the body that wrote the accounting rule.

    An influential accounting-industry group, the Center for Audit Quality, also seems to lean toward this view. In a paper issued last month, the center said the purchase of commercial paper is an example of a change in the contractual arrangements governing these vehicles. This "may also result in a reconsideration event," the paper said.

    But Citigroup believes its purchase of the CDO vehicles' commercial paper is different, because it had taken on the obligation to provide such assistance when the vehicles were created. This means the bank was acting within the contractual arrangements governing the vehicles, not changing them, according to the people familiar with Citigroup's thinking.

    Some accounting experts agree. "If all that's happening is one set of [paper holders] is going out and another is coming in, that's not a reconsideration event," says Stephen Ryan, an accounting professor at New York University. "I don't think you reconsider moment by moment; an event is not just bad luck happening."


    Question
    Securitization entails lending with collateral that, in the subprime crisis, was highly (and often fraudulently) overstated in value to outside investors in that collateralized debt. What can be done to save securitization in capital markets?

    "Coming Soon ... Securitization with a New, Improved (and Perhaps Safer) Face,   Knowledge@Wharton, April 2, 2008 ---
    http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm;jsessionid=a83051431af9532a7261?articleid=1933

    For generations, the strength of the U.S. housing market was due, in part, to securitization of mortgages with guarantees from the government-sponsored companies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Following the savings and loan debacle of the late 1980s, securitization -- which has been defined as "pooling and repackaging of cash-flow producing financial assets into securities that are then sold to investors" -- helped bring capital back to battered real estate markets.

    Today, securitization of subprime real estate loans is blamed for the global liquidity crisis, but Wharton faculty say securitization itself is not at fault. Poor underwriting and other weaknesses in the market for mortgage-backed securities led to the current problems. Securitization, they say, will remain an important part of the way real estate is funded, although it is likely to undergo significant change.

    "Securitization, in the long run, is a good thing," says Wharton finance professor Franklin Allen. "We didn't have much experience with falling real estate prices in recent years. The mechanisms weren't designed for that." He explains that economists were concerned about the incentives and accounting that shaped the private mortgage securitization market in recent years, but as long as real estate prices kept rising, the weaknesses in the system did not become clear. Now, after credit markets seized up and prices have declined sharply, those problems have been exposed.

    Allen believes financial markets will get back into the business of securitizing mortgage debt, but only after making some major changes. One new feature of future securitization deals, he says, could be a requirement that loan originators hold at least part of the loans they write on their books. Before the current crisis, loans were bundled into complex tranches that were passed through the financial system and onto buyers with little ability to assess the real value of the individual assets.

    "The way the collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and other vehicles are structured will change. They are too complicated," says Allen. "I'm sure the industry will figure out how to do it. There will be a lot of industry-generated reform and the industry will prosper. This is not, in my view, something that should be regulated."

    Privatizing Securitization

    According to Wharton finance professor Richard J. Herring, for decades, mortgage securitization was backed by government guarantees through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and it worked well. Of course, these agencies were regulated and bound by less-risky underwriting standards than those that ultimately prevailed in the subprime market which was also, potentially, more profitable. Indeed, default rates were so low in the mortgage-based securities market that banks and other private financial institutions were eager to take a piece of the residential business.

    At first, the transition to private securitization worked, because investors were willing to rely on three substitutes for the government guarantees. These included ratings agencies, new business models and monoline insurance designed to guarantee specialized mortgage-backed bonds. "Positive experience with private securitization led to an alphabet soup of innovations that sliced and diced the cash flows from pools of mortgages in increasingly complex ways," says Herring.

    Now, the subprime crisis has undermined confidence in all three pillars of private securitization. Ratings proved unreliable as even highly rated tranches experienced sudden, multiple-notch downgrades that were unknown in corporate bonds. Models developed by the most sophisticated firms selling mortgage-backed securities, including Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup and UBS, failed. Monoline insurers, it turned out, were not adequately capitalized.

    "There has been a highly rational flight to simplicity," says Herring. Over time, he believes, the real estate securitization market will reemerge as investors regain confidence in the ratings agencies, new models evolve, and monoline insurers are able to increase their capital. "But I think that it will be a long time before the market will be willing to accept the complex, opaque structures that failed," continues Herring. He adds that recovery will be delayed until investors are confident that the fall in house prices has reached the bottom.

    Wharton real estate professor Susan M. Wachter points out that many recent -- and historic -- international financial problems originated in real estate. The nature of real estate finance and incentive structures is more to blame than securitization this time around. "The most recent crisis is coming through the securitization market, but this isn't the only real estate crisis," Wachter notes, adding that the fundamental problem in real estate finance is that there is no way to bet against the industry. Real estate is essentially priced by optimists, and rising prices themselves justify even higher values as assets are marked to market, creating new incentives for investors to overpay.

    Wachter points to real estate investment trusts (REITS), publicly traded bundles of real estate assets, as an example of how securitization can help provide liquidity, but also a chance for short-sellers to correct against overly optimistic pricing. Research indicates that REIT prices may not have increased as much as other sectors of real estate finance because the industry has at least 200 analysts looking at the underlying assets in each REIT with the ability to point out faulty pricing to investors. "REITS have performed fluidly relative to the overall market, and that is a good thing," says Wachter.

    Fee-driven Lending

    Another problem was that much of the subprime lending was fee-driven, giving banks incentives to write loans to earn the fees because they could then pass the risky assets along to securitized bondholders. And even bank shareholders had no way to limit their real estate exposure because banks invest in various kinds of economic activity and not just in real estate. Biased pricing and bubbles also arise because the supply of real estate is not elastic. By the time the market recognizes supply has outstripped demand, construction has already begun on many more projects that will continue to be built out; this tends to exacerbate oversupply and create downward pressure on prices for years.

    In a research paper titled, "Incentives for Mortgage Lending in Asia," Wachter and her co-authors write: "With [the] forbearance of regulatory authorities and the intervention of governments, banks may be bailed out, mitigating the consequences for shareholders. Nonetheless, the fundamental factor which explains why episodes of bank under-pricing of risk are likely to occur is the inability of banking shareholders to identify these episodes promptly and incentivize correct pricing."

    Wharton real estate professor Joseph Gyourko notes that significant differences exist in the performance of commercial and residential real estate securities. "Securitized commercial property debt will come back once the market calms down," he says, adding that there has been very little default in commercial real estate finance. "You'll be able to pool mortgages and securitize them, but almost certainly won't be able to leverage them as much as you did in the past."

    The residential side, where there is significant default, is more problematic. Gyourko believes the residential market will go back to what it was in the mid-1990s and most borrowers will have to put down at least 10% of the sales price. "We will get rid of the exotic, highly leveraged loans," he says. "That will lead to lower homeownership, but it should. We put a lot of people into homeownership that we shouldn't have."

    Wharton emeritus finance professor Jack Guttentag, who runs a web site called mtgprofessor.com, says the short-term future for residential real estate is "bleak."

    "Secured bondholders have been badly burned. They discovered to their dismay that all kinds of problems are connected to mortgage-backed securities, which they hadn't anticipated." Guttentag also points to the failure of ratings agencies, which are already being revamped. The methodologies used to determine ratings were flawed, he says. "They used historic performance over a period that simply wasn't representative."

    "CDOs are Doomed"

    In the future, ratings agencies will need to operate on the assumption that a security rated AAA should be able to withstand a shock as great as the current crisis.

    "That will mean that under the best of circumstances, it will be harder to get a triple-A rating, which will reduce the profitability of securities," Guttentag says. Some forms of securities will die. CDOs are doomed, he adds, because the market has seen they are extremely difficult to value. "In the short term, the prospects are dismal. The market will recover, but I don't think we'll ever see CDOs again and the standards will be tougher, so the comeback will be gradual."

    Gyourko notes that the crisis is playing out in a presidential election year, complicating the response. "I think this is the worst time to have this happen. It's never a good time, but in an election year, you're more likely to get a bad policy response," he says. According to Guttentag, while Republican presidential candidate John McCain is taking a laissez-faire stance, the Democratic presidential candidates have focused on using the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to refinance loans that are in default. The idea is similar to what happened during the Great Depression of the 1930s with another agency called the Home Owners' Loan Corp. which was created specifically for that purpose.

    The problem, says Guttentag, is that FHA is not designed as a bailout agency. "The FHA's core mission is predicated on it being a solvent operation, actuarially sound, charging an insurance premium large enough only to cover losses. How they would reconcile that is not clear."

    Guttentag says attempts may be made to create a separate bailout agency within the FHA with different accountability. "But the devil is in the details," he warns, "and the details have to do with exactly who is going to be helped, what the requirements are, what the nature of the assistance is going to be, and myriad other factors that have to be worked out." The Bush administration has taken some steps to ease the crisis, including encouraging lenders to modify contracts to avoid foreclosure. A strong case can be made for these measures, Guttentag adds. "The cost of foreclosure is often greater than the cost of modifying the contract and keeping the borrower in the house." One downside is that once some loans are modified for those truly on the brink of foreclosure, other borrowers who could somehow manage to avoid foreclosure may demand the same modifications, shortchanging investors.

    In testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Wachter laid out a proposal developed with the Center for American Progress to resolve the current crisis. Under the so-called SAFE loan plan, the U.S. treasury and the Federal Reserve would run auctions, in which FHA originators, as well as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and their servicers, would purchase mortgages from current investors at a discount determined at the auction.

    Investors would take a reduction in asset value and yield in exchange for liquidity and certainty and the auction process would price pools and bring transparency back to the market. The FHA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac could then arrange for restructuring of loans.

    Meanwhile, Allen notes the Federal Reserve has taken some dramatic steps with interest rate policy to resolve the current economic crisis, but that could lead to tension with Europe and Japan over currency valuations. As the dollar continues to fall, U.S. companies are increasingly more competitive overseas. "The Fed cut the rate at the beginning, and that was fine, but now things are getting way out of line," he says.

    Furthermore, it is not clear that cutting rates is going to solve the basic problem. As rates continues to drop, foreigners may begin withdrawing their money from dollar-denominated investments, driving rates up. "What the Fed is doing is unprecedented," says Allen. "It is laudable that it is trying to stop a recession, but how many risks should you take to do that? We're now moving into an area where the Fed is probably taking too many risks. If inflation picks up and long-term rates go up, we'll be in a situation where we have to raise short-term rates as we go into recession, which is not a happy thing to."

    Vulture Capital

    The private sector has begun to show signs of willingness to get back into the fray. A number of vulture funds have begun to form to take advantage of distressed real estate prices. BlackRock and Highfields Capital Management have announced they will raise $2 billion to buy delinquent residential mortgages. The companies have hired Sanford Kurland, the former president of Countrywide Financial, to run the new venture called Private National Mortgage Acceptance, or PennyMac. "Many distressed funds will come in to discover prices," says Gyourko.

    Wharton real estate professor Peter Linneman offers an intriguing prescription to bring prices down to the point where the industry can start to rebuild. He suggests that the government tell banks that if they want to maintain their federal insurance, they should fire their CEO by the end of the day, and the government will pay the CEO $10 million in severance. Ousting the former CEOs gives the new bank CEOs an incentive to write down all the bad assets immediately, so that any improvement will make them look good going forward. That would speed the painful process of gradual price declines.

    "There's plenty of money out there waiting for these assets to be written down to bargain prices," says Linneman. In another quarter or two, the lenders would have new cash and be ready to lend again. Meanwhile, he says, the government should tell bankers it will keep interest rates down but raise them after the end of the year. "That says, 'Get your house in order in the next nine months because the subsidy ends at the end of the year.'" Linneman figures that 1,000 CEOs are accountable for about 80% of the current lending mess. If the government were to spend $10 billion to restore liquidity to the market in nine months with only 1,000 people losing their jobs, it would be the best investment it could make to restore the economy. "I'm only half-kidding," he quips.

    Linneman also argues that concerns about moral hazard -- or the tendency to take greater risks because of the presence of a safety net -- because of a bailout are not valid. Those concerns, he says, already exist and have been in place since the U.S. government agreed to insure bank deposits. "The minute you say to somebody, 'No matter what you do I'll give your people their money back,' you've created moral hazard," he says. "Now it's only a matter of how often and how much they will have to spend to settle up. If you go through our history, every eight years to 15 years we have had an episode."

    Continued in article

     


    "The Accounting Cycle:  FASB Needs to Change Accounting for SPEs," by: J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, January 2008 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x60543.xml

    The CDO imbroglio that has enveloped the financial sector created quite a stir in 2007. Mortgage foreclosures have led to losses for the banks, and investors in CDOs have been surprised by the degree of their risk exposure. "Super seniors" have not been super or senior.

    Amid this disarray, a simple question has to be asked: why are the activities and transactions of special purpose entities (SPEs), legal entities that run collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and similar financial vehicles, not displayed on the financial reports of corporate America? These SPEs remain hidden from view and corporate disclosures about them mist like a Chicago fog.

    Recall that Enron's episodes were sprinkled with many an SPE shenanigan. The old accounting rule said that if the SPE had at least 3 percent of its total capital from some outside source, then the business enterprise did not have to consolidate the SPE with its own affairs. While EITF 90-15 originally applied to certain leasing activities, business managers quickly applied it to all sorts of SPEs, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the Securities and Exchange Commission allowed them to do so. The threshold was so low that managers found it easy to keep SPE debt off the balance sheet and to make few disclosures.

    Because of Enron, FASB finally updated the rules to require consolidation unless outsiders contributed at least 10 percent of the capital to the SPE and this capital is at risk. Funny, FASB sat on its collective backside for over a decade before it took action. It seems the board members are incapable of taking proactive steps in any area.

    One of the criticisms was that 3 percent equity does not really put the equity at risk. While the 10 percent cutoff remains arbitrary, it clarifies the situation -- until the board muddied this clarity with some mystical, principles-based goobledy-gook. Many managers complained because they perceived that billions of dollars would be added to the corporate balance sheet. Apparently the appeals had some effect, for FASB modified the final rule. Interpretation No. 46R now states:

    9. An equity investment at risk of less than 10 percent of the entity's total assets shall not be considered sufficient to permit the entity to finance its activities without subordinated financial support in addition to the equity investment unless the equity investment can be demonstrated to be sufficient. The demonstration that equity is sufficient may be based on either qualitative analysis or quantitative analysis or a combination of both. Qualitative assessments, including but not limited to the qualitative assessments described in paragraphs 9(a) and 9(b), will in some cases be conclusive in determining that the entity's equity at risk is sufficient. If, after diligent effort, a reasonable conclusion about the sufficiency of the entity's equity at risk cannot be reached based solely on qualitative considerations, the quantitative analyses implied by paragraph 9(c) should be made. In instances in which neither a qualitative assessment nor a quantitative assessment, taken alone, is conclusive, the determination of whether the equity at risk is sufficient shall be based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative analyses.

    a. The entity has demonstrated that it can finance its activities without additional subordinated financial support.

    b. The entity has at least as much equity invested as other entities that hold only similar assets of similar quality in similar amounts and operate with no additional subordinated financial support.

    c. The amount of equity invested in the entity exceeds the estimate of the entity's expected losses based on reasonable quantitative evidence.

    Note that the 10 percent threshold can be ignored under several scenarios using either quantitative or qualitative excuses. As I said in 2003, this rule or standard is suspect and board members are spineless. The debt of an SPE is similar to the debt of a subsidiary. If FASB thinks that SPE debt does not have to be consolidated, it might as well announce that parent companies no longer have to show the liabilities of their subsidiaries.

    We can forget substance over form. While we are at it, we might as well toss out decision usefulness and relevance because FASB really doesn't promote these ideals, despite the rhetoric in the so-called conceptual framework.

    Given the ethical failures of both managers and auditors, I predicted in Hidden Financial Risk (2003) that many SPEs would remain unconsolidated. Indeed the majority of SPEs not only remain unconsolidated, but also the sponsoring organizations provide precious little disclosures about them. With the help of investment bankers, corporate managers have been highly creative in finding rhetoric that skirts principled accounting. When the corporate executives are managers of the investment banks, well, the creativity is off the charts.

    Years ago FASB and the SEC should have required the consolidation of SPEs. The last six months or so have clearly displayed the need for improved corporate reporting. This directive applies to the sponsors of CDOs including Citicorp and Merrill Lynch: they should consolidate their special purpose vehicles.

    How many more debacles in the market place will occur before FASB and the SEC get it right? When will they have men and women of courage?

    What's Right and What's Wrong With (SPE, SPEs), SPVs, and VIEs? --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm 


    "The Accounting Cycle:  Poor Performance of Credit Rating Agencies," by J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, December 2007 --- http://lyris.smartpros.com/t/204743/5562870/4383/0/

    Soon after Merrill Lynch disclosed its $8.4 billion write-down because of problems with collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and other financial instruments relating to subprime mortgages, the credit rating agencies started downgrading the securities. But, this is like the proverbial soldier who watches a raging battle from afar; when the war is over, he proceeds to bayonet the wounded. 

    Merrill Lynch and other banks got into the CDO business several years ago. The CDOs received an imprimatur from agencies such as Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch. Some CDOs were even evaluated as investment grade securities. The analysts at Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch apparently ignored the risks involved in the subprime mortgage market as well as the risks in real estate prices.

    This segment generated lots of money for Merrill Lynch and the other banks. The CDO business brought in millions and millions of revenues. This line of business was at least as profitable for the bond rating agencies, too, as their ratings produced massive amounts of money.

    Not surprisingly, problems developed because the financial institutions were lending funds to marginal borrowers, those with less-than-stellar credentials for loan applicants. When some of these riskier borrowers defaulted on their mortgages, the CDOs started losing value. The credit rating agencies did nothing; presumably, they felt that the CDOs still had investment grade status.

    With the losses by Merrill Lynch out in the open, everybody knows not only that the CDOs have less fair value, but also that the credit raters aren't earning their keep. Unfortunately, members of Congress believe that they should hold investigations on the matter. I say unfortunate because such a move would be a waste of time, energy, and money.

    Recall the downfall of Enron and the high credit ratings that Enron received from the credit rating agencies. These agencies did not downgrade Enron's debt until after the 2001 third quarter results became public and Enron's stock price started its nosedive. When Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, section 702(b) required the SEC to conduct a study of credit rating agencies to determine why these credit rating agencies did not act as useful watchdogs and warn the public about Enron's true situation. It accomplished little at the time; if Congress holds hearings now, nothing new will be learned. Until policy makers focus on the institution of credit ratings and follow the cash, they waste their time with investigations.

    Moody's and the other agencies make money by charging the business entities who are issuing debt. It doesn't take a genius to see the conflict of interest. The credit agencies lean on the issuer for more money or risk receiving a poor rating. Payment not only entitles one to a good rating, but also it gives one the privilege of not receiving a downgrade unless bad news becomes public.

    The SEC barely mentions this institutional feature in its "Report on the Roles and Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the Operation of the Securities Markets."

    This essay, written in January, 2003, practically ignores the problem. On page 41, the SEC report states, "The practice of issuers paying for their own ratings creates the potential for a conflict of interest." The SEC goes on to review comments by the large rating agencies themselves on how they manage this potential conflict of interest.

    The comments are pathetic. First, the SEC and the managers at credit rating agencies mangle the English language when they refuse to identify conflicts of interest for what they are. My dictionary defines conflict of interest as "the circumstance of a public officeholder, corporate officer, etc., whose personal interests might benefit from his or her official actions or influence." The term does not mean that they actually do benefit, but calls attention to the possibility. Calling such circumstances "potential conflicts of interests" merely attempts to push ethics aside. I can understand this behavior by the managers, but I don't comprehend the words of the SEC staff.

    Second, the comments rely heavily on the assertions of the credit rating agencies themselves. Managers of these agencies claim there is no problem, and of course the SEC should listen to them and accept every word as truth. Yeah, right!

    Third, on page 42 of the report, the SEC promises to explore whether these credit rating agencies "should implement procedures to manage potential conflicts of interest that arise when issuers [pay] for ratings." Either the SEC did not keep its promise or such actions are inadequate. Clearly, the credit rating agencies have not responded any differently to the CDO problem than they did with Enron's circumstances.

    Policy makers can reduce the problems by reducing the very real conflict of interests that perniciously raises its ugly head from time to time. The solution is to prohibit credit rating agencies to receive any funds from the issuers. If the ratings have any merit, then investors will be willing to pay for them.

    This essay reflects the opinion of the author and not necessarily the opinion of The Pennsylvania State University.

    Bob Jensen's threads on credit rating industry frauds are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#CreditRatingAgencies  

    Accounting for CDOs (including journal entries) under U.S. and Foreign GAAP --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/TheoryOnFirmCommitments.htm


    Pensions and Post-retirement Benefits: 
    Schemes for Hiding Debt

    Horrible (shell game) accounting rules for pension accounting
    Over the past three decades, we have allowed a system of pension accounting to develop that is a shell game, misleading taxpayers and investors about the true fiscal health of their cities and companies -- and allowing management to make promises to workers that saddle future generations with huge costs. The result: According to a recent estimate by Credit Suisse First Boston, unfunded pension liabilities of companies in the S&P 500 could hit $218 billion by the end of this year. Others estimate that public pensions -- the benefits promised by state and local governments -- could be in the red upwards of $700 billion.
    Arthur Levitt, Jr., "Pensions Unplugged," The Wall Street Journal, November 10, 2005; Page A16 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113159015994793200.html?mod=opinion&ojcontent=otep
     


    Question
    What do American Airlines pensions have to do with funding of the Iraq war?

    Answer
    Plenty, but who knows why?

    A pension measure tucked into last month’s Iraq war spending bill is causing some leading members of Congress to complain that American Airlines got a break worth almost $2 billion without proper scrutiny. The measure will allow American to greatly reduce its payments into its pension fund over the next 10 years. At the end of 2006, the fund had assets of $8.5 billion and needed an additional $2.5 billion to cover all its obligations. The new provision will allow American to recalculate those numbers, so that the shortfall disappears and the plan looks fully funded. Continental, along with a small number of regional airlines and a caterer, will also be able to take advantage of the provision. But American, the nation’s largest airline, is by far the biggest beneficiary, according to government calculations. Some lawmakers who would normally be involved in tax and pension measures say they were shut out of the process.
    Mary Williams Walsh, "Pension Relief for Airlines Faulted by Some Legislators," The New York Times, June 21, 2007 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/21/business/21pension.html?ref=business 

    Jensen Question
    How should accountants factor in politics in disclosing and reporting pension obligations, especially for airlines that do not declare bankruptcy?


    Changed pension accounting rules are in the wind
    This week, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, which writes the accounting rules for American business, will decide whether to go ahead with plans to change the way pension accounting is done. The board's current rule is 20 years old and has drawn fire from retirees and investors for many of the same reasons that disturb Mr. Zydney, who has made his concerns about his Lucent pension into something of a crusade. "Right now, the stuff isn't transparent," Mr. Zydney said. "There's no accuracy. No consistency. And everybody's trying to play some financial game to make things look better."
    Mary Williams Walsh, "A Pension Rule, Sometimes Murky, Is Under Pressure," The New York Times, November 8, 2005 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/08/business/08pension.html?pagewanted=1

    Off the government balance sheets - out of sight and out of mind


    This may be a helpful video to use when teaching the new FAS 132(R) and the new FAS 158

    "Can You Afford to Retire?" PBS --- http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/retirement/need/
    Click the Tab "Watch Online" to view the video (not free)!

    "PBS Frontline: Can You Afford to Retire," Financial Page, November 8, 2006 --- Click Here

    PBS Frontline has rebroadcast a critical examination of the nation's retirement system. You can access the interviews and written material for the program at PBS Frontline: Can You Afford to Retire. One can also view the program on-line, from the referenced link.

    The program highlights problems with both the Defined Benefit pension system (rapidly becoming obsolete) and the rising Contributory Benefit system, which brings with it a number of problems. The program considers:
    The program does not address the problem of high intermediation costs in the Contributory Pension system, or the preponderence of substandard investment vehicles (high cost annuities, load funds, and high cost active funds) in many employer provided plans.

    While the program explores the underfunding and closing of Corporate Defined Benefit plans, it does not touch on underfunding in the government pension system, nor does it address the fatal flaw of Defined Benefit plans: the total lack of portability of these plans for the employee.

    FAS 158 improves financial reporting by requiring an employer to recognize the overfunded or underfunded status of a defined benefit postretirement plan (other than a multiemployer plan) as an asset or liability in its statement of financial position and to recognize changes in that funded status in the year in which the changes occur through comprehensive income of a business entity or changes in unrestricted net assets of a not-for-profit organization. This Statement also improves financial reporting by requiring an employer to measure the funded status of a plan as of the date of its year-end statement of financial position, with limited exceptions.
    FASB --- http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/stsum158.shtml


    "FASB Proposal Puts Pension Plans on Balance Sheet," SmartPros, April 3, 2006 ---
    http://accounting.smartpros.com/x52449.xml

    The Financial Accounting Standards Board issued a proposal on Friday that would require employers to recognize the overfunded or underfunded positions of defined benefit postretirement plans, including pension plans, in their balance sheets. The proposal would also require that employers measure plan assets and obligations as of the date of their financial statements.

    According to the standards board, the proposed changes would increase the transparency and completeness of financial statements for shareholders, creditors, employees, retirees, donors, and other users.

    The exposure draft applies to plan sponsors that are public and private companies and nongovernmental not-for-profit organizations. It results from the first phase of a comprehensive project to reconsider guidance in Statement No. 87, Employers' Accounting for Pensions, and Statement No. 106, Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions. A second, broader phase will address remaining issues. FASB expects to collaborate with the International Accounting Standards Board on that phase.

    In a statement released on Friday, FASB said the current accounting standards do not provide complete information about postretirement benefit obligations. For example, those standards allow an employer to recognize an asset or liability in its balance sheet that almost always differs from its overfunded or underfunded positions. Instead, they require that information about the current funded status of such plans be reported in the notes to financial statements. That incomplete reporting results because existing standards allow delayed recognition of certain changes in plan assets and obligations that affect the costs of providing such benefits.

    "Many constituents, including our advisory councils, investors, creditors, and the SEC staff believe that the current incomplete accounting makes it difficult to assess an employer's financial position and its ability to carry out the obligations of its plans," said George Batavick, FASB member. "We agree. Today's proposal, by requiring sponsoring employers to reflect the current overfunded or underfunded positions of postretirement benefit plans in the balance sheet, makes the basic financial statements more complete, useful, and transparent. "

    The proposed changes, other than the requirement to measure plan assets and obligations as of the balance sheet date, would be effective for fiscal years ending after December 15, 2006. Public companies would be required to apply the proposed changes to the measurement date for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2006 and nonpublic entities, including not-for-profit organizations, would become subject to that requirement in fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2007.

    FASB is seeking written comments on the proposal by May 31, 2006. After the comment period, the board will hold a public roundtable meeting on the proposal on June 27, 2006, in Norwalk, Connecticut.


    So Long Footnoted Liabilities
    Pensions and other retiree benefits are graduating to the balance sheet; how far should a company go to protect its compensation information?; choosing your auditor wisely may help protect your stock price; and more.

    "So Long Footnoted Liabilities," by Rob Garver, CFO Magazine, February 2006, pp. 16-17 --- http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/5435560/c_5461573?f=magazine_alsoinside

    Verizon, Ford, and ExxonMobil, pay attention. It looks as though pensions and other retiree benefits are about to graduate from the footnotes to the balance sheet. And companies that have previously been able to hide underfunded retirement programs may have to count them as liabilities — often multi-billion-dollar liabilities.

    In November, the Financial Accounting Standards Board voted to move toward a proposal that would require companies to report the difference between the net present value of their pension- and other retirement-benefit obligations and the amount the company has set aside to meet those obligations. And although a final decision is a year or more away, the numbers won't be pretty. (See "Will Washington Really Act?")

    Standard & Poor's, in fact, estimates a retirement-obligations shortfall of some $442 billion in the S&P 500 alone. Indeed, it is difficult to understate the potential impact of the FASB plan, which is expected to be only the first phase in a larger effort to overhaul the accounting treatment of pensions and benefits. "We believe this FASB project will have a significant impact on stock evaluations, income statements, and balance sheets, and will become the major issue in financial accounting over the next five years," S&P wrote in its December report.

    The news was welcome to many in the accounting business who have been concerned that current rules allow companies to hide retiree obligations in the footnotes. John Hepp, a senior manager with Grant Thornton LLP, praised the board's decision to move toward a "simplified approach. We think this will be a big step forward."

    But it won't be without pain for many companies faced with adding a large negative number to their balance sheets, such as telecom giant Verizon Communications Inc. Standard & Poor's reported in December that Verizon has underfunded the nonpension portion of its postretirement benefits by an estimated $22.5 billion. The company is clearly trying to get a handle on retirement benefits and health-care costs, announcing that same month that it will freeze the pension benefits of all managers who currently receive them.

    While the company refused to comment, Verizon is far from alone. Ford and General Motors have underfunded their retirement obligations by $44.7 billion and $69.0 billion, respectively, and other big names facing a shortfall include ExxonMobil ($16.4 billion) and AT&T ($14.8 billion).

    If any of these companies think the markets will treat these obligations as a one-time problem, they had better think again, says S&P equity market analyst Howard Silverblatt. "Moving this onto the balance sheet is going to wake people up," he says. "The bottom line is that shareholder equity [in the S&P 500] is going to be decreased by about 9 percent." And as companies begin to explore their legal options for limiting the financial damage — including paring back benefits even further — Silverblatt predicts that the issue will become more politicized and remain in the public eye for years to come.


    Pension Fund Accounting Fraud in San Diego

    "San Diego Charges," by Nicole Gelinas, The Wall Street Journal, November 27, 2006; Page A12 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116459315111633209.html?mod=todays_us_opinion

    The SEC has announced that it has resolved its pension-fund fraud case against San Diego, with the city agreeing not to commit illegal shenanigans in the future and to hire an "independent monitor" to help it avoid doing so. Although the SEC went easy on the residents and taxpayers of San Diego in its settlement, it still has an opportunity to make an example of the former officials who the SEC determined committed the fraud. The feds should seize that chance to show they're serious about policing a sector of the investment world that remains vulnerable to similar fraud.

    San Diego ran into legal trouble with its pension fund because elected officials wanted to keep its municipal workers happy by awarding them more generous pension and health-care benefits, but also wanted to keep taxpayers happy by sticking to a lean budget. The two goals were mathematically irreconcilable. So San Diego officials, with the cooperation of the board members of the city employees' retirement system (the majority of whom were also city officials), intentionally underfunded the pension plan for years. They used the "savings" to award workers and retirees more benefits, some retroactive. Because taxpayers couldn't see how much retirement benefits for public employees eventually would cost them, they couldn't protest against those high future costs. The fund also violated sound investment principles by using "surplus" earnings in boom years to pay extra benefits to retirees, including a "13th check" in some years. Trustees should have put such "surpluses" aside for years in which the market was down.

    But the alleged escalated in 2002 and 2003, when city officials brushed aside warnings from outside groups, as well as from an analyst it had itself commissioned, about the fund's parlous financial straits. Although figures clearly showed that the pension fund would face a seven-fold increase in its deficit, to more than $2 billion, over less than a decade, San Diego didn't disclose what, according to the SEC, it "knew or was reckless in not knowing" was an inevitability, instead maintaining its charade. City officials disclosed not a word of the fund's financial troubles to potential investors or bond analysts as it raised nearly $300 million in new municipal securities during those two years.

    The SEC elected to go easy on the city. The feds won't levy a fine against it, reasoning that it would end up being the taxpayers who would pay. This argument has merit, since these taxpayers are already on the hook for the $1.5 billion deficit -- roughly equal to the city's operating budget -- the pension-fund fraud had concealed. Taxpayers could face fallout if wronged investors sue the city. But while SEC won't punish taxpayers, it can't afford to go so easy on the officials it's still investigating. (The SEC doesn't name the current and former officials under its scrutiny, but former Mayor Dick Murphy, former city manager Michael Uberuaga and former auditor Ed Ryan, as well as members of the City Council, all had degrees of responsibility for and knowledge of the pension fund's operations.) The SEC must demonstrate that it considers the fraud officials committed against the city's bondholders to be just as grave as similar frauds in the private sector.

    People who invest in municipal bonds do so because they feel that such investments are safer than investing in the common stocks of corporations. That's why cities and states enjoy access to capital at affordable interest rates. And, for tax reasons, municipal-bond investors often invest in the bonds of the city in which they reside, so they face double jeopardy. In the first place, if city officials are committing fraud, their bonds will turn out not to be as sound (and thus not as valuable) as they thought they were. The second risk is that they will have to pay higher taxes, or suffer lower government services, to cover pension-funding shortfalls in their city's budget if that is the case.

    Continued in article


    "FASB Improves Employer Pension & Postretirement Plan Accounting," AccountingWeb, October 4, 2006 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102640

    The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 158, Employers Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans last week, making it easier for users of financial information to understand and assess an employer’s financial position and its ability to fulfill benefit plan obligations. The new standard requires that employers fully recognize those obligations associated with single-employer defined benefit pension, retiree healthcare and other postretirement plans in their financial statements. It amends Statements No. 87, 88, 106 and 132R.

    “Previous standards covering these benefits went a long way toward improving financial reporting. However, the Board at that time acknowledged that future changes would be needed, and now our constituents share this view,” said George Batavick, FASB member, in the statement announcing the new standard. “Accordingly, today’s standard represents a significant improvement in financial reporting as it provides employees, retirees, investors and other financial statement users with access to more complete information. This information will help users make more informed assessments about a company’s financial position and its ability to carry out the benefit promises made through these plans.”

    The new standard requires an employer to:

    Statement No. 158 applies to plan sponsors that are public and private companies and nongovernmental not-for-profit organizations. The requirements recognize the funded status of a benefit plan and disclosure requirements are effective as of the end of the fiscal year ending after December 15, 2006, for employers with publicly traded equity securities and the end of the fiscal year ending after June 15, 2007, for all other entities. The requirement to measure plan assets and benefit obligations as of the date of the employer’s fiscal year-end statement of financial position is effective for fiscal years ending after December 15, 2008.

    http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas158.pdf Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 158, Employers Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans was developed in direct response to concerns expressed by many FASB constituents that past standards of accounting for postretirement benefit plans needed to be revisited to improve the transparency and usefulness of the information reported about them. Among the Board’s constituents calling for change were many members of the investment community, the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council, the User Advisory Council, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and others.

    The issuing of Statement No. 158 completes the first phase of the Board’s comprehensive project to improve the accounting and reporting for defined benefit pension and other postretirement plans. A second, broader phase of this project will comprehensively address remaining issues. The Board expects to collaborate with the International Accounting Standards Board on that phase.


    Like Texas (which has a bill pending to hide pension and health care liabilities for retired government workers and families)
    Connecticut has picked a fight with the independent board that tells state and local governments how to report their financial affairs.
    Mary Williams Walsh, "Connecticut Takes Up Fight Over Accounting Rules," The New York Times, June 2, 2007 ---
    Click Here
    Jensen Comment
    Funny thing is Andy Fastow said the same thing about accounting standards and auditors. If you're going to sell your bonds in the public capital markets, it seems that hiding debt from bond purchasers is not an especially good idea.

    At issue is the immense amount of such debt even when discounted back to a present value amount.
    Bob Jensen's threads on this controversial topic are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Pensions


    "Shocks Seen in New Math for Pensions," by Mary Williams Walsh, The New York Times, March 31, 2006 ---
    Click Here

    The board that writes accounting rules for American business is proposing a new method of reporting pension obligations that is likely to show that many companies have a lot more debt than was obvious before.

    In some cases, particularly at old industrial companies like automakers, the newly disclosed obligations are likely to be so large that they will wipe out the net worth of the company.

    The panel, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, said the new method, which it plans to issue today for public comment, would address a widespread complaint about the current pension accounting method: that it exposes shareholders and employees to billions of dollars in risks that they cannot easily see or evaluate. The new accounting rule would also apply to retirees' health plans and other benefits.

    A member of the accounting board, George Batavick, said, "We took on this project because the current accounting standards just don't provide complete information about these obligations."

    The board is moving ahead with the proposed pension changes even as Congress remains bogged down on much broader revisions of the law that governs company pension plans. In fact, Representative John A. Boehner, Republican of Ohio and the new House majority leader, who has been a driving force behind pension changes in Congress, said yesterday that he saw little chance of a finished bill before a deadline for corporate pension contributions in mid-April.

    Congress is trying to tighten the rules that govern how much money companies are to set aside in advance to pay for benefits. The accounting board is working with a different set of rules that govern what companies tell investors about their retirement plans.

    The new method proposed by the accounting board would require companies to take certain pension values they now report deep in the footnotes of their financial statements and move the information onto their balance sheets — where all their assets and liabilities are reflected. The pension values that now appear on corporate balance sheets are almost universally derided as of little use in understanding the status of a company's retirement plan.

    Mr. Batavick of the accounting board said the new rule would also require companies to measure their pension funds' values on the same date they measure all their other corporate obligations. Companies now have delays as long as three months between the time they calculate their pension values and when they measure everything else. That can yield misleading results as market fluctuations change the values.

    "Old industrial, old economy companies with heavily unionized work forces" would be affected most sharply by the new rule, said Janet Pegg, an accounting analyst with Bear, Stearns. A recent report by Ms. Pegg and other Bear, Stearns analysts found that the companies with the biggest balance-sheet changes were likely to include General Motors, Ford, Verizon, BellSouth and General Electric.

    Using information in the footnotes of Ford's 2005 financial statements, Ms. Pegg said that if the new rule were already in effect, Ford's balance sheet would reflect about $20 billion more in obligations than it now does. The full recognition of health care promised to Ford's retirees accounts for most of the difference. Ford now reports a net worth of $14 billion. That would be wiped out under the new rule. Ford officials said they had not evaluated the effect of the new accounting rule and therefore could not comment.

    Applying the same method to General Motors' balance sheet suggests that if the accounting rule had been in effect at the end of 2005, there would be a swing of about $37 billion. At the end of 2005, the company reported a net worth of $14.6 billion. A G.M. spokesman declined to comment, noting that the new accounting rule had not yet been issued.

    Many complaints about the way obligations are now reported revolve around the practice of spreading pension figures over many years. Calculating pensions involves making many assumptions about the future, and at the end of every year there are differences between the assumptions and what actually happened. Actuaries keep track of these differences in a running balance, and incorporate them into pension calculations slowly.

    That practice means that many companies' pension disclosures do not yet show the full impact of the bear market of 2000-3, because they are easing the losses onto their books a little at a time. The new accounting rule will force them to bring the pension values up to date immediately, and use the adjusted numbers on their balance sheets.

    Not all companies would be adversely affected by the new rule. A small number might even see improvement in their balance sheets. One appears to be Berkshire Hathaway. Even though its pension fund has a shortfall of $501 million, adjusting the numbers on its balance sheet means reducing an even larger shortfall of $528 million that the company recognized at the end of 2005.

    Berkshire Hathaway's pension plan differs from that of many other companies because it is invested in assets that tend to be less volatile. Its assumptions about investment returns are also lower, and it will not have to make a big adjustment for earlier-year losses when the accounting rule takes effect. Berkshire also looks less indebted than other companies because it does not have retiree medical plans.

    Mr. Batavick said he did not know what kind of public comments to expect, but hoped to have a final standard completed by the third quarter of the year. Companies would then be expected to use it for their 2006 annual reports. The rule will also apply to nonprofit institutions like universities and museums, as well as privately held companies.

    The rule would not have any effect on corporate profits, only on the balance sheets. The accounting board plans to make additional pension accounting changes after this one takes effect. Those are expected to affect the bottom line and could easily be more contentious.


    First They Do
    "Bill Requires Reporting Unfunded Federal Liabilities," AccountingWeb, April 12, 2006 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102016

    With state and local governments scrambling to meet the Government Accounting Standards Board’s (GASB) amended rules for reporting on postretirement benefits, and private and public companies getting ready for compliance with the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) proposed statement on recording pension liabilities, a congressman from Indiana has introduced legislation that would require the federal government to meet a similar standard. The Truth in Accounting Act, sponsored by Rep. Chris Chocola (R-Ind) and co-sponsored by Reps. Jim Cooper (D-Tenn) and Mark Kirk (R – Ill), would require the federal government to accurately report the nation’s unfunded long-term liabilities, including Social Security and Medicare, a debt that amounts to $43 trillion dollars, during the next 75 years, Chocola says, according to wndu.com.

    The U.S. Treasury Department is not currently required to file an annual report of these debts to Congress, wndu.com says.

    “When I was in business, the federal government required our company to account for long-term liabilities using generally accepted accounting principles,” Chocola told the South Bend Tribune. “This bill would require the federal government to follow the same laws they require every public business in America to follow. If any company accounted for its business the way the government accounts, the business would be bankrupt and the executives would be thrown into jail.”

    The legislation doesn’t propose solutions for the burgeoning liabilities, but it takes a crucial first step, according to Chocola, “by requiring the Treasury Department to begin reporting and tracking those liabilities according to net present value calculations and accrual accounting principles,” the Tribune reports.

    “In order to solve our problems and prevent an impending fiscal crisis,” Chocola said, “we have to first identify where and how large the problem is.”

    Chocola clearly sees a looming fiscal crisis. “Congress is the Levee Commission and the flood is coming,” he told the Tribune. “This [bill] is intended to sound the warning bell.”

    To support his position, according to the Tribune, Chocola referred to an article written by David Walker, a Clinton appointee who serves as Comptroller General of the United States and head of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Walker wrote that the government was on an “unsustainable path”.

    Speaking to a British audience last month, Walker said that the U.S. is headed for a financial crisis unless it changes its course of racking up huge deficits, Reuters reported. Walker said some combination of reforming Social Security and Medicare spending, discretionary spending and possibly changes in tax policy would be required to get the deficits under control.

    “I think it’s going to take 20-plus years before we are ultimately on a prudent and sustainable path,” Walker said, according to Reuters, partly because so many American consumers follow the government’s example. “Too many Americans are spending more than they take in and are running up debt at record rates.”

    Now They Don't
    "Bill Requires Reporting Unfunded Federal Liabilities," AccountingWeb, April 12, 2006 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102016

    With state and local governments scrambling to meet the Government Accounting Standards Board’s (GASB) amended rules for reporting on postretirement benefits, and private and public companies getting ready for compliance with the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) proposed statement on recording pension liabilities, a congressman from Indiana has introduced legislation that would require the federal government to meet a similar standard. The Truth in Accounting Act, sponsored by Rep. Chris Chocola (R-Ind) and co-sponsored by Reps. Jim Cooper (D-Tenn) and Mark Kirk (R – Ill), would require the federal government to accurately report the nation’s unfunded long-term liabilities, including Social Security and Medicare, a debt that amounts to $43 trillion dollars, during the next 75 years, Chocola says, according to wndu.com.

    The U.S. Treasury Department is not currently required to file an annual report of these debts to Congress, wndu.com says.

    “When I was in business, the federal government required our company to account for long-term liabilities using generally accepted accounting principles,” Chocola told the South Bend Tribune. “This bill would require the federal government to follow the same laws they require every public business in America to follow. If any company accounted for its business the way the government accounts, the business would be bankrupt and the executives would be thrown into jail.”

    The legislation doesn’t propose solutions for the burgeoning liabilities, but it takes a crucial first step, according to Chocola, “by requiring the Treasury Department to begin reporting and tracking those liabilities according to net present value calculations and accrual accounting principles,” the Tribune reports.

    “In order to solve our problems and prevent an impending fiscal crisis,” Chocola said, “we have to first identify where and how large the problem is.”

    Chocola clearly sees a looming fiscal crisis. “Congress is the Levee Commission and the flood is coming,” he told the Tribune. “This [bill] is intended to sound the warning bell.”

    To support his position, according to the Tribune, Chocola referred to an article written by David Walker, a Clinton appointee who serves as Comptroller General of the United States and head of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Walker wrote that the government was on an “unsustainable path”.

    Speaking to a British audience last month, Walker said that the U.S. is headed for a financial crisis unless it changes its course of racking up huge deficits, Reuters reported. Walker said some combination of reforming Social Security and Medicare spending, discretionary spending and possibly changes in tax policy would be required to get the deficits under control.

    “I think it’s going to take 20-plus years before we are ultimately on a prudent and sustainable path,” Walker said, according to Reuters, partly because so many American consumers follow the government’s example. “Too many Americans are spending more than they take in and are running up debt at record rates.”


    "The Next Retirement Time Bomb," by Milt Freudenheim and Mary Williams, The New York Times, December 11, 2005 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/11/business/yourmoney/11retire.html 

    SINCE 1983, the city of Duluth, Minn., has been promising free lifetime health care to all of its retired workers, their spouses and their children up to age 26. No one really knew how much it would cost. Three years ago, the city decided to find out.

    It took an actuary about three months to identify all the past and current city workers who qualified for the benefits. She tallied their data by age, sex, previous insurance claims and other factors. Then she estimated how much it would cost to provide free lifetime care to such a group.

    The total came to about $178 million, or more than double the city's operating budget. And the bill was growing.

    "Then we knew we were looking down the barrel of a pretty high-caliber weapon," said Gary Meier, Duluth's human resources manager, who attended the meeting where the actuary presented her findings.

    Mayor Herb Bergson was more direct. "We can't pay for it," he said in a recent interview. "The city isn't going to function because it's just going to be in the health care business."

    Duluth's doleful discovery is about to be repeated across the country. Thousands of government bodies, including states, cities, towns, school districts and water authorities, are in for the same kind of shock in the next year or so. For years, governments have been promising generous medical benefits to millions of schoolteachers, firefighters and other employees when they retire, yet experts say that virtually none of these governments have kept track of the mounting price tag. The usual practice is to budget for health care a year at a time, and to leave the rest for the future.

    Off the government balance sheets - out of sight and out of mind - those obligations have been ballooning as health care costs have spiraled and as the baby-boom generation has approached retirement. And now the accounting rulemaker for the public sector, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board, says it is time for every government to do what Duluth has done: to come to grips with the total value of its promises, and to report it to their taxpayers and bondholders.

    Continued in article


    NEWS RELEASE 11/10/05 FASB Adds Comprehensive Project to Reconsider Accounting for Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits

    Board Seeks to Improve Transparency and Usefulness for Investors, Creditors, Employees, Retirees and Other Users of Financial Information

    Norwalk, CT, November 10, 2005—The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) voted today to add a project to its agenda to reconsider guidance in Statement No. 87, Employers’ Accounting for Pensions, and Statement No. 106, Employers’ Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions.

    The Board’s objective in undertaking the project is to improve the reporting of pensions and other postretirement benefit plans in the financial statements by making information more useful and transparent for investors, creditors, employees, retirees, and other users. The agenda addition reflects the Board’s commitment to ensure that its standards address current accounting issues and changing business practices.

    In making its decision, the Board considered requests by various constituents, including members of the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council (FASAC), the FASB’s User Advisory Council (UAC), and the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

    Complex and Comprehensive

    “We have heard many different views from our constituents about how the current accounting model should be reconsidered to improve transparency and usefulness. The breadth and complexity of the issues involved and the views on how to address them are deeply held. While the accounting and reporting issues do not appear to lend themselves to a simple fix, the Board believes that immediate improvements are necessary and will look for areas that can be improved quickly,” said Robert Herz, Chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board.

    The accounting and reporting issues involved touch on many fundamental areas of accounting, including measurement of assets and liabilities, consolidation, and reporting of financial performance. They are also impacted by complex funding and tax rules that, while not directly associated with accounting standards, affect the economics the accounting seeks to depict.

    Comprehensive Approach with Initial Improvements in 2006

    Given these complexities, the Board believes that a comprehensive project conducted in two phases is the most effective way to address these issues. The first phase is expected to be finalized by the end of 2006.

    The first phase seeks to address the fact that under current accounting standards, important information about the financial status of a company’s plan is reported in the footnotes, but not in the basic financial statements. Accordingly, this phase seeks to improve financial reporting by requiring that the funded or unfunded status of postretirement benefit plans, measured as the difference between the fair value of plan assets and the benefit obligation - i.e., the projected benefit obligation (PBO) for pensions and the accumulated postretirement benefit obligation (APBO) for other postretirement benefits - be recognized on the balance sheet.

    The second broader phase would comprehensively address remaining issues, including:

    How to best recognize and display in earnings and other comprehensive income the various elements that affect the cost of providing postretirement benefits

    How to best measure the obligation, in particular the obligations under plans with lump-sum settlement options

    Whether more or different guidance should be provided regarding measurement assumptions

    Whether postretirement benefit trusts should be consolidated by the plan sponsor

    In conducting the project, the FASB will seek the views of parties currently involved in other, independent reviews of the pension system including the Department of Labor and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. Furthermore, consistent with its effort toward international convergence of accounting standards, the FASB expects to work with the International Accounting Standards Board and other standards setters.

    An Ongoing Improvement Effort

    The agenda addition represents the latest step in the FASB’s effort to ensure that standards for pensions and other postretirement benefits provide credible, comparable, conceptually sound and usable information to the public.

    In 1987, the Board issued Statement 87, which made significant improvements in the way the costs of defined benefit plans were measured and disclosed. It is important to note that at that time, the Board acknowledged that pension accounting was still in a transitional stage and that future changes might be warranted.

    Accordingly, additional enhancements since that time have included:

    Statement No. 106 (1990)—which made similar significant improvements to those made in Statement No. 87 but for postretirement benefits other than pensions

    Statement No. 132, Employers’ Disclosures about Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits, (1998)—which revised employers’ disclosures about pension and other postretirement benefits to enhance the information disclosed about changes in the benefit obligation and fair value of plan assets

    Statement No. 132R, Employers’ Disclosures about Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits (Revised 2003)—which provided expanded disclosures in several areas, including plan assets, benefit obligations, and cash flows.


    "Huge Rise Looms for Health Care in City's Budget," by Mary Williams Walsh and Milt Freudenheim, The New York
    Times,
    December 26, 2005 --- http://snipurl.com/NYT122605

    But the cost of pensions may look paltry next to that of another benefit soon to hit New York and most other states and cities: the health care promised to retired teachers, judges, firefighters, bus drivers and other former employees, which must be figured under a new accounting formula.

    The city currently provides free health insurance to its retirees, their spouses and dependent children. The state is almost as generous, promising to pay, depending on the date of hire, 90 to 100 percent of the cost for individual retirees, and 82 to 86 percent for retiree families.

    Those bills - $911 million this year for city retirees and $859 million for state retirees out of a total city and state budget of $156.6 billion - may seem affordable now. But the New York governments, like most other public agencies across the country, have been calculating the costs in a way that sharply understates their price tag over time.

    Although governments will not have to come up with the cash immediately, failure to find a way to finance the yearly total will eventually hurt their ability to borrow money affordably.

    When the numbers are added up under new accounting rules scheduled to go into effect at the end of 2006, New York City's annual expense for retiree health care is expected to at least quintuple, experts say, approaching and maybe surpassing $5 billion, for exactly the same benefits the retirees get today. The number will grow because the city must start including the value of all the benefits earned in a given year, even those that will not be paid until future years.

    Some actuaries say the new yearly amount could be as high as $10 billion. The increases for the state could be equally startling. Most other states and cities also offer health benefits to retirees, and will also be affected by the accounting change.

    Continued in article

    Jensen Comment
    FAS 106 (effective December 15, 1992) prohibits keeping post-retirement benefits such as medical benefits off private sector  balance sheets of corporations --- http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas106.pdf .  The equivalent for the public sector is GASB 45, but the new rules do not go into effect until for cities as large as Duluth and NYC until December 15, 2006 --- http://www.gasb.org/pub/index.html

    Effective Date:

      The requirements of this Statement are effective in three phases based on a government's total annual revenues in the first fiscal year ending after June 15, 1999:

      • Governments that were phase 1 governments for the purpose of implementation of Statement 34—those with annual revenues of $100 million or more—are required to implement this Statement in financial statements for periods beginning after December 15, 2006.
      • Governments that were phase 2 governments for the purpose of implementation of Statement 34—those with total annual revenues of $10 million or more but less than $100 million—are required to implement this Statement in financial statements for periods beginning after December 15, 2007.
      • Governments that were phase 3 governments for the purpose of implementation of Statement 34—those with total annual revenues of less than $10 million—are required to implement this Statement in financial statements for periods beginning after December 15, 2008.

    The new GASB 25 implementation dates may trigger defaults and "The Next Retirement Time Bomb."

    January 2, 2006 reply from Mac Wright in Australia

    Dear Bob,

    In considering the problems faced by these bodies, one has to remember that the promise of these benefits was held out to the then potential employees as an inducement to work in the system. Thus attempts at cutbacks are a form of theft. It is no different that finding that commercial paer accepted some time back is worthless because the acceptor has disappeared with his ill gotten gains (Ponzi)!

    Perhaps the message to government workers is "demand cash up front and do not trust any promise of future benefits!"

    Kind regards,

    Mac Wright

    January 2, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Mac,

    I think theft is too strong a word. In a sense, all bankruptcies are a form of theft, but theft is hardly an appropriate word since the victims (e.g., creditors) often favor declaration of bankruptcy and restructuring in an attempt to salvage some of the amounts owing them. Also, employees, creditors, and investors are aware that they are taking on some risks of default.

    The United Auto Workers Union and its membership have overwhelmingly elected to reduce GM's post-retirement benefits for retirees since over $1,500 per vehicle sold today for such purposes will end GM and reduce those benefits to zero. Is this theft? No! Is this bad management? Most certainly! In my viewpoint all organizations should fully fund post-retirement benefits of employees on a pay-as-you-go basis?

    The problem is more complex for national social security and national medical plans for citizens (not just government employees). Fully funding these in advance is probably infeasible for the nation as a whole and/or will stifle economic growth needed to sustain any types of benefits.

    What will happen to Duluth and NYC if the retired employee benefits are not reduced? Due to exploding medical costs, we can easily imagine taxes becoming so oppressive that there is a mass exodus from those cities, especially among yuppies and senior citizens having greater discretion on where to live. One can easily imagine industry migrations out of high-tax cities. Texas, Delaware, Florida, and New Hampshire cities look inviting for a Wall Street move since there would no longer be oppressive NY state income taxes added to all the extra NYC taxes. It is not too far fetched to imagine that post-retirement benefits will collapse to almost zero if retirees themselves do not accept some concessions to save the post-retirement udder from going completely dry.

    What is interesting to me is how an accounting rule change suddenly awakens city managers (e.g., the Duluth managers) to the fact that they should actually try to find out how much they owe former city employees and the dependents of those employees. This is just another example of where an accounting rule change instigates better financial management. We might call city management in Duluth and other cities abnormally stupid if it were not for the history of so many companies that were oblivious to their post-retirement obligations until FAS 106 was about to be required. A whole lot of executives and directors had no idea they were in such deep trouble until being faced with FAS 106 requirements to report these huge obligations arising from past promises of bad managers (many of whom are now trying to collect on what they promised themselves and their kids in the way of medical care).

    In fact, it leads us to question conflicts of interest when managers vote themselves generous post-retirement benefits. When you use the term "theft," Mac, you might question who is stealing from whom. Perhaps some of the retirees slipped these generous benefits in because they thought they could get away with something that would not be noticed until it became too late. Dumb managers may have been "dumb like foxes."

    Bob Jensen

    January 3, 2006 reply from Bill Herrmann [billherr@ROCKETMAIL.COM]

    An alternative to this discussion is the realization is that the employee who accepts future "guarantee" of benefits is in fact loaning the value of the expected benefits to the employer so has a credit risk much the same as if they were sending in cash for bonds or stock. There is a risk of bankruptcy or insolvency with any asset held by another party. Anyone with a "guaranteed future benefit" is susceptible to this risk.

    Bill Herrmann
    Spoon River College.

     


    Leases:  A Scheme for Hiding Debt

    Accounting rules still allow companies to classify lease obligations differently than debt, leaving billions of dollars off corporate balance sheets and relegating a big slice of corporate financing to the shadows.
    Jonathan Weil, "How Leases Play A Shadowy Role In Accounting" (See below)


    At the FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board), Bob Herz says he thinks "lease accounting is probably an area where people had good intentions way back when, but it evolved into a set of rules that can result in form-over substance accounting."  He cautions that an overhaul wouldn't be easy:  "Any attempts to change the current accounting in an area where people have built their business models around it become extremely controversial --- just like you see with stock options."
    Jonathan Weil, "How Leases Play A Shadowy Role In Accounting" (See below)  
    By the phrase form over substance, Bob Herz is referring to the four bright line tests of requiring leases to be booked on the balance sheet.  Over the past two decades corporations have been using these tests to skate on the edge with leasing contracts that result in hundreds of billions of dollars of debt being off balance sheets.  The leasing industry has built an enormously profitable business around financing contracts that just fall under the wire of each bright line test, particularly the 90% rule that was far too lenient in the first place.  One might read Bob's statement that after the political fight in the U.S. legislature over expensing of stock options, the FASB is a bit weary and reluctant to take on the leasing industry.  I hope he did not mean this.


    FASB Okays Project to Overhaul Lease Accounting
    The Financial Accounting Standards Board voted unanimously to formally add a project to its agenda to "comprehensively reconsider" the current rules on lease accounting. Critics say those rules, which haven't gotten a thorough revision in 30 years, make it too easy for companies to keep their leases of real estate, equipment and other items off their balance sheets. As such, FASB members said, they're concerned that financial statements don't fully and clearly portray the impact of leasing transactions under the current rules. "I think we have received a clear signal from the investing community that current accounting standards are not providing them with all the information they want," FASB member Leslie Seidman said before the vote.
    "FASB Okays Project to Overhaul Lease Accounting," SmartPros, July 20, 2006 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x53931.xml


    Lessor (Nope) Versus Lessee (Yup) Accounting Rules

    From WebCPA, July 31, 2008 --- http://www.webcpa.com/article.cfm?articleid=28636

    The Financial Accounting Standards Board has decided to defer the development of a new accounting model for lessors, saying the project will now only address lessee accounting.

    FASB also agreed with taking an overall approach to generally apply the finance lease model in International Accounting Standard 17, "Leases," adapted where necessary for all leases.

    The move is the latest in a long-running project for the board in setting standards for lease accounting. As FASB moves toward convergence of U.S. generally accepted accounting principles with International Financial Reporting Standards, it is also trying to make sure any new standards it approves match up as much as possible with the international ones.

    In the new lessee standards, FASB has decided to include options to extend or terminate the lease in the measurement of the right-of-use asset and the lease obligation based on the best estimate of the expected lease term. The board also agreed that contractual factors, non-contractual factors and business factors should be considered when determining the lease term.

    The board decided to require lessees to include contingent rentals in the measurement of the right-of-use asset and the lease obligation based on their best estimate of expected lease payments.

    FASB also decided that both the right-of-use asset and the lease obligation should be initially measured at the present value of the best estimate of expected lease payments for all leases. The board decided to require the best estimate of expected lease payments to be discounted using the lessee's secured incremental borrowing rate.

    FASB members discussed the subsequent measurement of both the right-of-use asset and the lease obligation, but the board was not able to reach a decision. The board also discussed whether there should be criteria to distinguish between leases that are in-substance purchases and leases that are a right to use an asset, but it was not able to reach a decision on that matter either.

     


    More Reasons Why Tom and I Hate Principles-Based Accounting Standards

    "Contingent Liabilities: A Troubling Signpost on the Winding Road to a Single Global Accounting Standard," by Tom Selling, The Accounting Onion, May 26, 2008 --- Click Here

    By the logic of others, which I can’t explain, fuzzy lines in accounting standards have come to be exalted as “principles-based” and bright lines are disparaged as “rules-based.” One of my favorite examples (actually a pet peeve) of this phenomenon is the difference in the accounting for leases between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. The objective of the financial reporting game is to capture as much of the economic benefits of an asset as possible, while keeping the contractual liability for future lease payments off the balance sheet; a win is scored an “operating lease,” and a loss is scored a “capital lease.” As in tennis, If the present value of the minimum lease payments turns out to be even a hair over the 90% line of the leased asset’s fair value, your shot is out and you lose the point.

    The counterpart to FAS 13 in IFRS is IAS 17, a putative principles-based standard. It’s more a less a carbon copy of FAS 13 in its major provisions, except that bright lines are replaced with fuzzy lines: if the present value of the minimum lease payments is a “substantial portion” (whatever that means) of the leased asset’s fair value, you lose operating lease accounting. If FAS 13 is tennis, then IAS 17 is tennis-without-lines. Either way, the accounting game has another twist: the players call the balls landing on their side of the net; and the only job of the umpire—chosen and compensated by each player—is to opine on the reasonableness of their player's call. So, one would confidently expect that the players of tennis-without- lines have a much lower risk of being overruled by their auditors… whoops, I meant umpires.

    Although lease accounting is one example for which GAAP is bright-lined and IFRS is the fuzzy one, the opposite is sometimes the case, with accounting for contingencies under FAS 5 or IAS 37 being a prime exaple. FAS 5 requires recognition of a contingent liability when it is “probable” that a future event will result in the occurrence of a liability. What does “probable” mean? According to FAS 5, it means “likely to occur.” Wow, that sure clears things up. With a recognition threshold as solid as Jell-o nailed to a tree and boilerplate footnote disclosures to keep up appearances, there should be little problem persuading one’s handpicked independent auditor of the “reasonableness” of any in or out call.

    IAS 37 has a similar recognition threshold for a contingent liability (Note: I am adopting U.S. terminology throughout, even though "contingent liabilities" are referred to as "provisions" in IAS 37). But in refreshing contrast to FAS 5, IAS 37 unambiguously nails down the definition of “probable” to be “more likely than not” —i.e., just a hair north of 50%. Naively assuming that companies actually comply with the letter and spirit of IAS 37, then more liabilities should find their way onto the balance sheet under IFRS than GAAP. And, IAS 37 also has more principled rules for measuring a liability, once recognized. But, I won’t get into that here. Just please take my word for it that IAS 37 is to FAS 5 as steak is to chopped liver.

    The Global Accounting Race to the Bottom

    And so we have the IASB’s ineffable ongoing six-year project to make a hairball out of IAS 37. If these two standards, IAS 37 and FAS 5, are to be brought closer together as the ballyhooed Memorandum of Understanding between IASB and FASB should portend, it would make much more sense for the FASB to revise FAS 5 to make it more like IAS 37. After all, convergence isn’t supposed to take forever; even if you don’t think IAS 37 is perfect, there are a lot more serious problems IASB could be working harder on: leases, pensions, revenue recognition, securitizations, related party transactions, just to name a few off the top of my head. But, the stakeholders in IFRS are evidently telling the IASB that they get their jollies from tennis without lines. And, the IASB, dependent on the big boys for funding, is listening real close.

    Basically, the IASB has concluded that all present obligations – not just those that are more likely than not to result in an outflow of assets – should be recognized. It sounds admirably principled and ambitious, but there’s a catch. In place of the bright-line probability threshold in IAS 37, there would be the fuzziest line criteria one could possibly devise: the liability must be capable of “reliable” measurement. We know that "probable" without further guidance must at least lie between 0 and 1, but what amount of measurement error is within range of “reliable”? The answer, it seems, would be left to the whim of the issuer followed by the inevitable wave-your-hands-in-the-air rubber stamp of the auditor.

    It’s not as if the IASB doesn’t have history from which to learn. Where the IASB is trying to go in revising IAS 37, we’ve already been in the U.S. The result was all too often not a pretty sight as unrecognized liabilities suddenly slammed into balance sheets like freight trains. As I discussed in an earlier post, retiree health care liabilities were kept off balance sheets until they were about to break unionized industrial companies. Post-retirement benefits were doled out by earlier generations of management, long departed with their generous termination benefits, in order to persuade obstreperous unions to return to the assembly lines. GM and Ford are now on the verge of settling faustian bargains of their forbearers with huge cash outlays: yet for decades the amount recognized on the balance sheet was precisely nil. The accounting for these liabilities had been conveniently ignored, with only boilerplate disclosures in their stead, out of supposed concern for reliable measurement. Yet, everyone knew that zero as the answer was as far from correct as Detroit is from Tokyo – where, as in most developed countries, health care costs of retirees are the responsibility of government.

    Holding the recognition of a liability hostage to “reliable” measurement is bad accounting. There is just no other way I can put it. If this is the way the IASB is going to spend its time as we are supposed to be moving to a single global standard, then let the race to the bottom begin.

    Bob Jensen's threads on principles-based standards versus rules-based standards --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#Principles-Based

    Bob Jensen's threads on synthetic leases --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/00overview/speOverview.htm

    Bob Jensen's threads on intangibles and contingencies --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes

     


    Question
    What's a "cookie-cutter" lease and why does it illustrate why accounting standards are not neutral?

    "FASB Launches Review of Accounting for Leases," AccountingWeb, June 12, 2006 ---
    http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102240

    The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has begun reviewing its guidance on one of the most complex areas of off-balance sheet reporting, accounting for leases, Chairman Robert Herz told Forbes. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had requested that FASB review off-balance sheet arrangements, special purpose entities and related issues in a staff report issued in June 2005. The most prominent topics for review were pension disclosure and accounting for leases.

    Having issued its Exposure Draft to Improve Accounting of Pensions and other Postretirement Benefits, FASB is now considering moving lease obligations from the current footnote disclosure to the balance sheet. But the sheer number of rules and regulations that relate to leases – hundreds, according to Business Week – offers experts plenty of opportunities to keep disclosure off the books and presents FASB with an enormous challenge.

    Companies are currently required to record future lease obligations in a footnote, but actual rent payments are deducted in quarterly income statements. Approximately 10 percent of leases are already disclosed on the balance sheet as liabilities because the company can purchase the equipment at the end of the lease, and therefore the lease is treated as a loan, or because lease payments add up to 90 percent of the value of the leased property.

    Robert Herz says, according to Business Week, that “cookie-cutter templates” have been created to design leases so that they don’t add up to more than 89 percent of the value of the property. And to add to the complexity, the AP says, if the contract describes a more temporary rental-type arrangement, it can be treated as an operating lease and recorded in the footnote.

    Leasing footnotes do not reveal the interest portion of future payments and require the analyst or investor to make assumptions about the number of years over which the debt needs to be paid, the AP says, as well as the interest rate the company will be paying. David Zion, an analyst from Credit Suisse told the AP that many professionals interpret the footnotes by multiplying a company’s annual rental costs by eight.

    Thomas J. Linsmeier, recently named a member of the FASB, said that the current rule for accounting for leases needed to be changed because it sets such specific criteria. “It is a poster child for bright-line tests,” he said, according to the New York Times.

    The SEC requested the review it said in a press release because “the current accounting for leases takes an “all or nothing” approach to recognizing leases on the balance sheet. This results in a clustering of lease arrangements such that their terms approach, but do not cross, “the bright lines” in the accounting guidance that would require a liability to be recognized. As a consequence, arrangements with similar economic outcomes are accounted for very differently.”

    Finding a way to define a lease for accounting purposes presents additional problems. Some accountants argue that since the lessor does not own the property and cannot sell it, the property should not be viewed as an asset, Business Week says. Others say that the promise to pay a rent is equal to any other liability.

    Of 200 companies reviewed by SEC staffers in 2005, 77 percent had off-balance-sheet operating leases, totaling about $1.25 trillion, the Wall Street Journal reported.

    Among the companies with the biggest lease obligations are Walgreen Co. with $15.2 billion, CVS Corp with $11.1 billion and Fedex Corp. with $10.5 billion, the AP reports. Walgreens owns less that one-fifth of its store locations and leases the rest. Fedex leases airplanes, land and facilities.

    Robert Herz, in an editorial response in Forbes to Harvey Pitt, former SEC chairman, acknowledged that FASB’s current projects, including the review of lease accounting, could generate controversy. But he says that the complexity and volume of standards impedes transparency, and that the FASB is working jointly with the IASB to develop more principles based standards.

    “Complexity has impeded the overall usefulness of financial statements and added to the costs of preparing and auditing financial statements – particularly for small and private enterprises – and it is also viewed as a contributory factor to the unacceptably high number of restatements,” Herz writes in Forbes.

    Herz does not expect the new rules to be completed before 2008 or 2009, Business Week says.


    Let me close by citing Harry S. Truman who said, "I never give them hell; I just tell them the truth and they think its hell!"
    Great Speeches About the State of Accountancy

    "20th Century Myths," by Lynn Turner when he was still Chief Accountant at the SEC in 1999 --- http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch323.htm

    It is interesting to listen to people ask for simple, less complex standards like in "the good old days." But I never hear them ask for business to be like "the good old days," with smokestacks rather than high technology, Glass-Steagall rather than Gramm-Leach, and plain vanilla interest rate deals rather than swaps, collars, and Tigers!! The bottom line is—things have changed. And so have people.

    Today, we have enormous pressure on CEO’s and CFO’s. It used to be that CEO’s would be in their positions for an average of more than ten years. Today, the average is 3 to 4 years. And Financial Executive Institute surveys show that the CEO and CFO changes are often linked.

    In such an environment, we in the auditing and preparer community have created what I consider to be a two-headed monster. The first head of this monster is what I call the "show me" face. First, it is not uncommon to hear one say, "show me where it says in an accounting book that I can’t do this?" This approach to financial reporting unfortunately necessitates the level of detail currently being developed by the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB"), the Emerging Issues Task Force, and the AICPA’s Accounting Standards Executive Committee. Maybe this isn’t a recent phenomenon. In 1961, Leonard Spacek, then managing partner at Arthur Andersen, explained the motivation for less specificity in accounting standards when he stated that "most industry representatives and public accountants want what they call ‘flexibility’ in accounting principles. That term is never clearly defined; but what is wanted is ‘flexibility’ that permits greater latitude to both industry and accountants to do as they please." But Mr. Spacek was not a defender of those who wanted to "do as they please." He went on to say, "Public accountants are constantly required to make a choice between obtaining or retaining a client and standing firm for accounting principles. Where the choice requires accepting a practice which will produce results that are erroneous by a relatively material amount, we must decline the engagement even though there is precedent for the practice desired by the client."

    We create the second head of our monster when we ask for standards that absolutely do not reflect the underlying economics of transactions. I offer two prime examples. Leasing is first. We have accounting literature put out by the FASB with follow-on interpretative guidance by the accounting firms—hundreds of pages of lease accounting guidance that, I will be the first to admit, is complex and difficult to decipher. But it is due principally to people not being willing to call a horse a horse, and a lease what it really is—a financing. The second example is Statement 133 on derivatives. Some people absolutely howl about its complexity. And yet we know that: (1) people were not complying with the intent of the simpler Statements 52 and 80, and (2) despite the fact that we manage risk in business by managing values rather than notional amounts, people want to account only for notional amounts. As a result, we ended up with a compromise position in Statement 133. To its credit, Statement 133 does advance the quality of financial reporting. For that, I commend the FASB. But I believe that we could have possibly achieved more, in a less complex fashion, if people would have agreed to a standard that truly reflects the underlying economics of the transactions in an unbiased and representationally faithful fashion.

    I certainly hope that we can find a way to do just that with standards we develop in the future, both in the U.S. and internationally. It will require a change in how we approach standard setting and in how we apply those standards. It will require a mantra based on the fact that transparent, high quality financial reporting is what makes our capital markets the most efficient, liquid, and deep in the world.

    Bob Jensen's threads on lease accounting are at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Leases


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on April 22, 2005

    TITLE: Lease Restatements Are Surging
    REPORTER: Eiya Gullapalli
    DATE: Apr 20, 2005
    PAGE: C4
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111396285894611651,00.html 
    TOPICS: Accounting, Advanced Financial Accounting, Lease Accounting, Restatement, Sarbanes-Oxley Act

    SUMMARY: Last winter, "the Big Four accounting firms...banded together to ask the Security and Exchange Commission's chief accountant to clarify rules on lease accounting...Now about 250 companies have announced restatements for lease accounting issues..."

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) Why is it curious that so many companies are now restating previous financial statements due to lease accounting problems? What does the fact that companies must restate previous results imply about previous accounting for these lease transactions?

    2.) What industries in particular are cited for these issues in the article? How do you think this industry uses leases?

    3.) While one company, Emeritus Corp., disclosed significant impacts on previously reported income amounts, companies are "...for the most part, not materially affecting their earnings, analysts say..." Are you surprised by this fact? What is the most significant impact of capitalizing a lease on a corporation's financial statements?  In your answer, define the terms operating lease and capitalized lease.

    4.) How do points made in the article show that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is accomplishing its intended effect?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    "Lease Restatements Are Surging:  Number Increases Daily; Accounting Experts Say GAAP Violations Are Rife," by Diya Gullapalli, The Wall Street Journal, April 20, 2005; Page C4 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111396285894611651,00.html

    When it comes to bookkeeping snafus, lease accounting may be the new revenue recognition.

    It all started in November, when KPMG LLP told fast-food chain CKE Restaurants Inc. that it had problems with the way CKE recognized rent expenses and depreciated buildings. That led CKE to restate its financials for 2002 as well as some prior years. CKE will also take a charge in its upcoming annual filing for 2003 through its just-ended 2005 fiscal year.

    By winter, the Big Four accounting firms had banded together to ask the Securities and Exchange Commission's chief accountant to clarify rules on lease accounting. Retail and restaurant trade groups began battling rule makers about the merits of issuing such guidance.

    Now, about 250 companies have announced restatements for lease-accounting issues similar to CKE's, and the number continues to rise daily.

    "We'd be shocked if this isn't the biggest category of restatements we've ever seen," says Jeff Szafran of Huron Consulting Group LLC, which tracks restatements.

    Given that so many publicly traded companies, especially retailers and restaurant chains, hold leases, it perhaps isn't surprising that lease restatements are snowballing. Accounting experts say the restatements also demonstrate that violations of generally accepted accounting principles still are widespread.

    "The whole subject has been a curiosity to me," says Jack Ciesielski, editor of the Analyst's Accounting Observer newsletter in Baltimore. "This was existing GAAP that hasn't changed, but I don't think we've seen the end of these restatements."

    Since many of the companies announcing restatements so far report on a January-ending fiscal year, Mr. Ciesielski and other accounting-industry watchers anticipate a slew of additional restatements in coming weeks as more companies prepare their books.

    Corporate-governance advocates say the volume of lease-problem restatements shows the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is doing its job. That 2002 law laid down guidelines for ensuring that companies had proper internal controls, systems to prevent accounting mistakes and improprieties. Indeed, many of the companies that have had to restate due to lease problems also have reported weakness in their internal controls.

    While Ernst & Young LLP clients Friendly Ice Cream Corp., Whole Foods Market Inc. and Cingular Wireless, a joint venture between SBC Communications Inc. and BellSouth Corp., all reported material weaknesses in internal controls in their latest annual reports due partly to lease issues, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP client J. Jill Group Inc. says its lease-driven restatement didn't signal such significant internal-control problems.

    The main rule on lease accounting hasn't changed much. Issued in 1976, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 13 is, in fact, one of the oldest rules written by the Financial Accounting Standards Board, which sets guidelines for publicly traded companies. While some parts of FAS 13 have been reinterpreted since then, auditors for the most part hadn't raised any concerns about clients' lease accounting -- until now.

    "Our industry has been accounting for leases using the same methodology for 20 years at least and had gotten clean opinions," says Carleen Kohut, chief financial officer of the National Retail Federation.

    The changes in lease accounting are "not the result of the discovery of new facts or information," reads a statement from Emeritus Corp., an assisted-living company that announced a restatement for lease accounting within a week of CKE.

    Had Emeritus correctly applied lease-accounting rules in 2003, it could have almost wiped out its profit. In a restated annual report released in January, the company said lease expenses and other adjustments lowered earnings to $204,000 for 2003 from the originally reported $4.5 million -- and such adjustments widened past years' losses even further.

    Emeritus didn't return calls for comment.

    Others companies such as home-furnishing store Bombay Co. announced a lease restatement in March and then withdrew the decision a week later, demonstrating lingering confusion over the matter.

    The SEC's letter released in February clarified three specific areas of lease accounting, focusing on leasehold improvement amortization, rent-expense recognition and tenant incentives.

    The bright side is that companies coming to grips with faulty lease accounting are, for the most part, not materially affecting their earnings, analysts say -- companies such as Emeritus being an exception. Rather, they say, the change is just a reshuffling of dollars across various line items.

    --- RELATED ARTICLES ---
     TITLE: FOOTNOTES: Recent US Earnings Restatements
    REPORTER: Dow Jones Newswires
    ISSUE: Apr 19, 2005
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,BT_CO_20050419_008924,00.html 

    A concise summary of the February 7, 2005 letter is provided at
    http://www.accountingobserver.com/blog/2005/02/secs-view-on-lease-accounting-do-overs/

    The complete February 7, 2005 letter from the SEC's Chief Accountant to Robert J. Kueppers is located at http://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/staffletters/cpcaf020705.htm

    In recent weeks, a number of public companies have issued press releases announcing restatements of their financial statements relating to lease accounting. You requested that the Office of the Chief Accountant clarify the staff's interpretation of certain accounting issues and their application under generally accepted accounting principles relating to operating leases. Of specific concern is the appropriate accounting for: (1) the amortization of leasehold improvements by a lessee in an operating lease with lease renewals, (2) the pattern of recognition of rent when the lease term in an operating lease contains a period where there are free or reduced rents (commonly referred to as "rent holidays"), and (3) incentives related to leasehold improvements provided by a landlord/lessor to a tenant/lessee in an operating lease. It should be noted that the Commission has neither reviewed this letter nor approved the staff's positions expressed herein. In addition, the staff's positions may be affected or changed by particular facts or conditions. Finally, this letter does not purport to express any legal conclusion on the questions presented.

    The staff's views on these issues are as follows:

    1. Amortization of Leasehold Improvements - The staff believes that leasehold improvements in an operating lease should be amortized by the lessee over the shorter of their economic lives or the lease term, as defined in paragraph 5(f) of FASB Statement 13 ("SFAS 13"), Accounting for Leases, as amended. The staff believes amortizing leasehold improvements over a term that includes assumption of lease renewals is appropriate only when the renewals have been determined to be "reasonably assured," as that term is contemplated by SFAS 13.
       
    2. Rent Holidays - The staff believes that pursuant to the response in paragraph 2 of FASB Technical Bulletin 85-3 ("FTB 85-3"), Accounting for Operating Leases with Scheduled Rent Increases, rent holidays in an operating lease should be recognized by the lessee on a straight-line basis over the lease term (including any rent holiday period) unless another systematic and rational allocation is more representative of the time pattern in which leased property is physically employed.
       
    3. Landlord/Tenant Incentives - The staff believes that: (a) leasehold improvements made by a lessee that are funded by landlord incentives or allowances under an operating lease should be recorded by the lessee as leasehold improvement assets and amortized over a term consistent with the guidance in item 1 above; (b) the incentives should be recorded as deferred rent and amortized as reductions to lease expense over the lease term in accordance with paragraph 15 of SFAS 13 and the response to Question 2 of FASB Technical Bulletin 88-1 ("FTB 88-1"), Issues Relating to Accounting for Leases, and therefore, the staff believes it is inappropriate to net the deferred rent against the leasehold improvements; and (c) a registrant's statement of cash flows should reflect cash received from the lessor that is accounted for as a lease incentive within operating activities and the acquisition of leasehold improvements for cash within investing activities. The staff recognizes that evaluating when improvements should be recorded as assets of the lessor or assets of the lessee may require significant judgment and factors in making that evaluation are not the subject of this letter.
       

    To the extent that SEC registrants have deviated from the lease accounting standards and related interpretations set forth by the FASB, those registrants, in consultation with their independent auditors, should assess the impact of the resulting errors on their financial statements to determine whether restatement is required. The SEC staff believes that the positions noted above are based upon existing accounting literature and registrants who determine their prior accounting to be in error should state that the restatement results from the correction of errors or, if restatement was determined by management to be unnecessary, state that the errors were immaterial to prior periods.

    Registrants should ensure that the disclosures regarding both operating and capital leases clearly and concisely address the material terms of and accounting for leases. Registrants should provide basic descriptive information about material leases, usual contract terms, and specific provisions in leases relating to rent increases, rent holidays, contingent rents, and leasehold incentives. The accounting for leases should be clearly described in the notes to the financial statements and in the discussion of critical accounting policies in MD&A if appropriate. Known likely trends or uncertainties in future rent or amortization expense that could materially affect operating results or cash flows should be addressed in MD&A. The disclosures should address the following:

    1. Material lease agreements or arrangements.
       
    2. The essential provisions of material leases, including the original term, renewal periods, reasonably assured rent escalations, rent holidays, contingent rent, rent concessions, leasehold improvement incentives, and unusual provisions or conditions.
       
    3. The accounting policies for leases, including the treatment of each of the above components of lease agreements.
       
    4. The basis on which contingent rental payments are determined with specificity, not generality.
       
    5. The amortization period of material leasehold improvements made either at the inception of the lease or during the lease term, and how the amortization period relates to the initial lease term.
       

    As you know, the SEC staff is continuing to consider these and related matters and may have further discussions on lease accounting with registrants and their independent auditors.

    We appreciate your inquiry and further questions about these matters can be directed to Tony Lopez, Associate Chief Accountant in the Office of the Chief Accountant (202-942-7104) or Louise Dorsey, Associate Chief Accountant in the Division of Corporation Finance (202-942-2960).


    From the FASB:  PROPOSED FASB STAFF POSITION No. FAS 157-a
    "Application of FASB Statement No. 157 to FASB Statement No. 13 and Its Related Interpretive Accounting Pronouncements That Address Leasing Transactions" --- http://www.fasb.org/fasb_staff_positions/prop_fsp_fas157-a.pdf

    Objective

    1. This FASB Staff Position (FSP) amends FASB Statement No. 157, Fair Value Measurements, to exclude FASB Statement No. 13, Accounting for Leases, and its related interpretive accounting pronouncements that address leasing transactions.

    Background

    2. The Exposure Draft preceding Statement 157 proposed a scope exception for Statement 13 and other accounting pronouncements that require fair value measurements for leasing transactions. At that time, the Board was concerned that applying the fair value measurement objective in the Exposure Draft to leasing transactions could have unintended consequences, requiring reconsideration of aspects of lease accounting that were beyond the scope of the Exposure Draft.

    3. However, respondents to the Exposure Draft indicated that the fair value measurement objective for leasing transactions was generally consistent with the fair value measurement objective proposed by the Exposure Draft. Others in the leasing industry subsequently affirmed that view. Based on that input, the Board decided to include lease accounting pronouncements in the scope of Statement 157.

    4. Subsequent to the issuance of Statement 157, which changed in some respects from the Exposure Draft, constituents have raised issues stemming from the interaction

    Proposed FSP on Statement 157 (FSP FAS 157-a) 1 FSP FAS 157-a between the fair value measurement objective in Statement 13 and the fair value measurement objective in Statement 157.

    5. Constituents have noted that paragraph 5(c)(ii) of Statement 13 provides an example of the determination of fair value (an exit price) through the use of a transaction price (an entry price). Constituents also have raised issues about the application of the fair value measurement objective in Statement 157 to estimated residual values of leased property. These issues, as well as other issues related to the interaction between Statement 13 and Statement 157, would result in a change in lease accounting that requires considerations of lease classification criteria and measurements in leasing transactions that are beyond the scope of Statement 157 (for example, a change in lease classification for leases that would otherwise be accounted for as direct financing leases).

    6. The Board acknowledges that the term fair value will be left in Statement 13 although it is defined differently than in Statement 157; however, the Board believes that lease accounting provisions and the longstanding valuation practices common within the leasing industry should not be changed by Statement 157 without a comprehensive reconsideration of the accounting for leasing transactions. The Board has on its agenda a project to comprehensively reconsider the guidance in Statement 13 together with its subsequent amendments and interpretations.

     


    AICPA PROVIDES GUIDANCE ON LEASE ACCOUNTING ---
    http://accountingeducation.com/index.cfm?page=newsdetails&id=141809

    Bob Jensen's threads on lease accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#Leases


    Despite a Post-Enron Push, Companies Can Still Keep Big Debts Off Balance Sheets.
    "How Leases Play A Shadowy Role In Accounting," by Jonathan Weil, The Wall Street Journal, September 22, 2004, Page A1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB109580870299124246,00.html?mod=home%5Fpage%5Fone%5Fus 

    Despite the post-Enron drive to improve accounting standards, U.S. companies are still allowed to keep off their balance sheets billions of dollars of lease obligations that are just as real as financial commitments originating from bank loans and other borrowings.

    The practice spans the entire spectrum of American business and industry, relegating a key gauge of corporate health to obscure financial-statement footnotes, and leaving investors and analysts to do the math themselves. The scale of these off-balance-sheet obligations -- stemming from leases on everything from aircraft to retail stores to factory equipment -- can be huge:

    • US Airways Group Inc., which recently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, showed only $3.15 billion in long-term debt on its most recently audited balance sheet, for 2003, and didn't include the $7.39 billion in operating-lease commitments it had on its fleet of passenger jets.

    • Drugstore chain Walgreen Co. shows no debt on its balance sheet, but it is responsible for $19.3 billion of operating-lease payments mainly on stores over the next 25 years.

    • For the companies in the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index, off-balance-sheet operating-lease commitments, as revealed in the footnotes to their financial statements, total $482 billion.

    Debt levels are among the most important measures of a company's financial health. But the special accounting treatment for many leases means that a big slice of corporate financing remains in the shadows. For all the tough laws and regulations set up since Enron Corp.'s 2001 collapse, regulators have left lease accounting largely untouched. Members of the Financial Accounting Standards Board say they are considering adding the issue to their agenda next year.

    "Leasing is one of the areas of accounting standards that clearly merits review," says Donald Nicolaisen, the Securities and Exchange Commission's chief accountant. The current guidance, he says, depends on rigidly defined categories in which a slight variation has a major effect and relies too much on "on-off switches for determining whether a leased asset and the related payment obligations are reflected on the balance sheet."

    A case in point is the "90% test," part of the FASB's 28-year-old rules for lease accounting. If the present value of a company's minimum lease payments equals 90% or more of a property's value, the transaction must be treated as a "capital lease," with accounting treatment akin to that of debt. If the figure is slightly less, say 89%, the deal is treated as an "operating lease," subject to certain other conditions, meaning the lease doesn't count as debt. The lease commitment appears not in the main body of the financial statements but in footnotes, often obscurely written and of limited usefulness.

    The $482 billion figure for the S&P 500 was determined through a Wall Street Journal review of the companies' annual reports. That's equivalent to 8% of the $6.25 trillion reported as debt on the 500 companies' balance sheets, according to data provided by Reuters Research. For many companies, off-balance-sheet lease obligations are many times higher than their reported debt.

    Given the choice between leasing and owning real estate or equipment, many companies pick operating leases. Besides lowering reported debt, operating leases boost returns on assets and often plump up earnings through, among other things, lower depreciation expenses.

    "It's nonsense," Trevor Harris, an accounting analyst and managing director at Morgan Stanley, says of the 90% rule. "What's the difference between 89.9% and 90%, and 85% and 90%, or even 70% and 90%? It's the wrong starting point. You've purchased the right to some resources as an asset. The essence of accounting is supposed to be economic substance over legal form."

    This summer, Union Pacific Corp. opened its new 19-story, $260 million headquarters in Omaha, Neb. The railroad operator is the owner of the city's largest building, the Union Pacific Center, in virtually every respect except its accounting.

    Under an initial operating lease, Union Pacific guaranteed 89.9% of all construction costs through the building's completion date. After completing the building, the company signed a new operating lease, which guarantees 85% of the building's costs. Unlike most operating leases, both were "synthetic" leases, which allow the company to take income-tax deductions for interest and depreciation while maintaining complete operational control. A Union Pacific spokesman declined to comment.

    Neither lease has appeared on the balance sheet. Instead, they have stayed in the footnotes, resulting in lower reported assets and liabilities. On its balance sheet, Union Pacific shows about $8 billion of debt, while its footnotes show about $3 billion of operating-lease commitments, including for railroad engines and other equipment.

    The 90% test goes to the crux of investor complaints that U.S. accounting standards remain driven by arbitrary rules, around which companies can easily structure transactions to achieve desired outcomes.

    It means different companies entering nearly identical transactions can account for them in very different ways, depending on which side of the 90% test they reside. Meanwhile, as with disclosures showing employee stock-option compensation expenses, most investors and stock analysts tend to ignore the footnotes disclosing lease obligations.

    Three years ago, Enron's collapse revealed how easily a company could hide debt. A big part of the energy company's scandal centered on off-balance-sheet "special purpose entities." These obscure partnerships could be kept off the books -- with no footnote disclosures -- if an independent investor owned 3% of an entity's equity. Responding to public outcry, FASB members eliminated that rule and promised more "principles-based" standards, which spell out concise objectives and emphasize economic substance over form, rather than a "check the box" approach with rigid tests and exceptions that can be exploited.

    The accounting literature on leasing covers hundreds of pages. The FASB's original 1976 pronouncement, called Financial Accounting Standard No. 13, does state a broad principle: A lease that transfers substantially all the benefits and risks of ownership should be accounted for as such. But in practice, critics say, FAS 13 amounts to all rules and no principles, making it easy to manipulate its strict exceptions and criteria as needed. One key rule says a lease is a "capital lease" if it covers 75% or more of the property's estimated useful life. One day less, and it can stay off-balance-sheet, subject to other tests.

    Continued in the article

    "Group (the IASB) to Alter Rules On Lease Accounting," The Wall Street Journal, September 23, 2004, Page C4

    BRUSSELS -- The International Accounting Standards Board next week will unveil plans to overhaul the rules on accounting for leased assets, the board's chairman said yesterday.

    Critics long have contended that the rules for determining whether leases should be included as assets and liabilities on a company's balance sheet are easy to evade and encourage form-over-substance accounting. "It's going to be a very big deal," Chairman Sir David Tweedie told Dow Jones Newswires after testifying to the European Parliament. International accounting rules on leasing exist already, but they are useless, Mr. Tweedie said.

    Airlines that lease their aircraft, for instance, rarely include their planes on their balance sheets, he said. "So the aircraft is just a figment of your imagination," Mr. Tweedie said. The board will convene a meeting next week to discuss changes to current rules, he said.

    The Wall Street Journal yesterday reported (see the above article) that the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board is considering adding lease accounting to its agenda of items for overhaul.

    From The Wall Street Journal's The Weekly Review: Accounting on September 24, 2004

    TITLE: Lease Accounting Still Has an Impact 
    REPORTER: Jonathan Weil 
    DATE: Sep 22, 2004 
    PAGE: A1 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB109580870299124246,00.html  
    TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Financial Statement Analysis, Lease Accounting, off balance sheet financing

    SUMMARY: The on-line version of this article is entitled "How Leases Play a Shadowy Role in Accounting." The article highlights the typical practical ways in which entities avoid capitalizing leases; reports on a WSJ analysis of footnote disclosures to assess levels of off-balance sheet debt; and comments on the difficulties the FASB may face in trying to amend Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 13.

    QUESTIONS: 

    1.) What accounting standard governs the accounting for lease transactions under U.S. GAAP? When was that accounting standard written and first put into effect?

    2.) When is the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) considering working on improvements to the accounting for lease transactions? Why is the FASB likely to face challenges in any attempt to change accounting for leasing transactions?

    3.) What are the names of the two basic methods of accounting for leases by lessees under current U.S. standards? Which of these methods is he referring to when the author writes, "U.S. companies are...allowed to keep off their balance sheets billions of dollars of lease obligations..."

    4.) What are the required disclosures under each of the two methods of accounting for leases? What are the problems with financial statement users relying on footnote disclosures as opposed to including a caption and a numerical amount on the face of the balance sheet?

    5.) How do you think the Wall Street Journal identified the amounts of lease commitments that are kept off of corporate balance sheets? Specifically identify the steps you think would be required to measure obligations under operating leases in a way that is comparable to the amounts shown for capital leases recognized on the face of the balance sheet.

    6.) What four tests must be made in determining the accounting for any lease? Why do you think the author focuses on only one of these tests, the "90% test"?

    7.) What financial ratios are impacted by accounting for leases? List all that you can identify in the article, and that you can think of, and explain how they are affected by different accounting treatments for leases.

    8.) What is a "special purpose entity"? When are these entities used in leasing transactions?

    9.) What is a "synthetic lease"? When are these leases constructed?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island


    This is Auditing 101:  Where were the auditors?

    "SEC Uncovers Wide-Scale Lease Accounting Errors," AccountingWeb, March 1, 2005 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=100600

    Where were the auditors? That is the question being asked as more than 60 companies face the prospect of restating their earnings after apparently incorrectly dealing with their lease accounting, Dow Jones reported.

    Companies in the retail, restaurant and wireless-tower industries are among those affected in what is being called the most sweeping bookkeeping correction in such a short time period since the late 1990s.

    Among the companies on the list are Ann Taylor, Target and Domino's Pizza. You can view a full listing of the affected companies.

    "It's always disturbing when our accounting is not followed," Don Nicolaisen, chief accountant at the Securities and Exchange Commission, said last week during an interview. He published a letter on Feb. 7 urging companies to follow accounting standards that have been on the books for many years, Dow Jones reported.

    Based on the charges and restatement announcements that have come in the wake of the SEC letter it seems companies have failed for years to follow what regulators see as cut-and-dried lease-accounting rules. The SEC has yet to go so far as to accuse companies of wrongdoing, but it has led people to wonder why auditors hired to keep company books clean could have missed so many instances of failure to comply with the rule.

    "Where were the auditors?" J. Edward Ketz, an accounting professor at Pennsylvania State University, said to Dow Jones. "Where were the people approving these things? This doesn't seem like something that really requires new discussion. If we have to go back and revisit every single rule because companies and their professional advisers aren't going to follow the rules, then I think we're in very serious trouble in this country."

    Tom Fitzgerald, a spokesman for auditing firm KPMG, declined to comment. Representatives for Deloitte & Touche LLP, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLC, and Ernst & Young LLP, didn't return several phone calls, Dow Jones reported.

    The crux of the issue is that companies are supposed to book these "leasehold improvements" as assets on their balance sheets and then depreciate those assets, incurring an expense on their income statements, over the duration of the lease. Instead, companies such as Pep Boys-Manny Moe & Jack had been spreading those expenses out over the projected useful life of the property, which is usually a longer time period, Dow Jones reported.

    As a result, expenses were deferred and income was added to the current period. McDonald's Corp. took a charge of $139.1 million, or 8 cents a share, in its fourth quarter to correct a lease-accounting strategy that it says had been in place for 25 years, Dow Jones reported, adding that Pep Boys said it would book a charge of 80 cents a share, or $52 million, for the nine months through Oct. 30, 2004.


    Debt Versus Equity

    What is debt? What is equity? What is a Trup?
    Banks are going to create huge problems for accountants with newer hybrid instruments

    From Jim Mahar's Blog on February 6, 2005 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

    The Financial Times has a very cool article on financial engineering and the development of securities that combine debt and equity-like features.

    FT.com / Home UK - Banks hope to cash in on rush into hybrid securities: "Securities that straddle the debt and equity worlds are not new. They combine features of debt such as regular interest-like payments and equity-like characteristics such as long or perpetual maturities and the ability to defer payments."

    "About a decade ago, regulated financial institutions started issuing so-called trust preferred securities, or Trups, which are functionally similar to preferred stock but can be structured to achieve extra benefits such as tax deductibility for the issuing company. Other hybrid structures have also been tried.

    But bankers were still searching for what several called the “holy grail” – an instrument that looked like debt to its issuer, the tax man and investors, but like equity to credit rating agencies and regulators.

    That goal came closer a year ago when Moody’s, the credit rating agency, changed its previously conservative policies, opening the door for it to treat structures with some debt-like features more like equity."

    The link to the Financial Times article ---
    http://news.ft.com/cms/s/e22d70f2-9674-11da-a5ba-0000779e2340.html


    Spruce up your basic accounting courses with fresh illustrations of accounting for preferred stock
    Especially note the reasons for choosing preferred stock

    Lehman Wants To Short-Circuit Short Sellers
    by Susanne Craig
    The Wall Street Journal

    Apr 01, 2008
    Page: C1
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120699998020978159.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
     

    TOPICS: Accounting, Financial Accounting, Stock Price Effects

    SUMMARY: On Monday, March 31, 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc, "...announced it plans to $3 billion of preferred shares....'I think an issue of this size with the investors we have on board will put the false rumors about our capital position to rest,' said Lehman Chief Financial Officer Erin Callan."

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Financial accounting for stock issuances, particularly preferred stock can be covered with this article, providing a background to understand reasoning behind these transactions and the Chief Financial Officer's responsibility to communicate to outsiders about this transaction.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1. (Introductory) What is the difference between preferred stock and common stock?

    2. (Introductory) What is "short selling?" How is it having an impact on Lehman Brothers, Inc., common stock value?

    3. (Advanced) What is the strategic reason for Lehman Brothers to issue preferred stock? In your answer, comment on the "capital position" mentioned by Lehman CFO Erin Callan and the need to communicate the strategy to investors and other interested parties.

    4. (Advanced) Why do you think that Lehman chose to issue preferred stock rather than, say, a rights offering for additional shares of common stock?

    5. (Advanced) Define the notion of "dilution." How does the issuance of preferred stock dilute the interests of common shareholders?
     

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
     

    "Lehman Wants To Short-Circuit Short Sellers," by Susanne Craig, The Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2008; Page C1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120699998020978159.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC

    Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. has unveiled its latest attempt to try to shake the shorts.

    On Monday, the firm announced it plans to issue $3 billion of preferred shares, a move that will strengthen its balance sheet and that it hopes will dispel speculation that it is facing a capital crunch. The question now: Will it be enough? "I think an issue of this size with the investors we have on board will put the false rumors about our capital position to rest," said Lehman Chief Financial Officer Erin Callan.

    Not everyone is on board. The Wall Street brokerage has become a favorite target of short sellers, traders who make money by betting that a stock's price will fall. The shorts now will likely ask: If Lehman had enough capital, why did it need to do the new issue, which will dilute the stakes of existing shareholders by potentially increasing shares outstanding by about 5%?

    Thursday, the stock fell almost 9%. Two weeks ago, in the wake of the forced sale of Bear Stearns Cos. to J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Lehman's stock took another nasty tumble, falling 19% to a 4½-year low. Some Lehman shareholders blamed the decline on heavy selling by short sellers, who borrow shares and sell them, hoping to buy them back at a lower price and lock in a profit.

    Monday, Lehman's stock fell 23 cents to $37.64 in 4 p.m. New York Stock Exchange composite trading. But in after-hours trading, the share price declined $1.12 to $36.52. Lehman maintains that the stock will rebound once investors learn both the terms of the offering and the fact that it has been "substantially" presold. Late last night, Lehman said there was $11 billion in investor demand for its offering.

    So far this year, Lehman's stock is down 43%, compared with 16% for the Dow Jones Wilshire U.S. Financial Services Index and 23% and 14%, respectively, for rivals Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Morgan Stanley. Lehman says that over the past few months it has been trying to lower the amount of debt it takes on relative to its assets, both by selling assets and now by raising capital -- so the new offering isn't necessarily aimed at beating back the short sellers.

    Still, as of March 12, there were 46.6 million shares, 9.1% of Lehman's total float, sold short. That is up from 9.4 million shares at the beginning of the year, according to the NYSE. Investors also are loading up on Lehman options, another way to bet on a fall in the firm's stock.

    The firm says it has enough cash on hand to weather the current crisis, $31 billion in cash and cash equivalents and another $65 billion in assets it can easily borrow against. Furthermore, thanks to a recent change in the rules, it now has access for the first time to Federal Reserve funds, a move that gives Lehman access to an essentially unlimited pool of money at the same rate as commercial banks.

    Lehman is no stranger to the skeptics. The brokerage and its chairman, Richard Fuld Jr., fought off rumors about a cash crunch in 1998 that were triggered by the near-collapse of hedge fund Long Term Capital Management. At that time, the firm hired a private-investigation firm to get to the bottom of the speculation circling the company. Since then, Mr. Fuld has won praise for diversifying Lehman, long known as a bond house, into lucrative areas like stock trading and investment banking.

    This time around, the firm has publicly spoken out against the shorts. It has met with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and top management is actively trying to track down the source of rumors as they arise.

    The main concern: Lehman's still-sizable exposure to the mortgage market makes it easy for critics to draw comparisons to Bear. A recent Bank of America report notes that mortgages represent 29% of total assets at Lehman, roughly in line with Bear, which had one-third of its assets in mortgages, and much higher than Merrill Lynch & Co. and Goldman Sachs, both at 12%, and 13% at Morgan Stanley. Ms. Callan estimates Lehman's total real-estate exposure is closer to 20% and it is a skilled operator in managing real-estate assets.

    "Looking toward the remainder of 2008, Lehman investors will be nervously waiting to see if the firm, with its balance sheet loaded with $87 billion of troubled assets which are under pricing pressure and which can't be easily sold, will be able to navigate the continuing credit storm and the de-leveraging environment that we anticipate," wrote Brad Hintz, an analyst at Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. and a former chief financial officer at Lehman.

    Nearly $31 billion of its holdings are commercial-real-estate loans. Even as it cut way back on making home loans, Lehman continued to lend to buyers of office buildings and other assets, and analysts expect it will take a hit on these this year.

    A big concern is Lehman's 2007 investment in Archstone-Smith Trust, which it bought with Tishman Speyer Properties in May 2007, just as the real-estate market was beginning to melt. Lehman bought in at $60.75 a share. Archstone is now private, but shares of its publicly traded rivals are down substantially, suggesting Lehman's investment is underwater.

    During a conference call to discuss its first-quarter earnings, Lehman said it currently holds $2.3 billion of Archstone's non-investment-grade debt and $2.2 billion of equity, both of which Ms. Callan said are being carried "materially below par." She said Lehman is working to sell assets and improve Archstone's financial profile. Lehman says it has taken write-downs on this investment, but the size of the haircut isn't known because it doesn't release this data on individual investments.

    Continued in article


    Question
    What are shareholder "earn-out"contracts"?
    (Another example of the increasing complexity of classifying debt versus equity.)

    How did eBay make a $1.43 dollar (or more) mistake?

    "Skype CEO steps down and parent company:  eBay takes $1.43 billion charge," MIT's Technology Review, October 1, 2007 --- http://www.technologyreview.com/Wire/19466/?nlid=575

    EBay Inc. announced Monday that the co-founder and chief executive of its Skype division was stepping down, and that the parent company would take $1.43 billion in charges for the Internet phone service division.

    Of the charges to be taken in the current quarter, $900 million will be a write-down in the value of Skype, eBay said. That charge, for what accountants call impairment, essentially acknowledges that San Jose-based eBay, one of the world's largest e-commerce companies, drastically overvalued the $2.6 billion Skype acquisition, which was completed in October 2005.

    EBay also said Monday it paid certain shareholders $530 million to settle future obligations.

    In 2005, eBay wooed Skype investors by offering an ''earn-out agreement'' up to $1.7 billion if Skype hit specific targets -- including a number of active users and a gross profit -- in 2008 and the first half of 2009. The Skype shareholders holding those agreements received the $530 million in an early, one-time payout, eBay spokesman Hani Durzy said.

    EBay also announced that Skype CEO Niklas Zennstrom will become non-executive chairman of Skype's board and likely spend more time working on independent projects.

    Durzy said the resignation of Zennstrom, a Swedish entrepreneur who started Skype, was not related to the impairment charge or Skype's performance.

    ''Niklas left of his own volition,'' Durzy said. ''He is an entrepreneur first and foremost, and he wanted to spend more time on some of his new projects that he has been working on.''

    Skype, which allows customers to place long-distance calls using their computers, reported second-quarter revenue of $89.13 million, up 102 percent from a year ago. It was the second consecutive quarter of profitability for the newest eBay division.

    Zennstrom is likely to work on developing Joost, an Internet TV service he started in 2006 with Skype co-founder Janus Friis, relying on peer-to-peer technology to distribute TV shows and other videos over the Web.

    Joost had at least 1 million beta testers in July and will launch at the end of the year, Zennstrom said earlier this summer.

    One of the pair's first collaborations was the peer-to-peer file-sharing network KaZaA, which launched in March 2000 and is used primarily to swap MP3 music files over the Internet. Zennstrom also co-founded the peer-to-peer network Altnet and the venture capital firm Atomico.

    Continued in article


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on July 16, 2004

    TITLE: Possible Accounting Change May Hurt Convertible Bonds 
    REPORTER: Aaron Lucchetti 
    DATE: Jul 08, 2004 
    PAGE: C1 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108923165610057603,00.html  
    TOPICS: Bonds, Convertible bonds, Earnings per share, Emerging Issues Task Force, Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board

    SUMMARY: The Emerging Issues Task Force is considering changing the requirements for including in the EPS calculation the potentially dilutive shares issuable from so-called CoCo bonds. These bonds have an interest-payment coupon and are contingently convertible, typically depending upon a specified percentage increase in the stock price.

    QUESTIONS: 

    1.) Describe the terms of CoCo Bonds. What do you think the term "CoCo" means? How do they differ from typical convertible bonds? Why do investors find typical convertible bonds attractive? Why do companies find it attractive to offer typical convertible bonds?

    2.) What is the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF)? How can the organization of that task force help to resolve issues, such as the questions surrounding CoCo bonds, more rapidly than the issues can be addressed by the FASB itself?

    3.) In general, what is the accounting issue being addressed by the EITF? What is the proposed change in accounting? Does any of this have to do with the actual accounting for the bonds and their associated interest expense?

    4.) Explain in detail the effect of these bonds on companies' earnings per share (EPS) calculations. Will the amount of companies' net income change under the proposed EITF resolution of this accounting issue? What will change? Is it certain that the change in treatment of these bonds will have a dilutive effect on EPS? Explain.

    5.) Why might an EITF ruling require retroactive restatement of earnings by companies issuing these bonds? How else could any change in treatment of these bonds be presented in the financial statements?

    6.) One investment analyst states that "the new accounting doesn't change economics, but investors [are] still likely to care." Why is this the case?

    7.) Why does one analyst describe CoCo bonds as a gimmick? Why then would we "probably be better off without it"?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University


    Coke:  Gone Flat at the Bright Lines of Accounting Rules and Marketing Ethics
    The king of carbonated beverages is still a moneymaker, but its growth has stalled and the stock has been backsliding since the late '90s.  Now it turns out that the company's glory days were as much a matter of accounting maneuvers as of marketing magic. 
    Guizuenta's most ingenious contribution to Coke, the ingredient that added rocket fuel to the stock price, was a bit of creative though perfectly legal balance-sheet rejeiggering that in some ways prefigured the Enron Corp. machinations.  Known inside the company as the "49% solution," it was the brain child of then-Chief Financial Officer M. Douglas Ivester.  It worked like this:  Coke spun off its U.S. bottling operations in late 1986 into a new company known as Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc., retaining a 49% state for itself.  That was enough to exert de facto control but a hair below the 50% threshold that requires companies to consolidate results of subsidiaries in their financials.  At a stroke, Coke erased $2.4 billion of debt from its balance sheet.
    Dean Foust, "Gone Flat," Business Week, December 20, 2004, Page 77.  
    This is a Business Week cover story.
    Coca Cola's outside independent auditor is Ernst & Young

    There were other problems, some of which did not do the famed Warren Buffet's reputation any good.  See "Fizzy Math and Fishy Marketing Lawsuit, Probes Prove Damaging to Coke," by Margaret Webb Pressler, Washington Post, June 20, 2003 --- http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A14384-2003Jun19&notFound=true 

    Coca Cola's marketing tactics were unethical and unhealthy for kids --- http://www.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ362/hallam/Coke%20Officials%20Beefed%20Up.pdf 

    Also see "The Ten Habits of Highly Defective Corporations," From The Nation --- http://www.greenmac.com/World_Events/thetenha.html 

     


    Contingent convertible bonds get a tax-treatment boost from a new IRS revenue ruling. But the window of opportunity may slam shut.
    "Cuckoo for Coco Puffs?" Robert Willens, Lehman Brothers, CFO.com, May 22, 2002
    Now the FASB intends to shut the loop-hole.  If the proposed rule (Section 404)  goes into effect, companies will have to record an increase in shares outstanding on the day they issue a Co-Co (Contingent Convertible Bond that can be converted only at threshold share prices), thus reducing EPS.  And the change would be retroactive, a step the board generally reserves for particularly egregious accounting practices, says Dennis Beresord, professor of accounting at the University of Georgia and FASB's former chief.
    "Too Much of a Good Thing," CFO Magazine, September 4, 2004, Page 21.


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on October 29, 2004

    TITLE: First Marblehead: Brilliance or Grade Inflation?
    REPORTER: Karen Richardson
    DATE: Oct 25, 2004
    PAGE: C3
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB109866115416054209,00.html 
    TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Allowance For Doubtful Accounts, Financial Statement Analysis, Securitization, Valuations

    SUMMARY: First Marblehead securitizes student loans and records assets based on significant estimates. Investors have significantly increased short selling on the stock because of concern over when the receivables recorded through securitization will ultimately be collected.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) Define the term securitization. What purpose does securitization serve?

    2.) What does the author mean by "gain-on-sale" accounting? When are gains recognized in securitization transactions?

    3.) What standard governs the accounting requirements for securitization transactions? Why does that standard focus on a question of discerning liabilities from sales? Is that accounting question a point of difficulty in the case described in this article? Explain.

    4.) Why are critics arguing that "it will be at least five years before any significant cash starts rolling in" on First Marblehead's assets?

    5.) According to what is listed in the article, how many factors must be estimated to record the assets and revenues under First Marblehead's business model? How uncertain do you think the company may be in its estimates of these of these items?

    6.) Why will it take time until "the company's massive earnings growth can be verified"? What evidence will help to evaluate the validity of the estimates made in First Marblehead's revenue recognition process?

    7.) What is the process of short selling? Why is it telling that there has been a significant increase in the number of short-sellers on First Marblehead's stock?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island


    FERF Newsletter, April 20, 2004

    Update on SFAS 150

    Halsey Bullen, Senior Project Manager at the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), gave an update on SFAS 150.

    Private Net last discussed SFAS 150 and FASB Staff Position (FSP) 150-3 in the February issue: http://www.fei.org/newsletters/privatenet/pnet204.cfm 

    Bullen said that SFAS 150 was originally designed to account for "ambiguous" instruments, such as convertible bonds, puttable stock, Co-Co No-Nos (conditionally convertible, no coupon, no interest instruments), and variable share forward sales contracts. Mandatorily redeemable shares of ownership issued by private companies were then included in the accounting for this class of instruments.

    Bullen said that FSP 150-3 allowed private companies to defer implementation of SFAS 150 until 2005 with respect to shares that were redeemable on fixed dates for fixed or externally indexed amounts, and indefinitely for other mandatorily redeemable shares. (We will assume indefinite deferral for mandatorily redeemable ownership shares issued by private companies.)

    As an update, Bullen said that in Phase 2, the FASB was considering several alternatives for "bifurcating" the ambiguous instruments into equity and liability components: * Fundamental components approach, * Narrow view of equity as common stock, * IASB 32 approach: bifurcate convertibles and treat any other obligation that might require transfer of assets as a liability for the full amount, * Minimum obligation approach, and * Reassessed expected outcomes approach.

    Bullen said that the FASB has encountered a number of challenges in trying to account for these ambiguous instruments, not the least of which are just basic conceptual definitions of shareholder equity and liability. For example, should equity be defined as assets minus liabilities, or should liabilities be first defined as assets minus shareholder equity?

    One FEI member asked Bullen, "Where is the concept of simplicity?" Bullen responded, "Simplicity is as simplicity does." In other words, if the financial instrument is not simple, how can its accounting be simple?

    Bullen told the participants to expect an exposure draft in late 2004 or early 2005.


    The Controversy Between OCI versus Current Earnings

    In June 1997, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued FAS 130 on "Reporting Comprehensive Income" --- http://www.fasb.org/pdf/aop_FAS130.pdf

    FAS 130 created an equity account called Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) or Accumulated OCI (AOCI) to serve as a means of keeping various types of unrealized changes in asset and liability values from mixing in with current earnings. For example, changes in the value of available-for-sale securities are required in FAS 115 to be carried at fair value with offsets to changes in fair value going to some equity account other than Retained Earnings. FAS 130 named this account to be OCI. FAS 130 also requires a Statement of Comprehensive Income that summarizes all changes in AOCI balances during each accounting period.

    Later when FAS 133 required carrying of derivatives at fair value, the OCI account became the required offset to changes in derivative fair values if those derivatives are cash flow or foreign exchange (FX) hedges. OCI cannot be used for Fair Value hedges.

    Comprehensive income is part of a larger initiative of both the FASB and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to provide options for and perhaps eventually require fair value accounting for all financial assets and liabilities (but not necessarily non-financial items).

    "The Accounting Cycle Let's Scrap the Comprehensive Income Statement Op/Ed," by: J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, June 2008 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x62289.xml

    The statement of comprehensive income, whether displayed as a separate financial statement or in conjunction with the income statement or as part of the statement of changes in shareholders' equity, has served its purpose. It is time to scrap the concept and incorporate these items where they actually belong -- in the income statement.

    Over the years the Financial Accounting Standards Board created a problem by allowing a variety of items to bypass the income statement, a result of te FASB's bias toward the balance sheet. In other words, FASB focused on reporting assets and liabilities of the business enterprise, but did not worry too much about the impact on the income statement. Included within the comprehensive income statement were foreign currency translation adjustments under the all-current method, holding gains and losses for investments under the available-for-sale category, gains and losses on derivatives if they are considered cash flow hedges, and losses if necessary to establish a minimum pension liability. If these things make sense to include on the balance sheet, surely their income statement effects are meaningful as well.

    The board sometimes justified this approach by claiming that these items had less reliability than other events and transactions included in the income statement. But, this argument loses water in today's world. Surely if the fair value changes recently booked in the accounts of financial institutions are reliable, then these other measurements are equally reliable. This follows because the fair value changes recently recognized are the result not of changes in market values but in changes in model estimates.

    Consider last year's 10-K for Merrill Lynch. The firm did not have a particularly good year, as witnessed by its 7.7 billion dollar loss. If the items in other comprehensive income are incorporated as well, the loss grows to almost 9 billion dollars.

    The foreign currently translation loss, net of taxes, is a mere 11 million dollar loss. Nonetheless, it is a real economic loss to shareholders and should be recognized as such.

    Merrill Lynch had losses on its investment securities considered available for sale of 2.5 billion dollars. Again, this is net of income taxes. As these securities reflect certain real changes of value, they too would be better displayed on the income statement.

    Merrill Lynch also shows deferred net gains of 81 million dollars on its cash flow hedges. Similarly, it would be more informative to users if they are reported in income.

    Finally, Merrill Lynch shows 240 million dollars of net actuarial gains and prior service costs. They too signify real economic flows and, therefore, they belong part of earnings.

    In 2007 we have reported losses of $7.7 billion versus comprehensive losses of $8.9 billion. In 2006 the two measures are the same, revealing an income of $7.5 billion. In 2005, however, the two measures have some differences as in 2007: net income is $5.1 billion while comprehensive net income is $4.7 billion.

    So why doesn't FASB scrap the comprehensive income statement? Surely the reliability of these items is as good as the reliability of the mark-to-model numbers that have recently hit the financials of corporate America. The more likely real reason for the comprehensive income concept is that it is a bargaining chip when creating new accounting policy. FASB gets what it wants, at least to some extent, on the balance sheet; in return, the compromise allows reporting entities not to announce lower incomes (or bigger losses) and it allows them to have less volatility in their annual earnings.

    Creditors and investors would be better served with a more accurate income statement. Let's renounce the reliability argument and show some political muscle. Scrap the notion of comprehensive income and strengthen the income statement.

    June 22, 2008 reply from David Albrecht [albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]

    My response to Ed is that it is my understanding that the new financial statements, on which the income statement will include no bottom line, will include these CI items.

    Is my understanding wrong?

    MicroSoft has an interesting approach to reporting Accumulated OCI on the income statement and the statement of changes in SHE: it merges the two together. I've always thought that by so doing, MS was casting its vote that the two should be comingled together on the income statement.

    David Albrecht
    Bowling Green

    June 22, 2008 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi David,

    Count me in as one who sees good things in OCI or something like OCI that separates realized gains and losses from those that have a 99.9999% chance never be realized if the company remains a viable going concern. It’s important to show the unlikely risks on the balance sheet, but I sure hate to see them be folded into earnings per share. In the case of hedging, this becomes a penalty for entering into good economic hedges that are certain to prevent losses. It’s a bad idea to penalize companies making good hedges with earnings volatility due to those hedges. That’s what companies pounded into the FASB when FAS 133 was being contemplated. It’s also the reason that FAS 133 went from 50 paragraphs to 524 paragraphs, because to keep changes in derivative contract fair values out of earnings the FASB had to invent what we now call “hedge accounting” (read that relief from unrealized earnings volatility due to hedging).

    For example, a cash sale is realized. A huge long-term gain in the value of an investment in Google’s common shares since its IPO stands a good chance of being realized but of course nothing is certain until the stock is sold. But changes in the value of an interest rate swap that’s a cash flow hedge is even more certain to never be realized.

    I repeat that the debits and credits to OCI from changes in the value of an interest rate swap used as a hedge, most likely will never be realized. Firstly, the swap is typically customized and unique for which there are not likely any buyers unless huge incentives are made to get out of the swap before it matures. Secondly, if the swap is held to maturity it’s certain that the accumulated OCI debits and credits for changes in value of the swap will sum up to zero. All debits and credits to OCI for a cash flow hedge are not important in the grand sum of things for derivatives held to maturity of the hedge and the hedged item.

    The only reason changes in value of a cash flow hedge are important on the balance sheet is to signal that there there’s risk/return from an unlikely premature settlement of a hedging derivative. Investors should know about these potential risks and returns at interim points in time since they truly exist in light of premature settlement. The signaling is on the balance sheet such as when an interest rate swap has a reported liability of $42,820,000 if the swap is terminated prematurely.

    At the same time, I would certainly hate to see the offsetting unrealized “loss” of $42,820,000 be mixed in with the realized earnings, because the probability of even a single dollar of this loss being ultimately realized is very, very unlikely if the company is truly a going concern.

    To illustrate these points consider the table in Paragraph 137 that depicts the journal entries of a cash flow hedge using an interest rate swap in Example 5 of Appendix B of FAS 133. Below I’ve reproduced Paragraph 137 table that also appears in http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/133ex05.htm
    it also appears with footnotes that explain the calculations in the Excel workbook at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/133ex05a.xls

    Note especially how the debits and credits in the OCI column sum to zero. This was certain at the commencement of the swap. I would certainly hate to see debits like $42,820, $33,160, $21,850 and credits like ($24,850), ($73,800), ($85,910), and ($1,960) be folded in with realized components of earnings each quarter.

    Note how the swap has a liability of $42,820 on June 30, 20X2. This is a good estimate of what XYZ Company would owe if it breached its swap contract and was faced with a court judgment when sued by swap’s counterparty. But if XYZ Company does not breach the contract, it is known in advance that the swap begins and ends with a value of $0. All the changes in value at interim reset dates are transitory and will wash out unless the contract is settled prematurely.

    Hence we most certainly need changes in value of interest rate swaps being booked at fair values. We also need, in my viewpoint, something like OCI that prevents highly unlikely unrealized gains and losses from having volatile impacts on other more likely or realized gains and losses. Note how the Swap and OCI columns sum to zero. This was certain in advance unless the swap was breached prematurely.

     

    .

     

     

     

    Example 5 of FAS 133 Appendix B Paragraph 137

     

     

     

     

     

    Swap

    OCI

    Earnings

    Cash

    LIBOR

     

    Debit (Credit)

    Debit (Credit)

    Debit (Credit)

    Debit (Credit)

    5.56%

    7/1/X1

     $                  -  

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Interest accrued

     $                  -  

     

     

     

     

    Payment (Receipt)

                (27,250)

     

     

                  27,250

     

    Effect of change in rates

                  52,100

                (52,100)

     

     

     

    Reclassification to earnings

                         -  

                  27,250

                (27,250)

                         -  

    5.63%

    9/30/X1

                  24,850

                (24,850)

                (27,250)

                  27,250

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Interest accrued

     $                350

                     (350)

     

     

     

    Payment (Receipt)

                (25,500)

     

     

                  25,500

     

    Effect of change in rates

                  74,100

                (74,100)

     

     

     

    Reclassification to earnings

                         -  

                  25,500

                (25,500)

                         -  

    5.56%

    12/31/X1

                  73,800

                (73,800)

                (25,500)

                  25,500

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Interest accrued

     $             1,026

                  (1,026)

     

     

     

    Payment (Receipt)

                (27,250)

     

     

                  27,250

     

    Effect of change in rates

                  38,334

                (38,334)

     

     

     

    Reclassification to earnings

                         -  

                  27,250

                (27,250)

                         -  

    5.47%

    3/31/X2

                  85,910

                (85,910)

                (27,250)

                  27,250

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Interest accrued

     $             1,175

                  (1,175)

     

     

     

    Payment (Receipt)

                (29,500)

     

     

                  29,500

     

    Effect of change in rates

              (100,405)

                100,405

     

     

     

    Reclassification to earnings

                         -  

                  29,500

                (29,500)

                         -  

    6.75%

    6/30/X2

                (42,820)

                  42,820

                (29,500)

                  29,500

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Interest accrued

     $              (723)

                       723

     

     

     

    Payment (Receipt)

                    2,500

     

     

                  (2,500)

     

    Effect of change in rates

                    7,883

                  (7,883)

     

     

     

    Reclassification to earnings

                         -  

                  (2,500)

                    2,500

                         -  

    6.86%

    9/30/X2

                (33,160)

                  33,160

                    2,500

                  (2,500)

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Interest accrued

     $              (569)

                       569

     

     

     

    Payment (Receipt)

                    5,250

     

     

                  (5,250)

     

    Effect of change in rates

                    6,629

                  (6,629)

     

     

     

    Reclassification to earnings

                         -  

                  (5,250)

                    5,250

                         -  

    6.97%

    12/31/X2

                (21,850)

                  21,850

                    5,250

                  (5,250)

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Interest accrued

     $              (381)

                       381

     

     

     

    Payment (Receipt)

                    8,000

     

     

                  (8,000)

     

    Effect of change in rates

                  16,191

                (16,191)

     

     

     

    Reclassification to earnings

                         -  

                  (8,000)

                    8,000

                         -  

    6.57%

    3/31/X3

                    1,960

                  (1,960)

                    8,000

                  (8,000)

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Interest accrued

     $                  32

                       (32)

     

     

     

    Payment (Receipt)

                  (2,000)

     

     

                    2,000

     

    Rounding error

                           8

                         (8)

     

     

     

    Reclassification to earnings

                         -  

                    2,000

                  (2,000)

                         -  

     

    6/30/X3

                         -  

                           0

                  (2,000)

                    2,000

     

    PS
    The interest accruals in the above table differ from those in Paragraph 137 of FAS 133 because the FASB screwed up the calculations and failed to correct them even though I did reported these calculation errors in Example 5 to the FASB years ago. The FASB did compute the interest accruals correctly for Example 2 in Paragraph 117, so the FASB batted 50% on their interest rate accrual calculations in FAS 133. However, such accruals are only a minor part of this outstanding illustration.

    I think Example 5 is the most important illustration in all of FAS 133 and IAS 39. If you fully understand the 133ex05a.xls workbook calculations and the Hubbard and Jensen explanation of how to value the Example 5 interest rate swap, I will give you a Certificate of FAS 133 Merit. Once again the links to learn from are as follows:

    The swap valuation explanation is at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/133ex05.htm
    The hedge accounting is explained in the Excel workbook at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/133ex05a.xls

    My accounting theory students inevitably despised this illustration until they saw the light.
    You would be surprised at how many former students contact me thanking me for explaining how to value swaps, because nearly all auditors encounter interest rate swaps on the job and don’t want to be fired from the audit for the same reasons KPMG was fired by its client named Fannie Mae.

    I can’t tell you how many questions and compliments I’ve received over the past few years regarding one of the most frequently hit documents year in and year out at my Website --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm
    That makes me feel good!

     

    June 22, 2008 reply from David Albrecht [albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]

    Bob,
    At 06:31 PM 6/22/2008, Bob Jensen wrote:

     
    Hi David,
     
    Count me in as one who sees good things in OCI or something like OCI that separates realized gains and losses from those that have a 99.9999% chance never be realized if the company remains a viable going concern. It’s important to show the unlikely risks on the balance sheet, but I sure hate to see them be folded into earnings per share. In the case of hedging, this becomes a penalty for entering into good economic hedges that are certain to prevent losses. It’s a bad idea to penalize companies making good hedges with earnings volatility due to those hedges. That’s what companies pounded into the FASB when FAS 133 was being contemplated. It’s also the reason that FAS 133 went from 50 paragraphs to 524 paragraphs, because to keep changes in derivative contract fair values out of earnings the FASB had to invent what we now call “hedge accounting” (read that relief from unrealized earnings volatility due to hedging).

    Bob,

    I just don't think that in the evolution of GAAP/IFRS to fair market valuation for the balance sheet, that there is any escape for stretching the income statement all out of any semblance of understandability (eeeehhhhh, I'm not sure the income statement has every been that understandable) and doing away with items of Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) and finally being all-inclusive.

    In the context of fair value accounting, I'm pretty sure that realizability is no longer relevant.  I had a pretty interesting discussion in class last week with some students about a classic pose from financial accounting:  conservatism.  That is, accountants are quick to recognize losses/declines and slow to recognize gains/increases.  When combined with realization, it means that a gain can be recognized when the earnings process is thought to be complete, but not before.  You even refer to realization (BTW, realization has a very interesting etymology).

    But in the rush to fair value accounting, conservatism and realizability have become as socially acceptable as an old fart of an accountant or a professor.

    Ceteris paribus, I think that balance sheets can be thought of as naturally hedged.  For example, let's take a case where a company has a simple balance sheet of CA  30, Investments 20, PPE of 50,   CL of 25, LTL of 45 and SHE of 30.  Such a balance sheet reflects an assumed capital structure of long-term financing of 60% debt, and might be appropriate for a product/equipment manufacturer.  This balance sheet captures the essence of the company at a time when neither times are good nor times are bad.  Now, let's assume that the economy slides into the downward part of an economic cycle.  Two things happen simultaneously--the resources/assets lose some current fair value because of the downturn (perceived prospects have taken an economy-wide collective hit), and debt financing becomes harder to get and is rationed by higher interest rates. affecting all matters of debt financing.  The fair value of the assets go down (and there's a loss), the fair value of the liabilities go down (and there's a gain).  The balance sheet stays in balance and the measure of company profitability (the new income statement) stays in balance as the gains and losses cancel out.  Perfect hedging.

    If US GAAP was to have it right, then not only would the financial assets in the investment category be marked to market, but so would PPE AND all the liabilities.  SHE would tag along.  In the above example, CL becomes a weightier part of the balance sheet right hand side.

    A consistent problem with US GAAP is that the rule makers have only gone part way (marking financial assets to market).  Gains and losses can't be included in the income statement because the income statement is under-specified.  Hence the decades-old need for OCI and its predecessor, unrealized gains/losses.

    Unfortunately, economic downturns don't hit all companies ceteris paribus, and company-specific prospects can either improve or deteriorate as compared to the economy as a whole.

    Take the case of airlines (pick one, any one).  In the current economic downturn, the assets (gas-guzzling owned and leased assets) have lost value at a much faster pace relative generic assets in the economy.  In the current world order, the jets are less valuable because of their low fuel efficiency puts the airline's existence at risk, and the airline's cost of capital has just gone sky-high because of this increased business risk.  As a result of oil futures and the attendant economic downturn, the airlines have incurred a real impairment in asset value, and this should be reflected in the financials, including the current income statement.  At least this is my opinion.  On the other side, have an airline just try retiring some of its long-term debt on the market.  With higher interest rate valuations applied, the debt has a lower market value and the company can realize real gains if it were to retire the debt.  Many airlines have effectively retired the debt by choosing bankruptcy reorganization.  And if they haven't yet chosen bankruptcy, the threat is always there, hence the rationale for decreasing the recorded value of liabilities. The gains and losses cancel, but shouldn't the investor be informed in the financial statements?

    Now, in the generic example, I can see some appeal to keeping gains and losses off the income statement because they aren't ever going to be realized, but in the airline example, I can see every reason for putting all gains and losses on the income statement so that investors can see the good and bad.  The bad is that assets have lost value, and the good is that in a case of financial reorganization, there will be a gain that will cancel out all asset declines.

    Bob, how does one separate the economy wide effects from the industry effects or even the company effects?  There is simply too much commingling.  As a result, why not put everything on the income statement?  I think this is Ed Ketz's basic position.  Mine as well.  Make the income statement line a one-size fits all garment.

    Unfortunately, there is no place on the income statement (as currently constituted) or such gains and losses.  That is why the FASB has made such a historical push to revamp it and do away with the bottom line.

    Now, one other issue to attend to:  your underlying assumption that the reporting company is a going concern, and as a result gains/losses will reverse in the next economic upswing and nothing will ever be realized.  The world is a complex environment, and such an assumption as going concern may no longer be relevant.  Ask Bear Stearns.  An auctioneer would say that its going concern went going-going-gone.

    In the current financial world, going concern takes on a whole new meaning.  Historically, auditors have never been effective in flagging going-concern problems.  I don't seen anything structural being done to audit markets that would make auditors more effective in this area.

    David Albrecht

    June 22, 2008 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi David,

    But you and Ed miss my major point.

    There are some unrealized gains and losses that “may” reverse with economic swings such as the unrealized gain or loss of that Google stock you bought five years ago. You and Ed make good points about such items, although I think Section 3 of the IASB’s exposure draft makes an excellent case on the other side of the coin in favor of fair value reporting of financial items --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases

    And this is coming from a guy who has been skeptical of fair value accounting all along --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
    I’m not so certain anymore as long as we don’t do dumb things with unrealized gains and losses.

    Section 3 of the IASB exposure draft makes a lot of sense to me --- "Reducing Complexity in Reporting Financial Instruments" that for a very limited time may be downloaded without charge from the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) --- http://snipurl.com/ias39simplification  [www_iasb_org]

    The point you miss is that there are some gains and losses that are certain to reverse contractually, and they are 99.99999% likely to be perfectly reversed irrespective of market swings because these contracts in reality are not likely to be breached or otherwise settled prematurely. A customized and unique interest rate swap is this type of contract where unrealized gains and losses are nearly always perfectly reversed at maturity.

    We must show the fair value of the swap at interim points in time because this is what the courts will declare we owe or are owed in case of a contract breach. But we should not show changes in these amounts in current earnings because the likelihood of our breaching this contract is miniscule. OCI is a very good vehicle for showing the changes in value of a cash flow hedging swap on the balance sheet without showing the unlikely realization of these amounts on the balance sheet.

    My point with an interest rate swap is that when the swap matures, the ultimate impact on realized earnings will be zero no matter how the market swings during the hedging period. Interim unrealized gains and losses on the swap should not be posted to current earnings if they are certain to wash out.

    Hence my illustration of Example 5 from FAS 133 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#OCI

    I hope you and Ed will carefully study the IASB’s Section 3 of  http://snipurl.com/ias39simplification
    Section 3 is making more of a believer out of me for financial instruments (but not non-financial instruments).

    Bob Jensen

    June 23, 2008 reply from Patricia Walters [patricia@DISCLOSUREANALYTICS.COM]

    I am primarily an investor and investor advocate with respect to financial reporting issues. I have recently returned to university teaching after 11 years with the CFA Institute. (That gives some context to my remarks.)

    As an investor, I want to see fair value information in both the balance sheet and the income statement. I understand this creates volatility and I'm willing to live with it to get a better understanding of economic reality (if such exists at all in corporate financial statements.) I also understand that this makes measurement more difficult. If the measurement is truly "unreliable", rather than simply "not the number management wants", then IFRS permits companies to make that claim and avoid, in most instances, reporting that number in the income statement. If you read any of the commentary that users of the financial statements (those whose own money or that of their clients) is on the line when they rely of financial statements to make investment and credit decisions, you will see that they are by and large in favor of fair value (price) accounting. The "academic accountants" are not the ones pushing for this.

    (As an aside, if banks do not believe the "fair value" of their loans is a reliable measure then why don't they feel the same way about the fair value of the underlying real estate.)

    I also am a firm believer in Comprehensive Income and see no reason why this needs to be arbitrarily divided into NI and OCI. In my view, transactions and events recorded in OCI are those that belong on the Income Statement but company management managed to negotitate with the standard-setting to hide them on the balance sheet. Simply, makes the investor's job more difficult.

    On Disclosure vs Reporting in the Financial Statements: I might agree with the person who said he had no problem with disclosure of certain information, just don't put it in the financial statements. Unfortunately, my experience is that managements often do not take disclosure information as seriously as recognized information. They just aren't as concerned about measurement reliability. This was emphasized to me in a presentation on this issue with respect to stock comp that I attended. The presenter admitted that information in the footnote was relied on and used by investors but that it just couldn't be moved to the income statement because it wasn't reliable.

    Unfortunately, in my view, the only way to improve measurement reliability is to require the information to be recognized and measured in the financial statements. Investors can make sense of this information.

    Regards, Patricia Walters, PhD, CFA
    Fordham University

    Jun3 23, 2008 reply from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]

    All of you have a wonderful opportunity to express your views on the subject of relevance vs. reliability to the FASB and IASB. The exposure draft on "The Objective of Financial Reporting and Qualitative Characteristics and Constraints of Decision-Useful Financial Reporting Information" is available at http://www.fasb.org/draft/ed_conceptual_framework_for_fin_reporting.pdf

    Comments are being solicited through September 29. I commented on the Preliminary Views document that preceded this exposure draft and probably will comment on this exposure draft too. This document is a key building block for the future of financial reporting and I urge all of you to consider participating formally in the debate.

    Denny Beresford

    For more on fair value accounting, go to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue


    Accrual Accounting and Estimation

    Question
    What are banks doing creatively to hide their non-performing loans in the 21st Century?

    Smells like old wine in new bottles.

    Banks Find New Ways to East Pain of Bad Loans
    by David Enrich
    The Wall Street Journal

    Jun 19, 2008
    Page: C1
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121383327218786693.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
     

    TOPICS: Business Ethics, Ethics, GAAP

    SUMMARY: Banks are revising internal accounting policies to mask their troubles. The maneuvers are legal but could deepen suspicion about the sector.

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: This article illustrates how a company can change its policies and the resulting impact of those changes on the company's accounting records. Sometimes those actions violate GAAP, but in the situations presented in the article, the changes are perfectly legal. The bad part of these actions is that those changes can present a very different picture of the banks' financial condition to the users of the financial statements.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1. (Advanced) What did these companies change that resulted in changes to their financial statements?

    2. (Advanced) Why are these changes allowed, even though they cause differences on the financial statements?

    3. (Introductory) Do the policy changes result in a permanent change over time on the financial statements? Why or why not?

    4. (Introductory) What is the regulatory impact of moving some loans to a new subsidiary? What is the impact on the financial statements? Why are these different?

    5. (Advanced) What are the public relations issues involved with these kinds of actions? Should the banks be concerned? Why or why not?

    6. (Advanced) What are the ethics of the actions of the banks in this article? What would be the ethical way to handle this reporting? If the reporting as stated is acceptable, should the banks add any additional information to the notes to the financial statement? If not, why not? If so, what should be added?
     

    Reviewed By: Linda Christiansen, Indiana University Southeast
     

     

    "Banks Find New Ways To Ease Pain of Bad Loans," by David Enrich, The Wall Street Journal,  June 19, 2008; Page C1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121383327218786693.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC

    In January, Astoria Financial Corp. told investors that its pile of nonperforming loans had grown to about $106 million as of the end of last year. Three months later, the thrift holding company said the number was just $68 million.

    How did Astoria do it? By changing its internal policy on when mortgages are classified on its books as troubled. The Lake Success, N.Y., company now counts home loans as nonperforming when the borrower misses at least three payments, instead of two.

    Astoria says the change was made partly to make its disclosures on shaky mortgages more consistent with those of other lenders. An Astoria spokesman didn't respond to requests for comment. But the shift shows one of the ways lenders increasingly are trying to make their real-estate misery look not quite so bad.

    From lengthening the time it takes to write off troubled mortgages, to parking lousy loans in subsidiaries that don't count toward regulatory capital levels, the creative maneuvers are perfectly legal.

    Yet they could deepen suspicion about financial stocks, already suffering from dismal investor sentiment as loan delinquencies balloon and capital levels shrivel with no end in sight.

    "Spending all the time gaming the system rather than addressing the problems doesn't reflect well on the institutions," said David Fanger, chief credit officer in the financial-institutions group at Moody's Investors Service, a unit of Moody's Corp. "What this really is about is buying yourself time. ... At the end of the day, the losses are likely to not be that different."

    Still, as long as the environment continues to worsen for big and small U.S. banks, more of them are likely to explore such now-you-see-it, now-you-don't strategies to prop up profits and keep antsy regulators off their backs, bankers and lawyers say.

    At Wells Fargo & Co., the fourth-largest U.S. bank by stock-market value, investors and analysts are jittery about its $83.6 billion portfolio of home-equity loans, which is showing signs of stress as real-estate values tumble throughout much of the country.

    Until recently, the San Francisco bank had written off home-equity loans -- essentially taking a charge to earnings in anticipation of borrowers' defaulting -- once borrowers fell 120 days behind on payments. But on April 1, the bank started waiting for up to 180 days.

    'Out of Character'

    Some analysts note that the shift will postpone a potentially bruising wave of losses, thereby boosting Wells Fargo's second-quarter results when they are reported next month. "It is kind of out of character for Wells," says Joe Morford, a banking analyst at RBC Capital Markets. "They tend to use more conservative standards."

    Wells Fargo spokeswoman Julia Tunis says the change was meant to help borrowers. "The extra time helps avoid having loans charged off when better solutions might be available for our customers," she says. In a securities filing, Wells Fargo said that the 180-day charge-off standard is "consistent with" federal regulatory guidelines.

    BankAtlantic Bancorp Inc., which is based in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., earlier this year transferred about $100 million of troubled commercial-real-estate loans into a new subsidiary.

    That essentially erased the loans from BankAtlantic's retail-banking unit. Since that unit is federally regulated, BankAtlantic eventually might have faced regulatory action if it didn't substantially beef up the unit's capital and reserve levels to cover the bad loans.

    Because the BankAtlantic subsidiary that holds the bad loans isn't regulated, it doesn't face the same capital requirements. But the new structure won't insulate the parent company's profits -- or shareholders -- from losses if borrowers default on the loans, analysts said.

    Alan Levan, BankAtlantic's chief executive, declined to comment on how much the loan transfer bolstered the regulated unit's capital levels. "The reason for doing it is to separate some of these problem loans out of the bank so that they can get special focus in an isolated subsidiary," he said.

    Other lenders have been considering the use of similar "bad-bank" structures as a way to cleanse their balance sheets of shaky loans. In April, Peter Raskind, chairman and CEO of National City Corp., said the Cleveland bank "could imagine...several different variations of good-bank/bad-bank kinds of structures" to help shed problem assets.

    Two banks that investors love to hate, Wachovia Corp. and Washington Mutual Inc., troubled some analysts by using data from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight when they announced first-quarter results. Other lenders rely on a data source that is more pessimistic about the housing market.

    Charter Switch

    Another eyebrow raiser: switching bank charters so that a lender is scrutinized by a different regulator.

    Last week, Colonial BancGroup Inc., Montgomery, Ala., announced that it changed its Colonial Bank unit from a nationally chartered bank to a state-chartered bank, effective immediately.

    That means the regional bank no longer will be regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which has become increasingly critical of banks such as Colonial with heavy concentrations of loans to finance real-estate construction projects.

    Instead, Colonial's primary regulators now are the Alabama Banking Department, also based in Montgomery, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. The change probably "is meant to distance [Colonial] from what is perceived as the more aggressive and onerous of the bank regulators," said Kevin Fitzsimmons, a bank analyst at Sandler O'Neill & Partners.

    Colonial spokeswoman Merrie Tolbert denies that. Being a state-chartered bank "gives us more flexibility" and will save the company more than $1 million a year in regulatory fees, she said.

    Trabo Reed, Alabama's deputy superintendent of banking, said his examiners won't give Colonial a free pass. "There's not going to be a significant amount of difference" between the OCC and state regulators, he says.

     


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on May 19, 2006

    TITLE: With Special Effects the Star, Hollywood Faces New Reality
    REPORTER: Merissa Marr and Kate Kelly
    DATE: May 12, 2006
    PAGE: A1
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114739949943750995.html 
    TOPICS: Accounting, Budgeting, Cost-Volume-Profit Analysis, Managerial Accounting

    SUMMARY: Special effects are driving a lot of movies to become box office hits. However, "in the area of special effects, technology can't deliver the kind of efficiencies to Hollywood that it generally provides to other industries...Amid the excitement, studios are beginning to realize that relying on special effects is financially risky. Such big budget films tend to be bonanzas or busts."

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) The author notes that studios are beginning to realize that films utilizing a lot of special effects might tend to be "bonanzas or busts." In terms of costs, why is this the case? In your answer, refer to the high level of costs associated with special effects work.

    2.) Why do special effects teams tend to amass significant costs? In your answer, define the terms "cost management" and "costs of quality" and explain how these cost concepts, that are typically associated with product manufacturing, can be applied to movie production.

    3.) Define the term "fixed cost." How does this concept relate to the financial riskiness of movies with significant special effects and resultant high cost? Also include in your answer a discussion of the formula for breaking even under cost-volume-profit analysis.

    4.) Define the term "variable cost." Cite some examples of variable costs you expect are incurred by studios such as Sony Pictures, Universal Pictures, and others.

    5.) Now consider firms such as Industrial Light & Magic, "a company set up by director George Lucas in 1975 to handle the special effects for his 'Star Wars' movies." Based on the discussion in the article, describe what you think are these firms' fixed and variable costs.

    6.) What manager do you think is responsible for costs of quality and cost control in producing movies? Suppose you are filling that role. What steps would you undertake to ensure that your hoped-for blockbuster film will have the greatest possible chance of financial success?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island


    "Biased Expectations:  Can Accounting Tools Lead To, Rather Than Prevent, Executive Mistakes," Knowledge@Wharton,  March 19, 2008
    http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm;jsessionid=9a30c173f4042b274364?articleid=1922 

    Accounting techniques like budgeting, sales projections and financial reporting are supposed to help prevent business failures by giving managers realistic plans to guide their actions and feedback on their progress. In other words, they are supposed to leaven entrepreneurial optimism with green-eye-shaded realism.

    At least that's the theory. But when Gavin Cassar, a Wharton accounting professor, tested this idea, he found something troubling: Some accounting tools not only fail to help businesspeople, but may actually lead them astray. In one of his recent studies, forthcoming in Contemporary Accounting Research, Cassar showed that budgeting didn't help a group of Australian firms accurately forecast their revenues. In a second paper,he found that the preparation of financial projections added to aspiring entrepreneurs' optimism, leading them to overestimate their subsequent levels of sales and employment.

    "It's been shown in many studies that people are overly optimistic," Cassar says. "What's interesting here is that, when you use the accounting tools, the optimism is even more extreme. This suggests that using the tools, which a lot of academics and government agencies say is good practice, can lead to even bigger mistakes."

    He is not suggesting that anyone ignore accounting activities and techniques. Investors and regulators expect firms to implement robust accounting systems. And they should, he says, because financial reports provide a detailed map of a business and its performance. But Cassar believes that businesspeople -- especially entrepreneurs, who bet both their reputations and personal wealth on their ventures -- should understand the limitations of accounting estimates as well as how common human tendencies, like optimism, can lead to their misinterpretation.

    Cassar's first study, titled "Budgets, Financial Reports and Manager Forecast Accuracy," set out to the test the usefulness of some basic tools in the accounting kit. It sprang from his work experience before he attended graduate school, when, as an accountant for a builder in his native Australia, he watched the company's gradual decline into bankruptcy. "My first job was as a financial and managerial accountant for a civil construction firm," he says. "My second, 18 months later, was working for the [bankruptcy] receiver of that same company."

    On review, the firm's accountants had seemed to do everything right. They had prepared budgets and put systems in place to get timely performance reports that could then be factored into the company's future budgets and plans. As two big highway jobs foundered, the losses showed up promptly in the monthly reports. Even so, company executives failed to take remedial action. "The project managers said that the losses would turn around, but they didn't," Cassar says. "On both those jobs, they went over budgeted costs by 50%. Those two jobs resulted in the demise of that company."

    But it wasn't the accounting systems that were the problem. It was the users. "No one would take responsibility because the cost of doing that was losing your job," Cassar says. "The irony is that, in the end, everyone lost their jobs."

    Cassar's study enabled him to assess whether budgeting and internal reporting have helped other firms more than they did his former employer. He examined a group of about 4,000 companies, all with less than 200 employees, surveyed by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Managers of these firms were asked whether they prepared budgets and internal reports and also were asked to provide revenue forecasts and in future years were asked to provide subsequent performance. The agency followed the firms over four years. Thus its data showed how close they came to meeting their forecasts.

    Cassar suspected that doing either budgets or internal reports -- or, better yet, both -- might improve a company's forecasts. "The presence in a firm of a budget preparation activity should result in improved forecast accuracy because the systematic collection of a broad range of information should allow for a more accurate assessment of future performance," write Cassar and his co-author, Brian Gibson, an accounting professor at Australia's University of New England. "However, budgeting in itself may not improve forecasting accuracy, because budgeting without internal reporting is a meaningless formal control system."

    When Cassar and Gibson crunched the numbers, their prediction was borne out: The impact of budgeting alone was trivial, improving forecast accuracy by less than 2%. But internal reporting made a real difference, improving accuracy by about 8.5%. And used together, the two techniques improved forecast accuracy even more, by about 12%. "Collectively these results suggest that internal accounting report preparation improves forecast accuracy. In addition, although the accuracy benefits from budget preparation appear limited, the improvement is greater when both budget preparation and internal account reporting are used," Cassar and Gibson write.

    What's more, the firms that saw the most improvement in their forecasts were ones that operated in the most uncertain environments, as measured by the variability of revenue. Arguably, these firms most needed the guidance.

    Cassar's second study, titled "Are Individuals Entering Self-Employment Overly-Optimistic? An Empirical Test of Plans and Projections on Nascent Entrepreneur Expectations," built on the findings of his first one. Here, he wasn't interested in whether accounting tools merely helped entrepreneurs; he wanted to know whether they could distort their thinking.

    His curiosity grew partly from his knowledge of the field of behavioral economics, which marries the insights and methods of psychology and economics. Behavioralists have documented a number of mental shortcuts and biases that can lead people to depart from the logic that traditional economic orthodoxy would suggest. One of the concepts, for example, introduced by Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman and co-author Dan Lovallo, is that "an inside view" can distort decision making. A person who adopts an inside view becomes so focused on formulating his particular plan that he neglects to consider critical outside information, like other people's experiences in pursuing the same goal.

    "Individuals form an inside view forecast by focusing on the specifics of the case, the details of the plan that exists and obstacles to its completion, and by constructing scenarios of future progress," Cassar summarizes. "In contrast, an outside view is statistical and comparative in nature and does not involve any attempt to divine the future at any level of detail."

    Doing financial projections for an entrepreneurial venture, Cassar realized, entails the creation of an inside view. The entrepreneur builds a storyline of success in her head and then plays it out in her spreadsheet, showing rising sales year after year. "Humans are good at storytelling and building causal links," Cassar notes. "They think, 'I'll go to college, I'll write a business plan, I'll raise some capital and then I'll go public or sell out to a big competitor.' There's a probability attached to each of these steps, but they don't think about that. They put all the links together and evaluate the likelihood of success at a much higher probability than is realistic."

    Consider the approximately 400 aspiring U.S. entrepreneurs whom Cassar studied. On average, they believed that their ideas had about an 80% likelihood of becoming viable ventures, though only half actually ended up becoming businesses. Of the entrepreneurs who realized their plans, about 62% overestimated their first-year sales, and about 46% overestimated what their employment would be at the end of year one. Employment, unlike sales, implies both costs and benefits, perhaps explaining the lower jobs figure, Cassar notes. As a company grows it needs more employees, but it also has to pay them.

    So far, none of this seems radical. Yes, entrepreneurs are optimistic. They have to be if they are undertaking the risks of starting a business. But when Cassar started to sort through the entrepreneurs' use of common accounting and planning techniques, he uncovered surprises.

    People who did financial projections were the most likely to overestimate the future sales of their ventures. In other words, "the same management activities that entrepreneurs rely on to cope with uncertainty appear to be causing individuals to hold optimistic expectations," he writes. Interestingly, writing a business plan also led to optimism about the likelihood of success, but it didn't lead to overly optimistic expectations because it's also "positively associated with the likelihood that the nascent activity will become an operating venture," he adds. Put another way, people who write plans are more likely to start companies, thereby justifying their optimism.

    One group turned out to be more realistic than the others -- entrepreneurs who had received money from real sales. "This demonstrates the benefit of actually making sales in improving the rationality of financial sales expectations," Cassar notes.

    Despite his findings, Cassar doesn't believe that aspiring entrepreneurs should abandon financial projections. For one thing, investors, particularly venture capitalists, wouldn't allow that; they expect firms in which they invest to do projections, if only because it demonstrates a command of the basics of budgets and accounting. For another, Cassar believes that preparing projections helps entrepreneurs understand the drivers of profitability in their businesses and the dynamics of their industries.

    But he says that entrepreneurs need to understand the ways in which accounting tools may subvert their thinking. "Acknowledging how management practices bias expectations may allow decision makers to use organizational or decision making controls to reduce this influence," he writes. "For example, generating reasons why the planned outcome may not be achieved or consciously relating past experiences to the forecasting task at hand are approaches individuals can take to reduce overly optimistic or overconfident forecasts."

    Cassar hasn't studied them, but he suspects that venture capitalists might be better than entrepreneurs at viewing financial projections with the appropriate skepticism. Because they see hundreds, even thousands, of business plans a year, they tend to take an outside view.

    "Very good VCs are good at picking winners because they know what the risks are," he says. "A lot of VCs, when they go through business plans, think, 'What are the drivers of value creation and what's the scope of their upsides? And what are the fundamental threats that the entrepreneur isn't focusing on because it's not in his interest to do so?'"

    Based on his own experience, Cassar sees "many benefits from managers and entrepreneurs using accounting techniques." However, he adds, "it is important to recognize that financial projections of success are merely projections based on beliefs, which are sometimes based on overconfident or optimistic assumptions. Using these accounting tools may actually exacerbate, rather than dampen, these tendencies."


    FAS 163 "Accounting for Financial Guarantee Insurance Contracts"--- http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas163.pdf

    From the AccountingWeb on May 27, 2008 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=105224

    Last week The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued FASB Statement No. 163, Accounting for Financial Guarantee Insurance Contracts. The new standard clarifies how FASB Statement No. 60, Accounting and Reporting by Insurance Enterprises, applies to financial guarantee insurance contracts issued by insurance enterprises, including the recognition and measurement of premium revenue and claim liabilities. It also requires expanded disclosures about financial guarantee insurance contracts. The Statement is effective for financial statements issued for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2008, and all interim periods within those fiscal years, except for disclosures about the insurance enterprise's risk-management activities. Disclosures about the insurance enterprise's risk-management activities are effective the first period beginning after issuance of the Statement. "By issuing Statement 163, the FASB has taken a major step toward ending inconsistencies in practice that have made it difficult for investors to receive comparable information about an insurance enterprise's claim liabilities," stated FASB Project Manager Mark Trench. "Its issuance is particularly timely in light of recent concerns about the financial health of financial guarantee insurers, and will help bring about much needed transparency and comparability to financial statements."

    The accounting and disclosure requirements of Statement 163 are intended to improve the comparability and quality of information provided to users of financial statements by creating consistency, for example, in the measurement and recognition of claim liabilities. Statement 163 requires that an insurance enterprise recognize a claim liability prior to an event of default (insured event) when there is evidence that credit deterioration has occurred in an insured financial obligation. It also requires disclosure about (a) the risk-management activities used by an insurance enterprise to evaluate credit deterioration in its insured financial obligations and (b) the insurance enterprise's surveillance or watch list.


    Questions
    Is there a problem with how GAAP covers one's Fannie?
    Would fair value accounting help in this situation?

    "Fannie Execs Defend Accounting Change Friday," by Marcy Gordon, Yahoo News, November 16, 2007 --- http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/071116/fannie_mae_accounting.html 

    Fannie Mae executives on Friday defended a change in the way the mortgage lender discloses losses on home loans amid concern from analysts that it could mask the true impact of the credit crisis on its bottom line.

    The chief financial officer and other executives of the government-sponsored company, which reported a $1.4 billion third-quarter loss last week, held a conference call with Wall Street analysts to explain the recent change.

    Analysts peppered the executives with questions in a skeptical tone. The way Fannie discloses its mortgage losses, addressed in an article published online by Fortune, raises extra concern among analysts given that Fannie Mae was racked by a $6.3 billion accounting scandal in 2004 that tarnished its reputation and brought government sanctions against it.

    Moreover, the skepticism from Wall Street comes as Fannie seeks approval from the government to raise the cap of its investment portfolio.

    The chief financial officer, Stephen Swad, said in the call that some of the $670 million in provisions for credit losses on soured home loans that Fannie Mae wrote off in the third quarter likely would be recovered.

    "We book what we book under (generally accepted accounting principles) and we provide this disclosure to help you understand it," Swad said.

    Shares of Fannie Mae fell $4.30, or 10 percent, to $38.74 on Friday, following a 10 percent drop the day before.

    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue

    Bob Jensen's threads on Fannie Mae's enormous problem (the largest in history that led to the firing of KPMG from the audit and a multiple-year effort to restate financial statemetns) with applying FAS 133 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm#FannieMae

     


     



    Honda Says Fuel-Cell Cars Face Hurdles
    by Yoshio Takahashi
    The Wall Street Journal

    Jun 17, 2008
    Page: B4
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121364017994578203.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
     

    TOPICS: Cost Management, Managerial Accounting, Product strategy

    SUMMARY: Honda Motor. Co. "...obtained the world's first certification for fuel-cell cars in the U.S. in 2002." Its president, Takeo Fukui, "...said prices have to fall further for fuel-cell cars to reach the mass market, even as the Japanese car maker unveiled the latest generation of fuel-cell vehicle."

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Management accounting and MBA course instructors may use this article to discuss the impact of fixed costs on pricing and product development. Most interestingly, this article identifies interrelationships between lines of two industries--automobile manufacturing and fueling stations--that can be used to discuss strategic investments.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1. (Introductory) What is the difference between a fuel-cell automobile and hybrid automobiles?

    2. (Introductory) Why is Honda developing these fuel-cell vehicles if it can't yet mass-market them? What factors are limiting the ability to mass market the vehicles?

    3. (Advanced) Why are fixed production costs higher if a car maker cannot mass produce the vehicle? In your answer, define the terms "fixed costs" and "barriers to entry".

    4. (Introductory) What variable production costs, identified in the article, are at issue in this case? What strategies can be undertaken to reduce those costs?

    5. (Advanced) Suppose you are Honda's president. What strategic choices in investment would you make to advance this line of Honda's business?

    6. (Advanced) Refer to your answer to question 4. What types of investments might you make? How might a financing entity be used to help make those strategic investments?
     

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    "Honda Says Fuel-Cell Cars Face Hurdles Prices Have to Fall For Autos to Reach The Mass Market," by Yoshio Takahashi, The Wall Street Journal, June 17, 2008; Page B4 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121364017994578203.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC

    TOCHIGI, Japan -- Honda Motor Co. President Takeo Fukui said prices have to fall further for fuel-cell cars to reach the mass market, even as the Japanese car maker unveiled the latest generation of fuel-cell vehicle.

    Fuel-cell cars are considered the most promising pollution-free vehicles, as they are powered through a chemical reaction between hydrogen and oxygen, and emit only water as a byproduct.

    But low-emission cars such as gasoline-electric hybrids and diesel vehicles are more popular now. A lack of hydrogen service stations, among other factors, is limiting demand for the cars, and therefore car makers can't mass produce them, keeping production costs high.

    Honda said Monday that it will begin leasing the third generation of a fuel-cell model called FCX Clarity in the U.S. in July. The company plans to lease the new zero-emission car in Japan this autumn.

    Mr. Fukui said the new fuel-cell car costs tens of millions of yen, significantly less than the several hundred million yen it cost to make previous models. The price would need to fall to below 10 million yen, or about $92,000, for fuel-cell cars to be a mass-market product, he said.

    "I think it wouldn't take 10 years" for his company to slash the price of its fuel-cell car to this level, he said.

    To cut the price, the company especially needs to reduce the use of expensive precious metals and address the costliness of the hydrogen fuel tank, he said.

    Honda, Japan's second-biggest car maker by sales volume, aims for combined lease sales of 200 vehicles of the latest fuel-cell model for the U.S. and Japan within three years. The lease fee is $600 a month in the U.S. The company hasn't disclosed the fee in Japan.

    Honda, which obtained the world's first certification for fuel-cell cars in the U.S. in 2002, is a leading maker of such vehicles and has been competing in the development of the advanced car with rivals such as Toyota Motor Corp. and General Motors Corp.

     


    Question
    When should warranty expenses be deducted all at once in a big bath rather than deferred like bad debt expenses in an Allowance for Future Warranty Expenses contra account?

    First Consider Some Problems of Estimation

    Speech by SEC Staff: Critical Accounting and Critical Disclosures
    by Robert K. Herdman
    Chief Accountant U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
    Speech Presented to the Financial Executives International —
    San Diego Chapter, Annual SEC Update
    San Diego, California January 24, 2002
    http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch537.htm

    Product Warranty Example For balance, let me go through an example of a manufacturer's warranty reserve. Consider a company that manufactures and sells or leases equipment through a network of dealerships. The equipment carries a warranty against manufacturer defects for a specified period and amount of use. Provisions for estimated product warranty expenses are made at the time of sale.

    Significant estimates and assumptions are required in determining the amount of warranty losses to initially accrue, and how that amount should be subsequently adjusted. The manufacturer may have a great deal of actual historical experience upon which to rely for existing products, and that experience can provide a basis to build its estimate of potential warranty claims for new models or products.

    Necessarily, management must make certain assumptions to adjust the historical experience to reflect the specific uncertainties associated with the new model or product. These assumptions about the expected warranty costs can have a significant impact on current and future operating results and financial position.

    In this example, investors may benefit from a clear description of such items as the nature of the costs that are included in or excluded from the liability measurement, how the estimation process differs for new models/product lines versus existing or established models and products, and the company's policies for continuously monitoring the warranty liability to determine its adequacy.

    In terms of sensitivity, investors would benefit from understanding what types of historical events led to differences between estimated and actual warranty claims or that resulted in a significant revisions to the accrual. For example, an investor could benefit from understanding if a new material or technique had recently been introduced into the manufacturing of the equipment and historically such changes have resulted in deviations of actual results from those previously expected. Similarly, if warranty claims tend to exceed estimates, say, if actual temperatures are higher or lower than assumed, that fact may also be relevant to investors.

    Obviously these examples don't address all of the possible scenarios. While each company will have differing critical accounting policies, the key points for everyone are to identify for investors the 1) types of assumptions that underlie the most significant and subjective estimates; 2) sensitivity of those estimates to deviations of actual results from management's assumptions; and 3) circumstances that have resulted in revised assumptions in the past. There is a great deal of flexibility in providing this information and some may choose to disclose ranges of possible outcomes.

    Continued in article

    Now Roll Ahead to Microsoft's Big Problem With Warranties in Year 2007

    Microsoft's Billion Dollar Attempted Fix
    Why isn't the need for this surprising from a company that almost always releases products in need of fixing before they're out of the box?

    In the face of staggering customer returns of the Xbox 360 console, the software maker announces a charge of at least $1.05 billion to address the problem In the quest for supremacy in next-generation gaming consoles, Microsoft (MSFT) had a big advantage by releasing the Xbox 360 a full year ahead of competing devices from Sony (SNE) and Nintendo (NTDOY). But hardware failures on the device are forcing Microsoft to cede some of its hard-won ground.
    Cliff Edwards, "Microsoft's Billion-Dollar Fix," Business Week, July 6, 2007 --- Click Here
    Also see http://www.technologyreview.com/Wire/19021/

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on July 13, 2007

    "Microsoft's Videogame Efforts Take a Costly Hit" by Nick Wingfield, The Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2007, Page: A3
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com

    TOPICS: Accounting, Financial Accounting, Financial Analysis, Reserves

    SUMMARY: Microsoft Corp. said it will take a $1.05 billion to $1.15 billion pretax charge to cover defects related to its Xbox 360 game console. Microsoft executives declined to discuss the technical problems in detail, but a person familiar with the matter said the problem related to too much heat being generated by the components inside the Xbox 360s. An analyst in the consumer-electronics industry, Richard Doherty, says the magnitude of the charge Microsoft is taking, which represents nearly $100 for every Xbox 360 shipped to retailers so far indicates Microsoft is concerned about widespread failures or that the company is being extremely conservative in taking this estimated charge. The charge will be taken in the quarter ended June 30, Microsoft's fiscal year end.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) Describe the accounting for warranty expenses. In general, why must companies report warranty expenses ahead of the time in which defective units are submitted for repair?

    2.) Why must Microsoft record this charge of over $1 billion entirely in one quarter, the last quarter of the company's fiscal year ended June 30, 2007? Support your answer with references to authoritative literature.

    3.) How are analysts using the disclosures about the warranty charge to assess Microsoft's expectations for the repairs that will be required and for the general success of this line of business at Microsoft?

    4.) Consider the analyst Richard Doherty's statement that either a high number of Xbox 360s will fail or the company is being overly conservative in its warranty estimate. What will happen in the accounting for warranty expense if the estimate of future repairs is overly conservative?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island


    Misleading Financial Statements:  Bankers Refusing to Recognize and Shed "Zombie Loans"
    One worrying lesson for bankers and regulators everywhere to bear in mind is post-bubble Japan. In the 1990s its leading bankers not only hung onto their jobs; they also refused to recognise and shed bad debts, in effect keeping “zombie” loans on their books. That is one reason why the country's economy stagnated for so long. The quicker bankers are to recognise their losses, to sell assets that they are hoarding in the vain hope that prices will recover, and to make markets in such assets for their clients, the quicker the banking system will get back on its feet.
    The Economist, as quoted in Jim Mahar's blog on November 10, 2007 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

    After the Collapse of Loan Markets Banks are Belatedly Taking Enormous Write Downs
    BTW one of the important stories that are coming out is the fact that this is affecting all tranches of the debt as even AAA rated debt is being marked down (which is why the rating agencies are concerned). The San Antonio Express News reminds us that conflicts of interest exist here too.
    Jime Mahar, November 10, 2007 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

    Jensen Comment
    The FASB and the IASB are moving ever closer to fair value accounting for financial instruments. FAS 159 made it an option in FAS 159. One of the main reasons it's not required is the tremendous lobbying effort of the banking industry. Although many excuses are given resisting fair value accounting for financial instruments, I suspect that the main underlying reasons are those "Zombie" loans that are overvalued at historical costs on current financial statements.

    Daniel Covitz and Paul Harrison of the Federal Reserve Board found no evidence of credit agency conflicts of interest problems of credit agencies, but thier study is dated in 2003 and may not apply to the recent credit bubble and burst --- http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/feds/2003/200368/200368pap.pdf

    In September 2007 some U.S. Senators accused the rating agencies of conflicts of interest
    "Senators accuse rating agencies of conflicts of interest in market turmoil," Bloomberg News, September 26, 2007 --- http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/09/26/business/credit.php
    Also see http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2007/05/rating-agencies-weak-link.html

    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue

    Bob Jensen's Rotten to the Core threads are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on July 9, 2004

    TITLE: Accrual Accounting Can Be Costly 
    REPORTER: Gene Colter 
    DATE: Jul 02, 2004 
    PAGE: C3 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108871005216853178,00.html  
    TOPICS: Earnings Management, Earnings Quality, Financial Accounting, Financial Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis, Restatement, Revenue Recognition

    SUMMARY: The article discusses a research study relating the extent of accrual accounting estimates to subsequent firm performance and incidence of shareholder litigation. The study was conducted by Criterion Research Group, LLC, and the article notes that the research is of interest to insurers that offer directors and officers policies.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) Summarize the research study described in the article. Who performed the research? What can you understand about the relationships examined in the project? What was the motivation for the research?

    2.) Define the term accrual accounting. Is it accurately compared to cash basis accounting by the description given in the article? Why must accrual accounting always involve estimates?

    3.) What is the overall impression of accrual accounting that is created in the article? In your answer, comment on the statement, "Accrual accounting is common and kosher."

    4.) Describe weaknesses of cash basis accounting as compared to the issues with accrual basis accounting that are presented in the article. Which basis do you think better presents information that is useful to financial statement readers? Support your answer; you may cite relevant accounting literature to do so.

    5.) What basis of accounting is being described using the computer network example in the article? What accounting standards prescribe this treatment? Name at least one other industry besides computer software sales in which this accounting treatment is required.

    6.) Refer again to question #5 and your answer. What alternative method must be used in this area if accrual accounting were to be avoided entirely? What are the disadvantages of this approach?

    7.) Why do you think some companies must record more extensive accruals and estimates than other companies must? Do these factors themselves lead to greater likelihood of shareholder litigation as is found in the article?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

    "Accrual Accounting Can Be Costly," by Gene Colter, The Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2004, Page C1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108871005216853178,00.html 

    Firms Booking Aggressively Are More Likely to Be Sued By Shareholders, Study Says

    Book now. Pay later.

    Pay the lawyers, maybe. A study to be released today suggests that companies that are most aggressive when booking noncash earnings are four times as likely to be sued by shareholders as less-aggressive peers.

    At issue is so-called accrual accounting, in which companies book revenue when they earn it and expenses when they incur them rather than when they actually receive the cash or pay out the expenses. Accrual accounting is common and kosher. Problems arise, however, when companies miscalculate how much revenue they've really earned in a given period or how much in related expenses it cost to get that money.

    For example, say Company A agrees to build a computer network for Company B over four years for $4 million, a job that Company A estimates it'll have to spend $1 million to complete. Company A works hard and estimates it ended up building half the computer network in the first year on the job, so it books $2 million of revenue that year. By accounting rules, it must accrue related costs in the same proportion as revenues, so it also books $500,000 of expenses in the same first year. But say it then turns out that Company A's costs to finish the network actually run to $2 million. Company A has to address that by booking $1.5 million of expenses in future years. In other words, Company A would end up increasing earnings in the first year, but at a cost to future earnings.

    Getting the numbers wrong isn't a violation of generally accepted accounting principles (though intentionally misestimating is). But companies have a lot of leeway, and those that make the most aggressive assumptions when booking what the green-visor guys call accruals can end up creating a misleading picture of their financial health in any given year. When skeptics refer to a company's "revenue recognition problems," this is often what they're talking about.

    The new study, based on six years of data, was conducted by Criterion Research Group LLC, an independent research firm in New York that caters primarily to institutional investors. It shows that companies that fall into what Criterion calls the highest accrual category are more likely to end up getting sued by shareholders.

    The study builds on earlier research by Criterion that showed companies that use more accruals underperform companies with fewer accruals. In that report, Criterion screened 3,500 nonfinancial companies over 40 years and found that those using the most accruals had poorer forward earnings and stock returns and also had more earnings restatements and Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement actions.

    None of this is to say that companies that end up in shareholder litigation set out to mislead shareholders. Rather, says Criterion Chairman Neil Baron, these companies simply run a higher risk of making mistakes with their books.

    "Accruals are estimates," Mr. Baron says. "If you're a company and a much higher percentage of your earnings come from accruals or estimates, it's much more likely that you're going to be wrong more often."

    Criterion screened companies involved in class-action suits from 1996 to 2003 for its new study. In each case it looked at a company's earnings for the year of the class start date, which is the year in which the alleged misbehavior began. Criterion then assigned these companies into one of 10 ranks, with those in the 10th group using the most accruals and those in 1st using the fewest. There were four times as many shareholder class-action suits among 10th group companies as there were among 1st group firms.

    A number of companies in the two highest accrual categories recently settled shareholder class actions related to accounting issues, including Rite Aid Corp., Waste Management Inc., MicroStrategy Inc. and Gateway Inc. Other companies still involved in ongoing shareholder class actions involving accounting issues also turned up in the aggressive-accruals group.

    Companies currently in Criterion's highest-accrual category include Chiron Corp., eBay Inc., General Motors Corp., Halliburton Co. and Yahoo Inc. -- none of which now face shareholder suits related to accounting -- among others.

    EBay spokesman Hani Durzy says he doesn't think his company belongs in the high-accruals gang, noting that the company's profit-and-loss statement "closely mirrors our cash flow." He adds: "We are essentially a cash business."

    A GM spokesman says, "All of GM's accounting policies and procedures are in full compliance with U.S. GAAP and are reviewed by our outside auditor and the audit committee, and we have, to the best of our knowledge, never had to restate earnings because of an accounting issue."

    An e-mail from Halliburton's public-relations office notes that Halliburton follows GAAP and adds that accruals "are universally required by GAAP."

    Representatives from Chiron and Yahoo said the companies had no comment.

    A Criterion analyst pointed out that accruals don't necessarily relate to everyday operations. For example, a company estimating and booking tax benefits from employee stock options is also using accruals. Estimates related to pension accounting are also accruals.

    Mr. Baron stresses that the vast majority of companies that book a lot of accruals are unlikely to face shareholder suits, restatements or SEC actions. Many may even outperform low-accrual companies. But he says investors should be "more scrutinizing" of financial statements from companies that make liberal use of accruals, because, statistically, they are most likely to run into these problems.

    Sophisticated investors, such as fund managers, might reckon they can spot bookkeeping alarms before the broad investing public and get out of a stock before the lawyers start filing briefs. But it's possible that companies with a lot of accruals can suffer even without litigation: Mr. Baron says his firm has been contacted by insurers that offer directors and officers policies, which large companies buy to protect executives and directors against lawsuits. The insurers are asking about Criterion's research as they weigh whether to charge D&O customers higher premiums, he says.

    Bob Jensen's threads on revenue accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm 


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on January 28, 2005

    TITLE: Quirk Could Hurt Mortgage Insurers  (Quirk = FAS 60)
    REPORTER: Karen Richardson 
    DATE: Jan 21, 2005 
    PAGE: C3 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110626962297132172,00.html  
    TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Insurance Industry, Loan Loss Allowance, loan guarantees, Contingent Liabilities

    SUMMARY: "Millions of people who can't afford to put down 10% or 20% of a home's price are required by their mortgage lenders to buy policies from mortgage insurers, which, by agreeing to shoulder some risk of missed loan payments, can lower the buyer's down payment to as little as 3%." However, as a result of a "quirk" in establishing Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 60, "Accounting and Reporting by Insurance Enterprises" in 1982, the FASB allowed an exclusion for mortgage insurers from requirements to reserve for future losses. This exclusion may lead to to delayed reporting of costs associated with the mortgage lending and of exacerbation of losses if default rates increase due to the type of borrowers taking advantage of this insurance in the hot real estate market.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) What is the purpose of mortgage insurance for a home buyer?

    2.) How do mortgage insurance providers, and insurance providers in general, earn profits on their activities? How are insurance rates determined? In general what costs are deducted against revenues determined from those insurance rates?

    3.) Access Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 60, "Accounting and Reporting by Insurance Enterprises," via the FASB's web site, located at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas60.pdf From the discussion in the summary of the standard, state the general accounting requirements contained in this statement.

    4.) Based on the discussion in the article, what is the exemption allowed for mortgage insurers from Statement No. 60's requirements? What is the reasoning for that exemption? What is your opinion about this reason?

    5.) Refer again to the FASB Statement No. 60 on the FASB's web site. Locate the exemption described in question 4 and give its citation.

    6.) Given this accounting requirement exemption, what are the concerns with measuring profit in the mortgage insurance industry in general (regardless of the issues with the current real estate market)? What is the technique used to handle that issue in financial reports? In your answer, specifically refer to, and define, the matching concept in accounting.

    7.) How does the potential caliber of the real estate buyers using mortgage insurance exacerbate the concerns raised in question 6?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island


    August 7, 2006 message from Ganesh M. Pandit, DBA, CPA, CMA [profgmp@hotmail.com]

    Hi Bob,

    How would you answer this question from a student: "I wonder if a company's Web site is considered a long-lived asset!"

    Ganesh M. Pandit
    Adelphi University

    August 9, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Ganesh,

    Accounting for Website investment is a classic example of the issue of "matching" versus "value" accounting. From an income statement perspective, matching requires the matching of current revenues with the expenses of generating that revenue, including the "using up" of fixed asset investments. But we don't depreciate investment in the site value of land because land site value, unlike a building, is not used up due to usage in generating revenue. Like land site value, a Website's "value" probably increases in value over time. One might argue that a Website should not be expensed since a successful Website, like land, is not used up when generating revenue. However, Websites do require maintenance fees and improvement outlays over time which makes it somewhat different than the site investment in land that requires no such added outlays other than property taxes that are expensed each year.

    I don't think current accounting rules for Websites are appropriate in theory --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm#Issue08

    It seems to me that you can partition your Website development and improvement outlays into various types of assets and expenses. For example, computers used in development and maintenance of the Website are accounted for like other computers. Software is accounted for under software amortization accounting rules. Purchased goodwill is accounted for like purchased goodwill under new impairment test rules. Labor costs for Website maintenance versus improvements are more problematic.

    Leased Website items are treated like leases, although there are some complications if a Website is leased entirely. For example, such a leased Website is not "used up" like airplanes that are typically contracted as operating leases. Leased Website space may be appropriately accounted for as an operating lease. But leasing an entire Website is more like the capital lease of a land in that the asset does not get "used up." My hunch is that most firms ignore this controversy and treat Website leases as operating leases. It is pretty easy to bury custom development costs into the "rental fee" for leased Website server space, thereby burying the development costs and deferring them over the contracted server space rental period. It would seem to me that rental fees for Websites that are strictly used for advertising are written off as advertising expenses. Of course many Websites are used for much more than advertising.

    Firms are taking rather rapid write-offs of purchased Websites such as write-offs over three years. I'm not certain I agree with this, but firms are "depreciating" these for tax purposes and you can see them in filed SEC financial statements such as the one at Briton International (under the Depreciation heading) ---
    http://sec.edgar-online.com/2006/01/27/0001127855-06-000047/Section27.asp

    It is more common in annual reports to see the term Website Amortization instead of Website Depreciation. A few sites amortize on the basis of Website traffic --- http://www.nexusenergy.com/presentation6.aspx
    This makes no sense to me since traffic does not use up a Website over time.

    Bob Jensen

    Bob Jensen's threads on e-Commerce and e-Business revenue accounting controversies are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm

     


    Earnings Management and Agency Theory
    The Controversy Over Earnings Smoothing and Other Manipulations

    Recall when "agency theory" assumed that CEO's had personal incentives to make accounting transparent without the need for outside regulation requirements? This is probably still being taught in accounting theory courses where instructors rely on old textbooks and journal articles.
    In the latest twist in the stock options game, some executives may have changed the so-called exercise date — the date options can be converted to stock — to avoid paying hundreds of thousands of dollars in income tax, federal investigators say . . . As those cases have progressed, at least 46 executives and directors have been ousted from their positions. Companies have taken charges totaling $5.3 billion to account for the impact of improper grants, according to Glass Lewis & Company, a research firm that advises big investors on shareholder issues. And further investigations, indictments and restatements are expected. Securities regulators are now focusing on several cases where it appears the exercise dates of the options were backdated, according to a senior S.E.C. enforcement official, who asked not to be identified because of the agency’s policy of not commenting on active cases. Besides raising disclosure and accounting problems, backdating an exercise date can result in tax fraud.
    Eric Dash, "Dodging Taxes Is a New Stock Options Scheme," The New York Times, October 30, 2006 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/30/business/30option.html?_r=1&oref=slogin

    You can read about agency theory at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agency_Theory

    You can read the following at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agency_Theory#Incentive-Intensity_Principle

    Incentive-Intensity Principle

    However, setting incentives as intense as possible is not necessarily optimal from the point of view of the employer. The Incentive-Intensity Principle states that the optimal intensity of incentives depends on four factors: the incremental profits created by additional effort, the precision with which the desired activities are assessed, the agent’s risk tolerance, and the agent’s responsiveness to incentives. According to Prendergast (1999, 8), “the primary constraint on [performance-related pay] is that [its] provision imposes additional risk on workers…” A typical result of the early principal-agent literature was that piece rates tend to 100% (of the compensation package) as the worker becomes more able to handle risk, as this ensures that workers fully internalize the consequences of their costly actions. In incentive terms, where we conceive of workers as self-interested rational individuals who provide costly effort (in the most general sense of the worker’s input to the firm’s production function), the more compensation varies with effort, the better the incentives for the worker to produce.

    Monitoring Intensity Principle

    The third principle – the Monitoring Intensity Principle – is complementary to the second, in that situations in which the optimal intensity of incentives is high correspond to situations in which the optimal level of monitoring is also high. Thus employers effectively choose from a “menu” of monitoring/incentive intensities. This is because monitoring is a costly means of reducing the variance of employee performance, which makes more difference to profits in the kinds of situations where it is also optimal to make incentives intense.


    Probably the best illustration of earnings management (both legitimate and fraudulent) is the saga of Enron --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnron.htm#Quotations 


    Earnings Management Deception
    The 1999 bulletin also said that if accounting practices were intentionally misleading "to impart a sense of increased earnings power, a form of earnings management, then by definition amounts involved would be considered material." AIG hinted some errors may have been intentional, saying that certain transactions "appear to have been structured for the sole or primary purpose of accomplishing a desired accounting result."
    Jonathan Weil, "AIG's Admission Puts the Spotlight On Auditor PWC," The Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2005 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111231915138095083,00.html?mod=home_whats_news_us
    Bob Jensen's threads on the AIG mess are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudRotten.htm#MutualFunds


    It's not clear who got the earnings game going (meeting earnings forecasts by one penny): executives or investors. But it's past time for it to stop. As the Progressive example shows, those companies that continue the charade do it by choice.
    Gretchen Morgenson, "Pennies That Aren't From Heaven," The New York Times, November 7, 2004 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/07/business/yourmoney/07watch.html?ex=1100836709&ei=1&en=8f6b67cd8cfe4757 

    Ask any chief executive officer if he or she practices the art of earnings management and you will undoubtedly hear an emphatic "Of course not!" But ask those same executives about their company's recent results, and you may very well hear a proud "we beat the analysts' estimate by a penny."

    While almost no one wants to admit to managing company earnings, the fact is, almost everybody does it. How else to explain the miraculous manner in which so many companies meet or beat, by the preposterous penny, the consensus earnings estimates of Wall Street analysts?

    After years of such miracles, investors finally seem to be wising up to the fact that an extra penny of profit is not only meaningless but may also be evidence of earnings management and, therefore, bad news. After all, the practice can hide 

    what's genuinely going on in a company's books.

    A study by Thomson Financial examined how many of the 30 companies in the Dow Jones industrial average missed, met or beat analysts' consensus earnings estimates during each quarter over the last five years. It also looked at how the companies' shares responded to the results.

    Over the period, on average, almost half of the companies - 46.1 percent - met consensus estimates or beat them by a penny.

    Pulling off such a feat in an uncertain world smacks of earnings management. "It is not possible for this percentage of reporting companies to hit the bull's-eye," said Bill Fleckenstein, principal at Fleckenstein Capital in Seattle. "Business is too complicated; there are too many moving parts."

    The precision has a purpose, of course: to keep stock prices aloft. According to Thomson's five-year analysis, companies whose results came in below analysts' estimates lost 1.08 percent of their value, on average, the day of the announcement. The loss averaged 1.59 percent over five days.

    Executives have lots of levers to pull to make their numbers. Lowering the company's tax rate is a favorite, as is recognizing revenues before they actually come in or monkeying with reserves set aside to cover future liabilities.

    If all else fails and a company faces the nightmare of an earnings miss, its spinmeisters can always begin a whispering campaign to persuade Wall Street analysts to trim their estimates, making them more attainable. Their stock might drift downward as a result, but the damage is not usually as horrific as it is when earnings miss the target unexpectedly.

    So it is not surprising that the strategy has become so widespread and that fewer companies in the Thomson study are coming in below their target these days. For the first three quarters of 2004, 10.9 percent missed their expected results, down from 11.7 percent in 2003 and 25 percent in 2002.

    At the heart of earnings management is - what else? - executive compensation. The greater the percentage of pay an executive receives in stock, the bigger the incentive to produce results that propel share prices.

    Continued in the article

    Coke:  Gone Flat at the Bright Lines of Accounting Rules and Marketing Ethics
    The king of carbonated beverages is still a moneymaker, but its growth has stalled and the stock has been backsliding since the late '90s.  Now it turns out that the company's glory days were as much a matter of accounting maneuvers as of marketing magic. 
    Guizuenta's most ingenious contribution to Coke, the ingredient that added rocket fuel to the stock price, was a bit of creative though perfectly legal balance-sheet rejeiggering that in some ways prefigured the Enron Corp. machinations.  Known inside the company as the "49% solution," it was the brain child of then-Chief Financial Officer M. Douglas Ivester.  It worked like this:  Coke spun off its U.S. bottling operations in late 1986 into a new company known as Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc., retaining a 49% state for itself.  That was enough to exert de facto control but a hair below the 50% threshold that requires companies to consolidate results of subsidiaries in their financials.  At a stroke, Coke erased $2.4 billion of debt from its balance sheet.
    Dean Foust, "Gone Flat," Business Week, December 20, 2004, Page 77.  
    This is a Business Week cover story.
    Coca Cola's outside independent auditor is Ernst & Young

    There were other problems, some of which did not do the famed Warren Buffet's reputation any good.  See "Fizzy Math and Fishy Marketing Lawsuit, Probes Prove Damaging to Coke," by Margaret Webb Pressler, Washington Post, June 20, 2003 --- http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A14384-2003Jun19&notFound=true 

    Coca Cola's marketing tactics were unethical and unhealthy for kids --- http://www.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ362/hallam/Coke%20Officials%20Beefed%20Up.pdf 

    Also see "The Ten Habits of Highly Defective Corporations," From The Nation --- http://www.greenmac.com/World_Events/thetenha.html 

     


    Goodwill and Other Asset Impairment

     

    "MCI Inc. Posts $3.4 Billion Loss For 3rd Quarter," by Shawn Young, The Wall Street Journal, November 5, 2004, Page B2 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB109956924948864745,00.html?mod=technology_main_whats_news 

    Results Reflect Write-Off Of $3.5 Billion on Assets; Revenue in 2004 to Drop 

    Results Reflect Write-Off Of $3.5 Billion on Assets; Revenue in 2004 to Drop By SHAWN YOUNG Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL November 5, 2004; Page B2

    MCI Inc. reported a $3.4 billion third-quarter loss, reflecting a $3.5 billion write-off the phone giant has said it is taking on assets that have lost value.

    The company also cautioned that 2004 revenue will be slightly below the $21 billion to $22 billion it had projected early in the year.

    "Slightly means slightly," said Chief Executive Michael Capellas. He noted that the company hadn't changed its projections since a regulatory setback led MCI and larger rival AT&T Corp. to virtually abandon marketing of home phone service to consumers. Both companies are now focused almost exclusively on business customers.

    Despite the revenue decline, MCI projects a fourth-quarter profit, the result of improving margins, lower costs and a little stabilization in the price wars that have wracked the long-distance industry. The profit would be the first for the former WorldCom Inc. in years. The company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 2002 in the wake of a massive accounting fraud. It emerged under the name MCI in April.

    The improving trends that could produce a fourth-quarter profit were also evident in operating results for the third quarter, which largely met investor expectations.

    Continued in the article

    Bob Jensen's threads on the Worldcom and MCI scandals are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnron.htm#WorldCom 


    "How to Avoid the Goodwill Asteroid," by Jon D. Markman, TheStreet.com, May 24, 2002 --- http://www.thestreet.com/funds/supermodels/10024147.html 

    One of the gravest fears of investors today is being totaled by an "asteroid" event -- moments when a stock gets pushed to the edge of extinction by a bolt from the blue, such as a drug application rejection, a securities probe revelation or a surprise earnings restatement.

    Yet many shareholders seem blithely unaware that at least one asteroid speeding toward their companies is entirely foreseeable: the likelihood that management will have to write down a decent-sized chunk of their net worth sometime this year and perhaps rather soon.

    This unfortunate prospect is faced, potentially, by companies such as AOL Time Warner (AOL:NYSE - news - commentary - research - analysis), Allied Waste Industries (AW:NYSE - news - commentary - research - analysis), Georgia-Pacific (GP:NYSE - news - commentary - research - analysis) and Cendant (CD:NYSE - news - commentary - research - analysis) that have accumulated a great deal of goodwill on their balance sheets over the past few years. That's accountant-speak for the amount a company pays for another company over its book value because of expectations that some of its intangible assets -- such as patented technology, a prized brand name or desirable executives -- will prove valuable in a concrete, earnings-enhancing sort of way.

    New Accounting Rules

    Companies carry goodwill on their balance sheets as if it were an asset as solid as a piece of machinery, and therefore it is one of many items balanced against liabilities, such as long-term debt, to measure shareholder equity or book value. Just as hard assets are depreciated, or expensed, by a certain amount each year to account for their diminished value as they age, intangibles have long been amortized by a certain amount annually to account for their waning value.

    The value of machinery rarely dissipates quickly, but the value of goodwill can evaporate in a flash if a company determines that it paid too much for intangible assets -- e.g., if a patent or brand turns out not to be as defensible as originally believed, or demand for a new technology falters. As you can imagine, companies typically don't want to admit they overpaid. But once they do, they must write down the vanished value so that the "intangibles" lines on their balance sheets reflect fair-market pricing. If the writedown leaves a company's assets at a level lower than liabilities, the company is left with a negative net worth, which, as you would expect, is frowned upon, and often results in a dramatically lower stock price.

    Until last year, companies tried to avoid recording goodwill after acquisitions by using a method of accounting called "pooling of interests." In these stock-for-stock deals, companies were allowed to record the acquiree's assets at book value even though the value of the stock it had given up was greater than the amount of real stuff its shareholders received. The advantage: No need to drag down earnings each quarter by amortizing, or expensing, goodwill.

    The rulebook changed this year, however, and pooling went the way of the dodo; now companies are forced to record goodwill on their books. As a compromise to serial acquirers, who have a powerful lobby, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) decided that companies would no longer have to amortize goodwill regularly against earnings. Instead, a new standard -- encompassed in Rule 142 -- requires companies to test goodwill for "impairment" periodically.

    Essentially, this means that while the diminished value of goodwill won't count against a company's earnings annually anymore, companies might need to write down huge gobs of it from time to time when accountants decide they can't ignore the fact that an acquisition didn't turn out as planned. It also means that because FASB 142 does not dictate a set of strictly objective rules for calculating impairment, writedowns will be somewhat subjective in both timing and amount.

    Don't Fall for These Three Ploys

    As a result, many market skeptics believe that FASB 142, which was intended to improve earnings transparency, may in some cases actually result in more egregious earnings manipulation than ever. Donn Vickrey, vice president at Camelback Research Alliance, a provider of analytical tools and consulting services for financial information, says he sees three ways that companies interested in managing their earnings could end-run shareholders using the new rule.

    The big bath. In this approach, companies will write off a big portion of the goodwill on their books, telling investors it is an insignificant "paper loss" that should have no impact on the firm's share price. The benefit: Future write-offs would be unnecessary, and the company's earnings stream could be more effectively smoothed out in future periods. This approach would work only if it does not put the company at risk of violating debt covenants that require it to maintain a certain ratio of assets vs. liabilities.

    Cosmetic earnings boost. Under FASB 142, many companies will record earnings that appear higher than last year's because of the elimination of goodwill amortization. However, the increase will be purely cosmetic, as the company's underlying cash flow and profitability would remain unchanged. Investors should thus ensure they are comparing prior periods with the current period on an apples-to-apples basis by eliminating goodwill amortization from comparable year-earlier financial statements. The amount might be buried in footnotes to the balance sheet, though Kellogg (K:NYSE - news - commentary - research - analysis) explains the issue clearly in its latest 10-k in the section devoted to its acquisition of cookie maker Keebler in March 2001. Kellogg says it recorded $90.4 million in intangible amortization expense during 2001 and would have recorded $121 million in 2002 had it not adopted FASB 142 at the start of the year.

    Avoid-a-write-off. Some companies might take advantage of the new rule by avoiding a goodwill write-off as long as possible to prevent the big charge to earnings. Since the tests for impairment are subjective, Camelback believes it will not be hard for firms to avoid write-offs in the short run -- a strategy that could both help them avoid violations in debt covenants and potentially provide a boost in executive compensation formulas.

    While any public company that does acquisitions will find itself facing decisions about how to account for goodwill impairment, companies with the greatest absolute levels of goodwill -- as well as ones with the greatest amount of goodwill relative to their market capitalization -- will be the most vulnerable in the future to having their earnings blasted by the FASB 142 asteroid.

    Continued at http://www.thestreet.com/funds/supermodels/10024147.html 


    "The Revisions to IFRS 3:  Bad Enough to Abandon Faith in IFRS?" by Tom Selling, The Accounting Onion, June 16, 2008 --- http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/06/ifrs-3-fall-short-of-convergence-again.html

    In my previous post, I described how an SEC honcho, while speaking to the choir at an event sponsored by FEI, espoused his version of faith-based accounting; though he could not provide a single, solid reason to explain why the U.S. should adopt IFRS, he has seen the light and has become a true believer. In contrast, reason-based accounting permits recitation of a vast litany of blasphemies against IFRS to make one a serious, if not committed, agnostic. Today, I write of one of these latest abominations: the latest revision to IFRS 3 on the accounting for business combinations.

    Goodwill and NCI: IASB Fakes Right and Goes Left

    Perhaps the most significant development in the accounting for business combinations is that FAS 141(R) now requires the same basis of measurement for assets acquired and liabilities assumed, regardless of the percentage of a company acquired (so long as control is achieved). Therefore, if control is attained without purchasing 100% of the existing equity interests in the acquiree, non-controlling interests (NCI) must be measured at full fair value.

    As you may be aware from reading my post "What Good Comes from Goodwill Accounting?", I am not a big fan of recognizing 'goodwill' under any circumstance, so I will grant that the justification for the FASB's approach is not airtight. Nevertheless, it was common knowledge that the FASB was given to understand that, by sticking its neck out to make these controversial changes to FAS 141(R), the IASB would follow suit.

    Instead, the IASB renegged on its promise in the worst way imaginable: they voted to allow entities a free choicebetween the partial and full fair value alternatives to goodwill and NCI measurement. What's more, issuers can make their choice on a transaction-by-transaction basis -- kind of like going to church one week and synagouge the next. Not even the most devoted acolyte can spin this any other way except as a significant step backwards from establishing the IASB as a credible agent of quality financial reporting and investor protection.

    And, it's not just me who is outraged. Read the strongly-worded dissents* of Mary Barth and John Smith, two of the three Americans on the IASB. As to the third American, Jim Leisenring, I guess I shouldn't be surprised that he capitulated to the majority. Leisenring was the most prominent voice in support of FAS 133 (on hedge accounting) when he was on the FASB; a standard whose middle name is inconsistency. Be that as it may, one can only imagine where the IASB will take the interests of U.S. investors when our membership, and hence our influence, on IFRS inevitably wanes.

    Mind These GAAPs, Too

    If the unprincipled and unconstrained choice of accounting treatments for goodwill and NCI aren't enough for you to abandon any faith in a high-quality convergence, consider two more of the numerous departures from U.S. GAAP; these may be even worse.

    First, the devilish game of managing the timing of contingent liabilities still thrives in IFRS. FAS 141(R) now requires that any non-contractual, contingent liability assumed in a business combination must be recognized at fair value, if the probability of occurrence is more likely than not. IFRS allows any contingent liability to be recognized, regardless of likelihood, if it can be reliably measured.

    As I discussed in a previous post on IASB machinations of contingent liability accounting, the ubiquitous criterion of "reliable measurement" is one of those areas of "judgement" in IFRS that help management make their numbers with little chance of being challenged by auditors. Here is how this game will be played in a business combination under IFRS 3(R): if management thinks that goodwill won't be impaired any time soon, they will recognize contingent liabilities to the max. The effect is to create an earnings bank of liability writedowns when unlikely events become, as anticipated, resolved without the incurrence of an actual liability. And speaking of inconsistency, IFRS 3(R) provides that all intangible assets are to be recognized, even if their fair values cannot be measured reliably. Where is the "principle" for that one?

    Second, FAS 141(R) requires extensive disclosures that are designed to aid analysts in determining the past and future effect of a business combination on earnings and financial position. For example, FAS 141(R) requires the following disclosures:

    The amount of revenue and earnings of the acquiree since the date of acquisition. Revenue and earnings of the combined entity for the current period as though the acquisition had been consummated as of the beginning of the period Revenue and earnings of the combined entity for the previous period, as if the acquisition had been consummated as of the beginning of the previous period. Inexplicably, IFRS does not require the third item, above. Therefore, inferences as to earnings trends of the combined entity from historical financial statements are defeated.

    The recent activities of the IASB, the high priests of IFRS, confirm that they are most definitely not the august body to which the future of U.S. financial accounting standards should be entrusted. To those who persist in practicing faith-based accounting, put IFRS's accounting for business combinations in your pipe and smoke it.

    --------------------------

    *Unlike statements of the FASB, IFRS publications are not freely available. Just thought you might want to know why I didn't provide a link.

    Bob Jensen's threads on goodwill accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#Impairment

    IFRS 3 on Business Combinations

    Contents paragraphs Introduction IN1–IN16 International Financial Reporting Standard 3 Business Combinations Objective 1 Scope 2–13 Identifying a business combination 4–9 Business combinations involving entities under common control 10–13 Method of accounting 14–15 Application of the purchase method 16–65 Identifying the acquirer 17–23 Cost of a business combination 24–35 Adjustments to the cost of a business combination contingent on future events 32–35 Allocating the cost of a business combination to the assets acquired and liabilities and contingent liabilities assumed 36–60 Acquiree's identifiable assets and liabilities 41–44 Acquiree's intangible assets 45–46 Acquiree's contingent liabilities 47–50 Goodwill 51–55 Excess of acquirer's interest in the net fair value of acquiree's identifiable assets, liabilities and contingent liabilities over cost 56–57 Business combination achieved in stages 58–60 Initial accounting determined provisionally 61–65 Adjustments after the initial accounting is complete 63–64 Recognition of deferred tax assets after the initial accounting is complete 65 Disclosure 66–77 Transitional provisions and Effective date 78–85 Previously recognised goodwill 79–80 Previously recognised negative goodwill 81 Previously recognised intangible assets 82 Equity accounted investments 83–84 Limited retrospective application 85 Withdrawal of Other Pronouncements 86–87 Appendices A Defined terms B Application supplement C Amendments to other IFRSs Approval of IFRS 3 by the Board Basis for Conclusions Dissenting opinions on IFRS 3 Illustrative Examples [Extracted from IFRS 3, Business Combinations. © IASC Foundation.]

     


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on Junly 30, 2004

    TITLE: FASB May Bite Into Overseas Profits 
    REPORTER: Lingling Wei 
    DATE: Jul 28, 2004 
    PAGE: C3 
    LINK: Print Only 
    TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board, International Accounting Standards Board

    SUMMARY: The FASB has voted 4-3 to instruct the staff to examine "whether it is practical to require companies to book a liability for taxes they potentially owe on profits earned and held overseas."

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) What was the vote undertaken at the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)? Did this vote actually establish a new accounting requirement? Explain, commenting on the FASB's process for establishing a new accounting standard.

    2.) Why did the FASB undertake this step with respect to deferred taxes? How does it fit in with other work being undertaken in concert with the International Accounting Standards Board?

    3.) FASB member Michael Crooch comments that "there is a fair amount of opposition to the change" proposed by the FASB. Do you think such opposition is unusual or common for FASB proposals? Support your answer.

    4.) Define the term "deferred taxes". When must deferred taxes be recorded? Why do we bother to record them? That is, how does the process of reporting deferred taxes help to improve reporting in the balance sheet and income statement?

    5.) What taxes currently are recorded on foreign earnings? Why do companies currently not calculate deferred taxes for profits on foreign earnings? Why then would any change in this area result in "a major hit to earnings"?

    6.) Why do you think that companies might reconsider repatriating foreign earnings if they must begin to record deferred taxes on those amounts? What does your answer imply in regards to the economic consequences of accounting policies?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on December 13, 2002

    TITLE: International Body to Suggest Tighter Merger Accounting 
    REPORTER: Silvia Ascarelli and Cassell Bryan-Low 
    DATE: Dec 05, 2002 
    PAGE: A2 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1039033389416080833.djm,00.html  
    TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting, Financial Statement Analysis, Goodwill, International Accounting, International Accounting Standards Board, Restructuring

    SUMMARY: The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is proposing a new standard for business combination accounting. The proposal prescribes accounting treatment that is more stringent than U.S. standards. For example, it disallows recording restructuring charges at the outset of a business combination; such charges must simply be recorded as incurred.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) Compare and contrast the standard for business combinations proposed by the IASB to the current U.S. standard. To investigate these differences directly from the source, access the IASB's web site at http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp.

    2.) Why are U.S. companies expected to be concerned about recording restructuring charges as they are incurred in the process of implementing a business combination, rather than when these anticipated costs are identified at the outset of a business combination? Do these two accounting treatments result in differing amounts of expense being recorded for these restructuring charges? Will such U.S. companies be required to report according to this IAS, assuming it is implemented?

    3.) How are the goodwill disclosures proposed in the IAS expected to help financial statement analysis?

    4.) How are European companies expected to be impacted by this proposed IAS and future proposals currently planned in this area of accounting for business combinations? Provide your answer by considering not only the article under this review, but also by again accessing the IASB's web site referenced above.

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

    Program professors can search past editions of Educators' Reviews at http://ProfessorJournal.com.  
    Go to the Educators' Review section and click on "Search the Database." You can also change your discipline selection or remove yourself from the mailing list.

     

    Some intangible assets are booked and amortized.  Accounting guidance in this area dates back to APB 17.  Usually these are contractual or legal rights (patents, copyrights, etc.) and amortizations and write downs are to be based on the following provisions in Paragraph 27 of APB 17:

    The Board believes that the value of intangible assets at any one date eventually disappears and that the recorded costs of intangible assets should be amortized by systematic charges to income over the periods estimated to be benefited. Factors which should be considered in estimating the useful lives of intangible assets include:

    • Legal, regulatory, or contractual provisions may limit the maximum useful life.
    • Provisions for renewal or extension may alter a specified limit on useful life.
    • Effects of obsolescence, demand, competition, and other economic factors may reduce a useful life.
    • A useful life may parallel the service life expectancies of individuals or groups of employees.
    • Expected actions of competitors and others may restrict present competitive advantages.
    • An apparently unlimited useful life may in fact be indefinite and benefits cannot be reasonably projected.
    • An intangible asset may be a composite of many individual factors with varying effective lives.

    When a company purchases another company, the purchase price may soar way above the book value of the acquired firm.  The reason for the unbooked excess is the unbooked market values of booked and unbooked assets plus synergy increments  less negative value of unbooked liabilities. Paragraph 39 of FAS 141 requires the partitioning of the unbooked excess value into (1) separable versus (2) inseparable components of unbooked excess purchase value.  The inseparable portion is then booked as "goodwill."  This portion is then booked as goodwill and is carried forward as an asset subject to impairment tests of FAS 142.  Paragraph 39 of FAS 141 requires an intangible asset to be recognized as an asset apart from goodwill if it arises from:

    · contractual or other legal rights, regardless of whether those rights are transferable or separable from the acquired entity or from other rights and obligations; or

    · separable, that is, it is capable of being separated or divided from the acquired entity and sold, transferred, licensed, rented, or exchanged regardless of whether there is an intent to do so. An intangible asset is still considered separable if it can be sold transferred, licensed, rented, or exchanged in combination with a related contract, asset or liability.

    Paragraphs 10-28 of FAS 141 provides examples of intangible assets that are considered "separable" and are not to be confounded in the goodwill account. But the majority of the unbooked excess value is usually the inseparable goodwill arising from "knowledge capital" arising from the following components:

    Knowledge Capital Components

    • Spillover Knowledge (see above)
    • Human Resources (see above)
    • Structural Capital (see above)

    Knowledge capital arises generally from the conservatism concept that guides the FASB and other standard setters around the world.  For example, human resources are not owned, controlled, bought, and sold like tangible assets.  As a result, investment in training are expensed rather than capitalized.  Research and development expenditures are expensed rather than booked under the highly conservatism rulings in FAS 2.  This includes most R&D in database and software development except when impacted by FAS 86.

    Knowledge capital is often the major component of goodwill.  But "goodwill" as defined in FAS 141 and 142 is a hodgepodge of other positive and negative components that comprise the net excess value difference between the market value of total owners' equity and the value of the firm as a whole.  This is summarized below:

    Goodwill Components

    + Market value of Owners' Equity  ($10 billion)
    -     Book value of Owners' Equity  ($01 billion)
    = Market to book difference in value    ($09 billion)
    - Adjustment of booked items to fair value  ($04 billion)
    = Goodwill that includes the following components ($5 billion)
    • Unbooked synergy value of booked items (+$1 billion)
    • Unbooked knowledge capital value (+$04 billion)
    • Other unbooked  items (-$01 billion)
    • Joint effects, including other synergies (+$01 billion)

    The components of goodwill are not generally additive.  For example, a firm has just been purchased for $10 billion and has a book equity value of $1 billion.  The market to book ratio is therefore 10=$10/$1.  Suppose the value of the individual booked assets and liabilities sums to $5 billion even though the booked value on a historical cost basis is only $1 billion.  However, when combined as a bundle of booked items, assume there is a combined value of $6 billion, because the value of the combined booked items is worth more than the $5 billion sum of the parts.  For example, if an airline sells its booked airplanes and airport facilities, these many be worth more as a bundle than the sum of the values of all the pieces.  If there were no unbooked items, the value of the firm would be $6 billion, thereby, resulting in $1 billion in goodwill arising entirely from synergy of booked items. 

    However, the value of the equity is $10 billion rather than $6 billion.  This difference is due to the net value of the unbooked asset and liability items and the synergies they create in combination with one another.  For example, if an airline sells the entire business in addition to its airplanes and airport facilities, there is added value due to the intellectual capital components such as experienced mechanics, flight crews, computer systems, and ground crews.  There are also negative components such as unbooked operating lease obligations on airplanes not booked on the balance sheet.  

    The components of goodwill are not additve in value, but in combination they sum to the $5 billion in goodwill equal to the market value of the combined equity minus the sum of the market values of the booked items (without the $1 billion in unbooked synergy value).  When combined with the booked items, the unbooked knowledge capital takes on more value than $4 billion it can be sold for individually.  For example, if American Airlines sold its entire SABRE reservations system in one sale and the remainder of the company in another sale, the sum would probably be less than the combined value of the unbooked SABRE system plus all of the booked items belonging to American Airlines.  This is because there is synergy value between the booked and unbooked items.  One of the synergy items is leverage.  Values of booked debt and assets may be more additive in firms having low debt/equity ratios than in high leverage firms where there investors adjust added values for higher risk.

    If investors seek to extrapolate firm value from balance sheet value, they will discover that historical costs are useless and that adustments of booked items to fair value falls way short of total value.  The problem is that major components of value never appear on the balance sheets.  The unbooked knowledge capital components of firm value have become so enormous that it is not uncommon to find market to book values of equity way in excess of the ten to one ratio illustrated above. 

    Goodwill cannot be booked in the United States except when there is a combining of two companies that must now be accounted for as a purchase under FAS 141.  Goodwill is the purchase price less the current fair values of the booked items (not adjusted for synergy value).  No formal attempt is made to report the portion that is knowledge capital, although management may justify the business combination on some identified knowledge capital items.  For example, if Microsoft purchased PeopleSoft, Bill Gates would make a public explanation of why the value of PeopleSoft is almost entirely due to unbooked items relative to booked items in PeopleSoft's balance sheet.

    The main reason why goodwill cannot be booked, unless there is a business combination transaction, is that estimation of the value of the firm on an ongoing basis is too expensive and subject to enormous measurement error.  One common approach is to multiply the market price per share times the number of shares outstanding.  But this is usually far different from the price buyers are willing to pay for all of the shares outstanding.  This difference arises in part because acquiring control usually is far more valueable than the sum of the shares at current trading values.  This difference arises in part because current share prices are subject to transient market price movements of shares of all traded companies, whereas the value of the firm in a business combination deal is much more stable.

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on April 4, 2002

    TITLE: Why High-Fliers Built on Big Ideas, Are Such Fast Fallers 
    REPORTER: Greg Ip 
    DATE: Apr 04, 2002 
    PAGE: A1 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,4287,SB1017872963341079920,00.html  
    TOPICS: Intangible Assets, Electricity Markets, Goodwill, Managerial Accounting, Pharmaceutical Industry, Research & Development

    SUMMARY: Greg Ip reports on the perils of life-cycle differences based on products and services that are reliant on intangible rather than tangible assets. That value is created with either is undeniable, but significantly riskier when that value is supported by something intangible that may disappear entirely.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) What is a product life cycle? How many of the 5 basic stages of a product's life can you name? What has happened to the product life cycle that is heavily dependent on technological changes? What part does intangible assets have in this change? How could the $5 billion in assets of a firm sell for $42 million?

    2.) What does the author mean when he says "value today is increasingly derived from intangible assets - intellectual property, innovative technology, financial services or reputation"? Explain in terms of Alan Greenspan's statement "a firm is inherently fragile if its value-added emanates more from conceptual as distinct from physical assets."

    3.) The article relates the story of Polaroid, once a pioneer noted for its technological prowess. Its "technology" asset formed the basis of its early success. How did technology and innovation finally slay it?

    4.) Other industries are exposed to the same sorts of forces, including the pharmaceutical and fiber-optic industries. How have they fared?

    5.) Why have companies tried to cast off hard assets in favor of intangible assets? In 2000, Jeffrey Skilling said, " What's becoming clear is that there's nothing magic about hard assets. They don't generate cash. What does is a better solution for your customer. And increasingly that's intellectual, not physical assets, driven." Do you suppose he's changed his mind?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

    A common mistake is to assume that "goodwill" is comprised only of unbooked assets such as knowledge capital.  Nothing could be further from the truth in terms of how goodwill is calculated under FAS 141 rules.  Goodwill also includes downward value adjustments for unbooked risk items such as off-balance sheet financing, pending and potential litigation losses, pending and possible adverse legislative and taxation actions, estimated environmental protection expenses, and various industry-specific liabilities such as unbooked frequent flyer certificate obligations.

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Reviews on June 20, 2002

    TITLE: Frequent-Flier Programs Get an Overhaul 
    REPORTER: Ron Lieber 
    DATE: Jun 18, 2002 
    PAGE: D1 LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1024344325710894400.djm,00.html  
    TOPICS: Frequent-flier programs, Accounting

    SUMMARY: Many frequent-flier programs are offering alternative rewards in exchange for frequent-flier miles. Questions focus on accounting for frequent-flier programs and redemption of miles.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) What is a frequent-flier program? List three possible ways to account for frequent-flier miles awarded to customers in exchange for purchases. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each accounting method.

    2.) Why are companies offering alternative rewards in exchange for frequent-flier miles? How is the redemption of miles reported in the financial statements? Discuss accounting issues that arise if the miles are redeemed for awards that are less costly than originally anticipated.

    3.) The article states that the 'surge in unredeemed points is causing bookkeeping headaches.' Why would unredeemed points cause bookkeeping headaches? Would companies be better off if the points were never redeemed? If a company created a liability for awarded points, in what circumstances could the liability be removed from the balance sheet?

    4.) Refer to the related article. Describe Jet Blue's frequent-flier program. How does stipulating a one-year expiration on frequent-flier points change accounting for a frequent-flier program?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

    --- RELATED ARTICLES --- 
    TITLE: JetBlue Joins the Fray But With Big Caveat: Miles Expire in a Year 
    REPORTER: Ron Lieber 
    PAGE: D1 
    ISSUE: Jun 18, 2002 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB102434443936545600.djm,00.html 

     

    Liabilities and Equity of Microsoft Corporation

    The off-balance sheet liabilities of Microsoft dwarf the recorded liabilities.

    • The major risk of Microsoft is the ease with which its products can be duplicated elsewhere such as in China.  From a global perspective this gives rise to perhaps billions in lost revenues and enormous expenditures to protect copyrights.

    • There are enormous contingency risks and pending lawsuits, particularly government lawsuits alleging abuse of monopoly powers and civil lawsuits from companies claiming unfair marketing practices and copyright infringements.

     

     

    Entrenched Assets and Market Dominance

    • Microsoft Windows and MS Office
    • AMR Sabre
    • Oracle Databases
    • AOL 

    Market-to-Book (ratio of market value of net assets/book value of net assets) > 6.0

    Conservatism is Largely to Blame

    • R&D expensed under FASB, but only R expensed by IAS
    • Amazon.com's tremendous investment in systems, marketing, and distribution software
    • AOL's customer acquisition costs
    • Distrust of valuations that are highly subjective and subject to extreme volatility
    Managers and auditors "don't want to put anything on the balance sheet that may turn out to be worthless.  If they don't have to value intangible assets, such as AOL's customer acquisition costs, their legal liability is reduced."  Baruch Lev
    Source: "The New Math," by Jonathan R. Laing, Barrons Online, November 20, 2000 --- http://equity.stern.nyu.edu/News/news/levbarrons1120.html
    Trinity students may go to J:\courses\acct5341\readings\levNov2000.htm

    Institutional Investors and Security Analysts Are Also At Fault

    Institutional investors and financial analysts are also quite happy with the current system because they think that they've go inside networks and proprietary information."  Baruch Lev
    Source: "The New Math," by Jonathan R. Laing, Barrons Online, November 20, 2000 --- http://equity.stern.nyu.edu/News/news/levbarrons1120.html
    Trinity students may go to J:\courses\acct5341\readings\levNov2000.htm

     

     

    Wages of factory workers are traced directly into finished goods inventories and are "capitalized" costs rather than expenses.  They are carried in the balance sheet as "tangible assets" until the the inventory items are sold or perish.  Then these costs become "expenses" in the income statement and are written off to the Retained Earnings account.  Similarly, wages of construction workers on a building are capitalized into the Buildings asset account rather than expensed in the income statement.  These wages become expensed over time in periodic depreciation charges. Costs of labor and direct materials that can be traced to construction of tangible assets thereby become assets and are written off across future periods.  Even indirect labor and material charges may be capitalized as overhead applied to tangible assets.  Tangible assets depict "touchable" items that can be purchased and sold in established markets such as commodity markets, real estate markets, and equipment markets.  

    Wages and salaries of research workers can be traced to particular projects.  However, under most accounting standards worldwide, research costs, including all direct material, labor,  and overhead costs are expensed immediately rather than capitalized as assets even though the revenues from the projects may not commence until many years into the future.  Research projects are typically too unique and too uncertain to be traded in markets.  Accounting standard setters recognize that there are many "intangible" items having future benefits or losses that are not booked as assets or liabilities.  Outlays for development of intangibles are expensed rather than capitalized until they can be better matched with the revenues they generate.  Examples in include research for new or improved products.  Intangibles also include contractual items such as copyrights, advertising, product promotions, and public relations outlays.  When intangibles such as patents and copyrights are purchased, the outlays can be booked as intangible assets.  Costs are then amortized over time.  However, resources devoted to discovery and development of intangibles are generally not booked as assets.  They are expensed when incurred rather than capitalized.  Typical examples of intangible expenses include the following:

    • Research (including development of patent and copyright items)
    • Long-term development of patents, products, and copyrights
    • Advertising and trademarks
    • Employee training and development
    • Public relations

    When an entire firm is purchased, the difference between the total price and the current value of all intangibles is typically booked to a "Goodwill" asset account.  When purchased as a lump sum, goodwill can be carried as an asset until its value is deemed to be "impaired."  However, when developed internally, goodwill is not booked as an asset.  This creates all sorts of problems when comparing similar companies where one company purchased its goodwill and the other company developed it internally.  In the U.S., goodwill accounting must be treated under purchase rather than pooling methods that, in turn, result in booking of "purchased goodwill."  FAS 141 spells out the accounting standards for Goodwill.   

    One requirement under FAS 141 is that contractual items such as patents and copyrights that can be separated from goodwill must be valued separately and be immediately expensed.  This is an attempt in FAS 141 to make it easier to compare a firm that acquires R&D in a business combination with a firm that develops its own R&D.  However, implementation of FAS 141 rules in this regard becomes very murky.

    FAS 142 dictates that firms are no longer required to amortize capitalized goodwill costs.  Instead firms are required to run impairment tests and expense portions of goodwill that has been deemed "impaired."  FAS 142 does not alter standards for intangibles that are not acquired in a business combination.  Hence, standards such as FAS 2 (R&D), FAS 19 (Oil and Gas), FAS 50 (Recording Industry), and FAS 86 (Computer Software) remain intact in situations apart from business combinations.  Paragraph 39(b) of FAS 142 admits to the following:

    In some cases, the cost of generating an intangible asset internally 
    cannot be distinguished from the cost of maintaining or 
    enhancing ... internally generated goodwill.

    There is nothing new about the sad state of accounting for intangibles.   In a working paper entitled "The Measurement and Recognition of Intangible Assets:  Then and Now," Claire Eckstein from Fairleigh Dickinson University quotes the following footnote from 1928:

    The Gold Dust Corporation
    August 31, 1928

    In view of the available surplus, and in the fact that the corporation carries its most valuable asset, viz, its goodwill at $1, and also because of the uncertain market value of industrial plants, it was concluded that it would be entirely approprate for the corporation to carry its plants in a similar manner as its goodwill, viz, at the nominal value of $1.

    The FASB admits that accounting for intangibles is in a sad state in terms of providing relevant information to investors.  An agenda project has been created that is titled "Disclosure of Information about Intangible Assets not Recognized in Financial Statements."  Analysts bemoan the state of accounting for intangibles.  In April 2001, Fortune stated the following:

    In the Fortune 500 there are thousands upon thousands of statistics that reveal very little
    that's meaningful about the corporations they purportedly describe.  At least that's the
    verdict of a growing number of forward-thinking market watchdogs, academics, accountants,
    and others.  Convinced that accounting gives rotten information about the value of performance
    in modern knowledge-intensive companies, they are proposing changes that would be
    earthshaking to the profession.

    Because so much of the problem rests in "knowledge intensive companies," Baruch Lev and others have come to view unrecognized intangibles as being synonymous with unrecognized "knowledge capital."

    Measuring the Value of Intangibles and Valuation of the Firm

    Knowledge Capital Valuation Factors (terminology adapted from Baruch Lev's writings)
    Value Creators
    • Scalability
           Nonrivalry (e.g., the SABRE airline reservations system)
           Increasing Returns (due to initial fixed cost followed by low marginal cost)
    • Network Effects
           Positive Feedback ¨(customer discussion boards)
           Network Externalities (fast word of mouth)
           Industry Standard (Microsoft Windows)

    Value Destroyers

    • Partial Excludability (training of employees who cannot be indentured servants)
           Spillovers
           Fuzzy Property Rights
           Private vs. Social Returns (training that creates immense competition other nations)
    • Inherent Risk
           Sunk Cost
           Creative Destruction (Relational database and ERP destruction of COBOL systems)
           Volatility of value due to competition and technological change
           Risk Sharing (only a few products emerge as winners amidst a trail of road kill)
    • Non-tradability
           Contracting Problems
           Negligible Marginal Cost

    A few years ago a hardback set of the thirty-two volumes of the Britannica cost $1,600…In 1992 Microsoft decided to get into the encyclopedia business…[creating] a CD with some multimedia bells and whistles and a user friendly front end and sold it to end users for $49.95…Britannica started to see its market erode…The company's first move was to offer on-line access to libraries at a subscription rate of $2,000 per year…Britannica continued to lose market share…In 1996 the company offered a CD version for $200…Britannica now sells a CD for $89.99 that has the same content as the thirty-two volume print version that recently sold for $1,600.
    Shapiro and Varian (1999, pp. 19–20)

    On November 14, 2002 the following links were provided at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/intangibles.html 

    1. Announcement: Lev's Book: Intangibles-Management, Measurement and Reporting has been published by the Brookings Institution Press. Get your copy now at book stores and retailers.
    2. Paper with Feng Gu: Intangible Assets, discussing Lev's methodology for measuring intangible assets.
    - intangible-assets.doc
    - intangibles-tables.ppt
    (Accompany Tables in Microsoft Powerpoint)
    3.

    Paper with Feng Gu: Markets in Intangibles: Patent Licensing,
    - patent-licensing.doc
    (Microsoft Word)
    - patent-licensing-tables.doc
    (Microsoft Word)

    4. April 16, 2001 - "Accounting Gets Radical" - Fortune
    5. April 2001 - "Knowledge Capital Scoreboard: Treasures Revealed" - CFO online
    6. May 10, 2001 - Interview with Baruch Lev - (in spanish)
    7. May 14, 2001 - "How Do We Guage Value of New Web Technologies?" - Wall Street Journal
    8. May 14, 2001 - "How do you value intangible assets?" - National Law Journal (No Online Version Available)
    9. June 18, 2001 - "Taking Stock of a Company's Most Valuable Assets" - Business Week

     

    There are all sorts of models for valuing an entire firm such that estimates of the value of unbooked items (goodwill) can be derived as the difference between the sum of the values of booked items and the entire value of the firm.  However, derivation of values of knowledge capital becomes confounded by the synergy effects. 

    The major problem is all valuation models is that they entail forecasting into the future based upon extrapolations from past history.  This is not always a bad thing when forecasting in relatively stable industries and economic conditions.  The problem in modern times is that there are very few stable industries and economic conditions.  Equity values and underlying values of intangibles are impacted by highly unstable shifts in investor confidence in equity markets, manipulations of accounting reports, terrorism, global crises such as the Asian debt crises, emergence of China in the world economy, and massive litigation unknowns such as lawsuits regarding mold in buildings.  Forecasting the future from the past is easy in most steady-state systems.  It is subject to enormous error in forecasting in systems that are far from being in steady states.

    The popular models for valuing entire firms include the following:

    • Valuation based upon analyst forecasts.  These alternatives have the advantages of being rooted in data outside what is reported under GAAP in financial statements.  Analysts may meet with top management and consider intangibles.  But there are also drawbacks such as the following:
    • The cart is in front of the horse.  When the purpose of accounting data is to help help investors and analysts set stock prices in securities markets, the forecasts of users (especially leading multiples) for valuation entails circular reasoning.
    • The recent scandals involving security analysts of virtually all major investment firms and brokerages makes us tend to doubt the objectivity and ability of analysts to make forecasts that are not self-serving.  See http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#Cleland 
    • Analyst forecasts tend to be highly subjective.  Comparing them may be like finding the mean between a banana and a lemon.
    • Valuation using stock price multiples (usually limited to comparing firms in a given industry and adjusted for leverage).  Multiples can be based upon price forecasts (leading multiples) or past price trends (trailing multiples).  In either case, the valuations are suspect for the following reasons:
    • The cart is in front of the horse.  When the purpose of the valuation exercise is to help help investors set stock prices in securities markets, the use of stock prices (especially leading multiples) for valuation entails circular reasoning.
    • Use of the current prices of small numbers of shares traded is not the same as the per-share value of all the shares acquired in a single transaction.  This difference arises in part because acquiring control usually i
    • s far more valuable than the sum of the shares at current trading values.  This difference arises in part because current share prices are subject to transient market price movements of shares of all traded companies, whereas the value of the firm in a business combination deal is much more stable.  For example, Microsoft share prices have declined about 40% between Year 2000 and Year 2002, but it is not at all clear that the value of the firm and/or its knowledge capital value has declined so steeply in the bear market of securities pricing in Year 2002.
    • Present value valuation based upon forecasted dividends (usually including a forecasted dividend growth rate). 
      The problem with forecasted dividends is that firms have dividend policies that do not reflect future value.  For example, many firms do not pay dividends at all or their payout ratios are too small to be reflective of firm value.  There may be enormous dividends decades into the future, but these are too uncertain to be realistic for valuation purposes.  Another problem is that forecasted dividend models generally require the estimation of a "terminal value" of the firm, and this usually entails grasping for straws.
    • Discounted abnormal earnings and returns valuation (including Edwards-Bell-Ohlson (EBO) and Steward's EVA Models)
      Abnormal earnings  and returns valuation models generally use forcasted after-tax operating profits discounted at the firm's current weighted average cost of capital.   There are variations of methods such as the abnormal returns method, the abnormal earnings method, and the free cash flow method of valuing returns to debt and equity.   

      One of the nicer summaries of the EBO versus EVA models can be found in "Measuring Wealth," by Charles Lee, CA Magazine, April 1996, pp. 32-37 --- http://www.cica.ca/cica/camagazine.nsf/e1996-Apr/TOC 

      The value of the firm depends on its ability to generate "abnormal earnings" above what can be earned in riskless or near-riskless investment alternatives.  There are immense problems in this valuation approach for the following reasons:
    • Empirical studies both before and after the Enron scandal indicate that earnings management is systemic and pervasive such that managers can manipulate abnormal earnings valuations with their earnings management policies (that are generally secret).
    • Earnings measures are subject to all the limitations of GAAP including the failure to expense employee stock options, inclusion of income on pension funds, write-off of R&D under FAS 2, and the expensing of expenditures for knowledge capital intended to benefit the future.  Actually, this problem is not as serious as it might seem at first blush since many of the accounting distortions wash themselves out over time if they are do to timing.  However, when the timing is long-term such as in the case of long-term R&D projects, distortions persist due to discounting.  For example, if a firm deducts $1 billion per year on a research project that may only start to pay off 15 or more years into the future, the conservatism badly distorts the discounted abnormal earnings and return valuation methods.
    • Abnormal earnings and returns valuation models implicitly assume firms that carry massive amounts of excess cash, beyond what is needed for year-to-year operations, distribute the excess cash as dividends to owners.  This just is not the case in some firms like Microsoft that carry huge cash reserves.  As a result, abnormal earnings and returns valuation methods must take this into account since abnormal earnings do not accrue to free cash reserves.
    MicrosoftAssets00.jpg (18291 bytes)
    • Real Options
      There are various valuation methods that are less widely used.  One of these is the Real Options approach that shows some promise even though it is still quite impractical.  See http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/realopt.htm 

    • Market Transaction
      On rare occasion, a portion of a company's knowledge capital is sold in market transactions that give clues about total value.  The sale of a portion of the SABRE system by American Airlines is an excellent example of a clue to the immense value of this   unbooked asset on the balance sheet..  The problem with this is that market price of a portion of the SABRE system ignores the synergy values of the remaining portion still owned by AMR.

    In the final analysis, the most practical approach to date is to attempt to forecast the revenues and/or cost savings attributable to major components of intellectual capital.   This is much easier in the case of software and systems such as the SABRE system than it is in components like human resources where total future benefits are virtually impossible to drill down to present values at particular points in time.

    The valuation of intangibles will probably always be subject to enormous margins of error and risk.

    One way to help financial statement users analyze intangibles would be to expand upon the interactive spreadsheet/database approach currently used by Microsoft Corporation for making forecasts.  Although this approach is not currently used by Microsoft for detailed analysis of intangibles, we can envision how knowledge capital components might be expanded upon in a way that financial statement users themselves can make assumptions and then analyze the aggregative impacts of those assumptions.  Click on the Following from http://www.microsoft.com/msft/ 

    FY 2003 Microsoft "What-if?" (193 KB) Do your own forecasting for Microsoft’s FY 2003 income statements based on your assumptions with this Excel projection tool --- http://www.microsoft.com/msft/download/PivotTables/What_If.xls 

    Pivot tables might also be useful for slicing and dicing information about intangibles.  Although Microsoft does not employ this specifically for analysis of intangibles, the approach used at the following link might be extended for such purposes:

    Financial History PivotTable (122 KB) Allows you to view and analyze historical Microsoft financial data.  For example, you can look at income statement line items dating back to 1985 --- http://www.microsoft.com/msft/download/PivotTables/historypivot.xls 

    Click here to view references on intangibles 


    FAS 141 and the Question of Value By PricewaterhouseCoopers CFOdirect Network Newsdesk, January 16, 2003 --- http://www.cfodirect.com/cfopublic.nsf/vContentPrint/CA13B226B214A04085256CB000512D34?OpenDocument 

    Just as early reactions to FAS 142 seemed to have overlooked the complexities in reviewing and testing goodwill for impairment, so too have reactions to complying with the Financial Accounting Standards Board's Statement No. 141 – Business Combinations.

    Adopted and issued at the same time as Statement No. 142 in the summer of 2001, the headline news about FAS 141 was the elimination of the Pooling-of-Interest accounting method in mergers and acquisitions. Going forward from June 30, 2001, all acquisitions are to be accounted for using one method only – Purchase Accounting.

    This change is significant and one particular aspect of it – the identification and measurement of intangible assets outside of goodwill – seems to be somewhat under-appreciated.

    Stephen C. Gerard, Managing Director at Standard & Poor's Corporate Value Consulting, says that there is "general conceptual understanding of Statement 141 by corporate management and finance teams. But the real impact will not be felt until the next deal is done." And that deal in FAS 141 parlance will be a "purchase" since "poolings" are no longer recognized.

    Consistent M&A Accounting

    The FASB, in issuing Statement No. 141, concluded that "virtually all business combinations are acquisitions and, thus, all business combinations should be accounted for in the same way that other asset acquisitions are accounted for – based on the values exchanged."

    In defining how business combinations are to be accounted for, FAS 141 supersedes parts of APB Opinion No. 16. That Opinion allowed companies involved in a merger or acquisition to use either pooling-of-interest or purchase accounting. The choice hinged on whether the deal met 12 specified criteria. If so, pooling-of-interest was required.

    Over time, "pooling" became the accounting method of choice, especially in "mega-deal" transactions. That, in the words of the FASB, resulted in "…similar business combinations being accounted for using different methods that produced dramatically different financial statement results."

    FAS 141 seeks to level that playing field and improve M&A financial reporting by:
      • Better reflecting the investment made in an acquired entity based on the values exchanged.
      • Improving the comparability of reported financial information on an apples-to-apples basis.
      • Providing more complete financial information about the assets acquired and liabilities assumed in business combinations.
      • Requiring disclosure of information on the business strategy and reasons for the acquisition.

    When announcing FAS 141, the FASB wrote: "This Statement requires those (intangible assets) be recognized as assets apart from goodwill if they meet one of two criteria – the contractual-legal criterion or the separability criterion."

    Unchanged by the new rule are the fundamentals of purchase accounting and the purchase price allocation methodology for measuring goodwill: that is, goodwill represents the amount remaining after allocating the purchase price to the fair market values of the acquired assets, including recognized intangibles, and assumed liabilities at the date of the acquisition.

    "What has changed," says Steve Gerard, "is the rigor companies must apply in determining what assets to break out of goodwill and separately recognize and amortize."

    Thus, in an unheralded way, FAS 141 introduces a process of identifying and placing value on intangible assets that could prove to be a new experience for many in corporate finance, as well as a costly and time-consuming exercise. Nonetheless, an exercise critical to compliance with the new rule.

    Continued at  http://www.cfodirect.com/cfopublic.nsf/vContentPrint/CA13B226B214A04085256CB000512D34?OpenDocument  

     


    Intangibles:  An Accounting Paradox

    Transfer Pricing of Intellectual Property Rights --- http://www.buildingipvalue.com/05_TI/031_034.htm


    An Accounting Paradox

    If you are following the accounting saga following the implosion of Enron and Andersen, I strongly recommend the Summer 2002, Volume 21, Number 2 of the Journal of Accounting and Public Policy --- http://www.elsevier.nl/inca/publications/store/5/0/5/7/2/1/ 

    Enron:  An Accounting Perspective

    • Reforming corporate governance post Enron: Shareholders' Board of Trustees and the auditor 97 -- 103 
      A.R. Abdel-khalik
    • Enron: what happened and what we can learn from it pp. 105 -- 127 
      G.J. Benston, A.L. Hartgraves
    • Enron et al.--a comment pp.129 -- 130 
      J.S. Demski
    • Where have all of Enron's intangibles gone? pp.131 -- 135 
      Baruch Lev
    • Enron: sad but inevitable pp.137 -- 145 
      L. Revsine
    • Regulatory competition for low cost-of-capital accounting rules pp.147 -- 149 
      S. Sunder

    Regular Paper

    • How are loss contingency accruals affected by alternative reporting criteria and incentives? pp. 151 -- 167 
      V.B. Hoffman, J.M. Patton

    Question:
    Where were Enron's intangible assets?  In particular, what was its main intangible asset that has been overlooked in terms of accounting for intangibles?

     

    Answer by Baruch Lev:

    Baruch Lev Quote from Page 131 (from the reference above)

    On December 31, 2000, Enron's market value was $75.2 billion, while its book value (balance sheet equity) was $11.5 billion.  The market-to-book gap of almost $64 billion, while not equal to the value of intangibles (it reflects, among other things, differences between current and historical-cost values of physical assets), appears to indicate that Enron had substantial intangibles just half a year before it started its quick slide to extinction.  This naturally raises the questions: Where are Enron's intangibles now?  And even more troubling: Why did not those intangibles--a hallmark of modern corporations--prevent the firm's implosion?  In intangibles are "so good", as many believe, why is Enron's situation "so bad"?

    Baruch Lev Quite beginning on Page 133 (from the reference above)

    So the answer to the question posed at the opening of this note--where have Enron's intangible gone?--is a simple one: Nowhere.  Enron did not have substantial intangibles, that is, if hype, glib, and earnings manipulation did not count as intangibles.  Which, of course, also answers the second question--why did not the intangibles prevent Enron's implosion.

    Back to Greenspan's comment about the fragility of intangibles: "A physical asset, whether an office building or an automotive assembly plant, has the capability of producing goods even if the reputation of the managers of such facilities falls under a cloud.  The rapidity of Enron's decline is an effective illustration of the vulnerability of a firm whose market value largely rests on capitalized reputation."  Intangibles are indeed fragile, more on this later, but "true" intangibles are not totally dependent on managers' reputation.  IBMs management during the 1980s and early 1990s drove the company close to bankruptcy, and was completely discredited (though not ethically, as Enron's).  But IBMs intangibles--innovation capabilities and outstanding services personnel--were not seriously harmed.  Indeed, under Lou Gerster's management (commencing in 1993), IBM made an astounding comeback.  Hypothetically, would a tarnished reputation of Microsoft, Pfizer, or DuPont's management destroy the ability of these similarly innovative companies to continuously introduce new products and services and maintain dominant competitive positions?  Of course not.  Even when companies collapse, valuable patents, brands, R&D laboratories, trained employees, and unique information systems will find eager buyers.  Once more, Enron imploded, and its trading activities "acquired" for change not because its intangibles were tied to management's reputation, but partly, because it did not have any valuable intangibles--unique factors of production--that could be used by successor managers to resuscitate the company and create value.

    Finally, to the fragility of intangibles.  As I elaborate elsewhere,3 along with the ability of intangible assets to create value and growth, comes vulnerability, which emanates from the unique attributes of these factors of production:

    Partial excludability (spillover): The inability of owners of intangible assets to completely appropriate (prevent non-owners from enjoying) the benefits of the assets.  Patents can be "invented around", and ultimately expire; trained employees often move to competitors, and unique organizational structures (e.g., just-in-time production) are imitated by competitors.

    Inherently high risk: Certain intangible investments (e.g., basic research, franchise building for new products) are riskier than most physical and financial assets.  The majority of drugs under development do not make it to the market, and most of the billions of dollars spent by the dotcoms in the late 1990s to build franchise (customer base) were essentially lost.

    Nonmarketability: Market in intangibles are in infancy, and lack transparency (there are lots of patent licensing deals, for example, but no details released to the public).  Consequently, the valuation of intangible-intensive enterprises is very difficult (no "comparables"), and their management challenging.

    Intangibles are indeed different than tangible assets, and in some sense more vulnerable, due to their unique attributes.  Their unusual ability to create value and growth comes at a cost, at both the corporate and macroeconomy level, as stated by Chairman Greenspan: "The difficulty of valuing firms that deal primarily with concepts and the growing size and importance of these firms may make our economy more susceptible to this type of contagion".  Indeed, intangible-intensive firms are "growing in size and importance", a fact that makes the study of the measurement, management, and reporting of intangible assets so relevant and exciting, irrespective of Enron the intangibles-challenged sorry affair.

     

    Answer by Bob Jensen

    I have to disagree with Professor Lev with respect his statement:  " Enron did not have substantial intangibles."  I think Enron, like many other large multinational corporations, invested in a type of intangible asset that has never been mentioned to my knowledge in the accounting literature.  Enron invested enormously in the intangible asset of political power and favors.  There are really two types of investments of this nature for U.S. based corporations:

    1. Investments in bribes and political contributions allowed under U.S. law, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)

    2. Investments in bribes and political contributions not allowed under U.S. law, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)

    I contend that large corporate investment in political power is sometimes the main intangible asset of the company.  This varies by industry, but political favors are essential in agribusiness, pharmaceuticals, energy, and various other industries subject to government regulation and subsidies.  Enron took this type of investment to an extreme in both the U.S. and in many foreign nations.  Many of Enron's investments in political favors appear to violate the FCPA, but the FCPA is so poorly enforced that it seldom prevents huge bribes and other types of investments in political intangibles.

    I provide you with several examples below.

    Two Examples of Enron's Lost Millions in Political Intangibles
    India and Mozambique:  Enron Invests in U.S. Government Threats to Cut Off  Foreign Aid

    SHAMELESS:
    1995'S 10 WORST
    CORPORATIONS


    by Russell Mokhiber and Andrew Wheat
    http://www.essential.org/monitor/hyper/mm1295.04.html 

     

    The module about Enron in 1995 reads as follows:

    Enron's Political Profit Pipeline

    In early 1995, the world's biggest natural gas company began clearing ground 100 miles south of Bombay, India for a $2.8 billion, gas-fired power plant -- the largest single foreign investment in India.

    Villagers claimed that the power plant was overpriced and that its effluent would destroy their fisheries and coconut and mango trees. One villager opposing Enron put it succinctly, "Why not remove them before they remove us?"

    As Pratap Chatterjee reported ["Enron Deal Blows a Fuse," Multinational Monitor, July/August 1995], hundreds of villagers stormed the site that was being prepared for Enron's 2,015-megawatt plant in May 1995, injuring numerous construction workers and three foreign advisers.

    After winning Maharashtra state elections, the conservative nationalistic Bharatiya Janata Party canceled the deal, sending shock waves through Western businesses with investments in India.

    Maharashtra officials said they acted to prevent the Houston, Texas-based company from making huge profits off "the backs of India's poor." New Delhi's Hindustan Times editorialized in June 1995, "It is time the West realized that India is not a banana republic which has to dance to the tune of multinationals."

    Enron officials are not so sure. Hoping to convert the cancellation into a temporary setback, the company launched an all-out campaign to get the deal back on track. In late November 1995, the campaign was showing signs of success, although progress was taking a toll on the handsome rate of return that Enron landed in the first deal. In India, Enron is now being scrutinized by the public, which is demanding contracts reflecting market rates. But it's a big world.

    In November 1995, the company announced that it has signed a $700 million deal to build a gas pipeline from Mozambique to South Africa. The pipeline will service Mozambique's Pande gas field, which will produce an estimated two trillion cubic feet of gas.

    The deal, in which Enron beat out South Africa's state petroleum company Sasol, sparked controversy in Africa following reports that the Clinton administration, including the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Embassy and even National Security adviser Anthony Lake, lobbied Mozambique on behalf of Enron.

    "There were outright threats to withhold development funds if we didn't sign, and sign soon," John Kachamila, Mozambique's natural resources minister, told the Houston Chronicle. Enron spokesperson Diane Bazelides declined to comment on the these allegations, but said that the U.S. government had been "helpful as it always is with American companies." Spokesperson Carol Hensley declined to respond to a hypothetical question about whether or not Enron would approve of U.S. government threats to cut off aid to a developing nation if the country did not sign an Enron deal.

    Enron has been repeatedly criticized for relying on political clout rather than low bids to win contracts. Political heavyweights that Enron has engaged on its behalf include former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, former U.S. Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher and retired General Thomas Kelly, U.S. chief of operations in the 1990 Gulf War. Enron's Board includes former Commodities Futures Trading Commission Chair Wendy Gramm (wife of presidential hopeful Senator Phil Gramm, R-Texas), former U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary Charles Walker and John Wakeham, leader of the House of Lords and former U.K. Energy Secretary.

     

    United States Deregulation of Energy That Needed a Change in the Law:  Enron's Investment in Wendy Gramm

    Forwarded by Dick Haar on February 11, 2002

    Senator Joseph Leiberman 
    706 Hart Senate Office Building 
    Washington, D.C. 20510

    RE: Enron Investigation

    Dear Senator Leiberman,

    I watched your Sunday morning appearance on Face the Nation with intense interest. Inasmuch as I own a fair amount of Enron stock in my SEP/IRA, I'm sure you can understand my curiosity relative to your investigation.

    Knowing you to be an honorable man, I feel secure that you will diligently pursue the below listed matters in an effort to determine what part, if any, these matters contributed to the collapse of Enron.

    1. Government records reveal the awarding of seats to Enron executives and Ken Lay on four Energy Department trade missions and seven Commerce Department trade trips during the Clinton administration's eight years.

    a. From January 13, 1995 through June 1996, Clinton Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and White House Counsel Mack McLarty assisted Ken Lay in closing a $3 billion dollar power plant deal with India. Four days before India gave final approval to the deal, Enron gave $100,000 to the DNC. Any quid pro quo?

    b. Clinton National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, threatened to withhold aid to Mozambique if it didn't approve an Enron pipeline project. Subsequent to Mr. Lake's threats, Mozambique approved the project, which resulted in a further $770 million dollar electric power contract with Enron. Perhaps, if NSA Advisor Lake had not been so busy strong-arming for Enron, he might have been focused on something obliquely related to national security like, say, Mr. Bin Laden? Could it be that a different, somewhat related, investigation is warranted?

    c. In 1999, Clinton Energy Secretary Bill Richardson traveled to Nigeria and helped arrange a joint, varied, energy development program which resulted in $882 million in power contracts for Enron from Nigeria. Perhaps if Energy Scretary Richardson had been more focused on domestic energy, we might have avoided:

    i. The severe loss of nuclear secrets to China and concurrently ii. developed more domestic sources of energy.

    d. Subsequent to leaving Clinton White House employ, Enron hired Mack McLarty (White House Counsel), Betsy Moler (Deputy Energy Secretary) and Linda Robertson (Treasury Official). Even a person without a high school diploma (no disrespect to airline security screeners) can see that this looks like Enron paying off political favors with fat-cat corporate jobs, at the expense of stockholders and Enron pension employees.

    e. Democratic Mayor Lee P. Brown of Houston (Enron headquarter city), received $250,000 just before Enron filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Isn't that an awful lot of money to throw away right before bankruptcy?

    The Democratic National Committee was the recipient of hundreds of thousands of dollars from 1990 through 2000. The above matters appear to be very troubling and look like, smack of, reek of, political favors for campaign payoffs. I know you will find out.

    2. Recently, former Clinton Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin called a top U. S. Treasury official, asking on Enron's behalf, for government help with credit agencies. As you well know, Rubin is the chairman of executive committee at Citigroup, which just coincidentally, is Enron's largest unsecured creditor at an estimated $3 billion dollars.

    3. As you well know, Mr. Leiberman, Citigroup is Senator Tom Daschle's largest contributor ($50,000) in addition to being your single largest contributor ($112,546). This fact brings to mind some disturbing questions I feel you must answer.

    a. Have you, any member of your staff, any Senate or House colleagues, any relatives or any friends of yours, been asked by Citigroup to intercede on their behalf, in an effort to recover part or all of Citigroup's $3 billion, at the expense of Enron's shareholders, employees and or Enron pensioners?

    b. Did your largest contributor, Citigroup, have anything to do with the collapse of Enron?

    c. Enron has tens of thousands of employees, stockholders and pensioners who have lost their life savings. How will you answer their most obvious question? Do you represent Citigroup, your largest contributor, or do you represent the Enron employees, et al, who stand to lose if Citigroup recovers any of its $3 billion?

    During Sunday's Face the Nation, both you and Senator McCain praised Attorney General Ashcroft for recusing himself from the Justice Department investigation because he had once received a contribution from Enron. I know in my heart, that, being the honest gentleman you are, you will now recuse yourself because of the glaring conflict of interest described above. I also know that you will pass this letter to your successor for his or her attention.

    Very truly yours,

    Robert Theodore Knalur


    Also see:  "Where Was Enron Getting a Return for Its Political Bribes?" at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#bribes 

    The extent to which Enron's investments and alleged investments in current and future political favors actually resulted in political favors will never be known.  Clearly, Enron invested in some enormous projects such as the $3 billion power plant in India knowing full well that the investment would be a total loss without Indian taxpayer subsidies.  Industry in India just could not pay the forward contract gas rates needed to run the plant.  

    Enron executives intended that purchased political influence would make it one of the largest and most profitable companies in the world.  In the case of India, the power plant became a total loss, because the tragedy of the September 11 terror made the U.S. dependent upon India in its war against the Taliban.  Even if the White House leaders had been inclined to muscle the Indian government to subsidize power generated from the new Enron plant in India, the September 11 tragedy destroyed  Enron's investment in political intangibles and its hopes to fire up its $3 billion gas-fired power plant in India.  The White House had greater immediate need for India's full support in the war against the Taliban.

    The point here is not whether Enron money spent for political favors did or did not actually result in favors.  The point is that to the extent that any company or wealthy employees invest heavily for future political favors, they have invested in an intangible asset and have taken on the intangible risk of loss of reputation and money if some of these investments become discovered and publicized in the media.  In fact, discovery and disclosure will set government officials scurrying to avoid being linked to political payoffs.

    Enron is a prime example of a major corporation focused almost entirely upon turning political favors into revenues, especially in the areas of energy trading and foreign power plant construction.  As such, these investments are extremely high risk.  

    It is doubtful that political intangibles will ever be disclosed or accounted for except in the case of bankruptcy or other media frenzies like the Enron media frenzies.  

    Question:
    Accountants and auditors face an enormous task of disclosing and accounting for political intangibles.

    Answer:
    Because disclosures and accounting of political intangibles will likely destroy their value.  Generally, accounting for assets does not destroy those assets.  This is not the case for many types of political intangibles that cost millions upon millions of dollars in corporations.


    August 28, 2002 reply from Craig Polhemus [Joedpo@AOL.COM

    -----Original Message----- 
    From: Craig Polhemus [mailto:Joedpo@AOL.COM]  
    Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2002 1:55 AM 
    To: AECM@LISTSERV.LOYOLA.EDU  
    Subject: Re: An Accounting Paradox: When will accounting for an asset destroy the asset?

    Bob Jensen writes:

    <<Question: Accountants and auditors face an enormous task of disclosing and accounting for political intangibles.

    Answer: Because disclosures and accounting of political intangibles will likely destroy their value. Generally, accounting for assets does not destroy those assets. This is not the case for many types of political intangibles that cost millions upon millions of dollars in corporations.>>

    Interesting. There are many instances where the reverse is true -- the marketing value to a lobbying firm of having made large contributions to the winning candidates (of whatever party) is greatest where it is well known. This applies regardless whether the contributions came from individual partners or (at least in those states where it's legal for state and local elections) from the firm itself.

    Even on a local level, if you're in a jurisdiction where judges are elected, would you prefer to go to a lawyer who contributed to the successful judge or to one who did not? I have a friend who asks this question directly whenever he's seeking local counsel. And if you're that lawyer, do you want that contribution to be secret or as public as possible? Maybe even exaggerated?

    Dita Beard is a classic example -- her initial "puffery" [whether truthful, partially truthful, or entirely false] about getting the IT&T antitrust case dropped based on a pledge of IT&T funding to support moving the 1972 Republican National Convention to Miami was a marketing aid to her ONLY if she let it be known, at least to her clients and potential clients.

    Similarly, Ed Rollins writes of a foreign "contributor" who apparently passed a million in cash to a middleman and thought it made it to the Reagan re-election campaign. Rollins believes the middleman (an unnamed Washington lawyer, by the way) held on to it all but the "contributor" felt he'd purchased access, and certainly the middleman benefited not just financially but also from the contributor's belief that the middleman had provided direct access to the campaign and hence the Administration.

    I express no opinion on how such things should be recorded in financial statements -- I'm just pointing out that publicity about large political contributions to successful candidates (whether within or exceeding legal limits) can be positive for some businesses, such as lobbying firms.

    Craig [Craig Polhemus, 
    Association Vitality International]


    August 28, 2002 reply from Bob Jensen

    Great to hear from you Craig.

    I agree that sometimes the accounting and/or media disclosure of investments in political favors may increase the value of those investments. Or it may have a neutral effect in some industries like agribusiness and oil where the public has come to expect that members of Congress and/or the Senate are heavily dependent upon those industries for election to office and maintenance of their power.

    On the other hand, it is unlikely that accounting and media disclosure of the Enron investments in political favors, including the favors of linking foreign aid payments to Enron's business deals, would have either a positive or neutral impact upon the expected value of those political favors to Enron.

    It is most certain that accounting and media disclosure political investments that are likely to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act would deal a severe blow to the value of those intangible assets.

    Thanks,

    Bob Jensen


    August 28 reply from mark-eckman@att.net 

    I think companies have invested a great deal in political intangibles outside the arena of government. Consider the current discussions on the importance of expensing stock option expensing as an example. Views are strong and vary widely on the issue but clearly, these positions exist only to gain visibility and increase political pressure.

    On the side that believes CPA stands for 'can't prove anything' we find the speech to the Stanford Director's College on June 3, 2002 by T. J. Rodgers, CEO of Cypress. Mr. Rodgers refers to expensing options as "...the next mistake..." and refers to "...accounting theology vs. business reality...." He opposes the Levin- McCain proposal and recounts the story you have on your website of the 1994 political storm in Silicon Valley when the FASB proposed expensing options. He believes that the free market will eliminate any abuse of option accounting. Contrast that with the opposition represented in the July 24, 2002 letter to CEOs from John Biggs at TIAA-CREF. Mr. Biggs also derides the profession by labeling APB 25 as an "...archaic method..." and that its use has the effect of “…eroding the quality of earnings…” by encouraging “…the use of one form of compensation.” Mr. Biggs completes his letter by equating option expensing to management credibility. Both of these men have made political investments with their comments, drawing lines in the sand. While the remarks were not made directly to any political body, and there is no tangible cost involved, this is still political pressure. It is also interesting both men focus on the accounting profession as the root cause rather than the value of the political intangibles that exist only in market capitalization.

    Consider how companies build political intangibles with analysts, institutional shareholders and others. ADP had an extended string of increased quarterly earnings – over 100 consecutive quarters. The PE multiple for the stock has been high for some time, due in no small part to the consistency of this trend. ADP management reminded shareholders with every quarter how long they had provided shareholders with higher earnings. When that streak recently ended, the stock dropped like a stone. Closing price moved down from $41.35 on July 17, 2002 to $31.60 the next day. The volume associated with that change was almost nine times the July 16 trading volume. How would anyone explain this event other than a reversal of political intangibles that did not exist on the financial statements?

    Power and politics are always with us. We just have to be smart enough to know which is for show and which is for $$$. (By the way, if you have a way to tell them apart, let me know.)


    August 28 reply from E. Scribner [escribne@NMSU.EDU

    Hi, Bob and Craig! 
    You've discovered an accounting application of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, which originated with the notion that to "see" an electron's position we have to "illuminate" it, which causes it to shift its position so it's not "there" any more. To quote from the American Insitutute of Physics ( http://www.aip.org/history/heisenberg/p08b.htm ), "At the moment the light is diffracted by the electron into the microscope lens, the electron is thrust to the right."

    When we "illuminate" political intangibles by disclosing them, they are not "there" any more.

    Ed Scribner 
    New Mexico State University
     Las Cruces, NM, USA ---
    --

    August 28, 2002 Reply from Bob Jensen
    Heisenberg's Theory Song
    "My get up and go got up an went." http://www.eakles.com/get_up_go.html  

     August 28, 2002 reply from Richard C. Sansing [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU

    There is an extensive literature on the economics of information. The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information by Jack Hirshleifer and John Riley is a good survey. Chapters 6 (The economics of emergent public information) and 7 (Research and invention) address the issues of the value of private information and the effects of disclosure on its value.

    Heisenberg's uncertainty principle both "originated" and (for practical purposes) terminated with the behavior of electrons and other sub-atomic particles. It applies to the joint indeterminacy of the position and momentum of electrons. It is only significant at the atomic level because Planck's constant is so small.

    Richard C. Sansing 
    Associate Professor of Business Administration 
    Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth 
    email: Richard.C.Sansing@dartmouth.edu 

     

     


    Accounting for Options to Buy Real Estate

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on July 14, 2006

    TITLE: Land-Value Erosion Seen As a Problem for Builders
    REPORTER: by Michael Corkery and Ian McDonald
    DATE: Jul 06, 2006
    PAGE: C1
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115214204821498941.html 
    TOPICS: Accounting, Advanced Financial Accounting, Impairment, Investments

    SUMMARY: "Land values are becoming a flash point for investors and analysts who watch the builders sector. Bears say the companies' land might not be worth what they paid for it, which could lead to painful write-downs. If they are right, it will be a blow to the already battered sector." Questions relate to the classification of land on building companies' balance sheets and the treatment of the write-down of the value of land.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) As an example of the type of building company discussed in this article, view the quarterly financial statements for Toll Brothers in their 10-Q filing with the SEC dated July 6, 2006. You may go directly through the following link or may access through the WSJ article on-line by clicking on Toll Brothers on the right-hand side of the page then SEC filings. http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/794170/000112528206003278/p413541-10q.htm  In what account does Toll Brothers classify Land on its balance sheet? Why is the Land classified this way?

    2.) Refer again to the Toll Brothers financial statements. By how much did Toll Brothers write down the values of land during the 6-month and 3-month periods ended on April 30, 2006 and 2005? Describe in words, the pattern of write-downs that you observe and compare it to the discussion given in the article.

    3.) How will adjustments to reflect decline in land values affect reported income and balance sheets of companies such as Toll Brothers, which hold land as inventory and a major component of their operations? How might these adjustments affect the company's stock price? Refer to information in the article in providing your answer.

    4.) Compare and contrast the accounting for land and recent decline in the market value of land described in question 2 above, to accounting by a company, such as a manufacturer or service entity, which owns land only in the location of its principal place of business (that is, as part of property, plant, and equipment).

    5.) Explain why the accounting differs under the two answers given to questions 2 and 3 above.

    6.) What are options? What type of option contracts do builders enter into? How much has Toll Brothers paid to enter into such contracts?

    7.) What is the book value of net assets? How is that measure used by analysts of companies in the building industry? How might the recent decline in land values affect the usefulness of book value for analyzing financial statements?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    "Land-Value Erosion Seen As a Problem for Builders," by Michael Corkery and Ian McDonald, The Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2006; Page C1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115214204821498941.html

    Already reeling from slowing housing sales and worries about the economy, shares of home builders face another issue: the value of the land on their books.

    Land values are becoming a flash point for investors and analysts who watch the builders sector. Bears say the companies' land might not be worth what they paid for it, which could lead to painful write-downs.

    If they are right, it will be a blow to the already battered sector. After a 28% average fall so far this year, many stocks of home builders trade close to -- or even at -- their "book value,'' which makes them tantalizing to bargain hunters. Book value is a company's assets minus its liabilities and is often seen as a rough approximation of how a business would be valued if liquidated.

    But if some land on builders' books is overvalued, their shares might also be overvalued.

    "People are looking at book value as a possible floor for the stock prices. The question is 'should that be a floor?' There could be some risk to that book value from land recently acquired or put under option contract," says Banc of America Securities analyst Daniel Oppenheim, whose firm does business with several builders.

    The debate is lively because the true extent of the land risk is tough to quantify. Many builders use options, where they put a deposit on a parcel to be purchased at a later date. Builders say options minimize their losses because they let them walk away from overpriced land, sacrificing typically no more than a 5% to 10% deposit.

    So far, the damage has been limited. In its last quarter, Centex Corp., a large builder based in Dallas, reduced its earnings by 14 cents a share in connection with walking away from option deposits and pre-acquisition costs in Washington, D.C., Sacramento, Calif., and San Diego. Last month, Hovnanian Enterprises Inc., based in Red Bank, N.J., said it plans to take $5 million in write-offs on land deposits, a small percentage of its total, and luxury home builder Toll Brothers Inc. in suburban Philadelphia wrote down roughly $12 million, mainly from land that it owned in the sluggish Detroit market. Builders say they often adjust their land values to the market, even in boom times, but some analysts expect charges to increase.

    Write-downs are "starting to happen,'' says Credit Suisse analyst Ivy Zelman, a longtime bear on the sector whose firm does business with several builders. "I don't think you can define what [the scope] is today and capture the risk."

    Parcels are valued at their purchase price on companies' books, so there isn't any way of determining the land's true market value until they sell houses on it. Older purchases are likely worth far more than their listed value on balance sheets, but newer land buys are probably worth less. Many builders say land prices are still fairly static, but Jeff Barcy, chief executive of Hearthstone, a large land investor based in San Rafael, Calif., says prices are declining in certain markets.

    "We expect the softening to continue for a while," Mr. Barcy says. "In the hottest markets you could see a 20% to 30% price decline."

    Ms. Zelman estimates that many companies are building houses on land that they bought or optioned a few years ago when land was less expensive. But some analysts say many companies purchased large amounts of land in 2005, at the height of the boom, and that could come back to hurt them if the housing market doesn't improve in a year or so.

    Some think these worries are overblown and creating an opportunity. Bulls acknowledge there may be scattered write-downs, but say undervalued land on company books likely outweighs any overpriced recent buys. They add that the sector's worries, from property values to job growth, are reflected in the stocks' prices. And they say home prices have to drop significantly to sink land values. Fans of the builder stocks also point to a flurry of recent share repurchases, indicating that insiders believe the stocks are cheap. NVR Inc., for example, has reduced its shares outstanding by more than 20% over the past five years, according to researcher CapitalIQ.

    Shares of the nation's five biggest home builders trade at about 1.3 times the their book value, compared with two times book on average over the past five years, according to Chicago researcher Morningstar Inc. The average U.S. stock trades at more than four times its book value.

    Pulte Homes Inc. and Beazer Homes USA Inc. trade at about 1.2 times book, while shares of M.D.C. Holdings Inc. trade at 1.1 times and shares of Standard Pacific Corp. trade at about book value.

    Home builders always have had a hard time getting respect on Wall Street, where investors often take a short-term view of the sector's performance potential. "The adage has been 'buy them at book value and sell when they get to two times book value,'" says Arthur Oduma, a senior stock analyst who covers the home builders at Morningstar. "So, that would tell you it's time to buy."

    And some are doing so. Henry Ramallo, a portfolio manager at Neuberger Berman, a Lehman Brothers company, with $116 billion under management, says he likes Toll Brothers because it takes the company about five years, on average, to develop land from the time the builder puts it under option. By the time Toll is ready to build on the land it optioned or bought in the past year, the housing market should have improved, Mr. Ramallo says. His firm has recently bought shares of Toll, which is trading at about 1.3 times book value.


     

     

     

    The Controversy over Accounting for Securitizations and Loan Guarantees

    Accounting for Loan Guarantees

    FASB Issues Accounting Guidance to Improve Disclosure Requirements for Guarantees --- http://www.fasb.org/news/nr112502.shtml 

    Accounting and Auditing Policy Committee Credit Reform Task Force --- http://www.fasab.gov/aapc/cdreform/98CR01Recpts.pdf 

    The new FAS 146 Interpretation 46 deals with loan guarantees of Variable Interest (Special Purpose) Entities --- at: http://www.fasb.org/interp46.pdf.


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on November 15, 2002

    TITLE: H&R Block's Mortgage-Lending Business Could Be Taxing 
    REPORTER: Joseph T. Hallinan 
    DATE: Nov 12, 2002 
    PAGE: C1 
    LINK:  http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB103706997739674188.djm,00.html 
    TOPICS: Accounting, Bad Debts, Cash Flow, Debt, Loan Loss Allowance, Securitization, Valuations

    SUMMARY: H&R Block's pretax income from mortgage operations grew by 146% during the fiscal year ending April 30, 2002. However, the accounting treatment for the securitization of these mortgages is being questioned.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) Describe the accounting treatment used by H&R Block for the sale of mortgages. Why is this accounting treatment controversial?

    2.) What alternative accounting methods are available to record H&R Block's sale of mortgages? Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each accounting treatment. Which accounting method is most conservative?

    3.) Why do companies, such as H&R Block, sell mortgages? Why does H&R Block retain the risks of non-payment? How could the sale be structured to transfer the risks of non-payment to the purchaser of the mortgages? How would this change the selling price of the mortgages? Support your answer.

    4.) How do economic conditions change the expected losses that will result from non-payment? How does the credit worthiness of borrowers change the expected losses that will result from non-payment? Support your answers.

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University


    "H&R Block Faces Issues With Mortgage Business," by Joseph T. Hallinan, The Wall Street Journal,  November 12, 2002, Page C1 ---- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB103706997739674188.djm,00.html

    Famous for its tax-preparation service, H&R Block Inc. last year prepared 16.9 million individual income-tax returns, or about 14% of all individual returns filed with the Internal Revenue Service.

    But the fastest-growing money maker for the Kansas City, Mo., company these days is its mortgage business, which last year originated nearly $11.5 billion in loans. The business, which caters to poor credit risks, has been growing much faster than its U.S. tax business. In the fiscal year ended April 30, Block's pretax income from mortgage operations grew 146% over the year before. The tax business, while still the largest in the U.S., grew just 23%.

    If those rates remain unchanged, the mortgage business will this year for the first time provide most of Block's pretax income. In the most-recent fiscal year, mortgage operations accounted for 47.3% of Block's pretax income.

    As Block's mortgage business has soared, so has its stock price, topping $53 a share earlier this year from less than $15 two years ago, though it has dropped in recent months as investors have fretted about the cost of lawsuits in federal court in Chicago and state court in Texas on behalf of tax clients who received refund-anticipation loans. But now, some investors and analysts are raising questions about the foundation beneath Block's mortgage earnings. "The game is up if interest rates rise and shut off the refinancing boom," says Avalon Research Group Inc., of Boca Raton, Fla., which has a "sell" rating on Block's shares.

    On Monday, the shares were up $1.53, or 4.8%, to $33.63 in 4 p.m. New York Stock Exchange composite trading -- a partial snapback from a $3.25, or 11%, drop on Friday in reaction to the litigation in Texas over fees H&R Block collected from customers in that state.

    The company dismisses concerns about its mortgage results. "We think it's a great time for our business right now," says Robert Dubrish, president and CEO of Block's mortgage unit, Option One Mortgage Corp.

    Much of Block's mortgage growth has come because the company uses a fairly common but controversial accounting treatment that allows it to accelerate revenue, and thus income. This treatment, known as gain-on-sale accounting, has come back to haunt other lenders, including Conseco Inc. and AmeriCredit Corp. At Block, gains from sales of mortgage loans accounted for 62% of revenue at the mortgage unit last year.

    In essence, under gain-on-sale accounting, lenders post upfront the estimated profit from a securitization transaction, which is the sale to investors of a pool of loans. Specifically, the company selling the loans records profit for the excess of the sales price and the present value of the estimated interest income that is expected to be received on the loans above the amounts funded on the loans and the present value of the interest agreed to be paid to the buyers of the loan-backed securities.

    But if the expected income stream is cut short -- say, because more borrowers refinance their loans than expected when the profit was calculated -- the company essentially has to reverse some of the gain, taking a charge.

    That is what happened at Conseco. The Carmel, Ind., mobile-home lender was forced to take a $350 million charge in 1998 after many of its loans were paid off early. It stopped using gain-on-sale accounting the following year, saying that the "clear preference" of investors was traditional loan accounting. AmeriCredit in Fort Worth, Texas, which lends money to car buyers with poor credit histories, abandoned the practice in September in the midst of a meltdown of its stock price.

    But Block says it faces nowhere near the downside faced by AmeriCredit and Conseco, which it says had different business models. Big Block holders seem to agree. "Block doesn't have anywhere near the scale of exposure [to gain on sale] that the other companies had," says Henry Berghoef, co-manager of the Oakmark Select mutual fund, which owns 7.7 million, or about 4.3%, of Block's shares.

    Another potential problem for Block is the way it treats what is left after it sells its loans. The bits and pieces that it keeps are known as residual interests. Block securitizes most of these residual interests, allowing it to accelerate a significant portion of the cash flow it expects to receive rather than taking it over the life of the underlying loans. The fair value of these interests is calculated by Block considering a number of factors, such as expected losses on its loans. If Block guesses wrong, it could be forced to take a charge down the road.

    Block says its assumptions underlying the valuation of these interests are appropriately conservative. It estimates lifetime losses on its loan pools at roughly 5%, which it says is one percentage point higher than the 4% turned in by its worst-performing pool of loans. (Comparable industry figures aren't available.) So Block says the odds of a write-up are much greater than those of a write-down and would, in a worst-case scenario that it terms "remote," probably not exceed $500 million. Block's net income for the fiscal year ended April 30 was $434.4 million, or $2.31 a share, on revenue of $3.32 billion.

    Block spokeswoman Linda McDougall says gain-on-sale provides an "insignificant" part of the company's revenue. She notes that Option One, Block's mortgage unit, recently increased the value of its residual interest by $57 million. She also says that the company's underwriting standards are typical of lenders who deal with borrowers lacking pristine credit histories.

    Bears contend that Block has limited experience in the mortgage business. It bought Option One in 1997, and Option One in Irvine, Calif., has itself been in business only since 1993. So its track record doesn't extend to the last recession of 1990 to 1991.

    On top of that, Block lends to some of the least creditworthy people, known in the trade as "subprime" borrowers. There is no commonly accepted definition of what constitutes a subprime borrower. One shorthand measure is available from credit-reports firm Fair, Isaac & Co. It produces so-called FICO scores that range from 300 to 850, with 850 being perfect. Anything less than 660 is usually considered subprime. Securities and Exchange Commission documents filed by Block's mortgage unit show its borrowers typically score around 600. Moreover, according to the filings, hundreds of recent Block customers, representing about 4% of borrowers, have FICO scores of 500 or less, or no score at all. A score below 500 would place an applicant among the bottom 5% of all U.S. consumers scored by Fair Isaac.

    Mr. Dubrish says Block stopped lending to people with FICO scores below 500 some two years ago and says he is puzzled as to why those with scores below 500 still appear in the company's loan pools.

    Block says its loans typically don't meet the credit standards set by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, which are the lending industry's norms. Block's customers may qualify for loans even if they have experienced a bankruptcy in the previous 12 months, according to underwriting guidelines it lists in the SEC documents.

    In many cases, according to Block's SEC filings, an applicant's income isn't verified but is instead taken as stated on the loan application. In other cases, an applicant with a poor credit rating may receive an upgraded rating, depending on factors including "pride of ownership." Most Block mortgages are for single-family detached homes, but Block also makes mobile-home loans, according to the filings.

    "We are doing a lot to help people own houses who wouldn't have the chance to do it otherwise," Mr. Dubrish says. "We think we're doing something that's good for the economy and good for our borrowers."

    A key figure in the mortgage business is the ratio of loan size to value of the property being mortgaged. Loans with LTV rates above 80% are thought to present a greater risk of loss. The LTV on many of Block's mortgages is just under 80%, according to the SEC filings. The value of these properties can be important if Block is forced to foreclose on the loans and resell the properties. Nationwide, roughly 4.17% of subprime mortgage loans are in foreclosure, according to LoanPerformance, a research firm in San Francisco. As of June 30, only 3.52% of Block's loans, on a dollar basis, were in foreclosure, even though its foreclosure ratio more than tripled between Dec. 31, 1999, and June 30.


    The Controversy Over Pro Forma Reporting and HFV

    Majority of Companies Produce Unreliable Financial Forecast, Potentially Hurting Share Prices

    The KPMG study of 544 global executives found that 78 percent of the companies surveyed reported forecasting errors of more than 5 percent. Although other factors are undoubtedly at play, companies with unreliable and inaccurate forecasting had a six percent drop on average in share price over the past three years, according to the survey findings. Similarly, the survey also found that companies that kept forecast fluctuations below the five percent mark realized a 46 percent rise in share price over the same three-year period, compared to a 34 percent increase among the companies that had more than a five percent margin of error in their forecasts.
    SmartPros, December 14, 2007 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x60077.xml


    Up Up and Away in My Beautiful Pro Forma

    "Creative Accounting Leads to Fuzzy Earns," SmartPros, December 27, 2005 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x51147.xml

    Dec. 27, 2005 (Associated Press) — If it weren't for some pesky accounting rules, telecom-equipment company Ciena Corp. would have lost a mere 2 cents a share in the fourth quarter. With those accounting rules, it lost 44 cents a share.

    The disparity is "the GAAP Gap" - the difference between "pro forma" earnings and earnings prepared according to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, or GAAP.

    GAAP is the nation's accounting standard. Pro forma earnings, by contrast, are governed by no fixed standard. Companies can toss out one-time charges, options expenses, goodwill write-downs - anything that looks bad. One-time windfalls, however, usually manage to stay in.

    Merrill Lynch's U.S. Strategist Richard Bernstein did the math on 1,600 stocks and found total earnings for their third calendar quarter grew 22 percent on a GAAP basis, but 31 percent on a pro forma basis.

    The gap was greater when the companies were subdivided by Standard & Poor's quality rankings. S&P grades stocks on their annual sales and dividend growth and actual earnings over a 10-year period. A company with very stable growth would rank "A+," while a company in bankruptcy would be a "D."

    "Lower quality companies are dramatically overstating their growth rates by using pro forma earnings," Bernstein wrote in a December 19 research report.

    Companies with a B- ranking have a GAAP growth rate of 1 percent, but a pro forma growth rate of 38 percent, according to Bernstein. B+ companies are more than doubling their growth rate: GAAP growth is 13 percent, but pro forma growth is 27 percent.

    Part of the problem, according to Bernstein, is that most post-bubble regulations focus on the quality of formal financial reporting, but "there appears to be no regulation" covering earnings conference calls and press releases.

    "Although the newer regulation is laudable, stocks trade on press releases and conference calls, and not on the formal financial statements that are released weeks after the announcement and call," he wrote. "We think regulation regarding company press releases and conference calls is sorely needed because of the significant deterioration in the quality of announced earnings."

    He calls for an end to pro forma earnings, saying they have made U.S. corporate earnings perhaps the most opaque they've been in his 23 years in the business.

    Continued in article

     


    Compilation and Review Standards Change
    As opposed to a formal audit, many accountants perform compilation and review services to generate unaudited financial statements for a client.  There is a new standard for these two services.

    According to SSARS, compilations and reviews are restricted to historical financial statements, even though clients often ask their accountants to provide financial statement elements and pro forma financial information. Michael Glynn, technical manager at the AICPA, reports on newly adopted standards allowing accountants to report on those financial statement elements or pro forma financial information under SSARS.
    "Compilations & Reviews New Standards," SmartPros, October 2005 --- http://education.smartpros.com/main1/extcoursedetail.asp?PartnerRed=accountingnet&CatalogNumber=APP515

     

    GAAP vs. Non-GAAP Earnings
    "Investors Applaud Oracle’s Non-GAAP Earnings," AccountingWeb, July 1. 2005 ---
    http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=101064

    SOX Regulation G, which went into effect in March 2003, defines non-GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) financial measures and creates disclosure standards for them. According to Strategic Finance magazine, the guidelines for non-GAAP financial measures stipulate that they may not:

    “The rapid integration of PeopleSoft into our business contributed to the strong growth in both applications sales and profits that we saw in the quarter,” Oracle President Safra Catz said in a written statement. “The combination of increased organic growth plus a carefully targeted acquisition strategy have pushed Oracle’s revenue and profits to record levels.”


    "Little Bitty Cisco," by Jesse Eisinger, The Wall Street Journal, November 6, 2003 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB106806983279057200,00.html?mod=technology%255Ffeatured%255Fstories%255Fhs 

    The way Wall Street eyes these things, including the liberal use of the words "pro forma," Cisco had an impressive fiscal first quarter.

    Revenue came in better than expected and grew 5.3% compared with a year ago, topping expectations of a flat top-line thanks in part to spending from the federal government (see article). How impressive is this? Well, the country's economy grew at 7.2%, and business spending on equipment and software rose 15%. Microsoft had revenue growth of 6%, IBM 8.6%, and Dell is estimated to come in at 15% growth. So Cisco Systems, one of the big tech dogs, looks like the runt of that particular litter. Is networking a growth industry anymore, or is it doomed to be troubled by overcapacity and a lack of business demand? The next few quarters are crucial.

    Earnings per share -- that is, pro forma earnings per share -- easily surpassed estimates, logging in at 17 cents a share, compared with the expectation of 15 cents a share and last year's 14 cents.

    The company's shareholder equity fell in the quarter to $27.4 billion from $28 billion a year ago. Cash flow from operations fell to $973 million from $1.1 billion a year earlier. Cash on hand and investments fell from $20.7 billion to $19.7 billion, which is still mountainous but lower year-over-year, nevertheless.

    Then there is the gross-margin story. Cisco has had Himalayan gross margins throughout the slowdown, because it was able to squeeze suppliers and find efficiencies. But now that revenue is finally increasing, gross margins fell. Product gross margins came in at 69%, down from 71% in the fourth quarter. Cisco is selling less profitable products, including some from its recent acquisition of Linksys. It also has outsourced much of its production. How much operating leverage does Cisco now have? That is the reason it sports its high valuation, after all.

    Then there is the outlook. Deferred revenue and backlog were down. Cisco's book-to-bill ratio, a measure that reflects order momentum, was below one. When book-to-bill is below one, orders are lower than billings, suggesting a slowdown, not acceleration. True, Cisco put out a forecast for modestly higher revenue for the second quarter compared with the first. But some questions should linger.


    Question:  How does former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling define HFV?
    Home Video Uncovered by the Houston Chronicle, December 19, 2002
    Skits for Enron ex-executive funny then, but full of irony now --- http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/metropolitan/1703624 
    (The above link includes a "See it Now" link to download the video itself which played well for me.)

    The tape, made for the January 1997 going-away party for former Enron President Rich Kinder, features nearly 30 minutes of absurd skits, songs and testimonials by company executives and prominent Houstonians. The collection is all meant in good fun, but some of the comments are ironic in the current climate of corporate scandal.

    In one skit, former administrative executive Peggy Menchaca plays the part of Kinder as he receives a budget report from then-President Jeff Skilling, who plays himself, and financial planning executive Tod Lindholm. When the pretend Kinder expresses doubt that Skilling can pull off 600 percent revenue growth for the coming year, Skilling reveals how it will be done.

    "We're going to move from mark-to-market accounting to something I call HFV, or hypothetical future value accounting," Skilling jokes as he reads from a script. "If we do that, we can add a kazillion dollars to the bottom line."

    Richard Causey, the former chief accounting officer who was embroiled in many of the business deals named in the indictments of other Enron executives, makes an unfortunate joke later on the tape.

    "I've been on the job for a week managing earnings, and it's easier than I thought it would be," Causey says, referring to a practice that is frowned upon by securities regulators. "I can't even count fast enough with the earnings rolling in."

    Texas' political elite also take part in the tribute, with then-Gov. George W. Bush pleading with Kinder: "Don't leave Texas. You're too good a man."

    Former President George Bush also offers a send-off to Kinder, thanking him for helping his son reach the Governor's Mansion.

    "You have been fantastic to the Bush family," he says. "I don't think anybody did more than you did to support George."


    "Bubble Redux," by Andrew Bary, Barron's, April 14, 2003, Page 17.

    Amazon's valuation is the most egregious of the 'Net trio.  It trades for 80 times projected "pro forma" 2003 profit of 32 cents a share.  Amazon's pro forma definition of profit, moreover, is dubious because it excludes re-structuring charges and, more important, the restricted stock that Amazon now is issuing to employees in lieu of stock options.  Amazon's reported profit this year under generally accepted accounting principles (which include restricted-stock costs) could be just 10 cents to 15 cents a share, meaning that Amazon's true P/E arguably is closer to 200.

    Yahoo, meanwhile, now commands 70 times estimated 2003 net of 35 cents a share, and eBay fetches 65 times projected 2003 net of $1.35 a share.

    What's fair value?  By our calculations, Amazon is worth, at best, roughly 90% of its projected 2003 revenue of $4.6 billion. That translates into $10 a share, or $4.1 billion.  This estimate is charitable because the country's two most successful brick-and-mortar retailers, Wal-Mart Stores and Home Depot, also trade for about 90% of 2003 sales.

    Yahoo ought to trade closer to 15.  That's a stiff 43 times projected 2003 earnings and gives the company credit for its strong balance sheet, featuring over $2 a share in cash and another $3 a share for its stake in Yahoo Japan, which has become that country's eBay.

    Sure, eBay undoubtedly is the most successful Internet company and the only one that has lived up to the growth projections made during the Bubble.  As the dominant online marketplace in the U.S. and Europe, eBay saw its earnings surge to 87 cents a share last year from three cents in 1998, when it went public at a split-adjusted $3.00 a share.

    Why would eBay be more fairly valued around 60, its price just several months ago?  At 60, eBay would trade at 44 times projected 2003 profit of $1.35 a share and 22 times an optimistic 2005 estimate of $2.75.  So confident are analysts about eBay's outlook that they're comfortable valuing the stock on a 2005 earnings estimate.

    Fans of eBay believe its profit can rise at a 35% annual clip in the next five years, a difficult rate for any company to maintain, even one, such as eBay, with a "scalable" business model that allows it to easily accommodate more transactions while maintaining its enviable gross margins of 80%.  If the company earns $5 a share in 2007--nearly six times last year's profit--it would still trade at 18 times that very optimistic profit level.

    Continued in the article.


    The New York Yankees today released their 4th Quarter 2001 pro forma results. Although generally accepted scorekeeping principles (GASP) indicate that the Yankees lost Games 1 and 2 of the 2001 World Series, their pro forma figures show that these reported losses were the result of nonrecurring items, specifically extraordinary pitching performances by Arizona Diamondbacks personnel Kurt Schilling and Randy Johnson. Games 3 and 4 results, already indicating Yankee wins, were not restated on a pro forma basis.
    Ed Scribner, New Mexico State

    Until recently, pro forma reporting was seen as a useful tool that could help companies show performance when unusual circumstances might cloud the picture. Today it finds itself in bad odour. 
    "Pro forma lingo Does the use of controversial non-GAAP reporting by some companies confuse or enlighten?," by Michael Lewis, CA Magazine, March 2002 --- http://www.cica.ca/cica/camagazine.nsf/e2002-mar/Features 

    For fans of JDS Uniphase Corp., the fibre-optics manufacturer with headquarters in Ottawa and San Jose, Calif., the report for fiscal 2001 provided the icing on a very delicious cake: following an uninterrupted series of positive quarterly earnings results, the corporate giant announced it was set to deliver US$67 million in pro forma profit.

    There was only one fly in the ointment. Like all such calculations, JDS's pro forma numbers were not prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), and as such they excluded goodwill, merger-related and stock-option charges, and losses on investments. Once those items were added back into the accounting mix, JDS suddenly showed a staggering US$50.6 billion in red ink - a US corporate record. Even so, many investors remained loyal, placing their trust in the boom-market philosophy that views onetime charges as largely irrelevant. The mantra was simple - operating results rule.

    "That was the view at the time," says Jim Hall, a Calgary portfolio manager with Mawer Canadian Equity Fund. "It just goes to show how wrong people can be."

    Since then, of course, the spectacular flameout of Houston's Enron Corp. has done much to change that point of view (though it's not a pro forma issue). Once the world's largest energy trader, the company now holds the title for the largest bankruptcy case in US history. The Chapter 11 filing in December came after Enron had to restate US$586 million in earnings because of apparent accounting irregularities. In its submission, the company admitted it had hidden assets and related debt charges since 1997 in order to inflate consolidated earnings. Enron's auditor, accounting firm Arthur Andersen LLP, later acknowledged that it had made "an [honest] error in judgement" regarding Enron's financial statements.

    While the Enron saga will continue in various courtrooms for many months to come, regulators on either side of the border have responded to the collapse with uncharacteristic swiftness. Both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States and the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) issued new guidelines on financial reporting just a few weeks after the Enron bust. In each instance, investors were reminded to redirect their focus to financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP, paying special attention to cash flow, liquidity and the intrinsic value of acquisitions. At the same time, issuers were warned to reduce their reliance on pro forma results and to explain to investors why they were not using GAAP in their reporting.

    SEC chairman Harvey Pitt moved furthest and fastest. In mid-January he announced plans to establish a private watchdog to discipline accountants and review company audits. Working with the largest accounting firms and professional organizations such as the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the SEC wants the new body to be able to punish accountants for incompetence and ethics violations. As Pitt emphasized, "The commission cannot, and in any event will not, tolerate this pattern of growing re-statements, audit failures, corporate failures and investor losses."

    The sheer scale of the Enron debacle has brought pro forma accounting under public scrutiny as never before, and, observers say, will provide a powerful impetus for financial reporting reform. "This will send a message to companies and accountants to cut back on some of the games they've been playing," says former SEC general counsel Harvey Goldschmid.

    Meanwhile, the CSA (the forum for the 13 securities regulators of Canada's provinces and territories) expressed its concern over the proliferation of non-standard measures, warning that they improve the appearance of a company's financial health, gloss over risks and make it exceedingly difficult for investors to compare issuers.

    "Investors should be cautious when looking at non-GAAP measures," says John Carchrae, chair of the CSA Chief Accountants Committee, when the guidelines were released in January. "These measures present only part of the picture and may selectively omit certain expenses, resulting in a more positive portrayal of a company's performance."

    As a result, Canadian issuers will now be expected to provide GAAP figures alongside non-standard earnings measures, explain how pro forma numbers are calculated, and detail why they exclude certain items required by GAAP. So far, the CSA has provided guidance rather than rules, but the committee cautions it could take regulatory action if issuers publish earnings reports deemed to be misleading to investors.

    Carchrae, who is also chief accountant of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), believes "moral suasion" is a good place to start. Nonetheless, he adds, the OSC intends to track press releases, cross-reference them to statutory earnings filings and supplemental information on websites, and monitor continuous disclosure to ensure a company meets its requirements under the securities act.

    Although pro forma reporting finds itself in bad odour, until recently it was regarded as a useful tool that could help companies show performance when unusual circumstances might cloud the picture. In cases involving a merger or acquisition, for example, where a company has made enormous expenditures that generate significant non-cash expenses on the income statement, pro forma can be used as a clarifying document, enabling investors to view economic performance outside of such onetime events. Over the years, however, the pro forma route has increasingly involved the selective use of press releases, websites, and other reports to put a favourable spin on earnings, often leading to a spike in the value of a firm's stock. Like management discussion and analysis, such communications are not within the ambit of GAAP, falling somewhere between the cracks of current accounting standards.

    "Obviously, this issue is of concern to everyone who uses financial statements," says Paul Cherry, chairman of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants' Accounting Standards Board. "Our worry as standard-setters is whether these non-GAAP, pro forma items confuse or enlighten."

    Regulators and standard-setters have agonized over this issue ever since the reporting lexicon began to expand with the rise of the dot-com sector in the late 1990s, a sector with little in the way of earnings that concentrated on revenue growth as a more meaningful performance indicator. New measures, such as "run-through rates" or "burn rates," were deemed welcome additions to traditional methodology because they helped determine how much financing a technology company might require during its risky startup phase.

    Critics, however, argued such terms were usurping easily understood language as part of a corporate scheme to hoodwink unwary investors. Important numbers were hidden or left out under a deluge of new and ever-more complex terminology. The new measurements, they warned, fell short of adequate financial disclosure.

    An OSC report published in February 2001 appears to support these claims. According to the report, Canadian technology companies have not provided investors with adequate information about how they disclose revenue, a shortcoming that may require some of them to restate their financial results.

    "Initial results of the review suggest a need for significant improvement in the nature and extent of disclosure," the report states, adding that the OSC wants more specific notes on accounting policy attached to financial statements. The report also observes that revenue is often recognized when goods are shipped, not when they are sold, despite the fact that the company may be exposed to returns.

    David Wright, a software analyst at BMO Nesbitt Burns in Toronto, says dealing with how technology companies record revenue is a perennial issue. The issue has gained greater prominence with the rise of vendor financing, a practice whereby companies act as a bank to buyers, lending customers the cash to complete purchase orders. If the customer is unable to pay for the goods or services subsequent to signing the sales agreement, the seller's revenue can be drastically overstated.

    But pro forma still has plenty of advocates - particularly when it comes to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). Such a measure, it is often argued, can provide a pure, meaningful and reliable diagnostic tool, albeit one that should be considered along with figures that accommodate charges to a balance sheet.

    Ron Blunn, head of investor relations firm Blunn & Co. Inc. in Toronto and chairperson of the issues committee of the Canadian Investor Relations Institute, says adjusted earnings can serve a legitimate purpose and are particularly helpful to analysts and money managers who must gauge the financial well-being of technology startups.

    The debate shows no signs of burning out anytime soon. On the one hand, the philosophy among Canadian and US standard-setters in recent years has appeared to favour removing constraints, rather than imposing them. New rules to apply to Canadian banks this year, for example, will no longer require the amortization of goodwill in earnings figures. On the other hand, it has become abundantly clear that companies will emphasize the reporting method that puts the best gloss on their operations. And while the use of pro forma accounting has remained most prevalent among technology companies, the movement to embrace more and varied language has spread to "old economy" companies such as Enron, gaining steam as the economy stumbled. Blunn theorizes the proliferation of nontraditional reporting and the increasing reliance on supplemental filings simply reflect the state of the North American economy.

    Carchrae has a slightly different diagnosis. When asked why pro forma reporting has mushroomed in recent years, he points to investors' slavish devotion to business box scores - that is, a company's ability to meet sales and earnings expectations as set out by equity analysts. Since companies can be severely punished for falling short of the Street's consensus forecast, there is intense pressure, especially in a bear market, to conjure up earnings that appear to satisfy forecasts.

    As a result, pro forma terminology has blossomed over the Canadian corporate landscape. Montreal-based telephone utility BCE Inc., for example, coined the term "cash baseline earnings" to describe its operating performance. Not to be outdone, Robert McFarlane, chief financial officer of Telus Corp., Canada's second-largest telecommunications company, cited a "revenue revision" and "EBITDA deficiency" to explain the drop in the Burnaby, BC-based phone service firm's "core baseline earnings" for its third quarter ended September 30, 2001. (According to company literature, core baseline earnings refers to common share income before discontinued operations, amortization of acquired intangible assets net of tax, restructuring and nonrecurring refinancing costs net of tax, revaluation of future tax assets and liabilities and goodwill amortization.)

    Meanwhile, IBM Corp. spinoff Celestica Inc. of Toronto neglected to mention the elimination of more than 8,700 jobs from a global workforce of 30,000, alluding to the cuts in its fiscal 2001 third-quarter report through references to "realignment" charges during the period.

    Many statements no longer use the term "profit" at all. And while statutory filings must present at least one version of earnings that conforms to GAAP, few rules have been set down by US or Canadian regulators to govern non-GAAP declarations. Accounting bodies in Canada and around the world are charged with policing their members and assuring statutory filings include income and revenue according to GAAP, using supportable interpretations. But pro forma numbers are typically distributed before a company's statutory filing is made.

    "Not to pass the buck," says Cherry, "but how can we set standards for something that's not part of GAAP?" Still, Cherry admits the use of non-GAAP terminology has become so widespread that accounting authorities are being forced to take notice. "The matter is gaining some prominence," he says, "because some of the numbers are just so different."

    Despite his reservations, Cherry acknowledges "the critical point is when information is released to the marketplace," which nowadays is almost always done via a press release. The duty to regulate such releases, he says, must rest with securities bodies - an opinion shared by Edmund Jenkins, chair of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the United States.

    Many authorities view the issue as a matter of education, believing that a high degree of sophistication must now be expected from the retail investing community. Others say the spread of non-GAAP reporting methodology, left unchecked, could distort markets, undermine investor confidence in regulatory regimes and ultimately impede the flow of investment capital. But pro forma devotees insist that introducing tough new measures to govern reporting would do little to protect consumers and encourage retail investment. Instead, new regulations might work to impede growth and limit available, useful financial information.

    Continued at http://www.cica.ca/cica/camagazine.nsf/e2002-mar/Features 


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators's Review on October 18, 2002

    TITLE: Motorola's Profit: 'Special' Again? 
    REPORTER: Jesse Drucker 
    DATE: Oct 15, 2002 
    PAGE: C1 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1034631975931460836.djm,00.html  
    TOPICS: Special Items, Pro Forma Earnings, Accounting, Earning Announcements, Earnings Forecasts, Financial Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis, Net Income

    SUMMARY: Motorola has announced both pro forma earnings and net income as determined by generally accepted accounting principles for 14 consecutive quarters. Ironically, pro forma earnings are always greater than net income calculated using generally accepted accounting principles

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) Distinguish between a special item and an extraordinary item. How are each reported on the income statement?

    2.) Distinguish between pro forma earnings and GAAP based earnings. What are the advantages and disadvantages of allowing companies to report multiple earnings numbers? What are the advantages and disadvantages of not allowing companies to report multiple earnings numbers?

    3.) What items were reported as special by Motorola? Are these items special? Support your answer.

    4.) Are you surprised that all the special items reduced earnings? What is the likelihood that there were positive nonrecurring items at Motorola? How are positive nonrecurring items reported?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University


    "Pro-Forma Earnings Reporting Persists," by Shaheen Pasha, Washington Post, August 16, 2002 --- http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25384-2002Aug16.html 

    While many on Wall Street are calling for an end to pro forma financial reporting given widespread jitters over corporate clarity, it's clear from second-quarter reports that the accounting practice is a hard habit to break.

    Publicly traded companies are required to report their results according to generally accepted accounting principles, or GAAP, under which all types of business expenses are deducted to arrive at the bottom line of a company's earnings report.

    But an ever-increasing number of companies in recent years has taken to also reporting earnings on a pro forma – or "as if" – basis under which they exclude various costs. Companies defend the practice, saying the inclusion of one-time events don't accurately reflect true performance.

    There is no universal agreement on which expenses should be omitted from pro forma results, but pro forma figures typically boost results.

    Indeed, as the second-quarter reporting season dwindles down with more than 90 percent of the Standard & Poor's 500 companies having reported, only Yahoo Inc., Compuware Corp. and Xilinx Inc. made the switch to reporting earnings under GAAP, according to Thomson First Call.

    While a number of S&P 500 companies, including Computer Associates International Inc. and Corning Inc., made the switch to GAAP in the first quarter, that still brings the number to 11 companies in total that have given up on pro forma over the last two quarters.

    "It's disappointing that at this stage we haven't seen more companies make the switch to GAAP earnings from pro forma," said Chuck Hill, director of research at Thomson First Call.

    Continued at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25384-2002Aug16.html  


    A new research report from Bear Stearns identifies the best earnings benchmarks by industry. GAAP earnings are cited as the best benchmarks for a few industries, but not many. The preferred benchmarks are generally pro forma earnings or pro forma earnings per share. http://www.accountingweb.com/item/91934 

    AccountingWEB US - Oct-1-2002 -  A new research report from Bear Stearns identifies the best earnings benchmarks by industry. GAAP earnings (earnings prepared according to generally accepted accounting principles) are cited as the best benchmarks for a few industries, but not many. Most use pro forma earnings or pro forma earnings per share (EPS).

    Examples of the most useful earnings benchmarks for just a few of the 50+ industries included in the report:

    • Autos: Pro forma EPS
    • Industrial manufacturing: Pro forma EPS shifting to GAAP EPS
    • Trucking: Continuing EPS
    • Lodging: Pro forma EPS, EBITDA and FFO
    • Small & mid-cap biotechnology: Product-related events, Cash on hand, Cash burn rate
    • Advertising & marketing services: Pro forma EPS, EBITDA, Free cash flow
    • Business/professional services: Pro forma EPS, Cash EPS, EBITDA, Discounted free cash flow
    • Wireless services: GAAP EPS, EBITDA

    EBITDA=Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.
    FFO=funds from operations.

    The report also lists the most common adjustments made to arrive at pro forma earnings and tells whether securities analysts consider the adjustments valid. Patricia McConnell, senior managing director at Bear Stearns, explains, "Analysts rarely accept managements' suggested 'pro forma' adjustments without due consideration, and sometimes we reject them... We would not recommend using management's version of pro forma earnings without analysis and adjustment, but neither would we blindly advise using GAAP earnings without analysis and adjustment."


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on July 27, 2002

    TITLE: Merrill Changes Methods Analysts Use for Estimates 
    REPORTER: Karen Talley DATE: Jul 24, 2002 
    PAGE: C5 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,BT_CO_20020724_009399.djm,00.html  
    TOPICS: Accounting, Earnings Forecasts, Financial Accounting, Financial Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis

    SUMMARY: Merrill Lynch & Co. has reported that it will begin forecasting both GAAP based earnings estimates in addition to pro forma earnings measures. To accommodate Merrill Lynch & Co., Thomson First Call will collect and report GAAP estimates from other analysts.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) Compare and contrast GAAP earnings and pro forma earnings?

    2.) Why do analyst forecast pro forma earnings? Will GAAP earnings forecasts provide more useful information than pro forma earnings forecasts? Support your answer.

    3.) Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of analysts forecasting both pro forma and GAAP earnings. Should analysts continue to provide pro forma earnings forecasts? Should analysts also provide GAAP earnings forecasts? Support your answers.

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University


    Denny Beresford's Terry Breakfast Lecture
    Subtitle:  Does Accounting Still Matter in the "New Economy" 

    Every accounting educator and practitioner should read Professor Beresford's Lecture at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/beresford01.htm


    Readers might also want to go to http://www.npr.org/news/specials/enron/ 
    (Includes an interview with Lynn Turner talking about pro forma reporting.)


    Deferred Taxes Related to FAS123 Expense – Accounting and Administrative Issues on New Trends in Stock Compensation Accounting
    PWC Insight on FAS 123  --- http://www.fei.org/download/HRInsight02_21.pdf 
    A recent PWC HR Insight discusses the applicable rules and answers questions raised on accounting for income taxes related to FAS 123 expense (for both the pro forma disclosure and the recognized FAS 123 expense). Per PWC, the rules are complex and require that the tax benefits arising from stock options and other types of stock-based compensation be tracked on a grant-by-grant and country-by-country basis


    Corporate America's New Math:  Investors Now Face Two Sets of Numbers In Figuring a Company's Bottom Line
    By Justin Gillis
    The Washington Post
    Sunday, July 22, 2001; Page H01 
    http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/archives/front.htm   

    Cisco Systems Inc., a bellwether of the "new economy," prepared its books for the first three months of this year by slicing and dicing its financial results in the old ways mandated by the rules of Washington regulators and the accounting profession.

    Result: a quarterly loss of $2.7 billion.

    Cisco did more, though. It sliced and diced the same underlying numbers in ways preferred by Cisco, offering an alternative interpretation of its results to the investing public.

    Result: a quarterly profit of $230 million.

    That's an unusually large swing in a company's bottom line, but there's nothing unusual these days about the strategy Cisco employed. Across corporate America, companies are emphasizing something called "pro forma" earnings statements. Because there are no rules for how to prepare such statements, businesses have wide latitude to ignore various expenses in their pro forma results that have to be included under traditional accounting rules.

    Most of the time, the new numbers make companies look better than they would under standard accounting, and some evidence suggests investors are using the massaged numbers more and more to decide what value to attach to stocks. The pro forma results are often strongly emphasized in news releases announcing a corporation's earnings; sometimes the results computed under traditional accounting techniques are not disclosed until weeks later, when the companies file the official results with the Securities and Exchange Commission, as required by law.

    Cisco includes its results under both the pro forma and the traditional accounting methods in its news releases. People skeptical of the practice of using pro forma results worry that investors are being deceived. Karen Nelson, assistant professor of accounting at Stanford University, said some companies were "verging on fraudulent behavior" in their presentation of financial results.

    Companies that use these techniques say they are trying to help investors by giving them numbers that more accurately reflect the core operations of their businesses, in part because they exclude unusual expenses. Cisco's technique "gives readers of financial statements a clearer picture of the results of Cisco's normal business activities," the company said in a statement issued in response to questions about its accounting.

    Until recently, pro forma results had a well-understood and limited use. Most companies used pro forma accounting only to adjust previously reported financial statements so they could be directly compared with current results. This most frequently happened after a merger, when a company would adjust past results to reflect what they would have been had the merger been in effect earlier. Pro forma, Latin for "matter of form," refers to statements "where certain amounts are hypothetical," according to Barron's Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms.

    What's changed in recent years is that many companies now using the technique also apply it to the current quarter. They include some of the leading names of the Internet age, including Amazon.com Inc., Yahoo Inc. and JDS Uniphase Corp. These companies have received enthusiastic support from many Wall Street analysts for their use of pro forma results. The companies' arguments have also been bolstered by a broader attack on standard accounting launched by some academic researchers and accountants. They believe the nation's financial reporting system, rooted in the securities law reforms of the New Deal, is inadequate to modern needs. In testimony before Congress last year, Michael R. Young, a securities lawyer, called it a "creaky, sputtering, 1930s-vintage financial reporting system."

    The dispute over earnings statements has grown in intensity during the recent economic slide. To skeptics, more and more companies appear to be coping with bad news on their financial statements by redefining the concept of earnings. SEC staffers are worried about the trend and are weighing a crackdown.

    "People are using the pro forma earnings to present a tilted, biased picture to investors that I don't believe necessarily reflects the reality of what's going on with the business," said Lynn Turner, the SEC's chief accountant.

    For the rest of the article (and it is a long article), go to 
    http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/archives/front.htm 
    The full article is salted with quotes from accounting professors and Bob Elliott (KMPG and Chairman of the AICPA)


    The Future of Amazon.com:  Unlike Enron, Amazon.com seems to thrive without profits.  How long can it last?

    "Economy, the Web and E-Commerce: Amazon.com." An Interview With Jeff Bezos CEO, Amazon.com, The Washington Post,  December 6, 2001 --- http://discuss.washingtonpost.com/zforum/01/washtech_bezos120601.htm 


    Amazon.com is pinning its hopes on pro forma reporting to report the company's first profit in history.  But wait! Plans by U.S. regulators to crack down on "pro forma" abuses in accounting may take a toll on Internet firms, which like the financial reporting technique because it can make losses seem smaller than they really are.  

    "When Pro Forma Is Bad Form," by Joanna Glasner, Wired News, December 6, 2001 --- http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,48877,00.html 

    As part of efforts to improve the clarity of information given to investors, the Securities and Exchange Commission warned this week that it will crack down on companies that use creative accounting methods to pump up poor earnings results.

    In particular, the commission said it will focus on abuse of a popular form of financial reporting known as "pro forma" accounting, which allows companies to exclude certain expenses and gains from their earnings results. The SEC said the method "may not convey a true and accurate picture of a company's financial well-being."

    Experts say the practice is especially common among Internet firms, which began issuing earnings press releases with pro forma numbers en masse during the stock market boom of the late 1990s. The list of new-economy companies using pro forma figures includes such prominent firms as Yahoo (YHOO), AOL Time Warner (AOL), CNET (CNET) and JDS Uniphase (JDSU).

    Unprofitable firms are particularly avid users of pro forma numbers, said Brett Trueman, professor of accounting at the University of California at Berkeley's Haas School of Business.

    "I can't say for sure why, but I can take a guess: They're losing big time, and they want to give investors the impression that the losses are not as great as they appear," he said.

    Trueman said savvy investors tend to know that companies may have self-serving interests in mind when they release pro forma numbers. Experienced traders often put greater credence in numbers compiled according to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which firms are required to release alongside any pro forma numbers.

    A mounting concern, however, is the fact that many companies rely almost solely on pro forma numbers in projections for future performance.

    Perhaps the best-known proponent of pro forma is the perennially unprofitable Amazon.com, which has a history of guiding investor expectations using an accounting system that excludes charges for stock compensation, restructuring or the declining value of past acquisitions.

    Invariably, the pro forma numbers are better than the GAAP ones. In its most recent quarter, for example, Amazon (AMZN) reported a pro forma loss of $58 million. When measured according to GAAP, Amazon's net loss nearly tripled to $170 million.

    Things are apt to get even stranger in the last quarter of the year, when Amazon said it plans to deliver its first-ever pro forma operating profit. By regular accounting standards, the company will still be losing money.

    Those results might not sit too well with the folks at the SEC, however.

    In its statements this week, the SEC noted that although there's nothing inherently illegal about providing pro forma numbers, figures should not be presented in a deliberately misleading manner. Regulators may have been talking directly to Amazon in one paragraph of their warning, which said:

    "Investors are likely to be deceived if a company uses a pro forma presentation to recast a loss as if it were a profit."

    Neither Amazon nor AOL Time Warner returned phone calls inquiring if they planned to make changes to their pro forma accounting methods in light of the SEC's recent statements.

    According to Trueman, few members of the financial community would advocate getting rid of pro forma numbers altogether.

    Even the SEC said that pro forma numbers, when used appropriately, can provide investors with a great deal of useful information that might not be included with GAAP results. When presented correctly, pro forma numbers can offer insights into the performance of the core business, by excluding one-time events that can skew quarterly results.

    Rather than ditching pro forma, industry groups like Financial Executives International and the National Investor Relations Institute say a better plan is to set uniform guidelines for how to present the numbers. They have issued a set of recommendations, such as making sure companies don't arbitrarily change what's included in pro forma results from quarter to quarter.

    Certainly some consistency would make it easier for folks who try to track this stuff, said Joe Cooper, research analyst at First Call, which compiles analyst projections of earnings.

    The boom in pro forma reporting has created quite a bit of extra work for First Call, Cooper said, because it has to figure out which companies and analysts are using pro forma numbers and how they're using them.

    But the extra work of compiling pro forma numbers doesn't necessarily result in greater financial transparency for investors, Cooper said.

    "In days past, before it was abused, it was a way to give an honest apples-to-apples comparison," he said. "Now, it is being used as a way to continually put their company in a good light."

    See also:
    SEC Fires Warning Shot Over Tech Statements
    Earnings Downplay Stock Losses

    Change at the Top for AOL
    Where's the Money?, Huh?
    There's no biz like E-Biz


    The bellwether Internet firm says it will stop reporting earnings in pro forma, a controversial accounting method popular in the technology sector --- http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,51721,00.html 

    "Yahoo Gives Pro Forma the Boot." By Joanna Glasner, Wired News, April 11, 2002 --- 

    Following the release of its first-quarter results on Wednesday, Yahoo (YHOO) said it will stop reporting earnings using pro forma, a controversial accounting method popular among Internet and technology firms.

    Instead, the company said it plans to release all results according to generally accepted accounting principles, or GAAP. Executives said the shift would provide a clearer picture of the Yahoo's financial performance.

    "We do not believe the pro forma presentation continues to provide a useful purpose," said Sue Decker, Yahoo's chief financial officer. In the past, the company has used pro forma accounting as a way to separate one-time expenses -- such as the costs of closing a unit or acquiring another firm -- from costs stemming from its core business.

    Decker attributed the decision in part to new rules adopted by the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board that take effect this year. The new rules require companies to report the amount they overpaid for acquisitions as an upfront charge.

    Accounting experts, however, said the rule change was probably not the only reason for Yahoo to drop pro forma. The accounting practice, popularized by technology firms in the late 1990s, has come under fire from regulators in recent months who say some firms have used nonstandard metrics to mask poor financial performance.

    The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission warned in December that it will crack down on companies that use creative accounting methods to pump up poor earnings results.

    In particular, the commission said it will focus on abuses of pro forma accounting, which allows companies to exclude certain expenses and gains from their earnings results. The SEC said the method "may not convey a true and accurate picture of a company's financial well-being."

    Experts say use of pro forma is especially common among Internet firms. In addition to Yahoo, the list of prominent Internet and technology firms employing pro forma includes AOL Time Warner (AOL), Cnet (CNET) and JDS Uniphase (JDSU).

    Although pro forma accounting can be useful in helping to predict a company's future performance, investors have grown increasingly suspicious of the metric following the bursting of the technology stock bubble, said Sam Norwood, a partner at Tatum CFO Partners.

    "Once the concept of pro forma became accepted, there were in some cases abuses," Norwood said. "There was a tendency for management to exclude the negative events and to not necessarily exclude the positive events.'

    Brett Trueman, an accounting professor at the University of California at Berkeley's Haas School of Business, said he wouldn't be surprised if other firms follow Yahoo's lead in dropping pro forma.

    Continued at  http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,51721,00.html 


    Bob Jensen's threads on pro forma reporting can be found at the following site:

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm 


    Triple-Bottom (Social, Environmental) Reporting

    While some in the profession may question the long-term viability of audit-only accounting firms, proposed guidelines issued recently by the Global Reporting Initiative may help make the vision more feasible. The GRI's guidelines for "triple-bottom- line reporting" would broaden financial reporting into a three- dimensional model for economic, social and environmental reporting. http://www.accountingweb.com/item/78245 

    While some in the profession may question the long-term viability of audit-only accounting firms, proposed guidelines issued recently by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) may help make the vision more feasible. The GRI's guidelines for "triple-bottom-line reporting" would broaden financial reporting into a three-dimensional model for economic, social and environmental reporting. Each dimension of the model would contain information that is valuable to stakeholders and could be independently verified.

    Numbers, Ratios and Explanations

    Despite the convenient shorthand reference to bottom lines, many of the GRI indicators are multi-faceted, consisting of tables, ratios and qualitative descriptions of policies, procedures, and systems. Below are examples of indicators within each of the three dimensions:

    Economic performance indicators. Geographic breakdown of key markets, percent of contracts paid in accordance with agreed terms, and description of the organization's indirect economic impacts.

    Environmental performance indicators. Breakdown of energy sources used, (e.g., for electricity and heat), total water usage, breakdown of waste by type and destination, list of penalties paid for non-compliance with environmental laws and regulations, and description of policies and procedures to minimize adverse environmental impacts.

    Social performance indicators. Total workforce including temporary workers, percentage of employees represented by trade unions, schedule of average hours of training per year per employee for all major categories of employee, male/female ratios in upper management positions, and descriptions of policies and procedures to address such issues as human rights, product information and labeling, customer privacy, and political lobbying and contributions. The GRI was formed in 1997 by a partnership of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES). Several hundred organizations have participated in working groups to help form the guidelines for triple-bottom-line reporting. These organizations include corporations, accounting firms, investors, labor organizations and other stakeholders.

    "What Is Environmental Accounting?" AccountingWeb, January 6, 2006 ---
    http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=101639

    Environmental Management Accounting (EMA) is a cover title used to describe different aspects of this burgeoning field of accounting. The focus of EMA is as a management accounting tool used to make internal business decisions, especially for proactive environmental management activities. EMA was developed to recognize some limitations of conventional management accounting approaches to environmental costs, consequences, and impacts. For example, overhead accounts were the destination of many environmental costs in the past. Cost allocations were inaccurate and could not be traced back to processes, products, or process lines. Wasted raw materials were also inaccurately accounted for during production.

    Each aspect of EMA has a general accounting type that serves as its foundation, according to the EMA international website. The following examples indicate the general accounting type followed by the environmental accounting parallel:

    Management Accounting (MA) entails the identification, collection, estimation, analysis, and use of cost, or other information used for organizational decision-making. Environmental Management Accounting (EMA) is Management Accounting with a focus on materials and energy flow information, with environmental cost information.

    Financial Accounting (FA) comprises the development and organizational reporting of financial information to external parties, such as stockholders and bankers. Environmental Financial Accounting (EFA) builds on Financial Accounting, focusing on the reporting of environmental liability costs with other significant environmental costs.

    National Accounting (NA) is the development of economic and other information used to describe national income and economic health. Environmental National Accounting (ENA) is National Accounting focusing on the stocks of natural resources, their physical flows, environmental costs, and externality costs.

    EMA is a broad set of approaches and principles that provide views into the physical flows and costs critical to the successful completion of environmental management activities and increasingly, routine management activities, such as product and process design, capital budgeting, cost control and allocation, and product pricing, according to the EMA international website.

    Continued in article


    Sustainability Accounting --- Click Here


    Banks Illustrate the Hypocrisy of Social Responsibility Accounting

    We hang the petty thieves and appoint the great ones to public office.
    Aesop

    That some bankers have ended up in prison is not a matter of scandal, but what is outrageous is the fact that all the others are free.
    Honoré de Balzac

    "Holding back the banks:  Predatory banking practices are likely to continue while political parties are too close to corporations and regulators lack teeth," by Prem Sikka, The Guardian (in the U.K.), February 15, 2008 ---
    http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/prem_sikka_/2008/02/holding_back_the_banks.html

    Politicians and regulators have been slow to wake up to the destructive impact of banks on the rest of society. Their lust for profits and financial engineering has brought us the sub-prime crisis and possibly a recession. Billions of pounds have been wiped off the value of people's savings, pensions and investments.

    Despite this, banks are set to make record profits (in the U.K.) and their executives will be collecting bumper salaries and bonuses. These profits are boosted by preying on customers in debt, making exorbitant charges and failing to pass on the benefit of cuts in interest rates. Banks indulge in insider trading, exploit charity laws and have sold suspect payment protection insurance policies. As usual, the annual financial reports published by banks will be opaque and will provide no clues to their antisocial practices.

    Some governments are now also waking up to the involvement of banks in organised tax avoidance and evasion. Banks have long been at the heart of the tax avoidance industry. In 2003, the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations concluded (pdf) that the development and sale of potentially abusive and illegal tax shelters have become a lucrative business for accounting firms, banks, investment advisory firms and law firms. Banks use clever avoidance schemes, transfer pricing schemes and offshore (pdf) entities, not only to avoid their own taxes but also to help their rich clients do the same.

    The role of banks in enabling Enron, the disgraced US energy giant, to avoid taxes worldwide, is well documented (pdf) by the US Senate joint committee on taxation. Enron used complex corporate structures and transactions to avoid taxes in the US and many other countries. The Senate Committee noted (see pages 10 and 107) that some of the complex schemes were devised by Bankers Trust, Chase Manhattan and Deutsche Bank, among others. Another Senate report (pdf) found that resources were also provided by the Salomon Smith Barney unit of Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase & Co.

    The involvement of banks is essential as they can front corporate structures and have the resources - actually our savings and pension contributions - to provide finance for the complex layering of transactions. After examining the scale of tax evasion schemes by KPMG, the US Senate committee concluded (pdf) that complex tax avoidance schemes could not have been executed without the active and willing participation of banks. It noted (page 9) that "major banks, such as Deutsche Bank, HVB, UBS, and NatWest, provided purported loans for tens of millions of dollars essential to the orchestrated transactions," and a subsequent report (pdf) (page111) added "which the banks knew were tax motivated, involved little or no credit risk, and facilitated potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters".

    The Senate report (pdf) noted (page 112) that Deutsche Bank provided some $10.8bn of credit lines, HVB Bank $2.5bn and UBS provided several billion Swiss francs, to operationalise complex avoidance schemes. NatWest was also a key player and provided about $1bn (see page 72 [pdf]) of credit lines.

    Deutsche Bank has been the subject of a US criminal investigation and in 2007 it reached an out-of-court settlement with several wealthy investors, who had been sold aggressive US tax shelters.

    Some predatory practices have also been identified in other countries. In 2004, after a six-year investigation, the National Irish Bank was fined £42m for tax evasion. The bank's personnel promoted offshore investment policies as a secure destination for funds that had not been declared to the revenue commissioners. A government report found that almost the entire former senior management at the bank played some role in tax evasion scams. The external auditors, KPMG, and the bank's own audit committee were also found to have played a role in allowing tax evasion.

    In the UK, successive governments have shown little interest in mounting an investigation into the role of banks in tax avoidance though some banks have been persuaded to inform authorities of the offshore accounts held by private individuals. No questions have been asked about how banks avoid their taxes and how they lubricate the giant and destructive tax avoidance industry. When asked "if he will commission research on the levels of use of offshore tax havens by UK banks and the economic effects of that use," the chancellor of the exchequer replied: "There are no plans to commission research on the levels of use of offshore tax havens by UK banks and the economic effects of that use."

    Continued in article

    "Bringing banks to book Financial institutions are not going to voluntarily embrace honesty and social responsibility - there is little evidence they do so now," by Prem Sikka, The Guardian, February 27, 2008 --- http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/prem_sikka_/2008/02/bringing_banks_to_book.html

    Anyone visiting the websites of banks or browsing through their annual reports will find no shortage of claims of "corporate social responsibility". Yet their practices rarely come anywhere near their claims.

    In pursuit of higher profits and bumper executive rewards, banks have inflicted both the credit crunch and sub-prime crisis on us. Their sub-prime activities may also be steeped in fraud and mis-selling of mortgage securities. They have developed onshore and offshore structures and practices to engage in insider trading, corruption, sham tax-avoidance transactions and tax evasion. Money laundering is another money-spinner.

    Worldwide over $2tn are estimated to be laundered each year. The laundered amounts fund private armies, terrorism, narcotics, smuggling, corruption, tax evasion and criminal activity and generally threaten quality of life. Large amounts of money cannot be laundered without the involvement of accountants, lawyers, financial advisers and banks.

    The US is the world's biggest laundry and European countries are not far behind. Banks are required to have internal controls and systems to monitor suspicious transactions and report them to regulators. As with any form of regulation, corporations enjoy considerable discretion about what they record and report. Profits come above everything else.

    A US government report (see page 31) noted that "the New York branch of ABN AMRO, a banking institution, did not have anti-money laundering program and had failed to monitor approximately $3.2 billion - involving accounts of US shell companies and institutions in Russian and other former republics of the Soviet Union".

    A US Senate report on the Riggs Bank noted that it had developed novel strategies for concealing its trade with General Augusto Pinochet, former Chilean dictator. It noted (page 2) that the bank "disregarded its anti-money laundering (AML) obligations ... despite frequent warnings from ... regulators, and allowed or, at times, actively facilitated suspicious financial activity". The committee chairman Senator Carl Levin stated that "the 'Don't ask, Don't tell policy' at Riggs allowed the bank to pursue profits at the expense of proper controls ... Million-dollar cash deposits, offshore shell corporations, suspicious wire transfers, alteration of account names - all the classic signs of money laundering and foreign corruption made their appearance at Riggs Bank".

    The Senate committee report (see page 7) stated that:

    "Over the past 25 years, multiple financial institutions operating in the United States, including Riggs Bank, Citigroup, Banco de Chile-United States, Espirito Santo Bank in Miami, and others, enabled [former Chilean dictator] Augusto Pinochet to construct a web of at least 125 US bank and securities accounts, involving millions of dollars, which he used to move funds and transact business. In many cases, these accounts were disguised by using a variant of the Pinochet name, an alias, the name of an offshore entity, or the name of a third party willing to serve as a conduit for Pinochet funds."

    The Senate report stated (page 28) that "In addition to opening multiple accounts for Mr Pinochet in the United States and London, Riggs took several actions consistent with helping Mr Pinochet evade a court order attempting to freeze his bank accounts and escape notice by law enforcement". Riggs bank's files and papers (see page 27) contained "no reference to or acknowledgment of the ongoing controversies and litigation associating Mr Pinochet with human rights abuses, corruption, arms sales, and drug trafficking. It makes no reference to attachment proceedings that took place the prior year, in which the Bermuda government froze certain assets belonging to Mr Pinochet pursuant to a Spanish court order - even though ... senior Riggs officials obtained a memorandum summarizing those proceedings from outside legal Counsel."

    The bank's profile did not identify Pinochet by name and at times he is referred to (see page 25) as "a retired professional, who achieved much success in his career and accumulated wealth during his lifetime for retirement in an orderly way" (p 25) ... with a "High paying position in Public Sector for many years" (p 25) ... whose source of his initial wealth was "profits & dividends from several business[es] family owned" (p 27) ... the source of his current income is "investment income, rental income, and pension fund payments from previous posts " (p 27).

    Finger is also pointed at other banks. Barclays France, Société Marseillaise de Credit, owned by HSBC, and the National Bank of Pakistan are facing allegations of money laundering. In 2002, HSBC was facing a fine by the Spanish authorities for operating a series of opaque bank accounts for wealthy businessmen and professional football players. Regulators in India are investigating an alleged $8bn (£4bn) money laundering operation involving UBS.

    Nigeria's corrupt rulers are estimated to have stolen around £220bn over four decades and channelled them through banks in London, New York, Jersey, Switzerland, Austria, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Germany. The Swiss authorities repatriated some of the monies stolen by former dictator General Sani Abacha. A report by the Swiss federal banking commission noted (page 7) that there were instances of serious individual failure or misconduct at some banks. The banks were named as "three banks in the Credit Suisse Group (Credit Suisse, Bank Hofmann AG and Bank Leu AG), Crédit Agricole Indosuez (Suisse) SA, UBP Union Bancaire Privée and MM Warburg Bank (Schweiz) AG".

    Continued in article

    Jensen Comment
    Prem Sikka has written a rather brief but comprehensive summary of many of the bad things banks have been caught doing and in many cases still getting away with. Accounting standards have be complicit in many of these frauds, especially FAS 140 (R) which allowed banks to sell bundles of "securitized" mortgage notes from SPE's (now called VIEs) using borrowed funds that are kept off balance sheet in these entities called SPEs/VIEs. The FASB had in mind that responsible companies (read that banks) would not issue debt in excess of the value of the collateral (e.g., mortgage properties). But FAS 140 (R) fails to allow for the fact that collateral values such as real estate values may be expanding in a huge bubble about to burst and leave the bank customers and possibly the banks themselves owing more than the values of the securities bundles of notes. Add to this the frauds that typically take place in valuing collateral in the first place, and you have FAS 140 (R) allowing companies, notably banks, incurring huge losses on debt that was never booked due to FAS 140 (R).

    FAS 140 (R) needs to be rewritten --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm
    However, the banks now control their regulators! We're not about to see the SEC, FED, and other regulators allow FAS 140 (R) to be drastically revised.

    Also banks are complicit in the "dirty secrets" of credit cards and credit reporting --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm#FICO

    Then there are the many illegal temptations which lure in banks such as profitable money laundering and the various departures from ethics discussed above by Prem Sikka.

    Bob Jensen's "Rotten to the Core" threads are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm

     

    Lessons Not Learned from Enron
    Bad SPE Accounting Rules are Still Dogging Us

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on October 19, 2007

    Call to Brave for $100 Billion Rescue
    by David Reilly
    The Wall Street Journal

    Oct 16, 2007
    Page: C1
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
     

    TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Securitization

    SUMMARY: This article addresses a proposed bailout plan for $100 billion of commercial paper to maintain liquidity in credit markets that have faced turmoil since July 2007, and the fact that this bailout "...raises two crucial questions: Why didn't investors see the problems coming? And how could they have happened in the first place?" The author emphasizes that post-Enron accounting rules "...were supposed to prevent companies from burying risks in off-balance sheet vehicles." He argues that the new rules still allow for some off-balance sheet entities and that "...the new rules in some ways made it even harder for investors to figure out what was going on."

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The bailout plan is a response to risks and losses associated with special purpose entities (SPEs) that qualified for non-consolidation under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities, and Financial Interpretation (FIN) 46(R), Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) Summarize the plan to guarantee liquidity in commercial paper markets as described in the related article. In your answer, define the term structured investment vehicles (SIVs).

    2.) The author writes that SIVs "...don't get recorded on banks books...." What does this mean? Present your answer in terms of treatment of qualifying special purpose entities (SPEs) under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities.

    3.) The author argues that current accounting standards make it difficult for investors to figure out what was going on in markets that now need bailing out. Explain this argument. In your answer, comment on the quotations from Citigroup's financial statements as provided in the article.

    4.) How might reliance on "principles-based" versus "rules-based" accounting standards contribute to solving the reporting dilemmas described in this article?

    5.) How might the use of more "principles-based standards" potentially add more "fuel to the fire" of problems associated with these special purpose entities?
     

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
     

    RELATED ARTICLES: 
    Call to Brave to $100 Billion Rescue: Banks Seek Investors for Fund to Shore Up Commercial Paper
    by Carrick Mollenkamp, Deborah Solomon and Craig Karmin
    The Wall Street Journal
    Oct 16, 2007
    Page: C1

    Plan to Save Banks Depends on Cooperation of Investors
    by David Reilly
    The Wall Street Journal
    Oct 15, 2007
    Page: C1
     

     

    Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm


     

    I have an article today on The Guardian website with the title "After Northern Rock". The lead line reads "The government's proposals for preventing another banking crisis are inadequate and will not work without major surgery". It is available at http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/prem_sikka_/2008/02/after_northern_rock.html 

    As many of you will know Northern Rock, a UK bank, is a casualty of the subprime crisis and has been bailed out by the UK government, which could possibly cost the UK taxpayer £100 billion. My article looks at the reform proposals floated by the government to prevent a repetition. These have been formulated without any investigation of the problems. Within the space permitted, the article refers to a number of major flaws, including regulatory, auditing and governance failures, as well offshore, remuneration and moral hazard issues.

    The above may interest you and you may wish to contribute to the debate by adding comments.

    As always there is more on the AABA website ( http://www.aabaglobal.org  <http://www.aabaglobal.org/>  ).

    Regards

    Prem Sikka
    Professor of Accounting
    University of Essex
    Colchester, Essex CO4 3SQ UK

     


    The Sad State of Government Accounting and Accountability

    Before reading this module you may want to read about Governmental Accounting at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governmental_accounting

    "Taxpayers distrustful of government financial reporting," AccountingWeb, February 22, 2008 ---
    http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=104680

    The federal government is failing to meet the financial reporting needs of taxpayers, falling short of expectations, and creating a problem with trust, according to survey findings released by the Association of Government Accountants (AGA). The survey, Public Attitudes to Government Accountability and Transparency 2008, measured attitudes and opinions towards government financial management and accountability to taxpayers. The survey established an expectations gap between what taxpayers expect and what they get, finding that the public at large overwhelmingly believes that government has the obligation to report and explain how it generates and spends its money, but that that it is failing to meet expectations in any area included in the survey.

    The survey further found that taxpayers consider governments at the federal, state, and local levels to be significantly under-delivering in terms of practicing open, honest spending. Across all levels of government, those surveyed held "being open and honest in spending practices" vitally important, but felt that government performance was poor in this area. Those surveyed also considered government performance to be poor in terms of being "responsible to the public for its spending." This is compounded by perceived poor performance in providing understandable and timely financial management information.

    The survey shows:

  • The American public is most dissatisfied with government financial management information disseminated by the federal government. Seventy-two percent say that it is extremely or very important to receive this information from the federal government, but only 5 percent are extremely or very satisfied with what they receive.

     

  • Seventy-three percent of Americans believe that it is extremely or very important for the federal government to be open and honest in its spending practices, yet only 5 percent say they are meeting these expectations.

     

  • Seventy-one percent of those who receive financial management information from the government or believe it is important to receive it, say they would use the information to influence their vote.

    Relmond Van Daniker, Executive Director at AGA, said, "We commissioned this survey to shed some light on the way the public perceives those issues relating to government financial accountability and transparency that are important to our members. Nobody is pretending that the figures are a shock, but we are glad to have established a benchmark against which we can track progress in years to come."

    He continued, "AGA members working in government at all levels are in the very forefront of the fight to increase levels of government accountability and transparency. We believe that the traditional methods of communicating government financial information -- through reams of audited financial statements that have little relevance to the taxpayer -- must be supplemented by government financial reporting that expresses complex financial details in an understandable form. Our members are committed to taking these concepts forward."

    Justin Greeves, who led the team at Harris Interactive that fielded the survey for the AGA, said, "The survey results include some extremely stark, unambiguous findings. Public levels of dissatisfaction and distrust of government spending practices came through loud and clear, across every geography, demographic group, and political ideology. Worthy of special note, perhaps, is a 67 percentage point gap between what taxpayers expect from government and what they receive. These are significant findings that I hope government and the public find useful."

    This survey was conducted online within the United States by Harris Interactive on behalf of the Association of Government Accountants between January 4 and 8, 2008 among 1,652 adults aged 18 or over. Results were weighted as needed for age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, region, and household income. Propensity score weighting was also used to adjust for respondents' propensity to be online. No estimates of theoretical sampling error can be calculated.

    You can read the Survey Report, including a full methodology and associated commentary.

  • "The Government Is Wasting Your Tax Dollars! How Uncle Sam spends nearly $1 trillion of your money each year," by Ryan Grim with Joseph K. Vetter, Readers Digest, January 2008, pp. 86-99 --- http://www.rd.com/content/the-government-is-wasting-your-tax-dollars/4/

    1. Taxes:
    Cheating Shows. The Internal Revenue Service estimates that the annual net tax gap—the difference between what's owed and what's collected—is $290 billion, more than double the average yearly sum spent on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

    About $59 billion of that figure results from the underreporting and underpayment of employment taxes. Our broken system of immigration is another concern, with nearly eight million undocumented workers having a less-than-stellar relationship with the IRS. Getting more of them on the books could certainly help narrow that tax gap.

    Going after the deadbeats would seem like an obvious move. Unfortunately, the IRS doesn't have the resources to adequately pursue big offenders and their high-powered tax attorneys. "The IRS is outgunned," says Walker, "especially when dealing with multinational corporations with offshore headquarters."

    Another group that costs taxpayers billions: hedge fund and private equity managers. Many of these moguls make vast "incomes" yet pay taxes on a portion of those earnings at the paltry 15 percent capital gains rate, instead of the higher income tax rate. By some estimates, this loophole costs taxpayers more than $2.5 billion a year.

    Oil companies are getting a nice deal too. The country hands them more than $2 billion a year in tax breaks. Says Walker, "Some of the sweetheart deals that were negotiated for drilling rights on public lands don't pass the straight-face test, especially given current crude oil prices." And Big Oil isn't alone. Citizens for Tax Justice estimates that corporations reap more than $123 billion a year in special tax breaks. Cut this in half and we could save about $60 billion.

    The Tab* Tax Shortfall: $290 billion (uncollected taxes) + $2.5 billion (undertaxed high rollers) + $60 billion (unwarranted tax breaks) Starting Tab: $352.5 billion

    2. Healthy Fixes.
    Medicare and Medicaid, which cover elderly and low-income patients respectively, eat up a growing portion of the federal budget. Investigations by Sen. Tom Coburn (R-OK) point to as much as $60 billion a year in fraud, waste and overpayments between the two programs. And Coburn is likely underestimating the problem.

    The U.S. spends more than $400 per person on health care administration costs and insurance -- six times more than other industrialized nations.

    That's because a 2003 Dartmouth Medical School study found that up to 30 percent of the $2 trillion spent in this country on medical care each year—including what's spent on Medicare and Medicaid—is wasted. And with the combined tab for those programs rising to some $665 billion this year, cutting costs by a conservative 15 percent could save taxpayers about $100 billion. Yet, rather than moving to trim fat, the government continues such questionable practices as paying private insurance companies that offer Medicare Advantage plans an average of 12 percent more per patient than traditional Medicare fee-for-service. Congress is trying to close this loophole, and doing so could save $15 billion per year, on average, according to the Congressional Budget Office.

    Another money-wasting bright idea was to create a giant class of middlemen: Private bureaucrats who administer the Medicare drug program are monitored by federal bureaucrats—and the public pays for both. An October report by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform estimated that this setup costs the government $10 billion per year in unnecessary administrative expenses and higher drug prices.

    The Tab* Wasteful Health Spending: $60 billion (fraud, waste, overpayments) + $100 billion (modest 15 percent cost reduction) + $15 billion (closing the 12 percent loophole) + $10 billion (unnecessary Medicare administrative and drug costs) Total $185 billion Running Tab: $352.5 billion +$185 billion = $537.5 billion

    3. Military Mad Money.
    You'd think it would be hard to simply lose massive amounts of money, but given the lack of transparency and accountability, it's no wonder that eight of the Department of Defense's functions, including weapons procurement, have been deemed high risk by the GAO. That means there's a high probability that money—"tens of billions," according to Walker—will go missing or be otherwise wasted.

    The DOD routinely hands out no-bid and cost-plus contracts, under which contractors get reimbursed for their costs plus a certain percentage of the contract figure. Such deals don't help hold down spending in the annual military budget of about $500 billion. That sum is roughly equal to the combined defense spending of the rest of the world's countries. It's also comparable, adjusted for inflation, with our largest Cold War-era defense budget. Maybe that's why billions of dollars are still being spent on high-cost weapons designed to counter Cold War-era threats, even though today's enemy is armed with cell phones and IEDs. (And that $500 billion doesn't include the billions to be spent this year in Iraq and Afghanistan. Those funds demand scrutiny, too, according to Sen. Amy Klobuchar, D-MN, who says, "One in six federal tax dollars sent to rebuild Iraq has been wasted.")

    Meanwhile, the Pentagon admits it simply can't account for more than $1 trillion. Little wonder, since the DOD hasn't been fully audited in years. Hoping to change that, Brian Riedl of the Heritage Foundation is pushing Congress to add audit provisions to the next defense budget.

    If wasteful spending equaling 10 percent of all spending were rooted out, that would free up some $50 billion. And if Congress cut spending on unnecessary weapons and cracked down harder on fraud, we could save tens of billions more.

    The Tab* Wasteful military spending: $100 billion (waste, fraud, unnecessary weapons) Running Tab: $537.5 billion + $100 billion = $637.5 billion

    4. Bad Seeds.
    The controversial U.S. farm subsidy program, part of which pays farmers not to grow crops, has become a giant welfare program for the rich, one that cost taxpayers nearly $20 billion last year.

    Two of the best-known offenders: Kenneth Lay, the now-deceased Enron CEO, who got $23,326 for conservation land in Missouri from 1995 to 2005, and mogul Ted Turner, who got $590,823 for farms in four states during the same period. A Cato Institute study found that in 2005, two-thirds of the subsidies went to the richest 10 percent of recipients, many of whom live in New York City. Not only do these "farmers" get money straight from the government, they also often get local tax breaks, since their property is zoned as agricultural land. The subsidies raise prices for consumers, hurt third world farmers who can't compete, and are attacked in international courts as unfair trade.

    The Tab* Wasteful farm subsidies: $20 billion Running Tab: $637.5 billion + $20 billion = $657.5 billion

    5. Capital Waste.
    While there's plenty of ongoing annual operating waste, there's also a special kind of profligacy—call it capital waste—that pops up year after year. This is shoddy spending on big-ticket items that don't pan out. While what's being bought changes from year to year, you can be sure there will always be some costly items that aren't worth what the government pays for them.

    Take this recent example: Since September 11, 2001, Congress has spent more than $4 billion to upgrade the Coast Guard's fleet. Today the service has fewer ships than it did before that money was spent, what 60 Minutes called "a fiasco that has set new standards for incompetence." Then there's the Future Imagery Architecture spy satellite program. As The New York Times recently reported, the technology flopped and the program was killed—but not before costing $4 billion. Or consider the FBI's infamous Trilogy computer upgrade: Its final stage was scrapped after a $170 million investment. Or the almost $1 billion the Federal Emergency Management Agency has wasted on unusable housing. The list goes on.

    The Tab* Wasteful Capital Spending: $30 billion Running Tab: $657.5 billion + $30 billion = $687.5 billion

    6. Fraud and Stupidity.
    Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-IA) wants the Social Security Administration to better monitor the veracity of people drawing disability payments from its $100 billion pot. By one estimate, roughly $1 billion is wasted each year in overpayments to people who work and earn more than the program's rules allow.

    The federal Food Stamp Program gets ripped off too. Studies have shown that almost 5 percent, or more than $1 billion, of the payments made to people in the $30 billion program are in excess of what they should receive.

    One person received $105,000 in excess disability payments over seven years.

    There are plenty of other examples. Senator Coburn estimates that the feds own unused properties worth $18 billion and pay out billions more annually to maintain them. Guess it's simpler for bureaucrats to keep paying for the property than to go to the trouble of selling it.

    The Tab* General Fraud and Stupidity: $2 billion (disability and food stamp overpayment) Running Tab: $687.5 billion + $2 billion = $689.5 billion

    7. Pork Sausage.
    Congress doled out $29 billion in so-called earmarks—aka funds for legislators' pet projects—in 2006, according to Citizens Against Government Waste. That's three times the amount spent in 1999. Congress loves to deride this kind of spending, but lawmakers won't hesitate to turn around and drop $500,000 on a ballpark in Billings, Montana.

    The most infamous earmark is surely the "bridge to nowhere"—a span that would have connected Ketchikan, Alaska, to nearby Gravina Island—at a cost of more than $220 million. After Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans, Senator Coburn tried to redirect that money to repair the city's Twin Span Bridge. He failed when lawmakers on both sides of the aisle got behind the Alaska pork. (That money is now going to other projects in Alaska.) Meanwhile, this kind of spending continues at a time when our country's crumbling infrastructure—the bursting dams, exploding water pipes and collapsing bridges—could really use some investment. Cutting two-thirds of the $29 billion would be a good start.

    The Tab* Pork Barrel Spending: $20 billion Running Tab: $689.5 billion + $20 billion = $709.5 billion

    8. Welfare Kings.
    Corporate welfare is an easy thing for politicians to bark at, but it seems it's hard to bite the hand that feeds you. How else to explain why corporate welfare is on the rise? A Cato Institute report found that in 2006, corporations received $92 billion (including some in the form of those farm subsidies) to do what they do anyway—research, market and develop products. The recipients included plenty of names from the Fortune 500, among them IBM, GE, Xerox, Dow Chemical, Ford Motor Company, DuPont and Johnson & Johnson.

    The Tab* Corporate Welfare: $50 billion Running Tab: $709.5 billion + $50 billion = $759.5 billion

    9. Been There,
    Done That. The Rural Electrification Administration, created during the New Deal, was an example of government at its finest—stepping in to do something the private sector couldn't. Today, renamed the Rural Utilities Service, it's an example of a government that doesn't know how to end a program. "We established an entity to electrify rural America. Mission accomplished. But the entity's still there," says Walker. "We ought to celebrate success and get out of the business."

    In a 2007 analysis, the Heritage Foundation found that hundreds of programs overlap to accomplish just a few goals. Ending programs that have met their goals and eliminating redundant programs could comfortably save taxpayers $30 billion a year.

    The Tab* Obsolete, Redundant Programs: $30 billion Running Tab: $759.5 billion + $30 billion = $789.5 billion

    10. Living on Credit.
    Here's the capper: Years of wasteful spending have put us in such a deep hole, we must squander even more to pay the interest on that debt. In 2007, the federal government carried a debt of $9 trillion and blew $252 billion in interest. Yes, we understand the federal government needs to carry a small debt for the Federal Reserve Bank to operate. But "small" isn't how we would describe three times the nation's annual budget. We need to stop paying so much in interest (and we think cutting $194 billion is a good target). Instead we're digging ourselves deeper: Congress had to raise the federal debt limit last September from $8.965 trillion to almost $10 trillion or the country would have been at legal risk of default. If that's not a wake-up call to get spending under control, we don't know what is.

    The Tab* Interest on National Debt: $194 billion Final Tab: $789.5 billion + $194 billion = $983.5 billion

    What YOU Can Do Many believe our system is inherently broken. We think it can be fixed. As citizens and voters, we have to set a new agenda before the Presidential election. There are three things we need in order to prevent wasteful spending, according to the GAO's David Walker:

    • Incentives for people to do the right thing.

    • Transparency so we can tell if they've done the right thing.

    • Accountability if they do the wrong thing.

    Two out of three won't solve our problems.

    So how do we make it happen? Demand it of our elected officials. If they fail to listen, then we turn them out of office. With its approval rating hovering around 11 percent in some polls, Congress might just start paying attention.

    Start by writing to your Representatives. Talk to your family, friends and neighbors, and share this article. It's in everybody's interest.

    The Most Criminal Class is Writing the Laws --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#Lawmakers

     

     



     

    Question
    What do the department store chains WT Grant and Target possibly have in common?

    Answer
    WT Grant had a huge chain of departments stores across the United States. It declared bankruptcy in the sharp 1973 recession largely because of a build up of accounts receivable losses. Now in 2008 Target Corporation is in a somewhat similar bind.

    In 1980 Largay and Stickney (Financial Analysts Journal) published a great comparison of WT Grant's cash flow statements versus income statements. I used this study for years in some of my accounting courses. It's a classic for giving students an appreciation of cash flow statements! The study is discussed and cited (with exhibits) at http://www.sap-hefte.de/download/dateien/1239/070_leseprobe.pdf
    It also shows the limitations of the current ratio in financial analysis and the problem of inventory buildup when analyzing the reported bottom line net income.

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on March 14, 2008

    Is Target Corp.'s Credit Too Generous?
    by Peter Eavis
    The Wall Street Journal

    Mar 11, 2008
    Page: C1
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120519491886425757.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
     

    TOPICS: Allowance For Doubtful Accounts, Financial Accounting, Financial Statement Analysis, Loan Loss Allowance

    SUMMARY: "'Target appears to have pursued very aggressive credit growth at the wrong time," says William Ryan, consumer-credit analyst at Portales Partners, a New York-based research firm. "Not so." says Target's chief financial officer, Douglas Scovanner, "The growth in the credit-card portfolio is absolutely not a function of a loosening of credit standards or a lowering of credit quality in our portfolio."

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: This article covers details of financial statement ratios used to analyze Target Corp.'s credit card business. It can be used in a financial statement analysis course or while covering accounting for receivables in a financial accounting course

    QUESTIONS: 
    1. (Introductory) What types of credit cards has Target Corp. issued? Why do companies such as Target issue these cards?

    2. (Introductory) In general, what concerns analysts about Target Corp.'s portfolio of receivables on credit cards?

    3. (Introductory) How can a sufficient allowance for uncollectible accounts alleviate concerns about potential problems in a portfolio of loans or receivables? What evidence is given in the article about the status of Target's allowance for uncollectible accounts?

    4. (Advanced) "...High growth may make it [hard] to see credit deterioration that already is happening..." What calculation by analyst William Ryan is described in the article to better "see" this issue? From where does he obtain the data used in the calculation? Be specific in your answer.

    5. (Advanced) Refer again to the calculation done by the analyst Mr. Ryan. How does that calculation resemble the analysis done for an aging of accounts receivable?

    6. (Advanced) What other financial analysis ratio is used to assess the status of a credit-card loan portfolio such as Target Corp.'s?

    7. (Advanced) If analysts prove correct in their concern about Target Corp.'s credit-card receivable balance, what does that say about the profitability reported in this year? How will it impact next year's results?
     

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
     

    "Is Target Corp.'s Credit Too Generous? Retailer's Loans Rose 29% From Year Earlier As Others' Books Shrink," By Peter Eavis, The Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2008; Page C1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120519491886425757.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC

    Ben Bernanke must love retailer Target Corp., because its credit-card business is one of the few operations in the country that has strongly increased lending in the face of the credit crunch.

    Now, though, some analysts are wondering whether the torrid expansion of the card business in the current tough environment could lead to higher-than-expected bad loans.

    At the end of Target's fiscal fourth quarter, which ended Feb. 2, the company had $8.62 billion of loans outstanding on its Visa cards, which can be used at other retailers as well as Target, and its private-label cards, which are for purchases at Target only.

    That total was up 29% from the $6.71 billion a year earlier -- and the growth rate was even greater than the 25% year-on-year rise posted in the fiscal third quarter. The card business has been responsible for a large part of the retailer's overall earnings growth.

    Other credit-card lenders' loan books have either shrunk or grown much more slowly. For instance, Discover Financial Services' U.S. credit-card business reported a 5% annual increase in loans in its fiscal fourth quarter, ended Nov. 30. Loans outstanding at Capital One Financial Corp.'s U.S. card business declined 2.8% in its fourth quarter, while Citigroup Inc.'s rose 3.6% and J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.'s was up 3%.

    Some fear that Target has lent too much at a time when a slowing economy makes it harder for borrowers to repay. And that it may be attracting struggling borrowers who can't get as much credit as they would like from other companies.

    "Target appears to have pursued very aggressive credit growth at the wrong time," says William Ryan, consumer-credit analyst at Portales Partners, a New York-based research firm.

    Not so, says Target's chief financial officer, Douglas Scovanner. The growth in the credit-card portfolio "is absolutely not a function of a loosening of credit standards or a lowering of credit quality in our portfolio," he says.

    For several years, critics have been predicting a blowup in Target's credit business. It never happened. And Mr. Scovanner notes that the company has yet to report credit losses that exceed company forecasts. He expects that to remain the case this year and predicts the company will report credit losses of about 7% of loans this year, up from 5.9% in the last fiscal year. Discover's credit losses were 3.82% of loans in its latest fiscal year, while Capital One's were 2.88%.

    Last year, Target made a choice to significantly increase its credit-card loans because it identified more borrowers that it felt comfortable lending to, Mr. Scovanner says. He adds that the loans likely won't increase at high rates in the near future from their level at the end of the latest fiscal year.

    "Target has a proven track record of managing its credit business," says Robert Botard, analyst for the AIM Diversified Dividend Fund, which holds Target shares. "Because of that track record, it's difficult to bet against them."

    But bears think this could be the point at which Target stumbles, because the high growth in its card portfolio has happened just as the economy has slowed and lenders have become tight-fisted. And if problems were to arise in the credit-card operations, they would happen at a time when the weak economy is slamming retail operations as well.

    Target's stock is up 2.5% this year, while the Standard & Poor's 500 index has slumped 13%. At a price/earnings ratio of 14.4 times expected per-share earnings for 2008, Target shares also trade above the market's multiple of 12.9 times. Yesterday, at 4 p.m. in New York Stock Exchange composite trading, Target shares fell 77 cents, or 1.5%, to $51.23.

    Investors often buy retailers to bet on an economic recovery, but Target may look less attractive to those sorts of buyers if it is grappling with problems in its credit-card operations. Target's pretax earnings rose by $128 million in the latest fiscal year. The lion's share of the increase -- $103 million -- came from the credit-card business.

    And Mr. Ryan at Portales expects Target's credit losses to be considerably higher than the company predicts. Indeed, the high growth may make it harder to see credit deterioration that already is happening, he says.

    Continued in article

    Question
    For investors, how informative is accrual accounting vis-a-vis cash flow reporting?
    Hint:  It all depends! --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#CashVsAccrualAcctg

     


    Question
    For investors, how informative is accrual accounting vis-a-vis cash flow reporting?
    Hint:  It all depends!

    From the Unknown Professor's Financial Rounds Blog on November 24, 2007 --- http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/

    More on The Accrual Anomaly and Abnormal Returns

    Here's another paper on "tradable" patterns in stock returns. The CXO Advisory Group recently put up a summary of the study titled "Repairing the Accruals Anomaly" by Hafzalla, Lunholm and Van Winkle. The paper examines the pattern that stock market performance of firms with low accruals (i.e. the difference between the firm's earnings and cash flows) is significantly greater than the performance of their higher accrual counterparts. It does a pretty good job of examining Sloan's "Accrual Anomaly" with a few tweaks:

    It corrects for the extent to which the firm is financially healthy, using Piotrowski's "financial health" indicator. It measures accruals in relation to earnings rather than to assets

    Their findings are that the accrual anomaly does a better job of sorting out investment performance for financially healthy firms. Their results are pretty strong (note- the following is CXO's summary):

    A hedge strategy that is long (short) firms of high (low) financial health (ignoring accruals) generates an average size-adjusted annual return of 9.36% across the entire sample. After excluding firms with the lowest financial health scores, a hedge strategy that is long (short) the 10% of firms with the lowest (highest) traditional accruals generates an average size-adjusted annual return of 13.64%, with 7.98% coming from the long side Using the total sample, a hedge strategy that is long (short) low-accrual, high financial health (high-accrual, low financial health) firms produces an average size-adjusted annual return of 22.93%, with a 14.92% from the long side.

    Here's a pretty good grapic of size adjusted abnormal returns on the various portfolios --- http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/

    "Repairing the Accruals Anomaly," by Russell J. Jundholm,  Nader Hafzalla,  and Edmund Matthew Van Winkle,

    Abstract:
    We document how the effectiveness of an accruals-based trading strategy changes systematically with the financial health of the sample firms or with the benchmark used to identify an extreme accrual. Our refinements significantly improve the strategy's annual hedge return, and do so mostly because they improve the return earned on the long position in low accrual stocks. These results are important because recent evidence has shown that, absent these “repairs,” the accrual strategy does not yield a significantly positive return in the long portion of the hedge portfolio. We also find that our new measure of accruals is not dependent on the presence or absence of special items and it identifies misvalued stocks just as well for loss firms as for gain firms, in contrast to the traditional accruals measure. Finally, we show that our repairs succeed where the traditional measure of accruals fails because they more effectively select firms where the difference between sophisticated and naïve forecasts are the most extreme. As such, our results are consistent with Sloan's earnings fixation hypothesis and are inconsistent with some alternative explanations for the accrual anomaly.

    Jensen Comment
    Current findings on these relationships may be more difficult to extrapolate as fair value accounting becomes more prevalent --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue


    It's elementary Watson! Of course the statement of cash flow matters.

    "Why the Statement of Cash Flows Matters," by Scott Rothbortm, TheStreet, September 21, 2007 --- Click Here
    Jensen Comment
    This really is elementary, but it does have some rather nice current examples.

    Perhaps a better topic would be "why accrual accounting still matters."

    "Which is More Value-Relevant: Earnings or Cash Flows?" by Ervin L. Black, Sr., SSRN, May 1998 ---
    http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=118089 
     

    Statements in the financial press and recent research suggest that controversy exists as to which accounting measure is more value-relevant: earnings or cash flows. This study examines the relative value-relevance of earnings and cash flow measures in the context of the firm life-cycle. Earnings are predicted to be more value-relevant in mature stages. Cash flows are expected to be more value relevant in stages characterized by growth and/or uncertainty. In general the hypotheses are supported using Wald chi-square tests (Biddle, Seow, and Siegel 1995) of the Edwards, Bell, Ohlson (1995) model. Evidence supports the hypothesis that earnings are more value-relevant than operating, investing, or financing cash flows in mature life-cycle stages. However, in the start-up stage investing cash flows are more value relevant than earnings. In growth and decline stages, operating cash flows are more value relevant than earnings.

    Jensen Comment
    The above paper by Professor Black is an illustration of a working paper that for quite a long time was available free from BYU. Now that it's on SSRN it's no longer free. SSRN did not necessarily contribute to the open sharing of research papers.

    By the way, even if cash flow statements were hypothetically more relevant in all instances, accrual accounting statements would still be vital. My DAH reason is that, if accountants only reported cash flows, it would be quite simple for managers to distort period-to-period performance by simply altering the contractual timings of cash in and cash out. This is much more simple to do for cash payments than for accrual transactions. There would also be the pesky problem of capital maintenance if depreciation and amortization gets overlooked. In theory capital maintenance is not overlooked in fair value accounting since values decline with asset deterioration. However, fair value accounting is quite another matter entirely --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue

     


    The Controversy Over Fair Value (Mark-to-Market) Financial Reporting

    Fair Value Re-measurement Problems in a Nutshell:  (1) Covariances and (2) Hypothetical Transactions and (3) Estimation Cost
    It's All Phantasmagoric Accounting in Terms of Value in Use

     

  • In an excellent plenary session presentation in Anaheim on August 5, 2008 Zoe-Vanna Palmrose mentioned how advocates of fair value accounting for both financial and non-financial assets and liabilities should heed the cautions of George O. May about how fair value accounting contributed to the great stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression. Afterwards Don Edwards and I lamented that accounting doctoral students and younger accounting faculty today have little interest in and knowledge of accounting history and the great accounting scholars of the past like George O. May --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_O._May
    Don mentioned how the works of George O. May should be revisited in light of the present movement by standard setters to shift from historical cost allocation accounting to fair value re-measurement (some say fantasy land or phantasmagoric) accounting --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#FairValue
    The point is that if fair value re-measurement is required in the main financial statements, the impact upon investors and the economy is not neutral. It may be very real like it was in the Roaring 1920s.

    In the 21st Century, accounting standard setters such as the FASB in the U.S. and the IASB internationally are dead set on replacing traditional historical cost accounting for both financial (e.g., stocks and bonds) and non-financial (e.g., patents, goodwill, real estate, vehicles, and equipment) with fair values. Whereas historical costs are transactions based and additive across all assets and liabilities, fair value adjustments are not transactions based, are almost impossible to estimate, and are not likely to be additive.

    If Asset A is purchased for $100 and Asset B is purchased for $200 and have depreciated book values of $50 and $80 on a given date, the book values may be added to a sum of $130. This is a basis adjusted cost allocation valuation that has well-known limitations in terms of information needed for investment and operating decisions.

    If Asset A now has an exit (disposal) value of $20 and Asset B has an exit value of $90, the exit values can be added to a sum of $110 that has meaning only if each asset will be liquidated piecemeal. Exit value accounting is required for personal estates and for companies deemed by auditors to be non-going concerns that are likely to be liquidated piecemeal after debts are paid off.

    But accounting standard setters are moving toward standards that suggest that neither historical cost valuation nor exit value re-measurement are acceptable for going concerns such as viable and growing companies. Historical cost valuation is in reality a cost allocation process that provides misleading surrogates for "value in use." Exit values violate rules that re-measured fair values should be estimated in terms of the "best possible use" of the items in question. Exit values are generally the "worst possible uses" of the items in a going concern. For example, a printing press having a book value of $1 million and an exit value of $100,000 are likely to both differ greatly from "value in use."

    The "value in use" theoretically is the present value of all discounted cash flows attributed to the printing press. But this entails wild estimates of future cash flows, discount rates, and terminal salvage values that no two valuation experts are likely to agree upon. Furthermore, it is generally impossible to isolate the future cash flows of a printing press from the interactive cash flows of other assets such as a company's copyrights, patents, human capital, and goodwill.

    What standard setters really want is remeasurement of assets and liabilities in terms of "value in use." Suppose that on a given date the "value in use" is estimated as $180 for Asset A and $300 for Asset B. The problem is that we cannot ipso facto add these two values to $480 for a combined "value in use" of Asset A plus Asset B. Dangling off in phantasmagoria fantasy land is the covariance of the values in use:

    Value in Use of Assets A+B = $180 + $300 + Covariance of Assets A and B

    For example is Asset A is a high speed printing press and Asset B is a high speed envelope stuffing machine, the covariance term may be very high when computing value in use in a firm that advertises by mailing out a thousands of letters per day. Without both machines operating simultaneously, the value in use of any one machine is greatly reduced.

    I once observed high speed printing presses and envelope stuffing machines in action in Reverend Billy Graham's "factory" in Minneapolis. Suppose to printing presses and envelope stuffing machines we add other assets such as the value of the Billy Graham name/logo that might be termed Asset C. Now we have a more complicated covariance system:

  •             Value in Use of Assets A+B+C = (Values of A+B+C) + (Higher Order Covariances of A+B+C)

    And when hundreds of assets and liabilities are combined, the two-variate, three-variate, and n-variate higher order covariances for combined ""value in use" becomes truly phantasmagoric accounting. Any simplistic surrogate such as those suggested in the FAS 157 framework are absurdly simplistic and misleading as estimates of the values of Assets A, B, C, D, etc.

    Furthermore, if the "value of the firm" is somehow estimated, it is virtually impossible to disaggregate that value down to "values in use" of the various component assets and liabilities that are not truly independent of one another in a going concern. Financial analysts are interested in operations details and components of value and would be disappointed if all that a firm reported is a single estimate of its total value every quarter.

    Of course there are exceptions where a given asset or liability is independent of other assets and liabilities. Covariances in such instances are zero. For example, passive investments in financial assets generally can be estimated at exit values in the spirit of FAS 157. An investment in 1,000 shares of Microsoft Corporation is independent of ownership of 5,000 shares of Exxon. A strong case can be made for exit value accounting of these passive investments. Similarly a strong case can be made for exit value accounting of such derivative financial instruments as interest rate swaps and forward contracts since the historical cost in most instances is zero at the inception of many derivative contracts.

    The problem with fair value re-measurement of passive investments in financial assets lies in the computation of earnings in relation to cash flows. If the value of 1,000 shares of Microsoft decreases by -$40,000 and the value of 5000 shares of Exxon increases by +$140,000, the combined change in earnings is $100,000 assuming zero covariance. But if the Microsoft shares were sold and and the Exxon shares were held, we've combined a realized loss with an unrealized gain as if they were equivalents. This gives rise to the "hypothetical transaction" problem of fair value re-measurements. If the Exxon shares are held for a very long time, fair value accounting may give rise to years and years of "fiction" in terms of variations in value that are never realized. Companies hate earnings volatility caused by fair value "fictions" that are never realized in cash over decades of time.

    Now consider real estate fair value re-measurement:

    Levels of "Value" of an Entire Company
    General Theory Days Inns of America
    (As Reported September 30, 1987)
    Market Value of the Entire Block of Common Shares at Today's Price Per Share
    (Ignoring Blockage Factors)
    Not Available 
    Day Inns of America
    Was Privately Owned
    Exit Value of Firm if Sold As a Firm
    (Includes synergy factors and unbooked intangibles)
    Not Available for
    Days Inns of America
    Sum of Exit Values of Booked Assets Minus Liabilities & Pref. Stock
    (includes unbooked and unrealized gains and losses)
    $194,812,000 
    as Reported by Days Inns
    Book Value of the Firm as Reported in Financial Statements  $87,356,000 as Reported
    Book Value of the Firm as Reported in the Financial Statements  After General Price Level Adjustments Not Available for Days Inns

     

    Neither $87,356,000 book value is the residual historical cost nor the $194,812,000 is a reliable estimate of "value in use" of the net assets of Days Inns in 1987. At that time Days Inns was very much a private and highly successful going concern contemplating an initial public offering (IPO). FAS 157 excludes $197,812,000 as an estimate of "value in use" since piecemeal liquidation of the hotels is most likely the "worst possible use" of these hotels. Their values also have high covariance valuation components, especially the covariance of the real estate values with the goodwill value and human capital values of Days Inns. Furthermore, value in use of these properties will greatly change if the sign on each hotel is changed from Days Inn to Holiday Inn. The reason is that phantasmagoric summation of all the first order to n-th order covariance terms.

    Among the various reasons Days Inn never went to the trouble of having Landhauer Associates or any other real estate appraisal firm appraise the exit (sales) value of each of its hundreds of hotels is that the cost of getting these appraisals updated each year is prohibitive as well as being subject to huge margins of error. Days Inns went to considerable expense having its exit values appraised this one time in 1987 for purposes of improving the proceeds of an IPO. Obtaining these appraisals annually is far too costly for financial reporting purposes alone. Furthermore it is highly unlikely that these hotels will ever be sold piecemeal. If they will ever be sold, it is more likely that all the hotels or large subsets of these properties will be sold in block, and the block value is much different the the sum of the appraisals of each property in the set. Value in use differs greatly from summations of piecemeal exit values

    It is useful to supplement historical cost allocation values with exit value estimates as well as other possible fair value estimates at a given point in time, but balance sheets summing component values as if no covariances exist is absurd except in the case of historical cost book values and passive financial investments and liabilities. Another problem is that realistic estimates of exit values of such things as the value of each of over 300 hotels is very costly to obtain on a periodic basis such as an annual basis. 

    Not everything that can be counted, counts. And not everything that counts can be counted.
    Albert Einstein

    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at various other links:

    I recently completed the first draft of a paper on fair value at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm 
    Comments would be helpful.

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes 

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms

    Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation, and Yield Curves for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm


    "Among Different Classes of Equity:  Valuation models can be tailored to unique financing structures." by Andrew C. Smith and Jason C. Laurent, Journal of Accouintancy, March 2008 --- http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/mar2008/allocating_value.htm 

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
    It is essential for board members, executive officers, CFOs, auditors and private equity investors to comprehend option-pricing models used to determine the per-share values of common and preferred shares.

    The AICPA Practice Aid, Valuation of Privately-Held-Company Equity Securities Issued as Compensation, describes three methods of allocating value between preferred and common equity, which include:

    Current Value Method (“CVM”) Probability Weighted Expected Return Method (“PWERM”) Option-Pricing Method (“OPM”)

    OPM, which is based on the Black-Scholes model, is a common method for allocating equity value between common and preferred shares.

    Valuation models must be tailored to the specific facts and circumstances of the equity in the company being valued.

    Bob Jensen's threads on valuation are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm


    Notable Quotations About the SEC's New Proposals for Oil & Gas Accounting

    I think I can always tell when the fix is in. First, big lies are woven into a large dose of truth, so they won't look to be as big as they are. There are certainly many things in the SEC's proposal to recommend it, especially along the lines of expanding the types of reserves that would be disclosed, and updating important definitions. Second, when the justification for a proposal makes no sense, there can be no debate; you can't tell the emperor he's naked. The lesson of the Cox's SEC is to never forget about the big special interests that write big checks to the big politicians that made him emperor for a day.
    Tom Selling, "SEC on Oil and Gas Disclosures: Current Prices Aren't 'Meaningful'?" The Accounting Onion, July 25, 2008 --- http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/07/oil-and-gas-dis.html


    Tom Selling put together a nice summary of some key issues in fair value accounting at
    The SEC's Fair Value Roundtable” The Accounting Onion, July 16, 2008 ---
     http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/07/the-secs-fair-v.html  

    On July 9, 2008, in Washington, DC, the SEC hosted a roundtable "to facilitate an open discussion of the benefits and potential challenges associated with existing fair value accounting and auditing standards." The roundtable was webcast and lasted about four hours. I admit that I literally fell asleep after listening to the discussion for the better part of three hours, so I missed the end. For all I know, the grand finale was a fireworks display, but I doubt it – this time, both literally and figuratively. When the SEC schedules these roundtable events for 9 a.m. on the east coast, I can't help but wonder what they are trying to tell those of us located in PAC-10 country (Go Sun Devils!). Maybe they would really prefer that no one listens.

    Anyway, the topics included, among other things, discussions of the aspects of current standards that could be improved, and the usefulness of fair value accounting to investors. I'm going to address three issues that are so basic and important enough that accounting professors may want to consider using them for a class discussion.

    Issue #1: "Held-to-Maturity" Investments

    James Tisch of Loews Corp., when talking about his company's insurance subsidiaries, teed up this issue by describing a situation where his company would invest in marketable debt securities whose valuation might be affected by interest rate changes -- even though there would be no changes to the borrower's credit risk. Being an insurance company subject to various regulatory authorities, a rise in interest rates would supposedly force Loews to declare the investments in the held- to-maturity-category of marketable debt securities, the least onerous of three evils (the other two requiring fair value accounting).

    Without the held-to-maturity option, the carrying amount of the investment would initially decline as interest rates rose, but could be expected to recover to the amount of the contractual obligation as the maturity date approached. Tisch's view seems to be that either fair value accounting would unreasonably record losses when it is highly probable that the entire investment plus interest will be recovered, or that constraints imposed by regulators trump the accounting that is most appropriate from an investor's viewpoint.

    I think that the best way to approach a question like this is to ask yourself a simple question: did Mr. Tisch's company suffer a loss because it chose to invest in fixed-rate, as opposed to variable-rate, debt instruments? Yes it did. While regulators may find that it obscures their own peculiar needs, there must surely more straightforward ways to solve the conflict with investor needs than to muck up the financial statements.

    And don't forget that apart from appeasing the needs of regulators, the held-to-maturity category is chicken salad for management: as Mr. Tisch implied, his company would manage its reported financial position by "cherry picking": if interest rates were to decline instead of rise, those same investments are probably classified as trading in order to get the asset and earnings bumps.

    In short, FAS 115 on marketable securities could have been a lot simpler if the goals for financial statements could be (and should be) a lot simpler. As another panelist observed, one shouldn't need a legal degree to be capable of reading all the disclosures. I believe the disclosures he was referring to owe their existence to low-quality solutions cobbled together to meet the needs of someone else besides investors. The SEC should be telling other regulators to go and make their own accounting rules if they don't like the ones that are supposed to protect investors.

    Issue #2: Fair Value of Liabilities

    Joseph Price, the CFO of Bank of America, expressed his opposition to applying fair value measurements to contractual obligations such as litigation (and by the way, one of my more recent posts discusses the misguided way in which the IASB would require fair value measurement for some non-contractual obligations). Mr. Price has no problem with a mixed attribute model of accounting, which is just another way of saying that he has no problem adding apples and oranges.

    The larger question, however, is whether any liability should be subject to fair value measurement. In addition to the claims that gain recognition on liabilities from deterioration of credit risk would distort earnings, other speakers pointed out that the character of the gain itself, often incapable of being monetized absent liquidation, creates problems.

    The academic, Kathy Petroni, conceded that it can be confusing when an operating loss can be more than offset by gains from writing down the value of one's own debt. However, she is also of the view that the gain on the debt is representationally faithful; in other words, the problem is not with the current valuation of the debt, but with incomplete asset revaluation. This is because not all balance sheet assets are measured at fair value, and not all economic assets are even recognized. Tom Linsmeier, of the FASB and also an academic, made the interesting observation that a write-down to liabilities could be reasonably interpreted by investors as a signal of the asset losses that were not recognized.

    As you may already have guessed, I am not sympathetic to stating liabilities at something other than current values. For one thing, we will never get to the point where all of the assets of a business are recognized, so we will never get to the point of measuring all of the components of economic income. Investor's don't expect financial reporting to account for all of the components of economic income. (Actually, that's what changes in stock prices do, but they have the distinct disadvantage of not allowing an analyst to directly identify the drivers of stock price changes.) What investors do expect is that the components of economic income that are measured are measured properly. If the deterioration of a company's credit worthiness creates an opportunity, amidst the other problems it must be experiencing, for it to restructure its debt advantageously, doesn't that opportunity benefit shareholders? Absolutely.

    And, by the way, I am not advocating that all liabilities, regardless of the likelihood that a cash outflow will occur, be given recognition. And perhaps, some non-contractual liabilities, due to their nature, should be excluded from recognition. So the problem of incomplete recognition extends to the liability side just as much as to the asset side.

    As the old saying goes, "perfection is the enemy of the good". What that means here is that we should not be distorting liability valuation just because some other element is not perfectly taken account of.

    Issue #3: Fair Value Accounting for Non-Financial Assets

    There was some discussion and support for measuring non-financial assets at fair value, but that support may have been even less enthusiastic than the support for fair value measurement of financial assets.

    Logic dictates that whatever approach to fair value for financial assets is taken, that same approach should be applicable to non-financial assets. What's good for the goose is good for the gander; otherwise, we permanently consign ourselves to adding apples and oranges. And speaking of which, I have also pointed out here that some folks who don't care whether they are adding apples and oranges don't even care how assets and liabilities are measured -- just so long as they can control what is reported on the (their) income statement. One of my favorite examples is the historic cost of a tract of land carried on the balance sheet of a foreign subsidiary: when multiplied by today's current exchange rate to translate into dollars, we don't end up with an historic cost in dollars, or a current value in dollars. We end up with what is essentially a random number. How do you test impairment of a random number?

    Speaking impairment, for those of you who have had to apply FAS 144 on the impairment of long-lived assets, or FAS 142 on goodwill impairment, or even inventory impairment, you would know from that unfortunate experience that the impairment model of accounting is perhaps the biggest source of complexity, if not broken altogether. Some would argue that it is a reason, in and of itself, to abandon historic cost accounting and move to some version of current costs.

    So, what if we went to fair value accounting for non-financial assets? That might solve the impairment problem, but it would raise another big issue, that being gain recognition before the non-financial assets, usually inventory, were actually sold. In a nutshell, that's why I think proponents of fair value are hesitant to extend the concept to non-financial assets -- more than anything, it exposes the main problem of fair value serving as a core accounting principle.

    The appropriate non-financial asset attribute to measure is replacement cost (entry prices), and not fair value (exit prices). To further appreciate this, take for example the issue of transaction costs to acquire inventory. If FAS 157 were applied to purchases of raw materials inventory, transaction costs (perhaps a brokerage fee) would be expensed immediately upon acquisition. We all know that this makes no sense: we immediately have an expense to report before we have any chance at all to generate a return on our investment. (By the way, the same anomaly applies to financial assets, but it has already been established by FAS 157 that the FASB doesn't seem to care much about this.)

    A replacement cost approach, on the other hand, would mean that all of the expenditures required to replace the asset should be part of the carrying amount of the asset. If we ultimately sell inventory for an amount greater than it would cost us to replace it, then we have a profit.

    Getting back to geese and ganders, if replacement cost is the appropriate attribute to measure for non-financial assets, then it must be the appropriate attribute for financial assets as well.

    Oh, Well…

    Overall, the roundtable contributed very little to the fair value debate that hasn't already been expressed and considered before. Nonetheless, it reinforces two points that may well conclude that class discussion that was suggesting:

    First, I would prefer to have a dialogue at the SEC instead of in London at IFRS headquarters. Chairman Cox himself unwittingly pointed this out when he asked one set of panelists whether they believe current accounting rules contributed in some way to the economic issues the financial institutions are now dealing with. What if the answer to his question is "yes"? That, by itself, should settle for ever the debate about who should be setting accounting standards for the U. S. capital markets. What if the answer to Cox's question is "we don't know"? QED.

    Second, it would be refreshing if for once, an issue were settled by simply asking what it is that investors would want. Why does it seem that policy makers are incapable of doing that?

     


    "FAS 157: Auditors are ready to assign fair value to financial assets," AccountingWeb, November 2007 --- 
    http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=104246

    When credit markets all but dried up as a result of the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the late summer, auditors of investment and commercial banks that elected to adopt Financial Accounting Standard 157, Fair Value Measurements, earlier than the effective date of November 15th were called upon to play a key role in determining the market value of mortgage-backed assets when few were being traded. Many of these banks had to report huge write-downs in the third quarter from declining assets values. But auditors of public companies have made it clear in three recently published white papers from their newly formed Center for Audit Quality that despite the severity of the current market crunch, they intend to apply the fair value standard consistently, and market problems will not influence their professional judgment about the quality of valuation models and assumptions used by banks.

    Continued in article

    Jensen Comment
    The following standards are especially pertinent to fair value accounting:
    FAS 105, 107, 115, 130, 133, 141(R), 142, 155, 157, 159
    FAS 157 is mainly a definitional standard. The key standard to date is FAS 159 that allows companies to cherry pick which contracts are to be carried at fair value and which are to be carried at amortized historical cost. To me FAS 159 is a terrible standard that can lead to all sorts of subjective manipulation, earnings management, and aggregation of apples and door knobs in summations of assets, liabilities, and earnings components. I think the FASB viewed FAS 159 as a political expedient way to expand fair value accounting into financial statements without having to fight the huge political battle with banks and other corporations who aggressively oppose required fair value accounting for all financial and derivative financial instruments.

    The FAS 141(R) revision of the business combinations standard FAS 141 makes a giant leap into fair value accounting for intangibles acquired with business combinations.


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on May 16, 2008

    MBIA's Book-Value View
    by David Reilly
    The Wall Street Journal

    May 13, 2008
    Page: C12
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121065046561187725.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
     

    TOPICS: Accounting, Banking, Fair Value Accounting, Financial Accounting, Financial Analysis, Financial Reporting, Financial Statement Analysis, GAAP, Generally accepted accounting principles, Mark-to-Market, Market-Value Approach

    SUMMARY: Mr. Reilly advises that investors "should stick to figures the company compiles according to generally accepted accounting principles" in analyzing MBIA's financial position, particularly its $8.70 per share book value. MBIA management provides an alternative book value measure that ignores items with which it disagrees about the treatment under generally accepted accounting principles, particularly mark-to-market requirements.

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Financial accounting, financial statement analysis, and accounting theory courses all may use this article to discuss the bias inherent in choosing alternative measures to GAAP.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1. (Introductory) Define the terms book value and book value per share. Why do these measures, based on financial statements, differ from market value per share?

    2. (Advanced) What is mark-to-market accounting? In general, for what MBIA balance sheet items do you think the company must employ this measurement method?

    3. (Introductory) " Some investors may...think mark-to-market accounting is overestimating losses at MBIA and other financial firms." How does overstating losses lead to concerns with accurately assessing book value and book value per share? What arguments support the assessment that losses may be overestimated?

    4. (Advanced) How is MBIA management trying to divert attention from book value per share according to generally accepted accounting principles to a measure it says 'provides an economic basis for investors to reach their own conclusions about the fair value of the company'? What qualitative characteristics of accounting information may be violated in the measures chosen by management?
     

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
     

    "MBIA's Book-Value View:  Bond Insurer Dons Rosier Glasses; Dot-Bomb Move?" by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, May 13, 2008; Page C12 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121065046561187725.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac

    Back in the dot-bomb days, companies liked to guide investors to rosy variations of their stated profit. These profit figures eventually became known as EBBS, or "earnings before bad stuff."

    Bond insurer MBIA Inc. is taking a page from that playbook. In its first-quarter earnings release Monday, MBIA said investors shouldn't look to its stated book value -- the measure of a company's net worth based on assets minus liabilities. Instead it prefers a metric it calls "analytic adjusted book value" that "provides an economic basis for investors to reach their own conclusions about the fair value of the company."

    A better name for this measure might have been SEEMM, or "shareholders equity excluding mortgage mess." At its core, this means avoiding marking assets to market -- that is, adjusting their value down to what they would sell for today. So MBIA's variation on book value excludes things like the $3.5 billion mark-to-market loss on derivatives that drove its $2.4 billion net loss in the first quarter. Rather, it includes management's expectations of losses, plus gains from future expected premium payments.

    This method leads to book value per share of about $42. By excluding only the mark-to-market losses, it shows an adjusted book value of $24 a share.

    That looks a lot better than MBIA's stated book value of $8.70 at the end of March, and its share price Monday of $9.85, up 42 cents, or 4.5%, in 4 p.m. New York Stock Exchange composite trading.

    Investors shouldn't forget the lessons of the Internet-stock bubble; they should stick to figures the company compiles according to generally accepted accounting principles. On the basis of that $8.70-a-share figure, the stock, even at its current level, isn't a bargain.

    MBIA Chief Financial Officer C. Edward Chaplin countered that the firm believes accounting rules don't provide a true view of long-term value. Items valued using market prices are in many cases "distorting the book value of the company as opposed to providing additional useful information to investors," he said.

    The company is in better position following the $2.6 billion in capital it has raised in recent months. That has led ratings firms to maintain its triple-A ratings and calmed investor fears that MBIA could go under.

    Some investors may be tempted to side with the company because they, too, think mark-to-market accounting is overestimating losses at MBIA and other financial firms. And the company's book value likely has improved since the end of March, given improvements in the debt markets.

    MBIA still has a lot of problems. One big one is the $18 billion in home-equity loans and second-lien mortgages to which it has exposure. This is one of the hardest-hit, and worsening, areas of the mortgage markets. Some 55% of these loans were originated by Countrywide Financial Corp., whose lending practices are under investigation by federal authorities.

    Another worry is the $40 billion in securities it insures that are backed by commercial mortgages. These haven't gone sour, but as the economy weakens, many analysts expect them to.

    MBIA Chief Executive Jay Brown said on a conference call he believed the company's various loss estimates were realistic. "We sell a promise," he said, referring to the company's pledge to make good on losses it insures against. So investors "are rightly focused on our ability to fulfill that promise."

    They should also be focused on reported numbers, not made-up ones that conjure memories of the market's last bubble.

    HSBC Cheers Investors, but Pitfalls Remain

    Monday's earnings numbers make HSBC Holdings PLC look tempting. Its write-downs were below consensus and growth is coming from Asia and the Middle East. But after the recent 20% rally in the stock, the good news is largely priced in and the bank's warning of a further slowdown in 2009 in the U.S. isn't.

    More worrisome is investors, who bid up HSBC shares 3.1% Monday, seem to believe that the bank has seen the worst of write-downs in the U.S. That is hard to believe since the U.S.-based HSBC Finance unit is deeply entrenched in states like California, Florida and Arizona, where house prices are continuing to decline. More than 40% of HSBC Finance consumer lending's real-estate portfolio is concentrated in states where delinquency is expected to keep rising.

    At the end of March, its portfolio of adjustable-rate mortgages stood at $17.1 billion. About $2 billion of those will have their first interest rates reset in 2008 and double that will reset in 2009. HSBC Finance's portfolio of "stated income loans" -- loans given out without verifying borrower's income -- is $7.2 billion.

    HSBC appears less optimistic than its investors. It is one of the first global banks to put out a serious warning of potential 2009 pain. If the warning comes true, the United Kingdom bank is preparing its investors for hurt and investors should pay heed

    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue

    Bob Jensen's threads on alternative valuations --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases


    Question
    How did fair value accounting turn a $215 million loss into a $195 million gain for the Radian Group?

    Answer
    Because the bonds it insured had been falling in value for a while, the swaps' values had been increasing, leading to charges in previous quarters. In the first quarter, a big chunk of that was reversed. That turned a loss into profit. In theory, the logic of the new accounting approach holds up. But that doesn't change the fact that for investors, the real-world outcome is perverse.

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on May 23, 2008

    When a Loss Is a Gain
    by David Reilly
    The Wall Street Journal

    May 19, 2008
    Page: C12
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121116684762202957.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
     

    TOPICS: Accounting, Financial Accounting, Mark-to-Market Accounting

    SUMMARY: Radian Group managed to post net profit of $195 million, despite a rough first quarter. The profit was a controversial byproduct of a new accounting rule that caused the company to report gains of about $2 billion on some of its liabilities.

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: This situation clearly shows the ironic results possible as a result of the new mark-to-market accounting rule. Use this article for a good critical thinking exercise analyzing the issues resulting from this rule.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1. (Advanced) How did Radian manage to post a net profit of $195 million when it had a loss of $215 million?

    2. (Introductory) What is the basic accounting rule when a firm experiences a reduction in the value of a liability? What is the reasoning behind this basic rule?

    3. (Introductory) What is mark-to-market accounting? Why was this new rule instituted? What is the value of the rule?

    4. (Advanced) The article states that Radian "clearly flagged" the impact of its application of the new rule. What does that mean? Is this required? What would happen if a company did not clearly flag the impact?

    5. (Advanced) What is the ironic result of this new rule? Do you think that this result was anticipated when the rule was drafted? Why or why not? How does this affect investors?

    6. (Advanced) What could happen if Radian's financial health improves in the future?
     

    Reviewed By: Linda Christiansen, Indiana University Southeast
     

    "When a Loss Is a Gain:  New Rule Helped Radian Turn Woes Into a Net Profit," by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2008; Page C12  --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121116684762202957.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC

    Like other companies that insure bonds and mortgages, Radian Group Inc. had a rough first quarter. What a surprise then that it managed to post net profit of $195 million.

    How that happened holds a cautionary tale for investors. Radian was in the black because its hobbled financial condition caused it to report gains of about $2 billion on some of its liabilities.

    The profit was a controversial byproduct of a new accounting rule involving mark-to-market accounting. Without the benefit of this quirk, Radian's loss would have been about $215 million.

    One of the basic rules of accounting says that a reduction in the value of a liability leads to a gain that usually boosts profit. Under the new rule, companies have to take into account the market's view of their own financial health when considering the market value of some liabilities. In this case, a company's poor health can lead to a reduction in the liability's value.

    Radian hasn't done anything wrong. It properly applied the new rule and clearly flagged its impact when it reported earnings last week. Others might not be so forthright, meaning investors will have to be even more sharp-eyed as the credit crisis plays itself out.

    The irony is that by marking these particular assets to market as the new rule requires, the weaker a company gets, the stronger it may look.

    "The most bizarre aspect of this is that if I'm going bankrupt, the market's diminishing perception of my credit-worthiness fuels my profits," said Damon Silvers, associate general counsel at the AFL-CIO and a longtime critic of market-value accounting.

    Another twist: If perceptions of Radian's financial health increase in coming quarters, the company could reverse the gain. That could lead it to take losses on some of its assets.

    Radian Chief Financial Officer C. Robert Quint doesn't take issue with the overall notion of market-value accounting. But he said aspects of it, such as these gains, can be troubling. "For investors to really understand what's going on behind the numbers is proving more and more difficult," he said.

    Other companies, notably big banks and brokers, have in recent months seen similar gains from declines in the value of their own debt, which also leads to a reduction of liabilities and a boost in profit. But the impact is more pronounced at Radian and other insurers because the gains are coming instead from their core insurance business, at least when it involves derivatives. Radian and others also saw an outsized impact because their first-time adoption of the rule led to a big, all-at-once adjustment.

    Here is how it plays out. Say a company holds a bond and insures against the bond's default by buying a credit-default swap from an insurer. If the bond falls 10%, the value of the swap would increase, say, by the same amount. The bond is considered riskier, so insurance on the bond is more valuable.

    In the past, a bondholder would have booked offsetting gains and losses as the bond fell in value and the insurance rose in value. But the new accounting rule on measuring market values says companies also have to consider how much something would fetch if sold today.

    If the market has doubts about the financial health of the insurer that issued the credit-default swap, that swap might not fetch the full 10% premium. While the bond it insures is riskier, the insurer that issued it is riskier, too. Maybe it could be sold for only a 5% gain. In that case, the initial 10% moves in both the bond and swap wouldn't cancel each other out and the bondholder would record a loss of 5%.

    For the insurer issuing the swap, though, this works in reverse. When bonds that Radian insured fell in value, the increase in the value of the swap, or liability, would be taken as a charge. The new rule added a wrinkle -- they could no longer assume that the only driver of the swap's value was the bond it insured. Instead, the insurers had to figure in the impact of their own perceived credit-worthiness and how that would affect the swap's value in a sale.

    Radian's perceived credit-worthiness plummeted in the first quarter as billions of dollars of mortgages it insured fell in value. With Radian's credit-worthiness in question, the value of the credit-default swaps it issued fell in value. That led to a big decline in the value it ascribed to swaps.

    Because the bonds it insured had been falling in value for a while, the swaps' values had been increasing, leading to charges in previous quarters. In the first quarter, a big chunk of that was reversed. That turned a loss into profit.

    In theory, the logic of the new accounting approach holds up. But that doesn't change the fact that for investors, the real-world outcome is perverse.

    Bob Jensen's threads on interest rate swap valuations are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm

    Bob Jensen's threads on FAS 133 and IAS 39 are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue


    Question
    What is the meaning of the new buzz acronym EBITDAGSAC?

    "EBITDAGSAC: A Guide to Cash Generation for Bankers," Long or Short Capital, April 28, 2008 ---
    http://longorshortcapital.com/ebitdagsac-a-guide-to-cash-generation-for-bankers.htm 


    "The Role of Fair Value Accounting in the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown," Journal of Accountancy, May 2008 --- http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/may2008/in_my_opinion.htm

    As the credit markets froze and stocks gyrated, investors and pundits naturally looked for someone, or some thing, to blame. Fair value accounting quickly emerged as an oft-cited problem. But is fair value really a cause of the crisis, or is it just a scapegoat? And might it have prevented an even worse calamity? On the following pages, the JofA presents three views on the debate.

     "Both Sides Make Good Points," by Michael R. Young

    How often do we get to have a raging national debate on an accounting standard? Well, we’re in one now.

    And while the standard at issue—FASB Statement no. 157, Fair Value Measurements—is fairly new, the underlying substance of the debate goes back for decades: Is it best to record assets at their cost or at their fair (meaning market) value? It is an issue that goes to the very heart of accountancy and stirs passions like few others in financial reporting. There are probably two reasons for this. First, each side of the debate has excellent points to make. Second, each side genuinely believes what it is saying.

    So let’s step back, take a deep breath, and think about the issue with all of the objectivity we can muster. The good news is that the events of the last several months involving subprime-related financial instruments give us an opportunity to evaluate the extent to which fair value accounting has, or has not, served the financial community. Indeed, some might point out that the experience has been all too vivid.

    WHAT HAPPENED We’re all familiar with what happened. This past summer, two Bear Stearns funds ran into problems, and the result was increasing financial community uncertainty about the value of mortgage backed financial instruments, particularly collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). As investors tried to delve into the details of the value of CDO assets and the reliability of their cash flows, the extraordinary complexity of the instruments provided a significant impediment to insight into the underlying financial data.

    As a result, the markets seized. In other words, everyone got so nervous that active trading in many instruments all but stopped.

    The practical significance of the market seizure was all too apparent to both owners of the instruments and newspaper readers. What was largely missed behind the scenes, though, was the accounting significance under Statement no. 157, which puts in place a “fair value hierarchy” that prioritizes the inputs to valuation techniques according to their objectivity and observability (see also “Refining Fair Value Measurement,” JofA, Nov. 07, page 30). At the top of the hierarchy are “Level 1 inputs” which generally involve quoted prices in active markets. At the bottom are “Level 3 inputs” in which no active markets exist.

    The accounting significance of the market seizure for subprime financial instruments was that the approach to valuation for many instruments almost overnight dropped from Level 1 to Level 3. The problem was that, because many CDOs to that point had been valued based on Level 1, established models for valuing the instruments at Level 3 were not in place. Just as all this was happening, moreover, another well-intended aspect of our financial reporting system kicked in: the desire to report fast-breaking financial developments to investors quickly.

    To those unfamiliar with the underlying accounting literature, the result must have looked like something between pandemonium and chaos. They watched as some of the most prestigious financial organizations in the world announced dramatic write downs, followed by equally dramatic write downs thereafter. Stock market volatility returned with a vengeance. Financial institutions needed to raise more capital. And many investors watched with horror as the value of both their homes and stock portfolios seemed to move in parallel in the wrong direction.

    To some, this was all evidence that fair value accounting is a folly. Making that argument with particular conviction were those who had no intention of selling the newly plummeting financial instruments to begin with. Even those intending to sell suspected that the write-downs were being overdone and that the resulting volatility was serving no one. According to one managing director at a risk research firm, “All this volatility we now have in reporting and disclosure, it’s just absolute madness.”

    IS FAIR VALUE GOOD OR BAD? So what do we make of fair value accounting based on the subprime experience?

    Foremost is that some of the challenges in the application of fair value accounting are just as difficult as some of its opponents said they would be. True, when subprime instruments were trading in active, observable markets, valuation did not pose much of a problem. But that changed all too suddenly when active markets disappeared and valuation shifted to Level 3. At that point, valuation models needed to be deployed which might potentially be influenced by such things as the future of housing prices, the future of interest rates, and how homeowners could be expected to react to such things.

    The difficulties were exacerbated, moreover, by the suddenness with which active markets disappeared and the resulting need to put in place models just as pressure was building to get up-to-date information to investors. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that in some instances asset values had to be revised as models were being refined and adjusted.

    Imperfect as the valuations may have been, though, the real-world consequences of the resulting volatility were all too concrete. Some of the world’s largest financial institutions, seemingly rock solid just a short time before, found themselves needing to raise new capital. In the aftermath of subprime instrument write-downs, one of the most prestigious institutions even found itself facing a level of uncertainty that resulted in what was characterized as a “run on the bank.”

    So the subprime experience with fair value accounting has given the naysayers some genuine experiences with which to make their case.

    Still, the subprime experience also demonstrates that there are two legitimate sides to this debate. For the difficulties in financial markets were not purely the consequences of an accounting system. They were, more fundamentally, the economic consequences of a market in which a bubble had burst.

    And advocates of fair value can point to one aspect of fair value accounting—and Statement no. 157 in particular—that is pretty much undeniable. It has given outside investors real-time insight into market gyrations of the sort that, under old accounting regimes, only insiders could see. True, trying to deal with those gyrations can be difficult and the consequences are not always desirable. But that is just another way of saying that ignorance is bliss.

    For fair value advocates, that may be their best argument of all. Whatever its faults, fair value accounting and Statement no. 157 have brought to the surface the reality of the difficulties surrounding subprime-related financial instruments. Is the fair value system perfect? No. Is there room for improvement? Inevitably. But those favoring fair value accounting may have one ultimate point to make. In bringing transparency to the aftermath of the housing bubble, it may be that, for all its imperfections, the accounting system has largely worked.

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Michael R. Young is a partner in the New York based law firm Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, where he specializes in accounting irregularities and securities litigation. He served as a member of the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council to FASB during the development of FASB Statement no. 157. His e-mail address is myoung@willkie.com.

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    "The Capital Markets’ Needs Will Be Served: Fair value accounting limits bubbles rather than creates them," by Paul B.W. Miller

    With regard to the relationship between financial accounting and the subprime-lending crisis, I observe that the capital markets’ needs will be served, one way or another.

    Grasping this imperative leads to new outlooks and behaviors for the better of all. In contrast to conventional dogma, capital markets cannot be managed through accounting policy choices and political pressure on standard setters. Yes, events show that markets can be duped, but not for long and not very well, and with inevitable disastrous consequences.

    With regard to the crisis, attempts to place blame on accounting standards are not valid. Rather, other factors created it, primarily actors in the complex intermediation chain, including:

    Borrowers who sought credit beyond their reach.

    Borrowers who sought credit beyond their reach.

    Investment bankers who earned fees for bundling and selling vaporous bonds without adequately disclosing risk.

    Institutional investors who sought high returns without understanding the risk and real value.

    In addition, housing markets collapsed, eliminating the backstop provided by collateral. Thus, claims that accounting standards fomented or worsened this crisis lack credibility.

    The following paragraphs explain why fair value accounting promotes capital market efficiency.

    THE GOAL OF FINANCIAL REPORTING The goal of financial reporting, and all who act within it, is to facilitate convergence of securities’ market prices on their intrinsic values. When that happens, securities prices and capital costs appropriately reflect real risks and returns. This efficiency mutually benefits everyone: society, investors, managers and accountants.

    Any other goals, such as inexpensive reporting, projecting positive images, and reducing auditors’ risk of recrimination, are misdirected. Because the markets’ demand for useful information will be satisfied, one way or another, it makes sense to reorient management strategy and accounting policy to provide that satisfaction.

    THE PERSCRIPTION The key to converging market and intrinsic values is understanding that more information, not less, is better. It does no good, and indeed does harm, to leave markets guessing. Reports must be informative and truthful, even if they’re not flattering.

    To this end, all must grasp that financial information is favorable if it unveils truth more completely and faithfully instead of presenting an illusory better appearance. Covering up bad news isn’t possible, especially over the long run, and discovered duplicity brings catastrophe.

    SUPPLY AND DEMAND To reap full benefits, management and accountants must meet the markets’ needs. Instead, past attention was paid primarily to the needs of managers and accountants and what they wanted to supply with little regard to the markets’ demands. But progress always follows when demand is addressed. Toward this end, managers must look beyond preparation costs and consider the higher capital costs created when reports aren’t informative.

    Above all, they must forgo misbegotten efforts to coax capital markets to overprice securities, especially by withholding truth from them. Instead, it’s time to build bridges to these markets, just as managers have accomplished with customers, employees and suppliers.

    THE CONTENT In this paradigm, the preferable information concerns fair values of assets and liabilities. Historical numbers are of no interest because they lack reliability for assessing future cash flows. That is, information’s reliability doesn’t come as much from its verifiability (evidenced by checks and invoices) as from its dependability for rational decision making. Although a cost is verifiable, it is unreliable because it is a sample of one that at best reflects past conditions. Useful information reveals what is now true, not what used to be.

    It’s not just me: Sophisticated users have said this, over and over again. For example, on March 17, Georgene Palacky of the CFA Institute issued a press release, saying, “Fair value is the most transparent method of measuring financial instruments, such as derivatives, and is widely favored by investors.” This expressed demand should help managers understand that failing to provide value-based information forces markets to manufacture their own estimates. In turn, the markets defensively guess low for assets and high for liabilities. Rather than stable and higher securities prices, disregarding demand for truthful and useful information produces more volatile and lower prices that don’t converge on intrinsic values.

    However it arises, a vacuum of useful public information is always filled by speculative private information, with an overall increase in uncertainty, cost, risk, volatility and capital costs. These outcomes are good for no one.

    THE STRATEGY Managers bring two things to capital markets: (1) prospective cash flows and (2) information. Their work isn’t done if they don’t produce quality in both. It does no good to present rosy pictures of inferior cash flow potential because the truth will eventually be known. And it does no good to have great potential if the financial reports obscure it.

    Thus, managers need to unveil the truth about their situation, which is far different from designing reports to prop up false images. Even if well-intentioned, such efforts always fail, usually sooner rather than later.

    It’s especially fruitless to mold standards to generate this propaganda because readers don’t believe the results. Capital markets choose whether to rely on GAAP financial statements, so it makes no sense to report anything that lacks usefulness. For the present situation, then, not reporting best estimates of fair value frustrates capital markets, creates more risk, diminishes demand for a company’s securities and drives prices even lower.

    THE ROLE FOR ACCOUNTING REPORTING Because this crisis wasn’t created by poor accounting, it won’t be relieved by worse accounting. Rather, the blame lies with inattention to CDOs’ risks and returns. It was bad management that led to losses, not bad standards.

    In fact, value-based reporting did exactly what it was supposed to by unveiling risk and its consequences. It is pointless to condemn FASB for forcing these messages to be sent. Rather, we should all shut up, pay attention, and take steps to prevent other disasters.

    That involves telling the truth, cleanly and clearly. It needs to be delivered quickly and completely, withholding nothing. Further, managers should not wait for a bureaucratic standard-setting process to tell them what truth to reveal, any more than carmakers should build their products to minimum compliance with government safety, mileage and pollution standards.

    I cannot see how defenders of the status quo can rebut this point from Palacky’s press release: “…only when fair value is widely practiced will investors be able to accurately evaluate and price risk.”

    THE FUTURE Nothing can prevent speculative bubbles. However, the sunshine of truth, freely offered by management with timeliness, will certainly diminish their frequency and impact.

    Any argument that restricting the flow of useful public information will solve the problem is totally dysfunctional. The markets’ demand for value-based information will be served, whether through public or private sources. It might as well be public.

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    Paul B.W. Miller, CPA, Ph.D., a professor of accounting at the University of Colorado, served on both FASB’s staff and the staff of the SEC’s ­Office of the Chief Accountant. He is also a member of the JofA’s Editorial Advisory Board. His e-mail address is pmiller@uccs.edu.

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    "The Need for Reliability in Accounting:   Why historical cost is more reliable than fair value," by Eugene H. Flegm

    In 1976, FASB issued three documents for discussion: Tentative Conclusions on Objectives of Financial Statements of Business Enterprises; Scope and Implications of the Conceptual Framework Project; and Conceptual Framework for Financial Accounting and Reporting: Elements of Financial Statements and Their Measurement. These documents started a revolution in financial reporting that continues today.

    As the director of accounting, then assistant comptroller-chief ­accountant, and finally as auditor general for General Motors Corp., I have been involved in the resistance to this revolution since it began.

    Briefly, the proposed conceptual framework would shift the determination of income from the income statement and its emphasis on the matching of costs with related revenues to the determination of income by measuring the “well offness” from period to period by measuring changes on the two balance sheets on a fair value basis from the beginning and the ending of the period. The argument was made that these data are more relevant than the historic cost in use and not as subjective as the concept of identifying costs with related revenues. In addition, those in favor of the change claimed that the fair value data was more relevant than the historic cost data and thus more valuable to the possible lenders and investors, ignoring the needs of the actual managers and, in the case of private companies, the owners.

    RELEVANCY REQUIRES RELIABILITY It seems to me that the recent meltdown in the finance industry as well as the Enron experience would have made it clear that to be relevant the data must be reliable.

    Enron took advantage of the mark-to-market rule to create income by just writing up such assets as Mariner Energy Inc. (see SEC Litigation Release no. 18403).

    Charles R. Morris writes in his recently released book, The Trillion Dollar Meltdown: Easy Money, High Rollers, and the Great Credit Crash, that “Securitization fostered irresponsible lending, by seeming to relieve lenders of credit risk, and at the same time, helped propagate shaky credits throughout the global financial system.”

    There is much talk of the need for “transparency,” and it now appears we have completely obscured a company’s exposure to loss! We still do not know the extent of the meltdown!

    ASSIGNING BLAME We are still trying to assign blame—Morris identifies former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan’s easy money policies—and certainly the regulators allowed the finance industry to get out of control. However, FASB and its fascination with “values” and mark to market must be a part of the problem.

    Holman W. Jenkins Jr. began his editorial, “Mark to Meltdown,” (Wall Street Journal, p. A17, March 5, 2008) by stating, “No task is more thankless than to write about accounting for a family newspaper, yet it must be shared with the public that ‘mark to market,’ an accounting and regulatory innovation of the early 1990s, has proved another of Washington’s fabulous failures.”

    Merrill Lynch reported a $15 billion loss on mortgages for 2007. Citicorp had about $12 billion in losses, and Bear Stearns failed. These huge losses came from mortgages that had been written up to some fictitious value based on credit ratings during the preceding years! In addition there is some doubt that those loss estimates might be too conservative and at some point in the future a portion of them may be reversed.

    THE BASIC PURPOSE OF ACCOUNTING Anyone who has ever run an accounting operation knows that the basic purpose of accounting is to provide reliable, transaction-based data by which one can control the assets and liabilities and measure performance of both the overall company and its individual employees.

    A forecast of an income statement each month as well as an analysis of the actual results compared to the previous month’s forecast are a key factor in controlling a company’s operations. The balance sheet will often be used by the treasury department to analyze cash flows and the need for financing. I do not know of a company that compares the values of the beginning and ending balance sheets to determine the success of its operations.

    How did we reach the current state of affairs where the standard setters no longer consider the stewardship needs of the manager but focus instead on the potential investor or creditor and potential values rather than transactional results?

    The problem developed because of the conflict between economics, accounting and finance—and the education of accountants. All three fields are vital to running a company but each has its place. In what some of us perceive to be an exercise of hubris, FASB has attempted to serve the needs of all three fields at the expense of manager or owner needs for control and performance measurements.

    HOW WE GOT HERE The debate over the need for any standards began with the 1929 market crash and the subsequent formation of the SEC. Initially, Congress intended that the chief accountant of the SEC would establish the necessary standards. However, Carmen Blough, the first SEC chief accountant, wanted the American Institute of Accountants (a predecessor to the AICPA) to do this. In 1937 he succeeded in convincing the SEC to do just that. The AICPA did this through an ad hoc committee for 22 years but finally established a more formal committee, the Accounting Principles Board, which functioned until it was deemed inadequate and FASB was formed in 1973.

    FASB’s first order of business was to establish a formal “constitution” as outlined by the report of the Trueblood Committee (Objectives of Financial Statements, AICPA, October 1973). With the influence of several academics on that committee, the thrust of the “constitution” was to move to a balance sheet view of income versus the income view which had arisen in the 1930s. Although the ultimate goal was never clarified, it was obvious to some, most notably Robert K. Mautz, who had served as a professor of accounting at the University of Illinois and partner in the accounting firm Ernst & Ernst (a predecessor to Ernst & Young) and finally a member of the Public Oversight Board and the Accounting Hall of Fame. Mautz realized then that the goal was fair value accounting and traveled the nation preaching that a revolution was being proposed. Several companies, notably General Motors and Shell Oil, led the opposition that continues to this day.

    The most recent statement on the matter was FASB’s 2006 publication of a preliminary views (PV) document called Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting: Objective of Financial Reporting and Qualitative Characteristics of Decision-Useful Financial Reporting Information. It is clear that FASB has abandoned the real daily users who apply traditional accounting to manage their businesses. The PV document refers to investors and creditors only. It mentions the need for comparability and consistency but does not attempt to explain how this would be possible under fair value accounting since each manager would be required to make his or her own value judgments, which, of course, would not be comparable to any other company’s evaluations.

    The only reference to the management of a company states that “…management has the ability to obtain whatever information it needs.” That is true, but under the PV proposal management would have to maintain a third set of books to keep track of valuations. (The two traditional sets would be the operating set based on actual costs and sales, which would need to be continued to allow management or owners to judge actual performance of the company and personnel, while the other set is that used for federal income tax filings.)

    Since there are about 19 million private companies that do not file with the SEC versus the 17,000 public companies that do, private companies are in a quandary. The majority of them file audited financial statements with banks and creditors based on historical costs and for the most part current GAAP. They are already running into trouble with several FASB standards that introduce fair value into GAAP. What GAAP do they use?

    Judging by the crash of the financial system and the tens of billions of dollars in losses booked by investment banks this year, the answer seems clear: Return to establishing standards that are based on costs and transactions, that inhibit rather than encourage manipulation of earnings (such as mark to market, FASB Statements no. 133 and 157 to name a few), and that result in data as reliable as it can be under an accrual accounting system.

    The analysts and other investors and creditors will have to do their own estimates of a company’s future success. However, the success of any company will depend on the quality of its products and services and the skill of its management, not on a guess at the “value” of its assets. Writing up assets was a bad practice in the 1920s and as bad a practice in recent years.

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    Eugene H. Flegm, CPA, CFE, (now retired) served for more than 30 years as an accounting executive for General Motors Corp. He is a frequent contributor to various accounting publications. His e-mail address is ehflegm@earthlink.net.

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    Jensen Comment
    There are many factors that interacted in causing the subprime scandals of 2008. But the one key factor that could have prevented both the Savings & Loan scandals in the 1980s and the Subprime Mortgage scandals of 2008 is professionalism in the real estate appraising industry. In both of these immense scandals real estate appraisers repeatedly provided fair value estimates above and beyond anything that could be considered a realistic fair value. There's genuine moral hazard in the relationships between real estate appraisal firms and real estate brokerage firms who desperately want buyers to get financing needed to close the deals. Banks also want desperately to close the deals so they can sell the mortgages to mortgage buyers like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac quasi-government corporations designed to buy up mortgages from banks.

    These huge scandals provide evidence of the unreliability and nonstationarity of fair value estimates. The freight train that's hauling in fair value standards to replace existing standards in the FASB and the IASB is fraught with peril. There are, of course, many instances where fair value is the only reasonable choice such as in derivative financial instruments where historical cost is usually zero or some miniscule premium paid relative to the huge risks involved. There are other instances such as with leases and pensions having contractual future cash flows where fair value estimation is reasonably accurate. But more often than not fair value estimates are little more than pie in the sky.

    As earnings numbers are increasingly impacted by unrealized adjustments for fair values, many of which wash out to a zero cumulative effect over time, the more firms are contracting based upon earnings before unrealized fair value adjustments. Labor unions are increasingly concerned that companies can manage earnings by such simple devices as implementation of hedge accounting effectiveness testing. Companies like Southwest Airlines exclude these unrealized fair value changes in earnings from compensation contracts with employees in order to ease the fears of employees.

    This is the driving force behind the FASB's bold initiative to eliminate bottom line reporting.
    Five General Categories of Aggregation
    "The Sums of All Parts: Redesigning Financials:  As part of radical changes to the income statement, balance sheet, and cash flow statement, FASB signs off on a series of new subtotals to be contained in each," byMarie Leone, CFO Magazine, November 14, 2007 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#ChangesOnTheWay

    "Profit as We Know It Could Be Lost With New Accounting Statements," by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, May 12, 2007; Page A1 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#ChangesOnTheWay

    "A New Vision for Accounting: Robert Herz and FASB are preparing a radical new format for financial, CFO Magazine, by Alix Stuart, February 2008, pp. 49-53 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#ChangesOnTheWay

    Bob Jensen's threads on alternative valuations --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases


    Question
    What is liquidity stress testing in the context of FAS 157?

    Definition --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#StressTest
    There are two categories:  Sensitivity Analysis and Scenario Analysis

    Ira Kawaller pulished a paper that talks about liquidity stress testing in conjunction with FAS 157 valuation definitions
    "Watching out for FAS 157: Fair Value Measurement," by Ira Kawaller, Bank Asset/Liability Management, April 2008 --- http://www.kawaller.com/pdf/BALMWatchingoutforFAS157.pdf
    Also at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/FairValue/StressTestKawaller.pdf

    Liquidity Risk Measurement Techniques and Stress Tests

    In the first article in this series on the considerations to the formulation of a liquidity stress testing framework, the background to liquidity risk and liquidity stress testing was presented (see March 2008 BALM). This second article in the series investigates various stress-testing categories in order to gain a better understanding of stress testing and how it could be applied in liquidity risk measurement. The basic liquidity risk measurement techniques are explored to establish a framework of potential analytical techniques to apply in the formulation of a liquidity stress testing methodology.

    Liquidity Stress Testing. The formulation of a liquidity stress testing framework requires a clear and decisive understanding of the stress testing technique applied, exactly what is stress tested, and the type of analyses conducted. This section will explore the methods of stress testing that can be applied in the liquidity risk management process. Furthermore, the types of analyses conducted in measuring liquidity risk and other considerations that should be incorporated in the stress testing framework will be discussed.

    Categories of Stress Testing. Generally, stress testing falls in two main categories – sensitivity tests and scenario tests.

    • Sensitivity tests specify financial parameters that are moved instantaneously by a unitary amount, for example, a 10 percent decline or a 10 basis point increase. This approach is a hypothetical perspective to potential future changes in the risk factor(s). Such sensitivity tests lack historical and economic content which limits its usefulness for longer-term risk management decisions. Sensitivity tests can also examine historical movements in a number of financial parameters. Historical movements in parameters can be based on worst case movements over a set historical period (e.g., the worst change in interest rates, equity prices and currencies over the past 10 years). Alternatively, actual market correlations between various factors may be analyzed over a set period of time to determine the movement in factors that would have resulted in the largest loss for the current portfolio. In sensitivity stress tests, the source of the shock is not identified and the time horizon for sensitivity tests is generally shorter, often instantaneous, unlike scenario tests.

    See my glossary at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#StressTest


    "SEC Gives Firms More Leeway In Pricing Asset-Backed Issues," by Judith Burns, The Wall Street Journal, March 31, 2008; Page C7 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120692976040976073.html?mod=todays_us_money_and_investing

    Chief financial officers of public companies received new guidance Friday from the Securities and Exchange Commission, giving firms more leeway to value asset-backed securities in cases where market prices or other relevant pricing information cannot be obtained.

    Public companies may use "unobservable inputs" to value asset-backed securities, but only when actual market prices or relevant observable inputs are not available, according to a letter from SEC staff accountants that will be sent to financial chiefs of public companies holding significant amounts of asset-backed securities.

    Firms that rely on "unobservable inputs" to value illiquid asset-backed securities must determine if that would have a material impact on their financial results, according to the letter. In such cases, the letter said, corporate results must include written explanations of how a firm determined the value of its asset-backed assets and liabilities, as well as how those values might change and what impact that would have on operations, liquidity and capital. SEC staffers said such explanations should appear in quarterly and annual results.

    Additionally, the SEC said public companies might need to provide more disclosure on risky, "Level 3" assets and liabilities, including changes that increased or decreased the amount of assets in that category. It also said firms might need to detail the nature and type of assets underlying asset-backed securities, such as riskier subprime home mortgages or home-equity lines of credit, along with credit ratings on such securities and changes or potential changes to those ratings.

    My threads on fair value accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue

    My free tutorials on FAS 133 and IAS 39 are linked at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

    My FAS 133 and IAS 39 glossary is at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm

    You can find quite a few interesting problems and answers about embedded derivatives in my exam material at  http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/ExamMaterial/PracticeQuestions/


    "FAS 157: The FASB's Prelude and Fugue on Fair Value of Liabilities," by Tom Selling, The Accounting Onion, May 4, 2008 --- http://accountingonion.typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/05/fas-157-the-fas.html

    FAS 157 on fair value measurements was supposed to provide comprehensive guidance for determining the fair value of pretty much any asset or liability.  Yet, almost two years after its initial publication, and well after companies have had to apply the standard to certain accounts, CFO.com reports that the FASB is still making up some of its rules on the fly, and having a tough slog to boot.  The problem described in the article has immediate consequences for derivative financial instruments that are classified as liabilities, but it could eventually affect the measurement of many other liability accounts as fair value measurement becomes more broadly applied:

    "At an unusually heated FASB meeting last week [no minutes published on the FASB's website yet], for instance, the members debated how companies should estimate the market value of liabilities when there's no actual market on which to base the estimate.

    During one point in the discussion, which concerned a proposed guidance by FASB's staff on how to mark liabilities to market under 157, chairman Robert Herz seemed, to member Leslie Seidman, to be contemplating an overhaul of the brand-new standard itself. Matters got so confusing that the board ordered its staff to go back and summarize the members' positions so that they could understand what they themselves had said.

    At issue was the question of how to measure the fair value of a liability for "which there is little, if any, market activity," according to 157. The standard defines fair value as "the price that would be received ... to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date." The question that FASB struggled with was: How do you determine the fair value of a liability that can only be settled, rather than sold?

    ...Often, for instance, when a company borrows money, it can't transfer its obligation to another party without an agreement from the bank. Or a market may not exist for transferring such liabilities."

    It's a mess that the FASB has gotten itself into for two related reasons.  The first is that the problems now being addressed are significant, and they were known long before FAS 157 was let out the door. The second is that FAS 157 is fundamentally flawed in its approach to fair value measurement of liabilities.  The solution, as I am about to describe, seems to me to be surprisingly simple. 

    This particular flaw in FAS 157 (see my previous post on many others) occurs in paragraph 5:

    "Fair value is the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability [italics supplied] in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date." 

    For every liability there is a counter party that holds an asset, and the economic value of the liability must be equal to the economic value of the asset. These are basic economic principles, which are not acknowledged in FAS 157.    If they were acknowledged, there would be no need for the phrase "or paid to transfer a liability."  That's because the value of any liability -- even one that cannot be transferred --must equal the value of the counter party's asset, which, perforce, can always be transferred.  Even though the evidence directly available to value the liability may be scant, the asset value might even be quoted in the newspaper; the non-transferability restriction on the debtor is just one more valuation parameter from the viewpoint of the creditor. 

    If you need further convincing that the solution to the problem of valuing any liability is to value the counter party's asset, let's consider an even thornier non-transferable liability that the FASB briefly considered and then dropped like a hot potato:  contingent environmental liabilities.  My understanding of federal environmental law is that the cleanup liability of a "potentially responsible party" is joint and several.  No other party can assume the liability, so the only way out from under it is to settle with the government.  Although I am not aware that the government has done this, it is theoretically possible for the government to transfer its contingent receivable to a third party.  Is the contingent receivable difficult to value?  Yes, but certainly no harder than many of the complex, illiquid derivatives that are roiling the global economy.  (And by the way, I recall seeing the issue of the fair value of contingent environmental liabilities posted on the FASB's website during the project phase of FAS 157.  The Board expressed a tentative conclusion, but it soon disappeared mysteriously, and without explanation.  I have searched Board minutes, and have come up with nothing.  If anyone has any further information on this that they would like to share, please contact me!)

    Because my solution to liability valuation is so simple (attention: CIFiR - SEC Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting) and obvious, I can't help but fear I have overlooked something.  If that is indeed the case, I hope a reader of this post will take the time to point it out, and I will gladly issue a mea culpa forthwith.  Yet, I derive some measure of comfort (and optimism) by an entry in the minutes of an FASB meeting (11/14/07) where Bob Herz stated that he disagrees with the measurement principles for liabilities in SFAS 157. 

    Who knows, maybe Bob and I are thinking along the same lines?  That gives me hope for the future.  But, I have to express my disappointment that liabilities were not dealt with in a comprehensive way before SFAS 157 was issued. There is much to be said for getting it right the first time.

    Jensen Comment

    Tom wrote the following:

    For every liability there is a counter party that holds an asset, and the economic value of the liability must be equal to the economic value of the asset. These are basic economic principles, which are not acknowledged in FAS 157.    If they were acknowledged, there would be no need for the phrase "or paid to transfer a liability."  That's because the value of any liability -- even one that cannot be transferred --must equal the value of the counter party's asset, which, perforce, can always be transferred.  Even though the evidence directly available to value the liability may be scant, the asset value might even be quoted in the newspaper; the non-transferability restriction on the debtor is just one more valuation parameter from the viewpoint of the creditor. 

    For one party the Pacioli equation A=L+E is tautological since E is the sink hole makes everything balance. But it does it necessarily hold that A(Bank) = L(Homeowner) for 30 years after Bank loaned Homeowner $1 million in cash in a jumbo 30-year mortgage for a home on June 16, 2006. In fact it may well be that A(Bank) = L(Homeowner) did not even hold on the June 16, 2006 since Bank and Homeowner probably had different opportunity costs of capital. Most likely Bank charged for a risk premium and holds the asset (the mortgage note) with values that vary from day-to-day with Homeowner's credit rating and with resale value of the home itself that is the collateral on the loan.

    In conventional mortgages the Bank can transfer the asset (mortgage note) wholesale to another buyer such as Fannie Mae. But Homeowner cannot transfer the liability since most conventional mortgages now have a clause that says the mortgage must be prepaid if Homeowner sells the house. What Fannie will pay Bank for the asset (mortgage note) wholesale varies with market conditions in the wholesale market for mortgages.

    At some point in time Homeowner can go back to Bank and ask to refinance the mortgage (which is tantamount to prepaying the original mortgage), but Homeowner must refinance in the retail market. Bank can deal in both the wholesale and retail markets for mortgages whereas Homeowner is confined to the retail market. The two markets are highly correlated like they are in blue book car markets, but they are not perfectly correlated. Hence I don't think Tom can assume that Bank's transferable asset is equal in value to Homeowner's non-transferrable liability. Homeowner does not have access to all the buyers and sellers in the wholesale market.

    Then there is the other problem that exploded in both the Savings & Loan crisis of the 1980s and the subprime crisis of 2008. In both scandals crooked appraisers overstated the lending value of real estate way beyond realistic selling prices. Suppose Homeowner got the $1 million mortgage on a house that realistically only had a $500,000 value on June 16, 2006 and has sunk to a fair value of only $200,000 on June 16, 2008. How would FAS 157 be applied to a non-transferrable mortgage liability? What is the value of L(Homeowner) on June 16, 2008? Is it necessarily the same as the A(Bank) or A(Fannie) value of the asset held by the current holder of the mortgage investment?

    The fair value of the L(Homeowner) liability to Homeowner is affected by many factors, one of which is the cost of having a lower credit rating simply by turning the property over the Bank. Homeowner may have troubles even getting another loan for several years, and Former Homeowner may have to pay premium rates to get another loan. But the value of the collateral (the house now valued at only $200,000) is far less than the unpaid balance on the loan of nearly $1 million since the( principal amount owing does not decline much in the first two years of a 30-year mortgage). In this instance I don't think Professor Selling can assume that L(Homeowner) = A(Bank) on June 16, 2008. In fact I think the two values are vastly different.

    And Bank (or Fannie Mae) is very sad since what they paid out for homeowners' mortgages is still way in excess of what the combined collateral is really worth in 2008. Fortunately many homeowners are still making payments even though their property is now probably worth less than the discounted cash flows of their remaining mortgage payments.

    The problem with FAS 157 is that it cannot make a silk purse out a sow's ear when valuing assets and liabilities for which markets are non-existent, including surrogate markets. There is also a problem of dynamics of markets. FAS 157 wants reported values of L(Homeowner) and A(Bank) on June 16, 2008. Homeowner may continue to make payments on a $1 million 30-year mortgage for property that is now worth only $200,000 because of transactions costs (including adverse credit ratings) today of walking away from the mortgage and because of hope that this is only a market bleep before the value rises back up in value to more than $1 million in anticipation of soaring inflation.

    There is always the feeling that markets will bounce back. And there are what the mathematicians call non-convexities caused by transactions costs that are real but undeterminable when the cost of lowered credit ratings are factored into transactions costs. For years, accounting theorists criticized economists for unrealistic assumptions of rationality and non-convexities in their models. Economic value was deemed by accountants as unrealistic due to unknown future cash flows, unknown future market conditions at affect prices and interest rates, and unknown future legislative actions and taxes. Now FAS 157 and 159 along with IAS 39 on the international scene wants to turn accountants into economists.

    Valuation is an art rather than a science. Accountants and economists who are teaching free cash flow and residual income valuation models might as well be teaching astrology to FAS 157 implementers. It all boils down to attaching precise-looking number tags to cloud movements that are beyond anybody's control.


    Why do bankers resist expanding FAS 159 into required accounting for all financial instruments?
    Misleading Financial Statements:  Bankers Refusing to Recognize and Shed "Zombie Loans"

    One worrying lesson for bankers and regulators everywhere to bear in mind is post-bubble Japan. In the 1990s its leading bankers not only hung onto their jobs; they also refused to recognise and shed bad debts, in effect keeping “zombie” loans on their books. That is one reason why the country's economy stagnated for so long. The quicker bankers are to recognise their losses, to sell assets that they are hoarding in the vain hope that prices will recover, and to make markets in such assets for their clients, the quicker the banking system will get back on its feet.
    The Economist, as quoted in Jim Mahar's blog on November 10, 2007 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

    After the Collapse of Loan Markets Banks are Belatedly Taking Enormous Write Downs
    BTW one of the important stories that are coming out is the fact that this is affecting all tranches of the debt as even AAA rated debt is being marked down (which is why the rating agencies are concerned). The San Antonio Express News reminds us that conflicts of interest exist here too.
    Jime Mahar, November 10, 2007 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

    Jensen Comment
    The FASB and the IASB are moving ever closer to fair value accounting for financial instruments. FAS 159 made it an option in FAS 159. One of the main reasons it's not required is the tremendous lobbying effort of the banking industry. Although many excuses are given resisting fair value accounting for financial instruments, I suspect that the main underlying reasons are those "Zombie" loans that are overvalued at historical costs on current financial statements.

    Daniel Covitz and Paul Harrison of the Federal Reserve Board found no evidence of credit agency conflicts of interest problems of credit agencies, but thier study is dated in 2003 and may not apply to the recent credit bubble and burst --- http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/feds/2003/200368/200368pap.pdf

    In September 2007 some U.S. Senators accused the rating agencies of conflicts of interest
    "Senators accuse rating agencies of conflicts of interest in market turmoil," Bloomberg News, September 26, 2007 --- http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/09/26/business/credit.php
    Also see http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2007/05/rating-agencies-weak-link.html

    Bob Jensen's Rotten to the Core threads are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm


    Three Articles from the American Bankers Association on Fair Value Accounting (as of the end of 2007) --- http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/FairValue/AmericanBankersAssn/


    Student Rap Video on FAS 159 --- http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hBoZTM8_cVw&feature=related
    This link was forwarded by Denny Beresford, I think with his tongue in his cheek. Denny knows that I consider FAS 159 to be rediculous.


    Question
    When is the purpose of reclassifying loans as "Held-to-Maturity" for purposes of stabilizing earnings rather than a true strategy to hold those notes to maturity, especially when the value of those notes is plunging daily? "Even analysts think so. "If you thought the accounting for investments in debt and equity securities was unnecessarily complex, the accounting for loans will make your head spin,"

    "Is Fair-Value Accounting Always Fair?" Matt A. Greenberg, The Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2008; Page A15 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120468197325912303.html?mod=todays_us_page_one

    Is Fair-Value Accounting Always Fair? March 5, 2008; Page A15 Regarding "Wave of Write-Offs Rattles Market" by David Reilly (page one, March 1): Thirty years ago, no accounting principle was more accepted than that assets are worth what they cost, absent proof of a permanent impairment of value. When such impairment was understood and confirmed, the carrying value was adjusted.

    Today, I see the overzealous accounting profession calling for long-term assets, those which the owners do not intend to sell, nor have need to sell, being forced to mark such assets to market on a regular basis. While this may make sense for equities, where market values tend to reflect economic reality or assets which may need to be sold in the normal course of operating the business, it makes no sense for assets intended to be held to maturity. The marking of long-term complex financial instruments where market values are temporarily depressed and meaningless for the longer term is terribly destructive. In many cases, the only market prices available are distressed sellers or some thin index which is regularly shorted by investment professionals.

    These are not real values, and marking to these prices causes unnecessary volatility and contractions in capital which restrict the ability of financial institutions to operate and grow. Perhaps the accounting profession is trying to overcompensate for its failures in the Enron fiasco and other similar cases, and to prevent lawsuits. Fair-value accounting, particularly for long-term complex instruments that do not trade in liquid markets, is illogical and destructive and should be re-examined immediately.

    Jensen Comment
    One problem here is bank's want it both ways. The want to classify investments and loans as "held-to-maturity" (HTM) so that they can avoid having to carry them at fair value such as allowed in FAS 115. However, bands want to classify them as HTM but want to sell them when fair value hits trigger points. Hence a lot of those "HTM" securities are not HTM after all.

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on February 29, 2008

    Banks Use Quirk as Leverage Over Brokers in Loan Fallout
    by David Reilly
    The Wall Street Journal

    Feb 27, 2008
    Page: C1
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120407667879295385.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
     

    TOPICS: Accounting, Advanced Financial Accounting, Banking, Fair Value Accounting, Investment Banking, Investments, Loan Loss Allowance

    SUMMARY: "Leveraged loans for buyouts were originally made with the idea that banks and brokers would quickly sell them to investors." That approach proved impossible when markets froze in August 2007. "Among banks, Citigroup and J.P. Morgan have the most at stake, with $43 billion and $26.4 billion in exposures, respectively....among brokers, Goldman has the biggest leveraged-loan exposure, at $26 billion, followed by Lehman Brothers...with $23.8 billion....By reclassifying (to held-to-maturity) some of the loans they hold, banks can avoid marking these loans to market, unlike brokerages which have to price these assets" at current market value at each balance sheet date. "J.P. Morgan...Chief Executive James Dimon said during a January conference call...[that] the bank reclassified loans...because it believed that at current depressed prices, some of its leveraged loans 'may be terrific long-term assets to hold.' That said, the more favorable accounting treatment doesn't hurt, either."

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Accounting for investments versus loans is the main topic in the article. The article refers to market value (fair value) measurement, lower or cost-or-market and the cost method as applied to held-to-maturity investments.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) Three methods of valuing loans and investments -- fair value, lower of cost or market and cost basis -- are described in the article, without using these terms. Summarize how each of these methods is described in the article.

    2.) Why do banks and investment brokerage houses face different requirements in accounting for loans they have offered in leveraged buyout transactions?

    3.) How might a bank face fewer reported losses by using the cost method of valuing loans than the fair value method? In your answer, comment on the possibility that the bank may have to report allowances for uncollectibility of these loans.

    4.) What is the significance of J.P. Morgan Chief executive James Dimon's statement that "at current depressed prices, some of its leveraged loans 'may be terrific long-term assets to hold'?"
     

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
     

    "Banks Use Quirk as Leverage Over Brokers in Loan Fallout," by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, February 27, 2008; Page C1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120407667879295385.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC 

    When it comes to losses on "leveraged loans" -- a big source of worry for investors in financial firms -- banks may have an advantage over their brokerage-house rivals in weathering the storm.

    Thanks to a quirk in accounting rules, banks such as J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. don't always have to book losses immediately on those loans even as brokers like Goldman Sachs Group Inc. are forced to take hits right away.

    Leveraged loans -- used by companies, usually with low credit ratings, and often to fund buyouts -- were originally made with the idea that banks and brokers would quickly sell them to investors. When markets froze in August, institutions found themselves stuck with billions of these loans that they couldn't unload.

    That led to losses last fall as financial firms were forced in many cases to mark these loans down by about 5%. The market for these loans is again struggling, and prices are falling further -- in some cases to about, or even less than, 90 cents on the dollar -- which will likely lead to another round of losses at financial firms.

    This makes it more likely some banks will look to shield at least part of their holdings from the swings in market prices. By reclassifying some of the loans they hold, banks can avoid marking these loans to market, unlike brokerages, which have to price these assets at whatever investors say they are worth.

    This isn't to say that banks will be able to entirely sidestep losses stemming from leveraged loans issued to fund huge corporate buyouts. But any kind of shock absorber would be welcome, given the depressed market conditions now.

    Still, while the accounting peculiarity may give banks an edge, it could also pose a danger to their investors, analysts warn. That is because investors could be lulled into complacency when it comes to the size and scope of the hits that the banks may face.

    Banks and brokers have nearly $200 billion in leveraged-loan exposure. Given recent falls in market prices of these loans, that could lead to $10 billion to $14 billion in write-downs, Oppenheimer analyst Meredith Whitney estimated in a recent note.

    Among banks, Citigroup and J.P. Morgan have the most at stake, with $43 billion and $26.4 billion in exposures, respectively, as of the end of last year. Among brokers, Goldman has the biggest leveraged-loan exposure, at $26 billion, followed by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. with $23.8 billion.

    The fact that a bank and a broker holding the same kind of loan could see very different effects highlights what some analysts feel is a major flaw in the accounting for leveraged loans. Brokers for years have argued that banks should also be required to assess the values of all their financial assets using market prices.

    The differing approaches also underscore that even as the use of so-called market values cause some firms to quickly recognize big losses -- even if there are growing questions about the reliability of these values in frozen markets -- not every financial player always has to measure up against this same yardstick.

    Seem strange? Even analysts think so. "If you thought the accounting for investments in debt and equity securities was unnecessarily complex, the accounting for loans will make your head spin," Credit Suisse accounting analyst David Zion wrote in a recent research note looking at issues surrounding loans.

    J.P. Morgan, for example, said last month that it had reclassified about $5 billion of $26 billion in leveraged loans it holds. J.P. Morgan declined to comment beyond what Chief Executive James Dimon said during a January conference call. At that time, he said the bank reclassified the loans this way because it believed that at current depressed prices, some of its leveraged loans "may be terrific long-term assets to hold."

    That said, the more favorable accounting treatment doesn't hurt, either. Here is how it works: Companies either classify loans as being "held for sale" or as investments, sometimes referred to as "holding to maturity." Loans held for sale are carried at whichever is lower: the original cost or the current market value. That is similar to "marking to market prices." Any losses are taken in the current period.

    But the value of loans held for investment doesn't change with every uptick or downtick in the market. Instead, such loans are said to be held at their cost, although they are initially marked to market prices if a firm is reclassifying them from held for sale.

    The big benefit is that holding loans for investment reduces volatility. Brokers like Goldman, Lehman, Morgan Stanley or Merrill Lynch & Co., on the other hand, have to mark just about everything they hold to market prices. So the firms -- which together have about $91 billion in leveraged-loan exposure, according to Oppenheimer -- take losses right away.

    This isn't to say banks completely avoid losses on loans held for investment. Mr. Dimon said in the bank's conference call that while it wouldn't mark the reclassified loans to market prices, it would "have to build up proper loan-loss reserves against those, and we would fully disclose that so there's no issue about what that did to the company."

    But in checking to see whether the value of a held-for-investment loan is impaired, a bank would look to see if there has been a change in the credit rating of an issuer, if the issuer has fallen behind in interest payments or if it looks like a delinquency could be looming.

    A bank wouldn't necessarily have to consider what the loan would fetch if sold in the market today, analysts say. That view, which reflects market perceptions, is what is causing big losses at many firms today. So looking only to credit quality could prove to be advantageous.


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review, March 7, 2008

    Wave of Write-Offs Rattles Market
    by David Reilly
    The Wall Street Journal

    Mar 01, 2008
    Page: A1
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120432957846104273.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
     

    TOPICS: Accounting, Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Financial Analysis, Financial Reporting, Financial Statement Analysis, Standard Setting

    SUMMARY: "The massive write-downs that financial firms are posting have begun to spur a backlash among some investors and executives, who are blaming accounting rules for exaggerating the losses and are seeking new, more forgiving ways to value investments." The article quotes comments by Ben Bernancke to the Senate banking committee saying that he doesn't know how to "fix" this accounting issue and that accountants must "make the best judgment they can." Also quoted are comments by FASB Chairman, Bob Herz.

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Use the article to discuss the various influences on accounting standards setting: Economic consequences of accounting choices, the political pressures that can arise, and the desire to uphold qualitative characteristics in financial reporting. The related article is a 'Letter to the Editor' written by a Westport, CT, investment advisor with approximately $230 million in assets under management.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) Define the concept of "valuation" in accounting, the historical cost basis, and fair-value accounting. Provide examples in which each of these bases of reporting is used in financial statements.

    2.) How is fair value accounting potentially contributing to the effects of losses reported by financial institutions?

    3.) In responding to questions by the Senate banking committee, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke says he does not know how to fix accounting issues arising from reporting on a fair-value basis and that "..accountants need to make the best judgment they can." What accountants are responsible for making judgments about whether to use the historical cost basis or fair-value basis for accounting valuations?

    4.) On what basis do accountants decide which is the appropriate model for valuation in financial statements? In your answer, define the conceptual framework in financial accounting and reporting and it's associated qualitative characteristics.

    5.) What are the economic consequences of accounting policy choice? List one argument made in the main article or the related one which exemplifies this concern with the economic consequences of accounting policy choice.

    6.) FASB Chairman Bob Herz acknowledges "the difficulty investors and companies are facing" but also argues that the alternative to fair-value reporting is to pretend "...that things aren't decreasing in value" and that company managements at times like these would "... say they think it's going to recover." Do you think that historical cost reporting works in this fashion?
     

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    "Wave of Write-Offs Rattles Market:  Accounting Rules Blasted as Dow Falls; A $600 Billion Toll?" by David Reilly, The Wall Street Journal, March 1, 2008; Page A1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120432957846104273.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC

    The massive write-downs that financial firms are posting have begun to spur a backlash among some investors and executives, who are blaming accounting rules for exaggerating the losses and are seeking new, more forgiving ways to value investments.

    The rules -- which last made headlines back in the Enron era -- require companies to value many of the securities they hold at whatever price prevails in the market, no matter how sharply those prices swing.

    Some analysts and executives argue this triggers a domino effect. The market falls, forcing banks to take write-offs, pushing the market lower, causing more write-offs.

    The rules' supporters, however, make a stark counter-argument: They can help prevent the U.S. from suffering the kind of malaise that gripped Japan in the 1990s -- as banks there sat on mountains of dud loans for years without writing them down.

    This debate gained new urgency Friday as the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 315 points, or 2.5%. Driving stocks lower was insurance giant American International Group Inc.'s announcement of an $11.1 billion write-down that led the firm to post a $5.3 billion loss for the fourth quarter, the biggest loss in the firm's 89-year history.

    Also rattling investors was a report by UBS that said losses among financial institutions could top $600 billion as the turmoil in global credit markets continues to unfold.

    No one, including the chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, knows with certainty what would be a better approach than using market prices for valuing holdings like these. "I don't know how to fix it," Mr. Bernanke said during testimony Thursday before the Senate banking committee. "I don't know what to do about it."

    Mr. Bernanke added that "I think the accountants need to make the best judgment they can."

    Despite the grim developments, many investors actually doubt that firms like AIG will suffer the full force of the losses they are now booking. Instead, these investors argue that the market has overreacted and will recover once the current panic subsides.

    Indeed, Martin Sullivan, AIG's chief executive, said Friday on the firm's conference call that he doesn't expect the losses to be permanent. "We are obviously witnessing and living through extraordinary market conditions," he said. "We are trying, as are many others, to value very complex instruments."

    Tumult also spread further in the normally staid market for municipal bonds -- debt issued by states and municipalities -- which is suffering one of its biggest crises in its history. Several hedge funds were hit with big losses after betting wrong on the direction of muni-bond prices, and as traders rushed to sell and exit their positions, portions of the market effectively froze.

    On Friday, muni-bond-prices fell for a 13th straight day, pushing yields significantly higher. (Bond yields move in the opposite direction as price.)

    For hundreds of muni-bond issuers, ranging from New York's Port Authority to the North Texas Tollway Authority, this tumult could cause borrowing costs to soar. That's a particular problem at a time when tax revenues are coming under strain from a slowing economy.

    AIG's argument that its write-downs were "unrealized" -- in other words, they may never actually result in a true charge to the company -- echoes points made by a number of other major financial firms. It's a sore point because companies feel they are being forced to take big financial hits on holdings that they have no intention of actually selling at current prices.

    The firms argue they are strong enough to simply keep the holdings in their portfolios until the crisis passes. Forcing companies to value securities based on what they would fetch if sold today "is an attempt to apply liquidation accounting to a going concern," said Charles Thayer of Chartwell Capital, a financial advisory.

    The market-value accounting approach is "exaggerating" the market turmoil, leading to write-downs that are "excessive," said Neal Soss, chief economist at Credit Suisse. "Many people would take the view that price and ultimately value have disconnected."

    Even analysts who are generally supportive of the market-value approach acknowledge it can make things tougher for investors in the current environment. It "increases the volatility of the accounts and it makes comparisons from quarter to quarter difficult," said Jeremy Perler of RiskMetrics Group, a research and strategy firm. "It certainly turns the world on end a little bit.

    Alternative accounting strategies don't offer much for markets to cling to. One alternative is to value a security based on what the buyer originally paid for it. However, that risks giving investors outdated information.

    The use of pricing models that don't pay heed to market values was discredited after Enron Corp. used them to book phantom profits earlier this decade.

    Enron, for example, would book a profit on a contract to buy or sell energy years in the future based on its own expectations of how much the contract would be worth over time. But Enron never tried to gauge what others in the market might think the contracts were worth.

    As the Fed chairman acknowledged in his recent Senate testimony, a move away from market values could in fact worsen current market turmoil. "The risk on other side is that if you do too much forbearance, or delay mark-to-market, that the suspicion will arise among investors that you're hiding something," Mr. Bernanke said.

    Buyers are already lacking trust and that has been a reason they have balked at buying securities that were typically seen as safe havens.

    But these market seizures are what have made market values so contentious. Robert Herz, chairman of the body that sets the accounting rules governing the use of market values, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, acknowledged the difficulty investors and companies are facing.

    "But you tell me what a better answer is," he said. "Is just pretending that things aren't decreasing in value a better answer? Should you just let everybody say they think it's going to recover?"

    Others who favor the use of market values say that for all its imperfections, it also imposes discipline on companies. "It forces you to realistically confront what's happening to you much quicker, so it plays a useful purpose," said Sen. Jack Reed (D., R.I.), a member of the Senate banking committee.

    Japan stands out as an example of how ignoring problems can lead to years-long stagnation. "Look at Japan, where they ignored write-downs at all their financial institutions when loans went bad," said Jeff Mahoney, general counsel at the Council for Institutional Investors.

    In addition, companies don't always have the luxury of waiting out a storm until assets recover the long-term value that executives believe exists. Sometimes market crises force their hands. Freddie Mac, for instance, sold $45 billion of assets last fall to help the company meet regulatory capital requirements.

    Investors can no longer take a firm's survival for granted in today's environment. Fed Chairman Bernanke in his testimony noted that it wouldn't be surprising if there were some bank failures due to the current market crisis.

     


    February 22, 2008 message from Tom Selling [tom.selling@GROVESITE.COM]

    On cost (replacement) versus (fair) value, Walter Teets and I have written a paper that we recently submitted to FAJ.  The basic thrust is that cost can be associated with principles-based accounting, and value cannot.  That’s why FAS 157 is rules based and filled with anomalies.  You can read the working paper here, or read my blog post that it was based on here.  Comments, especially on the working paper, would be much appreciated.

    Thomas I. Selling PhD, CPA
    602-228-4871 (M)
    602-952-9880 x205 (O)

    Website: www.tomselling.com 
    Weblog: www.accountingonion.com 
    Company: www.grovesite.com 


    Question
    What do CFO's think of Robert Herz's (Chairman of the FASB) radical proposed  format for financial statements that have more disaggregated financial information and no aggregated bottom line?

    As we moved to fair value accounting for derivative financial instruments (FAS 133) and financial instruments (FAS 157 and 159) coupled with the expected new thrust for fair value reporting on the international scene, we have filled the income statement and the retained earnings statement with more and more instability due to fluctuating unrealized gains and losses.

    I have reservations about fair value reporting --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue

    But if we must live with more and more fair value reporting, the bottom line has to go. But CFOs are reluctant to give up the bottom line even if it may distort investing decisions and compensation contracts tied to bottom-line reporting.

    Before reading the article below you may want to first read about radical new changes on the way --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#ChangesOnTheWay

    "A New Vision for Accounting:  Robert Herz and FASB are preparing a radical new format for financial, CFO Magazine, by Alix Stuart, February 2008, pp. 49-53 --- http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/10597001/c_10711055?f=home_todayinfinance

    Last summer, McCormick & Co. controller Ken Kelly sliced and diced his financial statements in ways he had never before imagined. For starters, he split the income statement for the $2.7 billion international spice-and-food company into the three categories of the cash-flow statement: operating, financing, and investing. He extracted discontinued operations and income taxes and placed them in separate categories, instead of peppering them throughout the other results. He created a new form to distinguish which changes in income were due to fair value and which to cash. One traditional ingredient, meanwhile, was conspicuous by its absence: net income.

    Kelly wasn't just indulging a whim. Ahead of a public release of a draft of the Financial Accounting Standards Board's new format for financial statements in the second quarter of 2008, the McCormick controller was trying out the financial statements of the future, a radical departure from current conventions. FASB's so-called financial statement presentation project is ostensibly concerned only with the form, or the "face," of financial statements, but it's quickly becoming clear that it will change and expand their content as well. "This is a complete redefinition of the financial statements as we know them," says John Hepp, a former FASB project manager and now senior manager at Grant Thornton.

    Some of the major changes under discussion: reconfiguring the balance sheet and the income statement to follow the three categories of the cash-flow statement, requiring companies to report cash flows with the little-used direct method; and introducing a new reconciliation schedule that would highlight fair-value changes. Companies will also likely have to report more about their segments, possibly down to the same level of detail as they currently report for the consolidated statements. Meanwhile, net income is slated to disappear completely from GAAP financial statements, with no obvious replacement for such commonly used metrics as earnings per share.

    FASB, working with the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and accounting standards boards in the United Kingdom and Japan, continues to work out the precise details of the new financial statements. "We are trying to set the stage for what financial statements will look like across the globe for decades to come," says FASB chairman Robert Herz. (Examples of the proposed new financial statements can be viewed at FASB's Website.) If the standard-setters stay their course, CFOs and controllers at every publicly traded company in the world could be following Kelly's lead as soon as 2010.

    It's too early to predict with confidence which changes will ultimately stick. But the mock-up exercise has made Kelly wary. He considers the direct cash-flow statement and reconciliation schedule among the "worst aspects" of the forthcoming proposal, and expects they would require "draconian exercises" from his finance staff, he says. And he questions what would result from the additional details: "If all of a sudden your income statement has 125 lines instead of 25, is that presentation more clarifying, or more confusing?"

    Other financial executives share Kelly's skepticism. In a December CFO survey of more than 200 finance executives, only 17 percent said the changes would offer any benefits to their companies or investors (see "Keep the Bottom Line" at the end of this article). Even some who endorsed the basic aim of the project and like the idea of standardizing categories across the three major financial statements were only cautiously optimistic. "It may be OK, or it may be excessive." says David Rickard, CFO of CVS/Caremark. "The devil will be in the details."

    Net Loss From the outset, corporate financial officers have been ambivalent about FASB's seven year-old project, which was originally launched to address concerns that net income was losing relevance amid a proliferation of pro forma numbers. Back in 2001, Financial Executives International "strongly opposed" it, while executives at Philip Morris, Exxon Mobil, Sears Roebuck, and Microsoft protested to FASB as well.

    (Critics then and now point out that FASB will have little control over pro forma reporting no matter what it does. Indeed, nearly 60 percent of respondents to CFO's survey said they would continue to report pro forma numbers after the new format is introduced.)

    Given the project's starting point, it's not surprising that current drafts of the future income statement omit net income. Right now that's by default, since income taxes are recorded in a separate section. But there is a big push among some board members to make a more fundamental change to eliminate net income by design, and promote business income (income from operations) as the preferred basis for investment metrics.

    "If net income stays, it would be a sign that we failed," says Don Young, a FASB board member. In his mind, the project is not merely about getting rid of net income, but rather about capturing all income-related information in a single line (including such volatile items as gains and losses on cash-flow hedges, available-for-sale securities, and foreign-exchange translations) rather than footnoting them in other comprehensive income (OCI) as they are now. "All changes in net assets and liabilities should be included," says Young. "Why should the income statement be incomplete?" He predicts that the new subtotals, namely business income, will present "a much clearer picture of what's going on."

    Board member Thomas Linsmeier agrees. "The rationale for segregating those items [in OCI] is not necessarily obvious, other than the fact that management doesn't want to be held accountable for them in the current period," he says.

    Whether for self-serving or practical reasons, finance chiefs are rallying behind net income. Nearly 70 percent of those polled by CFO in December said it should stay. "I understand their theories that it's not the be-all and end-all measure that it's put up to be, but it is a measure everyone is familiar with, and sophisticated users can adjust from there," says Kelly. Adds Rickard: "They're treating [net income] as if it's the scourge of the earth, which to me is silly. I think the logical conclusion is to make other things available, rather than hiding the one thing people find most useful."

    . . .

     

    Bob Jensen's threads on this proposed "radical change" in financial reporting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#ChangesOnTheWay 

    Jensen Comment
    As we moved to fair value accounting for derivative financial instruments (FAS 133) and financial instruments (FAS 157 and 159) coupled with the expected new thrust for fair value reporting on the international scene, we have filled the income statement and the retained earnings statement with more and more instability due to fluctuating unrealized gains and losses.

    I have reservations about fair value reporting --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue

    But if we must live with more and more fair value reporting, the bottom line has to go. But CFOs are reluctant to give up the bottom line even if it may distort investing decisions and compensation contracts tied to bottom-line reporting.

    Bob Jensen's threads on the radical new changes on the way --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#ChangesOnTheWay

     


    Question
    Should your paycheck be impacted contractually by FAS 133?

    I was contacted by the representative of a major and highly reputable transportation company union concerning possible manipulation of FAS 133 accounting (one of the many tools for creative accounting) for purposes of lowering compensation payments to employees. He wanted to engage me on a consulting basis to examine a series of financial statements of the company. It would be great if I could inspire some public debate on the following issue. The message below follows an earlier message to XXXXX concerning how hedging ineffectiveness works under FAS 133 accounting rules --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#Ineffectiveness

    _________________

    Hi XXXXX,

    You wrote:
    “Does the $502 million hedging ineffectiveness pique your interest?”

    My answer is most definitely yes since it fits into some research that I am doing at the moment. But the answers cannot be obtained from financial statements. Financial statements are (1) too aggregated (across multiple derivative hedging contracts) and (2) snapshots at particular points in time. Answers lie in tracing each contract individually (or at least a sampling of individual contracts) from inception to settlement. Results of effectiveness testing throughout the life of each hedging contract must be examined (on a sampling basis).

     

    Recall that there were enormous scandals concerning financial instruments derivatives that led up to FAS 133 and IAS 39. See http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds
    The SEC pressured the FASB to come up with a new standard that would overcome the problem of so much unbooked financial liability risk due to derivative financial instruments. FAS 133 and IAS 39 got complicated when standard setters tried to book the derivative assets and liabilities on the balance sheet without impacting current earnings for qualified effective hedges of financial risk.

    When the FASB issued FAS 133, The FASB and the SEC were concerned about unbooked financial risk of every active derivative contract if the contract was settled on the interim balance sheet date. When a contract like an option is valued on a balance sheet date, its premature settlement value that day may well be deemed ineffective relative to the value of the hedged item. The reason is that derivative contracts are traded in different markets (usually more speculative markets) than commodities markets themselves (where buyers actually use the commodities). But the hedging contracts deemed ineffective on interim dates may not be ineffective at all across the long haul. Usually they are perfectly effective on hedging maturity dates.

    Temporal ineffectiveness more often than not works itself out such that all those gains and losses due to hedging ineffectiveness on particular interim dates exactly wash out such there is no ultimate cash flow gain or loss when the contracts are settled at maturity dates. I attached an Excel workbook that explains how some commodities hedges work out over time. The Graphing.xls file can also be downloaded from http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/FAS133OtherExcelFiles/
    Note in particular the “Hedges” spreadsheet in that file. These explain the outcomes at the settlement maturity dates that yield perfect hedges. But at any date before maturity (not pictured in the graphs), the hedges may not be perfect if settled prematurely on interim balance sheet dates.

    I illustrate the accounting for ineffective interim hedges in both the 03forfut.pps and 05options.ppt PowerPoint files at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/JensenPowerPoint/
    The hedges may deemed ineffective under FAS 133 at interim balance sheet dates with gains and losses posted to current earnings. However, over time the gains and losses perfectly offset such that the hedges are perfectly effective when they are settled at maturity dates.

    The real problem with FAS 133 is that compensation contracts are generally tied to particular balance sheet dates where interim hedging contracts may be deemed ineffective and thereby affect paychecks. But some of those FAS 133 interim gains and losses may in fact never be realized in cash over the life of the each commodity hedging contract.

    What has to happen is for management to be very up front about how FAS 133 and other accounting standards may give rise to artificial gains and losses that are never realized unless the hedging contracts are settled prematurely on balance sheet dates. Compensation contracts should be hammered out with that thought in mind rather than blindly basing compensation contracts on bottom-line earnings that are mixtures of apples, oranges, toads, and nails due to accounting standards.

    Of course management is caught in a bind because investors follow bottom-line as the main indicator of performance of a company. The FASB recognizes this problem and is now trying to work out a new standard that will eliminate bottom-line reporting. The idea will be to provide information for analysts to derive alternative bottom-line numbers based upon what they want included and excluded in that bottom line. XBRL may indeed make this much easier for investors and analysts --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/XBRLandOLAP.htm

    If I were working out a compensation contract based on accounting numbers, I would probably exclude FAS 133 unrealized gains and losses.

    In any case, back to your original question. I would love to work with management to track a sampling of fuel price hedging contracts from beginning to end. I would like to see what effectiveness tests were run on each reporting date and how gains and losses offset over the life of each examined contract. But this type of study cannot be run on aggregated financial statements.

    If I can study some of those individual hedging contracts over time I would be most interested. It will take your clout with management, however, to get me this data. I have such high priors on the integrity of your company's management that I seriously doubt that there is any intentional manipulation going on witth FAS 133 implementation. Rather I suspect that management is just trying to adhere as closely as possible with FAS 133 rules. What I would like to do is help enlighten the world about the bad things FAS 133 can do with compensation contracts and investment decisions by users of statements who really do not understand the temporal impacts of FAS 133 on bottom-line earnings.

    I fear that my study would, however, be mostly one of academic interest that I can report to the public. Only an inside whistleblower could pinpoint hanky-pank within a company, and I seriously doubt that your company is engaged in disreputable FAS 133 hanky-pank beyond that of possibly not fully explaining to unions how FAS 133 losses in general may be phantom losses over the long haul.

    Bob Jensen


    Questions
    How are auditors dealing with fair market value accounting and credit market issues?

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on October 19, 2007

    With New, United Voice, Auditors Stand Ground on How to Treat Crunch
    by David Reilly
    The Wall Street Journal

    Oct 17, 2007
    Page: C1
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
     

    TOPICS: Audit Quality, Auditing, Auditing Services, Auditor Independence, Auditor/Client Disagreements, Banking, Fair Value Accounting

    SUMMARY: The article discusses three papers issued by the Center for Audit Quality on the recent issues in credit markets. The topics included the use of market prices for hard-to-trade securities and issues of banks' exposure to losses in off-balance-sheet entities. Organization of the Center for Audit Quality is discussed, along with reaction to the purpose of this entity from Lynn Turner, former Chief Accountant at the SEC, and an academic researcher at the University of Tennessee, Joseph Carcello.

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The article may be used to discuss the current credit market issues in an auditing class as well as a financial reporting class.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) Based on discussions in the article and on information at its web site (see http://thecaq.aicpa.org/) discuss the purpose and organization of the Center for Audit Quality.

    2.) What is self-regulation of the auditing profession? When did auditors lose the ability to self-regulate?

    3.) Some reactions described in this article are positive about the role that is being played by the Center for Audit Quality, while others are negative. Which view do you hold? Support your position.

    4.) Summarize concerns with the complexity of financial reporting guidance in the U.S. How might the work from the Center for Audit Quality contribute to that complexity? How might its work alleviate the issue of complexity in reporting standards?
     

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
     

    RELATED ARTICLES: 
    Auditors to Street: Use Market Price
    by David Reilly and Randall Smith
    The Wall Street Journal
    Sep 18, 2007
    Page: C2
     

     

    Also see http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/FairValue/

     


    May 17, 2006 message from Peter Walton

    I would like to take this opportunity to let you know about a forthcoming book from Routledge:

    The Routledge Companion to Fair Value and Financial Reporting --- Click Here

    Edited by Peter Walton

    May 2007: 246x174: 406pp

    Hb: 978-0-415-42356-4: £95.00 $170.00

    Jensen Comment
    Even though I have a paper published in this book, I will receive no compensation from sales of the book. And since I'm retired, lines on a resume no longer matter.


    A New Type of Intangible Investment (sort of not yet legal in the U.S.) --- Litigation
    How should it be booked and carried in financial statements?
    I say "sort of" since this intangible asset might be buried (as Purchased Goodwill") in acquisition prices when firms are purchased purchased or merged.

    The notion of litigation as a separate asset class is a novel one. It's hard to imagine fund managers one day allotting a bit of their portfolio to third-party lawsuits, alongside shares, bonds, property and hedge funds. But some wealthy investors are starting to dabble in lawsuit investment, bankrolling some or all of the heavy upfront costs in return for a share of the damages in the event of a win. The London-managed hedge fund MKM Longboat last month revealed plans to invest $100million (£50.5million) to finance European lawsuits. Today a new company, Juridica, floats on AIM, having raised £80million to make litigation bets.
    "The law is now an asset class," The London Times, December 21, 2007 --- http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/columnists/article3080766.ece

    Jensen Comment
    Under U.S. GAAP, intangible assets are generally booked only when purchased and are not conducive to fair value accounting afterwards. Probably the most serious problem in both accounting theory and practice is unbooked value (and in many cases undisclosed) of intangible assets and liabilities. Do the values of human capital and knowledge capital ring a bell? Does the cost retraining the world's workforce to use Office software other than Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, etc.) ring a bell?

    Contingent liabilities (particularly pending lawsuits) are problematic until the amount of the liability is both reasonably measurable and highly probable. Until now, contingent litigation assets were not investment assets. Contingent liabilities were booked as current or past expenses. Now purchased litigation assets having future value? Horrors!

    In the past when a company purchased another company, some of the "goodwill" value above and beyond the traceable value to net tangible assets could easily have been the value of future litigation such as when Blackboard acquired WebCT and WebCT's patents on online education software. Patents and Copyrights may have value with respect to fending off future competition.

    But patents and copyrights may also have value in future litigation regarding past infringements. Now hedge funds might invest in bringing litigation to fruition.

    Intangible assets and liabilities are, and will forever remain, the largest problem in accounting theory and practice! In some cases, such as Microsoft Corporation, booked assets are so miniscule relative to unbooked intangible assets that the balance sheets are virtually a bad joke.

    An enormous problem, besides the fact that current value of intangibles cannot be counted, current value can change by enormous magnitudes overnight as new discoveries are made and new legislation is passed, to say nothing of court decisions. Tangible asset values can also change, but in general they are not as volatile.

    December 25, 2007 reply from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]

    Bob,

    SFAS 141R (available on the FASB web site) substantially changes the accounting for both contingent assets and liabilities in connection with business combinations. In fact, 141R coupled with SFAS 160 on noncontrolling interests makes major changes to both the accounting for business combinations and the accounting for consolidation procedures. While the new rules can't be applied until 2009, anyone teaching advanced accounting or where ever else these topics are covered should throw out their old lesson plans and be prepared to enter into an entirely new world of accounting - not for the better in my humble opinion.

    By the way, another interesting thing to read on the FASB web site is the proposal to reduce the size of the FASB and make some other changes to improve the standard-setting process. We celebrated our family Christmas a few days ago because of travel plans and I'm working on my comment letter to the Financial Accounting Foundation today.

    Merry Christmas!

    Denny

    December 25, 2007 reply from Amy Dunbar [Amy.Dunbar@BUSINESS.UCONN.EDU]

    What I found interesting about 141R is the discussion in the appendices that showed both the FASB and IASB views and how the Boards reached convergence.

    141R also added a couple paragraphs to FIN 48 that result in goodwill no longer being adjusted if the contingent tax liability is increased or decreased. Instead the DR is to tax expense, which makes a lot more sense to me. If I read the statement correctly, the purchased assets and liabilities are stated at fair value under a recognition, then measurement principle. Taxes are exempt from those two principles; instead FAS 109/FIN 48 apply. What I couldn't tell is if the purchaser still has up to one year (the maximum measurement period) to get the tax contingent liability right before the DR goes to tax expense. Can anyone help me?

    Amy Dunbar
    UConn

    From the AccountingWeb on December 27, 2007 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/blogs/eva_lang_blog.html

    On December 4, 2007, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued FASB Statements No. 141 (revised 2007), Business Combinations. The new standard requires the acquiring entity in a business combination to recognize all (and only) the assets acquired and liabilities assumed in the transaction; establishes the acquisition-date fair value as the measurement objective for all assets acquired and liabilities assumed; and requires the acquirer to disclose to investors and other users all of the information they need to evaluate and understand the nature and financial effect of the business combination. The revision of 141 is part of the FASB's push toward "fair value," or mark-to market accounting.

    Financial Week (December 10, 2007) reports that Dennis Beresford, a former FASB chairman now serving on a Securities and Exchange Commission advisory committee that is studying the U.S. financial reporting system says “The rules will be difficult to apply and will require companies and analysts to relearn a lot of things.” The article goes on to say that the revisions to 141 “essentially extend the fair-value requirements to new areas. That will increase the valuation work required of corporate finance departments, and in some cases jack up the volatility of reported earnings as various assets and liabilities are marked to market.”

    Jensen Comment
    You can download FAS 141(R) from http://www.fasb.org/st/index.shtml#fas160

    December 31, 2007 reply from Gerald Trites [gtrites@ZORBA.CA]

    Warren Buffett referred to "mark to market" as "mark to myth", a comment that I think is right on the mark.

    Bob Jensen's threads on intangible/contingency asset asset and liability accounting are at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes 


    Introduction to Fair Value Accounting

    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at various other links:

    I recently completed the first draft of a paper on fair value at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
    Comments would be helpful.

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes 

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms

    Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation, and Yield Curves for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm


    The "Unknown Professor's Financial Rounds Blog states the following on September 21, 2007 --- http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/ 

    And They Say Accounting Doesn't Make Sense

    As a person who's trained primarily in finance, accounting rules sometimes look like they were designed by Monty Python. Here's the latest installment - your company's credit rating drops, so the market value of your liabilities fall. As a result, you show a profit. This is what happened to some Wall Street firms recently. Read the whole story here. IMO, the best line in the article is:

    But Moody’s Investors Service said buyers should beware of gains booked when brokers mark down their own debt liabilities. “Moody’s does not consider such gains to be high-quality, core earnings,” it said in a report issued Friday.

    Ya think?

    This is why we make all our Finance students take four accounting classes before they graduate. That way, they'll see these things often enough that they won't break out laughing.

    Question
    Why am I not laughing? Is it because I taught accounting for 40 years?

    Actually the fact that a lowered credit rating can lead to a realized gain should make sense even to a finance professor. Consider the following scenario:

    1. I sell a bond and record a liability for $100,000 that matures in ten years.
    2. My credit rating gets lowered the next day.
    3. I buy back the bond for $90,000 (the market value of the bond declines because of my lowered credit rating)
    4. I've made a $10,000 cash profit in one day because of a lowered credit rating
    5. I wonder if a finance professor can comprehend that this is a gain.
    6. I wonder if Moody's can understand that this is a very high quality earnings since its cash in the bank.

    Now what if I don't sell the bond but adopt the fair value accounting option for financial instruments under FAS 159. I did not realize a cash profit if I still owe $100,000 when the bond eventually matures. But the reason I report an unrealized holding gain follows the same logic as if I bought back the bond today. That's what the "fair value option" under FAS 159 is all about.

    If Moody's does not treat unrealized holding gains and losses as high-quality, core earnings, more power to them.

    Finance students who've taken four courses in accounting may not laugh because they understand why sometimes credit rating gains are high quality and sometimes low quality will not laugh because they understand why. But they may not understand why their finance professor is laughing.

    Bob Jensen's tutorials on fair value accounting are at the following two links:

     


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on October 5, 2007

    Virtuous Losses
    by WSJ Editors; Review & Outlook Page
    The Wall Street Journal

    Oct 02, 2007
    Page: A16
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
     

    TOPICS: Accounting, Accounting Theory, Advanced Financial Accounting, Bonds, Debt, Impairment

    SUMMARY: The editors laud UBS AG and Citigroup "for their announcements...that they'll soon take big writedowns for their mortgage bets." They react this way on the premise that "one question haunting the markets during the subprime meltdown has been where the financial bodies are buried." Similar reactions are evident for UBS and Citigroup shareholders; the companies' share prices both rose following the announcements. The editors conclude by offering evidence that credit markets are stabilizing and state that "by being forthright now, the banks can aid the process of bringing buyers back to the debt markets."

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: This article can be used to cover write-downs due to impairment losses on mortgage assets as well as to discuss debtholders as users of financial markets. The situation also could be described as a "big bath" write-down to clean house now while times are bad in credit markets in general and, at least for UBS, while corporate leadership is new.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) In the opinion page article, the editors argue that "marking asset to market is...better for the financial system as a whole, rather than hiding losses on the balance sheet and hoping for a rebound." What does this statement mean? In your answer, define the terms "historical cost" and "mark to market." Also, address the notion that a loss could be included in a balance sheet account.

    2.) Refer to the related articles. What are the assets on which losses were taken at UBS and Citigroup?

    3.) Some might argue that the losses being recorded by Citigroup and UBS AG constitute a "big bath" to pave the way for improving reported results in the future. How does a current writedown help to improve reported results in the future? What current circumstances at each of these firms and in the general economy might allow for taking this approach to writedowns?

    4.) Refer again to the opinion page article's conclusion that reporting losses now "can aid the process of bringing buyers back to the debt markets." Should financial reporting have a specific outcome, such as improving numbers of credit market participants, as its objective? Support your answer.
     

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
     


    "The Finer Points of Fair Value," by Thomas A. Ratcliffe, Journal of Accountancy, December 2007 --- http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/dec2007/fair_value.htm

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
    To adopt FASB Statement no. 159, companies must comply with the requirements of Statement no. 157, Fair Value Measurements.

    Companies and their auditors must consider whether the use of fair value option accounting reflects a “substance over form” decision by management rather than an effort to gain an accounting result.

    FASB has raised the bar for disclosure required when the fair value option is in play so that financial statement users will be able to clearly understand the extent to which the option is utilized and how changes in fair values are being reflected in the financial statements.

    Companies are encouraged but not required to present the fair value option disclosures in combination with the fair value disclosures required in other accounting literature.

    The guidance must be implemented on an instrument-by-instrument basis and is irrevocable.


    From the FASB:  PROPOSED FASB STAFF POSITION No. FAS 157-a
    "Application of FASB Statement No. 157 to FASB Statement No. 13 and Its Related Interpretive Accounting Pronouncements That Address Leasing Transactions" --- http://www.fasb.org/fasb_staff_positions/prop_fsp_fas157-a.pdf

    Objective

    1. This FASB Staff Position (FSP) amends FASB Statement No. 157, Fair Value Measurements, to exclude FASB Statement No. 13, Accounting for Leases, and its related interpretive accounting pronouncements that address leasing transactions.

    Background

    2. The Exposure Draft preceding Statement 157 proposed a scope exception for Statement 13 and other accounting pronouncements that require fair value measurements for leasing transactions. At that time, the Board was concerned that applying the fair value measurement objective in the Exposure Draft to leasing transactions could have unintended consequences, requiring reconsideration of aspects of lease accounting that were beyond the scope of the Exposure Draft.

    3. However, respondents to the Exposure Draft indicated that the fair value measurement objective for leasing transactions was generally consistent with the fair value measurement objective proposed by the Exposure Draft. Others in the leasing industry subsequently affirmed that view. Based on that input, the Board decided to include lease accounting pronouncements in the scope of Statement 157.

    4. Subsequent to the issuance of Statement 157, which changed in some respects from the Exposure Draft, constituents have raised issues stemming from the interaction

    Proposed FSP on Statement 157 (FSP FAS 157-a) 1 FSP FAS 157-a between the fair value measurement objective in Statement 13 and the fair value measurement objective in Statement 157.

    5. Constituents have noted that paragraph 5(c)(ii) of Statement 13 provides an example of the determination of fair value (an exit price) through the use of a transaction price (an entry price). Constituents also have raised issues about the application of the fair value measurement objective in Statement 157 to estimated residual values of leased property. These issues, as well as other issues related to the interaction between Statement 13 and Statement 157, would result in a change in lease accounting that requires considerations of lease classification criteria and measurements in leasing transactions that are beyond the scope of Statement 157 (for example, a change in lease classification for leases that would otherwise be accounted for as direct financing leases).

    6. The Board acknowledges that the term fair value will be left in Statement 13 although it is defined differently than in Statement 157; however, the Board believes that lease accounting provisions and the longstanding valuation practices common within the leasing industry should not be changed by Statement 157 without a comprehensive reconsideration of the accounting for leasing transactions. The Board has on its agenda a project to comprehensively reconsider the guidance in Statement 13 together with its subsequent amendments and interpretations.

     


    When do market investors become market makers?
    When "quants" become market makers instead of market players, it throws fair value accounting into a turmoil.

    November 23, 2007 message from Amy Dunbar [Amy.Dunbar@BUSINESS.UCONN.EDU]

    The subprime crisis has captured my attention, and on the chance that others on this listserv are interested in this area, I am sending this email about the paper, What Happened to the Quants in August 2007?  I assumed the hedge funds went down because of subprime investments, but it appears that was just one of many possible causes.  I would love to hear what others think, particularly about the possibility of regulatory reform (mentioned at the end below) --- http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1015987

    The paper has 9011 abstract views and 4447 downloads.  Looks like a lot of people are interested in the hedge fund losses.

    The paper is fascinating.  Its objective is to suggest reasons for the hedge fund losses during the week of Aug 6,  2007.  The funds were quantitative, market-neutral funds. No major losses were reported in other hedge-fund sectors. The paper compares August 1998 (think LTCM collapse) with August 2007, and concludes the following:

     

    In August 1998, default of Russian government debt caused a flight to quality that ultimately resulted in the demise of LTCM and many other fixed-income arbitrage funds. This series of events caught even the most experienced traders by surprise because of the unrelated nature of Russian government debt and the broadly diversified portfolios of some of the most  successful fixed-income arbitrage funds. Similarly, the events of August 2007 caught some of the most experienced quantitative equity market-neutral managers by surprise. But August 2007 may be far more significant because it provides the first piece of evidence that problems in one corner of the financial system - possibly the sub-prime mortgage sector and related credit markets – can spill over so directly to a completely unrelated corner: long/short equity strategies. This is precisely the kind of ”shortcut" described in the theory of mathematical networks that generates the “small-world phenomenon" of Watts (1999) in which a small random shock in one part of the network can rapidly propagate throughout the entire network.

    The authors hypothesize an unwind of a large long/short equity portfolio, most likely a quantitative equity market-neutral portfolio.

    Likely factors contributing to the magnitude of the losses of this apparent unwind were: (a) the enormous growth in assets devoted to long/short equity strategies over the past decade and, more recently, to various 130/30 and other active-extension strategies; (b) the systematic decline in the profitability of quantitative equity market-neutral strategies, due to increasing competition, technological advances, and institutional and environmental changes such as decimalization, the decline in retail order flow, and the decline in equity-market volatility; (c) the increased leverage needed to maintain the levels of expected returns required by hedge-fund investors in the face of lower profitability; (d) the historical liquidity of U.S. equity markets and the general lack of awareness (at least prior to August 6, 2007) of just how crowded the long/short equity category had become; and (e) the unknown size and timing of new sub-prime-mortgage-related problems in credit markets, which created a climate of fear and panic, heightening the risk sensitivities of managers and investors across all markets and style categories.

    They also note that

     the timing of these losses - shortly after month-end of a very challenging month for many hedge-fund strategies - is also suggestive. The formal process of marking portfolios to market typically takes several business days after month-end, and August 7-9 may well be the first time managers and investors were forced to confront the extraordinary credit-related losses they suffered in July, which may have triggered the initial unwind of their more liquid investments, e.g., their equity portfolios, during this period.

    Question:  FAS 115 requires investment securities (actually only trading and available-for-sale securities) to be marked to market, but what is the driving force behind marking to market on a monthly basis?  Reporting to investors in the fund?

     Do the losses of August 2007 signal a breakdown in the basic economic relationships that yield attractive risk/reward profiles for such strategies, or is August 2007 an unavoidable and integral aspect of those risk/reward profiles? An instructive thought experiment is to consider a market-neutral portfolio strategy in which U.S. equities with odd-numbered CUSIP identifiers are held long and those with even-number CUSIPs are held short. Suppose such a portfolio strategy is quite popular and a

    number of large hedge funds have implemented it. Now imagine that one of these large hedge funds decides to liquidate its holdings because of some liquidity shock. Regardless of this portfolio's typical expected return during normal times, in the midst of a rapid and large unwind, all such portfolios will experience losses, with the magnitudes of those losses directly proportional to the size and speed of the unwind. Moreover, it is easy to see how such an unwind can generate losses for other types of portfolios, e.g., long-only portfolios of securities with prime-number CUSIPs, dedicated shortsellers that short only those securities with CUSIPs divisible by 10, etc. If a portfolio is of sufficient size, and it is based on a sufficiently popular strategy that is broadly implemented, then unwinding even a small fraction of it can cascade into a major market dislocation.

    . . .

    However, a successful investment strategy should include an assessment of the risk of ruin, and that risk should be managed appropriately. Moreover, the magnitude of tail risk should, in principle, be related to a strategy's expected return given the inevitable trade-off between risk and reward. Therefore, it is disingenuous to assert that “a strategy is successful except in the face of 25-standard-deviation events." Given the improbability of such events, we can only conclude that either the actual distribution of returns is extraordinarily leptokurtic, or the standard deviation is time-varying and exhibits occasional spikes.

    In particular, as Montier (2007) observed, risk has become “endogenous" in certain markets - particularly those that are recently flush with large inflows of assets - which is one of the reasons that the largest players can no longer assume that historical estimates of volatility and price impact are accurate measures of current risk exposures. Endogeneity is, in fact, an old economic concept illustrated by the well-known theory of imperfect competition: if an economic entity, or group of coordinated entities, is so large that it can unilaterally affect prices by its own actions, then the standard predictions of microeconomics under perfect competition no longer hold. Similarly, if a certain portfolio strategy is so popular that its liquidation can unilaterally affect the risks that it faces, then the standard tools of basic risk models such as Value-at-Risk and normal distributions no longer hold. In this respect, quantitative models may have failed in August 2007 by not adequately capturing the endogeneity of their risk exposures. Given the size and interconnectedness of the hedge-fund industry, we may require more sophisticated analytics to model the feedback implicit in current market dynamics.

     

    The authors commented several times on the lack of transparency in the hedge fund market. I found the authors’ comments on the need for  possible regulatory reform interesting.

    Given the role that hedge funds have begun to play in financial markets - namely, significant providers of liquidity and credit - they now impose externalities on the economy that are no longer negligible.  In this respect, hedge funds are becoming more like banks. The fact that the banking industry is so highly regulated is due to the enormous social externalities banks generate when they succeed, and when they fail. But unlike banks, hedge funds can decide to withdraw liquidity at a moment's notice, and while this may be benign if it occurs rarely and randomly, a coordinated withdrawal of liquidity among an entire sector of hedge funds could have disastrous consequences for the viability of the financial system if it occurs at the wrong time and in the wrong sector.

    November 23, 2007 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Amy,

    Why do bankers resist expanding FAS 159 into required accounting for all financial instruments?
    Misleading Financial Statements:  Bankers Refusing to Recognize and Shed "Zombie Loans"

    One worrying lesson for bankers and regulators everywhere to bear in mind is post-bubble Japan. In the 1990s its leading bankers not only hung onto their jobs; they also refused to recognise and shed bad debts, in effect keeping “zombie” loans on their books. That is one reason why the country's economy stagnated for so long. The quicker bankers are to recognise their losses, to sell assets that they are hoarding in the vain hope that prices will recover, and to make markets in such assets for their clients, the quicker the banking system will get back on its feet.
    The Economist, as quoted in Jim Mahar's blog on November 10, 2007 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

    But there are questions in theory about fair value accounting!
    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue

     

    I personally think the driving forces behind FAS 115 were tendencies of banks to not recognize those "zombie" investments and adequately disclose highly likely losses. Firstly I might note that FAS 115 adjusts available-for-sale (AFS) securities to fair value without impacting earnings volatility except in the case of securities traders. According to Paragraph 86 of FAS 115, the FASB wanted to require fair value accounting for all financial securities but got hung up on debt instruments (such as mortgage debt) that more commonly are not AFS  and more difficult to mark-to-market (i.e. debt is often more difficult to value due to not being traded with unique covenants and is more likely to be HTM, held-to-maturity). The FASB justification for FAS 115 can be found in Paragraphs 39-43, although the elaborations in Paragraphs 86-100 are enlightening. IFRS requirements are similar, although penalties for violating HTM classification are somewhat more onerous.

    An interesting November 12 video on the “cascade theory” of what might be termed quantitative models, like lemmings, cascading over a cliff --- http://www.ft.com/cms/bfba2c48-5588-11dc-b971-0000779fd2ac.html?_i_referralObject=593529134&fromSearch=n

    In that sense the comparison of the LTCM disaster in 1998 with the August 2007 downfall seems to hold some water. Although the big losers in both instances were big and sophisticated investors who’re well aware of the unique risks of unregulated hedge funds, the externalities affecting Main Street (read that CREF investors) are very real. The LTCM fiasco could well have brought down equity markets in all of Wall Street --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#LTCM 

    One of the hardcopy journals I read cover-to-cover each week is The Economist on October 25, 2007. The following is one of my favorite readable papers among the thousands of articles written about this controversy --- http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10026288

    WHEN markets wobbled in August, almost all the media attention was focused on the credit crunch and the links to American mortgage loans. But at exactly the same time, another crisis was occurring at the core of the stockmarket.

    This crisis stemmed from the obscure world of quantitative, or quant-based, finance, which uses computer models to find attractive stocks and to identify overpriced shares. Suddenly, in August, the models went wrong.

    The incident revealed a problem at the heart of the financial system. In effect, the quant groups were acting as marketmakers, trading so often (some are aiming for transaction times in terms of milliseconds) that they set prices for everyone else. But unlike traditional marketmakers, quant funds are not obliged to make markets come rain or shine. And unlike marketmakers, they use a lot of leverage. This means that instead of providing liquidity in a crisis, the quants added to instability. There is a lesson there.

    In a way, the crisis stemmed from the quants' success. Many firms, such as the American hedge fund Renaissance Technologies, had done fantastically well and had been able to charge hefty fees. But if one firm can hire top mathematicians and use the latest technology, so can others. An arms race developed, with some trading faster and faster—even siting their computers closer to the exchanges in order to cut the time it took orders to travel down the wires.

    And as the computers sifted through the data, some strategies became overcrowded. A paper* by Amir Khandani and Andrew Lo of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology back-tested a proxy for a typical strategy, involving buying the previous day's losing stocks and selling the winners. Such a strategy would have delivered a daily return of 1.38% before (substantial) costs in 1995 but the return fell steadily to 0.15% a day last year.

    In the face of declining returns, the authors reckon, the natural response of managers would have been to increase leverage. But that, of course, increased their vulnerability when things went wrong.

    Both the MIT academics and a paper by Cliff Asness of AQR Capital Management, a leading quant group, agree that August's problems probably began when a diversified, or multi-strategy, hedge fund experienced losses in the credit markets. The fund sought to reduce its exposures but its credit positions were impossible to sell. So it cut its quant positions instead, since that merely involved selling highly liquid stocks.

    However, that selling pressure caused other quant funds to lose money as their favoured stocks fell in price. Those that were leveraged were naturally forced to reduce their positions as well. These waves of selling played havoc with the models. Quant investors thought they were aware of the risks of their strategy and had built diversified portfolios to avoid it. But the parts of the portfolio that were previously uncorrelated suddenly fell in tandem.

    In theory, quant funds could have been bold and borrowed more; after all, the stocks they thought were cheap had become even cheaper. The traders who took on the positions of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), after the hedge fund failed in 1998, ended up making money. But the example of LTCM, which went bust before it could be proved right, argued in favour of a more cautious approach. “We could have rolled the dice but that would have risked the business,” said one quant-fund manager. “I don't know of anyone that did so.”

    Avoiding that trap simply led quant investors into another. On August 10th, the stocks that quants had favoured suddenly rebounded. Those who had cut their positions most could not benefit from the rally. That category clearly included Goldman Sachs's Global Alpha hedge fund, which lost a remarkable 23% on the month.

    If it were just a few hedge funds, backed by rich people, losing money, it might not matter. But the funds had become too important: rather than adding stability, as marketmakers are supposed to do, they added volatility.

    Quants will adjust their models and clients will become more discerning; AQR's. Mr Asness says his firm will look harder for “unique” factors, that is, not used by other fund managers. But regulators should also reflect that markets are less stable than they assumed. The presence of leveraged traders such as quants at their heart means conditions can now turn, at the flick of a switch, from stability to panic.

    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue
    When "quants" become market makers instead of market players, it throws fair value accounting into a turmoil.


    Question
    Will “Minsky Moments” become “Minsky Accounting?”

    As both the FASB in the U.S. and the IASB international standards boards march ever onward toward "fair value" accounting by replacing historical costs with current values (mark-to-market accounting), it will plunge corporate accountants and their CPA auditors ever deeper into current value estimation. Financial statements will become increasingly volatile and fictional with market movements. It is becoming clear that the efficient markets hypothesis that drives much of the theory behind fair value accounting is increasingly on shaky ground.

    Especially problematic are moments in time like now (2007) when the bubble burst on subprime mortgage borrowing and investing that has caused tremors throughout the world of banking and investing and risk sharing. And once again, the ghost of long departed John Maynard Keynes seems to have risen from the grave. There's material for a great Stephen King horror novel here.

    It is time for accounting standard setters who set such new standards as FAS 157 and FAS 159 to dust off some old economics books and seriously consider whether they understand the theoretical underpinnings of new and pending fair value standards moving closer to show time. You can read more fair value accounting controversies in my work-in-process PowerPoint file called 10FairValue.ppt at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/JensenPowerPoint/

    Aside from badly mixing my metaphors here, the fundamental problem is that unrealized fair values painting rosy financial performance (as the speculative roller coaster rises with breath taking thrill toward the crest) become unrealized losses as the roller coaster swoops downward toward “Minsky Moments.” It's a fundamental problem in fair value accounting because an enormous portion of reported earnings on the way up become sheer Minsky mincemeat (before investments are sold and liabilities are not settled) and diabolical garbage on the way down. In other words in these boom/bust market cycles, financial statements (certified by independent auditors under new fair value accounting standards) become increasingly hypothetical fantasy replacing accustomed facts rooted in transactional accounting.

    Fair value standard setters are plunging accounting into the realm of economic theory that is itself less uncertain than astrology. It's time to rethink some of that Chicago School economic theory that we've taken for granted because of all the Nobel Prizes awarded to Chicago School economists.

     

    Question
    Did John Maynard Keynes rise from the grave?

    "In Time of Tumult, Obscure Economist Gains Currency:  Mr. Minsky Long Argued Markets Were Crisis Prone; His 'Moment' Has Arrived," by Justin Lahart, The Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2007; Page A1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118736585456901047.html?mod=todays_us_page_one

    The recent market turmoil is rocking investors around the globe. But it is raising the stock of one person: a little-known economist whose views have suddenly become very popular.

    Hyman Minsky, who died more than a decade ago, spent much of his career advancing the idea that financial systems are inherently susceptible to bouts of speculation that, if they last long enough, end in crises. At a time when many economists were coming to believe in the efficiency of markets, Mr. Minsky was considered somewhat of a radical for his stress on their tendency toward excess and upheaval.

    Today, his views are reverberating from New York to Hong Kong as economists and traders try to understand what's happening in the markets. The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, where Mr. Minsky worked for the last six years of his life, is planning to reprint two books by the economist -- one on John Maynard Keynes, the other on unstable economies. The latter book was being offered on the Internet for thousands of dollars.

    Christopher Wood, a widely read Hong Kong-based analyst for CLSA Group, told his clients that recent cash injections by central banks designed "to prevent, or at least delay, a 'Minsky moment,' is evidence of market failure."

    Indeed, the Minsky moment has become a fashionable catch phrase on Wall Street. It refers to the time when over-indebted investors are forced to sell even their solid investments to make good on their loans, sparking sharp declines in financial markets and demand for cash that can force central bankers to lend a hand.

    Mr. Minsky, who died in 1996 at the age of 77, was a tall man with unruly hair who wore unpressed suits. He approached the world as "one big research tank," says Diana Minsky, his daughter, an art history professor at Bard. "Economics was an integrated part of his life. It wasn't isolated. There wasn't a sense that work was something he did at the office."

    She recalls how, on a trip to a village in Italy to meet friends, Mr. Minsky ended up interviewing workers at a glove maker to understand how small-scale capitalism worked in the local economy.

    Although he was born in Chicago, Mr. Minsky didn't have many fans in the "Chicago School" of economists, who believed that markets were efficient. A follower of the economist John Maynard Keynes, he died just before a decade of financial crises in Asia, Russia, tech stocks, corporate credit and now mortgage debt, began to lend credence to his ideas.

    Following those periods of tumult, more investors turned to the investment classic "Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises," by Charles Kindleberger, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who leaned heavily on Mr. Minsky's work.

    Mr. Kindleberger showed that financial crises unfolded the way that Mr. Minsky said they would. Though a loyal follower, Mr. Kindleberger described Mr. Minsky as "a man with a reputation among monetary theorists for being particularly pessimistic, even lugubrious, in his emphasis on the fragility of the monetary system and its propensity to disaster."

    At its core, the Minsky view was straightforward: When times are good, investors take on risk; the longer times stay good, the more risk they take on, until they've taken on too much. Eventually, they reach a point where the cash generated by their assets no longer is sufficient to pay off the mountains of debt they took on to acquire them. Losses on such speculative assets prompt lenders to call in their loans. "This is likely to lead to a collapse of asset values," Mr. Minsky wrote.

    When investors are forced to sell even their less-speculative positions to make good on their loans, markets spiral lower and create a severe demand for cash. At that point, the Minsky moment has arrived.

    "We are in the midst of a Minsky moment, bordering on a Minsky meltdown," says Paul McCulley, an economist and fund manager at Pacific Investment Management Co., the world's largest bond-fund manager, in an email exchange.

    The housing market is a case in point, says Investment Technology Group Inc. economist Robert Barbera, who first met Mr. Minsky in the late 1980s. When home buyers were expected to have a down payment of 10% or 20% to qualify for a mortgage, and to provide income documentation that showed they'd be able to make payments, there was minimal risk. But as home prices rose, and speculators entered the market, lenders relaxed their guard and began offering loans with no money down and little or no documentation.

    Once home prices stalled and, in many of the more-speculative markets, fell, there was a big problem.

    "If you're lending to home buyers with 20% down and house prices fall by 2%, so what?" Mr. Barbera says. If most of a lender's portfolio is tied up in loans to buyers who "don't put anything down and house prices fall by 2%, you're bankrupt," he says.

    Several money managers are laying claim to spotting the Minsky moment first. "I featured him about 18 months ago," says Jeremy Grantham, chairman of GMO LLC, which manages $150 billion in assets. He pointed to a note in early 2006 when he wrote that investors had become too comfortable that financial markets were safe, and consequently were taking on too much risk, just as Mr. Minsky predicted. "Guinea pigs of the world unite. We have nothing to lose but our shirts," he concluded.

    It was Mr. McCulley at Pacific Investment, though, who coined the phrase "Minsky moment" during the Russian debt crisis in 1998.

    Continued in article

    Bob Jensen's fair value PowerPoint show ---  http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/JensenPowerPoint/

    August 18, 2007 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

    Bob,

    I thought we could all enjoy the following Keynes quotes:

    1. "Capitalism is the astounding belief that the most wickedest of men will do the most wickedest of things for the greatest good of everyone."

    2. How prophetic he was:

    "The day is not far off when the economic problem will take the back seat where it belongs, and the arena of the heart and the head will be occupied or reoccupied, by our real problems / the problems of life and of human relations, of creation and behavior and religion."

    3. How wonderfully Keynes anticipated stuff in games played by Bayesian players and stuff in self-fulfilling equilibria (which yielded three "Nobel" prizes), all without introducing any mathematics or economic mumbo jumbo:

    "Successful investing is anticipating the anticipations of others."

    4. The accountics folks might enjoy the following:

    "The difficulty lies not so much in developing new ideas as in escaping from old ones."

    "If economists could manage to get themselves thought of as humble, competent people on a level with dentists, that would be splendid."

    "When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?"

    5. This should thrill tax folks:

    "The avoidance of taxes is the only intellectual pursuit that still carries any reward."

    Jagdish

    August 20, 2007 reply from Paul Williams [Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]

    Apparently no economist ever dies -- they just come in and out of fashion. In George Akerlof's presidential address to the AEA in January 2006 ("The Missing Motivation in Macroeconomics") he concludes: "This lecture has shown that the early Keynesians got a great deal of the working of the economic system right in ways that are denied by the five neutralities (assumptions of the positivists).

    As quoted from Keynes earlier, they based their models on "our knowledge of human nature and from the detailed facts of experience."" Thus the recent interest in "norms" by Shyam Sunder and the urgency to provide "econonmic" explanations for "norms." So the very FIRST plenary speaker at the, Joe Henrich, at the Chicago 2007 AAA meeting, regaled us with his "evidence" that market integrated societies produce people who are more trusting and fair- minded because people from Missouri divide the spoils in a game that no one ever plays in their real lives more equitably than a hunter- gatherer from New Guinea for whom the game may have an entirely different meaning than someone from St.Louis (a synchresis, perhaps).

    Given that the integration of societies by "markets" represents the blink of an eye in evolutionary time (even for humans) one might consider that perhaps what makes Missourians different from hunter- gatherers is that they come from a Christian tradition that predates market integration by a couple thousand years (a tradition of Christian agape?).

    Linguists have long remarked that language is impossible without trust (how else can I believe that words mean what I am told they mean or how do I avoid starvation at birth unless I "trust" my mother? We are born trusting). Yet we get this facile rendering with regression equations of Adam Smith's argument stood completely on its head. For Smith markets were a possibility only within a society that was already integrated (in Smith's case by the kirk's dispositon of a stern Calvanist morality).

    Mike Royko (the columnist for the Chicago Tribune) once opined that he had finally figured out economic theory, to wit, "Economics says that almost anything can happen, and it usually does." The end of history? I bet not.

     


    May 17, 2006 message from Peter Walton

    I would like to take this opportunity to let you know about a forthcoming book from Routledge:

    The Routledge Companion to Fair Value and Financial Reporting --- Click Here

    Edited by Peter Walton

    May 2007: 246x174: 406pp

    Hb: 978-0-415-42356-4: £95.00 $170.00

    Jensen Comment
    Even though I have a paper published in this book, I will receive no compensation from sales of the book. And since I'm retired, lines on a resume no longer matter.


    FASB Statement No. 107
    Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial Instruments
    (Issue Date 12/91)
    [Full Text] [Summary] [Status]

    This Statement extends existing fair value disclosure practices for some instruments by requiring all entities to disclose the fair value of financial instruments, both assets and liabilities recognized and not recognized in the statement of financial position, for which it is practicable to estimate fair value. If estimating fair value is not practicable, this Statement requires disclosure of descriptive information pertinent to estimating the value of a financial instrument. Disclosures about fair value are not required for certain financial instruments listed in paragraph 8.

    This Statement is effective for financial statements issued for fiscal years ending after December 15, 1992, except for entities with less than $150 million in total assets in the current statement of financial position. For those entities, the effective date is for fiscal years ending after December 15, 1995.

    FASB Statement No. 115
    Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities
    (Issue Date 5/93)
    [Full Text] [Summary] [Status]

    This Statement addresses the accounting and reporting for investments in equity securities that have readily determinable fair values and for all investments in debt securities. Those investments are to be classified in three categories and accounted for as follows:

    Debt securities that the enterprise has the positive intent and ability to hold to maturity are classified as held-to-maturity securities and reported at amortized cost.

    Debt and equity securities that are bought and held principally for the purpose of selling them in the near term are classified as trading securities and reported at fair value, with unrealized gains and losses included in earnings.

    Debt and equity securities not classified as either held-to-maturity securities or trading securities are classified as available-for-sale securities and reported at fair value, with unrealized gains and losses excluded from earnings and reported in a separate component of shareholders' equity.

    This Statement does not apply to unsecuritized loans. However, after mortgage loans are converted to mortgage-backed securities, they are subject to its provisions. This Statement supersedes FASB Statement No. 12, Accounting for Certain Marketable Securities, and related Interpretations and amends FASB Statement No. 65, Accounting for Certain Mortgage Banking Activities, to eliminate mortgage-backed securities from its scope.

    This Statement is effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1993. It is to be initially applied as of the beginning of an enterprise's fiscal year and cannot be applied retroactively to prior years' financial statements. However, an enterprise may elect to initially apply this Statement as of the end of an earlier fiscal year for which annual financial statements have not previously been issued.

    FASB Statement No. 130
    Reporting Comprehensive Income

    (Issue Date 6/97)
    [Full Text] [Summary] [Status]

    This Statement establishes standards for reporting and display of comprehensive income and its components (revenues, expenses, gains, and losses) in a full set of general-purpose financial statements. This Statement requires that all items that are required to be recognized under accounting standards as components of comprehensive income be reported in a financial statement that is displayed with the same prominence as other financial statements. This Statement does not require a specific format for that financial statement but requires that an enterprise display an amount representing total comprehensive income for the period in that financial statement.

    This Statement requires that an enterprise (a) classify items of other comprehensive income by their nature in a financial statement and (b) display the accumulated balance of other comprehensive income separately from retained earnings and additional paid-in capital in the equity section of a statement of financial position.

    This Statement is effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1997. Reclassification of financial statements for earlier periods provided for comparative purposes is required.

     

    FASB Statement No. 133 and Amendments in FAS 137, 138, 149, and 155
    Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities
    (Issue Date 6/98)
    [Full Text] [Summary] [Status]

    This Statement establishes accounting and reporting standards for derivative instruments, including certain derivative instruments embedded in other contracts, (collectively referred to as derivatives) and for hedging activities. It requires that an entity recognize all derivatives as either assets or liabilities in the statement of financial position and measure those instruments at fair value. If certain conditions are met, a derivative may be specifically designated as (a) a hedge of the exposure to changes in the fair value of a recognized asset or liability or an unrecognized firm commitment, (b) a hedge of the exposure to variable cash flows of a forecasted transaction, or (c) a hedge of the foreign currency exposure of a net investment in a foreign operation, an unrecognized firm commitment, an available-for-sale security, or a foreign-currency-denominated forecasted transaction. The accounting for changes in the fair value of a derivative (that is, gains and losses) depends on the intended use of the derivative and the resulting designation.

    For a derivative designated as hedging the exposure to changes in the fair value of a recognized asset or liability or a firm commitment (referred to as a fair value hedge), the gain or loss is recognized in earnings in the period of change together with the offsetting loss or gain on the hedged item attributable to the risk being hedged. The effect of that accounting is to reflect in earnings the extent to which the hedge is not effective in achieving offsetting changes in fair value. For a derivative designated as hedging the exposure to variable cash flows of a forecasted transaction (referred to as a cash flow hedge), the effective portion of the derivative's gain or loss is initially reported as a component of other comprehensive income (outside earnings) and subsequently reclassified into earnings when the forecasted transaction affects earnings. The ineffective portion of the gain or loss is reported in earnings immediately. For a derivative designated as hedging the foreign currency exposure of a net investment in a foreign operation, the gain or loss is reported in other comprehensive income (outside earnings) as part of the cumulative translation adjustment. The accounting for a fair value hedge described above applies to a derivative designated as a hedge of the foreign currency exposure of an unrecognized firm commitment or an available-for-sale security. Similarly, the accounting for a cash flow hedge described above applies to a derivative designated as a hedge of the foreign currency exposure of a foreign-currency-denominated forecasted transaction. For a derivative not designated as a hedging instrument, the gain or loss is recognized in earnings in the period of change. Under this Statement, an entity that elects to apply hedge accounting is required to establish at the inception of the hedge the method it will use for assessing the effectiveness of the hedging derivative and the measurement approach for determining the ineffective aspect of the hedge. Those methods must be consistent with the entity's approach to managing risk.

    This Statement applies to all entities. A not-for-profit organization should recognize the change in fair value of all derivatives as a change in net assets in the period of change. In a fair value hedge, the changes in the fair value of the hedged item attributable to the risk being hedged also are recognized. However, because of the format of their statement of financial performance, not-for-profit organizations are not permitted special hedge accounting for derivatives used to hedge forecasted transactions. This Statement does not address how a not-for-profit organization should determine the components of an operating measure if one is presented.

    This Statement precludes designating a nonderivative financial instrument as a hedge of an asset, liability, unrecognized firm commitment, or forecasted transaction except that a nonderivative instrument denominated in a foreign currency may be designated as a hedge of the foreign currency exposure of an unrecognized firm commitment denominated in a foreign currency or a net investment in a foreign operation.

    This Statement amends FASB Statement No. 52, Foreign Currency Translation, to permit special accounting for a hedge of a foreign currency forecasted transaction with a derivative. It supersedes FASB Statements No. 80, Accounting for Futures Contracts, No. 105, Disclosure of Information about Financial Instruments with Off-Balance-Sheet Risk and Financial Instruments with Concentrations of Credit Risk, and No. 119, Disclosure about Derivative Financial Instruments and Fair Value of Financial Instruments. It amends FASB Statement No. 107, Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial Instruments, to include in Statement 107 the disclosure provisions about concentrations of credit risk from Statement 105. This Statement also nullifies or modifies the consensuses reached in a number of issues addressed by the Emerging Issues Task Force.

    This Statement is effective for all fiscal quarters of fiscal years beginning after June 15, 1999. Initial application of this Statement should be as of the beginning of an entity's fiscal quarter; on that date, hedging relationships must be designated anew and documented pursuant to the provisions of this Statement. Earlier application of all of the provisions of this Statement is encouraged, but it is permitted only as of the beginning of any fiscal quarter that begins after issuance of this Statement. This Statement should not be applied retroactively to financial statements of prior periods.


    Question
    How should you account for this one?
    Fair value accounting under FAS 141?   Yeah right!

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review, January 18, 2008

    Behind Bank of America's Big Gamble
    by Valerie Bauerlein and James R. Hagerty
    The Wall Street Journal

    Jan 12, 2008
    Page: A1
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120005404048583617.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
     

    TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Banking, Mergers and Acquisitions

    SUMMARY: The article describes the process of due diligence used by Bank of America and its ultimate reasoning in deciding to offer to acquire Countrywide Funding. "Terms of the deal call for Bank of America, the largest U.S. bank by market value, to give 0.1822 shares of Bank of America for each share of Countrywide. The deal could be renegotiated if Countrywide experiences a material change that adversely affects its business, but Mr. [Kenneth D.] Lewis [CEO of Bank America] said he does not anticipate that happening....Bank of America is buying a deeply troubled company, and it faces the risk that Countrywide's assets could continue deteriorating. As of Sept. 30, Countrywide's savings bank held about $79.5 billion of loans as investments. Three-quarters of those loans were second-lien home-equity loans...or option adjustable-rate mortgages....Overdue payments by Countrywide borrowers are surging....

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Introducing the acquisition process in business combinations, and the business combination as a solution to the problem of a struggling bank, is the best use of this article, though other topics such as the SEC's interest in Countrywide's loan loss reserves also are discussed.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) What is "due diligence"? How long did it take Bank of America to complete its due diligence prior to making an offer to Countrywide Financial Corp.?

    2.) How would Bank of America's analysts model how its portfolio of loans is likely to perform in the future? Describe the components of these models.

    3.) How do you think the results of analysts' modeling impact the negotiations between Bank of America and Countrywide? How do you think they impact the accounting for the transaction when it is completed later this spring?

    4.) How does fact that Countrywide has a book value of approximately $12 billion, triple the $4 billion price to Bank of America, provide a "cushion for potential damages, settlements and other litigation costs involving mortgages that went bad"?

    5.) Why is the SEC concerned with whether Countrywide has "...set aside enough reserves to cover potential losses on the loans on its books"? In your answer, define the term "reserves" as it is used in this quote and give other words preferred by accountants for this item.

    6.) What are the terms of the offer made by Bank of America? In your answer, be sure to address the issue of a contingency in the offer.

    7.) If the contingency described in the article were to come to pass, what would be its impact on the accounting for the business combination?

    8.) What other factors besides the performance of Countrywide's current loan portfolio are likely to impact the success of the acquisition and the mortgage lending operations in the future?
     

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
     

    RELATED ARTICLES: 
    No 'Fun': Bank of America Pulls Back
    by Valerie Bauerlein
    Jan 16, 2008
    Page: C3

     

    Tom Selling in his Accounting Onion Blog has a really nice piece on January 24, 2008 entitled "Peeling the Onion on the New Business Combination Standards: FAS 141R and FAS 160" ---

    This post examines the onion skin, if you will, of the new business combination standards. I'm going to explain the differences between the so-called 'purchase' method of accounting and the new 'acquisition' method. As is my habit, let's begin with a simple example.

    Assume that ParentCo acquires 70% of the outstanding shares of SubCo for $1,000. Additional facts are as follows:

    ParentCo estimates that the fair value of 100% of SubCo is $1,405: You should note that the fair value of SubCo may not ordinarily be calculated by extrapolating the purchase price paid to the remaining shares outstanding (i.e., $1,000/70% = $1,429 is not ordinarily the fair value). The reason is that a portion of the purchase price contains a payment for the ability to exercise control. In this case, the control premium would be $55, calculated as follows: ($1000 - .7($1405))/(1-.7) = $55

    It may be difficult to estimate the control premium, because it may have to be derived from an estimate of the full fair value of the acquired company, as above. But the new requirement to do so has not been controversial. That's because the larger the control premium, the lower will be goodwill. The book value of SubCo's assets and liabilities approximate their book value, except for one asset with a remaining useful life of 10 years. For that asset, the fair value exceeds the book value by $100.

    Tom then launches into a great analysis of this illustration.

    Bob Jensen's threads on intangibles and contingency issues on accountancy are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes

    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue

     

     


    FASB Statement No. 142
    Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets
    (Issue Date 6/01)
    [Full Text] [Summary] [Status]

    This Statement changes the subsequent accounting for goodwill and other intangible assets in the following significant respects:

    • Acquiring entities usually integrate acquired entities into their operations, and thus the acquirers' expectations of benefits from the resulting synergies usually are reflected in the premium that they pay to acquire those entities. However, the transaction-based approach to accounting for goodwill under Opinion 17 treated the acquired entity as if it remained a stand-alone entity rather than being integrated with the acquiring entity; as a result, the portion of the premium related to expected synergies (goodwill) was not accounted for appropriately. This Statement adopts a more aggregate view of goodwill and bases the accounting for goodwill on the units of the combined entity into which an acquired entity is integrated (those units are referred to as reporting units).

     

    • Opinion 17 presumed that goodwill and all other intangible assets were wasting assets (that is, finite lived), and thus the amounts assigned to them should be amortized in determining net income; Opinion 17 also mandated an arbitrary ceiling of 40 years for that amortization. This Statement does not presume that those assets are wasting assets. Instead, goodwill and intangible assets that have indefinite useful lives will not be amortized but rather will be tested at least annually for impairment. Intangible assets that have finite useful lives will continue to be amortized over their useful lives, but without the constraint of an arbitrary ceiling.

     

    • Previous standards provided little guidance about how to determine and measure goodwill impairment; as a result, the accounting for goodwill impairments was not consistent and not comparable and yielded information of questionable usefulness. This Statement provides specific guidance for testing goodwill for impairment. Goodwill will be tested for impairment at least annually using a two-step process that begins with an estimation of the fair value of a reporting unit. The first step is a screen for potential impairment, and the second step measures the amount of impairment, if any. However, if certain criteria are met, the requirement to test goodwill for impairment annually can be satisfied without a remeasurement of the fair value of a reporting unit.

     

    • In addition, this Statement provides specific guidance on testing intangible assets that will not be amortized for impairment and thus removes those intangible assets from the scope of other impairment guidance. Intangible assets that are not amortized will be tested for impairment at least annually by comparing the fair values of those assets with their recorded amounts.

     

    • This Statement requires disclosure of information about goodwill and other intangible assets in the years subsequent to their acquisition that was not previously required. Required disclosures include information about the changes in the carrying amount of goodwill from period to period (in the aggregate and by reportable segment), the carrying amount of intangible assets by major intangible asset class for those assets subject to amortization and for those not subject to amortization, and the estimated intangible asset amortization expense for the next five years.

     

    FASB Statement No. 155
    Accounting for Certain Hybrid Financial Instruments—an amendment of FASB Statements No. 133 and 140
    (Issue Date 02/06)
    [Full Text] [Summary] [Status]
     

    This Statement amends FASB Statements No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, and No. 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities. This Statement resolves issues addressed in Statement 133 Implementation Issue No. D1, “Application of Statement 133 to Beneficial Interests in Securitized Financial Assets.”

    This Statement:

    Permits fair value remeasurement for any hybrid financial instrument that contains an embedded derivative that otherwise would require bifurcation

    Clarifies which interest-only strips and principal-only strips are not subject to the requirements of Statement 133

    Establishes a requirement to evaluate interests in securitized financial assets to identify interests that are freestanding derivatives or that are hybrid financial instruments that contain an embedded derivative requiring bifurcation

    Clarifies that concentrations of credit risk in the form of subordination are not embedded derivatives

    Amends Statement 140 to eliminate the prohibition on a qualifying special-purpose entity from holding a derivative financial instrument that pertains to a beneficial interest other than another derivative financial instrument.

    Reasons for Issuing This Statement

    In January 2004, the Board added this project to its agenda to address what had been characterized as a temporary exemption from the application of the bifurcation requirements of Statement 133 to beneficial interests in securitized financial assets.

    Prior to the effective date of Statement 133, the FASB received inquiries on the application of the exception in paragraph 14 of Statement 133 to beneficial interests in securitized financial assets. In response to the inquiries, Implementation Issue D1 indicated that, pending issuance of further guidance, entities may continue to apply the guidance related to accounting for beneficial interests in paragraphs 14 and 362 of Statement 140. Those paragraphs indicate that any security that can be contractually prepaid or otherwise settled in such a way that the holder of the security would not recover substantially all of its recorded investment should be subsequently measured like investments in debt securities classified as available-for-sale or trading under FASB Statement No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, and may not be classified as held-to-maturity. Further, Implementation Issue D1 indicated that holders of beneficial interests in securitized financial assets that are not subject to paragraphs 14 and 362 of Statement 140 are not required to apply Statement 133 to those beneficial interests until further guidance is issued.

    How the Changes in This Statement Improve Financial Reporting

    This Statement improves financial reporting by eliminating the exemption from applying Statement 133 to interests in securitized financial assets so that similar instruments are accounted for similarly regardless of the form of the instruments. This Statement also improves financial reporting by allowing a preparer to elect fair value measurement at acquisition, at issuance, or when a previously recognized financial instrument is subject to a remeasurement (new basis) event, on an instrument-by-instrument basis, in cases in which a derivative would otherwise have to be bifurcated. Providing a fair value measurement election also results in more financial instruments being measured at what the Board regards as the most relevant attribute for financial instruments, fair value.

    Effective Date and Transition

    This Statement is effective for all financial instruments acquired or issued after the beginning of an entity’s first fiscal year that begins after September 15, 2006. The fair value election provided for in paragraph 4(c) of this Statement may also be applied upon adoption of this Statement for hybrid financial instruments that had been bifurcated under paragraph 12 of Statement 133 prior to the adoption of this Statement. Earlier adoption is permitted as of the beginning of an entity’s fiscal year, provided the entity has not yet issued financial statements, including financial statements for any interim period for that fiscal year. Provisions of this Statement may be applied to instruments that an entity holds at the date of adoption on an instrument-by-instrument basis.

    At adoption, any difference between the total carrying amount of the individual components of the existing bifurcated hybrid financial instrument and the fair value of the combined hybrid financial instrument should be recognized as a cumulative-effect adjustment to beginning retained earnings. The cumulative-effect adjustment should be disclosed gross (that is, aggregating gain positions separate from loss positions) determined on an instrument-by-instrument basis. Prior periods should not be restated.

     

    FASB Statement No. 157
    Fair Value Measurements
    (Issue Date 09/06)
    [Full Text] [Summary] [Status]
     

    This Statement defines fair value, establishes a framework for measuring fair value in generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), and expands disclosures about fair value measurements. This Statement applies under other accounting pronouncements that require or permit fair value measurements, the Board having previously concluded in those accounting pronouncements that fair value is the relevant measurement attribute. Accordingly, this Statement does not require any new fair value measurements. However, for some entities, the application of this Statement will change current practice.

    Reason for Issuing This Statement

    Prior to this Statement, there were different definitions of fair value and limited guidance for applying those definitions in GAAP. Moreover, that guidance was dispersed among the many accounting pronouncements that require fair value measurements. Differences in that guidance created inconsistencies that added to the complexity in applying GAAP. In developing this Statement, the Board considered the need for increased consistency and comparability in fair value measurements and for expanded disclosures about fair value measurements.

    Differences between This Statement and Current Practice

    The changes to current practice resulting from the application of this Statement relate to the definition of fair value, the methods used to measure fair value, and the expanded disclosures about fair value measurements.

    The definition of fair value retains the exchange price notion in earlier definitions of fair value. This Statement clarifies that the exchange price is the price in an orderly transaction between market participants to sell the asset or transfer the liability in the market in which the reporting entity would transact for the asset or liability, that is, the principal or most advantageous market for the asset or liability. The transaction to sell the asset or transfer the liability is a hypothetical transaction at the measurement date, considered from the perspective of a market participant that holds the asset or owes the liability. Therefore, the definition focuses on the price that would be received to sell the asset or paid to transfer the liability (an exit price), not the price that would be paid to acquire the asset or received to assume the liability (an entry price).

    This Statement emphasizes that fair value is a market-based measurement, not an entity-specific measurement. Therefore, a fair value measurement should be determined based on the assumptions that market participants would use in pricing the asset or liability. As a basis for considering market participant assumptions in fair value measurements, this Statement establishes a fair value hierarchy that distinguishes between (1) market participant assumptions developed based on market data obtained from sources independent of the reporting entity (observable inputs) and (2) the reporting entity’s own assumptions about market participant assumptions developed based on the best information available in the circumstances (unobservable inputs). The notion of unobservable inputs is intended to allow for situations in which there is little, if any, market activity for the asset or liability at the measurement date. In those situations, the reporting entity need not undertake all possible efforts to obtain information about market participant assumptions. However, the reporting entity must not ignore information about market participant assumptions that is reasonably available without undue cost and effort.

    This Statement clarifies that market participant assumptions include assumptions about risk, for example, the risk inherent in a particular valuation technique used to measure fair value (such as a pricing model) and/or the risk inherent in the inputs to the valuation technique. A fair value measurement should include an adjustment for risk if market participants would include one in pricing the related asset or liability, even if the adjustment is difficult to determine. Therefore, a measurement (for example, a “mark-to-model” measurement) that does not include an adjustment for risk would not represent a fair value measurement if market participants would include one in pricing the related asset or liability.

    This Statement clarifies that market participant assumptions also include assumptions about the effect of a restriction on the sale or use of an asset. A fair value measurement for a restricted asset should consider the effect of the restriction if market participants would consider the effect of the restriction in pricing the asset. That guidance applies for stock with restrictions on sale that terminate within one year that is measured at fair value under FASB Statements No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, and No. 124, Accounting for Certain Investments Held by Not-for-Profit Organizations.

    This Statement clarifies that a fair value measurement for a liability reflects its nonperformance risk (the risk that the obligation will not be fulfilled). Because nonperformance risk includes the reporting entity’s credit risk, the reporting entity should consider the effect of its credit risk (credit standing) on the fair value of the liability in all periods in which the liability is measured at fair value under other accounting pronouncements, including FASB Statement No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities.

    This Statement affirms the requirement of other FASB Statements that the fair value of a position in a financial instrument (including a block) that trades in an active market should be measured as the product of the quoted price for the individual instrument times the quantity held (within Level 1 of the fair value hierarchy). The quoted price should not be adjusted because of the size of the position relative to trading volume (blockage factor). This Statement extends that requirement to broker-dealers and investment companies within the scope of the AICPA Audit and Accounting Guides for those industries.

    This Statement expands disclosures about the use of fair value to measure assets and liabilities in interim and annual periods subsequent to initial recognition. The disclosures focus on the inputs used to measure fair value and for recurring fair value measurements using significant unobservable inputs (within Level 3 of the fair value hierarchy), the effect of the measurements on earnings (or changes in net assets) for the period. This Statement encourages entities to combine the fair value information disclosed under this Statement with the fair value information disclosed under other accounting pronouncements, including FASB Statement No. 107, Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial Instruments, where practicable.

    The guidance in this Statement applies for derivatives and other financial instruments measured at fair value under Statement 133 at initial recognition and in all subsequent periods. Therefore, this Statement nullifies the guidance in footnote 3 of EITF Issue No. 02-3, “Issues Involved in Accounting for Derivative Contracts Held for Trading Purposes and Contracts Involved in Energy Trading and Risk Management Activities.” This Statement also amends Statement 133 to remove the similar guidance to that in Issue 02-3, which was added by FASB Statement No. 155, Accounting for Certain Hybrid Financial Instruments.

    How the Conclusions in This Statement Relate to the FASB’s Conceptual Framework

    The framework for measuring fair value considers the concepts in FASB Concepts Statement No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information. Concepts Statement 2 emphasizes that providing comparable information enables users of financial statements to identify similarities in and differences between two sets of economic events.

    The definition of fair value considers the concepts relating to assets and liabilities in FASB Concepts Statement No. 6, Elements of Financial Statements, in the context of market participants. A fair value measurement reflects current market participant assumptions about the future inflows associated with an asset (future economic benefits) and the future outflows associated with a liability (future sacrifices of economic benefits).

    This Statement incorporates aspects of the guidance in FASB Concepts Statement No. 7, Using Cash Flow Information and Present Value in Accounting Measurements, as clarified and/or reconsidered in this Statement. This Statement does not revise Concepts Statement 7. The Board will consider the need to revise Concepts Statement 7 in its conceptual framework project.

    The expanded disclosures about the use of fair value to measure assets and liabilities should provide users of financial statements (present and potential investors, creditors, and others) with information that is useful in making investment, credit, and similar decisions—the first objective of financial reporting in FASB Concepts Statement No. 1, Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business Enterprises.

     

    FASB Statement No. 159
    The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities—Including an amendment of FASB Statement No. 115

    (Issue Date 02/07)
    [Full Text] [Summary] [Status]
     

     

    Why Is the FASB Issuing This Statement?

    This Statement permits entities to choose to measure many financial instruments and certain other items at fair value. The objective is to improve financial reporting by providing entities with the opportunity to mitigate volatility in reported earnings caused by measuring related assets and liabilities differently without having to apply complex hedge accounting provisions. This Statement is expected to expand the use of fair value measurement, which is consistent with the Board’s long-term measurement objectives for accounting for financial instruments.

    What Is the Scope of This Statement—Which Entities Does It Apply to and What Does It Affect?

    This Statement applies to all entities, including not-for-profit organizations. Most of the provisions of this Statement apply only to entities that elect the fair value option. However, the amendment to FASB Statement No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, applies to all entities with available-for-sale and trading securities. Some requirements apply differently to entities that do not report net income.

    The following are eligible items for the measurement option established by this Statement:

    Recognized financial assets and financial liabilities except:

    An investment in a subsidiary that the entity is required to consolidate

    An interest in a variable interest entity that the entity is required to consolidate

    Employers’ and plans’ obligations (or assets representing net overfunded positions) for pension benefits, other postretirement benefits (including health care and life insurance benefits), postemployment benefits, employee stock option and stock purchase plans, and other forms of deferred compensation arrangements, as defined in FASB Statements No. 35, Accounting and Reporting by Defined Benefit Pension Plans, No. 87, Employers’ Accounting for Pensions, No. 106, Employers’ Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions, No. 112, Employers’ Accounting for Postemployment Benefits, No. 123 (revised December 2004), Share-Based Payment, No. 43, Accounting for Compensated Absences, No. 146, Accounting for Costs Associated with Exit or Disposal Activities, and No. 158, Employers’ Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans, and APB Opinion No. 12, Omnibus Opinion—1967

    Financial assets and financial liabilities recognized under leases as defined in FASB Statement No. 13, Accounting for Leases (This exception does not apply to a guarantee of a third-party lease obligation or a contingent obligation arising from a cancelled lease.)

    Deposit liabilities, withdrawable on demand, of banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, and other similar depository institutions

    Financial instruments that are, in whole or in part, classified by the issuer as a component of shareholder’s equity (including “temporary equity”). An example is a convertible debt security with a noncontingent beneficial conversion feature.

    Firm commitments that would otherwise not be recognized at inception and that involve only financial instruments

    Nonfinancial insurance contracts and warranties that the insurer can settle by paying a third party to provide those goods or services

    Host financial instruments resulting from separation of an embedded nonfinancial derivative instrument from a nonfinancial hybrid instrument.

    How Will This Statement Change Current Accounting Practices?

    The fair value option established by this Statement permits all entities to choose to measure eligible items at fair value at specified election dates. A business entity shall report unrealized gains and losses on items for which the fair value option has been elected in earnings (or another performance indicator if the business entity does not report earnings) at each subsequent reporting date. A not-for-profit organization shall report unrealized gains and losses in its statement of activities or similar statement.

    The fair value option:

    May be applied instrument by instrument, with a few exceptions, such as investments otherwise accounted for by the equity method

    Is irrevocable (unless a new election date occurs)

    Is applied only to entire instruments and not to portions of instruments.

    How Does This Statement Contribute to International Convergence?

    The fair value option in this Statement is similar, but not identical, to the fair value option in IAS 39, Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement. The international fair value option is subject to certain qualifying criteria not included in this standard, and it applies to a slightly different set of instruments.

    What Is the Effective Date of This Statement?

    This Statement is effective as of the beginning of an entity’s first fiscal year that begins after November 15, 2007. Early adoption is permitted as of the beginning of a fiscal year that begins on or before November 15, 2007, provided the entity also elects to apply the provisions of FASB Statement No. 157, Fair Value Measurements.

    No entity is permitted to apply this Statement retrospectively to fiscal years preceding the effective date unless the entity chooses early adoption. The choice to adopt early should be made after issuance of this Statement but within 120 days of the beginning of the fiscal year of adoption, provided the entity has not yet issued financial statements, including required notes to those financial statements, for any interim period of the fiscal year of adoption.

    This Statement permits application to eligible items existing at the effective date (or early adoption date).

     

    Many other U.S. and International Standards directly or indirectly impact on fair value accounting! In particular international IAS 32 and IAS 39 require fair value accounting in many circumstances.

     


    Introduction to Valuation

    Damodaran Online: A Great Sharing Site from a Finance Professor at New York University and Textbook Writer --- http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/%7Eadamodar/

    This site has great sections on corporate finance, investments, valuation, spreadsheets, research, etc. For example, take a look at the helpers on valuation --- http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/%7Eadamodar/

    You can pick the valuation approach that you would like to go to, to see illustrations, solutions and other supporting material.

       
      Discounted Cashflow Valuation
      Relative Valuation
      Option Pricing Approaches to Valuation
      Acquisition Valuation
      EVA, CFROI and other Value Enhancement Strategies

     

    Or you can pick the material that you are interested in.

           
    Spreadsheets Overheads Datasets References
    Problems & Solutions Derivations and Discussion Valuation Examples PowerPoint presentations

    Jim Mahar's finance sharing site (especially note his great blog link) --- http://financeprofessor.com/

    Financial Rounds from an anonymous finance professor --- http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/

    Bob Jensen's threads on valuation are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value controversies in accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue

    Bob Jensen's finance and investment helpers are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Bookbob1.htm


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on September 22, 2006

    TITLE: FASB to Issue Retooled Rule for Valuing Corporate Assets
    REPORTER: David Reilly
    DATE: Sep 15, 2006
    PAGE: C3
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115828639109763950.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac 
    TOPICS: Accounting, Advanced Financial Accounting, Fair Value Accounting

    SUMMARY: On 9/15/2006, the FASB issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157, Fair Value Measurements. The standard "...provides enhanced guidance for using fair value to measure assets and liabilities. The standard also responds to investors' requests for expanded information about the extent to which companies measure assets and liabilities at fair value, the information used to measure fair value, and the effect of fair value measurements on earnings." (Source: FASB News Release available on their web site at http://www.fasb.org/news/nr091506.shtml) This new standard must be used as guidance whenever reporting entities use fair value to measure value assets and liabilities as a required or acceptable method of applying GAAP.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) What is the purpose of issuing Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157? In your answer, describe how this standard should help to alleviate discrepancies in practice. To help answer this question, you may access the FASB's own news release about the standard, available at http://www.fasb.org/news/nr091506.shtml or the new standard itself, available on the FASB's web site.

    2.) From your own knowledge, cite an example in which fair value is used to measure an asset or liability in corporate balance sheets. Why is fair value an appropriate measure for including these assets and liabilities in corporate balance sheets?

    3.) What is the major difficulty with using fair values for financial reporting that is cited in the article?

    4.) Define the term "historical cost." Name two flaws with the use of historical costs, one cited in the article and one based on your own knowledge. Be sure to explain the flaw clearly.

    5.) How does this standard help to alleviate the issue described in answer to question 3? Again, you may access the FASB's web site, and the news release in particle, to answer this question.

    6.) The article closes with a statement that "The FASB hopes to counter some of [the issues cited in the article] by expanding disclosures required for all balance sheet items measure at fair value..." What could be the possible problem with that requirement?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    "FASB to Issue Retooled Rule For Valuing Corporate Assets New Method Repeals Limits Spurred by Enron Scandal; Critics Worry About Abuses," by David Reilly,  The Wall Street Journal, September 15, 2006; Page C3 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115828639109763950.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac

    Accounting rule makers have wrapped up an overhaul of a tricky but important method of valuing corporate assets, despite some critics' warning that the change could reopen the door to abuses like those seen at Enron Corp.

    The overhaul, contained in an accounting standard that could be issued as early as today, will repeal a ban put in place after Enron collapsed into bankruptcy court in late 2001 amid an array of accounting irregularities. The ban prohibited companies immediately booking gains or losses from complex financial instruments whose real value may not be known for years.

    The Financial Accounting Standards Board's new rule will require companies to base "fair" values for certain items on what they would fetch from a sale in an open market to a third party. In the past, firms often would use internal models to determine the value of instruments that didn't have a readily available price.

    FASB prohibited that practice after Enron used overly optimistic models to value multiyear power contracts in a bid to pad earnings. The ban was meant to give the board time to come up with a new approach to determining fair values.

    The accounting rule makers say the new standard will give companies, auditors and investors much needed, and more nuanced, guidance on how to measure market values. Companies will have to think, "it's not my own estimate of what something is worth to me, but what the market would demand for this," said Leslie Seidman, an FASB member. While clarifying how to come up with appropriate values for some instruments, the new standard doesn't expand the use of what is known as fair-value accounting.

    Critics say the new rule reopens the door to manipulation and possibly fraud by unscrupulous managers. Requiring market values for instruments where there isn't a ready price in a market can be "a license for management to invent the financial statements to be whatever they want them to be," Damon Silvers, associate general counsel for the AFL-CIO, said at a meeting of an FASB advisory group this spring.

    Jousting over the standard reflects a deep rift within accounting circles. For decades, accounting values were mostly based on historical cost, or what a company paid for a particular asset. In recent years, accounting rules have moved toward the use of market values, known as fair-value accounting. In some ways this reflects the shift in the U.S. from a manufacturing to a service economy, where intangible assets are more important than the plant and equipment that previously defined a company's financial strength.

    Starting in the mid-1980s, companies also began using ever-more-complicated financial instruments such as futures, options and swaps to manage interest-rate, currency and other risks. Such contracts often can't be measured based on their cost. This spurred the use of market values, thought to be more realistic. But these values can be tough to determine because many complex financial instruments are tailor-made and don't trade on open markets in the same way as stocks.

    Of course, valuations based on historical cost also have flaws. The savings-and-loan crisis of the late 1980s, for example, was prompted in part by thrifts carrying loans on their balance sheets at historical cost, even though the loans had plummeted in value.

    Robert Herz, the FASB's chairman, acknowledges the difficulty in coming up with a market, or fair, value for many instruments. In discussions, he often asks how a company could reasonably be expected to come up with a fair value for a 30-year swap agreement on the Thai currency, the baht, which is a bet on the future value of that currency against another.

    The answer, according to Mr. Herz and the FASB, is to base the value on what a willing third-party would pay in the market and possibly include a discount to reflect the uncertainty inherent in the approach.

    In an interview earlier this year, Mr. Herz said this valuation approach would reduce the likelihood of a recurrence of problems such as those seen at Enron. "The problem wasn't that Enron was using fair values, it was that they were using 'unfair' values," he said.

    Still, "the bottom line is that fair-value accounting is a great thing so long as you have market values," said J. Edward Ketz, an associate accounting professor at Pennsylvania State University, who is working on a book about the FASB's new standard. "If you don't, you get into some messy areas."

    The FASB hopes to counter some of these issues by expanding disclosures required for all balance-sheet items measured at fair value, the board's Ms. Seidman said.

    October 15, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    The original 157 Exposure Draft proposed a Fair Value Option (FVO) that would have allowed carrying of virtually any financial asset or liability at fair value rather than just limiting fair value accounting to selected items that are now required to be carried at fair value rather than historical cost. Business firms, and especially banks, generally are against fair value accounting (due to reporting instabilities that arise from fair value adjustments prior to contract settlements). The FASB backed off of the FVO when it issued FAS 157, thereby relegating FAS 157 to a standard that clarifies definitions of fair value in various circumstances. Hence FAS 157 is largely semantic and does not change the present fair value accounting rules.

    I asked Paul Pacter (at Deloitte in Hong Kong where he's still very active in helping to set IFRS and FASB standards) for an update on the FVO Project (commenced in 2004) that failed to impact the new FAS 157 standard. His reply is below.

    October 31 reply from Paul Pacter (CN - Hong Kong) [paupacter@deloitte.com.hk]

    Hi Bob,

    Yes, FASB's FV Option (FVO) t is very much active -- an ED on phase 1 was issued in January, and a final FAS is expected before year end.

    • Phase 1 addresses creating an FVO for financial assets and financial liabilities.
    • Phase 2 addresses creating an FVO for selected nonfinancial items.

    Thus phase 2 would go beyond IFRSs, though several IFRSs have FV options for individual types of assets. IAS 16 and IAS 38 allow it for PP&E and intangibles -- though the credit is to surplus, not P&L, no recycling, subsequent depreciation of revalued amounts. IAS 40 gives a FV option for investment property -- FV through P&L. IAS 41 isn't an option, it's a requirement for FV through P&L for agricultural assets.

    Phase 2 would commence in 2007.

    Re possible amendment to FAS 157, I don't think FASB plans to do that, though I suppose there might be some consequential amendment. But I don't think the FVO will change the definition of fair value that's in FAS 157.

    Here's FASB's web page: http://www.fasb.org/project/fv_option.shtml

    Warm regards,

    Paul

    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at various other links:

    I recently completed the first draft of a paper on fair value at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
    Comments would be helpful.

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes 

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms

    Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation, and Yield Curves for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm

    Robert Walker's First Blog Entry is About Fair Value Accounting, October 27, 2006 --- http://www.robertbwalkerca.blogspot.com/

    Introduction
    I have decided to begin a commentary which expresses my views on accounting. As I begin to do this I envisage the source of my commentary to comprise three different sorts of writing in which I may engage:
    § Simple notes directly to the ‘blog’ such as this.
    § Formal submissions I may make to various bodies including the IASB.
    § Letters or reports I may write for one reason or another that I think might have some general readership.

    The expression of my views will stray from the subject matter of accounting per se to deal with matters of enormous significance to me such as corporate or public administration. Such expressions will not be too substantial a digression from the core subject matter because I believe that the foundation of good ‘corporate governance’, to use a vogue term, is accounting.

    Source of my ideas on accounting
    I would have to confess that the foundation upon which I base my philosophy of accounting is derivative, as much of human knowledge is of course. It is not for nothing that Newtown said that if he can see so far it is because he stands on the shoulders of giants. In my case, that ‘giant’ is Yuiji Ijiri. As I begin a detailed exposition of my views I shall return to the lessons I learned many years ago from Theory of Accounting Measurement, a neglected work that will still be read in 1,000 years or so long as humankind survives whichever is the shorter. As the depredations of the standard setting craze are visited upon us with ever increasing complexity, the message delivered by Ijiri will be heeded more an more.

    The basic structure of accounting
    Without wishing to be too philosophical about it, I need to begin by outlining what I mean by accounting. Accounting, in my mind, comprises three inter-related parts. These are:
    § Book-keeping.
    § Accounting.
    § Financial reporting.

    Book-keeping is the process of recording financial data elements in the underlying books of account. These financial data elements represent, or purport to represent, real world events. The heart of book-keeping is the double entry process. For instance at the most basic level a movement in cash will result in the surrender or receipt of an asset, the incurring or settlement of a liability and so on.

    I have no complete and coherent theory of the limits of book-keeping. Clearly cash movement (change of ownership) or the movement of commodity is the proper subject matter of book-keeping. Whether all forms of contract should be similarly treated is not clear to me. I am inclined to say yes. That is to adopt Ijiri’s theory of commitment accounting, but I can foresee that this leads me to conclusions that I may find unpalatable later on. Incidentally I say this because an epiphany I had, based on the notion of commitment accounting, some years ago is beginning to unravel.

    Book-keeping goes beyond recording to encompass control. That is the process by which the integrity of the centre piece of book-keeping – the general ledger expressing double entry – is ensured. I will not concern myself with such processes though this is not to say that they are unimportant.

    Accounting is the process by which sense is made of what is a raw record expressed in the general ledger. It is the process of distillation and summation that enables the accountant to gain on overview of what has happened to the entity the subject of the accounting. Accounting fundamentally assumes that the accountant is periodically capable of saying something useful about the real world using his or her special form of notation.

    Financial reporting is the process by which data is assembled into a comprehensive view of the world in accordance with a body of rules. It differs, in the ideal, from accounting in a number of ways. Most benignly it differs, for instance, by including ancillary information for the benefit of a reader beyond the mere abstraction from the general ledger. Again in the ideal there is an inter-relationship between the three levels in the accounting hierarchy. That is, the rules of financial reporting will, to some degree shape the order and format of the basic, book-keeping level so that the process of distillation and summation follows naturally to the final level of reporting without dramatic alteration.

    Perhaps what concerns me is that the sentiment expressed above can be seen, without much effort, to be only ideal and that in reality it does not arise. In short the golden strand that links the detailed recording of real world phenonmena to its final summation is broken.

    An example
    I was asked recently by a student of accounting to explain IAS 41, the IASB standard on agriculture. As I don’t deal in primary production at all, I had not thought about this subject for years.

    IAS 41 admonishes the accountant to apply ‘fair value’ accounting. Fair value accounting is the process by which current sale prices, or their proxies, are substituted for the past cost of any given item.

    For instance, you may have a mature vineyard. The vineyard comprises land, the vine and its fruit, the plant necessary to sustain the vine (support structures, irrigation channels etc.). Subsumed within the vine are the materials necessary for it to grow and start producing fruit. This will include the immature plant, the chemical supplements necessary to nurture and protect it, and the labour necessary to apply it.

    The book-keeping process will faithfully record all of these components. Suppose for example the plant, fertliser and labour cost $1000. In the books will be recorded:

    Dr Vineyard $1000
    Cr Cash $1000

    At the end of the accounting period, the accountant will summarise this is a balance statement. He or she will then obtain, in some way, the current selling price of the vine. Presumably this will be the future cash stream of selling the fruit, suitably discounted. Assume that this is $1200.

    The accountant will then make the following incremental adjustment:

    Dr Vineyard $200
    Cr Equity $200

    Looked like this there is a connection between the original book-keeping and the periodic adjustment at the end of the accounting period. This is an illusion. The incremental entry disguises what is really happening. It is as follows:

    Dr Equity $1000
    Cr Vineyard $1000

    And

    Dr Vineyard $1200
    Cr Equity $1200

    Considered from the long perspective, the original book-keeping has been discarded and a substitute value put in its place. This is the truth of the matter. The subject matter of the first phase of accounting was a set of events arising in a bank and in the entity undertaking accounting. The subject matter of the second phase is a set of future sales to a party who does not yet exist.

    From a perspective of solvency determination, a vital element of corporate governance, the view produced by the first phase is next to useless. However, the disquiet I had in my mind which I had suppressed until recently, relates to the shattering of the linkages between the three levels of accounting in the final reporting process. This disquiet has returned as I contemplate the apparently unstoppable momentum of the standard setting process.

    October 28, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Robert,

    I hope you add many more entries to your blog.

    The problem with "original book-keeping" is that it provides no answer how to account for risk of many modern day contracts that were not imagined when "original book-keeping" evolved in a simple world of transactions. For example, historical costs of forward contracts and swaps are zero and yet these contracts may have risks that may outweigh all the recorded debt under "original book-keeping." Once we opened the door to fair value accounting to better account for risk, however, we opened the door to misleading the public that booked fair value adjustments can be aggregated much like we sum the current balances of assets and liabilities on the balance sheet. Such aggregations are generally nonsense.

    I don't know if you saw my recent hockey analogy or not. It goes as follows:

    Goal Tenders versus Movers and Shakers
    Skate to where the puck is going, not to where it is.

    Wayne Gretsky (as quoted for many years by Jerry Trites at http://www.zorba.ca/ )

    Jensen Comment
    This may be true for most hockey players and other movers and shakers, but for goal tenders the eyes should be focused on where the puck is at every moment ---  not where it's going. The question is whether an accountant is a goal tender (stewardship responsibilities) or a mover and shaker (part of the managerial decision making team). This is also the essence of the debate of historical accounting versus pro forma accounting.

    Graduate student Derek Panchuk and professor Joan Vickers, who discovered the Quiet Eye phenomenon, have just completed the most comprehensive, on-ice hockey study to determine where elite goalies focus their eyes in order to make a save. Simply put, they found that goalies should keep their eyes on the puck. In an article to be published in the journal Human Movement Science, Panchuk and Vickers discovered that the best goaltenders rest their gaze directly on the puck and shooter's stick almost a full second before the shot is released. When they do that they make the save over 75 per cent of the time.
    "Keep your eyes on the puck," PhysOrg, October 26, 2006 --- http://physorg.com/news81068530.html

    I have written a more serious piece about both theoretical and practical problems of fair value accounting. I should emphasize that this was written after the FASB Exposure Draft proposing fair value accounting as an option for all financial instruments and the culminating FAS 157 that is mainly definitional and removed the option to apply fair value accounting to all financial instruments even though it is still required in many instances by earlier FASB standards.

    My thoughts on this are at the following two links:

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue

    Bob Jensen

    October 30, 2006 reply from Robert B Walker [walkerrb@ACTRIX.CO.NZ]

    Bob

    Thanks for the support. I have answered you in my second installment ( www.robertbwalkerca.blogspot.com ).

    I shall continue to write if for no other reason than for myself. I have had it in mind to write a book. I shall begin doing so this way.

    Robert

    October 30, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    I have difficulty envisioning forward contracts as “executory contracts.” These appear to be to be executed contracts that are terminated when the cash finally flows.

    Fair value appears to be the only way to book forward contracts if they are to be booked at all, although fair value on the date they are signed is usually zero.

    Once you are in the fair value realm, you have all the aggregation problems, blockage problems, etc. that are mentioned at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm 

    I guess what I’d especially like you to address is the problem of aggregation in a balance sheet or income statement based upon heterogeneous measurements.

    Bob Jensen

    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at various other links:

    I recently completed the first draft of a paper on fair value at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
    Comments would be helpful.

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes 

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms

    Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation, and Yield Curves for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm


    Fair value is the estimated best disposal (exit, liquidation) value in any sale other than a forced sale.  It is defined as follows in Paragraph 540 on Page 243 of FAS 133:

    The amount at which an asset (liability) could be bought (incurred) or sold (settled) in a current transaction between willing parties, that is, other than in a forced or liquidation sale. Quoted market prices in active markets are the best evidence of fair value and should be used as the basis for the measurement, if available. If a quoted market price is available, the fair value is the product of the number of trading units times that market price. If a quoted market price is not available, the estimate of fair value should be based on the best information available in the circumstances. The estimate of fair value should consider prices for similar assets or similar liabilities and the results of valuation techniques to the extent available in the circumstances. Examples of valuation techniques include the present value of estimated expected future cash flows using discount rates commensurate with the risks involved, option- pricing models, matrix pricing, option-adjusted spread models, and fundamental analysis.  Valuation techniques for measuring assets and liabilities should be consistent with the objective of measuring fair value. Those techniques should incorporate assumptions that market participants would use in their estimates of values, future revenues, and future expenses, including assumptions about interest rates, default, prepayment, and volatility. In measuring forward contracts, such as foreign currency forward contracts, at fair value by discounting estimated future cash flows, an entity should base the estimate of future cash flows on the changes in the forward rate (rather than the spot rate). In measuring financial liabilities and nonfinancial derivatives that are liabilities at fair value by discounting estimated future cash flows (or equivalent outflows of other assets), an objective is to use discount rates at which those liabilities could be settled in an arm's-length transaction.

    This is old news, but it does provide some questions for students to ponder.  The main problem of fair value adjustment is that many ((most?) of the adjustments cause enormous fluctuations in earnings, assets, and liabilities that are washed out over time and never realized.  The main advantage is that interim impacts that “might be” realized are booked.  It’s a war between “might be” versus “might never.”  The war has been waging for over a century with respect to booked assets and two decades with respect to unbooked derivative instruments, contingencies, and intangibles.

    CFA analysts' group favors full fair value reporting
    The CFA Centre for Financial Market Integrity – a part of the CFA Institute – has published a new financial reporting model that, they believe, would greatly enhance the ability of financial analysts and investors to evaluate companies in making investment decisions. The Comprehensive Business Reporting Model proposes 12 principles to ensure that financial statements are relevant, clear, accurate, understandable, and comprehensive (See below).
    "Analysts' group favours full fair value reporting," IAS Plus, October 31, 2005 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

     

    CFA Institute Centre for Financial Market Integrity
    Comprehensive Business Reporting Model – Principles

    • 1. The company must be viewed from the perspective of a current investor in the company's common equity.
    • 2. Fair value information is the only information relevant for financial decision making.
    • 3. Recognition and disclosure must be determined by the relevance of the information to investment decision making and not based upon measurement reliability alone.
    • 4. All economic transactions and events should be completely and accurately recognized as they occur in the financial statements.
    • 5. Investors' wealth assessments must determine the materiality threshold.
    • 6. Financial reporting must be neutral.
    • 7. All changes in net assets must be recorded in a single financial statement, the Statement of Changes in Net Assets Available to Common Shareowners.
    • 8. The Statement of Changes in Net Assets Available to Common Shareowners should include timely recognition of all changes in fair values of assets and liabilities.
    • 9. The Cash Flow Statement provides information essential to the analysis of a company and should be prepared using the direct method only.
    • 10. Changes affecting each of the financial statements must be reported and explained on a disaggregated basis.
    • 11. Individual line items should be reported based upon the nature of the items rather than the function for which they are used.
    • 12. Disclosures must provide all the additional information investors require to understand the items recognized in the financial statements, their measurement properties, and risk exposures.

    Standards of Value: Theory and Applications
    Standards of Value covers the underlying assumption in many of the prominent standards of value, including Fair Market Value, investment value, and fair value. It discusses the specific purposes of the valuation, including divorce, shareholders' oppression, financial reporting, and how these standards are applied.
    Standards of Value: Theory and Applications, by Jay E. Fishman, Shannon P. Pratt, William J. Morrison Wiley:  ISBN: 0-471-69483-5 Hardcover 368 pages November 2006 US $95.00) --- http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-0471694835.html


    "Will Fair Value Fly? Fair-value accounting could change the very basis of corporate finance," by Ronald Fink, CFO Magazine September 01, 2006 --- http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7851757/c_7873404?f=magazine_featured

    Much has changed in financial reporting since Andrew Fastow and Scott Sullivan, the finance chiefs of Enron and WorldCom, respectively, brought disgrace upon themselves, their employers, and, to a degree, their profession. Regulators and investors have pressed companies to be more open and forthcoming about their results — and companies have responded. According to a new CFO magazine survey, 82 percent of public-company finance executives disclose more information in their financial statements today then they did three years ago. But that positive finding won't quell calls for further accounting reform.

    The U.S. reporting system "faces a number of important and difficult challenges," Robert Herz, chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, told the annual conference of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in Washington, D.C., last December. Chief among those, said Herz, is "the need to reduce complexity and improve the transparency and overall usefulness" of information reported to investors. ad

    Critics contend that generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) remain seriously flawed, even as companies have beefed up internal controls to comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. "We've done very little but play defense for the last five to six years," charges J. Michael Cook, chairman and CEO emeritus of Deloitte & Touche LLP. "It's time to play offense."

    Cook, a respected elder statesman in the accounting community, goes so far as to pronounce financial statements almost completely irrelevant to financial analysis as currently conducted. "The analyst community does workarounds based on numbers that have very little to do with the financial statements," says Cook. "Net income is a virtually useless number."

    How can financial statements become more relevant and useful? Many reformers, including Herz, believe that fair-value accounting must be part of the answer. In this approach, which FASB increasingly favors, assets and liabilities are marked to market rather than recorded on balance sheets at historical cost. Fair-value accounting, say its advocates, would give users of financial statements a far clearer picture of the economic state of a company.

    "I know what an asset is. I can see one, I can touch one, or I can see representations of one. I also know what liabilities are," says Thomas Linsmeier, a Michigan State University accounting professor who joined FASB in June. On the other hand, "I believe that revenues, expenses, gains, and losses are accounting constructs," he adds. "I can't say that I see a revenue going down the street. And so for me to have an accounting model that captures economic reality, I think the starting point has to be assets and liabilities."

    More than any other regulatory change, fair value promises to end the practice of earnings management. That's because a company's earnings would depend more on what happens on its balance sheet than on its income statement (see "The End of Earnings Management?" at the end of this article).

    But switching from historical cost would require enormous effort from overworked finance departments. Valuing assets in the absence of active markets could be overly subjective, making financial statements less reliable. Linsmeier's confidence notwithstanding, disputes could arise over the very definition of certain assets and liabilities. And using fair value could even distort a company's approach to deal-making and capital structure.

    A Familiar Concept Fair value is by no means unfamiliar to corporate-finance executives, as current accounting rules for such items as derivatives (FAS 133 and 155), securitizations (FAS 156), and employee stock option grants (FAS 123R) use it to varying degrees when recording assets and liabilities. So does a proposal issued last January for another rule, this one for accounting for all financial instruments. FASB's more recent proposals to include pensions and leases on balance sheets also embrace fair-value measurement (see "Be Careful What You Wish For" at the end of this article).

    While both Herz and Linsmeier are careful to note that they don't necessarily favor the application of fair value to assets and liabilities that lack a ready market, they clearly advocate its application where there's sufficient reason to believe the valuations are reliable. Corporate accounting, Herz says, is the only major reporting system that doesn't use fair value as its basis, and he points to the Federal Reserve's use of it in tracking the U.S. economy as sufficient reason for companies to adopt it.

    The corporate world, however, must grapple with its own complexities. For one, fair value could make it even more difficult to realize value from acquisitions. Take the question of contingent considerations, wherein the amount that acquirers pay for assets ultimately depends on their return. Under current GAAP, the balance-sheet value of assets that are transferred through such earnouts may reflect only the amount exchanged at the time the deal is completed, because the acquirer has considerable leeway in treating subsequent payments as expenses.

    Under fair value, the acquirer would also include on its balance sheet the present value of those contingent payments based on their likelihood of materializing. Since the money may never materialize, some finance executives contend those estimates could be unreliable and misleading. "I disagree with [this application of fair value] on principle," James Barge, senior vice president and controller for Time Warner, said during a conference on financial reporting last May. ad

    Barge cites the acquisition of intangible assets that a company does not intend to use as a further example of fair value's potentially worrisome effects. Under current GAAP, their value is included in goodwill and subject to annual impairment testing for possible write-off. But if, as FASB is contemplating, the value of those assets would be recorded on the balance sheet along with that of the associated tangible assets that were acquired, Barge worries that an immediate write-off would then be required — even though it would not reflect the acquiring company's economics.

    Fair value's defenders say such concerns are misplaced. The possibility that a contingent consideration won't materialize, for starters, is already reflected in an acquirer's bid, says Patricia McConnell, a Bear Stearns senior managing director who chairs the corporate-disclosure policy council of the CFA Institute, a group for financial analysts. "It's in the price," she says.

    As for intangibles that are acquired and then extinguished, the analyst says a write-off would not in fact be required under fair value if the transaction strengthens the acquirer's market position. That position would presumably be reflected in the value of the assets associated with those intangibles as recorded on the balance sheet under fair-value treatment.

    "It may be in buying a brand to gain monopolistic position that you don't have an expense," McConnell explains, "but rather you have the extinguishment of one asset and the creation of another." Yet McConnell, among others, admits that accounting for intangibles is an area that would need improvement even if FASB adopted fair value.

    Deceptive Debt? Another area of concern involves capital structure, with Barge suggesting that fair value may make it more difficult to finance growth with debt. He contends that marking a company's debt to market could make a company look more highly exposed to interest-rate risk than it really is, noting during the May conference that Time Warner's debt was totally hedged.

    Barge also cited as problematic the hypothetical case of a company whose creditworthiness is downgraded by the rating agencies. By marking down the debt's value on its balance sheet, the company would realize more income, a scenario Barge called "nonsensical." He warned of a host of such effects arising under fair value when a company changes its capital structure.

    Proponents find at least some of the complaints about fair value and corporate debt to be misplaced. Herz notes fair value would require the company to mark the hedge as well as the debt to market, so that if a company is hedging interest-rate risk effectively, its balance sheet should accurately reflect its lack of any exposure.

    What's more, fair value could also improve balance sheets in some cases. When, for instance, a company owns an interest in another whose results it need not consolidate, the equity holder's proportion of the other company's assets and liabilities is currently carried at historical cost. If, however, the other company's assets have gained value and were marked to market, the equity holder's own leverage might decrease.

    A real-life case in point: If the chemical company Valhi marked to market its 39 percent stake in Titanium Metals, Valhi's own ratio of long-term debt to equity would fall from 90 percent (at the end of 2005) to 56 percent, according to Jack T. Ciesielski, publisher of The Analyst's Accounting Observer newsletter. ad

    Still, even some fair-value proponents share Barge's concern about credit downgrades. As Ciesielski, a member of FASB's Emerging Issues Task Force, wrote last April in a report on the board's proposal for the use of fair value for financial instruments, it is "awfully counterintuitive" for a company to show rising earnings when its debt-repayment capacity is declining.

    Herz and other fair-value proponents disagree, noting that the income accrues to the benefit of the shareholders, not to bondholders. "It's not at all counterintuitive," asserts Rebecca McEnally, director for capital-markets policy of the CFA Institute Centre for Financial Market Integrity, citing the fact that the item is classified under GAAP as "income from forgiveness of indebtedness." But Ciesielski says investors are unlikely to understand that, and that fair value, in this case at least, may not produce useful results.

    Resolving the Issues Even some of FASB's critics agree, however, that the current system needs improvement, and that fair value can help provide it. "Fair value in general is more relevant than historical cost and can lead to reduced complexity and greater transparency," Barge admits, though he has noted that the use of fair value may also lead to "soft" results that "you can't audit."

    For much the same reason, Colleen Cunningham, president and CEO of Financial Executives International (FEI), expressed concern in testimony before Congress last March that "overly theoretical and complex standards can result in financial reporting of questionable accuracy and can create a significant cost burden, with little benefit to investors." In an interview, she explains that her biggest concern is that FASB is pushing ahead with fair-value-based rules without sufficient input from preparers. "Let's resolve the issues" before proceeding, she insists.

    Herz concedes that numerous issues surrounding fair value need to be addressed. But important users of financial statements are pressing him to move forward on fair value without delay. As a comment letter that the CFA Institute sent to FASB put it: "All financial decision-making should be based on fair value, the only relevant measurement for assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses."

    Meanwhile, Herz isn't waiting for the conceptual framework to be completed before enacting new rules that embrace fair value. "In the end, we're not going to get everybody agreeing," Herz says. "So we have to make decisions" despite lingering disagreement.

    Ironically, one fair-value-based proposal that FASB issued recently may have created an artful means of defusing opposition. The Board's proposal for financial instruments gives preparers of financial reports the choice of using historical cost or fair value in recording the instruments on their balance sheets. That worries some people, who say giving companies a choice of methods will make it harder to compare their results, even when they're in the same industry.

    Continued in article

     


    "Guidance on fair value measurements under FAS 123(R)," IAS Plus, May 8, 2006 ---
    http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

    Deloitte & Touche (USA) has updated its book of guidance on FASB Statement No. 123(R) Share-Based Payment: A Roadmap to Applying the Fair Value Guidance to Share-Based Payment Awards (PDF 2220k). This second edition reflects all authoritative guidance on FAS 123(R) issued as of 28 April 2006. It includes over 60 new questions and answers, particularly in the areas of earnings per share, income tax accounting, and liability classification. Our interpretations incorporate the views in SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin Topic 14 "Share-Based Payment" (SAB 107), as well as subsequent clarifications of EITF Topic No. D-98 "Classification and Measurement of Redeemable Securities" (dealing with mezzanine equity treatment). The publication contains other resource materials, including a GAAP accounting and disclosure checklist. Note that while FAS 123 is similar to IFRS 2 Share-based Payment, there are some measurement differences that are Described Here.

    Bob Jensen's threads on employee stock options are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/sfas123/jensen01.htm


    Fair Value Accounting Book Review (Meeting the New FASB Requirements)

    From SmartPros on May 1, 2006
    Fair Value for Financial Reporting by Alfred King highlights the accounting and auditing requirements for fair value information and offers a detailed explanation of how the FASB is going to change "fair value," from determining the fair value of intangible assets to selecting and working with an appraiser --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x35458.xml

    Fair Value for Financial Reporting: Meeting the New FASB Requirements
    by Alfred M. King
    ISBN: 0-471-77184-8
    Hardcover 352 pages April 2006

     

    Click to Download the Comprehensive Business Reporting Model from the CFA Institute website.
    Click here for Press Release (PDF 26k).

    As you can see below, the war is not over yet.  In fact it has intensified between corporations (especially banks) versus standard setters versus members of the academy.

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on April 2, 2004

    TITLE: As IASB Unveils New Rules, Dispute With EU Continues 
    REPORTER: David Reilly 
    DATE: Mar 31, 2004 
    PAGE: A2 LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108067939682469331,00.html  
    TOPICS: Generally accepted accounting principles, Fair Value Accounting, Insider trading, International Accounting, International Accounting Standards Board

    SUMMARY: Despite controversy with the European Union (EU), the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is expected to release a final set of international accounting standards. Questions focus on the role of the IASB, controversy with the EU, and harmonization of the accounting standards.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) What is the role of the IASB? What authority does the IASB have to enforce standards?

    2.) List three reasons that a country would choose to follow IASB accounting standards. Why has the U.S. not adopted IASB accounting standards?

    3.) Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of harmonization of accounting standards throughout the world. Why is it important the IASB reach a resolution with the EU over the disputed accounting standards?

    4.) What is fair value accounting? Why would fair value accounting make financial statements more volatile? Is increased volatility a valid argument for not adopting fair value accounting? Does GAAP in the United States require fair value accounting? Support your answers.

    There are a number of software vendors of FAS 133 valuation software.

    One of the major companies is Financial CAD --- http://www.financialcad.com/ 

    FinancialCAD provides software and services that support the valuation and risk management of financial securities and derivatives that is essential for banks, corporate treasuries and asset management firms. FinancialCAD’s industry standard financial analytics are a key component in FinancialCAD solutions that are used by over 25,000 professionals in 60 countries.

    See software.

    Fair value accounting politics in the revised IAS 39

    From Paul Pacter's IAS Plus on July 13, 2005 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
    Also see http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/IASBFairValueFAQ.pdf

     
    The European Commission has published Frequently Asked Questions – IAS 39 Fair Value Option (FVO) (PDF 94k), providing the Commission's views on the following questions:
    • Why did the Commission carve out the full fair value option in the original IAS 39 standard?
    • Do prudential supervisors support IAS 39 FVO as published by the IASB?
    • When will the Commission to adopt the amended standard for the IAS 39 FVO?
    • Will companies be able to apply the amended standard for their 2005 financial statements?
    • Does the amended standard for IAS 39 FVO meet the EU endorsement criteria?
    • What about the relationship between the fair valuation of own liabilities under the amended IAS 39 FVO standard and under Article 42(a) of the Fourth Company Law Directive?
    • Will the Commission now propose amending Article 42(a) of the Fourth Company Directive?
    • What about the remaining IAS 39 carve-out relating to certain

    On June 23, 2005, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued an Exposure Draft (ED) entitled "Fair Value Measurements."  The original ED can be downloaded free at
    http://www.fasb.org/draft/ed_fair_value_measurements.pdf

    "Response to the FASB's Exposure Draft on Fair Value Measurements," AAA Financial Standards Committee, Accounting Horizons, September 2005, pp. 187-195 --- http://aaahq.org/pubs/electpubs.htm

    RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC ISSUES

    The FASB invited comment on all matters related to the ED, but specifically requested comments on 14 listed issues.  The Committee's comments are limited to those issues for which empirical research provides some insights, or those sections of the ED that are conceptually inconsistent or unclear.  The Committee has previously commented on other fair-value-related documents issued by the FASB and other standard-setting bodies.  This letter reiterates comments expressed in those letters to the extent they are germane to the measurement issues contained in the ED.  However, to better understand our perspective on reporting fair value information in the financial statements and related notes, we refer readers to those comment letters (i.e., AAA FASC 1998, 2000).

    Issue 1: Definition of Fair Value

    The Committee believes that the ED contains some conceptual inconsistencies between the definition and application of the fair value measurement attribute.  The ED proposes a definition of fair value that is relatively independent of the entity-specific use of the assets held or settlement of the liabilities owed.  In contrast, the proposed standard and related implementation guidance includes measurement that is, at times, directly determined by the entity-specific use of the asset or settlement of the liability in question.

    Some of the inconsistencies with respect to fair value measurement might be attributable to the attempt to apply general, high-level fair value guidance to the idiosyncratic attributes of specific accounts and transactions.  In some cases, application to specific accounts and transactions requires deviation from an entity-independent notion of fair value to one that includes consideration of the specific types and uses of assets held or liabilities owed by companies.  For example, as we note in our discussion of Issue 6 (below), one of the examples in the ED suggests that the fair value of a machine should include an adjustment of quoted market prices (based on comparable machines) for installation costs.  However, such an adjustment is dependent on the individual circumstances of the company that purchases the equipment.  That is, installation costs are included in the fair value of an asset only when the firm intends to use that asset for income producing activities.  Alternatively, if the firm intends to sell the asset, then installation costs are ignored.

    Some members of the Committee, however, do not perceive an inconsistency between the definition and application of the fair value measurement attribute.  These members view the definition of fair value and the context within which it is applied (i.e., the valuation premise) to be distinct, albeit related, attributes.  Although the definition of fair value can be entity-independent, the valuation premise (e.g., value-in-use or value-in-exchange) cannot.  Further, these members argue that ignoring the valuation premise in determining fair value could lead to unsatisfactory outcomes.  For example, if installation costs are ignored regardless of the valuation premise, then immediately after purchasing an asset for use in income-producing activities, firms would suffer impairment losses equal to the installation costs incurred to prepare the assets for use.

    The Committee raises the example of machinery installation costs to illustrate the confusion we experienced trying to reconcile the high-level (seemingly entity-independent) definition of fair value with the contextually determined application standards.  We note that the Introduction of the Ed suggests that the intent of the proposed guidance in the ED is to establish fair value measures that would be referenced in other authoritative accounting to establish fair value measures that would be referenced in other authoritative accounting pronouncements.  Presumably, these other pronouncements would also establish reasonable deviations from the entity-independent notion of fair value.  The Committee believes the most effective general purpose fair value measurement standard would adopt a general notion of fair value that is consistent across the definition of fair value, the accounting standard, and the implementation guidance.  To the extent the Board generally believes that fair value is an entity-specific concept, the high-level definition should reflect this as well.

    Issues 4 and 5: Valuation Premise and Fair Value Hierarchy

    Related to our previous comments, some members of the Committee perceive a contradiction between the definition of fair value in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the ED and the valuation premise described in paragraph 13.  The definition of fair value provided in paragraph 5 suggests a pure value-in-exchange perspective where fair value is determined by the market price that would occur between willing parties.  In contrast, the valuation premise described in paragraph 13 suggests that the fair value estimate can follow either a value-in-use perspective or a value-in-exchange perspective.

    Moreover, the fair value hierarchy described in the ED gives the highest priority to fair value measurements based on market inputs regardless of the valuation premise.  Some members of the Committee believe that quoted market prices are not necessarily an appropriate measure of fair value when a value-in-use premise is being considered.  This is especially true when a quoted price for an identical asset in an active reference market (i.e., a Level 1 estimate) exists, but is significantly different from a value-in-use estimate computed by taking the present value of the firm-specific future cash flows expected to be generated by the asset (i.e., a Level 3 estimate).  In such instances, following the fair value hierarchy might lead to a fair value estimate more in character with a value-in-exchange premise than a value-in-use premise.

    In summary, the Committee believes that: (1) integrating the two valuation premises (i.e., value-in-use and value-in-exchange) into the definition of fair value itself and (2) elaborating on the differences between the two premises would help ensure more consistent application of the standard.

    Issue 6: Reference Market

    Some members of the Committee are confused by the guidance related to determining the appropriate reference market.  With respect to the Level 1 reference market, the ED states that when multiple active markets exist, the most advantageous market should be used.  The most advantageous market is determined by comparing prices across multiple markets net of transactions costs.  However, the ED requires that transactions costs be ignored subsequently in determining the fair value measurement.  In our view, ignoring transactions costs is problematic because we believe such costs are an ordinary and predictable part of executing a transaction.

    In Example 5 (paragraph B9 (b) of the ED) where two markets, A and B, are considered, the price in Market B ($35) is more advantageous than the price in Market A ($25), ignoring transaction costs.  However, the fair value estimate is determined using the price in Market A because the transactions cost in Market B ($20) is much higher than in Market A ($5).  The guidance is less clear if we modify the example by reducing the transaction costs for Market B to $15.  In this instance, neither market is advantageous in a "net" sense, but Market B would yield the highest fair value estimate (ignoring transactions costs), which provides managers an opportunity to pick the most desirable figure based on their reporting objectives.

    Omitting transactions costs from the fair value estimate in Example 5 contrasts sharply with Example 3 (Appendix B, paragraph B7 (a)) where the value-in-use fair value estimate of a machine is determined by adjusting the quoted market price of a comparable machine by installation costs.  Installation costs are ignored only if the firm intends to dispose of the asset (Appendix B, paragraph B7 (b)).  Thus, managerial intent plays an integral role in determining whether fair value is computed with or without installation costs, but the same does not hold for transaction costs.  Since transaction costs are not relevant unless management intends to dispose of the asset, the Committee agrees that ignoring transaction costs is justified when a value-in-use premise is appropriate, but the Committee questions the appropriateness of ignoring transaction costs when a value-in-exchange premise is adopted.

    Issue 7: Pricing in Active Dealer Markets

    The ED requires that the fair value of financial instruments traded in active dealer markets where bid and asked prices are readily available be estimated using bid prices for assets and asked prices for liabilities.  Some Committee members believe that this requirement is inconsistent with the general concept of fair value and seems to be biased toward valuing assets and liabilities at value-in-exchange instead of value-in-use.  Limiting our discussion to the asset case, if a buyer establishes a long position through a dealer, the buyer must pay the asked price.  By purchasing the asset at the asked price, the buyer clearly expects to earn an acceptable rate of return on the investment in the asset (at the higher price).  Moreover, if after purchasing the asset, the buyer immediately applies the ED's proposed fair value measurement guidance (i.e., bid price valuation), the buyer would incur a loss on the asset equal to the bid-ask spread.

    In general, the bid price seems relevant only if the holder wishes to liquidate his/her position.  Although the Committee is not largely in favor of managerial intent-based fair value measures, we are uncomfortable with a bias toward a value-in-exchange premise for assets in-use.  If the Board decides to retain bid-based (ask-based) accounting for dealer traded assets (liabilities) in the final standard, then we propose that the final standard more clearly describe the conceptual basis for liquidation basis asset and liability valuation.

    Issue 9: Level 3 Estimates

    Level 3 estimates require considerable judgment in terms of both the selection and application of valuation techniques.  As a result, estimates using different valuation techniques with different assumptions will likely yield widely varying fair value estimates.  Examples 7 and 8 in Appendix B of the ED illustrate the wide variance in fair value estimates obtained with different valuation techniques.  The ED allows considerable latitude in both the valuation technique and inputs used.  Due to their incentives, managers might use the flexibility afforded by the proposed standard to produce biased and unreliable estimates.  The measurement guidance proposed in the ED is similar to the unstructured and imprecise category of standards analyzed by Nelson et al.  (2002).  They find that managers are more likely to attempt (and auditors are less likely to question) earnings management under such standards compared to more precise standards.

    The income approach to determining a Level 3 fair value estimate encompasses a basket of valuation techniques including two different present value techniques--the discount rate adjustment technique and the expected present value technique.4  The ED conjectures that these two techniques should produce the same fair values (see paragraphs A12, A13 and FN 17).  But, from an application perspective, this conjecture is not consistent with empirical results from studies of human judgment and decision making.5  In particular, psychology research repeatedly shows that people are very poor intuitive statisticians (e.g., people consistently make axiomatic violations when estimating probabilistic outcomes).  In light of these findings, statements such as "the estimated fair values should be the same" provide preparers, auditors, and users with an unfounded (and descriptively false) belief that the techniques suggested in the ED will produce the same fair value estimates.

    Some members of the Committee believe that the ED should explicitly caution preparers, auditors, and users by stating that individuals consistently make these judgment errors.  Further, these Committee members recommend that the ED require companies (when practicable) to (1) independently use the discount rate adjustment and expected present value techniques if they decide to use a present value approach to determine fair value and (2) reconcile the results of the two techniques in a meaningful fashion and document the reconciliation so it can be audited for reasonableness.  Moreover, the application of the present value techniques should be independent of suggested or existing fair value figures when practicable (e.g., the fair value amount recorded in the previous year's financial statements), because psychology research finds that preconceived targets and legacy amounts unduly influence current judgments and decisions (e.g., through "anchoring" and insufficient adjustment).

    Although the disclosures required under paragraph 25 of the ED provide some information regarding the potential reliability of a Level 3 estimate, they do not provide alternative benchmark models that the firm may have considered in determining those fair value estimates.  Hence, the Committee also recommends that the FASB consider requiring firms to disclose (1) fair value estimates under alternative valuation techniques, and (2) sensitivity of fair value estimates to the specific assumptions and inputs used.

    Issue 11: Fair Value Disclosures

    As mentioned previously, the Committee believes that the proposed fair value measurement disclosures are not complete.  The Committee believes that when a firm uses alternative valuation methods to determine fair value, information regarding the alternative techniques and inputs employed should be provided.  Furthermore, users of financial statements would get a better understanding of the reliability of fair value estimates if the financial statements provide detailed disclosures related to (1) fair value estimates produced by alternative valuation techniques and reasons for selecting a preferred estimate, and (2) information about the sensitivity of fair value estimates to changes in assumptions and inputs.

    The Committee also notes that the ED requires the expanded set of reliability related disclosures only for fair value estimates reported in the balance sheet (paragraph 25).  A complete set of financial statements also includes many fair value estimates reported in the notes to the financial statements.  Some members of the Committee believe that financial statement users would also benefit from receiving the reliability related disclosures for fair values disclosed in the footnotes.  Moreover, application of the fair value hierarchy has implications for the reliability of the unrealized gains and losses reported in net (or comprehensive) income.  Accordingly, some members recommend that firms be required to disclose a breakdown of unrealized gains or losses based on how the related fair value amounts were determined (i.e., quoted prices of identical items, quoted prices of similar items, valuation models with significant market inputs, or valuation models with significant entity inputs.)

    CONCLUSION

    The Committee supports the formulation of a single standard that provides guidance on fair value measurement.  We believe that such a standard would improve the consistency of fair value measurement across the many standards that require fair value reporting and disclosure.  In this comment letter, we identify some potential inconsistencies between fair value definitions and fair value determination, and suggest ways to improve disclosures so that users of financial statements can better appreciate the reliability (or lack thereof) of fair value estimates.

    Although the Committee recognizes that the ED is intended to provide fair value measurement guidance, we wish to caution against promulgating pronouncements that completely eliminate historical cost information from the financial statements.  Evidence reported in Dietrich et al. (2000) suggests that historical cost information is incrementally informative even after fair value information is included in regression analyses.


    4    FASB Concept Statement No. 7, Using Cash Flow Information and Present Value in Accounting Measurements, describes these techniques, albeit using different terminology.  In that Concepts Statement, traditional present value refers to the discount rate adjustment technique, while expected cash flow approach refers to the expected present value technique.

    5    Probability-related judgments and decisions are among the oldest branches of psychology and decision-science research.  Two excellent resources that catalogue the problems that individuals have with probability judgments and statistical reasoning are Baron (2000) and Goldstein and Hogarth (1997).

     

    What are the advantages and disadvantages of requiring fair value accounting for all financial instruments as well as derivative financial instruments?

    Advantages:

     

    1. Eliminate arbitrary FAS 115 classifications that can be used by management to manipulate earnings (which is what Freddie Mac did in 2001 and 1002.
    2. Reduce problems of applying FAS 133 in hedge accounting where hedge accounting is now allowed only when the hedged item is maintained at historical cost.
    3. Provide a better snap shot of values and risks at each point in time.  For example, banks now resist fair value accounting because they do not want to show how investment securities have dropped in value.

     

    Disdvantages:

     

    1. Combines fact and fiction in the sense that unrealized gains and losses due to fair value adjustments are combined with “real” gains and losses from cash transactions.  Many, if not most, of the unrealized gains and losses will never be realized in cash.  These are transitory fluctuations that move up and down with transitory markets.  For example, the value of a $1,000 fixed-rate bond moves up and down with interest rates when at expiration it will return the $1,000 no matter how interest rates fluctuated over the life of the bond.
    2. Sometimes difficult to value, especially OTC securities.
    3. Creates enormous swings in reported earnings and balance sheet values.
    4. Generally fair value is the estimated exit (liquidation) value of an asset or liability.  For assets, this is often much less than the entry (acquisition) value for a variety of reasons such as higher transactions costs of entry value, installation costs (e.g., for machines), and different markets  (e.g., paying dealer prices for acquisition and blue book for disposal).  For example, suppose Company A purchases a computer for $2 million that it can only dispose of for $1 million a week after the purchase and installation.  Fair value accounting requires expensing half of the computer in the first week even though the computer itself may be utilized for years to come.  This violates the matching principle of matching expenses with revenues, which is one of the reasons why fair value proponents generally do not recommend fair value accounting for operating assets. 
       

    "Derivatives and hedging:  An Analyst's Response to US FAS 133," by Frank Will, Corporate Finance Magazine, June 2002, http://www.corporatefinancemag.com/pdf/122341.pdf 

    However, FAS 133 still needs further clarification and improvement as the example of Fannie Mae shows. Analysts focus more on the economic value of a company and less on unrealised gains and losses.  Much of the FAS 133 volatility in earnings and in equity does not consistently reflect the economic situation.  This makes it difficult to interpret the figures.  Therefore, analysts welcome the decision of some companies voluntarily to disclose a separate set of figures excluding the effect of FAS 133.

    For more on Frank Will's analysis of FAS 133, Fair Value Accounting, and Fannie Mae, go to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

    Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm 

    You can read more about fair value at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms 

    Forwarded on May 11, 2003 by Patrick E Charles [charlesp@CWDOM.DM

    Mark-to-market rule should be written off

    Richard A. Werner Special to The Daily Yomiuri

    Yomiuri

    Since 1996, comprehensive accounting reforms have been gradually introduced in Japan. Since fiscal 2000, the valuation of investment securities owned by firms has been based on their market value at book-closing. Since fiscal 2001, securities held on a long-term basis also have been subjected to the mark-to-market rule. Now, the Liberal Democratic Party is calling for the suspension of the newly introduced rule to mark investments to market, as well as for a delay in the introduction of a new rule that requires fixed assets to be valued at their market value.

    The proponents of so-called global standards are up in arms at this latest intervention by the LDP. If marking assets to market is delayed, they argue, the nation will lag behind in the globalization of accounting standards. Moreover, they argue that corporate accounts must be as transparent as possible, and therefore should be marked to market as often and as radically as possible. On the other hand, opponents of the mark-to-market rule argue that the recent slump in the stock market, which has reached a 21-year low, can at least partly be blamed on the new accounting rules.

    What are we to make of this debate? Let us consider the facts. Most leading industrialized countries, such as Britain, France and Germany, so far have not introduced mark-to-market rules. Indeed, the vast majority of countries currently do not use them.

    Nevertheless, there is enormous political pressure to utilize mark-to-market accounting, and many countries plan to introduce the standard in 2005 or thereafter.

    Japan decided to adopt the new standard ahead of everyone else, based on the advice given by a few accountants--an industry that benefits from the revision of accounting standards as any rule change guarantees years of demand for their consulting services.

    However, so far there has not been a broad public debate about the overall benefits and disadvantages of the new standard. The LDP has raised the important point that such accounting changes might have unintended negative consequences for the macroeconomy.

    Let us first reflect on the microeconomic rationale supporting mark-to-market rules. They are said to render company accounts more transparent by calculating corporate balance sheets using the values that markets happen to indicate on the day of book- closing. Since book-closing occurs only once, twice or, at best, four times a year, any sudden or temporary move of markets on these days--easily possible in these times of extraordinary market volatility--will distort accounts rather than rendering them more transparent.

    Second, it is not clear that marking assets to market reflects the way companies look at their assets. While they know that market values are highly volatile, there is one piece of information about corporate assets that have an undisputed meaning for

    firms: the price at which they were actually bought.

    The purchase price matters as it reflects actual transactions and economic activity. Marking to market, on the other hand, means valuing assets at values at which they were never transacted. The company has neither paid nor received this theoretical money in exchange for the assets. This market value is hence a purely fictitious value. Instead of increasing transparency, we end up increasing the part of the accounts that is fiction.

    While the history of marking to market is brief, we do have some track record from the United States, which introduced mark-to-market accounting in the 1990s.

    Did the introduction increase accounting transparency? The U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board last November concluded that the new rule of marking to market allowed Enron Energy Services Inc. to book profits from long-term energy contracts immediately rather than when the money was actually received.

    This enabled Enron executives to create the illusion of a profitable business unit despite the fact that the truth was far from it. Thanks to mark-to-market accounting, Enron's retail division managed to hide significant losses and book billions of dollars in profits based on inflated predictions of future energy prices. Enron's executives received millions of dollars in bonuses when the energy contracts were signed.

    The U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board task force recognized the problems and has hence recommended the mark-to-market accounting rule be scrapped. Since this year, U.S. energy companies will only be able to report profits as income actually is received.

    Marking to market thus creates the illusion that theoretical market values can actually be realized. We must not forget that market values are merely the values derived on the basis of a certain number of transactions during the day in case.

    Strictly speaking, it is a false assumption to extend the same values to any number of assets that were not actually transacted at that value on that day.

    When a certain number of the 225 stocks constituting the Nikkei Stock Average are traded at a certain price, this does not say anything about the price that all stocks that have been issued by these 225 companies would have traded on that day.

    As market participants know well, the volume of transactions is an important indicator of how representative stock prices can be considered during any given day. If the index falls 1 percent on little volume, this is quickly discounted by many observers as it means that only a tiny fraction of shares were actually traded. If the market falls 1 percent on record volume, then this may be a better proxy of the majority of stock prices on that day.

    The values at which U.S. corporations were marked to market at the end of December 1999, at the peak of a speculative bubble, did little to increase transparency. If all companies had indeed sold their assets on that day, surely this would have severely depressed asset prices.

    Consider this: If your neighbor decides to sell his house for half price, how would you feel if the bank that gave you a mortgage argued that, according to the mark-to- market rule, it now also must halve the value of your house--and, as a result, they regret to inform you that you are bankrupt.

    We discussed the case of traded securities. But in many cases a market for the assets on a company's books does not actually exist. In this case, accountants use so-called net present value calculations to estimate a theoretical value. This means even greater fiction because the theoretical value depends crucially on assumptions made about interest rates, economic growth, asset markets and so on.

    Given the dismal track record of forecasters in this area, it is astonishing to find that serious accountants wish corporate accounts to be based on them.

    There are significant macroeconomic costs involved with mark-to-market accounting. As all companies will soon be forced to recalculate their balance sheets more frequently, the state of financial markets on the calculation day will determine whether they are still "sound," or in accounting terms, "bankrupt." While book value accounting tends to reduce volatility in markets to some extent, the new rule can only increase it. The implications are especially far-reaching in the banking sector since banks are not ordinary businesses, but fulfill the public function of creating and providing the money supply on which economic growth depends.

    U.S. experts warned years ago that the introduction of marking to market could create a credit crunch. As banks will be forced to set aside larger loan-loss reserves to cover loans that may have declined in value on the day of marking, bank earnings could be reduced. Banks might thus shy away from making loans to small or midsize firms under the new rules, where a risk premium exists and hence the likelihood of marking losses is larger. As a result, banks would have a disincentive to lend to small firms. Yet, for all we know, the small firm loans may yet be repaid in full.

    If banks buy a 10-year Japanese government bond with the intention to hold it until maturity, and the economy recovers, thus pushing down bond prices significantly, the market value of the government bonds will decline. Banks would thus be forced to book substantial losses on their bond holdings despite the fact that, by holding until maturity, they would never actually have suffered any losses. Japanese banks currently have vast holdings of government bonds. The change in accounting rules likely will increase problems in the banking sector. As banks reduce lending, economic growth will fall, thereby depressing asset prices, after which accountants will quickly try to mark down everyone's books.

    Of course, in good times, the opposite may occur, as we saw in the case of Enron. During upturns, marking to market may boost accounting figures beyond the actual state of reality. This also will boost banks' accounts (similar to the Bank for International Settlements rules announced in 1988), thus encouraging excessive lending. This in turn will fuel an economic boom, which will further raise the accounting values of assets.

    Thus does it make sense to mark everything to fictitious market values? We can conclude that marking to market has enough problems on the micro level to negate any potential benefits. On the macro level, the disadvantages will be far larger as asset price volatility will rise, business cycles will be exacerbated and economic activity will be destabilized.

    The world economy has done well for several centuries without this new rule. There is no evidence that it will improve anything. To the contrary, it is likely to prove harmful. The LDP must be lauded for its attempt to stop the introduction of these new accounting rules.

    Werner is an assistant professor of economics at Sophia University and chief economist at Tokyo-based investment adviser Profit Research Center Ltd.


    Measuring the Business Value of Stakeholder Relationships – all about social capital and how high-trust relationships affect the bottom line. Plus a new measurement tool for benchmarking the quality of stakeholder relationships --- www.cim.sfu.ca/newsletter 

    Trust, shared values and strong relationships aren't typical financial indicators but perhaps they should be. A joint study by CIM and the Schulich School of Business is examining the link between high trust stakeholder relationships and business value creation. The study is sponsored by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA).

    The research team is looking at how social capital can be applied to business. The aim of this project is to better understand corporate social capital, measure the quality of relationships, and provide the business community with ways to improve those relationships and in turn improve their bottom line.

    Because stakeholder relationships all have common features, direct comparisons of the quality of relationships can be made across diverse stakeholder groups, companies and industries.

    Social capital is “the stock of active connections among people; the trust, mutual understanding, and shared values and behaviors that bind the members of human networks and communities and make cooperative action possible” (Cohen and Prusak, 2000).

    So far the research suggests that trust, a cooperative spirit and shared understanding between a company and its stakeholders creates greater coherence of action, better knowledge sharing, lower transaction costs, lower turnover rates and organizational stability. In the bigger picture, social capital appears to minimize shareholder risk, promote innovation, enhance reputation and deepen brand loyalty.

    Preliminary results show that high levels of social capital in a relationship can build upon themselves. For example, as a company builds reputation among its peers for fair dealing and reliability in keeping promises, that reputation itself becomes a prized asset useful for sustaining its current alliances and forming future ones.

    The first phase of the research is now complete and the study moves into its second phase involving detailed case studies with six companies that have earned a competitive business advantage through their stakeholder relationships. Click here for a full report

    Bob Jensen's discussion of valuation and aggregation issues can be found at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm 


    That scenario isn't as farfetched as you might think. It's called a prediction market, based on the notion that a marketplace is a better organizer of insight and predictor of the future than individuals are. Once confined to research universities, the idea of markets working within companies has started to seep out into some of the nation's largest corporations. Companies from Microsoft to Eli Lilly and Hewlett-Packard are bringing the market inside, with workers trading futures contracts on such "commodities" as sales, product success and supplier behavior. The concept: a work force contains vast amounts of untapped, useful information that a market can unlock. "Markets are likely to revolutionize corporate forecasting and decision making," says Robin Hanson, an economist at George Mason University, in Virginia, who has researched and developed markets. "Strategic decisions, such as mergers, product introductions, regional expansions and changing CEOs, could be effectively delegated to people far down the corporate hierarchy, people not selected by or even known to top management."
    Barbara Kiviat (See below)

    "The End Of Management? by Barbara Kiviat, Time Magazine, July 12, 2004, pp. 88-92 --- http://www.time.com/time/insidebiz/printout/0,8816,1101040712-660965,00.html 

    The end of management just might look something like this. You show up for work, boot up your computer and log onto your company's Intranet to make a few trades before getting down to work. You see how your stocks did the day before and then execute a few new orders. You think your company should step up production next month, and you trade on that thought. You sell stock for the production of 20,000 units and buy stock that represents an order for 30,000 instead. All around you, as co-workers arrive at their cubicles, they too flick on their computers and trade.

    Together, you are buyers and sellers of your company's future. Through your trades, you determine what is going to happen and then decide how your company should respond. With employees in the trading pits betting on the future, who needs the manager in the corner office?

    That scenario isn't as farfetched as you might think. It's called a prediction market, based on the notion that a marketplace is a better organizer of insight and predictor of the future than individuals are. Once confined to research universities, the idea of markets working within companies has started to seep out into some of the nation's largest corporations. Companies from Microsoft to Eli Lilly and Hewlett-Packard are bringing the market inside, with workers trading futures contracts on such "commodities" as sales, product success and supplier behavior. The concept: a work force contains vast amounts of untapped, useful information that a market can unlock. "Markets are likely to revolutionize corporate forecasting and decision making," says Robin Hanson, an economist at George Mason University, in Virginia, who has researched and developed markets. "Strategic decisions, such as mergers, product introductions, regional expansions and changing CEOs, could be effectively delegated to people far down the corporate hierarchy, people not selected by or even known to top management."

    To understand the hype, take a look at Hewlett-Packard's experience with forecasting monthly sales. A few years back, HP commissioned Charles Plott, an economist from the California Institute of Technology, to set up a software trading platform. A few dozen employees, mostly product and finance managers, were each given about $50 in a trading account to bet on what they thought computer sales would be at the end of the month. If a salesman thought the company would sell between, say, $201 million and $210 million worth, he could buy a security — like a futures contract — for that prediction, signaling to the rest of the market that someone thought that was a probable scenario. If his opinion changed, he could buy again or sell.

    When trading stopped, the scenario behind the highest-priced stock was the one the market deemed most likely. The traders got to keep their profits and won an additional dollar for every share of "stock" they owned that turned out to be the right sales range. Result: while HP's official forecast, which was generated by a marketing manager, was off 13%, the stock market was off only 6%. In further trials, the market beat official forecasts 75% of the time.

    Intrigued by that success, HP's business-services division ran a pilot last year with 14 managers worldwide, trying to determine the group's monthly sales and profit. The market was so successful (in one case, improving the prediction 50%) that it has since been integrated into the division's regular forecasts. Another division is running a pilot to see if a market would be better at predicting the costs of certain components with volatile prices. And two other HP divisions hope to be using markets to answer similar questions by the end of the year. "You could do zillions of things with this," says Bernardo Huberman, director of the HP group that designs and coordinates the markets. "The idea of being able to forecast something allows you to prepare, plan and make decisions. It's potentially huge savings."

    Eli Lilly, one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world, which routinely places multimillion-dollar bets on drug candidates that face overwhelming odds of failure, wanted to see if it could get a better idea of which compounds would succeed. So last year Lilly ran an experiment in which about 50 employees involved in drug development — chemists, biologists, project managers — traded six mock drug candidates through an internal market. "We wanted to look at the way scattered bits of information are processed in the course of drug development," says Alpheus Bingham, vice president for Lilly Research Laboratories strategy. The market brought together all the information, from toxicology reports to clinical results, and correctly predicted the three most successful drugs.

    What's more, the market data revealed shades of opinion that never would have shown up if the traders were, say, responding to a poll. A willingness to pay $70 for a particular drug showed greater confidence than a bid at $60, a spread that wouldn't show if you simply asked, Will this drug succeed? "When we start trading stock, and I try buying your stock cheaper and cheaper, it forces us to a way of agreeing that never really occurs in any other kind of conversation," says Bingham. "That is the power of the market."

    The current enthusiasm can be traced in part, oddly enough, to last summer's high-profile flop of a market that was supposed to help predict future terrorist attacks. A public backlash killed that Pentagon project a few months before its debut, but not before the media broadcast the notion that useful information embedded within a group of people could be drawn out and organized via a marketplace. Says George Mason's Hanson, who helped design the market: "People noticed." Another predictive market, the Iowa Electronic Markets at the University of Iowa, has been around since 1988. That bourse has accepted up to $500 from anyone wanting to wager on election results. Players buy and sell outcomes: Is Kerry a win or Bush a shoo-in? This is the same information that news organizations and pollsters chase in the run-up to election night. Yet Iowa outperforms them 75% of the time.

    Inspired by such results, researchers at Microsoft started running trials of predictive markets in February, finding the system inexpensive to set up. Now they're shopping around for the market's first real use. An early candidate: predicting how long it will take software testers to adopt a new piece of technology. Todd Proebsting, who is spearheading the initiative, explains, "If the market says they're going to be behind schedule, executives can ask, What does the market know that we don't know?" Another option: predicting how many patches, or corrections, will be issued in the first six months of using a new piece of software. "The pilots worked great, but we had little to compare it to," he says. "You can reason that this would do a good job. But what you really want to show is that this works better than the alternative."

    Ultimately, "you may someday see someone in a desk job or a manufacturing job doing day trading, knowing that's part of the job," says Thomas Malone, a management professor at M.I.T. who has written about markets. "I'm very optimistic about the long-term prospects."

    But no market is perfect. Economists are still unsure of the human factor: how to get people to play and do their best. In the stock market or even the Iowa prediction market, people put up their own money and trade to make more. That incentive ensures that people trade on their best information. But a company that asks employees to risk their own money raises ethical questions, so most corporate markets use play money to trade and small bonuses or prizes for good traders. "Though this may look like God's gift to business, there are problems with it," says Plott, who ran the first HP experiments. Tokyo-based Dentsu, one of the world's largest advertising firms, is still grappling with incentives for an ad forecasting market it will launch later this year with the help of News Futures, a U.S. consultancy.

    And even if companies can figure out how to make their internal markets totally efficient, there are plenty of reasons that corporate America isn't about to jump wholesale onto the markets bandwagon. For one thing, markets, based on individuals and individual interests, could threaten the kind of team spirit that many corporations have struggled to cultivate. Established hierarchies could be threatened too. After all, a market implies that the current data crunching and decision-making process may not be as good as a gamelike system that often includes lower-level employees. In a sense, an internal market's success suggests that if upper managers would just give up control, things would run better. Lilly, which is considering using a market to forecast actual drug success, is still grappling with the potential ramifications. "We already have a rigorous process," says Lilly's Bingham. "So what do you do if you use a market and get different data?" Throw it out? Or say that the market was smarter, impugning the tried-and-true system?

    There could be risks to individual workers in an internal trading system as well. If you lose money in the market, does that mean you're not knowledgeable about something you should be? "You have to get people used to the idea of being accountable in a very different way," says Mary Murphy-Hoye, senior principal engineer at Intel, which has been experimenting with internal markets. "I can now tell if planners are any good, because they're making money or they're not making money."

    Continued in article


    Robert Walker's First Blog Entry is About Fair Value Accounting, October 27, 2006 --- http://www.robertbwalkerca.blogspot.com/

    Introduction
    I have decided to begin a commentary which expresses my views on accounting. As I begin to do this I envisage the source of my commentary to comprise three different sorts of writing in which I may engage:
    § Simple notes directly to the ‘blog’ such as this.
    § Formal submissions I may make to various bodies including the IASB.
    § Letters or reports I may write for one reason or another that I think might have some general readership.

    The expression of my views will stray from the subject matter of accounting per se to deal with matters of enormous significance to me such as corporate or public administration. Such expressions will not be too substantial a digression from the core subject matter because I believe that the foundation of good ‘corporate governance’, to use a vogue term, is accounting.

    Source of my ideas on accounting
    I would have to confess that the foundation upon which I base my philosophy of accounting is derivative, as much of human knowledge is of course. It is not for nothing that Newtown said that if he can see so far it is because he stands on the shoulders of giants. In my case, that ‘giant’ is Yuiji Ijiri. As I begin a detailed exposition of my views I shall return to the lessons I learned many years ago from Theory of Accounting Measurement, a neglected work that will still be read in 1,000 years or so long as humankind survives whichever is the shorter. As the depredations of the standard setting craze are visited upon us with ever increasing complexity, the message delivered by Ijiri will be heeded more an more.

    The basic structure of accounting
    Without wishing to be too philosophical about it, I need to begin by outlining what I mean by accounting. Accounting, in my mind, comprises three inter-related parts. These are:
    § Book-keeping.
    § Accounting.
    § Financial reporting.

    Book-keeping is the process of recording financial data elements in the underlying books of account. These financial data elements represent, or purport to represent, real world events. The heart of book-keeping is the double entry process. For instance at the most basic level a movement in cash will result in the surrender or receipt of an asset, the incurring or settlement of a liability and so on.

    I have no complete and coherent theory of the limits of book-keeping. Clearly cash movement (change of ownership) or the movement of commodity is the proper subject matter of book-keeping. Whether all forms of contract should be similarly treated is not clear to me. I am inclined to say yes. That is to adopt Ijiri’s theory of commitment accounting, but I can foresee that this leads me to conclusions that I may find unpalatable later on. Incidentally I say this because an epiphany I had, based on the notion of commitment accounting, some years ago is beginning to unravel.

    Book-keeping goes beyond recording to encompass control. That is the process by which the integrity of the centre piece of book-keeping – the general ledger expressing double entry – is ensured. I will not concern myself with such processes though this is not to say that they are unimportant.

    Accounting is the process by which sense is made of what is a raw record expressed in the general ledger. It is the process of distillation and summation that enables the accountant to gain on overview of what has happened to the entity the subject of the accounting. Accounting fundamentally assumes that the accountant is periodically capable of saying something useful about the real world using his or her special form of notation.

    Financial reporting is the process by which data is assembled into a comprehensive view of the world in accordance with a body of rules. It differs, in the ideal, from accounting in a number of ways. Most benignly it differs, for instance, by including ancillary information for the benefit of a reader beyond the mere abstraction from the general ledger. Again in the ideal there is an inter-relationship between the three levels in the accounting hierarchy. That is, the rules of financial reporting will, to some degree shape the order and format of the basic, book-keeping level so that the process of distillation and summation follows naturally to the final level of reporting without dramatic alteration.

    Perhaps what concerns me is that the sentiment expressed above can be seen, without much effort, to be only ideal and that in reality it does not arise. In short the golden strand that links the detailed recording of real world phenonmena to its final summation is broken.

    An example
    I was asked recently by a student of accounting to explain IAS 41, the IASB standard on agriculture. As I don’t deal in primary production at all, I had not thought about this subject for years.

    IAS 41 admonishes the accountant to apply ‘fair value’ accounting. Fair value accounting is the process by which current sale prices, or their proxies, are substituted for the past cost of any given item.

    For instance, you may have a mature vineyard. The vineyard comprises land, the vine and its fruit, the plant necessary to sustain the vine (support structures, irrigation channels etc.). Subsumed within the vine are the materials necessary for it to grow and start producing fruit. This will include the immature plant, the chemical supplements necessary to nurture and protect it, and the labour necessary to apply it.

    The book-keeping process will faithfully record all of these components. Suppose for example the plant, fertliser and labour cost $1000. In the books will be recorded:

    Dr Vineyard $1000
    Cr Cash $1000

    At the end of the accounting period, the accountant will summarise this is a balance statement. He or she will then obtain, in some way, the current selling price of the vine. Presumably this will be the future cash stream of selling the fruit, suitably discounted. Assume that this is $1200.

    The accountant will then make the following incremental adjustment:

    Dr Vineyard $200
    Cr Equity $200

    Looked like this there is a connection between the original book-keeping and the periodic adjustment at the end of the accounting period. This is an illusion. The incremental entry disguises what is really happening. It is as follows:

    Dr Equity $1000
    Cr Vineyard $1000

    And

    Dr Vineyard $1200
    Cr Equity $1200

    Considered from the long perspective, the original book-keeping has been discarded and a substitute value put in its place. This is the truth of the matter. The subject matter of the first phase of accounting was a set of events arising in a bank and in the entity undertaking accounting. The subject matter of the second phase is a set of future sales to a party who does not yet exist.

    From a perspective of solvency determination, a vital element of corporate governance, the view produced by the first phase is next to useless. However, the disquiet I had in my mind which I had suppressed until recently, relates to the shattering of the linkages between the three levels of accounting in the final reporting process. This disquiet has returned as I contemplate the apparently unstoppable momentum of the standard setting process.

    October 28, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Robert,

    I hope you add many more entries to your blog.

    The problem with "original book-keeping" is that it provides no answers about how to account for risk of many modern day contracts that were not imagined when "original book-keeping" evolved in a simple world of transactions. For example, historical costs of forward contracts and swaps are zero and yet these contracts may have risks that may outweigh all the recorded debt under "original book-keeping." Once we opened the door to fair value accounting to better account for risk, however, we opened the door to misleading the public that booked fair value adjustments can be aggregated much like we sum the current balances of assets and liabilities on the balance sheet. Such aggregations are generally nonsense.

    I don't know if you saw my recent hockey analogy or not. It goes as follows:

    Goal Tenders versus Movers and Shakers
    Skate to where the puck is going, not to where it is.

    Wayne Gretsky (as quoted for many years by Jerry Trites at http://www.zorba.ca/ )

    Jensen Comment
    This may be true for most hockey players and other movers and shakers, but for goal tenders the eyes should be focused on where the puck is at every moment ---  not where it's going. The question is whether an accountant is a goal tender (stewardship responsibilities) or a mover and shaker (part of the managerial decision making team). This is also the essence of the debate of historical accounting versus pro forma accounting.

    Graduate student Derek Panchuk and professor Joan Vickers, who discovered the Quiet Eye phenomenon, have just completed the most comprehensive, on-ice hockey study to determine where elite goalies focus their eyes in order to make a save. Simply put, they found that goalies should keep their eyes on the puck. In an article to be published in the journal Human Movement Science, Panchuk and Vickers discovered that the best goaltenders rest their gaze directly on the puck and shooter's stick almost a full second before the shot is released. When they do that they make the save over 75 per cent of the time.
    "Keep your eyes on the puck," PhysOrg, October 26, 2006 --- http://physorg.com/news81068530.html

    I have written a more serious piece about both theoretical and practical problems of fair value accounting. I should emphasize that this was written after the FASB Exposure Draft proposing fair value accounting as an option for all financial instruments and the culminating FAS 157 that is mainly definitional and removed the option to apply fair value accounting to all financial instruments even though it is still required in many instances by earlier FASB standards.

    My thoughts on this are at the following link:

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm

    Bob Jensen

     


    E-COMMERCE AND AUDITING FAIR VALUES SUBJECTS OF NEW INTERNATIONAL GUIDANCE The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) invites comments on two new exposure drafts (EDs): Auditing Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures and Electronic Commerce: Using the Internet or Other Public Networks - Effect on the Audit of Financial Statements. Comments on both EDs, developed by IFAC's International Auditing Practices Committee (IAPC), are due by January 15, 2002. See http://accountingeducation.com/news/news2213.html  

    The IFAC link is at http://www.ifac.org/Guidance/EXD-Download.tmpl?PubID=1003772692151 

    The purpose of this International Standard on Auditing (ISA) is to establish standards and provide guidance on auditing fair value measurements and disclosures contained in financial statements. In particular, this ISA addresses audit considerations relating to the valuation, measurement, presentation and disclosure for material assets, liabilities and specific components of equity presented or disclosed at fair value in financial statements. Fair value measurements of assets, liabilities and components of equity may arise from both the initial recording of transactions and later changes in value.

     
    Download
    "Auditing Fair Value Measurements And Disclosures"
    in MS Word format.

    File Size: 123 Kbytes
    Download
    "Auditing Fair Value Measurements And Disclosures"
    in Adobe Acrobat format.

    File Size: 209 Kbytes


    The FASB's Statement No. 148

    FAS 148 improves disclosures for stock-based compensation and provides alternative transition methods for companies that switch to the fair value method of accounting for stock options --- http://www.fasb.org/news/nr123102.shtml 
    The transition guidance and annual disclosure provisions of Statement 148 are effective for fiscal years ending after December 15, 2002, with earlier application permitted in certain circumstances.  .  Fair value accounting is still optional (until the FASB finally makes up its mind on stock options.)

    FASB Amends Transition Guidance for Stock Options and Provides Improved Disclosures

    Norwalk, CT, December 31, 2002—The FASB has published Statement No. 148, Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation—Transition and Disclosure, which amends FASB Statement No. 123, Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation. In response to a growing number of companies announcing plans to record expenses for the fair value of stock options, Statement 148 provides alternative methods of transition for a voluntary change to the fair value based method of accounting for stock-based employee compensation. In addition, Statement 148 amends the disclosure requirements of Statement 123 to require more prominent and more frequent disclosures in financial statements about the effects of stock-based compensation.

    Under the provisions of Statement 123, companies that adopted the preferable, fair value based method were required to apply that method prospectively for new stock option awards. This contributed to a “ramp-up” effect on stock-based compensation expense in the first few years following adoption, which caused concern for companies and investors because of the lack of consistency in reported results. To address that concern, Statement 148 provides two additional methods of transition that reflect an entity’s full complement of stock-based compensation expense immediately upon adoption, thereby eliminating the ramp-up effect.

    Statement 148 also improves the clarity and prominence of disclosures about the pro forma effects of using the fair value based method of accounting for stock-based compensation for all companies—regardless of the accounting method used—by requiring that the data be presented more prominently and in a more user-friendly format in the footnotes to the financial statements. In addition, the Statement improves the timeliness of those disclosures by requiring that this information be included in interim as well as annual financial statements. In the past, companies were required to make pro forma disclosures only in annual financial statements.

    The transition guidance and annual disclosure provisions of Statement 148 are effective for fiscal years ending after December 15, 2002, with earlier application permitted in certain circumstances. The interim disclosure provisions are effective for financial reports containing financial statements for interim periods beginning after December 15, 2002.

    As previously reported, the FASB has solicited comments from its constituents relating to the accounting for stock-based compensation, including valuation of stock options, as part of its recently issued Invitation to Comment, Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation: A Comparison of FASB Statement No. 123, Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation, and Its Related Interpretations, and IASB Proposed IFRS, Share-based Payment. That Invitation to Comment explains the similarities of and differences between the proposed guidance on accounting for stock-based compensation included in the International Accounting Standards Board’s (IASB’s) recently issued exposure draft and the FASB’s guidance under Statement 123.

    After considering the responses to the Invitation to Comment, the Board plans to make a decision in the latter part of the first quarter of 2003 about whether it should undertake a more comprehensive reconsideration of the accounting for stock options. As part of that process, the Board may revisit its 1995 decision permitting companies to disclose the pro forma effects of the fair value based method rather than requiring all companies to recognize the fair value of employee stock options as an expense in the income statement. Under the provisions of Statement 123 that remain unaffected by Statement 148, companies may either recognize expenses on a fair value based method in the income statement or disclose the pro forma effects of that method in the footnotes to the financial statements.

    Copies of Statement 148 may be obtained by contacting the FASB’s Order Department at 800-748-0659 or by placing an order at the FASB’s website at www.fasb.org .


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Reviews on June 20, 2002

    TITLE: And, Now the Question is: Where's the Next Enron? 
    REPORTER: Cassell Bryan-Low and Ken Brown 
    DATE: Jun 18, 2002 PAGE: C1 LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1024356537931110920.djm,00.html  
    TOPICS: off balance sheet financing, Related-party transactions, loan guarantees, Accounting, Fair Value Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Regulation, Securities and Exchange Commission

    SUMMARY: In the wake of the Enron accounting debacle, investors are concerned that another Enron-like situation could occur. The article describes steps taken to improve the quality of financial reporting.

    QUESTIONS: 

    1.) Why is it important that investors and other financial statement users have confidence in financial reporting?

    2.) What is a related-party transaction? What accounting issues are associated with related-party transactions? What changes in disclosing and accounting for related party transactions are proposed? Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed changes.

    3.) What is off-balance sheet financing? How was Enron able to avoid reporting liabilities on its balance sheet? What changes concerning special-purpose entities are proposed? Will the proposed changes prevent future Enron-like situations? Support your answer.

    4.) When are companies required to report loan guarantees as liabilities? What changes are proposed? Do you agree with the proposed changes? Support your answer.

    5.) What is mark to market accounting? How did mark to market accounting contribute to the Enron debacle? Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of proposed changes related to mark to market accounting.

    6.) What are pro forma earnings? How can pro forma earnings be used to mislead investors? What changes in the presentation of pro forma earnings are proposed? Will the proposed changes protect investors?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

    Controversies over revenue reporting are discussed at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm 


    From the Free Wall Street Journal Educators' Reviews for December 6, 2001 

    TITLE: Audits of Arthur Andersen Become Further Focus of Investigation
    SEC REPORTER: Jonathan Weil
    DATE: Nov 30, 2001 PAGE: A3 LINK:
         http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1007059096430725120.djm
     
    TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Auditing

    SUMMARY: This article focuses on the issues facing Arthur Andersen now that their work on the Enron audit has become the subject of an SEC investigation. The on-line version of the article provides three questions that are attributed to "some accounting professors." The questions in this review expand on those three provided in the article.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) The first question the SEC might ask of Enron's auditors is "were financial statement disclosures regarding Enron's transactions too opaque to understand?" Are financial statement disclosures required to be understandable? To whom? Who is responsible for ensuring a certain level of understandability?

    2.) Another question that the SEC could consider is whether Andersen auditors were aware that certain off-balance-sheet partnerships should have been consolidated into Enron's balance sheet, as they were in the company's recent restatement. How could the auditors have been "unaware" that certain entities should have been consolidated? What is the SEC's concern with whether or not the auditors were aware of the need for consolidation?

    3.) A third question that the SEC could ask is, "Did Andersen auditors knowingly sign off on some 'immaterial' accounting violations, ignoring that they collectively distorted Enron's results?" Again, what is the SEC's concern with whether Andersen was aware of the collective impact of the accounting errors? Should Andersen have been aware of the collective amount of impact of these errors? What steps would you suggest in order to assess this issue?

    4.) The article finishes with a discussion of expected Congressional hearings into Enron's accounting practices and into the accounting and auditing standards setting process in general. What concern is there that the FASB "has been working on a project for more than a decade to tighten the rules governing when companies must consolidate certain off-balance sheet 'special purpose entities'"?

    5.) In general, how stringent are accounting and auditing requirements in the U.S. relative to other countries' standards? Are accounting standards in other countries set in the same way as in the U.S.? If not, who establishes standards? What incentives would the U.S. Congress have to establish a law-based system if they become convinced that our private sector standards setting practices are inadequate? Are you concerned about having accounting and reporting standards established by law?

    6.) The article describes revenue recognition practices at Enron that were based on "noncash unrealized gains." What standard allows, even requires, this practice? Why does the author state, "to date, the accounting standards board has given energy traders almost boundless latitude to value their energy contracts as they see fit"?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University


    CPA2Biz Unveils Business Valuation Resource Center --- http://www.smartpros.com/x31976.xml 

    The BV Center will include resources and information from the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and industry experts on various factors affecting the value of a business or a transaction, such as mergers and acquisitions; economic damages due to a patent infringement or breaches of contract; bankruptcy or a reorganization; or fraud due to anti-trust actions or embezzlement. The BV Center will provide a comprehensive combination of solutions that meet the professional needs of CPAs practicing business valuation, including those who have achieved the AICPA's Accredited in Business Valuation credential. The BV Center will also provide networking communities for BV practitioners as well as a public forum for discussion of business valuation trends, developments and issues.

    "Tremendous growth in the BV discipline, coupled with a dynamic group of factors affecting business valuation, means that CPAs need a consistent, timely and relevant vehicle through which BV-related information can be disseminated to them," said Erik Asgeirsson, Vice President of Product Management at CPA2Biz. "The BV Center on CPA2Biz will provide them with AICPA books, practice aids, newsletters and software, along with industry expert literature and complementary third-party products and solutions. Because the issues associated with valuation impact CPAs in both public and private sectors -- auditors, tax practitioners, personal financial planners as well as BV specialists -- the BV Center will have a powerful horizontal impact on the profession."

    "I think that CPAs who practice in business valuation ought to go to the BV Center for information and tools that are timely, relevant and easy to obtain," said Thomas Hilton, CPA/ABV, Chairman of the AICPA Business Valuation Subcommittee. "The BV Center is a source CPAs can use to offer their clients a higher level of service, as well as to connect with other CPAs who provide valuation services."

    The CPA2Biz Website is at www.cpa2biz.com/ 

    Selected References on Accounting for Intangibles 
    (most of which were published after the above paper was written)

    BARUCH LEV'S NEW BOOK Brookings Institution Press has just issued Baruch's new book, Intangibles: Management, Measurement and Reporting. Regardless of the "dot com" collapse, this subject continues to be high on the corporate executive's agenda. Baruch foresees increasing attention being paid to intangibles by both managers and investors. He feels there is an urgent need to improve both the management reporting and external disclosure about intellectual capital. He proposes that we seriously consider revamping our accounting model and significantly broaden the recognition of intangible assets on the balance sheet. The book can be ordered at https://www.brookings.edu/press/books/intangibles_book.htm 

    Professor Lev's free documents on this topic can be downloaded from  http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/newnew.html 

     

    SSRN's Top 10 Downloads 
    (The abstracts are free, but the downloads themselves are not free,. However, your library may provide you with free SSRN downloads if it subscribes to SSRN)

    One approach to finding the “top” papers is to download the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) Top 10 downloads in various categories --- http://papers.ssrn.com/toptens/tt_ntwk_all.html
    This database is limited to the selected papers included in the database.

    For accounting, SSRN’s Top 10 papers are at http://papers.ssrn.com/toptens/tt_ntwk_204_home.html#ARN 
    The average number of downloads of this top accounting research network paper is 227 per month.  In contrast the top economics network research paper has an average of 2,375 downloads per month.  Downloads in other disciplines depend heavily upon the number of graduate students and practitioners in that discipline.

    The top ten downloads from the accounting network are as follows (note that some authors like Mike Jensen are not accountants or accounting educators):

    16010 A Comparison of Dividend, Cash Flow, and Earnings Approaches to Equity Valuation
    THEODORE SOUGIANNIS and STEPHEN H. PENMAN
    University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and Columbia School of Business
    Date posted to database:March 31, 1997
    10201 Value Based Management: Economic Value Added or Cash Value Added?
    FREDRIK WEISSENRIEDER
    Anelda AB
    Date posted to database:April 5, 1999
    8041 Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
    Michael C. Jensen, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS, Harvard University Press, Dec. 2000, and The Journal Of Financial Economics, 1976.
    MICHAEL C. JENSEN and WILLIAM H. MECKLING
    The Monitor Company and Deceased, University of Rochester Simon School
    Date posted to database:July 19, 1998
    7607 Evidence on EVA®
    Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 12, No. 2, Summer 1999
    GARY C. BIDDLE, ROBERT M. BOWEN and JAMES S. WALLACE
    Hong Kong University of Science & Technology, University of Washington and University of California at Irvine
    Date posted to database:September 20, 1999
    5194 A Generalized Earnings Model of Stock Valuation
    ANDREW ANG and JUN LIU
    Columbia Business School and University of California, Los Angeles
    Date posted to database:July 18, 1998
    5046 Which is More Value-Relevant: Earnings or Cash Flows?
    ERVIN L. BLACK
    Brigham Young University
    Date posted to database:September 2, 1998
    4927 Combining Earnings and Book Value in Equity Valuation
    STEPHEN H. PENMAN
    Columbia School of Business
    Date posted to database:November 5, 1997
    4254 Separation of Ownership and Control
    Michael C. Jensen, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY, Harvard University Press, 1998, and Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, June 1983
    EUGENE F. FAMA and MICHAEL C. JENSEN
    University of Chicago and The Monitor Company
    Date posted to database:November 29, 1998
    3843 Value Creation and its Measurement: A Critical Look at EVA
    IGNACIO VELEZ-PAREJA
    Politecnico Grancolombiano
    Date posted to database:May 19, 1999
    3771 Ratio Analysis and Equity Valuation
    DORON NISSIM and STEPHEN H. PENMAN
    Columbia Business School and Columbia School of Business
    Date posted to database:May 11, 1999
     
    Other Links on Accounting for Intangibles

    "ACCOUNTING FOR INTANGIBLES: THE GREAT DIVIDE BETWEEN OBSCURITY IN INNOVATION ACTIVITIES AND THE BALANCE SHEET," by Anne Wyatt, The Singapore Economic Review, Vol. 46, No. 1 pp. 83-117 --- http://www.worldscinet.com/ser/46/sample/S0217590801000243.html 

    "Accounting for Intangibles: The New Frontier" by Baruch Lev (January 11, 2001) --- http://www.nyssa.org/abstract/acct_intangibles.html 

    FAS 141 and 142 Summary (October 22, 2001) --- http://www.aasb.com.au/workprog/board_papers/public/docs/Agenda_paper_9-1_Accounting_for_Intangibles.pdf 

    New Rules Summary by Paul Evans (February 24, 2002) --- http://bloodstone.atkinson.yorku.ca/domino/Html/users/pevans/pewwwdl.nsf/98615e08bc387dd385256709007822b0/ddc242fb07932d4f85256b6a00494e9c?OpenDocument 

    ACCOUNTING FOR INTANGIBLES: A LITERATURE REVIEW, Journal of Accounting Literature, Vol. 19, 2000  
    by Leandro Cañibano Autonomous University of Madrid Manuel García-Ayuso University of Seville Paloma Sánchez Autonomous University of Madrid --- http://www.finansanalytiker.no/innhold/aktiv_presinv/Conf050901/Jal.pdf 

    "‘ACCOUNTING FOR INTANGIBLES’ AT THE ACCOUNTING COURT," by Jan-Erik Gröjer and Ulf Johanson --- http://www.vn.fi/ktm/1/aineeton/seminar/johanback.htm 

    NYU Intangibles Research Project --- http://www.stern.nyu.edu/ross/ProjectInt/about/ 

    "Alan Kay talks with Baruch Lev," (June 19, 2001) --- http://www.kmadvantage.com/docs/Leadership/Baruch%20Lev%20on%20Intangible%20Assets.pdf 

    International Accounting Standard No. 38 --- http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp?s=1020299&sc={2954EE08-82A0-4BC0-8AC0-1DE567F35613}&sd=928976660&n=982 

    IAS 38: Intangible Assets

    IAS 38, Intangible Assets, was approved by the IASB Board in July 1998 and became operative for annual financial statements covering periods beginning on or after 1 July 1999.

    IAS 38 supersedes:

    • IAS 4, Depreciation Accounting, with respect to the amortisation (depreciation) of intangible assets; and
    • IAS 9, Research and Development Costs.

    In 1998, IAS 39: Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, amended a paragraph of IAS 38 to replace the reference to IAS 25, Accounting for Investments, by reference to IAS 39.

    One SIC Interpretation relates to IAS 38:


    Summary of IAS 38

    IAS 38 applies to all intangible assets that are not specifically dealt with in other International Accounting Standards. It applies, among other things, to expenditures on:

    • advertising,
    • training,
    • start-up, and
    • research and development (R&D) activities.

    IAS 38 supersedes IAS 9, Research and Development Costs. IAS 38 does not apply to financial assets, insurance contracts, mineral rights and the exploration for and extraction of minerals and similar non-regenerative resources. Investments in, and awareness of the importance of, intangible assets have increased significantly in the last two decades.

    The main features of IAS 38 are:

    • an intangible asset should be recognised initially, at cost, in the financial statements, if, and only if:

      (a) the asset meets the definition of an intangible asset. Particularly, there should be an identifiable asset that is controlled and clearly distinguishable from an enterprise's goodwill;

      (b) it is probable that the future economic benefits that are attributable to the asset will flow to the enterprise; and

      (c) the cost of the asset can be measured reliably.

      This requirement applies whether an intangible asset is acquired externally or generated internally. IAS 38 also includes additional recognition criteria for internally generated intangible assets;

       

    • if an intangible item does not meet both the definition, and the criteria for the recognition, of an intangible asset, IAS 38 requires the expenditure on this item to be recognised as an expense when it is incurred. An enterprise is not permitted to include this expenditure in the cost of an intangible asset at a later date;

       

    • it follows from the recognition criteria that all expenditure on research should be recognised as an expense. The same treatment applies to start-up costs, training costs and advertising costs. IAS 38 also specifically prohibits the recognition as assets of internally generated goodwill, brands, mastheads, publishing titles, customer lists and items similar in substance. However, some development expenditure may result in the recognition of an intangible asset (for example, some internally developed computer software);

       

    • in the case of a business combination that is an acquisition, IAS 38 builds on IAS 22: Business Combinations, to emphasise that if an intangible item does not meet both the definition and the criteria for the recognition for an intangible asset, the expenditure for this item (included in the cost of acquisition) should form part of the amount attributed to goodwill at the date of acquisition. This means that, among other things, unlike current practices in certain countries, purchased R&D-in-process should not be recognised as an expense immediately at the date of acquisition but it should be recognised as part of the goodwill recognised at the date of acquisition and amortised under IAS 22, unless it meets the criteria for separate recognition as an intangible asset;

       

    • after initial recognition in the financial statements, an intangible asset should be measured under one of the following two treatments:

      (a) benchmark treatment: historical cost less any amortisation and impairment losses; or

      (b) allowed alternative treatment: revalued amount (based on fair value) less any subsequent amortisation and impairment losses. The main difference from the treatment for revaluations of property, plant and equipment under IAS 16 is that revaluations for intangible assets are permitted only if fair value can be determined by reference to an active market. Active markets are expected to be rare for intangible assets;

       

    • intangible assets should be amortised over the best estimate of their useful life. IAS 38 does not permit an enterprise to assign an infinite useful life to an intangible asset. It includes a rebuttable presumption that the useful life of an intangible asset will not exceed 20 years from the date when the asset is available for use. IAS 38 acknowledges that, in rare cases, there may be persuasive evidence that the useful life of an intangible asset will exceed 20 years. In these cases, an enterprise should amortise the intangible asset over the best estimate of its useful life and:

      (a) test the intangible asset for impairment at least annually in accordance with IAS 36: Impairment of Assets; and

      (b) disclose the reasons why the presumption that the useful life of an intangible asset will not exceed 20 years is rebutted and also the factor(s) that played a significant role in determining the useful life of the asset;

       

    • required disclosures on intangible assets will enable users to understand, among other things, the types of intangible assets that are recognised in the financial statements and the movements in their carrying amount (book value) during the year. IAS 38 also requires disclosure of the amount of research and development expenditure recognised as an expense during the year; and

       

    • IAS 38 is operative for annual accounting periods beginning on or after 1 July 1999. IAS 38 includes transitional provisions that clarify when the Standard should be applied retrospectively and when it should be applied prospectively.

    To avoid creating opportunities for accounting arbitrage in an acquisition by recognising an intangible asset that is similar in nature to goodwill (such as brands and mastheads) as goodwill rather than an intangible asset (or vice versa), the amortisation requirements for goodwill in IAS 22: Business Combinations are consistent with those of IAS 38.

     


    FASB REPORT - BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL REPORTING, CHALLENGES FROM THE NEW ECONOMY NO. 219-A April 2001 Author: Wayne S. Upton, Jr. Source: Financial Accounting Standards Board --- http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/fasb/new_economy.html 
    Upton's book challenges Lev's contention that the existing standards are enormously inadequate for the "New Economy."


    The Garten SEC Report: A press release and an executive summary are available at http://www.mba.yale.edu  
    The Garten SEC Report supports Lev's contention that the existing standards are enormously inadequate for the "New Economy."
    (You can request a copy of the full report using an email address provided at the above URL)

    Trinity University students may access this report at J:\courses\acct5341\readings\sec\garten.doc 


    FEI BUSINESS COMBINATIONS VIDEO PROGRAM http://www.fei.org/confsem/bizcombo2k2/agenda.cfm 

    American Accounting Association (AAA) members may view a replay of a day-long webcast on accounting for business combinations and intangible valuations (SFAS 141 and 142) at half the price that will be charged to other non-FEI members ($149 versus $299). The FEI hopes to use funds generated from AAA members to help the FEI assume sponsorship of a Corporate Accounting Policy Seminar.

    The webcast encompassed five presentations by experts with question-and-answer periods: (1) Overview of SFAS 141/142, by G. Michael Crooch, FASB Board Member; (2) Recognition and Measurement of Intangibles, by Tony Aarron of E&Y Valuation Services and Steve Gerard of Standard and Poors's, (3) Impact on Doing Deals: Structure, Pricing and Process, by Raymond Beier of PWC and Elmer Huh, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, (4) Testing for Goodwill Impairment, by Mitch Danaher of GE, and (5) Transition Issues and Financial Statement Disclosures, by Julie A. Erhardt of Arthur Andersen's Professional Standards Group.


    As an example (Digital Island Inc.) of the impact of FAS 142 on impairment testing for goodwill, please print the following document: http://www.edgar-online.com/brand/businessweek/glimpse/glimpse.pl?symbol=ISLD 

    Amortization of intangible assets. Amortization expense increased to $153.7 million for the nine months ended June 30, 2001 from $106.4 million for the nine months ended June 30, 2000. This increase was primarily due to a full period

    of amortization of the goodwill and intangibles related to the acquisitions of Sandpiper, Live On Line and SoftAware, which were completed in December 1999, January 2000 and September 2000, respectively. This increase was offset by a decrease in the current quarter's amortization as a direct result of a $1.0 billion impairment charge on goodwill and intangible assets in the quarter ended March 31, 2001. Amortization of intangible assets is expected to decrease in future periods due to this impairment charge.

    Impairment of Goodwill and Intangible Assets. Impairment of goodwill and intangible assets was recorded in the amount of $1,039.2 million. The impairment charge was based on management performing an impairment assessment of the goodwill and identifiable intangible assets recorded upon the acquisitions of Sandpiper, Live On Line and SoftAware, which were completed during the year ended September 30, 2000. The assessment was performed primarily due to the significant decline in stock price since the date the shares issued in each acquisition were valued. As a result of this review, management recorded the impairment charge to reduce goodwill and acquisition-related intangible assets. The charge was determined as the excess of the carrying value of the assets over the related estimated discounted cash flows.


    Forwarded by Storhaug [storhaug@BTIGATE.COM

    To follow up on this list's earlier brief discussion on FASB 141 & 142, below is a bookmark to a site "CFO.COM" which has an excellent compendium of articles and links, all of which help you evaluate these new FASB's.

    http://www.cfo.com/fasbguide 

    "The Goodwill Games How to Tackle FASB's New Merger Rules," by Craig Schneider, CFO.com --- http://www.cfo.com/fasbguide 

    The thrill of victory and the agony of defeat. Chances are senior financial executives will experience a similar range of emotions while wrestling with the Financial Accounting Standards Board's new rules for business combinations, goodwill, and intangibles. Use CFO.com's special report for tips on tackling the impairment test, avoiding Securities & Exchange Commission inquiries, finding valuation experts, and much more. While accounting is not yet an Olympic sport, with the right training, you'll take home the gold. We welcome your questions and comments. E-mail craigschneider@cfo.com.
    Take Your First Steps

    How to Survive the SEC's Second Guessing
    New rules for recording goodwill and intangibles may inadvertently produce more restatements.

    Cramming for the Final
    Get up to speed on the latest accounting rule changes for treating goodwill and intangibles.

    Pool's Closed
    FASB's new merger-accounting rules have already won some fans among deal makers.
    (CFO Magazine)

    Intangibles Revealed
    Once you identify them, how much will the fair value assessments cost?

    Four Ways to Say Goodbye to Goodwill Amortization
    Expert tips for tackling the impairment test.

     

    Congratulations to Baruch Lev from NYU --- http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/main.html 

    Baruch's picture adorns the cover of Financial Executive, March/April 2002 --- http://www.fei.org/magazine/marapr-2002.cfm 

    The cover story entitled "Rethinking Accounting:  Intangibles at a Crossroads:  What Next?" on pp. 34-39 --- http://www.fei.org/magazine/articles/3-4-2002_CoverStory.cfm 
    The concluding passage is quoted below:

    The Inertness and Commoditization of Intangibles 

    Intangibles are inert - by themselves, they neither create value nor generate growth. In fact, without efficient support and enhancement systems, the value of intangibles dissipates much quicker than that of physical assets. Some examples of inertness: uHighly qualified scientists at Merck, Pfizer, or Ely Lilly (human capital intangibles) are unlikely to generate consistently winning products without innovative processes for drug research, such as the "scientific method," based on the biochemical roots of the target diseases, according to Rebecca Henderson, a specialist on scientific drug research, in Industrial and Corporate Change. Even exceptional scientists using the traditional "random search" methods for drug development will hit on winners only randomly, writes Henderson.

    uA large patent portfolio at DuPont or Dow Chemical (intellectual property) is by itself of little value without a comprehensive decision support system that periodically inventories all patents, slates them by intended use (internal or collaborative development, licensing out or abandonment) and systematically searches and analyzes the patent universe to determine whether the company's technology is state-of-the-art and competitive.

    uA rich customer database (customer intangibles) at Amazon.com or Circuit City will not generate value without efficient, user-friendly distribution channels and highly trained and motivated sales forces.

    Worse than just inert, intangibles are very susceptible to value dissipation (quick amortization) - much more so than other assets. Patents that are not constantly defended against infringement will quickly lose value due to "invention around" them. Highly trained employees will defect to competitors without adequate compensation systems and attractive workplace conditions. Valuable brands may quickly deteriorate to mere "names" when the firm - such as a Xerox, Yahoo! or Polaroid - loses its competitive advantage. The absence of active markets for most intangibles (with certain patents and trademark exceptions) strips them of value on a stand-alone basis.

    Witness the billions of dollars of intangibles (R&D, customer capital, trained employees) lost at all the defunct dot-coms, or at Enron, or at AOL Time Warner Co., which in January 2002 announced a whopping write-off of $40-60 billion - mostly from intangibles.

    Intangibles are not only inert, they are also, by and large, commodities in the current economy, meaning that most business enterprises have equal access to them. Baxter and Johnson & Johnson, along with the major biotech companies, have similar access to the best and brightest of pharmaceutical researchers (human capital); every retailer can acquire the state-of-the-art supply chains and distribution channel technologies capable of creating supplier and customer-related intangibles (such as mining customer information); most companies can license-in patents or acquire R&D capabilities via corporate acquisitions; and brands are frequently traded. The sad reality about commodities is that they fail to create considerable value. Since competitors have equal access to such assets, at best, they return the cost of capital (zero value added).

    The inertness and commoditization of most intangibles have important implications for the intangibles movement. They imply that corporate value creation depends critically on the organizational infrastructure of the enterprise - on the business processes and systems that transform "lifeless things," tangible and intangible, to bundles of assets generating cash flows and conferring competitive positions. Such organizational infrastructure, when operating effectively, is the major intangible of the firm. It is, by definition, noncommoditized, since it has to fit the specific mission, culture, and environment of the enterprise. Thus, by its idiosyncratic nature, organizational infrastructure is the major intangible of the enterprise.

    Focusing the Intangibles Efforts 

    Following Phase I of the intangibles work, which was primarily directed at documentation and awareness-creation, it's now time to focus on organizational infrastructure, the intangible that counts most and about which we know least. It's the engine for creating value from other assets. Like breaking the genetic code, an understanding of the "enterprise code" - the organizational blueprints, processes and recipes - will enable us to address fundamental questions of concern to managers and investors, such as those raised above in relation to H-P/Compaq and Enron.

    Organizational Infrastructure By Example: A company's organizational infrastructure is an amalgam of systems, processes and business practices (its operating procedures, recipes) aimed at streamlining operations toward achieving the company's objectives. Following is a concrete example of a business process, part of the organizational infrastructure, which was substantially modified and thereby created considerable value. This was adopted from "Turnaround," Business 2.0, January 2002.

    Nissan Motor Co. Ltd., Japan's third-largest automaker and a perennial loser and debt-ridden producer of lackluster cars, received in March 1999 a new major shareholder, Renault, and a new CEO, Carlos Ghosn, both imported from France. Ghosn moved quickly to transform Nissan into a viable competitor, and indeed, in the fiscal year ending March 2001, the company reported a profit of $2.7 billion, the largest in its 68-year history.

    How was this miracle performed? Primarily by cost-cutting, achieved by a drastic change in the procurement process. Here briefly, is the old process: Nissan's buyers were locked into ordering from keiretsu partners, suppliers in which Nissan owned stock. The guaranteed stream of Nissan orders insulated those suppliers from competition. Suppliers can't specialize and can't sell excess capacity elsewhere. Each supplier was assigned a shukotan, Nissan-speak for a relationship manager. It was the shukotan who would negotiate price discounts - but favors got in the way.

    Here, in brief, is the new procurement process, as drastically changed by Ghosn: Ghosn gave Itaru Koeda, the purchasing chief, authority to place orders without regard to keiretsu relationships - and, more important, insisted that he use it. Then, a Renault executive and Koeda dumped the shukotan system, instead assigning buyers responsibility by model and part. They formed a sourcing committee to review vendor price quotes on a global basis. "This is the best change in our process," Koeda says. "Suppliers are specializing in what they do best, making them more efficient."

    The results? An 18 percent drop in purchasing costs, which was the major contributor to Nissan's transformation from a loss to a profit. Ghosn's next major set of tasks: To change the car design process in order to enhance the top line, sales; to rid Nissan of the myriad design committees and hierarchies that stifle and slow innovation; and to institute an efficient, effective innovative process.

    Baruch's cover story is accompanied by "Fixing Financial Reporting:  Financial Statement Overhaul," by  Robert A Howell, pp. 40-42 --- http://www.fei.org/magazine/articles/3-4-2002_Howell_CoverStory.cfm 

    Financial reporting is broken and has to be fixed - and fast! If it isn't, we will continue to see more cases such as Xerox, Lucent, Cisco Systems, Yahoo! and Enron. Xerox's market value is down 90 percent, or $40 billion, in the past two years. In the same period other market losses include; Lucent, down more than $200 billion; Cisco Systems, off more than $400 billion; Yahoo!, more than $100 billion; and Enron, down more than $60 billion in the largest bankruptcy of all time.

    Some argue that these are extreme examples of "irrational exubuerance." Some in the accounting profession say that such cases represent a small percentage of the aggregate number of statements audited - some 15,000 public company registrants. Perhaps. But a financial reporting framework that permits these companies to suggest that they are doing well, and, by implication, to justify market valuations which, subsequently, cost investors trillions in the aggregate, is unconscionable.

    Financial reporting, especially in the U. S., with its very public capital markets, has reached the point where "accrual-based" earnings are almost meaningless. Reported earnings are driven as much by "earnings expectations" as they are by real business performance. Balance sheets fail to reflect the major drivers of future value creation - the research and product, process and software development that fuel high technology companies, and the brand value of leading consumer product companies. And, cash flow statements are such a hodge-podge of operating, investing and financing activities that they obfuscate, rather than illuminate, business cash flow performance.

    The FASB, in its Concept No. 1, states, "financial reporting should provide information that is useful to present and potential investors and creditors and other users in making rational investment, credit and similar decisions." This is simply not so.

    The primary financial statements - income statement, balance sheet and cash flow statement - which derive their foundation from an industrial age model, need major redesign if they are to serve as the starting point for meaningful financial analysis, interpretation and decision-making in today's knowledge-based and value-driven economy. Without significant redesign, ad hoc definitions such as pro forma earnings, returns and cash flows will continue to proliferate. So will significant reporting "surprises!"

    Starting Point: Market Value Creation
    The objective of a business is to increase real shareholder value - what Warren E. Buffett would call the "intrinsic value" of the firm. It's a very basic idea: Investors get "returns" from dividends and realized market appreciation. Both investments and returns are measured in cash terms, so individuals and investors invest cash in securities with the objective of realizing returns that meet or exceed their criteria. If their judgments are too high, and that later becomes clear, the market value of the firm will drop. If judgments are too low and cash flows turn out to be stronger, market values increase.

    From a managerial viewpoint, the objective of increasing shareholder (market) value really means increasing the net present value (NPV) of the future stream of cash flows. Note, "cash flows," not "profits." Cash is real; profits are anything, within reason, that management wants them to be. If revenues are recognized early - or overstated - and expenses are deferred or, in some cases, accelerated to "clear the decks" for future periods, resulting earnings may show a nice trend, but do not really reflect economic performance.

    There are only three ways management may increase the real market, or "intrinsic," value of a firm. First, increase the amount of cash flows expected at any point in time. Second, accelerate cash flows; given the time value of money, cash received earlier has a higher present value. Third, if a firm is able to lower the discount rate that it applies to its cash flows - which it frequently can - it can raise its NPV.

    Given that cash flows drive market value, financial statements should put much more emphasis on cash flows. The statement of cash flows now prescribed by the accounting community and presented by management is not easily related to value creation. Derived from the income statement and balance sheet, it's effectively a reconciliation statement for the change in the balance of the cash account. A major overhaul of the cash flow statement would directly relate to market valuations.

    Cash Earnings and Free Cash Flows
    Managers and investors should focus on "cash earnings" and the reinvestments that are made into the business in the form of "working capital" and "fixed and other (including intangible) investments." The net amount of these cash flows represent the business's "free cash flows."

    With negative cash flows - frequently the case for young startups and high-growth companies - a business must raise more capital in the form of debt or equity. The sooner it gets its free cash flows positive, the sooner it'll begin to create value for shareholders. Positive free cash flows provide resources to pay interest and pay down debt, to return cash to shareholders (through stock repurchases or dividends) or to invest in new business areas.

    The traditional cash flow statement purportedly distinguishes between operating, investing and financing cash flows, and has as its "bottom line" the change in cash and cash equivalents. In fact, the operating cash flows include the results of selling activities, investing in working capital and interest expense, a financing activity. Investing cash flows include capital expenditures, acquisitions, disposals of assets and the purchase and sale of financial assets. Financing cash flows consist of what's left over.

    Indeed, the bottom-line change in cash is not a useful number, other than to demonstrate that it may be reconciled with the change in the cash account. If one wants a positive change in cash, simply borrow more. These free cash flows ultimately drive market value, and should be the focus of managers and investors alike.

    Replacing Income With Cash Earnings
    The traditional "profit and loss," or "income," statement needs modification in three ways, two of which are touched on above, along with a name-change, to "Operating Statement." That would suggest a representation of the business' current operations, without the emphasis on accrual-based profits.

    Interest expense (income) should be eliminated from the statement, as it represents a financing cost rather than an operating cost. A number of companies do this internally to determine "net operating profit after taxes" (NOPAT). Also, NOPAT needs to be adjusted for the various non-cash items, such as depreciation, amortization, gains and losses on the sale of assets, tax-timing differences and restructuring charges - which affect income but not cash flows. The resultant "cash earnings" better represents the current economic performance of a business than accrual income and, very importantly, is much less susceptible to manipulation.

    A third adjustment is the order in which the classes of expenses are displayed. Traditional income statements report cost of goods sold or product costs first, frequently focus on product gross margins, and then deduct, as a group, other expenses such as technical, selling and administrative expenses. This order made sense in the industrial age when product costs dominated. It does not for many of today's high-tech or consumer product companies. It would be more useful for companies to report expenses in an order that reflects the flow of the business activities. One logical order that builds on the concept of a business' value chain, is to categorize costs into development costs, product (service) conversion costs, sales and customer support costs and administrative costs.

    Reinvesting in the Business
    For most companies - especially those with significant investments that are being depreciated or amortized - cash earnings will be significantly higher than NOPAT. Unfortunately, cash earnings are not free cash flows because most businesses have to reinvest in working capital, property, plant and equipment and intangible assets, just to sustain - let alone increase - their productive capabilities.

    As a business grows in sales volume, assuming that it offers credit to its customers who pay with the same frequency, accounts receivable will increase proportionately. As sales volumes increase, so, too, will product costs, inventories and accounts payable balances. Working capital - principally receivables, inventories, and payables - will tend to increase proportionately with sales growth, and will require cash to finance it. The degree to which it grows is a function of receivables terms and collection practices, inventory management and payables practices.

    Companies such as Dell Computer Corp. collect payments up front, turn inventories in a few days and pay their vendors when due. The net effect is that as Dell grows it actually throws off cash, rather than requiring it to support increases in working capital. Most companies are not as efficient; the amount of cash needed to support increases in working capital can be as much as 20-25 percent of any sales increase. The degree to which working capital increases as sales increase is an important performance metric. Lower is better, which absolutely flies in the face of such traditional measures of liquidity as "working capital" and "quick" ratios, for which higher has been considered better.

    Balance sheets ought to reflect investments that represent future value. What drives value for many businesses in today's knowledge-based economy - pharmaceuticals, high technology, software and brand-driven consumer product companies - is the investments in R&D, product, process and software development, brand equity and the continued training and development of the work force. Yet, based on generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) accounting, these "investments" in the future are not reflected on balance sheets, but, rather, expensed in the period in which they are incurred.

    A frequent argument for "expensing" is the unclear nature of the investments' future value. Apparently, investors believe otherwise, evidenced by the ratio of market values to book values having exploded in the past 25 years. In 1978, the average book-to-market ratio was around 80 percent; today it is around 25 percent. In the early 1970s, when accounting policies were established for R&D, product lines were narrower and life cycles longer, resulting in R&D being a much less significant element of cost. Expensing was less relevant. Now, with intangible assets having become so central and significant, expensing - rather than capitalizing and amortizing them over time - results in an absolute breakdown of the principle of "matching," which is at the heart of accrual accounting. The world of business has changed; accounting practices must also change.

    Financial Statement Overhaul
    Financial statements need marked overhaul to be useful for analysis and decision-making in today's knowledge-driven and shareholder value-creation environment. The proposed changes fall into three categories:

    First - Move to a much more explicit shareholder (market) value creation and cash orientation, and away from accrual accounting profits and return on investment calculations predicated on today's accounting policies. Start with a shareholder perspective for cash flows, then reconstruct the statement of cash flows to clearly provide the free cash flows that the business' operations are generating. Cash earnings and reinvestments in the business comprise free cash flows.

    Second - Expand the definition of investments to include intangibles, which should be capitalized as assets and amortized according to some thoughtful rules. This will better reflect investments that have potential future value.

    Third - Change the title to "operating statement" and other "housekeeping" of financial statements, to include categorizing costs in a more logical "value chain" sequence and aggregating all financial transactions, such as interest and the purchase and sale of securities, as financing activities.

    Value creation is ultimately measured in the marketplace, so it stands to reason that if a firm's market value increases consistently, over time, and can be supported by improvements in its cash generation performance, real value is being created. For this to happen, the place to start is by fixing the financial statements. 

    Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm 

     


    The Shareholder Action On-Line Handbook (1993) (history, finance, investing, law)--- http://www.ethics.fsnet.co.uk/0home.htm 

    These Web pages are the on-line version of The Shareholder Action Handbook, first published in paperback 1993 by New Consumer. The Handbook aims to give practical advice to individuals about how they may use shares to make companies more accountable. The need for such a guide is now stronger than ever. Public concern in Britain about the accountability of company directors has risen to the extent that the subject makes regular appearances in debates in the House of Commons. While there are many obstacles to taking shareholder action, shareholders can do much to alter the course of corporate behaviour. Indeed, since the original version of the guide appeared there have been a number of successful shareholder action campaigns. However, there is considerable need both for new legislation to make it easier for shareholders to hold companies to account, and for the large institutional shareholders who own much of global industry to take their responsibilities as shareholders rather more seriously.


    Online Resources for Business Valuations

    Go to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm


    Understanding the Issues

    From The Wall Street Journal's Accounting Educator Reviews on January 22, 2002

    TITLE: Deciphering the Black Box 
    REPORTER: Steve Liesman 
    DATE: Jan 23, 2002 PAGE: C1 LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011739030177303200.djm  TOPICS: Accounting, Accounting Theory, Creative Accounting, Disclosure, Disclosure Requirements, Earnings Management, Financial Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis, Fraudulent Financial Reporting, Regulation, Securities and Exchange Commission

    SUMMARY: The article discusses several factors that have led to financial reporting that is complex and difficult to understand. Related articles provide specific examples of complicated and questionable financial reporting practices.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) What economic factors have led to the complexity of financial reporting? Have accounting standard setters kept pace with the changing economic conditions? Support your answer.

    2.) What determines a company's cost of capital? What is the relation between the quantity and quality of financial information disclosed by a company and its cost of capital? Why are companies reluctant to disclose financial information?

    3.) Explain the difference between earnings management and fraudulent financial reporting? Is either earnings management or fraudulent financial reporting illegal? Is either unethical? Could earnings management ever improve the usefulness of financial reporting? Explain.

    4.) Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of allowing discretion in financial reporting.

    5.) Refer to related articles. Briefly discuss the major accounting or economic situation that has caused complexity in the financial reporting of each of these companies. What can be done to make the financial reporting more useful?

    SMALL GROUP ASSIGNMENT: How much discretion should Generally Accepted Accounting Principles allow in financial reporting? Support your position.

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

    --- RELATED ARTICLES --- 

    TITLE: GE: Some Seek More Light on the Finances 
    REPORTER: Rachel Emma Silverman and Ken Brown 
    PAGE: C1 ISSUE: Jan 23, 2002 
    LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011744147673133760.djm 

    TITLE: AIG: A Complex Industry, A Very Complex Company 
    REPORTER: Christopher Oster and Ken Brown 
    PAGE: C16 ISSUE: Jan 23, 2002 
    LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011740010747146240.djm 

    TITLE: Williams: Enron's Game, But Played with Caution 
    REPORTER: Chip Cummins 
    PAGE: C16 ISSUE: Jan 23, 2002 
    LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011739185631601680.djm 

    TITLE: IBM: 'Other Income' Can Mean Other Opinions 
    REPORTER: William Bulkeley 
    PAGE: C16 ISSUE: Jan 23, 2002 
    LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011744634389346680.djm 

    TITLE: Coca-Cola: Real Thing Can Be Hard to Measure 
    REPORTER: Betsy McKay 
    PAGE: C16 ISSUE: Jan 23, 2002 
    LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011739618177530480.djm 

    Bob Jensen's threads on accounting and securities fraud are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm 


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on June 11, 2004

    TITLE: Outside Audit: Goodyear and the Butterfly Effect 
    REPORTER: Timothy Aeppel 
    DATE: Jun 04, 2004 
    PAGE: C3 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108629544631828261,00.html  
    TOPICS: Accounting Changes and Error Corrections, Pension Accounting, Restatement

    SUMMARY: Goodyear Tire & Rubber has announced the amount of its restatement from problems identified in 2003. The company as well has announced further restatements due to changes in the discount rate it uses for pension liability calculations.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) For what reason is Goodyear Tire & Rubber restating earnings for the last five years?

    2.) What accounting standards require restatements of past financial results? Under what circumstances are restatements required? What other types of accounting changes are possible? How are these categories of accounting changes presented in the financial statements?

    3.) In general, what adjustment is Goodyear Tire & Rubber making to its accounting for defined benefit pension plans?

    4.) Discuss the details of the change in accounting for the defined benefit pension plan. Specifically, define the discount rate in question and state how it is used in pension accounting.

    5.) Had the company not uncovered the issues identified under question #1, do you think they would be making the changes identified in questions #3 and #4? Why or why not?

    6.) Do you think that changes in the discount rate used in pension accounting are made by other companies? When do you think companies might change this rate? In general, what type of accounting treatment would you recommend for such a change? Support your answer.

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

    "Outside Audit: Goodyear And the Butterfly Effect:  A Valuation Rate Is Shaved By Half a Point and Presto, $100.1 Million Goes Poof," by Timothy Aeppel, The Wall Street Journal, June 4, 2004, Page C3 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108629544631828261,00.html

    There's a costly oddity tucked into Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.'s recent earnings restatement.

    As part of a larger revision reaching back five years, the U.S.'s largest tire maker changed the interest-rate assumptions associated with its domestic retirement plans. The upshot: By slicing half a point off a rate used to value the company's obligations to its pension fund and other post-retirement benefit plans, Goodyear also lopped off a total of $100.1 million in earnings over that period.

    This may be the first time a major company has restated earnings for this reason, although it was just one of several accounting issues the Akron, Ohio, tire maker addressed in its restatement announced May 19. Goodyear has identified a series of accounting irregularities over the past year and is the target of a continuing investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

    "I have a feeling that while they were scrubbing, they decided to scrub everything," says Jack Ciesielski, publisher of Analyst's Accounting Observer.

    Keith Price, a Goodyear spokesman, says the change doesn't mean Goodyear sought to inflate earnings in the past by using an inappropriately high discount rate. Most of the reduction in earnings was the result of Goodyear having to record additional tax expenses, he notes. Mr. Price says Goodyear decided to change its methodology for calculating the rate it uses going forward and, since a broader restatement was already under way, chose to extend the new approach into the past as well.

    The root of Goodyear's problem appears to be that it used an uncommon way of calculating the so-called discount rate it assumes for its traditional pension plan. A discount rate is simply an interest rate companies use to convert future values into their present-day terms. Companies calculate the pension-fund discount rate at the end of every year in order to project cash outflows in their retirement plans. The number changes from year to year. But it also tends to get buried in financial footnotes and overlooked.

    The higher the discount rate, the less the current value of a company's future obligations to its retirees under its plans. So, in Goodyear's case, the older, higher discount rate lowered the company's projected benefit payments -- which also had the effect of raising its pretax income.

    Goodyear's old method of setting the rate was to use a six-month average of corporate-bond rates. That's unusual, though not a violation of generally accepted accounting principles, says Mr. Ciesielski.

    The more common and accurate approach is to pick a discount rate based on rates at a point in time near to when the calculations are being done. That provides a better snapshot of reality, especially in an era when rates are falling, as they have in recent years.

    Sure enough, Goodyear's old methodology resulted in discount rates that were higher than those used by most other companies during the period in question. For instance, in its restatement, Goodyear cut the rate it used in 2001 to 7.5% from 8%. But a study by Credit Suisse First Boston notes that the median discount rate used by S&P-500 component companies that year was a far lower 7.25%. In fact, the study found only seven companies used rates of 8% or higher in 2001.

    Goodyear's numbers are now more in line with other companies' and shouldn't require further adjustment, say analysts. But like many old-line companies with a relatively large cadre of older workers and retirees, Goodyear is expected to face pension problems for years to come, since its plans are underfunded by about $2.8 billion.

    While Goodyear's pension concerns are not unique, Mr. Ciesielski says it is unlikely other companies will rush to restate earnings to reflect a new discount-rate assumption. Besides, coming up with the rate is still far from an exact science.

    David Zion, CSFB's accounting analyst, says even companies that use identical methodologies can arrive at sharply different discount rates. Those with fiscal years ending in June would have different rates than those with years ending in December, for example. And multinational companies face another complication: "The discount rate for a Japanese pension plan will be different than the discount rate in Turkey," Mr. Zion points out.

    In its restatement, Goodyear decreased overall pretax income by $18.9 million for the past five years as a result of its reassessment of the discount rate. And since Goodyear's pension plan is underfunded, the cut in the discount rate also magnified that negative condition. As a result, Goodyear had to add $160.9 million in liabilities to its balance sheet. The new liabilities forced Goodyear to record $81.2 million in additional tax expenses for 2002.

    This restatement comes at a time Goodyear's accounting is still under heavy scrutiny. The company launched an internal probe last year after it said it found problems in internal billing and the implementation of a new computer system. It later said it had identified serious misdeeds by top managers in Europe and cases in which U.S. plants understated workers' compensation liabilities.


    Hi Robert,

    I added your document to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/WalkerToFarrington.htm 

    I would not say that we are so much timid as we are squashed by lobbying pressures from industry.

    Bob Jensen

    Bob

    I wish to ask you a favour again. I have written the attached as a submission to a review of the New Zealand Financial Reporting Act 1993. It is currently under review due to the imminent adoption of the IASB's standards. It has thrown New Zealand's application of differential reporting into confusion. My submission deals with the way in which accounting must be the pivot upon which creditor protection functions. What I would hope Americans find interesting is the degree to which we have played out your laws - the corporate solvency test and GAAP - in a way you are too timid to do.

    The Government's discussion document to which the submission is a response is on this link:

    http://www.med.govt.nz/buslt/bus_pol/bus_law/corporate-governance/financial-reporting/part-one/media/minister-20040315.html 

    The letter is self-contained aside from the specific commentary at the end. Could you find space for it on your web-site?

    Robert B Walker


    Stock Option Valuation Research Database

    From Syllabus News on December 13, 2002

    Wharton School Offers Stock Data Via the Web

    The University of Pennsylvania's Wharton business school is offering financial analysts access to historical information on stock options over the Internet. The data, supplied by research firm OptionMetrics's Ivy database, covers information on all U.S. listed index and equity options from January1996. The Ivy database adds to the 1.5 terabyte storehouse of financial information from a range of providers now available through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). The university said that by making data from the Center for Research in Security Prices, Standard & Poor's COMPUSTAT, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the New York Stock Exchange, and other data vendors accessible from a simple Web-based interface, WRDS hopes to become the preferred source among university scholars for data covering global financial markets.

    Note from Jensen:  the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) home page is at http://www.wharton.upenn.edu/research/wrds.html 

    Wharton Research Data Services, a revolutionary Internet-based research data service developed and marketed by the Wharton School, has become the standard for large-scale academic data research, providing instant web access to financial and business datasets for almost all top-tier business schools (including 23 of the top 25 schools as ranked by Business Week magazine).

    Subscribers to Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) gain instant access to the broadest array of business and economic data now available from a single source on the Web. From anywhere and at any time, WRDS functions as an application service provider (ASP) to deliver information drawn from 1.2 terabytes of comprehensive financial, accounting, management, marketing, banking and insurance data.

    Launched in July 1997, the unique data service's client list of over 60 institutions now includes Stanford University, Harvard University, Columbia University, Yale University, Northwestern University, London Business School, INSEAD, University of Chicago, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and dozens of other institutions. Subscribers to WRDS need only PCs or even less-expensive Web terminals to endow their units with supercomputer capabilities and tap a massive, constantly updated source of data. Users click on the WRDS database and interactively select data to extract. The requested information is instantly returned to the web browser, ready to be pasted into a spreadsheet or any other application for analysis.

    To learn more about WRDS or to get licensing information, contact: Nicole Carvalho, Marketing Director Wharton Research Data Services 400 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall 3620 Locust Walk Philadelphia, PA 19104-6302

    1-877-GET-WRDS (1-877-438-9737)


    Knowledge@Wharton is a free source of research reports and other materials in accounting, finance, and business research --- http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/ 


     

    Forwarded by Robert B Walker [walkerrb@ACTRIX.CO.NZ

    FASB Understanding the Issues: Vol 4 Series 1 --- 

    I refer to the monograph on credit standing & liability measurement written by Crooch & Upton. --- http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/fasb/statusreport_articles/vol4_series1.html  

    The article seems to suggest you wish to have feedback on this and other matters. Accordingly, I send my thoughts on this matter.

    I would begin by observing that I think Concepts Statement 7 is inconsistent with the earlier 1996 study from which it was derived. I found that study utterly persuasive so I do not now find CS-7 persuasive. In moments of cynicism, I think that Mr Upton’s apparent epiphany is related more to the politics of accountancy than to its conceptual purity.

    By this I mean that the measurement of liabilities at risk free interest rate rather than at a rate reflecting credit standing would be so anathema to the generality of accountants that it is futile to suggest it. Indeed the Crooch & Upton begin by stating a basic premise of axiomatic significance to their case – no gain or loss should arise when engaging in simple borrowing. The idea that no sooner one entered a loan agreement than a loss would arise (because it would invariably be a loss) would have most accountants in a state of high dudgeon.

    The issue then is one of gain or loss. But then that is only if you perceive the world from an income orientation perspective. I don’t, primarily because of the influence of the conceptual framework. This is reinforced by my work as a liquidator of companies. I see the world purely from a balance sheet perspective and one subject to realisable value at that. In other words, I see the utility of accounting only in terms of solvency determination with all that entails in regard to the going concern assumption.

    Unlike the United States, in the jurisdiction in which I live accounting has been rendered central to creditor protection in our corporate law. Central to this law, in turn, is the conceptual framework (at least in my view and to test the hypothesis I have a case before the courts now). I am then caused considerable misgiving as the final consequence of FASB’s view is the effective emasculation of our law built, essentially, on American conceptual development.

    The ultimate consequence of what FASB propose is that as a company slides toward insolvency its liability value declines, the value of its net worth increases. Presumably as it has no credit standing at all because it is insolvent, it has no liabilities. This may be practically true when the creditors miss out but in my jurisdiction at least it is not legally true because those responsible for the creditors loss are held accountable, the impediments of the legal system notwithstanding.

    I note that Crooch & Upton make reference in a footnote to the theory of Robert Merton in which it is implied that the residual assets are able to be ‘put’ to satisfy the claims of creditors. That may be true in an economist’s fantasy but it is not true in law, a rather more important arena.

    I say perceiving a decline in the value of a liability is considerably more counter-intuitive than the problem of accelerating the recognition of cost of debt. This is a mere triviality by comparison. After all the same amount of charge is recognised over time. The advantage of accelerating loss is that it causes an entity to be more inhibited in its distribution policy as it has less equity to draw upon. That is to the advantage of creditors.

    It seems to me that there needs to be an objective value at which to determine the value of a liability, this being central to the ability to liquidate. Mr Upton in his 1996 study demonstrates that such a value will represent the price the debtor has to pay to have the liability taken away. That price will be determined by the seller providing sufficient resources to the buyer to ensure that the buyer will avoid any risk. The resources would need to be enough to acquire a risk free asset with the same maturity profile as the liability.

    The effect of perceiving the ‘price’ of a liability in this way is to necessitate that it is discounted at a risk free rate.

    I note that the only way to make CS-7 coherent is to assume that such transfers of assets are always made between parties of the same credit standing. This pertains to one of the major practical difficulties of reflecting credit standing in accounting measurement – that is knowing what it is. It may be easily determined in the publicly listed world in which Crooch & Upton inhabit. It is not in the small, closely held corporate world in which I operate. For accounting to have long term validity it must be applicable in all circumstances.

    I think it fair to note that there is another dimension to this that tends to undermine what I believe. I have a theoretical notion that the world upon consolidation nets to nil. That is to say, my financial asset and your financial liability must have the same value in our respective records. Call this a principle of reciprocity.

    Theoretically, so far as I understand it a lender will discount the face value of a zero discount bond at the risk free rate after having adjusted for the probability of receiving nothing at all. The effect of doing that is, at the inception of an advance, to carry the value of the asset at the cash value paid at that time. If the application of the principle of reciprocity was applied when the liability was revalued in the books of the debtor, the creditor would take up a gain that denied any risk existed.

    I find this inconvenient as it causes me to abandon a notion in which I fundamentally believe. I will just have to suffer cognitive dissonance, won’t I? But then one should not underestimate the psychology that underlies accounting, particularly in the face of the paradoxes it is capable of generating.


    Also see other articles on related topics at  http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/fasb/statusreport_articles/ 

     

    Pro-Forma Earnings (Electronic Commerce, e-Commerce, eCommerce)

    From the Wall Street Journal's Accounting Educators' Reviews, October 4, 2001
    Educators interested in receiving these excellent reviews (on a variety of topics in addition to accounting) must firs subscribe to the electronic version of the WSJ and then go to http://209.25.240.94/educators_reviews/index.cfm 

    Sample from the October 4 Edition:

    TITLE: Sales Slump Could Derail Amazon's Profit Pledge 
    REPORTER: Nick Wingfield 
    DATE: Oct 01, 2001 
    PAGE: B1 
    LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1001881764244171560.djm  
    TOPICS: Accounting, Creative Accounting, Earnings Management, Financial Analysis, Net Income, Net Profit

    SUMMARY: Earlier this year Amazon promised analysts that it will report first-ever operating pro forma operating profit. However, Amazon is not commenting on whether it still expects to report a fourth-quarter profit this year. Questions focus on profit measures and accounting decisions that may enable Amazon to show a profit.

    QUESTIONS: 

    1.) What expenses are excluded from pro forma operating profits? Why are these expenses excluded? Are these expenses excluded from financial statements prepared in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles?

    2.) List three likely consequences of Amazon not reporting a pro forma operating profit in the fourth quarter. Do you think that Amazon feels pressure to report a pro forma operating profit? Why do analysts believe that reporting a fourth quarter profit is important for Amazon?

    3.) List three accounting choices that Amazon could make to increase the likelihood of reporting a pro forma operating profit. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of making accounting choices that will allow Amazon to report a pro forma operating profit.

    SMALL GROUP ASSIGNMENT: Assume that you are the accounting department for Amazon and preliminary analysis suggest that Amazon will not report a pro forma operating profit for the fourth quarter. The CEO has asked you to make sure that the company meets its financial reporting objectives. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of making adjustments to the financial statements. What adjustments, if any, would you make? Why?

    Reviewed 

    By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island Reviewed 
    By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University Reviewed 
    By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

    Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory can be found at 
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm
     

    Bob Jensen's threads on real options for valuing intangibles are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/realopt.htm 

     


    Baruch Lev has a very good site on accounting for intangibles at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/intangibles.html 

    Also note Wayne Upton's Special Report for the FASB at http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/fasb/new_economy.html 


    E-COMMERCE AND AUDITING FAIR VALUES SUBJECTS OF NEW INTERNATIONAL GUIDANCE The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) invites comments on two new exposure drafts (EDs): Auditing Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures and Electronic Commerce: Using the Internet or Other Public Networks - Effect on the Audit of Financial Statements. Comments on both EDs, developed by IFAC's International Auditing Practices Committee (IAPC), are due by January 15, 2002. See http://accountingeducation.com/news/news2213.html  

    The IFAC link is at http://www.ifac.org/Guidance/EXD-Download.tmpl?PubID=1003772692151 

    The purpose of this International Standard on Auditing (ISA) is to establish standards and provide guidance on auditing fair value measurements and disclosures contained in financial statements. In particular, this ISA addresses audit considerations relating to the valuation, measurement, presentation and disclosure for material assets, liabilities and specific components of equity presented or disclosed at fair value in financial statements. Fair value measurements of assets, liabilities and components of equity may arise from both the initial recording of transactions and later changes in value.

     

    Download
    "Auditing Fair Value Measurements And Disclosures"
    in MS Word format.

    File Size: 123 Kbytes
    Download
    "Auditing Fair Value Measurements And Disclosures"
    in Adobe Acrobat format.

    File Size: 209 Kbytes

     

     


     

    External Auditing Combined With Consulting and Other Assurance Services:  Audit Independence?

    TITLE:  "Auditor Independence and Earnings Quality"R
    AUTHORS:  
    Richard M. Frankel MIT Sloan School of Business 50 Memorial Drive, E52.325g Cambridge, MA 02459-1261 (617) 253-7084 frankel@mit.edu 
    Marilyn F. Johnson Michigan State University Eli Broad Graduate School of Management N270 Business College Complex East Lansing, MI 48824-1122 (517) 432-0152 john1614@msu.edu  
    Karen K. Nelson Stanford University Graduate School of Business Stanford, CA 94305-5015 (650) 723-0106 knelson@gsb.stanford.edu  
    DATE:  August 2001
    LINK:  http://gobi.stanford.edu/ResearchPapers/Library/RP1696.pdf 

    Stanford University Study Shows Consulting Does Affect Auditor Independence --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=54733 

    Academics have found that the provision of consulting services to audit clients can have a serious effect on a firm's perceived independence.

    And the new SEC rules designed to counter audit independence violations could increase the pressure to provide non-audit services to clients to an increasingly competitive market.

    The study (pdf format), by the Stanford Graduate School of Business, showed that forecast earnings were more likely to be exceeded when the auditor was paid more for its consultancy services.

    This suggests that earnings management was an important factor for audit firms that earn large consulting fees. And such firms worked at companies that would offer little surprise to the market, given that investors react negatively when the auditor also generates a high non-audit fee from its client.

    The study used data collected from over 4,000 proxies filed between February 5, 2001 and June 15, 2001.

    It concluded: "We find a significant negative market reaction to proxy statements filed by firms with the least independent auditors. Our evidence also indicates an inverse relation between auditor independence and earnings management.

    "Firms with the least independent auditors are more likely to just meet or beat three earnings benchmarks – analysts' expectations, prior year earnings, and zero earnings – and to report large discretionary accruals. Taken together, our results suggest that the provision of non-audit services impairs independence and reduces the quality of earnings."

    New SEC rules mean that auditors have to disclose their non-audit fees in reports. This could have an interesting effect, the study warned: "The disclosure of fee data could increase the competitiveness of the audit market by reducing the cost to firms of making price comparisons and negotiating fees.

    "In addition, firms may reduce the purchase of non-audit services from their auditor to avoid the appearance of independence problems."

    A Lancaster University study in February this year found that larger auditors are less likely to compromise their independence than smaller ones when providing non-audit services to their clients.

    And our sister site, AccountingWEB-UK, reports that research by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW) showed that, despite the prevalence of traditional standards of audit independence, the principal fear for an audit partner was the loss of the client. 

     

    External Auditing Combined With Consulting and Other Assurance Services:  The Enron Scandal

    One of the most prominent CPAs in the world sent me the following message and sent the WSJ link:

    Bob, More on Enron. 
    It's interesting that this matter of performing internal audits didn't come up in the testimony Joe Beradino of Andersen presented to the House Committee a couple of days ago

    "Arthur Andersen's 'Double Duty' Work Raises Questions About Its Independence," by Jonathan Weil, The Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2001 --- http://interactive.wsj.com/fr/emailthis/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1008289729306300000.djm 

    In addition to acting as Enron Corp.'s outside auditor, Arthur Andersen LLP also performed internal-auditing services for Enron, raising further questions about the Big Five accounting firm's independence and the degree to which it may have been auditing its own work.

    That Andersen performed "double duty" work for the Houston-based energy concern likely will trigger greater regulatory scrutiny of Andersen's role as Enron's independent auditor than would ordinarily be the case after an audit failure, accounting and securities-law specialists say.

    It also potentially could expose Andersen to greater liability for damages in shareholder lawsuits, depending on whether the internal auditors employed by Andersen missed key warning signs that they should have caught. Once valued at more than $77 billion, Enron is now in proceedings under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.

    Internal-audit departments, among other things, are used to ensure that a company's control systems are adequate and working, while outside independent auditors are hired to opine on the accuracy of a company's financial statements. Every sizable company relies on outside auditors to check whether its internal auditors are working effectively to prevent fraud, accounting irregularities and waste. But when a company hires its outside auditor to monitor internal auditors working for the same firm, critics say it creates an unavoidable conflict of interest for the firm.

    Still, such arrangements have become more common over the past decade. In response, the Securities and Exchange Commission last year passed new rules, which take effect in August 2002, restricting the amount of internal-audit work that outside auditors can perform for their clients, though not banning it outright.

    "It certainly runs totally contrary to my concept of independence," says Alan Bromberg, a securities-law professor at Southern Methodist University in Dallas. "I see it as a double duty, double responsibility and, therefore, double potential liability."

    Andersen officials say their firm's independence wasn't impaired by the size or nature of the fees paid by Enron -- $52 million last year. An Enron spokesman said, "The company believed and continues to believe that Arthur Andersen's role as Enron's internal auditor would not compromise Andersen's role as independent auditor for Enron."

    Andersen spokesman David Tabolt said Enron outsourced its internal-audit department to Andersen around 1994 or 1995. He said Enron began conducting some of its own internal-audit functions in recent years. Enron, Andersen's second-largest U.S. client, paid $25 million for audit fees in 2000, according to Enron's proxy last year. Mr. Tabolt said that figure includes both internal and external audit fees, a point not explained in the proxy, though he declined to specify how much Andersen was paid for each. Additionally, Enron paid Andersen a further $27 million for other services, including tax and consulting work.

    Following audit failures, outside auditors frequently claim that their clients withheld crucial information from them. In testimony Wednesday before a joint hearing of two House Financial Services subcommittees, which are investigating Enron's collapse, Andersen's chief executive, Joseph Berardino, made the same claim about Enron. However, given that Andersen also was Enron's internal auditor, "it's going to be tough for Andersen to take that traditional tack that 'management pulled the wool over our eyes,' " says Douglas Carmichael, an accounting professor at Baruch College in New York.

    Mr. Tabolt, the Andersen spokesman, said it is too early to make judgments about Andersen's work. "None of us knows yet exactly what happened here," he said. "When we know the facts we'll all be able to make informed judgments. But until then, much of this is speculation."

    Though it hasn't received public attention recently, Andersen's double-duty work for Enron wasn't a secret. A March 1996 Wall Street Journal article, for instance, noted that a growing number of companies, including Enron, had outsourced their internal-audit departments to their outside auditors, a development that had prompted criticism from regulators and others. At other times, Mr. Tabolt said, Andersen and Enron officials had discussed their arrangement publicly.

    Accounting firms say the double-duty arrangements let them become more familiar with clients' control procedures and that such arrangements are ethically permissible, as long as outside auditors don't make management decisions in handling the internal audits. Under the new SEC rules taking effect next year, an outside auditor impairs its independence if it performs more than 40% of a client's internal-audit work. The SEC said the restriction won't apply to clients with assets of $200 million or less. Previously, the SEC had imposed no such percentage limitation.

    The Gottesdiener Law Firm, the Washington, D.C. 401(k) and pension class action law firm prosecuting the most comprehensive of the 401(k) cases pending against Enron Corporation and related defendants, added new allegations to its case today, charging Arthur Andersen of Chicago with knowingly participating in Enron's fraud on employees.
    Lawsuit Seeks to Hold Andersen Accountable for Defrauding Enron Investors, Employees --- http://www.smartpros.com/x31970.xml 

    Bob Jensen's threads on the Enron scandal are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm


    Quality of Earnings, Restatements, and  Core Earnings

    Question
    What are the primary alleged causes for the rapid increase in revisions to financial statements in the past few years?

    June 14, 2006 message from Denny Beresford [DBeresfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]

    An official in Washington DC sent me a note today saying that he is " interested in understanding the cause for the increased number of restatements. Can you recommend any good articles or research that explains the root causes, trends, etc?

    Can anyone suggest some good references to pass along?

    Denny Beresford

    June 14, 2006 reply from Ganesh M. Pandit, DBA, CPA, CMA [profgmp@HOTMAIL.COM]

    Perhaps this might help...Financial Restatements: Causes, Consequences, and Corrections By Erik Linn, CPA, and Kori Diehl, CPA, published in the September 2005 issue of Strategic Finance, Vol.87, Iss. 3; pg. 34, 6 pgs.

    Ganesh M. Pandit Adelphi University

    June 15, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Evidence seems to be mounting that Section 404 of SOX is working in uncovering significant errors in past financial statements. This is to be expected in the early phases of 404 implementation. But the revisions should subside after 404 is properly rolling. Companies like Kodak found huge internal control weaknesses that led to reporting errors.

    One of the most popular annual study if restatements is free from the Huron Consulting Group.

    Free from the Huron Consulting Group (Registration Required) --- http://www.huronconsultinggroup.com/

    "Restatements Should Subside as 404, Lease Issues Subside" --- http://www.huronconsultinggroup.com/uploadedFiles/CW-Restatements-021406.pdf

    "2004 Annual Review of Financial Reporting Matters - Summary" --- Click Here
    (I could not yet find the 2005 update, which is understandable since 2005 annual reports were just recently published.)

    There also is an interesting 1999 paper entitled "Accounting Defects, Financial Statement Credibility, and Equity Valuation" by W. Bruce Johnson and D. Shores --- http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/acct/papers/workingpapers/99-01.pdf

    Bob Jensen

    Core Earnings

    Bob Jensen's Overview --- Go to  http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/CoreEarnings.htm 

    "Beyond The Balance Sheet Earnings Quality," by  Kurt Badanhausen, Jack Gage, Cecily Hall, Michael K. Ozanian, Forbes, January 28, 2005 --- http://www.forbes.com/home/business/2005/01/26/bbsearnings.html 

    It's not how much money a company is making that counts, it's how it makes its money. The earnings quality scores from RateFinancials aim to evaluate how closely reported earnings reflect the cash that the companies' businesses are generating and how well their balance sheets reflect their true economic position. Companies in the winners table have the best earnings quality (they are generating a lot of sustainable cash from their operations), while companies in the losers table have been boosting their reported earnings with such tricks as unexpensed stock options, low tax rates, asset sales, off-balance-sheet financing and deferred maintenance of the pension fund.

    Krispy kreme doughnuts is the latest illustration of the fact that stunning earnings growth can mask a lot of trouble. Not long ago the doughnut maker was a glamour stock with a 60% earnings-per-share growth rate and a multiple to match-70 times trailing earnings. Now the stock is at $9.61, down 72% from May, when the company first issued an earnings warning. Turns out Krispy Kreme may have leavened profits in the way it accounted for the purchase of franchised stores and by failing to book adequate reserves for doubtful accounts. So claims a shareholder lawsuit against the company. Krispy Kreme would not comment on the suit. 

    Investors are not auditors, they don't have subpoena power, and they can't know about such disasters in advance. But sometimes they can get hints that the quality of a company's earnings is a little shaky. In Krispy's case an indication that it was straining to deliver its growth story came three years ago in its use of synthetic leases to finance expansion. Forbes described these leases in a Feb. 18, 2002 story that did not please the company. Another straw in the wind: weak free cash flow from operations. You get that number by taking the "cash flow from operations" reported on the "consolidated statement of cash flows," then subtracting capital expenditures. Solid earners usually throw off lots of positive free cash flow. At Krispy the figure was negative.

     Is there a Krispy Kreme lurking in your portfolio? For this, the fifth installment in our Beyond the Balance Sheet series, we asked the experts at RateFinancials of New York City ( www.ratefinancials.com ) to look into earnings quality among the companies included in the S&P 500 Index. The tables at right display the outfits that RateFinancials puts at the top and at the bottom of the quality scale. The ratings are to a degree subjective and, not surprisingly, some of the companies at the bottom take exception. General Motors feels that RateFinancials understates its cash flow. But at minimum RateFinancials' work warns investors to look closely at the financial statements of the suspect companies. 

    A lot of factors went into the ratings produced by cofounders Victor Germack and Harold Paumgarten, research director Allan Young and ten analysts. A company that expenses stock options is probably not straining to meet earnings forecasts, so it gets a plus. Overoptimistic assumptions about future earnings on a pension fund artificially prop up earnings and thus rate a minus. A low tax rate is a potential indicator of trouble: Maybe the low profit reported to the Internal Revenue Service is all too true and the high profit reported to shareholders an exaggeration. Other factors relate to discontinued operations (booking a one-time gain from selling a business is bad), corporate governance (companies get black marks for having poison pills), inventory (if it piles up faster than sales, then business may be weakening) and free cash flow (a declining number is bad).

    Continued in this section of Forbes

    Included in Standard & Poor's definition of Core Earnings are 

    • employee stock options grant expenses, 
    • restructuring charges from on-going operations, 
    • write-downs of depreciable or amortizable operating assets, 
    • pensions costs 
    • purchased research and development. 

    Excluded from this definition are 

    • impairment of goodwill charges, 
    • gains or losses from asset sales, pension gains, 
    • unrealized gains or losses from hedging activities, merger and acquisition related fees
    • litigation settlements

     


    The Quality of Earnings Controversy in Accounting Theory

    From The Wall Street Journal Weekly Accounting Review on April 13, 2007

    These Days, Detective Skills Are Key to Gauging a Stock
    by Herb Greenberg
    The Wall Street Journal

    Page: B3
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117590470676662738.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac
     

    TOPICS: Accounting, Disclosure, Disclosure Requirements, Earnings Quality, Financial Accounting, Sarbanes-Oxley Act

    SUMMARY: "When Circuit City Stores Inc. reported an unexpected fiscal fourth-quarter loss this past week, with its stock in the doldrums, Victor Germack felt vindicated. Last summer, when quite a few analysts were upgrading their ratings on the electronics retailer's stock, his research firm, RateFinancials, published a report blasting Circuit City for "very poor quality of earnings" and "poor accounting policies, footnotes and management discussion and analysis."" The concerns arose from a "preponderance of year-end lease terminations and the disproportional influence [on earnings from] the sales of extended warranties..." Circuit City's spokesman, Bill Cimino, cites other factors, such as a rapid decline in the price of flat-panel television sets, that impacted the results.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) What is the "quality" of a company's earnings?

    2.) What factors raised questions in some analysts' minds about the quality of Circuit City's earnings? List all that you find in the main article and in the related one, and explain the impact of the issue on the notion of "quality of earnings" or "quality of financial reporting."

    3.) Why did this question of quality of earnings not arise the minds of other analysts besides those of RateFinancials Inc.?

    4.) How does the corporate spokesperson address the question of the quality of Circuit City's earnings? How does his answer benefit Circuit City in its dealings with financial markets?
     

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
     

    RELATED ARTICLES: 
    Circuit City Highlights Doubts About Analysts
    by Steven D. Jones
    Sep 08, 2006
    Online Exclusive
     

     


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on May 27, 2004

    TITLE: J.C. Penney Profit Hurt by Eckerd 
    REPORTER: Kortney Stringer 
    DATE: May 19, 2004 
    PAGE: B4 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108488326393314408,00.html  
    TOPICS: Accounting, Earnings Quality, Financial Accounting, Financial Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis, Income from Continuing Operations, Net Income, Operating Income

    SUMMARY: Despite an earnings increase, J.C. Penney reported a 33% decline in net income. Questions focus on the components and usefulness of the income statement.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) Describe the primary purpose(s) of the income statement. Distinguish between the single-step and multi-step format for the income statement. Which type of statement is more common? Support your answer.

    2.) Explain the components of gross margin, operating income, income from continuing operations, net income, and comprehensive income. What is persistence? Which income statement total is likely to have the greatest persistence? Which income statement total is likely to have the least persistence?

    3.) Where are results from discontinued operations reported on the income statement? Why are results from discontinued operations separated from income from continuing operations?

    4.) What impact does the loss from the sale of Eckerd have on J.C. Penney's expected future net income? What impact does results from continuing operations have on expected future net income?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on May 23, 2002

    TITLE: SEC Broadens Investigation Into Revenue-Boosting Tricks; Fearing Bogus Numbers Are Widespread, Agency Probes Lucent and Others 
    REPORTER: Susan Pulliam and Rebecca Blumenstein 
    DATE: May 16, 2002 
    PAGE: A1 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1021510491566948760.djm,00.html  
    TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Statement Analysis

    SUMMARY: "Securities and Exchange Commission officials, concerned about an explosion of transactions that falsely created the impression of booming business across many industries, are conducting a sweeping investigation into a host of practices that pump up revenue."

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) "Probing revenue promises to be a much broader inquiry than the earlier investigations of Enron and other companies accused of using accounting tricks to boost their profits." What is the difference between inflating profits vs. revenues?

    2.) What are the ways in which accounting information is used (both in general and in ways specifically cited in this article)? What are the concerns about using accounting information that has been manipulated to increase revenues? To increase profits?

    3.) Describe the specific techniques that may be used to inflate revenues that are enumerated in this article and the related one. Why would a practice of inflating revenues be of particular concern during the ".com boom"?

    4.) "[L90 Inc.] L90 lopped $8.3 million, or just over 10%, off revenue previously reported for 2000 and 2001, while booking the $250,000 [net difference in the amount of wire transfers that had been used in one of these transactions] as 'other income' rather than revenue." What is the difference between revenues and other income? Where might these items be found in a multi-step income statement? In a single-step income statement?

    5.) What are "vendor allowances"? How might these allowances be used to inflate revenues? Consider the case of Lucent Technologies described in the article. Might their techniques also have been used to boost profits?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

    --- RELATED ARTICLES --- 
    TITLE: CMS Energy Admits Questionable Trades Inflated Its Volume 
    REPORTER: Chip Cummins and Jonathan Friedland 
    PAGE: A1 
    ISSUE: May 16, 2002 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1021494984503313400.djm,00.html 

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on May 27, 2004

    TITLE: SEC Gets Tough With Settlement in Lucent Case
    REPORTER: Deborah Solomon and Dennis K. Berman
    DATE: May 17, 2004
    PAGE: A1
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108474447102812763,00.html 
    TOPICS: Criminal Procedure, Financial Accounting, Legal Liability, Revenue Recognition, Securities and Exchange Commission, Accounting

    SUMMARY: After a lengthy investigation into the accounting practices of Lucent Technologies Inc., the Securities and Exchange Commission is expected to file civil charges and impose a $25 million fine against the company. Questions focus on the role of the SEC in financial reporting.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) What is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)? When was the SEC established? Why was the SEC established? Does the SEC have the responsibility of establishing financial reporting guidelines?

    2.) What role does the SEC currently play in the financial reporting process? What power does the SEC have to sanction companies that violate financial reporting guidelines?

    3.) What is the difference between a civil and a criminal charge? What is the difference between a class-action suit by investors and a civil charge by the SEC?

    4.) What personal liability do individuals have for improper accounting? Why does the SEC object to companies indemnifying individuals for consequences associated with improper accounting?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

    Bob Jensen's threads on revenue accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm 


    Standard & Poor's News Release on May 14, 2002 --- http://www.standardandpoors.com/PressRoom/index.html 

    Standard & Poor's To Change System For Evaluating Corporate Earnings

    Widely-Supported "Core Earnings" Approach to be Applied to Earnings Analyses and Forecasts for US Indices, Company Data and Equity Research

    New York, May 14, 2002 -- Standard & Poor's today published a set of new definitions it will use for equity analysis to evaluate corporate operating earnings of publicly held companies in the United States. Release of "Measures of Corporate Earnings" completes a process Standard & Poor's began in August 2001 when the firm began discussions with securities and accounting analysts, portfolio managers, academic research groups and others to build a consensus for changes that will reduce investor frustration and confusion over growing differences in the reporting of corporate earnings. The text of "Measures of Corporate Earnings" may be found at www.standardandpoors.com/PressRoom/index.html

    At the center of Standard & Poor's effort to return transparency and consistency to corporate reporting is a focus on what it refers to as Core Earnings, or the after-tax earnings generated from a corporation's principal business or businesses. Since Standard & Poor's believes that there is a general understanding of what is included in As Reported Earnings, its definition of Core Earnings begins with As Reported and then makes a series of adjustments. As Reported Earnings are earnings as defined by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) which excludes two items - discontinued operations and extraordinary items, both as defined by GAAP.

    Included in Standard & Poor's definition of Core Earnings are employee stock options grant expenses, restructuring charges from on-going operations, write-downs of depreciable or amortizable operating assets, pensions costs and purchased research and development. Excluded from this definition are impairment of goodwill charges, gains or losses from asset sales, pension gains, unrealized gains or losses from hedging activities, merger and acquisition related fees and litigation settlements.

    "For over 140 years, Standard & Poor's has stood for the investor's right to know. Central to that objective is a clear, consistent, definition of a company's financial position," said Leo O'Neill, president of Standard & Poor's. "The increased use of so-called pro forma earnings and other measures to report corporate performance has generated controversy and confusion and has not served investor interests. Standard & Poor's Core Earnings definition will help build consensus and restore investor trust and confidence in the data used to make investment decisions."

    "A number of recent high profile bankruptcies have renewed investors' concerns about the reliability of corporate reporting," said David M. Blitzer, Standard & Poor's chief investment strategist. "From the work we have just completed, our hope is to generate additional public discussion on earnings measures. Once there are more generally accepted definitions, it will be much easier for analysts and investors to evaluate varying investment opinions and recommendations and form their own views of which companies are the most attractive."

    Beginning shortly, Standard & Poor's will include the components of its definition for Core Earnings in its COMPUSTAT database for the U.S., the leading source for corporate financial data. In addition, Core Earnings will be calculated and reported for Standard & Poor's U.S. equity indices, including the S&P 500. Finally, Standard & Poor's own equity research team, which provides opinions on over 1100 stocks, will adopt Core Earnings in its analyses.

    "Core Earnings is an excellent analytical tool for the individual and professional investor alike," said Kenneth Shea, managing director for global equity research at Standard & Poor's. "It allows investors to better evaluate and compare the underlying earnings power of the companies they are examining. In addition, it enhances an investor's ability to construct and maintain investment portfolios that will adhere to a pre-determined set of investment objectives. With Core Earnings, Standard & Poor's equity analysts will be able to provide our clients with even more insightful forecasts and buy, hold and sell recommendations."

    From the outset, Standard & Poor's has sought to achieve agreement surrounding broad earnings measures that address a company's potential for profitability. In addition to emphasizing this approach in its equity analysis, Standard & Poor's will also make Core Earnings a part of its credit ratings analysis. The accuracy of earnings and earnings trends has always been a component of credit analysis and Core Earnings adds value to this process. Earnings are also a major element in cash flow analysis and are therefore a part of Standard & Poor's debt rating methodology.

    Standard & Poor's, a division of The McGraw-Hill Companies (NYSE:MHP), provides independent financial information, analytical services, and credit ratings to the world's financial markets. Among the company's many products are the S&P Global 1200, the premier global equity performance benchmark, the S&P 500, the premier U.S. portfolio index, and credit ratings on more than 220,000 securities and funds worldwide. With more than 5,000 employees located in 18 countries, Standard & Poor's is an integral part of the global financial infrastructure. For more information, visit www.standardandpoors.com


    S&P Main Core Earnings Site (including a Flash Presentation) --- http://snipurl.com/SPCoreEarnings 

    Subtopics
              Standard & Poor's Core Earnings Data
              Latest Standard & Poor's Research
              Previous Standard & Poor's Research
              Press Releases
              Bios
              Media Coverage
              Standard & Poor's Core Earnings Data and Services

     


    S&P PowerPoint Show on Core Earnings

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/corePowerpoint.ppt 

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/corePowerpoint.htm 


    Other Related Core Earnings Files

    Bob Jensen's Overview --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/CoreEarnings.htm 

    Updates, including FAS 133 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/CoreEarningsMisc.pdf 

    Pensions and Pension Interest --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/CoreEarningsPensions.pdf 


    Question:
    What ten companies have the most "inflated" measures of profit?

    Answer:
    "Shining A New Light on Earnings, BusinessWeek Editorial, June 21, 2002 --- http://www.standardandpoors.com/Forum/MarketAnalysis/coreEarnings/Articles/062102_coredata.html 

    How much does a company truly make? It's hard to tell these days. To boost the performance of their stocks, companies have come up with a slew of self-defined "pro forma" numbers that put their financials in a favorable light. Now ratings agency Standard & Poor's has devised a truer measure known as Core Earnings.

    The Goal: to provide a standardized definition of the profits produced by a company's ongiong operations. Of the three main changes from more traditional measures of profits two reduce earmings: Income from pension funds is excluded and the cost of stock options are deducted as an expense. The other big change boosts earnings by adding back in the charges taken to adjust for overpriced acquisitions. Here are the top 10 losers and winners under Core Earnings:


     


    Enhanced Business Reporting

    I attended the following CPE Workshop at the AAA Meetings in Orlando

    CPE Session 3: Saturday, August 7, 1:00 PM – 4:00 PM 
    Value Measurement and Reporting—Moving toward Measuring and Reporting Value Creation Activities and Opportunities

    Presenters: William J. L. Swirsky, Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants  
    Paul Herring, AICPA Director Business Reporting Assurance and Advisory Service 

    Description/Objectives: 
    Content – Presentations and dialogue about measuring the activities and opportunities that drive an entity’s value and, once measured, reporting these value creation prospects, in financial or nonfinancial terms, in addition to current financial information. The session will include information about research by the Value Measurement and Reporting Collaborative (VMRC) that will provide the foundation for the development of a framework of market-driven principles that characterize value measurement and reporting on a global basis.

    Objectives – To continue the dialogue on more transparent, consistent, and reliable reporting of an entity’s value; to provide participants with information about the research being undertaken by VMRC; to talk about disclosure; and to solicit feedback from the attendees about where they see gaps in the current practices on value measurement and reporting.

    Plan – To (1) provide context for value measurement and reporting; (2) describe research to date; and (3) describe reporting initiatives.

    The above workshop focused mainly upon the early stages of the Value Measurement and Reporting Collaborative that evolved into the Enhanced Business Reporting (EBR) Consortium)  for providing more structure, uniformity, and measurement of non-financial information reported to managers and other stakeholders --- http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/cpaltr/nov2002/supps/edu1.htm 
    This initiative that began in 2002 with hope that a collaboration between the AICPA, the Canadian CICA, leading consulting firms, and others could initiate a new business reporting model as follows:

    The Value Measurement and Reporting Collaborative, in which the AICPA is a participant, will play a crucial role in the new business reporting model. VMRC is a global effort of the accounting profession, along with corporate directors, businesses, business associations and organizations, institutional investors, investment analysts, software companies and academics. The key purpose of the collaborative is to help boards of directors and senior management make better strategic decisions using value measurement and reporting. It is anticipated that the current financial reporting model would, over time, migrate to this new model and would be used to communicate a more complete picture to stakeholders.

    Also see Grant Thornton's summary in 2004
    Grant Thornton in the US has posted a new publication of Directors Monthly, which focuses on "Business Reporting: New Initiative Will Guide Voluntary Enhancements." The publication discusses how non-financial information offers a better picture of corporate financial health. 
    Double Entries, September 9, 2004 --- http://accountingeducation.com/news/news5395.html 

    For years researchers and businesses have been attempting to find a better way to report on business performance beyond the traditional financial reporting effort.  Bob Jensen even wrote a 1976 book called Phantasmagoric Accounting --- See Volume 14 at http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aaa/market/studar.htm 

    Studies of reporting on non-financial business performance over the past 50 years have generally been disappointing.  Numbers attached to such things as cost of pollution and value of human capital were generally derived from overly-simplified models that really did not deal with externalities, interaction effects, non-stationarity, and important missing variables.  There is an immense need, especially by managers and lawmakers, for better business reporting that will help making tradeoffs between stakeholders.  At the Orlando workshop mentioned above, we heard a great deal about the need for a new business reporting model.  But when the presenters got down to what had been accomplished to date, I felt like the presentations lacked scholarship, especially in terms of the history of research on this topic over the past 50 years.  What was presented as "new" really had been hashed over many times in the past.  I left the Enhanced Business Reporting Consortium workshop feeling that this initiative is long on hype and short on hope.

    But I do not want to give the impression that the EBR initiative is not important.  Little is gained by the traditional accounting research tradition, especially in academe, of ignoring huge and seemingly intractable problems that seem to defy all known research methodologies.  High on the list of intractable problems are problems of measuring intangibles and human/environmental performance.  If nothing else, the Value Measurement and Reporting Collaborative will help to keep researchers focused on the bigger problems rather than less relevant minutiae.  At a minimum some progress may be made toward standardization of non-financial reporting.  

    You can track the progress of the Enhanced Business Reporting Consortium  at http://www.ebrconsortium.org/ 


    Economic Theory of Accounting

    Financial Statements Are Still Valuable Tools for Predicting Bankruptcy
    Despite growing public skepticism over how useful financial statements are in providing information to investors, researchers at Stanford’s Graduate School of Business have found that the value of financial ratios for predicting bankruptcy has not declined significantly over time. Professors Maureen McNichols and William Beaver and graduate student Jung-Wu Rhie have reexamined the usefulness for predicting bankruptcy of financial ratios such as return on assets (net income divided by total assets), cash flow to total liabilities (earnings before interest, depreciation, and taxes divided by both short- and long-term debt), and leverage (total liabilities to total assets). The study explored how three forces have influenced this predictive value over the past 40 years.
    "Financial Statements Are Still Valuable Tools for Predicting Bankruptcy," Stanford Graduate School of Business Newsletter, November 2005 --- http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/acctg_mcnichols-beaver_bankruptcy.shtml

    "Financial Statements Still Significant In Predicting Bankruptcy," AccountingWeb, May 17, 2006 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=102159

    Researchers have found that financial ratios are still valuable tools in predicting bankruptcy. The significance of financial ratios found in statements was explored in a study examining their predictive value over the last four decades, according to the Stanford Graduate School of Business (GSB).

    The GSB reported that the premise of the study was motivated by regulatory organizations, such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the Securities and Exchange Commission, seeking to increase the usefulness of information found in financial statements.

    The study, completed by Professors Maureen McNichols and William Beaver, with graduate student Jung-Wu Rhie, reexamined the use of financial ratios such as cash flow to total liabilities (earnings before interest, depreciation, and taxes divided by short-term debt plus long-term debt), return on assets (net income divided by total assets), leverage (total liabilities compared to total assets), according to the GSB.

    McNichols is the Marriner S. Eccles Professor of Public and Private Management at the GSB. Beaver is the Joan E. Horngren Professor of Accounting there.

    McNichols told the GSB, “One prediction is that if standard-setters are successful at incorporating additional information about fair values into financial statements, then we might expect their predictive ability for bankruptcy to increase.”

    On the other hand, traditional accounting standards may capture only a portion of current companies’ scope of activities. Also, financial statements may be seen as more “managed” than from other times in the past, according to the GSB.

    “If we look back in the 1960s, intangible assets -– as represented by investments in brands, research and development and technology -– were much less pervasive than they are today. These kinds of transactions are not well captured by our current accounting model,” Professor McNichols told the GSB. Concerning the “management” of financial statements, McNichols said, “Certainly, there is much more documentation of earnings management today than we’ve seen historically.”

    McNichols went on to say that any shift in the economic activities of companies might also offset any improvements in standards and informativeness of financial statements made by regulatory standard-setters, according to the GSB.

    In study results released in March 2005, financial statements were found to be highly significant in predicting bankruptcy over the two periods of the study, according to the GSB. Period 1 was 1962 to 1993 and Period 2 was 1994 to 2002. There was a decline in predictive ability from Period 1 to Period 2, although it was not statistically significant. Companies’ “hazard rate”, reflecting their risk of going bankrupt and using the three ratios, predicted higher risk in the year before bankruptcy, as well as other years before their insolvency. Beaver said, “In fact, we see differences in the ratios of bankrupt and nonbankrupt firms up to five years prior to bankruptcy.”

    The researchers then shifted their predictors toward more market-based values. These were cumulative stock returns over a year; the market capitalization of the firm (or common stock price per share, times the common shares outstanding); and the variability of stock returns. The use of these values was very predictive as well, according to the GSB.

    Predictability actually increased over time. Ninety-two percent of bankrupt companies were in the highest three deciles of Period 1 hazard rates and 93 percent for Period 2. The slight rise was attributed to market prices reflecting broader information, in addition to the information found in financial statements. The GSB reported that the incremental significance of non-financial statement information is reflected in the resulting difference between the two time periods.

    The researchers then merged the financial-ratio and market-based models into a hybrid model. Their results improved, coming up with a 96 percent chance of predicting bankruptcy for Period 1 and 93 percent over Period 2. This seems to show that market prices may compensate for even slight decreases in the predictivity of financial ratios. These results further indicate that the market draws upon additional information not available in financial ratios.

    McNichols told the GSB, “But it’s comforting to know that the behavior of the combined model, over time, is so stable.” The stability of their combined model suggests that bankruptcy can be predicted reliably in capital markets and this ability has not been eroded by changes in reporting.

    Dr. Edward Altman, Ph.D., developed his Z-score formula for predicting bankruptcy in 1968, according to Value Based Management. It consists of three different models, each for specific business organizations, including public manufacturers, private manufacturers and private general firms.

    The American Bankruptcy Institute collects and publishes metrics on bankruptcies. Review their listing of annual business and non-business filings by state (2000-2005) breaks down total bankruptcies into business and non-business numbers, as well as consumer bankruptcies as a percentage of the non-business metrics.

     


    October 30, 2002 message from JerryFeltham [gerald.feltham@commerce.ubc.ca

    Peter Christensen and I are pleased to announce that the first of two volumes on the fundamentals of the economic analysis of accounting has been published by Kluwer. This two volume series is based on two analytical Ph.D. seminars I have taught for several years, and is designed to provide efficient coverage of key information economic models and results that are pertinent to accounting research.

    The first volume is entitled:  Economics of Accounting: Volume I - Information in Markets.

    The attached file provides the table of contents of this volume, plus the preface - which gives a brief overview of the two volumes. The second volume is

    Economics of Accounting: Volume II - Performance Evaluation.

    We expect to complete it in the next few months.

    The two volumes can be used to provide the foundation for Ph.D. courses on information economic research in accounting. Furthermore, it is our hope that analytical researchers, as well as empiricists and experimentalists who use information economic analysis to motivate their hypotheses, will find our book to be a useful reference.

    We plan to maintain a website for the book. It will primarily be used to provide some problems Peter and I have developed in teaching courses based on the two books. In addition, the website will include any errata. The website address is:

    http://people.commerce.ubc.ca/faculty/feltham/economicsofaccounting.html 

    Also attached is a flyer from our publisher Kluwer. It announces a 25% discount in the price if the book is purchased prior to December 31.

    The publisher has also informed us that: "If students buy the book through your university bookstore (6 or more copies) they will receive an adoption price of $79.95 US."

    Information regarding discounts on this book for course use and bulk purchases can be obtained by sending an e-mail message to kluwer@wkap.com  (their customer service department).

    Jerry Feltham 
    Faculty of Commerce 
    University of British Columbia 
    2053 Main Mall 
    Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Z2 
    Tel. 604-822-8397 Fax 604-822-9470
    jerry.feltham@commerce.ubc.ca 


    A One-Hour Video on What it Means to Be Predictably Irrational (July 25, 2008) --- http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/
    The video is also at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VZv--sm9XXU
    This is quite interesting!

    From the Financial Rounds Blog on January 25, 2008 --- http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/

    "Dan Ariely (Duke University) - Predictably Irrational

    Here's a video of Dan Ariely (author of "Predictably Irrational") in his recent talk for the Google Authors program. Ariely has written a fascinating book about some of the cognitive and behavioral biases that most of us exhibit. If you listen carefully, you'll find that he even gives a hint about how to increase your student evaluations --- http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/

     

    Summary of what it means to be "predictably irrational" --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Predictably_Irrational

    New York Times Book Review
    "Emonomics," by David Berreby, The New York Times, March 16, 2008 ---
    http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/books/review/Berreby-t.html?_r=1&oref=slogin

    For years, the ideology of free markets bestrode the world, bending politics as well as economics to its core assumption: market forces produce the best solution to any problem. But these days, even Bill Gates says capitalism’s work is “unsatisfactory” for one-third of humanity, and not even Hillary Clinton supports Bill Clinton’s 1990s trade pacts.

    Another sign that times are changing is “Predictably Irrational,” a book that both exemplifies and explains this shift in the cultural winds. Here, Dan Ariely, an economist at M.I.T., tells us that “life with fewer market norms and more social norms would be more satisfying, creative, fulfilling and fun.” By the way, the conference where he had this insight wasn’t sponsored by the Federal Reserve, where he is a researcher. It came to him at Burning Man, the annual anarchist conclave where clothes are optional and money is banned. Ariely calls it “the most accepting, social and caring place I had ever been.”

    Obviously, this sly and lucid book is not about your grandfather’s dismal science. Ariely’s trade is behavioral economics, which is the study, by experiments, of what people actually do when they buy, sell, change jobs, marry and make other real-life decisions.

    To see how arousal alters sexual attitudes, for example, Ariely and his colleagues asked young men to answer a questionnaire — then asked them to answer it again, only this time while indulging in Internet pornography on a laptop wrapped in Saran Wrap. (In that state, their answers to questions about sexual tastes,, violence and condom use were far less respectable.) To study the power of suggestion, Ariely’s team zapped volunteers with a little painful electricity, then offered fake pain pills costing either 10 cents or $2.50 (all reduced the pain, but the more expensive ones had a far greater effect). To see how social situations affect honesty, they created tests that made it easy to cheat, then looked at what happened if they reminded people right before the test of a moral rule. (It turned out that being reminded of any moral code — the Ten Commandments, the non-existent “M.I.T. honor system” — caused cheating to plummet.)

    These sorts of rigorous but goofy-sounding experiments lend themselves to a genial, gee-whiz style, with which Ariely moves comfortably from the lab to broad social questions to his own life (why did he buy that Audi instead of a sensible minivan?). He is good-tempered company — if he mentions you in this book, you are going to be called “brilliant,” “fantastic” or “delightful” — and crystal clear about all he describes. But “Predictably Irrational” is a far more revolutionary book than its unthreatening manner lets on. It’s a concise summary of why today’s social science increasingly treats the markets-know-best model as a fairy tale.

    At the heart of the market approach to understanding people is a set of assumptions. First, you are a coherent and unitary self. Second, you can be sure of what this self of yours wants and needs, and can predict what it will do. Third, you get some information about yourself from your body — objective facts about hunger, thirst, pain and pleasure that help guide your decisions. Standard economics, as Ariely writes, assumes that all of us, equipped with this sort of self, “know all the pertinent information about our decisions” and “we can calculate the value of the different options we face.” We are, for important decisions, rational, and that’s what makes markets so effective at finding value and allocating work. To borrow from H. L. Mencken, the market approach presumes that “the common people know what they want, and deserve to get it good and hard.”

    What the past few decades of work in psychology, sociology and economics has shown, as Ariely describes, is that all three of these assumptions are false. Yes, you have a rational self, but it’s not your only one, nor is it often in charge. A more accurate picture is that there are a bunch of different versions of you, who come to the fore under different conditions. We aren’t cool calculators of self-interest who sometimes go crazy; we’re crazies who are, under special circumstances, sometimes rational.

    Ariely is not out to overthrow rationality. Instead, he and his fellow social scientists want to replace the “rational economic man” model with one that more accurately describes the real laws that drive human choices. In a chapter on “relativity,” for example, Ariely writes that evaluating two houses side by side yields different results than evaluating three — A, B and a somewhat less appealing version of A. The subpar A makes it easier to decide that A is better — not only better than the similar one, but better than B. The lesser version of A should have no effect on your rating of the other two buildings, but it does. Similarly, he describes the “zero price effect,” which marketers exploit to convince us to buy something we don’t really want or need in order to collect a “free” gift. “FREE! gives us such an emotional charge that we perceive what is being offered as immensely more valuable than it really is,” Ariely writes. None of this is rational, but it is predictable.

    What the reasoning self should do, he says, is set up guardrails to manage things during those many, many moments when reason is not in charge. (Though one might ask why the reasoning self should always be in charge, an assumption Ariely doesn’t examine too closely.)

    For example, Ariely writes, we know our irrational self falls easily into wanting stuff we can’t afford and don’t need. So he proposes a credit card that encourages planning and self-control. After $50 is spent on chocolate this month — pfft, declined! He has in fact suggested this to a major bank. Of course, he knew that his idea would cut into the $17 billion a year that American banks make on consumer credit-card interest, but what the heck: money isn’t everything.

     

    An Experiment With Toilet Paper and Other Messages --- http://www.predictablyirrational.com/

    Other videos on being Predictably Irrational

     

    Great Minds in Management:  The Process of Theory Development --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/GreatMinds.htm

     


    Question
    What's "institutional structure?"
    What's the theory entwined in the works of the three 2007 recipients of the Nobel Prize in Economics?

    Hint:
    Nobel Prizes --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nobel_Prize
    Nobel Prizes in Economics tend to go to mathematicians and/or conservative market theorists.
    Nobel Peace Prices tend to reflect liberal political biases, perhaps even not-so-hidden Nobel agendas.
    Nobel Prizes for accounting and mathematics are nonexistent, probably since both disciplines are built upon assumptions rather than reality. Actually this is also true for economics, although somehow an exception was made for this branch of astrology.

    "A Market Nobel," by Peter Boettke, The Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2007; Page A21 ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119249811353060179.html?mod=todays_us_opinion

    Yesterday Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson won the Nobel Prize in Economic Science for their pioneering work in the field of "mechanism design." Strangely, some have used this occasion to disparage free-market economics. But the truth is the deserving recipients owe a direct debt to free-market thinkers who came before them.

    Mechanism design is an area of economic research that focuses on how institutional structures can be manipulated by changing the rules of the game in order to produce socially optimal results. The best intentions for the public good will go astray if the institutional arrangements are not consistent with the self-interest of decision makers.

    Mr. Myerson's work on how to design auctions to elicit information about the value of the good being auctioned -- and how to maximize the revenue extracted from the auction -- has informed numerous privatizations of publicly owned assets over the past quarter-century. Mr. Maskin also contributed to auction theory, and applied the idea of mechanism design to assess political institutions such as voting systems.

    Mechanism design theory was established to try to address the main challenge posed by Ludwig von Mises and F.A. Hayek. It all starts with Mr. Hurwicz's response to Hayek's famous paper, "The Use of Knowledge in Society." In the 1930s and '40s, Hayek was embroiled in the "socialist calculation debate." Mises, Hayek's mentor in Vienna, had raised the challenge in his book "Socialism," and before that in an article, that without having the means of production in private hands, the economic system will not create the incentives or the information to properly decide between the alternative uses of scarce resources. Without the production process of the market economy, socially desirable outcomes will be impossible to achieve.

    In the mid-1930s, Hayek published Mises's essay in English in his book, "Collectivist Economic Planning." From there the discussion moved to the U.K. and the U.S. Hayek summarized the fundamental challenge that advocates of socialism needed to come to grips with. Hayek's argument, a refinement of Mises, basically stated that the economic problem society faced was not how to allocate given resources, but rather how to mobilize and utilize the knowledge dispersed throughout the economy.

    Hayek argued that mathematical modeling, which relied on a set of given assumptions, had obscured the fundamental problem. These questions were not being probed since they were assumed away in the mathematical models of market socialism presented by Oskar Lange and, later, Abba Lerner. Milton Friedman, when he reviewed Lerner's "Economics of Control," stated that it was as if economic analysis of policy was being conducted in a vacuum. Lange actually argued that questions of bureaucratic incentives did not belong in economics and were best left to other disciplines such as psychology and sociology.

    Leonid Hurwicz, in his classic papers "On the Concept and Possibility of Informational Decentralization" (1969), "On Informationally Decentralized Systems" (1972), and "The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation" (1973), embraced Hayek's challenge. He developed mechanism-design theory to test the logic of the Mises-Hayek contention that socialism could not possibly mobilize the dispersed knowledge in society in a way that would permit rational economic calculation for the alternative uses of scarce resources. Mises and Hayek argued that replacing the invisible hand of the market with the guided one of government would not work. Mr. Hurwicz wanted to see if they were right, and under what conditions one could say they were wrong.

    Those efforts are at the foundation of the field that was honored by the Nobel Prize committee. To function properly, any economic system must, as Hayek pointed out, structure incentives so that the dispersed and sometimes conflicting knowledge in society is mobilized to realize the gains from exchange and innovation.

    Last year Mr. Myerson acknowledged his own debt to Mr. Hurwicz -- and thus Hayek -- in "Fundamental Theory of Institutions: A Lecture in Honor of Leo Hurwicz." The incentive-compatibility issue has highlighted the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection (perverse behavior due to incentives caused by rules that are supposed protect us and selection problems due to imperfect information). Mr. Hurwicz helped repair a mid-20th century neglect of institutions in economic analysis.

    While we celebrate the brilliance of Messrs. Hurwicz, Maskin and Myerson, we should also remember that Hayek's challenge provided their inspiration. Hayek concluded that the private-property rights that come with the rule of law, freedom of contract, and freedom of association is still the one mechanism design that mobilizes and utilizes the dispersed information in an economy. Furthermore, it does so in a way that tends to capture the gains from trade and innovation so that wealth is continually created and humanity is made better off.

    Mr. Boettke is a professor of economics at George Mason University and the Mercatus Center.

    October 17, 2007 reply from Paul Williams [Paul_Williams@NCSU.EDU]

    Bob, et al.

    As I think I have mentioned before there is no Nobel Prize in economics. Alfred Nobel established his trust fund because of guilt over inventing dynamite. He awarded prizes only to those branches of intellectual endeavor that he believed had the potential to bring "goodness" to human kind and end wars forever (chemistry, physics, medicine, literature, and peace (essentially noble political acts because peace is largely about politics perhaps explaining why right- wingers don't tend to win the Peace Prize).

    In 1964 the Nobel Committee agreed to include within the prizes The Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Science in Honor of Alfred Nobel, funded not by the Nobel Trust, but by financial interests. This was a political move to bring legitimacy to economic "science" whose scientific prescriptions for policy always manage somehow to benefit financial interests.

    Apparently we have now "scientific" proof that labor is our punishment for the Fall from Grace. Science my a uh foot.

    October 17, 2007 reply from J. S. Gangolly [gangolly@CSC.ALBANY.EDU]

    Paul and Bob,

    The controversies involving the economics prize include:

    1. Theoretical v. Practical: Kantorovich, the Russian mathematician is supposed to have expressed disbelief at receiving one of the earliest economics Nobels (1975), since he had done virtually no work in economics except for laying the groundwork for what later became linear programming. But that was just a footnote in his life's work.

    The same can be said of the work of Reinhard Selten, John Nash, and to an extent Janos Kornai. Later, a number of other theoreticians were also awarded the economics Nobel, leading to grumbling among the applied/ empirical crowd. Probably the series of Nobel's awarded to Milton Friedman and others later were a reaction to this criticism.

    2. Left-wing v. Right-wing: In general, more Nobels have been awarded to quite-a-bit right-of-center economists, and hell has broken loose when one has been awarded to some one even an iota left-of-center. An example was Amartya Sen, who single-handedly revived the fascinating fields of economics of poverty and development.

    Milton Friedman was awarded the prize in 1976 right after the controversy surrounding the 1975 award to Kantorovich.

    I think economics Nobel's have generally tarnished the reputation of Nobels in general, but one feels good when some one like John Nash gets it. I was thrilled that Leonid Hurwicz got it this year, though I am not sure about Maskin and Myerson. With the latter two, it is way down hill from Selten, Nash, Harsanyi, Aumannn, Kantorovich, Arrow, Debreu, ...

    So far as I know, one "accountant" has won the economics Nobel. It is Richard Stone, who worked in the area of national income accounting.

    Incidentally, I stumbled upon a fascinating book titled "Against Mechanism: Protecting Economics from Science" By Philip Mirowski

    One quote from the book:

    "Contrary to popular misconceptions, I shall claim that economics needs protection from science, and especially from scientists such as Richard Feynman, or any other physicist who thinks he knows just what is needed for economists to clean up their act. Economics needs protection from the scientists in its midst, the Paul Samuelsons and the Tjalling Koopmans and all the others who took their training in the physical sciences and parlayed it into easy victories among their less technically inclined colleagues. And worst of all, economics needs protection from itself. For years, economics has enjoyed an impression of superiority over all the other "social sciences" in rigor, precision, and technical expertise. The reason it has been able to assume this mantle is that economics has consistently striven to be the nearest thing to social physics in the constellation of human knowledge."

    Jagdish

     

     


    Socionomic Theory of Finance and Fraud

    From Jim Mahar's Blog on July 21, 2006 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

    Socionomics and the Enron Scandal

    Right after my posting of the 1952 cartoon, B. C. emailed me the following video that is a documentary on Socionomics and even has Finance Professor John Nofsinger in it speaking about Enron and other scandals!

    What is socionomics?

    From Socionomics.org:
     
    "Socionomics is a new theory of social causality that offers fresh insights into collective human behavior. Over twenty years of empirical research demonstrates that social actions are not causal to changes in social mood, but rather changes in social mood motivate changes in social action."


    For instance, rather than suggesting that a rising economy (or stock market) makes people happy, this takes the related, but reversed, view that the economy improves because people are happy.

    While I do not want to argue the theory (for or against), Nofsinger makes an interesting point by saying that Enron and other scandals may have come when they did (after the tech bubble burst etc), not because of the scandals being worse, but because people were upset and hence "looking for trouble."

    Sort of a chicken or the egg argument that has many finance and economic implications (not least of which might be a predictable component in stock markets--for instance this builds upon the Elliot Wave Theory that was mentioned via Fibonacci sequences in the DaVinci Code.).

    Here is the description from video:

     
    " The Enron and Martha Stewart scandals made headlines at about the same time. It wasn't just coincidence. This four minute clip about socionomics from History's Hidden Engine explains why some scandals make news when they do, while others go unnoticed."

    I have to admit it is a thought provoking idea and it does fit some scenarios, but I am not yet willing to buy into it, although I may buy the book.

    Bob Jensen's theory threads are linked at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm

     


    Facts Based on Assumptions:  The Power of Postpositive Thinking

    Everyone is entitled to their own opinion, but not their own facts.
    Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan --- FactCheck.org ---
    http://www.factcheck.org/

    Then again, maybe we're all entitled to our own facts!

    "The Power of Postpositive Thinking," Scott McLemee, Inside Higher Ed, August 2, 2006 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2006/08/02/mclemee

    In particular, a dominant trend in critical theory was the rejection of the concept of objectivity as something that rests on a more or less naive epistemology: a simple belief that “facts” exist in some pristine state untouched by “theory.” To avoid being naive, the dutiful student learned to insist that, after all, all facts come to us embedded in various assumptions about the world. Hence (ta da!) “objectivity” exists only within an agreed-upon framework. It is relative to that framework. So it isn’t really objective....

    What Mohanty found in his readings of the philosophy of science were much less naïve, and more robust, conceptions of objectivity than the straw men being thrashed by young Foucauldians at the time. We are not all prisoners of our paradigms. Some theoretical frameworks permit the discovery of new facts and the testing of interpretations or hypotheses. Others do not. In short, objectivity is a possibility and a goal — not just in the natural sciences, but for social inquiry and humanistic research as well.

    Mohanty’s major theoretical statement on PPR arrived in 1997 with Literary Theory and the Claims of History: Postmodernism, Objectivity, Multicultural Politics (Cornell University Press). Because poststructurally inspired notions of cultural relativism are usually understood to be left wing in intention, there is often a tendency to assume that hard-edged notions of objectivity must have conservative implications. But Mohanty’s work went very much against the current.

    “Since the lowest common principle of evaluation is all that I can invoke,” wrote Mohanty, complaining about certain strains of multicultural relativism, “I cannot — and consequently need not — think about how your space impinges on mine or how my history is defined together with yours. If that is the case, I may have started by declaring a pious political wish, but I end up denying that I need to take you seriously.”

    PPR did not require throwing out the multicultural baby with the relativist bathwater, however. It meant developing ways to think about cultural identity and its discontents. A number of Mohanty’s students and scholarly colleagues have pursued the implications of postpositive identity politics. I’ve written elsewhere about Moya, an associate professor of English at Stanford University who has played an important role in developing PPR ideas about identity. And one academic critic has written an interesting review essay on early postpositive scholarship — highly recommended for anyone with a hankering for more cultural theory right about now.

    Not everybody with a sophisticated epistemological critique manages to turn it into a functioning think tank — which is what started to happen when people in the postpositive circle started organizing the first Future of Minority Studies meetings at Cornell and Stanford in 2000. Others followed at the University of Michigan and at the University of Wisconsin in Madison. Two years ago FMS applied for a grant from Mellon Foundation, receiving $350,000 to create a series of programs for graduate students and junior faculty from minority backgrounds.

    The FMS Summer Institute, first held in 2005, is a two-week seminar with about a dozen participants — most of them ABD or just starting their first tenure-track jobs. The institute is followed by a much larger colloquium (the part I got to attend last week). As schools of thought in the humanities go, the postpositivists are remarkably light on the in-group jargon. Someone emerging from the Institute does not, it seems, need a translator to be understood by the uninitated. Nor was there a dominant theme at the various panels I heard.

    Rather, the distinctive quality of FMS discourse seems to derive from a certain very clear, but largely unstated, assumption: It can be useful for scholars concerned with issues particular to one group to listen to the research being done on problems pertaining to other groups.

    That sounds pretty simple. But there is rather more behind it than the belief that we should all just try to get along. Diversity (of background, of experience, of disciplinary formation) is not something that exists alongside or in addition to whatever happens in the “real world.” It is an inescapable and enabling condition of life in a more or less democratic society. And anyone who wants it to become more democratic, rather than less, has an interest in learning to understand both its inequities and how other people are affected by them.

    A case in point might be the findings discussed by Claude Steele, a professor of psychology at Stanford, in a panel on Friday. His paper reviewed some of the research on “identity contingencies,” meaning “things you have to deal with because of your social identity.” One such contingency is what he called “stereotype threat” — a situation in which an individual becomes aware of the risk that what you are doing will confirm some established negative quality associated with your group. And in keeping with the threat, there is a tendency to become vigilant and defensive.

    Steele did not just have a string of concepts to put up on PowerPoint. He had research findings on how stereotype threat can affect education. The most striking involved results from a puzzle-solving test given to groups of white and black students. When the test was described as a game, the scores for the black students were excellent — conspicuously higher, in fact, than the scores of white students. But in experiments where the very same puzzle was described as an intelligence test, the results were reversed. The black kids scores dropped by about half, while the graph for their white peers spiked.

    The only variable? How the puzzle was framed — with distracting thoughts about African-American performance on IQ tests creating “stereotype threat” in a way that game-playing did not.

    Steele also cited an experiment in which white engineering students were given a mathematics test. Just beforehand, some groups were told that Asian students usually did really well on this particular test. Others were simply handed the test without comment. Students who heard about their Asian competitors tended to get much lower scores than the control group.

    Extrapolate from the social psychologist’s experiments with the effect of a few innocent-sounding remarks — and imagine the cumulative effect of more overt forms of domination. The picture is one of a culture that is profoundly wasteful, even destructive, of the best abilities of many of its members.

    “It’s not easy for minority folks to discuss these things,” Satya Mohanty told me on the final day of the colloquium. “But I don’t think we can afford to wait until it becomes comfortable to start thinking about them. Our future depends on it. By ‘our’ I mean everyone’s future. How we enrich and deepen our democratic society and institutions depends on the answers we come up with now.”

    Portions of the Colloquium will be made available online. For updates, and more information on the Future of Minority Studies project, check the FMS Web site.

    A version of the keynote speech from this year’s Colloquium, “Multiculturalism, Universalism, and the 21st Century Academy,” by Nancy Cantor, chancellor and president of Syracuse University, will appear soon at Inside Higher Ed.

    Earlier this year, Oxford University Press published a major new work on postpositivist theory, Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self,by Linda Martin Alcoff, a professor of philosophy at Syracuse University. Several essays from the book are available at the author’s Web site.

     


    Mike Kearl's great social theory site --- http://www.trinity.edu/~mkearl/

    Some sites to stimulate the sociological imagination --- http://www.trinity.edu/~mkearl/theory.html#imag

    According to Karl Popper (Logik der Forschung, 1935: p.26), Theory is "the net which we throw out in order to catch the world--to rationalize, explain, and dominate it." Through history, sociological theory arose out of attempts to make sense of times of dramatic social change. As Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills observed in Character and Social Structure (Harbinger Books, 1964:xiii), "Problems of the nature of human nature are raised most urgently when the life-routines of a society are disturbed, when men are alienated from their social roles in such a way as to open themselves up for new insight." Consider the historical contexts spawning the theoretical insights below:

    Neither the life of an individual nor the history of a society can be understood without understanding both. Yet men do not usually define the troubles they endure in terms of historical change and institutional contradiction. ... The sociological imagination enables its possessor to understand the larger historical scene in terms of its meaning for the inner life and the external career of a variety of individuals. ... The first fruit of this imagination--and the first lesson of the social science that embodies it--is the idea that the individual can understand his own experience and gauge his own fate only by locating himself within this period, that he can know his own chances in life only by becoming aware of those of all individuals in his circumstances. ...We have come to know that every individual lives, from one generation to the next, in some society; that he lives out a biography, and that he lives it out within some historical sequence (The Sociological Imagination, 1959:3-10).

    Judge a man by his questions rather than by his answers. --Voltaire (1694-1778)

    A definition is no proof. --William Pinkney, American diplomat (1764-1822)

    A theory is more impressive the greater the simplicity of its premises, the more different the kinds of things it relates and the more extended its range of applicability. --
    Albert Einstein, 1949

     

    SocioSite: Noted Sociological Theorists and Samplings of their Works

    Alan Liu's Voice of the Shuttle: Great collection of synopses and primary works of the great theorists

    Society for Social Research Page: Classical Sociological Theory. Good site for excerpts from the classics, courtesy of the University of Chicago.

    Serdar Kaya's The Sociology Professor, a portal of social theories and theorists

    Sociolog: many phenomenological links

    Larry Ridener's Dead Sociologists Index: Biographies of and excerpts from those who carved the discipline

    SociologyCafe's "Social Thinkers, Sociologists, and Online Texts" and Theory Outline

    PRAXIS: The Insurgent Sociology Web Site at University of California, Riverside

    Ed Stephan's "A Sociology Timeline from 1600"

    Carl Cuneo's Course on Theories of Inequality

    Marxist Internet Archive

    Marxism/ Leninism

    Marxism Made Simple

    Marx and Engels' Writings

    Engels' The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State

    Antonio Gramsci site from Queens College 

    Habermas links collected by Antti Kauppinen

    Durkheimian links

    Durkheim Homepage

    Weberian links

    Mannheim Centre for European Social Research

    Charles Horton Cooley's Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind

    George Herbert Mead Repository at Brock University

    All Things Simmelian--Georg Simmel Homepage

    Erving Goffman

    Game Theory Society--mathematically modeling "strategic interaction in competitive and cooperative environments"

    Thorsten Veblen's The Theory of the Leisure Class

    Foucault Homepage

    Jean Baudrillard speaks

    Anthony Giddens

    Howard S. Becker's Home Page--replete with recent papers, biographical updates and web recommendations

    Amitai Etzioni's Articles in Professional Journals and Books

    "Contemporary Philosophy, Critical Theory and Postmodern Thought" from the University of Denver

    Norbert Elias site from University of Sydney

    FreudNet: The A.A. Brill Library

    An evolving site to keep an eye on is Jim Spickard's Social Theory Pages, with historical backgrounds and intellectual biographies of the key players

    Need a dictionary for those works of critical theorists and postmodernists? Try the Red Feather Dictionary of Critical Social Science

    Gene Shackman's Social, Economic and Political Change--featuring links to theory, data and research about large scale long term political, economic and social systems change at the national and international level 

    World-Systems Archive
    The Research Committee on Sociocybernetics (of the Intl. Sociological Association)

    Want to see what theories sociologists are currently cooking up? Below is a sampling of sociological journals.

    Electronic Journal of Sociology Home Page
    Sociological Research Online
    Journal of World-Systems Research
    Journal of Mundane Behavior (first issue February 2000)
    Annual Review of Sociology--with 12-years of searchable abstracts
    Sociological Abstracts Home Page
    The Canadian Journal of Sociology
    Tables of Contents for all issues of Postmodern Culture